

Middle Eastern Studies

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

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To cite this article: Charles Tripp (2022) *Al-malik al-salih* – Islam and the monarchy in 1930s Egypt, Middle Eastern Studies, 58:3, 354-370, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2022.2047659

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2022.2047659

Published online: 26 Apr 2022.

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
2022, VOL. 58, NO. 3, 354–370
https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2022.2047659

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Al-malik al-salih – Islam and the monarchy in 1930s Egypt

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A marked feature of the first few years of King Faruq's reign was the attention paid to the place of Islam and of Islamic obligations in Egyptian politics, particularly in relation to the monarchy. There had been a general revival of interest in Islamic themes in Egyptian intellectual and public life, but the particular emphasis and timing of this focus were due to Ali Mahir Pasha's shaping of Palace policy. He was aware of the challenges facing the monarchy in an era when neither the sanction nor the methods of traditionally exercised political authority appeared likely to survive. By April 1936, when sixteen-year-old Prince Faruq ascended to the Throne after the death of his father King Fu'ad, the ground seemed to be shifting in Egyptian politics. The nationalist Wafd Party was set to return to power and a new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty promised to greatly diminish Great Britain's role in Egypt. In the event, this was not to be, particularly with the outbreak of war in 1939, but in 1936 it was imaginable.

Of even greater concern to those who were invested in the old style of politics, was the sense that a new era of mass politics was dawning, driven by a mobilised, educated and impatient urban public. Its power to challenge and to overturn the old order through mass protest and demonstration had been vividly shown by the events of 1935: the authoritarian government of Ismail Sidqi Pasha had been swept from power, taking his restrictive version of the Egyptian constitution with him, and opening the way for the return of the Wafd.[1] In this context Ali Mahir devised other means to reinforce the power of the Palace, developing elements of the populism that became so marked a characteristic of successive Egyptian regimes after 1952.

Populism has been well described as more of a political style or a rhetoric, irrespective of content, expressing a certain kind of governmental crisis, but varying in its particular targets and idioms, depending on the time and the context.[2] Characteristic of that style are some recurring features: the presentation of a simplified version of reality that calls for acclamation, not scrutiny; a claim to power based on the construction of charisma, rather than on institutional development; the portrayal of opposition as being driven by a secretive minority, throwing into sharper relief 'the people', the silent majority for whom the leader claims to speak.[3] If part of populism's style includes such features, then it needs to be recognised that it is also performative, in the sense of involving a repeated enactment of the focus of authority, be it the charismatic leadership or the repertoires of acclaim that are associated with it. Thus, a populist politics is performative in two senses: it creates a *mise en scène* for the theatrical playing out in public of the roles assigned in this repertoire; it also brings into being new ways of thinking about politics, potentially creating new formations for the basis for power, new ways of acting out the political.[4]

It is in relation to populism and its performative aspects that Ali Mahir's orchestration of distinctively Islamic themes in the public life of Egypt can best be understood. Islamic symbols and an Islamic myth of kingship were part of the repertoire whereby Ali Mahir sought control of a changing political world, using the king to appeal to 'the people' above the heads of their

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elected leaders. Secular trust in the Wafd as the representative of the majority of Egyptians was to be eroded and replaced by a different order of trust in the person of King Faruq, projected as sole protector and guarantor of his subjects' Islamic beliefs.

For such a technique to work, there needed to be a constituency eager to hear the message. In mid-1930s Egypt it appeared to many that the proclaimed consequences of such a policy were both desirable and urgently necessary.[5] For some, the most important outcome would be the re-establishment of Islamic principles as the main foundation of public life;[6] for others, virtue lay in the very fact of attention to the management of mass obedience and to the foundations of public order. Ali Mahir did not, therefore, lack allies, either among the elite or more generally. Nor did he lack authorities eager to act as interpreters of Islamic themes to the masses. However, in his utilitarian, and finally secular approach he seemed to have underestimated the political aspirations of those who did not see Islam simply as a prop for the Muhammad Ali dynasty. Consequently, he was faced with the challenge of retaining control of the instrument of control itself, to ensure that it was he who kept hold of the repertoire, rather than allowing it to dictate Palace policy. The imminent danger of this for his wider strategies led Ali Mahir eventually to play down the once radical promise of the Palace's involvement in Islamic issues, and to seek to relegate their partisans to a traditionally subservient position as cheer leaders for the king.

An Islamic narrative of the political: the image of the king as '*al-malik al-salih*'

A primary focus of Ali Mahir's strategy was the image of the king himself since the manufacture of charisma as a populist antidote to the institutional constraints of the state lay at the heart of that strategy. The power of Islam to influence the loyalties of their subjects had long been acknowledged by the Muhammad Ali dynasty, ensuring that their rule was legitimated by the senior Islamic authorities, despite the dynasty's departure from any strictly Islamic interpretation of the rights and duties of the sovereign.[7] King Fu'ad, installed by the British as King of Egypt, had accepted the 1923 constitution under duress, since he rejected the idea that his own authority was subordinate to the will of his people.[8] He had, therefore, been eager to appropriate sources of authority which either antedated the establishment of the constitutional regime, or which lay beyond the confines of the purely Egyptian political community. Most ambitiously, it had driven him to take a close interest in the Caliphate in the 1920s.[9] Within Egypt itself, his main preoccupation was to ensure that the senior Egyptian cleric, the Sheikh al-Azhar, would owe his position, and his loyalty, primarily to the king.[10]

Ali Mahir, prime minister from January to May 1936 and subsequently Head of the Royal Diwan, had a different view of the role of Islam, seeing it as a key weapon to use against the Wafd in the field of mass politics.[11] In April 1936 the ascent to the throne of the young King Faruq offered him the opportunity to exploit populist themes with renewed vigour, weaving an Islamic myth around the king in order to convince the mass of his subjects that Faruq was better qualified as a guardian of their true interests than the Wafd could ever be. The fact that King Faruq was almost wholly unknown to the public at large and to the political class gave Ali Mahir freedom to create an image to suit his purposes. Faruq's early portrayal as the 'righteous king' (*al-malik al-salih*), made him central to the political myth of a renewed 'Islamic monarchy'.[12]

Within a few days of the king's return to Egypt in May 1936 (he had been in England when his father died) this aspect of image creation began. His attendance at Friday prayers at the al-Hussein mosque in Cairo was elaborately staged, receiving a corresponding amount of publicity in the press.[13] This was the first of a regular series of weekly visits by the king to different mosques, the locations of which would be announced well in advance so that 'the necessary preparations could be made' – presumably also to ensure that the requisite popular acclaim

would be present.[14] *Al-Balagh*, at that time an organ of the Palace and of Ali Mahir in particular, was quick to draw a parallel between the king's visits and caliphal custom, while underlining the personal piety of King Faruq.[15] Significantly, after a royal visit to the mosque of al-Sayyida Zainab the following week, the Palace announced that the king wanted his visits to have 'a purely religious aspect, not an official one'. Consequently, government representation would be kept to a minimum.[16] Clearly, if the king were to be portrayed as the focus of Islamic hopes this could not be achieved if he were also surrounded by most of the Cabinet and the Regency Council.[17]

The celebration of the *mawlid al-nabi* (Birthday of the Prophet) a few days later provided a further opportunity to display the king in this most popular of Egyptian Islamic contexts. Supportive elements of the press reported that his presence had enhanced the 'greatness of the ceremony and its religious meaning'. The king had perforce to attend the ceremony in the company of his ministers, but he later returned to the scene of the festivities 'incognito' – whereupon he was immediately recognised and became the focus of a huge demonstration of popular loyalty. It was left to *al-Balagh* once more to drive home the significance of these events: a parallel was drawn between King Faruq and the second Caliph, ʿUmar, who was said to have disguised himself to mingle with his subjects. By happy coincidence the Caliph ʿUmar was also known as *al-Faruq* (he who can distinguish right from wrong).[18]

