

GERMAN RULE IN NORTH-EAST TANZANIA, 1885 - 1914

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Abstract: German Rule in North-East Tanzania, 1885-1914

This is a study of German conquest, occupation and administration in the Pangani valley region of mainland Tanzania, which was the most important area of German settlement and economic enterprise in the former German East African protectorate. Its emphasis is mainly on the local evolution of German administrative and economic policies and methods. It examines the close connexion between the pre-colonial social and political situation in this region and the immediate reactions of its African peoples to the German intervention. It also studies how these reactions have shaped German policies. It has been established, for example, that the decisive factor in the assumption of direct responsibility by the Imperial Government for the administration of German East Africa in January 1891 was the inability of the German East African Company to govern on account of the opposition of the African peoples to the German intervention. Similarly, it was the shock of German military defeat at the hands of Moshi warriors in June 1892 that compelled the German authorities in Berlin and in Dar es Salaam to abandon their experiment in civil administration in Kilimanjaro in favour of vigorous military rule throughout the north-east. The abolition of military rule in Usambara and Southern Pare in 1895 and its continuation in Uchagga and north-Pare section of the Moshi district till 1906, and in its Arusha sub-district until 1912, were also dictated primarily by local political conditions. In like manner, the virtual transformation of the north-east into a region of white settlement by 1912, even in spite of the pro-African policies

of Dernburg and Rechenberg between 1907 and 1912, was as a result of the growth of German economic enterprise in this region and the consequent increase in the population and power of its European settler communities.

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P R E F A C E

This is an attempt at foraging in the rich but largely untouched field of German local administration in Tanzania. For, with the possible exception of Ralph Austen's rather limited treatment of German local administration in north-west Tanzania in his North-western Tanzania under German and British Rule, New Haven and London, 1968, no serious study of the subject has yet been undertaken either at the regional or the territorial level. Since the publication of F.F. Müller's pioneer study of the German acquisition of a protectorate in East Africa in Deutschland - Zanzibar - Ostafrika, Berlin, 1959, scholars interested in the history of the German period in Tanzania have understandably concentrated on the problems of European settlement and economic exploitation. This is what John Iliffe has done in Tanganyika under German Rule, 1907-1912, Detlef Bald in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1900 - 1914, München 1970, and Rainer Tetzlaff in Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung; Wirtschafts und Sozialgeschichte Deutsch-Ostafrikas 1885 - 1914, Berlin 1970.

Although quite a lot is now known about the pre-colonial history of the peoples of north-east Tanzania from the researches of Kathleen Stahl in her History of the Chagga Peoples of Kilimanjaro, London, 1964, of Isaria N. Kimambo in his Political History of the Pare of Tanzania, Nairobi 1969, and of Steven Feierman in 'The Shambala Kingdom: a history' Ph.D. thesis, North-Western University, 1970, very little is yet known about the early colonial period. This study is, therefore, aimed not only at emphasizing the link between

the pre-colonial and early colonial periods, but also at breaking the hitherto unhelpful tendency towards the compartmentalization of researches into the two periods. By concentrating on the development of the German administration and the growth of German economic enterprise in the European settler-controlled highland districts of north-east Tanzania, this study hopes to stimulate similar researches in other regions of the country, so that a general picture of German local administration on the territorial level can be obtained.

I would like to seize this opportunity to express my gratitude to all those, in Europe and Africa, who have assisted me in the different stages of my research. I am particularly grateful to the authorities of the following institutions for permission to work in their archives: the Public Records Office, London; the Church Missionary Society, London; the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, London; the Congrégation du Saint-Esprit, Paris; the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam; and the Tanzania National Archives, Dar es Salaam. My special thanks go to Dr. Enders of Potsdam and to my former teacher, Professor Dr. Walter Markow of Karl Marx University, Leipzig, for their assistance in providing me with microfilms of German Reichskolonialamt documents relevant to my research.

I must thank the University of Ife, Nigeria and particularly its Vice-Chancellor, Professor H. A. Oluwasanmi, for the generous research and travel grants made available to me during the period of my study. I am also grateful to the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and its Department of History, for the opportunity given me to work in the Tanzanian National Archives as a Research Associate of the University.

My thanks also go to Dr. John Iliffe, formerly of Dar es Salaam, but now of St. John's College, Cambridge for suggesting to me the need to undertake a general study of German dealings with the African peoples of Tanzania during the early colonial period.

Finally, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Professor Roland Oliver, for the interest he has shown in my work and for his guidance and helpful criticisms. Although I have benefited quite considerably from his many valuable suggestions, I wish to emphasize that the views expressed in this thesis are wholly mine.

Chapter I

The Pre-Colonial Background

To understand the rationale for the diverse forms of African response to the imposition of German rule in the north-east of what is now mainland Tanzania towards the end of the 19th century, an investigation of the social, economic and political situation among its various ethnic communities on the eve of the German intervention is imperative. For the second half of the 19th century was a period of revolutionary social change and of political conflicts in this region, as in most of the interior of East Africa. This revolutionary situation was the result of the influence of the commercial revolution which had occurred in East Africa during the two decades after 1840, when Seyyid Said, the Omani Arab ^{ruler} transferred his court from Muscat to Zanzibar.¹ This commercial revolution had attracted European merchants and consuls to Zanzibar, which in turn had stimulated European interest in the exploitation of the commerce of the East African interior.² It is undoubtedly significant that German soldiers and settlers were to travel along the caravan route up the Pangani valley, which had been opened up by the Arab/Swahili subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar, who had for several decades controlled the long-distance trade of this region.³

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1. Alpers, E., The Coast and the development of Caravan Trade in Kimambo, I.N., and Temu, A.J., (ed), A History of Tanzania, Nairobi, 1969, p.46.
 2. Galbraith, J.S., Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895, Cambridge, 1972, p.20.
 3. Alpers, E., loc cit., p.52.

The peoples of north-east Tanzania, for whom the Pangani formed a connecting link, are made up of two main cultural types - the Bantu cultivators and the Nilo-Hamitic pastoralists - each of whom had absorbed an earlier Cushitic population, the largest surviving group of which are the Iraqu or the Wambulu.⁴ The Bantu peoples are settled in two big clusters - the Zigua cluster and the Pare-Chagga cluster⁵ - in the mountain ranges of Usambara/Upare and Kilimanjaro/Meru, where relief induces a higher rainfall than on the surrounding dry steppe inhabited by the pastoral, Nilo-Hamitic Masai.⁶ Culturally and linguistically, the people of Usambara - the Shambaa - belong to the Zigua cluster, which also includes the Bondei of the hinterland of Tanga, the Nguu and the Zigua of Handeni, as well as the Luvu the riverain Zigua people of Korogwe.

According to a Zigua tradition,⁷ the Zigua had experienced an increase of population from about the sixteenth century onwards, which had forced streams of emigrants from Uzigua to seek new homes in the neighbouring hills and mountains. These emigrants had then taken the names of the regions in which they finally settled, thus creating the four main divisions of the Zigua tribe. Whatever the reliability of this tradition, which claims the Zigua as the parent

4. Kimambo, I.N., 'The Peopling of Tanzania' in Kimambo, I.N. and Temu, A. J., loc. cit., p.9.

5. Murdoch, G.P., Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History, New York, 1959, p.306.

6. For the influence of geography on settlement in this region see O'Connor, A. M., An Economic Geography of East Africa, London, 1966, p.4 and p.7.

7. Selemani Kiro, 'The history of the Zigua tribe,' translated by Petro Sh. Mntambo, Tanganyika Notes and Records, Jan. 1953, No. 34, p.70; also Meyer, Hans, Das Deutsche Kolonialreich, Band I, Leipzig and Wien, 1909, p.208.

tribe of the Nguu, the Bondei and the Shambaa, there is no doubt^{about} the high degree of cultural unity which exists among these four peoples groups. For, apart from the fact that they speak languages that are mutually intelligible with one another,⁸ they also have the same pattern of settlement, since unlike the people of the Pare-Chagga cluster, they all tend to live in scattered villages.⁹ Moreover, Shambaa traditions have shown that it was Mbegha, their leader^{of} one of these waves of Zigua immigrants from Nguu, who had established a unitary kingdom in Usambara sometime early in the 18th century.¹⁰

The Pare-Chagga cluster on the other hand, had been formed by movements of population mainly from Ukamba and Uteita in modern Kenya, although there are traditions which claim waves of immigrants have come into this area from Nguu and Usambara some time in the 18th century.¹¹ According to information given to Carl Peters, the pioneer of German colonization in East Africa, by Marealle, the chief of the Chagga state of Marangu, the people of Marangu were descendants of immigrants from Ukamba, while the people of Moshi, another Chagga state, had originally come from Usambara.¹² This latter fact is supported by the clan history of the chiefs of Moshi which also claims that the founder of the chiefdom was one Makilo,

8. Baumann, O., Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete, Berlin, 1891, p.180.

9. Murdock, G.P., op. cit., p.308.

10. Kimambo, I.N., 'The interior before 1800' in Kimambo, I.N. and Temu, A.J., op. cit., p.27.

11. Kimambo, I.N., The Political History of the Pare of Tanzania, Nairobi, 1969, p.35.

12. Peters, C., Das Deutsch Ostafrikanische Schutzgebiet, München and Leipzig, 1895, p.121.

who 'came from Usambara but was not a true Shambaa, being of the Kilindi tribe ...'.¹³ If anything, these traditions certainly point to the interaction of peoples in north-east Tanzania between the 16th and 19th centuries, which must have increased the cultural unity of the region.

This unity is further reflected in the development of chieftaincy institutions among its various Bantu peoples as a result of the transformation of their loose political system based on clan organisations by the necessity to provide for the increasingly complex requirements of settled agricultural communities.¹⁴ Even before this transformation had led to the creation of the Gweno state in Upare in the 16th century and the Shambaa kingdom in the 18th,¹⁵ clans of blacksmiths had played dominant political roles in the political lives of both Upare and Usambara.¹⁶ In Kilimanjaro, where the Chagga had tended to operate on the basis of small political units on account of the influence of their geographical environment, a clan of blacksmiths had also been prominent in the creation of the Chagga state of Mamba.¹⁷

The relationship which developed between these Bantu communities and their Masai neighbours in the 18th and 19th centuries

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13. Oliver, R., 'Discernible developments in the Interior,' in Oliver, R., and Mathews, G., (eds) History of East Africa, Vol. I, Oxford, 1963, p.204.
 14. Kimambo, I. N., 'The Interior before 1800' in Kimambo, I. N. and Temu, A., op. cit., pp.27-28.
 15. Ibid.
 16. Ibid.
 17. Ibid, and Stahl, K., History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro, London, 1964, p.294.

further helped to promote the cause of cultural unity in this region. For, by forcing the Wambugu, an essentially Cushitic people, to move across the Pangani in the 18th century,¹⁸ it had initiated the process of cultural diffusion, which was to lead to the creation of the two sub-cultures of the Kwavi on Upare¹⁹ and the Warush and Wameru in Kilimanjaro.²⁰ These sub-cultures were based on the mixed system of agriculture developed by the conjunction of the cultures of the Bantu cultivators and the Masai pastoralists. For while the Bantu had adopted the cattle culture of the Masai along with its age-grade organisation,²¹ the latter had themselves been considerably influenced by the sedentary agriculture of their Bantu neighbours.

