Israel and the Druze Political Action:

Between Politics of Loyalty and Politics of Violence

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
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD

2015

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Abstract

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The political actions of the Druze of Israel have formed the focus of a large body of research. Despite this, academic studies to date have failed to explain why so many Druze resorted to a politics of loyalty when Israel was first established but have, in more recent years, resorted to a politics of violence.

The research herein proposes that a model of the politics of accommodation is able to explain the political actions of the Druze during the first three decades of the Israeli state. Data from The Israel State Archives and the archives of leading Druze families show that many Israeli-Druze resorted to a politics of loyalty. This loyalty was inextricably linked to the perception of the new state and its government's policy as creating a new structure of opportunity for the economic, social and political progress of the Druze community whilst also safeguarding the Israeli-Druze community as a distinctive cultural and religious group on its own land.

Similarly, it is proposed that the ethnic state supremacy model is able to explain the recent rise in the politics of violence within the Israeli-Druze community. Data from personal interviews with state officials and Druze activists confirmed that many Israeli-Druze resorted to a politics of violence because they perceived the Israeli government's policy as a threat to their preservation as a cultural and religious group on its own land.

This study of Druze political action is intended as a contribution to the debate surrounding the Israeli state's politics in relation to Israel's Arab minority. This research also seeks to address wider issues in that it proposes a model that is applicable to the general question of ethnic conflict resolution in divided societies and polarised states.

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Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to my friends, Janak Nabar, Germain Brion, Ali Oveissi, Maithili Parekh, Steven Fuller and Adrien Bourdon-Feniou, for helping me to take my first steps in British academia at the London School of Economics. In particular, my thanks to Janak for his guidance, revision and proofreading of my essays and of the numerous emails to my Professors at the Department of Government as well as the time he has spent explaining academic processes to me. I owe my deepest gratitude to my close friends at the School of Oriental studies, namely Dr. Rastin Mehri, my friend and flatmate during most of my studies and my dear friends Dr. Sahar Rad and Dr. Atef Alshaer who proofread my numerous drafts.

The journey I have taken during my UK studies would not have been possible without the financial support and the generosity of a number of organisations. I would like to thank the British Council, the Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL), SOAS Fieldwork Award and ISEF. I am indebted to my close friends and philanthropists, Martin Paisner, Shimon Spier, Jacque Brion, Robert Bruh, Gerald Ronson, the late David Lewis, Lady Valerie Cox and Salim Khyer Al-Deen.

A special thank you to my interviewees during my fieldwork who have open their hearts and doors to me and who have shared their experiences, memories, photographs and documents with me. To name but a few, thank you to Shaykh Zidan Atashah, Fahmi Halabi and Radi Nejm Malek Salallha, Lieutenant Colonel Wajdi Serhan, Lieutenant Colonel As'ad Subih, Mosheh Arens and Shaykh Fayz 'Azam.

Thank you to my mother. You have steadfastly supported me, even when I was urged to give up by so many of my relatives. Your unconditional love, support and encouragement has given me the strength to persevere even during the trying times. I am also indebted to my father, my sister Haia and my brother-in-law Amin, my brothers Yusif and Zoher and my sister-in-law

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Note of Transliteration

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This thesis uses the system of transliteration for Arabic set by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES):

The initial Hamza is marked as ʾ; the ع is represented by ʿ and the *tā marbūta* is represented by "a" or by "ah".

The IJMES system for Hebrew transliteration is also used, subject to the following adaptations: The ע is represented ʿa.

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Glossary of Terms

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'Arabstim	[sin. *'Arabist*] The term that was used to define government officials and Mapai politicians who were in charge of Arab Affairs until the early-1980s [*Hebrew*].
'abn'a al-ta'ifah	The sons of the community, i.e. members of one religious community [*Arabic*].
al-sufi	Refers to someone that practising the inner mystical dimension of Islam [*Arabic*].
al-ta'ifah	[*Lit. 'community'*]. A social unit with a common religion [*Arabic*].
al-ahl	[*Lit. 'extensive family'*]. Generally used to refer to an extended family that shares one geographical location [*Arabic*].
al-'aqil	A Druze religious Shaykh who practises the religion on daily basis and who attends the *khilwah* [*Arabic*].
al-dabkah	Druze folk dancing [*Arabic*].
al-dar	[*Lit. 'home'*]. One household composed of people with obligations and duties towards each other [*Arabic*].
al-dunam	An area of land. 1 *dunam* = 0.24 acres. This measurement was used during the Ottoman Empire and is still used in many areas of the Middle East [*Arabic*].
al-dw'air al-'Arabiyah	Refer to sub-departments with Israeli government. These sub-departments run Arab affairs [*Arabic*].
al-Druz fi Isra'il	The Druze of Israel [*Arabic*].
al-effendi	Referring to government officials of the Ottoman Empire [*Turkish*].
al-fallah	[*Lit .' a peasant'; pl. fallahin*]. Refers to a person reliant on the land for his livelihood [*Arabic*].
al-fid'ai	[*Lit. 'one who sacrifices himself (for a cause)' [pl. fida'iyin*]. Refers to Palestinians who have

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	committed militant acts against Israeli targets with little chance of surviving the acts [*Arabic*].
al-firman	Royal mandate or decree issued by the Sovereign of the Ottoman Empire [*Turkish*].
al-ghuzah	[*Lit. 'invaders'*]. Used to describe Arab land expropriation by the Israeli authorities [*Arabic*].
al-hamulah	[*Lit. 'a clan'; pl. ham'ayl*]. Extended Arab family that is strongly connected by marriage [*Arabic*].
al-haram	A scene (or situation) that contradicts the Druze religious principles [*Arabic*].
al-hatah	The traditional white scarf that an Arab man wears on the crown of his head. In some Arab countries this is known as the *kufiah* [*Arabic*].
al-'imam	Scholar who in charge of a mosque [*Arabic*].
al-'intifadah	[*Lit. 'shaking off'*]. Term that refers to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli army on the West Bank and Gaza [*Arabic*].
al-jahil	[*Lit. 'ignorant'*]. A Druze who does not practise the religion on daily and who does not attend the *khilwah*. The equivalent religious term is *jismanin* [*Arabic*].
al-khilwah	(*pl. khilwat*). The Druze place of worship or meeting-house found in every Druze community. The Druze time of worship is every Sunday and Thursday evening [*Arabic*].
al-khutba	The period of engagement before a wedding [*Arabic*].
al-madhun	Religious registrar in charge of weddings and divorces [*Arabic*].
al-mahr	The amount of money that the groom paid to the bride and her family during the *khutba* [*Arabic*].
al-majlis	[*Lit. 'assembly'*]. Refers to a religious meeting attended by Druze *mashaykh* [*Arabic*].
al-malakin	[*Lit. 'owners'*]. Generally refers to land-owners [*Arabic*].

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al-muhdin	[*singl. Muhd*]. Followers of *al-tawhid* religion [*Arabic*].
al-muftial-'akbar	Islamic scholar with extensive authorities within a province of the Ottoman Empire [*Arabic*].
al-mukhtrah	Referring to the headship of the village [*Turkish*].
al-musawah	Equal rights, herein referring to equal rights between Jewish majority and Druze community [*Arabic*].
al-Mutasrifiyah	A geographical area within a province of the Ottoman Empire [*Turkish*].
al-nakbah	[*Lit. 'the catastrophe'*]. Used by Arabs and Palestinians to describe the 1948 War, which saw the establishment of the Israeli state and displacement of more than 850 thousands Palestinians [*Arabic*].
al-niqab	The scarf a Druze woman wears to cover her head [*Arabic*].
al-qadi	[*pl. qadah*]. Islamic and Druze religious judge [*Arabic*].
al-rabitah al-Durziyah	The Druze League. This mainly consisted of Druze intellectuals. During the 1960s, the Druze League protested against the Israeli government's policy towards the Druze community [*Arabic*].
al-riasah al-ruhyiah	The spiritual religious leadership of the Druze community [*Arabic*].
al-sanjaq	A province in the Ottoman Empire [*Arabic*].
al-shawarb	A moustache worn by a Druze conservative and religious man [*Arabic*].
al-Shaykh	Druze conservative that practises the religion. The formal term in the community is *ruhani* (*pl. mashaykh* or in formal *ruhanin*) [*Arabic*].
al-shirwal	The religious costume worn by a Druze man that covers the lower part of his body [*Arabic*].
al-shuhada'	Martyrs and those sacrifice their life for their country [*Arabic*].

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al-sulhah	[*Lit. 'reconciliation'*]. The traditional Arabic reconciliation between *ham'ayl* [*Arabic*].
al-tanurah	The traditional clothing worn by a Druze woman on the lower parts of her body [*Arabic*].
al-tawhid	[*Lit. 'monotheism'*], The name of a monotheistic religion. Its followers believe in one God. Rooted in Ismailism, its followers incorporate beliefs and practises from Abrahamic religions as well as Neo-Platonism and other philosophies [*Arabic*].
al-turath Durzi	Refers to Druze folklore and tradition [*Arabic*].
al-wali	An Ottoman governor of a province during the time of the Ottoman Empire [*Turkish*].
al-waqf	[pl. *awqaf*]. Property endowment recognised in Islamic law and Druze religious references [*Arabic*].
al-wastah	[*Lit. 'intermediary'*]. Favouritism granted in politics or business, as used in many parts of the Middle East, including Israel [*Arabic*].
al-wirathah	[*Lit. 'inheritance'*]. The inheritance that next of kin receive once a parent dies [*Arabic*].
al-ziyarah	[Lit. 'visit']. The term used by the Druze of Israel when referring to their pilgrimage to holy places [Arabic].
anshey bitahon	[*Lit. 'military people'*]. The term commonly used to distinguish people who permanently work for one of the Israeli security institutions, such as the IDF [*Hebrew*].
'ard al-'ajdad	The land of our grandfathers, i.e. the land that the Druze villagers had inherited from their grandfathers [*Arabic*].
'ard 'amwat	[*Lit. 'dead land'*]. A land that is not suitable for agriculture [*Arabic*].
Bilad al-Sham	[*Lit. 'Greater Syria'*]. The name of the region within the Ottoman Empire that, after the World War II, was divided into Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria [*Arabic*].

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brit damim	[Lit. 'blood-covenant'] The term used to describe the warm feelings that many Israelis felt towards the Druze in during the early years of the state [*Hebrew*].
brit po'aley Yisrael	Jewish workers union that was operational during the Yishuv's government [*Hebrew*].
Eretz Yisrael	[*Lit. 'land of Israel'*]. The biblical name for historical Palestine [*Hebrew*].
ge'ulat krak'ut	[*Lit. 'land redemption'*]. Meaning to transfer land that is owned and controlled by Arabs to Jews [*Hebrew*].
Hadruzim bi Yisrael	The Druze of Israel [*Hebrew*].
Haganah	[*Lit. 'defence'*]. A Zionist militant organisation that was active in Palestine during the British mandate [*Hebrew*].
hakim al-sulh	The term refers to the judge in the civil court during Mandatory Palestine [*Arabic*].
ha-mitspim	[*Lit. 'observatory points'*]. A term that refers to the small Jewish settlements that are scattered on the Galilee hills [*Hebrew*].
hesder kraka'ot	The term used by the Israeli Land Authorities (ILAs) during land expropriation negotiations with Druze villagers [*Hebrew*].
hifiz al-baq'a	[*Lit. 'self-preservation'*]. A Druze principle that entitles Druze to implement measures for its self-preservation [*Arabic*].
hifiz al-ikhwan	A religious principle that compels Druze religious followers to safeguard the interests and survival of their coreligionists [*Arabic*].
Histadrut	General federation of Jewish labourers that existed during Mandatory Palestine. At the time, it was one of the most powerful economic and political institutions in Israel [*Hebrew*].
Inqadh Falastin	[*Lit. 'rescue'*]. A term used by the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) during the 1948 War [*Arabic*].
Jabal al-'Arab	The name of the province were most of the Druze in Syria are living. The capital city of the province

is Suwayda 'a [*Arabic*].

Jabal al-Druz	Meaning Druze Mountain, this refers to the mountainous terrain that defines the Suwayda's region in Syria [*Arabic*].
jam'aih al-dif'a 'an al-'aradi	The Land Defence Committee (LDC); a committee founded to defend Druze land against expropriation by the Israeli authorities [*Arabic*].
Jaysh al-'Inqadh al-'Arabi	The Arab Liberation Army (ALA); an army that stood against the Yishuv's forces during the 1948 War [*Arabic*].
kibbutz	[*Lit. 'gathering'*]. A Jewish collective community in Israel that was traditionally founded on agriculture [*Hebrew*].
Knesset	The name of the Israeli Parliament [*Hebrew*].
ktsinim meshuhrarim	Refers to Druze officers who have spent a great deal of their lives in military service [*Hebrew*].
lujnah al-mubadrah al-Durziyah	The Initiative Druze Committee (IDC), which, for many years, publicly opposed the Israeli government's policy for the Druze community [*Arabic*].
mamlkhtiyut	[*Lit. 'statism'*]. Refers to a policy that the leading party (Mapai) adopted during the early years of the state of Israel. This policy put the state's interests before the party's interests [*Hebrew*].
maqam	[*Lit. 'shrine' pl. maqamat*]. Druze holy place. Druze followers treat such places with respect and may only enter *maqam* with their heads and arms covered [*Arabic*].
mashykhat al-Islam	The highest religious authority during Ottoman Empire [*Arabic*].
mashykhat al-ta'ifah	The religious leadership of the Druze community in Israel [*Arabic*].
mazafah	A large sitting room in the house of the *mukhtar,* also known as *diwan* [*Arabic*].
meshek	Farmstead (*Hebrew*).
millet	The main mechanism for regulating the

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	relationship between the Ottoman Sunni-Muslim state and other non-Muslim governed groups [*Turkish*].
miluim	Reserve service in the IDF [*Hebrew*].
mushav	[*Lit. 'settlement'; pl. mushavim*]. Co-operative of agriculture in the Jewish community [*Hebrew*].
mu'tamar al-muthqafin al-Druz	A Druze organisation that was active during the 1960s and that opposed the Israeli government's policy for the Druze community [*Arabic*].
mushkilah al-'ard	The dispute between Druze villagers and Israeli Land Authorities (ILAs) [*Arabic*].
nekhes	[*Lit. 'fortune'*]. The way in which Israeli officials perceived the Druze community, namely as a state interest [*Hebrew*].
qadiya ta'fiyah	[*Lit. 'affairs'*]. The community affairs that the Israeli government was required to address as a matter of urgency during the early years of the Israeli state [*Arabic*].
qanunal-tajnid al-'Ijbari	The Compulsory Service Law 1956 as imposed by the Israeli government on the Druze youth [*Arabic*].
qiadah taqlidiah	Tradional leadership.
ru'asa al-majalis al-ma hliyah al-Durziyah	[sin. *majlis*] The head of Druze local councils (HDLCs) in Israel [*Arabic*].
sadir	Three years compulsory service in the IDF [*Hebrew*].
sariqat aradi	[*Lit. 'stealing of land'*]. Term that refers to all underhand methods used by Israeli authorities to expropriate land [*Arabic*].
shabab	[*Lit. 'youth'*]. Generally refers to active youth [*Arabic*].
Shabak	Israel's internal security service and one of the three main intelligence organisation in Israel, the other two being the military intelligence (Aman) and the Mossad [*Hebrew*].
sherut Yed'ut	Yishuv's intelligence agency [*Hebrew*].

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Sictor 'Aravi	A term Israeli officials use to refer to Arab sector [*Hebrew*].
siyasah al-tamyiz al-'unsriah	The Israeli government's policy of racial discrimination [*Arabic*].
tanzimat	[*Lit. 'organisation'*]. A period of reformation in the Ottoman Empire that began in 1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1876 [*Turkish*].
taqiyah	Religious dissimulation, i.e. to pretend to believe in something whilst actually believing in something different. Generally, this behaviour is used to prevent persecution for one's beliefs [*Arabic*].
ti'udat shihrur	The certificate that every Druze receives upon completing three years of service in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) [*Hebrew*].
tokhniyot bniyah	Construction maps that the Planning Committee provide to local councils [*Hebrew*].
tokhniyot pituah	[*Lit. 'development programmes'*]. All the development programmes in Druze villages that the Israeli government invested in during the 1950s and 1960s [*Hebrew*].
v'adot tikhnun vi-bniyah	The Planning and Construction Committees (PCCs) were responsible for construction in urban areas, including within Druze villages [*Hebrew*].
v'ada merkazit	[*Lit. 'central committee'*]. The official committee whose members included the Prime Ministers advisor on Arab Affairs, Mapai experts on Arab Affairs and secret agents from the Shabak and the police. The committee made many policy decisions that affected the Arab minority and the Druze [*Hebrew*].
Yassam	Name of a special unit within the Israeli police that is dedicated to contentious security missions, such as riots and crowd control [*Hebrew*].
yehud ha-Galil	The Hebrew name of the Israeli national plan that aimed to increasing the Jewish population in the Galilee [*Hebrew*].
yshuvim kehilatiyim	Jewish settlements for communities from the

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	same cultural background [*Hebrew*].
Yishuv	The Zionist settlement in Palestine that existed during the British Mandate, 1917-1948 [*Hebrew*].
ziyarah siyasiah	The term that state opponents within the Druze community used to describe the pilgrimages used to express loyalty towards the state of Israel [*Arabic*].

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List of Abbreviations

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ACAP	Arab Centre for Alternative Planning (in the Arab village of ʿAilabun)
ADLL	Arab Development and Labour List
ADME	Arab Department at the Ministry of Education
AHA	Abba Hushi Archive at the University of Haifa
ALA	Arab Liberation Army of 1948
CAP	The Custodian of Abandoned Property within the Israeli Government
CDI	Congress of Druze Intellectuals
DAUH	Druze Archive at the University of Haifa
DCC	Druze Cultural Committee
DDME	Druze Department at the Ministry of Education
DLC	Druze Local Council
DRC	Druze Religious Council
DZM	Druze Zionist Movement
EU	European Union
GSS	General Security Service; known by its Hebrew name of al-Shabak
HAC	Higher Arab Committee of 1936
HDLC	Head of the Druze Local Councils
IDC	Initiative Druze Committee
IDDMR	Islamic and Druze Department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IDMR	Islamic Department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs
ILA	Israeli Land Authorities
IMCAA	Inter-Ministerial Committee for Arab Affairs
INPA	Israel Nature and Parks Authority
ISA	The Israel State Archives
JBAA	Joint Bureau for Arab Affairs
JNC	Jewish National Council
JNF	The Jewish National Fund
JSD	Jewish Settlement Department in the Jewish Agency
KCFA	Knesset Committee of Foreign Affairs
LDC	Land Defence Committee
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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MK	Member of the Knesset
NRC	Northern Regional Committee
PCC	Planning and Construction Committee
PIM	Pro-Integration Movement
PJCA	Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association
PNM	Palestinian National Movement
PRO	The National Archive in London
PZO	Palestine of the Zionist Organisation
RCPC	Regional Committee for Planning and Construction
SCC	Security Central Committee
SMC	Supreme Muslim Council
STC	Sacred Trust Committee
YNC	Yeshuv National Council

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Map I   Druze Villages on the Galilee and the Carmel. A map showing the geographic locations of Druze villages that are discussed within this thesis.

Table I   Druze Villages in Israel and the Golan Heights.

Region	Village	
The Carmel Mountain	'Isfya - Dalyah al-Karmil	
Southern Galilee	Mghar[1]	Sajur
	Ramh	Shafa -'Amir[2]
Northern Galilee	'Ain al -'Asad	Jath
	al-Bqi'ah	Kfur Smai'a
	Bayt-Jan	Kisra
	Hurfesh	Yanuh
Western Galilee	Abu- Snan	Kfur Yasif
	Julis	Yarka
Golan Heights[3]	'Ain- qniah	Majdal Shams
	Bq'athah	Ms'adih

[1] Mghar is a mixed-Arab town with a Druze majority. [2]Shafa-'Amir is a mixed-Arab town with a Druze minority. [3]The Druze villages in the Golan Heights fell under the Israeli state's control after the 1967 War. Source: *The Druze in the Middle East: Their Faith, Leadership, Identity and Status*, by Nissim Dana 2003 XVIII.

Chapter 1

Introduction

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1.1   Historical Background

On the 3rd of October 2007, widespread riots rocked the Druze village of al-Bqiʿah. The riots were triggered by the Israeli police special forces entering the village with armoured vehicles and armed policemen: The objective was to arrest young men who were implicated in attacks perpetrated on state-provided facilities within the village (including the Post Office, Bank Hapoʿalim and the National Health Care Centre) as well as on the homes of alleged Druze allies of Israeli intelligence agencies and of new Jewish residents in the village. Over the next few days, press images predominantly depicted scenes of extreme violence. Many images were littered with the bloody faces of policemen and villagers, against a backdrop of burned cars in the narrow alleys of the village.[1]

Confrontations between Druze villagers and Israeli police were not unique to al-Bqiʿah. In recent times, similar confrontations have also erupted in several villages on the Carmel and the Galilee. For instance, in July 2004, a violent confrontation took place between Druze villagers and Israeli police in the village of ʿIsfya on the Carmel. This confrontation resulted in a number of policemen being seriously injured and their vehicles being destroyed. Villagers barricaded the main roads and prevented Israelis from passing through the village.[2] For two days after these events, the village was placed under a strict curfew.

The recent rise of the politics of violence among Israeli-Druze warrants investigation, not least because the indigenous Druze people continued to live peacefully in the Galilee and the Carmel for many years after Israel was established. In fact, it is only in recent years that some Druze have resorted to a politics of violence on the scale seen in villages such as al-Bqiʿah and ʿIsfya. Indeed, Israeli-Druze are traditionally recognised for their politics of

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[1] For more information, see *M'arriv* Newspaper, 30th October 2007, a report by the Israeli TV (Channel One), 7th October 2007 and a report by *Yediout Ha-Tzafon* (The News of the North), 6th November 2009.
[2] For more information, see *al- Hadith* newspaper, 18th July 2004.

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loyalty towards the Israeli state. In this context, the definition of a politics of loyalty is that of a form of political action where loyalists practise, and publicly express their genuine loyalty to the state as well as defend the state's interests.[3] For many years, this form of political behaviour was exhibited by most Druze youth serving in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) — organisations that were strongly identified with the state (Amrani 2010).[4]

The politics of violence recently adopted by some Druze is uncharacteristic of the Druze, albeit that such politics is commonly associated with many Arab religious communities in Israel. Herein, the term politics of violence refers to a form of political action where actors of a cultural group use violence with the intention to cause physical harm to state representatives.[5] The state of Israel has witnessed numerous acts of political violence perpetrated against its representatives and bodies. Thus far, such violence has only been seen in Arab villages with predominantly Sunni-Muslim occupants. The most poignant examples of violent clashes are those that took place during the Land Days of 1973, 1974 and 1977 and in the Triangle area and the Galilee during October 2000. As on many other occasions, Arab citizens, mainly Sunni-Muslim, resorted to violence in an attempt to prevent the Israeli government from implementing further land expropriation from their Israeli homelands (Jamal 2011; Bashir 2006; Ghanem and Mustafa 2009).

Events, such as those that took place in 'Isfya and al-Bqi'ah, had negative repercussions for the relationship between the state of Israel, and its Jewish majority, and the Druze community. Haim Yvin, a well-known news presenter for the Israeli Television-First Channel, ended his coverage of the confrontations at al-Bqi'ah with the following statement:

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[3] For a similar definition for politics of loyalty, see Choudhary (2010, 12).

[4] A brief documentary movie about the Druze of Israel and their politics of loyalty from the 1970s: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQTBHoZ5xPs, (access date: 14th February 2015).

[5] For a similar definition of the politics of violence, see Porta (2013). It should be emphasised that the politics of violence differs from classical 'resistance', which is political action that intends to attack all symbols of power. For an in depth insight into the politics of resistance, see Tripp (2013, 14).

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"...civil war erupted at *Peki'in* [*the name of al-Bqiʿah* in Hebrew] ...the Israeli police opened fire against a band of our brothers... the policemen shot against our brothers until yesterday..."[6]

The first Rabbi of the Jewish town of Safed also commented on these events and requested that the Israeli government punish the Druze youth who participated in the violent clashes with the Israeli police (Kul al-ʿArab, 30th November 2007). The recent clashes in al-Bqiʿah and in other Druze villagers, received a vehement backlash from Israeli officials, including this damning statement by the Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office:

"Druze has become a word that terrifies Israelis".[7]

Even though several years have passed since some of the violent confrontations, local villagers and Israeli officials alike are haunted by memories of the events: The Ministry of Tourism continues to boycott al-Bqiʿah by preventing Jewish pilgrims from visiting the holy Jewish places in the old part of the village and by stopping Jews from giving their custom to village shops. This harms the local economy. Indeed, according to the local council's spokesman, dozens of retail establishments that once served Jewish pilgrims have ceased trading as a consequence of this punitive policy (Hona, 6th June 2012).

It is noteworthy that specific groups within the Druze community are strongly identified with the politics of violence. These groups include religious-conservative shaykhs (publicly known by their Arabic name of the *mashaykh*) and some of their followers among the *shabab* (youth). Indeed, witnesses of the confrontations between Druze and the police in al-Bqiʿah and in Carmel villages would also have noticed that most of the protestors were Druze *mashaykh*. Their participation in the violent clashes cannot be

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[6] Documentary movie, *Tʿaudah Kḥulah* (Blue Identity Card): by Haim Yvin: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNI0PI56yfY, 5th May 2014 (access date: 10th February 2015).
[7] See www.ynet.co.ul, 3rd September 2009. (access date: 21st March 2015).

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ignored because of their distinctive attire, which comprises the *shirwal* on the lower part of the body and a white cap, known in Arabic as *hatah* (Figure 1.1). This attire contrasts with that of other community members, as *mashaykh* practise the *al-tawhid* daily.

Figure 1.1   Druze *mashaykh* wearing *al-shirwal* and *hatah.*
Copyright: Jamal ʿAli of al-Bqiʿah.

The Druze *mashaykh*'s involvement in the aforementioned clashes is particularly interesting given that Druze *mashaykh* resorted to a politics of silence when they were faced with the emergence of the Jewish Yishuv during Mandatory Palestine. Indeed, many Druze *mashaykh* resorted to a politics of silence throughout the struggle for control of Palestine and, as such, refrained from joining the Arab rebels in attacking the Yishuv's interests during the 1936 Arab Revolt and throughout the 1940s (Saleh 2000). Herein, politics of silence refers to a form of political action where actors of an ethnic groups express their accommodation in public, even though they may privately adopt an alternative, and potentially more contentious, political stance (i.e. 'act as if' politics)[8].

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[8] For an original study on 'act as if' politics, see. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics rhetoric and symbols in contemporary Syria* (Wedeen 1999)

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The aforementioned Druze *mashaykh* continued to display a politics of silence after Israel was established, with most of them even resorting a politics of loyalty. This loyalty was best exemplified by their support of the Israeli government's decision to recognise the Druze community as an independent religious community, first as a *millet* (in 1949) and then (in 1957) as an official independent religious community, like other religious communities in the new state. In addition to this, most Druze *mashaykh* encouraged and supported the Israeli government's decision to allow Druze youth to serve in the organisations that most identified with the state, namely the IDF (Layish 1985 and 1982).[9]

Interestingly, the Druze *mashaykh*'s politics of loyalty came at the time when other Druze groups were resorting to a politics of protest. In fact, unlike many Druze *mashaykh* who, in the early years of Israel, had supported the Israeli government's policy among the community, a number of Druze activists from the Congress of Druze Intellectuals (CDI) and from the Initiative Druze Committee (IDC), objected to the government's policy for the community and publicly opposed Druze youth service in the IDF and arrangements related to the community recognition (Firro 1999). Unlike a politics of violence (as defined above), herein a politics of protest refers to a form of contentious politics, where actors of an ethnic group make claims against the state and its policies but without resorting to violence.[10]

This thesis aims to determine why many Druze resorted to a politics of loyalty in the early years of the state of Israel and how this morphed into the rising tide of a politics of violence seen in more recent years. As illustrated in Section 1.2, these questions challenge research and theoretical frameworks that have thus far been used to explain the Druze's politics of loyalty during the early years of the state of Israel. The questions also provide

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[9] For more information about the *millet* system, see *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of Plural Society* (Benjamin and Lewis 1982).
[10] For a similar definition for politics of protest, see Gillion 2013.

opportunities to explore the capabilities of a policy of accommodation to support long term political stability in a polarised society.

1.2   The Puzzle and Major Arguments of the Thesis

Section 1.1 described how Druze *mashaykh* and Druze intellectuals resorted to different types of political action after the Israeli state was established. This divided politics challenges the ability of the "culturalism" approach to explain the political actions of Druze in Israel. Whereas Druze *mashaykh* resorted to a politics of loyalty (and, thus, supported community recognition by the state), Druze intellectuals resorted to a politics of protest (and opposed major aspects of recognition). This casts doubt over the reliability of approaches, like the culturalism approach, that are founded on the assumption that cultural groups are composed of individuals, social groups and substrata that are fundamentally united in terms of their politics because of a shared and distinctive cultural identity: In the case of the Druze, this would equate to all Druze following one political course because all Druze are followers of *al-tawhid* religion.

Indeed, proponents of culturalism regard a cultural group's political actions as monolithic acts that derive from the cultural characteristics that define the group (Greetz 1963). From this perspective, the Druze of Israel resorted to a politics of loyalty because they follow *al-tawhid* religion, a religion that distinguishes them from the other Israeli-Arabs. Culturalism was even adopted by Druze scholars, such as Falah (2000) and Atashi (2001), who, referring to the community as *al-Druz fī Isra'il* (in Arabic; the Druze community) or *Hadruzim bi Yisrael (*in Hebrew; the Druze community), went on to discuss the politics of loyalty of Druze as if they were referring to a politically united community.

Like many others, including Blanck (1958), Halabi (1970) and Koren (1991), Atashi and Falah, systematically ignored the fact that Druze intellectuals, like

Druze *mashaykh*, are followers of *al-tawhid* religion, many of whom resorted to politics of protest and persistently opposed the Israeli government's policy for the community, despite this shared religious identity. Indeed, Halabi (1970) wrote extensively about Druze service in the IDF and their contribution to the state's security, without a single reference to opponents of Druze service in the IDF.

The distinct politics of Druze *mashaykh* and Druze intellectuals also casts doubt on the "Control Model". Proponents of the "Control Model", such as Lustick (1979 and 1980), explain Druze politics of loyalty after Israel was established with reference to the government's security measures, as implemented by security agencies such as the military government (1948-1966), the police and the Shabak. These measures curtailed the free of movement of Druze citizens and prevented political organisations from being active within 'security zones'. As explained previously, these measures came at a time that Druze intellectuals were persistent in their efforts to oppose the Israeli government's policy for the Druze community and they were able to gain some community support for their campaign.

Lustick believes that cultural groups in divided societies resort to a politics of accommodation when faced with state-imposed security measures. Leaving aside the definition and dimensions of the term divided society (discussed in Section 1.3), what is important is that it is the state's security policy and agencies instil a politics of accommodation. However, whilst Lustick has written extensively on the topic of Arab and Druze political action, he has also systematically ignored the fact that many Druze intellectuals resorted to a politics of protest, even when they were faced overwhelming security deterrents, such as those deployed during military rule (1948-1966).

The dissimilarity between the politics of the Druze *mashaykh* and the Druze intellectuals also casts doubt on the reliability of another approach that has been used to explaining the Druze politics of loyalty during the early years of the state. This approach is famously known as the "Modernisation"

approach. Israeli researchers, such as Landau (1969 and 1993) and Smooha (1984) examined Arab and Druze politics of accommodation after Druze began interacting with the modern Israeli society. According to Smooha (1984), during the early years of the state of Israel, the Druze politics of accommodation is best explained by the progressive transition within the Druze community after Israel was established. In his words:

> "This minority endeavoured to adopt the living standards and norms of the Jewish majority and went through significant changes in the social, cultural, economic and political arenas, which have been documented in dozens of original and secondary studies".[11]

Proponents of Modernisation rely heavily on Emile Durkhiem's notions of Modernisation and emphasise the "pre-modern" or "traditional" cultural group's exposure to a modern Western society and how this changes the group's general political behaviour (Hernstein 1971). The interesting point, however, is that a politics of protest was adopted predominantly by Druze intellectuals, who were university graduates and who, more than any other group of Druze had been exposed to the Israeli society. Indeed, some intellectuals were highly influential and led to the CDI being formed: The CDI persistently opposed the Israeli government's policy for Druze villages and publicly opposed Druze compulsory service in the IDF (Teitelbaum 1985).

This thesis argues that the politics of accommodation more accurately explains Druze political action during the early years the Israeli state than Culturalism, the Control Model or Modernisation. The main reason for this is the flexible framework that the policy of accommodation provides. This framework is able to accommodate key features of Culturalism, the Control Model or Modernisation and model the interplay between them. In other words, the policy of accommodation model takes a holistic view of many cultural components of the group in the context of the political structure,

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[11] For further information on what known as Arab Normal Development, see Ghanem (2001,4).

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which, together, comprehensively explain the political actions taken by Druze in the early years of the state of Israel.

As an example, the Control Model often examines political action in terms of the state's security agencies' policy. The politics of accommodation, however, is able to provide a broader perspective to enable the researcher to examine how interactions with and between other state agencies influence political actions.[12] Indeed, during the 1950s, whilst it is true that security agencies (such as the police and the military government) were the most active of the state's agencies in relation to the Arab minority (including the Druze), other state agencies, such as the ruling party's (Mapai's) *'Arabstim* and the Interior Ministry that interacted with Israeli-Arabs on daily basis, were also seen to be state agencies. As will become clear in Chapters 3 and 4, these agencies had different views of the Arab minority and their interests were often incompatible with other security agencies. As an example, whilst the security agencies were preoccupied with concerns about the contentious politics of the Arab minority, the *'Arabstim* of the ruling party-Mapai were primarily focused on securing its votes for the Mapai during elections.

Culturalism examines the political actions of cultural group that is defined by its distinctive identity. In other words, the entire group is regarded as sharing the same politics. Contrasting with this, the politics of accommodation model provides a flexible framework that allows for the co-existence of different identities within a group. Thus, the politics of accommodation is able to examine the political attitudes of sub-groups within the cultural group, as well as the political action of the group as a whole. This flexible framework is crucial because of the fluidity and malleability that characterise an ethnic group's identity and because of the overlapping identities of different cultural groups (May 2004, 9).

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[12] For a good article on different approaches to state-society relationship, see Mitchell 1991.

For example, a person may be a Druze by birth, having been born into a family that follows *al-tawhid* religion. However, the same person may also be *al-fallah* who, during the 1950s, had spent time working in his land in the remote areas of the Galilee. At the same time, another person may also have been born into a Druze family that followed *al-tawhid* religion, but have gone on to pursue intellectual studies within one of the academic institutions in the new Israeli state and then to work in office, in the city of Haifa. Both these people are considered to be Druze but their ultimate identities differ and may significantly influence their political views and actions.

The politics of accommodation also provides a flexible framework for examining new identities that may, over time, emerge within the group. Such identities are the result of interactions with the political structure and the World, in general. Unlike Modernisation, this model is also able to examine the influence of these new identities on other sub-groups within the group. The ability to examine new identities within a group is important given that, following the Israeli government's decision to compel Druze youth to serve within the IDF; a new economic stratum emerged within the Druze community. This new identity was known by its Hebrew name *anshey bitahon* (service men). *Anshey bitahon* was a term used to refer to hundreds of Druze youth who, by the end of the 1950s, were serving (or had served) within one of the Israeli security forces. For the *anshey bitahon*, security work was their major source of income. Most importantly, as part of their integration, the Druze *anshey bitahon* had chosen to adopt an 'Israeli' identity that ran alongside their *al-tawhid* religious identity. The 'Israeliness' of the *anshey bitahon*'s identity was best measured in terms of their Hebrew language skills, Hebrew being the official language of the state of Israel. In contrast to this, up until the late 1950s, most Druze were *fallahin*, who spoke little or no Hebrew and relied on agriculture as their main source of income.

Section 1.2 proposed the politics of accommodation as a framework to explain the political actions of Druze during the early years of the Israeli

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state. Section 1.3 will examine the capacity of the model, or some of its major components, to explain Druze political action during Mandatory Palestine and the multi-ethnic struggle for control of Palestine during that period.

1.3   The Political Elite's Agreement and Politics of Silence

The politics of accommodation model was first proposed by Lijphart to explain political stability within small European democratic states. In the 1960s, like number of political scientists of his generation (including Gabriel Almond), Lijphart was preoccupied with understanding political stability within small European democratic states that were home to divided societies. At that time, there was an established opinion that social homogeneity was the most important factor behind the success of the democratic Anglo-American system.[13]   Indeed, in, for example, *Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (1968), Lijphart attempted to explain how societies, such as the Dutch society, had achieved peace and stability, despite social rifts between Calvinists and Catholics (see discussion below).

It is difficult to decipher the criteria that Lijphart and his colleagues used to identify politically stable democratic countries or, indeed, what defined stable democratic countries.   However, the inference is that Lijphart considered a democratic country to be one where regular and competitive elections took place.   According to Lijphart, such democracies are also associated with universal adult suffrage and civil liberties (Guelke 2012, 2). Nordlinger asserted that achieving political stability is more challenging when a democracy is home to people with diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural heritage, since such differences are persistent markers of political identity and are motivators of political mobilisation (see *Conflict Regulations in Deeply Divided Societies* 1972).[14]

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[13] See discussion in Guelke (2012, 7), Wolff (2012, 24) and Lijphart (1968 and1969).
[14] For similar definitions of divided society, see Choudhary (2010, 5), Lustick (1979, 325) and Guelke (2012, 28).

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Lijphart asserts that the agreements between the political elite that represented various cultural groups are what explain Netherlands politics of accommodation at the time. These agreements outlined the conduct expected of the elite during their political interactions with each other. Indeed, there is an expectation of mutual respect between political counterparts that includes understanding and tolerance of their disparate ideological commitments. Moreover, political counterparts would have be expected to put in place arrangements that demonstrate their acceptance each other's concerns, particularly when concerns were about survival, status, legitimacy and cultural and political rights. These arrangements were ratified in agreements that formed the foundations for tolerance and, in turn, the political stability that was seen in the Netherlands after World War II (Wolff 2012, 32).[15]

In addition to agreements about conduct expected of the political elite and the ability to understand the concerns of those represented by political counterparts, Lijphart identified a number of other conditions that favoured political stability or that made agreements between the political counterparts more effective and palatable. The most significant condition was what Lijphart referred to as the balance of power between the cultural segments in the plural society. According to Lijphart, when there is a balance of power, cooperation is encouraged and no one element dominates or has a clear majority (Lijphart 1977, 55).

This thesis supports the idea that agreements between the political elite that represent two different cultural groups can result in political stability between the two cultural groups, even during a multi-ethnic conflict, but only if the agreement can safeguard:

(1) The leading status of the group's political elite within their community and:

(2) The survival of the group as a distinctive and cultural group.

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[15] For further reading about political elite agreement, see Wolff (2012, 32), Bogaards (1998), Lijphart (1977 and 2002), McGarry and O'Leary (2004) and Zillman (2010).

This thesis proposes that, if these conditions are met, the agreement will be accepted and supported by both the elite and the masses within their cultural group.[16]

It is important to emphasise that political stability takes on a completely different meaning and dimension during a multi-ethnic conflict than it does in the small European states that were considered by Lijphart and his colleagues. Whereas political stability in small peaceful European states aims to secure a safe atmosphere for regular and competitive elections and civil liberties, political stability during a multi-ethnic conflict focuses on stabilising and diffusing volatile political situations, to the point that groups in conflict ultimately resort to forms of politics of silence and refrain from inflicting violence upon each other.[17]

Going back to the nature of the agreement, an agreement that protects the leading status of the group's political elite and that allows the self-preservation of the group as a cultural community will receive the support of the political elite for several reasons. According to Tarrow (1994, 98), the political elite are unlikely to be persuaded to make policy changes that conflict with their own interests. Similarly, Wolff asserts that the political elite will not accept agreements that are designed to undermine their status and will justify their opposition of attempts to disempower them (Wolff 2012, 7). Pearson (2001) adds that the political elite of the two groups cannot develop working relationships between them if the agreement includes arrangements that conflict with their interests.

An agreement capable of safeguarding the community's cultural identity and the leading status of its elite is likely to be endorsed by most of the people that are represented by the elite because it ameliorates the danger

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[16] See Lustick (1979) for more about the negative implications of limiting the discussion of political stability to democratic regimes.

[17] For discussions on conflict regulation in a deeply divided society under conditions of severe stress, see Nordlinger (1972, 2) and Guelke (2013, 7). For use of the term 'severely divided' society, as used to describe the Northern Ireland situation, see Horowitz (2001, 104-105).

of genocide and/or ethnic cleansing. Indeed, physical and cultural survival of a group is the driver behind ethnopolitical conflicts, with one side seeking to remove the cultural group from the society and the other cultural group fighting for survival (McGarry and O'Leary 1997 and Gurr 1994, 365).[18]   For instance, during the multi-ethnic conflict in Mandatory Palestine, one of the main objectives of the Yishuv's forces during the conflict was to reduce the size of the Arab population. This entailed the widespread use of coercion to induce the flight of Palestinians from the country (Morris 1987).

The Druze of Palestine resorted to a politics of silence during Mandatory Palestine. This provides a good example of how an agreement between the political elites of two cultural groups can engineer political stability between the two groups.   That is to say, if the agreement contains provisions that ensure the supremacy of the political leadership and the preservation of the group as distinctive cultural group, it is mutually beneficial to adhere to the agreement. Chapter 2 illustrates that, unlike many Arab rebels, most Druze community in Mandatory Palestine resorted to a politics of silence during the struggle for control of Palestine. Hence, Druze refrained from joining forces with Arab rebels during the most critical stages of the conflict, namely the 1936 Arab Revolt and the 1948 War. Leading scholars on Druze history describe this as the Druze of Palestine adopting a "neutral" stance towards the conflict (Firro 1999 and Parsons 2000).

In the latter example, the agreement between the Druze community's political elite and Yishuv's leadership contained provisions that protected the supreme status of the leading *ham'ayl* of the Druze community in Palestine, namely that of the Tarif of Julis, the Mʿadi of Yarka and the Khayr of Abu-Snan. The agreement received widespread support within the religious-conservative Druze community in Palestine, as it was perceived as an agreement that ensured the preservation of the Druze as a distinctive

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[18] A useful summary and vivid case studies on ethnic cleansing and genocide can be found in Guelke (2013, 46).

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religious and cultural community on its land in an otherwise severely conflicted country. As is discussed in Chapter 2, it was because of these arrangements between Druze community's political elite and Yishuv's leadership that most Druze resorted to a politics of silence.

Another reason why this agreement was reached was because of Lijphart's so-called a balance of power, between the leading Druze *ham'ayl* and the Yishuv's leadership, during the conflicts in Mandatory Palestine. Heads of leading *ham'ayl* struggled for their *hifiz al-baq'a* as a community on their land, while the Yishuv sort to protect the Zionist project in Palestine and establish a Jewish homeland in *Eretz Yisrael.* The following Section considers whether a politics of accommodation can reliably model political stability when there is incompatibility between two cultural groups.

1.4   Policy of Accommodation and the Politics of Loyalty

Since Lijphart first introduced the politics of accommodation model into the field of comparative politics, the model has been extensively refined, partly because of scholarly attempts to extend the debate on political stability to include non-democratic countries. In this respect, Lustick's (1979) call to extend this debate to situations beyond those seen in small European democratic states was a significant development. In *World Politics*, Lustick proposed:

> "that limiting discussions of how political stability was maintained in deeply divided societies within democratic regimes was unnecessarily restrictive and narrowed use of the model to the analysis of consociational devices that are used to facilitate political accommodation between the elite elements within a society that has more than two social groups".[19]

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[19] For further information on this debate between political scientists, see Guelke (2013, 8).

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By doing so, Lustick and other political scientists, found themselves drawn into academic discussions about the capabilities of the politics of accommodation, and other models, in terms of achieving political stability in countries in which societies are not only divided but are also polarised into dominant and subordinate cultural groups. These polarised countries are unlike some of the European countries discussed in Section 1.3 that enjoyed political stability despite social polarisation and the dominant group's monopoly of the state's bureaucracy and its affirmative hegemony over the subordinate group.

Indeed, where polarisation exists, the dominant group persistently attempts to monopolise and control the state's major power centres, namely the security apparatus. That is to say, there is no balance of power as the dominant group holds all the power. The idea here is to prevent the subordinate group from using power centres for their own benefit or from threatening the dominant group's monopoly over the centres. This scenario results in biased law enforcement that supports the dominant group's hegemony over the subordinate one (Guelke 2013, 37). For instance, the IDF, Shabak and police — the most important security agencies in Israel — are all controlled by Jews. Moreover, only two Arab politicians have been appointed as ministers since Israel was established in 1948 (Salih Tarif and Ghalib Mjadlah). Similarly, there has never been a time when more than ten Arabs were Knesset members at any one time, ensuring that the Knesset is always controlled by Jewish Zionist MPs.[20]

Where polarisation exists, the dominant group systematically monopolises the state's financial and natural resources.[21] This, of course, ensures that the lion's shares of resources are ring-fenced for the dominant group rather than being made available the subordinate group. It also means that the balance of power weighs heavily in favour of the dominant group. Indeed, all the major financial resources of the state of Israel are controlled by a board of trustees that is composed entirely of Jews. As noted by the

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[20] For more information, see: www.Knesset.gov.il (access date: 20th July 2015).
[21] This is not to suggest that the state is a single monolithic enterprise (Gurr 2004, 6).

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Mossawa Centre, there are also no Arab trustees on the boards of most of the important co-operative companies, such as the Dead Sea Factories, The Oil Refiners Ltd, the Israel Electric Cooperation and the Israeli Water National Company (Mossawa, July 2009).

As a final point, where polarisation exists, the state's identity closely mirrors the cultural identity of the dominant group, as do its symbols, such as the national anthem, the flag and the national holidays. This monopoly enables the dominant group to utilise the state's bureaucracy to preserve its cultural identity. In Israel, for instance, the state's symbols are also Jewish cultural symbols or are associated with Judaism: The Israeli flag depicts the Star of David, the Israeli national anthem symbolises the Jews return to *Eretz Yisrael* and state's official holidays correspond with religious holidays from the Torah.

It is also noteworthy that the term political stability takes on a different meaning and dimension here than it did when Lijphart and his colleagues examined political stability within European democratic countries during the early 1970s and, indeed, than it does during multi-ethnic conflicts (See Section 1.3). Here, the assumption is that the state is less concerned about competitive and fair elections than it is about ensuring that the dominant group continues to monopolise its bureaucracy and/or about protecting the dominant group's hegemony over the subordinate group.   From this perspective, a dominant group may define political stability in the same way as Lustick did in his article "*Stability in Deeply Divided Societies*" (1979):

> "Continued operation of specific patterns of political behaviour, apart from the illegal use of violence, accompanied by a general expectation among the attentive public that such patterns are likely to remain intact in the foreseeable future".

Given these examples, it is not surprising that Lustick referred to the political stability in the newly established state of Israel as a case study for testing the reliability of his "Control Model" in terms of achieving political stability within a polarised society. The examples above confirm that, during Israel's early years, the Israeli society was divided into a Jewish majority and an Arab minority but also that the Jewish majority clearly dominated the state's bureaucracy and exerted hegemony over its Arab minority. Despite this, the Arab minority did not resort to a politics of violence and the state enjoyed political stability for more than three decades. In Lustick's words:

> "Yet in thirty year of the state's existence, Israeli-Arabs have not succeeded in forming an independent Arab political party which could appeal to the communal sentiments of the minority and exert itself on behalf of Arab rights and Arab opinion in Israel. Not only has no Arab political party developed, but no significant independent Arab social, economic, cultural, or professional organisations have been formed, there are no independent newspapers, no Arab leaders of national stature have emerged, no Israeli-Arab terrorist organisations have crystallised and there have been only scattered instances of protests or demonstrations" (Lustick 1982).

Lustick, a well-known proponent of the "Control Model", holds the view that security arrangements imposed by the state explain the political stability during the first thirty years of Israel. From this perspective, Israeli security arrangements, as imposed by the military government, police and Shabak, best define the political actions of Palestinian-Arabs and Druze as well as the political stability that the new state of Israel enjoyed (Lustick 1982).

By way of contrast, this thesis supports the idea that the policy of accommodation can better explain Druze political action during the first thirty years of the Israeli state. This is not to say that Israel did not impose

security measures in order to achieve political stability but instead that, alongside security measures, the state also made institutional arrangements to tackle the antagonism of the Druze community.

A classic example of how such a policy works is Northern Ireland after the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, where, as Guelke observed, in addition to security measures, the British government implemented specific strategies to restore order and to reduce the levels of violence between Unionists and Nationalists. For instance, once the British authorities recognised that political prisoners were catalysing violence by both Unionists and Nationalists, they began treating political prisoners more leniently than other prisoners. By applying such measures, the authorities sought to reduce the levels of Nationalist antagonism towards the British authorities and Unionists — the dominant group identified with the British authorities (Gelke 2013, 56).

This thesis advances the policy of accommodation debate, by arguing that the policy of accommodation can achieve more than just political stability. In a polarised society, the policy of accommodation discourages subordinate groups from resorting to a contentious politics and has the capacity of encouraging subordinate group to resort to a politics of loyalty. It is proposed that the policy of accommodation can nurture a subordinate group's politics of loyalty, particularly if the institutional arrangements that apply as part of the policy are perceived as:

> (1) A new structure of opportunity for the groups' political elite to gain power and to manipulate the political system for their own purposes.[22]

> (2) A new structure of opportunity for breadwinners' economic progress. And:

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[22] For a useful discussion on the difference between mass level and elite level in ethnic conflict regulation, see Pearson (2001).

(3) A new structure of opportunity for the preservation of the group

and for protecting its distinctive cultural identity at the mass level.

The political elite are likely to resort to a politics of loyalty if the policy of accommodation makes arrangements that are perceived as a structure of opportunity that consolidate the elite's ability to gain power and to manipulate the political system for their own purposes (McAdam 1996, 22; Eisinger 1973). Such a perception is crucial since, as noted in Section 1.4, the political elite are more likely to sabotage arrangements for the subordinate groups that do not serve their own interests (Wolff 2012, 7). The elite's support is even more important if the policy arrangements require that the group's leaders dissuade their followers from resorting to violence (a position the followers may adopt because of their subordinate status).

As part of its policy of accommodation towards the Druze community, the Israeli government, under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion, decided to afford the Druze community the status of an independent-religious community, akin to those status already enjoyed by other Arab religious communities in Israel (Layish 2000). Most importantly, community recognition was perceived as structure of opportunity for consolidating the supreme status of the Tarif of Julis as the community's religious leadership and for consolidating the status of other leading *ham'ayl* within the community. As discussed in Chapter 3, these arrangements motivated the leading *ham'ayl* to resort to a politics of loyalty, which was best expressed in the form of their support and encouragement of Druze youth service in the IDF.

A policy of accommodation with arrangements that are perceived as a structure of opportunity for economic progress by subordinate groups' breadwinners will encourage them to resort to a politics of loyalty. In *Economic and Political Contention in Comparative Perspective*, Kousis and Tilly (2005) presented a systematic analysis of threats and opportunities

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created by economic change and demonstrated how these can motivate a subordinate group's collective action. Within this publication, Glenn offered a broader international relations perspective, looking at the European Union (EU) as a structure of economic opportunity. He described how prospective member states shape their institutions to align with the EU regulations, with the specific agenda of gaining access to EU funds.

As part of its policy of accommodation towards the Druze community, the Israeli government allowed Druze youth to serve in the IDF alongside other Israeli youth. Consequently, dozens of Druze youth joined the IDF and pursued careers within the IDF, Police Board and other security agencies. It is noteworthy that Druze youth service in the IDF was perceived as a structure of opportunity for Druze youth and a way for them and their *fallahin* families to integrate into the Israeli labour market. As illustrated in Chapter 4, because Druze youth were allowed to serve in the IDF, the families of serving Druze (including their sons) resorted to a politics of loyalty.

Both the political elite and the masses within a subordinate group will resort to a politics of loyalty, provided the policy results in arrangements that are perceived as a new structure of opportunity for preserving the group as a distinctive cultural group. This is because most members of a cultural group that reside within a divided and polarised society will seek to protect their right to preserve and promote their distinctive cultural identity, be it enshrined in a religion, language or other construct, using their own institutions (Lapidoth 1997, 175).[23]

During the 1950s, many Israeli-Druze perceived the government's recognition of the Druze community as an independent and religious community as a new structure of opportunity for the preserving the community as a cultural and religious group. This perception was particularly evident within the religious-conservative strata of the Druze

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[23] For more on cultural identity, see Wolff (2012, 27).

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community. As illustrated in Chapter 4, recognition was just one of the arrangements that encouraged the religious- conservative sub-group within the community to adopt a politics of loyalty and to support and encourage Druze service in the IDF.

Despite this, the failure of the British government's policy of accommodation to achieve political stability in Northern Ireland raises concerns about the ability of the policy to support long term political stability in a polarised society. The British-Anglo agreement (see above) eased 'the troubles' but failed to restore political stability to the streets of Northern Ireland.[24] Similarly, emergence of the politics of protest within the Druze community during the early-1980s lays challenge to the idea that a policy of accommodation designed to achieve political stability can achieve its objective over the longer term. Section 1.5 discusses the reasons why a policy of accommodation cannot ensure long term political stability.