In the construction of a sanctified public image of the king, Ali Mahir needed the approval of the Sheikh al-Azhar, Mustafa al-Maraghi, the most authoritative exponent of Islamic orthodoxy in Egypt. The Sheikh's very association with King Faruq in the public eye gave greater credibility to the projection of the king as *al-malik al-salih*.[19] For his part, Sheikh al-Maraghi was quick to see in the young king great potential for his own position in the state, and for the ultimate character of that state. He had claimed that the only things that the Egyptian people understood and that kept them in their place were Islam and fear of government. Without these restraints, he argued, the *fellahin* and the urban poor would revolt against all authority and this would lead to a collapse of Egyptian society into the horror of what he characterised as 'Bolshevismus'.[20] He claimed that this was the direction taken by the Wafd, alleging that it was not only diminishing the role of Islam in public life, possibly with Coptic inspiration, but was also 'heading straight for revolution' by encouraging militancy among the working class.[21] It was not surprising, therefore, that he moved into the orbit of the Palace during Ali Mahir's period of influence and lent himself willingly to the campaign to promote the Islamic virtues of King Faruq.[22] This was confirmed in May 1936 when Sheikh al-Maraghi was appointed as the king's tutor for Arabic and Islamic history – an assignment which, it has been suggested, was by no means an easy one.[23]

Meanwhile the king's visits to mosques continued with maximum publicity. Whether this was creating the genuine popularity which Ali Mahir hoped to use against the king's political enemies is hard to judge, especially since Ali Mahir had little intention of using that popularity in any systematic or representational way. The cheering crowds lining the roads to the mosques and the huge congregations present were creating the impression of massive popular acclaim for a pious Muslim king, performatively enacting the role on a mass scale. Even newspapers aligned with the Wafd vied with one another to give space to King Faruq's weekly act of piety. In an era of rapidly expanding newspaper circulation, the press was a sector to which Ali Mahir had devoted considerable attention, precisely because of its role in the development of mass politics and the vehicle it provided for the kinds of populist messages associated with his campaign.[24]

An Islamic narrative of the political: portraying the leaders of the Wafd as '*al-Kharijan ʿala al-Malik*'

One possible measure of the campaign's success lay in the disquiet felt by the Wafdist Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas.[25] The other side of the Palace's populist campaign was to present

the Wafd as the antithesis of the 'righteous king', as a party led by *al-kharijan ʿala al-malik* [two dissenters/rebels against the king].[26] It was accused of neglecting its 'Islamic duties', of being hostile to Islam itself and of being the front organisation for a sinister Christian conspiracy. The campaign aimed to turn the image of the Wafd on its head: far from being the representative of the majority (in the May 1936 elections the Wafd had won 169 of the 232 seats in the Egyptian parliament), it was alleged to be against the religion of the vast majority of Egyptians and controlled by Egypt's Coptic minority.

In January 1937 this aspect of the campaign opened in the context of the government's negotiations at Montreux to end the Capitulations and the Mixed Courts. At al-Azhar, the Association for the Defence of Islam held a conference to examine whether Egyptian legislation should be derived solely from Islamic law.[27] Unsurprisingly, it concluded that the *shariʿa* was the only proper basis for legislation, informing al-Nahhas that it was his duty as a Muslim to act.[28] *Al-Balagh* mischievously suggested that the government was planning to replace both the *shariʿa* courts and the *Majlis al-Hisbi* (the Probate Courts), with a system based exclusively on European legal principles. Protests and petitions from al-Azhar duly followed.[29] The government denied this, accusing those responsible of jeopardising the negotiations by alarming the European powers.[30] This was precisely the point that the Wafd's opponents wanted to make: the government appeared keener to cater to European sensibilities, than to implement Islamic principles.

When the government did announce its reforms of the *Waqf al-Ahli* (private religious endowment administration) and the *Majlis al-Hisbi*, the *shariʿa* lawyers who worked in these two institutions protested vehemently. Their protests followed a script that conformed closely to the Palace's campaign: they appealed directly to the king for justice, declaring 'we are not political men but men of religion, and we acknowledge only the king'. They also suggested that because the courts in question and the *awqaf* were Islamic institutions they lay outside the jurisdiction of parliament. This touched on the very foundations of the Egyptian constitutional state and provoked a correspondingly sharp response from the Wafdist paper *al-Jihad*.[31] The *shariʿa* lawyers claimed the reforms were an attack on Islam itself and petitioned the king once more, asserting that this should not be happening in the 'reign of the young king, pious and beloved of God', and asked for his help in the protection of Islam from the Wafdist government.[32]

Similar protests erupted on the issue of Islamic education. Like all students in Egypt, the graduates of al-Azhar feared the prospect of unemployment and resented the government's inability or unwillingness to help them. They felt particularly sharply the loss of al-Azhar's once dominant position as Egypt's only institution of higher learning, and the growth of secular institutions such as the *Dar al-ʿUlum* and the Egyptian University.[33] For the Palace, keen to demonstrate that the government had failed them, the background of student discontent was particularly useful. Sheikh al-Maraghi's value lay partly in his leadership of an organisation of roughly 15,000 students – and he knew well their capacity for disruptive political activity.[34] Issues that touched the interests of Azharis were therefore an ideal battleground for the war of Islamic images between the Palace and the government and one such issue was that of Islamic education.

In 1936 Ali Mahir's short-lived government had made it compulsory for all state school students who wanted to progress beyond the second year to pass an exam on the Quran, whether or not they were Muslims. The Coptic Patriarch had objected and had persuaded the Wafdist government to exempt Copts from this ruling. This was seized on by the opposition and a strike at al-Azhar followed. As Walter Smart (the Oriental Secretary at the British Embassy) remarked: 'The opposition was out to embarrass the government on any issue. This Coptic issue has always been a favourite one.'[35] In fact, it proved difficult to sustain this campaign, but mobilisation at the Egyptian University soon followed.

In March 1937, students at the College of Law demanded that courses of Islamic instruction be provided in all university colleges and that segregation of men and women should be

introduced on the campus. They claimed to base their petition on Article 149 of the Constitution ('Islam is the religion of the state'), and on the fact that 'a pious young king', aware of his Islamic obligations, now reigned in Egypt. This produced immediate praise from the Azharis and a statement of support and encouragement from Sheikh al-Maraghi.[36] It also provoked strong criticism, even ridicule from Taha Hussein (Dean of the College of Arts at the University).[37] Uproar ensued at al-Azhar where the demands of the university students had been declared 'essential for the preservation of the spirit of Islam'. Azhari ʿ*ulama* joined in – one of them telling a mass meeting of students that 'with a mighty Islamic king' at its head, Egypt now had the chance to lead all Islamic countries, but that this could only be achieved if the Western values represented by the university and the state which backed it were uprooted.[38] The Azharis went on strike and gathered *en masse* in front of the palace of the Prince Muhammad ʿAli, the Prince Regent, cheering for the royal family and for 'the glory of Islam'.[39] In the event, this proved to be the climax of the agitation on this issue.[40]

However, the purpose of these successive campaigns on limited but symbolically charged issues was not to reach any definite conclusion. Rather, they were pretexts for airing larger questions about Islam and Islamic obligations, publicly enacting images of the king and of the Wafd that conformed to the interests of the Palace. The struggle was real enough, but its presentation and performance were largely symbolic. This came to a head with the ceremony to mark King Faruq's coming of age in July 1937. Under Article 50 of the Constitution the king was obliged to swear an oath before both chambers of parliament 'to respect the Constitution and the laws of the Egyptian nation', implicitly recognising that he owed all his political authority to the Egyptian nation (Article 23).

The king could not avoid swearing this oath, but the Palace tried to give the ceremony a specifically Islamic character. In May 1937 *al-Ahram* gave considerable space to a suggestion that the king should attend a special ceremony at the mosque of al-Rifài (the site of King Fu'ad's tomb) where he would sit on a throne while the Sheikh al-Azhar invoked a special blessing over him. The king would swear an oath framed in religious terms and the Sheikh would confer on him the sword of his ancestor Muhammad Ali Pasha in lieu of a crown.[41] The Prince Regent took up the cause, although it was strongly suspected that Ali Mahir had originally suggested it to him, retiring discreetly thereafter into the background.[42] The Prince himself had a late Ottoman view that pan-Islamic sentiment held in check the natural inclination of their non-Turkish subjects to rise up against an alien dynasty.[43] He believed that under the guise of secular nationalism, possibly inspired by the Copts, the Wafd was turning the Egyptian people against the dynasty and paving the way for its extinction by stripping it of its twin supports: the Army and Islam.[44] Accordingly, he championed an Islamic form of ceremony, declaring that it corresponded with the 'magnificent Islamic aspects of the monarchy'.[45]

This was more serious than any of the other issues as it threatened to strike at the very heart of the secular constitutional state. A religious ceremony of investiture would be more than a theatrical show. It would performatively change the idea of the national Egyptian political community into that of a Muslim community, in which the 1923 Constitution and its related institutions would have no standing. The Wafd government therefore insisted that no religious ceremony would take place on the day that the king swore the constitutional oath.[46] It also labelled an Islamic 'coronation' as blasphemous, and claimed to have saved Islam in Egypt from the threat of heresy.[47] Confronted by this counter-campaign, and by the discouragement of the British and the other Regents, the Prince dropped the idea.[48] However, the campaign itself was the most important aspect of the exercise, suggesting that the Wafd was both anti-Islamic and too amenable to Coptic influence to deserve the people's trust.