Therefore, by the middle of the 19th century, before long-distance caravan trade was to act as catalyst for revolutionary change, there had been considerable interaction among the peoples of the Pangani valley. The tempo of this interaction had sometimes been dictated by the raids of the warlike Masai but largely by peaceful trade relations. For a network of regional trade connections, which were later to serve the ends of the Swahili-operated caravan traffic of the second half of the 19th century, had already come into existence. For example, the Shambaa had traded with the Swahili communities on the coast in Samli (Ghee) livestock, grain

18. Kimambo, I. N., *The Interior before 1800* ... p.29.

19. Ibid, pp.29-30.

20. Cory, H. 'Tribal Structure of the Arusha' in Tanganyika District Books, Vol. 3., School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

21. Oscar Baumann had noticed elements of republicanism among the Bantu of Usangi in north Pare. See Baumann, O., op. cit. p.254.

and tobacco in exchange for seas shells which were required for certain rituals in Usambara.²² By 1857 when the British explorer Richard Burton visited the country, there was considerable export of Shambaa grain to Zanzibar from the ports of Tanga and Pangani.²³ Burton had even noted that the tobacco exported from Usambara to Zanzibar was considered superior in flavour to that grown in other parts of the East African mainland.²⁴

The Shambaa had also maintained close trade relations with their Pare neighbours from whom they had obtained livestock in addition to goat and mpala skins, the latter of which was also a ritual object of some importance in Usambara.²⁵ These trade relations had led to the settlement of Shambaa and Zigua immigrants in the southern Pare plains,²⁶ starting a process which was to acquire a new political significance in the latter 19th century following the development of long-distance caravan traffic. The Pare had themselves traded iron to the Chagga states of Kilimanjaro, beginning with the Mamba chiefdom in the 18th century and the Keni chiefdom of Orombo early in the 19th.²⁷ The Chagga states had in turn supplied iron spears to the Masai and the Warush in exchange for cattle.²⁸ It is certainly ironical that Orombo, who would

22. Alpers, E. 'The Coast and the development of the Caravan trade' ... pp. 52-53.

23. Burton, R.F., Zanzibar; City, Island and Coast, Vol 2, London, 1872, p.228.

24. Ibid, p.233.

25. Alpers, E. loc. cit., p.53.

26. Oscar Baumann had reported on the existence of Zigua, Shambaa and Kamba settlements in Upare in 1890. See Baumann, O., op. cit., p.217; and Kimambo, I.N., A Political History of the Pare ... pp. 171-175.

27. Alpers, E., loc. cit., p.54.

28. Ibid.

probably have united the small Chagga chiefdoms into a powerful kingdom, had died fighting the Masai whom he had helped to arm!²⁹

The regularity, and indeed, the intensity of long-distance caravan traffic along the Pangani valley and across the Masai steppe from Mombasa³⁰ as from the middle of the 19th century were to create revolutionary changes of significant proportion in north-east Tanzania. Perhaps no ruler in this region knew more than Simbabwe Kimweri za Nyumbai of Usambara that this traffic must be rigorously controlled in the interest of stability and orderly development.³¹ This was why the external trade of the Shambaa kingdom was made a royal monopoly³², so as to prevent the Swahili traders from undermining the central authority by encouraging provincial chiefs to defy their king.

There is even some evidence that Kimweri had wanted to dispense with the services of these Swahili middlemen by trading directly with European merchants based at Zanzibar. This was why he had sent a commercial embassy under the leadership of one of his principal chiefs, the Mbeleko, to accompany his first European guest,

29. Kimambo, I. N., 'The Interior Before 1800' in Kimambo, I. N., and Temu, A., op. cit., p.29.

30. For a general account of the caravan traffic along these two main routes see Lamphear, J., 'The Kamba and the Northern Mrima' in Gray, R., and Birmingham, D., Pre-colonial African Trade, London, 1970, pp 95-96; and Kimambo, I. N., The Political History of the Pare ... pp. 125-127.

31. For the restrictions imposed on the entry and movements of foreigners in the kingdom by Kimweri see Burton, R.F., op. cit. p.212; and Krapf, J.L., Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours in Eastern Africa, London, 1860, p.275.

32. Coupland, R., East Africa and its Invaders, Oxford, 1938, p.351.

the German missionary Dr. Krapf, to Zanzibar in 1852 to make contacts with the European commercial houses operating from the island.³³ However, the opposition of the redoubtable Seyyid Said to any direct dealings between Europeans and what he regarded as his preserves in the East African interior was to end this dream. For the Sultan was anxious to demonstrate that he was in effective control of the East Coast and its hinterland in order to dispel rumours then circulating among Europeans in Zanzibar, particularly the French, that his authority was not effective on the mainland.³⁴ These rumours had gained ground as a result of a conversation which the missionary Krapf had with the French Consul on his return from Usambara in 1852, in which he said that he had seen the agents of Kimweri levy tributes on the coast.³⁵ By acting swiftly to assert his authority on the coast and to reach an accord with Kimweri in 1853,³⁶ Seyyid Said had begun Zanzibar's struggle to maintain her empire against the imperialist ambitions of the European powers.

The Zanzibar accord could not have come at a more opportune time for Kimweri, whose authority was then being threatened not only by constant Zigua raids but also by a dangerous separatist movement in the Shambaa sub-chiefdom of Mshihwi. Significantly, it was only with the assistance of Zanzibar that the Shambaa king could bring the situation under control.³⁷ However, Seyyid Said's intervention

33. Krapf, J.L., op. cit. p.404.

34. Groves, G.P., The Planting of Christianity in Africa, Vol. II, London, 1954, pp. 116-117.

35. Ibid.

36. Coupland, R., op. cit., pp. 351-352.

37. Ibid; and Burton, R.F., op. cit. pp. 192-193.

was to begin a period of Zanzibar's influence in the economic and political life of Usambara, and indeed of the whole of the Pangani valley. For his motive for assisting Kimweri with the security of his kingdom by the construction of a fort at Mt. Tongwe in Bondei was to give his Swahili subjects an undisturbed passage from Pangani into the interior. But as the aged Shambaa king was no longer able to exercise an effective personal supervision of his provincial chiefs, the Swahili traders took advantage of the situation to encourage these and other enterprising Shambaa to undertake private, illegal, trade. The result of this development was the collapse of central control of external trade and the increasing independence of the provincial chiefs from the king in Vugha far up on the mountain. It is certainly revealing that it was chief Semboja, the ruler of the important caravan village of Masinde on the plains below the Usambara range that led other provincial chiefs to revolt against Kimweri's young successor, Shekuluaru in 1869.³⁸

The Shambaa civil war, which lasted till the German military occupation of the lower Pangani valley in 1890, offered Swahili traders and provocateurs excellent opportunities to fish in the troubled waters of Usambara. During this rather protracted conflict, Semboja, the 'commercial prince', exploited to the full all his commercial connections not only with powerful Arab/Swahili and Indian traders and financiers in Zanzibar, Mombasa, Tanga and Pangani but also with the Zigua, the Masai, the Pare, the Teita and

38. Semboja had even shown tendencies to rebellion before the death of Kimweri za Nyumbai. See Baumann, O., op. cit. p.188.

the Kamba.³⁹ While his Arab and Indian patrons supplied him with firearms, his African allies in the interior provided him with auxiliaries and mercenaries which enabled him to take over the control of the royal capital of Vugha.⁴⁰ However, Semboja who was more interested in economic than in ritual power had stayed as chief of his caravan village of Masinde, allowing his eldest son, Kimweri, to keep up the appearance of power in Vugha. But in spite of their superior economic and military power, the Semboja faction was unable to impose order on the divided country, as the rival faction under Kibanga continued to rally the dissatisfied Shambaa against the illegitimate dynasty.⁴¹

Apart from the disintegration of the Shambaa kingdom, which allowed the Bondei to assert their independence,⁴² one great consequence of the Shambaa civil war was the growth of the slave trade in Usambara. Under the active encouragement of the Swahili traders who were the principal beneficiaries of this inhuman trade, prisoners captured by the two factions engaged in the war were sold into slavery. So great was the volume of this trade that Pangani became a major port of export for slaves, surpassing even Kilwa.⁴³

39. Abdallah bin Hemedi L'Ajje, Habari za Wakilindi, trans. ed. J.W.T. Allen, The Kilindi, Nairobi, 1963, pp. 129-130, p.175; and Extract from the Nationale Zeitung, Berlin, 14.8.1890, Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam, Reichskolonialamt, 404¹⁴ Report by Oscar Baumann on the political situation in Usambara.

40. Ibid; and Feierman, S., 'The Shambaa' in Roberts, A., Tanzania before 1900, Nairobi, 1968, pp. 10-11.

41. Baumann, O., Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete ... p.189.

42. For an account of this Bondei revolt by Abdallah bin Hemedi who had played a leading role in it see Habari za Wakilindi, pp. 198-231.

43. Müller, F.F., Deutschland - Zanzibar - Ostafrika, Berlin (East), 1959, p.94.

The result was not only the depopulation of the country but the destruction of its traditional social and economic system. Thus, on the eve of the German intervention, Usambara was a weak and bitterly divided country — a situation which gave the Germans excellent opportunities for manoeuvre.

In Upare, the political situation was similar to that of Usambara: the only difference was that the already confused political situation resulting from the fragmentation of the country's political structure, especially after the decline of the Gweno state in the 18th century,⁴⁴ was further confounded by the involvement of the Shambaa, the Teita and the Chagga in Pare politics. This involvement had been influenced by the fact that these neighbouring peoples had vital economic interests in the divided country. With the growth of caravan traffic along the Pangani-Moshi route in the second half of the 19th century, the Shambaa settlements which had developed in the Pare plains in the course of the century began to play the vital role of middlemen in the ivory and slave trade of Upare.⁴⁵ So lucrative was this trade that the ambitious Semboja of Masinde not only made efforts to tap it through his agents at the caravan centres of Kihurio and Gonja,⁴⁶ but also sought to secure the political control of the whole of southern Pare itself. The indigenous Pare chiefs, in order to maintain their position in the face of the aggressive economic competition which the caravan traffic had called into existence, were compelled to ally themselves

44. For the causes in this decline see Kimambo, I.N., *The Political History of the Pare* ... pp. 106-108.

45. For the development of caravan trade in Upare see *ibid*, pp. 126-128.

46. *Ibid*, pp. 171-174.

with particular coastal traders who readily supplied them with firearms in exchange for slaves.⁴⁷ The result was civil war in different parts of Upare - in Ugweno, in break-away Usangi, and in the smaller political units of the south.

In southern Pare, the decline in the influence of the traditional chiefs as a result of the troubled political conditions⁴⁸ had led to the rise of a new breed of upstart chiefs who owed their power not to tradition but to their success in the aggressive economic competition of the period. Although these new 'chiefs', like Mashombo of Mshewa,⁴⁹ the friend of Semboja of Masinde, were by no means popular since they had acquired their wealth and influence through slave raiding, they were tolerated by the Pare, who had learned to respect the regime of the strong. It was chiefs such as these that were later to serve as the flag bearers of the early German administration, making the Germans automatically unpopular with the Pare.

In northern Pare, civil war in Ugweno, following the secession of Usangi, had enabled Chagga chiefs to intervene in Pare politics, just as Semboja had done in the south. For Mandara of Moshi, who had originally been invited by Ghendewa of Ugweno to help him keep his chiefdom in fact had later come back to raid his former ally for cattle, ivory and slaves.⁵⁰ The Gweno chief was even killed in one of the slave raids organised by the Moshi

47. Ibid, pp. 127-128.

48. These had been aggravated by natural disasters like persistent drought, famine and the outbreaks of rinderpest in the second half of the 19th century. See *ibid*, pp.193-195.