1.5 Accommodation for Stability and the Politics of Protest

The failure of a policy of accommodation to instil long term political stability in countries such as Northern Ireland and Israel has resurrected the debate about the efficacy of such a policy within divided and polarised societies.[25] Indeed, according to Alvero de Soto (a leading UN practitioner in this area), identifying the right framework for achieving long term objectives, rather than to merely address immediate problems, remains a major concern for many theorists and policy makers who are engaged in conflict management within divided societies (Wolff 2012, XIV).

Since the early-1980s, the Druze community has increasingly resorted to a politics of protest. This emphasises the tempestuous nature of the long term relationship between the policy of accommodation and political

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[24] www.psni.police.uk (access date: 9th May 2015).
[25] For a list of states in which a policy of accommodation has failed to achieve political stability, see Wolff (2012, 13).

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stability. Indeed, despite all the arrangements the Israeli government has put in place since Israel was established, including community recognition and allowing youth service in the IDF, the Druze community has increasingly resorted to a politics of protest. As illustrated in Chapter 5, these protests took the form of large demonstrations in Jerusalem that were organised by *ru'asa al-majalis al-mahliyah al-Durziyah* (Head of the Druze Local Councils; HDLCs) and their leading *ham'ayl* and the long term strikes in Druze villages.

Herein, it is proposed that a policy of accommodation cannot achieve a political stability unless it also nurtures equality between subordinate and dominant groups. Any and all efforts to achieve equality first require that the socioeconomic inequalities that are important to the subordinate group are identified and, secondly, that these are addressed. In this thesis, it is, therefore, important to distinguish between the two forms of policy of accommodation, namely the policy of accommodation for equality and the policy of accommodation for stability, hereafter referred to more simply as accommodation for stability and accommodation for equality, respectively.

From the "top-down" perspective, accommodation for equality includes arrangements and incentives that improve the cultural, economic and political status of the subordinate group. The ultimate policy objective must be to close the gaps between the dominant and subordinate groups within a society. From this perspective, a policy of accommodation for equality may be deployed as a transitional step before full integration of the subordinate group into society.[26] Alternatively, it may be the pragmatic choice during important moments in the lifecycle of a consociational order, such as the transition to democratic rule: Once the order is operational and members of the dominant group develop reciprocal bonds of trust, it may

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[26] In Guelke (2013, 80), the term 'integration' is most commonly used to describe the removal of barriers erected by government or society to the full satisfaction of members of a minority, whether indigenous or immigrant, as equal citizens of the society.

then be possible to move towards an integrationist set of political institutions.[27]

From this top-down perspective, accommodation for stability may also include arrangements and incentives that improve the cultural, economic and political status of the subordinate group. However, the ultimate goal differs from that of accommodation for equality. Indeed, the ultimate aim is far removed from the goal of achieving equality between the subordinate and dominant groups: It is, instead, to secure the monopoly of the dominate group over the state's bureaucracy and to preserve this group's hegemony over the subordinate group. Hence, the arrangements put forward within this framework are incompatible with the eventual integration of the subordinate group into the larger society and cannot be considered as steps towards achieving consociational order between the dominant and subordinate groups.

Nowhere has the policy of stability been more evident than in Israel. After Israel was established, the Israeli government, under the Mapai leadership, invested in the Druze villages that had lacked any development during Mandatory Palestine. For example, local councils were founded in Druze villages and special budgets were allocated for improving the level of infrastructure and public service within these villages. However, the Israeli government's investment in Druze villages was outstripped by investment in the neighbouring Jewish settlements, which, consequently, witnessed significant improvements in all areas (Ghanem 2001).

From the "bottom-up" perspective, the arrangements that form part of accommodation for equality are perceived as a new structure of opportunity for improving the economic, cultural and political status of the subordinate group. This perception increases the subordinate group's sense of belonging to the state and nurtures its friendly attitude towards the state's dominant group.   The sense of belonging also encourages the

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[27] For more on consociational order during periods of transition, see Bashir and Kymlicka (2012, 3).

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subordinate group to comply with orders and to maintain political stability. For some members of the subordinate group this can even encourage them to adopt a politics of loyalty. Once this order is operational and subordinate and dominant groups reciprocate trust, a more integrationist set of political institutions is an option.[28]

From the bottom-up perspective, arrangements that form part of accommodation for stability are perceived as key reasons for the deprivation of the subordinate groups as compared to the dominant group within the society. This perception exacerbates the subordinate group's dissatisfaction with the state and fuels antagonism towards the state's authorities and its dominant group. Antagonism that has its foundations in a subordinate group's feelings of relative deprivation is likely to result in the subordinate group adopting contentious forms of politics that target the state's authorities and the dominant group (Gurr 1970 and Horowitz 1985).

As an example, dozens of Druze villagers joined the HDLCs' organised anti-government demonstrations that took place in Jerusalem during the 1980s. These demonstrations expressed the frustration of Druze villagers with the Israeli government. As described in Chapter 5, Druze villagers had become increasing frustrated with the government because they perceived the lack of infrastructure and public service development in their villages to be the direct result of the discriminatory policy of the Israeli government towards their villages.

More specifically, a long-term relative deprivation is seen to threaten the leading status of the subordinate group's political elite, more so if the political elite are required to dissuade the masses from resorting to contentious politics and/or are required to convince the masses to accept their subordinate status. The political elite will rarely adopt such a stance because of the risk of losing their leading status within their group. Indeed, should the political elite attempt to convince the masses to accept a

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[28] *Ibid.* Bashir and Kymlicka (2012).

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subordinate status, the backlash could mean that the masses direct their frustrations at their own political elite, as well as at the state authorities and dominant group.

During the 1980s, the HDLCs had no choice but to resort to a politics of protest to preserve their own and their *ham'ayl*'s leading status. Indeed, Druze villagers blamed the leading *ham'ayl* (particularly their heads) for the lack of development within their villages and requested their removal when the Ben-Dor Committee failed to deliver the long-awaited developments. As discussed in Chapter 5, the HDLCs organised demonstrations in Jerusalem and strikes in their villages to protest against the Israeli government's policy for their villages and, more significantly, to protect their own status, after many villagers laid the blame for the lack of development at the HDLCs' door.

It is noteworthy that the type of deprivation becomes less important when members of the subordinate come to perceive their subordinate status as being the consequence of their cultural identity. From the bottom-up perspective, the three forms of discrimination (economic, political and cultural) have what Frazer (2003) calls "dual-contingency" in the sense that each of them gives rise to grievances within the subordinate group. Hence, regardless of the type of subordination, a subordinate group that feels relatively deprived will, ultimately, resort to contentious politics.

As an example, in the early-1970s, a group of Druze intellectuals established the IDC. The IDC's main purpose was to protest against the disparity between development in Druze villages and in neighbouring Jewish settlements on the Galilee and the Carmel. Unlike other activists, who saw the disparity to be the result of the Israeli government's policy of mal-distribution, IDC leaders and activists perceived the relatively poor development of Druze villages to be the result of Israeli government's policy of cultural discrimination, a policy that was intended to keep non-Jews subordinate to the Jews, regardless of their religious affiliations.

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Over recent years, the rise of politics of violence within the Druze community raises questions about the ability of accommodation for stability to prevent a subordinate group from eventually resorting to a politics of violence. This form of political action, as illustrated in Section 1.6 and in Chapter 6, was seen during the clashes between Druze villagers and Israeli police forces in several villages, most significantly in 'Isfya in 2004, in al-Bqi'ah 2007 and in Dalyah al-Karmil in 2010. The reasons why accommodation for stability cannot prevent subordinate cultural groups from resort to a politics of violence are examined in Section 1.6.

1.6   Ethnic Supremacy and the Politics of Violence

Over recent years, there has been a rising tide of politics of violence within the Druze community. This challenges the notion that accommodation for stability can prevent subordinate ethnic groups from resorting to a politics of violence. Indeed, as describe in Section 1.5, Druze villagers have engaged a politics of violence in recent years.

This Section advances the debate on accommodation for stability. Herein, it is argued that accommodation for stability cannot nurture long term political stability and cannot prevent subordinate groups from resorting to a politics of protest. Nor can it prevent subordinate cultural groups from, eventually, resorting to a politics of violence. This is because accommodation for stability is a substitute for a state's ethnic supremacy policy that aims to exploit the state's natural, financial, political and cultural resources for the benefit of the dominant group.

In light of this, accommodation for stability may be deployed as a transitional step towards full ethnic supremacy. Alternatively, accommodation for stability may be pragmatic solution during important stages of the lifecycle of a national organisation or in a state struggling to achieve order where there is dominant group. Once such an order is operational, members of the dominant group monopolise the state's

bureaucracy and gain supremacy over the subordinate group. At this point, it may be possible to abandon accommodation for stability, and to even disband integrated political institutions that were once founded to implement the state's policy of accommodation, in favour of structures that fortify the supremacy of the dominant group.

The Yishuv's leadership's and, under the Mapai, the Israeli government's policy towards the Druze community, after Israel was established, provides a useful illustration of how accommodation for stability can act as a substitute for a state's ethnic supremacy. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Yishuv's leadership in Palestine and the Israeli government applied accommodation for stability to the Druze community and, therefore, did not expropriate land from Druze villagers. This policy formed part of the Yishuv's wider strategy to win control of Palestine and to consolidate its Jewish majority's control over the state's bureaucracy and hegemony over Palestinian-Arabs.

By way of contrast to the Yishuv and Israeli government, the right-wing coalitions led by the Likud party and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have the primary objective of consolidating the supremacy of the Jewish majority in Israel. Despite strong opposition from Druze villagers, Netanyahu's government continues to expedite and extend its land expropriation efforts in order to transfer land from Druze and into Jewish hands. Chapter 6 illustrates how, over the last three decades, thousands of *dunams* of land have been expropriated from Druze villagers for the purposes of enabling projects, such as Judaising the Galilee, or to directly serve the private interests of Jewish citizens.

The most obvious impact of a state's ethnic supremacy is exploitation of a state's resources that may be ring-fenced for the dominant group even though they are as necessary, if not crucial, for the preservation of subordinate group as a distinctive cultural group. Unlike accommodation of stability, which condemns ethnocide (the killing of cultures), linguicide (the

killing of language) and theocide (the deliberate killing of particular religious culture), ethnic supremacy encourages ethnocide, linguicide and/or theocide because its primary goal is to ensure a single public identity for the state and this can only be achieved by eliminating cultural differences in the society.[29]

The breadwinners within subordinate group will resort to a politics of violence, particularly if they perceive that the state's ethnic supremacy threatens their livelihoods and economic status. Indeed, whereas accommodation for stability may be perceived as the root cause of the subordinate group's economic status, ethnic supremacy is perceived as a direct threat to the income of breadwinners within the subordinate group. The result is widespread use of a politics of violence by breadwinners to protect their incomes. Chapter 6 discusses how Druze *fallahin w*ere the first to resort to politics of violence against military government officials when these officials threatened to expropriate their land during the 1950s. This is not surprising as *flahah* (agriculture) was a major source of income for Druze *fallahin*.

The masses within the subordinate group are likely to share a common perspective and to resort to a politics of violence against state's ethnic supremacy. This is because, as noted in Section 1.5, the "two dimension-discrimination" means each of economic discrimination (i.e. mal-distribution of financial resources), cultural discrimination and political discrimination determines the group's perception and stance in relation to the other two forms of discrimination. Furthermore, unlike accommodation for stability — that is perceived as the reason for the group's cultural subordination — ethnic supremacy is perceived as a threat to the group preservation as a distinctive cultural group in the society. This, in turn, triggers the use of a politics of violence by the subordinate group as they attempt to prevent their eradication as a distinctive cultural group. Indeed, in recent years, many Druze *mashaykh* and their followers have

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[29] For a similar discussion, see McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon (2008,41)

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resorted to a politics of violence in response to land expropriation that threatens survival of the community as a distinctive cultural and religious group on its ancestral land (Chapter 6).

Under the aforementioned circumstances, ethnic supremacy fundamentally reduces the ability of the political elite within the subordinate group to dissuade the masses from resorting to a politics of violence. This is because ethnic supremacy threats the preservation of the group as a distinctive cultural group and, in turn, the leading status of its political elite. Instead, the emergence of new political elite that replaces the elite who are loyal to the state is entirely expected. The new political elite encourage the subordinate group to defend the community's survival, even if that involves resorting to a politics of violence. Indeed, the Israeli government's expropriation of further land from Druze villagers meant that the traditional political elite within the Druze community no longer controlled villagers. Instead, as Chapter 6 illustrates, *jamʿaih al-difʿa 'an al-'aradi* (LDC) incited the villagers' anger to be directed towards the Israeli government.

1.7   Research Methods

The political actions of the Druze during Mandatory Palestine were used to examine the relationship of agreements between the cultural groups' political elite with the political stability during multi-ethnic conflicts. The Druze leading *ham'ayl* and many of their *fallahin* followers resorted to a politics of silence during the struggle for control of Palestine. This clearly demonstrates that political stability between cultural groups is only possible if their political elite are in agreement. The agreement between Druze leading *ham'ayl* and Yishuv's leadership was reached early in the 1930s. The impact of this agreement was most evident during the critical periods of the conflict, namely during the 1936 Arab Revolt and 1948 War.

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In order to examine the Yishuv's leadership policy for the Druze of Palestine, a substantive aspect of this research involved analysing the contents of historical documents, most of which are located in Israeli archives. The Abba Hushi Archive at the University of Haifa (AHA) was one of the most valuable archives in that it extensively documents the relationship between the Yishuv's leadership and the leading *ham'ayl*. Indeed, between the late-1920s and 1948 (i.e. during Mandatory Palestine and when Israel was established) Abba Hushi, who eventually became the first Jewish mayor of Haifa, was known for his relationship with the leading Druze *ham'ayl* from the Carmel and the Galilee. Throughout this time period, he served as an official of the Jewish Agency for Druze affairs.

Three other archives contain useful historical accounts of the relationship between the Yishuv's political leadership and leading *ham'ayl*. These are the Druze Archive at the University of Haifa (DAUH), the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem (ISA) and the National Archive in Surrey (PRO). PRO is particularly significant for this study since it contains documents that describe the role of the British authorities in the context of the relationship between the Yishuv's leadership and Druze political elite; a role that previous studies of the political actions of Druze during Mandatory Palestine have omitted to consider. In the period between World War I and World War II, the British authorities were the highest power in Palestine. For the first time, this study reveals that the omnipotent British authorities also played a significant role in determining the nature of relationships between different Druze *ham'ayl* communities and the Jewish-Yishuv.[30]

One of the major shortcomings of historical documents contained with Israeli archives is the fact that these documents, on the whole, represent the Yishuv's views of the Druze community. Thus, any conclusions drawn entirely on the content of these archives are likely to be heavily biased and misleading since the Druze perspective is poorly captured. Indeed, some of

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[30] See, for instance, Laura Robson (2012). *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine.*

the views expressed elsewhere by Druze are entirely different to their views, as recorded within these archives.[31]

To counter this bias, and to evaluate how the Druze and their leading *ham'ayl* perceived the Yishuv in Palestine, other resources were used during this research. Unfortunately, the Druze community lacks official archives. Thus, private family archives that belong to the heads of leading *ham'ayl* that were active at the relevant times, namely the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya, the M'adi of Yarka and the Khanayfis of Shafa-'Amer, were researched. Many of the documents collated from these archives have never been disclosed to the public and have provided valuable primary data about the way that Druze villagers perceived the Jewish-Yishuv, the British authorities and leaders of other Arab religious minorities during Mandatory Palestine.

The Khanayfis family archive is of particular interest given the volume of documents held by Zayid Khanayfis, the son of Shaykh Salih Khanayfis — the former head of the Khanayfis *Hamulah.* As noted by Firro (1999) and Parsons (2000), Shaykh Salih Khanayfis heavily influenced the development of relationships between the Druze community in Palestine and the Jewish-Yishuv, but his own records have never been viewed prior to this study, even though, since the 1st January 1939 (the date his father (Shaykh Hassan Khanayfis) was murdered), he has documented his activities on a daily basis. Shaykh Salih Khanayfis' diaries provide a valuable insight into the development of Druze relationships and the origins of the conflict between the state and the Israeli-Druze.

Shaykh Salih Khanayfis was my grandfather and I spent much of my teenage years in his company. It is entirely possible that my family ties to Shaykh Khanayfis have subconsciously influenced my perspective of historical events. However, I challenged my perspective and questioned whether I am advocating or defending Shaykh Khanayfis' decisions or actions. Neutrality

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[31] Such an approach was noticed in Parsons (2000) and Firro (1999) works on Druze community during Mandatory Palestine.

of reporting was maintained by cross-checking the information from the Khanayfis archive with, where possible, information from alternative sources. Moreover, Shaykh Khanayfis was regarded solely as head of a *hamulah* for the purposes of this thesis.

The forms of political action taken by many Druze after Israel was established provide this thesis with another invaluable resource. The shift in Druze politics allows the validity of the argument that a state's policy of accommodation has the capacity to encourage subordinate cultural groups to adopt a politics of loyalty within polarised society, to be tested. The Israeli state applied a policy of accommodation towards the community. This manifested through the government's decision to recognise the community as an independent religious groups, like other communities, and allowing its youth to serve in the IDF. The Druze community's politics of loyalty, on the other hand, was most clearly expressed by Druze youth service in the IDF and the massive Druze vote for the ruling party, Mapai.

In order to assess the Israeli state's policy towards the Druze between Israel being established in 1948 and throughout the "military rule" period (1948-1966), different archives were researched. The IDF's Archive in Tel-Aviv was amongst these archives. This archive contains a large number of official documents that describe the Israeli government's strategy in relation to the Arab minority, in general, and the Druze community, in particular. A second archive was also used. This was the Labour Party Archive at Bayt-Bairl that documents the relationship between heads of leading *ham'ayl* and Party leaders, including David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett, the serving Prime Ministers during the 1950s and the 1960s.

Once again, whilst these historical archives provide a useful overall picture of the Israeli state's policy towards the Druze community, they were unable to provide a detailed account of the way different sub-groups within the Druze community perceived the new state of Israel and its policy towards the community. In order to address these shortcomings and to determine

the perceptions of the state as held by the Druze political elite and masses, a field study was undertaken and personal interviews were conducted with elderly Druze community leaders. The interviews addressed questions about the policy the military government and Mapai officials as applied to the community in general and the leading *ham'ayl*, in particular. These interviews also provided opportunities to raise questions concerning the Israeli government's decisions to recognise the community as an independent religious group and to allow Druze youth to serve in the IDF.

Some interviewees made reference to my grandfather, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis, who, during most of the 1950s, was a member of the Knesset (MK) and a representative of the community in Mapai's Arab-List (Agriculture and Labour). I was aware that some of my interviewees, particularly former CDI activists who begun to oppose the Israeli government's policy for the Druze even when Israel was a newly formed state, would be reluctant to share their opinions about Shaykh Khanayfis, and his efforts, particularly those used to encourage a politics of accommodation.

Because of this potential censoring by interviewees, interview questions were formulated such that interviewees were asked to express their opinions about the decisions of political leaders, save those of Shaykh Salih Khanayfis, unless the interviewees were very much identified with the Shaykh's political camp. This tactic meant interviewees were not embarrassed about insulting my grandfather but that they were able to freely express their personal views on many related issues.

Between the early-1980s and the end of the 1990s, the Druze community increasingly resorted to a politics of protest. This scenario was used to examine how accommodation for stability fails to prevent a subordinate cultural group from resorting to a contentious politics over the longer term. The aforementioned policy included the Israeli government's budget allocation to DLCs. The allocations improved the level of infrastructure and

public services but not to a point that they closed the development gaps between Druze villages and their neighbouring Jewish settlements. This triggered the Druze politics of protest.

Interviews with Israeli officials, who had held positions that directly influenced Druze affairs during the National Unity government of the 1980s, proved invaluable in terms of understanding the motivation behind the changes in the state's policy towards the Druze community. Indeed, interviewees included the now late Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs, Yusif Ginat, and the Minister of Defence, Mosheh Arens. Interview data was supplemented with information from the media department at the University of Haifa. The latter houses an impressive number of articles from *Haaretz* and *M'arriv* newspapers and other Israeli publications that, together, provide a balanced account of the Israeli government's policy towards Druze villages.

At the epicentre of the change in Druze's political action stood HDLCs who, during the 1980s and 1990s, led demonstrations against the Israeli government in Jerusalem. Some HDLC members, including Shafik 'Ass'ad (head of Bayt-Jan local council) and a HDLC member who led strikes in Druze villages and demonstrations in Jerusalem, are now deceased. Nevertheless, some of the surviving HDLC members, such as Wahib Nasr al-Din (the head of Kisra village Local Council; 1984-1992), Mufid 'Amir (the head of Hurfesh Local Council; 1988-1994) and two former members of the Knesset, namely Saleh Tarif Salih Zidan 'Atshah, were interviewed.

The information provided by interviewees was cross-referenced with information from other sources, including articles from newspapers, periodicals and journals. This allowed interview data to be assessed for its reliability and objectivity. Indeed, since the 1970s, a growing number of journals have been published by Druze writers and activists, most notably

intellectuals of the IDC.[32]   These articles and opinions cover a variety of topics and help to develop an understanding of not only how the Druze political elite perceived the state's policy but also how Druze masses viewed the development of their villages. During this study, one of the most useful journals was al-Huda, a periodical published by a group of Druze intellectuals to promote their campaign throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

The recent rise in a politics of violence in Druze villages was used as a case study to examine the relationship between Israeli state's ethnic supremacy and the subordinate groups' politics of violence. To ensure Jewish control of the state's natural resources, the right-wing Israeli government expedited its efforts to expropriate land from Druze villagers. This resulted in many of Druze villagers resorting to a politics of violence and in clashes with Israeli police forces.

The information provided by Israeli officials from the Interior Office, members of Knesset and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) helped to explain the importance of land matters to right-wing governments that have recently come to power in Israel. Again, data were also collated from alternative sources, including files and recent decisions located within the Knesset library, newspapers articles, reports and on-line resources.

The violent confrontations between the villagers of 'Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil (at al-Jalamih) and Israeli police forces provided a unique opportunity to observe, first hand, a demonstration of the state's efforts to achieve ethnic supremacy.   Comparisons are made between this demonstration and previous meetings, where the Israeli government used armoured vehicles and armed forces to subjugate anger villagers and to demonstrate that land expropriation was to proceed, even if this involved the use of violent force by the state.

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[32] They could not write openly during the military rule in the Galilee and in the so-called 'security zone' up until 1966.

To gain an even greater understanding of the Druze response to land expropriation, a number of Druze villages were visited and interviews were conducted with Druze *fallahin,* Druze *mashaykh* and activists who campaigned against land expropriation. Shaykh Zahir Zahir of 'Isfya (the former Chairman of Lujnah al-Tawasl) and a number of his followers including, Yusif Hassan and 'Ali Qadmani were interviewed. LDC activists (including its Chairman Fahmi Halabi, Hatim Hassun and Yusif Khyer) and members of the management committee were also interviewed.

Finally, whilst the author strongly identified with the Druze struggle (perhaps understandably, given that I am colloquially (in Arabic) called *'abn'a al-ta'ifah* – a son of the community), every effort was made to remain objective throughout this research. All raw material and evidence within the substantive Chapters was analysed, cross-checked for inconsistencies and weighted according to reliability.

1.8   Thesis Structure

The empirical Chapters of this thesis are organised in chronological order to enable the reader to visualise and follow the changes in Druze political action throughout a substantial period of time. Indeed, this study covers events that span a century as we progress through Chapters 2 to 6. However, the intention is not to build a chronology of events. Instead, each of the substantive Chapters examines, in depth, an aspect introduced during the preceding Chapters.

Chapter 2 examines why, unlike Palestinian-Arab rebels, most of the Druze community that lived in Mandatory Palestine resorted to a politics of silence, and refrained from attacking the Yishuv's interests. It is shown that many Druze resorted to this form of political action after a consensus agreement was reached by the heads of their leading *ham'ayl* and the Yishuv's leadership. This agreement included arrangements to consolidate

the leading status of the Druze community's political elite and to preserve the community as a distinctive cultural and religious group during the conflict over Palestine.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine why almost all Israeli-Druze adopted a politics of loyalty during the first three decades of the Israeli state. Chapter 3 illustrates that leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of loyalty because, under the Mapai leadership, the Israeli government, decided to recognise the community as an independent religious group, in a similar way that it recognised other religious communities in Israel. This decision was viewed as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating the leading status of leading *ham'ayl* within the community and, in turn, was met with the leading *ham'ayl*'s loyalty to the state. Many Druze *mashaykh* also resorted to a politics of loyalty. However, the *mashaykh* adopted this political stance because the Israeli government's decision created opportunities to preserve the community as a distinctive cultural and religious group.

Chapter 4 concentrates on the Druze *fallahin*'s political action during the same period and examines why, like the leading *ham'ayl*, most *fallahin* resorted to a politics of loyalty. It is shown that the Israeli government's decision to allow *fallahin* sons to serve in the IDF, alongside Jewish youth, was seen as a new structure of opportunity for economic progress and encouraged their loyalty.

Chapter 5 uncovers why, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Druze community was increasingly drawn into a politics of protest. It is shown that leading *ham'ayl*, the IDC and many other Druze villagers resorted to political protests because of the government's discriminatory policy (under the National Unity leadership) for their villages, particularly for their local councils. This policy is perceived as the major reason for the subordinate status of the leading *ham'ayl* and the subordinate economic status of the masses within Druze villages.

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Finally, Chapter 6 examines the recent rise in a politics of violence within the Druze community. It is asserted that many of Druze villagers, including Druze *mashaykh* and their followers from the *shabab*, resorted to political violence as a reaction to the right-wing Israeli government's efforts to expropriate further land from Druze villagers. Most importantly, these land expropriation efforts were seen as threats to the preservation of the community as a distinctive cultural and religious community in the state – threats that justify their resorting to violence.

Chapter 2

The Struggle for Palestine and Druze Politics of Silence

"…The Druze do not initiate or participate in attacks against Jews … and the Jews do not attack Druze…".

— Shaykh Salih Khanayfis.[1]

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[1] From an agreement between Yehoshua Palmon, a Jewish-Yishuv leader, and Shaykh Salih Khanayfis, leader of a Druze *hamulah*, during the 1948 War. The Central Zionist Archive. File: S 25/6638. 23.1.1948.

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2.1 Introduction

Many of the Druze *ham'ayl* in Palestine adopted a politics of silence when faced with the emerging Yishuv and, by doing so, refrained from joining Arab forces that opposed the Yishuv's efforts to establish a Jewish state in historical Palestine. This form of political action contrasts with that of many Palestinian-Arabs, predominantly from the Sunni-Muslim majority, who contentiously resorted to violence against Yishuv's interests. The Druze *ham'ayl*'s politics of silence were best seen during the 1936 Arab Revolt and during the 1948 War — the most critical periods in the struggle over Palestine. Indeed, between 1936 and the establishment of the state of Israel, in 1948, most Druze *ham'ayl* resident in the Carmel and the Galilee refused to join the Arab rebellion against the Yishuv's interests, despite rebel efforts to recruit Druze to their cause.[2]

This Chapter examines why the majority of Druze *ham'ayl* in Mandatory Palestine resorted to a politics of silence towards the emerging Yishuv and refrained from joining the Arab rebellions' assault against the Yishuv's political ambitions for Palestine.[3] It is proposed that most Druze *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of silence because of an agreement that had been reached between the heads of their leading *ham'ayl* and the Yishuv's political leadership before the 1936 Arab Revolt began. At the heart of this agreement were a number of arrangements that, on one hand, consolidated the supreme status of the community's political elite and, on the other hand, demonstrated the Yishuv's political leadership's commitment to recognise the right of the Druze community to live in peace, without harm, as a religious and cultural group on its own land.

The Chapter assesses the ability of major elements of Lijphart's classical model of politics of accommodation to achieve political stability between cultural groups during a multi-ethnic conflict. It was previously argued (in Section 1.3)

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[2] Historians, such as Firro (1999), Parsons (2000) and Atashi (2001), use the term 'neutral position' to describe Druze political action during the 1948 War.
[3] See Chapter 1 for a definition of the politics of silence.

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that an agreement between the political elite that includes arrangements that ensure the supremacy of the political elite, and the preservation of their groups, encourages their cultural groups to resort to a politics of silence during a multi-ethnic conflict.

Section 2.2 examines the status of the political elite of the Druze community, in *Sanjaq* (district) Acre, during the last few years of the Ottoman Rule. It illustrates how regulations, introduced by the Ottoman authorities shortly before they left *Bilad al-Sham* (Greater Syria), afforded the Tarif of Julis supreme status within the community. Indeed, the new regulations gave the Tarif *Hamulah* superior status to that of other leading *ham'ayl* in *Sanjaq* Acre, namely that of the Mʿadi of Yarka and the Khayr of Abu-Snan.

Many of the leading Druze *ham'ayl*, and the Tarif of Julis in particular, were in turmoil during the period immediately after British occupation of Palestine, in 1917. Section 2.3 describes how the new *millet* system, as introduced by the British authorities as part of their efforts to consolidate communal identities among Palestinian-Arabs, subordinated the status of the Druze community in general and the Tarif of Julis in particular. It is proposed that the British authorities' policy for the community increased the discontentment of the community and assisted the Tarif in their efforts to recruit other *ham'ayl* to their 'struggle for recognition' by the British authorities.

Section 2.4 describes the main motives behind Druze leading *ham'ayl* resorting to a politics of silence during the 1936 Arab Revolt. It is shown that leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of silence in response to certain arrangements that the Yishuv's political leadership had put in place before the Revolt began. These arrangements were introduced to prevent Druze leading *ham'ayl*, and their coreligionist in Lebanon and Syria, from joining the Arab rebellion. Most importantly, the leading *ham'ayl* (in particular the Tarif *Hamulah*) perceived these arrangements as a political opportunity for consolidating their supreme status within their community and in their villages.

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Section 2.5 considers why many Druze *fallahin* followed the example of their leading *ham'ayl* and resorted to a politics of silence during the 1936 Arab Revolt. It is proposed that Druze *fallahin* did not perceive the emerging Yishuv in Palestine as a threat to their livelihoods from agriculture and, as a consequence, were not motivated to take political action against the Yishuv's interests. Amongst other factors, the Yishuv's leadership's decisions to avoid settling immigrant Jews on the Carmel and the Galilee and to halt land acquisition from Druze landowners convinced Druze *fallahin* that the emerging Yishuv was not a threat to them. As a result, Druze *fallahin*, unlike many other Palestinian–Arabs, resorted to a politics of silence rather than to a politics of violence during the 1936 Revolt.

The final Section of this Chapter examines the Druze community's politics of silence during the 1948 War. It shows that most of the Palestinian religious-conservative community resorted to this form of political action in response to the support that the Yishuv's leadership gave to leading Druze *ham'ayl* during their struggle against Palestinian-Arabs in the period before the war began. This was perceived as recognition of the right of the Druze community to live in peace, without harm, as a cultural-religious group, on its own land.

2.2   Druze Religious Leadership in *Sanjaq* Acre

At the start of the twentieth century, *mashykhat al-ta'ifah* (the Druze religious leadership) had specific legal rights bestowed upon them by the Ottoman authorities. These rights, according to Dana (2003, 86), were afforded after the religious leadership in Hasbaya (where the Druze Religious Centre in Lebanon is based) repeatedly complained to the *mashykhat al-Islam* (Supreme Islamic leadership) in Istanbul. The complaints were about the local *qadi Shar'ai* (Muslim religious judge) who had, contentiously, overturned the *mashykhat al-ta'ifah*'s decisions in matters relating to Druze marital status.

Indeed, in 1908 *mashykhat al-Islam* issued a directive to the *wali* (district officer) of Syria. This directive made reference to the *qadi Shar'ai* of Hasbaya, granting *mashykhat al-ta'ifah* the right to adjudicate on matters relating to Druze marital status. The directive also asserted that the Muslim *al-qadi* should not intervene in personal Druze community matters. This was because of the distinctive nature of the Druze culture and religious leadership, and because of the desire to maintain the *status quo* (Dana 2003).

The following year, the *wali* of Beirut, Adham Ibn-Mas'ud, extended *mashykhat al-Islam*'s directive to cover the five thousand Druze residents in the *Sanjaq* Acre (Map II).[4] Acre is where most of the Druze in Palestine resided. The *wali* of Beirut sent a letter to the *al-Mutasrifiyah* province officers of Acre. This letter stated that the directive sent by *mashykhat al-Islam* to the *al-qadi* of Hasbaya, in 1908, was to apply to all Druze in the *Sanjaq.* The letter emphasised that the new directive included the need to discourage *Shari'a* courts from handling affairs relating to Druze marriage, divorce, wills and inheritance.[5] To ensure this happened, Ibn-Mas'ud sent a second letter, dated 20th April 1909. This letter stated that the *al-Mutasrifiyah* should appoint Shaykh Muhmmad Tarif, from the Druze village of Julis, as an *al-qadi* of the Druze community in *Sanjaq* Acre (Falah 2000, 119).

Even before the appointment of Shaykh Muhmmad as an *al-qadi,* the Tarif were considered to be amongst the most influential Druze *hamulah* in *Bilad al-Sham.* According to Firro (1999), the emergence of the Tarif as a religious authority dates back to the mid-eighteenth century. This authority was attributed to their good relations with the Druze *sufi,* Shaykh 'Ali Al-Faris, who frequented the Tarifs' *khilwah* (Druze place for prayers), preached his moral teachings,

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[4] For similar maps, see also Pappe (2004, 27) and Laura Robson (2012, 4). According to the 1922 census, there were approximately 668,000 Arab-speaking Palestinians, of whom 7,000 were Druze; See Table III. For more information about the Druze population at the time, see Porath (1974, 19) and Atashi (2001, 45).
[5] See Ibn-Mas'ud's letter to the *wali* of Acre, dated 2nd March 1909. The Druze Archive. File name: Druze Under the Mandate, University of Haifa.

Map II   Administrative boundaries in Palestine under Ottoman Rule. Map drawn by the
Department of Geography at the Hebrew University. Source: Kimmerling and Migdal.
Palestinians the Making of People, p. 37.

recited the *sufi* poems and delivered his sermons.[6] The Tarifs religious status was enhanced during the late-1880s because of the significant role that Shaykh Mhana Tarif, father of Shaykh Muhmad, played in the erection of the shrine of Maqam Al-Nabi Shuʿayb in Hitin.[7]

His appointment as a *qadi* afforded Shaykh Muhmmad authority over other religious figures within the *Sanjaq*. In fact, his position was the only official-religious position that the Ottoman authorities bestowed upon Druze from the *Sanjaq*. As a *qadi,* Shaykh Muhmad had the final say in decisions that affected all of the key aspects of the lives of local Druze resident in the *Sanjaq*, including marriage and divorce and *waqf*. Most importantly, he allowed Druze Shaykhs to practice their religion with other Shaykhs in the *khilwah*.[8]

At that time, religion was a major part of the traditional-religious community's life in *Sanjaq* Acre. Indeed, regardless of the economic status of leading *ham'ayl* and *fallahin*, most Druze citizens practiced their religion daily, in a traditional and conservative way, to the extent that almost every man could be considered to be a "shaykh". That is to say, that the vast majority of the men in the community were *mashaykh,* who wore the Druze religious costume, practised their religion and religious rituals, attended the Sunday and Thursday prayers at the *khilwah* and grew moustaches (Salibi 2006).

The appointment of Shaykh Muhmmad as a *qadi* also meant that his *hamulah* was in a position of political supremacy, above that of other leading *ham'ayl* in *Sanjaq* Acre. This was largely to the increased dependence of other Druze *ham'ayl* on the *wastah* (intermediary) of Shaykh Muhmmad and his *hamulah*.[9]

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[6] *Sufism* is defined, by its believers, as the inner, mystical dimension of Islam. For more on *sufism* in Islam, see Martin *et al.* (2001).

[7] The shrine is one of the most important shrines for the Druze. It is located near the Palestinian village of Hitin, not far from the Sea of Galilee. See Figure 3.6 for a picture of the *maqam*.

[8] Druze *'imam* (religious leaders) had the right to prevent other followers practising religion in the *khilwah* — the Druze place of worship or meeting-house found in every Druze community. The Druze time of worship is every Sunday and Thursday evening.

[9] Similar to all other *ham'ayl*, Tarif was a patrilineal association, where members were linked by a network of complex relationships. The men were closely linked through the sharing of

Indeed, during the Ottoman Period, one of the most important determinants of the political status of an Arab *hamulah* was the degree of association between the head of the *hamulah* and Ottoman authorities and land owners, money lenders and other village notables (Shamir 1961). Shaykh Muhmmad was a Druze *al-qadi* and an official representative of the Ottoman authorities in the community. This meant that other Druze *ham'ayl* from the *Sanjaq* were reliant on him, particularly in matters that involved engaging with the Ottoman authorities.

The *al-qadi* appointment of Shaykh Muhmmad in 1909 did not completely alter the balance of power between the Tarif and the other leading *ham'ayl*. The latter ran the most important institution for the Druze in *Sanjaq* Acre at the time — the Druze Religious Council (DRC). The DRC operated as the official body for all Druze marital and religious affairs. In collaboration with the Tarif, the M'adi of Yarka and the Khayr of Abu-Snan continued to run the DRC in the *Sanjaq*. According to Faraj, representatives of the three leading *ham'ayl* ran the council throughout the second half of the 19th century and during the early years of the 20th century (Faraj 2000, 77).

The appointment of Shaykh Muhmmad as an *al-qadi* did not disturb the balance of power because the Druze, unlike other religious communities (such as the Christians or the Jews) who were more autonomous with regards their internal affairs, were not recognised as a *millet*.[10] Indeed, Shaykh Muhmmad's authority as a *qadi* was symbolic and limited to marital matters. His appointment merely ensured that communal and religious institutions did not hold adjudicating powers. This meant that members of the community were still able to approach *Shari'a* courts to request audiences (Falah 2000).

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rights and obligations in relation to each other's sisters and daughters. On the social structure of the *ham'ayl*, see Cohen (1965).

[10] The *millet* system was the chief mechanism for regulating the relationship between the Ottoman Sunni-Muslim state and other non-Muslim governed groups. For a detailed discussion on the *millet* system, see Braude and Lewis 1982: *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of Plural Society*. New York: Holmes and Meier. See also Carleton (1937).

There are two other reasons why the appointment of Shaykh Muhmmad did not alter the balance of power between the Tarifs and other leading *ham'ayl*. The first reason was the religious status of Shaykh S'aid M'adi within the community.[11] Shaykh S'aid was Shaykh *'aqil* and one of the most respected Shaykhs of *mashykhat Bilad al-Sham*.[12] In addition, the Khyar *Hamulah* held onto its leading position mainly because it was composed of *malakin* (landowners): Shaykh Salih Khayr (1835-1925) was the wealthiest Druze landowner. He owned a large number of *dunams* in Southern Galilee and employed many Druze peasants (Faraj 2000). The *malakin* played a powerful role in the empire during the *tanzimat*, not only because many families were dependent on land ownership, but also because they remained one the major *multazimun* (tax-collectors) in the region (Darwaza 1959, 141).[13]

To summarise, the newly-imposed regulations of the Ottoman authorities and the appointment of Shaykh Muhmmad as a Druze *qadi* immediately prior to the Ottoman leaving Greater Syria did not entirely alter the balance in power between the Tarif and other leading *ham'ayl* in *Sanjaq* Acre. However, these events did afford Shaykh Muhmmad and his *hamulah* certain privileges and supremacy over other leading *ham'ayl*, including the M'adi of Yarka and the Khayr of Abu-Snan. The extent to which the British authorities recognised their predecessor's decisions with regards the community and Ibn-Mas'ud's decision to appoint Shaykh Muhmad as a *qadi* is discussed in Section 2.3.

2.3   British Discrimination and the Tarifs Struggle for Recognition

Following the British occupation of Palestine in 1917, Shaykh Muhmmad Tarifs legal status as a Druze *al-qadi* was renewed. The Shaykh received a letter, dated 7th July 1919 and signed by Alexander Stanton (the British military

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[11] For more information about this charismatic authority, see Weber (1947, 385).

[12] For the difference between *jahil* and *'aqil* within Druze community, see Dana (2003, 23).

[13] The *tanzimat* were first imposed in 1839, but were implemented in different ways throughout the 19th century. For more information on the *tanzimat*, see Cleveland and Bunton (2009).

governor of Haifa).   Stanton's letter confirmed the Shaykh's renewed authorities as a Druze *qadi* and allowed the Shaykh to adjudicate issues of marital status, on the condition that both parties to proceedings consented to his adjudication. Stanton added that:

> "If the parties involved would disagree to appear in front of you, then their case should be transferred to the adjudication of the Muslim *Shari'a* court".[14]

Stanton's letter limited Shaykh Tarifs legal authority over marital affairs and withdraw his authority to preside over other personal status matters, such as inheritance.[15] The Shaykh refused to accept Stanton's decision and appealed the decision in the Municipal Court, in Haifa. During these proceedings, the Shaykh also requested that the court order the local civil court in Acre (*hakim al-sulh)* to relinquish its jurisdiction over all matters relating to the Druze (including wills, estates, marriages and divorce) and transfer the right of adjudication to him.[16]

Like Stanton, the President at the Municipal Court at Haifa rejected Shaykh Tarifs request to extend his legal authorities. In his letter, dated October 1919, the President asserted that he had instructed the *hakim al-sulh* and the *Shar'ai qadi* in Acre and Haifa to allow the Druze to handle marital matters according to their own laws. However, if one or both of the parties objected to this, the case should be transferred to the Muslim *Shari'a* court. As to matters of inheritance, it was decided that Muhmad Tarif could not handle such cases and they should be adjudicated in the *Shari'a* courts.[17]

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[14] Letter from Alexander Stanton to Shaykh Muhammad Tarif, 17th July 1919. See file: Druze under British Mandate. The Druze Archive, University of Haifa.

[15] On Shaykh Muḥmmad and the Druze's community's legal status during the final years of the Ottoman period of rule, see Section 2.2.

[16] Shaykh Muhmmad's letter to the Haifa Municipal Court. See file: The Druze under the British Mandate. The Druze Archive, University of Haifa.

[17] Haifa Municipal Court's letter to Shaykh Muhammad Tarif. See file: The Druze during the Mandate period. The Druze Archive. University of Haifa.

Shaykh Tarifs efforts to extend his authority cannot be divorced from the British authorities' policy in Palestine and their efforts to construct communal identities among the Arab religious communities.[18]   In particular, the Palestinian National Movement (PNM), which emerged in major cities like Jerusalem and Jaffa during the late period of the Ottoman rule in Palestine, was based on collaborations between Palestinian-Arabs from different religious backgrounds and on secular-national ideas. The PNM was perceived as a threat to the British authority's overriding focus on establishing a Jewish state of Palestine, best aligned with the famous Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Shlaim 2009).[19]

To consolidate Palestine's Arab communal identities, the British authorities maintained the *millet* system of their predecessors, the Ottomans, but modified it to complement their own goals for Palestine. The most important and radical step on this path was the decision by Herbert Samuel, the First British Commissioner in Palestine, to extend the *millet* system, such that it redefined the Sunni-Muslim community as a *millet,* like other religious communities in Palestine, including the Christians and the Jews (Robson 2012, 44).

The ramifications of this decision were first seen when the Palestinian Judicial system was reconstructed. *Shariʿa* courts were now responsible for the state courts that presided over matters of personal status. The state courts were, therefore, required to base their judgments on *Shariʿa* law and all Muslim citizens fell within their jurisdiction (Bentwich 1926; in Robson 2012). Soon after, the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), which the British created to consolidate communal identity among the Sunni-Muslim majority, was given authority over this court system. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the *mufti* of Jerusalem,

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[18] For a detailed study on British efforts to structure communal identities in Mandatory Palestine, see Robson (2012).

[19] The Balfour Declaration is a letter from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, to the Zionist leader, Walter Rothschild, which gave the Zionist movement the right to establish a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. For more information, see Schulze (2008, 114), Owen (2000, 20) and Porath (1974, 32). The British refused to use the word Palestinians *per se*, and referred to these communities by such terms as the 'non-Jewish communities' in Palestine. According to Khalidi (1997, 23), this denied Palestinians self-determination and was congruent with the British decision to favour Zionism.

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was appointed SMC's leader. In 1921, Hajj Amin al-Husayni was granted the title of *al-mufti al-'akbar* (grand *mufti*).   His organisation was granted substantial autonomy in running courts and *awqaf* (plural of *waqf*). It selected the *qadah* without government interference, even though the salaries of all its officials, including the *qadah*, were met by the British government (Robson 2011, 59).

In contrast to this, the Druze community was not recognised as a *millet*: Instead, the Druze community were seen as a minority within the Palestinian Sunni-Muslim community, even though there were differences in religious principles between Druze and Sunni-Muslim.[20] This meant, for instance, that the Druze of Palestine were compelled to use the *Shari'a* court system (Goadby p.192; in Robson 2012). Of course, this ran contrary to Druze religious principles as it meant that the Druze of Palestine were judged according to the Sunni-Muslim doctrine, rather than their own Shiite-Muslim doctrine, as derived from the Fatimid stream.[21] Naturally, the Druze were enraged by this decision. Their anger was most clearly vocalised by Ahron Cohen, a Jewish Agency activist who, in 1932, wrote an extensive report about the Druze in Mandatory Palestine that emphasised their dissatisfaction with the SMC's hegemony over their religious affairs.[22]

The British authority's decision not to recognise the Druze community as a *millet* subordinated the community political status. Part of Herbert Samuel's attempts to consolidate a communal identity among the Arabs of Palestine involved structuring government and representative positions according to communal affiliation. Hence, as the Druze community was never recognised as being an independent group, it lacked representation within government and other official institutions. For instance, the first Legislative Council of Palestine was established in August 1922 and was composed of 22 members, of whom 10 members were elected and 12 members were appointed. The appointed

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[20] For example, Druze do not follow the five pillars of Islam; see 'Azam (1979).
[21] For general reading about the Druze religion, see Hitti 2008.
[22] Ahron Cohen 1932. The Zionist Archive. File: S25/3542.

group included four Muslims, four Christians and four Jews but not a single Druze representative (Robson 2011, 59 and Porath 1974, 126, 196-198).[23] Albeit that the Legislative Council held little power in comparison to the British Commissioner, the Council still functioned satisfactorily at times. Moreover, it enabled representatives of the different religious communities to exchange views on routine government matters and air the economic concerns of their communities (Yapp 1996, 125).

The political subordination of the Druze also consolidated their economic subordination; the Druze lacked representatives and were, therefore, unable to engage with the British authorities. In light of this, it comes as no surprise that their villages lacked modern communications and infrastructure (such as rail and telephone networks) akin to those provided by the British authorities in some Palestinian cities.[24] The British government's investment in the Druze community was so poor that most Druze villages lacked even the most basic public services, such as schools and healthcare provision.[25] Indeed, Aaron Epstein confirmed this situation in a detailed report, in which he states that:

> "the economic conditions of the Druze was worse than their Arab neighbours".[26]

The decision by the British government not to recognise the Druze as a *millet* also eroded the status and authority of the leading Druze *ham'ayl*, namely the Tarif. Indeed, as part of their efforts to consolidate the communal identity among the Arabs, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and his SMC, were given extensive authority. This authority included the power to approve all government and

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[23] The Kings Order in Council of 1922. For more information, see Galnoor and Hofnung (1993). The second Council was established in 1930 and also did not include representatives from the Druze community, see Faraj (2000).

[24] Map of Railway Network. The National Archives, Surrey. File: CO 733/294/1.

[25] Map of Government Arab and Hebrew Schools (1938). The National Archives, Surrey. File: CO 733/294/1. On Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine, see Porat (1974, 20).

[26] Aaron Epstein (1939). A Report about the Druze of Palestine as Part of their Transfer to *Jabal al-Druz*. The Zionist Archive. File: S25/ 3523.

official representatives from his *millet*, which included the Druze.[27] From then on, Druze *waqf* became part of the *Waqf* Council, which was overseen by the SMC because the SMC controlled all religious Islamic foundations in Israel (Porath 1974, 188). This drastically reduced the DRC's income from donations made to Druze holy places, including Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, as well as from donations that community members had traditionally contributed to Druze *waqf*.[28]

The Tarif strove to persuade the British authorities to recognise the Druze community as a *millet*. This move was welcomed by other leading *ham'ayl*, including the Mʿadis and the Khyrs.[29] The Tarif had, presumably, realised that any change in their community's or *hamulah*'s status warranted recognition by the British authorities and that the Druze should cease to be considered to be a religious minority within the Sunni-Muslim *millet*.[30] In early 1924, Shaykh Tarif convinced a large number of the heads of leading *ham'ayl* to sign a petition that was then sent to the British Northern District, in Haifa. This petition requested the recognition of the Druze of Palestine as an independent community, as was already the case for other religious communities in Palestine.

However, the British authorities were keen to consolidate the status of Hajj Amin al-Husayni as well as that of the SMC. Hence, the Tarifs request was refused in the form of a letter sent by the British Northern District Officer, dated 2nd May 1924 and signed by the District Officer of Haifa. The British

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[27] According to Porath (1974, 13 and 184), the Al-Husayni family held the position of *al-mufti* of Jerusalem from the mid-nineteenth century.

[28] For information about the Druze religious leadership's dispute with SMC over Maqam al-Al-Nabi Shuʿayb in Hitin: In his report from 1932, Ahron Cohen, the Jewish Bureau agent, stated that Druze families he had visited complained about the SMC's control over the Maqam. Ahron Cohen (1932). "My visit to the Druze Villages". The Zionist Archive. File: S 25/3542. See also Gelber (1995, 174), in which it is argued that the major reason for the visit by the Druze religious leadership from Syria (in 1944) was to forge allegiances with their coreligionists during their dispute with the SMC over the Maqam.

[29] For philosophical debate on struggle for recognition, see Charles Taylor (1994).

[30] A copy of this petition is available from in the Khayr's family archive, in Abu-Snan. It has never been released due to its anti-Muslim language. It seems that the petitioners had to use phrases that highlighted their difference from Sunni-Muslims to make their case for recognition as an independent community. See similar argument in Falah (2000, 121).

Officer justified his refusal on the grounds that the Druze in Palestine had never been recognised as a *millet* by a formal authority since before the time of the Ottoman Rule. According to the letter, British legislation, dating back to 1922, only recognised the legal status of religious communities whose official status stemmed from Ottoman law in the order of *firman* (an order issue by the Sultan). In Ibn-Mas'ud's letter to Shaykh Muhmad Tarif, in 1909, he stated that Shaykh Muhmmad Tarif was not an Ottoman *firman* and did not meet the conditions set down in Article 7 of Palestine Law. This law only allowed recognised communities to establish communal institutions.[31]

At this stage in discussions, it must be emphasised that the leading Druze *ham'ayl*'s 'struggle for recognition' by the British authorities had consolidated the 'boundaries formation' of the community living in Palestine at that time, as well as their perception of 'we' and of 'others'. In other words, it consolidated the feeling that they shared a subordinate status in different fields, largely because of their religious allegiances.[32] This was clear when Druze *ham'ayl* refrained from participating in the riots that swept the country in 1929, but, more significantly, by their 'struggle for recognition' by the British authorities.[33]

In November 1930, leading Druze *ham'ayl* sent another petition to the British authorities. This petition was signed by ninety six *ruhanin* (spiritual) and *jismanin* (temporal) Druze that represented all the Druze villages in Mandatory Palestine. The petitioners listed some of the moral, religious and legal reasons that justified their demand to be recognised as an independent religious community, like other religious communities resident in Palestine at the time.[34] In their petition, the fact that Druze had refrained from participating in the Riots of 1929 was used to demonstrate the distinction between Druze and the Sunni-Muslim rioters (Firro 1999, 23 and Falah 2000).

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[31] See letter in Falah (2000, 257).
[32] For more on the relationship between boundary formation and contentious politics, see Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 78).
[33] For more information about 1929 riots, see Porath (1974).
[34] According to Firro (1999), this was the first time that so many heads of Druze leading *ham'ayl* had collaborated towards achieving a common political goal.

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In summary, the *millet* system of the British Mandate subordinated the Druze economic and political status in Palestine. As a consequence, the Druze of Palestine became a marginal minority within the Sunni-Muslim *millet* and lacked representation in government institutions. Economic development in their villages suffered.   Most importantly, the leading *ham'ayl*, the Tarif, become subordinate to the supremacy of Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the SMC, who oversaw Druze affairs, *awqaf* and holy places. The economic and political subordinate status of the community and that of their leading *ham'ayl* was the main motive behind the collaborative 'struggle for recognition' by the British authorities and, as illustrated by discussions in Section 2.4, the willingness to come to an agreement with the Yishuv's political leadership over a politics of accommodation.

2.4   'Friendly' Relationships and Leading *Ham'ayl's* Politics of Silence

The Yishuv's leadership in Palestine were alerted to the leading Druze *ham'ayl*'s stance towards the 1929 Riots and was keen to keep them out of future conflicts. In the opinion of the Yishuv's experts on Palestinian-Arab affairs (such as Itzhak Ben-Tzvi, the co-director of the Joint Bureau for Arab Affairs (JBAA) at the time), keeping leading Druze *ham'ayl* out of the conflict was important for two main reasons.[35] The first reason was to weaken the Palestinian-Arab anti-Yishuv resistance against the emergence of a Jewish state in Palestine. The second reason was to prevent their coreligionists in Syria and Lebanon from joining the Arabs during the conflict in Palestine (Cohen 2008; Firro 1999, 4; Gelber 1991, 141; Parsons 2000, 18-21).[36]

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[35] Ben-Tzvi was the Chairman of the Yeshiv National Council (YNC) and became the second president of the state of Israel, in 1952.
[36] Following the Riots of 1929, the political leaders of the Jewish Agency recognised the importance of making contact with the surrounding Arab communities and, in co-operation with the Jewish National Council (JNC), established the 'Joint Bureau for Arab Affairs' (JBAA). The Bureau's main purpose was to make contact with Arabs in the region, including with the Druze community in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon (Parsons 2000; Glossary).

