NADIR SHAH

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CHAPTER I.

Bibliographical Introduction

The quantity of documentary information on the subject of Nadir Shah is, at first sight, quite bewildering in its immensity; it is, moreover, all the more formidable by reason of its polyglot character. When one analyses this huge mass of material, however, one can whittle it down very considerably, by discarding such works as are mere paraphrases of those of earlier writers.

Special notes on the sources of outstanding importance are given in this introduction; those of lesser interest and value are mentioned in the bibliography at the end of the book.

For the sake of convenience, the authorities have been divided into two groups, namely, Oriental and European.

A. ORIENTAL SOURCES.

I. MIRZA MAHDI KHAN.

MIrzā Muhammad Mahdī Kaukabi Astarābādī was, as his name implies, a native of the northern Iranian province of Astarābād.¹ The dates of MIrzā Mahdī's birth and death are not recorded. He was probably born towards the close of the XVIIth or in the beginning of the XVIIIth century A.D.; there is evidence to show that he was still living in 1172 or 1173 A.H. (1758/59 or 1759/60).²

In consequence of his northern origin and upbringing, MIrzā Mahdī acquired a profound knowledge of Turki or Eastern Turkish. He stated, in the preface to his Turki-Iranian dictionary, the Sanglākh, that he greatly enjoyed reading Turki poetry.³

It is not recorded when Mirza Mahdi first met Nadir or on what date he entered the latter's service. As he belonged to Astarabad, he may, originally, have been employed by Fath Ali Khan, the well-known chief of the local Ashaqbash

¹ C. Schefer, in his 'Chrestomathie Persane', Paris, 1885, Vol.II page 235, states that Mirzā Mahdī was born in Māzandarān, apparently because Jones substitutes "Mazandarani" for "Astarabadi" in his preface.

² See the two chronograms at the end of MIrzā Mahdl's Turki-Iranian dictionary, the 'Sanglākh', which purport to give the date of the completion of that work; it is known which of these dates is the correct one. See C. Rieu's 'Catalogue of the Turkish Manuscripts' in the British Museum, London, 1888, page 265.

³ Rieu, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p.265.

Qājārs,¹ and may have accompanied Fath Alī Khān when the latter joined thah Tahmāsp at Sārī, in Māzandarān, in the spring of 1726; in that case, he would have first come into contact with Nādir in the following autumn, at Khabūshān (Qūchān); all this is, however, merely conjectural. It seems evident, from the intimate knowledge which Mīrzā Mahdī displays of affairs of state in those times, that he obtained some post at Tahmāsp's court in 1726, or shortly afterwards.

Mīrzā Mahdī was, perhaps from the very beginning of his royal service, in the office of <u>raqam</u> (royal order) writers and calligraphists or royal secretariat, of which he later became chief, with the title of Munshi Al-Mamālik.² It was he who, in January 1731, composed the preamble to the contract of marriage between Nadir's eldest son, Ridā Qulī, and Fātima Begum, one of the daughters of Shāh Sultān Husain.³

It was not until the day of Nadir's coronation (8th March 1736) that Mīrzā Mahdī was appointed official historiographer. The Armenian Catholicos, Abraham of Crete (on whose

¹ The Qājārs of Astarābād were divided into two branches or clans, known as the Yokharibash and the Ashaqbash; these branches were so called because they had at one time occupied, respectively, the upper and lower parts of Shāh Abbas's fortress of Mubārakābād there. See C. Huart's article on the Qājārs in E.1., Vol.II, page 613. Fath Ali Khān Qājār was the grandfather of Agha Muhammad, the first Qājār Shāh, and great-grandfather of Fath Ali Shāh.

² This title, meaning literally "Secretary of the Kingdoms", may be translated as 'Secretary of State'.

³ This preamble is given in MIrza MahdI's 'Durra-yi-Nadira', (a history of Nadir of which details will be given below) Bombay lithographed edition, 1293 A.H. (1876/77), pages 93 and 94. In this connection, see Schefer's "Chrestomathie Persane" J.

authority the last statement is made)¹, describes MIrzä MahdI as "un homme sage et modeste, intelligent, de moeurs douce, et porté à la condescendance",² The representatives in Iran of the East India Company, who had many dealings with MIrzā MahdI in connection with the Company's endeavours to secure the renewal of its privileges, found him, on the whole, reasonable and honest.

Mīrzā Mahdī was well qualified for his new post. In his previous capacity, he had made himself familiar with everything of importance that occurred at the court, and he must have had almost unique opportunities of ascertaining the facts of Nādir's early life; he was, moreover, an accomplished linguist, being well versed in Iranian, Arabic, Turki and Ottoman Turkish.

It is unfortunate, however, that MIrza MahdI, when compiling Nādir's biography, should have had to write his book in such a form and in such a manner as to please his royal master.³ The natural result is that the Tā'rIkh-i-Nādiri⁴ contains, in certain instances, exaggerated and distorted

- ² ibidem, page 305.
- ³ This statement, as will be seen below, does not apply to the last few pages of the Ta'rIkh-i-Nādirī, which were written after Nādir's death.
- ⁴ No title is mentioned in the work itself, but this is the one by which it is usually known; it is sometimes called the Tā'rīkh-i-Jahāngushāi-yi-Nādirī.

See M. F. Brosset's French translation of the Catholicos's interesting work, entitled "Mon Histoire et Celle de Nadir, Chah de Perse", in Brosset's "Collection d'Historiens Arméniens", St. Petersburg, 1876, Vol.II, page 312.

versions of what actually occurred; also, several important incidents are omitted altogether.

Owing, no doubt, to the circumstances under which it was written, the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī gives but little information as to Nādir's personal appearance and characteristics; fortunately, this deficiency can be largely made good by drawing upon other sources. Another matter on which Mīrzā Mahdī might, had conditions been different,/thrown more light, is the veritable nature of Nādir's religious beliefs.

Fear of NadIr's displeasure can hardly, however, have been the reason why MIrzä MahdI scarcely mentions the subject of Nādir's naval policy; the cause of his failure to deal adequately with this important question is a mystery. Nādir's efforts to create and maintain fleets on the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea were truly remarkable.

Notwithstanding these defects, the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī is an invaluable record of Nādir's life, and, as such, it affords the only sound foundation upon which a critical account of his whole career can be based.¹

The Tarikh-i-Nadirī gives, with a wealth of detail, particulars of Nadir's wars and punitive expeditions, but the author fails sometimes to give accurate geographical data.² The difficulties to which this defect has given rise are

See, however, the remarks on Muhammad Kazim's Kitab-i-Nadiri on pages9&10below. The portions of this work which are extant only relate to the years 1736-1747.

² For example, MIrza Mahdi's account of the routes followed by Nadir on his Mesopotamian campaign in 1733 is extremely difficult to follow.

aggravated by the large number of mistakes in place names, owing, doubtless, to careless copying. It is to be regretted that no carefully edited and well printed text of the Tā'rīkhi-Nādirī exists; some of the earlier MSS. are comparatively free from mistakes, but the Bombay and Tabriz lithographed editions teem with errors.

Despite an occasional over-indulgence in hyperbolic expressions (notably, on the occasion of the festival of Nau Rūz) and a somewhat wearisome repetition of flowery epithets when describing Nādir and his troops, MIrzā MahdI's style, in the Tarikh-i-Nādirī, is not unpleasing. His vocabulary is vast, and it is interesting to note, from his use of a number of Mongol and Turco-Mongol military expressions, that these were still, in his time, in use in Iran.

Mirza Mahdī completed the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī after he had returned from Constantinople in 1747.¹ During his absence, Nādir Shāh had been assassinated, and he could therefore write at last without restraint. In the concluding portion of his book, Mirzā Mahdī describes graphically the terrible change that took place in Nādir's character after the attempt upon the Shah's life in 1741, the blinding of Ridā Qulī Mīrzā (which he had previously omitted to mention), and the horrors of the last few years of Nādir's reign. It is a matter for profound regret that Mīrzā Mahdī did not completely revise or re-write his work,

Particulars will be given in due course of the diplomatic mission to the Porte on which Mirzã MahdI was sent after the signature of the peace with Turkey in 1746.

Instead, he seems to have given himself up to the completion of the Sanglakh.

Before leaving the subject of the Ta'rIkh-i-NādirI. it is necessary to make some mention of Sir William Jones's French translation of it.¹ One is apt, at first, to criticise Jones severely for the vast number of mutilated names which disfigure his translation, as well as for his incorrect conversion of the majority of the Muhammadan dates. It must. however, be borne in mind that, apart from the fact that the task of translating the Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri was forced upon Jones and that it was distasteful to him,² he had no personal Moreover, there were not, at that time, knowledge of Iran. any really accurate maps of that country, and books of reference were but few in number. Even to-day, with all the facilities which now exist, it would be impossible to make a translation of the Tarikh-i-NadirI that would be free from error, the main reason being that a number of the names mentioned cannot now be identified. As to the dates, there was no conversion table like that of Wüstenfeld in existence in Sir William Jones's times.

Sir W. Jones published, in 1773, an abridged English version of his translation: in the same year, T. S. Gadebusch's

This translation, entitled "Histoire de Nader Chah, traduite du Persan par ordre de sa Majesté le Roi de Dannemark", was first published in London in 1770. The Iranian MS. from which Jones made his translation is now in the Kongelige Bibliotek at Copenhagen: Niebuhr purchased this MS. in Shiraz in 1765, and gave it to that Library.
 See pages 316-320 of Sir William Jones's preface to his "Introduction to the History of the Life of Nadir Shah", in Volume XII of his works, London, 1807.

German translation of Jones's French text was published at Greifswald, and, at a later date, the Tsarevich David (the son of Giorgi XII, the last Georgian king) made a Georgian translation of it (see B. Dorn's 'Catalogue des Manuscrits et Xylographs Orientaux de la Bibliothèque Impériale Publique de St. Petersbourg', 1852, page 293).

Mirza Mahdi's second work on Nadir Shah, the Durrayi-Nadira, although a monument to his erudition, is also a manifestation of his bad taste. It is written throughout in the objectionable artificial style which Wassaf originated in the 4th century A.H. The text is so overloaded with recondite Arabic words as to be almost unintelligible, even to welleducated Iranians; how the work could have made any appeal to an illiterate man like Nadir is a mystery. If one may imitate one of Mirza Mahdi's metaphors, he gave, in this book, free rein to the high-mettled steed (tausan) of his verbosity and pedantry; in the Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri the author mercifully kept his steed in check, except for an annual Nau Ruz gallop.

The Durra-yi-Nadira contains but little that is not to be found in the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī;¹ it is, however, of some use for the purpose of checking the place-names and dates given Itseems in the highest degree unlikely in the latter work. that the Durra-yi-Nadira will ever be translated into any European language; to do so would be a singular waste of effort and time.

The preamble to Rida Quli Mirza's contract of marriage which. as stated on page 3 above, is in the Durra-yi-Nadira, is not contained in his official biography. 8.

In his concluding words in the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī. Mirza Mahdi expressed his intention of writing a history of the period following Nadir's death. Whether he ever carried out this intention is not known; in all probability, his preoccupation with the Sanglakh prevented him from doing so.

Some other specimens of MIrzā MahdI's writings exist. There is the letter from Nadir to Rida Quli Mirza which he composed, informing the Prince of the victory at Karnal:1 other letters of Mirza Mahdi's are included in a collection of documents published in Tehran in 1285 (1868/69).²

II. MUHAMMAD KAZIM. OF MERV.

ı

For many years Mirza Mahdi's Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri, the official biography of Nadir Shah, was looked upon as the most important source of information respecting that monarch. The late Professor Barthold expressed the opinion, however, that Muhammad Kazim's biography, which is known as the Nadir-Nama and the Kitab-i-Nadiri, is of even greater importance.

¹ The text of this letter is given by the contemporary Indian historian Muhammad Bakhsh in his Ta'rikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar va Jalus-i-Muhammad Shah (India Office Iranian MS.No.422), foll. 309(b) - 313(b); Muhammad Bakhsh states that this letter was written by MIrza MahdI. An English translation of the letter, by Sir John Malcolm, is in "Asiatick Researches", Vol.X, pages 539-547. It is pro-bable that Mirza Mahdi drafted Nadir's letter to Muhammad 'Ali Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, which Sir J. Malcolm also translated (see "Asiatick Researches", Vol.X, pages 535-539), and there can be but little doubt that his pen was responsible for the treaty of cession which Nadir compelled Muhammad Shah to sign at Delhi in 1739.

² This volume, according to Schefer, is called the Munsha'at-i-Mahdi; I have had no opportunity of examining it, so I am unable to say whether its contents throw any further light upon Nādir. 9.

Muhammad Kāzim's work was originally in three volumes, of which the first is, unfortunately, missing; the remaining volumes cover the period from 1736 to 1747. Only one copy of this work is known to exist; it is in the Institut Vostokovedenia, at Leningrad.

As I have never seen Muhammad Kāzim's MS,¹ it is useless for me to attempt to add to the notice of it which Professor Minorsky gives in his excellent "Esquisse d'une Histoire de Nader-Chah."²

III. MUHAMMAD MUHSIN.

Muhammad Muhsin, 'Amil-i-Divan, of Isfahān, was a mustaufi or treasury official in the service of Nādir Shāh. In the preface to his general history, entitled the Zubdatu't-Tawārīkh ("Cream of the Histories"), he states that Nādir ordered him to compile the work for the use of his eldest son Ridā Qulī Mīrzā. The work was composed in 1154 A.H. (1741/1742), after Nādir's return from Bukhārā and Khwārazm and not long before the unfortunate Prince was blinded.

Realising the extreme importance of studying this unique MS., I endeavoured to obtain the loan of it from the Institut Vostokovedenia, but the authorities of the Institut were unable to accede to my request because the MS. was then in use. I then tried to get a photostat copy made of the MS., but the figure which the Institut quoted for carrying out this work was beyond my limited means. Thanks to the kindness of M. Litvnov, I have been assured that, if I ever visit Leningrad, the Institut will give me every facility for studying this and any other MS. of insterest to me.

² Publication de la Société des Etudes Iraniennes et de l'Art Persan, No.10, Paris, 1934, page 46.

The Zubdatu't-Tawārīkh begins with Adam, but it is not until the era of the later Safavīs is reached that it becomes really detailed. Rieu is certainly justified in saying that the latter part of the chapter on the Safavis is "of special importance as being a contemporary record of the decline of the Safavī dynasty and of the rise of Nādir Shāh down to the time of his assumption of the royal title."¹

Although not so complete as the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādiri, the Zubdatu't-Tawārīkh nevertheless contains certain particulars which are not to be found in the former work, and the portion respecting the relations between Shāh Tahmāsp II and Nādir merits close attention.

The chronology, owing, perhaps, to careless copyists, is frequently faulty², and the haphazard arrangement of some of the chapters or sections is confusing.³ The author makes a surprising blunder when he states that Baghdad surrendered to Nadir when he besieged it for the second time, after the defeat and death of Topal Osman Pasha.⁴ Notwithstanding these defects,

- ¹ See Rieu's "Supplementary Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum," London, 1898, pages 24 and 25.
- ² Several of the dates relating to the Afghan wars are two or even three years out, and in some places, in the late Professor Browne's manuscript (No.G.15 in "A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental MSS. belonging to the late E. G. Browne ...", Cambridge, 1932), blanks have been left where dates should have been inserted. This MS. is far more legible than the one in the British Museum (O R.3498).
- ³ For example, a detailed account of the revolt of Mir Wais and the Afghan wars <u>follows</u> the chapter devoted to the assembly on the Mughan plain and Nadir's accession.
- ⁴ See Fol.217(b).

this work is one of the most important contemporary sources for Nadir's early career, and it is to be regretted that it stops short with his accession to the throne in 1736. It has the appearance of having been written quite independently of the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī.

IV. SHAIKH MUHAMMAD ALI HAZIN.

The Tadhkiratu'l-Ahwāl¹ of Shaikh Hazīn is an important contribution to the history of the era of Nadir Shah. It represents the view point of one of the few men of culture and literary taste who lived in, and survived, those troubled times, when, in Iran at any rate, the pen was much less mighty than the sword.²

The Shaikh has much to say of the devastation and ruin which Nādir brought upon the country of which he had been, at first, the saviour. It was, in fact, the Shaikh's distress at seeing the manner in which the Iranian people were oppressed that made him decide to leave Iran for India in 1734.³ Shaikh

¹ The Iranian text was edited by F. C. Belfour and published in London in 1831.

² Lutf 'All Beg Adhar, the author of the Atash-Kada", in the portion of that work entitled "Ahwāl-i-Mu'Asirin" ("Conditions of Contemporaries"), remarks upon the lack of literary men and poets during this epoch: he says "The suspicion of the soul and the disordered state (of affairs) are such that no one is in the mood to read poetry or to write it."

³ See F.C.Belfour's English translation of the Ahwāl, entitled "The Life of Shaikh Mohammed Ali Hazin", page 251. Belfour, in the preface to his translation, quotes (on pages v and vi) some lines from Abdu'l-Karīm's Bayān-i-Wāqi, which he translates as follows: "An illustrious person has observed, that the language of the Sheikh on this subject is not worthy of attention, because they (Nadir Shāh and he) were enemies to each other, and the venerable Sheikh from fear of him (Nadir Shāh), honoured India as the place of his retirement." The identity of this 'illustrious person' is not disclosed.

Hazin, though a partisan of the legitimate Safavi line, praises at times Nādir's prowess as a military leader, and his version of the Indian invasion is not unfair to the conqueror. The Shaikh's descriptions of Nādir's battles are not of the slightest value. He did not witness any of the battles of which he writes; being anything but a fighting man, he always found some excuse to absent himself whenever a clash of arms seemed imminent. He says that only two Iranian troops were wounded at Mihmāndūst and that no more than three were killed and a score slightly wounded at Karnāli

No biographical details of the Shaikh are given here, because they can be found in F. C. Belfour's English translation of the Ahwal. 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri (see pages 13-15below) and Sayyid Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai² have utilised the Ahwal to some extent in the preparation of their respective works.

V. KHWAJA ABDU'L-KARIM KASHMIRI.

'Abdu'l-Karīm, the son of Aqībat Mahmūd, of Kashmirj, the author of the Bayān-i-Wāqi', before recounting, in that work, his personal experiences when in the service of Nādir Shāh, devotes a number of pages to the conqueror's origin, and exploits up to the time of the Indian invasion.³ Whilst this portion of the Bayān is not based on first-hand observation and knowledge,

¹ See F. C. Belfour's English translation of the Ahwal, entitled "The Life of Sheikh Mohammed Ali Hazin", pages 193 and 299.

² The author of the Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirIn.

⁵ See foll.4(a)-15(a) of the Iranian MS. Add.8909 at the British Museum.

it is, nevertheless, of very considerable value. The author, having no reason to fear Nadir's resentment, writes freely and without exaggeration of his humble start in life; he gives, moreover, some anecdotes and interesting personal details regarding Nadir which are not to be found in Mirza Mahdi's official biography. 'Abdu'l-Karim states that he obtained his information from old companions of the Shah; if, he says, there are any errors in his narrative, it is their fault, and not his own; some of his information is derived from the Ahwal and other writings of Shaikh Hazin.¹

The portion of the Bayan which is based on the author's personal observation and experiences begins with an account of Nadir's stay in Delhi, where 'Abdu'l-Karīm was at that time. Being desirous of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, he entered the Shah's service, and accompanied the Iranian army on its return march to Iran and on the Turkistan campaign; on reaching Qazvīn he obtained permission from the Shāh to resign and to proceed to Mecca.

'Abdu'l-Karīm furnishes a number of particulars of the return of the army to Iran and of the conquest of Bukhārā and Khwārazm which are omitted by Mírzā Mahdí, while his description of the hardships of the troops when passing through the Kurram valley in December 1739 and their similar experiences in that of the Gurgān some fifteen months later,

¹ Fol. 101(b).

does much to amplify the official account.¹ Through his close association with the capable Indian physician Alavi Khān (whom Nādir had taken into his service at Delhi), 'Abdu'l-Karīm learnt much of Nādir's physical and mental condition, and his remarks on this subject are of decided interest.²

No complete English translation of the Bayān-i-Wāqi^{*} has yet appeared. In 1798 Francis Gladwin published, in Calcutta, his "Memoirs of Khojeh Abdulkureem", but Gladwin omitted all the earlier portion of the work; his translation (in which there is room for improvement) begins with Nādir's departure from Delhi. Lieutenant H. G. Pritchard translated this early part, together with much that Gladwin had already done, for Sir H. M. Elliot,³ but only a comparatively small portion of Pritchard's translation has been published.⁴

VI. MIRZA MUHAMMAD SHIRAZI.

MIrzā Muḥammad, the son of Abu'l-Qāsim, of Shīrāz wrote his Rūznāma or autobiography in 1200 A.H. (1785/1786) when he was an old man. Professor Sa'id Naficy, of Tehran, possesses a MS. of this autobiography, of which he has been

- ¹ Foll.32(a) and 61(b) respectively.
- ² See foll.66(b) and 99(b).
- ³ Pritchard's translation (in manuscript) is contained in the British Museum MS. Add.30782, foll.64-112.
- ⁴ Extracts from this translation are given in Elliot and Dowson's "The History of India as told by its own Historians" London, 1877, Vol.VIII; those relating to Nadir are on pages 126-132.

kind enough to send me a typewritten copy.¹

The first 21 pages of this typewritten copy are concerned with the trials and adventures of the author and his family during the Afghan period and that of the supremacy of Nadir. Mīrzā Muḥammad gives much prominence in his autobiography to events in Fārs and, above all, in Shīrāz, and the particulars which he gives of Nādir's expulsion of the Afghans from that city are of interest. He relates that, with the return of security at the beginning of Nadir's reign, the havoc wrought by the Afghans in and around Shīrāz was in due course repaired, and the gardens and fertile land in the vicinity were cultivated afresh; in this taskthe inhabitants were, he says, aided by extraordinarily abundant rain, which led to the saying: "Shīrāz has become Māzandarān."²

As is natural, Mirzā Muḥammad has much to say regarding the revolt of Muḥammad Taql Khān Shīrāzī, the Beglarbegi of Fārs, in 1744. Fasā'i, the author of the Fārsnāma-yi-Nasiri,³ cites Mīrzā Muḥammad as one of his authorities for his description of this uprising. Mīrzā Muḥammad deplores the terrible fate of Shīrāz and its gardens in consequence of Taqī Khān's revolt, but he regards as excessive the punishment which Nādir meted out to Taqī Khān. He speaks of the vow which Nādir had taken never to injure Taqī Khān, and states that the

- ¹ It consists of 113 pages.
- ² Page 9 of the autobiography.
- ³ See page 193 of the Tehran lithographed edition, published in Dhu'l-Qa'da 1312 A.H. (April/May 1895).

Shah tried to conciliate the rebel Governor before taking extreme measures.¹

VII. LUTF ALI BEG ADHAR.

Only a brief notice need be accorded to Lutf Ali Beg Adhar, the author of the well-known work, the Atash-Kada. In the section of his book entitled 'Ahwal-i-Mu'asirin' or "Conditions of Contemporaries"² Lutf'Ali Beg gives a brief historical outline from the time of the Afghan invasion up to the advent of Karim Khan half a century later. In this outline the author makes a number of references to Nadir and his campaigns and to events that occurred during his reign. He states, in concluding his remarks on Nadir, that the numerous revolts towards the end of his reign so maddened him that he determined to ruin Iran. As stated in the notice regarding Shaikh HazIn, Lutf 'All Beg remarks upon the great scarcity of poets and men of letters during the half century covered by his outline of events.3

- ¹ Pages 16-21 of the autobiography.
- ² Only the first 189 pages of the Bombay lithographed edition of 1277 A.H. (1860/61) have been numbered: as this section comes later in the book, no exact reference can be given. Some of the dates given in the above edition are incorrect.

³ The late Professor E. C. Brownehas drawn attention to this remark in his "Persian Literature in Modern Times" (the final volume of his "Literary History of Persia"), page 282. VIII. TAHIR BEG.

Tahir Beg, who appears to have been a native of the Darragaz district of Khurasan, wrote a history of Nadir entitled the Ta'rikh-i-Nadir, a MS. copy of which is preserved at Tehran.¹ Tahir Beg served in Nadir's army, but remained in India when Nadir returned to Iran: he afterwards entered the service of Shuja 'u'd-Daula. In the Bibliotheque Nationale at Paris there is an anonymous and incomplete history of Nadir Shah extending up to the year 1153 A.H. (1739/40) which may, it is thought, be by Tahir Beg.² In 1798 Colonel Gentil, the Author of the "Abrégé Historique des Souverains de l'Indoustan", 1772, (Bibliothèque Nationale MS. Fr.24219)³ presented the Bibliotheque Nationale with this anonymous MS. Colonel Gentil stated that he obtained his data regarding Nadir's origin from a certain'Taerbegui', evidently Tahir Beg. Jean Otter (see notice No.IV of the European authorities) says, in the preface to his 'Voyages en Turquie et en Perse', that he deposited in the Bibliothèque du Roi "une Relation en Langue Persanne, écrite à Dilli l'an 1153 de l'hégire", from which he had obtained some of his information regarding Nadir. The mention of the date 1153 A.H. led me to think that Otter's MS. might possibly be the anonymous one referred to above. I made

I have not been able to consult Colonel Gentil's work.

¹ Professor Sa'1d Naficy informed me of the existence of this
 MS.

² See the description of this MS. is M. Blochet's "Catalogue des Manuscrits Persans" in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, 1905, Vol.I., pages 302 and 303.

enquiries of M. Blochet, who, besides being good enough to inform me that the anonymous MS. was presented to the Bibliothèque by Colonel Gentil fifty years after Otter's death, stated that no trace can now be found of the MS. which Otter claims to have deposited. M. Blochet says that Otter's statement may have been incorrect or that, if Otter was right, the MS. in question has since been lost.

I have sent photostat copies of the first and last pages of the Paris MS. to Professor Naficy at Tehran, so that they may be compared with the authentic Tahir Beg MS. there. I am now awaiting Professor Naficy's reply.

As I have had no opportunity of studying either the Tehran copy of Țāhir Beg or the anonymous Paris MS., I am not in a position to express any opinion on their merits or demerits.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS.

Sir John Malcolm, in his 'History of Persia', gives translations of passages from a number of Iranian MSS, some apparently contemporary or nearly so, that relate to Nadir; unfortunately, he does not in all cases give the names of the authors; it would be of interest to know whether these MSS. are still in existence, and if so, where they are.

Space does not permit me to give separate notices here of the numerous Indian authors (except 'Abdu'l-Karīm Kashmīrī) who have written on the subject of Nādir. The majority of these

writers confine their attention to Nadir's invasion of India; references will be made in the footnotes to a number of these writers, who will, moreover, be mentioned in the Bibliography.

B. EUROPEAN SOURCES

I. THE STATE PAPERS AT THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

The correspondence exchanged between Whitehall and the British diplomatic representatives at Constantinople and St. Petersburg during the years 1729-1747¹, although concerned for the most part with affairs in Turkey and Russia respectively and with the policy of the British Government in regard thereto, nevertheless contains many references to Nadir Shah². The despatches from Constantinople frequently had, as enclosures, official communiqués (in Italian) from the Porte to the foreign diplomatic corps at that city respecting the wars with Iran, while those from St. Petersburg were sometimes accompanied by translations of reports from Kalushkin, the Russian Minister at the court of Nadir Shah, and of letters from Russian commanders

¹ A complete list of these representatives, with the dates of their appointments to and transfers from the Russian and Turkish capitals will be found in D.B.Horn's "British Diplomatic Representatives, 1689-1789", published by the Camden Society, London, 1932, pages 111-115 for Russia and 152-153 for Turkey.

² The St. Petersburg despatches (and many of the replies from London) are contained in the series S.P.91, Volumes X to XLVI (1728-1748), while the Constantinople despatches are in the series S.P.97, Volumes XXV to XXXIII. 20.

on the frontiers of Iran and Turkey. Also, the despatches themselves, by describing the reactions of the Turkish and Russian Courts to the reports which they received of the ebb and flow of Nādir's fortunes, supplement the valuable accounts to be found in the pages of von Hammer-Purgstall and Soloviev.¹

In the correspondence between the Northern Department and the representatives at St. Petersburg much space is devoted to the British trade with Iran via Russia, and a large proportion of this space is taken up with the Elton controversy and the difficulties of the Russia Company. There are, for example, memoranda by Elton himself, copies (in defective German) of the accusations against him by Bakunin, the Russian Consul at Resht, a hitherto unpublished letter on the subject written by Jonas Hanway at Astrakhan in November 1744, and many other documents of interest. The material regarding this question of the British transit trade with Iran is, in fact, so abundant that only a relatively small proportion of it can be utilised in a work dealing primarily with Nadir Shah. This subject of the British trade connection with Iran via Russia is one which merits separate treatment.

II. THE RECORDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

The archives of the East India Company at the India Office are a rich mine of information respecting the period of

See the separate notes regarding these two historians.

Nadir Shah. Not only is much of this information not to be found elsewhere, but the bulk of it has never been utilised The most important of these records, in so far as before. the subject of Nadir Shah is concerned, is the Gombroon Diary, wherein the Agent in Council at Gombroon (Bandar Abbas), recorded the day-to-day activities and transactions of the Company at that place, besides mentioning many events that occurred Volumes IV (1728-1737), V (1737-1746) and VI elsewhere. (1746-1752) of the "Persia - Persian Gulf" series of the India Office Records contain the portions of the Diary that deal with the period under review. Volume XV of the same series (covering the period 1729-1752) contains a large number of letters from the Agent in Council at Gombroon and from the representatives of the Company at Isfahan, Basra, etc., which supplement the data contained in the Diary and to some extent bridge the occasional gaps in that record. These gaps were caused through certain portions of the Diary being lost when pirates captured the vessels that were conveying these portions from Gombroon to Bombay.1

Further data are to be found in the Bombay records of the Company, but, as these are very voluminous and naturally relate mainly to India, it is no easy matter to extract the relevant material. J. A. Saldanha, in his "Selections from State Papers" (Calcutta 1908), has drawn upon the Bombay records

¹ The periods so affected are 27th July 1738-16th August 1739 and 31st July 1744-17th August 1745.

to some extent, but his work, besides being very incomplete, is marred by an extraordinary number of misprints. Some additional information is to be found in the Surat Commercial Diary and Consultations.

The Gombroon Diary and the letters contained in Volume XV throw much light upon the relations of the Company with the Iranian Government, the naval policy of Nadir Shah, and the course of events in the Persian Gulf, as well as happenings at Isfahān, Kirmān, ShĪrāz and Başra, where the Company had representatives. There are, for example, most graphic descriptions of the Iranian attempts to capture Basra in 1735 and 1743, and much valuable data respecting the relations between the Iranian Government and the Gulf Arabs, the Iranian campaigns in 'Omān and Nādir's great bid to establish Iranian naval supremacy in the Gulf. These records make at times pathetic reading: the staff often had to undergo severe hardships, and to run terrible risks. A number lost their lives from illness and one employee was murdered during a disturbance.

Although these records contain so much that is of value in respect to affairs that came within the orbit of the Company's representatives, they have, nevertheless, to be used with some caution in so far as they deal with events in other parts of Iran or Turkey.

There is doubtless a vast amount to be gleaned from the archives of the Dutch East India Company; I much regret that I have been unable to examine these Dutch records.

III. JAMES FRASER, of REELIG.

W. Irvine, in his brief article entitled "Some Notes on James Fraser", describes Fraser's "Nadir Shah"²as "a firsthand contribution to the history of the period, important not only by reason of its early date, but because of the number of original documents it has preserved, documents not to be found elsewhere." The only word to which one might take some exception in the above passage is "first-hand", because Fraser was never in Iran and, although he was in India during Nadir's invasion of that country, he did not come into personal contact with the conqueror.

So far as can be ascertained, James Fraser was employed as a Writer in the Surat, Cambay and Ahmadabad factories of the East India Company from 1730 to 1740.3

Fraser states, in his preface (page iv), that during the last three years of his (first) stay in India (i.e. from

1 Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1899, pages 214-220.

- ² It appears, from the "Gentleman's Magazine" for January 1742 (page 56), that the first edition appeared in that month; the price was 4/-. The second edition was published in March 1742.
- ³ Dictionary of National Biography. I have been unable to discover, in the Surat records, any reference either to Fraser's arrival there in 1730 or to his departure ten years later (he returned to England in 1740 in order to arrange for the pub-lication of his book); it is known, however, that he was at Surat during much, if not the whole, of that period. Fraser did not become a member of the Council of Surat until after his return there in October 1743; his appointment thereto is mentioned in a letter from Surat to London dated the 31st October of that year (see the India Office Volume No.1^B entitled "Bombay letters received - 20th January 1735 - 8th April Fraser returned from India in 1750 or 1751, and resid-1758"). ed at Reelig, Inverness-shire, of which place he became laird on his father's death; he died in 1754. 24.

1737 to 1740), he "held a Correspondence with some Persians and Moghols there (at Patna), and that frequently on the subject of Nādir Shāh's Expedition." He goes on to say:-

"The Account¹ of Nadir Shah's first Exploits I have been favoured with from a Gentleman now in England, who resided several years in Persia, speaks that Language, and has been frequently in Company with that Conqueror.

The Journal² of his Transactions in India, with the Letters and Cession of the Provinces, were transmitted from Dehli, by the Becretary of Sirbullind (Sarbuland) Khan, whom Nādir Shāh had appointed to be one of the Commissioners for levying the Contributions to Mirza Moghol, Son to Ali Mahommed Khan at Ahmedabad, who being my intimate Friend gave it to me."

Fraser omits to give the name of the author of the "Account" referred to above, but he states (page 128) that this individual left Iran for India in February 1737. It being obvious that the person in question must have been in the service of the East India Company, I consulted the Gombroon Diary, where I discovered that William Cockell, the Agent at Gombroon, left that Place for Bombay on the 9th/20th February 1737;³ no other employee of the Company left Iran for India in February 1737. Having regard to these facts, as well as to Cockell's position and qualifications, there can be no

1 See pages 71 to 128 of Fraser's work.

2 m " 152 " 223 " " " I have been unable to ascertain what has become of the original MS. from which Fraser made his translation. It is not amongst the Fraser MSS. which are now in the Bodleian Library, and it is possible that he may have given it to his friend Dr. Mead.

³ Gombroon Diary, 9th/20th February, 1737, in Volume IV of the "Persia and the Persian Gulf" records of the East India Company, at the India Office. doubt that he was Fraser's informant. Cockell was Representative of the Company at Isfahān during the latter part of Ashraf's reign and throughout that of Shāh Tahmāsp II. He was in Isfahān when Nādir entered the city in triumph in November 1729, after Ashraf had fled. Cockell came into personal contact with Nādir, as well as with Shāh Tahmāsp on several occasions. In May 1733 Cockell was appointed Agent at Gombroon (Bandar 'Abbās), where he remained until his transfer to Bombay in February 1737. After reaching India, Cockell was given a seat on the Council of the Bombay Presidency, and it was doubtless during his stay in Bombay that he met, or at any rate entered into correspondence with, Fraser.

Although it might be supposed that Cockell's "Account" would be a really reliable source of information regarding Nadir's early career, one finds, on examining it closely, that it is by no means free from errors. In fact, one discovers repeatedly, when carefully analysing such records of Nadir Shah, that their authors are very liable to make incorrect statements or to omit important facts unless they are describing incidents of which they themselves had first-hand knowledge or are quoting the <u>ipsissima verba</u> of some reliable eye-witness. It must be borne in mind that Iran is a country where high mountains or vast expanses of desert separate many of the principal centres, such as Işfahān and Mashhad; in the days of Nādir, communication between such centres was often slow and uncertain, particularly in times of crisis. It was consequently extremely

difficult for anyone in, say, Isfahān, to obtain accurate information of the course of events in Mashhad, or vice versa.¹ Wild rumours were often current, and these were not infrequently accepted as statements of fact.

Since Nadir spent but little time in Isfahan between 1729 and 1733, it is probable that Cockell had to compile his "Account", in part at any rate, from statements by persons who were, in fact, but ill-qualified to give him information. It is unlikely that Cockell derived much, if indeed any, data from Nadir himself; during Cockell's tenure of office at Isfahan, the relations between him and Nadir were, except at the outset, not of a cordial nature.

Whereas one is bound to comment adversely upon Cockell's "Account", one can accept as absolutely reliable and of great interest and value the "Personal Description and Character of Nadir Shah" which is also included in Fraser's book.² Cockell was likewise the author of this "Personal Description". It is of interest to compare this delineation of Nadir's personal appearance and character with that furnished by the Chevalier de Gardane, who was French Consul at Isfahan from 1727 to 1730.³ Both these descriptions of Nadir

- ² See pages 227-234.
- ³ See theremarks on La Mamye-Clairac and his authorities.

¹ Cf. the comment of the Agent at Gombroon on some astonishing rumour that was current in that town in October 1739: "It is certainly impossible to allow of the Truth of any Report in this Country without Visible Proof." (Gombroon Diary, 20th/31st October 1739).

are obviously based upon personal observation and knowledge.

Of Fraser's translations¹ of the various letters in Iranian and of the Journal of Mirza Zaman Khan it is unnecessary to say more here than that they afford some additional information of the Indian campaign and of the events at Delhi during Nadir's stay there in 1739.

IV. JEAN OTTER.

Otter's "Voyage en Turquie et en Perse, avec une Relation des expédition de Tahmas Koulikhan", was published in Paris in 1748, the year in which he died; it is not, apparently, known whether the book appeared before or after his death, which occurred on the 26th September.²

Otter states in his preface that he derived his information for the historical part of his work from MS. memoirs and from conversations which he had had with "well-informed persons." From 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan, the Iranian Ambassador to the Porte and members of his suite (in whose company Otter travelled from Constantinople to Iran in 1736/7), as well as

² Nouvelle Bibliographie Générale, Paris, 1862, Vol.XXXVIII, page 953. La Mamye Clairac likewise died in the same year that his book was published.

As regards Fraser's knowledge of Iranian, the following extract from the Surat Diary & Consultations, Vol.XXIV, page 69 (dated 31st December 1739), is of interest: "The Chief having requested of Mr. Fraser who is well versed in the Persian Language to translate our Phirmaund (farmān) as very often in transacting Business at the Durbar we are at a loss for a just Explanation of some things, the Translates of which were before in the Office not being so exact as this which Mr. Fraser has now translated...." (the text of his translation is then given).

from persons in Isfahān and elsewhere, he obtained a number of details regarding the life of Nādir Shāh. He claims that his account of Nādir's expeditions, particularly that to India, was based upon the statements of actual eye-witnesses and was, moreover, confirmed by 'une Relation en Langue Persane écrite à Dilli l'an 1153 de l'hégire' (of which mention has already been made in the notice regarding Tāhir Beg.)¹ Otter's description of Nādir's origin, his being dispossessed of Kalāt by his uncle, his first military success and subsequent disappointment, etc. follows Cockell's account in Fraser's 'Nādir Shāh' so closely that, although Otter does not acknowledge it, he must have taken much of it from that work.²

This part of Otter's work, like his description of the Indian expedition, is neither very accurate nor of much interest. The most valuable portion of his book is that wherein he describes what he actually saw and heard himself. He relates in a graphic way his experiences on the journey from Constantinople to Isfahān, his stay for over a year and a half in that city, his journey to Basra and his return to France through Mesopotamia. Being an accomplished linguist, he could talk freely to all the people with whom he came into contact; his conversations with the peasants in Iran reveal the terrible state of misery to which, even at that time (1739),

¹ See page 18 above.

² See Fraser, pages 71-88, and Otter, Vol.I, pages 298-302.

Nadir's ceaseless exactions had reduced them. Otter has much to say in regard to Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad, his methods of keeping the Arab tribes in check, and his relations with Nadir Shah.

Although Otter spent nearly four years at Basra, he cannot be looked upon as an important authority upon the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf during that period; the Gombroon Diary and letters of the representatives of the East India Company are of far greater interest, besides being more accurate.

On Otter's return from the East, he was given the post of Interpreter at the Bibliothèque du Roi and that of Professor of Arabic at the Académie des Inscriptions. J. P. de Bougainville, the author of the "Parallèle" between Alexander and Nādir Shāh (see the bibliography) had a high opinion of Otter, whose work he utilised largely in the preparation of his own.

V. LA MAMYE-CLAIRAC.

The "Histoire de Perse, depuis le Commercement de ce Siècle" by Louis André de la Mamye-Clairac (Paris, 1750) is a remarkably well-arranged and carefully prepared work. Although the author was never nearer Iran than Constantinople (where he was from 1724 to 1727), he obtained through the friends whom he made there and through French diplomatic and

consular officials¹ of his acquaintance a large amount of data relating to Iran.² The greater part of his book is concerned with the Afghan revolt and invasion and other occurrences previous to Nadir's rise into prominence; the author's actual narrative comes to an end with the year 1730, so that there is but little therein respecting Nadir. In the latter part of his third volume, entitled "Mémoires pour la Continuation de cette Histoire", La Mamye-Clairac publishes, however, a number of letters and reports which he obtained through the good offices of his diplomatic and other friends; these documents bring his record of events (with some gaps) up to the year 1739. One of the most interesting of these documents is the "Extrait de la Relation de M. le Chevalier de Gardane".⁹ The Chevalier de Gardane succeeded his brother as French Consul at Isfahan in 1727 and remained there until 1730. He, like Cockell, came into contact with Nadir after the last-named had driven out the Afghans from Isfahan and had occupied the city for Shah Tahmasp. The Chevalier gives, in this 'Extrait', a most favourable account of Nadir's character and attainments, which should be read in conjunction

- ¹ La Mamye-Clairac knew, amongst others, that astute diplomatist the Marquis de Bonnac, M. d'Andrezel, the Marquis de Villeneuve and the brother of the last-named.
- ² La Mamye-Clairac also utilised a number of works such as du Cerceau's version of Krusinski's Memoirs, the 'Relation' of Pere Reynal (which I have been unable to trace), the "Relazione della Rivoluzioni di Persia", (which I have also not seen), by the "Sieur Joseph", a Georgian who was interpreter at the French Consulate at Isfahan, etc.
- ³ See Vol. III, pages 105-109.

with that given by Cockell.1

Amongst the other documents, may be mentioned:-

- (i) Lettre sur Tahmas-Kouli-Kan, écrite de Constantinople le 8 Septembre 1736. This letter gives a brief and not inaccurate outline of Nadir's humble origin and of his rise to prominence, besides mentioning his friendly attitude towards some French Capucin monks; the information in this letter was, it is stated, obtained from an Armenian merchant who knew Nadir personally.2
- (ii) Sundry reports and letters relating to the campaign in Mesopotamia in 1733, including translations of reports by Ahmad Pasha and Topal Osman (Uthman) Pasha.
- (iii) An account of the conquest of India, based upon what appears to have been a French translation of the "Verdadeira Noticia",4 by a French adventurer named de Voulton,5 as well as on some letters from that individual.

La Mamye-Clairac took great pains to indicate his

sources, prefacing every section of his work with bibliograph-

ical details.

- 1 See Fraser, pages 227-234.
- ² Vol.III, pages 339-347.
- 3 n n 300-311.
- ⁴ I contributed to the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, Vol.IV, Part II, pages 223-245, an annotated translation of the Portuguese text (published in Lisbon in 1740) of de Voulton's 'Noticia': according to that text, the original was in Iranian. I did not know at the time when I made that translation that La Mamye-Clairac had utilised the 'Noticia'.
- ⁵ Cultru, in his "Dupleix: ses Plans, Politiques: sa Disgrace: Etude d'Histoire Coloniale", Paris, 1901, page 173, gives some details of de Voulton's interesting career; and further information on the subject is to be found in a letter from Robert Orme to Lord Holderness dated the 11th March 1755 (see page 274 of the Orme MSS. in the India Office Library).

La Mamye-Clairac died on the 6th May 1750, the year in which his 'Histoire de Perse' was published. Despite his interest in Iran, he wrote no other book regarding it, his time being, it seems, fully occupied with his duties as a military engineer and with the preparation of works on that subject.¹

VI. JONAS HANWAY.

Hanway has long been regarded as the principal English authority on the subject of Nadir Shah,² and his "Travels"³ has been quoted very extensively by subsequent writers, both British and foreign.

When one subjects Hanway's "Travels" to careful analysis, one finds, however, that it is unequal in quality. While all that he writes of his own personal experiences and

- 1 Only the first part of one of these works appears to have been published. It appeared 7 years after the author's death, and was entitled "L'Ingénieur de Campagne, ou Traité de la Fortification Passagère" (Paris, 1757); death supervened before La Mamye-Clairac could complete the second part. An English translation of the completed portion of "L'Ingénieur de Campagne" was subsequently published in London.
- ² Dr. Samuel Johnson, however, had no great opinion of Hanway. After the appearance of Hanway's somewhat ponderous book "An Eight Days' Journey from London to Portsmouth", the Doctor remarks: "Jonas acquired some reputation by travelling abroad, but lost it all by travelling at home." (Boswell's "Johnson", Vol.II, 122) Johnson's animosity had really been aroused by Hanway's "Essay on Tea" (the Doctor was not altogether consistent, for he had a great admiration for the well-known Scottish physician and wit, Dr. John Arbuthnot, who had held the same views as Hanway's as to the perniciousness of tea drinking).
- 3 First published in London in 1753 in four volumes. The references that follow are to the first edition.

his citations from the journals and statements of others recording what they themselves underwent or witnessed, are most worthy of attention, the same cannot in every case be said of those of his statements which were founded on previous works.

Hanway writes most graphically of his adventures during the Astarabad rebellion,¹ and his description of Nadir's camp, which he afterwards visited in order to seek redress for his losses, is most interesting. Hanway never, however, held converse with Nadir, of whom he only caught a fleeting glimpse on one occasion.²

It is most fortunate that Hanway thought fit to give extracts in his work from the journals of Elton, Woodroofe, Thompson and van Mierop, as it is highly probable that, had he not done so, little or none of their contents would have been preserved; much will be said hereafter respecting these journals, particularly that of Elton.

Before giving his account of Nadir's life, Hanway devotes nearly the whole of one of his four volumes to the history of the preceding twenty years. It will be found, on examination, that this history of the Afghan wars and the Turkish and Russian invasions is merely an abridged transla-

2 n n 243.

^{1 &}quot;Travels", Vol.I, pages 192-219.

tion of La Mamye-Clairac's work.¹ Hanway, however, has sacrificed much of the usefulness of the French original by suppressing most of the bibliographical notes. Considering the extent to which he made use of La Mamye-Clairac's "Histoire", Hanway's acknowledgment to that writer seems most inadequate.²

Hanway's principal sources for Nadir's career up to and including the Indian campaign are Fraser and Otter. For the subsequent portion of Nadir's reign up to 1744 Hanway obtained much valuable data, when in Iran himself, from Elton, Père Bazin³ and other Europeans whom he met there; he likewise acquired some information from Iranians, but his dependance on interpreters and the comparative shortness of his visit prevented him from learning much through this channel.

It is not easy to trace Hanway's sources for Nādir's concluding years and death; he probably obtained most of his material from those of his associates in the Russia Company who remained on in Iran until the collapse of the Anglo-Iranian trading enterprise via Russia occurred. Some of his

² See page XII of Hanway's introduction, in Volume I.

³ See Hanway's reference, in Vol.I, page 225, to his meeting at Resht with Bazin (whose name he omits) and two other French missionaries, one of whom was a Father le Garde. Hanway met Bazin and his companions on several occasions.

In Hanway's third volume ("The Revolutions of Persia: Containing the Reign of Shah Sultan Hussein, with the Invasion of the Afghans, and the Reigns of Sultan Mir Maghmud and his Successor Sultan Ashreff"), Parts II to V correspond to La Mamye-Clairac's first volume, while Parts VI to VIII correspond to the latter's second one.

information was derived from Dr. John Cook, of Edinburgh.¹ who was attached to the embassy under Prince Golitzin which the Empress Elizabeth sent to Nadir in 1746.²

Despite the fact that Hanway's book contains many mistakes and is not founded on any reliable Oriental source like the Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri, it must be regarded as a remarkable piece of work. Hanway, although he relies so much on other authorities, not all of whom are very reliable, punctuates his narrative with many shrewd remarks, and gives, on the whole, a very just appreciation of Nadir's character. As to the British trade with Iran via Russia, Hanway is, of course, a most important authority, but his bias against Elton must be taken into account.³ Hanway's chronology. though not perfect, is far superior to that of Jones.

- ¹ Dr. Cook lent Hanway his journal, extracts from which Hanway published in his first Volume (see pages 360 to 378 and 385 to 391). Cook, in his subsequent work "Voyages and Travels through the Russian Empire, Tartary and part of the Kingdom of Persia" (Edinburgh 1770), Volume II, pages 299-301, severely criticises Hanway, particularly the latter's attitude towards Elton. Though some of Cook's criticisms are justified, he goes, on the whole, too far; the chief reason for his rancour was, it seems, the fact that Hanway, though he had included his (Cook's) journal, had added "Jesuitical fables" (i.e. statements by Bazin). Hanway, in Cook's words, "ought to have considered the difference there is between a man of honour, who hates a lie, and a Jesuit, a man whose principles are subversive of society."!
- ² Nadir's assassination prevented this embassy from fulfilling its task. Particulars of the embassy are also given by another member of it, namely Dr. J. J. Lerch, in his "Nachricht von der Zweite Reise Mach Persien...." in Volume X of A. F. Busching's "Magazin".
- To judge from a letter which Hanway wrote to London from Astrakhan on the 7th November 1744, when on his way home, he was not at that time unfavourable to Elton; his bias appears to have developed after his return (the letter in question is not included or even referred to in his "Travels" a copy of it is in the Public Record Office, series S.P.91, Volume XXXVI.)

VII. PERE BAZIN, S.J.

Louis Bazin was born at Avranches on the 24th May In January 1731 he entered upon his noviciate, and, 1712. four years later, having completed his theological studies and obtained some knowledge of medicine, he left France for Iran.¹ From 1741 Bazin accompanied Nadir on his expeditions. Bazin was not invariably at the court, for Hanway met him at Resht in February 1744^2 and again at Lähijan in the following August; on the latter occasion Baz in gave Hanway some medical treatment.³ In December 1746 Bazin was appointed chief physician to Nadir, and remained with him until his assassination. In the terrible turmoil that followed Nadir's murder, Bazin narrowly escaped with his life. In February 1751 Bazin was at Bandar 'Abbas, possibly waiting for a ship to take him to France. In 1767 Bazin went to China; he died at Peking on the 15th March 1774.

In the "Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses"⁴ and also in the "Missions du Levant" two of Bazin's letters to Père Roger, the Procureur-Général des Missions du Levant, have been printed; Bazin wrote them on the 2nd February 1751, at Bandar Abbas.

1	These scanty details are taken from Volume I of the "Catalogue de la Compagnie de Jésus" by the Fathers Augustin and Aloys de Backer.							
2	Hanway,	Vol.I,	page	225.				
3	77	Π	Π	325.				
4	Publishe	ed in P	aris,	1780;	Vol.IV, pages 277-353.			

In the first of these letters Bazin mentioned rather briefly Nadir's origin and rise to power; his narrative gets progressively more detailed after reaching the point where his personal knowledge of Nadir begins. Bazin's description of the Shah's physical and mental condition and of the treatment which he gave him is most interesting, and affords, in conjunction with the data given by 'Abdu'l-Karīm Kashmīrī (see page 15 above) some clue as to the reason for his sudden outbursts of rage.

As Bazin was in close attendance upon Nadir during the last few months of his life, his testimony as to what occurred during that dreadful period is of the utmost value. Bazin was in the adjoining tent to the Shah when the latter was assassinated, and so was able to give as accurate a version as anyone of what occurred. A sketch-plan by Bazin of Nadir's camp is reproduced in the "Lettres Edifiantes."

It is unfortunate that no earlier letters of Bazin's seem to have been preserved.

VIII. SERGEI SOLOVIEV.

Although Soloviev belongs to a much later age than that of Nadir, his inclusion in this chapter is amply justified by the large amount of contemporary material which he found in the Russian official archives and utilised in the

¹ This sketch-plan was reproduced again in Sir Mortimer Durand's "Nadir Shah", London, 1908, opposite page 93.

compilation of those portions of his Istoriya Rosii that relate to Russo-Iranian relations during the period under review.

Soloviev carefully studied the mass of reports which had been received from the Russian diplomatic, consular and military representatives stationed in or on the borders of Iran. Of especial interest are the numerous reports from Kalushkin, who succeeded Prince Sergei Dimitrievich Golitzin as Russian Resident at Nadir's court in 1736.

Soloviev's history is also of importance in regard to the British trade with Iran via Russia and the Elton controversy.

IX. MARIE-FELICITE BROSSET.

Brosset, like Soloviev, belonged to a later generation, but he also worked in the official archives at Moscow and made use of contemporary material. His chief claim to fame, of course, is his great "Histoire de la Géorgie", in which the translations of the histories of Sekhnia Chkheidze, the Tsarevich Vakhusht, and Papouna Orbelian are, <u>inter alia</u>, given. These histories contain a great deal of information respecting the Iranian connection with Georgia during the period of Nadir. Brosset also includes a translation of the interesting letter regarding Nadir's invasion of India which Irakli of Georgia wrote to his sister Anne when on his way back from Delhi in 1739;¹ and there are some details of

¹ See H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 354-361.

Nadir's relations with King Taimuraz and Irakli in Brosset's translation of the 'Life' of Irakli by Oman Kherkhéoulidze,¹ and in his "Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la Géorgie."²

Lastly, reference must be made to Brosset's translation of the most valuable first-hand account by the Armenian Catholicos, Abraham of Crete, of the events immediately preceding Nadir's coronation and of the coronation ceremony itself.³

X. VON HAMMER-PURGSTALL.

The excellence of von Hammer's Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches is so well known that it needs no emphasising in these pages. Thanks to von Hammer, the accounts by the official Turkish historiographers and other writers of Nadir's campaigns against Turkey and his diplomatic relations with that country, have been made easily accessible to European readers. Von Hammer's exhaustive researches have resulted in the assembling of a fairly complete mosaic of the history of the period, as seen, for the most part, from the Turkish angle. It is natural that, not having access to many Iranian and other non-Turkish sources which are now available, von Hammer

1 See H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages

- ² Published at St. Petersburg in 1841, in "Mémoires, Sciences et Politiques," VIth series, Vol.V, pages 165-315.
- ³ See Brosset's "Collection d'Historiens Arméniens", St. Petersburg, 1876, Vol.II, pages 259-338.

should fall into some errors,¹ but these are, comparatively speaking, very few and far between.

XI. BASIL BATATZES.

Mention is made here of the Greek traveller Basil Batatzes more because of his early contact with Nadir than because of the importance of the information which he gives (which is very slight).²

Batatzes was one of the first Europeans to meet Nadir, with whom he claims to have had several 'secret conversations! at Mashhad, apparently in 1728³. Nadir. he says, gave him a farman, as well as a sum of money to cover his travelling expenses. On reaching Resht. Batatzes delivered to General Levashev some message from Nadir. Batatzes abstains from giving any detailed description of Nadir, and his exploits, because, he says, he has already done so in a detailed biography. This work has now, however, disappeared; it was read by D. D. Philippides in 1809, who, seven years later, published his recollections of it in his 9

with the sub-title:

² His account of Kalat, which he visited before proceeding to Mashhad, is, however, of interest (see Curzon's remarks in the first volume of his "Persia", page 136).

³ See page 223 of Emile Legrand's French translation of Batatzes, entitled "Voyages de Basile Vatace en Europe et en Asie", Paris 1886.

¹ E.g. his confusion between the expedition of the Qalgha Fath Girai to Daghistan in 1733 and that of the Khan of the Crimea to the same country two years later.

¹ It is a mystery why Philippides waited seven years before committing his recollections to paper, and why, when he did do so, he included them in a history of Roumania.

I have not been able to examine Philippides' recollections,² but Mr. Minorsky, who has done so at the Bibliothèque Nationale, assures me that they are of little value.

XII. MISCELLANEOUS.

In addition to the contemporary European sources mentioned above, a considerable number of articles and books respecting Nadir appeared in Europe during his lifetime, some of which were based upon a very flimsy foundation of fact, while others were sheer fantasy. The German writer, who called himself "Pithander von der Quelle", states that stories were current between 1734 and 1736 that Nadir was, variously, French, German, English and Brabançon by origin,³ while others made out that he was Scottish or

- Published at Leipzig in 1816. See Vol.I, 2nd Part, 2nd Supplement, page 22.
 There is no copy of his in the British Museum Library.
 Herkunfft. Leben und Thaten des Persianischen Monarchens
- ³ 'Herkunfft, Leben und Thaten des Persianischen Monarchens, Schach Nadyr Vormals Kouli-Chan Genannt', Leipzig, 1738. This is the earliest complete work of any size on the subject of Nadir that I have been able to trace. As it is of no real importance as a source, I have not given its author a separate notice. 42.

Irish (his then title of Tahmāsp Quli Khān leading one ingenious person to suppose that he was originally an Irishman named Thomas O'Kelly who had, on going to Iran, changed his name to 'Tahmas Kuli').¹

Mention is made in the Bibliography of the books on Nadir by Claustre, du Cerceau, Le Margne and others.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

A vast amount of work yet remains to be done before it can be claimed that our knowledge of Nadir Shah and his times is reasonably complete.

First and foremost, the MS. of Muhammad Kazim will have to be carefully compared with the Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri and other authorities of the first importance that have already been studied, and notes made of all the important new matter, as well as of such differences as may exist.

In the second place, there is doubtless a large amount of material in the archives at Moscow, Constantinople, Vienna and Paris that would well repay examination, but this would be a lengthy and arduous task. So far as I can gather, there is not a great deal to be found in Tehran, except certain MSS. such as that of Tāhir Beg's 'Tā'rīkh-i-Nādir'.

¹ See "Nadir Shah", the Stanhope Essay for 1885, by H. J. (now Sir Herbert J.) Maynard, Oxford, 1885, page 11.

Thirdly, there are the records of the representatives in Iran of the Dutch East India Company; these records would enable one to supplement the valuable data contained in those of the East India Company, to which reference has already been made. So far as I am aware, these Dutch records have not, up to the present, been utilised as a source for Nādir's history.¹

Lastly, there may be much to be gleaned in the contemporary press of various European countries. I have discovered a number of interesting references to Nādir in the London papers² from 1731 onwards, and there are, no doubt, similar discoveries to be made in the foreign press of the time. I have come across, but have not been able to follow up, references to articles in the 'Gazette de Hollande.'

¹ H. Dunlop, in his 'Perzië' (Haarlem, 1912) gives the texts of accounts by the Dutch East India Company's representatives at Isfahan of the siege of that city in 1722 (see pages 242-257), but these, of course, contain no reference to Nadir.

² 'The Daily Post', 'The General Advertiser', 'The Daily Courant', 'The Daily Journal', etc. I have had insufficient time to explore thoroughly the copies of these papers that are preserved in the British Museum.

CHAPTER II

The Origin and Early History of Nadir.

In the late autumn of 1688 A.D. Imam Quli Beg, of the Qiriqlu branch of the Afshar tribe¹, went with other members of the Qiriqlu from Kubkan², in their <u>yailaq</u> or summer grazing grounds, to spend the winter (<u>qishlamishi</u>), as was their wont, in the Darragaz district.

After Imām Qulī and his wife had crossed the Allahu Akbar range to the north of Kubkān and had camped near the village of Dastgird, the wife gave birth to a son; the parents named this son and Nadr Qulī Beg, after Imām Qulī's father.³ Mīrzā Mahdī gives the date of Nādir's birth as the 28th Muḥarram 1100 A.H.⁴ (22nd November 1688). 'Abdu'l-Karīm Kashmīrī, the author of the Bayān-i-Wāqi, states that some (unspecified) persons gave the year of Nādir's birth as 1099, and others as 1102 A.H.⁵ Mīrzā Mahdī's date, though it may not be absolutely correct, is doubtless less inexact than the others mentioned, but his statement that Nadir was born "in the

- ¹ For particulars of the Afshar tribe and its branches or clans, see Appendix I.
- ² Kubkan is 80 miles N.W. of Mashhad and 30 miles E.N.E. of Khabushan. It has been visited by Sir P. Sykes, who has described it in his "Seventh Journey in Persia", Geographical Journal, May 1915, page 364.
- ³ There is some doubt as to the correct form of this name. See Appendix II. For the sake of simplicity, I have decided to use the name Nadir throughout, instead of, successively, Nadr Quil Beg, Tahmasp Quil Khan, Wakilu'-d-Daula (and Na'ibu's-Saltana) and, lastly, Nadir Shah.
- ⁴ T.N., page 17. 5 Bayan, fol.101(b).

castle of Dastgird" is certainly a fabrication designed to flatter and exalt his patron and sovereign. In all probability, Nadir was born in a tent. Nadir afterwards erected a <u>maulud-khana</u> or "birthplace-house" on the site, which was situated just outside Dastgird.

But little is known of Imam Quli Beg, beyond the fact that he was poor and did not occupy any position of He is variously described as having been a importance. shepherd, skinner, agriculturalist or camel-driver.¹ The humble position of Nadir's parents is, moreover, obvious from Mirza Mahdi's tactfully worded statements that a sharp sword owes its excellence to its temper rather than to the iron mine whence its material was taken, and that a royal jewel derives its beauty from its water and colour rather than from the ore (sulb) in which it was found.² Nadir himself, though he always took pride in his Turkish or Turcoman blood and thereby claimed affinity with the descendants of Timur, never sought to magnify the status of his parents and ancestors. He was wont to say that he was "the son of the sword."3

¹ See, respectively Bazin (Lettres Edifiantes, page 279), Fasa'is Farsnama-yi-Nasiri, page 164, Rida Quli Khan's continuation of the Raúdatu'ş-Safa, Vol.VIII, page 220(a), Bayan, fol.101(b).

² T.N., p.16.

³ Cf. Nadir's famous remark at Delhi when questioned as to the lineage of his son Nasrullah. (Mention will be made in due course as to the circumstances which gave rise to this remark).

Iranian and European sources alike contain but little information regarding Nadir's early years. It is to be presumed that Nadir accompanied his parents on their annual movements between Kubkan and the district of Darragaz, and that, as soon as he grew old enough, he assisted his father to earn his scanty livelihood. Mirza Mahdi passes over this period in silence, merely saying that he 'placed his foot upon the ladder of manhood,¹ when he reached the age of 15. Hanway relates² that the Ozbegs made a raid into Khurasan in 1704, killed many persons and carried a number of others off as salves. Amongst the latter were, he says, Nadir and his mother; while Nadir escaped in 1708, his mother died in This incident is not mentioned by any Iranian captivity. authority, and its authenticity is extremely dubious.³ Cockell's statement⁴ that Nadir's father was not only chief of a clan of the Afshars, but was also in command of the fortress of Kalat is, like his story of Nadir's dispossession of his heritage by his uncle, devoid of fact. It can be regarded as certain that, had any relative of Nadir's occupied a position of importance, the fact would have been stressed by Mirza Mahdi.

1 T.N., p.17. 2 Vol.IV, page 4. 3 See Dr. Cook, <u>op.cit</u>., Vol.II, page 447. 4 See Fraser, page

When Nadir was still a youth, he took the step that was destined to lead him to higher things. Being, apparently, unwilling to adopt permanently the humble vocation of his father, Nadir entered the service of Baba All Beg Kusa Ahmadlu, who was chief of the Afshars of the town of Abivard and was Dabit or Governor of that place. By dint of his ability and bravery, Nadir speedily attracted the favourable notice of his master, and rose in time to be not only the commander of his guards, but also his son-in-law.¹

On the 25th Jumadi I, 1131 (15th April 1719) Rida Quli, Nadir's eldest son, was born. A few years later, Nadir's wife died; soon afterwards, he married another daughter of Baba'Ali Beg's, Gauhar Shad by name,² who bore him two sons, Nasrullah and Imam Quli.

What occurred during the next few years is very obscure. It appears that Baba Ali Beg died in 1723, and left his property to Nadir.³ Owing to tribal opposition, Nadir,

Raudatu's-Safā, Vol.VIII, page 220(a). Abdu'l Karīm states, possibly correctly, in the Bayān (fol.5(a)) that Bābā Ali Beg, after the death of Imām Qulī Beg, married the latter's widow, who was Nādir's step-mother. Being struck with the intelligence of the youthful Nādir, Bābā Ali Beg gave him one of his daughters in marriage; by this means, says Abdu'l-Karīm, Nādir obtained his real start in life.

² Mirza Mahdi mentions towards the end of the T.N. (page 246) that Gauhar Shad was the mother of Nasru'llah/Imam Quli.

⁹ Raudatu's-Safa, Vol.VIII, page 220(a) and Farsnama, page 164. Malcolm's statement (Vol.II, page 47) that Nadir murdered Baba Ali Beg seems most improbable. For one thing, such an act would have occasioned a family feud. It is well known that Baba Ali Beg's sons afterwards entered Nadir's service in which they attained eminent positions; had there been a feud, this could hardly have happened. however, was unable to succeed to his late father-in-law's position as chief of the local branch of the Afshars. Nadir, after occupying himself for a time with the management of his possessions, went to Mashhad and entered the service of Malik Mahmud Sistani, who had taken advantage of the chaotic state of Iran following upon the Afghan overthrow of the Safavi power, to seize Mashhad and much of the surrounding country.¹

Nadir's actual motives in taking this step are open to doubt, and the account which Mirza Mahdi gives of his relations with Malik Mahmud does not, for the most part, read at all convincingly. It seems most probable that Nadir, instead of being inspired with purely patriotic motives, as his official biographer asserts, really wished to seek advancement in another sphere, his further progress in the Abivard district being checked by local jealousy and opposition.

Nadir found two Afshar chiefs at Mashhad who, at first, were hostile to him. He won them over and, it is said, plotted with them to expel Malik Mahmud.² It was agreed that the Afshar and Jalayir³ tribesmen who were friendly to Nadir should be in readiness for action "on the day of the

¹ Malik Mahmud belonged to the Kayani family of Sistan, which claimed descent, through the Tahirid Maliks, from the Saffarids. Buchner, in the E.l., Vol.IV, page 459, doubts whether this claim could be substantiated.

² T.N., page 20.

³ It may have been at this time that Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and a number of the Jalayir tribe joined Nadir.

JarId"1, when Nadir would, while competing in the sport with Malik Mahmud, seize the bridle of the latter's horse. This action was to be the signal for the Afshars and Jalayir to rush up and kill Malik Mahmud and his followers. The plan miscarried, however, because Nadir, at the critical moment, failed to grasp the bridle of Malik Mahmud's horse. Malik Mahmud appeared to suspect nothing, and he and Nadir and the others with them returned to Mashhad together. Nadir. having reason to suspect that the two Afshar chiefs were not being faithful to him, murdered them both when on a hunting expedition. Fearing retribution from Malik Mahmud, Nadir fled to Abivard and Darragaz and endeavoured to raise a force of tribesmen to oppose him.²

Some horsemen, amongst them a certain Nasīr Aqā,³ responded to Nādir's appeal, and formed a band under his leadership which proceeded to pillage and raid in Khurāsān.⁴ The only determined opposition that Nādir met with in those anarchical times was from Malik Maḥmūd and from certain tribesmen who were partisans of the latter.

¹ For a description of the game of the jarid, see M. von Oppenheim's "Das Djerid und das Djerid-Spiel" in'Islamica', 1927, pages 590-617; the reference to the "Giuochi di Canne" in Thomas Herbert's 'Travels in Persia' (London, 1928, page 50) is likewise of interest. See also Sir H. Pottinger's description of the game as played in Baluchistar ('Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde', London, 1816, page 190)

² T.N., page 20. (I have not followed MIrza Mahdi's account very closely, as much of what he says seems to be most improbable.)

³ See Hanway (Vol.I., page 170).

⁴ Mirza Mahdi naturally makes no mention of these activities of Nadir's, but from what Abdu'l-Karim, Bazin and other authorities have stated, there seems to be no doubt that Nadir was for a time, leader of a band of robbers. 50.

Malik Mahmūd, having summoned in vain the Chamishgazak Kurds of Khabūshān to cooperate with him against Nādir, attacked them. Nādir marched to their assistance and forced Malik Mahmūd to retire. Having no artillery, Nādir and his allies were unable to follow up this success by pursuing the enemy and laying siege to Mashhad. Nādir then adopted the less onerous task of reducing several hostile tribal fastnesses in the neighbourhood of Abīvard.

It was at this juncture that Tahmāsp, the third son of Shāh Sulțān Husain,¹ although quite unable to oust the Ghilza'i usurper Mahmūd from Isfahān, sent his general Ridā Qulī Khān² to attack Malik Mahmūd. According to Mīrzā Mahdī, Ridā Qulī Khān, having heard of Nādir's prowess as a military leader, wished to cooperate with him, but was dissuaded from doing so by some of the Kurds of Khabūshān, who alleged that if he did so, and the operations were successful, Nādir would reap all the advantage and discredit him.³ Ridā Qulī Khān

3 T.N., page 25.

¹ Muhammad Muhsin, in his Zubdatu't-Tawārīkh (foll.210 (a) and (b)) describes how Tahmāsp, after escaping from Isthān, had tried to gather together the loyalist elements in northern Iran, but had failed to make head against the Afghans, owing to his love of pleasure and weakness of character. After a brief stay in Qazvīn (where he had himself proclaimed Shāh on the 14th Safar (Muhammad Muhsin, fol.210(b)), Tahmāsp was forced by the Afghans to fly to Adharbaijān. He remained there until, in 1725, the advance of the Turks caused him to seek refuge in Tehran. On the Afghans threatening Tehran, Tahmāsp fled to Māzandarān.

² Ridā Qulī Khān Shāmlū had been <u>eshik-āghāsī</u> or 'master of the threshold' at the court of Shāh Sultān Husain (see Muhammad Muhsin, fol.209(a)); he was a maternal uncle of Lutf All Beg, author of the Atash-Kada.

then twice attacked Malik Mahmūd, but was unsuccessful on each occasion.¹ In consequence of his failure, he was replaced later by another Safavī general, Muhammad Khān Turcomān.

Encouraged by his defeat of Ridā Quli Khān, Malik Maḥmūd determined to add Nīshāpūr to his domains; after an unsuccessful attempt by his nephew, he seized the place, despite efforts by Nādir and his brother Ibrāhām to prevent him.² Subsequently, Malik Maḥmūd severely defeated Nādir, who is said to have reached Kalāt accompanied by only two men.³

Muḥammad Khān Turcomān, Riḍā Qulī Khān's successor, reached Khurāsān at this stage, and, acting in conjunction with Nādir, defeated Malik Maḥmūd outside Mashhad. Nādir was unable to follow up this victory, because of a Turcomān rising at Baghbad, to the north-east of Abīvard. Having punished the Turcomāns of Baghbad, Nādir went to Merv, and later to Sarakhs, where he defeated the adherents of Malik Mahmūd.

Nādir was next engaged in hostilities was a kinsman of his named Ashur Beg Bābālu, who was allied with some of the Chamishgazak Kurds. Whilst Nādir was besieging Ashur Beg in his fortress, he received an addition to his forces of 500 Özbeg youths, whom ShIrGnazi of Khīva had sent to his assist-

³ ibidem, page 29.

¹ T.N., page 25.

² ibidem, page 28.

ance. Much about the same time (i.e. the winter of 1725/6) an envoy from Tahmāsp, named Hasan 'Ali Beg Mu'ayyiru'l-Mamālik, reached Nādir's camp. It appears that Tahmāsp, who was then in Māzandarān, had sent this envoy to report upon Nādir. Nādir is said to have sent Hasan 'Ali Beg back with a message to Tahmāsp urging him to march with his army to Khurāsān.²

After another expedition to Merv, where more troubles had broken out between the local Qājārs and the Turcomāns, Nādir once more set out against Malik Maḥmūd. However, when Nādir was close to Mashhad, Hasan ⁶Ali Beg arrived with the news that Tahmāsp was on his way from Māzandarān and that he desired his presence.³ Nādir accordingly abandoned his march on Mashhad and went instead to Khabūshān, where he met Tahmāsp for the first time.

T.N., page 33. Shir Ghazi had formerly been hostile to Nadir, but he decided to join forces with the latter through fear of Malik Mahmud.

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2 T.N., page 33. It appears from Muhammad Muhsin, fol.212(a), that Tahmāsp appointed Nādir deputy-governor of Ablvard on this occasion.
3 T.N., page 35.

CHAPTER III

Early Relations between Nadir and Tahmasp: The Capture of Mashhad and Tribal Campaigns, 1726-1729.

The fugitive Țahmāsp had received a most welcome reinforcement when Fath Ali Khān, the chief of the Ashaqbash Qājārs of Astarābād, joined him at Sārī, in Māzandarān, in the spring of 1726. Until Fatḥ Ali Khān joined him, Țahmāsp had seemed in a hopeless position. In Işfahān and most of central, southern and eastern Iran the Ghilza'is were supreme. The Turks were in possession of the north-western provinces and part of the west as well, and in the north the Russians had seized the coastal portions of Dāghistān, Shīrvān and Gīlān. Over Mashhad and the surrounding country Malik Maḥmūd ruled.¹ Lastly, sundry pretenders, claiming to be sons of Shāh Sulțān Ḥusain,² from time to time appeared and made a bid for power.

On receiving Nadir's message through Hasan Ali Beg, Tahmāsp and Fath Ali Khān proceeded from Māzandarān to Khurāsān via Jājarm. On hearing this news, Malik Mahmūd set out to attack Tahmāsp, but withdrew to Mashhad again on learn-

¹ The history of Tahmāsp's wanderings in northern Iran during the period 1722-1726 is very complicated, and only a very brief outline is given here.