49. Ibid, pp. 158-159; and 194-195.

50. Kimambo, I.N., *The Political History of the Pare ...* p.141.

warriors of Mandara. The political confusion resulting from the war of succession after Ghendewa's death later turned the unhappy chiefdom into a veritable reserve for hunting slaves. In their reports of January 1887 and October 1888 on Chagga slave raids in Ugweno, Messrs. Fitch⁵¹ and Taylor⁵² of the English Church Missionary Society's station at Moshi, had accused the Swahili traders based at Marangu and Taveta of encouraging both Mandara and his son-in-law Marealle of Marangu to undertake expeditions for 'routing up the miserable ... Waheno (sic)'.⁵³ Fitch who was genuinely worried that slave raiding would impede the efforts of the C. M. S. missionaries just establishing themselves in Uchagga, said Mandara had paid no attention to their arguments against the evils of slave trade. To the Moshi chief, 'the Swahili argument is better, for it is backed by gun-powder and calico.'⁵⁴

It is clear, therefore, that in the last two decades of the 19th century, the slave trade had replaced the peaceful trade in cattle, ironware and ivory as the most important economic activity of the leading Chagga states. The growth of this destructive trade had been influenced both by the need of the Chagga chiefs for fire-arms to prosecute their petty wars and the requirements of the Swahili traders who needed slaves not only to carry their ivory stocks to the coast but also to supply labour for the plantations of their

51. Fitch to Lang, 7.1.7, G3.A5/0 1887, CMS Archives, London.

52. Taylor to Price, 22.10.1888, G3.A5/0 1889, CMS Archives, London.

53. Ibid.

54. Fitch to Lang, 7.1.87, loc. cit.

wealthy Arab patrons in Zanzibar and Pemba.⁵⁵ During this period, the two most powerful Chagga chiefs, Sina of Kibosho⁵⁶ and Mandara of Moshi, had competed with each other for support not only among other lesser Chagga chiefs but among the warlike Masai and Warush as well as the Swahili traders.⁵⁷ It was, however, the latter chief, who was the weaker, who was able through careful diplomacy,⁵⁸ to secure greater support from the two groups; for it was in the interest of these traders to keep the Chagga states disunited and perpetually at war with one another. Of the Swahili traders most friendly to Moshi, Jumbe Kimemeta and the Swahili Fundi or Shundi, both of whom operated from Pangani,⁵⁹ were later to play significant

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55. Volkens, G., Der Kilimandscharo, Berlin, 1897, p.229. Volkens, who served as Agricultural Officer in Marangu between 1892 and 1893, claimed that it was Mandara of Moshi who first started selling his prisoners of war into slavery.
56. Sina was militarily the most powerful of all the Chagga chiefs before the German intervention. See Stahl, K., 'Outline of Chagga History' in Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 64, March 1965, p.42.
57. Ibid; and Stahl, K., History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro, London, 1964, p.243.
58. Ibid.
59. These two traders belonged to two different social classes in the class-conscious Swahili society. The former belonged to the pure Swahili aristocracy and was in 1885 a 'sub-governor of Pangani'. See General Mathews to Archdeacon Farler, 17.10.1885, Extract from The Times of London, n.d., enclosed in Kitchener to F.O., 30.6.1886, FO 84/1799, PRO London. The latter was 'a man from Kavirondo', who was certainly the Fundi Hadschi, the servant of the ivory hunter and trader Msukuma mentioned by Von der Decken in 1862. See Johannes to Government, 19.3.1897, G8/99, 104-105, Tanzania National Archives; and Kersten, O., Baron Carl Claus von der Decken in Ost-Afrika, Vo. II, Chp. 22, pp. 7-8.

roles in influencing the attitude of the Chagga to the German intervention and eventual occupation. For while the former would try to prepare the Chagga, particularly Moshi, for the rejection of German rule in favour of Zanzibar, the latter was to reconcile Uchagga to the German administration. And as the Swahili traders had worked to keep the Chagga disunited, so were the Germans to exploit Chagga disunity to further their political and economic interests.

On the eve of the German intervention, therefore, the political situation in the Pangani valley region was such that its peoples were in no position to prevent their domination by any external power strong enough to impose its will by force of arms. Since the Sultan of Zanzibar, whose subjects controlled its trade, had lacked the means to make his claims to overlordship in the East African interior effective, this region like other parts of the interior, was to fall under the iron grip of the Germans.

Chapter 2

The Scramble for the Pangani Valley Region, 1885 - 1890

If Carl Peters, the pioneer of German colonization in East Africa, had been given a free hand, German expansion in East Africa would certainly have started not from the obscure region of Usagara in the hinterland of Saadani, which no German before him had visited but from the comparatively well-known Pangani valley region, extending from the Pangani coast to Kilimanjaro, where Germans had been the first Europeans to undertake the work of exploration.¹ In fact, the German missionary J. Rebmann of the British Church Missionary Society's mission station at Rabai, who was in 1848 the first European to discover Mt. Kilimanjaro, was also the first to express the need for a European settlement in Uchagga.² But considerations of strategy demanded that Peters' first bid for territorial acquisition in East Africa should be kept secret in view of the prevailing British policy of supporting the independence and territorial integrity of the Sultan of Zanzibar,³ whose claims to the East African interior were extensive but undefined. He could not, therefore, have started from the immediate

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1. For the travels of J.L. Krapf and J. Rebmann and C.C. von der Decken, see Krapf, J.L.; Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours in Eastern Africa, Lond.; 1860, and von der Decken, C.C., Reisen in Ost-Afrika in den Jahren 1859 bis 1865 bearbeitet von Otto Kersten, 4 vols Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1869.
 2. Krapf, J.L., op. cit., p.246.
 3. For the development of this policy see Bennett, N.R., Studies in East African History, Boston, 1963, p.57.

Pangani hinterland without risking detection. And at that crucial stage, detection would have led to Britain making strong diplomatic representations to the Berlin Government of Prince Bismarck, who was not yet committed to a policy of colonial expansion, to frustrate his plans. It was only after the success of his Usagara expedition of November 1884 had generated such public interest and enthusiasm for colonial expansion in Germany as to force the hands of the reluctant Bismarck,⁴ that he could direct his attention to the acquisition of the Pangani valley region.

Indeed, the initial support in Germany for the efforts of Carl Peters' Colonial Society, which had sponsored the Usagara expedition had led to apprehension in Britain and Zanzibar about the extent of German colonial ambitions in East Africa. The result was that, before the official announcement on 2nd March 1885 of the declaration of a German protectorate over Usagara,⁵ British Consular officials in Zanzibar had been urging both the British Government and commercial interests to take speedy action to counter a possible German intervention into East Africa. The first to act was Sir John Kirk, the British Consul-General in Zanzibar. Having opposed in September 1884, a proposal made by the British geographer and explorer, Harry Johnston, that Britain should declare a protectorate over Kilimanjaro,⁶ he could not be expected to look kindly on the German claims. Even while Carl Peters was busy collecting 'treaties'

4. Eberlie, R.F., 'The German Achievement in East Africa' in Tanganyika Notes and Records, (TNR), No.55, Sept.1960, pp. 182 -183.

5. Rohlfs to Kirk, 3.3.1885, in Kirk to Granville, 13.3.1885, PRO London FO 84/1724.

6. Kirk to Granville, 27.9.1884; also Memorandum by Mr. Hill, explaining No. 86, confidential, to Sir John Kirk, FO 84/1676.

in the hinterland of Saadani, Kirk would only go so far as to support a scheme whereby British subjects, especially missionaries, would be encouraged to operate in Kilimanjaro, thereby creating a situation which the British Government could later seek to defend.⁷ For it was his belief that apart from the fact that Britain had been bound by treaty with France since 1862 to guarantee the integrity of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, British interests could best be served by helping the Sultan to consolidate his authority in the interior. But since the Usagara expedition had not only challenged the authority of the Sultan in the interior but had also stimulated a scramble for the Zanzibar empire, Kirk, acting on instructions from London,⁸ had to secure a declaration from Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar that he would 'cede no sovereign rights or territory to any association or power without consent of England'.⁹

As soon as this declaration was secured,¹⁰ the British Consul-General put before Seyyid Barghash a British Government proposal for a joint Anglo/Zanzibar expedition to Kilimanjaro under the command of General Mathews, the Sultanate's British military chiefs, to negotiate 'treaties with the chiefs of the district through which they should recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan ...'.¹¹ In return for sharing in the expenses of this expedition and guaranteeing the security of Zanzibar during its

7. Kirk to Granville, 23.11.1884, PRO London, FO 84/1679.

8. Granville to Kirk, 27.11.1884, FO 84/1676.

9. Ibid.

10. Coupland R., East Africa and its Invaders, Oxford, 1938, p.388.

11. Granville to Kirk, 5.12.1884, FO 84/1676.

absence, Britain would expect the Sultan to grant the British Government 'at any future time the right of pre-emption of so much land at any of the coastal ports as may be found necessary for the erection of any works tending to advance the continued prosperity of the district in question'.¹² The aim of this policy of securing an indirect control of Kilimanjaro through the extension of the influence of Zanzibar was to protect British commercial interests without necessarily increasing British imperial responsibility in East Africa beyond what they already were.¹³

Meanwhile, Kirk's deputy, Consul Holmwood, on leave in England, was publicly urging the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, in February 1885, to develop Kilimanjaro for trade and settlement.¹⁴ He was also privately urging the British Foreign Office to declare a protectorate over the region to prevent Britain 'being forestalled by others'.¹⁵ In order to arouse the interest of the Manchester capitalists in his proposal, which included the construction of a railway linking Kilimanjaro with the port of Mombasa, he painted a rather exaggerated picture of the commercial potentialities of the region. From the information he had collected from the British explorer Joseph Thomson, and from native sources, he believed that there could be found

12. Ibid.

13. Memorandum by Mr. Hill, 29.11.1884, explaining No. 86, confidential, to Sir John Kirk, FO 84/1676; for details of this policy see Galbraith, J.S., Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 87-88.

14. Extract from the Manchester Guardian, 13.2.1885 in Holmwood to Granville, 19.2.1885, FO 84/1730.

15. Holmwood to Granville, 19.2.1885, loc. cit.

' ... 300 tons of ivory lying dormant, the trade at present not being touched in that district. Then there are 200 or 300 tons of India rubber; I think you would probably find as much copal as the market would take, and I feel certain that you would find 300,000 hides from that district. There are enormous herds of cattle scattered about the country for hundreds of miles. The natives do nothing with them, they merely keep them; and I think you will find the export of hides a profitable business'.¹⁶

In a private correspondence with Lord Granville, he explained how such a scheme could be successfully executed. He believed that a railway between Kilimanjaro or Taveta, and Mombasa, or one of the adjacent ports beyond the limits of the Sultan of Zanzibar's monopoly district between Tanga and Kwale, would be viable for two main reasons. First, it would divert ivory from the 'old trade routes' leading to the ports of Bugamoyo and Saadani, to Mombasa, where as he argued, the ivory export, relieved of all duties, 'could well afford the additional freight for railway transit', which would itself be better than the established system of head portage. Secondly, the export of ivory 'from the undeveloped region beyond Kilimanjaro' even at half the quantities he mentioned to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce would add £30,000 to the annual income'.¹⁷ Assuming that the cost of constructing a 140-mile railway and equipment was £700,000 he claimed that there was 'good reason for

16. Extract from the Manchester Guardian, 13.2.1885, loc. cit.

17. Holmwood to Granville, 19.2.1885, F084/1730.

believing that after allowing for the working expenses, the capital invested would yield a return of about 5 per cent'.¹⁸ Since the coastal port necessary for the success of the scheme belonged to the empire of Zanzibar, he suggested that the Sultan should be induced to grant a concession for the scheme 'on terms which would admit of construction of a railway being deferred pending a further survey of the country'.¹⁹ Although this scheme appeared well thought-out, it was not immediately taken up either by the Manchester capitalists, whose organ, the Manchester Guardian, had expressed doubts about its profitability,²⁰ or by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, who had believed that it was for the commercial world to decide whether they wanted it or not.²¹

Significantly, it was during this period of British indecision that news reached Zanzibar that Germany intended to declare a protectorate²² over a part of East Africa outside the coast and interior 'where the Sultan's flag and authority are established'.²³ By March 1885, when Kirk reported on German activities in East Africa, both the old German trading firms of Oswald and Co. and Hansing and Co., long established in Zanzibar trade, and the agents of the new German East Africa Company of Carl Peters²⁴, had begun to establish

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Extract from the Manchester Guardian, 13.2.1885, loc. cit.