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In the period after the 1929 Riots, Ben-Tzvi's ideas were clearly expressed in writing. For instance, he drafted a document shortly after an incident involving a Druze *hamulah* from the Galilee. It was entitled "*Establishing Good Relations with the Druze Community in Eretz Yisrael*" (land of Israel, i.e. Mandatory Palestine). In this letter, he wrote:

   "... it is important to acquire the friendship of this community…friendly relationships with the Druze who live in *Eretz Yisrael* should influence our relationship with the Druze in Syria for the better. It is necessary to pay visits to the Druze leaders of *Eretz Yisrael* and to express our readiness to offer them legal help in matters concerning pressure that may be exerted on them by the government or by Muslims and Christians".[37]

For Ben-Tzvi, the relationship with Druze of Palestine was also one of the Yishuv's regional interests, as it influenced the attitudes of the Druze in Syria and Lebanon towards the conflict in Palestine. Ben-Tzvi's main goal was to consolidate the Yishuv's relationships with the Druze of Palestine, so that their coreligionists from Lebanon and Syria did not side with anti-Yishuv Palestinian-Arabs during the conflict. Ben-Tzvi's concerns are understandable if one takes into consideration the militant powers that the Druze in these countries possessed at the time: Druze were particularly powerful in Syria, where the Druze had powerful leaders, such as Sultan Basha al-Atrash who led the Syrian Revolution against the French forces, in 1925 (Al-B'ainiyy 2008).[38]

To cement 'friendly' relationships with the Druze of *Eretz Yisrael*, Ben-Tzvi offered their leading *ham'ayl* remedial assistance to restore their leadership status within the community. Such help was, in particular, forthcoming after

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[37] See "On Establishing Good Relations with the Druze", a report by Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi, August 1930. The Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem. File: 25/6638.
[38] In Lebanon, the political leadership of the community resided in the hands of two feuding families, namely the Junbalat and Arselan, who had a great deal of influence in Druze local and national affairs. Emir Majid Arselan was Member of the Lebanese Parliament. He was a national figure with considerable influence with respect to national matters. See Abu 'Imad (2009) for more information.

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the *ham'ayl* leadership status was undermined by the new *millet* system imposed by British authorities.[39] One of the best examples of Ben-Tzvi's efforts was when he mediated an agreement between Shaykh Salman Tarif (the Druze *al-qadi*) and British officials in a case concerning Al-Wahsh *Hamulah* of Mghar: In late April 1930, Shaykh Salman Tarif and the *mukhtar* (headman of the village) of Mghar, Hussin Al-Wahsh, addressed Ben-Tzvi to discuss the accusation made by the British authorities that his son was guilty of the murder of a British-Arab policeman, earlier that month. Ben-Tzvi, who was keen to consolidate the 'friendly' relationship with the Tarif, facilitated a meeting between Shaykh Salman and Al-Wahsh. The meeting took place in a hotel in Jerusalem and was financed by the Jewish Agency. It had the aim of ensuring that the British authorities release the *mukhar's* son (Parsons 2000, 21).

A few months later, in November 1930, after a disagreement between Druze and Jews in the village of al-Bqiʿah, Ben-Tzvi approached Shaykh Salman Tarif to broker reconciliation between the two communities (Firro 1999, 24). According to Faraj (2000), Shaykh Salman intervened and requested that the Druze of al-Bqiʿah, treat the Jews in their village according "to Druze principles and with all respect". It is noteworthy that, shortly after this incident, Ben-Tzvi and Shaykh Salman paid a visit to al-Bqiʿah, where they met with Druze local dignitaries.

By taking such steps, Ben-Tzvi tried to encourage the Tarif to perceive the Yishuv and its political leadership as a patron that could be engaged to consolidate their leadership status within their community. This support came at a time when the Tarif's community supremacy was being challenged. The main challenger was the Khayr *Hamulah*, whose leader opposed Shaykh Salman's, and his brother Amin's, endeavours to retain community supremacy for themselves following the death of their father, Shaykh Muhmmad, in 1928.

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[39] The use of 'friendly' is typical of Zionists and the way they romanticised their relationships with certain native groups, such as the Bedouin and the Caucasian. Penslar (2007, 95-96) claims this was just one of several tactics to justify and dominate.

Shaykh Salman successfully convinced the British authorities to appoint him as *al-qadi* and 'head of the Druze community'.   This heightened the Khayr's suspicion of the Tarif, who was seen as 'stealing' the community supremacy and running the DRC to serve to their own interests (Firro 1999, 23).

The Khayrs retaliated by mobilising an opposition camp from Druze *ham'ayl*. The Khayrs also demanded that their relative, Shaykh 'Abdallah Khayr, be appointed a member of the DRC, alongside the Tarifs.   This was to happen shortly after Shaykh 'Abdallah returned from Beirut: He was the first academic Druze, having completed his studies at the American University, in Lebanon (Faraj 2000, 77).   However, Shaykh 'Abdallah suggested fundamental changes as part of his plan for reorganising the community that would, at the time, damaged the Tarifs' position as a supreme *hamulah*. According to Firro (1999, 23), 'Abdallah was strongly influenced by Zionist organisations in Mandatory Palestine'. Indeed, in 1932 he had established the Druze Union, through which he aimed to concentrate Druze affairs in a Druze Council composed of members from different Druze villages, rather than from the Tarifs alone (Firro 1999, 23).[40]

Shaykh 'Abdallah's activities within the community drew the attention of the Yishuv's political leadership, including Ben-Tzvi, Eliahu Cohen and other officials from the JBAA. Consolidating relationships with Shaykh 'Abdallah was important because, as noted earlier, the Khayrs were considered to be one of the most powerful leading Druze *ham'ayl* within the community. Moreover, the Druze Union called for the withdrawal of Druze affairs from the remit of the SMC. This sparked the interest of the Yishuv's political leadership, since such a move would preserve the communal identity of the Palestinian-Druze and prevent Druze joining forces with Palestinian-Arabs in their anti-Yishuv campaign.[41]   According to Firro (1999), both Ben-Tzvi and Cohen met with Khayr, in Jerusalem, on several occasions during summer 1932. At the time,

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[40] Epstein (1939). The Zionist Archive. File: S25/3523.
[41] Eliahu Cohen, on his meetings with Druze Dignitaries, October 1932. The Zionist Archive. File: S25/6638.

Khayr was studying law and discussions centred on the political activity of Khayr's supporters within the community and their stance with regards to the conflict in Palestine.[42]

The Yishuv's political leadership's efforts to establish a 'friendly' relationship with the community went beyond the Tarifs and Khayrs *ham'ayl*. Indeed, the major concern of the Yishuv's leaders was that 'friendly' relationships with these two *ham'ayl* may not be sufficient to guarantee that Druze did not join forces with the Arab rebels. The reason for this concern was the fallout from the *ham'ayl*'s disagreement over community supremacy: This disagreement divided the community within each village into two main camps and, in April 1933, resulted in bloodshed during the *ziyarah* to Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb.

Early attempts to establish an extensive network of 'friendly' relationships were made by Ahron Chaim Cohen, an intelligence officer attached to the JBAA. He paid several visits to Druze villages in the Galilee and spent a large part of the summer of 1932 engaging with *mkhtatir* (plural of *mukhtar*) such as, Najib Mansur of ʿIsfya and ʾAhmad Hassun of Dalyah al-Karmil as well as with leaders of leading local *ham'ayl*, such as the Abu-Rukns on ʿIsfya and the Faraj of Ramh, in the Galilee. In Cohen's reports to his commanders at the Jewish Agency headquarters, Cohen made reference to the great 'appreciation' and 'respect' that leading local *ham'ayl* had for the emerging Yishuv in Palestine and for its political leadership. According to him:

> "Druze *ham'ayl* are keen to join a covenant with us…some of them think
> that the Jews control the world economy and politics …"[43]

The latter part of this statement is interesting because it shows how leading *ham'ayl* perceived the Yishuv's political leadership, namely as a loyal patron for preserving their political status in their own villages. By way of contrast to

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[42] Eliahu Cohen's Meeting with Shaykh ʿAbdallah Khyer, 17th April 1932. The Zionist Archive. File: S/25/6638.

[43] Ahron Cohen. The Zionist Archive, 1932. File: S25/3542. See also Firro (1999, 24) and Amranie (2010, 69).

the Tarifs and Khayrs, whose political ambitions were focused on community supremacy, the main struggle of other leading *ham'ayl* was with respect to leadership of their own villages. For instance, village leadership was the major concern for the two leading *ham'ayl* of 'Isfya, namely the Abu-Rukns and the Mansurs, and for the two leading *ham'ayl* of Dalyah al-Karmil (the Halabi) and Nasr al-Din) this struggle culminated in bloodshed within their village.[44]

To consolidate their status within their villages, heads of leading *ham'ayl* engaged with the Yishuv's political leadership on matters relating to their *ham'ayl* and their followers in the village. The diary of Shaykh Labib Abu Rukn refers to countless meetings with Yishuv's political leaders, as far a field as Tel-Aviv. During these meetings, he discussed matters that affected his relatives and acquaintances, particularly matters relating to *wastah* for work within one of the factories that belonged to Jewish owners. Most significant were the meetings between the Shaykh and Abba Hushi, the head of the Histadrut in Haifa (Figure 2.1), where the Shaykh requested that Druze youth from the Carmel be employed to work within one of the factories of the city of Haifa.[45]

As a result of the aforementioned support of leading *ham'ayl* by the Yishuv's political leadership during the early-1930s, most leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of silence during the 1936 Arab Revolt.[46] Indeed, there appears to be no historical documentation that indicates that the heads of leading *ham'ayl* were involved in the resistance against the Yishuv's establishment during the 1936 Arab Revolt. Nowhere was this politics of silence better expressed than in the *al-mukhtrah* of Mghar's response to a letter from Yusif Nahamni (the Jewish Agency official in Tiberius), in which Nahmani made enquiries about the Druze community's attitude towards the Arab rebellion against the Yishuv:

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[44] The Abu-Rukn Family Archive. 'Isfya.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] The Arab Revolt of Palestine began on 15th April 1936 following the death of two Jews (who were travelling between Nablus and Jerusalem) at the hands of a group of armed Arabs. For details on the 1936 Revolt, see Swedenburg (2003).

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> *To Mr Yusif Nahamni the respectful,[47]*
> *Mghar 10.10.1936*
>
>
> *Greetings.*
>
>
> *I received your orders. Your conscience can be clear since no Druze will forget your generosity, particularly the undersigned that is ready to fulfil all required duties...*
>
>
> *With all respect*
> *Al-Wahsh Hassan[48]*

Other leading *ham'ayl*, such as the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya (who had a strong economic exchange with emerging settlements around Haifa and Jezreel Valley), were ready to go even further. Their leaders attempted to dissuade Druze leaders from Syria and Lebanon from intervening in the Revolt. In September 1936, Shaykh Hassan Abu-Rukn travelled to the town of Kurak, in Transjordan, to meet Sultan Basha al-Atrash at his place of exile.[49] According to historians such as Firro (1999, 26) and Gellber (1995, 145), the Shaykhs agreed that the best solution for the Druze of *Eretz Yisrael* would be to maintain a 'neutral' stance towards the conflict. Shortly afterwards, Shaykh Hassan's cousin, Zayid, travelled to Lebanon. He passed through 35 Druze villages, where he attempted to convince villagers to turn down calls to join the Arab rebellion.

Summarising, Druze leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of silence during the 1936 Arab Revolt and refrained from joining other Palestinian-Arab rebels in attacking the Yishuv's interests. This political action was a response to the Yishuv leadership's support of the community's leading *ham'ayl,* between the

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[47] *Effendi* was a title of respect used during Ottoman Empire.
[48] Al-Wahsh Hassan to Yusif Nahamni, 10th October 1936. Israeli National Archive. File: Druze during the Yishuv.
[49] Sultan Basha al-Atrash and a group of Druze followers were exiled in Transjordan after the failure of their revolt against the Syrian Mandate, in 1927.

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1929 Riots and 1936 Arab Revolt. In addition to the Tarifs of Julis and the Khayr of Abu-Snan, other leading local *ham'ayl* perceived the Yishuv's leadership support as a political structure that would safeguard their leading status within the community, in general, and their villages, in particular.

Figure 2.1   Abba Hushi (on left) meeting with heads of Druze leading *ham'ayl* in the 1940s. Source: AHA.

2.5   'Friendly' Relationships and *Fallahin* Politics of Silence

Like their leading *ham'ayl,* the Druze *fallahin* (who, in the 1930s, accounted for the vast majority of Druze breadwinners) also resorted to a politics of silence during the 1936 Arab Revolt and refrained from harming the Yishuv's interests.[50] The main reason for the *fallahin* politics of silence was differences

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[50] Palestinian anthropologist, Nasser Abu Farha, argues that translating the name *al-fallah* as peasant is misleading since traditional European usage refers to someone who does not own land. Contrast this with the Palestinian *fallah* who owned the land and agricultural means. *Fallahin* were different from the *effendi*, the land-owning class, since they owned small holds, in many cases shared with other *fallahin* from the same village. Other academic works for Abu Farha include *the making of a human bomb* (2009).

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in the way that the emerging Yishuv perceived by them, as compared to many other Palestinian-Arabs who had chosen to join the rebellion: Unlike many Palestinian-Arabs who perceived the emerging Yishuv as a threat to either their survival as a cultural group or their enjoyment the natural resources of the country, many Druze *fallahin* did not develop anti-Yishuv feelings. On the contrary, many of them perceived it as a new structure of opportunity for their families' economic progress.[51]

Indeed, Israeli and Palestinian historians share the opinion that Jewish immigration to Palestine, during the 1920s and the 1930s, was a major reason for the 1936 Arab Revolt. According to Porath (1977, 39), over sixty-six thousand Jewish immigrants from Germany and Poland came to Palestine in 1935 alone. This mass migration was triggered by Polish anti-Semitism and the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany. Massive Jewish immigration of that time was perceived as a sizeable threat to the establishment of a Palestinian-Arab entity and resulted in many Arabs joining the Revolt.

In contrast to many Palestinian-Arabs in urban areas, the Druze of Palestine mainly lived in small villages on the mountains of the north of the country and did not have direct contact with Jewish immigrants. As a result of geographical separation, the Druze did not perceive Jewish immigrants as a threat to their existence. Indeed, the majority of the Jewish immigrants lived in cities, especially in Jerusalem, the coastal cities and Jaffa (Tzfadia 2008, 57 and Pappe 2004, 77). According to Yapp, more Jews than Arabs resided in towns, despite the Jewish population being less than a third of the size of the Arab population. At the time, only 12 per cent of Jewish immigrants lived outside urban areas, in the widely distributed *kibbutz* (Yapp 1996, 117-120). In the 1930s, the main Palestinian cities, such as Jerusalem and Jaffa, were still considered to be far from the Carmel and the Galilee, where most Druze villagers were settled during Mandatory Palestine.

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[51] According to Epstein (1939) the Druze community had 7,930 breadwinners, of whom 6,941 were agrarians producing mainly wheat, sesame and sorghum, 676 were fruit and vegetable farmers, 26 were foresters, 283 relied on rearing sheep, goats and cows, two relied on chickens, birds and bees, and two were fishermen and hunters. See also Faraj (2000,74).

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At that time, the land acquisition efforts of the Jewish Agency and other land organisations did not alarm Druze *fallahin* (see Map III). By way of contrast, many Palestinian-Arabs perceived land acquisition from Arab landowners as a threat to their national ambition to establish an Arab national entity within Palestine. The Yishuv's land expropriation efforts increased significantly during the early-1930s, largely to secure settlements for the thousands of Jewish immigrants flooding into Palestine at that time.   In fact, land acquisition was crucial for the construction of a substantial Jewish state in Palestine, motivating the Jewish Agency and land Zionist organisations to allocate the largest proportions of their budgets for the acquisition of Arab land (Pappe 2004, 205).[52]

Katz (1995) noted that Zionist land organisations that specialised in land acquisition invested in areas that immediately suited the housing and agricultural needs of new immigrants.[53] Druze land on the rocky Carmel and the Galilee Mountains did not meet these requirements.[54]   Indeed, the map published alongside the Peel Commission's conclusions, under the title 'Jewish Land Holding' from 1938, clearly indicates that Jewish land organisations did not possess land in the Galilee (i.e. where most Druze villages were located).[55]

Furthermore, Jewish-Zionist organisations, such as the National Fund, preferred to purchase land for so-called 'social return' rather than for 'economic return' (Katz 2005, 8). In other words, the preferred investment was in large areas of land that could be used for public benefit, such as to found agricultural training farms, *kibbutz* and *mushavim*. The Druze of Palestine lacked land for 'social return': Most of their land was from *mulk* (private ownership) of small plots that belonged to the Druze *fallahin*.[56] As Faraj (2000) noted, even Salih Khayr of Abu-Snan, who, at the time, owned the most

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[52] See Katz (2005) for more details on the numbers of *dunams* the Jewish-Zionist organisations purchase during the 1930s.
[53] According to Katz, this also explains why these organisations invested so heavily in purchasing land in the Coastal Plain of Palestine at that time (Katz 1995).
[54] According to Epstein (1939), in 1939 the Druze owned around 13,000 *dunams*.
[55] Jewish Land Holding. National Archive, London File: MFQ 1/465. A similar map can be found in Katz (2005, 25).
[56] *Ibid*. Epstein (1939).

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dunams in Western Galilee, was not mentioned in the report prepared for the Jewish Agency about Arab landowners in Palestine since 1920. Nor was he targeted for land acquisition (Faraj 2000, 71).[57]

Another reason why the Druze did not join the rebellion against the Yishuv's leadership was the perception of a lack of national identity among Druze *fallahin.* Indeed, Druze *fallahin* did not share the 'imagined community' of a Palestinian identity, as envisaged by educated Arabs in some cities. The 1936 Arab Revolt came after a protracted national debate between a number of Palestinian-Arab political forces, such as the SMC and the 'Istiqlal Party that were active in the 1920s and 1930s in major Palestinian cities, particularly in Jaffa, Nablus and Jerusalem. Leading historians report that these urban areas witnessed most of the debates relating to Zionist incursions and British colonial injustice towards the Arabs and that the debates were focused on the middle-class elite, traditional religious elite, and urban notables (Pappe 2004, 79; Yapp 1995; Robson 2011, 6).[58]

In the 1930s, Druze perceived Palestinian cities as being far from the Northern part of Palestine, where the Druze villages were situated.[59] Most Druze were not aware of the national debate or of the anti-Zionist campaign within political movements of the day. Nor were they familiar with the politics, as disseminated by Palestinian-Arab newspapers after the First World War.

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[57] For more information on JNF land deals with Arab absentee landlords during the 1920s and early-1930s, see Katz 2005 (Chapter 1 and 2) and Pappe 2004 (pp. 95-98). For more information about land tenure during Mandatory Palestine, see, Aumann 1976. *Land Ownership in Palestine, 1880-1948.*

[58] According to some historians, most Arabs that inhabited rural areas of Palestine at that time lacked a Palestinian national identity. For more on this, see Krebs (2006, 50), Pappe (1994) and Porath (1979, 49).

[59] Atashi (2001) claims that, up until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Druze of Palestine had strong connections with their coreligionists in Lebanon and Syria.

Map III   Land Ownership by Sub-Districts (1945).
The Map shows that, up until 1945, Jews owned around 3% of the land on the Galilee. Map prepared by the Institutions of Sub-Committee 2 of the Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question. Village Statistics, Palestine Government, Jerusalem 1945. Similar information can be found in Sami, Hadawi. 1957. *Land ownership in Palestine*. New York. See Also: Map of Jewish landholdings in Palestine. The National Archives, Surrey. Ref: MFQ 1047/764.

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Filastin of Jaffa, *al–Karmil* of Haifa and *Mir'at al-Sharq* of Jerusalem were newspapers that shaped the 'imagined community' of many Arabs in urban areas and spread anti-Zionist propaganda during the 1920s and 1930s. These publications did not reach rural areas, such as Druze villages.[60] In this respect, the education system in Palestine was another factor that influenced the national debate among the Palestinian-Arabs in urban areas. This was noted by the Peel Commission report that made specific reference to the development of the Palestinian education system and its importance for catalysing the nationalist spirit in the key cities (Porath 1977, 181).[61] The fact is that most Druze *fallahin* were illiterate and the remaining *fallahin* were poorly educated because of the British government's inadequate investment in the infrastructure of Druze villages, in general, and in education provision within these villages, in particular. The latter was best illustrated by a map entitled "Arab and Hebrew Schools in Palestine" that indicates the lack of state provision for education in the Galilee and in Druze villages.[62]

Based on this evidence, it could be argued that most Druze *fallahin* were not anti-Yishuv and, in contrast to many Palestinian-Arabs, did not perceive the Yishuv as a threat to their aspirations. On the contrary, many *fallahin* perceived the Jewish markets as opportunities for economic progress as they offered a new avenue for them to sell their agricultural products, such as grain, milk, wheat and eggs. Other Druze associated with agriculture, such as traders and mule drivers, also considered Jewish markets to be of benefit. Indeed, for the first time, Druze agriculture products could be traded outside of local confines and exported to the growing Jewish population, with its high levels of demand for food. According to my grandfather, Salah (who was a *fallah*), by the mid-1930s, many Druze *fallahin* were selling their agriculture products as

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[60] For more information about these newspapers and their role in constructing the Palestinian identity, see Khalidi (1997, Chapter 6).

[61] Notational-secular ideas were alien to most of the Druze of Palestine during the 1930s. Hence, it is not surprising that the 'Abdallah Khyer Union failed to gain any substantial support within the community.

[62] The National Archives, Surrey. Ref: CO 733/294/1.

far a field as the Jewish cities of Natanyya and Tel-Aviv or along the West Coast (see also Atashi 2001, 45 and Faraj 2000, 74).[63]

Epstein (1942) provided proof of the growing commercial exchange between Druze *fallahin* and Jewish markets. He noticed a change in the type of agricultural products that the Druze of Palestine began to produce to meet the demands of the growing Yishuv population. In his words:

> "Since 1931, changes have taken place in many villages, leading to an increase in the proportion [*of farmers*] engaged in growing vegetables, owing to the remunerative markets which large-scale Jewish immigration had provided".[64]

Other sources support these findings. For instance, the 1931 British census showed that the Druze of Palestine did not grow tobacco at all. A later report, by the Ministry of Minorities, was produced shortly after the Israeli state was established, in 1948, shows that many Druze families grew tobacco and sold it to the Dobek tobacco factory, in Haifa (Avivi 2007, 256; Atashi 2001, 46-49; Koren 1991, 24).

As part of the Yishuv's nation-state programme, industrial areas began to emerge. The industrial area around Haifa became a source of income for many Druze, especially those living in the nearby villages on the Carmel and Western Galilee (Faraj 2000, 70).[65] The tobacco manufacturer (Dobek), Solel Boneh — the cement manufacturer in Nsher — and the textile industry in Atta were some of the major recruiters of Druze workers from the region.[66] Moreover, the Ministry of Minorities' report of 1949 shows that a large number of the Druze of 'Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil worked outside their villages and were

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[63] My grandfather Salah from my father side was a *fallah* and less involved in public affairs than my maternal grandfather, Salih.

[64] Epstein. The Israel State Archives. File: FO 371/31347.

[65] Interview with Kais Firro. 24th October 2012. 'Isfya. According to Firro, dozens of Druze families arrived in the region after the failed 1927 Revolt. See also Faraj (2000, 70).

[66] Interview with Shaykh Khyer al-Din Nimr Halabi Dalyah al-Karmil, 24th October 2011.

registered with the Jewish Workers Organisation in Mandatory Palestine, *brit po´aley Yisrael* (The Workers Israeli Union), that belonged to the Histadrut.[67]

Gradually, Druze villagers began to frequent Jewish settlements for personal reasons, including to gain access to legal and health services and to meet with Jewish professionals (Figure 2.2).[68] Indeed, early Jewish immigrants had arrived from European countries and included highly skilled professionals such as doctors, opticians, orthopaedists and agricultural experts (Penslar 1991, 2007). Druze villagers began to attend the new health clinics in Haifa and, to a lesser extent, in other Jewish settlements in the region. These centres also attracted Druze from Syria and Lebanon. For instance, early negotiations between the Yishuv political leadership and Sultan Basha al-Atrash were conducted at the time that the Sultan's nephew was receiving medical treatment at the health resorts in Tiberias.[69]

Figure 2.2   Traditional agriculture during Mandatory Palestine as seen in Druze and Arab villages. Copyright: Photographer, Isam Telhami of 'Isfya.

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[67] Ministry of Minorities. "On Dalyah al-Karmil and 'Isfya." October 1948. The Israel State Archives. File: G297/80.

[68] *Ibid*. Shaykh Khyer al-Din.

[69] *Ibid*. Ahron Cohen Report. Report from 13th September, 1934.

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A clear statement of the economic and political benefits for both Druze leading *ham'ayl* and *fallahin* that derived from the emergence of the Yishuv in Palestine is found in a circular drafted for the Druze community by Yusif Nahamni, a prominent officer for the Jewish Agency, and Abba Hushi, the head of the Histadrut in Haifa. This circular was dated 26th July 1936 and came in the wake of the Arab Revolt.[70] In it, Nahamni addressed the Druze leading *ham'ayl* and *fallahin* with the following words:[71]

> "Dear Druze Shaykhs. You, the indigenous of the country, know that there is no truth in the Arab leaders' claim that the Jews are those who destroyed the country. ... Being our neighbours, you witness that we did not steal anything and we bought everything with our money.... It's due to the Jews that the country has developed and all its inhabitants benefit, regardless of their religious background. ... Notice the economic situation of neighbouring Syria and Lebanon where there are no Jews. ... Thousands of people moved to our country, where they could find income and rebuild their destroyed homes.... There is a special relationship between the Jews and the Druze, and myself and Ben-Tzvi did our best to help you when you were exposed to humiliation and accusation, and we are more than happy to do so in the future..."[72] (Parsons 2000, 27; Atashi 2001, 60).

To summarise, the majority of Druze *fallahin* followed their leading *ham'ayl* and resorted to a politics of silence during the 1936 Arab Revolt. This form of political action was adopted in response to the Yishuv political leadership's decision to avoid settling Jewish immigrants on the Druze land and to halt land acquisition from Druze landowners. By doing so the Yishuv prevented a situation that could have been perceived as a threat to Druze *fallahin* and/or to their livelihoods, as was the case for many of the Palestinian-Arabs who joined

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[70] See Gelber (1991) for more examples of the gestures made by the Yishuv's leadership to satisfy the needs of the Druze leadership.

[71] From the mid-1930s, Abba Hushi and Naḥamniyy became the most prominent officials in charge of Druze affairs, mainly because they lived in the North, near Druze villages, and, therefore, could meet with Druze *ham'ayl* to follow up developments (Gelber 1991).

[72] Letter to the Druze Shaykhs. The Zionist Archive. File: S 25/9165.

the Revolt. Section 2.6 examines how the absence of anti-Yishuv feelings influenced the political actions of Druze *fallahin* and their leading *ham'ayl* during the 1940s and the 1948 War.

2.6   The Yishuv as a Reliable Ally and Druze Politics of Silence during the 1948 War

The politics of silence adopted by leading *ham'ayl* and *fallahin* during the early stages of the Revolt was seen as an act of betrayal by some Arab rebels. These rebels used this perception of the Druze as justification for the collective punishment of the eleven thousand religious-conservative Druze resident in Mandatory Palestine during the Revolt.[73]   From the middle of 1938, Druze villages on the Carmel and in Western Galilee began to suffer at the hands of Arab rebels. On several occasions in November 1938, the village of 'Isfya was attacked by Yusif Abu-Durah's band and, as a result, several local villagers were killed. Those killed included Shaykh Hassan Abu-Rukn who, a few months earlier, had visited the Druze in Syria and Lebanon to dissuade them from supporting the Arab rebels in Palestine (Atashi 2011; Firro 1999).

On another occasion, *al-mukhar* of the village, Shaykh Najib Mansur, was publicly humiliated — alongside other local dignitaries: They were dragged towards the Arab village of 'Aum-Alzinat. Although Shaykh Najib survived the ordeal, other dignitaries did not. According to Atashi (2001), Abu Durah and his band forced the villagers to collect money and pay taxes as part of their contribution to the Revolt. Those who could not pay were crippled and those who could not join the rebels, were accused of treason and punished. On more than one occasion, the rebels gathered local villagers in the centre of the village to humiliate or beat them or to steal property or livestock (Atashi 2001).

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[73] The population numbers were taken from Eliahu Epstein: A Report about the Druze of Palestine as Part of their Transfer to *Jabal al-Druz*. 3rd May 1939. The Zionist Archive. File: S25/ 3523.

The attacks on Druze villages intensified after Hajj Amin al-Husayni escaped to Southern Lebanon and the British authorities gained control of the rebellions' centres in the major Palestinian cities. [74] The Higher Arab Committee of 1936 (HAC) leadership's efforts to control the situation failed and the revolt moved from urban to rural areas, specifically to areas around Nablus and the Galilee. Power now rested in the hands of local activists, who directed their attacks against government property, such as police stations, telegraph wires, bridges and Jewish settlements as well as against Muslim and Druze villagers who were seen to lack conviction for the Revolt (Yapp 1996 and Porath 1977, 181-85 and 233).[75]

Other villages on the Galilee suffered similarly aggressive attacks. For instance, in Kfur Smaiʿa, the rebels murdered Shaykh ʿAli Falah and, in the village of Kisra, they murdered Shaykh Najib Nasr al-Din and his son, Hamad. In the village of Abu-Snan, a few villagers were injured during attempts by Arab rebels to recruit their relatives to their cause. The villagers of Bayt-Jan were also attacked because they were suspected of providing shelter and refuge to Jews from the neighbouring town of Safad.[76]

Frustration intensified amongst the Druze following the murder of Shaykh Hassan Khanayfis and two other Shaykhs, near their village of Shafa-ʿAmir early in January 1939. These murders shocked the Druze communities in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. This was because Shaykh Hassan Khanayfis was head of one of the largest *hamulah* and Shaykh *ruhani* (spiritual). He was highly respected in the community. According to verbal history, Shaykh Hassan Khanayfis supported, and even financially contributed to, the rebel

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[74] In their petition to British District Commissioner (25th June 1939), Druze dignitaries from the Carmel claimed that they suffered twenty three attacks within a period of a few months (Shaykh Zidan ʿAtshah's private archive, ʾIsfya).

[75] Hajj Amin al-Husayni, escaped Palestine and fled to Lebanon in October 1937, where he was granted asylum by the French authorities.

[76] For extensive review on the rebel attacks on Druze villages, see Atashi (2001, Chapters 3 & 4).

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cause.   This only served to reinforce the belief that he was killed simply because he was a Druze Shaykh.[77]

Indeed, many of the Druze community in Palestine were convinced that Druze were being kidnapped and murdered by the rebels simply for being Druze rather than because of their politics of silence during the early days of the Revolt. This perception was reinforced by the rebels' indiscriminate attacks on Druze villages on the Carmel and those on the Galilee, attacks that took no account of the different economic backgrounds, leading *ham'ayl or al-fallah* within these villages*.* The anti-Druze perception is also supported by correspondence and petitions sent by Druze *mashaykh* to the Yishuv's leaders and to British officials that repeatedly drew attention to the rebel attacks against Druze properties and cultural-religious symbols.[78]

The heads of leading *ham'ayl* on the Carmel addressed the British authorities in Haifa. Their aim was to secure protection for their Druze villages. The authorities, however, were slow to respond to their request.   Ben-Tzvi reported that the local *ham'ayl* believed that the British government's reluctance to provide the necessary support stemmed from the priority given to the troubles around Jewish areas. Others within the community felt that the root cause for the lack of responsiveness on the part of the British authorities was the lack of Druze representation within the British government and within the civil service.[79]   Heads of the leading *ham'ayl* also formed a delegation of Druze dignitaries. This delegation visited Druze leaders in Lebanon and Syria and met with Zayid al-Atrash, in Syria, and Farid Zin al-Din, in Lebanon. The aim was to seek help in the struggle against the rebels. However, Atashi claims

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[77]According to Firro (1999), there is no documentation that shows that Shaykh Hassan Khanayfis was involved in Yishuv matters. Personal correspondence with his son, Yusif Khanayfis, confirmed the good relationships that his father enjoyed with Arab neighbours and the political leadership in Palestine. Interview with Shaykh Yusif Khanayfis, 18th October 2012, Shafa-'Amir.

[78] *Ibid.* Druze dignitaries petition to the British District Officer, 25th June 1939. In their petition, the dignitaries described how the rebels stole their livestock, damaged their property, insulted their women and burned rare Druze books. Shaykh Zidan Atshah's private archive, 'Isfya.

[79] Ben Tzvi to Moshe Sharett, 21st September 1936. The Central Zionist Archive. Copy available from The Druze Archive. File: Druze under British Mandate, University of Haifa.

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that these leaders provided little support because they were preoccupied with internal matters (2001, 74).

The heads of leading *ham'ayl* on the Carmel addressed the Yishuv's political leadership, namely Abba Hushi and Geura Zayd (a Haganah officer in Jezreel Valley). According to Gelber (1995), the Druze leading *ham'ayl* requested the assistance of the Yishuv leadership with defending Druze against the Arab rebels' attacks after they failed to enlist the help of their co-religionists in Lebanon and Syria.[80] In his diary, Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn of 'Isfya (Figure 2.3) wrote:

> "Shortly after we met with Abba Hushi, security procedures were arranged between the security patrol of the Jewish settlement of Yagour and the villagers of 'Isfya. ... Every day we met with their security patrol so we knew what was happening around [*meaning the Arab rebels' movements in the area*] and also to put in place security plans for the next few days.... Several Jewish leaders, such as Abba Hushi, were involved in these activities, and remained involved until the situation calmed down".[81]

Meanwhile, in Shafa-'Amir, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis (Figure 2.4), the son of Shaykh Hassan Khanayfis, returned home from Hasbaya, in Lebanon, where he was studying theology at Khlwat al-bayadah. He returned to avenge his father.[82] In his search for support, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis approached Abba Hushi, who agreed to provide him with the necessary weapons to exact his revenge. The Yishuv's political leadership was keen to provide the support needed by Druze leading *ham'ayl*, such as the Abu-Rukn and Khanayfis, to strike out against Arab rebels. This was because, unlike the Tarifs and Khyrs who approached the Yishuv's political leadership to gain the leadership's support in their struggle for community supremacy, these *ham'ayl* had approached them in order to take revenge on the Arab rebels. These

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[80] According to Atashi, Ben-Tzvi agreed to provide the squad of 'Isfya with twenty rifles (2001, 75).
[81] The Abu-Rukn family archive, 'Isfya.
[82] Interview with Shaykh Yusif Khanayfis, Shafa-'Amir, 18th October 2012.

retaliatory strikes eventually escalated the 'blood feud' and the antagonism between the Druze of Palestine and the surrounding Arab-Muslims.

The Yishuv's political leadership's support of leading *ham'ayl* from the Carmel and Shafa-'Amir also encouraged leading *ham'ayl* from the Galilee to engage with the Yishuv's political leaders during the 1940s. Indeed, many leading Druze were keen to exploit the Yishuv's political leadership's contacts within the British authorities and the leadership's economic power to improve their status within their villages and their own *ham'ayl*.[83] A prominent example was that of Shaykh Jabir M'adi of the village of Yarka, who, alongside his relative, Shaykh Sa'aid M'adi, competed against another leading *ham'ayl*, the Mulla, for their *hamulah*'s leadership and village supremacy. In his search for support, Shaykh Jabir contacted Abba Hushi. The two men agreed issues relating to security collaboration between the Yishuv's forces and Shaykh Jabir's *hamulah* around Yarka. [84]

Figure 2.3   Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn (1911-1989): Head of the Abu-Rukn *Hamulah* and MK between the years 1959-1961.

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[83] According to Morris (1989), in the 1940s, Arab villages and their hinterlands were dominated by one or two clans that made extensive use of social, economic and religious instruments to guarantee their control. See also Ghanem (2001, 16).

[84] On the struggle between the M'adis and the Mullas over village's leadership, see Avivi (2002, 175-176).

Importantly, the Yishuv's support of leading *ham'ayl* during and following the Revolt was perceived by *ham'ayl* leaders as recognition of their leading status within the community. The *ham'ayl* followers, on the other hand, saw Yishuv's support as endorsement of the right for Druze to live in peace as a cultural-religious group on their own land. From the latter's perspective, the emerging Yishuv became a formidable advocate for the principle of *hifiz al-baq'a* (the right for survival) as a cultural-religious community in Palestine.

Figure 2.4   Shaykh Salih Khanayfis (1913-2002): Head of the Khanayfis *Hamulah* and MK between the years 1951-1958.

Figure 2.5   Yehoshua Palmon (1913-1995): Leading intelligence officer in the Shai and Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs (1948-1956).

This perception is clear from events such as the heads of leading *ham'ayl* and their followers visiting the residence of Geura Zayd, the Yishuv's leader, in the neighbouring Jewish settlement of Kiryat Tivon:

In February 1940, a few months after the Arab Revolt ended, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis and Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn were accompanied by a group of over fifty villagers from their *ham'ayl* when they visited Zayd to pay their respects and give thanks for the support they received during the difficult period of the Revolt. A few days later, in a letter to Abba-Hushi, Shaykh Abu-Rukn wrote fondly of their visit:

"I saw the young Druze and Jews playing and dancing like brothers".[85]

This friendly relationship was welcomed by the Yishuv's political leadership, as it leant support to their strategy of keeping the Druze of Palestine out of the conflict. In line with this strategy, the Yishuv's leadership also increased the number of officials who were in direct contact with leading *ham'ayl* and who could provide them the necessary support. In addition to Abba Hushi, Geura Zayd and Yusif Nahmani — all of whom continued to be involved in Druze affairs throughout the 1940s — other senior officers from the Arab Department of the *Shai* (acronym *sherut Yed'ut*; pre-state secret service), such as Yehoshua Palmon (Figure 2.5), Mordecai Shakhevitch and Elias Sasson from the Arab Section of the Jewish Agency were involved in this capacity (Amranie 2010, 69). In the period before the 1948 War began, these officers were preoccupied with cultivating and consolidating 'friendly' relationships with the heads of leading *ham'ayl* and with their followers.

During this period, leading *ham'ayl* and their followers maintained their politics of silence with respect to the conflict in Palestine. Shortly before the war began, in October 1947, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, met with a Palestinian-Druze delegation and its chairman, Shaykh Najib Mansur — the *mukhtar* of 'Isfya — during the Arab League conference in Aley in Lebanon. He asked the

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[85] The Abu-Rukn family archive, 'Isfya.

delegation to publicly announce their struggle against the Jewish state. However, Shaykh Mansur and his delegation refused to do so once they returned to Palestine (Avivi 2007, 57).[86]

The most poignant example of the Druze leading *ham'ayl's* politics of silence was the agreement that Shaykh Salih Khanayfis reached with Yehoshua Palmon, the Shai officer during the initial period of the War. They agreed:

1. The Druze do not initiate or participate in attacks against the Jews.
2. The Jews do not initiate attacks against Druze.

Albeit that, in his reports to his commanders, Palmon emphasised that Shaykh Salih Khanayfis only represented the attitude of the Druze in his town of Shafa-'Amir (rather than the entire Druze community) the agreement is a very clear indication of the stance taken by most of the Druze of *Eretz Yisrael*.[87]

Indeed, between October 1947 and April 1948 (the start of the 1948 War), most of the Druze of Palestine maintained a politics of silence and did not participate in the clashes between the Yishuv and Arab forces. The Druze politics of silence was best exemplified by way they sheltered Palestinian-Arab refugees who had been forced to leave their villages because of the war and who were passing through Druze villages on the Carmel and the Galilee, *en route* to Northern and Southern Lebanon. Some of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reports indicate that the population of certain Druze villages doubled or even tripled, as a result of Palestinian-Arab migration. The two Druze villages on the Carmel, 'Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil, were particularly affected in this way.[88]

To conclude, the religious-conservative community, including its leading *ham'ayl* and *fallahin*, resorted to a politics of silence during the most critical period in historical Palestine — the 1948 War. As such, they refrained from

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[86] Pressure on the Druze, 11th November 1947. The Israel State Archives. File: 1/57/795.
[87] Yehoshua Palmon's Letter. The Central Zionist Archive. File: S 25/6638. 23.1.1948.
[88] Refugees on Druze Villages, 9.5.1950. The Israel State Archives. File: Ḥ3/20a/2402.

joining the ranks of Palestinian-Arabs and Arabs from neighbouring countries in their conflict with the Yishuv and struggle against the Yishuv's leadership establishing a Jewish national state in Palestine. The politics of silence was adopted because of the support that the Yishuv's leadership gave to leading *ham'ayl* and their followers during the sectarian bloody Palestine (between the Arab Revolt and the 1948 War). Leading *ham'ayl* and their followers alike perceived this support as recognition of their right to live in peace and as a religious-cultural community, on their own land.

2.7 Conclusion

The Yishuv's leadership was keen to keep Druze *ham'ayl* that resided in Mandatory Palestine out of the conflict over control of the country. To achieve this, the Yishuv leadership adopted a friendly policy towards the leading *ham'ayl*, which was manifested through offering them arrangements and supports that intended to consolidate their leading status within the community.

In response to Yishuv leadership policy, many leading *ham'ayl,* including the Tarifs of Julis, resorted to a politics of silence during the early stages of 1936 Arab Revolt. By so doing, they refrained from joining Palestinian-Arab rebels who were attacking the Yishuv's interests or Jewish settlers and their property. The leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of silence during the 1936 Arab Revolt because they perceived the Yishuv's leadership's policy as a structure of opportunity for maintaining their supremacy within the community and within their own villages.

Their followers from Druze *fallahin* also resorted to a politics of silence and refrained from joining Palestinian-Arab rebels in the Revolt. Most *fallahin* resorted to this form of political action because the Yishuv's leadership decided against settling Jewish immigrants in the Galilee and the Carmel and, therefore, halted land acquisition from Druze landowners. This manoeuvre by the

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Yishuv's leadership prevented a situation where the Yishuv was perceived as a threat to the Druze main source of income — from agriculture.

The majority of the religious-conservative community resident in Mandatory Palestine resorted to a politics of silence during the 1948 War and refrained from joining Palestinian-Arabs and Arabs from neighbouring countries in their rebellion against the Yishuv. This stemmed from the Yishuv's policy towards leading *ham'ayl* and their followers in the period between Arab Revolt and 1948 War, a policy that was perceived as the Yishuv's commitment to the right of the Druze community to live, without fear of harm, as a cultural and religious community, on its own land.

The Druze of Palestine resorting to a politics of silence during the struggle for controlling Mandatory Palestine is consistent with the arguments presented in Section 1.3. The argument therein was that an agreement between the political elite of two cultural groups can achieve a political stability between the two groups during a multi-ethnic conflict, providing the agreement protects the political elites' interests and ensures the group right for preservation. Indeed, most the Druze of Palestine resorted to a politics of silence and refrained harming the Yishuv's interests after their leading *ham'ayl* came to an agreement with Yishuv's leadership before the Arab Revolt. At the heart of this agreement were arrangements that safeguarded the leading *ham'ayl* supreme status within the community and within their own villages, as well as the Druze community's preservation in historical Palestine.

This agreement was obtained at a time when there was a power of balance between the Druze community and the Jewish Yishuv. The heads of leading *ham'ayl* struggled for their *hifiz al-baq'a* (community survival) on their land in the shadow of the conflict over the control of Palestine. The Yishuv's political leadership, on the other hand, struggled for the survival of the Zionist project in Palestine and to establish a homeland for the Jews in *Eretz Yisrael.* The nature of political action that the Druze resorted to after Israel was established

in the face of the unequal power between the Druze community and Jewish majority forms the focus of Chapter 3.

Chapter 3

Recognition and the Leading Druze *Ham'ayl's* Politics of Loyalty

"The friendship between the Druze community and the sons of Israel is not new: There is a family connection dating back to when Moses married Tzipora, the daughter of Jethro".[1]

— Shaykh Salman Tarif.[2]

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[1] In Hebrew, Jethro is the biblical name for Shuʿayb (in Arabic), who, according to the Old Testament, was father-in-law of Moses. See Maqam Al-Nabi Shuʿayb (Figure 3.1).

[2] Shitrit to Ben-Gurion. The Ministry of Minorities, 30th November 1948. The Israel State Archives. File: 302/78.

3.1 Introduction

Prior to 1948 and the establishment of the state of Israel, each year on the 25th of April the Druze made their annual *ziyarah* (pilgrimage) to the Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb. Although many Palestinian-Druze participated in this event, some did not and the pilgrimage was rather unremarkable. However, since the early-1950s, the pilgrimage to the Maqam has taken on a different meaning for the fourteen thousand and five hundred Druze that lived in the new sate.[3] As well as the traditional religious rituals and feasts that symbolised the Druze celebration of their holy day, the pilgrimage also evolved into an opportunity for the leading Druze *ham'ayl*, and many of their followers, to express their loyalties towards the new state, which was usually represented by government officials, the ruling party's (Mapai's) leaders and IDF officers (Figure 3.1).

Druze festival at the tomb of their prophet Jethro (Nebi Shu'eibi. (1968)

Figure 3.1   The annual *ziyarah* to the Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb (1968). Israeli officials and community leaders on the stage under the fluttering Israeli flags. Source: Ori Stendel: *The Minorities in Israel* (1973, 160).

This Chapter examines the relationship between the Israeli government's decisions to recognise the Druze community as an independent religious

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[3] For more information, see Table III.

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community after Israel was established, and the politics of loyalty adopted by leading Druze *ham'ayl* and many of their religious-conservative followers during the first three decades of the Israeli state. At the heart of this Chapter stands the claim that many of the leading Druze *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of loyalty because they perceived the government's decision as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their supreme status both within the state and within their own communities.   The leading Druze *ham'ayl*'s religious-conservative followers within the *mashaykh* also resorted to a politics of loyalty during this period. However, this politics was driven by the *mashaykh*'s perception that the Israeli government's decision was a new structure of opportunity for the preservation of their community as a distinctive cultural group on its own land.

The argument that a policy of accommodation can instil a politics of loyalty within subordinate cultural group was put forward in Section 1.4. Here this assertion is examined in greater depth.   It is proposed that subordinate cultural groups are likely to resort to a politics of loyalty if the arrangements applied as part of the state's policy of accommodation are perceived as arrangements that are intended to insure the supreme status of the group's political elite within the group and the self-preservation of the groups as a distinctive cultural group.

Section 3.2 describes the Israeli government's initial decision in relation to recognition of the Druze community as a *millet* even before the 1948 War ended. It shows how the community recognition as a *millet* complemented the Israeli security agencies' goals for the Arab minority in Israel and was consistent with the MFA's policy in relation to the neighbouring Arab countries. Most importantly, the Israeli government's decision to recognise the community as a *millet* helped the Tarifs of Julis to consolidate their status as a leading *hamulah*. This, arguably, encouraged the Tarifs to resort to a politics of loyalty, best expressed by their encouragement of Druze youth into service within IDF during the early-1950s.

Section 3.3 examines how recognition of the Druze community as a *millet* formed part of the overall goals the Mapai (the leading political party) had for the Arab minority, particularly for the Druze community. Such a move also suited the ambitions of other leading Druze *ham'ayl*, namely the Khanayfis of Shafa-ʻAmir, the Abu-Rukns of ʻIsfya and the Mʻadi of Yarka. It is asserted that, for these *ham'ayl*, Druze recognition as a *millet* was perceived as new structure of opportunity for consolidating their leading status within their community. This encouraged leading Druze *ham'ayl* to resort to a politics of loyalty. This loyalty was notably expressed through their support and encouragement of Druze youth service in the IDF during the 1950s.

Section 3.4 examines why the Tarifs and other leading Druze *ham'ayl* continued their struggle for recognition after the state recognised the Druze community as a *millet*. Therein, it is argued that the aforementioned struggle was due to the leading Druze *ham'ayl* competing with each other for recognition as the leading *hamulah* of the community. Ultimately, the Israeli government granted the Tarifs of Julis community supremacy, mainly because this *hamulah* was more aligned with the state's policy of accommodation for stability among the Arabs and the Druze communities than other leading *ham'ayl*.

Section 3.5, in contrast to the preceding Sections, examines why, during the 1950s and the 1960s, organisations founded by Druze intellectuals failed to propagate a politics of protest in relation to aspects of Druze recognition. It is demonstrated that the Israeli security agencies successfully limited the effectiveness of Druze intellectuals by preventing them from effecting changes in attitude within the community. The security agencies even took steps to eliminate the organisations. It is proposed that the security agencies reacted harshly to these organisations because they were seen to threaten the security agencies' efforts to achieve political stability amongst the Arab minority, in particular amongst the Druze community.

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Section 3.6 considers why leading local *ham'ayl* and religious *mashaykh* followed leading community *ham'ayl* rather than Druze intellectuals and why they supported the state's recognition of the community. It is shown that, similarly to the Tarifs, other leading local *ham'ayl* perceived community recognition as a new structure of opportunity for their economic, social and political progress. At the same time, religious *mashaykh* perceived recognition as a new structure of opportunity for the self-preservation of the community as a distinctive cultural and religious group. It is, therefore, unsurprising that leading local *ham'ayl* and religious *mashaykh* supported all decisions made by the Israeli government's that related to the recognition of the Druze community.

3.2   Community Recognition and the Tarifs' Politics of Loyalty

Shortly after the establishment of the state of Israel, the Tarifs of Julis renewed their efforts to have the Druze recognised as an independent community by the Israeli government. This is evidenced by the number of meetings and letters between Shaykh Amin Tarif (Figure 3.2), and some of his relatives, and Israeli officials shortly after the state of Israel was established.[4] One of the earliest meetings of this kind took place in January 1949, when Shaykh Amin met with Rabbi Y. Maimon Fishman, the Israeli Minister of Religions, at his office in Tel-Aviv.   They discussed the urgent need to recognise the Druze as an independent community in Israel. Shaykh Amin also submitted an official letter to Fishman on this matter and requested that it was presented to the Israeli government for approval.[5]

Shaykh Tarifs efforts were rewarded with the support of the first Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion (Figure 3.3), who expressed his willingness to provide the Druze community with a *millet* status before the end of the 1948 War. In one of his early meetings with Druze shaykhs, Ben-Gurion agreed to

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[4] For more on Tarifs meetings, see Avivi (2007, 165).

[5] A general report from the Muslim Affairs Officer in the North, 12th June 1949. The Israel State Archives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. File: Ḥ Z / 10/ 2567.

grant the Druze community the status of a *millet*, in accordance with the Ottoman *millet* system, in order that the Druze had complete autonomy over their religious affairs.[6] Ben-Gurion also met with the Minister of Minorities, Bechor Shitreet, and asked him to make the arrangements necessary to implement this agreement. In a report submitted by Shitreet, dated 30th November 1948, he wrote:

> "During my meeting with the Prime Minister at his office in Tel-Aviv, he emphasised the need to recognise the Druze community in Israel as *millet*.... This magnificent idea is so full of vision and anticipation for the future; I also think that we must encourage Druze recognition".[7]

Figure 3.2   Shaykh Amin Tarif (1898-1993). Shaykh Amin Tarif was the spiritual leader of the Druze community for more than forty years.

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[6] Ben-Gurion's Diary, 10th November 1948. IDF Archives, Tel-Aviv - Ramat-Gan. p. 807.
[7] Report on the Minister of Minorities visit to Druze villages. 30th November 1948. The Israel State Archives. Foreign Office File: KHT /8/2563.

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
Figure 3.3   David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973): The First Prime Minister of Israel

The decision to award the Druze community *millet* status entirely complemented the Israeli government's efforts to achieve political stability within the Arab minority.   This was evident from the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Arab Affairs' (IMCAA) recommended state policy in relation to this minority.[8]   Along with representatives from the General Security Service (GSS), the committee included representatives from the Prime Minister's Office (such as his Arab Advisor), the MFA, the Ministry of Minorities, and the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Religions.   In June 1949, the Committee presented its conclusions and made the following recommendation:

> "The Israeli government should encourage communal organisation along religious lines among the non-Jewish minorities in Israel".[9]

Community recognition was also congruent with the Israeli government's strategy for achieving post-1948 War diplomatic relationships with the Arab World and Islamic countries.   This was plainly evident in a letter sent by the Director of the Middle East Department at the MFA, Yaʿcov Shimʿoni, to the

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[8] Significant emphasis must be placed on the similarities between the IMCAA's recommendations with respect to the Arab minority in Israel and the British government's policy towards religious communities in Palestine. For more information, see Section (2.3).
[9] Report by the Prime Minister Advisor, Yehoshua Palmon, 9th June 1949. The Israel State Archives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. File: 'H'Z 23/2402.