The groundwork had been laid by the Palace's efforts to portray King Faruq as an Islamic monarch, implying that the national political community of Egypt was essentially a Muslim community. Non-Muslims would be tolerated, but their attitudes to the king could not be

expected to match those of Muslims and thus their political loyalties would be suspect.[49] Indeed opposition to the king – driven by Coptic enmity in the view of some – was portrayed as tantamount to hostility towards the political obligations of Muslims in Egypt.[50] Accusations of undue Coptic influence in the Wafd had surfaced regularly since the mid-1920s, especially during election campaigns, in order to portray the Wafd as a sectarian conspiracy, working hand in hand with the Copts' co-religionists, the British. These were powerful charges aimed at destroying the enduring bond between the Wafd and the electorate.[51]

In 1937/38 these accusations became more strident. By 1937 a split was developing in the Wafd between Mustafa al-Nahhas and Makram ʿUbaid (the Coptic Secretary-General of the party) on one side, and Ahmad Mahir and Fahmy al-Nuqrashi on the other. *Al-Balagh* accused al-Nahhas of being the dupe of ʿUbaid (a common trope in the depiction of the alleged Coptic hold on the Wafd).[52] As David Kelly (Chargé d'Affaires at the British Embassy) observed, the opposition 'members have been continually spreading it about that Makram and the Copts were ruling the roost'.[53] As the conflict between the king and the Wafd government intensified, the sectarian attack became more open. *Al-Balagh* alleged that the Ministry of Education would make Christian religious instruction compulsory in state schools.[54] Sheikh al-Maraghi prophesied a 'religious war' if the Wafd government remained in office, while Ahmad Mahir, chief dissident in the Wafd, predicted that the matter would soon develop into a religious issue if ʿUbaid 'pushed himself forward too much'.[55] Given the positions occupied by these two men, their gloomy predictions seemed more like threats than prophesies.

Sectarian language became most virulent after the king had dismissed al-Nahhas in December 1937, leading up to the general election campaign of March/April 1938.[56] Demonstrations hailing the king as 'Defender of Islam', 'Prince of the Faithful' and 'Caliph of the Muslims' formed a backdrop for anti-Coptic rhetoric, with al-Nahhas's and ʿUbaid's opposition to the king depicted in religious terms.[57] Ahmad Hussein, president of the organisation *Misr al-Fatat* (Young Egypt), made a speech to a crowd of thousands of Azhari and university students in which he indicted al-Nahhas's government for having made Coptic interests its overriding concern, accusing ʿUbaid (whom he called 'William Pasha' – conspicuously using ʿUbaid's English Christian name) of trying, with British help, to prevent the king's attendance at Friday prayers.[58] Similar charges were made by the Liberal Constitutionalist paper *al-Kashkul*, accusing al-Nahhas and ʿUbaid of being enemies of Islam, 'the religion of the nation and the state'.[59] It went on to allege that Copts had a stranglehold on the Wafd and that 'the al-Nahhas ministry is a Coptic ministry for the Copts'.[60]

The leaders of the two main parties standing against the Wafd – Muhammad Mahmud of the Liberal Constitutionalists and Ahmad Mahir of the newly formed Saʿdist Party – generally eschewed in public the more scurrilous side of the campaign.[61] However, they did not hesitate to associate their parties with the king and with the religious hierarchy. When Muhammad Mahmud opened the election campaign with a speech on 3 March 1938, Sheikh al-Maraghi was on the platform.[62] Equally, at a Saʿdist rally in Alexandria in March 1938 four *ʿulama* had been installed on the rostrum, one of them taking the opportunity to denounce al-Nahhas for trying to separate religion from politics, and ʿUbaid for seeking to undermine Islam in Egypt.[63]

Sheikh al-Maraghi was particularly conspicuous. On the occasion of *Qurban Bairam* (*ʿId al-Adha*) in February 1938 he broadcast a sermon that became an outspoken attack on the Wafd. He urged people to see through the Wafd to the Coptic conspiracy at its heart: there were 'enemies of Islam' who wanted to separate religion from politics and to suppress any manifestation of Islam. These men stayed in the wings, he continued, while pushing forward their Muslim dupes whom they had enslaved with the help of Satan. He identified these 'enemies of Islam' as either non-Muslims surreptitiously preaching their own religion, or else as 'apostate and atheist Muslims'.[64] When the Wafdist press criticised the Sheikh, he responded by claiming that he detested 'partisan politics' but that no Muslim could say 'I do not practise politics'. He claimed to be working for 'religious politics and the politics of Islam', not on behalf of any party, but

that if he were a party man he would 'wage war on al-Nahhas'. He also said that he wanted all sects in Egypt to live in harmony, but under the guidance of Islam, crudely underlining this point by stating that non-Muslims in Egypt should be happy to see the strengthening of Islam since only the fear of Judgement Day kept Muslims from slaughtering non-Muslims in the country.[65]

In the event, forceful deployment of state power sufficed both to rig the elections and to suppress any attempt by the Wafd to protest this outcome (only twelve of the 235 Wafdist candidates were able to win seats in the 264 seat Egyptian parliament), and the strident calls to defend Islam from a Coptic conspiracy fell silent.[66] For some, the whole enterprise had been a cynical endeavour to play upon the emotions of the mass of Egyptians. The prime minister, Muhammad Mahmud, admitted to the British Ambassador that the religious campaign was simply an electioneering device and promised to urge greater restraint upon Sheikh al-Maraghi.[67] The Sheikh himself was also keen to impress his moderation on the British, claiming implausibly that he had become involved in politics against his better judgment and wished that the religious issue should no longer be introduced into politics.[68]

By returning only twelve Wafdists to Parliament in 1938, the electorate had seemingly responded enthusiastically to the Palace's campaign. In reality, little choice had been exercised and the credibility of the Islamic myth of the monarchy, and the corresponding Coptic myth of the Wafd, had not been put to the test. There was something highly symbolic of the underlying purpose, rationale and method of the Palace's populist 'Islamic campaign' in the fact that, while the Palace was ostensibly appealing to the sentiments of 'good Muslims', it was too uncertain of their reactions to allow those sentiments free expression. Hence the widespread rigging of the elections by the state authorities. They had at their disposal an array of tried and tested administrative and repressive techniques to keep the Wafd out of power, making the appeal to religious sentiment redundant.

Controlling the Islamic narrative: the Caliphate

Ali Mahir had not played any public part in the prosecution of the 'Islamic campaign' against the Wafd during 1936–1938, leaving this task to his associates and protégés. The challenge he now faced was how to control the expectations of a new Islamic dispensation and to ensure that the representatives of these interests served the king, rather than vice-versa. His task was complicated by the fact that the campaign surrounding *al-malik al-salih* had revived interest in the Islamic Caliphate. This had seized the imagination of some of the public, but also, more dangerously for Ali Mahir, it was taken up by Sheikh al-Maraghi, mainly for reasons of political opportunism.