21. Footnote comment by Lord Granville to Holmwood to Granville 19.2.1885, F084/1730.

22. This had in fact, been declared on February 27, 1885 in Germany by the Kaiser. See Müller, F.F., Deutschland Zanzibar Ostafrika, Berlin (East) 1959, p.38.

23. Kirk to Granville, 8.3.1885, F084/1730.

24. For the background to the formation of this company see Müller, F.F., op. cit., chp. 3.

themselves along the coast, particularly at Bagamoyo, and in the interior, in Usagara. It was therefore in reaction to this German initiative that the British Consul-General began to put into operation his own scheme for the establishment of an informal British protectorate over Kilimanjaro. This was, however, after he had informed Seyyid Barghash that 'under any new order of things, such as that threatened' by the German irruption, the primary consideration of British policy, which had hitherto been to support the independence and territorial integrity of Zanzibar, would now be 'to see we are not shut out from markets that promise a great extension in the immediate future'.²⁵ It was to establish British claims to an effective occupation of the Kilimanjaro region that Kirk had in March 1885 requested Bishop Hannington of the Church Missionary Society to establish a mission station either in Taveta or Uchagga.²⁶ Hannington, who paid a visit to Kilimanjaro in the following month, would still have preferred a place near the coast, in spite of the friendly reception given him by Mandara, the diplomatic chief of Moshi.²⁷ But Kirk, who had hoped that the proposed mission would help him establish good relations with the chiefs of the area had done his best to influence the choice of Moshi, even in spite of his own admission of the unsettled political situation in the district.²⁸

It may well be pointed out that Kirk was not taking any liberty with his decision, as this line of action had already been

25. Kirk to Granville, 16.3.1885, F084/1724.

26. Ibid.

27. Hannington to Wigram, 21.4.1885; Hannington to stock, n.d; CMS Archives, London, G3. A5/0, 1885; also Kirk to Granville, 5.4.1885, F084/1725.

28. Kirk to Granville, 23.11.1884, F084/1679.

endorsed by the Foreign Office in December, 1884.²⁹ By influencing the CMS to establish a mission in Uchagga, he was simply playing one of the two cards in the diplomatic game to forestall the German acquisition of a region where Britain could claim territorial rights prior to that of any other country including Zanzibar. The British claim was based on an agreement concluded by Harry Johnston in July 1884 with the chiefs of Taveta, who had granted him a concession with governmental rights in the district.³⁰ This concession had in April 1885 aroused the interest of Sir William Mackinnon and a group of Manchester businessmen, whose aim was to prevent East Africa falling into German hands as a result of British inaction.³¹ It was, therefore, on behalf of this group called the British East African Association that Granville asked Kirk to enquire 'privately and unofficially' whether the concession which Mackinnon had unsuccessfully negotiated in 1878³² would now be acceptable if it were modified so as to secure existing treaty rights and to apply to the region from Saadani northwards.³³ The Foreign Secretary would also want to know whether the Sultan would claim the settlement in Kilimanjaro as under his sovereignty³⁴ before deciding on what would be his reaction to the proposal of the British East African Association, that the Sultan of Zanzibar be encouraged

29. Granville to Kirk, 5.12.1884, F084/1725.

30. For the background to the acquisition of this concession see Oliver, R., Sir Harry Johnston and the scramble for Africa, London, 1957, pp.73-75.

31. For details of this see Galbraith, J.S., op. cit., pp.95-97.

32. For a discussion of this proposed Mackinnon concession see Ibid., pp.55-70.

33. Granville to Kirk, 27.4.1884/1722.

34. Ibid.

to assign to them all his powers on the mainland and all islands except Zanzibar and Pemba in return for a fixed annual income and participation in the company to administer the concession.³⁵ It is particularly significant that this cautious request was made only two days after the German consul Rholf had officially notified Seyyid Barghash and other consular representatives on the island of Zanzibar of the declaration of a German protectorate over Usagara, Uzigua, Ukami and Nguru.³⁶

The declaration of a German protectorate over an area which Kirk had himself admitted could not be said to be actually under Zanzibar's sovereignty,³⁷ had immediately produced a crisis of confidence in Seyyid Barghash's relations with the European powers. The British Consul-General, who in January 1885 had been talking of his plans 'to cautiously sound the Sultan regarding joint action proposed',³⁸ now informed London that Seyyid Barghash was taking apparently independent decisions to protect his own interests. The first of these was to send a body of troops under General Mathews to the area being claimed by the German East African Company. On April 25, 1885, the day the Sultan was officially informed of the declaration of the German protectorate over Usagara and the neighbouring district, Count Joachim von Pfeil, an agent of the German company, who had established his company's first station at Sima in Usagara, had reported to the German consul in Zanzibar that about

35. Galbraith, J.S., *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

36. Kirk to Granville, 28.4.1885, F084/1725.

37. Kirk to Granville, 2.1.1885, F084/1730.

38. *Ibid.*

two or three dozen soldiers had been stationed in Muini, Usagara, by General Mathews.³⁹ Only the intervention of the British Consul-General had prevented Seyyid Barghash from personally leading his troops to the dispute region. Although Kirk had informed the Foreign Office that the Sultan's action was 'spontaneous',⁴⁰ it is difficult not to believe that he had urged Seyyid Barghash, on whom he exercised great influence, to assert his claims to the region before sending an official protest to the German Emperor on April 27, 1885.⁴¹

There is, however, a strong clue, provided by Kirk himself, that the Sultan had by then become suspicious of all Europeans, including his traditional friends, the British. For, before taking his other important decision to send a military expedition under General Mathews to establish his authority in Kilimanjaro, Seyyid Barghash had, without consulting the British Consul-General, who knew only about the proposed one under General Mathews, sent Jumbe Kimemeta, the sub-Governor of Pangani,⁴² 'to hoist the Zanzibar flag along the Pangani road to Chagga and assert his claims to suzerainty in that quarter'.⁴³ The Sultan had apparently taken this independent action for two main reasons. First, he had considered it necessary to act quickly to forestall the German Kilimanjaro expedition under Dr. Carl Jühlke and Lt. Kurt Weiss, which had been seen in Pangani

39. Pfeil to Rohlfs, 25.4.1885 in Rholfs to Bismarck, 30.6.1885, Deutsches Zentralarchiv (DZA) Potsdam, RKA 382.

40. Kirk to Granville, 1.5.1885, F084/1725.

41. Seyyid Barghash to Kaiser Wilhelm I, 27.4.1885, DZA, RKA 391.

42. General Mathews to Farler, 17.10.1885, Extract from the Times of London, n.d., enclosed in Kitchener to F.O., 30.6.1886, F084/1799.

43. Kirk to Granville, 7.5.1885, F084/1725.

on April 30, 1885.⁴⁴ Secondly, he was particularly anxious not to give an impression that his authority in the Pangani valley region had been established with British assistance, just as the British Government was itself anxious not to appear as furthering the power of Zanzibar in the interior in opposition to the colonial efforts of Germany.⁴⁵ What the Sultan appeared to have wanted was for the Mathews expedition to find that his authority had already been recognised by the chiefs of the region and simply to record the fact of this situation in treaties of acquisition which would then be communicated to the European powers through their consuls in Zanzibar. Seyyid Barghash was, therefore, prepared to act alone, though with Kirk's unofficial blessing,⁴⁶ as Granville had insisted in a despatch on May 1, 1885 that his action with regard to Kilimanjaro must be 'spontaneous', and that no British official must accompany the proposed expedition.⁴⁷ This abandonment of the earlier proposal for a joint Anglo/Zanzibar Kilimanjaro expedition was dictated primarily by considerations of European diplomacy, as the Gladstone Government was unwilling to antagonise Germany at a time when British

44. Kirk to Granville, 9.5.1885, F084/1725; the German expedition had started late because Kirk's agents at the Zanzibar Post Office had delayed the despatch of Dr. Peter's telegram urging that the Juhlke team move at once towards Kilimanjaro. See Bennett, N.R. 'The British on Kilimanjaro, 1884-1892', TNR No. 63, Sept. 1964, p.233.

45. The British position on this had been made clear to Kirk in December 1884. See Lister to Kirk, 20.12.1884, F084/1676.

46. Arendt, the German Consul, had believed that Kirk had in fact influenced the despatch of the expedition. Arendt to Bismarck, 7.5.1885, DZA, Potsdam, R.K.A. 384.

47. Granville to Kirk, 1.5.1885, F084/1722.

relations with France and Russia were at a low ebb.⁴⁸

While the Jühlke expedition was still busy collecting 'Treaties' of acquisition in the hinterland of Pangani - in Bondei and Southern Usambara - the Zanzibar expedition under General Mathews, had left Mombasa on May 7, 1885,⁴⁹ for Kilimanjaro via the Mombasa-Taveta-Moshi route. They had succeeded not only in getting the elders of Taveta to accept the overlordship of the Sultan of Zanzibar,⁵⁰ but in persuading Mandara of Moshi, with the help of Jumbe Kimemeta, who had just assisted the Moshi chief to beat off an invasion from the powerful Sina of Kibosho,⁵¹ to arrange a conference of Chagga chiefs friendly with or subordinate to him at Moshi. At this conference, which took place on May 30, 1885, Mandara of Moshi, Fumba of Kilema, Marealle of Mamba and some chiefs from Arusha/Meru were reported to have put their marks on a declaration already prepared from Zanzibar in which they all claimed that they were the subjects of 'His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar'.⁵² As a proof of their recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty, they had all received the red flag of Zanzibar, and had also agreed to send a delegation to accompany General Mathews to Zanzibar to demonstrate their allegiance to the Sultan.⁵³ Since Sina, the chief of Kibosho would not come to Moshi on account of the war between him and Mandara,

48. See Galbraith, J.S., op. cit., pp. 90-91.

49. Kirk says he was informed by Consul Smith from Mombasa that the expedition would leave on May 7, 1885. Kirk to Granville, 6.5.1885, FO84/1725.

50. Mathews to Smith 25.5.1885, in Smith to Granville, 10.6.1885, FO/1730.

51. Mathews to Farler, 17.10.1885, Extract from the Times of London, in Kitchener to FO, 30.6.1886, FO84/1799.

52. Kirk to Granville, 3.6.1885, FO84/1799.

53. Ibid.

General Mathews had to meet him at Taveta, together with his vassal chiefs from Western Kilimanjaro and Rombo, to get them to put their own marks on the Chagga declaration of May 30 and to receive their own flags.⁵⁴

Convinced that his mission had been a huge success, and that the Germans had been kept out, General Mathews and his troops had then marched to the coast along the Pangani Valley to reaffirm the Sultan's already established influence in Usambara and Bondei. However, on their way back they had seen a small party of European travellers, which at the sight of the troops, had quickly struck camp and hurriedly disappeared into the bush.⁵⁵ This was, in fact, the Jühlke expedition, which on the conclusion of its tasks in Bondei and Usambara was then making for Kilimanjaro. Dr. Carl Jühlke and his men had carefully avoided meeting General Mathews because, as in Usagara, the activities to the agents of the German East African Company had always been shrouded in the utmost secrecy, especially as the expedition intended to conclude its own treaty with the same Mandara of Moshi. In fact, Jühlke's treaty with Mandara was concluded on June 19,⁵⁶ before the Zanzibar expedition under General Mathews could report to the Sultan.