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Islamic Department at the Ministry of Religions (IDMR), in October 1948, in which Shim'oni wrote:

> "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinks that it is wrong to deal with the Druze community through the same department that deals with the Muslim community in Israel… We believe that it would be appropriate either to set up a new department for the Druze, or to change the department's name so it includes both the Muslims and Druze".[10]

In early 1949, the following statement appeared in another letter written by Chaim Zaev Hirshberg — head of the IDMR — to government officials:

> "There are international reasons which require us to look after the Druze community's interests in Israel and to provide it with the required legal and jurisdictional authorities, similar to the status of their co-religionists in Syria and Lebanon".[11]

Thus, for officials such as Shim'oni and Hirshberg, Druze recognition as a *millet* was important for other components of the state's strategy for the region. This becomes increasingly evident once Hirshberg's report is read in the context of other government reports produced around that time, namely those that discussed the fate of Jewish communities and their properties in neighbouring Arab countries after the establishment of the state of Israel. In the early 1950s, the fate of some of these communities was unclear, particularly in Arab countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Morocco and Libya. Significantly, it was also unclear whether the governments of these countries would allow migrant Jews, heading for Israel, to leave with their possessions (Lustick 1980, 62 and 230).

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[10] A letter by Ya'cov Shim'oni 21st October 1948. The Israel State Archives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. File: Ḥ Z /8/2563.
[11] Semi-Annual Report: August 1948-June 1949, 31st January 1949. The Israel State Archives. The Ministry of Religions. File: JL/9/ 6334.

According to Lustick, Israel's treatment of the Arabs was seen by some MFA officials as giving the state a powerful advantage. The Israeli government's treatment of Israeli Arabs was contrasted with the harassment of Jews in Arab countries and the confiscation of the property from Jewish citizens leaving from these countries. In particular, the MFA used the Druze of Israel as an example how well religious communities were treated in Israel. According to Firro, from the early days of the state, Israeli media used the socio-economic improvement of the Druze community to emphasise how contented religious minorities were within the new state (Firro 1994, 24 and 44).

In June 1949, Hirshberg changed the name of the IDMR to the Department of Islamic and Druze Department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (IDDMR).[12] In collaboration with Yehoshua Palmon (the Prime Minister's Advisor of Arab Affairs), Hirshberg also submitted a report to Ben-Gurion. This report contained a recommendation that the community's religious leadership, namely Shaykh Amin, be granted the right to adjudicate on Druze marital affairs and jurisprudence and the right to manage community's *awqaf* and other communal institutions.[13]

Druze recognition as a *millet* enabled the Israeli government to provide Shaykh Amin Tarif with an official title of 'the head of the community' and to renew the authorities of his brother, Salman, as the *qadi*. As noted in Chapter 2, both of these offices had lost a great deal of their power after, under the SMC leadership of Mandatory Palestine, the Druze community became a minority within the Sunni-Muslim *millet*. Once the Druze gained recognition, Shaykh Salman was allowed to adjudicate on all marital and personal issues pertinent to the Druze community and was appointed the head of the 'Supervisory Committee'. In this capacity, he managed thirty Druze *madhuns* (marriage registrars) that the Ministry of Religions had appointed following the

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[12] A letter from the Department of Islamic and Druze Affairs, June 1949. The Israel State Archives. Ministry of Religion. File: JL/9/6334.
[13] A report by Yehoshua Palmon, 9th June 1949. The Israel State Archives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. File: Ḥ Z 23/2402.

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recognition of Druze as a *millet* and after the Muslim *Shariʿa* courts' powers to adjudicate on Druze martial matters were removed (Layish 1981).

Shaykh Amin's and Shaykh Salman's positions reinstated the unique social status of the Tarifs' *Hamulah* within the community. As head of the community (Shaykh Amin) and as the *qadi* (Shaykh Salman), these Shaykhs had a great deal of influence with regards religious matters that were central to the lives of those residents within the Israeli religious-conservative Druze community during the 1950s. According to Shaykh Qadmani of Yarka:

> "The majority of the Druze of Israel practised religious rituals and ceremonies during the 1950s, and a large number of them attended the *khilwah* on a regular basis. It was unusual to meet a Druze man without a *shawarb* (moustache) and without a *hatah* (white head-scarf). All women would wear *al-tanurah* (long dress) and *al-niqab* (woman's head-covering)".[14]

In light of this, it is not difficult to imagine the important roles that the head of the community and the *al-qadi* — as the two supreme religious men — played within the religious-conservative Druze community at that time.

Druze recognition as a *millet* consolidated the Tarif *Hamulah*'s financial status within the community. As head of the community, Shaykh Amin was entitled to a monthly salary from the Ministry of Religions. The average salary of a head of a religious community in Israel is fixed by Knesset law. It is the same as that of any judge who sits in the Israeli Supreme High Court. As an *al-qadi* in the *Shariʿa* court, Shaykh Salman was, similarly, entitled to a monthly salary from the Ministry of Justice. In fact, Shaykh Salman's salary dwarfed those of other members of the *Shariʿa* court and of members of the Supervisory Committee, of which Shaykh Hussin ʿAlyan of Shafa-ʿAmir and Shaykh ʿAbdallah Khayr of Abu-Snan were all members. Indeed, some members of the aforementioned Committee were unpaid members from Druze *madhuns* (Avivi 2007).

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[14] Interview with Shaykh ʿAli, Qadmani, the *ʿimam* of Yarka, 22nd August 2011, Yarka.

During the 1950s, Shaykh Amin Tarif and Shaykh Salman also held the most senior official positions in the community. This reinforced the Tarif *Hamulah*'s political status within the community, as the Tarif could exploit their authority as government officials to perform *wastah* (mediation) between Druze *ham'ayl* and Israeli officials. As will become clear, Mapai's leadership encouraged such relationships with Israeli officials as they consolidated Mapai's position as the state leadership. According to Shaykh Mwafaq Tarif — Shaykh Amin's grandson — his grandfather was visited each day by leaders of Druze *ham'ayl,* religious dignitaries and breadwinners seeking *wastah* to resolve a variety of disputes with the Israeli officials.[15]

Given the benefits conferred upon the Tarif *Hamulah* by the Israeli government, it was, perhaps, reasonable for the Tarif *Hamulah* to resort to politics of loyalty and encourage others in the community to follow suit. The best example of the Tarifs' politics of accommodation was the encouragement Shaykh Amin Tarif and Shaykh Salman of Druze youth to serve the IDF — the organisation that has always been identified with security and survival of the state of Israel in the fractious Middle East. In early September 1953, Shaykh Salman spoke to the media and publicly announced that he, his brother and their *hamulah* fully supported the state of Israel and its concerns for the state's safety, going on to say that they encouraged Druze youth to join the IDF in, what became publicly known as, 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B'.[16]

In summary, the Israeli government and its leader, David Ben-Gurion, decided to recognise the Druze of Israel as a *millet* before the end of 1948 War. This recognition complemented the security agency's efforts to achieve political stability among the Arab minority and its foreign policy in relation to the neighbouring Arab countries. The Tarifs of Julis supported Druze recognition, since they perceived it as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their supreme status as a leading *hamulah* of the community in Israel. Therefore, the Tarifs resorted to a politics of loyalty, encouraged Druze service

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[15] Interview with Shaykh Mwafaq Ṭarif. 17th July 2012. Julis.
[16] For more on 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B', see Section 4.3. See also 'Druze Community Leadership and Military Service', *Haaretz* Newspaper. 1st September 1972.

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in the IDF and, as described in Section 3.3, encouraged other leading *ham'ayl* to follow their example.

3.3   Community Recognition and Leading *Ham'ayl's* Politics of Loyalty

In addition to the Tarifs, other leading Druze *ham'ayl* (i.e. the Khanayfis of Shafa-ʿAmir, the Abu-Rukns of ʿIsfya and the Mʿadis of Yarka) welcomed the Israeli government's decision to recognise the community as a *millet.*[17]   As revealed in Chapter 2, these *ham'ayl* adopted a politics of silence during Mandatory Palestine and encouraged all Druze to adopt this stance during the 1948 War.   It comes as little surprise that the leaders of these *ham'ayl* attempted to exploit their allegiances to the victor of the war (namely the state of Israel) to justify their claims to the right to enjoy any and all economic, political and social benefits the Israeli government conferred upon the Druze community.

Indeed, because of community recognition by the Israeli government, the heads of leading *ham'ayl* (Shaykh Salih Khanayfis, Shaykh Jabir Mʿadi (Figure 3.4) and Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn) were seen as political leaders that represented a recognised and independent community. This put them on a par with leaders of other religious communities in the new state.[18]   This situation contrasts sharply with that of the heads of leading *ham'ayl* under the British Mandate, since the *ham'ayl* were subordinate to Hajj Amin al-Husayni and his SMC.[19]

The recognition of the Druze as a *millet* enabled the aforementioned Shaykhs to participate in elections to the Knesset, like other Arab leaders.[20]   Indeed, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis was a Member of the Second Knesset of 1951. He was

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[17] For more on the leading *ham'ayl*'s efforts to preserve politics of silence during Mandatory Palestine, see Sections 2.4 and 2.6.

[18] On the relationship between recognition and participation as peers in social and political life, see Frazer (2003, 29).

[19] For more on this, see Section 2.3

[20] More information on the Arabs, who joined the Knesset in the 1950s and 1960s, is available from www.knesset.gov.il (11th June 2015).

appointed to this position after securing a senior place on the Arab Development and Labour List (ADLL). The ADLL was created before the elections by the ruling-party, Mapai, for the benefit of the Arab religious communities. Similarly, Shaykh Jabir M'adi, the leader of the M'adis, was appointed to the Second Knesset, after he secured a place on Mapai's 'Democratic Arab List'[21] and Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn, the leader of the Abu-Rukns, was appointed to the Fourth Knesset (in 1958) once he was placed on the Mapai's Arab-List, the 'Co-operation and Brotherhood' — just before the elections.

Figure 3.4   Shaykh Jabir M'adi (1910-2009). Shaykh Jabir M'adi was a Member of Knesset for more than twenty years after the state's establishment.

The shaykhs' positions within the Knesset afforded their *ham'ayl* unique social status within the community: In the 1950s, membership of the Knesset was considered to be highly prestigious since this was the first time that Druze had been elected to a national assembly. Indeed, as described in Chapter 2, during the 1920s and early-1930s the Druze community had lacked representation within the Legislative Councils founded by the British government in Palestine.[22]   Hence, the positions of the three Shaykhs in the Knesset

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[21] *Ibid.*
[22] For more about Druze representation in these Legislative Councils, see Section 2.3.

consolidated the political status of their respective *ham'ayl* within the community. The three leaders had direct links with the state's political leadership and could voice the concerns of their followers better than anyone else. Most importantly, as members of the ruling Mapai party, the shaykhs could perform *wastah* (mediation) for members of other *ham'ayl* on a variety of matters. During an interview, Dahish M'adi, son of the late Shaykh Jabir M'adi, described how Druze dignitaries had once regularly approached his father's *diwan* (Figure 5.3) in Yarka:

"Druze individuals and families approached my father for help with different matters of their life, including water connection for their land, licenses for their weapons, and employment within one of the Israeli security apparatus".[23]

In the 1950s, being a Member of the Knesset commanded a sizeable monthly salary. In addition to this, a Knesset Member received benefits such free telecommunications, health insurance, pensions, parliamentary assistants and extensive budgets for their offices. Putting these benefits in context, the Arab town of Shafa-'Amir, Shaykh Salih's hometown, was considered one of the most developed Arab villages. However, until the early-1960s, Shafa-'Amir had only three telephones.[24] Hassan, Shaykh Salih's eldest son, remembered the villagers' excitement about his father's Oldsmobile car, because at that time, the most of them used donkeys and horses for transportation. More significantly, around 70% of the villages worked as *fallahin* (peasants), relying on a modest income from their land, with the remaining villagers performing unskilled and poorly paid jobs in nearby industrialised areas.[25]

Given this impressive list of benefits, it seems reasonable for the three leading *ham'ayl* to have adopted a politics of loyalty once the community gained the Israeli government's recognition. Moreover, their encouragement of others in the community to follow suit is predictable: Like the Tarifs, the leading

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[23] Interview with Dahish M'adi, 14th August 2011, Yarka.
[24] Interview with Hassan Khanayfis, 15th August 2011, Shafa-'Amir.
[25] On the Druze community economic situation during the 1950s, see Sofer (1998, 197), Avivi (2002, 25) and Falah (1983, 544).

ham'ayl's politics of loyalty was adopted by Shaykh Salih, Shaykh Labib and Shaykh Jabir who then encouraged Druze youth to join the 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B' of the IDF when the IDF authorities called for recruits, in the autumn of 1953.[26]

It is noteworthy that recognition of the Druze community and the appointment of Druze Shaykhs to Mapai's Arab-List suited the Mapai's leadership goals for the Arab minority. Mapai's leadership created the Arab-Lists as a way of mobilising Arab votes, whilst, at the same time, avoiding a situation where Arab and Druze representatives were able to participate as full members of the ruling-party (Cohen 1989).

To ensure the majority vote, the Mapai's leadership secured representatives from different cultural communities of the Israeli-Arab minority. For instance, the Democratic Arab list (that the Mapai presented before the elections to the Second Knesset in 1951) included a Sunni-Muslim (Saif al-Din Zuʿabi), a Druze (Shaykh Jabir Mʿadi) and a Catholic-Christian (Masʿad Kasis). These candidates represented different geographical regions and different religious communities: Saif al-Din Zuʿabi was from Nazareth and represented the Arabs of the Eastern part of the Galilee, Shaykh Jabir Mʿadi was from the village of Yarka and represented the Druze of the Western part in the Galilee and Masʿad Kasis was from the village of Mʿaliya and represented the Upper Northern part of the Galilee.[27]

The key point is that Mapai's political leadership organised its Arab-Lists according to the 'imagined community' used to characterise the Arab minority of the 1950s. As discussed in Chapter 2, when the state of Israel was established in 1948, most of the Druze who lived in Northern Palestine were loyal to their religious community and, to a lesser extent, their local *ham'ayl*. This reflected the stance of many rural Arabs who resided Mandatory

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[26] A top secret document about the situation within the Community, 3rd November 1953. The Israel State Archives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. File: 'H'Z /B/28/2402.

[27] Other Arab-Lists included representatives from the Bedouins living in the Naqab and Arabs that lived in the Triangle. For more information on Arab members of the Knesset's background, see www.knesett.gov.il (access date: 2nd March 2015).

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Palestine. As noted by Pappe (2004) and other historians, rural Palestinian communities, including that of the Druze, never developed a Palestinian national identity.[28]

To maximise votes from the Arab minority, Mapai organised its Arab-Lists to infiltrate the loyalties within this minority. This explains why Mapai's leadership and Ben-Gurion himself supported the idea of granting the Druze community recognition as a *millet* with independent status: Such a move meant that Druze political leaders were on a par with other religious community leaders and, as such, they could secure votes from within the community in favour of the Mapai (Avivi 2007).

Druze allocation in Mapai's Arab-Lists also served the party's ideology of *mamlkhtiyut* (statism) that inculcated the idea that the state was a supreme entity and its interests took priority over those of the party. Despite Ben-Gurion's and his party's support of this ideology, Arab candidates from non-Druze communities (rather than from the Druze community) were placed on the Arab-Lists. Such participation was perceived by certain government officials as being a security threat.[29] Placing Druze candidates on Mapai's Arab-lists, on the other hand, was the ideal solution, since such a move would not harm the party's *mamlkhtiyut* reputation among Jewish voters. This is because the Druze were generally perceived as a religious community that sided with the Israelis in the struggle over the control of Palestine, and had forged what many Israelis called *brit damim* with the Israelis (Benziman and Mansur 1992, 197 and Avivi 2007, 329).[30]

It should be emphasised that the Druze leading *ham'ayl's* participation in Mapai's Arab-Lists served the political interests of their 'patrons' in the Party's elite. As described in Chapter 2, in addition to Abba Hushi and Yusif Nahmni, other Shai and Haganah officers joined what became publicly known as the state's political *'Arabstim* (experts for Arab affairs). After Israel was

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[28] See Section 2.5.
[29] For more on *mamlkhtiyut*, see Levy (2008, 119).
[30] See Section 2.6.

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established, these officials were responsible for ensuring political stability amongst the Arabs and securing the largest portion of their vote to benefit the Mapai and its Arab-Lists (Cohen 1989).

Yehoshua Palmon, a Shai officer and Ben-Gurion's Advisor on Arab Affairs during early years of the state, supported Shaykh Salih Khanayfis' leadership and encouraged other Israeli officials to adopt a similar stance. The relationship between Shaykh Salih and Palmon was consolidated during the 1940s and the 1948 War. At the time, Palmon was in the Shai and in charge of Druze affairs.[31] Following the establishment of the state, in 1948, Palmon was appointed as Ben-Gurion's first Advisor on Arab Affairs and became the most powerful 'Arabist figure in relation to Arab and Druze affairs (Parsons 2000). All the time Palmon was in office, he held steadfastly to his believe that most Druze had resorted to politics of silence through the war because of Shaykh Khanayfis' efforts, including the Shaykh's persuasion of Shakib Wahab and his troops to refrain from attacking Jewish settlements.[32]

Palmon looked after the interests of his 'client', Shaykh Khanayfis, and ensured that he secured prominent positions within Mapai's Arab-Lists. Shaykh Khanayfis' list seized the vast majority of the Druze vote in the election to the Second Knesset (1951). This increased Palmon's prestige among the state's political elite. It is noteworthy that the relationship between Palmon and Khanayfis went beyond that of patron and client. According to Shaykh Yusif if Khanayfis, the youngest brother of Shaykh Salih:

> "Palmon [*referring to him as a friend of the family*] used to spend a great deal of time at the house of my brother ... he visited us regularly, usually at sunset, in his jeep after a long day touring between the Arab and Druze villages in the Galilee ... then we would sit to dine together, with him as one of the family members... ".[33]

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[31] See Section 2.6.
[32] Interview with Adi Palmon, Yehoshua's son, 20th October 2011, Kryat Tivon.
[33] Interview with Shaykh Yusif Khanayfis, 25th October 2011, Shafa-'Amir.

Similarly, Abba Hushi supported Shaykh Jabir Mʿadi's leadership whilst he was in office. Hushi also ensured that his 'client' was on one of Mapai's Arab-lists. As noted in Section 2.3, during Mandatory Palestine Abba Hushi was head of the Histadrut in Haifa and became strongly identified with emerging 'friendly' relationships with Druze leading *ham'ayl*. With the establishment of Israel, Abba Hushi became one of Ben-Gurion's allies and a prominent figure during the Mapai leadership.[34] Like Palmon, Abba Hushi believed that his client should be the Party's representative within the Druze community.

In summary, Druze recognition as a *millet* fitted well with the Mapai's political ambitions for the Arab minority, particularly for the Druze community. Druze community recognition enabled Party's leaders to add Druze leaders to the Party Arab-List and, in turn, to secure the largest portion of votes to their lists, without overly compromising the *mamlkhtiyut* principle*.* Most importantly, community recognition enabled leading *ham'ayl* to fulfil their economic, political and social ambitions, both within the community and at state level. The leading *ham'ayl*'s complete loyalty to the state was best expressed by their support of Druze youth service in the IDF.

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[34] *Ibid.* Interview with Dahish M'adi.

3.4   State's Recognition and Leading Ham'ayl*'s* Struggle for Politics of Loyalty

The Israeli government's 1949 decision to grant the Druze community *millet* status fell short of meeting the Tarifs' demands of the Israeli government. Indeed, the Tarifs continued to struggle for recognition even after the Israeli government granted the Druze community *millet* status. On 15th July 1951, Shaykh Amin met with Palmon (Ben-Gurion's advisor on Arab affairs) and asked him to expedite the recognition of the Druze as an independent community.[35] During a meeting that took place in November 1953, Shaykh Amin also met with Moshe Sharett, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at his office in Tel-Aviv, to discuss the issue of recognition. Shaykh Amin asked Sharett to accelerate the granting of the community's independent legal status (Sharett 1978, 119).[36]

Throughout the 1950s, the three other leading Druze *ham'ayl* also struggled for recognition by Israeli officials. Indeed, at the time that the Tarifs were in conference with Israeli officials, the heads of the other leading *ham'ayl* (namely Shaykh Salih, Shaykh Labib and Shaykh Jabir) were also trying to convince Israeli officials to recognise the independent status of the community. On 3rd November 1953, Shaykh Salih and Shaykh Labib met with Itzhak Ben-Tziv (Figure 3.5), the President of the state of Israel, and Zaev Hirshberg, the head of the IDDMR. The objective was to discuss Druze recognition and the procedures required to make further progress with this matter.[37] Shaykh Salih, this time with Shaykh Jabir, also met with Sharrett at his office on the 24th November 1953 to discuss this very issue (Sharett 1978, 191).

The struggle over what was ostensibly referred to as 'community recognition' was, in reality, a struggle for *hamulah* recognition. Each of the heads of leading *ham'ayl* struggled for recognition of his leadership and his supreme status. In

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[35] A letter by Palmon, 24th July 1951, The Israel State Archives. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. File: 'H'Z 29/2402.

[36] For more on the Tarif's meetings on this matter, see Avivi (2007, 165).

[37] Minutes of a Meeting, November 1953. The Israel State Archives. The President Office. File: N/2262/60.

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the words of Taylor (1984, 45), being recognised by 'others' is only one side of the coin; it is more important to ask who the 'others' are. The heads of the leading *ham'ayl* were aware that the only way to preserve their *hamulah*'s supremacy was to obtain the recognition of the Israeli government and this motivated their countless meetings with Israeli officials, even after recognition of the community as a *millet*.

Figure 3.5   Itzhak Ben-Tziv (1884-1963):
Yishuv's political leader and the second President of Israel.

The practical upshot was that each of the leading *ham'ayl* wanted the same recognition that the British government afforded Hajj Amin al-Husayni and his family during Mandatory Palestine.[38] To this end, leading *ham'ayl,* as part of their struggle, expressed their complete loyalty to the state of Israel prior to the Israeli government's community recognition. These *ham'ayl* also gave their full support to the Druze Military Conscription Law of 1956, which called for compulsory service of Druze youth to the IDF. Indeed, as well as Shaykh Mʿadi, who publicly encouraged the Israeli authorities to impose compulsory conscription on the Druze, Shaykh Salman supported Druze enlistment in the IDF. In January 1956, Shaykh Salman, sent a letter to the military governor of

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[38] For more on the Hajj Amin al-Husayni authorities during Mandatory Palestine, see Section 2.3.

the Galilee, Colonel Michael Michael, expressing the willingness of the Druze community to comply with conscription orders and to protect the state and its security.[39]

Furthermore, it was proposed that the 'Druze Husaynis ', the recognised Druze *hamulah,* would independently manage community religious institutions (courts, *awqaf,* schools etc.) and operate as the fundamental structure of Druze religious and political participation within the new state, much like Hajj Amin when they ran the SMC and other Islamic institutions (such as *Shari'a* courts and *awqaf*), during Mandatory Palestine.[40] In April 1957 (prior to the Israeli government's decision to grant the community official independent status), the demand for this type of recognition was clearly expressed in Shaykh Amin Tarifs' letter to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Shaykh Amin stipulated that any recognition of the Druze as an independent community must ensure that the religious leadership of the community remained in the hands of its current leader (referring to himself) and that the religious court and *awqaf* must be run by the 'head of the community' and Druze *al-qadi* (referring to himself and to his brother Salman). The Shaykh also emphasised that these leaders must be in regular contact with the religious leadership based in Hasbya, in Lebanon.[41]

Shaykh Amin's demands were supported by other leading *ham'ayl*, but they also divided the community into two camps. At the head of one camp stood the Tarifs of Julis, who were allies of Shaykh Jabir M'adi — a Member of the Knesset who lived in the neighbouring village of Yarka. The other camp was led by another Member of the Knesset, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis of Shafa-'Amir, who had forged allegiances with the Abu-Rukns from the neighbouring village of 'Isfya. The struggle over recognition divided the leading local *ham'ayl* in Druze villages between the two major camps. In 'Isfya, for example, the

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[39] A letter from Druze Judge to the military governor in the Galilee, 22nd January 1956. IDF Archives. File: 752/70/72.

[40] This was confirmed in Shaykh Amin's letter to Ben-Gurion shortly before the Israeli government decided to grant the community independent status. IDF Archives, 12 April 1957. File: 622/70/72.

[41] Shaykh Amin's letter, 12th April 1957. IDF Archives. File: 622/70/72.

hamulah of Mansur and its leader Shaykh Najib supported the Tarifs' camp, while their legendary rivals, the Abu-Rukns, were allies of Shaykh Salih Khanayfis.[42]

Despite the efforts of other *ham'ayl*, the Israeli government decided to formalise the recognition of the Tarifs' supremacy. On 15th April 1957, the Minister of Religions, Rabbi Moshe Shapira, invited Shaykh Amin Tarif and dignitaries from his camp to visit his office in Jerusalem. The two purposes of this visit were to mark the recognition of the Druze community as an independent community and to grant the Tarifs supremacy over the community. A few days later, on 25th April, the Minister attended the annual *ziyarah* to Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb. Here, he publicly announced the Israeli government's recognition of Shaykh Amin Tarif and his camp.   This announcement came after the Khanayfis camp voiced its opposition to the Tarifs supremacy and boycotted that year's *ziyarah* (Avivi 2007, 175 and Dana 2003, 93).

Subsequent to these events, Shaykh Amin Tarif held the highest ranking religious position and was granted the title *al-riasah al-ruhyiah* (spiritual leadership)[43], in much the same way that the British authorities had granted Hajj Amin al-Husayni the title of *al-muftial-'akbar* (grand *mufti*), in May 1921.[44] (Shaykh Amin also became the official representative of the community on state matters and the leader of the communities in Lebanon and Syria). All Druze *awqaf* (sacred trusts) — including the a*wqaf* at Maqam al-Nabi Sablan in Hurfesh and Maqam al-Nabi Khader in Kfur Yasif and the safe box of Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb — of the community were also placed under the care of the Tarifs. This was a significant source of income for the Tarifs, given the regular contributions Druze visitors made to *awqaf* during their visits to the *maqam* (holy shrine).   In addition to this income, the Tarifs received a Treasury budget to restore Druze holy places in the Galilee and the Carmel, in particular those located at Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb.

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[42] Interview with Shrif Abu-Rukns, Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn's son, 21st August 2011, ʿIsfya.
[43] For more about the recognition procedure, see Layish (1981).
[44] See Section 2.3.

It should be emphasised that the Israeli government's decision to award community leadership to the Tarifs' *Hamulah* was influenced by a number of developments: Firstly, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis lost his 'patron' within the Israeli government when, in mid-1956, Yehoshua Palmon resigned from his position as the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs. Palmon was replaced by Uri Lubrani, who, unlike Palmon, did not have an amicable relationship with Shaykh Salih and his *hamulah* and was less protective of Shaykh Salih Khanayfis' interests and allocation within Mapai's Arab-Lists.[45,46] At the same time, Abba Hushi, patron to the Tarifs and M'adis, gained political power in the Mapai. After his resignation from the Knesset, Hushi, with the support of Ben-Gurion, became the first Jewish Mayor of Haifa.[47] During the 1950s and 1960s Abba Hushi was partially responsible for the Israeli government's recognition of the Tarifs and for ensuring Shaykh Jabir M'adi's participation in all of Mapai's Arab-Lists.[48]

Significantly, the appointment of the Tarifs as a leading *hamulah* complemented the Israeli government's policy of accommodation for stability and the Inter-Ministerial Committee's recommendation that the Arab minority be arranged along religious lines. The appointment of the Tarifs ensured the preservation of the religious-communal identity of the Druze rather than the preservation of a Palestinian-Arab identity. Preserving religious-communal principles within the community was in the Tarifs' interests, since their legitimacy was intrinsically linked to their unique religious status within the Israeli-Druze community. In fact, this explains why, in addition to *al-riasah al-ruhyiah,* the Israeli government granted the Tarifs the power to manage all Druze communal institutions, including the *Shari'a* court and *maqamat*.[49]

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[45] Mapai's political leader did not grant Shaykh Khanayfis a place on its Arab-Lists and he was not elected as member of the Fourth Knesset of 1958.
[46] *Ibid.* Interview with Hassan Khanayfis.
[47] For more on Hushi's role within Mapai's leadership during the 1950s, see Cohen 1989.
[48] For more information about Abba Hushi, visit Abba Hushi's archive, The University of Haifa.
[49] Firro (2005) observed that, under the management of the Tarif, Druze communal institutions and holy sites (namely Maqam al-Al-Nabi Shu'ayb) were used intensively for consolidating a communal identity within the community.

To summarise, the leading Druze *ham'ayl* continued their struggle for recognition even after the Israeli government recognised the Druze community as a *millet*. This struggle was centred on their own desire for supremacy, as afforded by status of the community's leading *hamulah* in the new state. It is also why they continued to express state loyalty and strongly supported the Druze compulsory service in the IDF. More interesting, however, is the fact that the Israeli government decided to recognise the Tarifs of Julis as the community leaders to further its own efforts to achieve political stability among the Arabs, particularly the Druze contingent therein. This decision, as will soon become clear, annoyed some Druze intellectuals.

3.5   Community Recognition and Druze Intellectuals' Politics of Protest

The Israeli government's decision to recognise the community as a *millet* was opposed by some Druze intellectuals. The first group of intellectuals to object were the Druze Cultural Committee (DCC). Composed of twenty men, this Committee began to protest against some of the major aspects of Druze recognition during the 1950s. On 5th June 1955, the DCC convened in Acre to discuss issues such as why the Ministry of Education's had refused to recognise '*Aid Al-Fitr* as an official holiday in Druze schools.[50] Shortly afterwards, two of the founding members, Nadim al-Qasim of Ramh (Figure 3.6) and Amin Khyer of Dalyah al-Karmil, met with officials from the Arab Department at the Ministry of Education (ADME), with the aim of persuading officials to reconsider their decision and to recognise '*Aid Al-Fitr* as an official holiday in Druze schools (Firro 1999, 154).

The members of DCC opposed ADME's decision because they saw the Israeli government's policy for the Druze from a different perspective to that of the Tarifs and other leading *ham'ayl*: Tarifs and other leading *ham'ayl* perceived community recognition as a new structure of opportunity for economic, political and social progress for the community and for their *ham'ayl*.

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[50] An important religious holiday celebrated by all Muslims. It marks the end of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting.

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Members of the DCC, however, perceived community recognition as part of the Israeli government's policy of accommodation for stability, which was primarily concerned with achieving political stability within the Arab minority rather than achieving equality between Jews and Druze.

Figure 3.6   Nadim al-Qasim (1931-2013):
Leader of the DCC and opponent of Israeli government's policy for the Druze community.

From the DCC's perspective, ADME's refusal to reinstate the '*Aid Al-Fitr* was tactical.   The aim was to erase elements of culture shared by the Druze community and other Palestinian-Arabs in Israel.[51] In line with this aim, the IMCAA divide the Arab minority into religious communities, predominantly to prevent the formation of a united Palestinian-Arab identity that, through collaborative efforts, might threaten the state's political stability. Against this backdrop, the DCC wanted the Druze community to regard itself as part of the Palestinian-Arab minority rather than as a distinctive religious community.

The DCC's concerns about the Israeli government's motives for granting community recognition were soon confirmed. The Israeli government pushed for the measures to be implemented, despite their significant shortcomings in relation to important areas of Druze life. As discussed in Chapter 5, up until the mid-1960s, Druze villages lacked any infrastructure development and most

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[51] Interview with Salman Falah, head of the Druze Department at the Ministry of Education (DDME); 1975-1988). 22nd September 2011, Haifa.

Druze villages lacked the most basic public services whilst their Jewish neighbours enjoyed excellent services and infrastructure. According to Atashi (2001, 150), nine out of the thirteen Druze villages in Israel were deprived of clean water and electricity and other villages, such as Kisra, Kfur Smai'a and Yanuh, were isolated because of their lack of access roads.

The DCC's concerns were also confirmed by the security apparatus' reaction to their activities. The DCC opposed the Inter-Ministerial Committee's recommendations and defied the security apparatus in charge of implementing these recommendations among the Arabs.[52] Without hesitation, the security agencies turned to security laws that allowed the movements of activists to be restricted to within the military rule territory. These laws included Article 109 (re: Police supervision), Article 110 (re: Administrative detention) and Article 125 (re: Closed areas and travel permits).[53] Indeed, the security agencies' reaction was to use the aforementioned provisions to eliminate the DCC's activities within the community. This involved placing some activists under house arrest and removing activists, including al-Qasim and three other teachers, from their positions within the ADME. Hence, the security agencies were largely responsible for the failure of the DCC to make a significant difference to the details of Druze recognition.

Al-Qasim, who was one of the prominent activists in the DCC, joined the newly formed the CDI whose members included Hamid Khalil Sa'ab of Abu-Snan and Faris Falah from the village of Kfur Smai'a, as well as a group of graduate students and intellectuals.[54] Like the DCC, members of the CDI believed that the Israeli government's major goal was to achieve political stability rather than to nurture equality between Jews and Druze citizens of Israel. The CDI held its inaugural meeting on 28th May 1961, in the city of Acre. During this

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[52] For a good review about the different government apparatus that implemented the Israeli government's policy amongst the Arab minority, see Avivi (2007, Chapter 2).

[53] For more on the military government's orders and restrictions, see Jiryis (1976, 9).

[54] Sa'ab became the first Druze general practitioner after completing his medicine degree at the University of Jerusalem. Falah became the first Druze legal advocate after completing his law degree at this University.

meeting, its members protested against the Israeli government's policy of handling *qadiya ta'fiyah* (community affairs).

By the early-1960s, the removal of *'Aid Al-Fitr* holidays was just one of many aspects of Druze recognition that Druze intellectuals objected to. The CDI also opposed the Israeli government's decision to give supreme control of community matters to the Tarifs (see Section 3.4 and Avivi 2007). In fact, the CDI demanded that an independent elected council be established to manage their community's affairs in place of the Tarifs and heads of other leading *ham'ayl*. The aim was to elect intellectuals and graduates to the council who were better able to assess the Israeli government's agenda and policies in relation to the community than the elderly, uneducated Shaykhs that composed the leading *ham'ayl*.[55] This council's proposed role was identical to that of the Druze Council, which 'Abdallah Khayr of Abu-Snan had attempted to establish during Mandatory Palestine.[56]

The Council's proposals were rejected by the Israeli security apparatus, since community recognition was primarily granted to achieve political stability. From the security apparatus' perspective, political stability was best achieved by implementing the Inter-Ministerial Committee's recommendations and consolidating religious identities among the Arabs and the Druze. Whilst the Tarifs expressed their loyalty to the state, it was appropriate that they managed all community institutions. After all, the Tarifs were most closely associated with the distinguished religious affiliates in the community.

Indeed, the Israeli security agencies' real objectives were best demonstrated by their support of the Tarifs during their struggle against leading *ham'ayl* and intellectuals who opposed the renewal of Shaykh Salman Tarifs appointment as a Druze *qadi*: In July 1963, the Regional Committee met to authorise the appointment of four Druze judges to the Druze *Shari'a* court. The meeting was conducted in the shadow of strong resistance from the heads of leading

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[55] Interview with Nadim al-Qasim, 6th June 1961. Avivi (2007, 315).
[56] For more on the Druze Council, see Section 2.4.

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ham'ayl and intellectuals.   The latter opposed the appointment of Shaykh Salman as a Druze *qadi* on the basis of his age: Shaykh Salman was over seventy years old, the legal age of retirement.   However, despite this opposition and questionable legality, the Regional Committee confirmed Shaykh Salman's appointment to ensure the leadership of the Tarifs (Avivi 2007, 203).

It should be mentioned that Mapai leaders, like the Israeli security agencies, supported the idea of placing all *qadiya ta'fiyah* (community affairs) in the hands of leading *ham'ayl*.   Indeed, the main concern for the Party's elite was the preservation of the state's leadership.   For this reason they continued to support leading *ham'ayl* and appointed their members to all official-communal positions relating to community recognition.   In return for these appointments, the Mapai relied on leading *ham'ayl* to secure the largest portion of votes to Mapai's Arab-Lists during elections, thus securing Mapai's leadership.   In fact, there is little doubt that the efforts of the leading *ham'ayl* were directly responsible for Mapai's Arab-Lists securing over ninety percent of the vote in some Druze villages during elections in the 1950s and 1960s.

To summarise, contrary to the claims of some leading *ham'ayl*, there were Druze intellectuals who believed that the Israeli government granted the Community official recognition with the primary goal of maintaining the state's political stability, rather than to achieve equality between Druze and Jews. This belief motivated Druze intellectuals to attempt to change certain elements of community recognition. This belief also often resulted in them resorting to a politics of protest.   However, their political actions had limited impact as the security agencies acted to thwart their activities, particularly those that threatened the security agencies' efforts to achieve political stability among the Druze and Arabs, in general.   Section 3.6 considers the reasons why leading local *ham'ayl* and religious *mashaykh* refrained from supporting the Druze intellectuals and, instead, continued to support state's community recognition.

3.6 Community Recognition and Leading Local *Ham'ayl* and Religious *Mashaykh* Politics of Loyalty

The failure of Druze intellectual organisations to influence the community recognition issue cannot be solely attributed to the Israeli security agencies' actions against them. In the 1950s and 1960s, most Druze were poorly educated and, consequently, there were few Druze intellectuals in the Druze community. This was another significant reason for the Druze intellectuals' lack of influence. In fact, although more Druze youth attended University after establishment of the state than ever before, the number of intellectuals was vanishing small compared to the vast numbers of Druze who lacked even the most basic levels of education.[57] According to Falah (2000), only eleven Druze youth had attended University up until 1966 and only twenty teachers held formal teaching qualifications and were certified by ADME.[58] A simple calculation reveals that each of the sixteen Druze villages had, on average, three or four local students and teachers. It is, therefore, no surprise that this rather small contingent of Druze intellectuals failed to have any significant impact on community recognition or on the Israeli government's policy for the community.[59]

Another factor that curbed the influence of Druze intellectuals was the strong opposition of the leading *ham'ayl*. The Tarifs, in particular, perceived the DCC and CDI as threats to their own economic, social and political progress or, in other words, everything they had gained because of the community's recognition (Avivi 2007): As discussed in Section 3.2, the Tarifs had gained the lion's share of community recognition and controlled all the community's official institutions. The Druze intellectuals and their organisations called for community councils to be established. These councils would be the state representatives of all Druze villages. Hence, the councils would have weakened the Tarifs' institutional control and, ultimately, eroded their

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[57] Until the establishment of the state of Israel, 'Abdallah Khayr of Abu-Snan was the only Druze graduate. See more about Khayr in Section 2.4.

[58] Other teachers were appointed by ADME solely on the basis of high school graduate certificates.

[59] For more on Druze education during the 1950s and 1960s, see Falah (2000).

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supremacy. According to Ori Lubraniyy, the Prime Minister's Advisor of Arab Affairs between 1956 and 1964, Shaykh Amin went as far as to request that the Israeli government refuse to recognise or collaborate with the CDI, in order to prevent this from happening.[60]

Other leading *ham'ayl* also opposed the activities of Druze intellectual organisations.   These *ham'ayl* perceived such organisations as threats to the unique social status they had enjoyed since the Israeli government recognised the Druze community as a *millet*.   Indeed, official community recognition meant that new government-communal positions (such as judges and registrars) could be created. Those appointed to these positions were from leading local *ham'ayl*, affording the latter unique social and economic status as well as a political benefits. For example, the status of the ʿAlyan *Hamulah* of Shafa-ʿAmir was dramatically improved when its leader was appointed as a *qadi in Shariʿa* court. This was a highly influential position, so much so that it was rare to attend a public event at which Shaykh Hussin ʿAlyan was not present.

Furthermore, all government-communal positions that were created as part and parcel of the recognition package were filled by dignitaries from leading local *ham'ayl* within Druze villages. For example, in May 1959, the IDDMR appointed a Sacred Trust Committee (STC), the three members of which were responsible for regulating Druze donations to sacred trusts and for authorising land wills. The members of the STC were Shaykh Salman Tarif and Shaykh Kamal Mʿadi of Yarka (a close relative of Shaykh Jabir Mʿadi) and Shaykh Hussin ʿAlayan (a close relative and friend of Shaykh Salih Khanayfis). Similarly, all the positions within the DRC and *Shariʿa* court were filled by representatives of Druze leading *ham'ayl*, such as the Tarifs of Julis, the Mʿadis of Yarka and the Abu-Rukns of ʿIsfya.[61]

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[60] Minutes of a meeting between Lubraniyy and Shaykh Amin, 9th April 1962. IDF Archives. File: 141/70/72.

[61] For more on communal official positions and specific officials appointed to these posts, see Avivi (2007, 201) and Leyish (1981).

As well as social status, such positions afforded the *ham'ayl* and their leader's special political status within the community. Similarly to Druze members of Knesset, being 'officers' within one of the official communal institutions enabled the heads of leading local *ham'ayl* to use their authority and perform *wastah (*mediation) between Druze villagers and Druze or Israeli officials. During an interview, Naif ʿAlyan, Shaykh Hussin's son, recalled how villagers, from every Druze village, addressed his father and asked for his assistance with many different matters.[62]

Official communal positions also provided leading *ham'ayl* with economic benefits otherwise reserved for the Tarifs and Druze members of Knesset: As a Druze *al-qadi,* Shaykh Hussin ʿAlyan received a monthly salary from the Ministry of Religions. He also benefited from free landline use and free access to security zones, areas which were off limits for other Arabs under the military rule.[63] According to his son, Naif, he routinely made donations to benefit orphans and impoverished families within the community.

Given these benefits and privileges, it comes as no surprise that Druze leading *ham'ayl* supported the Israeli government's recognition of the community and refrained from siding with Druze intellectuals. On the contrary, most leading *ham'ayl* expressed their support of Israeli government's policy for the community, including compulsory service of Druze youth in the IDF. Figure 3.7 shows these allegiances clearly: In it, Shaykh Amin Tarif and the heads of leading *ham'ayl* and Druze *Shariʿa* court *qadah* (plural of *al-qadi*) are marching between Druze soldiers from the Minorities Unit, at the court of Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, during early 1962.

Community recognition was also supported by many religious-conservative *mashaykh.* As indicated, in Section 3.1, during the 1950s and 1960s, the most of the Druze in each of their sixteen villages were *mashaykh*, who practised Druze rituals and religious duties, such as attending the *khilwah* regularly.[64]

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[62] Interview with Naif ʿAlyan, 24th August 2011, Shafa-ʿAmir.
[63] For more information about Druze under military rule, see Section 6.6.
[64] *Ibid.* Interview with Shaykh ʿAli Qadmani.

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Such devotion to the Druze religion was rewarded by the title of 'Shaykh', regardless of the position held by an individual within the community. In fact, practically every elderly Druze followed *al-tawhid* religion or, at very least, the major traditional principles of the Druze community, otherwise he would have been considered an outsider.

Figure 3.7   Druze religious leadership marching between Druze soldiers from the Minorities Unit. The scene depicts the court of Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, during early 1962.

Many Druze *mashaykh* and their *'amah* (plural for welcomed the Israeli government's recognition of their community because they believed it to be a remedy for their community's subordinate cultural status. The Druze *mashaykh* believed that community recognition was the first step towards remedying the historical injustice they had suffered during Mandatory Palestine: As described in Section 2.3, many Palestinian-Druze perceived the British authorities' refusal to recognise the Druze community as an independent community, and the subsequent classification of the Druze as a marginal minority within the Sunni-Muslim *millet*, as a threat to the survival of their community as a religious-cultural group. As noted also, the Druze *mashaykh*'s frustration increased when their communal religious affairs became the responsibility of the SMC and its leader, Amin al-Husayni.

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Interestingly, it was the same aspects of community recognition that concerned some Druze intellectuals that were welcomed as cultural remedies by Druze *mashaykh*. For example, the appointment of Shaykh Amin Tarif as a religious leader of the community erased memories of SMC and Hajj Amin al-Husayni's hegemony over Druze affairs. At the same time, the newly established Druze *Shariʿa* court and Druze *qadah* made significant strides towards removing Druze from the remit of the Islamic-*Shariʿa* courts and their judicial decisions founded on *Shariʿa*. Even the ADME's decision not to recognise ʿ*Aid Al-Fitr* as an official holiday was welcomed by Druze *mashaykh* and some of them went that far to claim that the Druze of Palestine celebrated the ʿ*Aid* as part of their *taqiyah* (religious dissimulation), to satisfy the surrounded Sunni-Muslim majority and to prevent religious persecution of the Druze.[65] The *mashaykh* insisted that community recognition allowed the now independent Druze community to follow its true religious principles once more (Avivi 2007, 313).

To summarise, Druze intellectuals had insufficient influence with the Israeli government and failed to draw adequate support for their challenge of specific aspects of community recognition. Besides being composed of small groups in Druze villages, their activities were opposed by the Tarifs and by leading local *hamʾayl*, who perceived the actions of intellectual organisations as threats to the economic, social and political progress that they have made since the Israeli government's had decided to grant the community a status of an independent religious community. The intellectuals were also opposed by Druze *mashaykh*, who perceived community recognition as a remedy for the subordination that the Druze community had suffered during Mandatory Palestine and as a new structure of opportunity for preserving the community as a religious and cultural group on its own land.

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[65] See article "Druze and ʿ*Aid Al-Fitr* by Fayz ʿAzam, Al-Fajer, issue (30) 2015.

3.7   Conclusion

As part of its strategy to achieve political stability amongst the Arab minority, the Israeli government applied a policy of accommodation to the Druze community after the Israeli state was established. This policy was implemented when the Israeli government decided to grant the Druze community *millet* status and, in 1957, status of an independent religious community. These events placed the Druze on an equal footing with other Israeli Arab religious communities (namely the Christians and the Sunni-Muslims) in the new state of Israel.

The Israeli government's decision to recognise the Druze as an independent religious community was welcomed by the Tarifs of Julis who perceived this decision as a remedy to the subordination they had suffered during Mandatory Palestine and as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their leading status within the community. Indeed, community recognition improved the economic, social and political status of the Tarifs as a leading *hamulah* of the Israeli-Druze community. The Tarifs, in turn, encouraged Druze military service in the IDF.

In addition to the Tarifs of Julis, the Khanayfis of Shafa-'Amir, the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya and the M'adis of Yarka welcomed community recognition. Like the Tarifs, these leading *ham'ayl,* perceived recognition as a remedy for their subordinate status during Mandatory Palestine and as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their leading status within the community. Leading *ham'ayl* were appointed to almost all of the newly created positions associated with community recognition, such as *qadah* at the *Shari'a* court and *'imah* (plural of *'imam*) at Druze *khlwat*. These positions fundamentally improved the economic, social and political status of the leading Druze *ham'ayl* within the community. This explains why leading *ham'ayl* supported the Israeli government's policy for their community and encouraged Druze youth service in the IDF.

In contrast to leading Druze *ham'ayl,* some Druze intellectuals opposed community recognition: They perceived recognition it as an attempt to ensure political stability among the Arab minority, particularly within the Druze community, rather than an attempt to achieve equality between the Druze community and the Jewish majority. However, Druze intellectuals failed to rally substantial support from the Druze community because, like leading *ham'ayl*, the Israeli security agencies were keen to ensure recognition of the Druze community.

The Israeli government's decision was welcomed by most of the Druze community from the religious-conservative *mashaykh.* The latter perceived the Israeli government's decision and the arrangements for recognition as a remedy for the cultural subordination that their community had suffered during Mandatory Palestine and a way to preserve the community as a cultural religious community in the new state.

The political action of Druze leading *ham'ayl* and most *mashaykh* in the new state of Israel indicate the dynamic between a policy of accommodation and a subordinate group's resort to politics of loyalty in a polarised society. In Section 1.2, it was proposed that a subordinate group will resort to a politics of loyalty if a policy involves arrangements that it perceives as a new structure of opportunity that maintaining the leading status of the group's political elite and that preserve the group as a distinctive cultural group: Indeed, Druze community recognition was regarded in this way by both the leading *ham'ayl* and the religious-conservative *mashaykh* after establishment of Israel. However, the reason why most Druze *fallahin* also resorted to a politics of loyalty during the first three decades of Israel is examined in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4

Military Service and Druze *Fallahin*

Politics of Loyalty

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"The Druze youth service in the Israeli Defence Forces is as important as practising the Druze faith…"

— Shaykh Amin Tarif.[1]

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[1] Minutes of a meeting between Shaykh Amin Tarif and the President of the state of Israel, Itzhak Ben-Tzvi. 11th July 1956. The Israel State Archives. The President's Office. File: N/2262/60.

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4.1 Introduction

Since 1948, Israeli-Jews have celebrated Independence Day and the establishment of the state of Israel on the 15th of May of each year. Thousands of Jews visit national parks, holiday resorts and other destinations to express their joy in *Yom H'atzmaut* (Hebrew for celebration of the proclamation of the state of Israel). These celebrations peaked during the first *Yom H'atzmaut* that took place in 1968, after the Six Days War. That year, there were spectacular IDF military parades to mark *Yom H'atzmaut* and the state's victory (after months of anxiety) over its neighbouring Arab countries during the Six Days War.[2]

Like many Israeli-Jews, a large number of Israeli-Druze celebrated *Yom H'atzmaut* in the early years of the state of Israel. Druze families from different villages organised large parties and feasts or visited national parks as far flung as the Sea of Galilee.[3] To many Israeli-Druze, these celebrations marked the Independence Day of 1968, when the Minorities Unit — composed largely of Druze soldiers — marched through the streets of Tel-Aviv, alongside other IDF units, to mark the event and, more significantly, to celebrate Druze soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder with Jewish soldiers in victory after the 1967 War (Figure 4.1).[4]

This Chapter explicates the centrality of the Israeli government's decision to allow Druze youth to serve in the IDF, as a key motivator for leading Druze *ham'ayl*, Druze *mashaykh* and most Druze *fallahin* to resort to a politics of loyalty during the first three decades of the state of Israel.[5] It is argued that, for leading *ham'ayl*, service in the IDF was a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their leading status within the community. Druze *mashaykh*, on

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[2] *Yom H'atzmaut*, *Marriv* Newspaper, 15th May 1968.
[3] In his movie, "*The Time That Remains*", Elia Suleiman demonstrated the way that Israeli-Arabs celebrated the state of Israel's Independence Day immediately after Israel was established.
[4] 'Druze Celebrate Independence Day', *Al-Yom* Magazine. 17th May 1968. For more information about Independence Day celebrations in an Arab minority, see Jamal (2011) and Cohen (2010, 39 and 136).
[5] See footnote 52 in Section 2.5.

the other hand, perceived IDF service as a remedy for the cultural subordination that the Druze community had suffered during Mandatory Palestine, as well as a new structure of opportunity that could ensure the preservation of the community as a religious and cultural group in Israel. As for *fallahin*, service in the IDF was perceived as a new structure of opportunity for economic, social and political progress within the new state and within their own community.

Figure 4.1   Druze Soldiers from the Minorities Unit dancing *al-dabkah*, Yarka 1957

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In line with Chapter 3, this Chapter presents evidence that supports the concept of a relationship between a policy of accommodation and the politics of loyalty that might be adopted by a subordinate cultural in a polarised society. In Section 1.4, it was argued that subordinate groups, or parts of them, will resort to a politics of loyalty if the arrangements commensurate with a policy of accommodation are perceived as:

1) A structure of opportunity that maintain the status of the group's political elite.

2) A structure of opportunity that ensure the preservation of their group as a distinctive and cultural group by the masses.

3) A structure of opportunity for economic progress by breadwinners and their families.

Section 4.2 examines why the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya and the *Jabal al-'Arab* battalion were allowed to fight alongside the Haganah forces during the 1948 War. The Section shows that Druze soldiers met the Haganah's militant objectives for the Arab resistant forces during the war and complemented the MFA policy in relation to the neighbouring Arabs states.[6] It is also shown that the Abu-Rukns formed a squad that fought alongside the Haganah to preserve their leading status within the community and within their village of 'Isfya. On the other hand, many Syrian-Druze soldiers joined the Haganah because they perceive their service as a new structure of opportunity for economic progress within the new state.

Section 4.3 examines why leading Druze *ham'ayl* encouraged Druze youth service in the IDF during the 1950s. It is argued that leading Druze *ham'ayl* (i.e. the Tarifs of Julis, the Khanayfis of Shafa-'Amir, the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya and

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[6] The Haganah is the name of the Jewish paramilitary organisation that was active in Mandatory Palestine between 1920 and 1948. The Haganah became the core of the IDFs, after the 1948 War.

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the M'adi of Yarka) perceived military service in the IDF as a new structure of opportunity for preserving the leading status that they secured within the new state and for improving their prospects of emerging victorious from the struggle for the community's supremacy.

Section 4.4 examines why Druze intellectuals' campaigned against Druze military service in the IDF, and why they failed to effectively mobilise the Druze. Unlike leading Druze *ham'ayl*, some Druze intellectuals perceived Druze military service as a device that the Israeli government used to achieve political stability among the Arab minority rather than a new structure of opportunity for the community's progress within the new state. It is also argued that IDF service opponents failed to recruit large numbers of Druze for their cause because the Israeli security agents thwarted their campaign and limited their activities within the community.

Section 4.5 examines why Druze *mashaykh*, like leading *ham'ayl*, supported Druze military service in the IDF. It is argued that, unlike Druze intellectuals — who perceived military service as part of the Israeli government's efforts to secure political stability among the Arab minority — most Druze *mashaykh* perceived military service as a remedy for the cultural subordination that the community had suffered during Mandatory Palestine and as a new structure of opportunity that would ensure preservation of the community (or *hifiz al-baq'a*) as a distinctive cultural community on its own land.