The question of whether the Caliphate was finally defunct had never been satisfactorily answered. The 1926 Caliphal Congress in Cairo had merely ended in the agreement that no-one should be proclaimed Caliph.[69] A decade later, King Faruq's regular attendance at Friday services and the question of the religious 'coronation' ceremony had elicited oblique references to the Caliphate in the Palace-sponsored press and in Palace circles.[70] It was not long before King Faruq was being portrayed not only as the 'righteous king' of Egypt, but also as the patron of Muslims the world over, edging closer to the universal pretensions appropriate to caliphal eligibility. Donations by the Royal *Khassa* (the Privy Purse) to Islamic missions from China, Turkey, the Balkans and Japan, as well as to the Fu'ad I Library in Beijing, brought forth public expressions of gratitude from the beneficiaries who cheered for the king and pledged their loyalty to the dynasty of Muhammad Ali.[71]

The Azhari student population with its *arwiqah* (dormitories) for different nationalities was ideal for emphasising pan-Islamic aspirations, allowing Sheikh al-Maraghi to take the lead. In December 1936 he despatched an Azhari mission to India and proposed sending similar missions to Kenya, Nigeria and Zanzibar. For some, this increase in Egyptian Islamic missionary activity

was part of an attempt to 'give Egypt Turkey's old preponderant position in the Muslim world'.[72] Sheikh al-Maraghi, however, had a more specific purpose in mind. The Azhari missions, aside from their public brief, had been charged with the conduct of propaganda in connection with the Caliphate, and with the selection of *nuwwab al-khalifah* (caliphal delegates) for each country.[73]

Ali Mahir himself had little sympathy with Islamic ideas for restructuring society and politics. His views were consistently secular, whether in the 1922 Constitutional Committee or, thirty years later, in his efforts to frame a new constitution after the Free Officers' coup d'état of 1952. He was equally brusque whenever the possibility arose of Islamic preoccupations complicating his own strategies, as he showed in his dealings with Saudi Arabia in 1935/36.[74] Sheikh al-Maraghi, on the other hand, had a particular interest in promoting the caliphal idea. He may have believed that the institution would transform Egyptian politics, but his advocacy was also driven by political ambition, despite his visible doctrinal unease.[75]

By 1938 he had begun to develop a theory of the Caliphate more precisely tailored to the political needs of the Egyptian monarchy and to overcome objections in the Muslim world. In conversation with the Aga Khan, he argued strongly for King Faruq's assumption of a 'local Caliphate title', suggesting that this would only apply to the territorial limits of Egypt, implicitly giving all other Muslim rulers the right to declare themselves Caliph in their own countries.[76] Reports of this encounter disturbed the mistrustful rulers of Saudi Arabia and of Turkey, especially since the involvement of the Aga Khan suggested possible British approval, leading the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, to instruct the British Ambassador to express Great Britain's misgivings to the Egyptian prime minister.[77]

Muhammad Mahmud needed no persuading that the whole idea should be dropped. When it had been useful to undermine the Wafd, he and his party were extremely complaisant about the Caliphate.[78] Now that he was in power, however, the prospect of a Caliph-King, or of an Islamic reorganisation of the state were deeply unwelcome.[79] Ali Mahir was also eager to thwart Sheikh al-Maraghi's ambitions. Turkish, Saudi and British reactions had shown that serious pursuit of the Caliphate would be seriously counter-productive. More specifically, Ali Mahir's concern was that Sheikh al-Maraghi was exploiting Islamic issues to enhance his own standing at Court.[80] Sheikh al-Maraghi kept the Islamic aspects of the king's authority, with its caliphal overtones, in the forefront of the public mind through his sermons and *Majallat al-Azhar*.[81] At the same time, he was in correspondence with the Shiʿi *ʿulama* of Iraq, with a view to convening a 'Supreme Islamic Council' in Cairo.[82] More dangerously for Ali Mahir, the Sheikh tried to gain greater access to the king through the Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan, Kamil al-Bindari Pasha, who reputedly also believed that Egypt should adopt an Islamic organisation of the state.[83]

The most dramatic public expression of this trend occurred in January 1939 when the delegates to the London 'Round Table' conference on Palestine assembled in Cairo. King Faruq attended Friday prayers at one of Cairo's main mosques, accompanied by the delegates, including Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Prince Saif al-Islam of the Yemen. Once inside the mosque, the king's aide-de-camp (ADC) was seen to shoulder the officiating *imam* out of the way, whereupon the king himself led the prayers as *imam*. As if to underline the caliphal prerogative that the king had just assumed, a large and well organised demonstration met him as he emerged from the building, acclaiming him as 'Caliph of all the Muslims'.[84] This crude assertion of King Faruq's caliphal claims offended not only the Yemeni and Saudi princes but also the ever-sensitive Turkish government which ridiculed the Caliphate and warned of the discord that any Egyptian claim would cause.[85]

The distance between Ali Mahir and the mood now emerging in the Palace can be seen in the fact that only a few weeks before this incident ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAzzam Bey (a close confidant of Ali Mahir) had taken pains to convince King Ibn Saud that Egypt did not aspire to the Caliphate, as it would be self-defeating.[86] Following the incident at the mosque, another associate of Ali Mahir, Hasan Nash'at Pasha (Egyptian Ambassador in London) issued an immediate, categorical denial that there was any intention of proclaiming King Faruq Caliph.[87] In

Egypt itself, Ali Mahir was in a delicate position – hence his cautious comment that the raising of the Caliphate issue was perhaps 'premature'.[88] He managed to escape further involvement by leaving for the conference in London. Once there, he expressed himself much more forcefully: the Caliphate was divisive, contrary to the whole purpose of his Palace policies, never liked by him and he hoped it was dying a natural death. He clearly regarded Sheikh al-Maraghi as the chief culprit in trying to resuscitate it.[89]

This was borne out by the Sheikh's behaviour in Ali Mahir's absence. On the king's birthday in February 1939, Sheikh al-Maraghi spoke with fervour of King Faruq's interest in Palestine, claiming that it proved the king's dedication to one of the cornerstones of Islam: the Islamic community that transcended ideas of fatherland or nationality.[90] At the same time *Majallat al-Azhar* prominently defended the institution of the Caliphate, significantly describing it in terms almost identical with those used to define the powers of the king in the Egyptian Constitution and praising the king for leading the *ummah* back to 'the golden age of the Islamic state'.[91] It seemed as if the focus on the Caliphate had caught the imagination of King Faruq himself and he publicly rewarded Sheikh al-Maraghi by giving him precedence over all government ministers. Apart from ruffling the feathers of the ministers themselves, this was taken to be an ominous sign of things to come.[92]

However, the days of al-Bindari's and of Sheikh al-Maraghi's ascendancy were numbered. Ali Mahir's return to Egypt led to the reassertion of his power at the Palace and the removal of al-Bindari.[93] Restored to his position as the king's favourite, Ali Mahir took sole control of Palace policy – to the evident displeasure of Sheikh al-Maraghi.[94] Ali Mahir could tolerate neither the implications for his own position, nor the possible consequences for the Egyptian monarchy and for Egypt's foreign policy of a determined pursuit of the Caliphate. With the re-establishment of his political control, therefore, this ambitious and contentious aspect of the Palace's Islamic policy was suppressed, only to emerge sporadically, often as a form of escapism for King Faruq, after Ali Mahir's eventual political demise.[95]

Controlling the Islamic narrative: Palestine

Sheikh al-Maraghi's reference in 1939 to King Faruq's interest in Palestine was not fortuitous. Palestine was rapidly becoming an issue that no Arab or indeed Muslim ruler could afford to ignore. Certainly, for King Faruq, with pretensions to pan-Islamic authority, it would have been impossible to do so. The challenge for Ali Mahir was to ensure that any Egyptian initiative on Palestine would not alarm the British but would placate local constituencies. This explains the otherwise surprising reticence of the Palace on the subject during 1936-7. The king's involvement was largely symbolic, receiving a delegation of Palestinians who presented him with a copy of the Quran and offered him the loyalty (*wala'*) of Palestine at the time of his assumption of constitutional powers.[96]

After the fall of the Wafd government, Ali Mahir could not allow the pace to be set by others, especially if the rallying cry was to be pan-Islamic, entailing open-ended and potentially awkward obligations for the 'righteous king'. Ali Mahir used a technique that had previously served him well: creating, through his patronage of student and other youth organisations, a surge of unrest which only his mediation would be able to quell. This had been evident in 1937 and seems to have contributed to Ali Mahir's growing interest in the Muslim Brotherhood during this period.[97] Unrest erupted with some violence in May 1938 (with the arrival of the Woodhead Commission on partition in Palestine). Large demonstrations, originating at al-Azhar, converged on the Palace and the British Embassy, hailing the king as 'Defender of Islam' and were followed by stormy meetings at the headquarters of the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA).[98] Some days later, at the *mawlid al-nabi*, the demonstrations became more violent when an attempt was made to attack Jewish commercial property and the Jewish quarter in Old Cairo.[99] There

was a strong suspicion of Ali Mahir's involvement, through his proxies, mainly to embarrass both Sheikh al-Maraghi and Muhammad Mahmud, and to establish his own indispensability in coping with the situation.[100] It succeeded to a large extent. Despite their fiery resolutions, the journal of the YMMA became less inflammatory, advocating a common Islamic defence of Palestine, but talking of intercession, not confrontation with the British government.[101]