One might wonder why it was Mandara of Moshi and not any other Chagga chief who was at the centre of the struggle between Zanzibar and Germany for the acquisition of Kilimanjaro. Although he was not the most powerful chief in Uchagga, Mandara had by

54. Mathews to Farler, 17.10.1885, loc. cit.

55. Rholf's to Bismarck, 3.7.1885, DZA, RKA 384.

56. For the background to the conclusion of this treaty, see Peters, C., Wie Deutsch - Ostafrika entstand, Leipzig, 1940, pp. 92-99.

July 1884, when Sir Harry Johnston visited him,⁵⁷ successfully established himself as the Chagga chief best known outside Kilimanjaro. This was because he was able to take advantage of the central location of Moshi and his alliance and friendship both with the Warush and the Arab/Swahili traders to turn his chiefdom into the commercial capital of Kilimanjaro. Since the coastal traders were interested in slaves and ivory, he had influenced his Warush allies to assist his own warriors to raid other Chagga chiefdoms as well as those of Ugweni in northern Pare for slaves and cattle.⁵⁸ To ensure that Moshi also became a centre of the ivory trade, he had recruited experienced elephant hunters from Ukamba and Uteita.⁵⁹ And as the traffic in slaves and ivory increased, so had Mandara grown in wealth, power, and fame; for it was the Arab/Swahili traders who supplied him with firearms for raiding purposes who had also carried exaggerated reports of his greatness to the East African coast.

Mandara himself, with an eye for diplomacy, had clearly recognised the value of outside contacts. This was why he had not only maintained relations with Semboja,⁶⁰ the powerful Kilindi chief of Masinde in Usambara, and with influential Arab/Swahili traders in Mombasa, Tanga and Zanzibar, but also with the Sultan of Zanzibar and with John Kirk, through whom he had communicated with Queen

57. For the details of Harry Johnston's visit to Kilimanjaro, see Oliver R., Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa, London 1957, pp. 62-66; Johnston, H.H., The Kilimanjaro Expedition, Lond. 1886; Coupland, R. The Exploitation of East Africa, Lond. 1939, pp. 383-384.

58. Fitch to Lang, 7.1.1887, CMS G3 A5/O 1887; and Stahl, K., History of the Chagga people of Kilimanjaro, Lond. 1964, p.243.

59. Volkens, G., Der Kilimandscharo, Berlin 1897, p.299.

60. Stahl, K., o. cit., p.249.

Victoria.⁶¹ Even the English Church Missionary Society's mission in Mombasa was not left out of his diplomatic schemes.⁶² Just as he would not allow any European traveller to pass through his chiefdom to visit other parts of the mountain⁶³ so would he not permit the CMS to operate anywhere in Uchagga outside his domain. Although it soon became obvious that he was just one of many Chagga chiefs and that he was even surrounded by enemies,⁶⁴ Mandara's fame outside Kilimanjaro was such that European visitors to Uchagga in the 1880's had appeared more inclined to deal with a chief who was reputed to be friendly than seek new and uncertain friends. The result of this attitude was the diplomatic isolation and virtual relegation of Sina of Kibosho, who was the most powerful chief in Kilimanjaro.

If the Chagga Declaration of General Mathews of May 30 and Jühlke's treaty with Mandara of June 19, 1885 are considered against the background of the current political situation in Kilimanjaro, the former appeared more realistic, as it had not recognised the paramountcy of the chief of Moshi. But unlike General Mathews, who was certainly aware of the true extent of Mandara's powers, Carl Jühlke and his companion Lt. Kurt Weiss, had been deceived by the clever Mandara, who had described himself to them as 'the undisputed, sole, legal possessor of the whole of Uchagga, Arusha Ugweni ...'⁶⁵ He was therefore not only recognised by the Germans as the 'Sultan

61. Wrag to Lang, 25.5.1885, CMS G3. A5/O 1885.

62. Hannington to Stock, n.d., CMS G3. A5/O 1885.

63. As early as 1869, Mandara had given von der Decken the impression that he was the King of the Chagga. See Peters, C., Das Deutsche Ostafrikanische Schutzgebiet, Munich, 1895, p.121.

64. Oliver, R., *op.cit.* p.66.

65. A special issue of the Kolonial - Politische - Korrespondenz, 6.8.1885, DZA, RKA 384,53.

of the Chagga but also secured the inclusion in the treaty a special clause which enjoined Jühlke to bring 'the rebellious governor of the province of Kibosho under his overlordship in a friendly manner'.⁶⁶

One might also wonder why Mandara had agreed to sign treaties with two different powers offering them the same piece of territory. The clue to this has been provided by Mandara himself. During the first interview he granted Messrs Fitch and Wray, the first resident CMS missionaries in Moshi, who had arrived there on July 1, 1885, Mandara was reported to have indicated his desire to give his country to the highest bidder saying 'the Sultan of Zanzibar wants my country, the Germans want my country, you want my country, whoever wants my country, must pay for it'.⁶⁷ It was certainly this motive of financial gain that had prevented him from telling Carl Jühlke that he had voluntarily entered into an agreement with General Mathews, on behalf of the Sultan of Zanzibar, hoping thereby to be able to get the presents brought by the Germans. Mandara was in fact, reported to have told Jühlke that he liked the Germans 'more than any other people, particularly the English and the Arabs', and that he was flying the Sultan of Zanzibar's flag out of respect and in consideration of the sum of 600 rupees given him to do so by General Mathews.⁶⁸ It is also true that he, like the other Chagga chiefs was unable to understand that the treaties implied the loss of independence. To Mandara in particular, and his attitude was certainly typical, flags meant no more than objects of curiosity

66. *ibid*, and Peters, C., Wie Deutsch - Ostafrika entstand, pp.97-99.

67. Fitch to Hannington, 9.7.1885)
Fitch to Lang, 3.8.1885) CMS G3. A5/O 1885.

68. Kolonial Politische Korrespondenz 6.8.1885. loc. cit., and Peters, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

and adornment.⁶⁹

By the end of June, 1885, when consular representatives in Zanzibar were officially informed of the Sultan's claims to sovereignty over Uchagga, Taveta, Uteita and Arusha, on the strength of General Mathews' treaties,⁷⁰ the ambiguity of British policy on the Kilimanjaro question was gradually being resolved in favour of an understanding with Germany. The conciliatory British approach to German claims in East Africa had, in fact, begun early in May, as General Mathews was on his way to Kilimanjaro to secure the region for Zanzibar. In this shift of emphasis from a policy of supporting the Sultan of Zanzibar to that of achieving a rapprochement with Germany, considerations of European diplomacy were the guiding factor. Sir Edward Malet, the British Ambassador in Berlin, strongly opposed Kirk's demands for a dynamic, pro-Zanzibar, East African policy⁷¹. Further, Malet obtained and transmitted to ^{the} German Foreign Office, an unequivocal clarification of British policy regarding the colonial efforts of Germany in East Africa, which had earlier been vaguely expressed in generalized statement that the British Government had 'no intention of opposing the German Schemes of colonization in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar ...',⁷² In a strongly-worded despatch on June 5, 1885, after arguing for a reversal of the British policy of consolidating the power of the Sultan on the mainland in favour of an Anglo/German commercial exploitation of East Africa, Malet had warned thus:

69. Bennett, N.R., loc. cit., p.239.

70. Kirk to Granville, 3.6.1885, F084/1799.

71. Kirk to Granville, 9.5.1885 on the need to support the Sultan reported to Malet in Granville to Malet, 11.5.1885, F084/1711.

72. Granville to Malet, 25.5.1885, F084/1711.

'If we cannot or will not work with Germany we shall be in a very awkward position because the German protection will be rendered effective despite us, and our influence with the Sultan must collapse, to say nothing of the chances of Zanzibar being blockaded'.⁷³

In fact, before the unequivocal declaration of May 30, 1885, that the British Government would welcome German colonial schemes 'the realization of which will entail the civilization of large tracts which hitherto no European influence has touched', Granville had informed Kirk in Zanzibar that the Sultan's claims in Usagara ... had already been prejudiced', and that the British Government was 'favourable to German enterprise in districts not occupied by any civilized power'.⁷⁴ Now that the considerations of European diplomacy had forced Britain to recognise the right of Germany to territorial acquisition in the East African interior, the British Government was not prepared to reconsider its position regarding the proposals of the British East African Association interested in taking advantage of Johnston's Taveta concession to exploit the commerce of Kilimanjaro. It is particularly significant that it was on May 30, 1885, when Sir Edward Malet informed the German Foreign Office about British support for German claims in Usagara, that the interest of this association in the Kilimanjaro region was made known to the German Government.⁷⁵ And the German Government, thankful for British support on the Usagara question, replied that they had no objection to the proposed scheme: moreover that in view of the good relations existing between the two Govern-

73. Malet to Granville, 5.6.1885, F084/1712.

74. Granville to Kirk, 20.5.1885, F084/1722; also Coupland, R.,

75. Malet to Granville, 5.6.1885, loc. cit.

ments, they had every reason to hope that they would arrive at 'an understanding with Her Majesty's Government on this question as they had done in regard to New Guinea and West Africa ...'.⁷⁶ Although the German reply was pointing towards a policy of partitioning the Kilimanjaro area between the two powers, the British Government simply related it to German claims to Usagara, as the German expedition to Kilimanjaro had not yet returned with their own treaties of acquisition.

It was therefore in the spirit of this Anglo/German accord, reinforced by the German promise not to use force to obtain concessions from the Sultan of Zanzibar,⁷⁷ that Kirk was urged by the British Foreign office to use his influence to secure the withdrawal of Zanzibar troops from Usagara and the recognition, by the Sultan of the German protectorate over 'all territories which may subsequently and amicably be determined to be included in it'.⁷⁸ By this time, however, the Sultan, Seyyid Barghash, had himself clearly seen the change in the direction of British policy, as Granville had early in June authorized Malet to inform Bismarck that he 'should answer the Sultan's letter by informing him that the British and German Governments were jointly inquiring into the question'.⁷⁹ Even the French Government, acting through its consul in Zanzibar had made it known to Seyyid Barghash that, if he would recognise German claims in Usagara, the German Government was willing to adhere to the Anglo/French Agreement of 1862,⁸⁰ which had guaranteed the

76. Salisbury to Scott, 26.6.1885, F084/1711.

77. Scott to Salisbury, 11.8.1885, F084/1712.

78. Salisbury to Kirk, 12.8.1885, F084, 1730.

79. Granville to Malet, 1.6.1885, F084/1711.

80. Kirk to Granville, 2.7.1855, F084/1730.

independence of Zanzibar. When the British demand for the Sultan's recognition of the German protectorate over Usagara and its neighbouring district was officially communicated to the Seyyid Barghash by Kirk on August 14 1885, he made it clear that he would comply only 'under pressure'⁸¹. Lord Salisbury, who had replaced Granville as Foreign Secretary following the fall of the Gladstone Government, was himself in full agreement with the Consul-General that his position in the whole situation was not only 'delicate but painful'⁸² in view of the almost complete reversal of the long established British policy of consolidating the power of the Sultan.

It was also in the spirit of the Anglo/German understanding developed over the Usagara question that the German Government, acting through Baron Plessen, its Chargé d'Affaires in London, on September 12, 1885 asked for the British Government's opinion on the claims of Zanzibar to Kilimanjaro, expressed in the Sultan's note of June 27, 1885. For an application had been made to it by the German East African Company for the declaration of a German protectorate over the same area, on the basis of the treaties secured by the Jühlke expedition. The German Government ^{was anxious to reach an understanding with the British Government} in view of the conflict between the views expressed by the Kilimanjaro chiefs in the Jühlke treaties and the British Foreign Office statement in the House of Commons 'that the chiefs of these districts had remained faithful to the Sultan of Zanzibar'.⁸³ In a reply to this note, sent through the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Salisbury, enclosing a copy

81. Kirk to Salisbury, 15.8.1885, F084/1730.

82. Ibid., A Salisbury's footnote comment.

83. Salisbury to Scott, 12.9.1885, F084/1712.

of the Chagga Declaration in favour of Zanzibar for transmission to the German Government, urged that it should be pointed out that it was dated the 30th of May, whereas the treaties concluded between Dr. Carl Juhlke on behalf of the German East African Company with the chiefs of Chagga and Taveta were dated the 13th of June.⁸⁴ It was his hope that 'the prior title of the Sultan to the districts mentioned in the German treaties',⁸⁵ would be enough to stop the German Government from pursuing the matter further. But in this he was mistaken, as the German Government would rather have an agreement on the future of the region with the British Government than with the Sultan, whose claims to territories in the interior had already been weakened by the Usagara affair.