Finally, Section 4.6 examines why hundreds of Druze youth served in the IDF after the Compulsory Service Law 1956 came into force. For these youth, and for their *fallahin* families, service in the IDF was perceived as a new structure of opportunity for economic and social progress within the new state and within their community. Hence, hundreds of Druze youth joined the IDF ranks and other Israeli security forces such that, by the early 1970s, a new economic and social stratum had been created within the community, known by its Hebrew name of *anshey bitahon* (men in security)*.

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4.2   Druze Fighting along the Haganah in the 1948 War

Militant collaboration between leading Druze *ham'ayl* and Yishuv's leadership began during the Arab Revolt of 1936. Prior to the Arab Revolt of 1936, such collaborative efforts were on an individual level and were limited to specific situations. For instance, as noted in Section 2.4, Shaykh Salman Tarif and Itzhak Ben-Tziv collaborated on security matters pertaining to the safety of the Jewish residents of al-Bqi'ah. On the hand, as discussed in Section 2.6, the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya sort Ben-Tzvi's and Abba Hushi's support in the late 1930s. This support was needed to defend their village, 'Isfya, from Palestinian-Arab attacks and, in particular, the collective punishment of villagers by Yusif Abu-Durah and his squad on the Carmel during the second stage of the Revolt.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Abu-Rukns were the first of the leading Druze *ham'ayl* to abandon the politics of silence. Archived family documents indicate that Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn encouraged his nephew, Slayman Abu-Rukn, and a group of fifteen to twenty young men from 'Isfya, to form a militant squad and to join the Haganah forces. Early in the March of 1948, Shaykh Labib addressed Haganah leaders in the region as well as an old friend of the *hamulah*, Geura Zayd of Kryat Tivon, to ask that youth from 'Isfya be provided with weapons, in order that they might fight alongside Haganah forces (Zidan 2004, 45).[7]

The Abu-Rukns had no choice but to marinate in the leading status they achieved in their village during the Yishuv period. Reiterating, security co-operation between the Abu-Rukns and the Yishuv's leadership during the Arab Revolt nurtured their mutual trust. As a result, the economic status of the Abu-Rukns improved. Indeed, Abba Hushi, the head of the Histadrut in Haifa at the time, used his authority to safeguard the interests of some of the Abu-Rukn's

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[7] Geura is the son of the Zionist leader Alexander Zayd and become a Haganah officer in Jezreel Valley after his father murder by a local Beduin. Geura has a strong relationship with the Druze *ham'ayl* from the Carmel and Shafa-'Amir. Interview re: his relationship with the Druze leaders since 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fbuKHAovBPs (access date: 21st July 2015).

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Hamulah members and arranged for them to be employed within the factories of the emerging industrial areas of Haifa. This, of course, improved the economic status of the Abu-Rukns who were now earning more money than villagers who had continued to rely on traditional agriculture as their main source of income.[8]

Abu-Rukns-Yishuv collaborations during the Arab Revolt improved the Abu-Rukns' social status within 'Isfya once they begun to perform *wastah* (mediation) between local villagers and the Yishuv's leadership. Local *fallahin* addressed the Abu-Rukns and requested assistance with acquiring permits from Abba Hushi and other Yishuv officers, in order that they might sell their agricultural products within the Jewish-Yishuv market: British authorities and Haganah forces had previously prohibited Arabs from entering Jewish regions, particularly those regions that had been attacked by Arab rebels (Atashi 2001, 46).[9]

Most importantly, the Yishuv's leadership welcomed the Abu-Rukns' offer to stand alongside the Haganah forces during the 1948 War. Haganah officers, such as Geura Zayd, saw the advantage of having soldiers that shared common cultural elements with the Arab rebels fight alongside the Haganah. In the case of the Druze, they valued soldiers who could speak and understand Arabic — the language also spoken by soldiers in the Arab forces. To this end, Zayd allowed the Abu-Rukns' squad to join the Haganah ranks and provided the requisite personnel support. According to Koren (1991, 53), Zayd posted the Abu-Rukns squad along the old road that connected Haifa and Tel-Aviv to protect Jewish convoys from Palestinian-Arab attacks.

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[8] Abu-Rukns' private archives, 'Isfya.
[9] As part of its policy of encouraging 'Hebrew work' in Palestine, the Yishuv's leadership tried to prevent Palestinian-Arabs from selling their agricultural products within Jewish markets. For more on this subject, see Shapira (1977).

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The Abu-Rukns were not the only Druze to join the Haganah forces. Indeed, the number of Druze in the Haganah increased after *Jabal al-'Arab*[10] battalion joined *Jaysh al-'Inqadh al-'Arabi* (the Arab Liberation Army; ALA), in the war over Palestine.[11] The battalion was part of ALA and was predominantly composed of Druze soldiers from al-Swayd'a. The battalion, under the leadership of the Druze Colonel Shakib Wahab, had entered Palestine at the start of April 1948 (Figure 4.2).[12] A few days after entering Palestine, the battalion camped near Shafa-'Amer (the home of Shaykh Salih Khanayfis) on a strategic point, near Haifa. The aim was to attack Jewish settlements around the city.

Figure 4.2   Colonel Shakib Wahab (1890-1980): The leader of the *Jabal al-'Arab* battalion.

On 16th April 1948, the battalion made several attempts to advance towards the city of Haifa, only to be thwarted by Haganah defence forces. After losing

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[10] *Jabal al-'Arab* is also famously known as *Jabal al-Druz*. It is an elevated volcanic area in the South Eastern part of Syria, subject to Suwayda 'a governance and it is famous for its predominantly Druze population.
[11] The ALA was largely composed of volunteers from Arab countries. It was set up by the Arab League and led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji. The ALA fought on the Arab side in the 1948 War but lost most of the major battles against the IDFs. For more see information Gelber (2001) and Shlaim and Eugene (2001).
[12] Wahab is a Lebanese-Druze military officer. He served in the Ottoman army during World War I and took part in the Arab revolt against the French, in 1926. For more information, see Gelber (2001, 233) and Zaher al-Deen (2004, 291).

many soldiers and a great deal of equipment during the battles of Hushayh and al-Kassayr (near Shafa-ʿAmer), the battalion attempted to progress towards Jezeeral Valley and assist Fawzi al-Qawuqji (the head of the Arab forces) who had entered Palestine from the East and had been defeated by the Yishuv's forces (Avivi 2007; Firro 1999, 43; Gelber 1995, 234; Parsons 2007).[13]

Significantly, the clashes between the Haganah and Druze battalion worried leading Druze *ham'ayl* (such as the Khanayfis, the Abu-Rukns and the Mʿadis) who had forged "friendly" relationship with the Yishuv political leadership. The Druze battalion joined forces with the Haganah and compromised the leading *ham'ayl's* efforts to maintain a politics of silence during the on-going conflict. It also flew in the face of Druze religious principle known as *hifiz al-ikhwan* (brothers' protection). At the heart of the *hifiz al-ikhwan* principle was the belief that every Druze should stand with his coreligionists in times of crisis. This principle required that Palestinian-Druze join forces with their coreligionists during the clashes with the Haganah forces.

For the aforementioned leading *ham'ayl*, the *Jabal al-ʿArab* battalion's intervention meant choosing between two cultural principles *hifiz al-baq'a* and *hifiz al-ikhwan*. As discussed in Section 2.6, many Palestinian-Druze and their leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of silence and refrained from attacking Yishuv's interests as a strategy to ensure their *hifiz al-baq'a*. At the time that *hifiz al-ikhwan*, a commitment between Druze to stand by each other during crisis, required the leading *ham'ayl* to side with the *Jabal al-ʿArab* battalion that had joined the ALA in Palestine. Hence, the leading *ham'ayl* were faced with a choice between maintaining their politics of silence and providing the support to the Druze battalion in the war against the Haganah.[14]

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[13] The actual number of Druze soldiers that were killed is not clear and while Firro (1999) talks about fifty soldiers being killed, Zaher al-Deen (2004) talks about more than eighty fatalities.
[14] According to Zidan (2004, 40), the Druze battalion received a very warm welcome from the Druze of Shafa-ʿAmer despite the local Druze concerns about the implications of the battalion's intervention for their relationship with the Jewish-Yishuv.

Even before the battalion's soldiers were buried, leaders of Druze leading *ham'ayl*, including Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn and Shaykh Salih Khanayfis, began mediating between the battalion and the Haganah officers in an attempt to reach a *sulhah* (traditional reconciliation).[15]   Ceasefire negotiations were conducted at the residence of Shaykh Salih Khanayfis, in Shafa-ʿAmer. Here, representatives of the battalion met with Geura Zayd and Moshe Dayan, a member of the Haganah General Staff at that time.[16]   At the core of the negotiations was the Haganah officers' insistence that battalion leaders cease their campaign against the Yishuv.   In return, Haganah officers gave an undertaking not to fuel a 'blood-feud' to avenge Haganah Jewish soldiers that were killed during the battle of Hushayh (Figure 4.3).[17]

Figure 4.3   The Druze of Shafa-ʿAmer remembering the Druze of the *Jabal al-ʿArab* **battalion** who were killed during the 1948 War (winter 2013). Copyright: Shamel Ibraheem of Shafa-ʿAmer.

At a meeting between battalion officers and Haganah officers (that took place in Kiryat ʿAamal) it was also agreed that Druze soldiers from *Jabal al-ʿArab*

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[15] The Khanayfis family Archive, Sahaf-ʿAmir
[16] In 1953, Dayan became the fourth IDF Chief of General Staff.
[17] Dayan's brother, Zorik, was killed by Druze soldiers on 18th April, during the battle of Hushayh.

battalion could join the Jewish-Haganah forces.[18]   There is evidence that the Haganah officers involved in these negotiations were aware that some Druze soldiers had joined the *Jabal al-'Arab* battalion for financial reasons rather than ideological ones, such as *Inqadh Falastin* (to save Palestine) — the motto of ALA during the 1948 War.[19]   In fact, it seems that Sultan Basha al-Atrash (Figure 4.4) had major reservations about deploying Druze soldiers, presumably because their impoverished background would mean that some Druze soldiers would desert the cause or switch allegiances to Israel if Israel presented them with a financial incentive to do so (Gelber 1995, 233). Al-Atrash was right to be concerned. After all, money motivated between five and seven dozen men to desert the battalion and to join the ranks of the Haganah forces.[20]

Figure 4.4   The Syrian Druze leader Sultan Basha al-Atrash, 1891-1982

[18] Kiryat 'Aamal was a Jewish settlement near the modern day Israeli town of Kryat Tivon, situated to the North of Haifa.
[19] *Jabal al-'Arab*'s soldiers received only one Palestinian lira and fifty qirsh for their service alongside the ALA. On the other hand, they received more than twenty liras for their service alongside the Haganah (Zidan 2004, 42; Firro 1999).
[20] According to Firro (1999) and Gelber (1995, 233), these soldiers were fighting all around the region and frequently changed sides since military service was regarded as a source of income. This is consistent with what Huggins and her co-author called 'violence workers' when referring to West African men who joined the French colonial army in the late-1940s (in Kananneh 2009).

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Shortly after the state of Israel was established, on 24th August 1948, Yaʿcov Dorri (the Chief of General Staff) announced the Minorities Unit. This unit was largely composed of Druze soldiers from the two villages on the Carmel ('Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil) and of former *Jabal al-ʿArab* battalion deserters who had remained in Israel to fight alongside the IDF.[21] On the 7th September 1948, an impressive ceremony took place at the Unit's base in Nsher (Figure 4.5). Here, private soldiers took an oath and swore their allegiance to the state of Israel and its military forces under the Minorities Unit flag. This flag combined the Israeli flag and the Druze five colours flag with the words:

> "I solemnly declare my loyalty to the state of Israel and to its Defence Forces…".[22]

Figure 4.5   Soldiers from the Minorities Unit Flying the Druze Flag in their Unit

To summarise, Yishuv and Haganah leadership allowed youth from the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya and the *Jabal al-ʿArab* battalion to fight alongside their forces during the 1948 War. The Haganah leadership appreciated the benefits of

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[21] A group of Bedouin soldiers from the Al-Haib Tribe and a number of Circissians from Kfur Kama also served in the Minorities Unit during in its infancy.

[22] For more about this ceremony, see Zidan (2004, 48).

having Arabic-speaking soldiers amongst their ranks, since the anti-Israeli forces also spoke this language. The Abu-Rukns, on the other hand, saw the Haganah's decision to allow Druze to join its ranks as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their status within the community and their own village 'Isfya. In the case of Syrian-Druze who joined the Haganah, this was a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their economic status in the new state.

4.3   Service in the IDF and Druze Leading *Ham'ayl's S*truggle for Recognition

Not all Israeli officials appreciated Druze youth joining the IDF during the 1948 War. Itzhak Avira, for instance, was a Haganah intelligence officer who questioned the preference of Geura Zayd and other IDF officers for Druze youth over that for other Arab religious minorities: Geura Zayd and other IDF officers even went as far as to encourage Israeli- and Syrian-Druze to join the Israeli forces.[23] In late July 1948, Avira sent a letter to Ezra Danin, the advisor to the Arab Department of the MFA, expressing his disappointment with what he saw as an erroneous assumption that the Druze were 'Kosher' and Muslims were not (Parsons 2001, 65).[24]

In his reply to Avira — that came just a few days before the Chief of the General Staff, Yaʿcov Dorri, announced the establishment of the Druze Unit (i.e. the Minorities Unit) — Danin wrote:

> "Concerning the attitude of the Druze and their treachery, they are no different from the Muslims and they are perhaps even worse... What determines their position is their lack of 'choice'. The Muslims have

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[23] Druze youth from Syria continued to join the IDF until the early-1950s; see Avivi (2011).
[24] 'Kosher' relates to Jewish dietary laws. In this context, Avivi meant to say that the Druze were not Jewish and they should not completely trusted.

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strength, whereas these Druze are weak; we can use their lack of choice

while we are fighting alone in this war" (Gelber 1995, 240).

From the perspectives of Danin and his colleagues at the MFA in Tel-Aviv, it was the Druze's lack of choice that motivated the decision to allow Druze to remain within the state of Israel and to serve in the IDF. Danin was referring to the lack of support the Druze had received from external political powers as the main reason behind the Israeli government's decisions to accommodate the Druze within the new state of Israel and to allow Druze to serve in the IDF.

Another reason behind the MFA's decision to allow Druze to serve in the IDF relates to the policy for neighbouring Arab countries. Archives uncovered by Gelber (1995, 241) reveal that MFA officials had little confidence in the IDF's ability to crush Arab forces and to force them to accept a peace treaty. The MFA was looking for a way to break the deadlock. It considered encouraging a *coup d'état* in one of the Arab states, with the aim of disaggregating the Arab coalition and distracting the Arab states from the conflict in Palestine.[25] The Druze in Syria and the Maronites in Lebanon were seen as the 'natural' candidates for such a *putsch* because the Yishuv political leadership had established some ties with their leadership before Israel came into existence. According to Gelber, the Druze of Syria became even more relevant to such an insurrection, after the relationship between their leadership and the Syrian government deteriorated, in the late-1940s.

Thus, the Minorities Unit was used as a tool to damage relationships between the Druze and the other religious communities in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Druze service in the IDF increased the tension between communities and resulted in Syrian and Lebanese authorities being less trusting of the Druze. Shimʿoni, a colleague of Danin at the MFA, admitted that the real reason that the Minorities Unit was established was to encourage Syrian-Druze to defect from the Syrian army. Thus, Druze were being used as "the sharp blade of a

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[25] Danin to Arazi, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17th January 1949. The Israel State Archives. File: 3749/1.

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knife to stab in the back of Arab unity".[26] Moreover, Tovia Lishansky, the first commander of the Minorities Unit, acknowledged that the aim was for the Minorities Unit to recruit as many Syrian Druze deserters as possible, with the objective of undermining the trust of the Syrian state in the Druze community. This was evident from his letter of appointment as the Minorities Unit commander and since he was required to be in constant communication with the Political Section of the Middle East Department, at the MFA.[27]

Propaganda by the Minorities Unit was spread using the Israeli press and media throughout the Arab World. This formed a major psychological element of warfare. The Israeli Radio Broadcast in Arabic praised the Unit's actions as a symbol of an "inter-communal fraternity" between the Druze and other ethnic communities in Israel. This sharply contrasted with the friction that was seen between ethnic communities in Lebanon and Syria (Firro 2001). Israeli secret agents, who had returned from Syria and from Lebanon, presented reports to their superiors that made specific reference to the tremendous impact that this propaganda had had on the Syrian and Lebanese authorities and how the relationships between the Druze and other religious communities had deteriorated in Syria and Lebanon as a result of it. According to Gelber (1995, 242), the Israeli Radio regularly broadcast news in Arabic and, on occasion, air-dropped leaflets over Syrian and Lebanese villages. The leaflets described the Minorities Unit's routine and its military role within the IDF and were used to encourage Syrian Druze youth to defect.

The Minorities Unit proved to be a success story. The Unit's contribution to the military mission of the IDF was already manifested in the 1948 War, in particular during 'Operation Hiram'. In late October 1948, the IDF initiated 'Operation Hiram' that aimed to capture the Galilee from the ALA and draw defence lines along the country's Northern borders. Yigael Yadin, Head of the Northern Front, assigned both the Oded and Golani detachments to this tour of

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[26] Shim'oni to Sasson, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16th August 1948. The Israel State Archives. File: 2570/11.
[27] A letter from the Chief of the General Staff, 24th August 1948. IDF Archives. File: 2289/50/339.

duty and ordered that the Minorities Unit fight alongside the first detachment, whose mission was to capture the Upper Galilee — including Druze villages, such as Yanuh and Kfur Smai'a (IDF Lexicon, 2000).

'Operation Hiram' hit complications when the Oded tried to capture the Druze village of Yanuh, during the night of 29th October 1948. The ALA, under the leadership of al-Qawuqji, were well prepared for the Israeli soldiers' arrival and caused heavy losses to its troops and equipment. Msbah Halabi (in 1970) claimed that eleven Druze soldiers from the Minorities Unit were killed during the clashes with the ALA during the Battle of Yanuh. In Halabi's words, the Druze *shuhada'* (martyrs) came from different Druze villages on the Carmel and Galilee and three came from Syria to fight in the IDF.

The Battle of Yanuh and the Minorities Unit's contribution to the IDF patrol's attack of Palestinian refugees on the Northern borders increased support for Druze service in the IDF (Zidan 2004, 66). Early in 1953, the third Chief of the General Staff, Mordecai Makhlef, asked the Israeli government to approve and sponsor the recruitment of an additional three hundred Druze youth by the Minorities Unit. Makhlef's proposal was welcomed by Ben-Gurion (the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence) who allocated 180,000 Israeli liras to be used for this purpose. The result was what became known as 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B' (Ben-Gurion 1957).[28]

To fulfil orders, Amnon Yanai, the new head of the Minorities Unit, invited heads of the leading *ham'ayl* to the Unit's base in Nsher (near the city of Haifa). According to Avivi (2007, 81) forty Druze dignitaries, representing all the Druze villages on the Galilee and the Carmel, attended a meeting that took place on the 7th of June 1953 at the Unit's camp. Yanai explained to his guests how important successful recruitment was for the Unit's prestige and for its survival as an independent unit within the IDF.

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[28] Ben-Gurion's diary. Volume 13, 18th May 1957. IDF Archives.

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Of particular note is the fact that heads of leading local *ham'ayl* were supportive of the 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B'. Indeed, they saw 'Recruitment Phase B' as an opportunity for them to demonstrate their loyalty to the state and, in turn, to preserve the official recognition they had gained since the establishment of the state: As observed in Chapter 3, all communal-official positions (whether that be *al-mukhtrah* of Druze village, *al-qadi* of *Shariʿa* court, member of the Histadrut or any other position of authority) were awarded to heads of leading *ham'ayl.* Such positions were perceived as opportunities for economic, social and political progress for their office bearers and for their *ham'ayl*. The ISA contain many letters written by Druze leading *ham'ayl*, such as the Halabi of Dalyah al-Karmil, the Baders of Hurfesh and the Qablan of Bayt-Jan. Many of these letters were addressed to Israeli officials and expressed their support of Druze youth service in IDFs.

Most importantly, 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B' was perceived as an opportunity for the community's four leading *ham'ayl* to gain community leadership.[29] To this end, Shaykh Salih Khanayfis and Shaykh Labib Abu-Rukn encouraged Druze youth from the Carmel and the Galilee to join the IDF. From their perspective, successful recruitment of Druze by the IDF would strengthen their standing with the Israeli authorities and would enhance their patron's, Yehoshua Palmon's, efforts to secure community leadership positions for his clients, namely the heads of the leading *ham'ayl*. According to one internal security agency report, around two hundred Druze youth enlisted after Shaykhs Khanayfis and Abu-Rukn encouraged Druze villagers to join the IDF. Most of the enlisting Druze were from *ham'ayl* that identified with the Khanayfis and Abu-Rukn camps.[30]

By way of contrast, although the Tarifs camp accepted 'Recruitment Phase B', they did so with some reservations. The camp's main concern was that successful recruitment might be seen as legitimising the leadership status of

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[29] For more information about the Druze leading *ham'ayl*'s struggle for recognition, see Section 2.3.

[30] A Secret Report About the Recent Developments Among the Druze. 3rd November 1953. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Israel State Archives. File: 'H'T/B/28/2402.

the Khanayfis' and the Labib Abu-Rukns' *ham'ayl* within the community. To this end, the *ham'ayl* thwarted each others efforts and dissuaded youth Druze from enlisting. According to one Minorities Unit report, Shaykh Salman Tarif toured Druze villages to discourage *ham'ayl* leaders from sending their relatives into active service with the IDFs. Shaykh Salman used the argument that Druze youth service in the IDF would adversely impact the standing and relationships of Israeli-Druze with their coreligionists and other religious communities in the neighbouring Arab countries of Syria and Lebanon.[31]

Intervention by Abba Hushi, their patron, meant that the Tarifs' opposition to 'Recruitment Phase B' rapidly dissipated. Abba Hushi's major concern was that his clients' opposition to 'Recruitment Phase B' might be seen as disloyalty to the state and to its security. Such a perception would weaken his efforts to secure the community leadership for the Tarifs. To remedy this situation, Abba Hushi and Shaykh Jabir M'adi organised a conciliatory meeting between Shaykh Amin and his brother, Salman, and Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. According to Firro (1999, 121), the two parties agreed to collaborate on matters pertaining to IDF recruitment of Druze youth. Subsequent to this meeting, Shaykh Salman spoke to the media and publicly announced his, his brother's and their *hamulah*'s concern for and support of the state of Israel, going on to encourage Druze youth to join the IDF during 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B'.[32]

To improve his own prospects, Shaykh M'adi took Druze service in the IDF one step further: He requested that Druze military service be made compulsory rather than voluntarily, as was already the case for Israeli-Jewish youth over eighteen years of age.[33] His aim was to demonstrate his loyalty to the state and his support of its policies. From early-1955, the Shaykh began to discuss

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[31] A Secret Report on the Developments among the Druze Community. *Ibid*. See also report by Sharett, in Firro (1999, 120).

[32] For more on 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B', See Section 3.2. See also the article entitled 'Druze Community Leadership and Military Service', *Haaretz* Newspaper, 1st September 1972.

[33] According to Avivi, Shaykh M'adi was determined to satisfy Mapai's leadership prior to the Third Knesset elections of 1956; see Avivi (2002, 104) and Firro (1999, 156).

compulsory conscription with the senior IDF officials, including Moshe Dayan and the Chief of the General Staff.[34]

From then on, it was just a matter time until the other leading *ham'ayl* followed the example set by Shaykh Jabir M'adi and used their support of the *qanun al-'tajnid al-'Ijbari* (the Compulsory Service Law 1956) as a way to express their loyalty to the state and, in turn, strengthen their bids for community leadership. Shaykh Salman was the first to write to the military governor in the Galilee. In his letter, the Shaykh expressed the willingness of the Druze community to fulfil all orders issued with the goal of protecting the state.[35] Later, the Governor received letters and statements from Shaykhs Khanayfis and Abu-Rukn, who were competing for community leadership and recognition by the Israeli government.

Leading *ham'ayl* had little choice but to follow Shaykh M'adi's example since the Israeli government had already stipulated (during a meeting on 24th April 1956 between the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs Office and the Central Committee) that the issue of the *ham'ayl's* recognition would only be addressed once the Druze Compulsory Service Law 1956 came into force.[36] Indeed, some Israeli security officers and Mapai's *'Arabstim* were fully aware that some leading *ham'ayl* were supporting Druze military service to improve their chances of recognition as the supreme authority within the Druze community rather than because of ideological reasons. Indeed, this was one of the reasons for postponing the recognition of leading *ham'ayl* until Compulsory Service Law 1956 had been imposed upon Israeli-Druze.

With this level of support from leading Druze *ham'ayl*, the implementation of Compulsory Service Law 1956 simply required the Israeli government to

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[34] He also sent a letter to the Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to request that compulsory enlistment should apply to Druze youth. The Shaykh expressed his hope that the Prime Minister would be able to apply the Law no later than 1st June 1956; see Avivi (2007, 87).

[35] A letter from the Druze judge to the military governor in the Galilee. 22nd January 1956. IDF Archives File: 752/70/72.

[36] Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting, 26th April 1956. The Israel State Archives. Israeli Police Brigade. File: 79/L/2449/27.

enforce compulsory conscription. In 1956, the Chief of the General Staff —
Moshe Dayan — instructed his commanders to call Druze youth over eighteen
years of age to military service within the IDF ranks.   Unlike previous
recruitment efforts, Druze youth were called under the Compulsory Service
Law 1956 that compelled military service. This decision, whilst welcomed by
leading *ham'ayl*, who perceived it as a new structure of opportunity for
consolidating their leading status, was opposed by some Druze intellectuals, as
discussed in Section 4.4.

4.4   Military Service and Druze Intellectuals Politics of Protest

Druze military service in the IDF was opposed by members of the Druze
community. Even before the Compulsory Service Law of 1956 came into force,
a handful of Druze intellectuals from the Carmel and the Galilee assembled
under the leadership of a group of intellectuals that included the poet Samih al-
Qasim of Ramh (Figure 4.6) and his relative, Nadim al-Qasim (who was the
head of the DCC) and the writer Nazih Hassun of Shafa-ʿAmir. The intellectuals
protested against Druze military service in the IDF and the Israeli authorities'
efforts to impose the compulsory military service on the Druze community.[37]
In April 1956, al-Qasim and his followers organised a gathering at the village of
Kfur Yasif. The aim was to oppose compulsory military service and to force the
Israeli authorities to repeal the Compulsory Service Law 1956.   The
intellectuals threatened to close schools in Druze villages and to boycott the
annual visit to Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb (Avivi, 2007, 89).[38]

From the perspectives of al-Qasim and that of his followers, the Israeli-Druze
were part of the Palestinian-Arab minority that remained in Israel after the

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[37] For more on Nadim al-Qasim, see Section 2.4. Interview with the poet Samih al-Qasim, 21st
October 2011, Ramh village.
[38] As noted in Section 3.1, in addition to its religious implications, the annual visit to Maqam al-
Al-Nabi Shuʿayb became an opportunity for leading *ham'ayl* and their followers to express their
loyalties to the new state.

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1948 War. In addition to their mother tongue, Arabic,[39] the Druze and the Palestinians shared a common history, spanning four centuries of Ottoman Rule and four decades of the British Mandate in Palestine.[40] Al-Qasim and his followers, therefore, believed that the Druze should refrain from any activities that had the purpose of oppressing their own people, namely the Palestinian-Arabs. Accordingly, their belief was that Druze should not fight alongside the Israeli forces as long as the state of Israel was at war with Palestinian-Arabs. In March 1956, the organisation's followers from Shafa-ʿAmer wrote to the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, requesting that he repeal the Compulsory Service Law 1956 on the grounds that Druze are Arabs:

> "..an Arab should not fight against his brother under any circumstances or in any place".[41]

This sentiment was expressed repeatedly in Samih al-Qasim's speeches against military service in the IDF. This prominent speaker was arrested by the Israeli police in June 1960 because he refused to enlist in the IDF. Al-Qasim justified his refusal with the following statement:

> "As an Arab, I believe in my Palestinian roots and I refuse to fight my own people… Your attempts to force me to carry a weapon against my people is a crime … and you [*referring to the Israeli authorities*] carry the full responsibility for this crime …"

> — Al-Mirsad, 14th June 1960.

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[39] For more on language and nationalism, see Fishman (1995).
[40] For a good introduction to the ways in which nations and nationhood have evolved through historical experience, see Smith (1986).
[41] *Ibid.* al-Qasim. See also Cohen (2010, 162).

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Figure 4.6   The poet Samih al-Qasim of Ramh (1939-2014): A prominent activist against Druze military service in the IDF.

One of the main concerns of the Druze intellectuals was the negative impact that Druze service in the IDF had on community relationships with other Palestinian-Arabs. Indeed, activists within this group were aware of the strain that the activities of the Minorities Unit, with its strong Druze presence, were placing on this relationship. In particular, the Minorities Unit continuously patrolled the state's Northern borders, preventing Palestinians who had fled the country during the 1948 War from crossing the borders and returning to their homes in the new state of Israel. Orders compelled action that often resulted in dozens of casualties amongst the refugees. This only served to breed mistrust and antagonism between Druze soldiers and their families and refugee members of Sunni-Muslim families that remained in the Israeli state.[42]

The Minorities Unit's activities became even more notorious when Parachute Regiment 101 was formed, after the Sinai War of 1956.[43] The IDF Chief of Staff created Regiment 101 to defend against Palestinian *fida'iyin* (sacrifices) along the Southern borders of Israel. The Minorities Unit was ordered to support Regiment 101 on this mission. Ariel Sharon was in charge of 101 command, infamous for its aggressiveness and the administration of collective

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[42] For more about Minorities Unit's militant activity during the 1950s, see Zidan (2004).
[43] Sharon became the Israeli Prime Minister between 2001 and 2006.

punishment in *fid'aiyin* bases that were concentrated in the residential areas of Gaza and Khan Younis and other towns in the Southern border with Egypt.[44]

Some Druze intellectuals held an entirely different view of military service within the IDF than that which was held by groups such as the Druze leading *ham'ayl* and soldiers from *Jabal al-'Arab* battalion: Druze leading *ham'ayl* perceived Druze military service as a new structure of opportunity for political, social and economic progress, whereas some Druze intellectuals saw it as a device used by the Israeli government to prevent Palestinian-Arabs from joining forces and, in turn, to achieve political stability.

By the time the Israeli government imposed the Compulsory Service Law in the spring of 1956, activists were already petitioning for its repeal. Signed petitions were being sent to Israeli officials. Early petitions were sent to Itzhak Ben-Tzvi, the President of the state,[45] Chairman of the Knesset, the Prime Minster[46], the IDF Chief of Staff and the Minorities Unit's Commanders.[47] Another petition, signed by fifty five activists from Druze villages, was sent to Shaykh Amin Tarif. The latter petition demanded that the Shaykh respect the views expressed by anti-military service activists at Kfur Yasif and oppose compulsory service. The activists threatened to boycott the annual *ziyarah* to Maqam al-Nabi Shu'ayb and to declare it as a mourning day unless their demands were met.[48]

As a consequence of anti-military activities, a number of Druze youths from different villages in the Galilee and the Carmel refused to comply with orders issued under the provisions of the Compulsory Service Law 1956 and enlist with the IDFs. For instance, fifteen of the thirty nine Druze from the village of Yarka that were called to service refused to comply with orders that were

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[44] S'aid Hassun, who served in the Minorities Unit between 1954 and 1956, confirmed this during a personal interview. 20th October 2011, Dalyah al-Karmil. For more information about the Minorities Unit's militant activity during this period, see Zidan (2004, 89).

[45] A letter to the President of the state. 8th February 1956. The Israel State Archives. The President Office. File: /2262/60.

[46] A letter to the Israeli Prime Minister. 16th February 1956. The IDF Archives. File: 13/70/72.

[47] For more information about these petitions, see Avivi (2002, 104).

[48] A letter to Shaykh Amin Tarif, spring 1956. The IDF Archives. File: 752/70/72.

distributed by village *mkhatir*, early in February 1956.[49] A Regional Committee report, dated March 1956, indicated that only fifty one out of one hundred and forty six Druze youths in the Galilee enlisted when ordered to do so. Similarly, only thirty two out of the one hundred and seventeen youths called to service from the two villages on the Carmel actually enlisted (Avivi 2002, 107).

Anti-military service activists did not recruit many Druze to their cause. Instead, Druze youth began to follow orders and enlist. According to IDF reports, in May 1956 alone, one hundred and five young people — representing all Druze villages — enlisted.[50] The report also indicated that the number of Druze who enlisted far exceeded target recruitment numbers of the IDF human resources commander for that particular quota.[51]

The inability of anti-compulsory service activists to the change attitudes of Druze and to gain support for their cause relates to the Druze lacking an Arab national identity during the 1950s. Although the Druze mother-tongue is Arabic and although Druze and Palestinian-Arabs are culturally similar, only a few Druze intellectuals saw themselves as Palestinian-Arabs in the 1950s. In reality, the 'imagined community' in which most Druze lived in Israel during the 1950s was not dissimilar to that which existed before the state came into being. Indeed, the community was limited to their *ham'ayl* and a few wider affiliations.[52] Firro (1999) saw that pan-Arabism and Palestinian national identities began to influence some Druze intellectuals after the radio was introduced and after the rise of Gamal 'Abd al-Naser's rule in Egypt and the speeches he delivered after the Anglo-French-Israeli attack, in October 1956[53].

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[49] A letter written by the military governor in the North, 12th February 1956. The IDF Archives. File: 752/70/72.

[50] A letter by the head of the human resources, 10th May 1956. IDF Archives. File: 752/70/72.

[51] Traditionally, IDF recruited Israeli soldiers who turned eighteen, in three cohorts during March, August and December every year.

[52] For more information about Druze communal identification during the 1940s, see Section 2.4.

[53] Firro (1999) noticed that, in the 1950s, only a small group of educated Druze were drawn to Arab nationalism. Most Druze villagers had little understanding of nationalism and national identity.

In addition to poor human resources, there were few Druze graduates and intellectuals in the 1950s and during most of the 1960s. As indicated in Section 3.5, this limited the intellectuals' influence within the community. Moreover, this small group lacked modern day means of wireless communication and printing capabilities. Up until the mid-1960s, only a few homes in each village had landline telephones, forcing anti-military service activists to attend face to face meetings to make every single decision. These meetings were generally conducted in one of the neighbouring Jewish cities which, unlike many Druze villages, had paved roads, were outside the 'security zone' and were not subject to military restrictions.[54]

A major reason for the failure of the anti-conscription campaign was the iron hand with which the Israeli security agencies compelled Druze to enlist. The internal security agencies, including the Israeli police, the Shabak and the military government, went to great lengths to reduce Druze non-compliance with conscription orders. Dozens of youths were arrested and imprisoned after the IDF enlistment centre passed their names to the security agencies. According to Cohen (2010, 160), these Druze were only released after they signed forms that declared their willingness to enlist. For instance, police officers at Haifa arrested twelve Druze who had refused to attend the IDF enlistment centre in the city for medical examinations. Seven of them were charged as criminals because they refused to enlist. The remaining Druze were only released after they gave their written consent for the examinations to take place.[55]

The Israeli security agencies' actions against non-compliant Druze were predictable when one takes into consideration that these agencies were responsible for implementing the Inter-Ministerial Committee's recommendations after the 1949 call for the Israeli-Arab minority to be arranged along religious lines.[56] These agencies were aware of the damage

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[54] See the DCC activities, as described in Section 3.5.
[55] Minutes of Regional Committee Meeting, 22nd March 1956. The Israel State Archives. File: 752/70/72.
[56] For more on the Inter-Ministerial Committee's recommendations, see Section 3.2.

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that Druze youth service in the IDF was having on relationships between the Druze and other Palestinian-Arabs. Indeed, Druze IDF service was divisive: It was intended to prevent the Palestinian-Arabs of different religious groups uniting against the state (Frisch 1999, 52).

In conclusion, some Druze intellectuals opposed Druze military service in the IDF and protested against the Israeli government's efforts to impose the Compulsory Service Law 1956 on the Druze community. In contrast to Druze leading *ham'ayl*, who perceived Druze military service as a new structure of opportunity for economic, social and political progress, the intellectuals saw Druze military service as part of the Israeli government's strategy to achieve political stability among the Arab minority. Druze intellectuals were thwarted in their efforts to prevent compulsory service by Druze youth. This was because the Israeli security agencies undermined the intellectuals' efficacy and expended a great deal of their energies enforcing the Law. The next Section examines why Druze *mashaykh* and leading local *ham'ayl* supported Druze military service in the IDF along with community leading *ham'ayl*.

4.5   Military service and Druze *Mashaykh* Politics of Loyalty

Like many Druze intellectuals, a number of Druze *mashaykh* also opposed Druze military service and protested against Compulsory Service Law 1956. These *mashaykh* assembled under the leadership of Shaykh Farhud Farhud of Ramh (Figure 4.7) and some of his followers, in the Galilee and the Carmel. In March 1956, Shaykh Farhud Farhud and his followers organised a public meeting at the shaykh's residence to discuss the Compulsory Service Law 1956. The meeting participants signed a petition destined for Shaykh Amin Tarif, asking Shaykh Amin Tarif to join them in their campaign and to convince Israeli authorities to repeal the law or face a boycott of the annual visit to

Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb and loss of recognition of his leadership (Avivi 2007, 89).[57]

A major concern for Shaykh Farhud, and for his followers, was that service in the IDF would adversely impact the survival of the community as a cultural-religious group. From Farhud's point of view, military service threatened the community because it meant that Druze youth were away from their villages for long periods of time, leaving them unable to practise their religion and pray in the *khilwah*. Moreover, the interaction between Druze youth and the secular-modern Israeli society was seen as a threat to the survival of the community as a unique cultural group because of the increased likelihood of Druze youth adopting alternative principles to the traditional-conservative principles that characterised the Druze community at the time (Farhud 2005).

Figure 4.7   Shaykh Farhud Farhud (1911-2013), a former head of the IDC

Shaykh Farhud's concerns about the implications of Druze military service are entirely understandable if one takes into consideration that Druze *mashaykh*'s actions were motivated by their communal-religious identity. Indeed, whilst

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[57] As noted in Section 3.1, the annual visit to Maqam al-Al-Nabi Shuʿayb had a political meaning. In addition to its religious implications, the visit became an opportunity for leading *ham'ayl* and their followers to express their loyalties to the new state.

some Druze intellectuals believed themselves to be Palestinian-Arabs first and foremost, the religious identity among the Druze *mashaykh* was crucial. In fact, it is surprising that Shaykh Farhud failed to draw more support from Druze *mashaykh* when he made his call in the 1950s, particularly since most Druze practised the religion and followed its traditional principles during that period.

Indeed, despite Shaykh Farhud's calls for support, only a few *mashaykh* joined his anti-conscription campaign. Instead, most Druze *mashaykh* supported, and even encouraged, Druze military service in the IDF. In fact, the *mashaykh* participated in official ceremonies that demonstrated support of politics of loyalty and that took place at annual *ziyarah* to Maqam al-Nabi Shu'ayb. Documents located within the ISA include many letters written by Druze *mashaykh* and Druze *'imah* and addressed to Israeli officials. In these letters, the *mashaykh* and the *'imam* expressed their concern for the state's security and their support of Druze military service in the IDF.[58]

The lack of support for the anti-conscription campaign can be attributed to the actions of the Israeli security agencies. As noted in Section 4.4, these agencies were keen to compel Druze military service since such service was vital if they were to achieve political stability amongst the community and the Arab minority. To prevent Shaykh Farhud from recruiting the Druze *mashaykh* to his campaign (that aimed to protect tradition and religion principles by preventing Druze military service), the IDF General Staff allowed Druze youth who practised *al-tawhid* religion to be exempt from compulsory service in the IDF. In a letter dated the 19th August 1957, the IDF Recruitment Centre informed Shaykh Amin Tarif that all Druze youth who practised Druze religious duties would be exempt from military service (Avivi 2007, 102).

Shortly afterwards, in a letter dating the 27th August 1957, 'Amous Gilad — the IDF's head of human resources — informed Shaykh Tarif that Druze women would also be exempt from military service and would not be called to serve. In the 1950s, the imposition of military service on Druze women would have

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[58] File: Druze Military Service. The Druze Archive. The University of Haifa.

conflicted with the cultural principle known as *al-'ard* (honour), which forbade Druze women from working outside of their villages or to come into intimate contact with men from outside the community.

A large number of Druze *mashaykh* perceived Druze military service as a remedy for the cultural subordination that the community had suffered during the British Mandate. As noted in Section 2.6, during the 1930s and 1940s the Druze on the Carmel and Galilee suffered collective punishment at the hands of the Arab rebels after they resorted to a politics of silence during the conflict to control Palestine. The Druze of Palestine were unable to protect themselves against the Palestinian rebels because they lacked weapons. This situation changed after Israel was established since many Druze served in the IDF and did have access to weapons.

The perception that military service was a cultural remedy was validated by the creation of the Minorities Unit with its dual loyalty towards its soldiers. Indeed, the general belief was that the Minorities Unit was formed to enforce Israel's security and to serve its Jewish majority but also to ensure the Druze community's *hifiz al-baq'a* as a cultural–religious group.[59] The duality of the Minorities Unit's loyalty amongst its soldiers and their extended families within Druze villages was symbolised in many ways. Great examples are the Unit's first Coat of Arms that depicts the Star of David and the Druze flag with its five colours and its two crossed swords (Figures 4.8).

Furthermore, from its inception, the Unit's official ceremonies were conducted at Druze holy locations, in particular at the Maqam al-Nabi Shu'ayb (Figure 4.9). This simplified the Minorities Unit's task of protecting the community as well as its holy places.[60] This dual loyalty is clearly evident in Figure 3.7, where Druze soldiers are shown standing to attention at the Druze holy place

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[59] Minorities Unit Report. The Druze Archive. The University of Haifa. File: Druze Service in the IDF.

[60] For more information on the IDF ceremony at the Maqam, see Firro (2001).

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of Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, in the presence of Shaykh Amin Tarif (their religious leader), Druze religious *mashaykh* and the heads of leading *ham'ayl*. After Israel was established, the Minorities Unit focused on patrolling the Northern borders of the country. Not once did the IDF official speaker need to justify the IDF Chief of Staff's decision to allocate the Minorities Unit to this duty since the Minorities Unit protected Druze villages on the Galilee from Palestinian guerrilla forces that threatened Israel's interests as well as Druze villagers.[61]

The link between military service and community rights for *hifiz al-baq'a* as a religious-cultural group were strengthened once the Israeli security agencies decided to allow armed Druze villagers to retain their weapons. Unlike Arabs from other religious communities, the Druze were not forced to handover their weapons to the Israeli authorities at the end 1948 War. The Druze villagers of Shafa-ʿAmer, for example, were allowed to keep their weapons after the Haganah occupied the town, at a time when local Sunni-Muslims and Christians were compelled to hand over their weapons at the Military Governor Centre.[62] Similarly, after the 'Operation Hiram' and the occupation of the Galilee, David Ben-Gurion requested that military governors allow the Druze to keep their weapons, on the condition that the weapons were registered with the relevant authorities (Ben-Gurion, in Avivi 2007, 154).

The relationship between Druze military service and community rights for *hifiz al-baq'a* was solidified once the Israeli authorities began rejecting the applications of Arab youths wanting to enlist with the IDF. This is despite the Security Service Law of 1949, a law based on a 'nation in arms' model that compelled every Israeli citizen to serve in the IDF once they turned eighteen. Indeed, in the early-1950s, the security agencies refused to allow thousands of

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[61] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Wajdi Serhan, Minority Unit Commander. 17th May 2013, Mghar. See also a documentary movie about the Minority Unit activity during the Second Lebanese War: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2DWizJsaHc (access date: 12th July 2015).

[62] It was Yigael Yadin who instructed the local military governor to allow the Druze of Shafa-ʿAmer to keep their weapons. In 1949, Yadin became the second Chief of Staff of the IDF.

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Christians and Arab-Muslim youths to enlist in the IDF.[63] This decision was welcomed by many Druze who saw this as a sign that the state's authorities were prioritising the Druze *hifiz al-baq'a* over their relationship with other Arab religious communities (Levy 2007, 117).

Figure 4.8   IDF Minorities Unit's Coat of Arms

Figure 4.9   Druze Soldiers from the Minorities Unit's marching at Maqam al-Al-Nabi Shu'ayb in Hitin (2013)

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[63] According to Avivi (2007), this was amongst the attempts made by Pinhas Lavon, the Minister of Defence, to put pressure on David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister and his political competitor. According to *al-Mirsad* newspaper, the large number of Arab youth who were ready to serve fuelled the concerns of the Israeli authorities, namely that Arabs might start demanding equal rights. Amnon Lien justified the government's refusal to allow these Arabs to enlist on the grounds that the Arabs' call to service was merely a test of their loyalty to the state (in Avivi 2007).

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In summary, a small group of Druze *mashaykh* opposed Druze military service in the IDF and protested against the Compulsory Service Law 1956. This group remained small, with no more than a few Druze *mashaykh* ever being recruited to the campaign during the 1950s and 1960s. The main reason for the limited success of this anti-conscription campaign was the Israeli authorities' efforts to turn Druze military service in the IDF into a perceived remedy for the cultural subordination that the Druze had suffered during Mandatory Palestine and into a new structure of opportunity that would be seen to preserve the community as a distinctive cultural group in the new state. Perhaps more interesting is the extent of the support that Druze youth and their families — the *fallahin* — gave to IDF service. This forms the topic of discussion for the following Section.

4.6   Military Service and *Fallahin* Politics of Loyalty

Dozens of Druze youth joined the IDF once the Compulsory Service Law 1956 came into force. Indeed, Druze service in the Minorities Unit increased year upon year. By the eve of the Six Days War of 1967 there were more than four hundred regular soldiers and officers in the Unit. The regular soldiers (in Hebrew, *sadir)* within the battalion were divided into four regiments, each of which served as part of the infantry forces, mainly along the state's Northern and Southern borders.[64] In addition to the regular soldiers, two thousand five hundred reserve soldiers (in Hebrew, *miluim*) served in the Unit's seven fighting companies and joined the regular service for several weeks each year.[65]

One of the main reasons for so many Druze soldiers enlisting during the aforementioned period was the perception, as held by Druze youth and their *fallahin* families, that military service in the IDF was a new structure of

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[64] For more about the Minorities Unit militant activity during the 1950s and the 1960s, see Avivi (2007, 116), Falah (2000, 227) and Zidan (2004).
[65] Every Israeli soldier has to serve for three years within the *sadir* framework and a period of one month every year within the *miluim* framework.

opportunity for their economic progress. In particular, IDF service within the *sadir* framework was a prerequisite for securing a career within one of Israel's security apparatus, such as the IDF, Israeli police border or the Israeli prison service. A Druze youth employed within one of these institutions received a monthly salary of sixteen lira in the 1960s, or a salary of twenty five lira if he served in the police border.[66]

In any case, employment within the security apparatus was more lucrative than *flahah* (agriculture) that, after the late 1960s, became a less sustainable source of income for most Druze *fallahin* because of the Israeli government's policy of land expropriation from Druze villagers: As will be discussed in Chapter 6, hundreds of *dunams* were expropriated from Druze *fallahin* during the first decade of the state of Israel. Indeed, most expropriated land was away from the residential areas of villages and within the agricultural areas, dramatically reducing potential income from agriculture.[67]

Employment within one of the Israeli security agencies also met the social needs of Druze youth and their families. The typical young Druze man was preoccupied with concerns about building his house and his *zawaj* (marriage) to a Druze woman. This desire had its roots in a culture where children outside of marriage were forbidden and where large families were seen as making major contributions to the basic social structure of a Druze man's extended *hamulah*, or, in Arabic, *al-dar* (home).[68] Employment within one of the security institutions meant that a Druze man could afford to build a house and marry without placing a financial burden on his already impoverished *fallahin* family.[69]

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[66] The difference between salaries explains also why so many Druze youth preferred to serve in the police border. Interview with Nahman Tal, the Head of the Arab Sector in the Shabak (The Secret Services). In Avivi (2002, 98).

[67] For more information on this topic, see Section 6.3. .

[68] *Al-dar* (the home) is ruled by a patriarchal system, where man and wife live with their unmarried daughters and all their sons and their wives and children. This extended family is united by living in one dwelling, under the same roof or in adjacent housing. For more information, see Stendel (1973, 71).

[69] According to Zureik, up until the mid-1960s, the fertility rate among Druze women was the highest in the country, at 7.49 children per woman, as compared to 4.68 children born to Christian women and 3.39 children to Jewish women (Zureik 2006, 12).

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Even for Druze youth who were not interested in a career within a security agency, IDF service was a prerequisite for their integration into the Israeli labour market. Indeed, after three years of *sadir* service, Druze youth were given what was known in Hebrew as *ti'udat shihrur* (a certificate of release from the IDF). Holders of *ti'udat shihrur* could gain employment in the emerging industrial areas, such as the Dead Sea, The Negev and Tal Yeruham — all of which, in the 1950s and 1960s, were inaccessible without *ti'udat shihrur* since they were considered 'security zones'.

Being a *ti'udat shihrur* holder was invaluable because it allowed a discharged Druze soldier to travel within Israel without first acquiring a permit from the military governor. *ti'udat shihrur* holders could even work within 'security zones'. The Israeli government had invested heavily in the industrial areas within 'security zones' during the 1960s and many discharged Druze soldiers secured profitable work in construction or other development projects at that time. According to Nahman Tal:

> "by the mid-1960s, you could find hundreds of Druze youth in every spot where work was to be done, as far as Eilat".[70]

The Qadmani of Yarka, for instance, became one of the wealthiest families in the country, after it secured construction contracts from the Israeli government. These contracts were in the emerging industries in the Negev and the Dead Sea.[71]

It is noteworthy that opportunities to work in areas within the 'security zones' after obtaining *ti'udat shihrur* came at the time that Druze villages in the Galilee were not being developed. As illustrated in Section 5.3, up until the mid-1960s, Druze villages in the Galilee under the military rule lacked any type of industrial development. Some villages even lacked road access and were

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[70] See Avivi (2002, 229). For further discussion on Druze workers in development areas, see the article published in *Haaretz*, 13th November 1966. Also, in Firro (1999, 192).
[71] Interview with Slaih Qadmani, 22nd June 2012, Yarka.

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completely cut off from major cities. This meant that any Druze who did not hold the right permission from the military governor or *ti'udat shihrur* struggled to visit or work within 'security zones'.[72]

Military service was also seen as empowering and vital for social progress within the community. After recruitment to the Minorities Unit, soldiers spent six months in military training during which time they learnt how to use their weapons and advanced military techniques. They were given daily Hebrew language classes, often taught by the *katzin tarbut* (cultural officer) of the Unit. This enabled soldiers to communicate with their Israeli commanders and other Israeli soldiers. Finally, soldiers of the Unit attended weekly *erev tarbut* (cultural evenings), at which lectures covering a variety of topics (including state and law, health and safety and mapping the country) were delivered (Zidan 2004, 109).[73]

By the time Druze soldiers were discharged from their three year *sadir* service, there were significant differences between them and their fellow villagers who had not served in the IDF. Druze villages lacked cultural and education institutions and, up until the mid-1960s, most villages only had elementary school provision. Ministry of Education reports indicate that over half of the community was considered illiterate at that time and most could not speak or write Hebrew – the official language of Israel (Falah 2000, 193).

Druze soldiers were eligible suitors for Druze girls who, otherwise, had a choice between marrying into poverty or marrying a relatively wealthy non-Druze, the highest infringement of the religion and *haram* (serious sin; Dana 2003, 123). An engaged soldier earned a monthly salary from which he could sponsor his fiancée during the *al-khutba* (engagement). His potential for

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[72] Most of the Arab villages, including the Druze villages, were under military rule between 1948 and 1966. For more information about the military government in Druze villages, see Avivi (2007, 44). On the topic of military government in the Arab sector, see Benziman and Mansur (1992, 36).

[73] The level of the illiteracy was so high amongst the soldiers that were recruited in November 1955, the Education Corp in the IDF provided intensive short courses for soldiers in order to improve their level of reading and writing , see Zidan (2004, 210).

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securing a position with one of the security apparatus meant he was also likely to be able to afford the *al-mahr* (the bridal price) that had to be paid to the fiancée's family.[74] Anish, a Druze woman from Shafa-'Amer, recalls how marrying a soldier was so desirable that, each Sunday morning, Druze girls in their early teens would stand behind their mothers to bless the soldiers returning from their tour of duty. Like other girls of her age, Anish would stand on the roof of her parents' house and follow her fiancée, until he boarded the bus at the only bus stop in the village.[75]

To conclude, by the early-1970s, thousands of Druze breadwinners were working within one of the Israeli security agencies. Work within any of these agencies was perceived as an opportunity for social progress within the community and economic progress for breadwinners and their *fallahin* families. According to Hassan (2000), the major income of more than twenty five percent of Druze breadwinners came from being employed by one of the Israeli security agencies, creating a new economic and social class within the Druze community, one which is known by its Hebrew name of *anshey bitahon* (men in security). The latter replaced the *fallahin*, who relied mainly on agriculture as a source of income. Hence, Druze traditional-conservative principles were replaced by *anshey bitahon*'s Israeli modern-secular principles.

4.7   Conclusion

As part of its policy of accommodation towards the Druze community, the Yishuv's leadership allowed Druze youth from the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya and fighters from the *Jabal al-'Arab* battalion to join the Haganah during the final stages of the 1948 War. This decision was welcomed by the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya, who perceived it as a new structure of opportunity for preserving the leading status that they had secured during the Yishuv period. The decision was also welcomed by many Syrian-Druze soldiers, who had arrived in Israel

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[74] For more on *al-mahr*, see Falah (2000, 133).
[75] Interview with Anish Sharouf, 16th June 2013, Shafa-'Amer.