By this stage, however, the main thrust of activity in Egypt concerning Palestine was in the hands of Ali Mahir's close friend Muhammad Ali ʿAlluba Pasha. In May 1938 he became president of the Parliamentary Committee for the Defence of Palestine and in that capacity he convened an Arab interparliamentary congress on Palestine in October, with Ali Mahir's allies being conspicuous in its direction and organisation.[102] This gave Ali Mahir considerable control, so it was scarcely surprising that he could confidently assure the British that he would be using his influence to ensure moderation at the congress itself.[103]

Sheikh al-Maraghi tried to exploit the congress for his concurrent caliphal ambitions, addressing the delegates in a sense more appropriate to the Islamic congress that he had wanted to summon.[104] However, this had little effect save to produce cheers hailing King Faruq as 'Commander of the Faithful', a common occurrence whenever there were Azhari students in the crowd. In fact, the more moderate and largely secular tone of ʿAlluba and of Ali Mahir prevailed at the congress, and the British were satisfied with the result.[105] This was crucially important for Ali Mahir. If he were to succeed in his ambition to become prime minister, it was imperative that the British should have no cause for alarm. He had consistently shown that he was aware of their fear that the 'Islamic campaign' of the Palace might create in Egypt 'an active Muslim and Arab consciousness… which might lead to an overactive interest in Palestine.'[106] The fact that he was treading a perilous path between exploiting pro-Palestine sentiment and the placation of the British was underlined in the autumn of 1938 when the Palace hastily abandoned its attempt to invite the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini to Egypt.[107]

When it became clear that the British themselves would be convening a conference on Palestine, Ali Mahir ensured his own control of any Egyptian representation. King Faruq prohibited Muhammad Mahmud's attendance and appointed his cousin, Prince ʿAbd al-Munʿim as head of the Egyptian delegation.[108] Since the Prince was clearly a figurehead, the delegation needed a competent Egyptian politician to give it effective direction. The prime minister, eager to remove Ali Mahir from Egypt, urged the king to send him to London.[109] Once there, he succeeded in impressing the British with his helpfulness, moderation, and refusal to endorse any of the anti-British sentiments seething below the surface of the London Conference.[110]

These moves were crucial to his success in realising his long-standing ambition to become prime minister a few months later. The consolidation of political power had been his principal reason both for exploiting the themes associated with the 'Islamic campaign', and for ensuring that they remained under his tight control. The question of Palestine was no exception. As prime minister he would demonstrate his continuing grasp of its significance in Egyptian politics: in public it was important to be seen to be active on behalf of the Palestinians, but such 'activity' did not need to have much substance. On no account should it interfere with the many other priorities of an Egyptian government.[111]

Controlling the Islamic narrative: the Muslim Brotherhood

Ali Mahir's efforts to keep control of the narrative of the 'Islamic campaign' were pursued mainly by traditional means – manoeuvres at the royal Court, cultivation of the king, intrigues with politicians, subsidies to newspapers, approaches to the British. However, there was another side to his engagement not only with the themes, but also with the forms of the new mass politics. This was his patronage of extra-parliamentary organisations, movements geared to the mobilisation of an excluded younger generation around a range of issues that were handled warily

by mainstream politicians. Through discreet sponsorship, Ali Mahir sought to influence the youthful, educated and increasingly large section of the public that had shown its potential for mass action in 1935.[112]

It was in this respect that Ali Mahir began to take an interest in the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), a group that had first appeared in Ismailiyya in 1928-1932 under the guidance of its founder Hasan al-Banna. There is some suggestion that the Palace had taken a close interest in the group even then.[113] In 1935 the Brotherhood's 3rd Congress created the organisation that would enable it to play an active part in politics, largely by petitioning senior public figures and the Palace about religious instruction in state schools.[114] The Brotherhood became more conspicuous in 1936 through actively fund-raising, demonstrating and pamphleteering on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine.[115] This coincided with Ali Mahir's attempts to imbue the king with an Islamic aura and to embarrass the Wafd by raising precisely those issues on behalf of which the Brotherhood had pledged to struggle. For Ali Mahir, this made it a promising tool in the campaign.

Equally attractive for Ali Mahir was the organisational aspect of the Brotherhood. As the 3rd Congress had shown, al-Banna did not intend the Brotherhood to fit into the parliamentary mould of politics. On the contrary, the structures established then and developed during 1936 and 1937, made no reference to existing political institutions. Formations such as the Rovers (*al-jawwalah*), developed from the Brotherhood's athletic clubs, indicated a preparedness for disciplined and radical extra-parliamentary political activity. Given Ali Mahir's intention at the time to mobilise and engage youth, if necessary through violent action, in order to bring down the Wafdist government, this aspect was an added lure, and it led to offers of royal patronage for al-Banna.[116] Nevertheless, the Brotherhood could not be wholly subservient to the Palace. Al-Banna may have been prepared to launch the Brotherhood on an overtly political path but there were reservations among other members of the organisation. Many of them were either indifferent or hostile to the whole edifice of the secular state, including the monarchy, or were as likely to be supporters of the Wafd as of any other faction.[117]

It was, however, useful for al-Banna that just when he was preparing to bring the Brotherhood into the public political sphere, there was a patron such as Ali Mahir who seemed willing to give him and his organisation the entrée he desired. At the same time there were issues – Islamic education, Palestine, the 'righteous king', the Caliphate – to enthuse his followers and to justify the Brotherhood's participation.[118] Nevertheless, after the dismissal of the Wafdist government, it was clear that a section of the Brotherhood found the Palace's professions of piety hard to take at face value. This dissent surfaced in the Brotherhood's journal, *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*. It questioned the bona fides of the Mahmud government, of the Palace and of Sheikh al-Maraghi, and poured scorn on those who tried to make of Islam a simplistic issue for party political purposes.[119] This was perhaps too close to the bone for al-Banna and for his new patrons at the Palace. He therefore repudiated the journal and brought out one more firmly under his control in May 1938 – *al-Nadhir*. This, he later claimed, marked the beginning of the Brotherhood's participation in the political struggle.[120]

As the pages of *al-Nadhir* repeatedly demonstrated, the Brotherhood was highly critical of the Mahmud government's inaction over Palestine and of its failure to introduce any of the Islamic legislation for which there had been repeated calls in 1937.[121] The Brotherhood could be relied upon to attack any government that failed by its own strict Islamic standards, but it could not be expected, without considerably more encouragement, to follow Ali Mahir's direction, as its changeable attitude to the Wafd demonstrated.[122] In late 1938 therefore Ali Mahir cultivated a closer relationship with the Brotherhood. It had become clear by then that there was a great deal more to the Brotherhood than the propaganda vehicle of its journal. Its tight organisational structure, the paramilitary formations of the Rovers and the Battalions (*al-kata'ib*), and the summer camps of 1938 had increased the numbers and the commitment of recruits, reflected in the 5th Congress of the Brotherhood in January 1939.[123]

Signs of the closer relationship between al-Banna and the Palace soon appeared. The Brotherhood moved into a new and imposing headquarters near the ʿAbdin Palace. Al-Banna, apparently flattered by the attention he was receiving, told his associates that it would not be long before the Brotherhood achieved everything it was after.[124] *Al-Nadhir* increased its attacks on the party system and on state institutions which, it claimed, were preventing the direct execution of the Royal Will. It called in effect for the restoration of something like royal absolutism, legitimised by the king's devotion to Islam and by his apparent desire to lay the foundations for an Islamic state in Egypt.[125] On the question of the Caliphate, the Brotherhood took a line close to Ali Mahir's: the king might be the most qualified of all Muslim princes to assume the title, but it should not be simply proclaimed, since that might do more harm than good. Instead, his assumption of the title should be the crowning glory of a long and detailed series of Egyptian foreign policy initiatives, which would secure the agreement of all other Muslim countries.[126]