The British Government's decision to urge at least 'the prior title' of Zanzibar was based on the opinion of Kirk, who had, on August 9, 1885, three days after the publication in Germany of Jühlke's treaties with the 'Sultans' of Bondei, Usambara and Kilimanjaro, informed the Foreign Office that the treaties were 'a pure invention of Jühlke and Co.'. With particular reference to those relating to Kilimanjaro he explained that he had himself seen the Chagga delegation sent by the chiefs who had signed the declaration of May 30 with General Mathews and who had witnessed the hoisting of the flag of Zanzibar.⁸⁶ A much more comprehensive criticism of those relating to Bondei and Usambara was made by Archdeacon J.P. Farler of the Universities Mission to Central Africa's station at

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Kirk to Salisbury, 9.8.1885, F084/1712; also Coupland, R., op. cit., p.420.

Magila, who had lived in Bondei since 1875. In despatches to the authorities of his Mission in London⁸⁷ and in letters to 'The Times' of London,⁸⁸ which he later embodied in a memorandum⁸⁹, Farler had tried to prove that Jühlke's treaties were not valid for three main reasons. They had not been concluded with the real chiefs; the region was already under the effective control of the Sultan of Zanzibar; and the 'Sultans' had no right to cede any territory even assuming that they had the right to conclude treaties with foreign powers.

Basing his criticism on the report of Jühlke's activities which he said he had obtained from 'the brother of both Sultan Semboja and Sultan Kibanga, the only two chiefs possessing any sovereign rights in the land of Usambara or in the valley of the Luvu',⁹⁰ and from his own personal 'knowledge of the people with whom these treaties are said to have been made',⁹¹ he explained that the 'Sultans' mentioned in the 'treaties' were no more than 'petty headmen of small villages' exercising no sovereign right. He gave two examples of this in Bondei. The first was the case of one Fungo, a Zigua immigrant who had with the permission of the Sultan of Zanzibar's governor at Pangani settled at Kwafungo, 'a small place of about 30 mud huts' ... immediately under the Sultan of Zanzibar's fort on Mount Tongwe'.⁹² The second was that of one Abanko, described

87. Farler to Penny, 30.6.1885, 28.9.1885 and 8.11.1885, USPG London, UMCA A1 (vi).

88. Times of London, 16.10.1885.

89. Memorandum on Dr. Jühlke's "Treaties" made with the natives of East Africa, 6.11.1885 in Kirk to Salisbury 21.11.1885, F084/1729.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

in Jühlke's treaties as 'Sultan Hadji Abaki', a Swahili subject of the Sultan of Zanzibar, who had a large farm worked by his slaves near the settlement of Fungo, and who was not even a headman let alone a 'Sultan' with the right to cede the whole of 'Southern Bondei' to the Germans.⁹³

In Usambara, Farler mentioned the case of one Malomo, also a Zigua, whom he described as 'a man entirely without power and influence' beyond his own shambas and small village 'of about 20 mud huts' in which he lived, with his family and slaves.⁹⁴ He explained that the 'Sultan' Suakilu, whom Jühlke had induced to sign a treaty ceding Usambara on behalf of himself and his brother Semboja, who had refused to have any dealings with the German expedition, was an illegitimate son of Kimweri the Great 'by a concubine', a man 'with no political power whatsoever', whom Semboja had made the headman of a few villages.⁹⁵ He then stated categorically that both Semboja who controlled southern Usambara and the upper valley of the Luvu (Pangani) as far as Pare, and his brother, Kibanga, who 'firmly ruled' northern Usambara and Bondei had recognised the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar to whom they used to send tributes.⁹⁶ And that just as Semboja had carefully avoided any involvement with Jühlke on account of his loyalty to the Sultan, Kibanga had sent him 'a solemn protest against the doings of the Germans in Usambara'.⁹⁷

93. Ibid; also Farler to Penny, 8.11.1885, loc. cit.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid; and letter of November to The Times of London, in 1885, Kitchener to FO, 30.6.1886, D084/1799.

97. Farler to Penny, 28.11.1885, loc. cit.

In conclusion, Farler argued that, assuming the so called 'Sultans' had any right to conclude treaties and to cede territories, they had not clearly understood the nature of the documents they were made to sign, and consequently had no notion they were giving anything away. He explained that the usual German procedure was

' ... to get a simple chief to put his mark on a piece of paper which purports to be merely an agreement to let the stranger build a house in his country and permission to buy a shamba, but which is really a treaty ceding the country'.⁹⁸

In his opinion, these treaties must be void because 'no land in Africa can be ceded in this way, (as) it requires the consent of the elders and the tribe not the chief'.⁹⁹

It is easy to come to the conclusion that Farler had bitterly criticised the German treaties because he was a British missionary opposed to the incorporation of his mission-field in a German protectorate. But the fact of the Sultan of Zanzibar's influence in Bondei and Usambara had become clear before Jühlke's Kilimanjaro expedition. The physical symbol of the Sultan's power in this area was the fort at Mt. Tongwe, which had originally been built sometime between 1852 and 1856 by Seyyid Said, at the invitation of Kimweri the Great of the Kilindi Kingdom of Vugha, who had wanted Zanzibar's assistance to clear the lower Pangani Valley of Zigua raiders. This fort, which by the time of Burton's visit in 1857, was controlled by a garrison of twenty-five Baluchi,¹⁰⁰ had acquired political importance in the 1870's in consequence of the role played during the Usambara civil wars by its commander, Mzee

98. Farler to Penny 28.9.1885, loc. cit.

99. Ibid.

100. Coupland, R. East Africa and its Invaders, Oxford, 1938, p.352.

Mwariko, a Zigua favourite ex-slave of Seyyid Said, who had once served as the Sultan's Wali (Governor) in Pangani.¹⁰¹ It was this man, Mwariko, who since the expulsion of the Kilindi chiefs from Bondei sometime in 1870, had exercised control over the Bondei headman (Jumbe) under the supervision of the Sultan's Wali in Pangani. This was the same 'Maliko', described by Farler as 'a Jamdar of the Sultan of Zanzibar', who was governor of the Luvu and Bondei district when he first arrived at Magila in 1875.¹⁰²

There appears to be no doubt that Usambara had come under the control of Zanzibar, especially during the Usambara civil wars, when the two Kilindi factions competed for the support of the Sultan. Sir Harry Johnston, who travelled across Usambara on his way to Kilimanjaro in 1884 had stated the red flag of the Sultan was flying over the house of chief Semboja, the most powerful Kilindi chief, at Masinde, and that the chief was eager to own himself a vassal of the Sultan of Zanzibar.¹⁰³

It is, however, interesting that while Farler was bitterly criticising the German treaties and strongly emphasizing the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over Usambara and Bondei, he was himself urging the British Government, soon after the publication of Jühlke's treaties in Germany, to declare a protectorate over Usambara and the Pangani valley, to forestall the Germans, as British missionaries had long been active in the region.¹⁰⁴ Although

101. Burton, R.F., Zanzibar: City, Island and Coast, vol. 2., London, 1872, p.157.

102. Farler to Penny, October 1887, USPG, UMCA, A1 (vi).

103. Johnston, H.H., op. cit., p.313.

104. Lister to Kirk, 158, 1885, mentioned in Kirk to Salisbury, 26.10.1885, F084/1729.

the Foreign Office appeared to have shown some interest in the scheme, Kirk, who around the same time had encouraged the CMS to establish a mission station in Kilimanjaro to set in motion the process of creating an informal protectorate, had opposed it on four major grounds.¹⁰⁵ The Sultan of Zanzibar was 'the unquestionable suzerain of the whole district', and as such it would conflict with the British policy of consolidating the power of the Sultan in the interior, which he still believed had not yet been compromised by the decision to support German claims to Usagara. Next, although Usambara controlled militarily the much frequented Pangani valley route, the highland centre to the north of the kingdom lay off the road and its resources were yet wholly undeveloped. Thirdly, such a protectorate could not exist without a seaboard, and he could not believe that the port of Pangani, if acquired for the project, would be useful, as it could only take very small vessels. The town of Pangani itself was 'one of the most unhealthy places on the coast', and the valley which a railway must run was a swamp in many places in the rainy season.¹⁰⁶

In opposition to Farler's proposal, Kirk had indirectly urged a reactivation of the Kilimanjaro scheme, which would be served by Mombasa - a town where, as he argued, there could be found 'a good harbour, a fairly healthy climate and a clear way from landing', and where the route inland across the Masai plain was 'over firm soil ... presenting no engineering difficulties of any sort ...'.¹⁰⁷ Besides, he felt that it would be comparatively

105. Kirk to Salisbury, 26.10.1885, F084/1729.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

easier to obtain the Sultan's support for any scheme for developing the Kilimanjaro region that lay far inland, and to obtain concessions for the construction of railways with harbour rights, than would be possible in the case of Usambara, 'owing to its proximity to the coast'.¹⁰⁸ But as action on the Kilimanjaro project had been deferred at the request of the German Government in view of the interest of the German East African Company in the same area,¹⁰⁹ nothing was done by the British Government on the two rival proposals of Farler and Kirk. Instead, it simply undertook to inform the Sultan of Zanzibar that 'the rights he claimed in his letter of June 27, 1885 over Usambara and Kilimanjaro were now under the consideration of the Government of the Emperor'.¹¹⁰

While the three- power Commission of Britain, France and Germany, which was agreed upon in June 1885¹¹¹ to delimit the boundaries of the Empire of Zanzibar, was about to begin its work, the British East African Association, which had taken over Johnston's Taveta concession early in November 1885¹¹² was secretly planning to establish itself in effective occupation of the Kilimanjaro region. But as their plan had leaked out in the Manchester Guardian,¹¹³ the German Government, which feared their activities would prejudice the work of the Delimitation Commission had strongly protested to

108. Ibid.

109. Salisbury to Malet, 1611. 1885, F084/1712.

110. Travers to Seyyid Barghash, 20.10.1885, F084/1729.

111. Galbraith, J.S., op. cit., p.100.

112. Ibid., p.102.

113. Ibid.

the British Government.¹¹⁴ Lord Salisbury had reacted to this German protest by asking the British Ambassador in Berlin to show Bismarck a copy of the Johnston Taveta concession in order to make it clear that it was older than any documents that might be produced by any other party to the Kilimanjaro question.¹¹⁵ He would also want the German Government to be informed that the action of the British East African Association would 'not prejudice by anticipation the decision as to the claim of the Sultan of Zanzibar to sovereignty over the Kilimanjaro territory'.¹¹⁶ Since this British explanation had again touched upon the claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar to Kilimanjaro, which the German Government had earlier refused to recognise,¹¹⁷ it had immediately led to further diplomatic exchange between the two Governments to clear the air on a vexed issue which was yet to be arbitrated upon by the Delimitation Commission.

While expressing its satisfaction at the promise by the British Government to defer the consideration of the request of the Mackinnon group interested in the commercial exploitation of Kilimanjaro, the German Government, through its Chargé d'Affaires in London, Baron Plessen, had again expressed its fears that any support given by the British Government to the company 'which would spring into activity under the concession of the Sultan of Zanzibar might prejudice the decision of the Boundary Commission',¹¹⁸ as it might be interpreted by the Sultan as a defacto British recognition of

114. Salisbury to Malet, 16.11.1885, F084/1712.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Kirk to Salisbury, 20.10.1885, F084/1729.