² On the 7th February 1725 Mahmūd Shāh, in a terrible fit of frenzy, put to death all the surviving members of the Safavī royal family who were in his power, with the exception of the ex-Shāh himself and two infant princes. Pretenders afterwards appeared, claiming to have escaped the massacre: Mirzā Mahdī gives particulars of six of these, (see there were as many as, 18.

ing of Nādir's march on that place from Merv.¹

After Tahmāsp and Fath Ali Khān reached Khabūshān, Nādir marched into the town at the head of 2,000 men, mostly Afshārs and Kurds.²

Tahmāsp then found himself with two powerful supporters. Both were not only ambitious, but also fully aware of his weakness of character. As was inevitable, acute rivalry speedily developed between Fath Ali Khān and Nādir. It has been alleged that Fath Ali Khān, being piqued at Nādir's advancement, began to intrigue against him and even entered into treasonable correspondence with Malik Mahmūd.³

Meanwhile, Țahmāsp, Fath Ali Khān and Nādir had left Khabūshān (on the 22nd Muḥarram 1139 = 19th September 1726), and camped, ten days later, by the shrine of Khwāja Rabī, 3 miles north of Mashhad.

Nādir proceeded to launchattack after attack upon the city, but was unable to force his way in.

During the siege of Mashhad, the tension between Nádir and his rival reached such a pitch that Nádir persuaded Tahmāsph to arrest Fath Ali Khān and then to put him to

3	*1	17	11	212(b).
2	Muḥammad	Muḥsin,	fol.	212(a).
Т	T.N., pag	ge 35.		

death.¹ The latter event took place on the llth October. All that can be urged in extenuation of Nādir's conduct on this occasion is that Fath Alī Khān would, in all probability, have summarily disposed of him, had he been in a position to do so.

His rival being removed from his path, Nadir took over the control of affairs from the supine Tahmasp, and made, or rather caused to be made, a number of appointments.² He himself became Qurchi-Bashī ("Master of the Ordnance"), and received the title of Tahmasp Qulī ("Slave of Tahmasp") Khān, while Kalb Alī Beg, one of his brothers-in-law, was appointed Eshīk-Aghāsī.

Nadir now gave his whole attention to the siege of Mashhad, but he was no more successful than before. Malik Maḥmūd, emboldened by the dissensions which broke out in Taḥmāsp's camp after Fatḥ Alī Khān had been put to death, made a sortie.³ A severe engagement was fought near Khwāja Rabī, which resulted in the defeat of Malik Maḥmūd and his

It is of interest to read the extremely conflicting accounts of this incident which are given by Mirzā Mahdī and Muhammad Muhsin on the one hand, and Abdu'r-Razzāq, the Qājār historian on the other. Mirzā Mahdī's explanation of Nādir's conduct is not at all convincing. Hanway regarded as baseless the charge of treason brought against Fath Ali Khān, and said that Nādir instigated the murder (Vol.IV, page 17). It is to be noted, however, that Fath Ali Khān had, previous to joining Tahmāsp in Māzandarān, been in revolt.

² For particulars of these appointments, see Muhammad Muhsin, fol.212(b).

³ T.N., page 38.

retreat to the city.

Although Malik Maḥmūd did not venture outside his defences again, Nādir could not carry the city by assault, and it was only through treachery, on the part of Pīr Muḥammad, Malik Maḥmūd's commander-in-chief, that enabled him to enter the city on the night of the l6th Rabī II (10th/11th December 1726).¹ Malik Maḥmūd, after vainly attempting to repel Nādir's forces, surrendered; having laid aside his crown, he retired to a cell in the shrine of the Imām Riḍā.

In fulfilment of a vow which he had made before the occupation of Mashhad, Nādir gave orders for the holy shrine to be repaired, for the dome to be gilt and for the erection of a second minaret.² As Nādir was born and bred a Sunnī, this action of his in restoring and embellishing a Shi⁶ a shrine is of interest. Nādir's object was probably mainly, if not entirely, political; the Shi⁶ a priesthood being at that time very influential, he doubtless wished to enlist their support.

Nadir had not been long in Mashhad before he realised that his newly-won position was by no means assured. He found that he could only place implicit reliance upon certain of the Afshars and upon the Jalayirs under Tahmasp Khan; over the majority of the wild tribesmen of Abivard, Darragaz, Kalat

¹ T.N., page 38 and Muhammad Muhsin, fol.212(b).

² T.N., page 39. Streck, in his article on Mashhad in the E.l. (Vol.III, page 471) states that this minaret was erected in 1730; this was, no doubt, the year in which it was completed.

and Khabūshān his hold was very precarious. Secondly, Tahmāsp's ministers started to poison their master's mind against Nādir; in the words of Muḥammad Muḥsin: "the Shāh, by reason of his youth¹ and his reliance upon them, believed their baseless statements."² It is not surprising that Tahmāsp's ministers should hate and fear Nādir. They were self-seeking, unpatriotic and indolent;³ they strongly resented the intrusion of a strong man like Nādir, and feared, not without reason, that he would establish an ascendancy over Tahmāsp and then use his influence to their detriment.

On learning that the Kurds of Khabūshān were intriguing with the hostile ministers and that Tahmāsp had gone to Khabūshān, Nādir left is haste for that place. Țahmāsp, it appears, had been induced to sign orders for his governors in Māzandarān, Astarābād and the Giraili district to come to his assistance against the traitor Nādir. It is even alleged that Țahmāsp sought to win over Malik Maḥmūd to his side.⁴

¹ Tahmāsp was then 27. I have refrained from giving him the title of Shāh at this stage, because it seems that his claim to be regarded as the successor to his father was weak. Shāh Sultān Husain, on the fall of Isfahān, had abdicated and had with his own hands invested the victorious Mahmūd with the crown. Mahmūd, moreover, had established his rule over a large part of Iran.

² Zubdatu't-Tawārīkh, fol.212(b)

³ No authority, not even Shaikh HazIn, has a good word to say for these ministers.

⁴ T.N., page 40. Mīrzā Mahdī states that Malik Mahmūd informed Nādir of this action of Tahmāsp's. It is unfortunate that no unbiased account of these happenings is extant.

Nādir laid vigorous siege to Khabūshān, where Tahmāsp was supported by the Chamishgazak and Qarāchorlū Kurds. After defeating these Kurds, Nādir came to terms with Ţahmāsp, who agreed to follow him to Mashhad. Nādir then returned to Mashhad where, with much ceremony, he received Ţahmāsp on the day of Nau Rūz 1139 (21st March, 1727); festivities and rejoicings continued for a week.¹

Scarcely had these celebrations come to an end when fresh risings of the Kurds took place. The forces of the insurgents were augmented by the Tatars of Merv and the Yamrili Turcomans. Sweeping across Darragaz, the rebel forces surrounded Nadir's brother, Ibrahim Khan.

Nadir, in company with Tahmasp, relieved Ibrahim Khan, afterwards besiging and taking Khabushan. Nadir thereupon crushed the rebels in Darragaz, but had to return to Khabushan to quell a fresh disturbance there. He then went back to Mashhad.

No sooner had Nādir reached Mashhad than fresh troubles broke out at Khabūshān, fomented, it is alleged, by Tahmāsp. This time, the Chamishgazak and Qarāchorlū were joined by the Shādillū Kurds. Nādir, however, speedily broke up the confederacy, and proceeded to Nīshāpūr, whither Ţahmāsp had gone. Meanwhile, the Tātārs of Merv revolted again, at the instigation of Malik Mahmūd. Nādir, having arranged for

¹ Muhammad Muhsin, fol.213(b).

the quelling of this revolt, had Malik Mahmud and his nephew Malik Ishaq put to death.

Disturbances had also broken out in Qā'īn where a Sīstānī chief named Husain Sultān, an ally of Malik Maḥmūd's, had expelled the governor whom Nādir had appointed.¹ On the 17th Dhu'l-Hijja 1139 (5th August 1727) Nādir and Ṭahmāsp left Mashhad for Qā'īn with 8000 men, and soon forced Husain Sultān to submit; a son and nephew of Malik Maḥmūd, who had been with him, fled to Isfahān, where they joined Ashraf.²

From Qā'īn Nādir marched via Isfidīn, in the Zīrkūh district, and Mādhinābād against the Afghans of Bihdadīn.³ It was a trying march in the height of summer, water being very scarce; also, the cannon kept sinking into the sand near Mādhinābād. Nādir took Bihdadīn by assault, and then besieged Sangān⁴ which had also refused to submit. Here Nādir narrowly escaped death when one of his cannon burst.⁵ On the 1st October Nādir took Sangān by assault and put all the inhabitants to the sword because of their having feigned

¹ T.N., page 46. The text of the Bombay edition is very corrupt here.

² Ashraf, the son of Abdu'l-AzIz (or, according to the Hayat-i-Afghani, of Abdu'l-Qadir, another brother of MIr Wais), had put his cousin Mahmud to death and seized the throne of Iran on the 22nd April 1725.

³ This place is now known as Behdavīn.

4 n n n n n Sangun-i-Pā'Tn.

5 T.N., page 47.

submission some days before and had then reopened hostilities. News was then received that 7,000 to 8,000 Abdali Afghans from Herat had reached Niazabad, in order to assist the Nadir at once marched off to meet inhabitants of Sangan. these Afghans, whom he encountered near Sangan. Knowing that his troops were inexperienced and that the many defeats which the Afghans had inflicted upon the Iranians had caused the latter greatly to fear them, Nadir did not risk an open Instead, he placed the bulk of his men in trenches battle. while he, at the head of 500 trained cavalry, made a series of attacks upon the Afghans. Although the troops in the trenches wished to take part in the fighting, Nadir refused After four days of fighting and skirmishthem permission. ing, the Afghans "exchanged fight for flight", 1 and retired Nadir, still feeling the need of caution towards Herat. because of the inexperience of his troops, refrained from pursuit, and returned to Mashhad. The time had not yet come for the trial of strength with the formidable Abdalis.

Relations between Tahmâsp and Nādir continued to be strained, the former's ministers seeking every opportunity to discredit the successful newcomer. Tahmãsp is said to have urged Nādir repeatedly to march direct on Isfahān, but Nādir always replied that it would be most imprudent to do so until the Abdālis of Herat, who were so near at hand, were subdued.²

¹ T.N., page 48. حرب بدل ساخته ² T.N., page 49.

It was at length agreed that Nādir and Tahmāsp, starting respectively from Mashhad and Nīshāpūr, should meet at Sultānābād (Turshīz), and march on Herat with their combined forces. Țahmāsp, however, having been persuaded by his advisers not to cooperate, informed Nādir that he would go to Māzandarān, while Nādir should proceed alone against the Abdālīs. Nādir started on his march, but discovered at Bākharz that the nobles were endeavouring to cause disaffection in his army. He therefore abandoned the advance on Herat and returned to Mashhad.¹

An Abdālī raid on the Biarjunand district (E.S.E. of Shāhrūd) caused Nādir to hasten from Mashhad, in the hope of intercepting the Afghans. On reaching Qadamgāh he heard that Țahmāsp was attacking the Bughairi Turks, who were friendly to him. Nādir appealed to Țahmāsp to desist and to cooperate with him against the Afghans; Țahmāsp replied by summoning Nādir to Sabzavār. Nādir, realising that a crisis was developing, gave up his project of intercepting the raiders, and went to Sabzavār. On arrival, he found the gates shut in his face; just previous to this, he had discovered that Tahmāsp had sent messages to all parts of his Khurāsān that/(Nādir's) orders and those of his subordinates were to be disregarded.²

¹ Muhammad Muhsin, fol.213(b).

2

ibidem.

Nādir, after waiting in vain for the gates of Sabzavār to be opened, began to bombard the town, which soon surrendered. Tahmāsp, having no alternative, then joined Nādir and swore to be friendly to him. That same night a number of t**Tahmāsp's** guards and retinue went to Māzandarān, with the object of fomenting trouble. Two days later, Nādir sent Tahmāsp to Mashhad under virtual arrest. After vainly trying to cut off the Afghan raiders, Nādir returned to Mashhad himself.

Almost immediately afterwards Nādir was informed that the Turcomāns inhabiting the plain between Durūn and Astarābād, were raiding the country round the former place. Calling upon the Chamishgazak and Qarāchorlū Kurds to accompany him, Nādir set out on a punitive expedition. The Kurds, however, refused to obey and attacked and defeated Ibrāhīm Khân. In the meanwhile, Nādir had reached the mountain known as the Balkhān Dāgh,¹ near which he met with and defeated the Turcomāns. On his return march Nādir learnt of the Kurds' defeat of his brother, so he advanced into their country and killed a large number of them.

Whilst these operations were in progress, one of Tahmāsp's followers, Muḥammad Alī Khān ibn Aṣlān by name, had proceeded successively to Bistam, and the provinces of Astarābād and Māzandarān, where he placed nominees of Tahmāsp

¹ This name is incorrectly given as Pul-i-Khān Dāghī in the Bombay edition of the T.N., page 53; Jones omits the name altogether.

in positions of authority. Serious disturbances then broke out in the two provinces. Nādir immediately set out for Astarābād, but turned northwards at Kafshgarī, crossed the Atrak, and crushed some rebellious Yamūt Turcomāns. He then went to Astarābād, where Tahmāsp joined him. Nādir marched into Māzandarān with Tahmāsp, and soon reduced the province to order, Dhu'l-Fiqār, the leader of the party hostile to him being killed. After taking measures to guard the passes leading from Māzandarān to the Tehran and Khār districts, which were in the hands of the Ghilza'i Afghans, Nādir sent an envoy, in Tahmāsp's name, to the court of Russia, to demand the restitution of Gīlān.¹

Leaving Tahmāsp at Sarī, Nādir returned to Mashhad in February or early March, 1729;² after Nau Rùz he began to prepare for his campaign against the Abdālīs.

2

Muhammad Muhsin says (fol.214(a)) that Nadir returned to Mashhad in the depth of winter.

¹ T.N., page 55. Butkov, in his 'Materiali alia Movoy Istorii Kavkaza, 1722-1803', St. Petersburg, 1869, Vol.I, page 100, states that Tahmasp wrote to General Levashev, in December 1728, that he would shortly be entering Gilan in company with Avramov (the Russian Consul at Resht). Regarding Tahmasp's emissaries to Russia and Constantinople in 1727/8, see Stanyan's despatches from Constantinople in S.P.97, Vol.XXV.

CHAPTER IV

Nādir's First Campaign Against The Abdālls.

Nadir's determination to crush the Abdalis and to win back Herat before attempting to recover Isfahan from the Ghilza'is is proof of his sound understanding of the Though the Abdalls, owing to internal situation. dissensions, had not made any attack on Khurasan on a big scale for several years, they were always a potential danger. In virtue of their position and their well-known fighting qualities, Nadir feared that, if he and Tahmasp and their forces were to absent themselves from Khurasan for any length of time, the Abdalis would compose their differences, and make a bold bid to take Mashdad, thus striking at the basis of his It could be regarded as practically certain that the power. majority of the fickle and unstable Kurds and other tribesmen of North-East Khurasan would, in that event, forget their vows, and ally themselves with the invaders or, at any rate, take advantage of their advent to throw off their allegiance.

The history of the Abdālīs during the preceding decade is, in places, obscure. After defeating the armies which Shāh Sulțān Husain repeatedly sent against them, and holding their own against the Ghilza'is, the Abdālī chiefs of

Muhammad Muhsin gives a detailed account of these campaigns, foll. 203(b) - 205(a).

Herat were completely independent. It seems that the Abdālī chief, Muhammad Zamān Khān Sadoza'i, who had seized power in 1718 by poisoning a rival chief, was himself supplanted later on by a certain Muhammad Khān Afghān. Muhammad Khan Afghan besieged Mashhad for some months in the winter of 1722/23, but failed to take it. On Muhammad Khan returning empty-handed to Herat, the Abdalis rose against him, and chose as their chief Dhu'l-Figar, the elder son of Muhammad Zamān Khān.² Civil war broke out in 1137 A.H. (1725/6) between Dhu'l-Figar and Rahman, the son of the chief whom his father had murdered. This war was only terminated by the Abdalis sending Dhu'l-Figar to Bakharz and Rahman to Qandahār. Allah Yar Khan, a brother of Muhammad Khan Afghan, was then elected chief, but was shortly afterwards attacked by Dhu'l-Figar.

On the Abdalls hearing of Nadir's impending attack on them, the rival factions patched up their differences and combined forces, Allah Yar Khan becoming Governor of Herat and Dhu'l-Fiqar that of Farah.

Nadir, having finished his preparations, left Mashhad in company with Tahmasp on the 4th Shawwal 1141 (3rd May 1729)³ and marched southwards, via Jam, Farmandabad⁴ and

- ³ T.N., page 56.
- ⁴ Now known as Farmanabad.

¹ They do not seem, however, to have taken any title beyond that of Governor.

² Ahmad Khān, the younger son of Muḥammad Zamān Khān, afterwards became famous as Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī.

Kārīz. At the same time, the Abdālīs, under Allah Yār Khān, advanced north-westwards from Herat.

Battle was joined between the Iranian forces and the Abdalis at Kafir Qal^ca¹, where the Abdalīs had signally defeated the Safavī general Safī Qulī Khan, ten years before.

Nadir pursued the same cautious policy as before; restraining the ardour of his troops, he surrounded his infantry with his artillery, and posted a body of cavalry on the flank. The AbdalTs were thefirst to attack and a desperate struggle took place. The Iranian infantry were thrown into confusion by an AbdalT charge, but Nadir retrieved the fortunes of the day and himself cut down one of the enemy leaders. He then received a lance-thrust in the right foot.² Night fell soon after, and both sides withdrew to their respective lines.

On the following day the Abdalis retired to the Hari Rud, with Nadir's army in pursuit.

Another battle was fought at Kūsūya where, after a severe struggle, the Abdālīs suffered a heavy defeat, and fell back precipitately on Herat, leaving their artillery, tents and baggage behind.

¹ Now known as Islām Qal^ca.

² T.N., page 57. According to Abdu'l-Karim Bukhari's "Tarikh-i-Ahmad" (Lucknow, 1850), page 4, Nadir was wounded by Hajji Mishkin Abdali, who had sworn to kill him or die in the attempt. See also Muhammd Abdu'r-Rahman's "Ta'rikh-i-Ahmad Shah Durrani."

Nadir and his troops advanced rapidly on Herat via Allah Yar Khan, having reorganised his forces, Tiroul. marched from Herat to oppose the Iranians. The two armies met near Ribāt-i-Pariān, a village a few miles west of Herat. The battle lasted from early morning until midday, when the Abdalis retired, leaving over one thousand dead on the field. A dust storm, lasting for 48 hours, effectively prevented any further fighting. On the third day, a messenger from Allah Yar Khan reached the Iranian camp with proposals for peace, but Nadir refused to listen to such proposals unless and until Allah Yar Khan and his fellow-chiefs came in person to make them. Allah Yar Khan was about to comply, when he received word that his erstwhile rival, Dhu'l-Fiqar, was marching to his assistance. Instead of submitting, Allah Yar Khan prepared to reopen hostilities.

Nadir detached a body of men to repel Dhu'l-Fiqar and encamped with the bulk of his forces at Shakiban. Dhu'l-Fiqar, having evaded the troops sent against him, hid in ambush near Shakiban; when Allah Yar Khan launched an attack on Nadir from the east, Dhu'l-Fiqar and his men fell upon the Iranian camp and began to plunder it. Nadir managed to detach sufficient men to drive off Dhu'l-Fiqar and to withstand Allah Yar Khan. On the following day, Nadir advanced and fought another obstinate battle with Allah Yar Khan and his men, in which he was victorious. Once more Allah Yar Khan

sent a messenger with peace proposals, to which Nādir returned the same answer as before. Some of the Abdālī chiefs then came in person to Nādir, and submitted to him. After offering excuses for their conduct, the chiefs offered not only to obey, but also to assist the Iranians against the Ghilza'is. Although Tahmāsp and his ministers were opposed to accepting the Abdālīs' offer, Nādir decided to do so. On the following day a large number of Abdālī chiefs came to the camp bearing presents, and were rewarded with robes of honour. Several of the more notable chiefs entered Țahmāsp's service, and Allah Yār Khān was officially appointed Governor of Herat.¹

Nādir and Tahmāsp started on their homeward march soon after, and reached Mashhad on the 4th Dhu'l-Hijja (lst July), having been absent for two months.

1 _{T.N., page 60.}

CHAPTER V.

The Expulsion of the Ghilza'is.

Ashraf had been at war with both Turkey and Russia. So far as tactics and diplomacy were concerned, Ashraf had acquitted himself very well in the war with Turkey, but he had had, in the end, to acquiesce in a serious loss of territory to the Turks, and the war had revealed that his military strength was distinctly limited. The fighting qualities of his Ghilza'i warriors remained unimpaired, but no reinforcements could be obtained from Qandahār, because of the feud that subsisted between Ashraf and his cousin Husain Sultān, the brother of the late Mahmūd.

In May and June 1729 rumours were current in Isfahān as to an impending attack by Husain Sulțān of Qandahār. These rumours were succeeded by reports that Țahmāsp, having been victorious over the Abdālīs of Herat, had begun to advance on Isfahān, in order to dispossess Ashraf of the throne. Ashraf, in alarm, sent reinforcements to the Afghan garrison in Qazvīn, and then, on the 13th August, himself marched to Tehran with a train of artillery and all the troops that he could muster.¹

On hearing of Ashraf's northward march, Nadir, who had just returned to Mashhad from Herat, hurriedly marched

¹ Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th July and 13th/24th October (based on letters from Cockell and Geekie, from Isfahan).

against the Afghans. Muhammad Muhsin states that, before the army left Mashhad, Tahmāsp and Nādir entered into an agreement whereby the former undertook, in return for Nādir's services, to grant to him in fief the provinces of Khurāsān, Kirmān and Māzandarān, after Isfahān had been retaken and the Afghans driven out from Iran.¹ Mīrzā Mahdī does not mention this agreement, but there seems to be no reason to doubt the accuracy of Muhammad Muhsin's statement.

On the 18th Safar (12th September) Nādir and Tahmāsp left Mashhad and marched via Nīshāpūr and Sabzavār to relieve Samnān, which Ashraf was besieging.² Ashraf, for his part, after detaching some of his force to continue the siege of Samnan, advanced eastwards to meet Nādir.

The Afghan advance guard, under Muhammad Saidāl Khān, made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Nādir's artillery at Bistām. Saidāl then fell back as far as Mihmāndūst, $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles E.N.E. of Dāmghān, where Ashraf joined him with the main part of the army.³

Nadir continued to advance until reaching the small river of Mihmandust, just to the east of the village of that name. At this spot, on the morning of the 6th Rabi^c I (29th September), the battle opened.⁴ Nadir had formed his men

^{Fol.215(a). It seems evident, from Tahmāsp's promise of} Māzandarān to Nādir, that he now regarded as a dead letter the treaty which he had concluded with Russia in September 1723, under the terms of which he had undertaken, inter alia to cede Māzandarān to that country; this treaty was never ratified.
T.N., page 61, Hazīn, page 192.
T.N., page 61.
" 62.

into one body, encircled by his musketeers and artillery, and had given strict orders that no one was to move or to fire until he gave the command. The Afghans, following their usual practice, were in three divisions. They impetuously charged the Iranian centre and then attacked the As soon as the Afghans came within musket shot, flanks. Nadir gave the order to fire. Though many Afghans fell, the rest pressed on, but found, to their surprise, that the Iranians were able, not only to withstand the shock of their attack, but to take the offensive. Much havoc was caused by the Iranian artillery which destroyed the Afghan zanburaks (swivel-guns mounted on camels) and inflicted heavy casualties.¹ On Ashraf's standard-bearer being killed by a cannon shot, the Afghans broke and fled. The Iranians. it is said, wished to pursue the enemy, but Nadir, feeling that they were as yet insufficiently experienced, held them back.²

Neither Mīrzā Mahdī nor Muḥammad Muḥsin gives the numbers of the opposing forces or the extent of their losses. Otter gives the strength of the Afghans as 50,000³, which

FRANKISH (EUROPEAN)

- ¹ Mīrzā Mahdī speaks of the "artilbry-men of foreign/race" (نوبجيان فرنگي نزاد), but, as it is most unlikely that Nādir could have had any foreign artillery-men at this early stage, Mīrzā Mahdī must have merely used the term to imply that the Iranian artillery-men were skilful (European artillery-men being then generally reputed to be the most skilled).
- ² T.N., page 62.
- ³ Vol. I, page 307.

seems on the high side, and Hanway estimates the Iranian strength at 25,000.¹ Fraser (Cockell) puts the Afghan losses at 12,000 and those of the Iranians at 4,000.²

Unstinted praise must be accorded to Nādir not only for his generalship and bravery during the battle, but also (and, indeed, more particularly) for his careful training of the troops beforehand and his strict enforcement of discipline.

Until the Qizilbāsh troops had felt his iron hand and acquired confidence in his leadership, they had, on many occasions, fled almost at the mere sight of an Afghan. Now, however, the Iranians not only stood their ground without flinching, but proved more than a match for their redoubtable adversaries. Like Cromwell and other great commanders, Nādir, besides having supreme faith in himself, had the gift of inspiring in others implicit confidence in his leadership,

After some interval had elapsed, Nādir and Ţahmāsp advanced to Dāmghān, whence an envoy was sent to Constantinople to demand the return of the provinces which the Turks had conquered; the envoy, however, died at Tabrīz.³ From Dāmghān the army continued on its westward march; en route, Nādir had, it is said, occasion to tell some unpleasing truths to Tahmāsp, who, in a rage, refused for a time to

³ T.N., page 63.

¹ Vol.IV, page 27.

² 'Nadir Shah', page 96. Shaikh Hazīn (page 193) states that the only Iranian casualties were two men who were slightly wounded!

proceed.¹ In the meantime, Ashraf had fallen back towards Varāmīn and had sent for reinforcements from Tehran; he then prepared an elaborate ambush for the Iranians in a narrow defile in the Khār valley. Nādir, having received warning of this ambush from his scouts, sent out strong bodies of musketeers to attack the enemy on both flanks, while he marched straight against them. These tactics were completely successful; once more he routed the Afghans, who fled to Isfahān leaving their cannon and baggage behind.²

Before advancing any further, Nadir persuaded Tahmasp to go to Tehran (which the Afghans had evacuated), in order, as MIrza MahdI put it, "to settle important affairs of the kingdom there."³

When Ashraf reached Isfahān after his series of defeats, he had no less than 3,000 of the <u>ulama</u> and other prominent inhabitants put to death, while his men plundered and set fire to the bazaars. Fearing lest the employees of the English and Dutch East India Companies should escape to Nādir, Ashraf had them stripped and thrown into prison, where they remained for 17 days; they then escaped with the connivance of their guards.⁴

Diary of the 9th/20th December.

¹ T.N., page 63. Stanyan reported, in a despatch to London dated the 24th November/5th December 1729 (S.P.97, Vol.XXV) that another Iranian envoy, who must have been sent previous ly, had reached Constantinople at the end of October.
² T.N., page 64.
³ m
⁴ See the letter from John Horne, the Agent at Gombroon, to London dated the 31st December 1729/11th January 1730 (Vol. XV of "Persia & the Persian Gulf" records), and the Gombroor

Ahmad Pāshā, of Baghdād, in response to an appeal for help from Ashraf, sent him some troops and, it is said, some cannon.¹ Ashraf then marched N.N.W. to the village of Murchakhūr, near which he encamped.

Nadir, after being relieved of the presence of Tahmasp, marched towards Isfahan via Natanz², and was only a few miles west of Murchakhur at the time of Ashraf's arrival there. Nadir did not venture to attack the Afghans, but made a feint towards Isfahan in the hope of luring the enemy from their position. The ruse was successful, as Ashraf advanced to the attack. Ashraf, in imitation of Nadir's tactics at Mihmandust, had formed his troops into one body and placed his artillery on the flanks. The Iranians wheeled round to face the oncoming Afghans, and attacked, their musketeers being in the van. The Iranian attack was so sudcessful that the Afghan cannon were seized; severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued in which the Iranians were victorious, despite furious flank and rear attacks by the enemy. The Iranians pressed home their advantage and captured all the Afghan artillery and many prisoners, amongst whom were a number of

¹ MIrzā Mahdī (page 65) states that Ahmad Pāshā sent "several Pāshās and a fitting number of men", and Shaikh Hazīn adds that Ahmad Pāshā also despatched a brigade of artillerymen. Longrigg, in his "Four Centuries of Modern Iraq" page 135, note 3) says: "The statement in Jihan Gusha and Jones that a formidable army of Turks, under the Governor of Hamadan, were with the Afghans is impossible to accept." The truth probably is that only a small contingent of Turks was actually sent.

² The Natanz route, though longer than the road via Quhrud, was practicable for artillery, whereas the other was not.

75.

Turks. Nadir is said to have treated these Turks kindly and to have set them free.

Ashraf reached Isfahān in the evening, and immediately made preparations for flight. Every available animal was collected for the conveyance of the women, children and treasures, and a start was made for Shīrāz three days later (13th November).¹

On Nadir learning of the Afghans' evacuation of Isfahan, he marched from Murchakhur and entered the city on the 16th November. One of Nadir's first acts was to send word to Tahmasp of his success and to urge him to come to Isfahan.

Tahmāsp accordingly left Tehran, and entered Isfahān on the 8th Jumādī I (29th November), nearly $7\frac{1}{2}$ years after his escape from it during the siege.

Isfahan, however, was merely the shadow of its 2 former self; it had suffered terribly during the siege of 1722, and many of the inhabitants who survived that ordeal, perished in subsequent massacres. Shaikh Hazin, who arrived in Isfahan soon after its recapture, said: "I..... beheld

¹ Gombroon Diary, 24th December/4th January (on the authority of letters from Cockell and Geekie from Isfahan dated the 4th/15th and 9th/20th December.) Mirza Mahdi, however, states, in the T.N. (page 67) and the 'Durra-yi-Nadira' (pages 75 and 76), that Ashraf left Isfahan on the same night that he arrived from Murchakhur. As Cockell and Geekie were on the spot, their testimony is to be preferred.

² See the translation in La Mamye-Clairac (Vol.III, pages 91 and 92) of a Turkish official's report; this official had been sent to Isfahan after its recapture, in order to report on conditions there. that great city, notwithstanding the presence of the King, in utter ruin and desertion. Of all that population and of my friends scarcely anyone remained".

On Tahmāsp's arrival, Nādir informed him that he wished to leave Isfahān for Khurāsān with his men as soon as the coronation ceremony had taken place. It is very doubtful whether Nādir really intended to act as he had stated. He well knew that, though Tahmāsp both disliked and feared him, he would not be able to dispense with his services until the Ghilza'is were finally expelled from Iran. Tahmāsp, as Nādir doubtless foresaw, pressed him to remain, and did so again on the following day, in the presence of all the army leaders. After long discussions, Nādir at length agreed to stay.²

Tahmāsp was now able to mount the throne of his ancestors,³ but he was Shāh only in name. For some time he could not even appoint his own ministers and functionaries, as Nādir prevented him from doing so, on the grounds that the money that would have to be paid to them as salaries would be better employed as pay for his troops. Even at this time, it was generally feared in Isfahan and at the court that Nādir wished to rise still higher; it was clear to all that the only way that he could do so would be to usurp the throne.⁴

1 Ahwal, page 205.

- ² T.N., page 68.
- ³ When Ahmad Pāshā, in the autumn of 1726, was advancing on Isfahān in order to reinstate the ex-Shāh Sultān Husain, Ashraf had the latter beheaded.

4 See the most interesting contemporary account of Nadir by the Chevalier de Gardane, who was French Consul at Isfahan until May 1730: La Mamye-Clairac included this account in his third volume, pages 105-109. 77. Nadir treated Cockell and Geekie with great civility, and sent, through them, a letter to the Agent at Gombroon asking him to act as Governor and Shah-bandar (port officer) there until an Iranian could be appointed. Nadir later requested the Company to lend its vessels for the purpose of intercepting any Afghans endeavouring to escape by sea; he desired the Agent to inform the Arab shaikhs on the Gulf coast that "if any of them permit any Ophgoons to Escape at their respective Ports, they with their Wives and Familys shall be sold for Slaves."¹

Nadir spent nearly six weeks in Isfahan nominally assisting, but really directing the Shah in the settlement of affairs of state.

The joy of the populace at the expulsion of the Afghans and the restoration of the Safavi monarchy was soon "greatly Eclipsed by the money that was ordered to be Collected from all sorts of People to pay the naked and hungry Soldiery which has been raised in so violent and despotick a Manner that severall have been Drub'd to death and others quite ruin'd.² Nadir forced the English and Dutch East India Companies to make considerable payments.

Nadir's troops behaved in a most cruel manner to the people of Isfahan, plundering their houses, and seizing morey from persons whom they sold as slaves.³

1	Gombroon	Diary, 1st/12th	February	1730.
2	tī	14th/25th		Ħ
3	11	5th/16th	July.	

78.

As will be related in more detail in the next Chapter, the Shah sent a letter to the Sultan of Turkey informing him of the reconquest of Isfahan, and requesting the return of the Iranian provinces which were still held by the Turks. Tahmasp followed up this letter by sending Rida Quli Khan Shamlu, the former general of Shah Sultan Husain, as Ambassador to Constantinople.

The Afghans at Kirman, hearing of the disasters suffered by Ashraf, abandoned the town on the 19th December, after blowing up the citadel.¹

On the 24th December Nādir, despite the severity of the weather, began the march from Isfahān to Shīrāz. Travelling by Abarqūh and Mashhad-i-Mādar-i-Sulaimān (Pasargadae), he reached Zarqān, 21 miles N.E. of Shīrāz, where he found Ashraf awaiting him with 20,000 men. An obstinate battle took place, in which Ashraf displayed considerable tactical skill. In the end, Nādir's determined leadership and the steadfastness of his men won the day, and the Afghans fled in some confusion to Shīrāz.²

On the following morning Ashraf sent Muhammad Saidāl Khān and two other Afghan notables to Nādir's camp to ask for

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¹ Gombroon Diary, 19th/30th January 1730 (on the authority of a letter from the Company's Armenian agent at Kirman).

² Mīrzā Muhammad Shīrāzī (page 6) states that 10,000 Afghans were taken prisoners. See also the Farsnāma, page 167.

quarter. Nādir replied that he would grant quarter and receive Ashraf's submission if he would first deliver up the few remaining members of the family of Shāh Sultān Husain, who were still prisoners in the Afghans' hands. These personages¹ were duly handed over, but Ashraf, acting on Saidāl's advice, left Shīrāz with such of his troops as were left, in the hope of escaping to Qandahār.

Nādir, seeing the dust raised by the Afghans, realised that he had been deceived, and started in pursuit. Nādir's advance guard, consisting of 500 Afshars and Qarāchorlū Kurds, came up with the Afghan rearguard at the Pul-i-Fasā, ten miles S.E. of Shīrāz. A fight took place, and many Afghans were captured, while numbers were drowned in the river.² Ashraf, however, made good his escape, and fled to Lār. Nādir himself pursued the fugitives for several <u>farsakhs</u>, but, being unable to overtake them, he returned to Shīrāz, whence he issued orders for every route to be closed to them.

Ashraf, after leaving Lar, continued his flight in a westerly direction. Some of the Ghilza'is, including Ashraf's brother and nephew, left him and made for the coast, where Shaikh Ahmad Madanī, of Marāgh, being desirous of assisting fellow-Sunnīs³ against the hated Shif as, enabled

¹ They were, apparently, all females.

² T.N., page 71.

³ Shaikh Hazīn states (page 228) that the Sunni Arabs of the Gulf coast belonged to the Shafi i sect.

them to take ship from Chārak to Julfār (Rasu'l-Khaima), on the Arabian side of the Gulf.¹ These Afghans, on reaching 'Uman, were attacked by the Arabs, who killed many of the fugitives and enslaved the survivors. When Shaikh Hazīn visited Muscat, a few years later, he saw and conversed with Ashraf's nephew and another Ghilza'i of rank who were then acting as Saqqās or water carriers.²

The authorities differ as to where and in what manner Ashraf met his end; according to the most probable account, Ashraf, whose following had been reduced to only two or three persons, was killed in Balūchistān or just within the borders of SIstān by one of the sons of the Brahoi chieftain, 'Abdu'llah Khān.³ Husain Sulțān, of Qandahār, later informed Nādir that Ashraf had been put to death near Zard Kūh by a force acting on his instructions.⁴

Nadir remained in Shīrāz until just before the Nau Rūz. During his stay, he gave orders for the town to be repaired and the gardens to be replanted.⁵ Shīrāz had suffered

¹ Gombroon Diary, 25th February/8th March, 1730.

² Shaikh Hazīn, page 202.

³ Shaikh HazIn (page 203), who adds that Abdu'llah Khan sent Ashraf's head to Tahmasp, together with a valuable diamond which was found upon his person. See also M. Longworth Dames in E.l., Vol.I, page 637.

⁴ T.N., page 78; H. G. Raverty, "Notes on Afghanistan and Part of Baluchistan, Geographical, Ethnographical & Historical", London, 1888, page 609.

London, 1888, page 609. 5 Mīrzā Muhammad Shīrāzī states, in his autobiography (page 7), that Nādir contributed 1500 tomans for repairing the Shāh Chirāgh mosque and also presented a quantity of gold from which a lamp was to be made (this statement is reproduced in the Farshama, page 160).81. terribly during the last few years, and, in the course of the final struggle with the Afghans, a large part of the town and practically all the gardens had been destroyed. All the Indian <u>banians</u> and many of the inhabitants had been killed by the Afghans in reprisal for an attack on them by the roughs of the town when the news of Ashraf's defeat at Murchakhūr became known.¹ Several days of continuous snowfall and rain had completed the devastation and destruction wrought by the Afghans.²

While at Shirāz Nādir caused Alī Mardān Khān Shāmīu³ to be sent on a mission to Muhammad Shāh, the Mughal Emperor, to announce the recapture of Isfahān and the projected reconquest of Qandahār. This envoy was ordered to request the Emperor, in the common interests of his realm and of that of Iran, to close his frontiers to all Afghan fugitives when the Qandahār campaign was undertaken.⁴

It is said that Nādir, at this juncture, once more expressed his intention of returning to Khurāsān, but, at length he decided instead to endeavour to wrest from Turkey the territories which she had seized.

¹ Gombroon Diary, 3rd/14th December 1729. The ShTrāz representatives of the English and Dutch East India Companies were seized, stripped and driven out of the town, and the establishments of the Companies were plundered; the losses of the English Company were assessed at nearly £17,000. Many particulars of these troubles are given by MTrža Muhammad ShTrazi, pages 4 - 6.

² Mīrzā Muḥammad Shīrāzi, page 5.

³ Ali Mardan Khan was described by the Agent at Gombroon as being a 'Creature' of Nadir's and as depending wholly upon him. The Company therefore thought it politic to convey him to Sind in one of its vessels.

⁴ T.N., page 72.

CHAPTER VI.

Nadir's first Turkish Campaign, 1730.

The Russian invasion of Iran in 1722 nearly led to war between Russia and Turkey. Turkey decided, in the spring of 1723, that it would be easier to prevent a further Russian advance in Iran by invading that country herself than to declare war upon Russia. Turkish forces accordingly entered Georgia and seized Tiflis. Further south, the aged Hasan Pasha accomplished his final success in life by taking Kirmanshah ¹.

The conclusion of the treaty between Russia and Tahmasp in September 1723^2 once more occasioned a critical situation between Russia and Turkey, and war was only averted by the able diplomacy of the Marquis de Bonnac, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, who induced the two powers to agree, in June 1724, to a partition of north-western and western Iran.³

- ¹ Hasan Pāshā, the Governor of Baghdād, died early in 1724, and was succeeded by his son Ahmad Pāshā.
- ² By this treaty Tahmāsp agreed to cede the districts of Darband and Baku, and the provinces of Gilān, Māzandarān and Astarābād to Russia, in return for assistance against the Afghans.
- ³ The partition treaty was signed at Constantinople on the 24th June 1724; for its terms, see Butkov, Vol.I, pages 58-62. France at that time wished to prevent war between Russia and Turkey, because she felt that a strong Turkey was a deterrent against Austrian aggression in the west. Great Britain, on the other hand, endeavoured, through her representative at Constantinople, to embroil Turkey and Russia, hoping thereby to weaken the northern power. Later, France and Great Britain were to exchange roles.

While Russia, subsequently to this partition treaty, made but little further progress in Iran,¹ Turkey steadily advanced, taking Erivan, Tabriz, Ganja and Ardabil, as well as Hamadan.

Tahmasp, in his desire to oust the Afghans, made several requests for aid to Russia and Turkey. An Iranian envoy reached Constantinople in October 1729, but the Turks received him somewhat coolly, for fear of giving umbrage to Early in the following year an Iranian pretender who Ashraf. claimed to be Safi Mirza,² the second son of Shah Sultan Husain, arrived in the Turkish capital where, although denounced as an imposter by the Iranian minister, he was well received by the In April 1730 rumours reached Constantinople of the Porte. defeat and capture of Ashraf, and in the same month the Sultan received Tahmasp's letter officially informing him of the recapture of Isfahan and demanding back the provinces captured by In June Ridā Quli Khān Shāmlū reached Constantinople Turkey. and repeated this demand, threatening war if the Porte refused to comply.³ Negotiations were, however, entered into, and a

- ¹ The death of Peter the Great in January 1725 was one cause of the lack of vigour shown by Russia; also, the heavy mortality of the Russian troops in Gilan discouraged further penetration in the southern portion of the Caspian littoral.
- ² This pretender, whose real name was Muhammad Alī Rafsinjānī, was the second to pose as Sāfī Mīrzā (the real prince of that name having been killed by Mahmud). He reached Shushtar, in darvish garb, in August 1729 and gave himself out to be the Safavi prince, thereby claiming the throne. Though "Safi Mirza" collected some followers from among the townspeople, the Governor of Shushtar forced him to fly to Turkish territory. On his crossing the frontier, the authorities sent him to Constantinople, thinking that his presence there might be of use. 3 See page 79 above. See also Lutf All Beg's 'Atash-Kada'.

treaty was signed whereby, as far as can be gathered, Turkey was to cede the occupied territory and Iran was to pay an annual sum to the Turks to reimburse them for the expense to which they had been put.¹

Nadir decided not to wait until an answer could be received from Turkey to the above-mentioned letter and the message sent through Ridā Qulī Khān. Leaving Shīrāz, Nādir marched via Basht and Behbehan to Ram Hormuz whence he despatched Rida Quli to Tahmasp's court, as the betrothal of hids som to Fatima Sultan Begum, a sister of the Shah, had been arranged. Nadir went on to Shushtar and Dizful; at the latter place he received Muhammad Khan Baluch, whom Ashraf had sent as Ambassador to Constantinople in 1727. Muhammad Khan Baluch had started on his return journey in September 1729; learning en route of Ashraf's overthrow and flight, he decided, after some hesitation,² to hand over to Nadir the letters which the Sultan had entrusted to him for delivery to Ashraf. Nādir rewarded Muhammad Khān Balūch by making him Governor of Kūhgilū.

From Burujird Nadir made a night march to Nihavand where he surprised and defeated the Turkish garrison; he followed up this success by putting to flight a strong Turkish force at Malayir.³

See Stanyan's despatch of 2nd/13th July 1730 (S.P.97, Vol.XXVI).
 See the despatch of the 29th June/10th July 1730 from Lord Kinnoull (who had just succeeded Abraham Stanyan as Ambassador at Constantinople,)S.P.97, Vol.XXVI.
 T.N., pages 75 and 76.

On or about the 18th June Nadir occupied Hamadan¹ without meeting with any opposition, the Turkish commander and the garrison having hurriedly retreated to Sinandij and thence to Baghdad. Nadir remained for a month at Hamadan, during which time detachments of his army reoccupied the province of Ardalan and regained Kirmanshah.

On the 1st Muharram 1143 (17th July) Nadir left Hamadan with the object of driving the Turks out of Adharbaijan.²

Meanwhile, news of Nādir's aggressive movements had reached Constantinople, and on the 24th July the Porte formally declared war on Iran. Notwithstanding this declaration of war and the extensive preparations that were being made, Ibrāhīm Pāshā, the pacific Grand Vizier, sent an envoy to the Shāh to urge the latter to accept the treaty signed on his behalf by Ridā Qulī Khān. Simultaneously, Ibrāhīm Pāshā sent orders to Aḥmad Pāshā of Baghdād to make every effort to arrive at an understanding with Iran.³ These attempts to achieve a peaceful settlement were frustrated by Nādir's vigorous offensive measures

² ibidem. Before leaving Hamadān, Nādir took a <u>fal</u> or augury from Hāfiz; this fal turned out to be very apt, for it read: عراق و فارس گرفتی بشعرخوش حافظ بیا که نربت بغداد و وقت تبریزست "Thou hast taken Irāq and Fārs with thy fine poetry, Hāfiz; come, for it is (now) the turn of Baghdād and of Tabrīz."

⁹ See Lord Kinnoull's despatch of the 24th July/4th August, S.P.97, Vol.XXVI. (Lord Kinnoull had succeeded Abraham Stanyan as British Ambassador at Constantinople a few days before this despatch was written.)

¹ T.N., page 78.

Marching via Sinandij (where he received word of Ashraf's death), Nādir sought to attack a strong Turkish concentration of troops¹ at Miyāndūāb, between Dimdim and Marāgha. The Turks, according to Mīrzā Mahdī, set out from Miyāndūāb to oppose Nādir, but, on sighting his forces, fled towards Marāgha before a shot had been fired. Nādir pursued the Turks for over 20 miles, killing and capturing large numbers and seizing all their artillery and baggage.² In consequence of this success, the districts of Dimdim, Sāūjbulāgh, Mukrī and Marāgha were restored to Iran.

After spending two days at Marāgha, Nādir marched north-westwards towards Deh Khariqān, a village near the shore of Lake Urumiya, where some Turks were reported to be. These Turks retreated to TabrIz, where a serious mutiny broke out almost immediately after their arrival. Many Turkish officers were killed by the mutineers who then expelled the loyalists, under Mustafā Pāshā, the commander-in-chief. On the morning after the disturbance, the Turkish mutineers marched out of the city, and both they and the loyal Turks were attacked by Nadir's forces. While the mutineers escaped to Erzeroum, Mustafā Pāshā and his men were routed near Suhailān, between TabrIz and Sufiān.³

On the following day (12th August) Nadir entered Tabrīz. Another Turkish army, under Rustam Pāshā, of Hashtarūd, not

² T.N., page 79. 3 " " 80.

¹ The local garrison had been reinforced by the arrival of strong contingents under Timur Pasha, the Governor of Van and Ali Rida Pasha, the Governor of Mukri.

knowing of the defeat of Mustafā Pāshā, now approached Tabrīz with the object of reinforcing him. Rustam Pāshā did not discover his mistake until it was too late, for Nādir hastened from Tabrīz and inflicted a crushing defeat upon his force, capturing him and many of his officers. Nādir, it is said, treated Rustam Pāshā kindly, set him and the other Turkish officers free and sent, through their intermediary, proposals of peace to the Grand Vizier.¹

In August reports of further Iranian successes were received at Constantinople. A tense situation began to develop between Turkey and Russia, since the former suspected that the latter was secretly lending assistance to Iran. As a matter of fact, there were definite grounds for these suspicions, because General Levashev, having received authorisation from St. Petersburg, sent several of his artillery and engineer officers, disguised as Iranians, to assist an Iranian force which was besieging Ardabil.² Levashev himself acted as intermediary for the surrender of the town which, after the Turkish evacuation, was held by Russia for a time.³

- ¹ T.N., page 81. MTrza Mahdi here states incorrectly that it was at this time (12th-16th August) that Nadir heard of the deposition of Sultan Ahmad, the accession of Sultan Mahmud his brother (<u>sic</u>), and the killing of Ibrahim Pasha the Grand Vizier; these events did not occur until the end of September 1730.
- ² Manstein, 'Memoires Historiques, Politiques et Militaires sur La Russie', Lyons, 1772, Vol.I, page 96. Friction had already developed between the two powers because of incidents in Shīrvān, where Cholāq Surkhai Khān (whom the Turks had made Khān of Shamākhī in 1728) had been pursuing an aggressive policy towards Russia.
- 3 Levashev obtained safe-conduct for the Turkish garrison which was thus enabled to reach Shamakhi.

The Grand Vizier, who was under orders to take the field against Iran, lingered at Scutari, hoping that the diplomatic measures which he had taken would render it unnecessary for him to leave with the army for the front. September, however, brought the news of the Iranian reconquest of Hamadān, Kirmānshāh and Tabrīz, and of the mutiny that had preceded the evacuation of the last-named city. News also reached the capital that the Tabrīz mutineers were approaching and that another mutiny had taken place at Erzeroum.

The enemies of Ibrahim Pasha alleged that the fall of Tabriz was due to instructions which he had issued, and pressed for his immediate despatch to the front, hoping that he would fail ignominiously and be disgraced.

The gathering discontent in Constantinople suddenly found expression in the rising led by the Albanian Patrona KhalII on the 28th September; owing to the weakness and irresolution of the Sultān and his ministers, the rising rapidly attained dangerous proportions, and resulted in the death of the Grand Vizier, the deposition of Aḥmad III, and the elevation to the throne of the latter's nephew Maḥmūd, the son of Mustafā II. The Turkish Government, being thrown into a state of great confusion by this upheaval, abandoned all thought of continuing the war against Iran.

As for Nadir, he had intended, after retaking TabrIz, to extend his conquests further, notwithstanding the fact that

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he had sent peace proposals to the Porte. The arrival of a courier from his son Ridā Qull, with the news that civil war had broken out amongst the Abdālls, that the loyal element had been driven out of Herat, and that the rebels were marching on Mashhad, caused him to suspend operations against the Turks and to hasten off to Khurāsān. No peace with Turkey was concluded, but a state of truce prevailed.

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CHAPTER VII.

Nādir's Second Campaign against the Abdalis

The instigator of the Abdālī revolt was Husain Sultān of Qandahār. As he had reason to fear that Nādir would in due course attack him, he despatched emissaries to Herat early in 1730 in the hope of inciting the Abdālīs to rise and so distract Nādir's attention!

Allah Yār Khān, the Governor of Herat, rejected Husain Sultān's proposal, but many of the Abdālīs revolted, and sent for Dhu'l-Fiqār Khān, Allah Yār Khān's old rival. Dhu'l-Fiqār, aided by the rebels in Herat, drove out Allah Yār Khān, and soon after marched on Mashhad, where Ibrāhīm Khān was in command. Allah Yār Khān, hearing of Dhu'l-Fiqār's advance on Mashhad, hastened from Mārūchāq (whither he had gone from Herat) to the assistance of Ibrāhīm Khān, and reached the city just before his rival camped at Khwāja Rabī^c.

Although Nādir had given his brother strict orders not to take the offensive under such circumstances, Ibrahim Khān, after some days of inaction, yielded to the bolder spirits amongst his men. He sallied out, but was driven back with heavy loss; through shame at this reverse, Ibrahim did nothing further. It was at this juncture that Ridā Qulī sent the courier to his father with the news of what had occurred.

¹ T.N., page 82.

² T.N., page 84: see also the history of RadI'u'd-Din Tafrishi, BM. MS. Add 6787, fol. 187 (b). 91. Before leaving Adharbaijān, Nādir ordered between 50,000 and 60,000 families of tribespeople to be transferred from that province and from Iranian 'Iraq and Fars to Khurāsān; amongst these were 12,000 families of Afshars (including 2,000 of the Qiriqlu branch); these Qiriqlu were sent to the district round Kūbkān and the other Afshars to Kałat.

Nādir left Tabrīz for Mashhad on the lóth August; on reaching the Qizil Uzan, he received a further message from Rida Qulī that the Abdālīs, after spending a month in the neighbourhood of Mashhad, had returned to Herat. There being no such pressing need for haste, Nādir turned aside from Tehran, marched through Māzandarān and Astarābād, crossed the Atrak and attempted in vain to overtake and punish some Yamūt rebels. He thereupon returned to Astarābād, whence he marched up the Gurgān valley and through Simalqān to Khurāsān. En route Nādir received the submission of some Göklän tribesmen who had also been in revolt!

On the llth November Nādir reached Mashhad. Great celebrations were held in the city in the following January when Nādir's eldest son, Riḍā Qulī, was married to Fāṭima Sulṭān Begum to whom, as already stated², he had been betrothed. A great hunting party was then organised in the neighbourhood of Kalat and AbIvard.

¹ T.N. page 86.

² See page 85 above. Nadir, at some unspecified date, himself married another daughter of the late Shah Sultan Husain, named Radiyya Begum. Butkov states (Vol. I. page 114) that Radiyya Begum had formerly been the wife of a Georgian prince. See also Professor Minorsky's "Esquisse", page 8, note 2.

When Dhu'l-Fiqar Abdall heard of Nadir's arrival at Mashhad and of the preparations that were being made for the forth coming campaign, he appealed to Husain Sultan, of Qandahar, for aid. Husain Sultan came in person to Isfaraz, where he met Dhu'l-Fiqar, but, for some unrecorded reason, they failed to agree. Husain Sultan then entered into negotiations with Nâdir, and handed over two Safarl princesses in exchange for the widows and children of Mahmud and some other persons. Soon afterwards Husain Sultan patched up his differences with Dhu'l-Fiqar, to whom he sent his well-known general, Muhammad Saidal Khan, with 2,000 to 3,000 men.

In order to render it difficult, if not impossible, for Husain Sultan to assist the Abdalls, Nadir sent word to 'Abdullah Khan Brahoi, the Governor of Baluchistan, to attack Qandahar from the south. 'Abdullah Khan, however, could not obey these instructions, as he was engaged in a struggle with Miyan Nur Muhammad Khudayar Khan, the Kalhora chief of Sind! In a battle between the two at Gandava, 'Abdullah Khan was killed.

Miyan Nur Muhammad, the son of Nasir Muhammad, the chief of Sind, succeeded his father in 1708; in 1717, having sworn fealty to the Mughal Emperor, he was given the title of Khudayar Khan. See T. Postans, "Personal Observation on Sind", London, 1843, page 168. Sir H. Pottinger states, in his "Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde", London 1876, page 278, that 'Abdullah Khan was the aggressor, having seized part of Khudayar Khan's territory. See also Leech in J.R.A.S., Vol. XII, pages 483 and 484. Leaving Mashhad immediately after the Nau Rūz festivities, Nādir marched towards Herat via Turuq, Turbat-1-Shaikh Jām, Ribāt-i-Tumān¹ to Nuqra, a small place seven miles west of Herat. A few days later, the Abdālīs emerged from the city, and an indecisive battle was fought. That night Muhammad Saidāl Khān, the Ghilza'i general, made a surprise attack on the Iranians and placed Nādir himself in great jeopardy. Nādir, with only 8 men, was surrounded in a small tower for some time. Eventually, the Afghans were repelled, and Nādir was relieved? On the following day Nādir made an unsuccessful attack on the Afghans who were holding the Takht-i-Safar, a garden on the lower slopes of the Kūh-i-Mullā Khwāja, 3½ miles N.N.W. of Herat. Nādir was more successful a few days later when he met and heavily defeated Dhu'l-Fiqār outside the city. At this stage, Allah Yār Khān arrived from Mārūchāq with reinforcements.

On the 4th May Nādir decided to invest Herat on every side; leaving a strong force at Nuqra, he crossed to the south side of the Hari Rūd and marched via the villages of Zandijān and Kabūtar Khān towards the bridge of Mālān, 3 miles south of Herat. The Afghans attempted to stem his progress, but were hurled back with severe loss, and on the following day Nādir seized the bridge.

Whilst Nadir was at Malan the Abdall artillerymen,

1													
	Thi	.s	plac	e wa:	s pro	bably	r near	• the	Pul-1-	Khatun,	which	was	built
									Tīmūr				

T.N., page 92.

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having noticed his magnificent tent, opened fire on it. A cannon destroyed the roof of the tent and struck the ground by the side of his couch, but fortunately left him unscathed.

Whilst Nādir's forces were completing the circle round Herat, Saidāl Khān, with a force of Ghilza'is and Abdālis, made a sortie, but was driven back with heavy loss? The encircling line was then drawn tighter round the city.

An Iranian detachment carried out a successful raid on Maimana and Chachaktu, but a larger force, which had been sent against Farah, met with disaster?

On the 17th Muharram 1144 (22nd July) Dhu'l-Fiqār emerged from Herat with a large body of men and crossed the Harl Rud. Nādir at once sent troops to cut off the Afghans, while he delivered a frontal attack. The Afghans were completely defeated, and Dhu'l-Fiqār narrowly escaped being drowned in the Harl Rūd. Saidāl, the Ghibza'i general, being discouraged at this defeat and at the heavy casualties sustained by his Ghilza'is during the siege, secretly fled from Herat one night. This reverse and the defection of Saidāl caused the Abdālī chiefs to make peace overtures through Allah Yār Khān, which Nādir agreed to accept. The Abdālīs, however, broke faith, thinking that the dust raised by an approaching Iranian

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¹ T.N., page 94. T.N., page 94. T.N., page 97.

force under Ibrahim Khān was that of a relieving army from Qandahār. Nādir, in anger, ordered a renewal of hostilities, but the Abdālīs, realising their error, humbly begged for forgiveness and asked for Allah Yār Khān to be made Governor of Herat. Nādir once more acceded to their request.

Dhu'l-Fiqar who, with his brother Ahmad, had been exiled to Farah, joined forces with Saidal at Isfaraz. On the strength of this news and of the rumoured approach of 40,000 Ghilza'is, Allah Yar Khan, in September, renounced his allegiance to Nadir, sent out raiding parties to Badghis and elsewhere, and made an unsuccessful attack on Nadir's force. Nadir, in retaliation, seized Allah Yar's family at Maruchaq. At the end of December the Abdalls made fresh proposals of peace, but withdrew them again immediately after these had been accepted by Nadir; the latter, in great anger, vigorously renewed the siege operations, with the result that, on lst Ramadan (27th February 1732) Allah Yar Khan finally surrendered, and the Iranian army at last occupied Herat. Allah Yar Khan and his companions were exiled to Multan, and 60,000 Abdalis were transferred to the districts of Mashhad, NIshāpūrand Dāmghān-

During the latter part of the siege of Herat, Ibrahim Khan had been investing Farah, which, despite the arrival of Saidal with 2,000 Ghibza'is, he eventually took. Nadir set out

Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 215(b). Another instance of Nadir's great concentration of tribespeople of good fighting qualities in Khurāsān; mention has already been made of his transference to that province of 60,000 families of Afshars and other tribes.

from Herat on the 19th Ramadan with the intention of going to Farah, but returned almost at once on receipt of the news of Tahmasp's defeat by the Turks at Kurijan and of his conclusion of peace with them!

The siege of Herat had occupied, in all, some 10 months. The most remarkable feature of the siege was Nādir's clemency, despite the repeated tergiversation of the Abdalls. It seems that Nādir was determined, by a display of moderation, to win over the Abdalls and that, in so doing, he was already endeavouring to put into practice his policy of recruiting his army as far as possible from non-Iranian stock. He doubtless felt that, being himself a Turk and an upstart, he could not depend upon his Iranian troops in the event of a final rupture between himself and the Shāh.

1 T.N., page 104.

CHAPTER VIII.

Tahmāsp's Turkish Campaign: His Defeat and subsequent Deposition.

When, in August 1730, Nādir's departure for Khurāsān freed Tahmāsp from the restraint imposed by his presence, he and his ministers gave themselves up to their pleasures, as in former times.¹ After spending several months in this fashion, Tahmāsp, in a fit of military ardour, left Isfahān in January 1731 with the object of driving the Turks out of the Iranian territory in the north-west which they still occupied. Tahmāsp doubtless wished to acquire some military glory himself and, at the same time, deprive Nādir of the opportunity of expelling the Turks.

From Hamadān Tahmāsp sent an envoy to congratulate Sultān Maḥmūd on his accession and also despatched an emissary to Surkhai Khān at Shamākhī. Surkhai, in order to show his loyalty to the Porte, beheaded the unfortunate emissary and his suite and sent their heads to Constantinople.

Tahmāsp proceeded from Hamadānto Tabrīz where he replaced the Governor whom Nâdir had appointed by his own nominee, and then marched against Nakhichevān and Erivān.²

Meanwhile Turkey had somewhat recovered from the revolution in the previous September; as Rida Qull Khan had received no answer from Iran to the communications which he had sent to

2 T.N., page 105.

- 98.

¹ Muhammad Muhsin, fol.215(a).

his court regarding the conclusion of peace, the Porte, instructed its commanders on the frontiers to be on their guard, and granted Ahmad Pāshā full powers to make peace or war. In March 1731 Ridā Quli Khān left Constantinople for Baghdād, but was imprisoned at Mardīn when news was received of Tahmāsp's advance on Erivān.

Evacuating Nakhichevān, the Turks fell back on Erivān. Near Echmiadzin Țahmāsp met with and defeated the Turkish forces;¹ his subsequent attempt to take Erivān ending in failure, he retired to Tabrīz. Learning that Alī Pāshā was advancing from Erivān and that Aḥmad Pāshā of Baghdād was marching on Iranian Iraq, Tahmāsp left Tabrīz and proceeded to Abhar.

Ahmad Pāshā, having retaken Kirmānshāh and overrun the whole of Ardalān, threatened Hamadān. Tahmāsp hastening southwards with 18,000 men, halted near the village of Kurijān, 20 miles N.E. of Hamadān. Ahmad Pāshā, having deluded Tahmāsp and his advisers with peace proposals, suddenly attacked the Iranians at Kurijān on the 15th September, and totally defeated them; several thousand of Tahmāsp's men perished, and all his baggage and artillery were captured. The survivors of the Iranian army dispersed to their homes, while Tahmāsp, accompanied by only a few guards, returned to Isfahān.²

Ahmad Pāshā proceeded to take Hamadān and Abhar, while Alī Pāshā, although repulsed at Dimdim, recaptured Marāgha and

1 2	Muhammad	fol.205(a);			Durra-yi-Nādira,		page	110.
	T.N., pag	e 106.	See	also	von	Hammer,	Vol.XIV,	page

99.

Tabriz; in the south, Huwaiza was seized by a Turkish force .

Peace negotiations were opened, and a treaty was concluded between Tahmasp and the Turks on the 10th January 1732 on the basis that all the provinces which Nadir had recaptured south and east of the Aras, together with Tabriz, were to be retained by Iran, while Ganja, Tiflis, Erivan, Nakhichevan, the Georgian kingdoms of Kakheti and Kartli, Shamākhi and Dāghistān The retrocession of Tabriz was very were to be held by Turkey. unpopular in Turkey, but the Government felt that it was better to conclude a speedy peace, at the price of Tabriz, than to protract negotiations by insisting on its retention. The Turks feared that, if they adopted the latter course, they would doubtless soon be confronted by Nadir in place of the feeble Tahmasp. Although the treaty was confirmed by the Porte, the Sultan himself, like many of his subjects, disapproved of its terms; in order to allay popular feeling, he dismissed the Grand Vizier, Topal Osman Pasha, 1 and the Mufti.

Almost simultaneously with the conclusion of the peace with Turkey, the treaty of Resht was signed by Iran and Russia. In April 1731 Baron Shafirov had arrived at Resht in order to negotiate, in company with General Levashev, a treaty with the

¹ Topal Osman Pasha believed that war with Iran was contrary to the true interests of Turkey; his fall was precipitated by a curious incident at Constantinople in which the captain of a British vessel was involved. See Lord Kinnoull's despatch of the 25th January/5th February 1732. Topal Osman was succeeded as Grand Vizier by All Pasha Hakimoghlu. (Von Hammer's account (Vol.XIV, pages 270 and 271) of this incident is inaccurate).

Shāh respecting the evacuation of GILān.¹ In consequence of Tahmāsp's campaign against the Turks, much delay occurred in the negotiations, and the treaty was not signed until the 1st February 1732.² Russia agreed to return to Iran, within the space of 5 months, all the territories occupied by her save those to the north of the Kura; these territories were to be held until the Turks were expelled from Armenia, Georgia and the other Iranian provinces which they held. Freedom of trade was accorded to Russian merchants in Iran and to Iranian merchants in Russia, and each power was to have a diplomatic representative at the court of the other.³

Tahmasp, on his return to Isfahan, gave himself up to pleasures and festivities to such an extent that "one would'say that no defeat had occurred."⁴

At this time a person claiming to be Isma'll Mīrzā, a younger brother of Tahmāsp, reached Isfahān. He had, he said, escaped from Mahmūd's clutches through the devotion of a servant, but had afterwards been captured and mutilated by the first pretender to take the name of Ṣafī Mīrzā.⁵ The man's claims were investigated by the court and Tahmāsp accepted him

- ¹ In October 1730 the Empress had, in a letter to Tahmasp, laid down the principles on which the evacuation was to proceed; see Butkov, Vol.I, page 106.
- ² Butkov, page 110. See also the despatch of the 7th/18th October 1732 from Claudius Rondeau, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, S.P.91, Vol.XIII.
- ³ Butkov, Vol.I, page 113.
- ⁴ Muhammad Muhsin, fol.215(b).
- 5 This 'Safi Mirza' had appeared in the Bakhtiari country in 1724 and had been killed three years later by a force which Nadir sent against him.

as his brother. Soon after, some of the ministers and eunuchs, and, it is said, even several of Tahmasp's women, plotted to depose the Shah and to replace him by Isma'il. The plot was discovered by Tahmasp, who immediately put Isma'il and his fellow-conspirators to death.¹

Nadir, on returning to Herat, sent word to the Sultan of Turkey that he must either relinquish all the Iranian occupied territory or prepare for war;² he simultaneously informed Ahmad Pasha, by courier, that he would shortly be advancing on Baghdad, and bade him prepare for his reception.³

Having thus notified the Turks of his intentions, Nādir made his attitude plain to his own countrymen. After sending a strongly-worded message to the Shāh's ministers, upbraiding them for their conduct in the matter of the peace treaty, Nādir issued a remarkable manifesto to the "headmen, peoples and nobles of the kingdom", "calling upon them all to know that, with divine aid, his sword had conquered cities and provinces, the Iranian armies had been victorious, the Abdālīs, having been defeated, were now well-disposed, and the Ghilza'is had been

- ¹ T.N., page 107. Cockell, in reporting this plot and its outcome to Gombroon, referred to Isma'll as a pretender (Gombroon Diary, 9th/20th May), but MIrzā Mahdī regarded his claim as genuine.
- ² T.N., page 108, von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 283, Asiatick Researches, Vol.X., page 536.
- ⁹ T.N., page 108. Lord Kinnoull on the 3rd/14th June, announced the receipt at Constantinople of "very surprising news" from Ahmad Pāshā, who had received a letter full of threats from Nādir. S.P.97, Vol.XXVI.

subdued. Nadir then referred to the peace treaty, saying:-

"Verily this peace is, in the eyes of wisdom, nought but a picture upon water and a mere mirage (sarab); its fundamental object, namely, the deliverance of the Persian prisoners was not accomplished, this important matter not being included in the Treaty We wish to remove the evilness of transgressors from among Moslems and to cleanse the kingdom of all sources of evil The bearing of such a matter is far from honour and is repugnant to a proud nature. Since the frontiers (as laid down in the treaty) are contrary to the pleasure of the Divine Being and are opposed to what is expedient for the kingdom: we therefore did not

Nadir went on to say that, after the Idu'l-Fitr (end of March 1732) he would at once make war and would attain his object stage by stage, and concluded by stating that whoever did not join him would be

"deprived of the attributes of honour and of the share of the bliss of the religious; his recompense shall be the curse of Allah and he shall be cast out from the community of Islām and numbered with the hosts of the Khārijites."

It was evidently at this time that Nadir sent the letter to Muhammad Ali Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, which Sir John Malcolm has translated in "Asiatick Researches".²

In this letter Nadir denounces the treaty, and in referring to his victories, speaks of "the happy auspices of the House of Haidar (All) and the twelve holy Imams." He goes on to say: "This day is big with ruin to their enemies and with joy to the sect of the Shiah, the discomfiture of the evil-

² Vol.X, pages 533-539. Fasà'I quotes a few lines of this letter in the Farsnama, page 170.

¹ The full text of the manifesto is given in the T.N., pages 108-110. A verse from Hafiz is incorrectly quoted by Mirza Mahdi.

minded is the glory of the followers of "Alī". Nādir concluded by announcing his intention of resuming the Turkish war after the 'Idu'l-Fitr, and requesting the Beglarbegi to proceed to Isfahān and point out to the Shāh why the treaty could not be respected.

In all probability, it was Mīrzā Mahdī who drafted the manifesto and the above letter.

Although Nādir stigmatised the treaty to such an extent, it was not, however, so unfavourable to Iran as it might, under the circumstances, have been; in fact, as stated above, the provisions of the treaty were regarded in Turkey as being definitely derogatory to that country.

Although it may have been galling to Nadir to see some of the fruits of his victories sacrificed by reason of the folly and incompetence of Tahmasp, there can be but little doubt that any annoyance which he may have felt on this score was far more than outweighed by his satisfaction at being given such an opportunity for arraigning the Shah. Nadir, in fact, could The terms of Nadir's not have hoped for a better opening. manifesto and of his letter to Muhammad All Khan show that he was expecting some opposition to the renewal of the Turkish war, and that he was determined to brook no interference or opposi-In fact, it is not going too far to say that tion from anyone. his words were intended more as a challenge to Tahmasp and his supporters than as a threat to the Turks.¹ Nadir's references

¹ See Sir J. Malcolm's remarks in "Asiatick Researches", Vol.X, page 527.

to the twelve Imāms and his apparent championing of the Shi'a cause are of especial interest; he clearly wished to excite and utilise Shi'a fanaticism for his own ends; so long as the Shi'a ladder was of use to him in his upward progress, he would not kick it away. By wording his manifesto and letter as he did, Nādir aimed at not only rallying the majority of the Shi'a to his side against the Sunni enemy, but also at discrediting Tahmāsp. If Tahmāsp's followers refused to go to war against Turkey, they would be branded as heretics; if they acquiesced in Nādir's policy, they would be acting against the wishes of their sovereign, and lowering his prestige.

After spending Nau Rūz at Herat, Nādir went to Mashhad whence he sent Hasan'All Beg to Isfahān to explain to Ţahmāsp his reasons for not accepting the treaty, and to request the Shah to meet him at Qum or Tehran in order to march jointly against the Turks.¹ With the object of strengthening his position, Nādir dismissed many provincial governors and replaced them with his own nominees.

While at Mashhad Nādir appointed 'Abdu'l-Ghani Alī Kuza'i Governor of the Abdālīs and rewarded many other Abdālī chiefs. He ordered these chiefs to be ready with horses, arms and provisions for the march to 'Irāq. Having given orders for the shrine of the Imām Ridā to be circumambulated and for the Imām's intercession to be besought, Nādir marched via Khabūshān

¹ T.N., page 111.

to Jājarm, whence, with a small force, he made a swift, but unsuccessful, dash northwards to the Balkhān Dāgh against the Turcomāns. Whilst on this expedition Nādir learnt that the Russians had completed their evacuation of Gllān. Rejoining his main army at Qūsha (25 miles S.W. of Dāmghān), Nādir went to Tehran, where he distributed the large sum of 50,000 tomans (£110,000) to his followers for the repair and renewal of their equipment.¹ He had intended marching through Farāhān to the Turkish frontier, but he set out instead for Iṣfahān, the reason for this change being (according to Mīrzā Mahdī) that Ṭahmāsp had not only refused to join him at Qum or Tehran, but was acting in collusion with Ahmad Pāshā.²

Nadir arrived at the capital on the 25th August. There are several versions of what subsequently occurred, which, although identical in their essentials, differ in points of detail.

¹ T.N., page 114.

[&]quot; " This statement is an exaggeration, but it is true that Tahmāsp wrote to Ahmad Pāshā, regarding the threatened renewal of the war, excusing himself by saying that "he cannot govern Tamas Kuli Khān who with his victorious Army has power to do what he pleases, and will do what he pleases; but this is only a political excuse in the Schah for breaking his last Treaty of peace with the Grand Sigr." (Lord Kinnoull, 3rd/14th June, 1732, S.P.97. Vol. XXVI). W. Cockell reported to Gombroon on the 8th/19th July that Nādir intended "to break the peace with the Turks which his Majesty is entirely averse to, but to no purpose, having no Power to Prevent his arbitrary Proceeding" (Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th August, 1732).

After ceremonial visits had been exchanged, Nādir invited the Shāh to the Hazārjarīb garden. After receiving the Shāh with great respect, Nādir took him to his private apartment. Thereupon Tahmāsp,

"having summoned, as was customary, the lords and nobles of the state, expressed a desire for wine and musicians and called for the instruments of pleasure and the makers of joy (arbāb-i-tarab). The Highness-with-the rank-of-Alexander (Nādir), out of politeness, respect, and hospitality, obeyed, and prepared everything..... and for three days and three nights His Majesty, in company with the worthless nobles, was occupied with drinking and pleasure. All the chiefs, cavalry leaders and commanders of the armies of Irāq and Khurāsān obtained complete information as to what occurred...... His Majesty became intoxicated."

Nadir convened a great conference (<u>kingash</u>) of the Qizilbash and leaders, where the unsuitability of Tahmasp for his exalted position was emphasised. The people of Isfahan were then called upon to witness the condition of the Shah. Thereupon, it is said, all agreed to the deposition of Tahmasp and the elevation of his infant son Abbas to the throne. Tahmasp, together with his haram and attendants, was then sent under strong guard to Mashhad.

Cockell reported to Gombroon³ on the 19th/30th September that Nadir had proclaimed Abbas Mirza as Shah "under

¹ Muhammad Muhsin, foll. 215(b) and 216(a). MIrzā Mahdī does not mention the Shāh's drunkenness; there seems, nevertheless, to be no doubt not only that Tahmāsp took too much to drink on this occasion, but that Nādir encouraged him to do so. The whole episode has the appearance of having been carefully planned beforehand. (See Shaikh Hazīn, page 221).

² Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216 (b) 3

Gombroon Diary, 3rd/14th October.

pretence of his Father having forfeited the Crown by his Lazy Indolent Management and his being a Sott¹ and a Sodomite. That this struck such a Terrour into the Nobility and Inhabitants that none had courage to oppose him..... Since which there has not been the least trouble and this unexpected Revolution has been brought to pass without any bloodshed."

According to Muhammad Muhsin's version, the deposition of Tahmāsp occurred six days after Nādir's arrival in Isfahān, that is, on the 31st August 1732; Cockell, however, states that Nādir seized and imprisoned Tahmāsp on the 22nd August (2nd September N.S.), and had Abbās proclaimed Shāh on the following day.²

It may well be asked why Nadir did not go one step further, and mount the throne himself. Caution rather than modesty was doubtless the reason. Nadir probably realised that there was still a strong feeling of loyalty throughout the country to the Safavi dynasty, and felt that, strong though he was, it would be wiser to wait until he had still further increased the non-Iranian element in his army before actually supplanting the ancient royal line.³

1 The Carmelite monk, Leandro di Santa Cecilia, in his "Persia Ovvero Secondo Viaggio" ... dell'oriente (Rome 1757), Vol.II, page 155, said that Tahmāsp was "molto dedito al vino", a statement which is abundantly confirmed by other writers, such as Lutf Ali Beg, and later authorities like Fasā'i, Mīrzā Muḥammad Ali (the author of the Daura-yi-Mukhtaṣar-i-Tā'rīkhi-Irān), etc.

- ² Gombroon Diary, 3rd/14th October.
- ³ In this connection, see Hanway, Vol.IV, page 73.

On the 17th Rabī^cI (7th September) the investiture of Abbās III took place at the Tālār-i-Tawīla palace. On the Infant's cradle being brought forward, Nādir laid the jīqa by his head and placed a sword and shield by his side.¹ Homage was then rendered to the new monarch; for seven days and nights the drums sounded.

Nadir, in taking on the officie of regent, adopted the titles of Wakilu'd-Daula and Na'ibu's-Saltana in place of that of Tahmasp Quli Khan.

The news of the <u>coup d'etat</u> was received at St. Petersburg with satisfaction, where Nadir was looked upon as having always been "a declar'd friend to Russia"² Many at St. Petersburg believed that Nadir would, as soon as he was firmly established, "find means to despatch this young Sophy."³

Ambassadors were sent to Turkey, Russia and India to convey the tidings officially to the rulers of those countries. Muhammad Ali Khān, the Beglarbegi of Fārs, who was appointed Ambassador to India, was instructed to repeat to the Emperor the request made through Ali Mardān Khān in 1730 for the Indian frontier to be closed to Afghan fugitives.⁴

Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216. See also T.N., page 116; Fraser (Cockell), pages 108 and 109, and Rondeau 2nd/13th December 1732 (S.P.91, Vol.X).

2 Rondeau, 30th December 1732/10th January 1733. (S.P.91, Vol.X).
3 ibidem.

[±] T.N., page 116.

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In Constantinople the tidings of Nadir's deposition of Tahmasp caused anxiety for the future.¹ The Porte, besides preparing for a clash of arms in western Iran, determined to strengthen its influence in Daghistan and Shirvan and so to threaten Nadir with attack from that quarter. Instructions were accordingly sent to Qaplan Girai, the Khan of the Crimea, to take action in the desired sense. Qaplan Girai therefore gave the titles of Vizier and Beglarbegi respectively to Surkhai Khān and his son Muhammad.² On being pressed to take more active steps, Qaplan Girai, early in 1733, despatched his Fath Girai, Qalgha, /with 20,000 Tatars, to Daghistan, with orders to raise the tribes there against Iran and to invade that country.⁴ As Fath Girai, marching by the nearest route, crossed into Russian territory, great alarm was caused in St. Petersburg, and Nepluiev. the Russian Minister at Constantinople lodged a vehement protest. A critical situation arose between Turkey and Russia when it became known that a battle had been fought in the Chechen territory between Fath Girai's army and 4,000 Russians under General

¹ Lord Kinnoull, 13th/24th December 1732 (S.P.97, Vol.XXVI).

- ² Howorth, "History of the Mongols", Part II, Division I, page 577.
- ³ The Qalgha or deputy of the Khan, was the highest dignitary in the Crimea, after the Khan himself. For further details, see Howorth, <u>op.cit</u>., page 610.

⁴ Butkov, Vol.I, page 118. Von Hammer's chronology is at fault in regard to the Khān of the Crimea; in this instance, he states that the Porte decided to create this diversion <u>after</u> Topāl Osmān's defeat and death in November 1733 (See Vol.XIV, page 311). Yeropkin, whom Count von Hesse-Homburg, the Commander-in-Chief of the forces on the Iranian and Turkish frontier districts, had sent to oppose the Tātārs. The Russians forced the Tātārs to retreat; ultimately, Fath Girai and his men left Russian territory and joined the Turkish forces in Adharbaijān and Georgia.

CHAPTER IX.

The Resumption of the War with Turkey; Nadir's Mesopotamian Campaign.

Although Nādir now had the supreme control of the affairs of the kingdom, he was unable immediately to carry out his intention of taking the offensive against Turkey, the reason being that a revolt broke out in the Bakhtiārī country.

The revolt was occasioned by the Governor, a BakhtiārT chief whom Nādir had just appointed, putting a man to death for insubordination. The tribesmen rose to avenge the man's death and killed the Governor, some of them afterwards flying to the <u>garmsTr</u> or hot country.¹ The SunnT Arabs of the coastal districts, led by Shaikh Ahmad Madani, of Marāgh,² also rebelled, and for many months carried out raids in the neighbourhood of Bandar Abbās, Cong, Basidu and elsewhere.

Nādir, having given orders for the Bakhtiārīs who had fled to the <u>garmsīr</u> to be pursued and caught, left Isfahān for the Bakhtiārī highlands on the 19th October. Marching via the sources of the Zayanda Rūd and the Karun river, he traversed the heart of the Bakhtiārī country; as Nādir and his army advanced,

¹ T.N., page 116., Tadhkira-yi-Shushtariyya, page 67.

² Gombroon Diary, 28th November/9th December 1732. Shaikh Ahmad Madani (who, as stated on page 80-1 above, aided some of the Ghilza'i fugitives to escape to Arabia) was always ready, on the slightest provocation, to flout the authority of the Government.

the Bakhtiārīs fell back before them and took refuge in their stronghold at Banavār. After enduring a siege lasting 21 days, the Bakhtiārī defenders, in despair, made a sortie and met their end fighting to the last.¹ Nādir, in pursuance of his usual policy, sent off 3,000 Haft Lang Bakhtiārī families to Khurāsān.

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Nādir then proceeded through Failī Luristān to Kirmānshāh which town the Turks evacuated after a brief siege.² During his halt at Kirmānshāh Nādir gave orders for the Zand tribe in the districts of Malāyir and Qalamrau Alī Shakar to be severely punished for their continual depredations since the time of the Afghan invasion.³

Having been joined by his main forces, Nādir left Kirmānshāh for the Turkish frontier on the 10th December. Hearing that Aḥmad Pāshā had fortified the frontier passes at Darna, Mandali and Badra and had posted strong forces at Zuhāb and on the Tāq-i-Girra, Nādir resolved to surprise the Turks by attacking them from an unexpected direction. Striking north or northeast from the main road near Karind, he crossed the lofty Biwanij table-land into the Zimkān valley near Gahvarra, and, turning N.W. up the valley, went over the Gardana-yi-Yanakiz. He then, during the night, skirted the south and south-west flanks of the mountain immediately to the east of Zuhāb and fell upon

- ² Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216(b)., Hanway, Vol.IV, page 76.
- ³ See Muhammad Sādiq's "Tārīkh-i-Giti-Gushā'i" (sometimes called the "Tā'rīkh-i-Zandīyya"), BM., MS., Add.23524, fol.4(a).

¹ T.N., page 116.

the Turks while it was still dark.¹ Many of the Turks were killed and their commander, Ahmad Pāshā Bājilān, was captured.²

Having sent detachments to collect provisions from the neighbourhood of Buhriz and ordered his brother-in-law, Lutf All Beg Kusa Ahmadu, the commander of the contingents from Adharbaijan, Ardalan and Hamadan, to cross the Turkish frontier further north and to join him on the Mesopotamian plain, Nadir, instead of marching direct on Baghdad, made a feint towards Kirkuk, in the hope of drawing Ahmad Pasha out of Baghdad. When a few miles beyond Tuz Khurmatu Nadir halted; after detaching 7,000 men to invest Kirkuk,³ he marched south to Qara Tappa where Lutf All Khan and his army, having proceeded via Qara Chwolan, The combined forces then went via Tash Kopru joined him. towards Shahraban, probably crossing the Jabal Hamrin by the Sagal-Tutan pass. Having defeated 10,000 to 12,000 Turks near Shahraban, Nadir marched to Yangija, whence he endeavoured, during the night, to seize the bridge at Buhriz; in the darkness, however, he and his men went astray. The advance on Baghdad was then resumed, and a reconnoitring Turkish force, under Muhammad Pāshā, was intercepted, many of the enemy being killed and wounded and the remainder captured.

- ¹ This route is based largely on conjecture, some of the geographical details given by Mirzā Mahdī (T.N., pages 117 and 118) being incomprehensible.
- 2 T.N., page 118. There seems to be no evidence in support of von Hammer's statement (Vol.XIV, page 284) that the Beg of Darna assisted Nādir on this occasion.
- ³ T.N., page 119. Sulaimān Sā'igh, in his "Tā'rīkhu'l-Mausil" (Cairo, 1923), page 275, is incorrect in saying that Kirkūk was taken on this occasion. Von Hammer, following the Turkish historian Subhi, is likewise in error in stating that Arbīl Longrigg, "Four Centuries of Modern Irad", page 138, note 1.

On the 31st December 10,000 Iranians crossed over to the west side of the Tigris at Samarra, in order to threaten Baghdad from that side. The main Iranian force camped opposite the shrine of Kazimain, above Baghdad, on the 17th January 1733, and three days later Nadir sent a body of jazayirchis to guard the shrine of Abu HanIfa at Mu^cazzam; meanwhile, the Iranians had seized the bridge at Buhriz.

The Turks having previously denuded the whole district of supplies and taken them to Baghdād, Nādir arranged for provisions for his forces to be brought from Tuz Khurmatu, Zuhāb and Mandali.¹

As the Turks had fortified the right bank of the Tigris opposite the Iranian camp, Nādir determined to cross the river and turn their position. With the aid of a foreign engineer,² a floating bridge, consisting of palm-trunks laid upon inflated skins, was constructed and placed in position, apparently some distance up-stream from Baghdād. On the 1st Ramadān (15th February) Nādir crossed over with 2,500 men and was followed the next day by another 1,500; the bridge then broke asunder. Without waiting for these 1,500 men, Nādir set out in the direction

¹ T.N., page 121.

² According to the Bombay edition of the T.N., (page 121) this man had been sent on a mission to Nadir by"the Austrian (or German) King" (the adjective used is <u>Namsa</u> which has either meaning). There is no record in the Haus-, Hof-und Staats-Archiv at Vienna of any diplomatic mission having been sent to Iran at that time; it is most unlikely that any German mission swould have been sent.

Hearing of the Iranian advance on the western of Baghdad. side of the river, Ahmad Pasha despatched a strong body of Janissaries, with cavalry and artillery in support, to meet the When the two armies met, the Turkish infantry proved enemy. more than a match for the Qarachorlu Kurds and Göklän Turcomans whom Nadir had with him, but the Afghan troops stood firm. The position had become extremely critical when the 1,500 troops mentioned above most opportunely made their appearance, and enabled Nadir to rout the Turks. This victory gave Nadir the mastery of the west bank of the Tigris and enabled him to draw his cordon tightly round Baghdad. The Turks opposite the Iranian camp retired within the walls of the city, leaving the cannon and equipment there and at Old Baghdad¹ to the Iranians.² At Nadir's orders, Iranian detachments occupied Samarra, Hilla Karbalā, Najaf and other places, to all of which Iranian Governors were appointed.³

The fragments of the broken bridge were then collected, and floated down to Kāzimain; there they were joined together and strengthened by means of boats which had been captured from the Turks.⁴

1 Mirza Mahdi's "Kuhna Baghdad" is evidently the same as the area marked by Niebuhr as "Ruinen von Alt Baghdad" just north of the portion of the city situated on the west bank of the Tigris; it is obviously distinct from the ruins of the Sasanian town of Daskara and the later Arab town of Dastajird which are now known as Eski Baghdād. (See Niebuhr's "Reisebeschreibung", Copenhagen, 1778, Vol.II, Table XLIV). 2 T.N., page 123. 3 11 Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216(b). 11 4 11 11 124.

The city was now completely blockaded. The Iranians, like the Ghilza'is surrounding Isfahān in 1722, had no proper siege artillery, and although the city was bombarded with some vigour, the walls could not be breached sufficiently to enable an assault to be launched.¹ Nādir therefore had to rely upon famine within the city rather than upon his cannon to make Ahmad Pāshā to yield.

Extraordinarily elaborate fortifications were constructed by the Iranians. Strong forts were built on each side of the Tigris nine miles above Baghdad, and no less than 2,700 towers, each a musket shot from the other, were constructed round the city.²

Abdu'l-Alī, the Shaikh of the Bani Lam Arabs, having joined Nādir, the latter arranged for him to cooperate with the Governor of Huwaiza in an attack on Basra. A siege of the town was threatened for a time, but the troops designed for the purpose soon dispersed,³ the Arabs, it is said, going back on their word, while the Iranian troops were called away to suppress a rebellion in the Province of Lār .4

- Nadir's manner of conducting this siege was in marked contrast to that of Sultan Murad IV in 1638. Otter (Vol.I, page 321) rightly describes Nadir's operations as a blockade rather than a siege.
- ² Fuller particulars of these fortifications are given in the letter which Jean Nicodème, the French physician who accompanied Topāl Osmān Pāshā, wrote to the Marquis de Villeneuve on the 10th August 1733, after Topãl Osmān's victory over Nādir and his relief of Baghdād (see von Hammer, Vol.XIV, pages 525 and 526).
- ³ Letter from Martin French, the Basra representative of the East India Co., to the London office of the latter, 19th/30th March 1833 (Vol.XV of the I.O. records). Muhammad Muhsin is incorrect in saying that Basra was captured.

⁴ T.N., page 124.

According to the Gombroon Diary, Nadir, besides wishing to capture Basra, also intended for a time to send an expeditionary force against Muscat,¹ but nothing came of this project.

The descriptions of the sufferings of the inhabitants of Baghdād recall those of the people of Isfahān in 1722; large numbers died from famine and disease.² Hanway describes how Nādir derisively sent several cart-loads of water-melons into the city and how Aḥmad Pāshā, in return, presented Nādir with a quantity of the best bread.³

Nādir, in order to discourage the defenders, caused, every fortnight or so, bodies of 10,000 to 12,000 of his troops to leave the Iranian lines quietly by night, make a short march into the desert, and rejoin the camp the next morning with colours flying, as though they had just arrived to reinforce the besiegers.⁴ By the end of Muharram 1146 (13th July) the plight of Baghdād was such that Aḥmad Pāshā sent envoys to Nādir to arrange the terms for its surrender.

- See the entry on the 22nd April/3rd May 1733 stating that the Agent had received a letter from Nadir requesting him to have shipping in readiness to transport a force to Muscat.
- ² The Armenian Joseph Emin, who went through the Siege when a child of 7, gives an account of his experiences in his "Life & Adventures", London, 1792, page 20.
- ³ Hanway, Vol.IV, pages 82 and 83. See also the story recounted by Longrigg in "Four Centuries of Modern Iraq", page 140.
- ⁴ See the French translation of Ahmad Pāshā's despatch to the Porte, in La Mamye-Clairac's Vol.III, page 301.

Deligverance for the besieged was, however, near at hand, for the Turkish relieving force, under the Sar'askar Topal 'Osman Pāsha¹ was approaching from the north. The Porte, on realising that Baghdad was in great jeopardy, placed Topal Osman Pāshā in command of an army of some 80,000 combatants, drawn largely from the European portion of Turkey. Marching via Diarbakr and Mosul, Topal Osman's progress became slower after he had passed the latter place, owing to the number of rivers be to/crossed; when he approached Kirkūķ, the devastated state of the country rendered the question of supplies a difficult one.

A day or so after Aḥmad Pāshā had opened the negotiations for the surrender of Baghdād, he received a message from Țopāl Osmān to the effect that he was marching to his relief as quickly as he could. It was doubtless the receipt of this message which caused Aḥmad Pāshā to prevaricate, and stipulate that the city should not be handed over to Nādir until the end of Ṣafar (11th August). Aḥmad Pāshā read out in public the letter from Ṭopāl Osmān, but the people refused to believe that it was genuine until they had been shown the seal and signature upon it.²

On leaving Kirkūk (which had managed to resist the Iranian force that Nādir had sent against it when he was about

¹ For the previous history of Topal Osman, see in particular A. de Claustre's "Histoire de Thamas-Koulikan" (Paris, 1743), pages 225-247. (Hanway appears to have derived his information from this source.)

² See La Mamye-Clairac's translation of Ahmad Pasha's despatch to the Porte, Vol.III, pages 300-307.

to march on Baghdād), Topāl Osmān marched to the Tigris and kept to its banks, so as to protect the boats carrying his provisions, as well as to have water for his men. Nādir sent word to Ţopāl Osmān that he would be ready to give him battle whenever he pleased; the Turkish Sar^caskar retained the messenger and sent no answer.

In order to meet the coming attack, Nadir despatched all his army northwards, except for a skeleton force of 12,000 men. Nadir ordered the withdrawal to be done in such manner that the besieged should not know that "one drop of that boundless ocean" had ebbed away.¹

Nādir did not leave the Iranian lines outside Baghdād until the evening of the 6th Safar (18th July), and joined his army on the following morning just before the battle began. The exact site of this battle is difficult to determine, as the names given by von Hammer and other authorities have undergone such mutilation; von Hammer states that the battle was fought at Douldjeilik, by the banks of the Tigris, thirty leagues from Baghdād.²

Topal Osman had stationed his men by the river, where they were strongly entrenched, with their cannon in position;

¹ T.N., page 125.

² Vol.XIV, page 290. 'Dould jeilik' suggests some place on the Tigris close to Dujail (the latter place, though at more or less the distance from Baghdad indicated by von Hammer, is some miles west of the river). French, in his letter from Basra to London dated the 6th/17th August 1733, states that the battle was fought at Jadīda. There is a village named Khān Jadīda on the left bank of the Tigris 20 miles N. of Baghdad.

in numbers they were slightly superior to the Iranians.

The battle began at 8 a.m., when the opposing advanceguards encountered each other; soon after, the cannon of the Turkish rear-guard opened fire on a large body of Iranians who had marched round and attacked from the north-east. The main attack was launched an hour later by Nadir, at the head of 50,000 men; the Iranian and Afghan infantry who were in three divisions forced the Turkish centre back, and captured some of their cannon; the position of the Turks seemed highly critical when 2,000 of their Kurdish auxiliaries fled. Topal Osman. however, did his utmost to rally his troops and sent forward his reserve force, consisting of 20,000 men, with the result that the Iranian attack was stemmed and the lost cannon recaptured. Nadir himself was in the thick of the fighting; while leading the attack on the Turkish artillery, his horse was wounded and He promptly mounted another horse and rode again into fell. the fray.1

The wind being from the north, the dust and smoke raised by the combat were blown in the faces of the Iranians, and the July sun blazed down upon them. After several hours of fierce fighting all ranks were suffering terribly from thirst;² no water was obtainable, as the Turks were in possession of the river bank.

- ¹ T.N., page 126.
- ² Both Mīrzā Mahdī and Muhammad Muhsin speak of the agonies of thirst of the Iranians. (See T.N., page 126, Durra-yi-Nādira, pages 123-5, and Zubdatu't-Tawarikh, folio 216(b)).

On Nadir's second horse being wounded, it fell on its head and threw Nadir to the ground. Though he was at once provided with another steed, many of his troops, on seeing him fall, imagined that he had been wounded or killed, and a panic ensued which the Iranian officers were unable to check.¹ Seeing that further efforts were useless, Nadir retreated from the field with such of the survivors of his army who had not fled. The casualties on the two sides are variously estimated; the Iranians appear to have lost over 30,000 killed, while 3,000 were taken prisoner.² All Nadir's artillery,³ baggage and provisions were left in the hands of the Turks; altogether, it was a signal triumph for Topal Osman, for Nadir's army was shattered, and the way to Baghdad now lay open; the victory, however, was not quite complete, for Nadir himself had escaped.

The Turks had by no means escaped scatheless, as they lost some 20,000 men.

It is difficult to understand Nadir's generalship in this campaign. He would surely have been better advised either to wait within his fortified lines outside Baghdad, and make

- ¹ T.N., page 127.
- ² Nicodème, at one end of the scale, puts the Iranian losses in killed at 40,000, while Mīrzā Mahdī, at the other, says that only 2,000 fell! There can be no doubt that the Iranian losses were very heavy, and 30,000 seems to be a reasonable figure. Many Iranians were killed after the battle as they were quenching their thirst by the side of the Tigris.

³ Nicodème (von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 523) says that the Iranians left all their cannon on the field, including 4 30-pounders, 6 15-pounders and 8 9-pounders. There were also 500 camels "avec des ambares" (i.e. <u>zanburaks</u>). Almost all the Iranians' horses and beasts of burden were taken. Topāl Osmān advance that much further and attack him there, or else to have left Baghdād at an earlier date and attacked Topāl Osmān when he was crossing the Greater or the Lesser Zab. Instead of following either of these courses, Nādirģave battle at a spot that was very disadvantageous for himself and his men. One can only assume that Nādir's lack of judgment on this occasion was due to over-confidence.

As soon as the news of Topal Osman's victory reached Baghdad, Ahmad Pasha ordered a sortie, and overwhelmed the 12,000 Iranian troops who were manning Nadir's fortifications. The bridge of boats was cut, and all the Iranians' supplies fell into Ahmad Pasha's hands. Many of the Iranian troops were killed; a number of survivors on the west side of the Tigris escaped by devious ways to Iran, their flight being facilitated by the Bani Lam.¹

Topāl Osmān, having spent the evening of the 19th July and the following two days resting his troops and attending to the wounded, resumed his march, and on the 23rd July he and his army camped within sight of the forts and towers erected by the Iranians round Baghdād. Soon afterwards Ahmad Pāshā arrived at the Turkish camp. On the following day, the 24th July, Topāl Osmān entered Baghdād. At the Sarʿaskar's request, no special honours were accorded him, since, as he said, "to God only is victory to be attributed." In the words of Nicodème, it seemed

T.N., page 127.

that Topal Osman and those with him were entering a tomb rather than a town; the dead lay piled up in heaps, and thousands of people were suffering from hunger or disease. It was said that 110,000 persons had perished during the siege.¹

Such was the devastation wrought by the Iranians in the country around Baghdad that Topal Osman, after a halt of 8 days some 7 miles from Baghdad, had to withdraw the bulk of his troops to Kirkuk in order to prevent them from dying of starvation.

Nadir and the remnants of his army made their way via Buhriz to Mandalī, and were joined en route by some of the survivors of the skeleton besieging force which Ahmad Pasha had routed.³ The Iranian soldiers were in a sorry plight, many being on foot and almost naked.⁴ What happened to the wounded is not recorded.

Although Nādir's conduct of the siege of Baghdād and of his operations against Topāl Osmān is open to criticism, his behaviour after his defeat deserves the highest praise. The disaster, he said, had been ordained by Fate, and it was useless to revile at its decrees.⁵ In this spirit Nādir set about the stupendous task of reconstituting his army.

¹ Nicodème, (Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 527).
² As-will be seen in the subsequent chapter, Topal Osman sent Fulad Pasha, with some 6,000 mon, to Jam Shah.
³ Durra-yi-Nadira, page 127.
⁴ Muhammad Muhsin, fol.217(a).
⁵ T.N., page 128. Nadir held a conference with his principal officers at Mandalī, and gave his men leave to return to their homes to refit.¹ He issued urgent orders to all parts of Iran for arms and equipment of all kinds, together with baggage animals, to be collected. The artillery and munitions were to be of better quality and greater in quantity than before.² Instructions were issued to the provincial authorities to see to the refitting of their troops, who were to be at Hamadān in two months' time, and to enrol recruits.

On the 4th August Nādir arrived at Hamadān, and attended in person to his great task. He ordered 200,000 tomans (approximately £440,000) to be distributed to the troops to compensate them for their losses and to enable them to purchase new equipment; every man who had lost a horse worth ten tomans, was given one worth double that amount, and the same principal was followed in regard to camels, tents and arms.³

In the relatively short space of two months the gigantic work was accomplished, and, on the 22nd Rabi II (2nd October) Nadir left Hamadan for the Turkish frontier with his reconstituted army.⁴ On reaching Kirmanshah, Nadir heard that Fulad Pasha, of Adana, was stationed on the Diyala river a few miles beyond Zuhab, in order to guard against an advance on

- ² Muhammad Muhsin, fol.217(a).
- ³ T.N., pages 128 and 129.
- ⁴ T.N., page 130, and Durra-yi-Nadira, page 129.

¹ Tadhkira-yi-Shūshtariyya, page 68.

Kirkūk. As on his previous march, Nādir left his baggage and artillery behind and, marching by mountain tracks, aimed at surprising the enemy. The attempt was less successful than on the previous occasion, but the Turks, after a skirmish had taken place, beat a retreat.

It was at this juncture that the news first reached Nadir¹ that Muhammad Khan Baluch had revolted. This rising was really more a royalist movement than a rebellion. Nadir's exactions had made him unpopular and his treatment of Tahmasp had outraged the feelings of many Iranians who had not, however, dared to show their sentiments openly. It was reported in Isfahan in April 1733² that Nadir had sent for Tahmasp with the object of reinstating him, but Nadir, after his defeat, changed his mind and ordered Tahmasp to be retained in Mashhad, because, under the altered circumstances, Tahmāsp's rule would have been "inexpedient and a hindrance."³ It was, no doubt, Nadir's change of mind that caused numbers of the Safavi faction⁴ to join Muhammad Khan Baluch.5

¹ T.N., pages 131 and 132. It is stated in the Gombroon Diary, under the date 25th October/5th November 1733, that reports had been current for some little time that Muhammad Khan Baluch had rebelled and had declared in favour of Tahmasp.

² See the Gombroon Diary, 26th June/7th July 1733.

³ T.N., page 130.

⁴ The direct descent of the Safavi monarchs from All, through Husain and the Imam Mūsa al-Kāzim, caused them to be much venerated by their Shiʿa subjects. See Shaikh Hazin, page 241.

⁵ Muhammad Khān was also joined by numbers of Balūch, Arabs and Khūzistān tribesmen. See MIrzā Muhammad Shīrāzī's autobiography, page 11.

Nadir felt that this revolt was not of sufficient gravity to cause him to postpone his Turkish campaign and resolved to deal with it after he had finished with the Turks.

· · ·

It is impossible to recount with any pretence to accuracy the course of events between the skirmish by the Diyāla and the battle of Lailān, because the geographical data given by Mīrzā Mahdī and Hanway are vague and fanciful in the extreme.¹ It seems that Nādir advanced towards Kirkūk much as ne had done previously, but his object on this second occasion was entirely different. He was aiming not at luring Ahmad Pāshā away from Baghdād, but at meeting with and crushing Topāl Osmān Pāshā. If he could defeat Topāl Osmān, his lost prestige would be regained, and Baghdād in the south and Tabrīz in the north would both be at his mercy.

Topal Osman was under no illusions as to his position. His losses in the battle of the 19th July had not been made good, despite repeated requests to Constantinople not only for reinforcements, but also for a younger man to take his place. Nadir, on the other hand, now had an army even more numerous and better equipped than before.

By the 24th October Nadir had reached the plain of Lailan, a few miles S.E. of Kirkūk, and an engagement took place between detachments of his force and of Topal Osman's army; both sides claimed the victory, but the advantage rested, appar-

¹ See Longrigg, <u>op.cit</u>., page 145.

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ently, with the Turks.¹ Topāl Osmān, however, kept his main force within its defences. Nādir thereupon marched off to the north-east and captured the fortress of Surdāsh, in the hope that Topāl Osmān would emerge from Kirkūk and march to its relief. Part of the Turkish forces fell into Nādir's trap, for scouts brought him word, when he was at a place called Qarā Täppä,² that Mamish Pāshā, with 12,000 men, had entered the Aq Darband defile.³

Taking a route which was thought to be impracticable, Nādir marched his men over the hills and into the defile at a point above the Turkish position. On the following day (9th November), Nādir, after sending some <u>jazāyirchis</u> to make a detour and to get across the Turks' line of retreat, advanced to the attack.

Soon after the battle was joined with Mamish Pāshā and his men, the main Turkish force under Topāl Osmān arrived, and engaged the Iranians. For two hours a tremendous fire was kept up by both sides;⁴ then the Iranian troops, being anxious to wipe out the memory of their previous defeat, made a furious

- ¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, pages 291 and 292, Hanway, Vol.IV, page 97.
- ² Qarā Täppä is not marked on existing maps; it is obviously distinct from the Qarā Täppä just to the north of the Jabal Hamrin.
- ³ There is a description of this defile in C.J.Rich's "Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan", London, 1836, Vol.I, pages 58 and 59.
- 4 See the interesting letter which Nadir wrote to the Count of Hesse-Homburg regarding this battle; a French translation of this letter was sent by Lord Forbes and C.Rondeau from St. Petersburg to London on the 2nd/13th February 1734 (S.P.91, Vol.XVI). In this letter, which appears to have been written towards the end of Nov.1733, the names and dates have suffered some distortion in the process of translation from Iranian to Russian and from Russian to French. 128.

charge and drove in the Turkish centre. Topal Osman left his litter, and, having mounted a horse, endeavoured to rally his men,¹ but a fierce flank attack by the Abdalls caused the Turks to give way again. The day was irretrievably lost when the brave Topal Osman was shot down. The unfortunate Sar askar's head was then cut off, stuck on the point of a lance and taken in triumph to Nadir. The whole Turkish army was in flight by this time, and heavy casualties were inflicted upon the fugitives by the <u>jazayirchis</u> whom Nadir had previously detached for this purpose. At a conservative estimate, the Turks lost some 20,000 men killed and prisoners.²

Nadir caused Topal Osman's body to be recovered and sent it, together with the head, to Baghdad for burial, in charge of a Turkish qadi named Abdu'l-Karīm Efendi who was one of the prisoners taken in the battle.

After the battle, Nādir despatched a force under Bābā Khān Chāushlu, the Beglarbegi of Luristān, who was then near Samarra, to cross the Tigris, and reoccupy Hilla, Najaf and Karbalā and prevent supplies from reaching Baghdād. As there was, apparently, no hope of relief for Ahmad Pāshā, Nādir left enough troops to blockade Baghdād while he himself marched northwards to recover Tabrīz. On reaching the town of Bāna, he learnt that

Hanway, Vol.IV, page 98. Mirza Mahdi alleges that Topal Osman only mounted a horse in order to escape, but this does not seem in accordance with the Sar'askar's character.

² No reliance can be placed upon MIrzā Mahdī's figures; while, in the T.N. (page 135) he states that 10,000 Turks were killed and 3,000 captured, he raises the number of killed to 20,000 in the Durra-yi-Nadira (page 137). Hanway's figure of 40,000 killed seems far too high.

Timūr Pāshā, on hearing of the Turkish defeat at Aq Darband, had evacuated Tabrīz and that an Iranian force had reoccupied it.¹ There being no longer any necessity to proceed to Adharbaijān, Nādir marched southward again in order to join his forces that were blockading Baghdād. He was confident that the city would speedily fall into his hands.

On reaching Tuz Khurmatu, Nādir received disquieting news of Muḥammad Khān Balūch's rebellion.² Nevertheless, Nādir did not deem the situation in Khūzistān and Fārs sufficiently critical for him to proceed there in person; instead, he sent orders to Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir (who was then at Istahān) and to the new Governor of Kūhgilū³ and other provincial authorities and leaders to cooperate in crushing the revolt.

From Tuz Khurmatu Nādir marched to Samarra and thence to the Iranian investment lines round Baghdād. On the 7th December Ahmad Pāshā sent a confidential messenger to Nādir, who, after showing Ahmad's authority to conclude a treaty of peace, delivered his offer to restore to Iran the conquered territories.

After negotiations extending over several days, Nadir and Ahmad Pasha reached agreement and signed the treaty on the

1	T.N., page 136 and Nadir's letter to Count von Hesse-Homburg.								
2	For particulars of the progress of this revolt and its suppres-								
sion, see the ensuing Chapter.									
3	Nadir, as soon as he heard of Muhammad Khan's revolt, had de-								
	creed his dismissal from this post, and had appointed in his								
	place a certain Isma'il Khan Khazīma.								

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19th December. The provisions of this treaty were, briefly, as follows:-

- (i) Turkey agreed to relinquish all the Iranian territory conquered during the last ten years and to revert to the frontier as laid down by the Turco-Iranian treaty of 1639.
- (ii) The prisoners taken by both nations were to be released, and the captured cannon restored.
- (iii) Iranian pilgrims visiting the holy places in Turkish territory in the vicinity of the frontier were to be accorded certain privileges.

It can be regarded as certain that, had it not been for the rebellion of Muhammad Khān Baluch, Nādir would have refused to agree to any terms that did not include the surrender of Baghdād.

In accordance with the provisions of this treaty, Ahmad Pāshā forthwith sent orders to the Pāshās of Ganja, Shīrvān, Erivān and Tiflis to evacuate their respective territories and to/ at liberty all their Iranian prisoners. Nādir, in return, liberated all the Turkish prisoners in his hands.

Costly presents were exchanged between Nadir and Ahmad Pasha, and arrangements were made for the former to visit the shrines at Kazimain, Najaf and Karbala.¹

Before leaving the vicinity of Baghdad, Nadir gave two letters for the Grand Vizier to the Qadi Abdu'l-Karim Efendi, who

¹ T.N., pages 137 and 138.

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was to take the treaty to Constantinople for ratification; in these letters Nadir drew attention to the common origin of the Ottoman Turks and the Turcomans, and pointed out that this was a reason for concluding peace.¹

Martin French reported to London from Basra that 90 days were allowed for the ratification of the treaty to be received from the Porte.

According to Lord Kinnoull, Ahmad Pasha did not expect the Porte to ratify the treaty. In an explanation of the circumstances under which he had been compelled to sign the document, Ahmad said that he only agreed to its terms as a means of gaining time, since he could not possibly have held out for another month.²

The Qādī Abdu'l-Karīm Efendi reached Constantinople in the middle of February 1734. After several councils had been held to consider the question of the treaty, the Porte rejected it on the grounds that it was dishonourable. Although the Sultān and his ministers approved of Ahmad Pāshā's conduct under such difficult circumstances, they nevertheless dismissed him from his post as Governor of Baghdād, doubtless because of the machinations of his arch-enemy AII Pāshā, the Grand Vizier.³ In accordance with the decision taken, the orders which Ahmād

¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 335.

² Despatch dated the 18th February /1st March 1739 (S.P.97, Vol.XXVII).

³ Ahmad Pāshā was appointed Governor of Aleppo, but he was, at his own request, appointed to Urfa instead. See Longrigg, <u>op.cit</u>., page 147.

Pāshā had sent to the Pāshās of Ganja, Shīrvān, Erivān and Tiflis were disregarded, and more troops were sent to reinforce the Sar^caskar Abdu'llah Köprülü (who had been raised to that rank on the death of Țopāl^cOsmān) at Diarbakr. The Porte nevertheless sent no message to Nādir expressly denouncing the treaty; instead, it endeavoured for a time to make Nādir believe that the question was still under consideration and that a lasting settlement would shortly be made.

The Russian Court had followed with interest, and, at times, with anxiety the course of the Turco-Iranian campaign. The news of Nadir's defeat by Topal Osman caused considerable perturbation, it being feared that Iran would be forced to come at Constantinople to terms with Turkey and that the French Ambassador/(the Marquis de Villeneuve) would then succeed in inducing the Porte to go to war with Russia.¹ Russia was already deeply involved in the war of the Polish succession and would have been faced with a critical situation had Turkey been able to yield to the importunities of France, and attack her; it was only the continuance of the war

¹ French policy in relation to Turkey and Russia had undergone a complete change: whereas in 1723 and 1724, France had played the part of mediator (see page 83 above), in 1733 she was just as actively engaged in endeavouring to fan into flame the increasing animosity between the two powers, because of the intervention of Russia in the war of the Polish succession on the side of Augustus of Saxony. France had espoused the cause of Stanisla's Lesczinski, the father-in-law of Louis XV. (see F. Martens' "Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la la Russie avec les Puissances Etrangères", Vol.I, page 70 and Vol.XIII, pages 42 and 43). Great Britain, which in 1723 and 1724 had tried to embroil Russia and Turkey in war, now, on the other hand, played the rôle of peace-maker.

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with Imain which compelled Turkey to keep the peace with Russia. The march of Fath Girai to Daghistan, the resulting submission of many of the northern Caucasian tribes to Turkey, and the action with the Russian forces at the Chechen territory were additional sources of anxiety and tension. The situation was greatly eased as far as Russia was concerned when Nādir decisively defeated the Turks in the great battle in which Topal Osman The Porte was thrown into the utmost consternalost his life. tion on receiving the news of this battle, and the hopes of the Marquis de Villeneuve for an early termination of the Turco-Iraniam war were completely dashed; the French Ambassador had been hoping, once peace with I ar ain was concluded, to bring about the re-appointment of Topal Osman Pasha as Grand Vizier, and then to engage Turkey and Russia in war.1 The Russian court was, as was natural, proportionately relieved when it received the news of Nadir's great victory.²

Lord Kinnoull, 1st/12th December 1733 (S.P.97, Vol.26). The strongly Francophile sentiments of Topal Osman were common knowledge, and he was, moreover, extremely hostile to the Austrians and Russians.

² Lord Forbes' despatch from St. Petersburg of 8th/19th December 1733 (S.P.91, Vol.15).

CHAPTER X.

The Suppression of Muhammad Khān Balūch's revolt: Prince S. D. Golitzin's Embassy: Nādir's Lazgī Campaign.

After Nādir had visited the shrines at Kāzimain, Najaf and Karbalā, he sent off his artillery to Isfahān via Khurramābād. Taking the desert route via Huwaiza to Shushtar, he seized and put to death the Governor and imprisoned many of the inhabitants because they had aided Muḥammad Khân Baluch.¹ Nadir then proleaving his baggage there, he marched ceeded to Ram Hormuz; Hearing that Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir and light towards Behbehan. the Beglarbegi of Kühgilü had joined forces and were marching on Muhammad Khan Baluch, Nadir effected a junction with these commanders at Du Gunbadan, and pressed on towards the Shulistan defile, where Muhammad Khān, with 15,000 men, was reported to be. When the Iranian advance guard appeared, Muhammad Khan, who had had no news of Nadir's coming, imagined that it was merely an isolated body of troops, and hastened to attack it. He was disillusioned when he saw the main Iranian force arrive, and heard Nadir, in his voice of thunder, issuing orders to his men.

Muhammad Khān Balūch was entirely defeated, and fled from the field, leaving 3,000 dead. Though pursued by Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir, he escaped to Shīraz and thence to Jāhrum and Lār.

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¹ T.N., page 138, Durra-yi-Nādira, pages 139 and 140, Tadhkira-yi-Shūshtariyya, page 69.

He was refused admittance into Lar, and hastened on to the garmsir.

When Nadir found that his quarry had slipped through his fingers, he sent messages to both the English and Dutch Agents at Gombroon to send vessels without delay to patrol the coast and prevent Muhammad Khān and his followers from escaping. The Agents replied that the ports were so numerous that they could not keep watch over all with the scanty shipping available, but promised to send vessels to any specified port.¹

Meanwhile Tahmasp Khān Jalāyir had pursued Muḥammad Khān to Shaikh Aḥmad Madanī's stronghold of Marāgh, and had begun the siege of that fortress. At the beginning of May the place was taken by assault and Shaikh Aḥmad was captured, but Muḥammad Khān and a few others escaped to the island of Qais.²

It was at this juncture that a certain Latif Khān reached Gombroon and gave the English and Dutch Agents letters from Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir stating that Nādir had appointed Latīf Khān

"His Admiral of the Gulph, with Orders to Purchase Shipping of the Europeans of Gombroon. He therefore required our Compliance with the Caun's Desires in sparing Two Ships for their service which they should be paid for"?

This was Nadir's first attempt to acquire a navy.

1	Gombroon	Diary,	3rd/14th	Febru	uary, i	1734	•	
2	11	tt	8th/19th	May,	1734 ,	and	Durra-yi-Nādira,	page 1 41
3	17	ti	7th/18th	f1	11			

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The escape of some of the Afghans to Arabia, and the difficulty of preventing fugitives like Muhammad Khān from following suite had evidently brought home to Nadir the great importance of sea power.

As the English and the Dutch almost invariably prevaricated when asked to lend their ships or to cooperate with the Iranian land forces, and as the Arabs who possessed vessels were usually in sympathy with those against whom the Government were wished to take action, or/in revolt themselves, Nadir certainly had a sound reason for wishing to have a fleet of his own.

At Tahmasp Khan's request, the Dutch and English each sent a vessel to Qais, and Shaikh Rashid of Basidu and the powerful Huwala chief, Shaikh Jabbara of Tahīri and Bahrain also Muhammad Khan was eventually captured and provided vessels. sent in chains to Isfahan. Nadir ordered Muhammad Khan to be blinded; three days later he died, but it is uncertain whether he did so by his own hand or as a result of the treatment which he received.1

Shaikh Ahmad Madani was put to death, and many of the refractory tribesmen of the Gulf ports (Banadir) and of the Huwaiza district were transported to Khurasan and Astarabad. Further, their fortresses were rased to the ground, and Shaikh Jabbara was made to collect an indemnity of 10,000 tomans from Shaikh Rashid of Basidu and other Arab chiefs.² The power of

¹ T.N., pages 143 and 144. See also Fraser, page 113, Hanway, Vol.IV, page 111, Farsnama, page 176, Shaikh Hazin, page 266, and Abuail-Karim, fol.12(b).

² Gombroon Diary, 28th June/10th July, 1934.

the Arabs was thus entirely broken.

In the meantime Nadir had gone to Shīrāz, where he remained for over two and a half months. During his stay in Shīrāz, he appointed Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Khān Shīrāzī Beglarbegi of Fārs.¹

On the 14th Dhu'l-Qa'da (18th April) Nādir left Shīrāz for Isfahān; whilst he was en route news was brought to him of the birth of Shāhrukh, the son of Riḍā Qulī and Fāṭima Sulṭān Begum on the 21st March.² Nādir was accorded a great reception when he entered Isfahān, "the streets being covered at his Entry in the same Manner as for the King and the Illuminations and fire Works on this Occasion lasted there for some days."³

During Nădir's stay in Işfahān the Qādī Åbdu'l-Karīm Efendi arrived from Constantinople, bearing a letter for Nādir which stated that 'Abdu'llah Pāshā Köprülü, the Sar askar, had been empowered to conclude peace with Iran. Despite the assurances of 'Abdu'l-Karīm, Nādir was convinced that the Porte was merely endeavouring to gain time; he nevertheless treated 'Abdu'l-Karīm courteously, and sent him back with a message to 'Abdu'llah Pāshā that all would be well if the occupied Iranian territory were returned; if this were not done, the war would recommence. Nādir's belief was, as it turned out, only too

- ² T.N., page 141.
- ⁹ Gombroon Diary, 3rd/14th and 15th/26th June, 1734 (on the authority of letters from Geekie, Cockell's successor at Isfahan).

¹ Farsnama, page 178.

well-founded, for the Turkish <u>ulamā</u>, on being consulted by the Grand Vizier in April 1734, recommended that the war with Iran should be continued and that none of the conquered provinces should be given back so long as Russia retained any Iranian territory.¹

Almost immediately after Nādir had given the Turkish envoy his <u>congé</u>, Prince Sergei Dimitrievich Golitzin and his suite arrived from St. Petersburg.² After an interview with Nādir, Golitzin conducted his negotiations with Mīrzā Kāfi Nāşirī Khulafā; his instructions were to report upon the situation in Iran and to use every endeavour to induce Nādir to terminate the truce with Turkey. Golitzin reported to his court that Nādir's attitude was difficult, as he was very proud and much resented being asked to take any action; much tact was therefore essential.³

Although Nādir at first agreed to Golitzin's request that, if Turkey made war on Russia Iran would attack Turkey, he afterwards procrastinated and clouded the issue by making inquiries respecting other matters. When Golitzin said that

¹ Lord Kinnoull, 27th April/8th May 1734 (S.P.97, Vol.XXVII).

- ² See Schnese's account of the journey in Dr. J. J. Lerch's "Nachricht von der Zweiten Reise nach Persien von 1745", in Büsching's "Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographie", Vol.X, pages 461 and 462. See also the T.N., page 154, (Mîrza Mahdî always refers to Prince Golitzin as 'Kannās', this being, presumably, his rendering of the Russian word KH93 = 'prince').
- ³ Soloviev, Vol.XX, page 1332.

Russia was prepared to assist Iran, Nādir thanked him, but said that he did not see how he could avail himself of this offer if the Russians would not go to Shamākhī or Baghdād. If circumstances arose that involved a rupture with Turkey, he hoped to deal with the Turks without help from abroad; if he succeeded, he would advance through Anatolia to Constantinople, when Russia could attack Turkey from the other side.¹

As nothing further had been heard from Turkey respecting the ratification of the treaty and the restoration of the occupied territory, Nädir set out for the Turkish frontier on the 12th Muharram 1147 (14th June 1734). Accompanied by Prince Golitzin and his suite, Nädir marched via Gulpäyagān to Hamadān. It seems that, up to his arrival at Hamadān, Nādir had intended advancing on Baghdād via Kirmānshāh.² On leaving Hamadān, however, Nādir marched to Sinandij and Marāgha. The main, if not the only reason for this change of plan was that Nādir received word from an Iranian agent in Russia that the Russian court had ordered the Georgian ex-king Vakhtang and his son Bakar to go to Darband whence they were to capture Shamākhī and conquer Kartli for Russia.³

- ¹ Soloviev, Vol.XX, page 1333.
- ² Vakhusht's "Histoire de Kartli", H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 130 and Schnese, <u>op.cit.</u>, page 462.
- ³ Vakhusht, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 129. Brosset states, in a footnote, that the actual text of the instructions to Vakhtang and his son was reproduced in the MoAnoe COBPANIC JAKOHOBD Vol.IX, page 317.

At Maragha a Turkish envoy came to Nadir, but it seems that he brought no message of importance. Nadir then despatched his (paternal) uncle Baktash Khan Qiriqlū and the soldiers under him to Tabrīz, and ordered a number of tribal Governors to concentrate at Dimdim, where they were to wait until it was known whether there was to be peace or war with Turkey.¹

Nādir reached Ardabīl on the 10th August² where he received a message from 'Abdu'llah Pāshā requesting him to postpone for two years his demand for the return of the occupied territory; if an envoy were then sent to the Ottoman court, the provinces would be handed over.³ This message showed Nādir conclusively that the Turks had no intention of concluding peace on the terms agreed upon between him and Ahmad Pāshā.

Nādir decided to strike the first blow, not at the Turks themselves but at their vassal Surkhai, the Khān of Shīrvān. In taking this decision, Nādir had a fourfold object. First, he wished to capture Shamakhi before Vakhtang could seize it for Russia. Secondly, he felt that the presence of Iranian troops so close to Baku and Darband would induce the Russians to expedite the conclusion of the treaty which Golitzin had for

² Schnese, <u>op.cit</u>., page 464. According to the T.N., Nadir did not reach Ardabil until the 19th Rabi'I (19th August).

' T.N., page 144. -

¹ T.N., page 144.

so long been negotiating. Thirdly, Nadir certainly had grounds for wishing to humble Surkhai. In the last place, by taking Shamakhi, he would be recovering part of Iran's lost territories.¹

Surkhai, as Khān or Governor of Shīrvān, had received orders from Aḥmad Pāshā to evacuate that province (see page 131 above), but, when the Governor of Astāra, at Nādir's request, wrote to remind Surkhai of these instructions, he replied: "With the swords of the Lazgi lions we have conquered Shīrvān; what right has Aḥmad of Baghdād or anyone else to interfere in this way?"²

When Nadir, on the 21st August, reached the Kura,³ Surkhai became alarmed and fled to the Daghistan mountains.⁴ Nadir thereupon crossed the Kura and occupied Shamakhī, apparently without meeting with any resistance.⁵ After appointing a Governor, Nadir levied a heavy tax upon the inhabitants.⁶

Whilst at Shamākhī, Nādir, through Golitzin, threatencd Russia with war unless Baku and Darband were creturned, his

- ¹ The Grand Vizier believed that Russia had prompted Nadir to take ShamākhI. See Lord Kinnoull's despatch of the 12th/ 23rd September, 1734. (S.P.97, Vol.XXVII).
- ² T.N., page 145.
- ³ Lerch in his "Auszug aus dem Tagebuch" in Büsching's "Magazin", Vol.III, page 21, gives the (0.S.) date as August 10th. According to the T.N. (page 148), Nädir reached the Kura on the 29th Rabi'I (29th August).
- ⁴ Durra-yi-Nadira, page 143.
- ⁵ Butkov is incorrect in saying that Shamākhī was besieged for two months, and makes a further mistake in stating that Surkhai was killed on this occasion. (Vol.I, page 126)
- ^o Schnese, <u>opcit</u>., page 464,

argument being that Turkey would not restore the provinces in her occupation so long as Russia retained any Iranian territory. The Russian court then sent word to Nādir that, notwithstanding the treaty of Resht, Russia would evacuate all Iranian territory, provided that Iran ratified the Resht treaty and bound herself to regard Russia's enemies as her own. In October 1734 General Levashev (who had succeeded the Count von Hesse-Homburg in the cormand of the Russian forces in Dāghistān) received orders to evacuate all territory south of the Darband district, including the town of Baku, and to prepare for the handing over of Darband.¹ As will be seen below, Baku was not, however, given up until the spring of 1735.

On the 15th September Nādir left Shamākhī with half his army, numbering 12,000 men, and penetrated into the heart of the Ghāzī Qumūq country, with the object of destroying Qumūq itself. Three days later Țehmāsp Khān Jalāyir set out with the remaining 12,000 men for the Qabala district, where Surkhai was reported to be. Țahmāsp Khān encountered Surkhai at Deve Batan, on the road from Shamākhī to Qabala. Surkhai had some 20,000 men in all, including 8,000 Turks and Tātārs from Ganja under the command of Muṣṭafā Pāshā and the Qālgha Fath Girai (another Turkish force had been sent to assist Surkhai, but had been heavily defeated and forced back to Tiflis by King Taimuraz of Kakheti). Despite his inferior numbers, Tahmāsp Khān routed

¹ Butkov, Vol.I, page 127.

Surkhai's composite force; Surkhai fled towards Qumūq, and the Turks and Tātārs retired to Ganja. Tahmāsp Khān followed up this success by capturing and destroying Surkhai's fortress of Khāchmaz.¹

Meanwhile, Nādir was advancing with some difficulty in the Ghazi Qumūq country. Surkhai, after offering to submit, attempted resistance, but he suffered defeat again near Qumūq, and fled to Avaria. Nādir then destroyed Qumūq and seized Surkhai's treasures.

Khāṣṣ Fūlād Khān, the son of Adil Girai, the former Shamkhāl of Tarkhū, who was a personage of some importance in Dāghistān, submitted to Nādir. Nādir revived the post of Shamkhāl, and conferred it on Khāṣṣ Fūlād.²

The lateness of the season rendered any further pursuit of Surkhai out of the question. Nādir, after spending a week at Qumūq, went to Akhti where he attacked and put to flight and number of hostile Lazgīs. From Akhti Nādir went via Khāchmaz to Qūtqashīn, over a most difficult road. From Qūtqashīn Nādir went to Qabala, where a messenger from King Taimuraz brought him news of his victory over the Turks. The Turks had received a further set-back shortly after Taimuraz's triumph, for Giv Amilakhor, of Ksan, captured the citadel of

¹ T.N., page 146.

^{2 &}quot; " 148. Nadir apparently wished to review the Shamkhalate as it had been originally, i.e. before the split occurred between the mountain Ghazi Qumuqs and those of Tarkhu.

Gori.¹ Leaving Qabala on the 22nd October, Nādir crossed the Kura south of Aresh,² and marched to Ganja, under the walls of which he camped on the 3rd November. From this camp Nādir sent word to Vakhtang at Darband to come to his camp, but Vakhtang deemed it wiser not to obey. Being unable to carry out his instructions from the Russian court, Vakhtang returned to Astrakhan.³

¹ Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 47 & 48.

² The T.N. has 'Aras' for 'Aresh', which, of course, makes nonsense.

³ Vakhusht, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 130.

CHAPTER XI.

Siege of Ganja. Treaty of Ganja between Russia and Iran. Iranian military successes.

Nādir took elaborate measures for the prosecution of the siege of Ganja. The town having been evacuated by 'Alī Pāshā (who had retired to the citadel), Nādir mounted cannon on top of a mosque, but the Turkish artillery soon silenced this battery. Attempts were then made to scale the walls of the citadel by means of lofty wooden stagings, but these stagings were destroyed by the fire of the defenders. Active mining and counter-mining went on, and on one occasion six Iranian mines, which were exploded simultaneously, did great damage to the walls and killed 700 Turks! In the course of the siege Nādir thrice narrowly escaped death; on one occasion a soldier by his side was decapitated by a cannon ball, and Nādir's face and clothing were spattered with the unfortunate man's brains and blood?

The usual Iranian weakness in artillery and the difficulty of compaigning actively in winter combined to render the siege long and arduous. The Turks defended themselves with spirit and inflicted severe loss on the Iranians.

Golitzin realised at an early date that the siege was likely to be a lengthy one owing to the inexperience of the Iranians in siege warfare and their lack of heavy cannon. Feeling

- ¹ T.N., page 150.
- ² T.N., page 151.

that the delay in the capture of Ganja would be harmful to Russian interests as well as to those of Iran, Golitzin offered to assist Nādir. The offer was gladly accepted, with the result that Levashev, in November, sent an engineer officer and four bombardiers, all clad in Iranian clothes, to Nādir's camp; some heavy artillery was also sent! Nādir is said to have been inclined at first to under-estimate the prowess of these Russians, but he was soon convinced of their ability?

Feeling it to be impossible to carry Ganja by assault, Nādir decided merely to blockade the place and to employ part of his army for the reconquest of Tiflis and other places. Nādir accordingly detached some troops who, in conjunction with their Georgian allies, laid siege to · Tiflis.

On the 16th/27th December Golitzin, acting on instructions from St. Petersburg, informed Nādir that the Empress, feeling assured that he was able to expel the Turks, had agreed to return the territory still in Russian hands on condition that Nādir undertook never to give up the territory in question to Turkey, but treat as his foes the enemies of Russia, and to confirm in writing his promise to Golitzin to do all in his power to withstand Turkey. Nādir was delighted at this message and promised to accede to these

² Dr. J. Cook, <u>op. cit</u>., Vol. II, page 465.

¹ Soloviev, Vol. XX, page 1333, Lerch, Büsching's 'Magazin', Vol. III, page 37.

requests!

The result of this development was the signature of the treaty of Ganja on the 10th/21st March 1735. Russia undertook to evacuate Baku within a fortnight and Darband within two months from the date of signature of this treaty; Iran promised, in return, to be the perpetual ally of Russia, and never to surrender Baku and Darband to any other power? The Sulaq was agreed upon as the frontier between Russia and Iran, and each power bound itself not to negotiate a peace with Turkey without the knowledge and consent of the other?

Russia surrendered Baku and Darband within the stipulated periods, and although not obliged to do so by the terms of the treaty dismantled and evacuated the fortress of the Holy Cross. Thus ended the Russian occupation of Northern Iran which Peter the Great had begun 13 years before. The only real advantage which Russia had derived from this occupation was that Turkey had thereby been prevented from establishing herself on the shores of the Caspian Sea, but this advantage, important though it was, had been dearly bought. It had cost the lives of no less than 130,000 Russian soldiers, the majority of whom had perished from sickness in the unhealthy province of Gilan⁴

As Abdullah Pāshā, who was then at Qārs, made no move

1	Soloviev. Vol. XX, page 1333.
	Butkov. Vol. I, pages 130 and 131.
Δ	T.N., page 154.
-	Manstein's 'Mémoires', page 95. 148.

to relieve Ganja, Nādir, a few days after the Nau Rūz celebrations, sent a body of troops towards Qārs in the hope of making him "raise his head from the collar of obscurity" and so enable the Iranians to attack himł Nādir also despatched troops to keep watch upon the warlike Jār and Tala LazgIs.

It was probably at this time that Nādir gave orders for the inhabitants of Shamākhī to move en masse to Aq Sū, 15 miles to the W.S.W. Shamākhī was destroyed, and a new town arose at Aq Sū, to which place Turkish prisoners of war were sent to provide the necessary labour. Aq Sū was then re-named New Shamākhī. Nādir's pretext for this action was that the site of Shamākhī was too open to attack? but Hanway is probably correct in saying that Nādir rased the town to the ground and slaughtered many of its inhabitants because of "the countenance which this city had given to the Lesgees"?

Nādir, after arranging for the blockade of Ganja to be carried on, left for Qārs at the head of a considerable force⁴ After making an unsuccessful attempt to intercept Tīmūr Pāshā, the Governor of Vān, who was marching to the relief

1	T.N., page 155.
Z	T.N., page 154, Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b), Butkov, Vol. I, page 126, Dorn, Geschichte Schirwans, page 413.
3	Vol. IV, page 115.
4	Durra-yi-Nādira, pages 145 and 147.

of Tiflis, Nādir tried to reach the fortress of Qazanchai by an extremely difficult mountain route, hoping that the threat to the fortress would rouse 'Abdu'llah Pāshā from his lethargy. Thick snow on the mountains rendered the tracks impassable¹, so Nādir had to abandon his project and advance on Qārs via Lori. On the 24th May he camped three miles from Qārs. As 'Abdu 'llah Pāshā still remained inactive behind his walls, and as provisions were scarce in the neighbourhood of Qārs, Nādir retired to Abaran, where he very graciously received the Armenian Catholicos Abraham. He then proceeded to Erivān, which he besieged; an Iranian force which was sent against Bāyazīd succeeded in capturing that fortress?

Nādir left enough troops to continue the siege of Erivān, and marched to Echmiadzin with his main force, so as to be ready to attack Abdullah Pāshā, should the latter leave Qārş. After returning to Erivān to repel a sortie by the garrison, Nādir went to Parakar where he received the welcome news that Abdullah had crossed the Akhurian river (Arpa Chai) with an immense army and was advancing towards him?

The Turkish army consisted of 30,000 Janissaries and

Ī.	T.N., page 156. See also the Catholicos Abraham's "Mon
	Histoire et celle de Nādir. Chah de Perse". in Brosset's
	"Collection d'Historiens Arméniens", St. Petersburg, 1876,
_	Vol. II, page 267.
	T.N., page 157.
2	T.N., page 157, also the Catholicos Abraham, op. cit., page 270.

50,000 cavalry; the numbers of the Iranians are given as only 15,000 by Mirzā Mahdī and as 18,000 by the Catholicos; but it seems that these numbers only relate to Nādir's advance guard and that his main force, which (as will be seen below) came into action later in the battle, consisted of some 40,000 men, making the Iranian strength 55,000 in all?

Leaving his baggage behind, Nādir hastened to meet the Turks. On the evening of the 25th Muharram (17th June) Nadir and his men reached the village of Akhikandi, close to the Zanga Chai, and camped on a hill called Aqfappä. Simultaneously, 'Abdu'llah Pāshā's army arrived at Baghavard, two <u>farsakhs</u> away, on the further side of a plain⁴.

On the following morning the Turks, confident in the superiority of their numbers, took the offensive. Nadir, having first posted a large number of his men in ambush, charged down the hill with only three regiments and fell upon the Turks. What his men lacked in numbers, they more than made up for in courage. Nadir, with a number of <u>jazayirchis</u>,

See the translation of a letter which Nadir sent to Prince Golitzin at Darband after the battle: this translation was enclosed in Rondeau's despatch of the 6th/17th September. (Golitzin, in company with Mirzā Kāfi Nāṣiri Khulafā, who was being sent as Ambassador to St. Petersburg, left Nādir's camp for Darband just before the battle of Baghavard.) Mirzā Mahdī's figures, namely, 70,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry, are much exaggerated.

- ² Catholicos Abraham, page 271.
- ³ This is the total given by Hanway, Vol. IV, page 119.
 - T.N., page 157, Durra-yi-Nādira, page 147.

made for a small hill on the plain on which Abdu Ilah Pasha had placed some of his artillery, and captured it. while another body of men advanced against the artillery on the Turks' left wing. Whilst these attacks were in progress the Turkish and Iranian centres became engaged. The Iranian heavy artillery and zanburaks or camel-swivels poured a most destructive fire upon the Turkish centre, which was soon thrown into confusion and began to retreat. At Nadir's command, the Iranian cavalry, as well as the troops in ambush, then charged the Turks as they fell back, and converted the retreat into a rout. 'Abdu'llah Pāshā, the Sar'askar, Sārū Mustafa Pāshā, a son-in-law of the Sultan, and a number of other Turkish officers of note were amongst the slain, and an immense number of Turks were taken prisoners! The remnant of the defeated army Between 3,000 and 4,000 Turks who fled in various direction. were going to Ashtarak were cut off by Armenians and then killed by the pursuing Iranians. Nādir afterwards informed Prince Golitzin that he had never been so fortunate since he had begun to wage war?

¹ T.N., page 159. There is some divergence between the various authorities as to the date of this battle. While MIrzā Mahdī gives the date as the 26th Muharram (18th June), the Catholicos gives it as the 8th/19th June, as do General Yeropkin (a copy of his report of the battle was given by Veshniakov to Lord Kinnoull in the following September - see S.P. 97. Vol. XVII) and Nādir himself in his letter to Golitzin. There seems no doubt that the 19th June is the correct date.

See Nadir's letter to Prince Golitzin.

After the battle, Nādir had the corpse of Abdu'llah Pāshā Köprülü recovered and, as in the case of that of Topāl Osmān Pāshā, sent to the Turks. He then sent some of the Turkish prisoners to Ganja, Erivān and Tiflis to inform their compatriots there of the victory!

When, on the 3rd July, the news of the Turkish disaster reached Constantinople, it caused the utmost dismay. The Grand Vizier, 'Alī Pāshā Hakīm-Oghlu, was blamed for the defeat and was dismissed, and Isma'il Pāshā, the Governor of Baghdād, took his place as Grand Vizier. Ahmad Pāshā was made Sar'askar, in succession to the defunct 'Abdu'llah Pāshā, and was soon afterwards reinstated as Governor of Baghdād?

When the Turkish prisoners brought the news of the battle of Baghavard to Alf Pāshā, the Governor of Ganja, he at once asked for quarter, and surrendered the fortress on the 9th July 1735: he had stubbornly defended it for $8\frac{1}{2}$ months. 'Alf Pāshā and the Qālgha Fath Girai were kindly received by Nādir, who allowed Alf Pāshā to go to Qārs and Fath Girai to Tiflis. Ishāq Pāshā, the Governor of Tiflis, soon followed 'Alf Pāshā's example and surrendered on the 12th August? Erivān alone held out.

- ² Otter, Vol. I, page 32.
- ⁵ T.N., page 160. The Catholicos Abraham (page 278) and Sekhnia Chkheidze (H. de la G., Vol. II., Part II, page 48) both give the same date as MIrza MahdI.

¹ T.N., page 159.

For the second time Nadir proceeded to Qars, which he besieged for a month, cutting off the water-supply and ravaging the country from the Arpa Chai to Erzeroum!

Before describing the concluding phase of the Turkish war, some mention must be made not only of the Iranian attempt to capture Başra in April 1735, but also of the march of the Khān of the Crimea to Daghistān in the summer and autumn of that year.

Reference has been made on page 136 above of Nādir's first attempt to found a navy. Under circumstances which will be explained elsewhere? Nādir had procured two English vessels in December 1734 and had by degrees collected a small fleet. Bushire was made the base of this inchoate navy, and an old Portuguese fort there was put into a state of repair.

In April 1735 LatIf Khān, the Iranian 'Admiral in the Gulph' as the East India Co.'s representatives termed him, entered the Shattu'l-Arab with his fleet, having as his object the capture of Başra. On being joined by a number of Arabs who were in revolt against the Turks, LatIf Khān proceeded up[stream.

² See Appendix No. III.

¹ T.N., page 160 and Catholicos Abraham, page 277: the latter states that Nadir transferred 6,000 Armenian families from the district of Qars to Khurasan.

This naval attack had most unpleasant consequences for Martin French at Basra, as well as, later, for the East India Co. itself.

The facts, as reported by French; are as follows:-

When Latif Khan entered the Shattu'l-Arab, with 3 'grabs', 50 large trankeys and several smaller vessels, the Pasha of Basra called upon French to hand over two of the Company's vessels which were then anchored off the town. French protested that the British and Iranians were friendly nations and that the East India Co. had settlements in Iran, etc. but the Pasha cut short these arguments by seizing the two vessels, placing 200 men in each and sending them off downstream against Latif Khan. The two ships met the Iranian fleet at a narrow part of the river five leagues below Basra, where the Iranians had get two batteries. The crews of the British vessels delayed engaging the enemy as long as they could, but on the 23rd May/3rd June, the Turks forced them to attack. Fighting continued for 3 days and ended in the rout of the Iranians. Only two men were killed and one wounded in the British ships, although they

"received above fifty shot in their Hulls, besides ye damage done their Masts and Yards . . . The Bashaw has transmitted an account of this Action with great incomiums to the Port, and has likewise wrote to the Earl of Kinnoull about it, the action was doubtless very brisk, but I could wish it were against some other Nation, tho' I believe they (i.e. the Iranians) will do us the justice to think that nothing less than an absolute necessity cou'd ingage us to Act against them".

¹ Letter from French to London, dated the 5th/16th June 1735. See also the Gombroon Diary, 18th/29th June. The Agent and Council at Gombroon took a very serious view of the matter which, they feared, would aggravate still further the bad relations subsisting between the Company and Nādir¹. Nādir was angry when he received the news, but his wrath was not directed solely against the Company. He dismissed Latif Khān from his post, saying that he should not have attacked until the land force of 8,000 men was ready to cooperate with him.

The Company's representatives were so apprehensive of the punishment that Nâdir might inflict upon them that they at first contemplated evacuating the factory at Gombroon and taking to their vessels. Urgent messages were sent to Whittwell, the representative, at Kirmân, to settle up the Company's affairs there, and to come to Gombroon. The affair, however, was ultimately smoothed over because Nadir was extremely anxious to obtain more shipping from, or through the intermediary of, the Company, and the latter did what it could to accommodate him.

In 1734, as in 1732, the Porte requested the Khān of the Crimea to march to Dāghistān. The Khān excused himself on the grounds that funds were lacking and that his men were unwilling to go? it appears that, in reality, he was loath to $\frac{1}{1}$ The question of Nādir's relations with the Company will be

dealt with at greater length in Appendix III.

² Tagebuch des Russisch-Kaiserlichen Generalfeld-Marschall Grafen von Münnich (Leipzig, 1843), page 131.

quit the vicinity of the Polish frontier, as he wished to intervene in the war of the Polish succession on the side of Stanislaus Leszczynskil Early in May 1735 the Porte issued firm orders for the Khan to march with 80,000 men to Daghistan and thence into Shirvan and this time it would brook no refusal. When Nepluiev, the Russian Resident at Constantinople, and his assistant Veshniakov heard of these orders, they strongly protested to All Pasha, the Grand Vizier, but he informed them in reply that many of the leaders, ulama and others of Daghistan had appealed to the Porte for assistance against Nādir, who had already defeated Surkhai and appointed a new ruler (i.e. Khāss Fulād). The Grand Vizier added that the Porte had considered this petition and that it felt obliged, under the circumstances, to take the people of Daghistan under its protection and to send them military assistance; the orders to the Khan had therefore been issued and could not be rescinded? The British, Austrian and Dutch representatives at Constantinople pointed out to the Grand Vizier the great danger of war with Russia that this march (like that of Fath Girai two years before) would cause, but All Pasha replied that the orders must stand, and that the Iranian war could not be brought to an end unless the Khan marched to Daghistan; he added, however, that the Khan would be given strict orders not to enter Russian territory? 1

Butkov, Vol. I, page 123 (Butkov is guilty of an anachronism here, as he states that Qaplan Girai started for Daghistan in November 1733.)

² Lord Kinnoull, 24th May/4th June 1735.

3 ibid.

See also Soloviev, Vol. XX, page 1328. 157. It is beyond the scope of this work to describe the further attempts which were made by the British, Austrian and other representatives (except the French Ambassador) to exert a moderating influence. All was in vain, and in July 1735 Qaplān Girai set out with 53,300 men¹, and reached Dāghistān in October. No actual military encounter with the Russians occurred during this march, but the Russian Court, without declaring war on Turkey, sent General Leontov, with 20,000 regular troops and a force of Cossacks, to ravage the Crimea, with the double object of relieving the pressure on Nādir and of punishing the Crim Tātārs for their frequent raids on Russian territory?

Alarmed by the attitude of Russia and by Nādir's threat to Anatolia, Turkey decided to offer peace terms to Iran. Not only had Nādir recovered all the Iranian provinces and towns (with the exception of Erivān, which was still holding out), but he had carried the war into Turkish territory.

Ahmad Pāshā, who was at Erzeroum at this time and who had been empowered to negotiate the terms of the peace, sent an envoy to Nadir offering to deliver up Erivān and to conclude peace on the basis of <u>uti possedetis</u>. Nadir, however, was besieging Qārs and demanded the cession of that fortress: an indemnity for all the losses suffered since the Turkish

See Munnich, op cit. page 133 for details of the composition of this force.

² Butkov, Vol. I., pages 123 and 124. See also Count Ostermann's statement to Rondeau which the latter reported in his despatch dated the 8th/19th November (S.P. 91, Vol. XVIII)

occupation of Iranian territory began and the inclusion of Russia in the treaty! Nadir soon afterwards dropped his demand for Qars, whereupon Ahmad Pasha ordered Erivan to be surrendered, which accordingly opened its gates to the Iranians on the 3rd October? Three days later Nadir raised the siege of Qars and marched away to Tiflis. The remaining points of the peace treaty were left unsettled, but discussions were resumed after a brief interval.

Nadir was given a good reception at Tiflis, the streets through which he had to pass being strewn with carpets. He treated well the Georgians who had submitted to him, but banished to Khurāsān 6,000 families of the rebels?

When Nadir had spent nearly 3 weeks in Tiflis, he heard that Qaplan Girai was marching on Darband with his army. Though he knew that Ali Pāshā, the former Governor of Ganja, was on his way to settle the frontier question on the former basis and that the Sultan had sent instructions to Qaplan Girai to return to the Crimea, he insisted upon setting out to attack the Khan⁴. Nadir marched through the districts of Jar and Tala where he killed many Lazgis and burnt a number of villages. He then went via Shaki to Shamakhi with the object of encountering the Khan. On reaching Shamakhi Nadir learnt that Qaplan Girai, having heard of his advance and having also ¹ Lord Kinnoull, 20th/31st October 1735 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVII) ² T.N., page 161, Catholicos Abraham, <u>op. cit</u>. page 278.
³ Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G. Vol. II, Part II, page 49. Just previous to Nādir's arrival, Taimuraz and some other Georgian notables had fled to Circassia and Russia because Nadir had granted Kartli and Kakheti to his nephew Ali Mirzā (who was a Mohammadan) instead of to Taimuraz. 4

⁴ T.N., page 163.

received the Sultan's orders to return, had left for the Crimea. Before leaving Daghistan, Qaplan Girai made Eldar, a brother of the late Adil Girai¹, Shamkhal, and appointed Surkhai Governor of ^ShIrvan and Ahmad Khan, the Usmi of the Qaraqaitaq, Governor of Darband²

Beyond immobilising a relatively small number of troops whom Nādir had detailed to watch his movements, Qaplan Girai, during his stay in Dāghistān, had done nothing, in a military sense, to affect the issue of the Turco-Iranian war except to give some encouragement to the LazgTs; on the other hand, his expedition aggravated the already tense situation between Russia and Turkey.

Notwithstanding the beginning of winter, Nādir continued his campaign in Shīrvān and Dāghistān. Marching from Shamākhī via Alti Aghāch and Darrakandi, he punished the inhabitants of Budūq and Khalūq (Khinalūq) and took measures to intercept the fugitives. He then went via Gilyar to the north of Darband where he camped on the 21st November; here Nādir learnt that Eldār, the 'anti-Shamkhāl', Surkhai and the Usmi Ahmad Khān had joined forces at Ghāzānīsh, in order to attack Khāss Fūlād. Nādir thereupon went to Majālis where he

Eldar was thus the uncle of Khāss Fulad, whom Nādir had made Shamkhāl. For the genealogy of this family, see 1. Berezin's 'ΠΥΤΕΠΕCΤΒΙΞ Πο ΑΑΓΕCΤΑΗΥ И ЗАКАВКАЗЪЮ' Kazan, 1848, page 77.

² T.N., page 164. See also Dorn's 'Geschichte Schirwans', pages 413 and 414.

heavily defeated Khān Muhammad, the son of Ahmad Khān. From Majālis Nādir and his forces proceeded through the mountain country to Gubden, in Khāss Fūlād's territory, killing the tribespeople and plundering and burning their villages as they went.