When Ali Mahir left for the London Conference on Palestine in 1939, he was given a rousing send-off by units of the Brotherhood. Perhaps less justifiably, in view of what occurred at the Conference, he was met on his return by an even more enthusiastic demonstration of support, headed by al-Banna's deputy, Ahmad al-Sukkari. This was so obviously a demonstration organised to greet Ali Mahir, rather than to applaud any concrete achievement on behalf of Palestine, that a strong protest was made to al-Banna by a substantial group within the Brotherhood about the growing rapprochement between the organisation and Ali Mahir.[127] Al-Banna was able to calm these protests at the time, and the close relationship with Ali Mahir continued, indeed intensified, even though it led to a series of expulsions and defections.[128] For al-Banna, the Palace had more to offer the Brotherhood, both in the immediate present but also possibly in the future, than any parliamentary government could manage.[129] However, this was a transactional relationship. It had little to do with the Brotherhood's Islamic ideals and could only be sustained if Ali Mahir were in a position to support and protect the organisation. Within three years, under the pressure of wartime conditions, neither side saw much advantage in the relationship, and it ended. Indeed, the Brotherhood did not even want to be reminded that it had ever existed.[130]

Conclusion

Ali Mahir's strategies for bridging the gap between the monarchy and the mass of Egyptians, by appealing over the heads of their elected representatives and undermining the institutions of representative government were very much in the spirit and style of populist politics practised elsewhere, as well as later in Egypt after the fall of the monarchy itself. At this particular moment in Egyptian political history, weaving an Islamic aura around the person of the young king provided an opportunity to tap into more general concerns about the place of Islam in public life, as well as to create, in King Faruq, a figure of authority whose very performance of the role was sufficient to bring forth uncritical acclaim. This attempted construction of charisma was meant, in theory, to avoid detailed scrutiny and to establish an affective bond between the king and his Muslim subjects. This was more than simply image creation. As the strategy's deployment in the years following King Faruq's accession demonstrated, it had the capacity to change power relations, as well as to shape the national imaginary of the Egyptian political community. Performatively, the king's adoption of the role and script of a distinctively 'Islamic sovereign' had potentially radical implications for the very understanding of sovereignty itself and for the nature of the state, as well as for what it would mean to be an Egyptian citizen. In this sense, therefore, the strategy followed the populist pattern of government answerable to an ideal or an entity that the government had itself defined, not to the people in whose name it governed.

As Ali Mahir was to discover, this strategy had a series of outcomes that were encouraging, but also troubling for his own ambitions. On the one hand, he found that the idiom and rhetoric of Islam did lend itself to a politics of acclaim and, at least for a time, had a wider resonance among the Egyptian public, providing the general enthusiasm that was so crucial for the staging of the performative politics of authoritarian rule. On the other hand, there were those who had more specific and concrete goals in mind if Islamic principles were to be seriously incorporated into the governance and political identity of Egypt. These included the Sheikh al-Azhar and a significant section of the *ʿulama*, as well as those who felt most keenly the demotion of Islamic institutions in Egypt and those who hoped that the rule of *al-malik al-salih* would in itself bring about important material changes in the law, in the hierarchies of status and in the fortunes of the country itself. In addition, it drew in new groupings, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, that were developing an ideology and an organisation with revolutionary potential. All these elements were useful allies for Ali Mahir during this period. However, all of them had their own agendas and their own views about the place of Islam in public life in Egypt. For many it was the monarchy that should serve Islam rather than vice versa, and if it failed to do so, some would conclude that it did not merit their obedience.

This was a dangerous outcome, but one that was implicit in Ali Mahir's strategy. It was, after all, his intention that Islamic themes, symbols, authorities and organisations, both traditional and new, should all serve the king and, through the king, the cause of Palace policy – a policy directed by Ali Mahir alone. It was not part of his plan that there should be any meaningful recasting of the institutions or ethos of the Egyptian state to bring these in line with distinctively Islamic understandings of the law, of legitimate authority or of social conduct. This went against his own secular understanding of power and threatened to bring into the political arena actors whose main preoccupation was the realisation of Islamic ideals, however disruptive that might be, placing in jeopardy his vision and his own political position. Ali Mahir's major objective was the reinforcement of existing hierarchies of class and privilege with the king at its apex, in the face of the disruption threatened by the new currents and constituencies of mass politics. The appeal to Islamic ideals and the sentiments they evoked was to be in the service of this objective, providing a language for the populist style of politics that made its appearance in the 1930s. Once the 'Islamic appeal' no longer served the purpose that Ali Mahir had envisaged for it, he dropped it from his repertoire and spurned its protagonists. This did not of course mean that the sentiments to which he had appealed or the organisations that had emerged simply vanished. On the contrary, they continued to animate and to mobilise large sections of the Egyptian public and would find their radical expression within a decade, independent of the Palace, hostile to the institutions of the Egyptian state and with no place for a monarchy in their imagined future of Egypt.

Acknowledgments

A note on sources: some of the primary research for this article was carried out in 1978–79 in Cairo, using the resources at the *Markaz Watha'iq wa-Ta'rikh Misr al-Muʿasir* (The Centre for the Documents and Contemporary History of Egypt) (CDCHE). It held copies of files from the ʿAbdin Palace, from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Public Security (*Al-'Amn al-ʿAmm*) administration. It also held the bound multi-volume collection of ʿAbdin Palace Press Files (PPF), mainly newspaper cuttings. At that time, the Centre was housed in the *Dar al-Kutub* (The National Library) in Bulaq. It was subsequently moved to the *Dar al-Watha'iq* (The National Archives) in Bulaq, as a separate archival unit No. 0076, entitled *Wizarat al-Kharijiyyah qabl Thawrah Yuliu 1952* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the July 1952 Revolution).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

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8. He took particular exception to Article 23 that stipulated 'The Nation is the source of all power' and tried unsuccessfully to have it removed in his abortive 'counter-constitution' of 1922-3 – ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Rafiʿi, *Fi Aʿqab al-Thawrah al-Misriyyah* [On the Consequences of the Egyptian Revolution] (Cairo: Dar al-Shaʿb, 1969), pp.72–74.
9. Elie Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-1952', in his book of essays *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp.182–98.
10. The National Archives, London (TNA) FO 141/530 408/73/27; FO 141/530 408/82/28; Fakhr al-Din al-Hamdi al-Zawahiri, *Al-Siyasah wa-l-Azhar* [Politics and al-Azhar] (Cairo: Tabaʿat al-ʾIʿtimad, 1945), pp.67–70.
11. TNA FO 371/19070 J1455/110/16.
12. The sorts of expectation of which the king now became the focus can be seen in *Majallat al-Azhar* 9/9 (1938), pp.577-78. The dangers of failing to live up those expectations can equally be seen in *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, 28 January 1938, pp.1–3.
13. *Al-Ahram* 9 May 1936 ʿAbdin Palace Press Files (PPF).
14. *Al-Ahram* 12 May 1936, PPF.
15. *Al-Balagh* 18 May 1936, PPF; Ali Mahir had ensured the subservience of *al-Balagh* to his interests by giving its owner a large share of the £E 10,000 that he had taken from the funds of the Ministry of the Interior just before leaving office in May 1936 – see TNA FO 141/772 616/3/36.
16. *Al-Ahram* 28 May 1936, PPF.
17. The three-member Regency Council occupied the position of the sovereign until King Faruq came of age in 1937.
18. *Al-Ahram* 1 June 1936, PPF; *al-Balagh* 4 June 1936, PPF.
19. See Jacques Berque, *Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution* (London: Faber & Faber, 1972) pp.520 and 534.
20. TNA FO 141/481 158/72/37.
21. TNA FO 141/481 158/72/37; TNA FO 141/772 616/50/37; TNA FO 371/20888 J5041/20/16.
22. Sheikh al-Maraghi had already gained the king's favour in April 1936 by issuing a *fatwa* ruling that King Faruq, at 16, was old enough under Islamic law to have charge of his own property and to be the guardian of the royal '*awqaf*, forestalling thereby a rumoured plan to delay his coming of age until he was 21. TNA FO 141/481 158/72/37; TNA FO 141/772 616/50/37.
23. *Al-Siyasah* 18 May 1936, PPF; Ahmad Murtada al-Maraghi, *Ghara'ib min ʿAhd Faruq* [Curiosities from the Era of Faruq] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li-l-Nashr, 1976), pp.38–39 This account should be treated with some caution, but, as a son of the Sheikh, the author may be echoing some of the exasperation felt by his father at the time.
24. Kamal Mustafa, *Al-Sahafah wa-l-'Adab fi Mi'ah Yawm* [The Press and Literature during the Hundred Days] (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Anwar, 1938), pp.61–64 and 82–83.
25. TNA FO 141/772 616/7/36; TNA FO 371/20107 J4278/2/16; TNA FO 371/20108 J4572/2/16; *Al-Ahram* 5 June 1936, PPF and 6 June 1936, PPF; *Al-Balagh* 5 June 1936, PPF.
26. The dual form refers to the two Wafdist leaders: Mustafa al-Nahhas and Makram ʿUbaid, with the pejorative association of the *khawarij* of early Islamic history. See Endnote 57.
27. The name of the group was emotive enough, but it had a special connotation in Egypt, given the prominence of its similarly named forerunner in the early 1930s, organised by Sheikh al-Maraghi to combat Christian missionary activity – and to embarrass the government of the day. *Oriente Moderno* 13 (1933), pp.375–76.
28. *Al-Jihad* 18 January 1937, PPF.