118. Salisbury to Malet, 25.1.1886, F084/1757.

his sovereignty over Kilimanjaro. It then tried to show that unlike the English Company, which had not yet become active, the German East African Company had been firmly established there 'since the spring of 1885'. Besides, its operations in Kilimanjaro would not, like those planned by the English Company, impede the work of the Commission, since it was these that had led to its establishment.¹¹⁹ It then concluded by saying if the commission recognised the rights of the Sultan to sovereignty over Kilimanjaro, 'the question of the future settlement would be a matter to be regulated between the Sultan and the English Government',¹²⁰ but if it was otherwise, it would have to be 'a matter for negotiation between the Imperial and the English Government'.¹²¹ Considering the German position in relation to the claims of Zanzibar, it is clear that the German Government was subtly suggesting the second alternative, which would mean an Anglo/German rather than an Anglo/Zanzibar collaboration on the Kilimanjaro question.

The British Government on the contrary, was unwilling to consider this second alternative, which would involve its recognition of a German protectorate over Kilimanjaro, with British commercial interests operating in the region subject to conditions that might be imposed by the German Government or the German East African Company. Emphasizing that the British explanation had been misunderstood by the German Government, Rosebery urged Malet to inform the Germans that the operations of the English Company would not be dependent upon concessions granted by the Sultan, but on the

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

concession 'obtained by Mr. Johnston from the native chiefs without any communication with the Sultan'.¹²² He also wanted it to be made clear that concessions from the Sultan, if they could be obtained, were only needed 'to obtain security for outlay',¹²³ in developing the settlement on Kilimanjaro. After stressing that the Taveta concession had given the British 'unquestionably a prior claim' to any that might be advanced by Carl Jühlke, the validity of whose treaties was still in question, he rejected the claim that the German Company was already firmly established there or that the German Government, which had asked the British Government to restrain its own capitalists, could not restrain its advance'.¹²⁴ The tough line taken by the British Foreign Office on this question forced the German Government to declare that it was not its intention to deny the English Company the right of taking advantage of the treaty concluded by Johnston, but to prevent it 'for the present' from accepting 'any concession of a political character from the Sultan', 'as it might create in him the belief that he is regarded on the English side as entitled to exercise sovereign rights in Kilimanjaro territory'.¹²⁵

The hope that an Anglo/German understanding on this issue would lead to 'an arrangement satisfactory to both parties', raised by Carl Peters in his communication with the German Foreign office,¹²⁶ had indeed proved illusory. For, during the negotiations between his German East African Company and the British East African Association

122. Rosebery to Malet, 17.2.1886, F084/1757.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Rosebery to Malet, 24.3.1886, F084/1757.

126. Ibid.

of Sir William Mackinnon in London in February 1886, the latter had refused to recognise the claims of the former to Usambara and Kilimanjaro or to surrender its Taveta concession in lieu of participation in the ventures of the German Company. As the British group wanted nothing but an arrangement which would let them control at least a part of Kilimanjaro, the negotiations had broken down because Carl Peters would not agree to a partition of territories he already considered German.¹²⁷

Meanwhile, the larger questions of the spheres of influence of the European powers in East Africa and the extent of the empire of Zanzibar were being settled by the delimitation Commission, which had started work in Zanzibar in December 1885. Since the Sultan of Zanzibar was only asked to send an observer to the sittings of the Commission - an offer which was rejected - it was clear from the beginning that European rather than Zanzibar interests would be the most important consideration. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Britain, which had previously supported the Sultan's vast claims in the interior, would from now on agree with other powers on the commission, at the insistence of Germany, that the Sultan should only be allowed to sovereign rights over the coastal strip extending only ten miles inland between Kipini in the north and the Ruvuma in the south. Since the decision of the commission were to be unanimous, the British delegate, Colonel Kitchener, who had earlier questioned the validity of Jühlke's treaties and had urged the prior title of the Sultan of Zanzibar to Kilimanjaro,

127. For details of these negotiations see Müller, F.F.,
op. cit., p.251.

had to accept the decision of the two other members giving 'nothing to the Sultan in the interior of Africa'.¹²⁸

The Anglo/German Convention of November 1, 1886, which followed the report of this commission formally recognised the right of Seyyid Barghash to this coastal strip as well as the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Mafia, Lamu and other small islands within a radius of twelve nautical miles, with the exception of Witu. But more important to the two signatory powers, the convention also recognised the existence of two spheres of influence in the 'hinterland' of East Africa, the German sphere extending from the Rovuma to the Uмба and the British sphere from the Uмба to the Tana. The Kilimanjaro question was still left unresolved, Britain only promising to use her good offices to promote a friendly arrangement of the rival claims of the Sultan and the German East African Company to Kilimanjaro districts.¹²⁹ But as a result of German compromise over the question of the coastal possessions of Zanzibar,¹³⁰ Britain promised to support German negotiations with the Sultan for the lease of the custom duties of the ports of Dar es Salaam and Pangani.¹³¹ This promise was fulfilled in April 1888, when the German East African company secured a 50-year lease of the customs of the coastal ports within its sphere, including the administration

128. Kitchener to FO, 30.6.1886, F084/1799.

129. Müller, F.F., op. cit., 495-496; Coupland, R., op. cit., pp. 484-485.

130. Coupland, R., The Exploitation of East Africa, London, 139, p.

131. By December 1886, Britain was already urging the Sultan to concede this. Iddesleigh to Holmwood 23.12.1886, F084/1777.

of justice, land and buildings.¹³² Two years later another Anglo/German Agreement decreed the cession of the coastal strip of the Germans. This was the Anglo/German Convention of July 1, 1890, which also settled the Kilimanjaro question. Since the British Government had influenced the new Sultan, Seyyid Khalifa, to withdraw his claims to the region¹³³ before the conclusion of the Berlin negotiations which had led to the signing of this convention, the German Government had shown its willingness to agree to a settlement of the 'hinterland' question in East Africa that would recognise a British protectorate over Uganda.¹³⁴ The result of this Anglo/German understanding was the decision of the British Government to concede the ownership of Kilimanjaro to the German East African Company. In return, the German Government recognised the rights of the rival Imperial British East African Company founded in 1888 to Taveta.¹³⁵ Thus, as in the case of Usagara, the Sultan of Zanzibar was again left in the cold by his British allies, whose decision had been influenced more by the considerations of European diplomacy than by those of African policy.¹³⁶ Within a short time, Zanzibar herself was to lose her independence to the British, who had once served as its guarantor.

To the African people of Pangani region in particular, and of East Africa in general, the partition agreements between Britain

132. Müller, F.F., op. cit., 286.

133. Iddesleigh to Holmwood, 29.11.1886, and Holmwood to Iddesleigh. 7.12.1886, FO84/1777.

134. Salisbury to Malet, June, 1890. FO84/2030.

135. Galbraith, J.S., op. cit., p. 186.

136. Ibid., pp. 185-187.

and Germany were of no immediate political significance. For neither the British nor the German Government was yet interested in assuming direct responsibility for the administration of its East African protectorate. With their limited financial and human resources, the British and German Companies charged with the duty of administering East Africa on behalf of their governments were soon to find their plans frustrated by the opposition of the local African communities.

Chapter 3

The German Occupation of the Pangani Valley Region, 1885-1891

Before the two Anglo/German conventions of 1886 and 1890 had formally recognised the rights of Germany to the territories claimed by the German East African Company, the agents of this Company had been very busy trying to establish themselves in effective occupation of the areas they had already acquired by treaty. Even before the Company was chartered in February 1885 to undertake the task of colonization in East Africa, one of its agents, Count von Pfeil had established an experimental agricultural and commercial station in Sima, Usagara earlier in January.¹ This pioneer station had been followed by another in the same district, at Kiora, later in the year.² It was, however, not until December 1885 during the Company's second Kilimanjaro expedition under Herr Hoernecke's leadership that its first station in the Pangani valley was established at Korogwe.³ It was hoped that this station would serve not only as a provisioning centre for caravans bound for Kilimanjaro but as the commercial centre of Usambara and northern Zigua. In June 1887, the month after the arrival of Carl Peters in Zanzibar as the Company's chief representative, seven new stations were established, among which were the Mafi station on the river Pangani north of

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1. Kolonial - Politische - Korrespondenz, 22.1.1887.
 2. Arendt to Bismarck 6.3.1886, Deutsches Zentralarchiv (DZA), Potsdam, Reichskolonialamt (RKA) 382.
 3. Peters, C., Das Deutsche Ostafrikanische Schutzgebiet, München, 1895, p.97.

Korogwe.⁴ The Moshi station was founded in August 1887 by Otto Ehlers and Herr Braun, who was a member of the second Kilimanjaro expedition, and who was left behind as the resident agent.⁵ In addition to these trading stations, a subsidiary of the Company, the German East Africa Plantation Company, founded in 1886, had established two tobacco plantations in the same year, one at Saadani on the coast and the other at Lewa in Bondei.⁶

By 1888, a total of fourteen stations, including the Zanzibar depot, had been established by the German East African Company,⁷ but, unfortunately for the Company, none of these stations had achieved the purpose for which they were intended. Instead of the huge profits expected by its directors, it kept running at a loss, and had to depend on annual subventions from the Government to enable it carry on its operations in East Africa. These subventions ranged from one million Marks in the first year to 1,318,000 Marks in the fifth.⁸ Such was the financial involvement of the Berlin Government in the operations of this company that its rivals, the two old German Companies operating in Zanzibar, the Hamburg Companies of Hansing and Co. and Oswald and Co. proposed the formation of a single state-financed national company for the commercial exploitation of all the German protectorates in order to prevent the expenditure of the tax-payers' money as subsidies to an incompetent

4. Kurtze, B., Die Deutsch Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, Jena,

5. See Fitch to Lang, 12.8.1887, G3.A5/0 1887, C.M.S. Archives, London.

6. Forster, B., Deutsch - Ostafrika, Leipzig, 1890, p.86.

7. Büttner, K., Die Anfänge der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik in Ostafrika, Berlin, 1959, p.92.

8. Ibid., p.93.

private company.⁹

A number of essentially local factors account for the failure of the company to realise its objectives. The first was the Company's lack of political control over its area of operations, as its stations were largely at the mercy of the native chiefs who were in effective political control. As early as March 1886, Arendt, the German Consul General, in his report on the activities of the Company, had stated that it would not be able to make any significant headway without the military occupation of its area of operations.¹⁰ He said that even the ivory firm of H.A. Meyer, which was on friendly terms with the company, had complained to him about the confused and insecure political situation in the interior as a result of the 'nominal sovereignty' exercised by the German East African Company.¹¹ To show that the company was not in effective control Arendt had reported the outbreak of two serious uprisings at the beginning of 1887 at the Usungula station, which was manned by von Bülow, whom he said had attempted to resist the arrest of one African in his services by the native chief who claimed the servant was his subject.¹²

The GEAC could not even make any pretensions to political authority in Bondei and Usambara. The mere establishment of the Korogwe station was sufficient to revive the controversy regarding

9. Ibid., p.92.

10. Arendt to Bismarck, 6.3.1886, DZA Potsdam, RKA 396.

11. Ibid.

12. Arendt to Bismarck, 24.1.1887, DZA, Potsdam, RKA 397.
Cf. Gerald Portal's report on the rival Imperial British East African Company in January 1893. See Galbraith, J.S., Mackinnon and East Africa, 1898-1895, Cambridge, 1972, p.228.