On the 17th Sha'bān (2nd January 1736) Nādir left Gubden for Qumūq with Khāss Fūlād. Surkhai had gathered together all the available tribesmen whom he had stationed in a strong position in the valley of the Ghāzī Qumūq Qolsu, through which the Iranian army would have to pass; in addition, he had fortified the mountain tops.

Nādir ordered his <u>jazāvirchis</u> to attack the enemy and sent the Afghans to carry their mountain positions, which they did. The operations were successful, and Surkhai had to retreat? Eldār, who was on his way to join Surkhai, was also defeated. Nādir then marched on to Qumūq where he received the submission of the chiefs. Surkhai, they said, had fled to Avaria, whether he had sent his family some time before. As nothing further could then be done against Surkhai, Nādir marched towards Quraish, a fortress belonging to the Usmi. Ahmad Khān sent his daughter³ to Nādir, together with a number of his principal followers, and asked for pardon. Nādir agreed

¹ T.N., page 165. ² ibid.

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³ According to Rondeau, she was reputed to be "the finest woman in the East". Abbas Quli, in his 'Gulistan Iram' (page 238), states that Nadir handed the girl over to Husain All, the Khan of Qubba.

to pardon the Usmi, on condition that the Lazgīs of Doqqūz-Para gave him 1,000 horses and sent their principal families as hostages. The headmen of Tabarsarān then submitted to Nādir and provided hostages. In this way, the affairs of Dāghistān were settled, and Khāss Fūlād and the other loyal Dāghistāni leaders were rewarded and given leave to return to their homes. Nādir, having sent the hostages to Darband, proceeded to the Mughān plain (Chūl-i-Mughān).

CHAPTER XII.

Nādir's Coronation.

Having defeated the Afghans and Turks, subdued the Lazgis and other rebels, and recovered, except for Qandahar, all the territory which had been lost, Nadir decided that the time had come to make himself Shah <u>de jure</u> as well as <u>de facto</u>. In order to give his action some show of legality, Nadir determined to have the crown conferred upon him at the declared wish of all the leading military, civil and religious personages of the Empire. He had already, as far back as July or August 1735, taken the significant step of sending ragams to all parts of the kingdom stating that, up till that time, his efforts to reconquer the lost territories had prevented him from establishing 'a certain rule of government' One of these <u>raqams</u> was received at Gombroon early in September. It was stated therein that Nadir, after taking Erivan, would go to Tabriz or Qazvin, and that the Governors, Deputy Governors, Kalāntars, Kadkhudās, etc. were to be in readiness to meet him at whichever of these two places he afterwards directed "when he will establish a Rule of Government to be observed over the whole Kingdom, and then retire to Chorazoon (Khurāsān) "? It seems obvious that Nadir had, in reality, no intention of

- See the Gombroon Diary, 8th/19th September 1735.

² See the Gombroon Diary, 8th/19th September 1735. It is strange that MIrza MahdI makes no mention of the issue of these <u>ragams</u>, but it by no means follows from this omission that the <u>ragam</u> quoted in the Diary was not authentic. retiring afterwards to Khurāsān, but that he merely had this statement inserted so as to cloak his designs on the throne.

Somewhat later, Nādir followed up this step by issuing special orders $(\underline{farāmīn-i-mutā^{a}})^{1}$ to all parts of the country bidding the army commanders, Governors of provinces and towns, <u>gādīs</u>, <u>ulamā</u> and nobles to assemble on the Mughān plan where a <u>gurulta'i</u>² or national council was to be held for the purpose of conferring the crown of Iran upon the person whom the council considered to be most worthy to receive it.

The site selected for the <u>qurulta'i</u> was close to Javād, on the piece of land bounded on the north by the Kura and on the east by the Aras, immediately to the west of the point of their confluence. Nādir gave orders for 12,000 buildings of wood and reeds, together with mosques, rest-houses, bazaars and baths, to be erected at this place. Splendid apartments for himself, his haram and his suite were also to be built?

Marching as rapidly as possible via Hasan-Qal'asi and Aq Sū (or New Shamākhī), Nādir reached the Mughān plain on the evening of the 22nd January 1736⁴. Soon after Nādir's coming, the army leaders, Governors and other persons of

T.N.,	page	167.	Muhammad	Muhsin,	fol.	217(b)).
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⁵ T.N., page 167. Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b).

⁴ T.N., page 167. Catholicos ^Abraham, page 282 (the Catholicos states that he had travelled from Echmiadzin at Nādir's express invitation and that he reached the camp on the 12th/23rd January, the day after Nādir's arrival).

importance began to arrive in large numbers. At the end of the month AlI Pāshā, who had become Governor of Mosul, came in order to conclude the peace negotiations; in company with him was his <u>mihmāndār</u>, Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān Zangana, the Governor of Kirmānshāh! By the 20th Ramadān (3rd February), the whole of the delegates had arrived, numbering some 20,000? Supplies of food were brought to the camp from the surrounding country, and were rationed out daily to all present?

Elaborate measures were taken for guarding the camp, and the bridge over the Kura at Javãd was protected by two strong towers that were erected on the northern side of the river. Nādir's own quarters were protected by 6,000 kashikchīs or special guards. Discipline was strictly enforced by the <u>nasaqchis</u>, much to the admiration of the Catholicos⁴. The dignitaries, being far too numerous to be received simultaneously were divided up into batches, each batch being given a separate audience⁵. The Catholicos Abraham, 'Alī Pāshā, and other notables were received in audience on the first day of the '<u>Idu'l-Fitr</u> (1st Shawwāl = 14th February). The Catholicos, though too frightened to count exactly, estimated that 1,000 persons were

⁻ T.N., page 167.

² Muhammad Muhsin, fol 217(b). Bazin (<u>op. cit</u>., page 287) states that only 15,000 were present. The number given by Mirzä MahdI, viz, 100,000, seems much exaggerated, even if he included in the total all the servants and camp-followers. ³ Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b). ⁴ Catholicos Abraham, page 286. Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b). ⁵ ibidem page 292. seated in the audience hall. Rose-water perfumes and sherbet were distributed to everyone, and a band consisting of 22 musicians played. On the following day Nādir appointed a committee consisting of Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir and six other persons: this committee requested those gathered in the audience hall to confer together and to recommend whom they considered most fitted to govern the country. Nādir, the committee stated, was old and was worn out by his campaigns; thanks to the divine Providence, he had delivered Iran from her enemies and re-established peace in the country. He now, they continued, wished to go to Khurāsān and rest in his fortress (of Kalāt).

The gathering then dispersed. Later, they reassembled and unanimously recommended that Nādir should be chosen as their ruler. The next day, when all were present, Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir, on behalf of Nādir, laid down three conditions:-

- No one should abandon Nadir and support any son of the Shah.
- (2) The Sunnī faith should be adopted in place of the Shi'a; and the obnoxious and heretical practices of Shi'a must cease. The Shi'a faith had been adopted by Shāh Isma'il and had occasioned much bloodshed between Iran and Turkey. ". . . if the people of Iran desire that we should reign, they must abandon this doctrine which is opposed to the faith of the noble predecessors and the great family of the Prophet, and (they must) follow the religion of the Sunnīs. Since the Imām 166.

Ja'faru's-Sādiq was descended from the Prophet . the faith (tarfqa, literally the 'road') of the people of Iran is clearly this religion. They should make him the head of their sect."

(3) No act of treason should be committed against Nadir All should be submissive to them. or his son.

According to the official account of the proceedings, all those who were present signified their acceptance of these conditions without demur, but Fraser (Cockell)² and Otter³ have recorded that the Mulla-bashi rose and objected to the forced abjuration of the Shi'a faith. Nadir is said to have dealt summarily with the objector, whom he ordered to be seized and It is quite probable that so revolutionary a move strangled. as the substitution of the Shi^ca faith by that of the Sunni may have met with strong opposition from the priesthood; it by no means follows that, because Mīrzā Mahdī is silent on this score, no such incident occurred; in fact, Shaikh Hazin relates that Nadir, on this occasion, "on some pretext having put to death one or two of the most celebrated men of the time, he displayed before them the dread instruments of execution. . . " Shaikh Hazin, it is true, does not state who these colebrated men were, but who was more likely than the mullas to give Nadir a pretext

for such action?

- 1 T.N., page 168.
- ² Pages 120-122.
- ³ Vol. I., pages 332-334.
- 4 The Catholicos likewise omits all mention of any incident of this nature, but he may, of course, have been too frightened to mention it.

Fraser and Otter both state that Nādir's execution of the Mullā-bāshī caused the mullās to become his bitter enemies. On Nādir learning of their hostile attitude, he confiscated a large part of their revenues.

Otter says that this action of Nādir's gave rise to varying comment in Iran, some persons saying that he had always been a Sunnī at heart, and others that he was a man without religion. It was recognised later, Otter continues, that Nādir had only pretended to show zeal for the Shi'a faith in the earlies stages of his career, in order to serve his own purposes, and that, if he declared himself a Sunnī when he came to the throne, it was merely in order to succeed the more easily in the realisation of his schemes of conquest of the neighbouring countries!

It seems, however, more likely that Nādir substituted the SunnI faith for the Shi^c a because the latter had been so closely identified with the SafavIs; the SafavI dynasty had owed much of its strength to its warm espousal of the Shi^c a doctrine, and the zeal which it showed for this doctrine had naturally made the priesthood its fervent supporters. Consequently, it seems highly probable that Nādir felt that the Shi^c a <u>ulamā</u>, if left undistrubed and unweakened by him, might at any time use their considerable influence with the people to work for the restoration of Tahmāsp or his son Abbās. Secondly, Nādir may have felt that his suppression of the Shi^c a faith

Otter. Vol. I, page 334.

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might facilitate the conclusion of peace with Turkey and so enable him to devote his energies, for a time at least, to the east. Whether Nadir acted in the way he did in order to please the large numbers of Sunnīs in his army may or may not have been the case; but it is certain that he would not have dared to make so drastic a change if there had not been so many Sunnis in his service.

After the assembly had signified their acceptance of the three conditions, a <u>fatwa</u> recording what had been agreed was drafted and sealed.

The Catholicos states that, even after this <u>fatwa</u> had been issued, Nādir, in appearance at least, endeavoured to refuse the crown, but that he at length yielded to the entreaties of the nobles and other dignitaries.

In the meantime, discussions had evidently been in progress with All Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador.

It appears that Nādir, from the time when he left Qārs in October 1735 until the arrival of Alī Pāshā at the Mughān camp, had been negotiating intermittently with Ahmad Pāshā and Alī Pāshā through the intermediary of messengers. Kalushkin reported to St. Petersburg, in December or January, that the Turkish Ambassador was making lavish presents to influential persons at the Iranian Court and that the people

¹ Catholicos Abraham, page 302.

were longing for peace with Turkey+

Before his coronation, Nādir made the deputies agree to his sending an embassy to the Sultan in order to negotiate a peace on the following basis?-

- (1) The Iranians having given up their former beliefs and chosen the religion of the SunnIs, were to be recognised as a fifth sect, to be known as the Ja^c far1.
- (2) Since each of the Imâms of the four existing sects had a column (<u>rukn</u>) in the Ka^c ba assigned to them, a fifth column was to be provided for the Imam Ja far.
- (3) An Iranian Amīru'l-Hājj (leader of the Pilgrimage), with a position equivalent to that of the Amīrs of the Syrian and Egyptian pilgrims, should be appointed, and be allowed to conduct the Iranian Pilgrims to Mecca.
- (4) The prisoners on both sides were to be exchanged, and none of them was to be allowed to be bought or sold3
- (5) Each country was to maintain a representative at the court of the other.

Although Nādir had now obtained the 'consent' of everyone to his accession, there was, nevertheless, some delay

² T.N., pages 168-169.

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⁵ Jones (Vol. XI, page 362) has mistranslated the last part of this clause; instead of saying that the prisoners were not to be bought or sold, he stated that trade between the two nations was to be free.

Soloviev, Vol. XX, page 1334.

in arranging for his coronation. The reason for this delay was two-fold; in the first place, the engraving of the seal for the new Shah had not been completed and the dies for the new money were not yet ready. Secondly, the astrologers, on being ordered to discover an auspicious date for the ceremony, fixed upon the 24th Shawwal 1148 (ath March 1736).

Numbers of the Khans and other dignitaries now took their departure, without waiting to attend the coronation. The Catholicos Abraham left on the 23rd February/5th March, because of the cold and of the shortage of bread?

On the following day Alī Pāshā left for Constantinople, to communicate to the Porte Nādir's peace proposals in the form indicated above? Alī Pāshā was accompanied by Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān whom Nādir had appointed Ambassador to Turkey. Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān was instructed to convey to the Sultān the news of Nādir's accession (although Nādir was not actually Shāh at the time of his departure), and had full powers to conclude peace. With Abdu'l-Bāqī were Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsim Kāshānī, the Ṣadr or Shaikhu'l-Islām of Iran, and Mullā Alī Akbar, the Chief

¹ T.N., page 169.

³ Catholicos Abraham, page 310.

² Catholicos Abraham, page 310. It is probable that many of the khâns left for the same reason. The Catholicos states that there was a great scarcity of bread not only at Mughân, but also throughout the Tabrīz district, Ganja, Erivān and elsewhere. The rest of the Catholicos' description of the proceedings at Mughân and of the coronation ceremony is based on information which he received from an Armenian priest named Ter Thouma, who remained on at Mughân. Ter Thouma was housed in Mīrzā Mahdī's tent and was therefore very close to Nādir's place of residence. (Mīrzā Mahdī at that time was responsible for the preparation and issue of Nādir's orders (raqam).)

Mulla¹, the purpose of the ecclesiastical members of this mission was to discuss with the Turkish <u>ulama</u> the religious points that were likely to arise in connection with Nādir's demand for the recognition of the Ja'farI sect and for the erection of a fifth pillar in the Ka'ba. The mission bore a letter² from Nādir to the Sultān which set out, at considerable length, the former's views on the religious question and his reasons for urging the recognition of the Ja^cfarI sect, etc. A special envoy was also sent to St. Petersburg to notify the Empress of Nādir's accession. This envoy reached St. Petersburg early in July, 1736.

On Wednesday, the 7th March, Nādir's eldest son, Ridā Qull, whom his father had just appointed Vali of Khurāsān, left the Mughān camp for Mashhad to take up his new duties?

As the astrologers had recommended, the coronation ceremony was held on the 24th Shawwal 1148 (8th March 1736), 'at eight hours and 20 minutes after sun-rise'4

¹ T.N., page 170. Mīrzā Mahdī is misleading here, as it appears from his account that ^AII Pāshā and the Iranian embassy left the Mughān plain <u>after</u> the coronation ceremony. The Catholicos, however, explicitly states that they left 2 days before, i.e. on the 24th February/6th March.

² See the "Maktub-i-Nadiri" in the "Armaghan" (Tehran, October 1929), pages 449-453.

³ Catholicos Abraham, page 313.

⁴ T.N., page 169 and Durra-yi-Nādira. The 24th Shawwal, which is the date given by Mīrzā Mahdl, agrees exactly with that of the Catholicos Abraham, viz. 26th February O.S. or 8th March N.S. Hanway is in error in stating that the coronation took place on the 11th/22nd March: he is also incorrect in saying (Vol. IV. page 127) that 'the Armenian patriarch, who was in the camp, performed part of the ceremony, by buckling on his sabre'.

Those khans and other persons of consequence who still remained at the camp assembled in Nadir's audience-hall at the appointed time, all clad in their robes of honour. The golden crown, which the Armenian priest Ter Thouma describes as being shaped like a helmet and adorned with precious stones and magnificent pearls, was placed on Nadir's head by Mirza Zaki. All those present knelt down and prayed, save the Chief Mulla, who intoned the prayer. Whilst this prayer was being uttered, all kept their arms above their heads; afterwards, whilst the Fatiha or opening chapter of the Qu'ran, was being read, they bowed down, with their faces to the ground. When the Fatiha was finsihed, everyone seated himself in his appointed place, according to his rank! Then followed a scene similar to that which took place at Nadir's reception on the first day of the 'Idu'l-Fitr (see page 166 above).

Before taking their leave, all present bowed down before the new Shah?

From the time of his coronation, Nadir ceased to be known as the WakIlu'd-Daula, Nā'ibu's-Saltana or Vali Instead, he took the title of Nadir Shah? thus Ni^cmat. changing his own name Nadr (or Nadhr) into Nadir.

The poet Qawamu'd-Din made the Arabic chronogram the best is in what has occurred". Some of the wits of the time, by transposing the first two letters,

٦ Catholicos Abraham, page 311. Mīrzā Mahdī omits these details, simply saying that Nādir was crowned "with the splendour of Farīdun and the pomp of Solomon".

² Catholicos Abraham, page 311. 3

Shaikh Hazin, page 270. 173.

completely reversed the meaning of the phrase without altering its numerical value, which is 1148! This chronogram was reproduced on the coins struck at this time and later?

When Nādir was left alone with his brother and a few of his other relatives and some high officials, a number of singers and musicians appeared and entertained them for half an hour. Two hours after the ceremony had begun, all was over, and Nādir, taking off his crown, put on once more his ordinary headdress, which is described as being a turban in the shape of a cross, covered with a piece of extremely fine white wool, the two ends of which were embroidered and came down over Nādir's ears?

On the same day, after the ceremony, Nadir made Mīrza Mu'min chief of the <u>raqam</u> writers and calligraphists, in place of Mīrzā Mahdī. In order to console Mīrzā Mahdī, Nadir appointed his his historiographer⁴.

The day closed with more music, this time provided by drums, cymbals and trumpets; for three days and nights this music continued without a pause?

¹ T.N., page 170. Shaikh Hazīn (p. 271) quotes the following lines by a poet who preferred to remain anonymous:
 "We have cut off all desire for property and life At the date "The best is what has happened.""
 ² Catholicos Abraham, page 330. See also R. Stuart Poole, "The Coins of the Shahs of Persia", (London, 1887), page 72 and Plate VII.

³ ibidem, page 312.

- 4 ibidem, page 312.
- ⁵ ibidem, page 313. It will be recalled that, after the accession of the infant Shah Abbas III, the drums were played for a whole week the page 109 above).

As for the youthful 'Abbās III, Nādir sent him, after his deposition, to join his father Tahmāsp in Khurāsān¹, where he remained until Ridā Qulī had him, his father and younger brother Sulaimān put to death in 1740.

Nadir appointed his brother Ibrahim commander-inchief of the whole of Adharbaijan, and ordered all the Governors "from the borders of Qaplan Kuh to the Arpa Chai and the limits of Daghistan and Georgia" to obey him?

After the Nau Rūz festivities, Nādir had discussions with his commanders regarding the projected Qandahār campaign, and questioned the Afghans in his service as to the state of the country there.

Some days were then devoted to feasting; and it was not until the 14th April that Nadir and his army left the Mughan camp for Qazvin4

Before his departure Nādir sent back the Kartlian representatives with orders to raise the sum of 3,300 tomans (£7,260) and to provide a garrison of 500 men at Tiflis. This order provoked a revolt in Upper Kartli which was headed by Giv Amilakhor, Vakhusht Abashidze, Shanshi and other Georgian leaders. This revolt was stamped out later in the year by Safi Khān Bughairi

- ¹ See Shaikh Hazin, page 272, and the Bayan, fol. 14(b). Hanway is in error in stating (Vol. IV, page 123) that Abbas died early in 1736 and that "some art was used" to bring about his death.
- ² T.N., page 170.
- ³ Kalushkin reported that, after the coronation, there was much drunkenness and, in consequence, considerable disorder in the camp. See Soloviev, Vol. XX, page 1356.
- ⁴ T.N., page 172.
- ⁵ For particulars of this revolt, see Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G., Vol. II, Part II, pages 50 and 51.

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CHAPTER XIII.

The Truce between Iran and Turkey: Nadir's Relations with Russia: Capture of Bahrain: BakhtiarI Operations.

As related in the previous chapter, 'Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān and 'Alī Pāshā left the Mughān camp for Constantinople on the 4th March 1736. As yet unaware of this fact and of the nature of Nādir's proposals, the Porte, on the 20th April, sent a full power of authority to Ahmad Pāshā to conclude the peace treaty; satisfaction was expressed at the reports which Ahmad Pāshā had evidently sent in regard to the abandonment of the Shi'a doctrine, but it was made perfectly definite that consent would never be given to the inclusion of Russia in the treaty.¹

At the first meeting between the Iranian and Turkish negotiators, the Shah's letter to the Sultan was read, as were also his letters to the Grand Vizier and the Mufti. In the discussions that followed, agreement was reached without diffi-

See Rondeau's despatch of the 22nd June/3rd July 1736 (S.P.91, Vol.XVIII), in which a translation of the power of authority to Ahmad Pasha was enclosed (Sir E. Fawkener, the new British Ambassador at Constantinople had evidently forwarded the translation to Rondeau). Obviously, the Porte had not yet learnt of Nadir's proposals regarding the Ja'farl sect, etc.

² Sir E. Fawkener, 7th/18th August (S.P.97, Vol.XXVIII).

culty respecting the exchange of prisoners, the reciprocal appointment of ambassadors and the nomination of an Iranian Amīru'l-Hājj.¹ The case was entirely different, however, in regard to Nādir's religious points; these points were discussed, on the Iranian side, by the Sadr, Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsim Kāshānī and the Mullā-Bāshī, 'Alī Akbar; the Turkish negotiators were Laili Aḥmad Efendi, the acting Chief Qādī of Anatolia, Masīhzāda 'Abdu'llah Efendi, the nominal occupant of that position, and 'Abdu'llah Pāshā, the head of the <u>fatwa</u> records, and Ahmad Efendi, the former Qādī of Constantinople.² 'Alī Akbar, the very capable Mullā-Bāshī, is said to have taken a prominent part in these discussions and to have caused the Turkish representatives considerable embarrassment by his dialectical skill.³

The Turks flatly refused to accede to Nādir's religious proposals; as neither side would give way over the two points involved, it was decided to draw up a treaty containing the first three points only, and to send an embassy to the Shāh to inform him of the situation. 'Abdu'l-BāqI Khān agreed to accept the treaty thus truncated, subject to its being confirmed by Nādir, and he and the Turkish représentatives signed it on the 28th September. On the 17th October 'Abdu'l-BāqI Khān, Abu'l-Qāsim KāshānI and 'AlI Akbar were invited to a meeting of the Council where they were officially given the treaty. In the

1 Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 344. 2 n n n 343. 3 Otter, Vol.I, page 134. preamble Nādir was officially recognised as Shāh; then followed three articles each dealing with one of the three points on which agreement had been reached; lastly, it was provided, in an annex, that the frontiers between the two powers were to be identical with those laid down in the treaty of the 7th May 1639¹.

The state of war between Iran and Turkey was thus officially suspended, pending a solution of the religious difficulties and the receipt of Nādir's views.

When 'Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān returned to Iran, the Porte despatched at the same time, as its Ambassador, Muṣṭafā Beg, together with Masīhzāda 'Abdu'llah Efendi and the Qādī of Adrianople to assist him on the religious questions.² The Turkish embassy left Constantinople on the 23rd November 1736, and was followed the next day by 'Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān and his suite.³ The results achieved by this Turkish mission will be described in Chapter XIV.

Whilst the Turco-Iranian peace negotiations were in progress, the Russo-Turkish situation had steadily deteriorated. War between the two powers had been practically inevitable ever since the march of Qaplan Girai to Daghistan and Leontov's inva-

³ See Otter, (Vol.I, page 37), who accompanied Abdú'l-Bāqī Khān to Iran. The Armenian Tambouri Aroutine was a member of the Turkish Ambassador's suite (see the Bulletin de l'Institut Egyptien, Cairo, 1914, Vol.XIII, page 174). 178.

¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, Page 348. Sir E. Fawkener reported, on the 24th September/5th October, that the Porte had ordered all persons having Iranian slaves in their possession to deliver them up to the courts of justice in the places where they resided. In the course of a month between two and three thousand Iranian slaves were given up.

² Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 346.

sion of the Crimea. At Constantinople the situation was aggravated by the efforts of the French Ambassador to incite Turkey to attack Russia. On the Russian side, the repeated urgings of Nepluiev and Veshniakov to their Government to attack "the barbarians" when they were, apparently, being forced to their knees by Nādir, more than counteracted the moderating influence which the British, Austrian and Saxon Ministers at St. Petersburg strove to exert.

When Russia at length decided to go to war, she was no doubt influenced by the belief that Nādir would not only make no separate peace, but would actively cooperate with her against Turkey. Nādir, as has been seen, had made more than one attempt to persuade Turkey to include Russia in the projected peace treaty, but the terms of the Turks' repeated refusals must have made it plain to him that they would never agree to do so.

On the 28th May 1736 Russia declared war on Turkey; Kalushkin shortly afterwards received orders to inform Nādir of this and to notify him of the siege of Azov; he was, further, to point out to Nādir that this was the moment for Iran to take action against Turkey, when the latter power was being forced to use every effort to repel the Russian onslaught. Nādir's gaze, however, was by now directed eastwards instead of westwards. He replied that, while he would not undertake any hostile operations against the Turks, he would delude them with proposals of peace, and that he would not come to terms with them unless

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Russia were also a party to the settlement.¹

Kalushkin informed Nadir, through the medium of MIrza Mahdi, that it was strange that the Shah, who had by his insistence, embroiled Russia with Turkey, should now abandon his ally and seek a new friend in one who really desired nothing more than to ruin Iran. Nadir retorted that the Russian military operations were all of a minor nature; Iran had no need of Azov, just as Russia had no need of Baghdad. Would Russia undertake a campaign against Constantinople? The Empress should lead or send her armies thither; there was, however, no hurry, as Russia and Iran would first have to settle the plan of campaign; Nadir concluded by saying that he would not make peace till he received the Empress's answer. In reporting these conversations to St. Petersburg, Kalushkin stated that the Iranian nobles became noticeably colder to him every day, when he urged Iran to attack Turkey. Iran could not, in fact, resume the Turkish war as she was in a dangerous condition, the country and people having become terribly impoverished.²

The Iranian envoy who reached St. Petersburg at the beginning of July 1736, after officially notifying the Empress of Nādir's accession, assured her and her ministers that Nādir would make no separate peace; he received in return the promise that Russia would likewise refuse to make peace with Turkey unless Iran were included.³

3 ibidem.

¹ Soloviev, Vol.XX, page 1356.

² ibidem.

The news of the signature of the Constantinople treaty came therefore as a shock to the Russian court. Nadir, however, had not, technically at any rate, broken his word to Russia. The settlement effected at Constantinople was, in reality, little more than an agreement officially to suspend hostilities; moreover, this treaty was never ratified by Nadir.

Nādir remained for three months at Qazvīn. Whilst there, he issued an edict to give effect to the religious changes which he had announced at the Mughān assembly. This edict forbade the use of the words "Alī the Friend of God" in prayer, as being contrary to orthodox usage. He also ordained the omission, after the Fātiḥa and Takbīr, of the words "May the King from whom all our fortune flows, live for ever", on the grounds that mortal man could not be perpetuated.¹

Fraser states² that Nādir went through another coronation ceremony at QazvIn "where the Ceremony of Inauguration of the Iranian Monarchy is performed. Having girt on the Royal Scymitar, and put the Imperial Crown on his Head, he took the usual Oath" etc., etc. Neither MIrzā Mahdī nor any other contemporary Iranian authority, so far as the writer is aware, mentions a second coronation taking place at Qazvīn, and

See Fraser, pp.123-127, who quotes what purports to be a translation of this edict. It was issued some time in the month of Safar 1149 (12th June-9th July, 1736).

² Fraser, p.127. Otter (Vol.I, p.335) also mentions this coronation, but he probably copied Fraser. Ridā Quli Khān Hidāyat omits all reference to any such ceremony in his 'Raudatu'ş-Şafā'. it therefore seems most improbable that it took place; the investiture on the Mughan plain was surely sufficient. It seems, moreover, unlikely that Nadir would follow a Safavi precedent by being crowned at Qazvin.

When Nādir was at Qazvīn, the news arrived of the recapture of Baḥrain. For some little time LaṭIf Khān (who had been recently reinstated by Nādir as 'Admiral of the Gulf') had been making preparations at Bushire for an expedition to Baḥrain.¹ One of his ships was the "Northumberland", formerly an East India Company vessel, which LaṭIf Khān had forced the Captain to sell for 5,000 tomans.² Precise details of this expedition are lacking, but it appears that it set out from Bushire in March or early April 1736, when it was known that Shaikh Jabbāra had left Baḥrain to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca.³

The Shaikh's deputy resisted for a time in the fortress, but was forced by superior numbers to yield. On returning to

- ⁺ Relations between the Persians and Shaikh Jabbara had of late become very strained.
- ² Gombroon Diary, 17th/28th June 1736. When the Agent upbraided the captain of the "Northumberland" for selling his vessel, the captain explained that LatIf Khān had taken him at a disadvantage, when much of his cargo had been landed and he himself was ashore; he said, however, that though he had sold the vessel under duress, he had got 'a great price' for her.
- ³ See T.N., p.172 and At-Tuhfatu'n-Nabhāniyyat Fi Tā'rīkhi'l-Jazīrati'l-Arabiyyati (Čairo, 1929/30, p.113), by Shaikh Muhammad ibn Shaikh Khalīfa ibn Hamadi'n-Nabhān. The latter writer (whose account contains a number of mistakes) states that the fort now known as the Qal'atu'd-Dīwān, in the south of the island of Manāma, is believed to have been built at Nādir's command. Bushire was re-named Bandar Nādiriyya at or about this time.

Bushire, Latif Khān sent the keys of this fortress to Muhammad Taqî Khān¹ who, in turn, sent them to Nādir. Nādir thereupon rewarded Muhammad Taqi Khān and added Bahrain to the province of Fārs. The successful Bahrain expedition led, as will be explained in a later chapter, to a more ambitious project, namely the conquest of Omān and the establishment of Iranian naval supremacy in the Persian Gulf.

As the Chahār Lang section of the Bakhtiārl, under their leader AlI Murād, had been in revolt for some considerable time and had defeated a body of troops which Nādir had sent to subdue them whilst he was besieging Erivān, he determined, now that he was no longer occupied with the Turks, to crush these rebels before proceeding eastwards.

The account given by MIrzā Mahdl of the operations in this Bakhtiārf campaign is extremely difficult to follow, because very few of the places which he mentions can now be traced.³ Though it is impossible, for this reason, to give a detailed description of this campaign, the main outline of it can be indicated.

- According to Fasa'I (p.180), Muhammad TaqI Khan went in person on this expedition to Bahrain, but this is incorrect.
- ² T.N., p.174. According to the late Sardar Zafar, this AlT Murad belonged to the Chahar Lang section of the Bakhtiaris. The Haft Lang tribesmen remained loyal, and cooperated with the royal troops in suppressing the rebellion.
- ³ Though the writer has been allowed to utilise the excellent maps prepared by the geologists of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (which are far in advance of any other existing maps of the BakhtiarI country), and has, moreover, consulted Keighobud Ilkhan, the son of the late Sardar Zafar, he has been only able to identify very few of these places. The unidentifiable places have either ceased to exist or are now known by different names.

Having had previous experience of crushing revolts in Dāghistān, the Kūhgilū province, and the Bakhtiārī country itself, Nādir determined to attack from several different points and to advance into the Bakhtiārī country by converging routes. He himself, at the head of his Kurdish and Afghan troops, entered the mountain country from the north or northeast in the middle of August 1736, after leaving his baggage and supplies at Charpās, in charge of Nasrullah Mīrzā.¹

A sharp engagement with the Bakhtiārīs resulted in their defeat and flight to a fortress called Līrūk, which is described as one of the most inaccessible of their strongholds; it was, apparently, situated in the very mountainous country to the E.N.E. of Dizfūl.²

Meanwhile other bodies of troops were penetrating into the Bakhtiarl country from Isfahan, Kirmanshah, Shushtar and the Province of Kungilu. Numbers of Bakhtiarls were killed and many were captured.

After scouring the country on the borders of Luristan, the Iranian forces pursued the remaining rebels south-eastwards,

² ibidem. The Ab-i-LIrūk, which is mentioned by MIrza Mahdi, seems from the context to be the Ab-i-Diz under another name. The difficulty of the terrain which the royal forces had to traverse is expressed in the following phrase in the Durra-yi-Nādira (p.158):"From farsang (farsakh) to farsang (there was) nothing but stones (sang) and boulders (Kharsang)"

¹ T.N., page 175.

and crossed the watershed on to the Isfahān side of the mountains. 'Alī Murād and a few followers took refuge in a cave near a place called Gūrkash, not far from the Bakhtiāri fortress of Banavār. 'Alī Murād's hiding place was eventually discovered, and he, his family and adherents were seized and taken to Nādir. At the Shāh's orders, 'Alī Murād was blinded and had his hands and feet cut off; two days later, the wretched man died.¹

With this cruel action, Nādir completed his subjugation of the Bakhtiārīs.²

In accordance with his usual practice, Nādir enrolled a considerable number of Bakhtiārīs in his army; as will be seen later, these Bakhtiārīs rendered signal service during the siege of Qandahār.

Having thoroughly crushed the rebel Bakhtiāris, Nadir marched through the Karkunān district to Isfahān, where he arrived on the 9th Jumādī II (15th October).³ He immediately busied himself with the preparations for his long-projected attack on Husain Sultan, of Qandahār.

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¹ T.N., page 176, and Durra-yi-Nadira, page 159.

² Nadir is still remembered in the Bakhtiari country; the Bakhtiari fortress of Diz-i-Shahi is also known as Sangar-i-Nadiri at the present time (1934).

³ T.N., page 176.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Re-conquest of Qandahar.

From the time when he ejected the Ghilza'is from central and southern Iran in the winter of 1729/1730, Nādir always had in his mind the desire to reconquer the city and province of Qandahār and to remove once and for all the danger of attack from that quarter.

Events elsewhere, however, continually interfered with his plans. First there was the war with Turkey in 1730; then came the Abdālī campaign. Nādir would probably have marched against Husain Sultān in the summer or autum of 1732, had not Tahmāsp's disastrous Turkish campaign diverted his energies to the west. Thereafter, until the autum of 1736, Nādir was occupied successively with the Turkish war, Muḥammad Khān Balūch's revolt, the Lazgī campaign, the Turkish campaign of 1735, the Mughān assembly and the coronation and, lastly, the Bakhtiārī revolt.

With the conclusion of the truce with Turkey and the outbreak of the war between that country and Russia, there was no fear of invasion from the west and north-west, at any rate for some time to come. The LazgIs had been chastened,¹ and the BakhtiārIs had been thoroughly subdued. Ridā Qull Mīrzā had been sent in the early spring to punish the Governor of Andkhud and to maintain order in the north-east of Khurāsān,

As subsequent events were to prove, the LazgIs were not, however, thoroughly quelled. 186. while measures were in contemplation for bringing about the submission of the Baluchis.

Whilst still engaged on his Bakhtiari campaign Nadir had sent orders to the Governor of Isfahan to make a levy of 18,000 tomans as a contribution to the cost of the coming expe-The Shah's agents were busy at Gombroon dition to Qandahar. at the same time requisitioning provisions for the troops; they carried out their duties so rigorously that the inhabitants were reduced to the utmost misery. Besides being forced to supply provisions, the merchants and other inhabitants were made to pay 72,000 rupees, 'a sum so extravagant that it has near Completed the ruin of Everyone'.¹ In the province of Kirman Nadir so denuded the people of supplies that there was a famine there for seven or eight years afterwards.² What was done at Isfahan, Gombroon and in Kirman was no doubt carried out with equal ruthlessness elsewhere.

Nadir decided to march to Qandahar via Kirman and SIstan. Since much of the country to be traversed was desert, he gave orders for large quantities of provisions to be sent on in advance to the various halting places. In order to provide the necessary transport, the Government authorities commandeered large numbers of draught animals, including those that were

¹ Gombroon Diary, 18th/29th August, 1736.

² N. de Khanikoff, "Mémoire sur la Partie Méridionale de l'Asie Centrale", Paris, 1861, page 192.

conveying a consignment of the East India Co's wool from Kirman to Gombroon.¹

After spending five weeks in Isfahān, Nādir began his march on the 17th Rajab 1149 (21st November 1736) at the head of 80,000 men, of whom the majority were cavalry;² there were large numbers of Khurāsānīs and Abdālīs, and a strong contingent of Bakhtiārīs.

Nādir took with him, as hostages rather than volunteers, several prominent Georgians, amongst whom were King Taimuraz, Giv Amilakhor, and Bardzim, the Eristav of the Aragwi.³

After spending a few days at Kirman,⁴ the army pro-

- 1 The Shah's agents even stopped caravans on the roads, seized the animals and left the goods which they had been carrying by the road side. See Gombroon Diary, 18th/29th August and 23rd August/3rd September 1736 and J. A. Saldanha's "Selections from State Papers", page 49.
- ² Fraser, page 128 and Färsnäma, page 181. According to the former Tahmäsp Khän Jaläyir joined Nädir shortly afterwards with another 40,000 men. Hanway (Vol.IV, page 146) gives similar figures, but he is in error in stating that Nadir marched via Khurasan.
- ³ Vakhusht, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 132, and Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 52.
- ⁴ Nādir was at Kirmān for a few days late in December 1736. Henry Savage (who had succeeded Whittwell there) reported that he had been forced to make Nādir a present to the value of 160 tomans, "the Dutch having led the way with a more considerable one". (Gombroon Diary, 1st/12th January 1737). In February 1737 Savage stated that "the King has sent orders to seize all the beasts again to carry Powder and Shott and draw Cannon to Candahar"; this, he said, would make it impossible for him to forward any wool for some time.

ceeded via Bam, Tum-i-RTg and Gurg to STstān;¹ the STstān-Qandahār border was crossed on the 2nd Shawwāl (3rd February 1737), and the army reached Girishk on the 18th of the month, after passing through Farah, Dalhak and Dilaram. Girishk was place held by a Ghilza'i force, but this/speedily surrendered on a bombardment being opened. Whilst at Girishk Nādir detached portions of his forces to subdue the district and fortress of ZamIndāvar and the town of Bust.²

After a halt of three days at Girishk, the army marched via Shāh Maqsūd to the Arghandāb, on the west bank of which it camped. That night Husain Sultān, with a force of picked men, crossed the river by a ford and fiercely attacked the Iranian camp. The Ghilza'is, however, were repulsed with heavy loss.³

From Kokarān, where he crossed the river, Nādir marched towards the Qaitūl ridge on which the northern and northwestern defences of the fortress were situated. Despite cannon fire from the fort on the lofty Kūh-i-Lākā, at the western end of the ridge, the Iranian army crossed a projecting spur of this

ibidem.

¹ T.N., page 176, and Durra-yi-Nādira, page 160. Sir F.Goldsmid, on page 250 of his "Eastern Persia: an Account of the Journey of the Persian Boundary Commission, 1870-71-72", (London, 1876), states that he found a ruined gate 29 miles from Gurg which was said to be a relic of Nādir's passage. N. de Khanikoff, who travelled along this route in 1858, mentions that Nādir had to have the pass over the ridge extending N.N.W. of Siāh Kūh (some 65 miles N.W. of Nuşratābād) widened by means of the axes carried by his men, so that his artillery could pass. This pass consequently became known as the Gardana-yi-Tabarkand (see de Khanikoff, <u>op.cit</u>., page 164) ² T.N., page 178. ³

mountain, and, skirting the western and southern walls of the city, encamped on the plain to the east of it.¹

On the 8th Dhu¹-Hijja (9th April) Nādir moved his camp a short distance to Surkh Shīr², where he caused a whole city to be built, complete with walls and citadel, bazaars, mosques, baths and rest houses; to this place he gave the name of Nādirābād.³

Meanwhile Nādir had begun the siege of the city. As Aurangzīb and, later, his brother Dārā Shukūh, had found to their cost in the middle of the XVIIth century, Qandahār was so strongly fortified as to be impregnable unless the besieging force had heavy and efficient artillery. The city was protected on the north by the Qaitūl ridge and on its other sides by enormously strong walls,⁴ made of dried mud strengthened with chopped straw and stones; in places, these walls were ten yards in thickness.⁵

As Nadir was, as usual, deficient in siege artillery, he was forced to adopt blockading methods similar to those

¹ T.N., page 178.

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- " " 179. See also Durra-yi-Nādira, p.160. Surkh Shīr or Nādirābād was two miles S.E. of Qandahār.
- ³ According to 'Abdu'l-KarIm, Nādir ordered each of his men to build a house, while he himself caused a fortress and fort¹fications to be erected. (Bayān-i-Wāqi, folio 14 b.)

⁴ The Emperor Shah Jahan had given Aurangzib, in 1649, positive orders to attempt no assault on the fortress until these walk could be breached; Aurangzib's artillery, however, could not make any appreciable impression upon them.

⁵ Ferrier's "Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkistan and Beloochistan" (Translated by Captain W. Jesse), London, 1856, page 317. 190. which he had employed during the siege of Baghdad. A ring of strong forts was built round Qandahar; between these forts, towers were placed at intervals of 100 yards, and others were afterwards added.

Since Husain Sultān had had ample warning of Nādir's intention to besiege Qandahār, he had laid in large quantities of provisions, so the siege was likely to prove a long one. Nādir, however, had one great advantage over Aurangzīb in that his army, which consisted largely of hardy mountaineers and men from Khurāsān, was far better able to withstand the rigours of a winter campaign than were Aurangzībis Indian troops; Nādir was thus able to contemplate a siege of several months duration with comparative equanimity.¹

The only serious problem was the provisioning of his large army, which required far more food than the country surrounding Qandahār could supply. Reference has already been made to the privations which the inhabitants of Kirmān had to undergo as a result of the depletion of their resources in order to provide supplies for the army; this was not all that the unfortunate people had to endure, for <u>state beginning of 1738</u>, draught animals became so scarce that, in February 1738, men and women were compelled to act as porters from the Kirmān district to Qandahār, the men having to carry fifteen, and the women seven, Tabrīz maunds (some 97 and 45)

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Nadir obtained fresh supplies of powder, etc. by caravan from Kirman.

lbs. respectively) of grain.¹

In May news of the capture of Bust was received at the camp, and the town of Ṣafā fell soon after. Imām Verdi Beg Qiriqlū then advanced against Qalāt, which fell after a siege lasting over two months, when one of Husain Sultān's sons named Muḥammad, his general Saidāl and a number of other Ghilza'i leaders were captured and brought to Nādirābād. Nādir had Saidāl blinded, because he looked upon him as a dangerous man.²

On the 11th Muḥarram 1150 (11th May 1737), Nādir despatched Muḥammad Khān Turcomān, the former Ṣafavī general, on a mission to Muḥammad Shāh. The reason for this mission was that, when an Iranian detachment had defeated some Ghilza'is a few <u>farsakhs</u> beyond Qalāt, and the survivors had fled over the Indian frontier, the Mughal authorities made no attempt to stop them.³ Muḥammad Khān Turcomān had orders not to remain for more than 40 days at the Mughal Court, but, as will be seen later, he was detained there for over a year.

Meanwhile, bodies of Iranian troops were operating in Balūchistān, where PIr Muḥammad and Asilmas Khān had been sent earlier in the year to quell a revolt. Owing to a quarrel between PIr Muḥammad and Asilmas Khān, the former, on one

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1 Gombroon Diary (Volume V, 1st March 1738.
2 T.N., page 181.
3 The text of Nadir's letter to the Emperor is quoted in the
anonymous Sahifa-yi-Iqbal, B.M., MS. OR.3281, foll.71(a)
The MS. also quotes the Emperor's reply which
was drafted, but never, apparently, sent.
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3 T.N., page 190.

occasion, refused to go to the latter's assistance, with the result that a number of Iranian troops perished. When the facts were reported to Nādir, he ordered PIr Muḥammad to be beheaded.¹

Muḥabbat Khān and Imtiyāz Khān, two of the sons of the late Brahoi chieftain, Abdullah Khān, reached Nādir's court some time in the summer of 1737, and were well treated by him, Muḥabbat Khan being made Governor of Balūchistān.²

The operations against the Afghans of ZamIndāvar were not attended with success at first, partly owing to the treachery of some Afghans, and it was not until the end of January 1738 that the district was completely subdued.³

To return to the siege of Qandahār. Owing to the great strength of the defences, Nādir made no attempt to deliver an assault until the 30th January 1738, when his troops captured part of the outer fortifications and, what was far more important, some towers on the Qaitūl ridge. One of these towers, which was built of stone, was near the Chihil Zīna, at the eastern end of the ridge,⁴ and overlooked Qandahār. The Iranian troops hauled mortars and cannon up to this point, whence they bombarded the city.⁵

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1 T.N., page 182.
2 ibidem.
3 T.N., page 185.
4 ibidem.
5 ibidem.
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As some of his Bakhtiārī troops had repeatedly asked leave to deliver an attack, Nādir allowed 300 of them, together with 300 Chamishgazak Kurds and a like number of Abdālīs to carry out an assault on the 13th March. Husain, however, had received word of the impending attack and had concentrated his troops at the threatened point; the result was that the assailants were repelled with the loss of 200 killed and wounded.¹

Ten days later, Nādir decided to launch another assault, this time with between 3,000 and 4,000 picked men (including many Bakhtiārīs, who had volunteered again). On the night of the 2nd Dhu'l-Hijja (22nd/23rd March), whilst his troops were taking up their positions wherever they could find cover, Nādir ascended to the tower near the Chihil Zīna, in order to witness the delivery of the assault the next day.

After the midday prayer the signal was given, and the BakhtiārIs rushed forward towards a strong tower, which they scaled by means of ladders and captured. Another strong position then fell to the assailants and this success led, in turn, to the capture of the walls, gates and remaining towers of the fortress.²

Husain Sultan managed to escape with his haram

- ¹ T.N., page 186. See also the Durra-yi-Nadira, page 162. Jones (Vol.XI, page 406) incorrectly states that the attackers numbered 300 in all.
- ² T.N., page 187. Both Anand Ram Mukhlis and Otter (Vol.I, page 336) ascribe the fall of Qandahar to treachery.

and a few followers to another fort which still held out,¹ but the rest of his adherents were either killed in the final onslaught or taken prisoners.

Nādir brought his cannon to bear upon Husain Sulțān's place of refuge, with the result that the Ghilza'i leader, on the following day, sent his elder sister Zainab, together with a number of Ghilza'i chiefs, to beg Nádir for quarter; this action, as Mīrzā Mahdī explains, was in accordance with the Afghan custom of <u>nannawāt</u>.² Nādir respected this custom, and granted Husain Sulțān and his family and followers their lives; soon afterwards he despatched them all to Māzandarān.

Nādir found imprisoned in Qandahār his former foe Dhu'l-Fiqār Khān, the Abdālf leader, and his younger brother Aḥmad; the two brothers had fled from Herat to Qandahār, but had been seized and thrown into prison by Husain. After making Dhu'l-Fiqār and his brother a grant from his treasury for their sustenance, Nādir sent them to Māzandarān.³

- 1 T.N., page 187. MFzā Mahdī falls into error here, for he states that Husain Sultān took refuge "at Qaitūl which is on the top of a mountain on the <u>south</u> side of the fortress". Sir J. Sarkar, on the authority of the Adāt-i-Alamgīrī, says that Qaitūl is the name of the ridge to the <u>north</u> of the fortress. (See his "History of Aurangzib", Vol.I, page 126).
- ² T.N., page 188. Mīrzā Mahdī described this custom as being equivalent to that of the Arabs which is known as <u>dakhīl</u> (the phrase أَنَّ رَضِل فَلَانَ means "I am under the protection of so-and-so"). See also Elphinstone's explanation of the term in his "Account of the Kingdom of Caubul", (London 1839 Vol.I, page 295).
- ³ T.N., page 188. See also Abdu'l-Karīm Alavī's Bukhari's "Tā'rīkh-i-Ahmad", page 4, where it is stated that Nādir treated Dhu'l-Fiqār and Ahmad with great kindness.

Nādir then gave orders for the fortress of Qandahār to be rased to the ground¹ and for the surviving inhabitants to move to Nādirābād, which he made capital of the province of Qandahār. 'Abdu'l-Ghanī Khān was made Governor of the province and other Abdālī chiefs were appointed Governors of Girishk, Bust and Zamīndāvar. The Abdālī tribesmen who were settled at Nīshāpūr and elsewhere in Khurāsān were brought <u>en masse</u> to Qandahār (where they had formerly lived) and were given the lands of the Hotiki Ghilza'is², while the latter were transferred to Khurāsān; here they were granted the lands which the Abdālīs had just given up.³ A considerable number of young Ghilza'is were enrolled in Nādir's bodyguard instead of being transported to Khurāsān.

Ridã Qulí Mírzā had taken up his duties as Governor of Khurāsān on his arrival in that province from the Mughan plain in the spring of 1736. As ^cAlī Mardān Afshār, the Governor of Andkhud, had disobeyed Nādir's orders, the young Prince, having collected a force of some 12,000 men, set out for Andkhud via Bākharz in April or May 1737, with the object of punishing him.⁴ When the Prince was nearing Andkhud,

 The walls of the fortress were so solidly constructed that this order could only be partially carried out. Even in 1934 much of these walls could still be seen, and part of the citadel was still standing.
 Husain Sultan belonged to the Hotiki clan of the Ghilza'is.
 T.N., page 188 and Ta'rIkh-i-Ahmad, page 4.
 T.N., pages 170 and 182. the Afshārs of that town seized All Mardān and surrendered the place; All Mardān and his associates were then sent to Qandahār for punishment.

Ridā Qulī went on from Andkhud to Aghcha, which surrendered to him on the 29th June. Two days later the young Prince advanced on Balkh, where the Governor attempted resistance, but surrendered after a siege lasting three days. All the Özbeg and other chiefs in the Balkh district then submitted to the Prince, as did the people of Qundūz; Ridā Qulī then annexed the whole province of Balkh to the empire.¹

Although he had received no orders to go beyond the Oxus, Ridā Qulf crossed that river and advanced on Bukhārā via Qarshi. Abu'l-Faid Khān,² the Khān of Bukhārā, having obtained help from Ilbārs,³ the ruler of Khwārazm, attempted to bar Ridā Qulf's progress. Although the Prince was very considerably outnumbered, he boldly attacked and defeated the combined forces of Bukhārā and Khwārazm.⁴

- 1 T.N., page 183. For reasons which will be explained later, Balkh was not formally annexed to Iran until Nādir went to Bukhārā in person, after his Indian campaign.
- ² Abu'l-Faid Khan, the son of Subhan Quli Khan, was a descendant of Chingiz Khan. He was a man of weak character and was a mere puppet in the hands of his capable and ambitious chief minister, Muhammad Rahim BI, of the family of Manqit. See A. Vambery's "History of Bokhara", London, 1873, page 338.
- ³ Ilbars Khan Qazaq, the ruler of Khwarazm, also claimed descent from ChingIz Khan. Unlike Abu'l-Faid, he was a resolute and truculent chief.

⁴ T.N., page 183.

When Nādir received news of his son's advance beyond the Oxus and his attack on the forces of Abu'l-Faid, he despatched orders to him to cease fighting and to return to Balkh. Nādir sent word to Abu'l-Faid that he recognised his sovereign rights over Bukhārā, as a descendant of ChingIz Khān and as a Turcoman, and that he had ordered his son to cease making war upon him.¹

In-response to a summons from Nadir, the Turkish Ambassador and his suite, who had reached Isfahan from Constantinople at the end of July 1737, left the former city for Qandahar at the beginning of February 1738, accompanied by 'Abdu'l-Baol Khan. The two Ambassadors arrived at Nādirābād on the 9th May, 1738.² The letter from the Sultan which Mustafa Pasha delivered to Nadir offered excuses for his inability to recognise the Ja^cfari sect or to agree to the erection of a fifth pillar in the Ka'ba; it was also stated that the sending of the Iranian pilgrims via Syria might prove a cause The Sultan therefore begged Nadir to excuse his of trouble. acceptance of the first two points; as to the third, he suggested that the Iranian pilgrims should proceed to Mecca via Najaf, in which case he would arrange for their protection and well-being en route.3

Nadir informed the Turkish Ambassador and his advisers that the questions of the Ja'fari sect and of the

ī	T.N.,	page	184.
2	· n	11	189.
3	1	Ħ	189.

198.

fifth pillar for the Ka^cba were, in his view, the most important part of the treaty. He then appointed Alf Mardān Khān, the Governor of Faili Luristān, as his Ambassador to Turkey, who was to travel back with the Turks and discuss the matter further at Constantinople.¹ According to Otter,² Nādir, when giving his last audience to Mustafā Khān charged him to give a faithful account to his sovereign of all that he had seen, and to assure the Sultān that he would have news of him as soon as he returned from India. 'Ali Mardān Khān and the members of the Turkish mission left Nādirābād for Constantinople on the 1st Şafar (21st May)³.

It is possible that Nādir deliberately kept the religious controversy alive, so as to be able to use it as a pretext for again attacking Turkey, whenever it suited his purpose to do so.

T.N., page 189.
 Otter, Vol.I, page 225.
 T.N., page 189.

CHAPTER XV.

The Invasion of India. I. Qandahar to Karnal.

As already stated! Muhammad Khān Turcomān, in May 1737, was sent post-haste to the Mughal Court with a letter from Nadir² respecting the failure of the Emperor to close the Indian frontier to Afghan fugitives; the envoy was under orders to limit his stay at Delhi to 40 days. When Muhammad Khan delivered this letter, the Emperor and his ministers were perplexed; if they replied to Nadir's letter, by what title should he be addressed?³ Instead of deciding this question, they resolved to return no answer until the result of the siege of Qandahar became known. Moreover, despite the remonstrances of Muhammad Khān, they refused to give him leave to depart. A whole year thus passed, and when, after the fall of Gandahar, there was still no news of Muhammad Khan, Nadir sent emphatic orders to him to return at once and to bring whatever reply the Emperor might wish to give 4

1 See page 192 above.

- For the text of this letter, see the anonymous MS. Sahīfa-yi-Iqbal (BM. OR. 3281) fol. 71(a)-73(a): this MS. also gives what purports to be the Emperor's reply, but this, if authentic, could have been nothing more than a draft, since it is known that no answer was sent.
- ³ Shaikh Hazin, page 286; Siyar, page 470; Bayan, fol. 15(a).
 ⁴ T.N., page 190.

Without waiting for an answer to this message, Nādir set out from Nādirābād for Ghazna on the 21st May 1738, and crossed the Indian frontier, apparently at or near Mūkūr¹, a few days later. Thus began the invasion of India.

Nadir nevertheless kept up the semblance of friendship with the Emperor for some time to come, and excused his violation of the frontier on the grounds that he merely wished It is highly probable, however, to punish the Afghan fugitives. that Nadir's expressed desire to punish the Afghans was merely a pretext, and that he had for some time harboured the design of conquering India. The almost continual campaign of the past few years had caused famine in Iran and had brought her to the verge of bankruptcy, besides rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain sufficient recruits to replace casualties and wastage. Nadir had doubtless realised that, under such circumstances, he could not hope to succeed in his design of marching to the Bosphorus. As Iran could not meet his requirements, he must look elsewhere; he could recruit the manpower he wanted from among the warlike Afghans and Özbegs. but that would be impossible without money. India, it must have seemed, offered the only solution to the problem. The ambassadors whom Nadir had sent on several occasions to that country must, on their return, have informed him of the enormous wealth, as well as the increasing weakness, of the

¹ The T.N. (page 191) gives the name of the place where the frontier was crossed as Chashma-yi-Makhmur, which cannot now be identified.

Mughal Empire! With the spoils of India, he could raise and pay his Afghan and Özbeg levies, and so renew his war with Turkey; besides, by invading the Panjāb, he would be following the example of Alexander the Great, Mahmūd of Ghazna and Tīmūr, and thereby merit the title of "World Conqueror".

Another reason for the invasion, according to a number of contemporary historians and writers, both Indian² and European3 is that Nādir entered India at the invitation

² See, in particular, the Jauhar-i-Samsam of Muhammad Muhsin SiddIqi; the writer was, however, a zealous supporter of Samsāmu'd-Daula Khān Daurān, the Ámīru'l-Umarā or Commander-in-Chief of the Mughal army and one of the leaders of the 'Hindustani' party. Khan Dauran was very hostile to the Nizāmu'l-Mulk who was a prominent member of the rival 'Central Asian' faction at the Court (feeling between these two parties was very intense). The accusation is also made in Rustam Ali's Tarikh-i-Hindi (B.M. MS. OR. 1628, fol.281(b)), but it is qualified by the words "it is said that" . . . See also the 'Halat-i-Nadir Shah' by Amra Chandiri (I.O. MS.4008), 'Nadir Var' (a ballad on Nadir's invastion) by Nijabat, a Haral Rajput (see the paper read by R.B. Pandit Hari Kishan Kaul before the Panjab Historical Society on the 26th September 1916), and Tilok Das's Hindi poem (see W. Irvine's annotated translation in the J.R.A.S. 1897, Vol. LXVI).

³ Fraser, pp. 129-133; Otter, Vol. I, page 355; Hanway, Vol. IV, page 142. Belief in the Nizāmu'l-Mulk's guilt was certainly very widespread; that it was by no means confined to India is evidenced by a remark made to J. Otter in 1743 by the Kiahya of Mosul. Wishing to imply that Ahmad Pāshā was in collusion with Nādir, the Kiahya said: "N'y auroit il pas parmi nous un second Nizam ul-Mulk, qui trahit le Grand Seigneur, et fait venir le Roi (Nādir) contre nous". (See Otter, Vol. II, page 365). Dr. Jadunath Prasad, in his (unpublished) thesis entitled "The Life and Career of Mīr Qamaru'd-Dīn, Nizāmu'l-Mulk Asaf Jah I", is, however, convinced of his innocence.

¹ Anand Rām, in his Tadhkira (vol.163(b)), says that "the train had long been laid and from these negotiations (i.e. the various missions from Nādir to Muhammad Shāh) sprang the spark that fired it". He adds that the above was merely the apparent motive for the invasion, and that the true reason was the weakness of the Mughal monarchy.

of the Nizāmu'l-Mulk, the veteran Viceroy of the Deccan; it has also been asserted that Sa'ādat Khān, the Subadār of Oudh, was jointly responsible with the Nizāmu'l-Mulk for inviting Nādir to come! It is by no means impossible that either or both of these nobles may, indeed, have been guilty of treason. Chin Qilich Khān, the Nizāmu'l-Mulk, was of Central Asian extraction, and Sa'ādat Khān was an Iranian by birth? consequently, neither may have had any deep feeling of loyalty to the Mughal state. On the other hand, the charge against them has never been, and now probably never will be, proved; the only way that that could be done would be to produce the incriminating letters that are alleged to have been exchanged.

Hanway, it appears, is fully justified in remarking? "It appears to me highly probable that Nādir did not stand in need of such instruments (i.e. the Nizāmu'l-Mulk) for the execution of his ambitious designs".

After crossing the Indian frontier, the Iranian Army halted for a few days at Qarabagh, 37 miles south-west

Risāla-yi-Muhammad Shāh (B.M. MS. OR 180, foll. 106(b)-107(b)); the anonymous author of this work was (like Muhammad Muhsin Siddīqī) a warm supporter of Khān Daurān.

² For Sa'ādat Khān's antecedents, see the 'Imādu's-Sa'ādat, fol. 6(a), and the recent work by Dr. Srivastava, entitled "The First Two Nawabs of Oudh", Lucknow, 1933, pages 5-30.
³ Vol. IV, page 142.

of Ghazna. When the Governor of Ghazna heard of Nadir's arrival at Qarabagh, he abandoned his post and fled to Kabul; the <u>gadis</u>, <u>ulama</u>, and notables of the town, however, came in a body to Qarabagh, and submitted to Nadir!

Ghazna was reached on the 22nd Safar (11th June), and from there the army went on towards Kābul. Soon after leaving Ghazna, Nādir sent the following message to the Kotwāl of Kābul:

> "We are not concerned with the Kingdom of Muhammad Shah, but since these frontiers are like a mine (<u>ma dan</u>) of Afghans and numbers of fugitives have also joined them, it is (our) intention to extirpate these people. Be not anxious for yourselves, but undertake the obligations of hospitality."²

Nāṣir Khản, the Ṣubadār of Kābul and Peshāwar, when faced with the task of repelling the invaders, appealed to Delhi for money to pay his troops?

When Nādir's army arrived within two stages of Kābul, a deputation, consisting of the notables of the city, came out and made their submission to him. However, Sharza Khān, the commander of the citadel, offered resistance, and held out until the end of June⁴.

1 T.N., page 191.

² Shaikh Hazin, page 287.

- ⁵ Ghulām Husain blames Khān Daurān for the relatively defenceless state of the province of Kābul. Had Khān Daurān, he says, attended to his duties, Nādir would not have wished to come to India or he would not, at any rate, have had such facility in coming. Ghulām Husain describes Nāsir Khān as a man who, when he was not hunting, was engaged in his devotions and in reading the Qu'rān. (Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirin, page 469)
- ⁴ T.N., page 192. Nasir Khan was not in Kabul at the time of Nadir's approach; as will be seen below, he was engaged in collecting a force to defend the Khaibar Pass.

On the 14th July Nädir sent an envoy to Muhammad Khān with a long message complaining of his behaviour and stating that he (Nādir) had come to Kābul with the sole object of punishing the Afghans; the people of Kābul having resisted him, he had been obliged to punish them. Nādir concluded by expressing his friendship for the Emperor! The envoy leftfof Delhi in company with some notables of Kābul; when the party reached Jalālābād, they were stopped by the Governor and the envoy was slain; the Kābulīs were, however, sent on to Peshawar?

Since provisions were scarce at Kābul, Nādir took his army some forty miles northwards, to the fertile district of Charikār, in the Kūhistān, where food and fodder were to be had in abundance. After a halt of 22 days in this district, the army left for Gandamak on the 5th September; on reaching Gandamak, Nādir stormed the mountain fastnesses of the local tribesmen⁴. A punitive expedition was then sent on in advance, to Jalālābād, where it avenged the murder of the Iranian envoy.

⁻ T.N., page 193.

² T.N., page 194. Shaikh Hazin states (pp. 288 and 289) that Nadir sent a trooper accompanied by ten horsemen on this errand. At Jalaabad they were set upon by a mob and all but one were killed; the survivor managed to escape to Kabul.

³ T.N., page 194. The town of Charikar stands on the site of Alexandria, which was founded by Alexander the Great in the Spring of 329 B.C.

⁴ The names of these tribes are not given. It is stated by Anand Ram (fol. 164(b)) that the Safi Afghans offered much resistance to Nadir.

Nadir and his main force thereupon advanced to Bahar Sufla¹, a few miles S.W. of Jalalabad, where Rida Qull, in response to a summons from his father, joined the latter on the 7th November, having travelled from Balkh via the Qunduz (Badakhshan) district?

After reviewing the troops from Balkh whom Ridā Quli Mirzā had brought with him, Nādir made the young prince Viceroy of Iran "with power to dismiss and appoint Governors and (other) persons of authority"? A few days later, at the beginning of Shaʿbān (l4th November), Nādir placed the diadem on the head of his second son Naṣru'llah and gave orders that he and each of his other sons should, in the manner of kings, wear the jiga on the right side, instead of the left.⁴ On the Jrd Shaʿbān Ridā Quli took leave of his father and returned to Iran, and on the following day Nādir and his army set out for Jalālābād, outside which place they camped six days later.⁵ On leaving Jalālābād, Nādir sent forward 12,000 men to act as an advance guard, with orders to keep two stages ahead of the main force,

In the meantime Nasir Khan, though he had received no assistance from Delhi in response to his appeal, had collected a considerable force of Afghans of the districts of of Peshawar and the Khaibar, whom he stationed in the Khaibar Pass⁶,

- ³ T.N., page 195.
- 🗄 ibidem.
- ⁵ For the shortage of provisions experienced here, see Brosset's translation of a letter which an Armenian correspondent sent to Kalushkin from Jalalabad. H. de la G. Vol.II.Part II,p.369.
 ⁶ This force, according to the T.N., (page 196) was 20,000 strong. See also Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirin, page 471.

¹ Bahār Sufla is, apparently, identical with Bahār Pā'īn.

² T.N., page 195.

apparently close to its eastern end, a few miles west of the fort of Jamrūd.

On hearing of the presence of this hostile force in the Khaibar Pass, Nādir adopted his favourite device of making a détour by an unfrequented route and falling upon his foe from an unexpected quarter. At the village of Barikāb, 20 miles east of Jalālābād, Nādir left his baggage and artillery in charge of Naṣru'llah Mīrzā, and set off himself, at the head of 30,000 cavalry, to the village of Siāh Chob², 9 miles to the S.S.E.

No further place names on this route are given by any of the contemporary authorities consulted, but it seems that Nādir and his men went on from Siāh Chob in an east-southeasterly direction towards the Tsatsobi pass. Irakli of Kakheti, who, with a number of Georgians accompanied Nādir on his Indian expedition, relates that, starting in the morning, they covered four <u>aghāch³</u> before halting in the evening, probably at

1 T.N., page 196. Barikab is known now as Barikao.

- ² Mīrzā Mahdī makes no mention of a guide, but Tambouri Aroutine, (page 188) says that, when Nādir was wondering how he was going to traverse the Khaibar Pass in the face of opposition from Nāşir Khān, a spy offered to guide the army by a difficult alternative route, which would bring Nādir and his men to a point an hour and a half or two hours' march beyond the place where Nāşir Khān and his force were awaiting him. See also Major H.R. James' 'Report on the Settlement of the Peshawar District' (Lahore, 1865, page 36) and the article entitled 'Friends and Foes' in the 'Pioneer Mail' (of Allahabad) of 23rd August 1885. Mirzā Mahdī gives scarcely any details; all he says (T.N., page 196) is that on the route via Seh Chūbá, there was a high mountain and that the road was very difficult to traverse owing to its steepness.
- ³ The Turkish <u>aghach</u> is equivalent to the <u>farsakh</u>.

some point near China, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles N.W. of the Tsatsobi pass. On Nadir arriving soon after, they went on again by moonlight: Irakli states that they soon entered a pass (the Tsatsobi) where the cold was very severe. Owing to the narrowness of the defile and the roughness of the track, there was great confusion, and it took 5 hours for the troops to traverse the pass, which was half an <u>aghach</u> in length!

Nādir continued his march into the Bāzār valley and must have passed through or near the village of Chora, 12 miles S.E. of the Tsatsobi pass. From Chora he doubtless followed the trend of the valley east and then north-east until within a few miles of Jamrūd; it appears that he entered the Khaibar pass either at its eastern end of else a mile or two further west, by scaling the intervening ridge between it and the Chora-Jamrūd route. Whichever he did, he and his men, though they must have been much fatigued by their long march of some 48 miles² came up to Nāṣir Khān's position, and attacked it so fiercely that the Indo-Afghan force, after suffering heavy losses, was driven back to Jamrūd and Peshawar, leaving Nāṣir Khān and a

See the letter from Irakli II of Kakheti to his sister Anna (H. de la G., Vol. II, Part II, page 355). Irakli, who had joined Nadir at Qandahar shortly before his father Taimuraz had been allowed to return to Georgia, accompanied Nadir on his Indian expedition (for further details, see Brosset's translation of Irakli's 'Life' by Oman Kherkhéoulidze, in H. de la G., Vol. II, Part II, pages 206 and 207).

² MIrzā Mahdī (T.N., page 196) gives the length of this march as 30 <u>farsakhs</u> which, taking into account the shortness of the <u>farsakh</u> in mountainous country, is very much the same. number of other officers and men prisoners in the hands of the Iranians!

The advance on Peshawar was resumed three days after this battle, by which time the main portion of the army and the baggage and artillery had had time to come up via the Khaibar Pass. Dismayed by the defeat and capture of Nāsir Khān, the people of Peshawar offered no resistance to Nādir's forces.

Nadir remained for nearly four weeks at Peshawar; whilst he was there, the unwelcome news arrived of the death of his brother Ibrahim Khan at Kakh, in Shirvan, at the hands of the LazgIs?

Before continuing on his way, Nādir despatched a strong force to ravage the country between Peshawar and the Indus and to construct a bridge of boats over that river at Attock. On receiving word that this bridge was completed, $\frac{1}{2}$ T.N., page 196; Anand Rām, fol.165(a).

T.N., page 196. In consequence of a succession of Lazgi raids into Georgia and Shirvan, Ibrahim, in the late summer of 1738, collected a force of Iranian and Kartian troops, and penetrated into the Lazgi district of Jar, which he devastated. Whilst Ibrahim Khan was on his way back, the Lazgis rallied, and fell upon his army, killing him and a large number of others, and putting the remainder to flight. Amongst the survivors was King Taimuraz, who had but recently returned from Qandahar. See Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G., Vol. II, Part II, page 53.

³ "Daniel Moginié" (S.H. Maubert de Gouvest), in his book 'L'Illustre Paisan', (Lausanne, 1754), page 160, asserts that a French engineer named Bonal (who had, he says, joined Nādir at Tiflis in 1735) constructed this bridge. Moginiés work, however, is so highly imaginative in places that one hesitates to accept as correct any of his statements (such as this) which are not corroborated by other authorities. Sir Alexander Burnes, in his 'Travels to Bukhara', Vol. I, pages 267 and 268, states that these floating bridges over the Indus could be completed in from three to six days; such bridges could only be thrown across the Indus from November to April. Nadir left Peshawar on the 25th Ramadan (6th January, 1739)¹ and had reached the further bank of the Indus with all his forces by the 4th Shawwal (15th January). From this point the Iranian army headed for Wazirabad, and crossed the Jhelum (which, like the other rivers of the Panjab, was low at that season) without difficulty?

Near the small fortress of Kunja Mazra, situated 12 miles N.W. of WazIrābād, at a road-junction, the Iranian advance was opposed by 5,000 to 6,000 men of the Lahore forces, under the command of Qalandar Khān. The Indians were driven back to the fortress, which was then taken; Qalandar Khān and many of his men were killed.

The Iranian advance was then resumed, and the Chenāb was crossed in safety. The Iranian army advanced upon, and

- Anand Rām, fol. 166(a). According to the Bombay edition of the T.N. (page 197), Nādir left Peshawar on the 15th Ramadān; Anand Rām seems more likely to be correct, because 33 days appears rather an undue amount of time for his army to take to get from Peshawar to the further side of the Indus.
- ² T.N., page 197.
- ³ The text of the TarIkh-i-NādirI is obscure here (page 197); it gives the name of the fortress as Kāchha MIrzā "on that (i.e. the east) side of the river of WazIrābād" (i.e. the Chenāb). No fortress called Kāchha Mirza can be traced; Sir J. Sarkar, in a personal letter to me, expresses the view that 'Kāchha MIrzā' is a mistake for Kunja Mazra; as to the words أَنْ مَرْضَ آَنْ مَرْضَ ('that') should read أَنْ مَرْضَ اللَّهُ ('this') or that the account was written at Delhi, when أَنْ مَرْضَ اللَّهُ ('that side'), would mean the <u>western</u> side of the Chenāb. This explanation seems better than the one which I had previously had in mind, namely that Kāchha MIrzā was at a point somewhere near Kāchha Sarai (which, according to the Manāzil-i-Futuh (fol. 8(b)) was 10 coss from YamInābād, on the road to WazIrābād.

sacked, WazIrābād, and it inflicted the same fate upon Yamīnābād (Eminābad) and other places on the line of march!

From Yamīnābād Nādir marched to the Degh Nala which he may have crossed by the Shāh Daula bridge? It was here that he is said to have heard that Zakariyā Khān, the Governor of Lahore, had made a strongly fortified position on the banks of the Ravi to the north of the city, on the direct line of his approach? Nādir, instead of marching direct on Lahore, turned due east for a time, in order to outflank the Indian position on the Ravi. At Mulkpūr(or Mubārakpūr)⁴ the Iranians sighted and then engaged a strong body of Indian troops under the Zamīndār of Adīnanagar⁵ who were marching to the assistance of Zakariyā Khān. The

Anand Rām, fol. 167(b). The lot of the inhabitants of the Panjāb was indeed pitiable, for, besides suffering severely at the hands of the Iranians, they were preyed upon by thousands of highway robbers who made their appearance in these troubled times (Shaikh HazIn, page 292); moreover, those who fled to the hills for safety were there despoiled by the Sikhs (see Malcolm's "Sketch of the Sikhs" in Asiatick Researches, (Calcutta, 1810), Vol. XI, page 238 and J. Browne's "History of the Origin and Progress of the Sicks" in his India Tracts (London, 1788), page 13.

² See note 4 below.

⁵ Anand Ram fol. 167(b) and Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirin, page 472.

 ⁴ Mīrzā Mahdī states that Mulkpūr was 6 coss from Lahore. Professor Sarkar considers that Mulkpur should read
 ⁴ Mubārakābād', which is a place 9 miles north of Lakodehr. If this is correct, it seems unlikely that Nādir crossed the Degh Nala by the Shāh Daula bridge; it is probable that he crossed that river further upstream.

⁵ This name is given as AdInagar by Mirzā Mahdi (page 197); but it is evidently Adinanagar (now called Dinanagar, 75 miles E.N.E. of Lahore and 8 miles N.N.E. of Gurdaspur).

Indians were defeated, but a number succeeded in reaching Lahore. The Iranian army crossed the Ravi near Lakodehr! Soon after, battle was joined with the forces of Zakariya Khan which, according to Shaikh HazIn, consisted of 14,000 to 15,000 cavalry and a number of militia? Yahya Khān, the Governor's eldest son, managed to cut his way through the Iranian ranks, and hastened to the Emperor's camp with the news? On the following day (22nd January), the battle was resumed, but ZakarIya Khan, because of the inadequacy of his forces and the failure of the Emperor's generals to afford him any support, soon realised that he could not resist any longer, and asked for quarter. Nādir returned a favourable answer, and ordered 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan, on the 23rd January, to meet Zakariyā Khān and to conduct him to his presence⁴ On the Governor's arrival, Nadir treated him with great honour and respect. Two days later Nadir again received Zakariya Khan; on this occasion the latter handed over to the conqueror 20 lakhs of rupees in gold, several elephants and other gifts?