29. *Al-Balagh* 30 January 1937, PPF and 4 February 1937, PPF.
30. *Al-Jihad* 12 March 1937, PPF.
31. *Al-Jihad* 29 May 1937, PPF.
32. *Al-Ahram* 21 August 1937, PPF.
33. Daniel Crecelius, 'Non-ideological responses of the Egyptian Ulama to modernization', pp.190–98 in Nikki Keddie (ed.), *Scholars, Saints and Sufis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
34. St Antony's College, Oxford: Sir Miles Lampson (Lord Killearn) Diary (Lampson Diary) 1 February 1935, pp.36-37, Lampson Collection GB165-0176, Box 2/4 MECA; TNA FO 371/23305 J1985/1/16; TNA FO 141/630 913/1/37; Abu-l-Wafa' Al-Maraghi, *Al-Shaikh al-Maraghi* [Sheikh al-Maraghi] (Cairo: Al-Matbaʿah al-Muniriyyah bi-l-'Azhar, 1957), pp.16 and 18.
35. TNA FO 141/675 45/2/37, 45/3/37, 45/4/37; *Al-Balagh* 29 January 1937, PPF, 1 February 1937, PPF and 8 February 1937, PPF.
36. *Al-Misri* 7 March 1937, PPF; *al-Ahram* 8 March 1937, PPF.
37. *Al-Misri* 10 March 1937, PPF and 13 March 1937, PPF. He pointed out that the segregation of the sexes was reactionary and without religious justification – and remarked that it was curious that the students should choose to petition this particular government for measures that they could have asked for during the previous twenty years.
38. *Al-Misri* 14 March 1937, PPF.
39. *Al-Ahram* 15 March 1937, PPF. The Prince, evidently impressed by this demonstration, gave a long reply in which he extolled the piety of King Faruq and reportedly 'took a somewhat fanatical anti-Christian line', although these remarks were omitted from press accounts of his speech. TNA FO 371/20883 J1411/20/16.
40. *Al-Misri* 10 March 1937, PPF and 12 March 1937, PPF.
41. TNA FO 141/675 52/1/36, Attiyah (Sudan Agency, Cairo) to Director-General of Public Security (Khartoum), 30 December 1936; *Al-Ahram* 14 May 1937, PPF.
42. Al-Maraghi, *Ghara'ib min 'Ahd Faruq* (1976) pp.194-95.
43. Lampson Diary 30 May 1936, p.144 Lampson Collection GB165-0176, Box 3/1 MECA and 10 March 1937, pp.48-49 Lampson Collection GB165-0176, Box 3/2 MECA.
44. TNA FO371/20883 J1411/20/16; TNA FO371/20884 J3105/20/16; TNA FO 141/644 158/49/37.
45. *Al-Ahram* 16 May 1937, PPF; Lampson Diary 6 June 1937, pp.99-100 Lampson Collection GB165-0176, Box 3/2 MECA.
46. Lampson Diary 6 June 1937, p.98 Lampson Collection GB165-0176, Box 3/2 MECA; TNA FO 141/644 158/49/37.
47. *Al-Misri* 17 May 1937, PPF, 19 May 1937, PPF and 21 May 1937, PPF; TNA FO 141/481 158/72/37; *Al-Jihad* 19 May 1937, PPF; *Al-Misri* 21 June 1937, PPF and 23 June 1937, PPF; *al-Jihad* 7 July 1937, PPF; *Mudabit Majlis al-Nuwwab* [Debates of the Chamber of Deputies] 2nd Ordinary Session, 59th Sitting, 21 July 1937.
48. Lampson Diary 6 June 1937, pp.99–100 Lampson Collection GB165-0176, Box 3/2 MECA.
49. The Coptic Patriarch had sought to allay this suspicion at the height of the struggle between the Wafd and the Palace in December 1937 when he sent the king a letter pledging the loyalty of the Coptic community, but in doing so he was himself criticised for suggesting that there was a political distinction between the Copts and their Muslim compatriots – Centre for the Documents and Contemporary History of Egypt (CDCHE) F2/D2 *Qasr ʿAbdin: Malafʿala al-'Aqbat*, [ʿAbdin Palace: File on the Copts] File 23; *al-Ahram* 30 December 1937, PPF.
50. TNA FO 371/20888 J5041/20/16 Pink minute 8 December 1937; FO 371/20885 J3811/20/16.
51. B. Lynn Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics 1918–1952* (London: Routledge, 2013) pp.256-66; Tariq al-Bishri, 'Misr al-hadithah bain Ahmad wa-l-Masih' [Modern Egypt between Ahmad and the Messiah], *Al-Katib* 121 (1971), pp.143–48, 151–53.
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54. *Al-Balagh* 26 September 1937, PPF.
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56. *Al-Balagh* 8 November 1937 PPF; *Al-Ahram* 20 November 1937, PPF.
57. See, for instance a pamphlet, possibly published by Young Egypt, in early 1938, entitled *al-Kharijan ʿala al-Malik* [Two Dissenters/Rebels against the King], Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, USA: American Mission in Egypt Archives 04 0427; 'Le Roi Farouk et le Caliphat' [King Farouk and the Caliphate], *Correspondence D'Orient*, February 1938, PPF.
58. *Misr al-Fatat* 24 January 1938, pp.8–9; *The Egyptian Gazette* 25 January 1938 p.7; TNA FO 371/21945 J407/6/16. For details on Young Egypt see James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975).
59. *Al-Kashkul* 11 February 1938, pp.34–35.
60. *Al-Kashkul* 25 February 1938, pp.1–2, 4; 11 March 1938, pp.4, 6; 25 March 1938, pp.1–2.
61. *Al-Dustur* 16 March 1938, PPF and 20 March 1938, PPF.