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with the *Jabal al-'Arab* battalion and who envisaged service with the Haganah as a remedy for their impoverished economic status and as a new structure of opportunity for economic progress in the new state.

Figure 4.10   Religious Druze women at a large gathering in Dalyah al-Karmil (2013)

The Israeli authorities' decision to increase the number of Druze soldiers in the IDF, using what became known as 'Reserved Recruitment Phase B' of 1953 and Military Conscription Law of 1956, was welcomed by the leading Druze *ham'ayl* (namely the Tarifs of Julis, the Khanayfis of Shafa-'Amir, the Abu-Rukns of 'Isfya and the M'adi of Yarka). These *ham'ayl* saw the Israeli government's decision as a new structure of opportunity to preserve their leading status within the community.

Unlike leading Druze *ham'ayl*, some Druze intellectuals opposed and protested against Druze military service and the Compulsory Service Law 1956. They believed that the Israeli government's decision to allow Druze to serve in the IDF was divisive and intended to ensure political stability among the Arab minority and that the aim was not to achieve equality between the Druze and state's dominant group, the Jews. These intellectuals also believed that Druze, as part of the Palestinian minority that remained in Israel, like other Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, should not serve in the IDF.

The Druze intellectuals did not gain a great deal of support from the Druze. Instead, like leading Druze *ham'ayl* and Druze-Syrian soldiers, most Druze *mashaykh* welcomed the Israeli government's decision to allow Druze youth to serve in the IDF. With the notable exception of Shaykh Farhud and a few of his followers, most Druze *mashaykh* believed that Druze military service would remedy the cultural subordination that the community had suffered during Mandatory Palestine and create opportunities for ensuring the community *hifiz al-baq'a* as a religious-cultural group in the new state.

The decision to enlist Druze into the IDF was also welcomed by many Druze youth and their *fallahin* families. By the early-1970s, hundreds of Druze served within *sadir* and *miluim* frameworks and had secured careers within one of the Israeli security agencies. This, in turn, had resulted in a new economic and social stratum within the community, known by its Hebrew name of *anshey bitahon.* Druze youth and their families perceived Druze military service in the IDF and a career within one of Israel's security agencies as a new structure of opportunity for economic and social progress, both within their own community and the wider Israeli society.

The community's encouragement and support of service within the IDF — one of the most agencies most strongly identified with the state — lends weight to the argument put forward in Section 1.4, namely that a policy of accommodation will result in the subordinate cultural group resorting to a politics of loyalty within a polarised society. In the aforementioned Section, it was proposed that subordinate groups, or elements therein, are likely to resort to a politics of loyalty if they perceive the arrangements applied as part of policy of accommodation as creating a new structure of opportunity for consolidating the leading status of their political elite, the economic progress of breadwinners within the community and the preservation of the group as a culturally distinctive group. These conditions were met during the first three decades of the state of Israel and, hence, Druze resorted to a politics of loyalty. However, this loyalty, as the following Chapter explains, was later replaced by more contentious forms of politics.

Chapter 5

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The Predicament of Druze Local Councils and the Druze Politics of Protest

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The miserable conditions in our villages are a direct result of the Israeli government's discriminatory policy, which, for all its promises of change, remained *hibr ʿala wraq* (ink on paper).

—Hamd Sʿaib.[1]

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[1]Interviews with Hamd Sʿaib, the HDLCs between 1984 and 1988, 16th August 2014. Abu Snan. See also, Druze Demonstrating in Jerusalem, *Marriv* newspaper, 21st May 1991 and Atashi (1997, 248).

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5.1   Introduction

In May 1991, hundreds of Druze from the Carmel and the Galilee demonstrated outside the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, in Jerusalem. This demonstration was one of many that were organised by the HDLCs during the late-1980s and the early-1990s and, like previous demonstrations, the protestors stood against what HDLC leaders called the *siyasah al-tamyiz al-'unsriah* (policy of racial discrimination) of the Israeli government towards Druze villages and their local councils.   The dozens of demonstrators marched for *musawah* (equal rights) and fair government budget allocations between Druze villages and neighbouring Jewish settlements (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Druze religious and political leadership, demonstrating outside the Knesset in Jerusalem during the winter of 1985

This Chapter examines the relationship between the lack of development within Druze villages (in terms of infrastructure and public service provision) and the increase in Druze protests since the early-1980s. As illustrated herein, many leading Druze *ham'ayl*, *lujnah al-mubadrah al-Durziyah* activists (IDC), Pro-Integration Movement (PIM) members and *Ktsinim meshuhrarim* (ex-service officers) resorted to a politics of protest that involved general strikes

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and demonstrations in Jerusalem. These protests were motivated by what was seen as discrimination against the Druze because of their religious identity, a discrimination embodied in the government's policy that meant development gaps between the poorly developed Druze villages and the well developed neighbouring Jewish settlements continued to exist.

The Chapter provides further evidence for the existence of a relationship between a policy of accommodation and a subordinate cultural group's politics of loyalty (see also Section 1.4). It is argued that a subordinate cultural group will resort to a politics of loyalty if the group perceives the arrangements that form part of a policy of accommodation as a new structure of opportunity that consolidate: (1) economic progress of the masses within the group; (2) the group's preservation as a distinctive cultural group and; (3) the leading status of the political elite within the group.

This Chapter also provides a comprehensive example of the relationship between policy of accommodation and a subordinate group's politics of protest. It is argued that a subordinate cultural group will resort to a politics of protest if it perceives the arrangements that form part of a policy of accommodation as being major reasons for: (1) the subordinate economic status of the masses; (2) the group's cultural subordination and; (3) threats to their political elite's leading status.

Section 5.2 examines why leading local *ham'ayl* welcomed the Israeli government's decision to keep the *al-mukhtrah* system when Israel was established, despite Druze community calls for elected councils. It is shown that *al-mukhtrah* complemented the efforts of the leading party, Mapai, to preserve its state leadership and the positions of Israeli security agencies responsible for maintaining political stability within the Druze community and the wider Arab minority. Most importantly, local leading *ham'ayl* perceived *al-mukhtrah* as a structure of opportunity to preserve their leading status within their villages.   It was this perception that resulted in leading *ham'ayl*

expressing loyalty towards the state and supporting the Mapai during general elections to the Knesset.

Section 5.3 deciphers why the CDI proposed the election of new local councils within Druze villages and why the CDI failed to mobilise support from the Druze *fallahin.* It is argued that members of the CDI saw these local councils as being part of the Israeli government's plan to ensure political stability among the Druze community, rather than as the instruments for creating equality between Druze villages and their neighbouring Jewish settlements. It is also revealed that, unlike some Druze intellectuals, most Druze *fallahin* villagers (who, in the 1960s, accounted for the majority of Druze) believed that local councils would improve the infrastructure and public services within their villages. Consequently, *fallahin*, like the leading *ham'ayl,* resorted to a politics of loyalty and voted for to the Mapai party.

Section 5.4 examines why IDC members protested during the mid-1970s. Such protests were typified by large demonstrations such as the one that took place at Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, in April 1974. It is shown that the IDC's activists protested against the Israeli government because of the disparity between Druze villages and neighbouring Jewish settlements. According to IDC activists, this disparity was the direct result of the Israeli government's discrimination against the Druze community. The IDC perceived the Israeli government's policy as part of strategy that was intended to subordinate the economic and cultural status of the Arab minority in Israel.

Section 5.5 examines why, during the 1970s, the IDC failed to recruit Druze outside its own circles to its cause. It is revealed that many of Druze villagers remained loyal to the state because the *Arabist* members of the ruling party (Mapai) and the security agencies, made extensive efforts to ensure that the Israeli government's policy was perceived as being motivated by accommodation for equality. This was mainly achieved by the Ben-Dor Committee that, after the IDC's demonstrations at Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, promised to secure a long list of privileges for the Druze community and for

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their local councils. Importantly, the community leadership saw Ben-Dor's positioning as a structure of opportunity to maintain their leading status within the community. Similarly, the *mashaykh* saw the Ben-Dor Committee as a way of preserving the Druze cultural group and as a way for the masses to make economic progress.

Section 5.6 examines why there has been an increasingly evident politics of protest among the Druze community since the mid-1980s. This form of political action has taken the form of long term strikes within Druze villages and large demonstrations at the Knesset and at the Prime Minister's Office, in Jerusalem. It is argued that sub-groups of the Druze community that had traditionally identified with a politics of loyalty, such as Druze leading *ham'ayl*, resorted to a politics of protest when they began to perceive the Israeli government's discriminative policy and lack of development in their villages as a threat to their leading status in the community. A politics of protest has also become more prevalent within the masses, because they began to perceive the same policy and the same lack of development as the reason behind the economic and cultural subordination of the group.

5.2   *Al-Mukhtrah* and Druze Leading *Ham'ayl's* Politics of Loyalty

During Mandatory Palestine, the public affairs of Druze villages, like those of other Arab villages, were overseen by local *mukhtar*. By consensus, *al-mukhtrah* was chosen from the largest *hamulah* in the village on the basis of his ability to resolve inter-family disputes and broker reconciliations, but also because of his *rujulah* (manliness) and ability to defend against threats to his village.[2] Some *mkhatir,* such as Shaykh Najib Mansur of 'Isfya (Figure 5.2), were also recognised by the British authorities in Palestine and even received a regular salary for their services. However, other *mkhatir*, such as Shaykh

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[2] For more about a *al-mukhtar's* roles during Mandatory Palestine, see Baer (1964, 162) and Al-Haj and Rosenfeld (1990, 29).

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'Abdallah Faris of Hurfesh, were only recognised by the local villagers and the surrounding villages and were not in receipt of such salaries.[3]

The emergence of the Jewish-Yishuv as a political and economic power in Mandatory Palestine created new ways for some Druze *mkhatir* to consolidate their political, social and economic status within their villages. These *mkhatir* engaged with the Yishuv's leadership on personal matters and issues of relevance to other *fallahin.* Hassan al-Wahsh, the *mukhatr* of Mghar was a good example of how local *mkhatir* addressed the Yishuv's political leadership for assistance with personal matters.[4]

Figure 5.2   Shaykh Najib Mansur: The *mukhtar* of 'Isfya and the head of the local council between 1959-1969 (right) with David Ben-Gurion (centre) and the Shaykh's son Kamal (left). Copyright: Tawfeek Halabi of Dalyah al-Karmil.

Reiterating, Yishuv's leadership invested a great deal of effort in consolidating 'friendly' relationships with Druze local *mkhatir*. This was part of a wider

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[3] Interviews with Kamal Manosur, son of Shaykh Najib Manosur, 26th July 2012. 'Isfya; Interview with Kamil Faris, 2nd August 2012, Hurfesh. For more on the status and the authorities of the *al-mukhtrah* during Mandatory Palestine, see Baer (1964, 164).
[4] For more about Shaykh Hassan al-Wahsh, see Section 2.4.

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strategy to develop what Ben-Tzvi called 'friendly' relationships with the Druze *ham'ayl* of *Eretz Yisrael*. Such relationships would ensure that *ham'ayl* did not join forces with the anti-Israeli Arab rebels. As noted in Section 2.4, the local *mkhatir* played an important role in this respect, particularly in light of two major developments. The first of these developments was the famous dispute between Tarif and the Khayrs over community leadership, during the 1940s. This culminated in both of these *ham'ayl* failing to deliver a solution that guaranteed the community's 'neutral' position with respect to the ongoing conflict in Palestine. The second development centred on the fact that local villagers were loyal, first and foremost, to their leading local *ham'ayl* and *mukhtar*, rather than to any other authority within the community.

As a consequence of the Yishuv's leadership's efforts, Druze *mkhatir* followed the example of Druze leading *ham'ayl* (such as the Tarifs and the M'adi) and resorted to a politics of silence during the 1948 War.[5] On the eve of the 1948 War, Shaykh Najib Mansur — the *mukhtar* of 'Isfya — met with Hajj Amin al-Husayni in Aley, Lebanon. The meeting formed part of the anti-Jewish forces' efforts to recruit the Druze of Palestine to their cause. However, Shaykh Najib Mansur rejected Amin's invitation and instructed his followers to return home to their villages in the Carmel and the Galilee and not to take part in the conflict (Avivi 2007, 57).[6]

Because the Druze resorted to a politics of silence during the 1948 War, the Israeli authorities allowed Druze *mkhatir* to maintain and use their positions in the period after Israel was established. In 'Isfya, the village on the Carmel, for example, Shaykh Najib Mansur, like many *mkhatir* who had served during Mandatory Palestine, retained his position in Israel and became the official state representative of his village. Shaykh 'Abdallah Faris was the *mukhtar* of Hurfesh and remained in his position until the establishment of the local council in 1961.[7]

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[5] My interviews, as well as historical documents, reveal that none of the Druze *mkhatir* opposed the Jewish establishment in Mandatory Palestine.

[6] "Pressure on the Druze", 11th November 1947. The Israel State Archives. File: 1/57/79.

[7] *Ibid.* Interview with Kamil Faris.

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The Israeli government's decision to retain Druze *mkhatir* after Israel was established resulted in protests by DCC members and the early discharge of Druze soldiers.[8]   DCC activists, who longed for change in their villages,[9] realised the advantages of elected local councils: Local councils were similar to those appointed in Jewish settlements that, unlike *mkhatir*, handled public affairs and development of the infrastructure within their settlements. The DCC demanded these provisions be made available for their own villages. Salman M'adi of Yarka, for instance, recalled signing a petition in 1957. This petition was delivered to Shlomu Vaknim, the head of the *al-dw'air al-'Arabiyah* (the Arab section) within the Interior Ministry and demanded that an elected local council be established in Yarka.[10]

The DCC and activists like Salman M'adi believed that it was elected councils that catalysed developments within Jewish settlements. Indeed, some Jewish local councils founded during the Yishuv period were responsible for the superior infrastructure and public services seen within their designated settlements. Such improvements included better levels of education and health and safety as well as standards of water supply, waste disposal and public access, the likes of which were not seen in most Druze villages until the late-1950s (Benziman and Mansur 1992 and Landau 1969).

Calls for change did not gain momentum because most Druze villages' public affairs were still being managed by unelected *mkhatir* a situation that did not change until the late-1960s. In fact, only two villages on the Carmel ('Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil) had appointed local councils to work alongside the local *mkhatir,* Shaykh Najib Mansur, for instance, remained *al-mukhtar* until the early-1960s (Avivi 2002, 247). Other Druze communities in the Galilee, such as Bayt-Jan and Hurfesh, were recognised as Druze villages and were able to

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[8] See Section 3.5 for more information about the DCC.
[9] For more on the debate over the position of *al-mukhtrah*, see Landau (1969, 158), Landau (1993, 158), Avivi (2002, 278) and *'Al-Hamishmar* newspaper, 25th June 1950. Additional source: Interview with Salman M'adi, 22nd October 2011, Yarka.
[10] By the British Mandate, many Jewish settlements were already being run by elected local councils. See Benziman and Mansour (1992, 183).

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elect local councils (by the authority of the Interior Ministry of 1964), but, nonetheless, continued to be run by *mkhatir* (Avivi 2002, 247).

Al-mukhtrah stayed in power in Druze villages because of the Mapai's *'Arabstim.* This party was keen to stay in power and *al-mukhtrah* was vital for achieving this goal. Indeed, Mapai's Arabists were aware of the influence *al-mukhtrah* had in their villages and of the local villagers' loyalty to their-*mkhatir.* Mapai's Arabists, as discussed in Section 3.6, were keen to use the *mkhatir* influence to secure the majority vote for Mapai's Arab-Lists on Election Day (Avivi 2002, 226).

In exchange for being allowed to stay in their positions, Arab and Druze *mkhatir* became the main *kabalni kulot* (vote contractors) in their villages. In other words, they ensured a large turn out of villagers at the general elections and that, more importantly, those villagers who cast votes voted for one of the Leading Party Arab-Lists. Arguably, Arab *mkhatir* were responsible for Mapai's Arab-Lists securing more than ninety per cent of the votes cast by many Arab and Druze villagers during the general elections to the Knesset in the first decade of the state of Israel (Cohen 1989).

The Israeli security agencies, including the military government, the Police and Shabak preferred the a*l-mukhtrah* system to that of elected local councils. This is because replacing *al-mukhtrah* by elected councils invoked elections, the right of expression and the right to campaign — ideals that contradicted these agencies' agenda, namely to maintain political stability using military rule (Jiryis 1976). The Israeli security agencies' concerns about elected councils were clearly expressed by Colonel Eli Melekh, head of the military government, when he addressed a committee that Ben-Gurion presided over. This committee was set up to discuss Arab and Druze participation in national and local elections. According to Melekh, the military government would not allow free movement and freedom of propaganda in security zones.[11] In another

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[11] A letter from the head of the military government to the Minister of Defence and Interior Minister, 13th December 1948. The Israel State Archives. Interior Ministry. File: G/12/2201.

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meeting, this time of the Northern Regional Committee (NRC) that took place in August 1954, the election of a local council in the Druze village of al-Bqi'ah was opposed because:

> "...in principle, the committee does not favour elected local councils within Arab settlements because it is easier to manipulate disorganised individuals (referring to *al-mukhtrah*s) to be a self-aware and politically organised public figures.." (Cohen 2010, 202).[12]

Another, key reason for retaining the authority of *al-mukhtrah* relates to the relationships between *al-mukhtrah*s and their *ham'ayl*.[13] The latter saw the *al-mukhtrah*s as political structures that should be safeguarded in order to ensure their *hamulah*'s supremacy within their villages and within the wider community. Traditionally, public meetings within villages took place in *al-mukhtar's mazafah* (guest room) and were attended by local villagers who would meet official representatives and be informed about public matters that affected their villages (Figure 5.3).[14] The *mukhtar* also represented his village at official meetings, such as meetings with government officials and community leaders. For example, on the eve of the 1948 War, Shaykh Najib Mansur (the *mukhtar* of 'Isfya) represented the Carmel villages at a meeting with Hajj Amin al-Husayni. The Shaykh also represented these villages in June 1953, during a meeting with Amnon Yanai, the head of the Minorities Unit. This meeting was convened to discuss Druze service in the IDF.[15]

The *mkhatir* and their *ham'ayl* opposed the election of local councils. They feared that innovation may threaten the very political structure that had helped to secure their political status in their villages (Al-Haj and Rosenfeld

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[12] For more information about the official Israeli view of elected bodies among the Arab minority, see Benziman and Mansur (1992, 184).
[13] On *al-mukhtrah's* opposition to elected local councils within the Arab villages, see Ghanem (2001, 138-142) and Haj and Rosenfeld (1990, 51).
[14] See Baer (1964, 164) for more information about the role of *al-mukhtrah*s in different areas of the Near Middle East.
[15] For more information about this meeting, see Section 4.3.

1990, 29).[16] For instance, the *mkhatir* were government officials and were in close contact with Mapai's *'Arabstim* and central government officials charged with Druze affairs. The *mkhatir*, as a result of their positions, could conduct *wastah* between local villagers and government officials in personal and public matters. Kamel Saleh Faris, the son of Shaykh 'Abdallah Faris, the *mukhtar* of Hurfesh, recalled how, every evening, *the mazafah* of his father's residence was packed with local villagers seeking assistance with matters, such as the water supply to their land, driving licenses and tax revenues.[17]

Figure 5.3   The *mukhtar*'s *mazafah* (circa 1940). Credit: University of Dundee Archive Services. MS 38/1/7/27.

The leading *ham'ayl*'s support of the *al-mukhtrah*s was motivated by their own desire to retain economic supremacy. As the official representatives of Druze villages, *mukhtar* received every government subsidy that was allocated to their villages and were responsible for distributing goods to local families. In the early-1950s, the *mukhtar* of Dalyah al-Karmil, Shaykh Qasim Halabi (Figure 5.4), received the food supply issued by the Ministry of Minorities for his

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[16] A similar argument was put forward by Landau (1959 and 1969). According to Elazar (1987, 163), some *mkhatir* used the excuse that elected councils would increase the involvement of authorities in village affairs and increase their tax burden.

[17] Interview with Kamil Faris, 2nd August 2012, Hurfesh.

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village.[18] According to Avivi (2002, 227), certain *mkhatir* had even took advantage of their positions and distributed goods in away that unfairly advantaged their own relatives.[19]

Figure 5.4   Shaykh Qasim Halabi (1912-1974). Shaykh Qasim Halabi was the *mukhtar* of Dalyah al-Karmil between 1940 and 1951 and head of the local council between 1953 and 1957.

In summary, the Israeli government decided to maintain the *al-mukhtrah* system after Israel was established, despite DCC calls to replace this system with that of elected local councils. The DCC saw *al-mukhtrah* as a device used by the state to achieve political stability rather than a means to create equality between the Druze and the Jewish majority.   The Mapai party, however, welcomed *al-mukhtrah* because they complemented the Mapai's political ambitions for the Druze community and helped the security agencies to achieve political stability among the entire Arab minority. *Al-mukhtrah* was also welcomed by the *al-mukhtrah*s and their *ham'ayl* because of the perception that *al-mukhtrah* would create opportunities for maintaining their leading status in their villages.   After all, it was the *al-mukhtrah*s that

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[18] A letter from the Ministry of Minorities, 17th July 1949. The Israel State Archives. File: J/56/1319.

[19] It should be emphasises that the Avivi does not mention specific names.

encouraged leading *ham'ayl* to resort to a politics of loyalty and to vote for the Mapai.

5.3   New Local Councils and the *Fallahin* Politics of Loyalty

The *mukhtrah* system in Druze villages did not last long and by the late-1960s most Druze villages had elected local councils that were equivalent to those elected in 'Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil in the mid-1950s. All Druze villages on the Galilee were recognised as villages by the Interior Ministry, enabling them to elect local councils: Yarka's local council was recognised in 1964, Bayt-Jan's council was recognised in 1965 and, shortly afterwards, Kfur Smai'a and al-Bqi'ah were united under one co-opted elected local council that represented both villages (Avivi 2007).

The reality is that there was considerable pressure to replace unelected *mkhatir* with elected local councils. This pressure originated from the Arab Department of the Interior Ministry. From the mid-1950s, officials from this department complained about the difficulties of overseeing two different systems of local authority, namely *al-mukhtrah* for Arabs and local councils for Jews. In particular, officials were aggrieved about the difficulty of authorising large scale-projects in Druze villages and that required statutory approval — approval that local councils, but not *mkhatir*, could give. Hence, government companies in charge of such projects, including Makorot (the national water company) and Hevrat ha-Hshaml (the electricity company), needed guarantees from statutory authorities before they could begin projects in Arab and Druze villages.[20]   Makorot, for instance, refused to install running water in these villages before the local council signed contracts that ensured Makorot would be remunerated (Landau 1969, 159).

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[20] Local Council Law (1951) stated that each Israeli constituency would be managed by a local council that would be known by the same name as the constituency. The first council members were to be elected by the Interior Minister, while successive local councils were to be elected by the local inhabitants. For more information on this, see Glnour (1993, 791).

Mapai's political competitors, including other Jewish-Zionist parties, criticised the *al-mukhtrah* system. These parties saw how Mapai's Arabists abused their positions as *mkhatir*, to bolster Arab votes for Mapai's Arab-Lists during elections to the Knesset. Criticism of this practice intensified when, in 1955, the Ahhdut ha-H'avudah Party was formed from within the Mapam's ranks. The Ahhdut ha-H'avudah Party was now competing with both Mapam and Mapai for Arab votes. Yisrael Bar-Yehuda, the Interior Minister at the time, was the first to submit a report to the Knesset on this matter. He recorded that the military government's refusal to establish local councils in Arab and Druze villages was driven by the fear that Mapai would lose power in the Arab Sector (Cohen 2010, 108).

The Israeli security agencies also changed their view of elected local councils. They realised that their efforts to achieve political stability would be equally effective with local councils in place, particularly once the security agencies and the Interior Ministry had agreed that council member lists must be pre-approved by the security agencies (Avivi 2007, 293 and Hillel 2010, 207).[21] For example, after the Interior Ministry authorised the local council of al-Bqi'ah, there was a four year delay before the council was actually formed because the military governor refused to accept its composition (Avivi 2007, 291 and Cohen 2010, 205). Moreover, the security agencies ensured that all local councils remained dependent on the central government, particularly for financial support. Hence, no local councils could operate without the support of the central government and the security agencies (Landau 1993, 145).

The local councils within Druze villages did not meet with the approval of Druze intellectuals who, in the mid 1960s, founded the CDI. The CDI protested against the newly constituted local councils because they perceived them as devices that the Israeli government had installed to consolidate political stability without significant changes in terms of the status of Druze villages. On 26th August 1966, CDI members convened their inaugural meeting in the

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[21] Minutes of Regional Committee, 21st December 1955. IDF Archive. File: 12/58/151. See also Avivi (2002, 246).

village of Kfur Yasif, near the holy place of Maqam al-Nabi Khadir. Its members expressed their anger towards the Israeli government's policy that had left their villages with inadequate infrastructure and public service provision. A petition was also signed during the meeting and delivered to the Mayor of Haifa, Abba Hushi. The petition demanded Abba Hushi use his influence with the Israeli government to encourage investment in Druze villages, with a view to equalising Druze and Jewish settlements (Firro 1999, 185).

In their petition, the CDI emphasised the Israeli government's relatively poor investment in Druze villages, as compared to the investment in infrastructure and public services that was seen in Jewish settlements. Particular reference was made to the disparity between investment in Druze villages located at the Upper Galilee and equivalent Jewish settlements. According to the petitioners, some villages (such as Kisra, Kfur Smaiʿa and Yanuh) even lacked access roads and, as a result, could only be reached foot or by horse/donkey. In January 1964, these three villages were struck by a measles epidemic that killed twenty four children. The Israeli press blamed the lack of access by road for the failure of medical assistance to reach these children in time. The press also discovered that nine Druze villages lacked access to clean water and electricity, even though such amenities were available in even the smallest Jewish settlement in the same area (Atashi 2001, 150).

The CDI's attempts to rally Druze support for their protests involved meetings at the homes of some CDI leaders. Yet the CDI's campaign did not gain momentum, partly because Mapai's Arabists refused to collaborate with such organisations. This stance ensured that the heads of leading *ham'ayl* retained control of village affairs and continued to support Mapai's Arab-Lists.[22] The Israeli security agencies also opposed the activities of CDI out of fear that such organisations might threaten political stability within the community.[23] This was evident at the Central Committee meeting of the 7th November 1966, during which Abrham Ahituv, the representative of the Shabak, announced his

[22] For more information about the CDI activities, see Section 3.5.
[23] See Section 3.6.

organisation's disapproval of CDI activities on the basis that such activities might encourage Druze youth to join Arab-National organisations (Avivi 2007, 321).

The CDI's activities were also condemned by the Tarifs — the community's religious leadership and leading local *ham'ayl*.[24]   The Tarifs were concerned about the consequences of the CDI's activities for their legitimacy as the leading *hamulah* of the community.   According to Faraj (1992, 83), Shaykh Amin Tarif refused to handover the keys to Maqam al-Nabi Khadir in the village Kfur Yasif.   As a result, CDI members were forced to meet at nearby house that belonged to Nawaf Milhm, a CDI activist.   The leading local *ham'ayl*, who continued to hold powerful positions within the new local councils, also opposed CDI activities because of the perceived threat to their leading status within their villages.

Most of the thirty four thousand Druze that lived in Israel during the 1960s also opposed the CDI's activities because they saw the newly established local councils as a new structure of opportunity for their villages' development (Table II). In fact, over ninety percent of Druze in most villages expressed their appreciation of the councils by voting to elect new local council assemblies. Most importantly, a massive Druze vote went to the Mapai's Lists that were most committed to the development of Druze villages (Al-Haj and Ronsfeld 1990).

The position adopted by most Druze is, perhaps, predictable when one takes into account that, in the 1960s, the largest proportion of the Druze community was composed of *fallahin* families that relied on basic *flahah* (agriculture) as their main source of income. Most Druze *fallahin* had little involvement with Jewish developments and could not relate to the CDI activists' constant comparison of development in Druze villages with development in Jewish settlements.   Indeed, most *fallahin* families viewed the development, albeit scant, that they had witnessed in their villages since Israel was established as a

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[24] See also the Tarif's stance towards the CDI (Section 3.6).

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huge improvement on the lack of investment and development they had witnessed during British Mandate.[25] Unlike some CDI activists and discharged soldiers, the *fallahin* perceived the newly formed local councils as being responsible for the positive changes they had seen in their villages during the 1950s and the 1960s, including changes that enabled *al-dw'air al-'Arabiyah (*Arab desks) in the Ministry of Minorities, Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Education to allocate government resources intended to bring development to these villages. The plans were publicly known by their Hebrew name as *tokhniyot pituah* (development programmes; Landau 1969).

As an example, the Israeli government's 'Five Year Plan of 1962-1967' aimed to improve the infrastructure and the level of public services within *Sictor 'Aravi* (Hebrew; Arab Sector), which refers to all Arab villages — including Druze villages.[26] An early improvement involved the two villages on the Carmel — Dalyah al-Karmil and 'Isfya —being connected to the city of Haifa via a paved road. Later, in 1954, the village of Bayt-Jan, located on the upper part of the Galilee, was connected by a main road to Ramh-al-Bqi'ah. In 1963, Hurfesh, which is located on the border with Lebanon, was connected by a main road that ran between Nahariyah and Miron. 'Ain al-'Asad, once considered the most isolated of the Druze villages with population of less than four hundred, was also connected by the road between Nahariyah and Safad (Avivi 2007).

Prior to the Israeli state, Druze villagers relied entirely on rain water wells, as none of the Druze villages were connected to the water company's network. This situation changed when seven Druze villages were connected to the Makorot water network in the early-1960s. These villages included Shafa-'Amir, Mghar, Ramh, Kfur Yasif, Hurfesh, Dalyah al-Karmil, and 'Isfya. In addition, Bayt-Jan was connected to the water network in 1966. In 1967, al-

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[25] For more information about the British authorities' investment in Druze villages, see Section 2.3.
[26] Five Year Plan for the Arab and Druze villages Development, February 1962. The Israel State Archives. File: J/1/1653/6337. For a brief review of the Five Year Plan of 1962, see Avivi (2007, 271).

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Bqi'ah and Kfur Smai'a were connected to the water network and the last and most remote village, 'Ain al-'Asad, was connected in 1969.[27]

Further improvements in public services were evident once local councils were established in the Druze villages. The education system, in particular, was developed such that the number of primary schools rose from two to thirteen by the mid-1960s. This meant that almost every Druze village had at least one primary school. Some villages, like Bayt-Jan and Hurfesh benefited from two primary schools and, by the late-1950s, provided for the educational needs of dozens of pupils (Falah 2000). The improvements in male education were impressive. The education of girls had increased to 40.6% by mid-1960s. The number of Druze teachers also increased, from eight male teachers in 1948 to 180 teachers in the early-1970s, of which 23 were female (Ben-Dor 1976).

Figure 5.5   Villagers of Yarka dancing *al-dabkah* outside the village local council during the early 1970s

To summarise, some Druze intellectuals opposed the Israeli government's policy for Druze villages and resorted to a politics of protest, even after local councils were established. In particular, CDI members saw the newly formed local councils as part of the Israeli government's attempts to maintain political

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[27] This information was collected from various sources, including: The Druze Archive, the University of Haifa, Haifa. Falah (2000, 87) and Avivi (2007, 272).

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stability within the Druze community rather than as an effort to achieve equality between Druze and Jewish settlements. By way of contrast, in the 1960s, most Druze villagers were *fallahin* who perceived the new local councils as a new structure of opportunity for their villages' development and, consequently, resorted to a politics of loyalty, expressed by casting their votes for the leading party's lists.

5.4   Accommodation for Stability and IDC's Politics of Protest

The Israeli government's *tokhniyot pituah* improved the infrastructure and public services seen in Druze villages but failed to address the disparity between the infrastructure and services available in Druze villages and their neighbouring Jewish settlements. The Galilee witnessed a heroic level of development in Jewish settlements, after Levi Eshkul's government embarked upon *yehud ha-Galil* (Judaising the Galilee). This plan was officially authorised during the mid-1960s and called for eleven new settlements to be established in the Galilee and for existing Jewish towns, such as Nazareth Illit, Karmiel and M'alot, to be expanded (Benziman and Mansour 1992, 166).[28]

In addition to thousands of new homes, all new Jewish settlements and neighbourhoods were provided with modern infrastructure and advanced public services. These settlements benefited from services such as modern schools, public transport, emergency centres, public gardens, leisure clubs and community centres. Moreover, Jewish neighbourhoods were well connected by networks of well lit modern roads and were served by water and sewage networks. The Jewish settlement of Karmiel, for example, was established in 1964 at the heart of the Galilee. A mere stone's throw away from Druze

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[28] That is in addition to fifty small new Jewish settlements and seven towns (Kiryat Shmona in 1949; Shlomi in 1950; Hatzorr and Migda ha-'Amek in 1952; Nazaret, Illit and M'alot in 1957 and Karmiel in 1964) that were built before the Six Days War, in 1967 (Benziman and Mansour 1992, 166).

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villages such as Rāmh and Sajur, Karmiel witnessed significant development in all the aforementioned areas during the 1970s.[29]

This situation contrasted sharply with that of Druze villages: Not a single new Druze settlement was built on the Carmel or in the Galilee. The number of Druze villages remained the same as when the state was established, despite the Israeli government's commitment to establish a new Druze village to house newly wed Druze couples. In fact, in 1959, during a visit to Shaykh Amin Tarif in Julis, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion reiterated the promise to establish a new Druze village for the community — a promise that was never delivered (Avivi 2007).

Whilst *tokhniyot pituah* provided some development within Druze villages, villages continued to lack vital infrastructure and public services. For example, up until the early-1970s, the four Druze villages on the Upper Galilee (Bayt-Jan, Kfur Smaiʿa, Sajur and ʿAin Al-ʾAsad) were not connected to the electricity grid and, like other Druze villages; they lacked basic public services enjoyed by their Jewish neighbours, including secondary schools, public transportation and medical centres (IDC periodical, July 1974).

In the early-1970s, a group of Druze intellectuals and *mashaykh* established the IDC (Figure 5.6). The IDC's main aim was to address the disparity between Druze and Jewish settlements. Its main activities include Amin Khyer who, as discussed in Section 3.5, established the DCC in the 1950s, and who, at the time, opposed some major elements relating to the community's recognition.[30] IDC board members included Shaykh Farhud Farhud of Ramh (Figure 4.7) and the famous poet, Samih al-Qasim (Figure 4.6), who as noted in Section 4.4, was already campaigning against Druze military service in the IDF.[31] The IDC spoke out against the Israeli government's so-called *siyasah al-tamyiz al-ʿunsriah* (policy of racial discrimination) against the Druze. According to the

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[29] For more information about the development of Karmiel, visit:
http://www.karmiel.muni.il/Pages/default.aspx. (access date: 12th May 2015).
[30] See Section 3.5.
[31] See Section 4.4.

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IDC, this discrimination was intended to protect the hegemony of the Jewish majority over state's financial and natural resources and, in turn, increase the socioeconomic gap between the Druze and the Jews (Farhoud 2005, 21 and 212 and Atashi 2001, 162)*.*

Figure 5.6   IDC meeting at Shafa-ʿAmir, 1978. From left to right: Nazih Hassun, Tawfiq Ziad, Samih al-Qasims, ʿAisam Khatib and Naif ʾAslim.

The IDC famously interrupted the annual *ziyarah* to Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, on 25th April 1974: Members of the IDC, and their supporters from all the Druze villages, gathered during the early hours of the 25th April to protest against this so-called *ziyarah siyasiah* (political pilgrimage). The IDC accused the Druze religious leadership (namely the leading *ham'ayl* and *mashaykh*) of being committed to *brit damim* (blood covenant) and for trying to exploit the annual *ziyarah* to the Maqam to curry favour from the state.[32] They even interrupted

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[32] For more on Druze *ziyarah* to the Maqam, see Section 3.3. See also Firro (2005, 217).

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the speech of the honorary guest and the official representative of the state, Yitzhak Rabin, and prevented Rabin from making his way to the stage, until they were sure that the IDC's head, Shaykh Farhud Farhud, would be able to speak from the main stage — the same stage that proponents of *brit damim* (blood-covenant) were speaking from.

It is difficult to ignore the IDC's mistrust and mockery of members of the community that remained loyal to the state, such as the Tarifs, leading *ham'ayl,* the PIM, *anshey bitahon* and the Druze Zionist Movement (DZM).   These feelings were reflected by the language that IDC leaders used when accusing pro-state elements of betraying the community's interests for the sake of their own interests.[33]

In order to recruit Druze to their campaign, IDC members initially distributed leaflets to *ziyarah* participants. The leaflets made comparisons between the underdevelopment seen within Druze villages around Carmel and the Galilee and the more impressive developments within neighbouring Jewish settlements. One leaflet, which is available from the DAUH, states:

> "Many of our villages have witnessed no development and lack the most vital projects. Where are the electricity projects in Bayt-Jan, Kisra, Kfur Smai'a, Sajur, 'Ain al-'Asad? Almost one third of the Druze population lives without electricity".

Another IDC leaflet states:

> "Many of our villages lack proper schools, clubs, industrial areas, structural planning, licenses for building, proper streets, electricity, public transportation, medical centres, subsidies, mortgages and the right jobs for a comfortable life and secure future" (Farhoud 2005, 136).[34]

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[33] IDC File. The Druze Archive. The University of Haifa. Haifa.
[34] Petition to the Israeli Authorities, 1973. Farhoud's family private archive, Rāmh.

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The IDC's demonstrations during the annual *ziyarah* were not predicted by some Israeli academics. Scholars such as Layish (1961) and Oliva (1972) had, up until then, analysed Druze political behaviour through Druze religious principle that is commonly known by its Arabic name, *al-taqiyah* (dissimulation) and attempted to define Druze political behaviour by their religious identity. According to Layish, this principle required that Druze avoid harm to the community, even if avoidance came at the price of converting to other religious principles. This principle goes some way towards explaining why most Druze continued to resort to a politics of loyalty despite the Israeli government's discriminatory policy.

Layish and his colleagues did not take into account some of the major changes that had occurred within the Druze society since Israel was established, most significantly the increase in the number of Druze graduates in the community. IDC members included a number of Druze graduates from Israeli academic institutions, many of whom had become aware of developments within Jewish settlements and who wanted equivalent development in their own villages. Some reports indicate that there were around five hundred and thirty Druze current or former students of Israeli Universities. Around another fifty students attended international Universities during the mid-1980s (Ben-Dor 1976, 136; Landau 1993, 83; Avivi 2007, 295; Falah 2000, 193).[35] Unlike the predominantly intellectual composition of the IDC, the DCC and the CDI were reliant on the support of a handful of Druze intellectuals.

Another major reason why the IDC was able to enlist the support of Druze graduates and intellectuals relates to the abolition of the military government. As described in Section 3.5, after Israel was established, the Israeli security agencies used military rule in the Galilee to limit communications between members of Druze organisations that opposed the Israeli government. The abolition of the military government, in 1966, compromised the security agencies' abilities to prevent IDC activists from meeting. As a result, IDC

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[35] The University of Haifa was established on the Carmel, in the early-1960s. It is located near Druze villages to encourage Druze youth to pursue academic studies.

members were able to meet to discuss community affairs, in particular the development of their villages.[36]

The emergence of mass media also facilitated communications between IDC members and their followers. Indeed, the late-1960s saw the introduction of new publishing methods and 'print ink' to the Arab sector. This provided IDC members with a useful means of disseminating their ideologies, principles and concerns about the underdevelopment of Druze villages to the entire Druze community. The IDC's file in the DAUH includes copies of many leaflets and periodicals that the IDC activists had distributed during the 1970s.[37]

To summarise, the Israeli government's *tokhniyot pituah* during the 1960s failed to address disparities between infrastructure and public services provision in Druze villages and Jewish settlements. As a result, a group of intellectuals and graduates established the IDC that campaigned against the Israeli government's discriminatory policy for the Druze community and which, according to the IDC, was the cause of disparities between Druze villages and their neighbouring Jewish settlements. The IDC's politics of protest involved gatherings, petitions and demonstrations (most notably demonstrations that took place during the *ziyarah* to Maqam Al-Nabi Shuʿayb in April 1974). How the Israeli government reacted to IDC's action, is the focus of the following Section.

5.5 Ben-Dor's Committee and the Leading *Ham'ayl* and Mass Politics of Loyalty

IDC demonstrations at Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb surprised both the Mʿarakh (Hebrew: Labour Party) and the Israeli security agencies' Arabists. Indeed, this was the first time, since Israel was established, that Druze activists had so

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[36] By July 1977, the IDC had seven branches in different Druze villages. IDC periodical. July 1977. IDC file, The Druze Archive, The University of Haifa. For more information about IDC activities and branches during the 1970s, see Farhoud (2005) and Firro (1999, 205-206).
[37] IDC File, the Druze Archive, The University of Haifa, Haifa.

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vehemently protested against the Israeli government's policies. The Arabists within leading party and the Israeli security agencies were shocked, since this behaviour was atypical of Druze, who would normally have resorted to a politics of loyalty. As noted in Section 4.1, during the annual *ziyarah* to Maqam al-Nabi Shu'ayb Israeli state officials were usually welcomed by feasts, traditional music and *al-dabkah (*Arab traditional dancing; see Falah and Azam 1979).

Curbing the effects of IDC propaganda and preventing widespread frustration within the community became a major concern for the *'Arabstim* in the leading M'arakh party.[38]   Concern grew when the IDC claimed that the Israeli government's *tokhniyot pituah* were intended to ensure the hegemony of the M'arakh's political elite and of its Jewish leadership rather than to ensure equality between Druze and Jewish Israeli citizens. These claims threatened the M'arakh's support within the community at a time when the M'arakh was already concerned about the gradual erosion of support for their party and its Arab-Lists within the community.[39]   There were early signs of this decline: During the 1969 election, the Mapai (the name of the party until 1969) lost ten per cent of its Druze vote to the opposition, the Communist Party (*Rrakah* in Hebrew; *al-Jabha* in Arabic), rather than to one of its own Arab-lists.[40]   This trend continued and, during elections to the Eight Knesset in 1973, eighteen per cent of the Druze vote went to the Communist Party (Firro 1999, 197).

The IDC's activity drew the attention of the Israeli security agencies, in particular that of the Shabak (internal security agencies) and the police. Their concerns increased following the IDC's claims that military service did not and would not translate into equality between Druze and Jews and that the Israeli government was only interested in securing political stability. This alerted the security agencies to potential problems with enlisting Druze to serve in the

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[38] The M'arakh was a coalition between the Mapai and three small Jewish-Zionist parties standing for election to the Seventh Knesset of 1969.
[39] For more on Arab votes for Jewish parties during the first three decades of Israel, see Landau (1993, 133).
[40] "New voices among the Druze", H*aaretz* newspaper, 24th October 1969.

IDF.[41] As noted in Section 4.3, service in the IDF was crucial if security agencies were to be able to organise the Arab minority along communal lines and, in turn, ensure the state's political stability among this minority. It is noteworthy that this strategy survived the abolition of the military government, in 1966. For example, at a summit that took place during the summer of 1969, the Prime Minister's Deputy Advisor on Arab Affairs, Yusif Ginat, instructed representatives of the security agencies to closely adhere to the original plan and to encourage religious identities among the Arab minority.[42]

Indeed, to appease the Druze community, Prime Minister Rabin instructed the *'Arabstim* of his party to appoint an 'Investigation Committee' (i.e. Ben-Dor's Committee) to appraise the situation in the Druze community. This committee was named by its chairman, Dr Gabriel Ben-Dor, who, a few years earlier, had completed a PhD thesis on the topic of Druze politics in Israel whilst studying at Princeton University.[43] The committee's members also included two other Druze graduates, Fayz 'Azam of 'Isfya and Sami Faraj of Ramh. According to 'Azam :

> "Israeli officials, who were involved in Druze affairs, showed very high concern for the wave of anger that had washed over certain circles within the Druze community during the early-1970s and realised that they had to act quickly to calm down tempers".[44]

The Israeli government asked Ben-Dor's Committee to re-examine its policy in relation to the Druze of Israel. Within a few short months, the Committee

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[41] Interview with Said Nafa'a, the general secretary of the IDC during the 1970s and a Member of the Knesset between 2007 and 2011, at his office in Shafa-'Amir. October 2010.

[42] The Policy Towards the Minorities in Israel, 7th August 1969. The IDF Archive. According to Avivi (2002, 249), Ginats' recommendations received the support of the Deputy Prime Minister, Yigal Allon.

[43] Interview with Professor Ben-Dor. The Director of National Security Studies at the University of Haifa, 15th November 2013, Haifa.

[44] Interview with Shaykh Fayz 'Azam, 24th June 2012. 'Isfya. Shaykh 'Azam was a teaching assistant at the University of Haifa when he was asked to be a member of Ben-Dor's Committee. At that time he was *jahil* (secular) but when I interviewed him he was 'a*qil* (a practising Druze Shaykh).

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published its recommendations. These recommendations were adopted in the form of the Israeli government's new Resolution number 128, in June 1975, that resulted in an Inter-Ministerial Committee being established. The Committee was chaired by the Director of the Prime Minister's Office at that time, 'Amos Eran. The Israeli government's Resolution number 792, dated October 1975, afforded Eran's Committee members the status of 'Directors for Druze Affairs', offices that came with the full authority to implement Ben-Dor's recommendations.[45]

The HDLCs and their leading *ham'ayl* welcomed Ben-Dor's recommendations, particularly recommendations that increased local council budgets. In turn, most HDLCs and their *ham'ayl* voted for the M'arakh during the 1977 general elections to the Knesset (Cohen 1989). This comes as little surprise when one considers that members of the leading *ham'ayl* were appointed to positions of power within DLCs, such as the Council's head, deputy head or secretary. The more generous local council budgets were intended to provide HDLCs with the opportunity to improve their villages' infrastructure and public services. The budgets also contained provisions for laying main roads, constructing public housing, sewage systems and industrial areas, as well as for promoting tourism within Druze villages.[46]

In addition to HDLCs and their leading *ham'ayl*, a number other leading local *ham'ayl* supported Ben-Dor's recommendations. The main reason these families supported Ben-Dor's recommendations was the substantial proportion of budgets were allocated for recruiting additional administrative and executive staff, which were likely to be members of these families. For example, when the local council of Dalyah al-Karmil was established, it comprised of the head and deputy head of the council and its secretary. In 1951, these three people were responsible for providing basic services for the two thousand five hundred residents of the village. By the mid-1970s, the

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[45] Ben-Dor's Committee, The Israel State Archives, Jerusalem. File: CL/1/1352/13012. See also, Dana (2003, 113).

[46] Ben-Dor's Committee from November 1974, The Israel State Archives, Jerusalem. File: CL/1/1352/13012. See also, Dana (2003, 113).

same council employed more than fifty people to work alongside the HDLC, Shaykh Nawaf Halabi (Abu 'Azam), his deputy and his secretary (Figure 5.7). The new posts included the posts of treasurer, heads of the Education Department and Safety and Health Department officials. By this time, the local council was to provide public services for seven thousand and eight hundred residents of Dalyah al-Karmil.[47] Many of the newly created positions within LDCs were filled by members of leading local *ham'ayl* and large families, all of whom perceived such employment as an opportunity for economic progress and a way to improve their and their families' social and political status within their village.[48]

Figure 5.7 Shaykh Nawaf Halabi, Head of Dalyah al-Karmil local council (right) **with the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1976).** Source: The Druze Archive. File RE: Dalyah al-Karmil. The University of Haifa, Haifa.

Furthermore, not all Druze intellectuals and graduates prescribed to the IDC's Palestinian-Arab identity. In 1966, a group of Druze graduates established the *al-rabitah al-Durziyah* (the Druze League) which, like the IDC, was mainly composed of Druze graduates and intellectuals who had attended one of Israel's higher education institutions during the 1960s. The most famous activists within the Druze League were Fayz 'Azam of 'Isfya, Sami Faraj of Ramh, Zidan 'Atshah of 'Isfya (Figure 5.8), Muhmad Ramal of Yarka, Monir Fāres of Hurfesh, Salman Falah of Kfur Smai'a and Fadil Mansur of 'Isfya. Unlike IDC members, who saw themselves and the community as an integral

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[47] Interview with Shaykh Nawaf Halabi, 19th July 2012, Dalyah al-Karmil.
[48] *Ibid.*

part of the Palestinian-Arab minority that had remained in Israel after the *al-nakbah* (catastrophe) of 1948, Druze League members, like much of the Druze community, saw themselves as members of a religious-cultural community that was distinct from other Arabs.[49]

The Druze League also disagreed with the IDC activists' approach to achieving equality between Druze and Jewish settlements. The IDC encouraged further collaborations with the Palestinian-Arab parties, particularly the Communist Rakakḥ Party — the main opposition to the Mʿarakh and its policy for Israeli-Arabs.[50] The Druze League members, on the other hand, believed that further 'separation' of the Druze from the Arabs was the best strategy for achieving equality between Druze and Jews and for closing the development gaps seen in Druze and Jewish settlements.

Druze League members welcomed Ben-Dor's recommendations, particularly the suggested assignment of Druze and Arab affairs to different government departments and the recommendation that a separate education system be established for Druze. The latter involved the new system being accompanied by new primary and high schools within Druze villages (Figure 5.9). This change to the education system provided dozens of employment opportunities and, in turn, a new structure of opportunity for the economic progress by Druze graduates during the 1970s. Moreover, the Druze League's founders and their successors (later known as the PIM) secured senior positions within the new DDME.

In early 1975, Salmān Falaḥ of Kfur Smaiʿa was appointed the head of the new DDE and Fayz ʿAzam of ʿIsfya lead a team of Druze teachers that were responsible for preparing a curriculum for the new subject of *al-turath Durzi* (Druze tradition). Other appointments in Druze schools included those of

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[49] For more about Druze identity during British Mandate, see Section 2.5.
[50] For more about the opposition role of the Communist Party during the 1960s and 1970s, see Rekhess (1993).

Figure 5.8   Zidan 'Atshah: A prominent leader of the Druze League and MK between the years 1977-1981 and 1984-1988

Figure 5.9   One of the first modern schools in Druze villages. Scene from the Druze village of Yarka during the late 1970s.

Farhat Birani of Dalyah al-Karmil as the inspector of the history curriculum in Druze schools and of Ridan Khir Al-Din as the inspector of linguistics. According to 'Azam, there were fourteen full-time committees that prepared the Druze curriculum. By the late-1970s, each of these committees was

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composed of a main supervisor, between five and ten members and approximately two thousand employees who worked for the DDE.[51]

For those who held such positions, the appointments meant economic advancement and prestige within the community. Indeed, senior DDE employees were able to use their authority to conduct *wastah* and to appoint close relatives and friends to posts within their and their colleagues' departments.[52] Teaching or administrative roles within Druze schools were also prestigious for Druze women who had recently completed their higher education since, for the first time, women were able to undertake paid work and were not confined to being housewives.[53]

Many of the Druze *mashaykh* welcomed Ben-Dor's recommendations, particularly those that were supportive of a separate education system for the Druze community. One reason for the Druze *mashaykh* welcoming the recommendations was the fact that new curriculum stipulated that new schools should be founded in Druze villages to ensure that Druze youth did not have to study in mixed Arab towns. Druze girls, in particular, were forbidden from studying outside of their village. Indeed, interacting with men from other religious backgrounds is a *haram* (scene), which contradicts the Druze religious principles. The second reason proposals were welcomed was because the new curriculum emphasised the Druze religious identity by incorporating Druze themes of relevance to the Druze religion, Druze tradition and Druze folklore. In other words, the curriculum consolidated the communal-Druze identity within future Druze generations and would help to preserve the community as a distinctive cultural group (Halabi 1997 and Firro 1999, 225).

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[51] "Committees for Druze Curriculum — the Ministry of Education". April 1978. The Druze Archive. The University of Haifa. Additional source: Interview with Fayz 'Azam, 13th October 2012, 'Isfya.
[52] *Ibid*.
[53] For more information about Druze women and social constructions in the 1950s, See Section 4.5.

Ben-Dor's Committee also received the support of *anshey bitahon* who, by the mid-1970s, represented the single largest group within the community.[54] Most *anshey bitahon* welcomed Ben-Dor's recommendations that called for equal rights for serving and former IDF Druze and Jewish soldiers. For example, Ben-Dor's Committee instructed the Ministry of Housing to authorise the construction of new homes and to increase lending to serving and former Druze servicemen, so they could start a new life in their villages.[55] Moreover, Druze villages that were located near the Northern borders were recognised as 'confrontation villages', like Jewish settlements in the same area. These villages benefited from financial aid from the Israeli government that included reduced rates of council tax and income tax as well as government subsidies and compensation for loss caused by confrontations with the PLO.[56]

Most significantly, Ben-Dor's Committee and the Israeli government's policy in relation to Druze villages received the support of the DZM (Figure 5.10). This organisation was established shortly after the IDC demonstrations at the Maqam.[57] Its composition included dignitaries from leading Druze *ham'ayl*, recently discharged and politically-skilled *anshey bitahon*, Druze *mashaykh* and graduates from the PIM. By way of contrast to IDC, the DZM saw the government's policy for Druze villages as a new structure of opportunity for all aspects of community progress, including the development of their own villages.[58] For example, DZM members proudly highlighted how all Druze villages were connected to main roads and to the national grid. During the

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[54] For more information about the emergence of *anshey bitahon*, see Section 4.6.