By making his submission and paying

ditto.

According to Anand Rām, Nādir wheeled to the <u>right</u>, after crossing the Degh Nala and outflanked the Indians by marching to the <u>west</u> of their position. In view of what has been said above, this could not have been the case. In this connection, see Irakli's letter to his sister (H. de la G., Vol. II. Part II, page 35), and Sir Alexander Burnes "Travels to Bokhara", Vol. II, page 16.

² Shaikh Hazîn, page 293. Muhammad Muhsin SiddIqI, in the Jauhar-i-Şamsām, fol. 6(a), states that ZakarIyā Khānhad 40,000 horsemen. With his usual bias, he adds that ZakarIyā Khān, owing to his understanding with the Nizāmu'l-Mulk, made no serious attempt to stop Nādir's progress. (See also Otter Vol. I, page 374). Shākir Khān, in his "Tadhkira" fol. 41(a) makes a similar allegation, adding that Saʿādat Khān was jointly responsible with the Nizāmu'l-Mulk for giving the instructions to ZakarIyā Khān not to oppose Nadir.
³ Anand Rām, fol. 167(b). this ransom, Zakariyā Khān was enabled to save Lahore from being sacked!

Nadir remained for 12 days in Lahore, where he behaved as though he were already master of India. He allowed Zakariyā Khān to retain his position as Governor of Lahore, and he gave orders for the reinstatement of Fakhru'd-Daula, the ex-Governor of Kashmir, who, after being driven out of his province by a rebellion, had been deprived of office and was living in poverty in Lahore. Nadir also confirmed Nāsir Khān, his former opponent, as Subadār of Kābul and Peshawar?

During Nādir's stay in Lahore news was received of the Emperor's efforts to gather together an army to oppose him. Nādir, on receiving this news, addressed a letter to the Emperor? Nādir began by mentioning the Turcomān origin of the Emperor and himself and stated that he had nothing but friendly feelings in his mind. He then referred to the Afghans, saying that, as India had suffered even more than Iran at the hands

Anand Ram, fol.168(a). Tilok Das, however, asserts that Lahore was sacked, but his poem cannot be regarded as possessing any real historical value.

2 T.N., page 197.

³ T.N., page 198. This letter is not in Jones' translation or in the present writer's MS. Shaikh Hazin (page 295) states: "Twice or thrice from Lâhôr also, before he came up with the Indian army, Nâdir Shâh sent a message to Muhammad Shâh to expedite the return to him of his ambassador Mohammed Khân. But although they carried his ambassador along with them on their march, they would not grant him his congé; and at that time it did not appear, what their design could be in keeping him." of that race, it would seem natural that the Indian ministers should wish to punish them. He repeated his statements regarding the Emperor's treatment of his envoys, and concluded by warning Muhammad Shāh that, if he went to war, the Indian Army would feel the strength of his army. If, however, the survivors submitted, he would pardon them.

Nadir left Lahore on the 26th Shawwal (6th February) and marched to Sirhind, where he arrived ten days later! At Sirhind Nadir heard that Muḥammad Shāh had reached Karnal with an army of 300,000 men, 2,000 elephants and a large number of cannon?

It is now necessary to describe what had, in the meanwhile, been happening at the Mughal Court. When the news of Nādir's capture of Kābul reached Delhi, "no one listened to a word or if he listened, he did not understand."³ However, on reports being received of Nādir's continued progress, the Emperor summoned the Nizāmu'l-Mulk from the Deccan to advise him. When the Nizāmu'l-Mulk reached the Court, he found that his enemy Khān Daurān, the leader of the Hindustani party, was allpowerful, being in command of the army and possessing much influence over the feeble Emperor; consequently, any advice which the Nizāmu'l-Mulk offered received but scant attention,

I T.N., page 198. See also Ghulām Ali Khān's Muqaddama-yi-Shāh 'Alam Nāma, fol. 59(b) (B.M. MS. Addl. 24028) 2 T.N., page 199. 3 Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirin, page 471. and little or nothing was done! There was much talk of setting out to repel the invader, but no attempt was made to send assistance to Zakariya Khān. At the beginning of Ramadān (13th December 1738) Khān Daurān, Qamaru'd-Din Khān, the I^c timadu'd-Daula, and the Nizāmu'l-Mulk marched out of Delhi at the head of the army, but they proceeded no further than the Shālimār gardens where they camped for the rest of the month? Khān Daurān, it is true, wrote to Sawai Jai Singh and other Rajput leaders? on whose bravery he set much store, but, as Sir J. Sarkar points out:

"Rajputana had been hopelessly alienated since Aurangzib's time, and Jai Singh and other chieftains were now aiming at political salvation by declaring their independence and calling in the Mahrattas to help in dissolving the Empire. The Rajahs made excuses and delayed coming."⁴

The Emperor even went so far as to appeal to the Peshwa Baji Rao, but "reliance on the Mahrattas, even if seriously contemplated, proved like leaning on a broken reed."⁵ A summons was then sent to Sa^cādat Khān Burhānu'l-Mulk, the Subadār of Oudh, who, in response thereto, set out to join the Emperor in the third week of January, 1739⁶.

	At the beginning of Shawwal (12th January), when the
	Rustam Ali (fol. 282(a)) states that when Khan Dauran suggested any plan, the Nizāmu'l-Mulk opposed him, and vice versa.
.2	Anand Ram, fol. 168(b).
2	Siyarmu'l-Muta'akhkhirin, page 472.
4	Sir J. Sarkar's "Nādir Shāh in India", page 31.
5	ibidem, page 32.
6	Dr. A.L. Srivastava, <u>op. cit</u> ., page 63.

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news reached Delhi of the arrival at the Indus of the force which Nädir had sent on in advance, the Mughal army at last set out, but its progress was so leisurely that it took a month to cover the four stages from the Shalimar gardens to Karnāl. In response to urgent requests by the Nizāmu'l-Mulk and Khān Daurān, the Emperor himself left Delhi on the 18th Shawwal (29th January), and reached Panipat, 20 miles south of Karnal, on the 27th of that month (7th February); he arrived at Karnal a few days later. It had originally been intended to advance beyond Karnal, but, as the plain just to the north of that town was a suitable camping-ground, being plentifully provided with water by the Ali Mardan canal and protected by thick jungle to the north, and as it was deemed expedient to await the arrival of Sa adat Khan and the contingent from Oudh? the Indian commanders proceeded no further. A mud wall was constructed round the camp, the eastern side of which was bounded by the Ali Mardan canal. Guns were mounted at intervals on the wall round the camp which is said to have been fourteen miles in circumference⁴

The numbers of combatants in the Indian camp are

1 Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirin, page 472.

² Anand Rām (fol. 168(b)) states that when the news was received that Nādir Shāh had reached the Indus, the Indian commanders urged the Emperor to advance against the invaders.

³ Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirin, page 472.

⁴ Journal of MIrza Zaman (Fraser, page 152). Hanway (Vol. IV, page 159) states that "some writers mention it as twelve miles".

variously given, ranging from only 80,000 to the fantastic figure of 1,200,000; it is probable that the former figure is close to the truth. If, however, the numbers of noncombatants are taken into account, the total may, as Sir J. Sarkar suggests, have been nearly a million all told.

From Sirhind, Nādir sent out a force of 6,000 Kurdish cavalry, under Hājjī Khān² to reconnoitre the Indian position. On the next day the army set out for Ambala via Rāja Sarai. Leaving his baggage and <u>haram</u> at Ambala, Nādir marched to Shāhābād, 35 miles north of Karnal on the 19th February. That same night the Kurdish patrols whom Nādir had sent out from Sirhind came into contact with the Indian forces, and a number of Indian troops were killed and others captured? The Kurdish patrols then fell back to Sarai ⁶Azīmābād, a village 23 miles south of Shāhābād and 12 miles north of Karnāl; from this village they sent Nādir their report, together with some of the prisoners. The Shāh thereupon ordered these patrols to reconnoitre both to

the east and to the west of the enemy position4

- Ι MIrza Mahdi, as stated on page 214 above, gives the strength of this Indian host as 300,000 men. Sir J. Sarkar ("Nadir Shah in India", page 34) reduces this figure to 75,000 combatants. The French adventurer de Voulton, in his "Verdadeira e Exacta Noticia" (which the present writer translated from the Portuguese and published, together with an introduction and notes, in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, Vol. IV, Part II, pages 223-245), states that the Mughal army, <u>after</u> the battle of Karnal, consisted of 400,000 horsemen and 800,000 infantry. There is no doubt, however, that the number of camp-followers was exceptionally large, and that some writers, like de Voulton, may have erroneously included their numbers in the total of the fighting force. 2 see also Fraser, page 153. T.N., page 199; 3 The Indian commanders are said to have been T.N., page 199.
- most negligent as regards sending out patrols.
- ⁴ T.N., page 199.

On the 12th Dhu'l-Qa'da (21st February) Nādir moved forward and, marching via Tirawari, arrived at Sarai Azīmābād early in the morning of the 13th; here the Governor of Ambala put up a show of resistance for a time!

Nādir learnt from his scouts and from Indian prisoners of the strength of the Emperor's position, as well as of the existence, south of Sarai ⁶Azīmābād, of a belt of jungle, traversed by only one narrow road, extending for eight miles in the direction of Karnāl. It became clear to him that the only practicable course open to him was to make a détour to the east of Karnāl, which would enable him not only to outflank the enemy but also to avoid this belt of jungle. If Muhammad Shāh issued forth from his lines, he would give him battle on the plain, some 7 miles in width, stretching eastward from Karnāl to the Jumna; if, on the other hand, the Emperor elected to remain inactive behind his fortifications, he would march on to Pānipat and thence to Delhi²

No further advance was made on the 13th Dhu'l-Qa'da, but on the next morning (Monday, the 23rd February), Nādir left Sarai Azīmābād, led his troops across the Ali Mardān canal and, marching south-east for some miles, camped at a point apparently just to the north of the village of Kunjpura, which is situated $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles E.N.E. of Karnāl and a mile and a half west of the Jumna. Nādir, at the head of some of his body-guard, rode up close

2 ibidem.

¹ T.N. page 200.

to the Indian camp; after taking a careful note of the disposition of the enemy, he returned to his own camp!

Scouts reported to Nādir in the evening that Sa^cādat Khān, the Subadār of Oudh, who was on his way to reinforce the Emperor with 30,000 men, had reached Pānipat, 20 miles to the south of Karnāl? Nādir immediately despatched a strong force to intercept Sa^cādat Khān?

1 T.N., page 200.

- ² ibidem. See also Sir J. Malcolm's translation of Nadir's letter to Ridā Quli Mīrzā in "Asiatick Researches", Vol. X, page 542 (for reasons which will be given later, this letter has to be used with care as an authority.) According to this translation, the letter was written at Delhi on the 29th Dhu'l-Qa'da 1115 (sic). The Iranian text of this letter is given by Muhammad Bakhsh ("Ashūb") in his Tā'rīkh-i-Shahādat-i-Farrukh Siyar va Jalūs-i-Muhammad Shāh (India Office MS. No. 422), foll.309(b)-313(b). Ashūb says that this letter was drafted by Mīrzā Mahdī in the camp at Karnāl (not Delhi, as stated in the translation).
- ³ ibidem. In the Risala-yi-Muhammad Shah, fol. 106(b), it is stated that Sa^c adat Khan secretly sent word to Nadir of his coming.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Invasion of India. II. Karnal.

On the morning of the fateful 15th Dhu'l-Qa'da (24th February), Nādir split up his army into three divisions. He ordered Naşrullah Mirza, who at that time was in command of the left wing, to advance from the Jumna towards Karnāl,¹ while he himself, with a number of men, marched southwards between the Jumna and the 'AIT Mardān canal in order to reconnoitre the enemy position and to inspect the field of battle. Whilst Nādir was so engaged, the troops whom he had despatched the previous evening to intercept Sa'ādat Khān returned, saying that the Subadār had managed to elude them by making a detour and that he had reached the Emperor's camp at midnight;² they had, however, pursued him and captured a number of his men, besides taking much booty.

- ¹ T. N., page 200. Mirza Mahdi says that Nadir ordered Nasrullah to advance towards Karnal "from the north side of the river Jumna". Sir J. Sarkar ("Nadir Shah in India", page 37) takes this as meaning that the young Prince had crossed the Jumna, which, as he rightly observes, was unlikely. The explanation may be that Nasru'llah and his men had been advancing to, or posted at, some point close to where the village of Khirājpūr (1 mile E.N.E. of Kunjpūra) now stands; for a mile or so to the S.E. and S. of Khirājpūr, the Jumna flows from east to west before turning south again; thus, Nasru'llah, when at or near Khirājpūr, would have been <u>north</u> of the Jumna.
- ² T.N., page 201. 'Abdu'l-Karīm (Bayān, fol.16a.) and other authorities confirm that Sa'ādat Khān reached the Emperor's camp at this time. Rustam 'Alī (fol.283(a)) gives the strength of his force as only 20,000 men. Owing to a wound received three months before, Sa'ādat Khān was unable to ride a horse, and had either to be carried in a portable chair or to mount an elephant.

On hearing this news, Nādir halted, his position then being some three and a half miles to the east of the Indian camp;¹ here he was joined by Nasru'llah and his troops.²

In the meantime, Sa'ādat Khān had gone to pay his respects to Muhammad Shāh. During his audience word was brought to Sa'ādat Khān that the Qizilbāsh troops were plundering his baggage.³ Enfuriated by this news, Sa'ādat Khān took a hurried leave of the Emperor; despite all endeavours to restrain him, he called his men to arms, and rushed off to try and recover his baggage. His troops, who had been continually on the march for a whole month and who were unused to forced marches, were much fatigued, and but few responded to his call; nevertheless Sa'ādat Khān pressed impetuously on, though followed only by 1,000 cavalry and some hundreds of infantry.⁴

¹ T.N., page 201.

² ibidem.

- ⁹ Bayan, fol.16(b). Harcharan Dās, in his "Chahār Guldhar Shujā^ci" states that Muhammad Shāh had doubts as to Sa^cadat Khān's loyalty, and made him swear on the Qo'rān that he would be faithful (see fol.81a.) Harcharan Dās, like 'Abdu'l-Karîm, asserts (fol.82a.) that the news of the Qizilbāsh attack upon Sa^cādat Khān's baggage train reached him during his audience.
- ⁴ Abdu'l-Karīm states that many of Sa'ādat Khān's men believed that he was still with the Emperor, while others, putting the care of their horses before all else, refused to stir. (Bayān, fol.17(a)). Anand Rām (fol.169b.) says that Sa'ādāt Khān "with a headlong impetuosity misplaced in a commander, flew to the scene of action accompanied by only the few horsemen who were with him, without collecting his artillery or waiting to form his men in any kind of order."

When Sa'adat Khan and his small force emerged from the Indian lines, they encountered some Iranian patrols who were advancing from the opposite direction. The Iranians immediately feigned flight in the hope of luring Sa'adat Khan and his men further away from their lines.1 Sa^cādat Khan hastened after the retreating foe, and sent urgent appeals to the camp for reinforcements to enable him (as he imagined) to follow up his success. The Emperor wished to go in person to Sacadat Khan's assistance, but the Nizāmu'l-Mulk and Khān Dauran dissuaded him, saying that it would be a mistake to fight that day.²

The Emperor then asked the Nizāmu'l-Mulk for his advice, who replied that, as Khān Dauran was in command of the right wing and therefore nearest to Sa'adat Khan, he should go to the assistance of the last named.3 The Emperor agreed, and Khan Dauran accordingly set out, at the head of between 8,000 and 9,000 cavalry.⁴

Nadir, who, as Mirza MahdI remarks "had longed for such a day",⁵ donned a coat of mail and a helmet, and put

¹ Bayan, fol.17(a).

² ibidem, fol. 17(b).

Bayān, fol.18(a). According to Anand Rām (foll.169(b) and 170(a)), Khān Daurān, on receiving this order, said that the army had not expected to fight that day and that it would be better to wait till the morrow, when the artil-3 lery could be placed in the front. The Emperor was displeased at this answer, whereupon Khan Dauran, "who had the good of his master at heart", mounted his elephant, and set out.

⁴ Bayan, fol.18(a).

⁵ T.N., page 201. See also Asiatick Researches, Vol.X, page 543. 222.

himself at the head of 1,000 picked Afshār horsemen, in readiness to ride from place to place and direct the operations.¹ When Nādir heard of the advance of Sa'ādat Khān and Khān Daurān, he placed 3,000 of his men in ambush, and sent out two bodies of <u>jazāvirchīs</u>, each 500 strong, with orders to draw the enemy into the trap.²

Hanway states that Nàdir, in order to frighten the elephants of the Indians, ordered stagings to be carried by pairs of camels; on these stagings he had naphtha and other combustible materials placed, which were to be set on fire during the battle.³

It was one o'clock in the afternoon when the battle began. Sa^cādat Khān and his scanty force, who formed the Indian right wing, became heavily engaged with the Iranians at Kunjpūra. The <u>jazāvirchīs</u>, who had been posted behind the walls and buildings there, poured in a destructive fire.⁴ A little later on, Khān Daurān's division, which now constituted the Indian centre, came into action with the Iranian centre under Naşru'llah. A wide gap separated Khān Daurān's division from that of Sa^cādat Khān and a similar gap existed

¹ Fraser, (quoting Mīrzā Zamān's 'Journal') page 157. 2

- ibidem.
- ³ Hanway, Vol.IV, page 166. Cf. Firdausi's description of Alexander's method of Scaring Fut's elephants.
- ⁴ Father J. Tieffenthaler's "Beschreibung des Feldzuges des Thamas Kulichan", in J. Bernoulli's "Historisch-Geographische Beschreibung von Hindustan", Berlin, 1785-1787, Vol.II, Part II, page 50.

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between the former and the Indian left wing. For this reason, none of the Indian leaders had knowledge of what the others were doing, and there was thus a complete lack of cohesion and co-ordination on their side.¹ Moreover, so hurriedly had the Indian commanders advanced to the attack that they had little or no artillery with them.

Sa^cādat Khān's men were the first to give ground, though they only did so after sustaining heavy casualties. He himself, surrounded by some of his followers, bravely continued the fight until his elephant was charged by that of his naphew Shīr Jang, which had been maddened by a wound.² Sa^cādat Khān's elephant then got out of control, and bore him into the Iranian ranks, where he was made prisoner.³

The Indian centre, under Khān Daurān, fought on bravely, but they, like Sa'ādat Khān's men, were mown down by the rapid and accurate fire of the <u>jazāvirchls</u>, as well as by that from the <u>zanburaks</u>. The swordsmanship, of which the Indians were so proud, was of little avail against such

¹ Bayan, fol.18(b).

² Muhammad Bakhsh ("Ashūb"), "Tā'rīkh-i-Shahādat-i-Farrukh-Siyar va Jalūs-i-Muhammad Shāh", fol.216(a), Bayān, fol. 19(b), Ghulām Alī Naqavī's Imādu's-Saʿādat, foll.31(a) and -31(b).

For the manner in which Sa^c adat Khan was captured, see the Siyar, page 473 and Irakli, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 359.

methods of fighting; as Abdu'l-KarIm remarked: "An arrow cannot answer a <u>jazâyir</u>."

The end came when Khān Daurān, who had already been wounded, received a mortal wound from a musket shot and fell unconscious in his <u>howda</u>;² his brother and son and many other <u>umarā</u> were among the slain.³ Bereft of their leader, the few survivors of the Indian centre were speedily overcome, and at five o'clock the battle was over. Khān Daurān's servant, at great personal risk, succeeded in bringing his mæterback to the Indian camp.⁴

Though so successful in the field, Nadir was too prudent to attempt an attack on the Emperor's position;⁵ as will be seen later, he had other expedients in view for bringing about the subjection of Muhammad Shah and his army.

The points that are chiefly remarkable in respect to this engagement are, in the first place, the marked contrast between Nadir's generalship and that of the Indian

- ⁴ Ashub, fol.219(b).
- ⁵ T.N., page 203.

Bayan, fol.18(b). A vivid, but fanciful, account of the battle is given by Nijabat in his ballad "Nadir Var", (see Kaul's translation in the Journal of the Panjab Historical Society, Vol.VI, lines 659-682); see also Tilok Das's poem (W. Irvine's translation in J.R.A.S., Vol.LXVI, Part I). Neither of these poetical descriptions can be regarded as having any historical value.

² Ashub, fol.219(a).

³ For lists of the <u>umarā</u> killed or wounded, see Ashūb, fol. 219(b), Bayan, foll.19(a) and 19(b), Siyar, p.473, Fraser, page 158, etc.

leaders; in tactics, as in strategy, Nādir was immeasurably superior. Secondly, the numbers actually engaged on both sides formed but a small proportion of the whole. The Indian left wing, after emerging from its lines and taking up a position by the side of the Ali Mardan canal, remained passive the whole time,¹ and of Khan Dauran's and Sa'adat Khan's divisions, many did not advance to the attack.

The casualties sustained by the Indians have been much exaggerated by some writers, such as Mirza MahdI, who puts their losses in killed alone as high as 30,000.² In all probability, the Indians may have lost some 10,000 men;³ they could not have lost many more, since the total number engaged on the Indian side was not greatly in excess of that figure. According to a contemporary letter quoted by Fraser,⁴, the losses on the Iranian side were 2,500 killed

- It is alleged in the Jauhar-i-Samsām (fol.34(a)) that the Nizāmu'l Mulk prevented the Emperor from sending reinforcements to Khān Daurān.
- ² T.N., page 202. Nadir himself also exaggerates the Indian losses; in his letter to Rida Qull, he stated that the enemy lost upwards of 20,000 in killed, and a much greater number captured. (Asiatick Researches, Vol.X, page 544); as Nadir concludes his letter with the words "Make copies of this our royal mandate and disperse them over our empire, that the well-wishers of our throne may be happy and rejoice...", it is obvious that he deliberately magnified his success in order to give heart to his supporters. The letter contains some other particulars of the battle which cannot (evidently for the above reason) be reconciled with accounts by other writers.

4 Fraser, page 158. Hanway repeats these figures. Shaikh Hazin (page 299) goes to the other extreme by asserting that the Wranians lost only 3 men killed and a score wounded (c.f. his statement that their casualties at the battle of Mihmandust only amounted to a couple of men, who were slightly wounded!)

³ De Voulton, <u>op.cit</u>., page 230.

and 5,000 wounded, but these figures seem on the high side.

In the evening, the Nizāmu'l-Mulk, the I'timādu'd Daula and the eunuchs of the Imperial <u>haram</u> went to see Khān Daurān. The wounded commander-in-chief, who had recovered his senses in the meanwhile, said to them, in tones that were almost inaudible through weakness:

"We have completed our business..... Do not let the Emperor meet Nadir Shah or take Nadir to Delhi, but remove this calamity (bala) from here by any means in your power."1

That same evening Sa'ādat Khān was brought before Nādir. After answering tactfully some questions which Nādir put to him respecting the resources of the Emperor, Sa'ādat Khān recommended the Shāh to summon the Nizāmu'l-Mulk and to discuss the terms of peace with him.² Nādir followed this advice, with the result that the Nizāmu'l-Mulk, having been invested by the Emperor with power to negotiate, went to the Iranian camp, where he arrived after nightfall on the 25th February.³

Siyar, page 473. According to Otter (Vol.I, page 381), the Nizāmu'l-Mulk insulted Khān Daurān as he lay moribund and helpless, and so revenged himself for a number of rude remarks which the Commander-in-Chief had made in regard to him at the Court (Khān Daurān is said by Tilok Dās and others to have likened the Nizāmu'l-Mulk to a monkey).

²'Imadu's-Sa'adat, fol.31(b).

³ Shākir Khān was with the Nizāmu'l-Mulk on this occasion and has described the meeting with Nādir (see the translation of the relevant passage in the Tadhkira in Elliot & Dowson, Vol.VIII, pages 232-4.) On being conducted to the Shah, the Nizamu'l-Mulk discussed with him the terms of settlement, and it was agreed that Nadir should inflict no further injury on India and return to Iran in consideration for an indemnity of 50 <u>lakhs</u> of rupees,¹ payable in instalments. Having requested the Nizamu'l-Mulk to invite the Emperor to lunch on the following day, Nadir gave the Indian statesman leave to return.

Notwithstanding the death-bed advice of Khān Dauran, Muhammad Shāh accepted Nādir's invitation. Mīrzā Mahdī states that the Emperor, on the 17th Dhu'l-Qa'da (26th February), formally abdicated and that, after removing the crown from his head, he set out for the Iranian camp.² It is curious that, while Mīrzā Mahdī mentions the Emperor 's abdication, he omits to say whether Muhammad Shāh formally handed his crown over to Nādir on this or any subsequent occasion.³ It is obvious

- 1 The amount is given as 2 crores by Ghulām Alī (Siyar, page 473) and Otter, Vol.I, page 384, but Sir J. Sarkar ("Nadir Shah and India", page 50) puts the amount at only 50 lakhs. According to the Bayan (fol.20(b)), the amount of the indemnity was left unsettled, but this seems unlikely.
- 7 T.N., page 203. M. de Bussy, in his "Remarques sur l'Histoire de Nader Cha, Roy de Perse" (see the Orme MSS. in the India Office, Vol.XXIII, page 32), says that Nadir had intended to seat himself on the throne of India, but that the Nizamu'l-Mulk dissuaded him from doing so, on the grounds that he would not be able to hold so large a country in subjection (de Bussy claims to have obtained the above and other information relating to Nadir from Iranians who remained in India after the Shah's departure.)
- ³ It is possible that Muhammad Shah surrendered the crown to Nadir on the occasion of his second visit to the Iranian camp when he, as will be seen below, was virtually a prisoner, but if this were so, why should Mirza Mahdi mention the abdication as having taken place before the first visit?

from what occurred later that the Emperor did, in fact, abdicate, and that Nadir assumed for a time the crown of India, but nothing appears to be on record as to any official ceremony of investiture having taken place.

Muhammad Shah, on reaching the Iranian lines, was received by Nasru'llah MIrza whom Nadir had sent to meet him and conduct him to the tent of audience. When the Emperor drew near, Nadir himself emerged, and greeted his imperial guest in the customary manner,¹ much stress being laid on the fact that they were both of Turcoman origin. Nadir then took Muhammad Shah by the hand, led him into the tent and seated him on the throne by his side. After some conversation together (which was conducted in Turkish)², the Shah and Emperor were served with food. Nadir, in order to show his guest that the food had not been poisoned, exchanged dishes at the beginning of the meal.³ Nadir himself handed a cup of coffee to the Emperor. The meeting between the two monarchs passed off without the slightest hitch or unpleasantness; "nothing that courtesy and friendship required was omitted during the whole conference, which lasted a quarter of the day!

- Anand Ram, fol.171(a) says: "When they (i.e. Muhammad Shah and Nasru'llah) drew near, the Shah himself came forward, and the usual etiquette between the Iranian and Mughal Courts followed." See also Nadir's letter to Rida Quli Mirza, in Asiatick Researches, Vol.X, page 545.
- ² The Nizāmu'l-Mulk had previously informed the Emperor that he would have to converse with Nadir in Turkish (Harcharan Dās fol.87a.)
- ³ Harcharan Das, fol.87(b).
- ⁴ Anand Ram, fol.171(b).

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The Emperor was then escorted back to his own camp; it is said that the successful outcome of the meetings between Nadir Shah, the Nizamu'l-Mulk and the Emperor restored the peace of mind of the Indian troops, who now had hopes of being allowed to return to their homes.

Ever since the evening after the battle, however, Nadir had kept the Indian camp closely invested; no one was suffered to leave, and no provisions were allowed to be brought in.¹ By this means, Nadir knew that he could ensure prompt compliance with his terms.

Khān Daurān having died on the day after the battle, the posts of Commander-in-Chief and Paymaster-in-Chief which he had held, became vacant.² In circumstances which it is unnecessary to describe here,³ the Nizāmu'l-Mulk obtained the post of Mīr Bakhshī (Paymaster-in-Chief), a position which Sa^cādat Khān, it is said, had been hoping to obtain himself. When Saʿādat Khān found that the Nizāmu'l-Mulk had forestalled

1 T.N., page 203; de Voulton, page 230.

- ² There is much disagreement between the authorities as to the date of Khan Dauran's death. I have selected the 25th February, since that is the date given by MIrza Mahdi (T.N. page 202), by Anand Ram, fol.170(b), and by Nadir himself (see "Asiatick Researches", Vol.X, page 543.) MIrza Zaman (Fraser, page 161) and Siyar give, respectively, the 27th and 28th February.
- ³ For these particulars, see Harcharan Das, fol.88(a), also Siyar, pages 473-4. The Nizamu'l-Mulk also obtained the post of Amiru'l-Umara, and it is known that Sa'adat Khan had had designs on that as well (see Siyar page 474), and Dr. Srivastava, <u>op.cit</u>., page 69.

him, he became beside himself with rage.1 In this state, he rushed off to Nadir Shah and sought to undo the work of his successful rival by inducing the Shah not to rest content with such a small indemnity as that provided for in the treaty made with the Nizamu'l-Mulk. Sacadat Khan pointed out that, if the Shah were to march to Delhi, he would be able to obtain an incalculable amount of gold, jewellery and other valuables from the Emperor's treasuries and from the houses of the nobles and merchants.² Sa^cadat Khan added: "There is now no one of note at the Imperial Court except Asaf Jah, who is a trickster and a philosopher. If this trickster is snared, everything will happen as your Majesty desires."3 Nadir showed pleasure at these words of Sa'adat Khan's, and determined to follow his advice.

After purposely waiting a few days, Nadir, on the 24th Dhu'l-Qa'da (5th March), summoned the Nizamu'l-Mulk again, and ordered him to request the Emperor to revisit his camp. The Nizamu'l-Mulk protested that this procedure would not be in conformity with the treaty, but the Shah, after saying that his purpose was not to abrogate the treaty or to act to the detriment of the Emperor, insisted that a further interview was necessary.⁴

Siyar, page 474; Rustam^cAlī, fol.286(a).
 Siyar, page 474.
 Harcharan Dās, fol.88(b).
 Siyar, page 474.

The blockade of the Indian camp not having been relaxed, the lack of food there had become so acute¹ that the Nizāmu'l-Mulk had no option but to comply. He accordingly wrote to the Emperor in the sense demanded by Nadir Shah. On receiving this letter, Muhammad Shah, despite the remonstrances of some of his nobles, who advised a further appeal to arms,² proceeded to the Iranian camp on the 26th Dhu'l-Qa^c da (7th March), accompanied by a retinue of 2,000 persons.³

Though Nadir outwardly treated the Emperor with respect and ordered 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan to attend to his wants,⁴ Muhammad Shah, was, in reality, a prisoner,⁵ as were also the nobles in his entourage. After the Emperor's arrival, Qizilbash troops were sent to his camp who seized all the artillery and arrested such of the leaders and nobles who were still there.⁶ The Indian rank and file were then informed that they were at liberty to stay on at Karnal or to proceed to Delhi or to their homes.⁷ Bereft of all their leaders,

- ² Anand Ram, fol.173(a).
- ³ Bayan, fol.22(a).
- ⁴ T.N., page 203.
- ⁵ Anand Ram, fol.173(a).
- ⁶ De Voulton, page 236. Ashub (fol.260(a)) states that Nadir ordered the Indian cannon to be sent to Qandahar. See also Asiatick Researches, Vol.X, page 546.
- 7 Siyar, page 474.

Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 167); De Voulton (page 231) states that 4000 Indian troops were killed when trying to obtain provisions and fodder outside their camp. He adds that the scarcity of food was such that "the measure of wheat and rice which used to cost the tenth part of a rupee was sold at ten rupees or 100 sous.

and weakened by famine, the Indian soldiers endeavoured as best they could to escape to their homes, but large numbers were killed en route by roving bands of Qizilbash cavalry and by robber bands, as well as by the peasantry.¹

On the 1st Dhu'l-Hijja (12th March) the Shah and the Emperor left Karnal for Delhi, Muhammad Shah keeping a <u>coss</u> (approximately 2 miles) behind Nadir.²

Previous to his departure, Nādir had despatched in advance Sa'ādat Khān, whom he had appointed Wakīlu'l-Muṭlaq (beputy of the Absolute) of India, and Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir, with an escort of 4,000 cavalry. They bore with them a royal order (shiqqa) from the Emperor to the Governor Luṭfullah Khān for the handing over to Tahmāsp Khān of the keys of the city, and also an edict (raqam) from Nādir confirming Luṭfu'llah Khān in his position.³

Hazin, page 296, and de Voulton, page 231, Ashub, fol.257(a).
 T.N., page 203; Fraser, page 177.

Bayan, fol.22(a). Ashub, fol.260(b). Shakir Khan, fol.43(a). Fraser, page 175.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Invasion of India. III. Delhi.

When the news of the battle of Karnal was brought to Delhi, the capable Kotwal of the city, Hajji Fulad Khan, took effective measures to prevent any panic or outbreaks of lawlessness, and steps were taken to put the city into a state of defence.¹

When Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir and Sa^cadat Khān reached the gates of Delhi, they found them closed against them. They thereupon sent to the Governor, Lutfu'llah Khān, the <u>shiqqa</u> or order from the Emperor and Nādir's <u>raqam</u>, with the result that Lutfu'llah Khān opened the gates and delivered up to Tahmāsp Khān the keys of the fortress and those of the treasuries and store-houses.²

Preparations were then begun for the reception of the Emperor and Nadir Shah.

Meanwhile Nadir Shah and Muhammad Shah were on their way to the capital. Travelling via Panipat, Sonepat and Narela, the two monarchs reached the Shalimar gardens, just

Anand Ram, fol.172(b). The letter from Surat which was published in the London "Daily Post" of 23rd November 1739 states that "the traitor Saadul-Cawn (sic) was sent with an army of 24,000 men to Dilly where they shut the gates against him, but he, with his usual Perfidy, telling them that the Mogul ... had beaten Nadir Shah and was in pursuit of him, gained admittance." In the Jauhar-i-Samsām (fol.53b), Naşru'llah is said to have been sent to Delhi with 5,000 horsemen, under the guidance of Sa'ādat Khān who "being a fellow-countryman, had become a friend of the enemy and increased his dignity."

outside Delhi, on the 7th Dhu'l-Hijja (18th March). On the following day, Nadir 'gave leave' to the Emperor to enter the city, in order to prepare for his reception.¹ Nadir himself remained in the Shalimar gardens till the 9th Dhu'l-Hijja (20th March), when he made his entry into Delhi in great state. The streets were lined with troops,² and the Shah's procession was headed by 100 elephants on each of which several <u>jazavirchis</u> were mounted. Nadir himself was on horseback, and when he reached the fortress and dismounted, the cannon thundered forth a salute.³

The Emperor received Nadir with great pomp and ceremony and gave him costly presents. Mirza Mahdi gives an exaggerated and distorted account of what occurred. The Emperor, according to him, "spread the table of humility for the feast of hospitality."⁴ Nadir, in return, thanked the Emperor for his attentions and informed him that he was, in virtue of the treaty concluded at Karnal, once more in possession of his kingdom.⁵ In recognition of Nadir's magnanimity, Muhammad Shah then/offered his guest all the royal treasures and jewels. "Although all the treasures of the (other) kings of the earth were not equal to a tenth

¹ T.N., page 203, Fraser, page 178.

² Ashub, fol.263(a).

³ Irakli. (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 360).
⁴ T.N., page 204.

⁹ ibidem. These were (if uttered) but empty words, for Nadir, as will be seen below, did not reinstate Muhammad Shah until just before his departure from Delhi. part of a tenth part" of these gifts, Nadir refused for a long while to accept them, and only gave way after the Emperor had repeatedly urged him to do so.¹ Needless to say, this reluctance on Nadir's part was merely feigned.

After his reception and entertainment by the Emperor, Nadir took up his quarters in the palace built by Shah Jahan, near the Divan-i-Khass,² while Muhammad Shah occupied a building close to the Asad Burj or Lion Tower.³ As for the Qizilbash troops, some were quartered in and around the fortress and others were billeted in the city itself.³

On the morning of Saturday the 10th Dhu'l-Hijja (21st March), which, besides being the Iranian Nau Ruz, was also the Muhammadan festival of the Idu'd-Duha (feast of Sacrifice), the <u>Khutba</u>, in accordance with instructions already given, was read in Nadir's name in all the mosques of the city; moreover, coins were struck on which he was given the title of "King of Kings" and "Sultan over the Sultans of the Earth.^{#5} Nadir held the usual Nau Ruz reception and distributed robes of honour to his principal officers.

That same morning Sa'adat Khan died; some doubt exists as to the actual cause of his death. According to

1 T.N., page 204. 2 ibidem. 3 Tieffenthaler (on the authority of Diogo Mendes), page 56. 4 ibidem. 5 Ashub, foll.263(a) to 264(a). 236. one authority,¹ Sa'ādat Khān had suffered much from his foot on the previous day (doubtless from his wound); he had, however, paid no heed to the matter, and on the morning of the 10th Dhu'l-Hijja he expired. Another writer states that the Khan took poison after Nadir had severely rebuked him in public.²

In the afternoon Nādir went to the Emperor's quarters, to return his visit of the day before. Towards the close of the day, after the Shāh had returned to his own palace, wild rumours became current in the city that he had met with an untimely end; other reports were that he had been seized and imprisoned by order of the Emperor.³ No one took the trouble to see whether there was any foundation for these rumours,⁴ which spread with the rapidity of lightning through the crowded streets and bazaars. Mobs speedily collected

- ¹ Abdu'l-Karīm, Bayan, fol.22(b). See also the Siyar (page 475) where it is stated that Sa adat Khan died of gangrene (literally, <u>saratān</u> = cancer) in the foot.
- ² Rustam Ali (fol.289(a)) says that the Nizāmu'l-Mulk suggested to Sa'ādat Khān, after Nadir had spoken roughly to him at the public Darbar or Court, that they should both take poison. Sa'ādat Khān, "since he was a soldier and had no knowledge of the guile of this old man, drank a cup of poison and died, whereas the Nizāmu'l-Mulk quaffed a glass of <u>sharbat</u> and slept peacefully init the next morning". Dr. Srivastava (op.cit., page 75) believes in the theory of suicide, and refers, in support of this, to an entry in the Delhi Chronicle of the loth Dhu'l-Hijja that Sa'ādat Khān had taken poison and died.
- 3 It is said in the Siyar (pages 474 and 475) that some Indians asserted that Nadir had died, and others stated that he had been killed by two of the Emperor's Galmug women guards. According to de Voulton (<u>op.cit.</u>, page 237) "four young <u>Omhras (i.e. Umara) of ordinary rank (de nobreze ordinaria)</u>, having become intoxicated at eight in the evening, spread the rumour that the Emperor had killed Nadir Shah with a blow." See also Anand Ram, 174(a).

⁴ Shaikh Haz**i**n, page 298.

and, carried away by excitement, began to attack those of the Qizilbash troops who were in the town. These rumours and disturbances, which were to have such appalling consequences. are said to have arisen in the following way: ¹ at noon that day Tahmasp Khan Jalayir despatched some mounted nasagchis to the Paharganj granaries, which are situated to the south-west of the city, with orders to open them and to settle the price at which the corn was to be sold. The nasagchIs duly carried out their orders, but the price which they fixed, namely ten sirs for one rupee, so exasperated the corn-dealers that they caused a mob to assemble. This mob then attacked and killed the nasacchis together with some other Iranian soldiers who had come to purchase corn. The instigators of the attack then spread a report that Nādir had been cast into prison, and others said that he had been poisoned. In their progress through the city, these reports became more and more distorted and fantastic. and "foolish persons with arms and equipment having collected together, created a disturbance.^{#2} Many of the Qizilbash troops, walking singly or in pairs in the narrow streets, were taken entirely by surprise and fell an easy prey to their assailants. The Indian writer Muhammad Bakhsh

- MIrzā Zamān, in Fraser, pages 180 and 181. It is also stated in the Bayān, fol.24(b), that the disturbance began in the Paharganj quarter.
- ² Siyar, page 474. According to Ashūb, the disturbance began when "three or four <u>gharis</u> (گهری) of the day remained," i.e. between one hour and 12 minutes and one hour and 36 minutes before sunset.

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("Ashub") saw from the roof of a house the Qizilbāsh soldiers being set upon and cut down from all sides by bands of men who were, for the most part, from Kābul and Peshawar, and who were seeking to revenge the slaughter of their fellow-countrymen at Karnāl. Muhammad Bakhsh states that some of these men had belonged to Sa'ādat Khān's army.¹ When the reports of Nādir's death reached the Iranian soldiery, their consternation was so great that their ability to resist was greatly lessened.²

Shaikh Hazin asserts that none of the Indian <u>umara</u> took any steps to control the mob, and that some Indian nobles even murdered the Iranian guards whom Nadir had, at their own request, sent to protect their houses.³

The estimates of the numbers of the Iranians who lost their lives on this occasion vary from merely a few hundred to

¹ Ashub, fol.265(b).

² Bayan, fol.22(b).

⁹ Shaikh Hazin, page 299; see also Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 182). It is noteworthy that no suggestion has ever been made that the Emperor or any leading Indian noble was in any degree responsible for fomenting the trouble. In fact, Mirza Mahdi himself expressly exonerates Muhammad Shah and his nobles (T.N., page 205). Also, it has never been seriously alleged that Nadir or his men deliberately provoked the disturbance in order to provide an excuse for sacking the city (in this connection, see Bayan, fol.22(b)).

as much as 7,000;¹ it seems probable that some 3,000 actually perished.²

During the disturbance, some Indian nobles, of whom the most prominent were Sayyid Niyaz Khan, a son-in-law of Qamaru'd-din Khan, and Shah Nawaz Khan, having collected together some 500 men, raided the royal elephant stables, killed the superintendent and removed the elephants. They then left the city and took possession of a fort situated just outside it.³

When the first report of the disturbance reached Nadir on Saturday night, he refused to believe it, and angrily exclaimed that some of his soldiers had falsely accused the inhabitants of stirring up trouble, so as to provide themselves with an excuse to pillage the city.⁴ Nadir then ordered one of his <u>vasauls</u> to go and ascertain the true state of affairs and to report to him. This man, on emerging from the castle, was killed almost immediately by the mob, and a

1		-
	The estimates given by the principal authoriti follows:-	les are as
	Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 185)	400
	Siyar, page 475	700
	Bayan, fol. 22(b) Rustam Ali, fol.287(b)	3,000
	De Voulton, <u>loc.cit</u> ., page 238)	5,000
	Père Saignes (Lettres Edifiantes,	
	Vol.IV, page 253)	5,000 to 6,000
	Shaikh Hazin, page 299	7,000
2	I follow Sir J. Sarkar, who accepts 'Abdu'l Kar of 3,000 as the most probable one.	Im's figure
٦		
-	T.N., page 206.	
4	Bayan, fol.22(b).	

second <u>vasāul</u>, whom Nādir sent after him, suffered the same fate. Realising then that the trouble was of a serious nature, Nādir despatched a body of 1,000 <u>jazāyirchīs</u> tonquell the rioters, but, owing to the darkness and the smallness of their numbers, they failed to restore order.¹ The Shah then ordered his men to remain under arms all night, to defend themselves if attacked, but to take no further action without sanction from him.²

At sunrise the next morning Nādir mounted his horse and, with a strong escort, rode through the streets to the golden-domed Raushanu'd-Daula mosque, in the middle of the Chandni Chok quarter.³ It is said that when Nādir had approach ed close to this mosque, someone fired a shot at him from a balcony or window. The bullet missed Nādir, but killed an officer beside him.⁴ On reaching the mosque, Nādir, after ascertaining in what quarters of the city the attacks on his men had been perpetrated, ordered his soldiers to leave no person living wherever a Qizilbāsh had lost his life.⁵ At nine a.m. the Qizilbāsh troops began their dreadful task.

1	Bayan, fol.23(a)., Harcharan Das, fol.90(b).
2	T.N., page 205.
3	ibidem.
4	Mirzan Zaman (Fraser, page 183).
	T.N., page 205, Hazin, page 300, Siyar, page 475.

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After the streets had been cleared of the rabble, the soldiers forced their way into the shops and houses in the doomed portions of the city, killing the occupants and laying violent hands on anything of value.¹ The money-changers' bazaars and the shops of the jewellers and merchants were all looted, and large numbers of buildings were set on fire and destroyed, all within them perishing in the flames. No distinction was made between innocent and guilty, male and female, or old and young.²

Nadir remained in the mosque, his drawn sword by his side, whilst the work of destruction went on.³ When the massacre had been in progress for some hours, the Emperor sent the Nizamu'l-Mulk and Qamaru'd-Din Khan to the Shah, to implore him to be merciful.⁴ After listening to their pleadings, Nadir commanded the Kotwal, Hajji Fulad Khan, to go through the streets, with a body of Iranian <u>Masagchis</u>, and to convey to his soldiers the order to refrain from further action.⁵ The fact that this order was instantly obeyed is proof of the completeness of Nadir's control over his men.⁶ He then com-

¹ Anand Ram, fol.173(a).

² Ashub, foll.270(b) and 271(a).

- ⁵ Tieffenthaler, page 56.
- ⁴ T.N., page 206. See also de Voulton (page 238), who says that the Nizamu'l-Mulk went alone to Nadir, whom he found eating sweetmeats.
- Anand Ram, fol.174(b).

⁶ Abdu'l-Karim (fol.24(b)) regards the prompt obedience of the Iranian troops on this occasion as "one of the most wonderful things in the world." The massacre ceased at 3 p.m., having lasted for six hours. 242. manded his troops to restore to their families the prisoners whom they had taken.¹

How many persons, the vast majority of whom were guiltless of any crime against the Iranians, lost their lives on this terrible occasion will never be accurately known; the estimated totals range from 8,000 to the fantastic figure of 400.000.2 Sir J. Sarkar considers that, having regard to the relatively small area affected and the short duration of the havoc, the number of those put to the sword was probably not in excess of 20,000;⁵ to this figure must be added the several hundred persons (mostly women) who committed suicide. As Anand

- 1 T.N., page 206; MIrza Zamán (Fraser, page 187) states that these prisoners were not released until the next day (12th Dhu'l-Hijja = 23rd March).
- ² As in the case of the killing of the Iranian troops, there is much divergence between the authorities regarding the total number of victims in this massacre.

"Abdu'l-Karim (according to the MS. belonging to Sir J. Sarkar's MS.) 8.000 'Abdu'l-Karlm (according to B.M. MS. fol.23(b)) 20,000 Mirza Mahdi, T.N., page 206 Rustam Ali, fol.288(a) 30,000 'nearly one lakh Harcharan Das, fol.91(a) 100,000 Tieffenthaler, page 56 Hanway, Vol.IV, page 177. (Hanway says that another 10,000 committed suicide) 110,000 Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 185) Surat letter (in "Daily Post" of 23rd 120,000 to 150,000 November 1739) 200,000 225,000 Otter, Vol.I, page 393 50,000 to 400,000 Mahratta letters (N.B. Ashub gives no aggregate figure, but states that, in addition to the numbers of people burnt alive in their houses, the bodies of 14,000 to 15,000 persons were afterwards collect ed and burnt.) 3 "Nadir Shah in India", page 66. The limits of the area destroyed ed on this occasion are given by Abdu'l-Karim (Bayan, fol. 24(b)) and by Anand Ram (fol.174(a)). Two Christian churches and the house of a devout Christian lady were destroyed (Pere Saignes, "Lettres Edifiantes", vol.IV, page 260); two Portuguese Jesuits named Matthias Rodriguez and Francisco da Cruz escaped injury by taking refuge in a house in a remote part of the city. (Tieffenthaler, page 57, Saignes, page 260)

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Ram remarked, Delhi had not experienced such a catastrophe since the time of Timur.1

Nadir's next step was to send a force under 'Azimu'llah Khan and Fulad Khan to apprehend two Indian nobles named Sayyid Niyaz Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan, and their followers, who, as stated above, had taken up their position in a fort outside the city after raiding the elephant stables on the previous night. This fort was duly attacked, and the two Indian leaders and their followers were captured; later in the day they were put to death.²

According to Mirza Zaman,³ Nadir also took vigorous punitive measures against the people of the Sarai of Ruhu'llah Khan and the Tatar Mughals of MughalpDras because they had killed some Iranian troops whom Nadir had previously sent to the Sarai to seize the cannon there.

Having re-established order in the city and surroundings, Nadir confirmed Hajji Fulad Khan in his position as Kotwal.⁴

For some days after this massacre, the streets remained littered with corpses; at length, in the interests of public health, Nadir ordered the Kotwal to collect and burn

- ³ Fraser, page 187.
- ⁴ ibidem.

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¹ "Tadhkira", fol.174(b). (Timur sacked Delhi in December 1398.)
² T.N., page 206.

the bodies. Timber from the wrecked houses provided fuel for the funeral pyres, on which the bodies of Muhammadans and Hindus were piled and burnt without distinction of creed or caste.1

Having taken his toll of human lives, Nadir now began to exact his tribute of money and jewels. The possessions of Khan Dauran and Muzaffar Khan were seized, and a strong body of Qizilbash was despatched to Oudh to confiscate and bring to Delhi the effects of Sa'adat Khan.² Later, Nadir appointed a commission, under Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, to assess the contributions of the nobles and of the merchants and citizens.

All this while a cordon of Iranian troops surrounded the city, and forcibly prevented anyone from leaving, though they allowed persons to enter.³ Further, the granaries were kept under seal and were guarded by Iranian troops; these measures were evidently intended to expedite the collection of the tribute.

On the 16th Dhu'l-Hijja (27th March) Nadir despatched a <u>farman</u> by <u>chapar</u> to Iran exempting all the provinces of that country from taxation for three years. At the same time, he richly rewarded his officers, and gave his soldiers their arrears of pay, together with a gratuity; he also gave

³ Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 188).

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¹ Siyar, page 475, Hazin, page 300.

² Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 188), and T.N., page 207.

presents to the camp followers and servants ranging from 60 to 100 rupees in amount, according to their status.¹

While the people of Delhi were still mourning their dead, Nadir, having demanded for his son Nasru'llah the hand of an Indian princess, a daughter of Yazdan Bakhsh and greatgrand-daughter of Aurangzib, ordered displays of fireworks and lavish entertainments. For a whole week these festivities continued, and on the 27th Dhu'l-Hijja (6th April) the marriage ceremony took place.²

Having heard a report at the end of Dhu'l-Hijja that certain of his men intended to observe the anniversary of the killing of Husain ibn'Ali on the 10th Muharram in the usual Shi'a manner, Nādir issued strict orders forbidding, on pain of death, any <u>ta'zias</u> (passion plays) or <u>marthias</u> (threnodies), saying that these were only for the ignorant and heretical.³ Some of the Qizilbāsh, nevertheless, disobeyed these orders, and were severely punished in consequence.⁴

¹ T.N., page 207. The date, which is omitted by Mirza Mahdi, is given by Mirza Zaman; the latter states that Nadir gave his troops all their arrears of pay and a gratuity equivalent to six months' pay.

² T.N., page 206, Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 197). Sir J. Malcolm quoting from some unspecified Iranian MS., relates: "when the pride of the Royal House of Delhi required that his son, who was to marry a princess of that family, should give an account of his male ancestors for seven generations, the conqueror exclaimed: "Tell them that he is the son of Nādir Shāh, the son of the sword, the grandson of the sword; and so on, till they have a descent of seventy instead of seven generations." (History of Persia, Vol.II, pages 46 and 47).

⁴ Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 199).

The work of assessing, and then of collecting, the levy on the citizens occupied some time. Emissaries of the Kotwal, together with Iranian <u>nasaqchis</u>, went from house to house enforcing the appearance of the owners and making inventories of all that they possessed, in order to calculate their individual contributions in accordance with their means;¹ in the case of some rich men, the assessment was as high as 50%.² Nadir is said to have given orders that the townspeople should be preserved from violence and treated with lenity during the carrying out of this work.

When all the returns were complete, Delhi was assessed at two <u>crores</u>, and the Nizāmu'l-Mulk, Sarbuland Khān and three other nobles were ordered by Nādir to collect the money. For this purpose Delhi was divided into five sections, and each of these nobles was made responsible for the collection of the money in one of these sections.³ While Sarbuland Khān, carried out his disagreeable task as humanely as he could,⁴ some of the other nobles acted very harshly, with the result that many families were entirely ruined and numbers of persons, being driven to desperation, committed suicide.⁵ In some instances torture was employed to enforce payment.

- ¹ Anand Ram, fol.175(b).
- ² Bayan, fol.25(b).
- ³ Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 201).
- ⁴ ibidem, page 217.
- ⁵ Anand Ram, foll.176(b) and 177(b). Anand Ram himself had to pay 5 lakhs.

The aggregate value of all the money, jewels and other objects of value which Nādir obtained from the Emperor, his nobles and people must have been at least 70 crores of rupees;¹ as Anand Rām remarks,² "the accumulated wealth of 348 years changed owners in a moment."

On the 3rd Safar 1152 (12th May) Nadir held a great <u>darbar</u> or court to which he invited the Emperor and his principal nobles. Nadir, with his own hands, placed the crown of Hindustan on the head of Muhammad Shah, and handed him a belt and a sword set with jewels; he then gave splendid coats of honour to the nobles.³

According to Mirza Mahdi,⁴ Muhammad Shah, in gratitude for his reinstatement as Emperor, then pressed Nadir to accept all the territories of the Empire situated to the west of the Indus "from the frontier of Tibet and Kashmir to the place where that river flows into the ocean, together with the provinces of Thatta and the ports and fortresses belonging to

Mirza Mahdi (T.N., page 207) values the gifts, including the Peacock Throne, which Nadir received from the Emperor and nobles at 15 crores, together with jewels "beyond enumeration Anand Ram (fol.175(a)) says that these jewels were worth 50 crores. Mirza Zaman (Fraser, pages 220 and 221) and Otter (Vol.II, page 90) both estimate the total value of the spoils at 70 crores; Otter adds that the booty taken by the officers and soldiers was worth 10 crores. 'Abdu'l-Karim (Bayan, fol.26(a)) gives the figure of 80 crores, while de Voulton's list of the items amounts to the undoubtedly exaggerated total of 111 crores (pages 242 and 243).

- 2 Tadhkira, fol.175(a). (It was actually 350 lunar years from the time when Timur sacked Delhi in December 1398.
- **3** T.N., page 208.
- 4 ibidem. It is in such euphemistic terms that Mirza Mahdi refers to what was obviously a forced cession of territory.

them.ⁿ¹ MIrzā Mahdī goes on to say:

"....since the greater part of the countries to the north and west of the river Indus had always been regarded as being within the territory of Khurāsān, His Majesty agreed to their being added and an instrument² was drawn up by Muhammad Shāh and was delivered to that exalted Government (i.e. Nādir), and is preserved in the imperial treasury."

Nādir thereupon, it is said, gave Muḥammad Shāh some advice on the art of government, and exhorted the Indian nobles to obey their master;³ he concluded by saying that, if the Emperor were ever in need of his assistance, he would send a force and that he himself could reach him in 40 days from Qandahār. According to MIrzā Zamān,⁴ Nādir advised Muḥammad Shah to keep a standing army of 60,000 cavalry, to confiscate the <u>jāgIrs</u> (fiefs or domains) of the nobles, and to forbid them to maintain forces of their own.

¹ T.N., page 208.

- ² This is evidently the deed or treaty of cession which is quoted by Ashūb (Vol.II, foll.313(b) to 314(b)), and which, as Ashūb remarks, Nādir compelled the Emperor to write. (c.f. Sir J. Malcolm's statement in his "History of Persia", Vol.II, page 79 that this document was "no doubt dictated by the conqueror." There is some doubt as to the actual date of this treaty; Ashūb gives the 29th Safar 1152 which is evidently too late; in the translations given by Fraser (pages 223-226) and others, the date 4th Muharram is given, which seems to be too early, unless, of course, the instrument was drawn up and signed long before the investiture ceremony took place (Nādir may well have deferred this ceremony until the collection of the indemnity had been completed 3 T.N., page 208, Mirzā Zamān (Fraser, page 208), Otter, Vol.II, page 90. J. Grant Duff, in his "History of the Mahrattas" (Bombay 1878) Vol.I, page 468, states that Nādir wrote to, <u>inter alios</u>, Baji Rao, stating that although he had not assisted the Emperor, he must now attend to his commands.
- ⁴ Fraser, pages 206 and 207.

The Emperor's name was now substituted for that of Nādir in the Khutba, as well as on the coinage. Muhammad Shāh was thus once more a sovereign, but his kingdom had shrunk, and his commander-in-chief and many thousands of his soldiers and subjects had been slain. Also, his jewels were gone, his treasuries were empty, and his prestige, which his own indolence and pusillanimity had done so much to injure, had been still further impaired.

Having accomplished all that he had set out to do, Nādir decided to depart from Delhi; in fact, the advent of summer rendered imperative an early start on the homeward march, and Nādir had, moreover, other aims in view.

Before leaving Delhi, Nādir despatched a number of Indian boat-builders and carpenters to the river Oxus, via Kābul and Balkh, in order to build boats for the transport of his army in the campaign which he had in contemplation for the reduction of the rulers of Bukhārā and Khwārazm to obedience.¹ In addition, he engaged numbers of other carpenters, as well as sone-cutters, masons, goldsmiths and other craftsmen,² his intention being to erect in Iran a city on the model of Delhi.³ Some Indians of higher rank and attainments were also enrolled

1 It has not, apparently, been recorded when Nadir first conceived the idea of invading Bukhara and Khwarazm; he may have done so when listening, in November 1738, to Rida Qull Mirza's account of his campaign (see pages 197, 198 and 206 above), or possibly even earlier.

T.N., page 208.

Hanway, Vol.IV, page 197. See also Otter, Vol.I, page 402, who says that Nadir intended to erect this city near Hamadan, and that it was to be called Nadirabad. in the Shāh's service; the most important of these was 'Alavi Khān, the Hakīm-Bāshī or Chief Physician, whom Nādir engaged to cure him of an intestinal complaint which he had contracted before his conquest of India.¹ Another Indian of some note, Khwāja 'Abdu'l-Karīm ibn Aqībat Maḥmūd, of Kashmīr, who subsequently wrote the Bayān-i-Wāqf, entered Nādir's service at this time.

An immense baggage train consisting of mules and camels was prepared for the transport of all the treasures, and several hundred elephants and a large number of horses were included in the spoils.² All at length being ready, Nadir left Delhi on the 7th Safar (16th May) for the Shalimar gardens, where he halted until the following day. The long homeward march then began in earnest.

Bayān, fol.66(b).

Bayan, fol.30(b). MIrza Zaman (Fraser, page 221) puts the number of elephants at 1,000, while 'Abdu'l-Karim gives 500; Hanway is probably right in saying that there were not more than 300 (which is the figure given by Rustam All, fol.291(a)).

CHAPTER XVIII

The Invasion of India. IV. Delhi to Qandahar.

From the Shalimar gardens Nadir proceeded as far as Sirhind by the route which he had followed on his outward march. The long and richly laden baggage train proved an irresistible bait to the more daring of the peasants, who on several occasions attacked and looted the rear end of the train; it is said that Nadir lost 1,000 baggage animals and therloads in this way before he reached Thanesar.¹ Enraged by these exploits of the peasants, Nadir ordered massacres wherever they had occurred, and thus added to the devastation and havoc wrought by his men when on the way to Delhi.

The heat on the plains was already so considerable as to cause much suffering amongst the soldiers and campfollowers. In order to reach the foothills more rapidly and so escape to some extent from the heat, Nādir turned to the north at Sirhind, and marched via Sialkot to Akhnur on the Chenāb river.² An additional reason for this change of route was that the countryside between Sirhind and Lahore had been so ravaged on the outward march that sufficient provisions for the troops and fodder for the animals would not have been available.³

Hanway, Vol.IV, page 199.

² T.N., page 208, Bayān, fol.27(b), Anand Rām, fol.179(a). 3 Bayān, foll.27(a) and 27(b). Just after his departure from Delhi Nādir had despatched Ḥayātu'llah Khān, the eldest son of Zakariyā Khān, to Lahore, in company with 'Abdu'l-BāqI Khān, with orders to collect a <u>crore</u> of rupees from that city. As soon as Zakariyā Khān was informed of this order, he raised more than the sum demanded, and took it in person to Nādir, whom he met somewhere to the N.E. of Lahore. Zakariyā Khān accompanied Nādir as far as the Chenāb.¹

Akhnur was reached on the 27th Safar (5th June), and the cold waters of the Chenāb did much to refresh the soldiers, whose sufferings from the great heat had been much aggravated by their heavy clothing; every day, many had died.²

Copious rains in the mountainous country to the north had caused the river to rise considerably, and the current was very strong. The troops began to cross by the bridge of boats at Akhnur, but this bridge proved unequal to the strain imposed upon it by the great strength of the current and by the unusually heavy load. When only a portion of the army had reached the further bank, the bridge broke asunder, and 2,000 men were drowned in the swirling waters.³

¹ Anand Rām, fol.178(b).

² Bayãn, fol.27(b), T.N., page 208. Irakli II also speaks of the terrible heat and of the numbers of men who succumbed to it. (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 362.)

³ Anand Rām, fol.179(a). ⁶Abdu'l-Karīm (Bayān, fol.27(b)) states that the inhabitants of those parts, having been warned of Nādir's approach, had retired to the hills. They then cut down as many big trees in the vicinity of the river as they could, and cast them into the Chenāb. Borne swiftly downstream, these tree trunks were dashed against the floating bridge at Akhnur with such force that the chains connecting the boats snapped in two. 253

It proving impossible either to repair this bridge or to build another one nearby, Nādir gave orders for the remainder of the troops and the baggage and artillery to be ferried across at Kullowal, 30 miles downstream from Akhnur; this passage by ferry proved a lengthy process, and it was not until the 7th Rabī'II (14th July) that it was completed.¹

Knowing that his men had amassed much plunder at Delhi, Nādir, before the crossing was begun, issued an order that every man was to surrender all his loot. Many men obeyed and were rewarded, but, as Nādir knew that many others had disregarded his order, he posted some trustworthy men at the crossing place who searched every man as he passed. Some men buried their valuables, in the hope that they would be able to return later and recover them, but in this they were. disappointed; others are said to have been so enraged that they threw their jewels and money into the river.²

Before leaving the further (western) bank of the Chenāb, Nādir set free his Indian prisoners and ordered

¹ T.N., page 208.

² Bayan, fol.28(a). In February 1740 some merchants arrived at Gombroon from Nādir's camp who said that it was "excessively rich in Monèy and Jewells. But the latter he (Nādir) engrosses to himself, having forbid the soldiers retaining Diamonds or other Stones On their coming to any Pass, He had their Baggage brought before him and examined to prevent their concealing such...." (Gombroon Diary, 22nd February, 1740). In his "History of Persia" (Vol.II, page 86), Sir J. Malcolm, after mentioning this order of Nādir's, says:- "I have heard many Persian noblemen, when speaking on this subject, refer the conduct of Nādir more to policy than avarice. He feared, they affirmed, his soldiers would be spoiled by wealth."

Zakariyā Khān to assist them to return to their homes; he then gave the Khān leave to go back to Lahore.¹

It was, apparently, at this time that Nādir, doubtless as a result of his difficulties over the Chenāb crossing, sent orders to Muḥammad Tāqī Khān, the Beglarbegi of Fārs, to bring reinforcements by sea to Sind. These orders reached Muḥammad Tāqī Khān at the end of October or early in November;² the manner in which he carried them out, or rather in which he attempted to do so, will be described in the next chapter.

In heavy rain the army advanced from the Chenāb to the Jhelum; having crossed the latter river by a bridge,³ the army continued its march via Rāwal Pindi to Hasan Abdāl.⁴ Whilst at Hasan Abdāl, Nādir despatched impressive embassies to Constantinople and St. Petersburg in order to announce his conquest of India. Each of the Ambassadors, who started on their lengthy journeys on the 20th Rajab (23rd October), took gifts of great value, as well as a number of elephants, to present to the ruler to whom he was accredited.⁵

¹ Bayan, fol.28(b), T.N., page 209.

² It appears from the T.N. (page 211) that Nadir only issued these orders when at Kabul in December 1739, but this is impossible; it is clear from the Gombroon records that they reached the Beglarbegi late in October or early in November, so they must have been despatched several months before. See Gombroon Diary, 5th November, 1739.

³ See Irakli's letter, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 363. ⁴ T.N., page 209, Bayān, fol.29(b).

⁵ T.N., page 209. Further details of these embassies will be given subsequently.

At the end of Rajab Nādir received word from Ridā Qulī Mīrzā that Ilbārs, the Khān of Khwārazm had taken advantage of his (Nādir's) absence in India to raid the Abīvard and Nasā districts of Khurāsān.¹

On leaving Hasan Abdāl, Nādir bore westwards towards the Indus.² He was now in the country of the warlike Yūsufza'is, who offered much resistance. After some heavy fighting had taken place, Nādir came to terms with these resolute tribesmen, and enlisted a large number of them in his army; had he not reached this understanding with them, much delay would have resulted, and he would have been unable to reach the high country round Kābul before the advent of the winter snow rendered the roads impassable.³

After crossing the Indus, Nādir went to Peshawar and on through the Khaibar Pass and Jalālābād to Kābul, where he arrived on the 1st Ramadān (2nd December).⁴ Aļl the Afghan leaders and notables of the province came to pay homage to Nādir at Kābul. No less than 40,000 Afghans of Peshawar, Kābul, the Hazārajāt andother districts enrolled in his army and were sent to Herat where they were to await Nādir's arrival⁵.

T.N., page 210.
 The route which Nādir followed is probably the same as that briefly described by Muhammad Ja'far Shāmlū in his Manāzilu'1-Futūh, foll.7(a) and 7(b).
 T.N., page 210, Bayān, foll.29(a) and 29(b).
 T.N., page 210.
 T.N., page 211.

Some time previously, Nadir had summoned Miyan Nur Muhammad Khudāyār Khān, the powerful Governor of Sind, to meet him at Kābul and to do homage to him there, but the Kalhora chief disregarded this order.¹ Being at such a distance and feeling that Nadir would not march his tired troops so far to the south, Khudayar Khan had no misgivings. It is characteristic of Nadir that he refused to brook this flouting Though it was nearly mid-winter and the of his authority. cold was intense, he started southwards from Kabul on the 8th Ramadan (9th December) in order to punish Khudayar Khan.² The elephants did not accompany Nadir on this southward march, because it would have been impracticable to take them. They were, instead, sent to Iran via Ghazna, Qandahār and Herat.

Details are lacking in regard to the route followed by Nadir between Kabul and the Kurram valley. He doubtless marched south for 15 miles to Zahidabad; here he may have branched off to the south-east and crossed into the upper

Bayan, fol.31(b). According to Leech's "Brief History of Kalat" (J.R.A.S., Vol.XII, page 484), Muhabbat Khan, the eldest son of 'Abdullah Khan Brahoi, mindful of a promise which Nadir had made, during the siege of Qandahar, to assist him against Khudayar Khan, the slayer of his father, reminded Nadir of this promise when the army reached the Indus. For the feud between Khudayar Khan and 'Abdu'llah Khan, see page 93 above.

² According to Otter (Vol.II, pages 97 and 98), Nādir, after leaving Kābul for Qandahār, despatched Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān, with 5,000 men, to receive the submission of Khudāyār Khān. On receiving word from Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān of Khudāyār Khān's refusal to submit and of his preparations for resistance, Nādir, who was then 'very close to Qandahār', "retraced his steps in order to bring Khudāyār Khān to reason." This statement (which is copied by Hanway, Vol.IV, page 202) is clearly devoid of foundation.

Kurram valley via AlI Khel and Ahmad Khel. Alternatively, he may have marched on southwards from Zahidabad to Khak Hazāra, three stages from Kābul; from Khāk Hazāra the route runs almost due east to Hazar Darakht, near the headwaters of the Kurram. Of the two routes, this latter is the more practicable in winter, and is therefore the one which he probably There is a tradition to the effect that Nadir marched took. still further south before turning east, and entered the Bannu country via the Daur valley.¹ It is said that Nadir so thoroughly subdued the Daur tribe that they paid an annual tribute of Rs.12,000 to the Kabul authorities until the time of Zamān Shāh DurranI.² References in other authorities to the traversing of the Bangashat³ and the length of time spent in the Kurram valley seem to prove, however, that Nadir and the bulk of his army went that way and not by the Daur valley. but it is nevertheless possible that Nadir sent some of his troops by the latter route.

The march in these parts was trying in the extreme, and many of those who had survived the stifling summer heat of the plains now succumbed to the cold of the high country in

³ See the Bayan, foll.31(b) and 32(a), T.N., page 211.

Hayāt-i-Afghānī, page 628, and S. S. Thorburn, "Bannu; or Our Afghan Frontier", London, 1876, page 24. Sir E. D. Maclagan has very kindly informed me of a local tradition in support of this statement; this is that the fountain of Zwoh, between the Tochi and the Baran passes at the mouth of the Daur valley was polluted by the numbers of Nadir's soldiers and camels that fell into it.

Hayāt-i-Afghānī, page 418.

mid-winter. The army and the long baggage train had to cross the swift Kurram river no less than 22 times; so many baggage animals were carried away and drowned during these crossings that one quarter of the spoils of India was lost.¹

At last, on the 1st Shawwal (1st January, 1740) the army emerged from the grim and forbidding defiles of the Kurram, called by the men the 'valley of the demon'; on entering the lower country, they rejoiced to see green fields and to breathe the warmer air.²

Although the soldiers rejoiced when they left the Kurram valley behind, their troubles were by no means at an end. The local zamindars retired to their strongholds and offered resistance³, and certain of the Bannuchi tribesmen attacked the Iranian columns.⁴ It is said, however, that some of the Bannuchis were terrified at the sight of the Iranians, who were all clad in red and had tents of the same colour. Nadir dealt ruthlessly with the tribesmen who attacked him; the Garri clan is said to have been 1,000 strong when Nadir came; only two remained after he had gone.⁵

¹ Bayān, fol.32(a).

2 " " " and 32(b).

3 n n 32(b).

⁴ Sir E. D. Maclagan informs me that, according to local tradition, the townspeople of Kaki and Bharth mistook the Iranian advance guard forma company of merchants travelling in the manner of the Powindahs, and delivered an attack. They paid dearly for their mistake, for Nadir had them all put to the sword. As the Powindahs always travelled fully armed and in large bodies when in dangerous country, it is not altogether strange that the Bannuchis should have mistaken the Iranian advance guard for a company of them.
5 Hayāt-i-Afghānī, page 628. Large numbers of baggage animals had, as stated above, been drowned in the Kurram; many more died through lack of fodder, and transport became very scarce. Further to the south, it was found that the tribespeople had, at the orders of Khudāyār Khān, taken away and hidden as much of the grain as they could carry and had burnt the rest; consequently, parties of troops had to be sent far afield to obtain sufficient supplies.¹

It seems that Nādir struck southwards from the Kurram river near Bazār Ahmad Khān to the Tochi river, and that he passed through or close to the towns of Bharth and Kaki, traversed the district of Nar² and the Marwat desert.³ He must have gone over the Pezu pass, between the Bhittani and Marwat ranges, and then marched southwards to Dera Isma^{*}Il Khān,

- Z Sir E. D. Maclagan states: "The natives have a strange story about a poor Bannuchi in Nar who, on Nadir's approach, fled up a very large tree; the place beneath this tree was selected by Nadir's Khalasis as the spot on which the tents of the harem should be pitched; the ladies espied the poor man in the tree, and when the Shah himself came out, the poor wretch fell down in abject terror, but Nadir, instead of punishing him, said with a sort of princely contempt that, as the harem was now of no value, he might take it all, and the Bannuchi ploughman found himself saddled with an emperor's harem and all its servants and accoutrements. He was only too pleased to accept a few rupees from the ladies and to let them return to Khurasan." These local traditions are of interest, but implicit reliance must not be placed on them. For example, Sir H. B. Edwards (<u>op.cit.</u>, Vol.II, page 20) relates that the people of Multan believed that the fine groves of date-palms surrounding the city owed their origin to date stones left on the ground by Nadir's soldiers, "a legacy of wealth and beauty such as conquest seldom leaves behind." It is, however, known for certain that Nadir did not march through Multan.
- 3 Thorburn, <u>op.cit.</u>, page 24, states that Nadir completely cowed the Marwats as well as the Bannuchis, and that he levied heavy tribute from both tribes. 260.

¹ Bayān, fol.33(a).

where he arrived on the 5th Shawwāl (5th January 1740).¹ At Dera Isma^c Il Khān, Sādiq Khān, the Chief of the Dāūdpūtra tribe², came to pay homage to Nādir and promised to assist him against Khudāyār Khān.³

At Dera Isma'Il Khān Nādir embarked the greater part of his army in boats and proceeded by river to Dera Ghāzī Khān, which he reached on the 15th Shawwāl (15th January).⁴ From this town Nādir sent a further summons to Khudāyār Khān, but the Khān again returned no answer.

Having reduced to obedience all the tribes in the neighbourhood, Nādir set out southward again, and reached Larkana on the 14th Dhu'l-Qa^cda (12th February); here he received word that Khudāyār Khān had fled in the direction of Gujerat. Leaving his baggage at Larkana, Nādir hastened in pursuit.⁵ On arriving at Shahdādpūr he found awaiting him

- ¹ T.N., page 212.
- ² For an account of the origin and history of the Daudputras see Pir Ibrahim Khan's "History of Bahawalpore", London, 1848, page 24 and Mohun Lal's "A Brief Account of the Origin of the Daudputras and of the power and birth of Bahawal Khan, their Chief", in J.R.A.S.B., Vol.VII.
- ³ Not long before, Khudayar Khan, jealous of the increasing power and affluence of the Daudputras, had attacked them and so incurred their enmity. See Pir Ibrahim Khan, <u>op.cit</u>., page 18.
- 4
 - ⁻ T.N., page 212.
- 5 ibidem.

some presents and a petition from the Khān;¹ the latter, however, had fled across the desert to his fortress of 'Umarkot² where helensconced himself in fancied security.