62. *La Patrie* 4 March 1938, PPF.
63. *La Réforme* 29 March 1938, PPF.
64. *La Bourse Égyptienne* 12 February 1938, PPF; TNA FO 371/21945 J893/6/16.
65. *La Bourse Égyptienne* 19 March 1938, PPF.
66. Yunan Labib Rizq, *Al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah qabl Thawrah 1952* [Political Parties before the 1952 Revolution] (Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1970) p.52; for details of the methods used to suppress the Wafdist vote see TNA FO 371/21946 J1059/6/16, J1424/6/16, J1543/6/16.
67. Lampson Diary 8 March 1938, p.44 Lampson Collection GB15-0176, Box 3/3 MECA.
68. Lampson Diary 10 May 1938, p.85 Lampson Collection GB165-0176, Box 3/3 MECA; TNA FO 371/21947 J2086/6/16.
69. *Oriente Moderno* 6 (1926), pp.265–73.
70. TNA FO 141/675 52/1/37; TNA FO 141/445 494/2/37 and 494/3/37.
71. *Al-Balagh* 9 February 1937, PPF and 23 February 1937, PPF; *al-Ahram* 1 August 1937, PPF.
72. TNA FO 371/20916 J1519/676/16; *Oriente Moderno* 17 (1937) pp.219-20; TNA FO 371/20917 J2269/676/16.
73. FO 371/21838 E1870/1034/65, Director of the Intelligence Bureau (New Delhi) to the Oriental Secretary (Cairo), 8 March 1938; TNA FO 141/649 304/4/37.
74. TNA FO 141/533 560/2/35.
75. Ralph M. Coury, 'Who "invented" Egyptian Arab nationalism?' Part I, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13/3 (August 1982) p.261; Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate' (1970) pp.179-81, 183, 193, 208-212.
76. TNA FO 371/21838 E1114/1034/65.
77. TNA FO 371/21838 E1870/1034/65.
78. *Al-Siyasah* 26 and 27 January 1938, PPF.
79. TNA FO 371/22004 J2691/2014/16 and J2792/2014/16.
80. TNA FO 371/21838 E1114/1034/65; TNA FO371/21947 J2107/6/16.
81. *Majallat al-Azhar* 9/9 (1938) pp.577-78; *Majallat al-Azhar* 10/1 (1939), pp.5–11.
82. TNA FO 371/22004 J3026/2014/16; Francine Costet-Tardieu, *Un réformiste à l'université al-Azhar: oeuvre et pensée de Mustafa al-Maraghi (1881-1945)* [A Reformist at the University of al-Azhar: work and thought of Mustafa al-Maraghi], (Paris and Cairo: Karthala & CEDEJ, 2005), pp.141–43.
83. Muhammad Husain Haikal, *Mudhakkirat fi al-Siyasah al-Misriyyah 1912-1952*, [Memoirs dealing with Egyptian Politics 1912–1952] Vol. 2 (Cairo: Matbaʿah Misr, 1953), pp.156–57.
84. TNA FO 371/23305 J1171/1/16.
85. TNA FO 371/23361 J564/364/16 and J433/364/16. Significantly, it was al-Bindari who instructed the editor of *al-Ahram* to attack the Turkish government TNA FO 371/23304 J674/1/16.
86. TNA FO 371/23272 E1109/1108/25.
87. TNA FO 371/23361 J364/364/16.
88. TNA FO 371/23361 J564/364/16.
89. TNA FO 371/23304 J674/1/16, Kelly minute, 28 February 1938.
90. *Majallat al-Azhar* 10/1 (1939) supplement preceding p.3.
91. *Majallat al-Azhar* 10/1 (1939), pp.36–38; *Majallat al-Azhar* 10/2 (1939), pp. 81–83.
92. Lampson Diary 14 February 1939, p.29 Lampson Collection GB15-0176, Box 3/4 MECA; Adel M. Sabet, *A King Betrayed – the Ill-Fated Reign of Farouk of Egypt* (London: Quartet Books, 1989), pp.75–77.
93. Lampson Diary 22 March 1939, pp.58–59 Lampson Collection GB15-0176, Box 3/4 MECA; TNA FO 371/23305 J1386/1/16 and J1443/1/16.
94. Lampson Diary 3 May 1939, p.93 Lampson Collection GB15-0176, Box 3/4 MECA.
95. Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate' (1970), pp.206–7.
96. *Al-Balagh* 13 August 1937, PPF.
97. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ramadan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Tanzim al-Sirri* [The Muslim Brotherhood and the Secret Organisation] (Cairo: Mu'assasah Ruz al-Yusuf, 1982), pp.33–34.
98. *The Egyptian Gazette* 2 May 1938, p.7.
99. *The Egyptian Gazette* 14 May 1938, p.8; Jacques Pignal, 'Egypte et la crise palestinienne' [Egypt and the Palestinian Crisis], *En Terre d'Islam* 13 (1938), pp.411–16.
100. TNA FO 371/21876 E2652/10/31, Special Department, Ministry of the Interior.
101. *Majallat al-Shubban al-Muslimin* 9/9 (June 1938), pp.563–66.
102. TNA FO 371/21878 E4257/10/31; TNA FO 371/21879 E4441/10/31; Apart from ʿAlluba himself, these included Tawfiq Dus Pasha (a Coptic notable long associated with the Palace), ʿAbd al-Hamid Bey Saʿid (President of the YMMA and a long-standing client of the Palace) and ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAzzam Bey (a friend and client of Ali Mahir since at least 1936) TNA FO 371/21882 E6032/10/31.
103. TNA FO 371/21881 E5816/10/31.
104. TNA FO 371/21881 E5844/10/31; TNA FO 371/21883 E6508/10/31; TNA FO 371/21884 E6732/10/31.
105. TNA FO 371/21881 E5931/10/31 and E5942/10/31.
106. TNA FO 371/21838 E1870/10/31, minutes by Colville and Campbell.

107. TNA FO 371/21883 E6489/10/31 Lampson to Halifax (No. 588).
108. TNA FO 371/23219 E244/6/31 and E304/6/31; TNA FO 371/23220 E482/6/31; Lampson Diary 17 January 1939, pp.13-14 Lampson Collection GB15-0176, Box 3/4 MECA.
109. TNA FO 371/21883 E6489/10/31; TNA FO 371/23220 E543/6/31; TNA FO 371/23221 E644/6/31; TNA FO 371/23222 E925/6/31.
110. TNA FO 371/23224 E1372/6/31; James P. Jankowski, 'The government of Egypt and the Palestine Question 1936-1939', *Middle Eastern Studies* 17/4 (October 1981), pp.438–40.
111. TNA FO 371/23241 E7323/6/31 and E7399/6/31; TNA FO 371/23242 E7667/6/31.
112. Charles Tripp, *ʿAli Mahir and the Palace in Egyptian Politics 1936-1942: Seeking Mass Enthusiasm for Autocracy*, (SOAS University of London, PhD, 1984), pp.173–244.
113. TNA FO 371/41329 J1880/31/16, PIC paper No. 49, p. 2.
114. Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp.14 and 183; Marius Deeb, *Party Politics in Egypt: the Wafd and its Rivals* (London: Ithaca Press,1979) pp.385-86; Hasan al-Banna, *Mudhakkirat al-Daʿwah wa-l-Daʿiyyah* [Memoirs of the Call and the One Who Calls] (Cairo: Dar al-Shahab, 1977), pp.250–52.
115. TNA FO 141/536 403/12/16; TNA FO 371/20035 E4415/3217/31.
116. Muhammad Zaki ʿAbd al-Qadir, *Mihnat al-Dustur 1923-1952* [The Ordeal of the Constitution 1923-1952] (Cairo: Maktabah Madbuli, 1973), pp.96–100; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers* (1969), pp.195–97, 200–2.
117. In fact, the first official government subsidy to the Brotherhood, of which al-Banna was very proud, had come from al-Nahhas's brother who was a provincial governor at the time (May 1937) – al-Banna, *Mudhakkirat* (1977), p.233.
118. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers* (1969), p.16; James Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington D.C., privately published, 1950), p.16.
119. *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, 7 January 1938, pp.1–2 and 28 January 1938, pp.1–3.
120. al-Banna, *Mudhakkirat* (1977), pp.144–45 and 148.
121. *Al-Nadhir*, 7 Rabì al-Akhir 1357 [6 June 1938], pp.3–7, 14 Rabì al-Akhir 1357 [13 June 1938], pp.3–10 and 27 Jumada al-Ula 1357 [25 July 1938], pp.11–12.
122. *Al-Nadhir*, 12 Jumada al-Thaniyah [9 August 1938], pp.4–6 attacked the Wafd for being a party hostile to Islam and under Coptic control. But in the next issue, it praised al-Nahhas at length and commented favourably on the 'changing attitude' to Islam in the Wafd – *al-Nadhir*, 26 Jumada al-Thaniyah [23 August 1938], pp. 3–7. There was some suspicion that this was due to a subsidy from the Wafd to encourage the Brotherhood to make difficulties for the Mahmud government over the Palestine issue TNA FO 371/21881 E5898/10/31.
123. al-Banna, *Mudhakkirat* (1977), pp.241-46; Deeb, *The Wafd and its Rivals* (1979), pp.386–87.
124. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends* (1950), pp.17 and 37.
125. *Al-Nadhir*, 17 Dhu al-Hijjah 1357 [7 February 1939], pp.11–12, 27–28.
126. *Al-Nadhir*, 8 Muharram 1358 [28 February 1939], pp.3–4.
127. al-Banna, *Mudhakkirat* (1977), p.267; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers* (1969), p.17; Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends* (1950), pp.23 and 86 (note 21).
128. *Al-Nadhir*, 17 Dhu al-Hijjah 1357 [7 February 1939], pp.11–12; Mahmud ʿAbd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun 1928–48* [The Muslim Brotherhood 1928-48] Part 1 (Alexandria: Dar al-Daʿwah, 1979), pp.142–48, 200–202.
129. *Al-Nadhir*, 29 Jumada al-Ula 1358 [17 July 1939], pp.9.
130. Ramadan, *al-Ikhwan* (1982), pp.37–38.