[55] Report of the Committee of the General Directors for Druze Affairs. Centre of Information, the Knesset, June 1976. See also a footnote in Firro (1999, 216).

[56] Jewish and Druze villages located on the Northern border of the state were recognised as 'confrontation villages' after the PLO began to attack Israel from the borders with Lebanon during the early-1970s. The PLO began to use the Northern Front after it was forced to leave Jordan during 'Black September' in 1971. For more on this, see Sayigh (1997, 319).

[57] Interview with Yusif Nasr al-Din, 14th October 2012, Dalyah al-Karmil. See also Amrani (2010, 78) and Landau (1993, 45).

[58] Some DZM saw the establishment of the state of Israel as *gaoulah* for the Druze. In biblical Hebrew, *gaoulah* means salvation and was usually used to refer to the Jews' salvation from the Pharaohs' Rule in Egypt. In modern times, the word refers to the salvation of the Jews after the Nazi Holocaust.

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1970s, electricity, in particular, enabled Israeli entrepreneurs to open textile factories in Druze villages and to employ hundreds of Druze women.[59]

Because of these perceived benefits, many DZM members resorted to a politics of loyalty, as best expressed by their support of the state's new leading party, Hirut, during general elections and of its lists during elections to local councils. Indeed, at the time, the IDC encouraged Druze to vote for the Communist Party (the party most identified with the Palestinians' cause), whereas DZM members encouraged Druze to vote for the Zionist-Nationalist Hirut party and its leader, Menachem Begin. During the 1977 general elections, almost twenty percent of Druze voted for Hirut and 'Aml Nasr al-Din of Dalyah al-Karmil was elected the first Druze member of Knesset for the party.[60]

Figure 5.10   The Druze Zionist Movement. Yusif Nasr al-Din is behind the podium giving a speech in front of Chaim Herzog (seated in the middle), the 6th President of the state of Israel during the early 1980s.

It is important to emphasise that Ben-Dor's supporters and loyalists were generally suspicious and scathing of the IDC and their followers. Indeed, the

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[59] The Druze Zionist Movement file. The Druze Archive. The University of Haifa. Haifa.
[60] For more information, see: www.knesset.gov.il. (access date: 27th March 2015).

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DZM's political retort involved very insulting language. For instance, ʿAtif Kayuf of ʿIsfya of the PIM said:

> "Behind our villages' underdevelopment is the paltry group of graduates who want to prove themselves". [61]

Nasr al-Din of the DZM (Figure 5.11) went further and requested that all Druze who opposed the Israeli government be transferred to beyond the Green-Line of 1967 in order that they might live with other Palestinians, in the West Bank.[62]

Figure 5.11   Amal Nasr al-Din of Dalyah al-Karmil: Druze MK with Zionist-Nationalist Hirut Party (1977-1988)

Summarising, in response to the IDC's demonstration at Maqam Al-Nabi Shuʿayb, the Mʿarakh and the Israeli security agencies' Arabists established Ben-Dor's Committee. The Israeli government adopted most of this Committee's recommendations, including recommendations relating to infrastructure and public service development within Druze villages. The

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[61] Interview with ʿAatif Kayuf. 22nd May 2013, ʿIsfya. ʿAatif Kayuf has a rich personal archive that contains documents from his activity with the PIM.
[62] ʾAmal Nasr al-Din's private archive, Dalyah al-Karmil.

Committee's recommendations were welcomed by the HDLC and their leading *ham'ayl*, PIM members, *anshey bitahon,* Druze *mashaykh* and DZM, all of whom continued to view the Israeli government's policy in relation to the Druze as a new structure of opportunity for the preserving their community as an independent cultural and religious community, or as a new structure of opportunity for social, economic and political progress by their families, both within the state and within their community. All of these groups expressed their politics of loyalty by securing a massive vote for Jewish Zionist parties during the general elections of 1977, including the Zionist–Nationalist party, Hirut. However, as the following Section reveals, Ben-Dor's Committee failed to achieve the desired political stability. Indeed, within a few years, traditionally loyal Druze sub-groups began to resort to a politics of protest and the IDC continued to oppose the Israeli government and its advocates within the community.

5.6   Accommodation for Stability and Leading *ham'ayl's* Politics of Protest

Throughout the 1970s, Ben-Dor's Committee suppressed feelings of frustration within the Druze community. However, by the late 1980s, many Druze who had traditionally identified with a politics of loyalty were resorting to a politics of protest. This was evident when, on 17th June 1988, hundreds of Druze demonstrated outside the Knesset and the Prime Minister's Office, in Jerusalem. The protestors had travelled by bus from villages on the Carmel and the Galilee, carrying Druze flags and signs with the slogan that IDC members had touted during their demonstrations a decade earlier, during the time of the *ziyarah*. This slogan read:

Kafa li-siyasah al-tamyiz al-'unsriah (stop political racial discrimination, (Figure 5.12).[63]

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[63] "The Druze Demonstrating in Jerusalem". 18th June 1988. *Marriv* Newspaper.

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The demonstrations in Jerusalem were instigated by the HDLC. The HDLC were appointed two years earlier and was composed of the heads of the local councils from the thirteen Druze villages as well as members of Druze-lists to the local councils of mixed Arab towns, such as Shafa-'Amir and Ramh.[64] According to Hamd S'aib (who led the HDLCs between 1984 and 1988) the main objective of the HDLCs was to increase their collaboration so that *al-musawah* (Arabic; equal rights) might be acquired for Druze and that the gaps in developments that were seen in Druze and Jewish settlements in the Galilee might be closed.[65]

Figure 5.12 Druze Shaykhs demonstrating against the Israeli government's "racial discrimination" in Jerusalem during the late 1980s

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[64] Shafa-'Amer and Ramh are not recognised as Druze villages by the Israeli government. This is because most of their residents are not Druze. For more information see List of Druze villages in Table I.

[65] Interview with Hamd S'aib, 16th August 2014. Abu-Snan.

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At first, HDLC members met with government officials in an attempt to convince them of the urgent need to change the government's budget allocation for DLCs. According to S'aib, the HDLCs had endless meetings with Shimon Peres and Yithzk Shamir, and with other government officials from the Prime Minister's Office. Along with Peres and Shamir, they also met with other government officials from the National Unity government that governed Israel between 1984 and 1988. The aim was to encourage the government to witness, first hand, how poorly major ministries (such as the Interior Ministry and Housing Ministry) and other Israeli offices invested in development in Druze villages and the impact these actions had on the Druze community.[66] During a personal interview S'aib indicated that it was the Israeli officials' refusal to change their policy and collaborate with HDLCs that resulted in the HDLCs' politics of protest.

Unlike some IDC members who resorted to a politics of protest in the newly founded Israeli state, all HDLC members were from leading *ham'ayl* that were traditionally identified with a politics of loyalty.[67] Indeed, Hamd S'aib of Abu-Snan, Wahib Nasr al-Din of Kisra, Rslan Abu-Rukn of 'Isfya and Mofid 'Amir of Hurfesh, all served as head of the local councils within their villages during the 1980s and early 1990s as well as being heads of their leading *ham'ayl* that had traditionally identified with a politics of loyalty.

The HDLCs became increasingly frustrated with the lack of implementation of Ben-Dor's recommendations, which according to S'aib, remained as *hibr 'ala wraq* (ink on paper). Indeed, in is now clear that the development of Druze villages was never a priority for the Hirut Party and, hence, its right wing coalition did not allocate adequate financial resources for the development of Druze councils once it had secured the office during the general election in 1977.[68] Instead, line with their ideologies, Hirut and other right-wing parties in the coalition invested heavily in developing the Jewish settlements on the

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[66] For more on the National Unity government in Israel during the 1980s, see Korn (1994).
[67] See Section 5.2.
[68] *Ibid*, Interview with S'aib.

land that Israel occupied after the Six Days War of 1976, namely land on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the surrounding Jewish towns as well as other locations where their voters were concentrated.[69]

In addition the new Druze village that was promised never materialised. This meant that the number of Druze villages remained the same, more than a decade after Ben-Dor's Committee published its recommendations for a new village. The existing villages were, as a result, supposed to accommodate more around seventy thousand Druze who were resident in Israel during the early-1980s (Table III). Moreover, most Druze villages lacked any potential for residential development because the Israeli government had already restricted residential development and defined boundaries outside of which development would not be permitted. These boundaries were marked on what were called *tokhniyot bniyah* (construction maps)*.* As will become clear in Section 6.6, successive Israeli governments used these construction maps to prevent the expansion of Druze and Arab villages and, in turn, preserve land for further expropriation by the state.

Leading local *ham'ayl*, particular their heads, were the first to be blamed for the poor infrastructure and public services in the Druze villages. Indeed, many Druze villagers blamed leading local *ham'ayl* for the disparity between development and infrastructure in their villages and in the neighbouring Jewish settlements. For instance, according to 'Ali 'As'ad, the villagers of Bayt-Jan held Shafik 'As'ad — the head of the local council and of his *hamulah* — responsible for the only road that connected their village with the outside world remaining narrow and risky, for neighbourhoods in the village's suburbs being cut off from any electricity, sewage or water supply, as well as for the entire village being reliant on one small healthcare centre.[70]

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[69] See for example, "Elections Results According to Regions". The General Elections of 1977. www.knesset.gov.il. (access date: 9th February 2015).

[70] Interview with 'Ali 'As'ad, close cousin to Shafik 'As'ad, 13th September 2012, Bayt-Jan.

In light of this, it seems feasible that Druze leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of protest to protect themselves from accusations that were being made by their fellow villagers. In other words, like HDLC, leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of protest to defend their leading status within their villages once they realised the Israeli government's policy towards their villages threatened their leading status within their villages. HDLC and their leading *ham'ayl* also attempted to convince Druze villagers that the disparity between their villages and neighbouring Jewish settlements was rooted in the Israeli government's policy rather their own mismanagement.

Hence, the HDLCs and leading *ham'ayl* blamed the Israeli government for the lack of industrialisation within Druze villages that led to a situation where most Druze breadwinners were forced to seek work outside of their own villages:[71] Indeed, up until the 1990s, Druze villages were like many other Arab 'dormitory villages', with most breadwinners working in Jewish areas during the day and returning to their villages in the evening (Al-Haj 1987).

The lack of employment within Druze villages resulted in higher levels of unemployment, particularly for Druze women. This is because, at the time, Druze women who were not permitted to work outside of their own villages. As a result, many Druze women saw their employment opportunities dwindle. This, in turn, meant that many more families, now reliant on a single income, were classed as low income families. Thus, local councils were compelled to offer them exemption from paying taxes.

The latter situation contrasted sharply with that seen in Jewish settlements: Jewish settlements were in receipt of all the support they needed from the state in order to develop their infrastructure and public services. Indeed, Jewish settlements in the Galilee were part of the National Plan and one of the Hirut government's main goals between 1977 and 1984 — *Yehud ha-Galil* (Judaising the Galilee). *Yehud ha-Galil* was also agreed by the leaders of the

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[71] This was also one of the reasons why so many Druze breadwinners pursued careers within one of the Israeli security agencies. For more information, see Section 4.6.

M'arakh and Hirut (Shimon Peres and Itzhak Shamir, respectively) before they set up a coalition for the National Unity government in the 1980s. As observed by Koren (1994), *yehud ha-Galil* and developing Jewish settlements in the Galilee to house the growing Jewish population was one of the few national projects that the M'arakh and the Hirut leaders both supported; they had completely different views on other national projects, such as building in areas that Israel occupied after the Six Days War (Figure 5.13).

To encourage Jewish young couples to reside in what, during the 1980s, were viewed as the periphery, local councils within Jewish settlements were given financial support to develop the infrastructure and modern public services within their settlements. Thousands of new homes, as well as modern schools, leisure clubs, community centres and other facilities, were built within residential neighbourhoods.   These neighbourhoods were connected by modern roads, benefited from road lighting, public gardens, a sewerage network and modern public services, such as public transport and emergency centres.[72]

The Jewish settlement of Karmiel, for instance, was established in 1964 at the heart of the Galilee, a few kilometres from Druze villages, such as Ramh and Sajur. Karmiel witnessed massive development during the 1980s, when two huge modern neighbourhoods, Dania A and Dania B, were built.   These neighbourhoods provided more than six thousand homes and each neighbourhood was served by two new primary schools and a new comprehensive high school with modern facilities. Each neighbourhood also benefited from a leisure club and a community centre and excellent public transport that connected the new neighbourhood with the city centre and with other Israeli towns (Figure 5.14 and 5.15).[73]

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[72] For more on *yehud ha-Galil,* see Soffer and Frenkel (1998).

[73] Interview with Shayul Ahyun, Speaker of Karmiel Town Council between 1990 and 1998, 17th August 2012, Karmiel.

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Furthermore, several industrial areas were constructed near major residential areas to enable entrepreneurs to set up factories. These factories provided a source of income for Jewish settlers of all ages. Industrial areas were developed in the suburbs of Karmiel, M'alot and Nazareth Illit. The Karmiel industrial area was expanded by four thousand *dunams* to encourage large companies to move their businesses to it. Indeed, companies such as the Keter plastic factory, Dilta Ha Galeel swing factory and Kalill metal factory provided employment and a source of income for more than six thousands workers by the early 1990s.[74]

As a consequence, these industrial areas reduced the level of unemployment within Jewish settlements. Full-time employment meant higher incomes and higher taxes. This in turn meant that the local council's benefited from higher tax revenues and more income to support the local council. Moreover, local councils were not obliged to offer exemptions to low income families, as was the case for many Druze councils. For certain towns, such as Karmiel, around twenty five percent of the council's annual income came from taxes associated with the industrial area (Figure 5.16).[75] In other words, local councils within Jewish settlements benefited from state funding and from state funding of industrialisation projects that, ultimately, reduced the levels of unemployment, increased personal income and, therefore, tax revenue payable to the council. This extra income enabled these local councils to invest in their settlements and to maintain and develop infrastructure and modern public services.

The politics of protest displayed by the HDLCs and their leading *ham'ayl* was encouraged by the IDC. In fact, the IDC encouraged the wider Druze community to resort to a politics of protest against, what they called "the Israeli government's *siyasah al-tamyiz al-'unsriah"*. At the IDC's annual conference in September 1987, 'Amir 'Amir of Hurfesh announced that the IDC, with its *cadre*, would support the HDLCs in their struggle for *musawah*

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[74] *Ibid.*
[75] *Ibid.*

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(equality) even though there was little hope of the Israeli government revising its policy towards Arabs and Druze villages:

> "Unfortunately some of us still believe the lies of the Israeli government … [they] never learned from previous lessons that this government has never taken us [referring to the Druze community] seriously and that all the agreements that were signed are just *hibr ʿala maiy* (ink on water)".[76]

Some PIM members also supported the decision of the HDLC and even took part in the demonstrations in Jerusalem. The PIM became more resolute once its members realised that Israeli government officials were expediting the appointment of Ben-Dor's Committee to prevent erosion of the Druze community's support of the Mʿarakh, but that there was no real intention of implementing many of the Committee's recommendations.[77] In his letter to the Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir, dated February 1991, Zidan ʿAtshah (Figure 5.8), wrote:

> "All Druze local councils are suffering from deficit and some of them haven't paid the monthly salary to their employees for more than six months….. The Israeli government has not even invested in the foundation of one industrial area within these villages over the last five decades and, as a result, the level of unemployment among their population has rocketed…. There are no proper sewage and water networks … my concern is that if the situation remains like this, we may find ourselves witnesses to confrontations between the Druze and the state".[78]

Some *Ktsinim mesuhrarim* also resorted to a politics of protest because of the underdevelopment of Druze villages. As serving Druze officers and generals in

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[76] *Ibid.* IDC File. The University of Haifa.
[77] Interview with Kanj Mansur, head of the Local Council in ʿIsfya between 1984 and 1992, 5th September 2012, ʿIsfya.
[78] Zidan Aṭshah's private archives, ʿIsfya.

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Figure 5.13   *Yehud ha-Galil* early neighbourhood in Karmiel, picture from 1964.
Copyright: Karmiel City Hall Website.

Figure 5.14   A view of the modern city of Karmiel, 2013.
Copyright: Karmiel City Hall Website.

Figure 5.15   One of the new neighbourhoods established over recent years in Karmiel.
Copyright: Karmiel City Hall Website.

Figure 5.16   Karmiel's industrial area: Aerial view.
Copyright: Karmiel City Hall Website.

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the IDF and Police Border, these Druze servicemen were not at liberty to express their views. However, disappointment was evident within this group, as expressed in the letter that ex-Colonel Jidʿan ʿAbass (Figure 5.17) wrote to the Minister of Labour and Welfare, in July 1992. In his words:

"Like many of my colleagues, I believed that military service would improve the 'quality' between the Druze and the Jews but, as many within my group, we realised that we were wrong".

ʿAbass' letter did not stop there. It drew attention to a long list of differences in the infrastructure and public services seen in Druze and Jewish settlements. Abass raised concerns about Druze youth joining Arab-National Parties and taking a stance against the Israeli state in the future, a development that would erode the relationship between the two 'people' (referring to the Druze and the Jews) and their longstanding *brit damim* (blood-covenant).[79]

In summary, Ben-Dor's Committee intended to create equality between Druze and Jewish settlements. However, between 1984 and 1990, the Israeli Hirut and the National Unity governments made no effort to implement the Committee's recommendations.   As a consequence of this inaction, poor infrastructure and public services and deficits in local council treasuries, the HDLC and members of leading *ham'ayl*, IDC, PIM and *ktsinim meshuhrarim* resorted to a politics of protest, in the form of long-term strikes in their villages and demonstrations in Jerusalem.

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[79] Interview with Jidʿan ʿAbass, 16th August 2013, al-Bqiʿah

Figure 5.17   Colonel Jidʿan ʿAbass of al-Bqiʿah

5.7   Conclusion

As part of its politics of accommodation towards the Druze community the Israeli government allowed heads of leading local *ham'ayl* to continue as *al-mukhtrah*s and to remain as the official state authority within their villages. *Al-mukhtrah* served the Mapai's political ambitions well: During elections to the Knesset, *al-mukhtrah*s and their leading *ham'ayl* become the main *kabalni kulot* (vote contractors) for the Party in the Druze. *Al-mukhtrah* also supported the Israeli security agencies' policy by not opposing or speaking out against the military government's restrictions, as imposed within Druze and Arab villages at that time. Most importantly, *al-mukhtrah* was perceived as a structure of opportunity for the leading *ham'ayl* to maintain their leading status within their villages. In turn, this encouraged the leading *ham'ayl* to resort to a politics of loyalty and to support the Mapai party during election to the Knesset.

Unlike leading local *ham'ayl,* some Druze intellectuals opposed the Israeli government's decision to maintain *al-mukhtrah* and requested the establishment of elected local councils on the same footing as neighbouring

Jewish settlements. The CDI saw *al-mukhtrah* as devices that the Israeli government used to maintain political stability within the Druze community rather than as authorities that would create equality between Druze villages and neighbouring Jewish settlements. The CDI, nonetheless, failed to draw adequate support for their cause because most Druze *fallahin* followed their leading *ham'ayl* and perceived *al-mukhtrah* and government's *tokhniyot pituah* as a structure of opportunity for their villages' development and opportunities that had been lacking during Mandatory Palestine.

The number of Druze intellectuals and graduates that opposed the Israeli government policy among Druze villages and objected to the establishment of the new local councils increased because the IDC was established early in the 1970s. The IDC persistently opposed the Israeli government's policy and blamed the government for the lack of development in Druze villages, even after local councils were formed in all Druze villages. The IDC resorted to a politics of protest and organised large demonstrations during the annual *ziyarah* to Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb, on 25th April 1974. They also encouraged their fellow Druze to support the Communist Party, which, at that time, was the main opposition to the Israeli government and its policy towards the Druze community and Arab minority as a whole.

Unlike the IDC and its followers, most Druze welcomed the election of new local councils and Ben-Dor's Committee that was formed after IDC demonstration at Maqam al-Nabi Shuʿayb. Indeed, leading local *ham'ayl* continued to perceive the new local councils as a structure of opportunity that they could use to preserve their leading status within the community and their own villages, particularly once the Israeli government adopted Ben-Dor's recommendations and increased budget allocations to local councils. The PIM also welcomed the Ben-Dor's Committee, particularly once the Israeli government decided to adopt its recommendations and to establish a special department for Druze sector within the Ministry of Education. These arrangements were perceived as a structure of opportunity for the PIM's economic and social progress in the community and the wider Israeli society.

The *mashaykh*, on the other hand, saw the new local councils and Ben-Dor committee as a new structure of opportunity for the community's *hifiz al-baq'a*. This explains why these sub-groups and their followers resorted to a politics of loyalty and voted for the Mapai Party during Knesset elections and for Mapai's lists during local council elections.

However, despite this loyalty to the state, by the early-1980s and throughout the 1990s, many Druze were resorting to a politics of protest and participating in large demonstrations in Jerusalem and protracted strikes in Druze villages. Interestingly, the heads of leading *ham'ayl*, who traditionally identified with politics of loyalty, were the most active protestors. The latter perceived the Israeli government as a threat to their leading status within their villages. This contrasts with the IDC and the PIM, who chose to resort to a politics of protest because they saw the Israeli government as being responsible for the Druze community's cultural subordination. This situation also contrasts with that of the *ktsinim meshuhrarim* who saw the government's policy as a major contributor to their and their families' economically disadvantaged status.

The political activities of many within the Druze community during the first three decades of the Israeli state supports the arguments presented in Section 1.4, namely that a subordinate cultural group political elite will resort to a politics of loyalty if the arrangements that are embodied within a policy of accommodation are perceived as a new structure of opportunity for maintaining their leading status in the group. This was the way in which many leading local *ham'ayl* perceived *al-mukhtrah* and, later, the new local councils. The masses within the group will also resort to a politics of loyalty if they perceive the policy as delivering a new structure of opportunity for the group's cultural self-preservation and economic progress. Indeed, this was also the perception that many Druze villagers held of new local councils and Ben-Dor's Committee, a perception that encouraged their politics of loyalty.

Finally, the political actions taken by many Israeli-Druze since the mid-1980s supports the arguments presented in Section 1.5. In particular, these events

support the idea that a subordinate cultural group's political elite will resort to a politics of protest if the arrangements set in place as part of policy of accommodation are perceived as a threat to their leading status within the group: This is the way that leading local *ham'ayl* perceived the lack of development within their villages, at the time. The masses within the group will also resort to a politics of protest if they perceive the government's policy and the arrangements involved as part of its policy of accommodation as the underlying cause of the group's economic and cultural subordination: This was the way that many PIM activists and *ktsinim meshuhrarim* have perceived the Israeli government's policy towards their villages since the mid-1980s onwards.

Chapter 6

Land Expropriation and the Druze Politics of Violence

The Israeli government recruits our Druze youth into the IDF as first class citizens, on the other hand it is expropriating their families' land as if they were a second class Arab citizens…where is the logic in this?

— Fahmi Halabi.[1]

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6.1 Introduction

On the 30th October 2007, the citizens of Israel woke to the news that an *'intifadah* had erupted in the night at the Druze village of Al-Bqiʿah, located in the upper part of the Galilee. The following morning, the pictures that dominated headline news in major Israeli newspapers were of violent clashes between the Israeli police Special Forces (known as the Yassam) and the villagers of Al-Bqiʿah. The headline story in that day's *Marriv* newspaper was that of the Druze youth, who had kidnapped an Israeli policewoman and held her hostage, throughout the night, in the *khilwah* of the village*.* Meanwhile, the *Yidiaut Ahrunut* newspaper printed pictures of the bloodied faces of Israeli policemen and Druze, against a backdrop of burning cars (Figure 6.1).[2]

This Chapter examines the centrality of land expropriation by the Israeli government as a major reason for the rise in the politics of violence within the Druze community over recent years. It is argued that a large number of Druze villagers, namely the *mashaykh* and their followers from the *shabab*, resorted to this form of political action in response to the right-wing Israeli government's extensive expropriation of land from Druze villagers over the preceding years: These acts were perceived as a threat to the survival of their community as a distinctive religious and cultural group; a threat that justified resorting to a politics of violence.

This Chapter revisits and elaborates on discussions presented in Section 1.3 by looking at Lijphart's classical model of politics of accommodation and its ability to achieve political stability between cultural groups during a multi-ethnic conflict. When read in conjunction with Chapter 2, Section 6.2 demonstrates that political stability can exist between two cultural groups during a multi-ethnic conflict. Under such circumstances, the groups will not resort to a politics of violence against each other if the agreement between political elite

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[2] Yidiaut Ahrunut, 31st October 2007. *Marriv* 31st October 2007. See also full report, in ʿAn Al-Bqiʿah al-Smud (2008).

of the two groups ensures the elite's leading status and preservation of the groups as distinctive cultural groups.

Section 6.2 examines early attempts, made by some of the Yishuv's political leaders and Zionist land organisations, to acquire land from the Druze of Palestine. The discussions highlight how the same Yishuv leaders attempted to take advantage of Arab rebellion attacks on Druze villages during the 1936 Arab Revolt in order to acquire Druze land. The latter involved transferring all the Druze of Palestine to *Jabal al-Druz* in Syria. However, the Yishuv leaders' land expropriation efforts were stalled after the Arab Revolt was over because the Druze leading *ham'ayl* in Palestine insisted on remaining on their own land. Moreover, the Yishuv's leadership were afraid that land expropriation efforts would jeopardise its attempts to encourage leading *ham'ayl* to adopt a politics of silence in the conflict over Palestine, particularly after these *ham'ayl* refused to support the Yishuv's 'Transfer Plan'.

The Chapter also lends support to the argument presented in Section 1.5, namely that a subordinate group will resort to a politics of protest if they perceive the arrangements that form part of the state's politics of accommodation as reasons for their economic, cultural or political subordination. Along with Chapter 5, Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.6 illustrate that subordinate cultural groups will eventually resort to a politics of protest if policy arrangements subordinate the economic status of the masses and the leading status of the political elite in the group.

Section 6.3 describes how the Israeli government's efforts to acquire land from Palestinian refugees, in the period immediately after the 1948 War, impacted Druze *fallahin* and their source of income from agriculture. The affected *fallahin,* made claims against and protested against the military government, whom they held responsible for the land acquisition. These claims were not effective at mobilising the leading Druze *ham'ayl* who, at the time, perceived the Israeli government policy (vis-à-vis the community) as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their leading status. Nor were they effective in

Figure 6.1   Clashes at the Druze village of Al-Bqiʿah
Between local villagers and Israeli police (October 2007)

relation to the Druze *mashaykh* , who perceived the policy as a new structure of opportunity for the group's preservation as a distinctive cultural and religious group. Section 6.4 highlights some of the methods used by the Israeli government to expropriate additional land from Druze villagers during the 1960s and the 1970s, for the purpose of *yehud ha-Galil* (Judaising the Galilee). As was evident, expropriation increased the level of frustration among the affected villagers of Yarka and Kisra, who, consequently, resorted to a politics of protest. However, the affected villagers and the IDC leaders' efforts to mobilise other Druze against Israeli government policy failed. This was because the government's Arabists' collaboration with loyalist leadership had managed to broker an agreement that convinced the affected villagers to stop protesting.

Section 6.6 examines the recent emergence and activity of land defence committees (LDCs) in Druze villages. These committees were founded by activists who, up until the late-1990s, were strongly identified with a Druze politics of loyalty and originated from leading Druze *ham'ayl* and PIM. It is proposed that these committees were founded to thwart the Zionist-Nationalist Israeli government's efforts to expropriate yet more land from Druze villages (in order to benefit the Jewish majority within the state) and to defend their leading status within the community.

Finally, the Chapter supports the argument that was presented in Section 1.5, concerning the relationship between policy of ethnic state's supremacy and subordinate potential of accommodation for stability to prevent the subordinate cultural group from resorting to a politics of violence. Therein, it was argued that policy of ethnic state's supremacy encourages subordinate ethnic groups for resorting to a politics of violence. Hence, accommodation for stability cannot prevent a politics of violence because it supports and leans towards ethnic supremacy, which involves dedicating all of a state's natural, cultural political and financial resources to ensure the supremacy of the dominant cultural group in the society, even if the relevant resources are crucial for the survival of a subordinate cultural group as a distinctive element.

In the long-term this, in turn, increases the level of frustration among members of subordinate cultural group and the likelihood that they will resort to a politics of violence to prevent their dissolution as a distinctive cultural group. Section 6.5 highlights the reasons behind early episodes of the politics of violence among the Druze of Israel. The villagers of Bayt-Jan (a village located in the Upper part of the Galilee) were the first to resort to a politics of violence, when, in the summer of 1987, they confronted the Israeli police with knives and sticks at the site of Al-Jarmq. It is argued that the villagers of Bayt-Jan resorted to a politics of violence after their leaders concluded that the Israeli government's policy of land expropriations threatened their future survival as a distinctive cultural and religious extended family (*al-ahl Bayt-Jan*).

Section 6.7 examines the politics of violence that erupted in different villages, as best illustrated by the clashes between Druze villagers and Israeli police in Druze villages over recent years. Many Druze *mashaykh* and their followers from the *shabab* have resorted to this form of political action in response to the Zionist-Nationalist government's determination to expropriate the few unsettled *dunams* that remained in Druze villagers' hands. It is argued that many of the Druze *mashaykh* and their followers perceive land expropriation as an act of cultural discrimination that threatens the survival of the community as a distinctive cultural and religious group on their own land — a threat that justifies their resorting to a politics of violence.

6.2   The 'Transfer Plan' and Druze-Yishuv's Agreement of Politics of Accommodation

Historical documents reveal that the Yishuv's leadership, and some of their Zionist land organisations, attempted to acquire land that belonged to Druze villagers during Mandatory Palestine. According to Faraj (2000, 70), the Druze of Palestine occupied around 325,000 *dunams* in 1930s. The Yishuv's

leadership attempted — on more than one occasion — to acquire this land.[3] Early acquisition attempts were made in the early-1930s, when the JNF and the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PJCA) embarked upon negotiations with the notable Lebanese Halabi family: This family owned lands in the Galilee, including the Druze villages of Sajur, Kfur-Smiʿa and al-Bqiʿah (Saleh 2000, 191).

The proposed sale of Sajur, Kfur-Smiʿa and al-Bqiʿah was strongly opposed by local villagers and, as a result, the Zionist organisations were unable to negotiate a deal. According to Saleh, the local villagers and community religious leaders in Palestine refused to collaborate with the leaders of the Zionist organisations and refused to sell their lands. In early July 1932, ʿAbdallah Khayr, the Chairman of the Druze Union, met with Elyahou Chaim from the Jewish Agency and informed him of the Druze's opposition to the deal and of their refusal to sell their lands or leave their villages. Khayr also warned Elyahou of the damage that might be inflicted on the then 'friendly' relationship between the Druze and the Jews if such a deal were to go through in the future (Saleh 1989).[4]

The most significant attempt at land acquisition took place during the Arab Revolt of 1936. In particular, some of the Yishuv's political leaders tried to take advantage of the rebel attacks on Druze villages, and to put into practice what became known among historians as the 'Druze Transfer Plan' (Firro 1999, 26; Parsons 2000, 35).[5] At the heart of this plan stood the idea that the Jewish Agency would purchase all the Druze villages on the Carmel and the Galilee and transfer their residents to *Jabal al-Druz* (Druze Mountain) in Syria.

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[3] The number of *dunams* is based on a study conducted by the Arab Centre for Alternative Planning (ACAP April 2008). However, it is difficult to verify the precise number of *dunams* because of the confusion in land registration during Mandatory Palestine. Moreover, it is difficult to determine whether some of these *dunams* were considered as being Druze land since they were pastures (see also Falah 2000, 71).

[4] A letter from Alyahou to Arlzorov, dated 13th July 1932. The Israel State Archives. S/25 6638. For more about 'friendly' relationship between Druze and Jewish Yishuv during Mandatory Palestine, see Section 2.3.

[5] For more on rebels attacks on Druze villages, see Section 2.6.

In exchange for Jewish Agency financial support, Druze families willingly left to start a new life in Syria.

The Transfer Plan was, in fact, the most significant of the Yishuv's political leaders' attempts to acquire land from Druze villagers during Mandatory Palestine. This, however, contrasts with the consistent efforts that the Yishuv's leadership put into acquiring land from other Arabs residents of Mandatory Palestine. As noted in Section 2.5, the Yishuv's political leadership put great efforts into *ge'ulat krak'ut* (land redemption) and deployed land acquisition, land expropriation, land exchange, purchase, or any other method that ensured land transfer from non-Jewish hands to Jewish hands.[6]

Ge'ulat krak'ut was a crucial element within the Zionist doctrine, one which fully supported the idea that the land of *Eretz Yisrael* (land of Israel) belonged to ʿ*am Israel* — the people of Israel (Yiftachel 2006, 41).[7] To this end, the Yishuv's political leaders and Zionist movements, both in Palestine and overseas, co-operated and put huge effort into extending their control over land in *Eretz Yisrael*. Indeed, because of their roles in land redemption during Mandatory Palestine, Jewish-Zionist leaders, such as the Baron Rothschild, Yehoshua Hankin and Yusif Wites, as well as Zionist land organisations, such as the JNF and Palestine of the Zionist Organisation (PZO), are part of the Zionist myth and admired by Zionist activists.[8]

The rationale behind the relatively small number of attempts to acquire land from Druze villagers was explored in Section 2.5. The most important reason behind these attempts was, undoubtedly, related to the refusal of the Druze leading *ham'ayl* to collaborate with Yishuv's political leadership on this matter. This also explains why Abba Hushi, who presided over the Druze Transfer Plan and who negotiated with the Druze leaders in Syria and with Sultan Basha al-

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[6] For more about other efforts of land acquisition from Druze villagers, see Falah (2000, 190).
[7] Although Zionism has never been a monolithic movement or ideology, most Zionists agree that the redemption of the land is a crucial element of Zionism. For more on this, see more Laqueur (2003).
[8] For more information about land redemption from Arabs, see Benziman and Mansur (1992, 157), Shimoni (1995, 333) and Yiftachel (226, 41).

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Atrash on behalf of the Yishuv's leadership, did not inform heads of leading *ham'ayl* in Palestine about the plan.

Yishuv's leadership endeavoured to implement the Druze Transfer Plan by appointing a team from expertise on Arab affairs (Gelber 1991). This team was presided over by Abba Hushi, the head of the Histadrut in Haifa during the 1930s.[9] Furthermore, the Transfer Plan received both the official permission and the financial backing of the most senior Yishuv leader, Chaim Weizmann, who was, at that time, the PZO President (Figure 6.2). According to Parsons (2000, 35), Weizmann and his colleagues welcomed the voluntary and collective emigration of the Druze of Palestine because this made land available for Jewish settlements on the Carmel Galilee and because this, in turn, would encourage similar mass migrations by Arabs.

Figure 6.2   Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952).
In 1948, Weizmann became the first president of the state of Israel.

As a way of promoting the Transfer Plan, Abba Hushi and his team met with Sultan al-Atrash (the Druze leader of Syria) at least three times between August 1938 and April 1939.[10] However, despite Abba Hushi's efforts to convince the Sultan that the transfers plan was beneficial for the Druze of

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[9] See Section 2.4 for more information about Abba Hushi and the Druze during Mandatory Palestine.

[10] For more information about Sultan al-Atrash, see Al-Bʿainiyy (2008).

Palestine, Sultan was disinterested and gently declined Hushi's offer. According to Firro (1999, 27) that Sultan's main concern was that any collaboration with the Yishuv's political leadership on this matter might be perceived as Druze betrayal of the Arab struggle against the Jewish-Zionists' efforts to establish a national home in Palestine. Firro has similarly concluded that:

> "Israeli archives contain not one single document written or signed by Sultan Basha al-Atrash which would indicate that he supported the 'Transfer Plan'".

> — (Firro 1999).

Logically, one could also argue that the Israeli archives contain not a single document, written or signed by any leading *hamulah*, which would indicate that any of them collaborated with Abba Hushi to implement the Transfer Plan. The truth is that Hushi did not involve any of the leaders in the negotiations over the Transfer Plan because he did not want to risk undermining his and his colleagues' efforts to consolidate 'friendly' relationships with leading *ham'ayl* in the event that the Transfer Plan should fail. In other words, Hushi negotiated the Transfer Plan, with Sultan Basha and other Yishuv political leaders, as if there was no intention to cultivate a politics of accommodation with the leading Druze *ham'ayl*, and, at the same time, Hushi conducted negotiations about the politics of accommodation with leading Druze *ham'ayl*, as if there were no attempts to implement the Transfer Plan.[11]

This is consistent with the discussions in Chapter 2, regarding the major reasons behind leading *ham'ayls* politics of silence, vis-à-vis the Yishuv. Therein, it was proposed that leading *ham'ayl* resorted to politics of silence during the conflict in Palestine because of the agreement they had struck with the Yishuv's leadership to protect their leading status. More importantly, however, the religious-conservative majority that lived in Palestine perceived the emerging Yishuv as a structure of opportunity for the community's self-

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[11] For more on the Transfer Plan, see Falah (2000, 190).

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preservation as a cultural and religious group within Palestine, or as they call it in Arabic, *hifiz al-baq'a*.

The Yishuv's leaders began to have reservations about the Transfer Plan once they realised that the relevant negotiations would harm the 'friendly' relationship they were trying to establish with leading Druze *ham'ayl*. These concerns were amplified when some leading *ham'ayl* began dismissing their obligations under their agreement with the Yishuv and refused to collaborate with the Yishuv's leaders. According to verbal history, the dispute between Shaykh Salih Khanayfis and Abba Hushi (discussed in Section 3.4) began with Shaykh Khanayfis' discovery that Abba Hushi had met with Sultan al-Atrash to discuss the Transfer Plan that aimed to drive Druze into Syria.[12] This also explains why the Shai official, Yehoshua Palmon, rather than Abba Hushi, became the Shaykh Khanayfis' patron through most of the 1940s and 1950s.

To summarise, Yishuv's political leadership made several attempts to acquire land that belonged to Druze villagers during Mandatory Palestine. The most significant of these attempts was the Transfer Plan, which involved acquisition of all Druze land and the transfer of Palestinian-Druze to Syria. The plan was dismissed because leading Druze *ham'ayl* refused to collaborate with the Yishuv's leadership on this matter and to move to Syria. The Yishuv's political leadership, on the other hand, were afraid that the Transfer Plan had harmed their efforts to cement 'friendly' relationships with leading *ham'ayl* and, in turn, it threatened the political stability within the Druze community, such that Druze might join forces with the Arab rebels in their struggle against the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine.

6.3 Land Acquisition and *Fallahin's* Claim Making

What the Yishuv's leadership failed to achieve during Mandatory Palestine, the Israeli government implemented after Israel was established. Indeed, one of

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[12] Interview with Hassan Khanayfis, 15th August 2011, Shafa-'Amir.

the Israeli government's major concerns was maximising land acquisition from Palestinian-Arab refugees who had moved to one of the neighbouring Arab states during the 1948 War or who had fled to another Arab town within the newly formed state.[13]

In one of his earlier appearance before the Knesset Committee of Foreign Affairs (KCFA) on the 2nd May 1949, Mosheh Sharett, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, told the committee members:

> "We have the tendency to perceive all absentee's properties [*referring to those Palestinian refugees who left their villages in the course of the War or in the period before it*] as already being state property that we have the right to do whatever we want with according to our needs...".[14]

From the Israeli government's point of view, land acquisition from Arab citizens and refugees was crucial for absorbing the thousands of Jewish immigrants that were arriving into the newly established state and to provide them with basic living needs, including housing, security and economic capacity.[15]   In June 1949, to implement plans for land acquisition from Palestinian refugees, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, appointed Zalman Lifshitz to lead a committee that included a number of officials from various government departments. The role of this committee was to formulate a common policy on the question of land acquisition.[16] The Committee put this plan into action by exploring ways to acquire land previously owned by Palestinian refugees, foreign citizens and institutions, such as those run by the Christian churches

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[13] For more information about Palestinian refugees and internal refugees, see Morris (2008 and 2004) and Jamal (2011).

[14] By 'absentee property' Sharett meant to the land and property that almost eight hundred thousand Palestinian-Arab refugees left behind them in the course of the 1948 War. For more information, see Morris (1988).

[15] This immigration was enabled by the 'Right or Return Law', which entitle every Jew in the world a potential citizenship in the state of Israel. For more on this law, see Kretzmer (1999, 36).

[16] For more about information about land owned by the state of Israel after the 1948 War, see Yiftachel (2006, 58). Among others, the Committee included Yehoshua Palmon, the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs and Yusif Weitz, the Director of the JNF's Land Department.

since the late 19th century, as well as land occupied by Arab citizens in the Galilee and the Triangle (Firro 1999, 129).[17]

The first Druze *fallahin* to be harmed as a result of the Israeli government policy of land acquisition were those who cultivated land that belonged to Palestinian-Arabs. The latter had fled the country during the 1948 War but were not allowed to return to Palestine to claim back their land once the war was over. The 'Absentee Property' Law of June 1948 entitled the Israeli government to confiscate properties, including land that belonged to such absentees.[18] It also entitled the government Custodian of Abandoned Property (CAP) the right to not only hold absentees' properties, but also to use these properties at its own discretion, as it wished or needed. This included the right to transfer properties for use by other government bodies, such as the Development Authority.[19]

The case of the villagers of Hurfesh is a good illustration of how Druze *fallahin* lost large parts of their land following the Israeli government's decision to implement the 'Absentee Property' Law. In 1953, the military government announced that local *fallahin* were forbidden to enter almost three thousand *dunams* that formed part of a 'closed-area'. Ben-Gurion justified the military governor's decision later that year during his speech at the Knesset, on the grounds that the confiscated land constituted 'absentee property', which was registered for British tax revenue under the name of a Sunni-Muslim family by the name of Qadurah, a family that had fled the country during the 1948 War. Ben-Gurion went on to say that this entitled the Israeli government to confiscate and transfer the land for CAP use.[20]

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[17] In the period before the state's establishment, Lifshitz, held an official position within the JNF.
[18] The definition of Absentee, according to Israeli Law, is a person who lived in one of the Arab countries between 29th November 1947 and 14th May 1948. For more information, see, the Absentee Property Law, The Knesset, Jerusalem.
[19] For more details about the Absentee Property Law, see a report by Mossawa Centre (2009, 97).
[20] Knesset Assembly Protocol, 8th July 1953, p. 1871. The Knesset. Jerusalem.

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It is not within the scope of this Chapter to discuss, in depth, all the strategies used by the Israeli government to acquire land from Druze villagers in the early years of the state of Israel. However, it must be emphasised that the Israeli government relied upon different laws in different areas to accelerate and facilitate the confiscation process. New laws were passed by the Knesset once Israel was established and even land laws from the British Mandate period and from the time of Ottoman Rule were utilised.[21] For example, it was the Law of State Property 1951 that allowed the transfer of all land registered under the name of the British Mandate government to the Israeli state. This law was used when the Israeli government confiscated the five hundred *dunams* that belonged to the villagers of Mghar, in 1954 (Avivi 2007, 221).[22]

Land acquisition was brutally executed, mainly by soldiers of the military government following orders from the Minister of Defence. The soldiers would declare, with no advance notice, a certain area as a 'closed zone'. As noticed by Avivi (2007, 150) — who himself is a former high ranking officer of the Mossad (the Institute for intelligence an Special Operations) — one of the main purpose of imposing a military government on Arab areas was to decrease Arab control over land that the government intended to expropriate for Jewish use.

In the above example, the military governor's office declared that six thousand *dunams* in areas referred to as Mghur al-Druz (and that belonged to Druze villagers from Bayt-Jan) as a 'closed area'. The military governor office justified this decision on the grounds that the Mghur al-Druz land was too close to the Northern border and to some military positions controlled by the Syrian Army. Three years later, the military governor declared another two thousand *dunams*, belonging to villagers from Hurfesh, as a 'closed area'. This time, he justified his decision on the grounds that this land was close to the borders with Lebanon, rather than with Syria (Avivi 2007, 229).

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[21] For a list of these laws, see the report by Mossawa (2009, 90). The Development Authority was in charge of developing Jewish settlements in the early years of the state of Israel.

[22] For how the 1951 Law of State Property was used among other Arabs, see Jamal (2011, 119).

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The Israeli government's policy of land expropriation amplified the feelings of anger among Druze *fallahin* who had lost their land and, in turn, their main source of income, namely from agriculture. The affected *fallahin* of Bayt-Jan, for example, organised sizeable gatherings in their houses. These were attended by a large number of Druze dignitaries from neighbouring villages. A petition was also signed and sent to the Minister of Minorities' Affairs, requesting that he permit them to re-enter their land. The *fallahin* of the village of Hurfesh also signed a petition against the military government's decision and sent it to Members of the Knesset (MKs). They managed to recruit a MK, Mosheh Sneh of the Israeli Communist Party, to their cause. He, in time, became the spokesman for these villagers in the Knesset (Avivi 2007, 244).

Land acquisition from Druze *fallahin* angered Shaykh Salih Khanayfis and Shaykh Jabir M'adi, Druze MKs who served during the 1950s and who felt obliged to protect the interests of their followers. On the 4th of July 1957, the two Shaykhs met with Ben-Gurion and his Advisor on Arab Affairs, Shmoyel Duvon to complain about the *fallahin*'s ill- treatment and to express their anger about land acquisitions. Shaykh Khanayfis emphasised how feelings of frustration among these villagers has increased since they were forced to give up the land they had cultivated for many generations, simply because they lacked appropriate registration documents from the British Authorities.[23] In addition to these Druze MKs, Shaykh Amin Tarif — the head of the religious leadership — also presented a petition. This petition was signed by a large number of Druze dignitaries representing all the Druze villages and spoke out against the military governor's policy of land expropriation because of its negative implications for the villagers' daily lives.[24]

The affected *fallahin*, were unable to rally sufficient support from Druze villagers in the 1950s. The leading *ham'ayl* were not willing to risk losing the

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[23] The Israel State Archives. 126/65/1039. Protocol a meeting between the Prime Minister and Arabs MKs from the 4th July 1957. . Also, in Ben-Gurion, Section 21, Minutes of Meeting from the 5th July 1957 (Avivi 2007, 212).

[24] Druze Dignitaries letter to the military governor, 4th November 1958. IDF Archive 622/70/72.

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privileges afforded to them (as part of the Israeli government's politics of accommodation) for a few plots of land. As indicated in Section 3.3, the Israeli government's general policy and its decision to recognise the community as a *millet* was perceived by leading Druze *ham'ayl,* particularly the Tarifs of Julis, as creating opportunities for economic, social and political progress. The Khanayfis, M'adis and Abū-Rukns, like the Tarifs, perceived the Israeli government's policy as new structure of opportunity for economic, social and political progress, particularly after community recognition enabled their leaders to be elected as MKs.

Like leading Druze *ham'ayl*, the leading local *ham'ayl w*ere reluctant to risk losing their privileges for the sake of a few plots of land*.* As noted in Section 5.2, these *ham'ayl* welcomed the Israeli government's decision to maintain *al-mukhtrah*s as the official authority of their villages after the establishment of the state. Similarly to other governmental-communal positions, such as *qadi* and *madhun*, the position of *mukhtar* was perceived as a structure of opportunity for economic, social and political progress by the leading local *ham'ayl*, both within their villages and within the community as a whole.

The Druze *mashaykh* were also unwilling to risk losing the significant privileges that the community had gained following the state's politics of accommodation. As discussed in Section 3.6, most Druze *mashaykh* welcomed the Israeli government's decision to allow all Druze villages, with their thirteen thousands residents, to remain, without fear of any harm, on their land during the 1948 War. This decision was perceived as a structure of opportunity for community *hifiz al-baq'a* (survival) as a distinctive cultural and religious group on its own land and worth surrendering a few plots of land for.

Such achievements may appear insignificant today. However, these achievements were viewed very differently by the Palestinian-Druze of that time and also by those who witnessed the displacement of more than eight hundred and fifty thousand fellow Arabs from other religious communities or that of (mainly and not only Sunni-Muslims and Christians) forced out their

country (Figure 6.3), only to become refugees in one of the neighbouring Arab countries (Morris 1988). Furthermore, in contrast to the vast majority of the Arabs in the Galilee and the Triangle, Druze were generally less restricted in terms of their movement under military rule, enabling many of their breadwinners to continue living normal working lives (Avivi 2007).

Figure 6.3   Palestinian-Arabs leaving Mandatory Palestine during the 1948 War to become refugees in neighbouring Arab countries

To conclude, although the Druze of Palestine were allowed to remain in the Israeli state after the 1948 War, this did not protect land belonging to *fallahin*. According to Firro (1999, 153), some twenty eight thousand *dunams* were expropriated from Druze *fallahin* in Israel's first decade. Land expropriation severely affected the *fallahin* and their source of income from agriculture. As a consequence, the *fallahin* made claims and protested against the military government, who they perceived as being responsible for the process. However, the *fallahin*'s political actions failed to rally significant support from the community. This was because the community's leading *ham'ayl* and local *ham'ayl* perceived the Israeli government policy (vis-à-vis the community) as a new structure of opportunity for economic, social and political progress and because the *mashaykh* saw the policy as an opportunity for *hifiz al-baq'a*.

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6.4   Judaising the Galilee and Druze Villagers' Politics of Protest

The decision of Levi EshKul's government (from 1966) relating to *yehud ha-Galil* (Judaising the Galilee) was unachievable without the large-scale confiscation of Arab lands, including Druze lands, by the Israeli government after Israel was established.[25] The Israeli government continued to justify land redemption by relying on extant land laws and the legal and financial support of land Zionist organisations, such as the JNF. To this end, the government also brought into play an old land law from the Ottoman Rule period. This law was traditionally known as `*ard 'amwat* (dead land) and entitled government organisations to expropriate rocky lands that were wholly or partly unsuitable for agriculture use, or that had not been cultivated for more than ten years.[26]

By referring to `*ard 'amwat*, the Israeli Land Authorities (ILAs) were able to seize many *dunams* of land from Druze villagers who were resident on the mountainous areas of the Galilee and the Carmel. ILA officials initiated the expropriation process within so-called *hesder kraka'ot* (land settlement). From then on, the ILA has been entitled, by law, to negotiate with villagers about their ownership of their land that has been labelled as `*ard 'amwat* (Kretzmer 1990, 49).  Even a layperson can see large parts of the mountainous areas of the Galilee and the Carmel are rocky and `*ard 'amwat*, making them unsuitable for agriculture use, at least during certain times of the year. Thus, `*ard 'amwat* enabled the expropriation of large expanses of Druze land.

The villagers of Yarka were among the first to lose dozens of *dunams* of their land in the 'Ajroush area, when the ILA officials announced it as state land.[27] The expropriation process relied on a 1943 report that was drafted by the British Authorities, which stated that dozens of *dunams* in the aforementioned area were not suitable for agriculture. Furthermore, as a way of preventing

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[25] For more on *yehud ha-Galil*, see Section 5.3.
[26] According to Ottoman Law, `*ard 'amwat* is defined as land located more than a mile and a half from the borders of the villages or land that can not be reached by the mosque crier. For more information, see Mossawa (2009).
[27] Interview with, Mifleh Mulla former head of the local council of Yarka, 18th August 2012, Yarka.

changes in the decision, the Regional Committee for Planning and Construction (RCPC) at the Interior Ministry provided the Yarka Local Council with a jurisdiction map that leaves the 'Ajroush area outside of village residential borders (Avivi 2007, 238).

The expropriated villagers of Yarka reacted by organising large gatherings with political and religious leaders from the community. They also established the Committee for defending Yarka's Land and appointed Shaykh Marzuq M'adi as its head. The Committee sent petitions to Ben-Gurion, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Agriculture, the Speaker of the Knesset, the military governor and to many other officials in an attempt to have expropriated lands returned to the villagers of Yarka.[28] When signing the petitions, its signatories emphasised their attachments and ties to their ancestral lands and how their fathers cultivated the now expropriated land for many years before the establishment of the state.

The villagers of Kisra reacted in a similar way when they realised that hundreds of *dunams* from the area called al-Balhusiyya were about to be expropriated by the ILAs because these lands were declared as `*ard 'amwat*. At first, the villagers tried to convince the ILAs how, despite the mountainous topography, hard work and traditional agricultural methods (that relied mainly on animals and growing particular shrubbery and olive and citrus trees; Ben-Dor 1979, 109) could turn this land into cultivated land. Despite these efforts, in June 1976, ILA officials fenced off the area with barbed wire and tried to demarcate the expropriated land on the ground. Both young and old men went to the site of al-Balhusiyya, armed with hoes and sticks to protect their land and to stop ILA officials from executing their duties. According to Saleh, they managed to stop ILA bulldozers from the digging and even brought their own bulldozers to the site in order to demarcate their land.[29]

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[28] *Ibid*. Mifleh Mulla, personal archive.
[29] When Saleh S'aid was interviewed, he indicated that his family was one of many that lost their land in al-Balhusiyya, following the ILAs' decision to expropriate them. 10th August 2012. Kisra.

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The IDC, which contentiously criticised the Israeli government's policy among the Druze community, was the first to support the villagers of Kisra during their struggle.[30]   Some IDC meetings were attended by Arab Communist leaders of that period, namely two MKs, Tawfiq Tubi and Emil Habibi, who freely described the Israeli officials as *al-ghuzah* (invaders) during their public speeches.[31]   Indeed, from the IDC's perspective, and that of their supporters from within the Communist Party, land expropriation from the Druze villagers was another manifestation of the Israeli government's *siyasah al-tamyiz al-'unsriah* (political racial discrimination; discussed extensively in Section 5.6) against the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel, including the Druze.