On the 28th Dhu'l-Qada (26th February) Nādir left Shahdādpūr and made a forced march for 30 <u>farsakhs</u> across the desert to Umarkot where he arrived on the following day. Burying his treasures, the Khān prepared for a further flight, but it was too late.³ Khudāyār Khān offered to submit, on condition that the lives of himself and his family were spared; Nādir readily consented, for he could not afford to delay, since his troops were without water or supplies.⁴

Various stories are told of the interview between Nādir and Khudāyār Khān and of the manner in which the latter was made to disgorge his treasures. According to 'Abdu'l-Karīm, a number of objects of value that had formerly belonged to the Ṣafavī monarchs were discovered amongst them; on enquiries being made, it was found that the Ghilza'i Afghans of Qandahār, on being subdued by Nādir, had scattered their Iranian spoils in all directions; some of these spoils had been purchased by Khudāyār Khān.⁵ The value of all the gold, jewels and

- ¹ T.N., page 212.
- The Emperor Akbar was born at Umarkot in October 1542; in 1591 Akbar marched through the place when on his successful expedition against Sind.

³ T.N., page 212, Anand Rām, fol.183(a), Bayān, fol.34(a). ⁴ Bayān, fol.34(a).

5 fol.34(b). See also the somewhat different accounts given by Leech, in his "Brief History of Kalat" in J.R.A.S.B. Vol.XII, page 485, and Sir H. Pottinger's "Travels in Beloochistan", pages 352 and 353. 262. pearls which the Khān was forced to hand over amounted to over a crore of rupees.¹

After spending a few days at Umarkot, Nādir returned to Larkana, taking Khudāyār Khān with him in chains. Five days after reaching Larkana, Nau Rūz was celebrated there with great pomp and magnificence.² It was at this time, apparently, that Zakariyā Khān, in response to a summons from Nādir, arrived at Larkana, where the Shāh treated him with even more courtesy and consideration than before.³

Since Nādir was pleased with Khudāyār Khān's bearing and behaviour after his submission, he forgave him, and made him Khān of Thatta and part of Sind, which formed approximately onethird of his former dominions; Nādir also conferred on him the title of Shāh Qull ('Slave of the Shāh') Khān. In return, Khudāyār Khān had to undertake to pay an annual tribute of 10 <u>lakhs</u> of rupees and to furnish a contingent of 2,000 cavalry under the command of one of his sons.⁴ Nādir then divided up the remainder of Khudāyār Khān's territories; he gave Kachhi, the portion of Sindajoining Balūchistān, to Muḥabbat Khān, the Governor of that province, and rewarded Ṣādiq Khān, the chief of the Dāūdpūtras, by granting him the district of Shikārpūr and the high plateau of Sind.

¹ T.N., page 213, Postans, <u>op.cit</u>., page 169.
 ² Bayān, fol.34(b).
 ³ Anand Rām, fol.183(b).
 ⁴ T.N., page 214. See also Leech, in J.R.A.S.B., Vol.XVII, page 45

Whilst Nādir was at Larkana an ambassador arrived from Muhammad Shāh¹ bearing a letter and costly gifts. Nādir returned a suitable reply, and sent the Emperor a present of some fine horses and 200 camel-loads of Balkh melons - a trivial return for the peacock throne and the other treasures of India which he had been "given"!²

After enjoining upon Zakariyā Khān and his son Hayatū'llah the need for serving the Emperor faithfully, Nādir gave them both leave to depart.3

Having despatched instructions to Ridā Qulī Mīrzā (who was then at Tehran) to proceed to Herat,⁴ Nadir left Larkana for Nādirābād on the 13th Muḥarram, 1153, (10th April), taking two of Khudāyār Khān's sons with him as hostages.⁵ The route taken was via Gandāva and Sibi, then over the 54-mile Bolan Pass, the dreaded Dasht-i-Bi-Daulat desert, Shāl (Quetta) and Fushanj (Pishin); Nādir and his army arrived at Nādirābād on the 7th Ṣafar (4th May)⁵, just over two (lunar) years from the time when he had set out from there for the conquest of India

¹ T.N., page 215, Bayan, 35(a). Muhammad Shah is said to have become alarmed on receiving news of Nadir's campaign in Sind and of his summons to Zakariya Khan, fearing lest a second invasion of India might be impending.

² MIrzā Mahdī may have been conscious of the relatively insignificant value of Nādir's presents to Muhammad Shāh, for he devotes some space to describing how Nādir delighted above all in, first, the water melons of Balkh and Herat, and secondly, in a beautiful horse (T.N., page 215) the moral drawn being, of course, that Nādir sent to the Emperor the two things in which he himself took most delight.

- 3 T.N., page 214.
- **4 ⁿ *** 215.
- 5 ibidem, Bayan, fol.35(a). 6 T.N.. page 215. The Bayan
- 5 T.N., page 215. The Bayan gives this date as the 3rd Safar (30th April). 264.

CHAPTER XIX.

The First $^{\circ}$ Omān Campaign and Operations in the Persian Gulf, 1737 - 1740.

Some time in 1736 the Imām Saif ibn Sulțān of Omān appealed to Nādir for aid against his rebellious subjects.¹ It seems that Latīf Khān, the Admiral of the Gulf, whose expedition to Bahrain had been so successful, persuaded Nādir to take advantage of the situation in Omān to send an expeditionary force to conquer the coutry.² Nādir could have needed but little inducement to agree; with Muscat and the Omān coast in his hands, the establishment of Iranian naval supremacy in the Gulf would be an easy matter.

On the 14th March 1737 the Iranian fleet, consisting of four ships (two of which had been purchased from the English), two 'grabs' and some smaller vessels, reached Gombroon from Bushire under the command of Latif Khān "who hoists his Flag, being a white ground with a red Persian sword in the middle."³ After 5,000 men, and 1500 horses had embarked, the fleet sailed on the 12th April for Khor Fakkān (74 miles/south of Ras Musandam) where it arrived four days later.⁴ Latīf Khān, after landing

1	Salll ibn Razlq's "History of the Imams and Seyyids of Oman" (Badger's translation), London, 1871, page 13.							
23	Gombroon Diary, 2nd/13th February, 1738.							
 ³ Letter from Gombroon to London of 6th/17th May, 1737. ⁴ See C. Guillain's "Documents sur l'Histoire, la Géograph le Commerce de l'Afrique Orientale", (Paris, 1856), Voi 								
	le Commerce de l'Afrique Orientale", (Paris, 1856), Vol.I, page 529.							

some of the troops at Khor Fakkan, sailed back northwards, rounded Ras Musandam and landed the remainder at Julfär (Rasu'l-Khaima), where he met the Imām. In company with Saif ibn Sultān, LatIf Khān marched inland and at Falju's-Samīnī defeated Bal'arab ibn Himyar al-Ya'riba, who, although a relative of Saif, was the leader of the rebels.¹ The Iranians and Saif's adherents then occupied the towns of al-Jauf and'Ibra. At 'Ibra dissension broke out between Said and LatIf Khān because the latter had begun to act as if the Iranians were already masters of the whole country. The alliance between the Imām and the Iranians was therefore broken off and the latter returned to Julfār.²

No further steps to establish control over Omān were made during the summer and autumn of 1737, but in November Taqī Khān, the Beglarbegi of Fārs, received peremptory orders from Nādir to prosecute the campaign.

In January 1738 Taqì Khān and Latlf Khān, after commandeering all the English and Dutch trankeys at Gombroon, sailed for Julfār with 6,000 men. Taqì Khān went with considerable misgivings, and quarrelled with Latlf Khān because the latter had persuaded Nādir to undertake the venture. The Beglarbegi and the Admiral smoothed over their differences, and joined forces with Saif ibn Sultān, whose lack of success.

¹ See C. Guillain's "Documents sur l'Histoire, la Géographie et le Commerce de l'Afrique Orientale", (Paris, 1856), Vol.I, page 529.

² Gombroon Diary, 21st July/1st August, 1737.

against his rebellious subjects had forced him once more to seek Iranian aid. The combined armies again defeated Bal^c arab ibn Himyar, and occupied the towns of Bahla and Nizwa;¹ they then advanced to Muscat. The Iranians occupied the town without difficulty, but could not secure possession of the ĕaštērn and western forts,² although they besieged them for five weeks. Taqī Khān quarrelled with the Imām at Muscat, doubtless because of the Iranian attempt to seize these forts. Saif ibn Sulțān withdrew with his fleet and troops and made terms with Bal^carab, who promised to assist him against the Iranians.

Taqī Khān, being unable to take the Muscat forts, likewise left for Barka at the end of May, but was/unable to obtain possession of the Barka forts. At Barka dissensions once more broke out between Taqī Khān and Latīf Khān, with the result that the former poisoned the Admiral.³ Taqī Khān and his men were, it appears, reduced to great straits.⁴ After a vain attempt to seize Sohār, the Iranians had to retire to Julfār. Meanwhile, disaster had befallen the Iranian garrison which had been left at Bahla.

The failure of Taqī Khān to pay and adequately feed the Arab seamen (most of whom were Huwalas) led to a serious

1	Salil ibn Raziq Gombroon Diar	, <u>op.cit</u> ., page 142, Guillain, Vol.I, page 529, 7, 8th/19th April, 1738.
2	These forts were	e known respectively as al-Jalali and Marani; built by the Portuguese.
3	Gombroon Diary,	26th June/7th July, 1738.
4	ibidem,	13th/24th July, 1738.

mutiny in the Iranian fleet, and the Iranians lost for a time the command of the Gulf to the mutineers and their allies, the Huwala and Omani Arabs. Basidū was raided and the Iranians in Bahrain were besieged in a castle, and it became necessary for provisions to be sent in English vessels to the troops at Julfar.¹

By the end of 1738 dissensions had broken out amongst the Arabs, and in January 1739 the Iranian's, having recovered some vessels, defeated the mutineer and rebel fleet, the Arab admiral being blown up.² In March the Beglarbegi arrived at Gombroon with "positive orders to level Muscatt to the ground."³ However, no progress could be made with the conquest of 'Omän because TaqI Khān was called away almost immediately in order to quell a revolt in the Kūhgilū province.⁴ After TaqI Khān had subdued the rebels in that province, he received, in October or early November 1739, the orders to proceed to Sind which Nadir had sent to him when delayed at the Chenāb.⁵

Having obtained the loan of a large Dutch vessel and purchased stores from the English, Taqī Khān left Gombroon on the 3rd December for Sind by land via Makrān, at the head of 2,000 cavalry. The fleet, which hadtaken on board several

1	Gombroon Diary, 26th July/6th August, 1738.							
2	Letter from Gombroon	to London,	3lst	March/1	lth	April,	1739.	
3	ibidem.		π	Ħ	#	Π	π	
4	4 ibidem 15th/26th May.							
5	T.N., page 211. See	also page 2	255 ab	ove.				

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thousand Iranian troops, sailed the same day.¹ A rendez-vous was made at Gwadar, whence Taqi Khan marched inland to Kesh where, some time in February, he was heavily defeated by the Baluch tribes, led by Malik DInar, of Makran.² Provisions ran short both on shore and in the fleet, with the result that many died of starvation. On the 5th/16th April Tagi Khan returned to Gombroon from his disastrous expedition "wherein the greatest want of Conduct imaginable has appeared".3 Two davs later, the Admiral, Mir Ali Khan, arrived, looking "greatly dejected"; he reported many deaths owing to lack of water and Towards the end of April TaqI Khan received a curt food. summons from Nadir to proceed to Nadirabad, where the Shah was shortly to arrive. By the lst/12th May the whole fleet had assembled again at Gombroon, but it was reported to be "unfit for any Enterprise", and fears were even entertained of an attack by the Arabs.⁴

As for TaqI Khān, he was, on arrival at the court, severely reprimanded and deprived of his post.

The history of the second Omān campaign and subsequent operations in the Persian Gulf will be given in Chapter XXIII.

1	Gombroon Diary, pages 87 and	19th/30th 88.	n Nover	nber.	See	also	Otter,	Vol.II,
2	T.N., page 214.							
	Gombroon Diary,							
4	11 H	lst/12th	May	11				

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CHAPTER XX.

The Viceroyalty of Rida Quli Mirza.

The viceroyalty of Ridā Qull Mīrzā is a subject that has been much neglected by Iranian Historians, and some of the European writers who have touched upon it and have passed judgment upon the Prince's conduct seem to have done so without sufficiently examining the facts.

Ridā Quli had undoubtedly inherited many of his father's qualities and defects. He was brave and ambitious. and he could, at times, be both avaricious and cruel, but the blemishes in his character have been exaggerated by such The former relates that writers as Bratishchev and Hanway. when Nadir made Rida Qull Viceroy of Iran, he arranged that no one save Ibrahim Khan should have the right to interfere with him in the exercise of his powers; 1 Mirzā Mahdi, however, makes no mention of Ibrahim Khan being invested by Nadir with any overriding authority on this occasion (though Nādir had done so in 1736, when Ridā Qulī was made Governor of Khurasān). This point may, perhaps, be regarded as academic, because Ibrahim Khan was already dead when Nadir appointed his son Viceroy; but Nadir at that juncture was not aware of this fact, and Mirza Mahdi's act of omission might be taken to

See G. F. Müller's German translation of V. Bratishchev's account, in the former's "Sammlung Russischer Geschichte", St. Petersburg, 1763, Vol.VIII, page 465.

mean that the Shāh conferred unfettered power upon his son. If this is so, and if one takes into account the fact that Ridā Qulī was Nādir's favourite son, the young Prince's quasi-regal behaviour as Viceroy does not seem so surprising.

Hanway, in writing of this period, states that Ridā Quli, "by practising all the acts of cruelty and extortion, soon incurred the hatred of the people. In order to cover his rapacious avaride, he took the specious name of a merchant, Hanway then mentions Ridā Quli's monopoly of the silk trade. It is true that Elton and Graeme (who, as will be related subsequently,² arrived in Gīlān in June 1739 with a cargo of goods belonging to certain merchants who were members of the Russia Company) say that Ridā Qulī had by his for each

"Kupecheens³ become, in a manner, the sole Merchant or Trader in all Persia, as none but the Schah's Kupecheens could buy any Goods imported. And as to Raw Silk, not only the Product of the Province of Gilan, but of all the other Provinces that produce Silk, was wholly engrossed by the Schah. Hence we, amongst the rest, were obliged to tender our Goods to the Schah's Kupecheen."

Elton and Graeme, however, later go on to say that it was not Rida Quli, but a merchant of Isfahan (whom the Prince had made his Treasurer) who 'engrossed' to himself all the

- Hanway, Vol.IV, page 180. It is to be noted that Hanway did not visit Persia until 1743.
- 2 See Appendix III. "Kupecheen" is a corruption of the Russian word KYTYNHA meaning 'merchant'.

³ See Elton and Graeme's "A Journey through Russia into Persia by Two English Gentlemen who went in the year 1739 from Petersburg, in order to make a Discovery how the Trade from Great Britain might be carried on from Astracan over the Caspian", London, 1742, pages 26 and 27. European imports.1

Notwithstanding these restrictions on trade, Ridā Qulī, in response to a petition from Elton and Graeme, gave them considerable trading privileges in August 1739.² Elton and Graeme expressly state:

"that he (Ridā Qulī) is ready to redress Grievances, and encourage trade, we could produce several Instances; witness the Decree ... he so readily granted us, and that, it is said, he lately granted to the Armenians, which impowers them to carry their Goods to any Market in Persia, without regard to the Schah's Kupecheens, that it is to be hoped the Treasurer's Projects are near to an end."

Further, it is important to note that no trading monopoly existed in the south of Iran; there is, moreover, definite evidence to prove that Ridā Qull had the interests of the people there at heart. When, sometime in 1739, Muhammad Taqī Khān ordered the Kalāntar of Kirmān to collect and forward to him 1500 tomans in respect of taxes,⁴ the official made representations to Ridā Qull, with the result that the Prince gave instructions for the order to be cancelled. Meanwhile, however, the Beglarbegi had forced the Kalāntar to raise the money; the luckless official, being unable to obtain more than a fraction of the amount from the

Elton and Graeme, <u>op.cit</u>., page 29.
ibidem, page 45.
ibidem, page 32.

⁴ Volume X of the Bombay Government Public Consultations quotes a letter from Gombroon of the 20th March 1739 which states that the Beglarbegi had just informed the Agent of his intention to raise 20,000 Tomans, to reimburse himself for the expenses to which he had been put in connection with the Muscat expedition. 272. populace, had to borrow the balance from the representatives of the English and Dutch Companies at Kirmān. The Kalāntar thereupon made further representations to Riḍā Qull, who immediately ordered the Beglarbegi to refund the money, out of which the Europeans were to be repaid all that they had advanced.¹

This was not the only occasion on which Ridā Quli intervened to annul some high-handed action by Taqi Khān. In the autumn of 1738 the Beglarbegi performed some unspecified action that was detrimental to the East India Company. The Gombroon Agent referred the matter to Bombay, and the President there wrote a letter to Nādir complaining of the Beglarbegi's conduct. This letter reached Iran during Nādir's absence, and was dealt with by Ridā Quli. The Prince

"in answer thereto wrote the Agent that He had signified our Complaint to the Beglerbeggy who would do Us justice: they (i.e. the Agent and Council at Gombroon) are well informed the Beglerbeggy is much exasperated at this Letter."²

In October 1739 Taqī Khān's son was at Isfahān, on his way to Ridā Qull's court. It is said that Ridā Qull, at the instigation of some of the Beglarbegi's enemies, had the

- 1 The particulars given above are taken from the Bombay Government 'Public Consultations', Vol.XI, 1740, the entry in which is based on a letter from Gombroon of the 28th February, 1740. The Gombroon Diary gives no details of this incident, but makes (on the 23rd February, 1740) the following comment upon Ridã Qull's action: "It is no unpleasant Prospect of what his future Reign may be, to find this Prince interest himself so much in favour of his Subjects."
- ² Bombay Government 'Public Consultations", Vol.X, 1739.

son stripped of his equipage, horses and arms.¹ There can be no doubt that Rida Quli and Taqi Khan disliked each other; and it is by no means impossible that Taqi Khan's hostility to Rida Quli may have been instrumental to some extent in bringing about the terrible punishment which Nadir inflicted upon him in 1742; this is a point which will be dealt with more fully in due course.

The outstanding event during Ridà Quli's tenure of the office of Viceroy was the execution of the luckless ex-Shāh Taḥmāsp and his family. This cruel act, for which the Prince was directly responsible, is undoubtedly a great stain upon his character.

As early as the spring of 1739 it was reported in Iran that disaster had befallen Nādir's army in India and that the Shāh himself had perished,² and other rumours to the same effect were afterwards repeatedly in circulation; in the absence, often for long periods, of reliable news, these reports were widely believed.³ A particularly persistent report of Nādir's death reached Iran late in 1739, and it is said that Ridā Qulī feared that the people might rise in favour of Tahmāsp or his son ʿAbbās and restore one or other of them to the throne.

¹ Gombroon Diary, 6th November, 1739.

² When this rumour reached Isfahan, Otter's Iranian friends, fearing the outbreak of disturbances, advised him to leave the country. Otter acted on their advice, and left Isfahan for Baghdad on the 12th/23rd April 1739 (Vol.II, page 2). Bratishchev states (<u>op.cit</u>., page 470) that the Indians in Iran deliberately disseminated false news.

Bratishchev, <u>op.cit</u>., page 470.

In order to obviate this risk and to secure the succession for himself in the event of the report of Nādir's death proving to be correct, Rida Qull gave orders for Tahmasp, his two young sons 'Abbās and Sulaimān, and even, it is said, the ex-Shāh's wives, to be strangled.¹ All that can be urged in extenuation for this terrible act is that Ridā Qull realised that he would, in all probability, lose not only his right to the succession, but also his life, if any Safavī restoration took place.

The exact date of this tragic event is not, apparently, recorded, but it is probable that Ridā Qulī gave the order for the executions before he left Mashhad for the purpose of holding his Nau Rūz assembly at Tehran; it may therefore have been towards the end of February, 1740.²

In the spring of 1740 it was believed in Basra that Ahmad Pāshā had hopes of securing the throne of Iran for himself, should the reports of Nādir's death prove to be well-

¹ Hazin, pages 302 and 303, Abdu'l-Karim Bukhari, page 46. It is probable that Rida Qull believed this report of Nadir's death to be true; Hanway (Vol.IV, page 208) says that the Prince "received this account with a seeming satisfaction", but (as usual) he gives no authority for this statement. Bratishchev (op.cit., page 467) states that Rida Quli found in Tahmasp the greatest obstacle to the realisation of his great ambition to secure the throne, and that the means by which he thought to gain his ends showed his criminal dispo-Later (page 468) Bratishchev records what purport sition. to be the ipsissima verba of Fatima Begum, Rida Quli's wife and sister of the slaughtered ex-Shah, when she reproached her husband for his deed. (One cannot help doubting the accuracy of such citations, because Bratishchev himself could, obviously, not have been present, and he makes no attempt to explain how he obtained his information). Accord to Bratishchev (page 469) Rida Oull was stung to the quick by his wife's reproaches and "cut short the stream of her words and of her life with his sword." 2 The first mention by the Agent at Combroon of the tragedy is in a letter to London dated the 3rd/14th June, 1740. 275.

founded.¹ It is not known whether there was, in fact, any real basis for this belief; as Ahmad Pāshā was a very ambitious man and had conquered much of Western Iran in the troubled period following the Afghan invasion, he may perhaps have thought of repeating his exploits, in the event of Nadir's death, and of exercising dominion over the Iranian provinces of Kirmānshāh, Ardalān and Hamadān, as well as over the Turkish Vilayets of Baghdād and Başra.

Most exaggerated reports were spread at Isfahān and elsewhere of the Prince's object in holding the assembly at Tehran, it being said that

"he had summoned all the Cauns and Governors of Persia to attend him (at Tehran) as Nâdir at Chulamagon (Chuli-Mughân) and was then by order of his Father to take upon himself the Absolute Sovereignty as Monarch of Persia^{#2}

It was later ascertained, however, that Rida Quli's reason for holding this assembly was merely to receive the annual accounts.

Previous to the holding of this assembly, Ridã Qull, doubtless on receipt of instructions from Nādir, issued a proclamation at Isfahān

"whereby Every body is required to bring into the King's Mints all Silver Coins that were formerly Current, such as abassees, mamoodies and nadirrees and to receive in lieu of them rupees being of the same value with those he (Nadir) Stamped in India and which are to pass for ten shahees Silver each".

He went on to say that he had not yet heard of any alteration

- ¹ Dorrill's letter to London, dated the 5th/16th March 1740.
- ² Gombroon Diary, lst/l2th April 1740 (on the authority of a letter from Joseph Hermet, the Company's "Linguist" at Isfahān).
- 3 ibidem.

The Gombroon Agent expressed the view that this change would have a good effect upon trade, if the exchange continued to fall there.¹ He went on to say that he had not yet heard of any alteration in the gold coin, "nor do we find any of the other become so plenty as to be in every Body's hands."

On the 12th/23rd March the Gombroon Diary referred to the "Ease enjoyed by the People from the Suspension of Taxes by Shaw Nadir and the Flattering Expectations they are in of the Young King's Government from several Acts of Justice he has shewn."

The people were soon, alas! to be disappointed in so far as the taxes were concerned; as to Ridā Quli, his period of authority was nearing its end.

Of the lot of the common people and peasantry during this period there is not a great deal on record, but what there is makes pathetic reading. In the south the exactions of TaqI Khān occasioned much misery, and many of the young recruits enrolled or rather impressed for the 'Omān expedition never saw their homes again. As regards the centre and west, there is Otter's interesting account of his journey from Işfahān to Baghdād via Kangavār and Kirmānshāh. Otter draws a gloomy picture of the condition of the peasantry; their state was by no means enviable when he had travelled to Işfahān with 'Abdu'l-Bāqī Khān in 1737, but, when returning to Baghdād two years later, he found that it had deteriorated a

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Gombroon Diary, 5th/February 1740. (on the authority of a letter from Joseph Hermet, the Company's "Linguist" at Isfahān).

good deal more.¹

Although Nadir ordered Rida Quli more than once to attend his Court at Herat, the Prince deferred obeying the summons for some time, on the grounds that affairs of state at Tehran still necessitated his presence there. It is difficult to say whether this was a genuine excuse or whether it was, as has been suggested.² merely a pretext of Ridā Quli's to delay meeting his redoubtable parent, because he feared that the latter had received unsatisfactory reports of his con-Ridā Quli at length set out from Tehran, at the head of duct. 12,000 picked horsemen and met Nadir at Qara Tappa, in BadghIs. on the 26th June.³ Nadir proceeded to review Rida Qull's force and then incorporated it in his own army, leaving the Prince without any command. It is said that the reason for this action was that Nadir's suspicions of his son had been aroused by the latter's unauthorised putting to death of the ex-Shah Tahmasp.4

At or about the same time Nadir made Nasru'llah Viceroy of Iran in place of Rida Quli, and ordered the last-named to accompany him on the Turkistan expedition.⁵ Reports of the

T	Otter.	Vol.II,	pages	13	and	14.
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² Bratishchev, <u>op.cit</u>., page 478.

⁷ T.N., page 217. MIrzā Mahdi gives no indication of the manner in which Nādir received his son. Bratishchev (page 478) states that Nādir received the Prince "More with the severity (<u>Ernsthaftigkeit</u>) of a powerful sovereign than with the friendliness of a father." 4 Abdu'l-Karīm Bukhāri, page 46.

5 Bayan, fol.38(b).

Prince's disgrace were soon in circulation, and reached Gombroon¹ and St. Petersburg² in August and December respectively.

In the Gombroon Diary, on the 6th/17th August, 1740, it is said that a report of the Prince's disgrace had reached the town, "which is somewhat surprising, considering the General Reports of the Prince's Conduct seemed to be favourable, but it may be to divert the Odium occasioned by the Death of Shaw Thomas, the deposed King....."

² Edward Finch (who was Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at St. Petersburg from 1740 to 1742) reported, in December 1740, that Ridā Qulī had been disgraced, because of his "undue practices and abuse of Power." (S.P.91, Vol.XXVI).

the construction of the Oxus flotilla, he sent a humble message to Nādir in India, saying that he was of an ancient line of kings (i.e. of ChingTz Khān and his descendants), that he was unable to oppose Nādir and that he hoped that the Shāh would honour him by being his guest. Nādir, in reply, thanked him for his invitation to Bukhārā, and said that, after reaching Herat and Balkh, he would go on to Bukhārā. In conclusion, he assured Abu'l-Faid that he had no designs upon his kingdom; he would, however, have to punish Ilbārs.

vance viâ ra Tappa, ruchaq, achaktu and dkhud to lkh. Having met Ridā Qull Mīrzā at Qarā Tāppā, as related in the previous chapter, Nādir marched in company with him to Balkh via Mārūchāq, Chachaktu and Andhkud. In crossing the desert country many men and baggage animals perished through lack of water.¹

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In accordance with the orders which Nādir had sent from India, the Commander of Balkh had had 1,100 boats² built by the Indian carpenters and shipwrights. When Nādir reached the banks of the Oxus at a point opposite the small town of Killf, he found this flotilla in readiness; he then gave instructions for corn and stores, as well as cannon, to be placed on board. Part of the army was ferried across to

Bayan, fol. 40(a).

T.N., page 217. MIrza MahdI describes these boats as being from two to three thousand maunds burden, i.e. from, approximately, 54 to 84 tons. tables of khara come pay homage. th August.

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Killf, and, when the main body began to march downstream on the left bank, this detachment kept pace with it on the other side of the river. Kirki was reached on the 27th Jumadi I (20th August); here Muhammad Rahim BI, the principal minister of Abu'l-Faid², the Governors of Qarshi and other towns and the majority of the chiefs of

Transoxiana came to do homage to Nadir. Nadir, however, d, continues was not satisfied with this show of submission, and

> determined to continue his advance. He sent Rida Quli with 8,000 men on in advance as far as Charjui, and ordered his nephew 'Ali Quli Khan to patrol the east side of the river and to keep parallel with Rida Qull.²

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Nādir himself arrived at Charjui on the 8th Jumadi II (31st August), and ordered a bridge of boats to be made; when this bridge was completed, the army crossed over to the right bank of the river.4

dir insists Abu'l-Faid ming in erson.

The principal nobles of Bukhara again came to render homage to Nadir, but the Shah insisted that Abu'l-Faid must come in person; otherwise the advance on Bukhara would continue.⁵ Abu'l-Faid at first entertained thoughts of

T.N., page 217. ²See note 3 on page 197 above. ³T.N., page 218. 4 T.N., page 218. ⁵ibidem, Bayan, fol.42(a). ubmission of bu'l-Faid. offering resistance, but wiser counsels prevailed; he accordingly left his capital and humbly made his submission to the conqueror at Qarākul, one stage from Bukhārā. On the 20th Jumādī II (12th September) Nādir accepted Abu'l-Faid's submission.¹ Nādir, in company with Abu'l-Faid, went on to Charbakr, a suburb of Bukhārā, whence, at the suggestion of Abu'l-Faid, he sent an envoy, in company with two Khwājas of Juibar², to Ilbārs, with a letter summoning him to come and seek pardon for his wrong doing. When Ilbārs read Nādir's letter, he was so enraged that he put the envoy and the two Khwājas to death.³

lsaqchis lintain trict order longst Iranin troops 1 Bukhara. It is said that Nādir, after having become possessed of the wealth of India, looked with contempt upon the paltry possessions of the Bukhārans.⁴ The <u>nasaqchīs</u> maintained strict order amongst the Iranian troops in the city, and the troops were made to pay full value for all that they required. The surrounding country was, however, ravaged by Qizilbāsh patrols.⁵

Whilst at Bukhārā Nādir sent to Samarqand for the tomb-stone of Tīmūr and the bronze gates of the Madrasa; these were, by his orders, despatched to Mashhad.¹

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No less than 20,000 Özbegs and other tribesmen of Bukhārā, Samarqand and elsewhere in Turkistān were enrolled in Nādir's army and sent to Khurāsān.²

On the 15th Rajab (6th October) Nādir presented Abu'l-Faid with a magnificent robe and invested him with the title of Shāh. At the same time, however, he declared that Charjui, Balkh and all Bukhāran territory south of the Oxus were annexed to Iran. Having espoused one of Abu'l Faid's sisters and arranged for his nephew Ali Quli Khān to wed the new Shāh's daughter, Nādir, on the 7th October, left Bukhārā for Khwārazm. Just previous to his departure, Nādir sent Ṭahmāsp Khān Jalāyir to quell some disturbances which, he heard, had broken out in his Indian possessions. Ṭahmasp Khān was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief of all the provinces which had been taken from the Mughal Emperor.³

Bayān, fol. 45(a). Gombroon Diary, 27th January/7th February 1741. This tomb-stone, which was dark green in colour and well polished (see Khanikoff, <u>op.cit.</u>, page 132), was split in two in the process of removal (Bayān, fol.45b.). Nādir subsequently sent the tomb-stone and gates back to Samarqand. See Barthold, in Zapiski, XXV, pages 83-88, on the authority of Muhammad Kāzim).

²Bayan, fol. 45(a).

³T.N., page 219. According to PIr Ibrahim Khan (<u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 27-30), Tahmasp Khan, when endeavouring to stamp out a rising of the Daudputras, was defeated by them and lost the bulk of his forces. rcomans reaten dir's lines communicalon at arjui.

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bars at Barasp. Whilst en route for Charjui, Nādir received word that the Turcomāns of Khwārazm, who were in great force, had joined with a large body of Özbegs and were marching on Charjui in order to destroy the bridge and cut his lines of communication.¹ Leaving his baggage train to follow, Nādir hastened to the river at the head of a picked body of troops. Having reached Charjui before the enemy could come up, Nādir crossed to the other side of the Oxus and prepared for battle. On the following day the Turcomāns and Özbegs appeared, but Nādir speedily put them to flight.²

Nadir halted for several days at Charjui after this battle, in order to enable the rest of the army and the baggage train to arrive and to cross the river. Having laden the boats with stores and cannon, and sent these on downstream, Nadir, on the 28th Rajab (19th October) set out for the Deve Boyun ("Camel's Neck") gorge, where the width of the Oxus is reduced by two-thirds.

On reaching Deve Boyun Nādir learnt that Ilbārs with a strong force was at the strong fortress of Hazārasp, $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the west. On the 16th Sha'bān (6th November)

T.N., page 220, Bayan, fol. 47(a).

²ibidem, page 221. ^{(Abdu'l-KarIm (fol.47b.) states that the Qizilbāsh troops suffered very severely from thirst on this occasion, and that, when Nadir was informed of this, he had the noses of the two chief water-carriers cut off because they had failed to carry out their duty properly.} adir does ot attempt b attack azarasp. ind marches in Khiva.

Nadir left his baggage at Deve Boyun, and marched towards Hazārasp. He found, however, that Ilbars had filled the moat surrounding the fortress with water from one of the canals from the Oxus, and that he could not bring his artillery within effective range.¹ It being impracticable to deliver a frontal assault under such conditions or to blockade the fortress, Nadir marched on towards Khiva, hoping that the threat to Ilbars' capital might cause him to emerge from Hazarasp. When the Iranian army had marched one stage, Ilbars left Hazarasp, as Nadir had hoped, but kept close to the Oxus, not daring to give battle.² A number of Yomut and Tekké Turcomans, however, advanced to the attack. A sharp engagement ensued, which resulted in the rout of the epels Turco-Turcomans; those who survived fled to Ilbars, who fell back

> with them towards Khanaga, another of the fortresses of Khwārazm, lying between Khīva and Hazārasp.³ On the following

lbars in brtress of lanaga.

bdir's army

m attack.

dir besieges day Nadir advanced on Khanaga and defeated Ilbars' men; Ilbars himself and the survivors took refuge in Khanaqa, where they were soon rigorously besieged. The fortress was heavily

> T.N., page 221, Bayan, fol. 52(a). ²T.N., page 221. ³T.N., page 222.

rrender of ortress.

bstinacy of lbars.

dir has bars and 20 this chiefs rangled. hir Khan de Vali of twarazm.

w'l-Khair, he Qazaq hief, comes haid Ilbars, ht is too hte. bombarded for three days and mines were also employed to destroy the walls. When, on the 24th Sha^c bān (14th November) the Iranians were preparing to deliver a general assault, the garrison, together with many of the Ozbeg chiefs, offered to surrender. Ilbārs himself, however, remained obdurate, and stayed within the fortress until he was, at Nādir's orders, seized and forcibly removed.¹ In consequence of Ilbārs' contumacy, Nādir had him strangled a few days after the fall of Khānaqa, together with a score of his chiefs.² Nādir then installed Tāhir Khān, a descendant of Chingiz Khān, as Valĭ of Khwārazm and appointed a number of suitable persons as his principal officials.³

When Ilbars had realised that he was in real danger from Nādir, he had sent to Abu'l-Khair Khan, the chief of the Little Horde of the Qazaq, for assistance.⁴ In response to Ilbars' appeal, Abu'l-Khair, with a mixed force of Qazaqs and of Ozbegs from the neighbourhood of the sea of Aral, advanced to his aid, and occupied Khiva.

T.N., page 222. According to Abdu'l-KarIm BukharI (page 49), Ilbars himself asked for, and was granted, quarter. When, however, the relatives of the murdered Khwajas demanded retribution for the blood of the latter, Nadir gave orders for Ilbars and 21 of his principal officers to be put to death.

²ibidem. Bayan, fol. 55(a), ⁶Abdu'l-KarIm BukharI, page 49. ³T.N., page 223.

⁴ibidem.

sends a ssian officer his envoy Nadir.

From there Abu'l-Khair sent as his envoy to Nadir a Russian engineer officer named Muravin, whom, it is said, he trusted more than his own chiefs. 1 Muravin, on being brought before Nadir, informed the Shah that Abu'l-Khair offered to submit, and that he wished to be allowed to become Khan of Khiva. Nadir treated Muravin graciously and charged him to request Abu'l-Khair to come in person to his court where he would be received and rewarded as a subject of the Empress of Russia, with whom he (the Shah) wished to remain on peaceful and friendly terms.² Muravin returned with this message to Abu'l-Khair, but the Qazaq chief, either because he feared to trust to Nadir's word or because of a plot hatched by the people of Khiva, fled back to his horde on the Qazaq steppes.3

ight of 1-Khair.

ce of Khiva.

After the flight of Abu'l-Khair, the people of Khīva decided to resist Nādir, and refused to yield when tile resisthe summoned them to surrender. Khīva, like Hazārasp, was a fortress well-known for its strength and was surrounded

> See the "Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks", (Ferry de Pigny's French translation of A. Levshin's Описание Киргизъ-Казачьихъ, или Киргизъ-KANCAYKNXDOPAD & CTETTER page 194. Muravin and two other Russian engineer officers named Gladishev and Nazimov had been sent by the Russian Government, at the request of Abu'l-Khair, to examine the site for a fortress at the mouth of the SIr Daria (see Howorth's "History of the Mongols", Vol. II, pp. 913 & 914).

Levshin, pp. 194-195.

⁹Levshin, page 195.

by a deep moat. The Iranian troops drained away the water from this moat by means of ditches, and bombarded the fortress from all sides. The Khīvans then repented of their obduracy and surrendered.¹

dir pberates arge numbers f Iranian laves. In Khīva and elsewhere in Khwārazm Nādir discovered no less than 12,000 Khurāsānīs imprisoned or enslaved. He ordered all these people to be provided with horses, baggage animals, food and money, and assigned to them as their place of residence a town at Chashma-yi-Khalanjān² which he had ordered his Indian builders and craftsmen to erect on the model of Delhi.³ This town was afterwards re-named Khīvaqābād.⁴

also sets ee and prodes for ten ssian slaves.

Amongst the slaves in the hands of the Khivans were ten Russians; Nādir liberated these men and gave es.

¹T.N., page 223. Levshin (page 195) states that the Russian Tatar Zhanaiev, who was in Khiva during the siege, wrote a report thereon which is (or was) to be found in the archives of the Orenburg Frontier Commission.

The correct reading of this name is difficult to establish; it is given as above in my MS., as "Khilijan" in the Bombay edition of the T.N.(page 223), and as "Gelenjiah" by Jones (Vol.XII, page 28).

⁹Bayān, fol.57(b). ⁶Abdu'l-Karīm Kashmīrī states here that Nādir first called this place Maulūdgah, but the real Maulūdgāh (i.e. Nādir's birth-place) was just outside Dastgird, in Darragaz. ⁶Abdu'l-Karīm is doubtless correct in saying that Nādir sent many of the people of Khīva as slaves to Khīvaqābād, so that they might experience the treatment which they had meted out to their Iranian captives.

⁴The name is sometimes written as Khīva-ābād (it is from a misreading of the form Khīvaqabad that Gladwin gets his "Jieyookabad". E. O'Donovan, who visited the ruins of Khīvaqābād in 1880, gives a description of them in his book "The Merv Oasis", Vol.II, pages 78 and 80.

them 50 roubles and a horse apiece to enable them to reach their own country; they ultimately reached Samara in safety, under the leadership of the Russian Tatar named Zhanaiev.¹

Nādir detached a force of only moderate strength to support Tahir Khān; in order to strengthen the latter's position, he compelled the local chiefs to swear allegiance to the new Vali.²

dir's parture from iva. h December 40. Having spent several days in settling the affairs of Khwarazm in this fashion, Nadir left Khīva on the 17th Ramadan (6th December) for Charjui.³ From the latter place, the army marched across the desert to Merv; as water was extremely scarce on this route, Nadir had previously made elaborate arrangements for sufficient supplies to be available.⁴

From Merv Nādir proceeded viā Kalāt, Mayāb, his own village of Kubkān, Khabūshān and Rādkān to Mashhad; he arrived at the last-mentioned place at the end of Shawwal (17th January 1741).

Levshin, page 195.

²T.N., page 224. The reason why Nadir did not leave a larger force is, according to MIrza MahdI, that he felt that the people of Khiva would be unable to bear the burden of maintaining it.

²T.N., page 224.

⁴For details of these arrangements, see Bayan, fol. 48(a).

CHAPTER XXII

The Daghistan Campaign and Relations with Russia (1741-1743)

re in the thickly-wooded Bavad

hir at Nādir remained for nearly two months at Mashhad. shad th January - Before leaving that city for Dāghistān, he entrusted the th March 1741. affairs of Khurāsān to Nasru'llah Mírzā. Since there was

a dearth of supplies on the NIshāpūr-Sabzavār route, Nādir decided to march westwards viâ Khabūshān, Astarābād and dir leaves Ashraf. Accompanied by Ridā Qulī Mīrzā, Nādir left Mashhad shhad. th March 1741. on the 26th Dhu'l-Hijja (14th March 1741), and a week later

spent the Nau Rúz at Aliābād, in the Khabushan district.

From there he marched via Simalgan through the Giraili

ving condions in the rgan valley call that of & Kurram.

country and then, in pouring rain, down the Gurgān valley. In this valley the conditions were very similar to those experienced in that of the Kurram; the river had to be crossed no less than 23 times; as before, many of the baggage animals perished from drowning and others from lack of fodder.² In time, however, Astarābād and then Ashraf were reached, and the march was continued through Sārī, ^cAliābād and Zirāb towards the Gaduk pass.

It is known that Rida Qulf accompanied his father on this journey; this disproves the truth of Abdu'l-KarIm's assertion that the Prince was disgraced at Mashhad for some unknown reason and exiled to Tehran.

²T.N., pp. 226 and 227. See also Bayan, fol. 61(b).

tempt on dir's life ear Pul-ifid. 15th W, 1741.

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forts to

tack down te woulde assassin.

On the 28th Safar 1154 (15th May 1741), Nadir, after crossing the Talar river by the Pul-i-SafId, some 20 miles north of the Gaduk pass, in the thickly-wooded Savad Kuh district, was proceeding along a narrow road, accompanied by his haram and the <u>quruqchis</u> (haram guards); the troops, as was usual, were some distance away. Suddenly, a marksman hidden behind a tree some twenty paces from the road fired at Nadir as the latter passed; the bullet, after grazing Nadir's hand and wounding him in the thumb, embedded itself in his horse's neck. The animal fell to the ground, bringing the Shah down with it; it is said that Nadir, with great presence of mind, lay still on the ground, feigning death, and so escaped a second shot. For a moment, all was confusion, but, when it was seen that Nadir was not seriously hurt, the eunuchs and gurugchis, headed by Rida Quli Mirza (who had hastened up with the rearguard), made a prolonged search in the adjacent forests. No trace of the would-be assassin could, however, be found, and the march was resumed after a brief delay.

T.N., page 228. According to 'Abdu'l-Karīm Kashmīrī, there were two men waiting in ambush; when Nādir approached, they rushed out, one of them firing at him. Nādir, who was slightly wounded, at once flung himself off his horse, feigning death, and the two men, thinking that they had killed him, ran away. (Bayān fol. 64a). In this connection, see also Bratishchev, Sammlung, Vol.VIII, pp. 483 and 484, but his account is too fantastic to be taken seriously. As will be seen below, the culprit was eventually found to be a man named Nik Qadam, one of the guards of Dilāvar Khān, of Tāyimanī.

293.

Well would it have been for Iran and also for Nadir's reputation had that bullet found its intended mark. Nadir was then at the culminating point of his career. Besides delivering his country from the yoke of the Afghans, he had humbled the Turks, caused the Russians to give up all the Iranian territory remaining in their power after their voluntary evacuation of GIIan, and had subdued the Bakhtiārīs, Abdālīs and Ghilzais; also, he had despoiled India, and conquered Turkistan, while his troops had seized part of Arabia. All that remained to be done to satisfy his ambition was, first, to avenge the death of his brother by the reduction of the LazgIs, and secondly, to achieve the complete humiliation of Turkey. As will be seen, his attempts to realise these remaining aims were not only unsuccessful, but they caused untold suffering and loss, particularly to Nadir's own subjects.

dir reaches hran, where receives lushkin.

lushkin's astructions on St. etersburg. From the Gaduk pass Nadir proceeded to Tehran, where he gave audience to Kalushkin, the Russian Resident; the latter had just received orders from St. Petersburg, to assure the Shah of Russia's friendly intentions. This action was necessary, because Khulafā, the Iranian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had, it appears, been sending to Nadir false reports that were very unfavourable to Russia. Kalushkin was also instructed to ascertain and report upon Nādir's real intentions.¹

alushkin's eport. adir's ndependent ttitude.

pssibility f his ecoming pstile to ussia.

dir at hzvin. 1st May jth June 141. Kalushkin reported to St. Petersburg that the Shāh was very independent and that it was much more difficult to speak to him than it had formerly been. "The new Nebuchadnezzar has been rendered quite mad by his triumphs. He says: 'It was not difficult for me to conquer all India If I move with only one leg I take India; if I move with both legs, I shall conquer the whole world!'" Although Kalushkin found that Nādir was hostile to Turkey, he could not be sure that he would always remain friendly to Russia?

After a brief halt in Tehran, Nadir proceeded to QazvIn, where he arrived on the 31st May. It is noteworthy that Rida QulI was left behind at Tehran; it does not appear to be known whether the Shah already suspected him of having instigated the attempt upon his life or whether the Prince was still in disgrace because of his behaviour when Viceroy.³

¹Soloviev, Vol.XXI, pp. 84 and 85. ²Soloviev, Vol.XXI, pp. 84 - 86.

⁹Mirza Mahdi merely says (page 229) that Rida Quli was ordered to remain in Tehran, "of which province the revenues were to be his." Bratishchev (<u>op.cit.</u>, page 487) relates that Nadir treated the Prince kindly at Tehran, and that he gave him no post and left him behind, as he wished to free him from the toils of the forthcoming campaign. Nadir, however, ordered two of his trustiest eunuchs to remain with the Prince, ostensibly to look after his health and safety, but really to spy upon him. Giv Amilakhor and another Georgian chief came to Nadir at QazvIn and informed him of the situation in Kartli. When he heard of the ravages of the LazgIs in that country, Nadir was furious and swore that he would punish the people of Daghistan. Nadir made Giv Amilakhor <u>Eristav</u> of Ksan, and sent a force of Afghans and other troops to that district, where much fighting took place.¹

adir proeeds to aghistan. Having spent fifteen days in Qazvīn, Nādir set out in person for Daghistān viā Qarājā Dagh, Barda^ca and the district of Qabala.

It will be recalled that when Nadir was at Nadirabad in May 1740 he ordered the AbdaTi chief 'Abdu'l-Ghani Khan and his brother-in-law Fath 'Ali Khan to go to Shirvan and to cooperate with the army commanders in Georgia and Adharbaijan in suppressing the Lazgis of Jar and Tala during the autumn and winter.² For some unrecorded reason, 'Abdu'l-Ghani Khan and the other commanders did not launch their attack on the Lazgis until March 1741. After severe fighting, the Lazgis were defeated and many were forced to submit.³

Details of this minor campaign are given by Papouna Orbelian in H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 58-61.

²See page 280 above.

²T.N., pages 227 and 228.

ny Lazgis bait.

When Nadir reached Shirvan, large numbers of LazgIs came to offer their submission. The salutary lesson just given to the tribesmen of Jar and Tala, followed by the advent of the Shah at the head of his army of some 150,000 men; doubtless induced these Lazgis to take this

course. The Gaspian coast and Taking begin his march on

ir at Ghazi Nadir marched on northwards, and by the 1st Jumadi I aug. h August - (14th August) he had penetrated to the town or village of th September. Chazi Qumuq, in the heart of Daghistan.

TS of vasion of wara zm .

It was at Chazl Qumuq that the unwelcome news reached him that a mixed force of Özbegs, Aral Tatars and

Qazaqs had invaded Khwarazm, captured Khiva and put to Khan death Tahir Bog and his supporters.2

lir's vance on aria.

At the beginning of Rajab (12th September), Nadir left Ghazi Qumuq with the intention of reconnoitring the th September. borders of Avaria. In view of the lateness of the season,

it seems doubtful whether Nadir seriously contemplated forcing

Bazin, who was at Darband in October 1741 when Nadir arrived there, gives the strength of his army then as 150,000. He states that it was composed mainly of Indians, Ozbeg Tatars and Afghans and that there were but few Iranians. Bazin thus comments on the small number of Iranians: "il (i.e. Nadir) sçavoit que les peuples naturellement attachés à leurs Souverains, ne suivent qu'à regret un Usurpateur, et qu'ils ont pour le trahir l'exemple que lui-même leur a donné." (See Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 288).

²T.N., page 229.

lis comlled to indon his tempt. his way through the mountains at that time and occupying the whole country. However that may be, the severity of the weather, together with the obstinate resistance of the mountaineers, forced Nadir to give up all idea of advancing further northwards and compelled him to turn eastwards and make for the Caspian coast! Had Nadir begun his march on Avaria a month or so earlier, it is possible that he might have forced his way through the formidable mountain barrier to Khunzakh, the Nutzal's capital; by so doing, he would have had the key of Daghistan in his hands. With the Shamkhal Khass Fulad, Surkhai, and the Usmi and other chiefs all in chastened mood, and the strength of his army still unimpaired by the hardships and losses of a protracted campaign in exceedingly difficult country, Nadir would have stood a much better chance of success than he did in the following year. The consequences of an early settlement of the Däghistan problem might well have been most important. With his military reputation unblemished and his army intact and flushed with successes in India, Turkistan and Daghistan, Nadir would have proved an even more formidable opponent to the Turks than he did in 1743. It is not unlikely that Nadir,

T.N., page 230, Bratishchev, page 489. Butkov does not mention this attempt of Nādir's to reach the Avar country in 1741.

instead of attacking Turkey, might have made a determined attempt to wrest Kizliar and Astrakhan from Russia; L that power, being taken by surprise, with many of her troops withdrawn from the southern frontiers in order to strengthen her forces then engaged in the war with Sweden, might have had serious difficulty in parrying a sudden thrust by Nadir. Nadir, as will be seen below, afterwards seriously contemplated an attack on his northern neighbour, but the opportunity of doing so with a reasonable chance of success had passed.

ragaitag tibesmen tack dir's '00ps.

When Nadir was at Chiragh, on his way back to the Caspian coast, he heard that the Qaragaitag tribesmen had attacked some of his troops in the thick forest country, killing many of them and capturing part of their baggage.² The bold Tatars also hovered around his own force, skirmishing and attacking the convoys; one night they even raided Nadir's dir's rage. own quarters. Nadir's rage at this incident was such that he had a number of his own officers and men put to death; 3 he then swore that he would not quit Daghistan until all the rebels had been forced to submit.4

> Kalushkin had already made some disquieting reports to St. Petersburg regarding Nadir's attitude towards Russia; in this connection, see page 295 above.

²T.N., page 230. Bazin (page 290) states that the LazgIs had at first only thought of submission; when, however, they saw that, after submitting, their folk were exiled to Khurasan and were stripped of all their possessions, and that their families were ruthlessly slaughtered by Nadir if his suspicions were aroused, they resisted him with the courage of despair.

Bazin, page 290.

4T.N., page 230.

Nādir reached Darband on the 5th Sha^c bān (16th October); leaving his baggage in the town, he hastened off toattack the Qarāqaitāq tribesmen. In order to counteract the LazgI raids, Nādir had forts built throughout the Shamkhāl's territory, stationed from 2 to 3 <u>farsakhs</u> apart.¹

On the 10th Ramadān (19th November) Nādir returned from his expedition, having apparently failed to achieve his object.² As there was plenty of water and forage available at Dasht-i-Kafari, <u>3 farsakhs</u> north-west of Darband, the Shāh established his winter quarters there.³

goes into ter quarters Kafari. enber 1741.

> The provisioning of so large an army in a country that consisted, for the most part, of forests and mountain crags presented serious difficulties. Little food was procurable in the neighbouring province of ShIrvan, because of the repeated ravaging to which it had been subjected, and Kartli⁴ and Kakheti were in a similar state. The only

T.N., page 230.

²As Mirzā Mahdī is silent as to the result, one is justified in inferring that it was unfavourable.

³T.N., page 230, Butkov, Vol.I, page 212.

⁴ Papouna Orbelian states that so heavy a tax was levied on Kartli in 1741 that many persons fled to Turkey, while others wilfully devastated their own lands. (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 57 and 58.)

have a leet on the spian.

solution was to procure supplies by sea. Having already Mir's desire a fleet on the Persian Gulf, Nadir determined to have one on the Caspian as well; the great difficulty, of course, was to obtain the vessels. There were already some Iranian vessels in service, but these were small and of primitive design and build: further, the Iranians were almost entirely unskilled in navigation. Nadir is said to have sent to Surat for ship-builders and sailors, in order to remedy this deficiency.²

> Until he could get ships of his own, Nadir had, therefore, to depend almost entirely on Russian traders for his sea-borne supplies; many of these traders made vast profits.² When Kalushkin informed Nadir of the accession of Elizabeth Petrovna, after the coup d'état of the 6th December, 1741, the Shah replied that he was very glad to hear the news, since the throne of Russia belonged

Captain Woodroofe's Journal, in Hanway, Vol.I, page 149. Such vessels as the Iranians possessed had been built, for the most part, by Russian deserters or renegades.

²See Hanway's hitherto unpublished letter from Astrakhan to his principals, dated the 7th/18th November 1744, and the Memorial from the Russia Company to Lord Carteret, dated the 13th/24th January 1744 (S.P.91, Vol.XXXVI.) In the Memorial it is stated that Nadir took this action "long before Mr. Elton ever was in Persia", (i.e. before, presumably, Elton arrived in Iran for the second time, in June 1742). Nothing seems to have been done in Surat to comply with this request of Nadir's.

³Hanway appears to be in error in asserting (Vol.IV, page 225) that these Russian merchants were not allowed by law to sell supplies to the Shah, as Butkov (Vol.I, pages 212 & 510) says that the Russian Government only permitted merchants of Russian nationality to despatch food supplies to the Iranian ports on the Caspian.

to her by right, as the daughter of Peter the Great. Nadir then gave Kalushkin a coat of honour and a thousand isks Russia roubles, and requested him to arrange for the loan of ten lend him Russian vessels, some of which would be used in his vessels.

> operations against the Daghistan rebels and some for the transport of supplies from Astrakhan. Kalushkin, in transmitting this request, warned his Government that, if Nadir were lent these vessels, he would never return them,

as he was most anxious to have a fleet of his own. In Ma refuses consequence of Kalushkin's warning, the Government refused accede to to accede to Nadir's demand. Nadir, however, as will be mest. seen below, was able later to obtain the nucleus of his Caspian fleet from an unexpected quarter.

> The festival of Nau Ruz was celebrated at the camp in the customary fashion.

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According to MIrza MahdI, Nadir, at this time, fully intended to abdicate in favour of one of his sons and to retire to Kalat, as soon as he had come to a final settlement with Turkey.²

Before opening his campaign in the spring, Nadir sent his agents northward to Enderi and Kostek, in the country of the Qumiqs, to purchase supplies and horses, but Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 200. ²T.N., page 234. er which the trade connection between

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these tribespeople angered the Shah by charging exorbitant prices, and by taking part in robberies, besides helping the Lazgis.¹

ir's iccessful ing camgn in arsaran. At the end of May 1742 Nadir marched against the rebels of Tabarsaran. It is said that he made three attacks on these tribesmen in considerable force, but in each case he was unsuccessful, and on the last occasion he barely escaped with his life.² Surkhai and the Shamkhal Khass Fulad were with Nadir most of the time, and "in the performance of their service made no fault";³ the Usmi, on the other hand, renounced his allegiance, and retreated to his strong castle of Quraish.

It was in July 1742 that the connection began between Captain Elton and the Iranian Government which was destined to have such unfortunate consequences for the Russia Company and to end in disaster and death for Elton himself.

At the end of June in that year the vessel which Elton had just built at Kazan⁴ for the conveyance of the British merchants' goods between Astrakhan and the Iranian ports on the Caspian arrived at Enzeli on her maiden voyage. She

Butkov, Vol.I, page 212.

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²ibidem, page 213. See also Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 200. 3_{T.N., page 235}.

⁴The circumstances under which the trade connection between Great Britain and Iran via Russia was established are described in Appendix III.

carried a composite crew of Russian and British seamen and was commanded by Captain Woodroofe; Captain Elton was also on board. When her cargo of English goods had been discharged at Enzeli, for disposal in Iran, the vessel was taken into the service of the Iranian Government, and was used on two occasions in 1742 for the conveyance of rice to Darband: the troubles that arose with the Russians in consequence of these voyages and of other actions of Elton's will be described in Appendix III. By utilising this British vessel for the transport of rice from Iran, Nadir was able, to some extent, to break through the monopolistic "ring" formed by the Russian traders for the conveyance of foodstuffs by sea to his forces in Daghistan: this was undoubtedly the initial reason for the development of the crisis between the Russian Government and the Russia Company, and was the cause of Elton and Woodroofe meeting with such hostility from Russian officials at Resht and Darband in 1742.

's camp ran In consequence of repeated attacks by the Daghistanis, Nadir, in July 1742, made an entrenched camp in the north of Tabarsaran, near Gubden, where, it is said, he intended to found a town.¹ It was only with the greatest difficulty that

Butkov, Vol.I, page 213.

provisions could be brought to this camp; besides being short of food, the Iranian troops and convoys were subjected to frequent attacks by the LazgIs, Qarāqaitāqs and other hostile tribesmen. In consequence of the sufferings of his men and their heavy losses through casualties and wastage, Nādir cynically called his new camp "Irān Kharāb" or "ruined of Iran".¹ The great heat and the badness of the water there caused some form of plague to break out, which particularly affected the Afghan troops. So serious did this outbreak become that Nādir transferred the sufferers to another camp some thirty miles to the north, near Buinaq, and forbade anyone to mention the epidemic.²

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rough nger and lness.

> Kalushkin had repeatedly endeavoured to convince the Shah that the Daghistan campaign would have evil

consequences for Iran, but Nadir paid no heed to his words.

Lushkin remended his rernment to rengthen troops on Iranian mtier. Hushkin s aims. Soon after making this recommendation, Kalushkin;died; s and is

es and is meeded as he was succeeded as Resident by his interpreter Vasili sident by mishchev. Bratishchev.³

> Butkov, Vol.I, page 213, Lerch, in Büsching's "Magazin", Vol.X, page 399. Butkov, pages 213 and 214. Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 201.

> > 305.

By degrees the Iranian troops obtained the ascendancy over the tribesmen in Tabarsaran, and Nadir therefore decided to make another attempt to conquer Avaria and also to punish the Qumiqs, although the latter step would involve crossing the Russian frontier. Hearing that a strong force of Russians had reached Kizliar, Nadir abandoned his idea of attacking the Qumiqs, but he persisted in his design against the Avars.¹

After an initial defeat, the Iranians captured Aq Qūsha in August 1742, and advanced on Avaria and Kāfir Qumūq viâ Ghāzānīsh.² An advance-guard 6,000 strong was ambushed by the Lazgīs in a defile, and was compelled to retreat after sustaining heavy loss. The Shāh, in a paroxysm of rage, gave orders for several of the officers of the defeated force to be put to death. In September, Nādir himself led the advance, and employed no less than 3,000 men with axes to clear a track through the jungle³ At one village, which was, apparently, near the Avar-Qoisu, the Iranians met with a severe check, and were compelled to retreat.⁴ Avaria continued unconquered, and,

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Butkov, Vol.I, page 220. Bratishchev reported that Nadir was less truculent after he had heard of the arrival of Russian reinforcements on the frontier (see Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 201).

²Butkov, Vol. I, page 215. For an explanation of how Kafir Qumuq received its opprobrious name, see Barthold's article on Daghistan in E.1, Vol.I, page 890.

³ibidem.

⁴This may possibly have been the village of Arakani where, Mr. J.F.Baddeley has informed me, there is a local tradition that Nādir was never able to advance beyond that point, owing to the brave resistance of the inhabitants.

consequently, the key to Dāghistān remained beyond Nādir's reach. It was, apparently, at this juncture that another Iranian force climbed the mountain on which the Usmi's stronghold of Quraish was situated, and in three days carried the fortress by assault. Ahmad Khān, however, succeeded in making his escape before his stronghold fell, and fled to Avaria.¹ The Qarāqaitāq tribe, having lost their main fortress and being deprived of their leader, submitted to the Iranians.²

In October, Nādir retreated from the borders of Avaria, and marched viâ Tarkhū and Bashli to Irān Kharāb, where he made his winter quarters.

It was at Iran Kharab that the terrible incident of the blinding of Ridā Qull Mīrzā took place.³ Many versions of the events leading up to the tragic finale exist, and the actual facts are difficult to ascertain. It appears that Nādir's would-be murderer was tracked down near Oba⁴ and taken into custody some months after the perpetration of the outrage. The man, Nik Qadam by name, was in due course brought to the camp and taken before the Shah. When guestioned by Nādir, the

1 T.N., page 235.						
2 _{11 11}						
3 Bazin, page 292;	Lerch,	in	Büsching's Magazin",	Vol.X,	page	400.
4 T.N., page 230.						

man stated that he alone was responsible for the attempt.

Mirzā Mahdi states that the instigator of the crime was Aqā Mirzā, the son of Dilāvar Khān of the Tāymani, and that Nik Qadam was one of Dilāvar Khān's guards.¹ A number of writers have asserted that the person really responsible was Ridā Qulī Mīrzā,² but it has never been proved conclusively that the Prince was guilty. Bazin firmly asserts that he was innocent, and adds "mais au Tribunal d'un Usurpateur le soupçon vaut la preuve."³ Further, in the concluding portion of the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī, which Mīrzā Mahdī wrote when he no longer had any reason to withhold or distort the truth, it is stated that Nādir's mind was poisoned against his son by "the

1

T.N., page 231.

2

Hanway, Vol.IV, page 210; Bayān-i-Wāqi, foll.64(b) and 65(a), Bratishchev, pages 477 and 478 (for the plot which, this writer alleges, Ridā Quli Mīrzā, his maternal uncle Lutf 'Alī Khān and a certain Muhammad Beg Afshār hatched, see page 477). 'Abdu'l-Karīm Bukhāri, who also believed in the Prince's guilt, states (page 49) that Nādir's suspicions of his son were first aroused when, after discovering that Nīk Qadam was the culprit, he recollected that Ridā Qulī had been riding with Hazāra Muhammad Khān Tāyimanī at the time of the outrage.

3

Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 292. Lerch also believed in the Prince's innocence (see Büsching's "Magazin", Vol.X, page 400.)

4

T.N., pages 262 and 263.

evil whisperings and imputations"¹ of malicious persons. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that Ridā Qulī had made a deadly enemy of Taqī Khān Shīrāzī;² it is therefore possible, and even highly probable, that Taqī Khān, who possessed great influence with the Shāh, may, through his friends at court, have calumniated the Prince when he knew that he had already incurred his father's displeasure and aroused his suspicions by his conduct as Viceroy.

The terrible remorse which Nādir afterwards undoubtedly felt may have been due to a belated realisation of the innocence of his son.

Bazin relates that the blinding was carried out in the presence of a number of nobles. Afterwards Nadir held that they had committed a crime by not offering themselves in place of his son, and caused fifty of them to be strangled

2

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[&]quot;<u>Wasāwis va tawahhumāt</u>". Malcolm (Vol.II, page 97) remarks that Nādir "is believed to have had no evidence of his son's guilt but his own suspicions". Lower down on the same page Malcolm adds that Nādir's lack of success against the LazgIs "had increased the natural ferocity of his temper; and, listening to the enemies of Reza Kooli, he, in a moment of rage, ordered him to be blinded." In a footnote relating to this passage, Malcolm says: "I have conversed with the descendants of several of Nādir's chief omrahs, who all concurred in the truth of Meerza Mehdi's statement of this fact."

See pages 273 and 274 above.

in his presence.¹ Nadir is said to have been so overcome with grief after the terrible scene that he retired to his tent and remained there for three days.²

Malcolm, quoting from some unspecified Iranian MS., states that after Ridā Quli had been blinded, Nādir said that his crimes had forced him (Nādir) to take this dreadful measure. The Prince replied: "It is not my eyes you have put out, but those of Persia."³

In November 1742, Nādir set out again northwards. He had, it appears, the intention of crossing the Terek when it was frozen and of marching on Kizliar, to which place he laid claim, on the grounds that it had formerly belonged to Iran. In taking this decision, Nādir was influenced by

Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 292. Bratishchev (pages 495-502) gives a detailed account of Rida Qull's attitude when urged to confess and of the meting out of the punishment; this authority states (page 498) that Nādir at first ordered the Prince to be beaten, and that he only gave the order for him to be blinded after an assembly of nobles and mullãs had, by a majority vote, recommended the infliction of this penalty; a minority urged that Ridā Qull should be put to death. Both Bratishchev (page 501) and Papouna Orbelian (H. de la G., Vol. II, Part II, page 70) state that Nādir caused his brother-in-law, Lutf Ali Khan, to be blinded as well as Ridā QulT Mīrzā.

²Bratishchev, page 503.

³Malcolm, Vol.II, page 97, and Matla^cu'sh-Shams, Vol.II, page 17. See also Hanway, Vol.IV, page 211.

⁴Butkov, Vol.I, page 220. According to a letter from St. Petersburg, dated the end February 1743, which was published in the London paper "The Daily Post" on the 21st of that month, news had been received at the former capital that Colonel Selenski, the Commandant of the fortrees of Kizliar, had been brought in irons to Moscow because he had "given assistance to the Rebels of Daghestan against Schach Nadir, which was the Occasion of that Monarch's advancing towards our Frontiers and was given him on that Head." messages which he had just received from the ruler of the Chechens, stating that he wished to become an Iranian subject and offering to show him routes by which he could invade Russia. Nadir also, it appears, had the design of forcing his way through to the Crimea¹ via Kabarda and Kuban.

It seemed for a time as if war between Iran and Russia was inevitable.² Bratishchev, in reporting to St. Petersburg the warlike intentions of the Shah, said that Elton had offered to lend hisvessel to Nadir in the event of war breaking out between Iran and Russia.³

Russia, having for some time past been apprehensive of anhostile move by Nādir, had considerably strengthened her troops on the southern frontier. Furthermore, since Turkey and Iran wished to attack each other by marching through the

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	Butkov, Vol.I, page 220, says that Nadir ordered the route from Enderi to the Cherkass country and the Crimea to be surveyed.
2	In Lord Carteret's despatch of the 15th/26th February 1743 to Sir Cyril Wich, it is stated <u>inter alia</u> :- "The French flatter themselves there must be a war with Persia (i.e. between
-	Persia and Russia), and rejoice much in it. They have a notion that the present Sophy has long had an Eye to the Russian Dominions and did formerly demand the present Empress, when Princess, in Marriage, for himself or Son, but being refused and so disappointed of coming to the Succession that way, He will try to obtain his end by conquest." (S.P.91, Vol.XXXIV).
5	Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 202. Neither Woodroofe nor Hanway mentions this offer of Elton's, but it is possible that it may have been made. Elton at that time (December 1742/ January 1743) had certainly reason to complain of the treat- ment to which Woodroofe and he had been subjected by the Russian officials in Iran.

northern Caucasus, Russia took special measures to ensure the friendship of the people of Kabarda. However, the menacing attitude of Turkey towards Nadir prevented hostilities from breaking out between Iran and Russia. The Shah had received several reports of the movement of large Turkish forces towards the Iranian frontier; the arrival of a Turkish embassy at the Iranian camp early in 1743, with a message from the Sultan in which he categorically refused to recognise the Ja^cfarI sect or to agree to the erection of the additional column or pillar in the Ka'ba, caused Nadir to renounce his idea of invading Russia and to decide on war with Turkey instead.² On the 15th Dhu'l-Hijja 1155 (10th February 1743), Nadir set out on his southward march.3 He left the Abdall chief Abdu'l-GhanI in command of the Darband garrison.⁴

The mountaineers of Daghistan had proved more than a match for the conqueror and his veterans. All that Nadir

For particulars of these measures, see Butkov, Vol.I, page 224.
T.N., page 236. The Shah's decision naturally came as a great relief to the Russian Court. On the 12th/23rd March 1743 Sir C. Wich reported to Whitehall: "Proof of the Russian Court's being not apprehensive is that the nine regiments sent towards Astrakhan are now ordered back to Petersburg." (S.P.91, Vol.XXXIV).
3_{T.N.}, page 236.

Butkov, page 226.

had been able to do was to subdue the lowlands of Dāghistān and capture a few isolated fortresses such as Quraish. The cost to Nādir in terms of man-power, as well as in material resources, was very heavy, and his prestige naturally suffered greatly.

In blizzards and extreme cold, the Iranian host dragged its way southwards towards the Mughan steppes. The troops suffered terribly from hunger as well as from cold, and were even reduced to the extremity of eating pies made of human flesh.¹ So many men and animals died on the road from the Samur to Shabran that it was strewn with bodies and carcasses.² The difficulties encountered and the hardships suffered on this terrible march are evidenced by the fact that it took no less than forty days for the army to go from Darband to the Kura.³

1 Butkov, Vol.I, page 227. 2 ibidem " ³T.N., page 237.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Iranian Operations in the Persian Gulf, 1740-1744, and the second Oman Expedition.

In Chapter XIX the history of the Iranian operations in the Persian Gulf and Omān was taken down to May, 1740, when the Iranian fleet had reassembled off Gombroon after the abortive expedition to Makrān.

The Arab crews of the vessels were in a very discontented state, as their pay was again greatly in arrears and they were receiving insufficient rations. Matters came to a head early in September, when a general mutiny broke out at Laft, where the fleet then was; the mutineers killed the Admiral, Mīr Alī Khān and all the Iranians that offered resistance, and then removed the entire fleet to Khor Fakkān;¹ some of the vessels were afterwards taken to the island of Qais. The Gombroon Agent thus comments on this mutiny:

"...unless the Arabs are brought back to Obedience We believe it has entirely Frustrated his Majestie(s great Scheme of a Fleet, since these are the People who could only have been brought to accomplish his purpose, the Persians being entirely Averse to, as well as Ignorant of, Sea Affairs which indeed the Scituation and Nature of their Country, not productive of any one Requisite for the Purpose, seems to disallow....^{#2}

A few days later the new Admiral, Mahmud Taqi Khan by name, arrived at Gombroon, After requesting the Agent to

Gombroon Diary, 26th August/6th September, 1740.

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Gombroon Diary, 26th August/6th September, 1740; Otter, Vol.II, page 130.

arrange for the sale of a large ship, the Admiral wrote to the ringleader of the mutineers urging him and his associates to submit to the East India Company; the Agent also wrote to the same effect, and the trankey conveying these letters sailed under English colours.¹

Without waiting for a reply, the Admiral forced the Dutch to lend him two of their ships which were then anchored off Gombroon. The Admiral boarded one of these ships and sailed off, in company with the other, as well as some smaller vessels, to attack the Arabs. An engagement took place with the Arabs early in October in which neither the Dutch nor the Admiral distinguished themselves.² Later in the month the Admiral quarrelled with the Dutch, and placed armed guards on their vessels. Meanwhile, the mutineers and the Huwala Arabs roved where they pleased in the Gulf; they appeared off Cong in November, and in the following month they made a further attempt to conquer Bahrain.

When Nādir heard of the mutiny and the Huwala revolt, he sent orders for 6,000 men to be collected and 15,000 tomans to be raised, and endeavoured to purchase more vessels at Surat; he is said to have ordered no less than 11 ships from there in 1741.³

¹ Gombroon Diary, 14th/25th September, 1740.

² For particulars of this action, see the Gombroon Diary, 12th/ 23rd October, 1740, and Saldanha's "Selections from State Papers", page 55. An English gunner, who was on board one of the small vessels, made a full report to Gombroon.

³ See H. Dodwell's reference, in "A Calendar of the Madras Records 1740-1744" (Madras 1917), page 235, to a letter from Stephen Law, etc. at Bombay to Fort St. George, dated 9th December, 1741.

By March 1741 the Arabs had, as usual, fallen out amongst themselves, and some of them opened negotiations with the Government. In May a newly-purchased vessel arrived from Surat.¹

Early in September it was reported that Nādir, in his determination to have a fleet, had ordered carts to be made for transporting timber from Māzandarān to the Gulf.² Later in the year a large consignment of this timber reached Isfahān en route for the coast; it was said that the Shāh had given orders for some ships to be built at Bushire "of One hundred Guz Shaw or upwards of Three hundred English feet length by the Keel and proportionate Dimensions; one particularly is to have 500 (sic) guns and to bear his (Nādir's) Name, and they are to be supplied with Workmen and Stores from the Europeans.³

Shortly after, the Agents of the East India Co. and the Dutch Company each received a <u>ragam</u> from Nādir ordering him to send :

"three knowing Men, Carpenters to Effect a purpose he has of building Ships at Boucheir, and That we also supply the People with what Stores they may want on a receipt given us for which We are to be paid their Value by the Beglerbeggy But if We fail in this Service, He shall let us feel his Displeasure."

The Agent thus comments on Nadir's shipbuilding project:

"But what probability there is of such mighty Affairs being accomplished may in part be guessed at by the

1	Gombr	oon	Diary,	17th/28th May, 1741.
2	t	r	n	25th August/5th September, Bazin, page 318.
2	1 1	I	Ħ	27th November/8th December.

means they are obliged to use for procuring Timber Bringing it near Sixty Days on Men's Shoulders from Mazanderoon, and They must come at every other Material with equal difficulty."

Time was to prove the wisdom of these words. Nadir had a cannon foundry erected at Bandar Abbas, where two copper cannon were cast in September 1741; it was intended to cast no less than 300 for the fleet.¹

In October the Iranian. Sardār seized two Dutch ships at Gombroon, and went to attack the Arab mutineers and rebels on the island of Qais. After some 500 Iranians had been landed, the Arab fleet appeared. In the ensuing engagement the Arabs were getting the worst of it when the Sardār was killed through the bursting of a gun on his vessel.² The Iranians, in dismay, then broke off the battle, and left the unfortunate landing party to its fate.

At the beginning of January 1742 two ships arrived at Gombroon from Sind which the East India Co. had procured for Nadir, and another vessel was acquired at Bushire by an 'unauthorised' purchase.³

Events in Omān were now once more to lead to Iranian intervention in that country. After the Iranians had, as related in Chapter XIX, been forced to retire to Julfār in 1738, the Imām Saif ibn Sultān was for some time supreme.

- 1 Gombroon Diary, 13th/24th September.
- 2 n n 19th/30th October. Otter's version of this engagement is inaccurate.
- Gombroon Diary, 27th January/7th February 1742.

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His licentious ways, however, estranged many of his subjects, and, in February 1742¹ they again broke into open revolt, deposed Saif and conferred the Imamate on his cousin Sultan ibn Murshid.² Saif, as before, appealed to the Iranians for aid, and TaqI Khan sent a favourable reply. The opposition, however, seemed likely to be strong, because the Huwala Arabs had joined the supporters of Sultan ibn Murshid.

As the Huwala Arabs had seized Khasab, near Ras Musandam, the Iranian garrison at Julfar marched on the Huwalas there in April 1742 and inflicted a crushing defeat Shatkh Rāma, one of the principal Huwala leaders, on them. was killed in the battle, and over 500 Arabs were captured.³ On the 10th/21st June the Iranian fleet sailed for Julfar carrying reinforcements and stores;⁴ but it was not until the following November that Kalb All Khan, the Sardar of the Hot countries, crossed over to the Arabian shore. He was followed 3 weeks later by Taqi Khan himself. By this time the Iranian fleet had been further strengthened by the arrival of four new ships from Surat.

F According to Shaikh Abu Sulaiman (see Guillain, Vol.I, page 535), the date of Sultan ibn Murshid's elevation to the Imamate was the 10th Dhu'l-Hijja, 1154 (16th February, 1742) Salil ibn Raziq is obviously wrong in saying (page 145) is clear from the Gombroon Diary that the revolution took place early in 1742, because the Agent of the E.I.Co. re-ceived a letter at the beginning of April of that year from the Beglarbegi asking for ships to take troops across to the assistance of Saif ibn Sultan. See also Otter, Vol.II page 163. that Sultan ibn Murshid became Imam in 1151 (1738/9); 2 Sultan ibn MurshId's mother was a daughter of Saif ibn Sultan I. (Guillain, Vol.I, page 535).
3 Gombroon Diary, 19th/30th April, 1742, Otter, Vol.II, page 169.
4 " " 10th June, 1742; Otter, Vol.II, page 168, says that TaqI Khan, on this occasion, sent 6,000 men to Juliar in response to the deposed Lmam's appeal for assistance.

TaqI Khan, on meeting Saif ibn Sultan at Julfar, concluded a treaty whereby he undertook to restore him to the Imamate if he would, in return, recognise the suzerainty The allies then proceeded to attack Sultan ibn of Iran. Murshid and his adherents.¹ While a portion of the Iranian army, under Kalb AlT Khan, laid siege to Sohar, the Beglarbegi and Saif ibn Sultan proceeded by sea to Muscat, which was still held by partisans of the ex-Imam.² The Iranian troops were able to go where they wished in the town, but Saif ibn Sulțăn refused them access to the forts of Al-JalalI and TaqI Khan resolved to get possession of these forts Marani. by foul means if he could not do so by fair. Knowing the weakness of Saif ibn Sultan for drink, the Beglarbegi had brought a cask of Shīrāz wine from Iran. When invited, with some of his officers, to a banquet in Marani fort, TaqI Khan brought this cask of wine with him, and succeeded in making Saif and his officers completely drunk; this, it appears, was no difficult proceeding in so far as Saif was concerned. Whilst Saif and his officers were lying insensible, Taqi Khan and the Iranians with him secured possession of the fort without difficulty or bloodshed. The Beglarbegi then stole Saif's seal and affixed it to an order which he had had written in Saif's name, to the commander of the fort of al-Jalali, charging him to admit the Iranian troops. The Arab commander,

1 Guillain, Vol.I, page 536, Otter, Vol.II, page 163.
2 n page 537.

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suspecting nothing, obeyed the order. When Saif recovered his senses, he found, to his dismay, that both forts were in the possession of the Iranians.¹

It being useless to attempt to regain the forts, Saif decided to continue the war against Sultan ibn Murshid.

Sohār was very ably defended by the Governor, Ahmad ibn Sa'ld who, as will be seen below, later founded the Al-Bu Sa'ld dynasty of Muscat. Taqī Khān and Saif ibn Sulţān advanced against Sulţān ibn Murshid, who, finding his forces out-numbered, retired towards Sohār, where he hoped to be able to break through the Iranian lines and join Ahmad ibn Sa'ld. Sultān ibn Murshīd succeeded, apparently, in entering Sohār, but he was killed soon after, when leading a sortie.² Ahmad, however, continued bravely to resist the Iranians until July, when, having begun to run short of food and munitions, he deemed it expedient to come to terms.³ The siege had lasted for seven or eight months, and had cost the Iranians over 3000 men.⁴

- This is the story as given by Niebuhr, in his Beschreibung von Arabien, (page 300); Guillain gives a slightly different version. The Agent of the E.I.Co. at Gombroon received a letter from the Iranian Government on the 18th February 1743 stating that the Beglarbegi had captured Muscat. Reports of Taql Khān's subterfuge must have been spread abroad, for the Agent added that it was supposed that the place had been taken "by dealing underhand with the Imām's slaves to deliver him the forts."
- ² Guillain, Vol.I, page 538. Some uncertainty exists as to whether Sultan Murshid was killed in this way or whether he perished when attempting to force his way through the Iranian lines.
- 3 Gombroon Diary, 21st July, 1743. The news of the capitulation was received in Gombroon by trankey from Sohar on that day. See also Niebuhr's Beschreibung von Arabien page 301.
- 4 Gombroon Diary, 21st July. SalIl ibn RazIq's account of the siege (page 140) is grossly exaggerated, and Otter's statements (Vol.II, page 181) are incorrect. 320.

Shortly after the death of Sulțān ibn Murshid, Saif ibn Sulțān, being overcome with grief at witnessing the state to which his own behaviour and acts had reduced his country, left the Iranians and retired to Rastāq, where he died a few days later. Thus ended ingloriously the Ya'riba dynasty of 'Omán.¹

It is to be noted that, if Saif ibn Sultan had succeeded, with the help of the Iranians, in getting himself reinstated as Imam and if he had then accepted, as he had agreed to do, the suzerainty of Iran, Zanzibar and the dependencies of 'Oman on the African mainland² would <u>ipso</u> <u>facto</u> have likewise formed, in theory at least, part of Nadir's empire.

Ahmad ibn Sa'id managed to ingratiate himself with Taqi Khan to such an extent that he not only managed to obtain confirmation of the position as Governor of Sohar, but also had Barka added to his domains.³

It is stated in the Gombroon Diary that 3,500 recruits were to be sent over to Arabia, to replace those who had lost their lives at Sohar and elsewhere,

"the King having ordered that when they were Masters of the Sea-Shore to march inland and it is supposed his

² The internal troubles in Oman had, however, led to a weakening of the Oman1 authority in East Africa, which resulted in the loss of Mombasa (which the Portuguese temporarily re gained) in 1733 - see O. Kersten's "Tabellarische Uebersicht der Geschichte Ostafrikas", pages 17 and 18, in Vol.III of Baron von der Decken's "Reisen in Ost-Afrika", Leipzic, 1879

³ Guillain, Vol.I, page 538, Niebuhr, page 301, Sal11 ibn RazIq, pages 149 and 150. 321.

¹ Guillain, Vol.I, page 538.

Designs are to conquer the whole Country, but while he is doing this he is destroying his Own, and Nothing but Misery, Tyranny and Oppression are to be seen or heard in these Parts, the People being daily tax'd (so) that before Time is given for collecting one Another is laid on."

Meanwhile, the war between Iran and Turkey, which had been threatening for so long, at last broke out. Nevertheless, Nādir did not order the withdrawal of his forces from Omān, with the exception of some vessels which were at Sohār; it appears that he intended to use these vessels in the combined land and river operations against Basra.²

For some time past there had been serious friction in 'Omàn between Taql Khān and Kalb'All, and each sent to Nādir accusations against the other. Nādir was greatly displeased, and ordered the recall of his brother-in-law; he appointed Muḥammad Ḥusain Khān Qirqlū, who had just returned from a mission to Russia, to succeed him as Sardār of the Garmsīrāt.³ Nādir was also displeased with Taql Khān, whose recall he ordered almost immediately afterwards;⁴ according to Mīrzā Mahdī, Kalb ʿAlī and Taqī Khān were recalled simultaneously.⁵ Early in October Muḥammad Ḥusain Khān Qirqlū, the new Sardār of the Hot Countries, passed through Gombroon on his way to Sohār.

1	Gombroon Diary, 21st July/1st August, 1743.
2	" " 24th August/4th September. These vessels must have arrived too late to participate in the initial operations (for particulars of the siege of Basra, see the ensuing Chapter).
3	Autobiography of Mirza Muhammad Shirazi, page 16.
4	ibidem.
)	T.N., page 249. 322.

Taqī Khān, with part of the fleet, arrived at Gombroon on the 20th November/1st December, and was followed a few days later by Kalb'Ali Khan; the latter secretly informed the Company's 'linguist' that Taq' Khan had actually revolted and that he had spent several days trying to persuade him (Kalb Alf) to join in the revolt. Taqi Khan had the ex-Sardar strangled a few days later and caused his body to be thrown down a well; he then publicly raised the standard of revolt and marched off to Shiraz. The measures which Nadir took to quell this revolt will be given in the following Chapter; all that is necessary to say here is that Nadir was so occupied in suppressing TaqI Khan that he was unable to pay any attention to Oman. When the Shah had overcome TaqI Khan, he became so taken up with the prosecution of the Turkish war that he was likewise unable to concern himself with affairs in Omān. In consequence, the Iranian garrison there received no reinforce-The able Ahmad ibn Sa^cId took advantage of this ments. One of the conditions of Ahmad's settlement with situation. the Iranians at Sohar had been that he was to pay them tribute regularly. After the departure of TaqI Khān, Ahmad, however, failed to make his payments on the appointed dates, alleging that he had no means of sending the money to Muscat. As a result, the commanders at that place became short of money and were unable to pay their troops, many of whom consequently deserted.² Having invited these commanders to Barka, on the

¹ Gombroon Diary, 30th December, 1743 / 10th January, 1744.
² Niebuhr's "Beschreibung von Arabien", page 302, Guillain, Vol.I, page 539.

pretext of arranging for the payment of the tribute due, he seized them and the soldiers who had accompanied them. Ahmad then proceeded to Muscat and summoned the Iranians there to surrender, offering them money if they yielded of their own accord, with the alternative of imprisonment if they did not. Being deprived of their leaders and short of provisions, and having no hope of being able to resist Ahmad, the majority surrendered. It is said that Ahmad put some of the Iranians to death, but allowed the others to return to Iran.¹ In this way, Ahmad became master of the coast from Muscat to Sohār; later he extended his sway over the whole country, with the exception of Julfar and a small strip of adjacent territory which the Iranians managed to retain for some years.² Having expelled the invaders and restored order in Oman, Ahmad had no difficulty in inducing the chief Qadi to arrange for his election as Imam, thus founding the Al-Bu-Sa'Id dynasty, which rules in Muscat to this day. The election of Ahmad to the Imāmate is said to have taken place in the latter part of 1744.3

In so far as Iran was concerned, the Oman campaigns had proved a costly failure. At least 20,000 men had perished

- ² Entries in the Gombroon Diary show that, as late as 1748, ships carrying men and provisions were being sent over from time to time to Julfar.
- ³ Guillain, Vol.I, page 542, and Kersten's "Tabellarische Uebersicht", page 18. Salil ibn Raziq states (page 152) that Ahmad ibn Sa'id became Imam in 1154 A.H. (1741/1742) but this is clearly impossible. 324.

Niebuhr's "Beschreibung", page 303. Salil ibn Raziq's account (pages 153 and 154) of Ahmad's treachery to the Iranians and his subsequent massacre of them seems much exaggerated.

either in battle or from the ravages of disease,¹ but this heavy sacrifice brought no commensurate advantage. Like the Dāghistān campaigns, but on a lesser scale, the Omān operations imposed a prolonged and useless drain upon Nādir's resources, and the efforts to provide men and material to carry them on caused much privation and suffering in Southern Iran.

Nevertheless, success would certainly have been attained had Nādir, instead of entrusting the supreme command to the corrupt and inefficient Taqĩ Khān, given it to some honest and capable military leader like Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir.

For Omān the results were vastly different. Although the Iranian invasions entailed for a time much loss and hardship to the inhabitants, they brought about the union of the conflicting interests and led directly to the supersession of the decadent Ya'riba dynasty by that of the Al-Bu Sa'Ids.²

Nādir's bid for sea-power, like his attempts to conquer'Omān, ended in nothing. Nevertheless, the great and persistent efforts which Nādir made to acquire and maintain a fleet are most remarkable, particularly as he himself had no personal experience or knowledge of the sea and as the vast

¹ There are several references in the Gombroon Diary to heavy wastage from disease in the Iranian armies in Omān.

² R. Said Ruete, in his lecture to the Central Asia Society in 1929, pointed out that the Al-Bu Sa'Id dynasty achieved power by driving out the Iranians just as the Ya'riba dynasty had previously done so by expelling the Portuguese. See the Journal of the C.A.S., Vol.XVI, Part IV, page 419.

majority of his subjects were ill-fitted, by inclination, upbringing and environment, to become seamen. By means of purchase, Nādir built up a fleet of 30 vessels in the Gulf, but it seems to have achieved but little after 1743, and its condition progressively deteriorated. The fantastic attempt to build ships at Bushire with timber from Māzandærān ended in August 1743, when orders came from Nādir for work on the large vessel to be stopped, owing, it appears, to peculation on the part of those in charge of the construction!

Gombroon Diary, 24th August/4th September 1743. Sir W. Ouseley saw the remains of this vessel when he arrived at Bushire in March 1811. (See his "Travels in Various Countries of the East, more particularly Persia," London, 1819, Vol. I, page 188.) The construction of this large vessel involved the death of a Fleming named La Potterie. This man was resident at Isfahān and Nādir insisted on him going to Bushire to supervise the construction of the vessel. La Potterie protested that he knew nothing of ship-building, but his objections were disregarded. The poor man was so troubled by his new duties that his health became undermined. He at length got leave to return to Isfahan, but died en route, in August 1742 (see A. Martineau, "Le premier Consulat de France à Bassora (1739-1745), in the Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, Paris 1917, pages 411 and 412.

CHAPTER XXIV.

The Turkish War. I. The Mesopotamian Campaign.

Turkey, like Russia - and indeed Iran itself - received but little authentic news of Nadir during the conqueror's absence in India. The relations between Turkey and Iran remained in the same anomalous state as they had done since 1736. There was no real peace, for the treaty had not been ratified; there was merely a prolonged cessation of hostilities. It was natural that the Sultan and his advisers should feel some anxiety lest Nadir, if he returned victorious from India, should renew the war; they were well aware that Nadir would not scruple, if occasion arose, to use as a pretext for reopening hostilities the failure to reach agreement on the religious questions. However, whilst the Shah was so far away, and particularly when persistent rumours arrived of his defeat, the Porte felt that the danger, if not entirely removed, had become remote. The relief felt by the Porte in this respect was reflected in its relations with Russia and Austria. The Treaty of Belgrade had been signed on the 18th September 1739, but when difficulties arose in connection with the fulfilment of certain of the terms of settlement, the behaviour of the Porte was anything but conciliatory. However, a sudden change in the attitude of the Porte towards Russia and Austria was

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noticeable when it became known in Constantinople that Nadir was at length on his way back from India, and the difficulties with the two Christian Powers were smoothed over.¹

In January 1741 the Iranian Ambassador, Hajji Khān Chamishgazak, with an enormous retinue, made a most imposing entry into Aleppo.² Three months later he reached Constantinople, where he was received by the Grand Vizier. Hajji Khān's 'haughty and contemptuous carriage' on this occasion and his obstinate refusal to discuss with anyone but the Sultan the objects of his mission gave great offence.³

After being given an audience by the Sultan, the Ambassador discussed the religious questions with the Turkish ministers and <u>ulama</u>. The views of the Porte remained unchanged in this respect, but it was not deemed prudent, at that juncture, to refuse outright to accede to Nadir's demands. The Porte therefore replied evasively that action would be taken in accordance with the precepts of the true law.⁴

Since the Ambassador had not been given full powers to conclude peace and since it was not altogether clear from

⁴ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, page 41.

¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 36.

² See "A Relation of what passed at Aleppo on the occasion of the Arrival of Hadjy Khan, the Persian Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte", in S.P.97, Vol.XXXI.

For details, see Sir E. Fawkener's despatch of the 23rd March/ 3rd April 1741, and "The Daily Post" of the 26th May.

the messages which he brought whether Nadir desired peace or war, it was decided to arrive at no settlement with Hājji Khān, but to send an embassy to Iran. The ambassadors selected were Munif Efendi, a high official of the Treasury, and Nazīf Mustafā Efendi, the director of the Constantinople Customs.1 This embassy reached Nadir's camp (some 11 miles north of Darband) in January 1742.² The Turkish envoys delivered a message from the Sultan in which the latter made excuses for his inability to accede to the Iranian religious Nadir replied that he wished that the Sultan would demands. recognise the Ja'fari sect, since his (Nadir's) fundamental object was to tighten the cords of friendship. As the matter of this fifth sect contained the elements for the pacification of the Muslim state, and as the Sultan was Caliph of Islam, Nadir would, he said, go in person to Turkey in order to achieve finality regarding the question. "I am hoping that if Allah wills, the matter may be arranged there on my arrival? With this threat Nadir concluded his reply.

Feeling that it would not be amiss to give his religious policy the semblance, at any rate, of hieratic approbation, Nadir convened an assembly of the <u>ulama</u>, under the presidency of the Mulla-Bashi, Ali Akbar. The <u>ulama</u> knew what was expected of them, and obediently confirmed the <u>fatwa</u>

³ T.N., page 231.

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¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 42, where Munif Efendi is stated to have been تذكره جيسي

² T.N., page 231. Nazīf's name is wrongly given as Latīf in the Bombay edition.

of 1736 regarding the establishment of the Ja'fari sect, the erection of the fifth pillar in the Ka'ba and the abjuration of the Shi'a heresy.¹

Nadir, although he had thus flung down the gauntlet to Turkey, was unable, for some thirteen months, to put his threats into execution, owing to his being kept fully occupied by the LazgIs and their allies in Daghistan.

Notwithstanding the repeated reports of Nādir's reverses in Dāghistān, the Porte was alarmed when, early in April 1742, Munif Efendi and Nazīf Efendi returned to Constantinople with Nādir's reply and their information as to his threatening attitude.

Reports from the Turkish commanders on the frontier confirmed the information brought back by the Ambassadors, and active preparations for war were made.

When informing Whitehall of the above developments, Sir E. Fawkener added that there was a great lack of provisions near the frontiers.

"This war," he said, is on all accounts very unseasonable for it finds the Turks still panting under the fatigues of the last with the Christians, and with the remembrances still fresh of the difficulties and hazards of the past Persian Campaigns, the Country yet feels the heavy effects of them, and is so exhausted as to be very ill-provided for the subsistence of Armys. There is also such an indisposition in all sorts of People to go that way, that it will be no easy matter to draw together an Army of any consequence.....^{#2}

- 1 T.N., pages 232 and 233.
- ² Sir E. Fawkener's despatch of the 8th/19th April.

As the year wore on, additional news was received of Nadir's difficulties in Daghistan; consequently the Porte became rather less apprehensive.

A curious incident is recorded in the Gombroon Diary. On the 24th May/4th June 1742 it was stated that

"Shaw Nadir would send an Embassadour to the King of England in order to engage a firm alliance with him, that He, the King, was informed Our King (whom it seems he mistook for the Emperor) had had some Part of his Territories wrested from him by the Turks, Wherefore he would join with us against them and wanted to know whether we thought our King would be induced to hearken to his Propositions."

The Agent replied that this matter was "an Affair of Kingdoms and foreign to our Purpose" and that it concerned another ruler. Moreover, the Turks were the friends of the British. The Agent concluded "We find they (i.e. the Iranians) are entirely strangers to what lyes without them."

The Porte held grave doubts as to the loyalty of Ahmad Pāshā of Baghdād, and it is said that Alī Pāshā did his best to blacken his enemy's character.² The truth of the matter was that Nādir certainly had a great regard for Ahmad Pāshā³ which the latter reciprocated, but there is no proof

- Nevertheless, Nadir, by means of his numerous embassies, was very well informed of the situation in both Constantinople and St. Petersburg.
- ² Otter, Vol.II, page 359.

Otter, (Vol.II, page 184) states that he was informed by an Iranian that Nādir once asked some of his courtiers who, in their opinion, was greater than he was. The courtiers replied that they knew of no one who was even his equal. Nādir then said "You are wrong. Ahmad Khān, the Governor of Baghdād, is assuredly greater than I, since he has maintained himself for so long between two enemies as strong as myself and Sultān Mahmūd, and he does what he wishes with us." that Ahmad would really have betrayed his country and become a henchman of the Shāh's;¹ he was too fond of his position as Pāshā of Baghdād, where he ruled almost as a sovereign, many days' journey from Constantinople; under Nādir, the authority of the Crown would have been a reality, instead of a mere shadow.

Many Turks and Arabs in Mesopotamia did not scruple to make largesums of money by supplying Nadir's agents with horses, mules and camels, although they must have realised that these animals would be of great use to the Iranians when at length hostilities with Turkey began again.²

Early in 1743, just before Nādir's departure from Dāghistān, a further Turkish embassy arrived at his camp, and delivered a letter from the Sultān, in which the last-named excused himself once more for his inability to agree to recognise the Ja^cfarī sect and to authorise the erection of the fifth pillar in the Ka^cba. In reply, Nādir informed the Sultān of the impending advance of his "world-conquering army."³

Longrigg, in his "Four Centuries of Modern Iraq", (page 161) states that there is, in recorded facts, "no justification for the odious nickname of 'Nidhamu'l-Mulk\$' bestowed by his detractors". (Otter, on page 365 of his second volume, says that the Kahya of Mosul, when in conversation with him in June 1743, referred to Ahmad Pāshā as "a second Nizāmu'l Mulk", and alleged that the Pāshā was the true author of all the troubles that were then about to afflict the country?

² Otter states (Vol.II, pages 247 and 248) that all the time that he was at Isfahān and Başra, that is for some 6 years, this traffic had been in progress.

³ T.N., page 237.

Thenfollowed the terrible march to the Mughan plain,¹ where a halt for 20 days was made to enable the men and baggage animals to recover. After this respite, the march was resumed via Hashtarud and Qara Chaman; passing within four <u>farsakhs</u> of Tabriz, the army continued southwards to Marivan, where the Princes Nasru'llah, Imam QulI and Shahrukh joined it from Mashhad on the 24th Rabi⁶ II (18th May). An ambassador from Muḥammad Shāh arrived in company with the Princes, and brought with him a number of costly gifts. Nādir then resumed his march to Sinandij.

The renewed threat of war with Iran made Turkey more inclined to be friendly with, or at any rate, not hostile to, Russia. The news of the sending of the Russian reinforcements to Astrakhan and Kizliar had, for a time, alarmed Turkey, as it feared at first that these forces were to be used against her, in conjunction with Nādir's hosts. This fear proved groundless, but Turkey continued to act with circumspection in so far as Russia was concerned.²

Nādir, before leaving Dāghistān, had sent envoys to Ahmad Pāshā demanding the surrender of Baghdād. The Pāshā, on receiving this message, sought to gain time by send-

¹ See page 313 above.

² Stanhope Aspinwall (who became Chargé d'Affaires on Sir E. Fawkener's departure on leave from Constantinople in November 1742) reported on the 8th/19th July 1743 that the Turks dare not alarm Russia, "much less hold a stiff or threatening style with, lest She might be provoked to retaliate it upon them, in the end, by joining the Persians, an Apprehension which has been long thought here more than chimerical." (S.P.97, Vol.XXXII).

ing word to Nādir, through his Kahya, Muhammad Agha, that he wished to maintain friendly relations with him, but that he could not surrender Baghdad until the end of his term of office; the Sultan had appointed him, and he had to do his duty. Ahmad concluded by asking for a respite.¹

Muhammad Agha delivered this message to Nådir at Sinandij; the Shāh received it in good part, but despatched several bodies of troops to seize Samarra, Hilla, Najaf, Karbalā, and other places in Mesopotamia. Nādir, at the same time, appointed Qoja Khān Shaikhānlū, of the Chamishgazak tribe to command the forces that were to besiege Baṣra; the Shāh ordered the Governors of Shīrvān, Huwaiza, Shūshtar and Dizfūl and the Arabs in those parts to cooperate with Qoja Khān.² The siege of Baṣra by these forces will be described later in this chapter.

On the 1st July Nadir sent Nasru'llah and the other Princes to Hamadan. He then gave the Mughal Ambassador leave to return, and handed to him many gifts for the Emperor.³

3 ibidem.

¹ T.N., page 239. Sulaimán Så'igh states, in his "Tã'rīkhu'l-Mausil (Cairo, 1923), page 278, that Ahmad Pāshā resolved to adopt a cunning policy, and sent word to Nādir that he should in the first place conquer Mosul and that he would, on his return, find the gates of Baghdād open. According to Von Hammer (Vol. XV, page 57), Ahmad Pāshā wrote to one of Nādir's advisers that he had proposed to the Porte that two eminent lawyers should be appointed to find a solution of the difficult question of the Ja'farl sect; if Ahmad Pāshā actually made any such proposal, he doubtless did so with the knowledge that it would be rejected; all that he wished to do for the moment was to gain time, in order to gather in the harvest and accumulate stocks of provisions.

Since Nadir contemplated going into winter quarters in the neighbourhood of Baghdad, he gave instructions for quantities of corn to be collected in the Shahrizar district for despatch later to his camp.¹

Nādir marched through the Shahriz**ū**r with Kirkūk as his immediate objective. Khālid Pāshā, a member of the wellknown Baban family, who was Governor of the Shahriz**ū**r district, fled before him; Nādir paused to appoint as Governor Khālid's cousin Salīm.² Previous to Khālid Pāshā's flight, Ahmad Khān, the (Iranian) Governor of Ardalān, had fled with some 500 followers to join the Turks.³ It is said that his failure to pay a large sum to Nādir was the reason for his defection.⁴

Muhammad Agha was then sent to Constantinople with Ahmad Pāshā's report on the situation.

On the 14th Jumādī II (5th August), Nādir and his army appeared before Kirkūk.⁵ The garrison retired to the citadel and refused to submit. When, a week later, Nādir's artillery arrived, he bombarded the citadel from all sides and forced the defenders to yield after the siege had lasted for 9 days.⁶

1	T.N., page 239. Von Hammer (Vol.XV, pages 69 and 70) says that Nadir's seizure of corn while on his march to Kirkūk caused a severe famine at Baghdād.
	T.N., page 240.
3	Muhammad Sharif's "Zubdatu't-Tawarikh-i-Sinandiji", fol.210(a)
4	Otter, Vol.II, page 280.
5	T.N., page 240.
6	See M.H. Pognanis French translation, entitled "Chronique

 See M.H.Pögnøn's French translation, entitled "Chronique Syriaque Relative au Siège de Mossoul par les Persans en 1743", of a Syriac MS., the original of which was written by a certain Habèche (? Habash), in 1746. The Syriac text and M. Pognon's translation were published in the "Florilegium Melchior de Vogue", Paris, 1909, pages 489-503.

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According to Mīrzā Mahdī, Nādir had resolved not to advance beyond Kirkūk, because he hoped that the messages which had been sent to the Porte through the intermediary of Ahmad Pāshā and his Kahya Muḥammad Agha would elicit a favourable response. A letter from the Sultān reached Nādir whilst he was at Kīrkūk, and its terms proved to be anything but favourable. The Sultān informed Nādir that the Shaikhu'l-Islām had issued a <u>fatwa</u> which declared lawful the killing or capturing of Iranians, whose religion was contrary to Islām.¹ The Porte had, simultaneously, sent orders to Ḥājji Ḥusain Pāshā,² of Mosul, to take all necessary measures to put the city into a state of defence.

The provocative terms of the Sulțān's letter made Nādir decide to advance on Mosul, and on the 3rd September he left Kirkūk. ArbTl offered resistance, but was speedily taken. On the march to Mosul, the Iranian troops plundered and destroyed the villages and devastated the countryside. No distinction was made between Muslim and Christian, and in some villages, churches and monasteries were destroyed and the monks made prisoners.³

Husain Pāshā, in the meantime, was busily preparing for the impending siege. His small garrison was augmented by the arrival of his namesake, the Governor of Aleppo, with

¹ T.N., page 240.

² Husain Pāshā's grandfather, Abdu'l-Jalīl by name, and a Nestorian Christian by faith, had been for long in the service of the Pāshā of Mosul. For details of this interesting family, see Niebuhr's "Reisebeschreibung", Vol.II, pages 362 and 363, and Longrigg, <u>op.cit</u>., pages 158 and 347. 3 Habèche, page 499, and Sulaimān Sā'igh, page 278.

his troops; the combined forces numbered some 30,000 men.

On Nadir summoning Husain Pasha to yield, he met with a firm refusal.¹

Abdu'l-Fattan Beg, a brother of Husain Pasha, thereupon advanced with a portion of the garrison to oppose Nadir, and a battle was fought on the east side of the Tigris. Abdu'l-Fattan Beg and his men were defeated, but managed to recross the river and reach Mosul, despite efforts of the Iranians to cut them off.²

On the 25th Rajab (14th September) the Iranian army camped at Yarimja, close to the tomb of the Prophet Jonah.³ The Tigris was bridged both above and below Mosul, and numbers of men crossed over to complete the encirclement of the town.

News of the threat to Baghdād and the fall of Kirkūk produced consternation in Constantinople. Fears of an uprising caused the Qizlar-Agha to bring about the dismissal of the Grand Vizier, 'Alī Pāshā, and the appointment of Hasan Pāshā, an ex-Janissary, to the post. There seems to be no doubt that 'Alī Pāshā was made a scapegoat, and that

¹ Sulaimān Ṣā'igh, page 281.

² Sulaimān Sā'igh, page 283. According to Mīrzā Mahdl, (T.N., page 240) it was the Governor of the Koi Sanjap who thus endeavoured to oppose Nādir.

³ This is the date given in the Tā'rlkh-i-Nādirl (page 240) and in the Turkish official account of the siege of Mosul, an Italian translation of which was sent to the foreign diplomatic representatives at Constantinople (see Stanhope Aspinwall's despatch of 20th November/1st December 1743, S.P. 97, Vol.XXXII). Von Hammer (Vol.XV, page 70) gives the date as the 13th.

Hasan Pasha was chosen not only because he was a capable man, but also because his appointment would be popular in the army.¹

When news of the siege of Mosul arrived, there was further alarm, and it is said that Bonneval's advice was sought.²

Having entirely surrounded the city, Nadir constructed redoubts, and erected fourteen batteries; in these batteries 160 cannon and 230 mortars were mounted.³ By the 8th Sha^c bān (27th September), all preparations for the siege were completed, and the batteries opened fire. For eight days and nights a continuous cannonade was maintained.⁴ and many thousands of cannon balls and bombs rained upon the defenders.5 Breaches were made in the walls, but these were always repaired

Much mining and counter-mining⁶ went on, and no fewer than seven general assaults and five subsidiary attacks

1 Stanhope Aspinwall to Whitehall, 5th/16th October, 1743 (S.P.97, Vol.XXXII) and Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 69.

² "The Daily Post", 30th November, 1743. The correspondent of the paper stated that Bonneval planned to finish the war in one campaign, but that his plan was not adopted.

³ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 70 and 71.

⁴ See the official Turkish account of the siege. Habeche (page 500) states that the bombardment lasted for 9 days and nights.

⁵ Niebuhr (Reisebeschreibung, Vol.II, page 367) puts the number at 40,000, the official Turkish account at 60,000, while Sulaiman Sa'igh (page 284) raises it to no less than 100.000 - doubtless a gross exaggeration.

⁶ The Iranian mines did, on the whole, considerably more harm to the besiegers than to the besieged, as the majority exploded backwards. The Turks are said to have had the services of a capable engineer from Constantinople (see C. J. Rich's "Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan and of the Site of Ancient Nineveh", London, 1836, Vol.II, page 46). 338.

were delivered. Once, after the walls had been breached by a mine, the Iranians rushed forward impetuously to the attack; 1700 scaling ladders were planted against the walls, but the æssailants were beaten off with heavy loss by the defenders, who showed desperate courage.¹ The Christian element of the population played a most important part in the defence of the city, and were afterwards given special privileges in reward for their services.² A legend was afterwards current that the Iranian forces were dispersed by the miraculous interposition of St. George, St. Matthew and the Prophet Jonah, "who suddenly appeared among them armed and mounted."³

On the 22nd Sha'ban (11th October) Nadir received serious news from Shirvan, where the pretender Sam MIrza and Muhammad, the son of Surkhai, with a force of Lazgis, had captured and afterwards put to death the Governor of Shirvan, between Shamakhi and Shabran.⁴

Soon after Nādir heard of this uprising, he received further disquieting news: namely, that the pretender "Ṣafl Mīrzā" (alias Muḥammad ʿAlī Rafsinjānī), whose cause the Turks had warmly espoused, was marching from Ezeroum via Qārş to the Iranian frontier.⁵

⁵ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 71.

¹ Turkish official account.

² Niebuhr, <u>op.cit</u>., Vol.II, page 361, Sulaimān Sā'igh, page 289. ³ Rich, <u>op.cit</u>., Vol.II, page 46.

⁴ For details of this revolt, see the ensuing chapter.

These reports, together with the knowledge that his troops were becoming disheartened by their repeated failures and heavy losses, caused Nadir to make overtures to Husain Pāshā for a cessation of hostilities. Nādir's proposals were at first rejected, but, on fresh overtures being made by him, negotiations were opened. Nadir and Husain Pasha exchanged costly gifts, and it was arranged that the siege would be raised if Husain Pasha forwarded the Shah's peace proposals to Constantinople.¹ At this juncture Muhammad Agha arrived from Constantinople, bearing a message from the Sultan in which the latter said that he placed no reliance upon Nadir's friendship and brotherly feeling, because he had violated the frontier. If, however, Nādir would retire to the borders of Iran, he could there discuss with Ahmad Pasha the questions at issue.²

Nādir agreed to this proposal, and, on the 2nd Ramadān (20th October) he and his army left Mosul for Kirkūk and Qarā Täppä. Leaving the bulk of his army and all his baggage at Qarā Täppä, Nādir set out to visit the holy shrines of Mesopotamia.³ Thus began another phase of the extraordinary relations between Iran and Turkey during this period (all this while the siege of Baṣra was in progress, as will be seen below).

- ² ibidem. See Notel on p. 341.
- ⁾ ibidem.

¹ T.N., page 241.

At Shahraban Nadir was met by Muhammad Agha and other notables, who brought him presents from Ahmad Pasha.

From Shahraban, Nādir proceeded to Kazimain, where he visited the shrines of the Imāms Mūsa al-Kāzim and Muhammad Taqī¹, so venerated by the Shi'a. Nādir then re-crossed the Tigris, in a barge of state furnished by Aḥmad Pāshā, and went to the tomb of Abu Ḥanīfa, at Muʿazzam.²

On the 1st Shawwāl (18th November) Nādir proceeded to Karbalā, where he performed the circumambulation (<u>tawāf</u>) of the shrine. Radiyya Begum, who was a daughter of Shah Sulțān Husain and who had married Nādir in 1730, gave 20,000 <u>nādiris</u> for the repairing of the sacred building.³ Later in the month Nādir journeyed to Najaf via Hilla, where he had convened a great assembly of the <u>ulamā</u> of Iran, Afghānistān, Balkh and Bukhārā on the one hand, and of the Holy Cities of Mesopotamia on the other, in order to discuss and settle the religious question.⁴

1 The seventh and ninth, respectively, of the Shi'a Imāms. Friedward Autor Autor

2 T.N., page 241.

³ According to Mirzā Mahdi, Nādir visited Karbalā on the 1st Shawwāl, <u>after</u> having been at Najaf (T.N., page 246), but we know from As-SuwaidI (Schmidt, <u>op.cit.</u>, page 95) that the meeting of <u>ulamā</u> at Najaf took place on the 24th Shawwāl, so the visit to Karbalā must have preceded the meeting.

⁴ T.N., page 241.

In order, no doubt, to predispose the local divines in his favour, Nadir gave orders for the dome of the shrine of Ali at Najaf to be gilded.

By far the fullest and most interesting account of these religious discussions is that given by the Turkish Arabian divine Abdullah ibn Husain as-Suwaidi. Ahmad Pasha sent Abdullah to Nadir in order to assist in the task of reconciling the conflicting religious elements in Iran.¹ Nedir. accordingte Abdullah, had arranged the whole affair beforehand with Alf Akbar, the Mulla Bashi. Abdullah, on being received by Nadir, conversed with the Shah in the Turcoman Nadir requested 'Abdullah to render assistance dialect. in removing "disloyalty" (i.e. non-conformity with the SunnI code), but, instead of asking him to take part as a disputant, he requested him to act as umpire, to take note of everything and to report fully thereon to Ahmad Pāshā. On the conclusion of the audience Abdullah met All Akbar the Iranian Mulla-Bashi, with whom he had a long informal discussion on the text of the Qu'ran and the traditions. 'Abdullah, who was a staunch Sunni, found 'Ali Akbar irreconcilable on certain doctrinal points. On the following day (24th Shawwal = 12th December 1743) the 'ulama assembled; there were 70 Iranian clergy and two groups of Afghans and Bukhārans. Abdullah as-SuwaidI as arranged, was umpire,

Professor Schmidt, <u>op.cit</u>., pages 83-100.

and Ali Akbar and a Bukharan Mulla were the chief spokesmen. It soon became clear that Nadir had carefully arranged matters beforehand with 'All Akbar and the other Iranians, for he, when cross-questioned on the alleged 'disloyalty' of the latter, was most deferential and correct in his views. Finally, agreement was reached between the Iranians and the two groups of Bukhāran and Afghan divines. On the next day all the 'ulama, together with those of Najaf, signed a document setting forth the terms of the Iranians' undertaking, and Abdullah as-Suwaidi then signed and sealed it in his capacity In this document the religious policy of Shah as umpire. Isma'Il and his successors was deplored, the legitimacy of the first three Caliphs was recognised, as was also the true descent of Ja'faru's-Sadiq from the Prophet. Lastly, the right of the Iranians to recognition as belonging to the Ja'farī sect was affirmed.¹

After the <u>ulamā</u> had completed their deliberations and issued their manifesto, Nādir's wife Gauhar Shād, the mother of the Princes Naṣru'llah and Imām Qull, gave the sum of 100,000 nādiris for the repairing of the walls and tilework of the shrine, and presented a jewelled censer and another of gold for use therein.²

In the meanwhile, Nādir and Aḥmad Pāshā had been discussing the terms of peace, and had reached agreement on

- ¹ See also the T.N., page 246.
- ² T.N., page 246.

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its terms at the end of November or beginning of December.¹ Nadir thereupon issued orders for the raising of the siege of Başra; a description of this siege must now be given.

The operations in the south of Mesopotamia had not been conducted with anything like the same vigour as those in the north. When Nādir had started on his advance to Kirkūk and Mosul, he had, as already stated, appointed Qoja Khān Shaikhānlū, of the Chamishgazak tribe, to the command of the force which was to advance on Başra.² Qoja Khān, the Governor of Huwaiza and Salmān (who was also known as Sulaimān), the well-known chief of the Ka'ab Arabs³ (who had recently moved into Iranian territory round Dūraq, and had become Iranian subjects) prepared to make a joint advance on Başra from Huwaiza.

¹ Muhammad Agha was evidently sent to Constantinople about this time, with the terms of the proposed arrangement or treaty, because Stanhope Aspinwall reported his arrival at the capital in the middle of February 1744 with the treaty for-ratification. The full terms of the draft treaty are not disclosed, but they evidently showed no abatement of Nādir's religious demands. Aspinwall said that the Porte desired peace, but that it could not with honour comply with the Iranian demands regarding Mecca; the draft treaty was therefore rejected. (S.P.97, Vol. XXXII). Mīrzā Mahdī states (page 247) that this treaty provided for the return to Turkey of the fortresses of Kirkūk, Arbīl, Qurna and others that had been captured.

³ See Sayyid Ahmad Kasrawi's "Tā'rīkh-i-Panj Sad Săla-yi-Khūzistān" (Tehran, 1931/1932), page 119. In 1740 the Ka'ab tribe had migrated into purely Iranian territory, in the neighbourhood of Dūraq and the Jarrāhi river, where they occupied lands which had, up till then, been in the hands of the Khūzistān branch of the Afshār tribe.

On the 16th July two envoys from the Governor of Huwaiza reached Başra and stated that unless the town surrendered a general massacre of the garrison and inhabitants would result.¹ Some of the neighbouring Arab tribes, which had for years past been in intermittent revolt against the Turks, joined the Iranians. The Turkish commander in Başra sent a galley and some trankeys to prevent the Iranians and their Arab allies from crossing to the west side of the Shatțu'l-Arab. The Iranians, nevertheless, succeeded in crossing over, by means of boats which had been built at Huwaiza.²

As soon as Thomas Dorrill, the Resident of the East India Company at Basra, heard of the threatened Iranian attack, he ordered a small brigantine belonging to the Company, that was then anchored off the town, to slip away quietly by night and go to QatIf.³ He feared that, if the vessel remained, the Turks would seize her and employ her against the Iranians, as they had done in the case of the two Company ships at Basra in 1735. When the Mutasallim discovered that the brigantine had gone, he accused Dorrill of being in league with the Iranians. Unluckily, the crew (who were mostly Basra lascars) of the vessel mutined before

¹ Dorrill to London, 20th/31st August, 1743 (Vol.XV of the India Office Records, Persia and the Persian Gulf series). 2 T.N., page 239.

⁷ See the very interesting letter from Dorrill to London, dated the 7th/18th April, 1744, describing the siege and the incident of the brigantine.

she had proceeded far, and forced the master to bring her back. The Mutasallim was as delighted at this turn of events as Dorrill was the reverse, and demanded the handing over of the vessel. On Dorrill refusing, the Mutasallim had him seized and placed for 48 hours in a tent situated on the walls of the town, under a guard of Janissaries. The Mutasallim then spread spries of Dorrill's sympathy with the Iranians, with the result that the lives of Dorrill and his assistant, Danvers Graves, were in great danger from the exasperated soldiery. Dorrill, feeling that death would assuredly be his portion unless he agreed to surrender the vessel, at last gave his consent, but he managed to convey a message to the master urging him to destroy her at all hazards. The master accordingly bored holes in the bottom of the brigantine, and pretended that she had sprung a leak. When the Turks perceived that the vessel was in a sinking condition, they consented to her being run ashore. Dorrill was then released, but his troubles were by no means over. All the Europeans in Basra were made to furnish arms, levy soldiery and provide horses at their own expense:

#all this when money (was) so scarce we could hardly raise enough to buy ourselves bread; thus we were

Dorrill and Graves said, in a letter to Gombroon dated the 7th/18th December 1743) that when the Iranian Sardar and the Beglarbegi heard of the ill-treatment to which they were being subjected, they ordered their soldiers to call out to the Mutasallim "if he was not ashamed to treat strangers in such a manner who came into their country as Merchants and not to fight." (Gombroon Diary, 17th/28th January, 1744).

harassed during the whole siege which lasted from the 28th August to the 27th November¹, and during the last eleven days the place was continually Bombarded night and day from 21 mortars placed at different quarters."²

On the evening of the 27th November/8th December messengers arrived from Nādir and Ahmad Pāshā ordering the fighting to cease, as a treaty had been signed. The gates of Başra were then flung open, and compliments and presents passed between the Turkish commanders and officials on the one hand, and the Sardār (Qoja Khān) and the Governor of Huwaiza on the other. The Governor of Huwaiza sent a "Complaisant Message" to Dorrill "for his suffering so much on their Account", and asked him and Graves to visit the Iranian camp, but Dorrill thought it politic to offer excuses and to send a present instead.³ On the 5th/16th December the Iranian army marched away to Huwaiza, while the commanding officers went to Najaf, to report to Nādir.⁴

On concluding the treaty with Ahmad Pāshā, Nādir proceeded to Shahrabān where he remained for some weeks;

¹ These dates are Old Style.

² Dorrill and Graves, in their letter to Gomproon, referred to above, said that the Iranians, at thebeginning of the siege, had but little artillery. They applied to Nādir for some cannon of heavier calibre, "upon which he sent them great Guns, Powder, Ball and 21 Mortars with 6000 Shells, which arrived in their Camp the 16th ulto. (i.e. the 16th/27th November)". See the Gombroon Diary, 17th/ 28th January, 1744.

³ Dorrill's letter to London on the 7th/18th April. ⁴ Gombroon Diary, 17th/28th January, 1744.

whether he intended to remain there until he knew whether or not the Porte had ratified the treaty is not, apparently, known. In January 1744 alarming news of revolts and disturbances in various parts of Iran caused Nādir to decide to return to that country, and on the 30th January he and his army left Shahrabān for Māhidasht and Kurdistān.¹

1 T.N., page 249. Von Hammer (Vol.XV, page 71), on the authority of two French accounts which Penkler, the Austrian Resident at Constantinople, sent to his court, states that two Turkish armies, each 100,000 strong, the one commanded by the Sar'askar of Baghdād (Ahmad Pāshā) and the other by the Sar'askar of Mosul (Husain Pāshā) attacked the Iranians near Sinna, and inflicted a heavy defeat on them; these accounts put the Iranian losses at between 40,000 and 50,000. I have had no opportunity of seeing these French accounts, but it would seem that they are grossly exaggerated. Ahmad Pāshā would surely not have attacked Nādir at that time, and Husain Pāshā and his army would hardly have ventured to do so alone. There is no mention of this alleged battle in the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī, and Muhammad Sharīf, the author of the Zubdatu't Tawārīkh-i-Sinandiji, likewise ignores it.

CHAPTER XXV.

Revolts in Iran 1743-1744.

The constant need of men, money and supplies for the prosecution of the Turkish war led to much suffering and discontent throughout Iran in 1743. In the north-west provinces the <u>muhassils</u> had been particularly active, with theresult that an individual of obscure origin, who called himself Sam Mirza and gave himself out to be a son of Shah Sultan Husain, and therefore laid claim to the throne, had no difficulty in collecting a number of supporters from among the malcontents of Darband and Tabarsaran.1 Sam was soon joined by Muhammad, the son of Surkhai, who had been hiding in Avaria since Nādir's Dāghistān campaign. The rebels were able to gain many adherents in the province of Shirvan.

Haidar Beg Afshār, the Governor of Shīrvan, set out to crush the rebels, but was completely defeated between Shamākhī and Shabran. Sām and Muḥammad captured Haidar Beg and put him to death, and then seized Aq Sū, his place of

Some years before, this individual, whom MIrzā Mahdi describes as being of "unknown lineage", had appeared in Adharbaijān. Nādir's nephew, Ibrāhim Khān (formerly known as Muhammad Alī Beg), had captured Sām, cut his nose off and then freed him. (See T.N., page 247, Papouna Orbelian, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 77, and Hanway Vol.IV, page 241). (Hanway, however, mistakes the younger Ibrāhim Khān for his father). No son of Shāh Sultān Husain bearing the name of Sām MIrzā is mentioned by Muhammad Muhsin, in his Zubdatu't-Tawārikh. residence.¹ As was natural, this success led to an extension of the revolt. Some Mughanli soldiers,² who formed part of the garrison of the fortress of Qubba, murdered their fellow troops (who were Afshārs), and delivered the fortress to Sām and Muhammad.³ In Darband itself there was great danger of a rising.

Simultaneously, but quite independently of Sām and Muḥammad, Giv Amilakhor, the <u>Eristav</u> of Ksan, had rebelled against Nādir's authority, and was joined by bands of Cherkass and Ossetine tribesmen from the northern Caucasus.⁴ For a time Tiflis was threatened.

Nādir, on hearing of the serious outbreak in Shīrvān and Dāghistān, sent emphatic orders for it to be stamped out. Muḥammad ʿAlī Khān, the Governor of Darband, seized and put to death many rebels in that neighbourhood. He then defeated the Mughānlis, many of whom he had blinded and then sent them to their homes.⁵ ʿAshūr Khān Bābālū, the

- ³ T.N., page 247.
- ⁴ Papouna Orbelian, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 78. This writer gives a detailed description of the troubled state of Georgia at this time. He relates (page 72) how Nadir, when he heard that Giv Amilakhor had given hostages for his good behaviour, made a superb gesture. The Shah ordered the hostages to be sent back, exclaiming in anger: "In the whole extent of my domains from whom have I taken hostages, to ensure hisployalty? If he (Giv) submits, let him come to me and so carry out my orders; if he will not, let him be exterminated....."
- 5 T.N., page 248.

¹ T.N., page 247.

² The Mughānlis were a tribe inhabiting the Qāniq district, in close proximity to the Lazgis of Jār/and Tala.

commander-in-chief of Adharbaijān, marched from Erivan to the scene of revolt, and was joined by Fath All Khān Afshār, the Charkhchi-Bāshī and many other commanders. Nādir despatched his son, Naṣru'llah Mīrzā, with 15,000 men; on reaching Tabriz, Naṣru'llah took command of the royal forces. The Prince's troops encountered the rebels near the Bāgh-i-Shāh, close to Shamākhī, and routed them, taking more than a thousand prisoners. Muḥammad was wounded, but escaped, while Sām fled to Georgia.

Even more serious was the revolt of TaqI Khān Shīrāzī. Taqī Khān's rebellion was due to several causes. He is said to have become puffed up with conceit after his capture of Muscat;¹ he knew that Nādir was displeased with him and suspected him, and when he received the order for his recall, he decided openly to revolt. He believed that, with the influence which he imagined that he possessed in Fārs, together with the control of the land forces there and on the Gulf coast and the support of the fleet, he could successfully resist Nādir.

It has already been stated how TaqI Khān, on reaching Gombroon from Muscat early in December 1743, after trying in vain to persuade Kalb AlI Khān to join him in his revolts, had the unfortunate Sardār put to death.² TaqI

Niebuhr's "Beschreibung von Arabien", page 301.
See page 323 above.

351.

Khan likewise tried to win over the commander of the Iranian fleet (which had just been augmented by the arrival of eight new vessels from Surat), but the commander refused to join him, and sailed away from Gombroon.¹

On the 16th January Taqī Khān, having openly revolted, set out from his camp near Gombroon for Shīrāz, at the head of 2,500 men.²

When Nādir received word of this rebellion, he recalled Husain Khān Qiriqlū from Omān. Husain Khān collected such troops as he could in the GarmsIrāt and marched after Taqī Khān. At Fasā Husain Khān came up with Taqī Khān, but, his heart failing him, he retired to Kāzarūn; thereupon Taqī Khān entered Shīrāz, and prepared the city for defence.³ Meanwhile, troops whom Nādir had sent southwards reinforced Husain Khān, and others soon joined him from Khūzistān, Kirmān and Khurāsán.⁴ Some jazāyarchis, artillery and zanburaks were also sent, so that Husain Khān in time had a very formidable army.⁵

1 Gombroon Diary, 20th/31st December, 1743.

" " 30th December/10th January, 1744.

- ³ Autobiography of MIrzā Muḥammad Shīrāzī, page 18. News of Taqī Khān's initial success reached Gombroon in April.
- ⁴ Mirzā Muhammad Shīràzī, page 18 (Fasā'i, in the "Fārsnāma", page 194, quotes from this authority). Henry Savage, who was the East India Company's representative at Kirmān, wrote from there to Gombroon on the 25th March that 3000 men from "Corasoon" (Khurāsān) had passed through the town on their way to join the forces operating against the rebels. Savage stated that the country was thrown into great confusion by the revolt, and that the roads were so infested with robbers that his messengers feared to venture out. (See the entry in the Gombroon Diary on the 4th/15th April 1744).

5 Mirza Muhammad Shirazi states (page 18) that Husain Khan had between 40,000 and 50,000 men. It is related that Nādir, despite his anger at the murder of his brother-in-law, sent Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAll, the Sadru'l-Mamālik, to conciliate Taqī Khān, whom he had sworn not to harm.¹ The efforts of the Sadr to conciliate Taqi Khan were, however, of no avail. Husain Khan then besieged Shiraz closely. At length, with his immense superiority of force, Husain Khan captured the city, after besieging it for four and a half months; two days later, Taqi Khan fell into his hands.²

Nadir issued orders for all Taqi Khan's titles to be taken away from him. Taqi Khan was then sent under close guard to Nadir. But for his vow, Nadir would doubtless have put Taqi Khan to death at once; as it was, his treatment of the rebel was infinitely more cruel. Three of the Khan's sons and one of his brothers were put to death, and the members of their families were sold as'slaves.³ Taqi Khan then had one of his eyes put out and was made a eunuch; on his reaching the Shah's camp, Nadir had Taqi's favourite wife given over to the soldiery in his presence; he had doubtless been left the use of one eye so that he might

1 Mirza Muhammad Shirazi, page 19.

- 2 " " " " " This writer (who was an eye-witness of these events) states that Shirāz suffered terribly as a result of this siege. All the lovely gardens around were destroyed; when the royal troops entered the city, they pillaged every house and put to death many persons. Two towers containing human heads were erected. After the siege, plague broke out and carried off no less than 14,000 people.
- ³ Mīrzā Muhammad Shīrāzī, page 20.

witness this culminating point of his humiliation and disgrace.¹

Nādir subsequently repented of his cruel treatment, and restored Taql Khān to favour; a year later he made Taql Khān Governor of the province of Kābul.²

As Husain Khān's troops had not been paid for several months, money had to be raised to pay them. Messengers reached Gombroon from Shīrāz with orders to collect 4,000 tomans within three days. These messengers "immediately went to drubbing the Banians and Merchants that refused the Tax laid upon them", and many persons, to escape this persecution, left the town.³ At Işfahān there were similar exactions, and the 'linguist' and broker of the East India Company were imprison+ ed; the broker was compelled to give a bond for 2,000 tomans.

The <u>muhassils</u> then demanded 3,000 tomans from Peirson, the Resident of the East India Company at Isfahān,⁴ and threatened him with imprisonment if he refused to pay; in the end, he managed to avoid seizure by paying 460 tomans. The Armenians were forced to pay 1,000 tomans, and pressure was also put on the Dutch.⁵ Peirson, later in the year, wrote that it was difficult to collect money due to the

- ¹ Hanway, Vol.IV, page 243.
- ² Fārsnāma, page 195. Bazin (Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 297).
- Gombroon Diary, 1st/12th July 1744.
- ⁴ Owing to troubles with the Government, the European staff had been withdrawn from Isfahān in April 1735 and no Europeans were stationed there àgain until the 17th June 1743.
- 5 Gombroon Diary, 6th/17th July, 1744 (quoting from a letter from Isfahan dated the 11th/18th June).

Company, because of the Shah's exactions; the Company's merchants, he said, had to pay up 4,500 tomans.¹

Practically at the same time as Taqī Khān rebelled, Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān, one of the sons of the late Fatḥ Ali Khān Qājār, headed a revolt in the province of Astarābād. As Hanway, who was at Astarābād at the time and fell into the hands of the rebels, has given a full account of this uprising,² it is unnecessary to go into any detail here. Suffice it to say that the revolt was soon suppressed and that many persons were executed. As at Shīrāz, two towers of human heads were erected. Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān succeeded in escaping to the Turcomāns, with whom he stayed until after Nādir's death.³

News of yet further disturbances reached Nādir early in 1744, this time in the far north-east, where some of the people of Khwārazm, having joined with the Yomūt Turcomāns, killed Ertāq Aināq, the Governor whom Naṣru'llah had installed as ruler of Khwārazm in 1742. Nādir instructed his nephew, 'Alī Qulī Khān, to proceed to Khurāsān, in order to prepare for a punitive expedition. According to Mīrzā Mahdī, Nādir intended to go to Khwārazm himself in the following year (1745).⁴

 Gombroon Diary, 5th/16th October (quoting from an Isfahan letter of the 24th August).
 See Volume I, Chapters XXX and XXXI, and Vol.IV, page 245.
 For particulars of Muhammad Hasan Khān's wanderings in the desert and Nādir's efforts to effect his capture, see pages 9 and 10 of the Tā'rīkh-i-Qājāriyya, by Mirza Taqī Sipihrî (Lisānu'l-Mulk).
 T.N., page 250. Although the country was seething with discontent, Nādir was still strong enough to stamp out rebellion; he was able, moreover, to galvanise the exhausted nation once more into action against Turkey.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Conclusion of the Turkish War.

Having marched from Shahraban to Mahidasht, Nadir went on to Kirmanshah and Qalamrau; he celebrated the Nau Ruz festival at the last-mentioned place.1 The armistice with Turkey still continued, but Nadir, not having abated his demands, could hardly have expected a favourable reply Muhammad Agha, Ahmad Pāshā's Kahya, after from the Porte. being kept waiting for some time in Constantinople, was back towards the end of February with a message that the proposed treaty was rejected and that Nadir's sincerity was doubted.² Once more, Ahmad Pasha's loyalty was questioned; 3 nevertheless, in March 1744 he was appointed Sar^caskar of the southern forces. The Pasha of Qars, who had orders from the Porte to support SafI Mirza, sent numbers of letters in favour of the pretender across the frontier, in the hope of gaining adherents for him.⁴ On Nadir reaching Abhar (whither he had proceeded from Qalamrau) he received word of this action,

- ² Stanhope Aspinwall to Whitehall, 10th/21st February, 1744, S.P.97, Vol.XXXII.
- ³ ibidem. Rāghib, the Rais-Efendi, was made Governor of Egypt in April 1744; Von Hammer (Vol.XV, page 76) says that the reason why he was sent away to Egypt was that he was a friend of Ahmad Pāshā, who was suspected of having an understanding with Nādir.
- 4 T.N., page 250.

Hanway reached Nadir's camp at this place on the 31st March, 1744, his object being to obtain redress for his losses in the Astarabad rebellion. His account of his visit to the camp is most interesting; it is given in Vol.I, pages 240-259.

and ordered the Governor of Erivan to ascertain from the Pāshā the reason why he was conducting such propaganda whilst the peace negotiations were in progress. The Pāshā replied that he had had no news of such negotiations and that his orders were to support Ṣafī Mīrzā. Nādir, in anger, sent word to the Pāshā that he would soon set out to meet him and Safī Mīrzā.¹

Soon after, Nādir duly began his march north-westwards; whilst en route, the welcome news was brought that Taimuraz and Irakli had captured Sām Mīrzā in the district of Ksan. Nādir sent orders for one of Sam Mirza's eyes to be put out and for him then to be sent, with some Turkish prisoners, to Qārs, "so that he and Ṣafī Mīrzā could look upon one another."²

When at Gori, Nādir heard the further agreeable news that Taimuraz and Irakli had inflicted a serious defeat upon the Turks. Nādir was very pleased at this news, and rewarded the Georgian princes by giving Kartli to Taimuraz and Kakheti to Irakli.³

¹ T.N., page 250.

² ibidem, page 251; Papouna Orbelian, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 80 and 81. Vakhusht, in his Histoire du Karthli, (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 197), states that when Sām was endeavouring to join the Turks, his guide betrayed him and took him and 60 followers to Taimuraz; Taimuraz arrested Sām and sent him to Nādir in Irakli's custody.

³ T.N., page 251; Vakhusht, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 198, Papouna Orbelian, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 84 and 85.

From Gori, Nādir marched to Qārs, just to the south of which he camped at the end of May. The Turkish garrison, which consisted of picked troops, strove to dislodge him, but he repulsed them after five hours of severe fighting.¹ Nādir then moved nearer to the fortress round which he began to construct fortifications;² he endeavoured to divert the stream from which Qārs drew its water supply, but the garrison frustrated this design. Almost continual skirmishing went on for a long time until, on the 24th August, an indecisive battle was fought.³

Nadir had for some time been making proposals of peace to the Sar'askar; after the above-mentioned engagement the Pasha, although not authorised by the Porte, entered into negotiations. Ahmad Efendi Kesrieli, one of the Turkish envoys, persuaded the Shah to treat direct with the Sultan, and set out with the Turkish envoys for Constantinople.⁴ Nadir, however, continued the siege with vigour; although he is said to have suffered a severe reverse on the 19th

Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 82. It is impossible to reconcile completely the version given in the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī (page 252).

² Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 86. Papouna Orbelian states that Nādir had 4,000 workmen brought from Tiflis, who were engaged on this work for a month. (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 89).

³ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 83 (on the authority of Izzi); this battle is not mentioned by MIrzā MahdI.

⁴ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 83 and 84. This authority states that the murmurings of the garrison and the tricks of Kisrieli induced the Pāshā to negotiate.

September, I he went on with his operations until the cold forced him to raise the siege on the 9th October.²

Whilst the siege of Qārs was in progress, an Ambassador from Muhammad Shāh reached Constantinople, bringing a letter for the Sultān. The Emperor and his ministers wished to form an alliance with Turkey against Nādir Shāh, but the Porte, in reply, merely gave vague assurances of friendship.³

Nādir retired from Qārs to the Arpa Chai and thence went to Akhalkalaki,⁴ where he camped for a time, whilst winter quarters for the army were being prepared at Barda'a; on the 6th December he reached Barda'a.⁵ Instead of remaining there for the winter, Nādir left for Dāghistān three weeks later⁶ in order to punish the Lazgis. Having crossed the Kura at Javād, he divided his forces into four divisions, and marched rapidly northward despite the severity of the weather. The Lazgis were taken by surprise, and submitted, after the

- Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 86. The Turks, according to this authority, forestalled an attack by Nādir, and captured 9 of his <u>zanburaks</u> and much baggage. See also Stanhope Aspinwall's despatch of the 13th/24th October, (S.P.97, Vol.XXXII).
- ² T.N., page 252; Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 86.

³ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 87. Von Hammer considers that this mission may have been the result of Bonneval's intrigues, as he had, some three years before, suggested to the French Ambassador the advisability of an alliance between India and Turkey against Iran.

- 4 T.N., page 252; Papouna Orbelian states (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 91) that Nādir sent raiding parties from here to the Turkish district of Akhaltzikhe.
- ⁵ T.N., page 252.
- 6 ibidem.

Iranians had captured large numbers of their cattle and sheep. On the day of the Adha festival (10th Dhu'l-Hijja 1157 = 14th January, 1745), Nādir went to Darband, whence he returned to Barda'a.¹

Nādir only remained for three weeks at Barda'a; hearing that water and fodder were more abundant north of the Kura, he marched via Aresh to Shakki. Nādir stayed at Shakki from March until June, after which he proceeded via Miyānkūh to Gökcha, in the <u>yailāq</u> of Erivan.² Whilst on the way there, Nādir was taken seriously ill,³ and had to be conveyed for several stages in a litter. Nādir, however, was skilfully tended by his physicians and soon recovered.

On the 5th Rajab 1158 (3rd August 1745) Nādir set out from Gökcha in the direction of Qārṣ. It so happened that Yegen Muḥammad Pāshā, with 100,000 men⁴ had already left Qārṣ and was marching towards Erivan. Nādir placed his army in position at Murãd Täppä, near Baghavard, on the spot where

- ² ibidem, " 253.
- ⁵ ibidem. Peirson wrote from Isfahān to Gombroon on the 5th/16th October 1745 that Nādir was then being tended by a Jesuit. This may have been Père Damien, of Lyons, who, according to Père Desvignes (Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 401) had previously treated Nādir for some form of liver disease.
- ⁴ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 96. Stanhope Aspinwall reported, on the 19th/30th June 1745, that Yegen Muhammad had advanced in defiance of his instructions, because he feared that there would be a famine and possibly a mutiny as well, if he remained inactive. Mīrzā Mahdī gives the strength of the Turkish army as 140,000 men, of whom 100,000 were cavalry and the remainder Janissaries.

¹ T.N., page 252.

he had so decisively defeated Abdullah Köprülü's army ten years before.1

The Turkish army continued its advance until, on the lOth Rajab (8th August), it halted a couple of <u>farsakhs</u> away from the Iranian camp.² On the following day, the Turks launched a strong attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss. For four days the battle continued; the Turks suffered so severely in this fighting that Yegen Muhammad Pāshā was obliged to retire.

A few days after this battle, couriers arrived from Nașru'llah Mīrzā, who had been operating against the Turks in Kurdistān and the north of Mesopotamia; the Prince reported that he had defeated the Turks near Mosul.³ Nādir sent a messenger to Yegen Muḥammad with a copy of this letter, but just as the man was nearing the Turkish camp, a great tumult arose in it. Many of the Turkish soldiers had mutinied, and in the disturbance that ensued the unfortunate Yegen Pāshā was killed.⁴ The Turks were by now very demoralised, and fled in confusion, leaving all their artillery and

See pages 151-153 above. Von Hammer makes two errors here; he states, first, that the battle took place 12 years before, and secondly, that the defeated general was Topāl Osmān; he evidently confused the first battle of Baghavard with that fought at Aq Darband in 1733.

² T.N., page 254.

³ T.N., page 255.

^{4 &}quot; " " Von Hammer (Vol.XV, pages 96 and 97) says that Yegen Muhammad died either at the hands of a rebel or of chagrin at his defeat.

baggage in Nādir's hands; it is said that they lost over 20,000 men in all.¹

Nadir showed surprising moderation after this great victory. It is probable that he realised that, victorious though he was, his country was too exhausted to enable him to carry the war into Turkey with any hope of success. The success which he had just obtained would, on the other hand, enable him to secure an honourable peace.

Nādir gave orders for those of the Turkish prisoners who were wounded and helpless to be set free and to be conveyed to Qārs.² At the same time, he despatched messengers to the Turkish Sar'askar, Hājji Aḥmad Pāshā, with peace proposals in which, for the first time, there was no insistence on the recognition of the Ja'fari sect or on the setting up of the fifth column in the Ka'ba. Nādir still

- ¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 97; Mīrzā Mahdī (T.N., page 255) claims that the Íranians, who pursued the fugitives as far as the Arpa Chai, killed from 10,000 to 12,000 Turks, and that they captured over 5,000 men, including several Pāshās and other officers of lower rank. In an account (doubtless from Turkish sources) which Stanhope Aspinwall forwarded to Whitehall on the 30th August/10th September. it was said that Yegen Muhammad had 130,000 men in all. On advancing from Qars towards the frontier, he defeated some small bodies of Iranians. Flushed with these success es, the Pāshā marched on towards Erivan, near which town Nādir was encamped with 40,000 men; in an adjacent valley were another 40,000 Iranians. Some detachments of Iranians, as at Karnal, lured on their opponents by feigning flight, and so brought Yegen Muhammad's army into collision with the Shah's main forces. Immediately afterwards the other Iranian army attacked the Turkish flank. The Turks, according to this account, lost 28,000 men, including 3 Pāshās. (S.P.97, Vol.XXXII).
- ² T.N., page 256.

claimed, however, the cession of Van, Turkish Kurdistān, Baghdād, Najaf, Karbalā and Basra.¹

The Porte found these proposals unacceptable, and began actively to prepare for a fresh campaign. All Pāshā Hakīm Oghlu was appointed Sar askar of Qārs in place of Hājjī Ahmad Pāshā, and efforts were made to secure the active cooperation of Surkhai and the Usmi Ahmad Khān, in Dāghistān.²

In the midst of all these preparations, an Iranian Ambassador named Fath AlI Khān arrived unexpectedly³ at Constantinople, attended by only a few persons; he had travelled via Baghdād (where he had been detained for some time). The Sultān issued an order (<u>khatt-i-sharlf</u>) for the proposals brought by the Ambassador to be discussed in a full Council; this was accordingly done on the 1st February 1746.⁴ It was found that, although Nādir was no longer adamantine on the religious issues, his territorial demands were still exorbitant.⁵ The Council nevertheless declared that from the moment when Nādir abandoned his religious claims, peace between the two Empires was re-established, at

1 Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 98. 2 m m page 99. 3 Stanhope Aspinwall's despatch of the 9th/20th January 1746. (S.P.97, Vol.XXXII). 4 Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 101 and 102. 5 ibidem, page 102.

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any rate as regards its essential conditions. They stated, however, that no Turkish territory could be ceded. It was at length agreed that NazIf Efendi, who had previously been on a mission to Iran (with Munif Efendi), should be sent to Iran to discuss the terms of peace.

Meanwhile, Nādir had left Adharbaijān and proceeded, by easy stages, via Hamadan and Farahan, to Isfahan which he reached on the 4th Dhu'l-Hijja (28th December 1745). En route Nadir had received envoys from the ruler of Khotan² (in Chinese Turkistān).

The Shah's sojourn in Isfahan was a period of trials and tribulations for the inhabitants, especially for those that were wealthy. It was said that Nadir had lists prepared of all the people of any wealth at Isfahan and elsewhere.⁹ Nadir demanded 10,000 tomans from the Governor of the city, and had him bastinadoed. "The King" it is related "Ordered him to Cry out, when under Punishment, that such and such Armenians were indebted to him, who were immediately sent for and Mossels (muhassils) set on them to take the money without any examining into the Matter." There was no redress

¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 102. NazIf Efendi bore a letter from the Sultan to the Shah and another from the Mufti (the celebrated Pirizāda) to the Iranian Mulla-Bāshī. The Porte insisted upon renunciation of the claims respecting the Jafari sect and the fifth pillar in the Kaba, but offered to restore the frontiers as fixed by the Treaty of 1639.

² T.N., page 256. Professor Minorsky, in his "Esquisse", page 33, suggests that this should, perhaps, read "Khoqand 3 Gombroon Diary, 28th January/8th February, 1746. 4

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whatever. A little later, the Shah decreed that goats should be taxed, with the result that many of these animals were destroyed by their owners, to avoid payment of the tax.¹

As was natural, trade suffered severely by reason of the merciless exactions on the merchants.

On the 2nd February 1746 Nādir left Işfahān and went to Mashhad via Ardkān and Tabas; Mashhad was reached on the 17th March, and the Nau Rūz was celebrated there. After a short stay at Kalāt, Nādir returned to Mashhad, and later marched westwards and camped at Kurdān, in the Sāūj Bulāgh district, 37 miles W.N.W. of Tehran.

Nazīf Efendi, the Turkish Ambassador, arrived at the royal camp at Kurdān, and was received by Nādir with impressive ceremonial and pomp.² Discussions afterwards ensued between the Turkish Ambassador and Nādir's ministers, and agreement was reached after five conferences had been held. On the 17th Sha^c bān 1159 (4th September 1746) the Treaty was signed at Kurdān, and so brought to a close the long period of strife between Iran and Turkey.

MIrzā MahdI, before quoting the Treaty in full,³ gives the text of the letter accompanying it which Nādir

² Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 117 and 118. Nādir was seated on the Peacock Throne when he received Nazīf Efendi; Von Hammer gives a description (page 117) of the jewels which the Shāh wore on this occasion.

¹ Gombroon Diary, 8th/19th March (on the authority of a letter from Peirson, the Isfahān Resident, dated the 31st January/ 11th February).

³ T.N., pages 260 and 261. A French translation (from the Turkish text) is given by Gabriel Efendi Noradoungian in his "Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman" (Paris, 1897), Vol.I, pages 306/308. 366.

addressed to the Sultān.¹ This letter, which begins with a doxology and praise of Muḥammad and the Orthodox Caliphs, refers to the heresies of Shāh Isma'Il, the evils which they brought upon Iran and the troubles which they stirred up between Iranians and Turks. Nādir, after repeating that he had accepted the crown of Iran on condition that the Iranians abjured the Shi'a faith, expresslygives up his claim for recognition of the Ja'fari sect, and concludes by renouncing all claim to one of two portions of territory in Iranian'Irāq and Adharbaijān which, in the time of Shāh Isma'Il had been transferred to Turkey.²

The Treaty itself consisted of a preamble, three articles and a supplement.

It was declared, in the preamble, that the peace made in the time of Sultan Murad IV was to be observed and that the frontier between the two States should be as laid down in that instrument. It was further agreed that the two States should abstain "from those matters which excite any resentment (<u>kadūrat</u>) and are detrimental to the conclusion of peace."³

The first article provided that the Turkish authorities would allow Iranian pilgrims to go via Baghdad or Syria to Mecca and that they would be protected en route.

It was laid down in the second article that each State should send an Ambassador to the Court of the other every three years.

1 T.N., pages 259 and 260.

3 T.N., page 260.

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² It is not specified in the letter to which of these two areas this renunciation applied.

In the third article it was agreed that the prisoners of both the parties should be set free and allowed to return to their homes, and that the buying or selling of them (as slaves) should be unlawful.

The Supplement stated that the Governors of the frontier places were to abstain from acts detrimental to friendship, that the Iranian peoples, having abandoned "those unseemly opinions which were created in the times of the Safavis, and having in their fundamental beliefs followed the path of the people of the Sunnat", should treat the Orthodox Caliphs with Thenceforward these peoples should go, via Turkey. respect. to and from Mecca, Madina and the countries of Islām in the manner of the Turkish pilgrims and of the peoples of the other Islamic countries; they were likewise to visit the Holy Cities in Mesopotamia. So long as they carried no merchandise, the Governors and officials of Baghdad should levy no tax. Similar privileges were to be accorded to Turkish subjects in Iran. The Supplement concluded with an undertaking that the treaty should always remain in force between the two States.¹

The Porte, on Nazīf's return to Constantinople with the Treaty, decided to send an embassy of unexampled magnificence to Nādir's court. Ahmad Efendi Kisrieli was appointed as Ambassador; his suite consisted of 1,000 persons and he took with him gifts which surpassed in sumptuousness and value

¹ T.N., page 261.

those which the Porte had hitherto sent to any Asiatic or European sovereign.¹ However, this mission never accomplished its task, because Nādir was assassinated while it was still on its way to him.