With respect to the Druze, land expropriation was also part of the Israeli government's policy of accommodation for stability that was designed to create an absolute dependency on Druze military service, which, in turn, would enhance the loyalty of Druze: Gradually, Druze *fallahin*'s dependency on land as source of income decreased as Druze began depending on security agencies for employment. Indeed, by the mid-1970s, less than 25 percent of the Druze labour force worked in agriculture and, at the same time, more than 30 percent of Druze breadwinners were employed by one of the Israeli security services (Hassan 1995). This marked a significant change, particularly when one takes into consideration that, through 1950s and 1960s, the vast majority of Druze families had relied solely on agriculture as a source of income.[32]

Along with the IDC, other leading *ham'ayl* including the Tarifs, stood alongside the villagers of Kisra. First Shaykh Amin, then other leaders, added their signatures to some of the petitions that the villagers sent to Israeli officials. Later, on 3rd September 1975, the Shaykh invited a large group of Druze dignitaries, from all Druze villages, to the shrine of Maqam al-Nabi Khader in Kfur Yasif, with the aim of protesting against land expropriation from Kisra's villagers. At the end of their meeting, the participants submitted a petition to

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[30] For more information about the IDC, see Section 5.4.
[31] In Firro (199,221)
[32] See also Ben-Dor (1979, 111).

the then Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, calling upon him to take immediate action against the Israeli Authorities' land expropriation in Kisra (Firro 1999, 222).

The politics of protest used by religious leaders and by leading *ham'ayl* to end land expropriation in Kisra is surprising, particularly if one compares it to the politics of loyalty that characterised these subgroups at the time.[33]   A fundamental reason for this change relates to the IDC leaderships' criticism of the so-called *qiadah taqlidiah* (traditional leadership): They blamed Druze religious leaders and leading *ham'ayl* for lacking the appropriate skills to prevent further land expropriation and criticised them for collaborating with the Israeli Authorities, at the expense of the community's interests.   This criticism was perhaps best expressed in an article that discussed the al- Ithad, as written by Muhmmad Nfa'a, an IDC leader:

> " ...the Druze youth knows exactly that these notables [*my emphasis; leaders of leading ham'ayl*] on whom the authorities rely are no more than shaky wooden pillars and props which have been infested by woodworm and need to be replaced...".[34]

The PIM had also criticised *al-qiadah al-taqlidiah,* on the grounds that they lacked the requisite experience and skills for dealing with the Israeli Authorities, particularly in matters relating to land expropriation. As noted in Section 5.5, the PIM consisted of Druze youth, mainly males, who had graduated from one of Israeli's higher education institutions in the 1960s and early-1970s (Figure 6.4).[35]   PIM's members believed the *al-qiadah al-taqlidiah*'s lack of skills was as one of the major reasons why ILAs succeeded in expropriating large parts of Druze land.[36]

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[33] Shaykh Tarif, for instance, refused the *mu'tamar al-muthqafin al-Druz*'s request to conduct their late-1960s meeting at Maqam al-Al-Nabi Khader that was convened to protest against the Israeli government's economic discrimination towards Druze villages. See Section 3.5.
[34] Al-Itihad, 14th August 1970. See, also al-Qasim Nadim, in Firro (1999. 95).
[35] For more on this, see Section 5.4.
[36] Al-Huda (1974, 18).

Figure 6.4   Members of PIM during a conference at the University of Haifa (1988). The sign in the background reads: "Natural Authorities and Druze Villages: Integration or Contradiction". From Left to right: Shafik 'As'ad, Nour Al-Din Shanan, Dr. Fadil Mansur.

It is not surprising that PIM members were mostly activists and that they endeavoured to settle the dispute between the villagers of Kisra and the ILA using peaceful means.[37]   For the PIM's members, this was an opportunity to demonstrate to *al-qiadah al-taqlidiah* that they possessed the right skills and language to gain equality for the Druze community. It was also an opportunity to demonstrate, to the IDC's leadership, that the Israeli government was willing to resolve disputes over Druze land in a peaceful way.

It is noteworthy that some of the PIM leaders'efforts successfully bridged the rift between the ILA's officials and the affected villagers of Kisra. Dr. Fadil Mansur of 'Isfya was one of the PIM's most prominent activists at the time. In early May 1976, he managed to set up an agreement between a representative of the Prime Minister Office, 'Amos Eran, and the villagers of Kisra. This agreement recognised the villagers'ownership of agricultural and cultivated

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[37] For more on PIM activity during the 1970s, see Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

land, although ownership of the villagers' uncultivated land was not addressed until a later date.[38]

The agreement with villagers was reached, largely because of the goodwill of the Ruling-Party — the M'arakh's leadership. This leadership wanted to resolve disputes over the land of Kisra in a peaceful way.[39] As noted in the previous Chapter, election results for the Eighth Knesset worried the M'arakh's party leaders. Of particular concern was the fact that eighteen percent of the Druze vote went to the Communist Party on the Election Day in late December 1973, rather than to the M'arakh and its Arab-Lists. It was important for the party's Arabists to prevent further decline in party support and to restore the trust of its Druze voters. This was, in fact, the major reason behind Rabin's, and his staff's, decision to enter an agreement with the villagers of Kisra over their land, in May of 1976.

The security organisations, in particular the Shabak and the police, were also interested in calming the rising tide of anger among the Druze. The security agencies were keen to prevent another Land Day like that of the 30th March 1976 (when six Arab demonstrators were killed and more than a hundred others were injured by the Israeli forces in several Arab towns).[40] In his report to the *v'ada merkazit* (the Security Central Committee; SCC), Nissim Touqtakeli, the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs, enunciated his support of the Israeli government's policy of land expropriation among the Arabs in general. However, he suggested peaceful negotiations, rather than aggressive methods, should be used to expropriate land that belonged to Druze villagers (Avivi 2007, 242).[41]

To summarise, the Israeli government's plan of *yehud ha-Galil* would not have been realised without Arab and Druze lands. Arabs and Druze paid the price

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[38] Interview with Faḍil Mansur, 6th June 2012, 'Isfya. For more on 'Amos Eran's position, see Section 5.4.
[39] More than half of the Arab votes went to the Communist Party in elections to Eighth Knesset of 1977, which took place the year after the Land Day of 1967, see Landau (1993, 133).
[40] For more information about the Land Day, see Bashir (2006).
[41] Cabinet letter, 6th April 1961, IDF Archive 621/70/72.

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for every single Jewish settlement from their own expropriated lands. The *fallahin* of the two Druze villages, Yarka and Kisra, were the most affected by this plan, after large areas of their lands were expropriated in the 1960s and 1970s. This seriously damaged the villagers' income from agriculture. However, the efforts made by the IDC leadership, to utilise the villagers' frustration and mobilise the community to resort to a politics of protest, failed. This was because the Israeli government's *'Arabstim* were keen to maintain political stability among the community and were ready to reach agreements with most of the *fallahin*. This, in turn, dissipated much of the anger within the community.

6.5   The Strangulation of Villages and Bayt-Jan Villagers' Politics of Violence

The willingness of the M'arakh leaders to resolve the dispute with the villagers of Kisra using peaceful means was not accepted by the new Ruling-Party, Hirut, which came to power after the 1977 general elections. Prior to the elections, this Party's leadership made a commitment to Israeli voters to Judaise all land under the state's control — including those land that were occupied during the 1967 War (i.e. the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights). In his first televised interview, on the 19th May 1977, the incoming Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, made it clear that he and his government would refuse negotiations that involved Israel's withdrawal to 1967 borders. He also stated that his government's first priority was to settle these lands, including the Galilee, with Jews.[42]

In early November 1977, the Head of Jewish Settlement Department in the Jewish Agency (JSD), Shmoulek Ben-Tovim, appeared in front of the Labour Committee, at the Knesset. He asked the Committee to support his organisation's project to build Jewish settlements in the Galilee, known in

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[42] Israeli Channel One: Interview with Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 19th May 1977, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dycFO7cY7zk (access date: 8th February 2015).

Hebrew as *yshuvim kehilatiyim* (settlements for communities). Ben-Tovim told the Committee members that his plan had already received the go ahead from the Prime Minister's Office and other relevant government departments, including the Ministry Justice and the Interior Ministry. He also emphasised that establishing small *yshuvim kehilatiyim* was not intended to stop intensive development within other large Jewish settlements in the region (e.g. in Karmiel and Safad). To the contrary, *yshuvim kehilatiyim* were to be developed in parallel to larger settlements (Benziman and Mansur 1992, 167).

The intention was to build the new *yshuvim kehilatiyim* on top of the hills that were scattered all around the Galilee. This was why the plan became famously known by its Hebrew name, *ha-mitspim* (observatory points). This name referred to the location of these settlements on the hills and the view of surrounding Arab villages from them (Figure 6.5). By way of contrast with other large Jewish towns in the Galilee such as Karmiel and Nazareth Illit, *yshuvim kehilatiyim* were built as homes for one hundred to five hundred Jewish families, from similar ethnic backgrounds.[43] The idea was that Jewish families from similar backgrounds, mostly related by state of immigration, could continue to live in harmony together. At the same time, these Jews could contribute to 'Judaising the Galilee', which, up until the early-1980s, was still suffering from what many Israeli national leaders called 'hostile' frontiers, because of the Arab majority in these areas.[44]

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[43] Ethnic division among the Jewish majority is usually based on their country of origin. For more on the Jewish ethnic division, see Eliezer Ben-Rafael (1991).

[44] This phrase was contentiously used by Israeli politicians from right-wing parties.

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
Figure 6.5   A view of *yshuvim kehilatiyim* like many others from around the Galilee

By the early-1980s, almost forty small Jewish settlements were established on the hills of the Galilee.[45]   Similarly to other Jewish settlements that were created during the first three decades of the Israeli state, these *yshuvim kehilatiyim* were furnished with modern infrastructures and advanced public services.[46]   Furthermore, regional councils were founded for the purpose of managing public services, such as schools and cultural centres, for the new settlers.[47] Finally, small factories, workshops and cowsheds were set up within each settlement or *meshek*. The intention was to provide a source of income for the local settlers which, in turn, would support the economy of their *mitspeh* (observatory).

Importantly, the aforementioned Jewish settlements would not have been founded without collaborations between the Israeli government, Zionist land organisations and Jewish Zionists philanthropists from around the world. This process also required the simultaneous implementation of two policies. The

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[45] For the list of names of all the forty *mitspim*, see http://www.moin.gov.il (access date: 10th January 2015).

[46] On the level of development within new Jewish settlements in the Galilee, see Section 5.4.

[47] The Misgav Regional Council, for instance, provides public services to thirty five small community settlements. For a brief review about the work of the Council, see http://www.misgav.org.il (access date: 10th January 2015).

first of these policies was the intensive land expropriation that Israeli government, in collaboration with other land Zionist organisations (such as the JNF, the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut), imposed on Arab and Druze villages in the Galilee. The second policy also involved collaboration between the aforementioned organisations but involved strangulating villages targeted for expropriation to prevent them from any expansion beyond their residential areas. This was achieved by land segregation, such as demarcation of boundaries for residential buildings and fracture areas on maps for Local Councils, to ensure that residential areas in Arab and Druze villages would not expand beyond the allocated boundaries.

These activities enabled the Israeli government and Zionist land organisations to attempt to preserve unsettled land (located outside the residential areas) for future expropriation (Yiftachel 2006, 112). To this end, the Bureau for Construction and Planning at the Northern District (department within the Interior Ministry) conducted a flat-survey shortly after Israel was established. This involved all Druze villages on the Carmel and the Galilee. The main idea behind these surveys — as clearly stated by Ghad Landau, the Head of the Bureau at the time — was to demarcate the line-building of each village and, in turn, prevent expansion of residential areas beyond the line (Avivi 2007, 261). DLCs were also provided with construction maps showing the building boundaries of their villages, with the stipulation that construction works either within or outside these construction maps required prior authorisation by the *vʿadot tikhnun vi-bniyah* (Planning and Construction Committees; PCCs).

The village of Bayt-Jan is typical of a Druze village that has been affected by both policies since the state was first established. In terms of land expropriation, the villagers of Bayt-Jan lost six thousand *dunams* in Mghur al-Druz after the military government closed the area and prohibited *fallahin* entry into this newly declared security zone (see Section 6.3). At the same time, the regional PCC provided the Local Council with a limited Construction Map in mid-1960s that only included part of the village residential areas with

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ninety four *dunams* for future development.[48]   Moreover, it took another twenty years before the PCC provided the village with a revised map. However, even the revised map left new residential areas out of the jurisdiction authority of the Local Council, including an area called al-Jarmq that covered over twelve thousand *dunams* and that had been declared a natural reserved area, thereby prohibited any kind of construction work on it (Map IV).[49]

Map IV   The Village of Bayt-Jan as surrounded by Natural Reservation. Bayt-Jan (red area) was prevented from expanding by the Natural Reservation (indicated in green).

In May 1987, the villagers of Bayt-Jan entered their land in Al-Zabud (part of area) with machines and tractors. The main purpose was to prepare the land for agriculture cultivation and for construction, but by doing so they were also defying the 1967 Interior Ministry decision that prohibited mechanical machines, felling of trees and grazing of animals in reserved natural areas.[50]

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[48] The official name of the map is G/648.

[49] The map was released to the public in 1987 under its official name of G/400: Interview with Radi Njem, HDLC Bayt-Jan, 14th June 2012. See also Avivi (2013 and 2007, 229) and Firro (1999, 138 and 224).

[50] For more information, see Natural Reserved Regulation Law of 1979. The Knesset.

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These actions also defied the ILA's JNF and the Israel Nature and Parks Authority (INPA) officials who had, in previous years, made a concerted efforts to prevent the villagers of Bayt-Jan from using al-Jarmq to meet their residential and/or agriculture needs.[51]

The villagers' determination to regain control of their land and the Zionist–National Israeli government's determination to expropriate it led to the violent clashes between the villagers and the Israeli police in Al-Zabud, in May 1987 (Figure 6.6).[52] The Israeli police disregarded the fact that the villagers of Bayt-Jan were citizens of the state and treated them as a threat to the state's security.[53]   Police forces arrived, supported by the Police Guard that is ordinarily used to maintain order in occupied territories in the West Bank. To remove villagers from Al-Zabud site, the Police Guard even went as far as to deploy water cannons and tear gas. As a result, a number of villagers and policemen were injured and many police vehicles were destroyed.

It should be emphasise that the violent clashes were the final resort for the villagers of Bayt-Jan, who were attempting to protect their land from further expropriation.[54]   Indeed, the late Shafik 'As'ad, Bayt-Jan's HDLC at the time, tried to convince the Israeli officials to consider the negative implications of their decisions regarding the village's development: 'As'ad emphasised that there had been a dramatic increase in the population of the village, from around 1,600 Druze when Israel was established in 1948 to around 8,000 Druze in the early-1980s (Table II). He also pointed out that the 1,834 *dunams* that construction map G/400 had allocated for residential needs were by no means sufficient to meet the young generation's demands for building areas.[55]

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[51] Interview with Wafid Qablan, 19th September 2012, Bayt-Jan.
[52] *Marriv* newspaper, 16 May 1984. For more information about the development of the events, see Segal (1993).
[53] Some of my interviewees described the clashes at Bayt-Jan as 'the Druze Land Day'. For more information on Land Day, see Section 6.4.
[54] As was noted earlier in this Chapter, the affected *fallahin* made claims after the military governor acquired their land in Mghur al-Druz. Others continued to cultivate their land and use it to graze their sheep, even after the Interior Ministry announced al-Jarmq as a natural reserve.
[55] Interview with Munib 'A'sad, one of Shafik's assistants during that period. 23rd September 2012. Bayt-Jan See also, Firro (1999, 224).

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Figure 6.6   The villagers of Bayt-Jan demonstrating against land expropriation (early 1987): In the middle of the picture is the late Shafik 'Ass'ad, the head of Bayt-Jan local council at the time.

Participants in the clashes at Al-Zabud represented all the families of the village. According to Malik Salallha, *al-ahl Bayt-Jan* (the extended family of Bayt-Jan) had never been as united as they were during the clashes with the Israeli police at Al-Zabud. The participants included the male youth from the town᾽s leading local *ham'ayl,* the Qablans and 'As'ads, *anshey bitahon*, *mashaykh,* PIM graduates and IDC representatives.[56] This united front is not surprising when one takes into consideration the fact that the inhabitants of the village were, essentially, a one family, with strong family and blood-ties. This is particularly the case since the villagers of Bayt-Jan share geographical location and the religion forbids all forms of mixed-marriages with other non-Druze communities. Accordingly, most of the villagers of Bayt-Jan were, in fact, related by marriage or blood to one another.[57]

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[56] Interview with Malek Salallha, a secondary school teacher in Bayt-Jan and a writer. 19th June 2013.

[57] Interview with Yusif Hamoud, one of the most prominent activists against land expropriation during the Al-Zabud events, 18th June 2012, Bayt-Jan.

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Year	Druze Population	Notes
1922	6,975	The British Mandate Census of 1922
1931	9,148	The British Mandate Census of 1931
1945	13,000	The British Mandate Census
1948	13,853	Israeli Interior Ministry: Non-Jews in the new state
1949	14,500	Israeli Population Bureau
1960	23,300	
1967	32,100	
1978	47,300	
1982	65,600	From this entry population numbers accounts for the Druze in the Golan Heights
1990	82,600	Central Bureau of Statistics
1996	96,300	
2004	113,000	
2008	123,000	
2013	133.400	

Table II   The Druze population in Mandatory Palestine and Israel (1922-2013).
Sources: Avivi (2007, 379); Dana. (2003, 100); Faraj (2000, 74); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics – Jerusalem.

'ahl Bayt-Jan had the unanimous support of HDLCs, Druze MKs and the community's religious leaders (the Tarifs) during their struggle. This support came because of the threats to their villages on the Carmel and the Galilee and was evident from a speech given by the Druze MK, Zidan Atshah, following the violent events at Bayt-Jan. During his speech, he told the assembly how Druze villages on the Carmel and the Galilee were suffering from lack of land for natural development because of the government's policy (Faraj 2012, 134). In respect to Bayt-Jan specifically, the levels of frustration grew amongst the villagers over the years and, after 1948, *'ahl Bayt-Jan* had suffered extensive land expropriation they suffered at the hands of ILAs and restrictive construction maps had been imposed on the villagers by the Interior Ministry. The villagers saw the government's policy as a risk to their natural development on that land and to their long-term survival as an 'extended family' and distinctive cultural and religious community.

The clashes at Bayt-Jan encouraged some Israeli officials to attempt to end the violence at Bayt-Jan. One official was Mosheh Arens, the Minister for Defence,

who attempted to resolve the dispute between the ILA and the villagers peacefully. From Arens' perspective, Druze politics of loyalty to the state and the *brit damim* between the Druze community and the Israeli state is a *nekhes* (in Hebrew: fortune), which the state's leaders should safeguard. Arens was referring to the role that the Druze soldiers were playing at the time in defending the state's borders and that the soldiers had played during in the 1980s War in Lebanon.[58]

Bayt-Jan's leading *ham'ayl*, namely the 'As'ads, were also keen to prevent further violence in Al-Zabud. This was because they needed the financial support of Israeli Authorities to run the local council: Without such support, they would eventually lose control over their village leaders. As noted in Section 5.3, Israeli security forces were ready to allow elected local councils to be established within Druze villages, in so far as the elected local councils remained dependent on the central government for financial allocations and budgets. The 'As'ads could not allow themselves to be labelled as an *al-hamulah* that triggered such violent politics. This was because of the risk that the local council would lose financial assistance of the Israeli Authorities and, in turn, they would lose their power to the competing *hamulah* in the village, the Qablans.[59]

More than anyone, the *anshey bitahon* of Bayt-Jan welcomed Arens' compromise as a way to end the dispute over Al-Zabud. This is not surprising given that *anshey bitahon* were the most politically loyal Druze and a group that had participated in missions to ensure the state's security on a daily basis. By late-1980s, more than forty percent of Bayt-Jan's breadwinners were employed by one of the Israeli security organisations and were reliant on this employment for major source of income. This was particularly the case for other Druze villages, where many youths continued to perceive service within

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[58] Interview with Mosheh Arens, who at the time held the position of Minister of Minorities in the Israeli government, 16th August 2013, Tel-Aviv.
[59] Interview with a local activist, who wished to remain anonymous. 12th May 2012. Bayt-Jan.

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one of Israeli security organisations as a structure of opportunity for economic and social progress (Hassan 2000).[60]

To conclude, the Israeli government, under the leadership of the Likud party, expedited the national plan of *yehud ha-Galil* and land expropriation from Druze villagers. This process was executed by ILAs that made intensive and aggressive attempts of land expropriation and by the Interior Ministry that strangulated development using construction maps. The village of Bayt-Jan was one of the Druze villages that suffered as a result of both of these Israeli policies. However, by the late-1980s, many villagers had been involved in confrontations with the Israeli police at the site of Al-Zabud. The numerous participants in the clashes resorted to a politics of violence, after perceiving land expropriation as a threat to the survival of their extended family as a distinctive religious and cultural family on its own land.

6.6   Expropriating the Last Plots and 'Loyalist' Politics of Protest

The willingness of some Israeli officials to broker a compromise between the villagers of Bayt-Jan and ILAs over al-Jarmq land was not accepted by INPA. The latter referred matters to the High Supreme Court of Israel and were able to reject the agreement between the villagers of Bayt-Jan and ILA on legal grounds, despite its endorsement by the Minister of Minorities just a few months earlier. INPA convinced the High Court that the agreement was not legal, albeit that the agreement was reached for political reasons. INPA insisted that for the agreement to be legal, the *status quo* of Al-Jarmq would have required legislative change by the Knesset, prior to any agreement of this nature having been reached.[61] The Israeli political leaders involved in striking up the agreement gradually withdrew from the legal battle and repeatedly postponed serious discussions on the matter. Wafid Qablan, who, at the time, was an activist against land expropriation from the villagers, stated:

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[60] On military service as a structure of economic and social progress, see Section 4.6.
[61] Interview with Sʿaid Nafaʿa, 21ˢᵗ January 2013, Bayt-Jan.

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" ...all our efforts to recruit Israeli politicians to our side in the struggle were useless... they always found reasons why they cannot attend the court and to stand by our side....even political leaders who truly believed that Druze loyalty to the state and Jews' 'blood covenant' is a state interest and put efforts in solving the dispute over Al-Jaramq in peaceful methods at the beginning, disappeared afterwards". [62]

This response is not surprising given that, for two decades, the Israeli government has been led by Zionist-Nationalist parties for whom land redemption is a major principle. In line with this ideology, the Israeli government, under the leaderships of Yitzhak Shamir and of Ariel Sharon, made significant efforts to expropriate as much Arab and Druze land as possible, particularly once they had promised to Judaise the land of Israel from the 'river to the sea'.[63] Furthermore, the Israeli government was ready to use all means to achieve this goal, including the most violent means that a modern democracy would not use against its own citizens. For example, in 2004, the Israeli government did not hesitate in sending armed forces of Police Border to the village of 'Isfya, with purpose of forcibly expropriating a plot of land that the ILAs had laid claim to, despite the villagers claiming it as their own.[64]

It is due to this discriminatory policy, which has repeatedly seen the transfer of land from Druze hands to Jewish hands, that the Druze villagers on the Galilee and the Carmel lost the vast majority of their land.[65] According to the ACAP, the Israeli-Druze lost two thirds of their land over the last six decades because of the blatant and unviable policy of land expropriation. A 2008 report shows that, in the early-1950s, a small population of around fifteen thousand people that resided the state owned around 325,000 *dunams* of land. By 2008, the Druze population was around a one hundred thousand people and the Druze land ownership had dropped to a mere 116,000 *dunams* (Table III). Based on

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[62] *Ibid.* Interview with Wafid Qablan.
[63] Referring to the River of Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea.
[64] Confrontations in 'Isfya, Kul al-'Arab, 19th October 2004.
[65] According to ACAP report, sixteen different Jewish-Zionist organisations were responsible for land expropriation from Arab and Druze.

these data, the Druze of Israel had lost a total of 210,000 *dunams* over six decades and each village had lost around sixty percent of its land. There were less fortunate villages: Bayt-Jan had lost over 83% of its land and Hurfesh, Ramh and 'Isfya had each lost almost 75% of their land (ACAP Report, 2008).

The expropriation of more than two thirds of Druze land did not satisfy the Zionist-Nationalist Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu. This government was keen to expropriate the remaining *dunams* owned by Druze villagers. One illustration of this is the Israeli government's Decision 1537 of May 2008.[66] According to this decision, seven government projects, which had started in different parts of the state, were to pass through two areas in 'Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil (al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah, respectively). These projects included; the Cross Israel Motorway (known by its Hebrew name *Hotzeh Israel*) that connects the Southern and Northern parts of the state; the Natural Gas Pipeline that was laid to provide the region of Haifa with natural gas, and; a railway track, which was to connect the city of Haifa with other Jewish cities on the Eastern side of the state, mainly 'Afula.

As was the case for many landowners before them, the affected landowners at al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah only knew about the intended land expropriation once ILA's bulldozers began to advance towards their land. According to Fahmi Halabi (the LDC chairman) this tactic was used by ILA officials in order to prevent the villagers from having sufficient time to organise themselves against the ILA's land expropriation efforts.[67] In a very similar way to that used by the military government to expropriate land from *fallahin*, the borders of their expropriated land were marked out with barbed wire to demarcate 'closed areas' (see Section 6.2).

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[66] Israeli Government Decision Number 1537. The Government Decision Report for 2008. The Knesset Library. Jerusalem.
[67] Interview with Fahmi Halabi, HLDC in Dalyah al-Karmil. 15th September 2013. Fahmi was head of Dalyah al-Karmil local council between 1989 and 1998.

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Village(s)	Village jurisdiction: Mandatory Palestine (*dunams*)	Village jurisdiction in 2008 (*dunams*)
Kisra	110, 300	11,705
Kfur Smaiʿa	7,215	
Bayt-Jan	44,725	5,080
ʿA in al-ʾAsad		3,570
Yanuh	12,975	13,300
Jath	5,865	
Dalyah al-Karmil	31,870	16,150
ʿIsfya	32,245	
Hurfesh	17,245	4,230
Abu- Snan	12,800	6,700
Yarka	32,110	15,630
Julis	14,440	4,490
al-Bqiʿah	14,260	5,560
Sajur	8,160	3,570
Ramh	25,560	6,335
Mghar	55,550	20,715
Total	**325,320**	**116,035**

Table III   Druze land in historical Palestine and in Israel
The source: ACAP (2008)

In addition to the affected villagers, a new organisation (that was founded a few years earlier by Druze activists from the Galilee and the Carmel) had also attempted to stop the ILA's bulldozers from moving through Druze at al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah. This organisation was the LDC (Figure 6.7). LDC activists organised large gatherings at the two sites of al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah, and within the two villages of ʿIsfya and Dalyah al-Karmil. Acting on behalf of the affected villagers, they also submitted numerous signed petitions

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to Israeli officials and even tried to recruit some of these officials to their cause.[68]

Figure 6.7   Members and leaders of the LDC (summer 2013)

Similarly to the IDC, LDC leaders believed that land expropriation from Druze was the evidence of the racial discrimination of the Israeli government towards the Druze. The IDC and the LDC collaborated in the community's struggle against land expropriation and during their efforts to recruit support from left-wing Arab political parties and other organisations that were actively campaigning against land expropriation. Indeed, some of the LDC trustees were also active within the IDC (e.g. Ghalib Sayf of Yanuh is also the general secretary of the IDC). Since the early-1970s, the IDC has contentiously campaigned against the Israeli government's policy of land expropriation and opposed the policy for the Druze and for Druze youth military service in the IDF.[69]

Unlike the IDC, which is known for its politics of protest and longstanding campaign against the Israeli government's policy for the Druze community, the LDC leadership is composed from the heads of leading *ham'ayl* that, up until the late-1990s, were strongly identified with politics of loyalty and known for

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[68] *Ibid.*
[69] For more information about IDC activities against military service, see Section 4.4.

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their unwavering support of the Israeli government's policy for the Druze community. Indeed, the Halabi and Abu-Rukn are among leading *ham'ayl* that traditionally supported Druze service in the IDF and encouraged the Druze vote for the Mapai and its successors.[70] In January 2013, a few weeks before the general elections to the Knesset, Fahmi Halabi, the Chairman of the LDC, along with other leading members (such as Labib Abu-Rukn), made an appeal to their followers. The appeal was for them to vote for the left-wing al-Jabha - Rakah party, the political party that was (and still is) renowned for its criticism of the Israeli government's policy for Israeli-Arabs.

Some LDC activists were also members of PIM which, during the 1970s and the 1980s, was identified with the Druze politics of loyalty. As described in Section 5.5, PIM leaders used their language and professional skills to promote a politics of loyalty within the Druze community and to discredit the IDC's claims against Israeli government policy. More recent years have seen PIM leaders drawing upon these skills when debating the Druze villagers' moral and legal rights on their land with government officials. These leaders call upon research centres and professional engineers to provide evidence supportive of their argument that land expropriation has negative implications for the economic and natural development of their community. In fact, the aforementioned 2008 ACAP survey can be attributed to this group's encouragement for more accurate, reliable and relevant data to be gathered and used during debates with Israeli land officials.[71]

In addition to the number of *dunams* that the Israeli government expropriated from each Druze village, the 2008 ACAP survey reveals a disparity between the increasing Druze population density and a declining the number of *dunams*.[72] It also exposes the scarcity of land for industrialisation, particularly given that most land had already been used for residential purposes. This created a situation where many households were totally reliant on jobs within the

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[70] For more information about leading *ham'ayl's* politics of loyalty, see Section 3.2.
[71] Interview with Zidan 'Atshah, 2nd March 2012, 'Isfya.
[72] See ACAP report, (2008).

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Jewish market and within Jewish settlements. Often, these were jobs were ones that most Jewish citizens were unwilling to do. Finally, it shows how the lack of land for residential development resulted in dozens of Druze youth, in most villages, building their houses without the appropriate permissions from the RCPC. Such actions resulted in them falling foul of the law and being liable for penalties of thousands of shekels.[73]

The LDC members also included *ktsinim meshuhrarim*, who for many years, served in one of the Israeli security agencies and who were considered to be one of the most identifiable group with community's politics of loyalty. As discussed in Section 5.6, well-known *ktsinim meshuhrarim*, such as Colonel Jid'an 'Abass, have, in recent years, expressed their disappointment with the Israeli government's general policy in relation to the Druze community and with the government's lack of investment towards closing the development gaps between Druze villages and Jewish settlements. An increasing sense of relative deprivation was evident amongst the Druze, particularly those left without legal recourse to build their homes in their villages because of the lack of land for construction. Many Druze youth were also aggrieved at being put in this situation after having spent a considerable part of their lives serving the state.[74]

Over recent years, accounts of Druze *ktsinim meshuhrarim* whose homes are under threat of demolition (because they were built without appropriate permission) have made headline news within the community. The affected *ktsinim meshuhrarim* feel much like the Palestinian-Arabs, whose houses were demolished by the Israeli authorities, ostensibly for security reasons.[75] However, by way of contrast to many other Palestinian-Arabs, who are perceived by the Israeli authorities as a threat to the state's security, Druze

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[73] More than three hundred and fifty houses in Dalyah al-Karmil alone were built illegally. See article: "The fate of unauthorised homes in Dalyah al-Karmil": www.Hona.co.il from the 16th September 2013. (access date: 8th February 2015).

[74] Interview with Khalil Halabi, 18th September 2012, Dalyah al-Karmil.

[75] According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, almost twenty thousand homes were demolished by the IDF between 1967 and 2014; see: http://www.icahd.org/uk. (access date: 22nd January 2015).

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ktsinim meshuhrarim had spent a large part of their lives serving the most identifiable institutions with the state's security. The story of Major Yasir Khatib, a *kat'iin meshuhrar* from Bayt-Jan, dominated the local and national news after the Regional Court at Acre sentenced him to serve a six month prison term and ordered him to pay more than four hundred thousand shekels as a penalty for building his house without permission from the RCPC. Khatib's case justifies a famous expression that has been circulating (in Hebrew) amongst many Druze in recent years: *Shavim be-madim 'aravim ba-izrahout* (equal in uniform and Arabs in civil life).[76]

To summarise, as part of its policy of consolidating Jewish control over the state's resources, the Zionist–Nationalist Israeli government continued its efforts to expropriate land from Druze villagers. The heads of leading *ham'ayl*, PIM leaders and *ktsinim meshuhrarim* (who were, for many years, strongly loyalist) resorted to a politics of protest and encouraged other Druze villagers to gather, demonstrate and issue fiery petitions against state's policy. These sub-groups had resorted to a politics of protest because they perceived the Israeli government's land expropriation as a threat to their leading status in the community.

6.7 Occupying 'Druze Land' and Druze Politics of Violence

The LDC's attempts to prevent the arrival of the bulldozers at al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah failed. There was little hope that LDC leaders could successfully challenge government's policy of land expropriation using the Israeli judicial system. After all, the judiciary, including the Supreme High Court, are bound by and must apply laws that have been enacted by the Knesset and in recent years the Knesset has been controlled by Zionist–Nationalist (right-wing) parties that are committed to Zionist principles, such as land redemption. In most cases, the judicial system (including the Supreme High Court) has ignored the fact that the Druze of Israel have owned the land in question since before

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[76] Interview with Yasir Khatib, 13th January 2014. Bayt-Jan.

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the establishment of the state. The judiciary has also denied the Druze collective right to use their own land to improve their standards of living. Instead, the judiciary has praised the Zionist narrative and prioritised the Jewish people and their rights over the land — including Druze land — in the centre of the ideological order.[77]

The right-wing Israeli government's policy in relation to land and the expropriation of every single unsettled *dunam* that belongs to Druze villagers was challenged by a group of *mashaykh* with their *shabab* followers, who came together from all Druze villages to stop so-called *sariqat aradi* (stealing of land) by the Israeli government.[78] In contrast to LDC, who attempted to solve land disputes with ILA through negotiations, the *mashaykh* and their leaders believe that only violence can stop ILA bulldozers from expropriating further land from Druze villagers. According to Shaykh Salman Kayouf, there is no point negotiating with ILA officials since they have no interest in any negotiations that do not result in them controlling all expropriated land.[79] Furthermore, whenever ILAs expropriate Druze land, they are afforded the protection of armed and special Israeli police forces, including Police Border Units and the Yassam. Consequently, clashes that took place on the 17th August 2010 at al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah resulted in a number of policemen and *mashaykh* being injured and police vehicles being seriously damaged.

The Druze *mashaykh* have resorted to a politics of violence in recent years. This is interesting because, until the 1990s, they were considered to be strongly identified with a politics of loyalty. As was described in Sections 3.6 and 4.5, the vast majority of Druze *mashaykh* welcomed the Israeli government's decision to recognise the community as an independent religious community and were supportive of Druze youth service in the IDF. At the time, most Druze perceived the Israeli government's policy as a new structure of

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[77] For a brief review on Supreme High Court's stand towards land expropriation, see Jamal (2011).
[78] Interview with Shaykh Munhal Mansur, 15th January 2014, 'Isfya.
[79] Interview with Shaykh Salman Kayouf, 22nd September 2013, 'Isfya.

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opportunity for the community's cultural restoration and its survival as a distinctive cultural and religious community on its own land.

However, over recent years, large scale land expropriation from Druze villagers has changed the *mashaykh's* view of the Israeli government and of the contribution of its policy to the preservation of the community as a distinctive religious group. This is largely because the amount of land remaining for construction in Druze villages is insufficient to support the natural development of the community as a distinctive religious group on its own land. Indeed, surveys from recent years show that, in the last two decades, dozens of young Druze couples have chosen to settle in one of the Jewish towns, such as Jerusalem, Haifa and Karmiel, because of a lack in land for construction in their own villages. These youths reside in Jewish towns because they could not obtain official permission from the RCPC to build their homes in their own villages (e.g. in Julis: Figure 6.8).

The phenomenon of Druze couples relocating to Jewish towns is one the Druze *mashaykh*'s major concerns. In particular, it is perceived as a threat to the community's existence as a distinctive cultural and religious group. This is because there is an increasing likelihood that future generations of Druze in Jewish towns will marry people who are not Druze, which, in turn, threatens the Druze ethno-religious identity and the survival of the Druze as a distinctive religious community. This is because the *al-tawhid* religion and its *muhdin* (Druze) followers believe that a Druze can only be born as a Druze if both his/her father and mother are *muhdin.* Thus, the discovery of a mixed-marriage tends to enrage these religious groups (Figure 6.8).[80]

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[80] Interview with Shaykh Mwafaq Tarif, Head of the Druze Community in Israel, Julis. 13th January 2014 (Figure 6.9).

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Figure 6.8   Families from the village of Julis demonstrating against the lack of land for construction

Land is religiously sacred for Druze and their *mashaykh* because, historically, Druze villages were built on or near land that surrounded one of their holy tombs. This matter was extensively discussed in the Lebanese anthropological work of Fouad Khuri entitled '*Being a Druze'* (2004). Khuri states that Druze Land around, what once known as, Greater Syria become a homeland, sanctified by a multitude of *maqamat* (shrines), *khilwat* (retreats), *al-majlis* (assemblies) and tombs of righteous individuals who had spread the religion within Druze settlements. Khuri provides a detailed historical review of the roots of Druze villages in Lebanon, Syria and historical Palestine, demonstrating that it is difficult to find a Druze village that does not have one or more shrines (Khuri 2004, 212).[81]

Finally, *al-'ard* (land) has been playing a significant role in this ethnic groups' struggle to preserve their cultural identity. Traditionally, Druze transferred their land from father to son through *al-wirathah* (inheritance). They signed to ensure their continuation and survival as a *dar* (Literally *'home'*) and as an *al-ahl* (extended family), such as *al-ahl Bayt-Jan* (the extended family of Bayt-

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[81] For instance, Maqam al-Al-Nabi Sabalan is located at the village of Hurfesh, and Maqam Sidi Abu Ebrahim is located at Dalyah al-Karmil.

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Jan).[82] *Al-ahl Bayt-Jan* is, in turn, part of another extended family called *'abn'a al- ta'ifah* (the sons of the community, i.e. those who follow the same religious community).

Figure 6.9   Shaykh Mwafaq Tarif — Head of the Druze Community in Israel

For these reasons Druze *mashaykh* and their followers' rejected proposals of compensation as a solution for expropriation, or what is known in public as *mushkilah al-'ard* (the land problem). From their perspective, compensation merely addresses some financial aspects of land loss, but it cannot address the cultural and religious dimensions of their loss of *'ard al-'ajdad* (the land of grandfathers) that is enshrined in their tradition and religion — the same way that *Eretz Yisrael* is sacred for many religious and Zionist Jews. This has culminated in *mashaykh* demonstrating against land expropriation (Figure 6.10).[83]

To summarise, Druze *mashaykh* and their followers from the *shabab* have resorted to a politics of violence over recent years, in response to Zionist-Nationalist (right-wing) Israeli government's policy to expropriate the last unsettled *dunams* from Druze villagers. Many groups within the community, such as the LDC, perceive land expropriation as a discriminative policy that

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[82] For more information, see Section 6.5.
[83] For more information about land and Zionism, see also Ben-Dor (1979, 9).

subordinates the economic status of the community. By way of contrast, Druze *mashaykh* and their followers perceive the Israeli government's efforts to expropriate further Druze land as a threat to their community's survival as a distinctive cultural and religious group; a threat that justifies resorting to a politics of violence.

Figure 6.10   Druze *mashaykh* and villagers demonstrating at the site of al-Jalamih protesting against land expropriation.

6.8   Conclusion

As part of their efforts to establish the Jewish state, the Yishuv's political leaders and Zionist organisations attempted to purchase land from the Druze of Palestine. To this end, the Yishuv's leaders met with Druze leaders in Syria, such as Sultan Basha al-Atrash, and attempted to convince them to support a plan that would see the transfer of all Druze villagers to Syria. Yishuv's leaders, however, withdraw their support of the plan when they realised that Druze leading *ham'ayl* in Palestine were determined to remain on their land and that such a plan may thwart their own efforts to prevent the Druze forming allegiances with Arab rebels during the conflict over Palestine.

The establishment of the state of Israel, in 1948, gave the Israeli government the political structure it needed to implement Zionism and transfer Druze land to Jewish hands. At first, and throughout its military government, the Israeli government focused on the acquisition of land that Druze *fallahin* had cultivated but that was, officially, registered in the names of Palestinian refugees or the British Authorities. However, since the early-1960s, the *Hesder Kraka'ot* law entitles ILAs to expropriate any land that is not fully cultivated or settled by Druze villagers.

The affected *fallahin* made claims against the military government for their loss of income from agriculture that was attributed to land expropriation. Along with signing petitions and holding large demonstrations, some villagers from Yarka and Kisra even tried to prevent ILAs from expropriating their land by forming human barricades. However, it was *'ahl Bayt-Jan* (the extended family of Bay-Jan) who first resorted to a politics of violence and confronted the ILAs and the Israeli police at the site of Al-Zabud. These clashes resulted in serious injuries to a number of policemen and damage to their vehicles. The villagers of Bayt-Jan and their leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of violence after coming to the conclusion that further land expropriation would threaten their survival as a distinctive cultural community on their own land.

The violence at Bayt-Jan and at other Druze villages has not deterred the Zionist-Nationalist (right-wing) Israeli governments that have recently come to power. On the contrary, the efforts of the right-wing Israeli governments to expropriate every single unsettled *dunam* from Druze villages on the Carmel and the Galilee have been reinforced since these violent confrontations. The most recent of these clashes were seen at the two sites of al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah, where the ILA used heavy bulldozers and special units of Israeli forces to expropriate land that belong to the villagers of in these villages on the Carmel 'Isfya and Dalyah al-Karmil.

The LDC was the first to oppose the Israeli government's decision to expropriate Druze villagers at al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah. At first their opposition took the form of a legal protest. However, they soon joined Druze *mashaykh* and their *shabab* followers and confronted the ILA's bulldozers and the Israeli police forces. As a result of these confrontations, a number of policemen were injured and both ILA and police vehicles were damaged. The Druze *mashaykh* and their followers resorted to a politics of violence because they perceive the Israeli government's efforts to expropriate further land and to acquire the last unsettled *dunams* from Druze villagers as a threat to the community's survival as a distinctive religious and cultural group in the region.

The elite within the Israeli-Druze community have resorted to a politics of violence over recent years. This supports the argument presented in Section 1.6, namely that the political elite of subordinate cultural group will resort to a politics of violence if the state's policy is perceived as a threat to their leading status within the group. Certainly, this is the way that the LDC has responded to Israeli government's land expropriation efforts of recent years. These findings also lend support to the second argument put forward in Section 1.6, namely that a breadwinners of subordinate cultural group will resort to a politics of violence if the state's policy is perceived as a threat to their source of income since Druze *fallahin* have resorted to a violence following the Israeli government's decision to expropriate their land at al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah. Finally, the research findings within this Chapter confirm that subordinate

cultural groups' masses will resort to a politics of violence if they perceive the state's policy as threat to the preservation of the group as distinctive cultural group, as was clearly the case for the Druze *mashaykh* who joined forces with the LDC and their followers at al-Jalamih and al-Mansurah.

Conclusion

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1. Israel and Druze Political Action

Druze politics of violence in recent years has been the focus of number of academic works (Amrani 2010). In line with this academic interest, the primary objective of this thesis was to conduct a study that explains the change that occurred within the community's political action and the rise of politics of violence over recent years. As the thesis reveals, the clashes that began in 1987 in the village of Bayt-Jan in what known as the "Battle for al-Zabud" have spread to other Druze villages. The most recent events occurred at the village of Magdal Shams on the Golan Heights, immediately prior to the completion of this thesis.[1]

The rise in the politics of violence among the Druze community in more recent years is an interesting change for a number of reasons, including the fact that the Druze of Israel are famously known for their politics of loyalty towards the Israeli state and its Jewish majority. The most poignant demonstration of this loyalty is the service of thousands of Druze youth in the IDF — the security agency most associated with the state (Kfir and Dor 2015).

During the course of this research, it has become increasingly clear that the recent shift to violent politics cannot be explained unless the Druze political actions during the early years of the Israeli state and Mandatory Palestine are examined. .In line with previous academic studies, this thesis asserts that most Druze resident historical Palestine resorted to a politics of silence and refrained from taking sides during the conflict over Palestine, even during its most critical stage — the 1948 War.[2]

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[1] On 2nd June 2015, a group of Israeli Druze youth attacked an IDF ambulance that was carrying a Syrian citizen who was suspected of attacking Druze villages on the other side of the country's borders. See article in http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.2666425. (access date: 4th July 2015).

[2] Similar claims were put forward by Firro (1999) and Parsons (2000).

In line with Parsons (2000), Section 2.4 shows that Yishuv's leadership's relationships with leading Druze *ham'ayl* was one of the major reasons behind the Druze of Palestine adopting a politics of silence during the conflict over Palestine. In *The Druze between Palestine and Israel 1947-1949*, Parsons illustrates how Yishuv's political elite, including Ben-Tzvi and Abba Hushi, met the interests of the leading *ham'ayl* from the Galilee and the Carmel, such as the Tarif and Khanayfis, and managed to convince them to stay out of the conflict in exchange for the Yishuv securing their *ham'ayl's* interests and leading status.

Druze family archives revealed that the *fallahin* — who, at the time, accounted for the most of the Druze community in Palestine — also resorted to a politics of silence. However, whereas leading *ham'ayl* resorted to a politics of silence to preserve their leading status within the community, the *fallahin*'s politics of silence stemmed from the perception that the emerging Yishuv was not a threat to their livelihoods and income from agriculture. On the contrary, some *fallahin* saw the emerging Yishuv as creating a new structure of opportunity for their economic progress.

At that time, the conservative-religious community, including the leading *ham'ayl* and the *fallahin*, believed that the emerging Yishuv presented a new structure of opportunity for the community's preservation as a distinctive and religious group on its own land. This perception was highly influential in terms of the Druze politics of silence since *hifiz al-baq'a* (self–preservation) of the community as a distinctive cultural and religious group was the main concern for the conservative-religious community resident in Palestine. This was most relevant once Palestinian-Arab rebel attacks against their villages intensified, whilst, at the same time, the Yishuv's leadership tempered its Zionist ambitions and halted its plan to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Syria.

The aforementioned case study and Druze politics of silence during the struggle over Palestine, adds weight to the argument that cultural groups

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can reach political stability and refrain from attacking each other's interests during a multi-ethnic conflict. Such a result will achievable if the agreement between the political elite safeguards the leading status of the political elite and ensures the survival of the subordinate group as a distinctive cultural group.

This study undertakes a more comprehensive analysis of Druze political action in the first three decades of the Israeli state than has been undertaken by other studies. Indeed, previous research has suffered from 'absolutism' and has persistently addressed community political action as a derivative of the Israeli state's policy. Concurring with Avivi (2007), this research recognises the tremendous influence that the Israeli government's policy in relation to the Druze community had on the political actions taken by the Druze. However, Druze political actions can only be fully explained once Druze perceptions of the policy are examined.

For instance, Chapter 3 highlights the Israeli government's efforts to recognise the Druze community as an independent religious community and the commensurate benefits to the state but also assesses the way that community recognition was perceived by the leading *ham'ayl*. As noted, the latter perceived as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their leading status within the community and in the Israeli society in general. Similarly, Chapter 4 focuses on the Israeli government's efforts to encourage Druze youth to serve in the IDF and how this service affected the political stability among the Arab minority. Importantly, these efforts also resulted in most Druze *fallahin* believing that IDF service was a new structure of opportunity for improving their economic status in the new state. At the same time, most of the religious-conservative *mashaykh* perceived IDF service as a new structure of opportunity for preserving the community as a distinctive and cultural group on its own land.

From these research findings it appears that a majority among the community resorted to a politics of loyalty because they perceived the

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arrangements that formed part of the state's policy towards the Druze as structures of opportunity for economic, cultural, political or social progress. This confirms this thesis' second argument that a subordinate cultural group will resort to a politics of loyalty if:

(1) the subordinate group's political elite perceives the state's policy as a new structure of opportunity for consolidating their leading status;

(2) the subordinate group's breadwinners perceive the state's policy as a new structure of opportunity for their economic progress; and,

(3) the great majority of the subordinate group perceives the state's policy as a new structure of opportunity for the preservation of the group as a distinctive and cultural community.

The academic studies that examined the rise in politics of protest among the community suffered also from 'absolutism' and have persistently addressed community political action as a derivative of the changes that occurred in the social structure of the community, particularly the emergence of new sub-groups within the community and the Arab society as a whole (Al-Haj 1987). Indeed, this research recognises the influence of emergent sub-groups within the Druze community, such as the Druze graduates and *anshey bitahon*, who had entirely different expectations from the state than those of their *fallahin* forefathers.

However, any attempts to explain why Druze have resorted to a politics of protest over recent years would inevitably fail if the changes in the state's policy towards the Druze following the rise of the Hirut party to power in 1977 were to be ignored. This change was best manifested through the National Unity government that led the country in the 1980s decision to ignore the Ben-Dor Committee's recommendations and the HDLC's request for further budget allocations to Druze villages.

As emphasised in Chapter 5, the level of frustration among sub-groups that traditionally identified with politics of loyalty (namely leading *ham'ayl*) intensified because the National Unity government invested heavily in *yehud ha-Galil* and the development of the neighbouring Jewish settlements, whilst Druze villages saw very little investment in comparison. This policy, in time, came to be perceived as a threat to the leading *ham'ayl*'s status within their villages and as the reason for the subordinate economic status of traditionally loyal sub-groups such as the *anshey bitahon* and PIM.

The Druze resorted to a politics of protest during the 1980s, lending support to the argument that the politics of accommodation can only maintain long term political stability within a polarised state if the aim is to achieve equality and is perceived by the subordinate groups as having this aim. Hence, it has been argued in this thesis that a politics of accommodation cannot achieve stability if the aim is to maintain stability for its own sake, rather than to achieve equality between the dominant and subordinate groups over the longer term. Since the mid-1980s, traditionally loyal sub-groups resort to a politics of protest. The trigger for these protests was not the Israeli government's reversal of its decision to recognise the independence of the Druze community. Nor can it be attributed to Druze youth service in the IDF. Instead, the root cause of the protests is because of the failure of policy arrangements to deliver equality between the Druze and the Jews in Israel.

The rise of politics of violence among the community provides another example of the implications of a central authority's policy towards a subordinate cultural group and the latter's political actions. As Chapter 6 illustrates, the rise in politics of violence cannot be divorced from the Zionist-Nationalist (right-wing) government that has controlled Israel for the last two decades nor from its determination to consolidate the Jewish supremacy within the state. This was best demonstrated by its determination to expropriate the last unsettled plots of land in Druze hands,

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including those that are intended for the future natural development of Druze villages.

As also indicated in Chapter 6 land expropriation from Druze villagers is not a new policy: It dates back to the early days of the Israeli state when thousands of *dunams* were expropriated from Druze villagers for the purpose of building new Jewish settlements and Judaising the Galilee. The significant factor was the change in the way that some Druze began to perceive land expropriation. In particular, in recent years the religious-conservative *mashaykh* and their followers have perceived it as a threat to the survival of the community as a distinctive and cultural group on its own land.

The rise of a politics of violence also supports another argument that this thesis has developed around the relationship between ethnic supremacy and a subordinate group resorting to a politics of violence. This is because an ethnic supremacy policy aims to exploit the state's natural, financial, political and cultural resources for the benefit of the dominant group, including those resources that are necessary, if not crucial, for the preservation of subordinate group as a distinctive cultural group. This is precisely the type of threat that encourages members of subordinate groups to resort to a politics of violence, as was the case when many Druze villagers faced land expropriation.

2.   Multi-Ethnic States and Cultural Groups Political Action

The Druze community in Israel shares a great deal of similarity with other cultural group in the Middle East; each of these groups has its own distinctive cultural components that distinguish the group from neighbouring cultural communities. Just as the Druze all follow the *al-tawhid* religion, these groups have their unique cultural components that result in a degree of cultural homogeneity. However, each of these groups is, in actual fact, an assembly of heterogeneous sub-groups that share

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cultural components with other cultural groups. For instance, the Arabic language is spoken by most Middle Eastern communities, regardless of sectarian identity or formal citizenship.

Consistent with other academic research that has focused on a cultural group's political action, this thesis supports the claim that there is a strong relationship between a central authority's policy towards a group and the political actions adopted by that group. Hence, in order to understand a cultural group's political actions, one must first thoroughly analyse the motives and methods of the central authority in relation to that group. In the case of Druze political action in the state of Israel, this requires analysing the rather varied motives and methods of different state agencies as opposed to regarding the state as a unified entity.

The thesis also supports recent research that states that emphasis must be placed on groups' perceptions of any central authority policy when performing a thorough and comprehensive analysis of a cultural group's political actions.   This is particularly important because the central authority's actual and perceived intentions may differ. For instance, whilst the Israeli government's main intention was to use Druze military service to increase the state's political stability, most Druze *fallahin* saw military service as a new structure of opportunity for their economic progress.

The Israeli government under Mapai's leadership has different views and policies towards the Druze community than those held by the Likud and other nationalist party governments. Similarly, the conservative-religious Druze community that lived in newly established Israel had completely different views and requirements from the secular-modern Druze community that that now resides in the Carmel and the Galilee. This illustrates that neither the central authority nor the cultural groups are fixed entities. Instead, they are evolving and subject to any number of internal and external influences. Hence, in order to understand a cultural group's political actions over a period of time, it is necessary to take into

account the heterogeneity that characterise each group and the emerging identities within both the central authority and the group in the framework of a flexible model such as that proposed by this thesis.

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