Nādir, for his part, sent as Ambassadors to the Porte Mustafā Khān Shāmlū and Mīrzā Mahdī; they took with them a golden throne set with jewels (doubtless one of the spoils of Delhi), pearls from Omān,² two dancing elephants (<u>fīl-i-raqqāsī</u>), a letter in friendly terms, and the text of the treaty.³

¹ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 119 and 120. The value of these presents is given as 700 purses.
² Bahrain is presumably meant.
³ T.N., page 259.

CHAPTER XXVII

Nadir: The Concluding Phase.

After the successful conclusion of the peace negotiations at Kurdān, Nādir proceeded to Isfahān, where he arrived early in December 1746. Nādir remained at Isfahān until the 23rd January 1747; during his stay there he practised the most terrible cruelties, and there can be no doubt that his mind was completely unhinged at times.

Père Bazin, who at that time was made Nādir's principal physician, describes Isfahān as resembling a city which, having been taken by assault, had been given up to the fury of a conquering army.¹ Whenever Bazin emerged from the palace, he would see the corpses of 25 to 30 men who had been strangled at Nādir's orders or murdered by the soldiery.² Bazin relates that, one day, an inventory of the palace furniture, etc., was made, and a small carpet was found to be missing; the keeper of the royal jewels was accused of having stolen this carpet and was promptly bastinadoed. Whilst being beaten, the man cried out that his predecessor had sold the carpet to eight merchants, four of whom were Jews and the others Armenians and Indians.³

¹Bazin, page 299.

²ibidem, page 300.

³Accusations were frequently made in this way, sometimes by previous arrangement with the man who was being beaten; those accused were immediately punished without examination or trial.

These unfortunate men were seized forthwith and each one, without even the semblance of a trial, suffered the loss of an eye; they were then cast in chains into a fire. Bazin states that all those who witnessed this execution, including those who carried it out, were aghast.¹

On the 10th Muḥarram 1160 (23rd January 1747) Nādir left Iṣfahān for Yazd and Kirmān. Wherever Nādir halted, he had people tortured and put to death, and caused towers of their heads (<u>kalla-yi-minārī</u>) to be erected.² At Kirmān, Nādir imposed terrible punishments upon the populace, in retribution for a revolt which had broken out there in June 1746.³ The toll of victims was consequently heavy; and Captain Possiet, a member of Prince Golitzin's mission to Nādir,⁴ who had gone on in advance and was at Kirmān at this time, saw two high towers of heads there.⁵

Bazin, page 300. Lutf Alf Beg, Atash-Kada. Mirza Mahdi states, probably in reference to this incident, that Nādir carried injustice to such a pitch during his stay in Isfahan that he caused several Indians, Armenians and Muslims to be burnt in the Maidan (T.N. page 264).

²T.N., page 265.

³The Governor, Muhammad AmIn Beg, had headed this revolt, which was due to the usual cause, namely, exfessive taxation. The loyal members of the garrison, after expelling the local Afshārs (who were disaffected and who proceeded to join the rebels), took refuge in the citadel. Savage and Graves, the representatives of the East India Co. at Kirmán, hid their cash and books and sought shelter in a fort at some distance from the town until reinforcements arrived and restored order. See the Gombroon Diary, 10th/21st July 1746.

⁴For particulars of this mission, see Lerch (Büsching's "Magazin", Vol.X, page 367 et seqq.), Dr. J. Cook's "Voyages and Travels through the Russian Empire, Tartary and part of the Kingdom of Persia" (Vol.II, pages 242-260), and Hanway, Vol.I, Chapters LIV to LVIII. Golitzin and the other members of the mission arrived at Resht in April 1747, and were on their way to Nadir's camp when they received news of the Shah's assassination; 5 Lerch, op.cit., page 421, Cook, Vol.II, page 499. 771

As will be seen in Appendix III, the East India Company suffered severely from an act of extortion by Nādir, when the Shāh was at Kirmān early in 1747.

At the Shāh's orders, enormous contributions were levied upon the inhabitants of Isfahān and, indeed, throughout the empire, "whereby (in the words of Peirson and Blandy), and through the scarcity of Money, No bounds is had to Usury and many Places have revolted hereupon, for nobody is exempt and the King has likewise imposed large sums upon his Sons and Nephews which with his intolerable cruelties in killing to the amount of forty to fifty People every Day and other outrages gives every Reason to fear he is out of his senses".¹

In Georgia, King Taimuraz was ordered to pay a very large sum. The King and his son Irakli were quite unable to pay this amount, and prepared for armed resistance; Taimuraz later decided to go in person to Nādir in order to plead for a reduction. He left Tiflis with this object in view in May 1747, and was on his way to the Shāh when he heard of his assassination.²

In Adharbaijān the excessive taxation demands occasioned an open revolt; the pretender, Sām Mīrzā, reappeared and was proclaimed Shāh by the people of Tabrīz.³

Letter from Peirson and his assistant Blandy to London, dated the 16th/27th May 1747, in Vol.XV of the Persia and Persian Gulf records. Papouna Orbelian, in H. de la A., Vol.II, Part II, pages 114-117 and 119-123. ibidem, page 119. See also page 10 of Das Mujmil Et-Târîkh-i Ba'dnâdirîje by Abu'l-Hasan ibn Amīn Gulistāna (Leiden edition, 1891, edited by Oskar Mann).

SIstan had for nearly a year been in rebellion; the outbreak had begun in March 1746, when the Khan of that province headed the malcontents, and carried out a raid on Bam. The SIstani rebels were subsequently strengthened by a number of Baluch tribesmen.¹

The Nau Rūz festival was held outside Kirmān, but it must, under the circumstances, have been an occasion of horror rather than of rejoicing. At the end of March Nādir decided to go to Mashhad and marched across the terrible Dasht-i-Lūţ, where many men perished of hunger and thirst, while others were swallowed up by the treacherous ground.²

At Tabas, the first town reached on the further side of the desert, Nādir was met by his sons, sixteen in number, whom he had summoned to his presence. After looking at them for some time, Nādir offered his crown to each of the three eldest in turn, but they, fearing a trap, refused, pleading their incapacity, extreme youth and lack of experience.³

Gombroon Diary, April and May 1746. (There were several entries in the Diary during this period in regard to the SIstan revolt; these were based on reports received from Graves at Kirman).
²Bazin, pages 307 - 308.
³Bazin, page 308. These three elder sons are not mentioned by name; it is to be presumed that they were Nasrullah, Imam Quli

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name; it is to be presumed that they were Nasrullah, Imam Quli and the eldest of the other sons, and that the blind Rida Quli was not of their number. Mashhad was reached at the end of April. There Nādir renewed the cruelties which he had practised at Isfahān and Kirmān. The consequence was that no one felt secure; all feared, not only for their fortunes, but also for their lives. Urged by the instinct of self-preservation, everybody, not excluding Nādir's own relations, entered into plots and sought to join in the revolts which were in progress or on the point of breaking out in practically every part of Iran!

Nadir had sent his nephew Ali Quli Khan, together with Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, to subdue the formidable rebellion in SIstan? Word being brought to these two leaders that the Shah had ordered them to pay, respectively, 100,000 and 50,000 tomans into the royal treasury, Ali Quli Khan joined the rebel SIstanis? Even Tahmasp Khan, who had throughout been most loyal to Nadir, became alarmed and joined Ali Quli Khan. Nevertheless, when Tahmasp Khan discovered that Ali Quli Khan was aiming at supplanting his uncle, he ceased to rebel and endeavoured to dissuade Ali Quli Khan from aspiring to the throne. Ali Quli Khan refused to listen to Tahmasp Khan, whom he poisoned; he

Bazin, page 309.
T.N., page 265. Bazin (page 309) says that Nādir sent a force
 of 40,000 men to crush this rebellion.
T.N., page 265.

then "raised the standard of absolute authority and spread his claims (to the throne) throughout the kingdom".¹ Many tribes and persons were constrained by fear to join 'All QulI Khān; amongst his adherents were the Kurds of Khabūshān, who signalised their revolt by raiding the royal stud farm at Rādkān.²

Nādir, who had been greatly afflicted by the defection of his nephew,³ was enraged by this Kurdish raid,⁴ and set out from Mashhad, at the head of some 16,000 men, to punish the perpetrators. It was evident that Nādir was aware of the rapidly growing danger, for, before he left, he took the precaution of sending his family to Kalāt for security.

On Nādir's approach, the Kurds retreated into the mountains. Advancing on Khabūshān, the Shāh halted at Fathābād, two <u>farsakhs</u>⁵from that town, on the evening of the 19th June. Bazin, who was in attendance upon Nādir at this time, relates⁶ that the Shāh "seemed to have some presentiment of the evil which was awaiting him at this spot. For some days he had kept in his <u>haram</u> a horse saddled and bridled. He attempted to escape to Kalāt. His guards surprised him, pointed out the evils which his flight would entail, proclaimed that they were his faithful servants, that they would fight for him against

I T.N., page 265. ²ibidem. ³Gulistāna, op. cit., page 12. ⁴T.N., page 265, and Matla^cu"sh-Shams, Vol.I, page 164. ⁵T.N., page 265. ⁶Bazin, page 311.

all his enemies and that not one of them would abandon him. He then allowed himself to be persuaded, and returned. He clearly perceived that for some time a number of plots against his life were being woven. Of all the nobles at his court, Muhammad Quli Khān, his relation, and Sālih Khān were, the most discontented and the most active. The first was in command of the guards² and the second the superintendent of his household. The latter caused him less fear because his post gave him no authority over the troops; but he dreaded the former, (who was) a man of swift action (<u>expédition</u>), esteemed for his bravery, and (who was) on good terms with his officers. It was on him that suspicion fell. He (Nādir) resolved to forestall him.

He had in his camp a corps of 4,000 Afghans; these foreign troops were entirely devoted to him and hostile to the Persians. On the night of the 19th/20th June he summoned all their chiefs. "I am not satisfied with my guards", he said to them, "your loyalty and your courage are known to me. I order you to arrest all their officers to-morrow morning and to place them in irons. Do not spare any of them if they dare to resist you. It is a question of my personal security, and I entrust the preservation of my life to you alone.""

The Afghans, after promising to carry out these orders, retired, and began to get their men in readiness for action.

The secret, however, was divulged to the Iranians. Muhammad Qulī Khān, after being informed by one of his spies, passed on the news to Sālih Khān. An agreement was then entered into between these two, whereby "they undertook not to abandon each other and to put to death that very night the common enemy who had resolved to put them to death on the following day". This covenant or agreement was only shown

Muhammad Qulf Khān was one of the Afshārs of Urumiyya; it was apparently because he was an Afshār that Bazin termed him a relation (<u>parent</u>) of Nādir.

²He was Kesh**ikchi-**Bāshi.

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to those of their fellow-officers whom they trusted the most.

It was finally agreed that Muḥammad Khān Qājār, of Erivan, Mūsa Beg, of the Eyerlū Afshārs, Qoja Beg Gunduzlū,¹ of the Afshārs of Urumiyya, and some seventy others were, with the help of Ṣāliḥ Khān and Muḥammad Qull Khān, to carry out the murder of the Shāh.

It is related that most of the conspirators, on reaching the entrance to the tent where Nādir was sleeping, became powerless to proceed owing to their fear of him, and that only three of them actually entered.² The eunuch or guard at the entrance was seized and strangled and the three resolute men pressed on.

Chūki, the daughter of Muḥammad Husain Khān, in whose tent Nādir was passing the night, was aroused and noticed the dim form³ of one of the assassins. With trembling hand, she awoke the Shah, who sprang up from his bed in surprise. Seeing Şāliḥ Khān advancing, Nādir heaped abuse on him. "Drawing his sword, he (Nādir) rose from his place and ran towards Fate (Ajal). His foot (however) caught in one of the tent ropes and caused him to fall." Before Nādir could recover himself, Sāliḥ Khān

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Gulistāna, op. cit., page 14 (this name is wrongly given as Foja in Oskar Mann's edition). Mīrzā Mahdī says (page 265) that the plot was hatched at the instigation of Alī Qulī Khān, but this statement does not accord with the accounts given by Bazin and Gulistāna. It is far more probable that self-preservation was the main motive, and that this induced the conspirators to further the aims of Alī Qulī Khān by murdering the Shāh. ²Gulistana, page 14.

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page 19. Literally "blackness" (<u>siāhī</u>)

struck at him, cutting off one of his hands. After striking this blow, Sālih Khān became, it is said, powerless to do more and stood as if rooted to the ground from fear of Nādir; it was Muhammad Khān Qājār who followed up the attack, and cut off the Shāh's head.

Having accomplished their principal object, the assassins and their accomplices seized whatever they could of Nādir's possessions, and put to death all whom they knew had stood well with him. They forced their way into the women's quarters and seized the women's valuables, but did not otherwise molest them. The assassins then hastened to the tents of the three ministers who had enjoyed Nādir's particular favour, killing two of them, but sparing the third.¹

These deeds were followed by a scene of terrible confusion and horror in the camp. The 4,000 Afghans whom Nādir had ordered, the evening before, to arrest the officers of his guards, could not be induced at first to believe that the Shāh was really dead.² Hastening to the royal tent in order, as they thought, to protect Nādir, the Afghans found their way barred by 6,000 Qizilbāsh guards who were joined by another body 4,000 strong. Notwithstanding these odds, the Afghans,

²Bazin, page 322, Gulistāna, page 20.

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Bazin, page 323. Bazin omits to mention the names of the two ministers who were killed but says that the third was "Mayar Kan"; by this he may possibly have meant Husain Quli Khan Mu'ayyiru'l-Mamalik.

under the leadership of Ahmad Khān Abdālī, broke through their opponents' ranks and entered the royal tent. When they beheld the headless trunk of the Shāh lying in a pool of blood, they were horror-struck. After giving expression to their grief, the Afghans retired; although attacked and pursued by the Qizilbāsh, they beat off their adversaries and reached Qandahār in safety!

The story of Alī Quli Khān's elevation to the throne and of his brief reign does not fall within the scope of this narrative, but mention must be made of the manner in which he disposed of Ridā Quli Mīrzā, Naṣru'llah Mīrzā, Imām Qulī Mīrzā and their younger brothers.

Feeling that he would not be secure upon his throne so long as Nadir's sons remained alive, Ali Quli Khan despatched a body of Bakhtiaris, under a Georgian named Suhrab Khan, against the fortress of Kalat, to which, as stated above², Nadir had sent the Princes for safety. Although excessively strong, the fortress was captured after a siege of sixteen days, treachery or negligence on the part of the defenders having enabled the besiegers to make an entry³.

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2	Bazin,	page	524;	Gulistāna,	pages	20	and	21;	T•N•	page	203.	
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MIrzā Mahdī (T.N., page 266) says that some of the garrison, after fetching water from outside the fortress, negligently left standing against the cliff or wall the ladder which they had used. The besiegers were able to ascend the wall by means of this ladder. See also Gulistāna, page 23. Bazin, page 328, suggests treachery.

Nasrullah, Imam Quli, Shahrukh and the other princes fled in the direction of Merv, but they were overtaken and forced to return to Kalāt. Nasrullah put up a strenuous resistance, but was overpowered. The unfortunate Ridā Qulī and fifteen of his relatives were put to death at Kalat, while Nasrullah and Imam QulT were slaughtered after being taken to Mashhad.¹ Nādir's grandson, Shāhrukh, alone MIrza MahdT relates that All Qull Khan (or was spared. Adil Shah as he styled himself on his accession) spared the young prince so that, if the people of Iran wished to have one of the sons (sic) of the late ruler (Khaqan) as Shah in place of himself, Shahrukh would be available.² Gulistana seems more likely to be correct in stating that Adil Shah did not put Shahrukh to death because the people might wish to have as their monarch one who belonged to the ancient Safavi line.³ Adil Shah poisoned the remaining brothers of Nasrullah and Imam QulI, and put to death all those of Nadir's widows and women who were with child.4

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T.N., page 266.
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ibidem, "
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Gulistāna, page 24.
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Bazin, page 329.
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Nādir's head and body were eventually brought to Mashhad and interred in the tomb which he had had built there, almost opposite the mosque of Shāh Abbās, a number of years before; the body of Ridā Quli was later placed in the same tomb. Aghā Muḥammad Shāh, on ascending the throne, had the remains of Nādir (and of Karīm Khān as well) exhumed and brought to Tehran, where they were laid under the threshold of his palace, so that "whenever he went abroad he might trample upon the dust of the great persecutor of himself and his family."¹

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Curzon, Vol.I, page 165. (Curzon is wrong in stating, on the same page, that Agha Muhammad, "mindful of the source to which he owed his calamity, rased Nādir's tomb to the ground." In the first place, it was Adil Shah, and not Nādir, who was responsible for Agha Muhammad's misfortune. Secondly, Nādir's tomb was demolished by the <u>Mujtahids</u> of Mashhad in 1802, after the execution of Nādir Mīrźa, who was one of the sons of Shāhrukh and therefore a greatgrandson of Nādir. (Nādir Mirza, together with his brother Naṣrullah, had aroused the animosity of the <u>mujtahids</u> by despoiling the shrine of Imām Ridā, and he had later incurred their mortal enmity by murdering one of the principal priests.) Curzon, in this second instance, has made the same mistake as de Khanikoff (from whose work - page 107 - he presumably obtained his information.)

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Nadir's Character and Attainments.

The object of this final chapter is to give, as briefly as possible, particulars of Nādir's character, appearance and health, together with a survey of his attainments and defects.

I. Personal Characteristics.

Mirzā Mahdī gives but little information respecting Nadir's character, appearance and personal tastes, the explanation probably being that he regarded such details as unnecessary and possibly even out-of-place in his official record. It is, however, obvious from a perusal of the Ta'rIkh-i-Nadiri that Nadir was a man of very strong personality and that (although almost illiterate) he was possessed of very considerable Notwithstanding his humble origin Nadir intellectual power. seemed, in the words of Bazin, "born for the throne." In the vivid account of Nadir's character and appearance which Cockell gave to Fraser, it is stated² that Nadir was tall, robust and very good-looking. In his earlier days, his bodily strength and powers of endurance were very great.

¹ Bazin, page 216.

Fraser, page 227. For Nādir's appearance in later years, see Bazin, pages 315 and 316, and as-Suwaidi, (Schmidt), page 90.

According to Mīrzā Mahdī, Nādir's principal delights in life were, first, a melon of Herat and, secondly, a good horse.¹ In the matter of attire, Nādir's tastes were simple, except, of course, on state occasions; he had, however, a love of jewels² which he was able fully to satisfy after despoiling India. As to his attitude towards women, Hanway is probably right in rejecting the exaggerated stories that were told about him; in his later days, Nādir had, according to the same authority, thirty-three women in his <u>haram</u>, exclusive of their attendants.³

Nādir showed, at times, that he had a sense of humour. Abdu'l-Karīm Kashmīri relates that Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir, who was short, stout and very swarthy, was once charged and nearly killed by a wild boar. When Nādir heard of this incident, he was greatly amused, and remarked: "Little Brother was playful with Big Brother, nay rather, he was rude to him!"⁴ When Nādir was at Delhi, he ordered 150 women to be added to the 850 who were already in Qamaru'd-Dīn Khān's <u>haram</u>, in order that that Minister might qualify for the military rank of <u>Mīm-Bāshi</u> or chiliarch.⁵

1

T.N., page 215. See also page 264 above.

² See, for example, as-Suwaidi's description of the jewellery and ornaments which Nādir was wearing when the Shāh received him at Najaf. (Schmidt, <u>op.cit</u>., page 89). See also, Hanway, Vol.IV, page 268.

³ Hanway, Vol.IV, pages 268 and 269. See also Malcolm, page 85 (footnote).

⁴ Bayan, foll.39(b) and 40(a).

⁵ Malcolm, Vol.II, pages 85 and 86.

II. Nadir's Health

During his youth and middle age Nādir enjoyed excellent health, but from his fiftieth year and onwards he had recurrent physical troubles which had, as will be seen below, a most unfortunate effect upon his character. ^CAbdu'l-Karīm relates that Nādir had, before his invasion of India, contracted an intestinal complaint and, apparently, dropsy, which were accompanied by severe melancholia¹. It is possible that the disease may have been occasioned or, at any rate, aggravated by the fact that Nādir had lost all his molar teeth? further, the hardships which he had undergone during his many campaigns must have had some deleterious effect upon his constitution, robust though it was at the outset of his active career.

As Nadir could get no relief from the incompetent Iranian physicians, he engaged, when at Delhi, the capable

1 Bayan, fol. 66 (b). The text, which is somewhat corrupt, reads: جون نادر شای قبل از تصرف هندوستان بمرض مراق و استفسار (<u>بن</u>ع) و طغیان سودا makes nonsense, and it seems possible that this may be a mistake for استفساد. ("seeking to do evil"), but it appears more likely that it may be intended for استقسار ("dropsy"). If one adopts the latter meaning and adds a tashdid to the مراق مرق من , the sentence may be translated as follows: "Since Nadir Shah, before his conquest of India, had become afflicted with an abdominal illness, dropsy and excessive hypochondria . . . " The word , without the <u>tashdid</u> of the , comes from the root زين, and means, according to Lane, the oesophagus; this does not make good sense, and the modern Iranian meaning of راق as 'hiccoughs' is likewise unsuitable. It seems probable that the reading should be , the plural form of برخ (from زق) which Lane defines as "the thin and soft tender part of the belly". 2 Bayan, fol. 99 (b). Further, when Abdu'llah as-Suwaidi was received by Nadir at Najaf in December 1743, he noticed that the Shah had lost several of his front teeth and that his eyes were jaundiced. See Schmidt, op. cit., page 90.

Indian doctor Alavī Khān as his chief physician. ^CAlavī Khān did not limit his treatment to mere drugs, but also employed "words that were more bitter than the remedy";¹ in other words, he ventured to admonish Nādir for his outbursts of temper.

Nādir, being pleased at Alavī Khān's frankness, followed his treatment and acted upon his advice, with the result that his state of mind as well as of body greatly improved; in fact "for fifteen to twenty days (at a time) he would not order anyone to be beaten to death."² 'Abdu'l-Karīm states that, even after the attempt on Nādir's life in Māzandarān, he did not punish anyone until he had calmly investigated the matter.³

'Alavī Khān left Nādir's service in July 1741. When deprived of the Indian doctor's treatment and influence, Nādir soon reverted to his former state and by the autumn and winter of that year he was performing the most atrociously cruel actions.⁴ In the autumn of 1742 there occurred the tragic blinding of Ridā Quli Mīrzā; had Nādir been in a normal state during the preceding few months, he would probably never have condemned his son to this fate. It is said that Nādir's

- ¹ Bayan, fol.99(b).
- ² ibidem.
- 3 ibidem.
- ⁴ Bazin, page 290.

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whole nature was changed by this terrible event, and that his health suffered much as a result;¹ it was indeed a vicious circle.

In June or July 1745 Nādir was taken seriously ill when near Miyāndūāb and had to be carried in a litter for several stages.² He recovered from this attack, but in December 1746 his condition was such that he feared that some serious illness was imminent. Being profoundly dissatisfied with his own physicians and having heard much of the skill of European practitioners, he requested Peirson, the representative of the East India Company at Iṣfahān, to procure a European doctor for him. Peirson was much perplexed as he did not know where he could find such a doctor, but, on his attention being drawn to Père Bazin, he introduced him to the Shāh, Nādir was pleased with Bazin and made him his chief physician.³ Bazin states⁴ that Nādir was then suffering from

1 T.N., page 263.

² ibidem, page 253. Père Desvignes (see page 361 above) states that Nadir had been treated by Père Damien of Lyons for some disease of the liver. It is not known whether this illness was a recurrence of this liver trouble and whether Père Damien was still in attendance upon him.

3 Bazin, pages 303 and 304.

⁴ ibidem, page 304. It was probably on the strength of Bazin's diagnosis that Byron wrote as follows in "Don Juan", Canto IX, No.XXXIII:-

Oh! ye who build up monuments defiled, With gore, like Nadir Shah, that costive sophy, Who, after leaving Hindostan a wild, And scarce to the Mogul a cup of coffee, To soothe his woes withal, was slain, the sinner! Because he could no more digest his dinner! (The edition published in London in 1833 has, in Vol.XVI, page 289, the following footnote appended to the above lines: "He was slain in a conspiracy, after his temper had been exasperated by his extreme costivity to a degree of insanity"). dropsy¹ in an early stage (<u>une hydropisie commencee</u>) and had frequent attacks of vomiting as well as severe constipation and liver trouble.

On comparing the scanty data furnished by Abdu'l-Karim with the fuller particulars which Bazin gives, one is, it seems, justified in assuming that Nadir's intestinal trouble and the accompanying lack of mental equilibrium had continued and had, in fact, grown progressively worse, during the five and a half years that elapsed between the departure of Alavi Khan and the advent of Bazin.

It would not be correct to assert that Nadir's frenzied outbursts were always due entirely to physical causes; it seems rather that, in general, his physical state rendered him liable to become unduly affected by happenings of an unpleasant nature, besides occasionally making him act cruelly for no apparent motive.

Bazin's medical treatment began when Nadir was at Kirman, at the beginning of 1747. Bazin relates that he succeeded in almost curing Nadir, but that, on the latter reaching Mashhad, he recommenced his cruelties!² It is not clear from Bazin's account whether Nadir's relapse was due to his discontinuing the medical treatment or whether the cumula-

Bazin, page 310.

It is possible that the dropsy might have been aggravated by Nādir having contracted malaria (which he very probably did during his operations in Māzandarān or on the march through Sīstān to Qandahār).

tive effect of the news of the various revolts, together with the fatigue occasioned by the trying march across the desert to Mashhad, proved too much for his already unstable mental condition. There appears to be no doubt that Nadir's mind was definitely deranged during the last month or so of his life.

III. Nadir as a Military Leader.

It is abundantly clear from the various accounts that have come down to us that Nādir was nothing short of a military genius. Curzon is not guilty of exaggeration when he says: "Less than 20 years after this disaster (i.e. the overthrow of the Safavi monarchy by Maḥmūd the Ghilza'i in 1722) we are confronted with the spectacle of a Persian conqueror overrunning Central Asia, upsetting kingdoms and empires, and in the eighteenth century presenting the phenomenon in Asia that Europe owed to Napoleon in the nineteenth

It is inevitable that Nādir should have been likened to Alexander; such a comparison was not due entirely to the love of his admirers for hyperbole.²

The kind of tactics in which Nādir excelled was the swift cavalry raid, delivered, generally with crushing effect, from some totally unexpected quarter. In open warfare, too,

¹ "Persia", Vol.I, page 575.

² See J. P. de Bougainville's "Parallèle de l'Expédition d'Alexandre dans les Indes, avec la Conquête des mêmes Contrées par Tahmas-Kouli-Khan", Paris, 1752. (Bougainville's work, being based mainly on Otter's imperfect account of Nādir, does not do sufficient justice to him).

Nadir was most successful.

The true greatness of Nādir's military achievements can only be fully appreciated when one compares the deplorable state of the Iranian armies in the time of Shāh Sultān Husain with the wonderful efficiency of Nādir's hosts only a few years later. Nādir was much more than a mere commander of men; he was a splendid organiser and was able, by the sheer force of his personality, to impose his will upon and completely metamorphose the seemingly unwarlike man-power at his disposal.

Little by little, Nādir instilled new life into the Iranian soldiery and, by his cautious methods, restored the confidence in themselves which they had lost under a series of incompetent commanders. By his infusion of large numbers of Afghans and Özbegs into his ranks, Nādir raised still higher the fighting value of his army, and by his rigid enforcement of discipline and his insistence upon drill,¹ he welded the whole into a most formidable fighting machine. The remarkable extent to which Nādir could control his heterogeneous forces is graphically illustrated by their instant obedience when they received his order to cease from massacring and plundering the people of Delhi and, later, by his troops allowing him to dispossess them of their Indian spoils.

¹ Sir F. Goldsmid's "Persia, and its Military Resources", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 7th March 1879, Vol.XXIII, page 155. See also Colonel G. Drouville's "Voyage en Perse", Paris, 1828, Vol.I, page 85.

Nadir possessed the inestimable gift of being able to inspire in others the supreme confidence in his leadership which he himself possessed.

One of Nadir's most remarkable gifts was his amazing memory; this was of particular service to him as a commander. Cockell said that he could

"readily call all the principal officers in his numerous Army by their Names. He knows most of the private Men who have served under him any Time, and can recollect when and for what he punished and rewarded any of them."

A number of contemporaries of Nadir refer to his remarkably loud voice which enabled him to make his commands easily heard above the din of battle and which on several occasions struck terror into the enemy.

Nādir was least successful in his conduct of sieges, mainly because his heavy artillery was deficient both in quality and quantity. Nevertheless, when compared with the standards of his predecessors, Nādir's artillery, generally speaking, was really extremely good. It was due very largely to the assistance and advice of some French officers that Nādir was enabled to make the Iranian artillery more formidable than it had ever been before;² in fact, it has been stated by a competent authority that Iran did not possess any real artillery until the time of Nādir.³

¹ Fraser, page 233.

² Drouville, <u>op.cit</u>., Vol.II, page 142.

³ ibidem.

In general, Nādir thought out his important campaigns beforehand to the last detail¹, but on a few occasions he showed himself lacking in foresight. Nādir's conduct of the first operations against Topāl Osmān Pāshā, which ended in his complete defeat, was not well thought out, possibly, as has already been suggested,² because he was over-confident. Secondly, he showed lack of judgment in his later Lazgī campaigns; although he seemed to grasp the fact that, unless he could conquer Avaria, Dāghistān would never be utterly at his mercy, he always deferred until too late in the season his endeavours to force his way through to Khunzakh.

IV. Nadir as a Statesman and Ruler.

Nadir was essentially a warrior. He was at his best when leading his army; when called upon to control the destinies of his country in peace time, he was less successful, the reason being that he was always preparing for the next war. Peace was to him nothing but an irksome, but sometimes necessary, interlude.

In his foreign policy Nadir displayed undoubted skill, but in formulating this he always had an eye to forthcoming campaigns.

As monarch of Iran, Nadir ruled by force alone, which, indeed, was really the only means that he, as a usurper,

1 Bazin, page 316.

See pages 122 and 123 above.

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could employ. His supersession of the Safavi line, his suppression **XEPEXXEXIVE** of the Shi^c a religion and his crushing taxation, tendered him hateful to the majority of his subjects, despite the lustre which his military exploits gave to Iran. Nadir, like the earlier Safavis, endeavoured to secure his north-east frontier against Turcoman and Özbeg raiders by moving Afshars, Bakhtiāri, Kurdish and other warlike tribesmen to the border districts; this policy had the additional advantage of splitting up and so weakening the Bakhtiāris and other turbulent tribes; further, it increased the population and importance of Khurāsān.

Nadir seems to have had no regard whatsoever for the welfare of his subjects or to have made any seriouseffort to build up the material resources of his empire; he looked upon his people merely as tax-payers and as furnishers of man-power and supplies for his enormous army. The long wars with the Abdalis and the Turks, following upon the period of Afghan domination, had, by the time Nadir ascended the throne, terribly impoverished and exhausted the country. When Nadir returned from India with spoils worth many millions of pounds, he had an excellent opportunity of remitting taxation for a number of years and so letting the Iranians recover from the terrible drain upon their physical and financial resources. Nādir. however, hoarded his spoils, and resumed his exactions in a

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manner even harsher and more thorough than before. Merchants were taxed almost out of existence, while agriculturalists fared even worse; besides being heavily taxed, the latter frequently had their man-power and their crops requisitioned. Nadir did not seem to realise the fact that, by pursuing this policy so ruthlessly, he was killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.

In some respects, Nadir endeavoured to break away as far as possible from the ways and customs of his Safavi The most important of these changes was, of predecessors. course, the substitution of the Sunni for the Shi'a religion, the reasons for which have already been given. Secondly. Nādir made Mashhad the capital of his kingdom in place of Isfahan, but this step was taken largely because of his preference for his own province of Khurāsān. Thirdly, Nādir abandoned the pernicious Safavi practice of keeping the royal princes in the <u>haram</u> until the time came for them to rule; the lamentable results of this policy were clearly shown on the accession of Shah Sultan Husain and of his son Tahmasp II. Nadir on the other hand, gave his sons military and other appointments at an early age.¹

¹ The Gombroon Agent thus commented upon Nādir's policy: "It is no small Proof of his (Nādir's) Superior Sense and Judgement that can depart from a bad Custom so long and cruelly maintain'd by his Predecessors and all other Eastern Princes of immuring their Children with Eunuchs and Women in a Seraglio till by their Father's Deaths they were called in to the World, Monsters to Govern" (Gombroon Diary, 6th/17th November, 1739).

In the autumn of 1740, while Nādir was in Turkistān, it was reported in Isfahān¹ that the Shāh

"intends to change the Persian habit, his Subjects to shave their Beards² and to put on Turkish Dress as also to destroy all Places that were built (by) or bear the Name of Shaw Abas and erect others in their stead, likewise to bring a River some days distant from Isfahan to water the City."³

This report proved to be nothing more than a rumour, but it is noteworthy that Nādir had already changed the headdress of his subjects, having (as we learn from Otter), invented and forced them to wear a hat "with four corners round which they place a f shawl of wool."⁴

Although Nadir did not succeed in founding an enduring dynasty, he, like Henry VIII, added very considerably to the property of the crown by his wholesale confiscation of religious lands and endowments.

By his efficient system of spies, Nādir received mecret reports on the behaviour of the governors of provinces and towns; retribution was, in general, promptly exacted for peculation and disloyalty.

- ¹ Gombroon Diary, 19th/30th November, 1740.
- ² In imitation of Peter the Great?

Nadir was by no means the initiator of this scheme (known as the Karkunan), which was to divert the head waters of the Karun into the Zayanda Rūd by means of a tunnel. The work was begun by Shah Tahmasp I, and was continued, on a different basis, by Abbas the Great and, later, by Abbas II. (See Herbert's "Travels", page 135 and Sir W. Foster's note thereon; also, Curzon's "Persia", Vol.II, page 316).

[•] Otter, Vol.I, pages 39 and 40. An interesting modern parallel is the creation of the Pahlavī hat by H.I.M. Shah Ridā Pahlavī.

V. Nadir's Attitude towards Religion.

It seems probable that Nādir, although born a Sunni, had little or no religious conviction or feeling. Bazin says:

"It would be difficult to decide as to what religion he belonged. Many of those who think that they had known him best, claim that he had no religion. He used to say, sometimes, fairly openly that he thought as highly of himself as of Muhammad and AlI; that they were so great because they were good fighters, and that, after all, he believed that he had attained the same degree of glory as they had by (force of) arms."1

Religious fanaticism was not one of Nādir's faults; his persecution of the Shi'a was conducted for purely secular reasons. Nādir was tolerant towards his Christian subjects, with whose freedom of worship he never interfered. The Armenian Catholicos Abraham speaks in the highest terms of his good treatment at the hands of Nādir, who even attended service in the cathedral at Echmiadzin.² The Catholicos subsequently received a special invitation to the assembly on the Mughān plain, where, on arrival, he "was the object of particular attention" and Nādir personally assigned to him a daily subsistence allowance.³

Nadir raised no objection to the presence of foreign missionaries in Iran; a number of these were in Isfahan, while others were in Gilan. As has been stated above, Nadir, during the last few months of his life, employed the Jesuit missionary,

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³ ibidem, pages 280 and 285.

¹ Bazin, page 318.

Catholicos Abraham, page 270.

Père Bazin, as his chief physician.

According to the Jesuit, Père Desvignes, there were no less than 22 Orthodox Armenian churches in Julfa, as well as four Catholic places of worship. The population of the suburbawas 10,000 at that time.¹

It was, apparently, during Nādir's Indian expedition that his interest was aroused by Sura XLVIII (Suratu'l-Fath) of the Qu'rān, where, in verse 29 reference is made to the Pentateuch (<u>Taurāt</u>) and the Gospels (<u>Injīl</u>).² Nādir asked the Mullā-Bāshī (Alī Akbar) if the Pentateuch and Gospels were extant; on receiving an affirmative reply, Nādir ordered Mīrzā Mahdī to arrange for an Iranian translation of both to be made. The preliminary steps must have been made by letter from India, because the Gombroon Agent received a letter from the Isfahān 'linguist', early in June 1740 to the effect that:

"Shaw Nadir.... has appointed Moolahs to make a Translation of the Bible, Jewish Talmud and Mahumetan Alkoran, who were for coming to be in our house (at Isfahān) but he (the 'linguist') prevented them".)

- See Père Desvignes! "Lettre crite de Julfa..." in "Lettres Edifiantes", Vol.IV, page 364.
- ² For an English translation of this verse, see Rodwell's "The Koran", London, 1911, page 463.
- ³ Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th June, 1740. ⁴Abdu'l-KarIm (Bayān, foll.65(b) and 66(a)) says that Nādir first became interested in the matter during the Turkistān expedition, but this is impossible; it is clear from the Gombroon Diary (and, as will be seen, from Père Desvignes' account) that the instructions for the translations to be made were received in Isfahān <u>before</u> the start of the expedition to Bukhārā and Khīva.

The Jesuit Père Desvignes, writing in May 1744, states that Nādir sent a mullā to Işfahān with orders to collect such Jews, Armenians and 'Francs' as were considered necessary forthe work of translation.¹ According to the same authority, the work began in May 1740 and lasted for 6 months.² Two Roman Catholic missionaries and two Armenian Catholics, two Orthodox Armenian monks and two priests undertook the translation of the New Testament, while Jewish rabbis translated the Old Testament. Some disagreement arose between the Catholic and Orthodox collaborators; as to this, Père Desvignes wrote

"we had the consolation of seeing that in almost all these disputes the Muhammadan (i.e. the mulla in charge of the work) guided solely by reason, decided in favour of the Catholic statements....."

The Qu'ran was also translated into Iranian.

When at length the work was completed, the translators were summoned to appear before Nādir at Qazvīn. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Isfahān, two Catholic missionaries and four Armenian bishops, together with the mullā in charge, proceeded to Qazvīn where Nādir received them graciously and paid them for their expenses en route. The Shāh, however, stated that he had no time to examine their work and that, as

¹ Père Desvignes, <u>op.cit</u>., pages 402-404.

² A copy of the Iranian translation of the Gospels, made under the supervision of Père Lagarde in GIlán in 1746, is in the Bibliothèque Nationale, in Paris. See Blochet's "Catalogue des Manuscrits Persans.....", Vol.I, page 6, No.7.

there was only one God, there could be only one Prophet. These words greatly disappointed the pious translators who had hoped that much good would accrue to the Christian faith in Iran by reason of their work.¹

VI. Nadir and the Arts.

The arts, save for that of war, did not flourish in Nādir's time. It was a period when the sword was mightier than the pen. The two chief literary figures of Nādir's day were Mīrzā Mahdī and Shaikh Hazīn, of whom it is unnecessary to say more here.² Nādir himself seems to have had but little liking for literature and poetry. The only poet for whom he appeared to have any regard was Hāfiz (his interest in the poet's works may, however, have been confined to the drawing of <u>fāls</u> or auguries). It is strange that, unlettered though he was, Nādir was one of the two most generous donors to the library of the Şahn of Imām Ridā at Mashhad, to which

See the somewhat different and apparently less well-informed account by the Carmelite friar Leandro di Santa Cecilia, in his "Persia Ovvero Secondo Viaggio...Dell'Oriente", Rome, 1757, Vol.II, page 222. According to other authorities, Nādir, on receiving the translators, ridiculed alike the Christian, Jewish and Muhammadan faiths and declared that, if God vouchsafed him life, he would give mankind a much better religion that all those which had been known up till that time (see, in this connection, Hanway, Vol.IV, pages 216-219 and Otter, Vol.II, page 153).

See the bibliographical introduction.

he presented 400 manuscripts.¹ Further, it must not be overlooked that it was at Nādir's orders that the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī was written.

In the construction of towns and buildings Nadir was more active. Mention has been made already of his building of New Shamakhi, Nadirabad and Khivaqabad, of his additions to the shrine of Imam Rida at Mashhad, and of the erection of his Mauludgah outside Dastgird, in Darragaz. At' Kalat he caused a number of buildings to be erected, one of which was his treasure-house, known as the Maqbara-yi-Nadira². Shīrāz benefited for a time at the behest of Nadir, and it was not his fault that most of the improvements which were carried out were undone during the revolt of TaqT Khan. Nādir did practically nothing for Isfahan, but at Qazvin he erected a new palace, of which Hanway has given a description.⁴ At the town of Ashraf, in Mazandaran, he built the Chihil Sutur, which Sir W. Ouseley has described and depicted in his "Travels"

² Several persons have described this building, which is now probably in the last stages of decay. In Sykes' "History of Persia", Vol.II, page 264, there is a photograph of it by Major Watson. See also Macgregor's "Narrative of a Journey through the Province of Khorassan and on the N.W. Frontier of Afghanistan", London, 1879, Vol.II, pages 51 and 52.

¹ De Khanikoff, pages 100 and 101.

³ Autobiography of MIrzā Muhammad Shīrāzī, page 19.

^{*} Vol.I, pages 231 and 232.

Vol.III, page 270 and plate No.LXXI.

During his stay at Delhi Nādir had several portraits of himself painted.¹ On Nādir's return to Iran, he engaged, for a time, (through Elton) a young painter named Cassel or Cassels, who painted eight battle-pictures for him.²

2

In a memorandum, dated the 13th/24th January 1744, by the Russia Company on the subject of the Russian charges against Elton, it was stated that "None of the people who were with Mr. Elton are entered into the service of the Shah, excepting one Cassel a German Painter to whom he gives a salary of 1000 Roubles per annum to paint his Battles." (S.P.91, Vol.XXXVI). The picture in the Chihil Sutun of one of Nādir's battles is probably one of Cassel's. For details of the manner in which Cassel (or Cassels, who was half-English and half-Prussian) is alleged to have behaved to.Elton, see Cook, Vol.II, page 514. Cook states that Cassel painted 8 pictures for Nādir.

See Dodwell's "A Calendar of the Madras Records , 1740-1744", page 30. One of these portraits was presented to Richard Benyon, the Governor of Madras.

APPENDIX I

The Afshar Tribe.

It is impossible here to attempt to solve the problem whether the Afshārs are of Turkish or Mongol origin. All that can be said is that Rashīdu'd-Dīn, in his Jami^cu't-Tawārīkh¹ described them as Turks and that they have generally, but not, it is true, invariably² been regarded as such.

The Afshärs are believed to have been driven westward from Central Asia by the advancing Mongols in the XIII century A.D., and to have settled first in Adharbaijān; afterwards they became widely disseminated in Iran.³ Shāh Isma^cIl I recruited his formidable army mainly from the Afshārs and from six other Turkish (or Turco-Mongol) tribes, namely, the Shāmlū, Rūmlū, Ustājlū, Takallū, Dhu'l-Qadar and Qājār.

7

See the edition, "Sbornik Lyetopisei", edited by N. Berezin, St. Petersburg, 1861, Vol. VII. According to Abu'l-GhāzI, "Awshār" (or "Afshār") means "one who promptly finishes an affair": see the Turkish text of the "Shajarat-i-Turk", edited by Desmaisons, St. Petersburg, 1874, Vol.II, page 28. ²As to the alleged Mongol origin of the Afshārs, see "Les Afšars d'Urumiyeh" by B. Nikitine, in the "Journal Asiatique", January-March 1929. ³In this connection, see the interesting articles by Sayyid

Ahmad Aqā Tabrīzī, in the Tehran periodical Ayanda, No.IV, 1304 (1926), No. IX, 1305 (1927), and Part II, No. VIII, 1306 (1928). Dr. M. Afshār was kind enough to send me copies of these articles.

Mīrzā Mahdī states that the Qiriqlū (or Qirikhlū) branch of the tribe, to which Nadir belonged, went to Khurāsān in the time of Shah Isma^cIl I (1502 - 1524 A.D.), and that they made their yailag or summer camping ground by some springs known as Mayab Kubkan, just south of the Allahu Akbar range! Sayyid Ahmad Aqā Tabrizi says, however, that Shah Abbas I moved the Qiriqlu Afshars and the Chamishgazak Kurds to that district, in order to oust the Özbegs therefrom? However that may be, it seems that there were Afshars in Khurasan from, at any rate, the beginning of the XVI century A.D., for KhwandamIr, in his Habibu's-Siyar, speaks of a certain Shahrukh Beg Afshar Yājūjī being sent from Herat in 920 A.H. (1514/15 A.D.) to the province of Qandahar, in order to subdue a rebel named Shuja Beg there. I am quite unable to say whether there was any close connection between the Yajuji and Qiriqlu Afshars (the epithet "Yajujf", i.e. "of Gog", may only have been applicable to Shahrukh Beg himself).

1 T.N., page 17. 2 See the Ayanda, Part II, No. VIII, page 601. 3 Habību's-Siyar, Vol.III, Part IV, page 75.

Nādir's relations with the various branches of the Afshārs were by no means invariably friendly. He was, according to Mīrzā Mahdī, deserted by certain of the Afshārs during his first attempt to overcome Malik Maḥmūd Sīstānī;¹ later on, certain clans revolted against him (e.g. at Kirmān in 1746) and several Afshārs, including one belonging to Nādir's own clan, were implicated in the final conspiracy against him.²

T.N., page 19; see also page 50 above. 2 See pages 374 and 377 above.

APPENDIX II.

Nadir's Original Name.

There is some doubt as to the correct form of Nadir's original name. In the first place, Mirza MahdI, Muhammad Muhsin and others write Nadr Qulf Beg, while some, such as Shaikh HazIn, give the form Nadhr Qull Beg. The fact that Nadir, on becoming Shah, unquestionably took the name Nadir and not Nadhir, seems to show that Nadr and not Nadhr was the original form. Also, if any significance is to be attached to the meaning of the name, Nadr Quli ("the slave of the wonderful") makes much better sense than Nadhr Qull ("the slave of the votive offering"). Secondly, there is the view held by Professor Naficy of Tehran, that "Ali" should be substituted for "QulI". He bases his argument on the fact that Nadir Ali is the name shown not only in the Waqf-Nama or deed of bequest relating to Nadir's tomb at Mashhad, but also on the gilt portico of the shrine of the Imam Rida at Mashhad (see the Matla 'u'sh-Shams, Vol.II, page 20); he also states that Quli (Turkish for "slave") is only used after the name of a divinity, saint or protector.

On the other hand, the MSS. of the Tā'rīkh-i-Nādirī, Zubdatu't-Tawārīkh, Bayān-i-Wāqi, etc., all give "Quli" and not "Alī"; also, Nadr Qulī is not an impossible combination,

as Nadr is an alternative form of Nadir (meaning the "rare", "unique" or "wonderful"), and so could be taken as referring to Allah.

As to the name Nādir Alī which is said to be on the gilt portico of the shrine at Mashhad, it is known that Nādir, on three occasions, gave orders for the shrine to be repaired and embellished. After capturing the city in December 1726 Nādir had some repairs carried out and ordered the dome to be gilt and a second minaret built. It seems probable that the portico was constructed later, either after his coronation in 1736 or in 1740 or 1741 after his return from India. This would, if correct, account for the form "Nādir" instead of "Nadr": as to the name "Åli", this may have been added in order to please the <u>Muitahids</u>.

The Waqf-Nāma, being of later date, does not furnish conclusive evidence.

APPENDIX III.

The British in Iran.

During Nādir's period of power, Great Britain had not, despite her fairly considerable commercial interests in Iran, any diplomatic or consular representatives in the country.¹ While the Dutch were also, strangely enough, unrepresented in this way, the Russians maintained, for the greater part of the time, a Resident at the Court, as well as a Consul in Gilān. France, whose stake in the country was smaller than those of the three powers mentioned above, had a Consul at Isfahān until May, 1730.

Nādir's first contact with the British was, as will be seen below, in November 1729. Hanway relates that Nādir more than once remarked of the English that "they are bold, and appear like men of business."²

Save for Dr. Cook at the end of Nādir's reign and for sundry officers and men of the Mercantile Marine who belonged to independently owned vessels, no persons of British nationality other than those in the service of, or connected with, the East India and Russia Companies visited Iran during the period under review.

¹Captain Elton recommended, probably in 1743, that one of the British subjects in GIIan should be appointed British Consul there. (See Hanway, Vol.II, page 28).

²Vol. I, page 258.

Since the Russia Company did not actively concern itself with Iran until 1739, the affairs of the East India Company will be dealt with first.

I. The East India Company.

It would be easy to fill at least one volume with the record of the Company's affairs in Iran between 1729 and 1747. Space, however, only permits of a brief summary being given.

The East India Company, during the period under review, maintained establishments at Gombroon, Isfahan (for part of the time on a greatly reduced scale), Kirman and Shīrāz. It was, on the whole, a most unfavourable time for trading in Iran. The invasions by the Afghans, Turks and Russians and the state of insecurity prevailing in many parts had brought about severe economic depression. When, through Nādir's military exploits, Tahmāsp was established on his throne in Isfahan, the hopes of the Company, as of the community at large, for the coming of a more settled and Unfortunately, such hopes were prosperous era were aroused. vain, for Nadir was no economist, and soon showed that he had no regard at all for the encouragement of trade, whether Iranian or foreign. All that he wanted was the provision of men, money and supplies, in order that he might carry out his martial aims.

As has $already_{\Lambda}$ pointed out, Nādir seemed to have no conception that his extortionate ways were rapidly ruining the country.

been

Although Nādir was, at the outset, friendly to the Isfahān representatives of the Company, it was not long before his attitude completely changed! In general, the English and Dutch Companies were on bad terms with each other, and it was therefore easy for Nādir to play off one concern against the other.

It was customary, and in fact necessary, in those times for the companies to make periodical gifts to influential ministers, Governors and lesser officials. In this respect, the Dutch Company had a considerable advantage over its rival, because, owing to its being almost a national enterprise, it had more funds at its disposal. Consequently, the Dutch Company nearly always led the way with presents and, by their more lavish scale, it was sometimes able to secure concessions that were denied to its poorer rival. Moreover, the English Agent frequently got reprimanded by Bombay and London for making presents at all, although, under the then existing conditions, little or nothing could be accomplished without

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In December 1729 Nādir, by threatening to use violence, extorted 300 tomans from Cockell at Isfahān. According to the Gombroon Diary (of the 14th/25th February) the Dutch had bribed Nādir's officers and had alleged that the East India Company had been assisting the "Ophgoons" (Afghans).

this means of securing the good will of influential persons. It was the misfortune of the Company that, for nearly ten years, it had to conduct most of its business with the Government through the medium of Muhammad Taqī Khān Shīrāzī, the corrupt and disloyal Beglarbegi of Fārs.¹

The Company was extremely anxious to secure from the Government the renewal of certain privileges which it had lost; the most important of these were the right of being customs-free at Gombroon and, secondly, the grant of one half of the customs receipts at that part. Further, there was its claim for the repayment of a loan of 3,000 tomans to Shāh Sultān Husain, as well as for compensation for sundry losses.

Shah Tahmasp showed himself very favourably inclined towards the Company, and promised to make amends for its losses, but it soon became evident that the Shah was in no position to carry out his undertakings.

It was in the matter of shipping that Nādir sought to make most use of the Dutch and English Companies; he made it clear to them both that they could expect no redress of their grievances unless and until they met his wishes in this respect. The English Company, like the Dutch, often found it most inconvenient, for purely commercial reasons, to lend its ships 1 Otter well describes Taqī Khān as "un homme de mauvaise foi

et avide de présens." (Vol.II, page 86).

to the Iranian Government. Moreover, it had the fear that its vessels might be used against the Turks. As it had a factory at Başra, it was apprehensive lest the Turks should seize its effects and maltreat its representatives there, in retaliation for such use. For similar reasons, it was averse to its shipping being employed against the Arabs of Muscat and elsewhere.

The Company adopted, as an alternative, the sale of ships to Nadir. Then followed aslong contest between the Company and the Shah; the former promising ships in return for the grant of its former privileges and the latter stating that he would do nothing in this respect unless and until his naval requirements were met. Needless to say, Nādir always found some excuse to defer granting all that the Company wanted. In return for its services for procuring ships, the Company recovered certain of its privileges, but it never obtained its chief desideratum, namely, that of being customs It nevertheless secured payment for a time free at Gombroon. of 1,000 tomans a year out of the customs receipts there, and was later granted in lieu thereof one-third of the customs on freight borne by its own vessels.¹ It was not, however, deemed to be in the Company's interests that Nadir should have a strong

Gombroon Diary, 12th/23rd March, 1737.

fleet in the Gulf, and measures were taken to prevent "unauthorised" sales of vessels to the Iranians.²

The unfortunate naval affair during the siege of Basra in May 1735 seemed at first certain to precipitate a crisis between Nādir and the Company, but, as stated in Chapter XI , the pressing needs of Nādir for additions to his fleet caused him to show no resentment.³

Meanwhile, in March 1735, the Company's factory at Isfahan had been practically closed down. Geekie, the Resident there, was withdrawn, and the establishment was left in charge of Hermet, the "linguist".⁴ The main reason

See the summary of a letter from the Bombay Presidency dated the 21st November 1741, in H. Dodwell's 'A Calendar 2 of the Madras Records, 1740-1744, page 230'.

Such sales naturally adversely affected the Company's bargaining powers. In order to prevent these sales, as well as to keep the Iranian navy from becoming too strong, the Bombay Presidency, in 1741, decided to permit no vessel to proceed to an Iranian port until the owner had given a bond not to sell her to the Iranians without permission, under a penalty of 40,000 Rs. (See Dodwell, op.cit., Page 230). Despite these measures, a vessel named the "Robert" was disposed of at Bushire in January 1742 without authorisation by the Company. The Agent remarked (Gombroon Diary, 27th January/7th February 1742) that this sale was "Contrary to orders and transacted unluckily at a Juncture when We are endeavouring to raise the greatest Merit possible by a compliance of this kind." (The owner sold the vessel for 1,000 tomans, but TaqT Khān deducted 150 tomans as his commission.)

³See page 156 above. The Company was, of course, entirely blameless in the matter, but TaqI Khān threatened the Agent that Nādir would, if the reports of the incident proved correct, "put a Ring in our Ears which We shall remember to the Day of Judgement". (Gombroon Diary, 16th/27th July, 1735)

⁴Gombroon Diary, 28th March/8th April and 2nd/13th April 1735.

for this step was the decline in trade and the growing difficulty in recovering debts owing to the Company, due to the increasing impoverishment of the inhabitants (at a later date, Nādir's choise of Mashhad as his capital caused the star of Isfahān to wane still further). Further, the troubles with the Government, which were largely occasioned by its exactions, were an additional reason for the withdrawal.

The provisioning of the Qandahār expeditionary force, as already related, interfered seriously with the Company's transport arrangements. Consignments of wool from Kirmān to Gombroon were greatly delayed owing to the lack of camels and mules.

In February 1742 TaqI Khān gave fresh proofs of his dishonesty. The Company had, shortly before, delivered two vessels to the Government, for which it had received 8,000 tomans on account; another 1300 tomans remained to be paid. TaqI Khān privately requested the Company not only to forego any further payment, but to give him a receipt (to be forwarded to Nādir) for 10,000 tomans. As the Agent considered that a complaint to Nādir would not only be useless,² but would result

⁻See pages 187 and 188 above.

²Nādir's toleration of Taqī Khān's misdemeanours was remarkable. It is stated in the Gombroon Diary (13th/24th March 1742) that it was discovered, after Taqī Khān's dismissal from his post in 1740, that he had embezzled 1500 tomans. On this matter being reported to Nādir, he merely ordered Taqī Khān to pay up the sum in question. Consequently, the Agent deemed it useless to report Taqī Khān's conduct to Nādir: to do so would merely incur the Beglarbegi's resentment and would achieve no useful purpose at the court.

in arousing the Beglarbegi's enmity, he compromised by agreeing to receive another 800 tomans and to waive all claim to the remaining 500.¹

The attempt by certain members of the Russia Company (see part II of this Appendix) to establish themselves in Northern Iran and to secure a share of the trade in woollen goods, led to the East India Company sending two European factors to Isfahān in the early summer of 1742, to reopen the factory there on the former basis.² It was also proposed to open a factory at Mashhad, but this project was not approved by the London management.³

Peirson, the new Resident at Isfahān, sent Hermet to the Shāh's camp in July 1743 in order to make a further attempt to secure the renewal of the Company's privileges; this step was taken partly because of the endeavours of the Russia Company merchants to secure privileges from the Shāh. When Hermet reached the camp, he was interviewed by Mīrzā Mahdī, who said that it would not only be useless, but also

Gombroon Diary 20th February/3rd March 1742. See also Otter, Vol.II, pages 162-3. Otter, however, gives an incomplete account of this incident, as he was not in possession of all the facts.

See the reference, in the Gombroon Diary of the 6/17th August 1743, to Peirson's letter from Isfahan of the 16th/ 27th July.

most injudicious for him to appear before Nādir unless he could make the Shāh a suitable present. When he found that Hermet was not in a position to make any present to the Shāh, Mīrzā Mahdī advised him to return to Isfahān; although Hermet offered Mīrzā Mahdī 100 tomans, the latter refused to take any action.¹

The Omān campaign, by reason of the requisitioning of supplies and heavy taxation which it occasioned, had a bad effect upon trade in southern Iran. The revolt of Taqī Khān in 1744 caused a further set-back to trade. It is stated in the Gombroon Diary² that the Dutch, in concert with the Shāhbandar of Gombroon, drew up and sent to Nādir a document charging the East India Company with complicity in Taqī Khān's revolt. The Agent, on the old "tu quoque" principle, retaliated by sending the Shāh a counter-charge against the Dutch.

Trading conditions during the concluding years of Nādir's reign were most unfavourable.³ The Shāh's extortionate ways became more burdensome than ever. When Nādir was at Kirmān in the early part of 1747, he forced Graves, the Company's representative there, to give him a draft on the Işfahān office for 1100 tomans, which he sent to the Işfahān authorities, for

Gombroon Diary, 20th/31st December 1743.

² " " 10th/21st April 1744.

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²Dorrill informed London on the 5th/16th December 1745 that "the Name of Trade is forgot.....in Persia", owing to the continued revolts and disturbances. collection. When the draft was presented for payment, Peirson had insufficient funds in hand to meet it, and was forced to borrow in order to make up the required total. In reporting the matter to Gombroon, Peirson stated that he had had very great difficulty in arranging this loan. It is a proof of the insecurity of those times that the <u>minimum</u> rate at which money was then available on loan at Isfahān was 15% per mensem.¹

The Shah's conduct was so unreasonable and trading conditions were so bad that the Company more than once contemplated the complete abandonment of its Iranian business. It nevertheless persevered and, in due course, it weathered the storm.

As for the Dutch, they fared no better than their British rivals during these troubled times. The French Compagnie des Indes, in pursuance of Dupleix's policy of expansion,² made a most ill-timed endeavour to re-establish its trade at Gombroon in 1740.³ After suffering severely at the hands of TaqT Khān (who on one occasion confiscated a

Letter from Peirson and Blandy to London, dated the 16th/27th May 1747.

²H. Castonnet des Fosses "Les Relations de la France avec la Perse", Angers, 1889, page 30.

⁵Otter strongly advised the Company's representative not to proceed with this project (see his Vol.II, pages 86 and 87).

French vessel and held the captain to ransom), and losing its Agent and his assistant through illness? the Company appointed a new Agent, Duplessis by name, who endeavoured, but without success, to secure a share in the Kirmān wool trade. Realising the futility of continuing the factory under the then existing conditions? the Company recalled Duplessis, who left Gombroon in July 1743. Although the factory there was closed, French vessels continued to call at irregular intervals and to carry on some trade with the local merchants.

Otter, Vol. II, page 156.

A. Martineau, 'Le premier Consulat de France à Bassora . .' page 69. Gombroon Diary, 19th/30th October, 1740.

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ibidem. In Martineau's words, the French "étaient obligés de subir tons les caprices des autorités locales. Ces caprices étaient souvent déraisonnables, pourtant ils allaient rarement jusqu'à la persécution". See also R. Vadala, "Le Golfe Persique", Paris, 1920, page 110.

II. THE RUSSIA COMPANY.

After Peter the Great had conquered the littoral of Dāghistān and Shīrvān and had occupied Gīlān, he endeavoured to stimulate trade and industry in his new dominions by inviting the English to revive their former trade with Iran through Russia.¹ Although nothing came of this project during Peter's lifetime, a most important step towards its realisation was taken in 1734, when the commercial treaty between Great Britain and Russia was concluded. In clause VIII of this treaty provision was made for British merchants to send their goods in transit through Russia to Iran or vice versa on payment of a def of 3% ad valorem.²

It was not until that "enterprising but indiscreet Englishman", Captain John Elton, paid his first visit to Iran in 1739, that actual advantage was taken of the above privilege. Elton, whilst employed by the Russian Government on the Orenburg expedition, made several vain attempts to travel from the Yaik river to the Sea of Aral and thence on to Khīva and Bukhārā. The primary object of his journey to Iran in 1739, with the young Scotsman Mungo Graeme, was to open up trade with "the

Hanway, Vol.I, page 13. See also W. Tooke's "View of the Russian Empire under Catherine II" (London, 1800), Vol.III, page 446.
²The text of this clause is given by Hanway, Vol.I, pages 47 and 48.
³Malcolm, Vol.II, page 102.

Bucharies" (as he termed Bukhārā and Khīva) viâ Astarābād. Reference has been made in Chapter XX to the trading privileges which Ridā Qulī Mīrzā accorded to Elton and Graeme in August 1739, and to the journey of Thompson and Hogg to Khiva and Bukhara in 1740-41. Leaving Graeme behind in Iran, Elton returned to St. Petersburg, where he arrived at the end of January 1740. Elton gave glowing accounts to the British merchants at St. Petersburg of the prospects of the trade with Iran; in July 1740 he wrote a long memorandum in which he set forth the privileges which, he considered, should be secured from the Russian Government in order that the transit trade might be carried Elton wrote another memorandum for the information of on. Edward Finch, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, in which he gave particulars of his scheme and drew attention to the advantages which the British traders would enjoy.1 Elton pointed out the importance of Mashhad, which Nādir had made his capital, but stated that the Mashhad trade was of less importance than that with "the Bucharies", Kābul, Qandahār, India and even Tibet, which could be carried on through Mashhad. It was essential for the success of the project that the British merchants should have their own

For the text see "The Gentleman's Magazine", Vol.XII (1742), pages 21-25. (This memorandum is the "pompous memorial" which Hanway quotes in his Vol.I, pages 35-42.)

vessels on the Volga and Caspian. The costs involved in sending British woollen goods by the Russian route would, Elton continued, be certainly far less than the freight on such goods when sent viâ India or Turkey. In Iran itself the position was eminently favourable; Ridā Qulī had thoroughly subdued the troublesome Turcomān and Özbeg tribesmen on the north-east frontier: as to trade rivals, the East India Company had had to withdraw from Isfahān some years before, and the Dutch, although they remained there, were doing but little business. Lastly, much profit could be made out of Gīlān silk.

Finch forwarded copies of these memoranda to London, together with a translation of Ridā Qull Mīrzā's decree in favour of the British merchants,^I to Whitehall on the 29th July/9th August 1740;² in his covering despatch Finch stated that the Russian Government "entertains a good Opinion of the Undertaking and seems likely to encourage it".

The Russia Company in London was favourably impressed with Elton's arguments. Since the establishment of trade on the lines proposed by Elton would involve an infringement of the rights of the Levant Company, the Russia

A translation of this decree is given in "The Gentleman's Magazine, 1742, Vol.XII, pages 25 and 26. See also Hanway Vol.I, pages 30-33. 2 S.P. 91, Vol.XXIV.

Company entered into negotiations with the Board of Trade,¹ with the result that, in 1741, an Act of Parliament was passed which removed this disability, despite the opposition of the Levant Company.

In the meantime two British factors, Thompson and Hogg by name, left St. Petersburg for Khīva and Bukhārā. They reached Khīva safely, but were detained there during Nādir's siege of the town in November 1740. Thompson went on to Bukhārā in the following year. He stated that in both Khīva and Bukhārā "no foreign commodity bears a price proportionate to the risque of bringing it to market".²

Particulars have already been given of how Elton and Woodroofe, after being entrusted with a cargo of goods by certain of the British merchants at St. Petersburg (it is important to note that the Russia Company did not trade with Iran in its corporate capacity), reached Iran in June 1742 and of how Russian animosity was aroused by their carrying cargoes of rice from Enzeli to Darband for the Iranian troops in Dāghistān.³ The Russian authorities were alarmed when

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For details of the conferences held at the Board of Trade, see the Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, January 1734/5 to December, 1741, Vol.XLVIII, pages 346-356 and 376 and 377 (London, 1930).

²See page 304 above.

²See the Journal of Thompson & Hogg in Hanway, Vol.I, pages 351 and 354.

Elton made a survey for the Shāh of the south-east coast of the Caspian.¹ Then came reports of Elton having entered the Shāh's service - of his ship-building activities on Nādir's behalf.

The Russian Government protested against Elton's conduct, but the Russia Company believed at first that the charges against Elton were based upon false and malicious reports by Armenian and Russian merchants. On further protests being made, some of the British merchants in St. Petersburg who were interested in the Iranian trade sent Jonas Hanway to Iran on a mission of investigation.² Others of the merchants remained, however, firm believers in, and supporters of, Elton.³ Hanway has described in great detail his experiences in Iran and his discussions with Elton It seems clear from a hitherto unpublished letter⁴ and others. which Hanway wrote to London from Astrakhan when on his way back from Iran that he then (November 1744) entertained a more favourable idea of Elton and his activities than he afterwards allowed to appear in his published record.

See Woodroofe's Journal (in Hanway, Vol.I, Chapter XX).
² In February 1743 Hanway had accepted a partnership in the St. Petersburg firm of Dingley and Klencke. (See S.P.91, Vol.XLIII and Hanway, Vol.I, page 83.
³ Cook, Vol.II, page 510.
⁴ This letter was dated the 7th/18th November 1744; a copy is to be found in S.P.91, Vol. XXXVI.
421.

Notwithstanding Russian opposition, some progress was made with the Iranian trade venture. A factory was established at Mashhad, and the woollen goods imported through Russia and Gilān began competing in central Iran with those of the East India Company, with the result that that company reopened its Isfahān factory¹.

Difficulties in Iran itself, as well as in Russia, were not slow in arising. Early in 1743 goods to the value of some 3,500 tomans were seized by the Government in Gilān? In November of the same year Mungo Graeme was murdered by robbers when returning from Mashhad to Resht? Further, the climate, particularly in Gīlān, caused much illness and some mortality amongst the British factors; Hanway states that five (out of a total of sixteen) died between 1740 and 1744.

1 See page 413 above. 2 Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th January 1743. The Agent remarked, with a certain satisfaction, that "paying Customs (in Iran) proves no Exemption from Impositions, and it is not Our Masters that suffer only in such Calamitous Times". 3 Hanway, Vol. II, page 24. See also the letter from Gombroon to London (apparently written early in 1744), in Vol. XV of the Persia and Persian Gulf Records. 4 Hanway, Vol. I, page 221. Moreover, the manner in which the transit duty was calculated in Russia amounted to 7% in the current Russian money, instead of the 3% stipulated.¹

As time went on, the complaints of the Russian Government grew more and more vehement, particularly after Elton had completed his first vessel for Nādir.² Although Hanway had failed to persuade Elton to sever his connection with the Iranian court, further efforts were made through Lord Tyrawley to induce him to do so.³ He was even offered a pension of £400 a year (to be levied on the Iranian trade), with the alternative of a commission in the British Navy.⁴ Elton, when pressed once more to return to England, produced a decree from Nādir, dated the 21st November 1745, stating that "the properest of the Christians" (i.e. Elton) was not permitted to leave Iran as it was necessary for him to attend

This duty was payable in rix-dollars (<u>reichsthalers</u>). See the Petition from the Russia Company to the King in Council, a copy of which was sent by Whitehall to St. Petersburg on the 30th July 1742 (S.P.91, Vol.XXXI.)

² Lerch, when at Darband, saw an 18-gun frigate which Elton had built. Elton was then (1745), Lerch said, an Admiral, but he was, nominally at any rate, under the "Over-Admiral", Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān, who was also Governor of Baku. At that time, two frigates and four smaller vessels were said to be finished, while other ships were under construction. (Büsching's "Magazin", Vol.X, page 404).

³James O'Hara, Baron Tyrawley, was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from 1743 to 1745.

Hanway, Vol.II, page 34.

the court at the next Nau Rūz and "to settle our naval affairs on a right foundation".¹

Bakunin, who had succeeded Arapov as Consul at Resht, sent to St. Petersburg in 1745 and 1746, two long reports containing accusations against Elton. Copies of these reports, couched in very Russified German, were communicated by the Russian Government to Lord Tyrawley and his successor, the Earl of Hyndford.² Lord Hyndford formed the opinion that the agitation against Elton was engineered largely by the enemies of Bestuzhev (who had been responsible, on the Russian side, for the conclusion of the 1734 treaty).³ However that may have been, the situation went from bad to worse.

At the request of the Russian Government, the two British ships on the Caspian were sold to Russian merchants and sailed thereafter under the Russian flag. The next step was far more drastic; by a decree issued in November 1746 the Empress withdrew the transit privileges accorded by the treaty

Lord Hyndford, in his despatch of the 22nd November/3rd December 1745, forwarded these reports to London, where they were examined by the Russia Company. 2 See Lord Hyndford's despatch referred to in the preceding note. 3 Hanway, Vol.II, page 47.

of 1734 and requested the British Ambassador to inform the British merchants concerned that no more goods should be consigned to Iran and that they should immediately liquidate their affairs there and withdraw their servants and effects.¹

The British Government protested at this decree, and pointed out that it was most unfair to penalise those British merchants engaged in the Iranian trade who were not associated with Elton; the Russian Government, however, remained adamant. Notwithstanding this ban on their trade, some merchants and factors remained on in Iran, in the hope that the decree might be rescinded. However, in the disturbances that broke out in Iran after Nādir's death, everything was lost, goods to the value of £80,000 being seized.² By 1751 all the British, save Elton, had left northern Iran. As for Elton, he was murdered in Gilan in April 1751.³ Although the Russian charges against him were, in many respects, grossly exaggerated, and in some cases actually false, the basic fact remains that it was his

Hanway, Vol.II, pages 74-78. The extent to which Elton's actions were resented in Russia may be gauged from the fact that, as long afterwards as December 1762, when the Earl of Buckingham was endeavouring to negotiate another commercial treaty in Moscow, he reported that, on touching upon the question of British trade with Iran, he found: "Mr. Elton's misconduct has made an impression which it will be very difficult to get the better of." See "The Despatches and Correspondence of John, Second Earl of Buckingham, Ambassador to the Court of Catherine II, 1762-1765." (London, 1900), page 113.


²Hanway, Vol.II, page 90.

³Hanway, Vol.II, page 120. According to Lerch (Büsching's "Magazin", Vol.X, page 460), Elton was murdered in 1750.

injudicious conduct in entering Nadir's service and in assisting him to found a navy on the Caspian which, by arousing the fears of Russia, brought about the collapse of the enterprise. As Hanway very truly remarked:...."unless we could convey our merchandize through the Russian empire with the good will of that nation, there could be no conveyance at all".¹ It was unfortunate that Elton did not use his undoubted talents in such a manner as not to prejudice the interests of the Russia Company merchants. If, for example, he could have persuaded Nadir to place him in charge of the Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf, he would have had ample scope for his abilities, without giving Russia any grounds for It is probable, however, that the East India Company offence. would not have relished anyone like Elton being appointed to a high position in the Iranian fleet, it being to that Company's advantage for Iran to have an ineffective fleet.

When all is said and done, however, it is clear that, even if Elton had done nothing to alienate the good will of Russia, the Iranian venture would have ended in failure, owing to the course of events in Iran.

Hanway, Vol.II, page 39.



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ABSTRACT OF A THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D.

NĀDIR SHĀH

By Laurence Lockhart, B.A., (1935)

This thesis is historical rather than biographical. The story of Nādir's life, after his rise to power, is to so large an extent that of Iran as well that it has been necessary to relate the history of that country during the period of Nādir's prominence; further, I have had to give, in outline, the course of events in adjacent countries, in so far as this was affected by Nādir's policy and acts. Ranging as he did from beyond Qārs in the west to Delhi in the east, threatening Russia for a time from Dāghistān, and seeking dominion in Turkistan and in Arabia, Nādir was undeniably a figure of great international importance for several years.

In compiling the thesis, I have utilised, as far as possible, purely contemporary authorities. When describing important events, I have endeavoured to draw my facts from more than one source; in fact, I have, throughout, sought to coordinate the Iranian and other authorities available. I have tried to be strictly impartial, neither seeking, to gloss over Nādir's illdeeds/nor to magnify his good actions.


In the course of my investigations, I was fortunate enough to come upon a fairly considerable amount of hitherto unutilised material, notably, at the India Office and the Public Record Office.


Events have been recorded chronologically, except in the last chapter where, in the appraisement of Nādir's qualities, I found that some recapitulation was necessary.


I have devoted some space to the activities and tribulations of the East India Company and of the Russia Company but, in order not to cumber the main narrative unduly, I have included in an appendix the bulk of the information respecting these two Companies.

Besides giving a bibliographical introduction, I have compiled a bibliography of the sources consulted, and I have had a series of maps prepared.









SHA

HĀZĪ

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• Charikar KŪHISTĀN

ABL

MAP ILLUSTRATING NADIR'S OPERATIONS AFGHANISTAN AND WESTERN INDIA

ZAMINDĂVAR

Scale of Miles

. KALĀT KA/CHH

KARACHI

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SHAL QUETTA

BĂMIĂN

MAP Nº6