the suzerainty of Zanzibar in the district.¹³ To develop the Lewa plantation, the company's subsidiary, the German East African Plantation Company, had to depend mainly on contract labour supplied by Arab/Swahili slave owners, whose allegiance was to Zanzibar, because local Bondei workers were simply not available.¹⁴ The absence of a trading station in Usambara proper, shows that the company had realized the danger involved in moving into an area still engulfed in civil war, and whose chiefs were opposed to German penetration.¹⁵ During his journey along the Pangani valley in March 1887 with the Hungarian explorer, Count Telewski, Lt. Ludwig von Hühnel had reported on the German East African Company's lack of effective political control in Bondei and Luvu. For example, at its Mafi station north of Korogwe, the company's resident representative, Herr Brausche was persona non grata with the local African chief Sedenga of Nkaramu 'who had forbidden any of his men to do him (Brausche) the slightest service'.¹⁶

Before the establishment of the Moshi station in August 1887, the GEAC had recognised the need to establish a kind of political authority acceptable to all Chagga chiefs. For they knew that the whole of Kilimanjaro could never be effectively controlled through the agency of Mandara. This was probably why Carl Peters had urged the German Consu-General in Zanzibar to propose to the Government in Berlin the necessity of getting the Sultan of Zanzibar to send an

13. Bishop Smythies to the Times of London, 4.5.1886, UMCA MSS.I. U.S.P.G. Archives, London.

14. Müller, F.F., Deutschland - Zanzibar - Ostafrika, Berlin (East) 1959, p.243.

15. Farter to Penny, 30.6.1885 and 8.11.1885, Box A1(vi) U.M.C.A., U.S.P.G. Archives, London.

16. von Hühnel, L., Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stephanie, trans. Nancy Bell, Lond. 1894, pp. 63-68.

expedition to Kilimanjaro to establish his authority under the control of the Company's agents.¹⁷ This proposal is of particular interest, coming at a time when the controversy over the ownership of the region had not yet been resolved. It was no doubt a compromise solution which would have meant a kind of joint Zanzibar/German enterprise, similar to the kind of arrangement between Britain and Zanzibar over the inland possessions of the Sultan, which Kirk had proposed to the Foreign Office in September 1884.¹⁸ But as Bismarck had rejected this proposal, saying no useful purpose would be served by it,¹⁹ especially when Germany was insisting that the Sultan's dominions did not extend far inland, the company had to fall on the expedient of using the authority of Mandara of Moshi instead.

At Moshi, the company's station was entirely dependent on the whims and caprices of Mandara, who was determined for reasons of security and prestige, to prevent its agents from operating anywhere outside his chiefdom.²⁰ Reporting on the situation in Moshi in August 1888, one of the resident CMS missionaries, the Reverend W.S. Taylor, said 'the German station is hampered in every possible way', no trade being practicable under Mandara²¹ and that Herr Braun, the German Company's representative, had told him that.

17. Arendt to Bismarck, 24.1.1887, DZA Potsdam, RKA 384.

18. Kirk to Granville 27.9.1884, Fo 84/1676, PRO London.

19. For details, see Müller, F.F., op. cit., pp. 262-263.

20. For example, Mandara had prevented Otto Ehlers and his party from establishing a depot at Kibongoto. See Fitch to Lang, 12.8.1887, G3.A5/O 1887, C.M.S. Archives, London,

21. Taylor to Price, 19.8.1888, G3.A5/O 1888, C.M.S. Archives, London.

'Mandara was merely playing with us and that, continue as long as we would here in Moshi, things will always be the same. (and) as long as Mandara has Europeans under him he will evidently go on treating them in the same unreasonable fashion.²²

Taylor had then mentioned a proposal made to him by Herr Braun about moving both the German station and the CMS mission station from Moshi to 'a fertile spot, centrally located in one of the beautiful forests by a river in the plains beneath', where 'Mandara will no longer be able to pursue his obstructive policy'.²³ The German company's representative had hoped that the settlement so created would develop rapidly, as it would attract natives escaping 'from the tyrannical rule of their Chagga Chiefs',²⁴ as well as German colonists then expected on the mountain. To encourage support for his proposal, Herr Braun was reported to have promised, on behalf of his company, to see that 'the change of locality is made with the most trifling expense to the CMS'.²⁵ Taylor was in favour of this proposal, which he enthusiastically put forward to the CMS authorities, not only because he too was at that time experiencing difficulties with Mandara, but also because he had wanted to prevent Braun from inviting the Catholics, who were then proposing to establish their own mission in the area. He stated that if the plan was adopted he and the German representative intended to have 'complementary stations with practical chiefs',²⁶ adding that Marealle

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

of Marangu had asked for a resident European and would send children to be educated but for his fear of Mandara.

Although the plan to use foreign missionaries to further the aims of the German East African Company was nothing new, as it had been rejected by the French Holy Ghost Fathers mission and by the British Universities Mission to Central Africa on the intervention of both the French and British Consul-Generals the former in June 1887 and the latter in May 1888,²⁷ the Braun proposals had some novel aspects; for this envisaged the establishment of an independent settlement under the political administration of the German East African Company and the spiritual control of the CMS. But like the two earlier proposals to which reference has been made, it was not supported by the CMS authorities in London,²⁸ and so the mission continued to remain in Moshi, even when the German station was later removed to Marangu in 1891 by Carl Peters.

Another factor contributing to the Company's lack of political control was the opposition of the Arab/Swahili traders, who had since the middle of the 19th Century opened up the trade routes of the East African interior. In as much as they were the subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the traders were opposed to the political ambitions of the German attempts to browbeat their Sultan into surrendering his mainland possessions. Reporting on the hostility of these traders to the German East African Company early

27. See Kieran, J.A., 'The Holy Ghost Fathers in East Africa, 1863 - 1914', Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1966, p.290.

28. Lang to Price, 2.1.1889, G3.A5/L, 1889, C.M.S. Archives London.

in 1886, Arendt, the German Consul-General in Zanzibar said that anti-German feeling in the interior had been spread not only by the agents of the Sultan but by Arab/Swahili traders as well. According to him, 'every Arab and Swahili who had seen the naval demonstration in Zanzibar and the consequent submission of the Sultan, and had then gone out into the interior, had warned the Bantu tribes against the supposedly friendly, present-bringing agents of the German East African company.²⁹

The Arab/Swahili traders were also opposed to the Germans on another score. As the German Company's stations in the interior were also expected to serve as toll-collecting centres, caravans, who would again have to pay custom duties at the coastal ports controlled by officials of the Sultan of Zanzibar, had resented the tolls demanded by the agents of the company, and were in most cases always sufficiently well armed to evade them.³⁰ It was the need to strengthen the financial position of the German East African Company through the collection of custom duties at the coastal ports, where they could only be effectively collected, that forced the company's to ask the Sultan of Zanzibar for the lease of the coastal strip in April 1888.³¹

Perhaps, with sufficient patience and tact, the German East African Company would have been able to overcome the opposition of the local chiefs as well as the hostility of their Arab/Swahili

29. Arendt to Bismarck, 6.3.1886, DZA, Potsdam, RKA 382.

30. Kurtze, B., op. cit., p.87.

31. Müller, F.F., op. cit., p.285.

competitors. But these were virtues which the officials of the company seemed to have lacked; for instead of making friends through patient diplomacy, since they knew that they lacked the resources for an effective occupation, they had resorted to acts of high-handedness and extreme brutality to compel obedience. In fact, there is a striking similarity between the activities of this company and those of the Royal Niger Company in the Niger delta during the same period. For in Usagara as in the Niger delta, the activities of the chartered company were not much better than organised burglary.³² It is undoubtedly significant that the cause of the Kidete incident of October 1885, which had immediately given the invading Germans a bad name in the East African interior,³³ was the seizure by a member of a German caravan under Lt. Schmidt of bows and arrows belonging to a villager who had earlier refused to sell them.³⁴

At the beginning of 1887, two serious anti-German revolts had also occurred at the German East African Company's station at Usungula, resulting from the failure of the resident German agent, Lt. von Bülow to conciliate the local chiefs.³⁵ During the armed conflict that followed, whole villages were set on fire on the orders

32. For local African reaction to the Royal Niger Company see Anene, J.C., Southern Nigeria in Transition, 1885-1906, Cambridge, 1966, p.216.

33. Farler to Penny, 8.11.1885, UMCA Box A1(vi) U.S.P.G. Archives London. The Rev. J.P. Farler, who heard the news of the incident in Bondei had to warn his men in the outstations 'to avoid in every way being identified with them (the Germans) by the natives'.

34. Ibid.

35. Arendt to Bismarck, 14.2.1887, DZA, Potsdam, RKA 397.

of the German agent, with their African inhabitants suffering heavy casualties.³⁶ Such conduct was certainly not the way to win the Germans friends among the already suspicious peoples of the interior. And as Harry Johnston was later to criticise the operations of the Royal Niger Company in the Oil Rivers Protectorate,³⁷ Arendt, the German Consul-General in Zanzibar was forced to complain to Bismarck in Berlin about the maladministration of the German East African Company.³⁸ He mentioned in particular, the use of military regulations against Africans in their Tanganiko station close to the British border near the coast.³⁹ The Company's directors, who were bent on making profits at all costs, apparently did not share the anxiety of the diplomat about the presentation of a good image, and therefore left their officials to their own devices. The absence of a code of conduct for these officials was to prove disastrous for the Company in August 1888, when they took over the administration of the customs duties of the coastal ports from the agents of the Sultan of Zanzibar;⁴⁰ for the acts of highhandedness and tactlessness committed against the poorly armed Africans of the interior could not be committed with impunity on the coast. It was exactly these that led to the outbreak of an anti-German revolt on the East African coast in August 1888.

Contrary to official German claims that the coastal rebellion, led by Bushiri bin Salim al-Harthi, was the handiwork

36. Ibid.

37. Memorandum on the British Protectorate of the Oil Rivers, 24 July, 1888; cited in Anene, J.C., op. cit., p.96.

38. Arendt to Bismarck, 10.3. 1887, DZA Potsdam, RKA 397.

39. Ibid.

40. Galbraith, J.S., op. cit., p.149.

of Arab slave traders, who were opposed to the abolition of the slave trade,⁴¹ there is sufficient evidence to support the contention that it was primarily caused by German tactlessness and acts of contemptuous highhandedness. In a telegram to Bismarck pointing out what he regarded as the main causes of the rebellion, Sultan Khalifa bin said of Zanzibar had lent great weight to this contention when he stated inter alia:

' ... The company's officials took dogs into our mosques, they insulted the women, they caused two dollars to be paid for every grave that was dug for burial ... They seized all ground that was not registered, lastly, they spat on our flag everywhere and said we were no longer Sultan, but that now they and many more were the Sultan Our old officials whom the people know were removed by the company. Our troops sent away'.⁴²

The ghost of an anti abolitionist movement conjured up by the official German interpretation of the rebellion was laid to rest by Bishop Smythies of the UMCA, who, in his reaction to the imposition of an Anglo/German blockade of the East African ports during the outbreak of the rebellion had explained that:

'The disturbances on the coast have had nothing to do with opposition from the slave traders, or with Mohammedan feeling; but are entirely due to the highhanded action of the members of the German East African company who have treated the parts of the coast they have settled as a conquered country'.⁴³

Bishop Smythies' view were also shared by Bishop Courmount of the Bagamoyo mission of the French Holy Ghost Fathers, who similarly

41. Kieran, J.A., o. cit., p.291.

42. Telegram from Sultan Khalifa to Bismarck, 3.10. 1888, DZA Potsdam, RKA 689.

43. Smythies to Penny, 10.11. 1888, UMCA MSS. I, U.S.P.G. Archives, London.

rejected the German interpretation of the rebellion as a religious war against Christianity, and had regretted the publicity given to it in the European press.⁴⁴ And, like the U.M.C.A. Bishop, who had explained that Bushiri, the leader of the coastal rebels, had been particularly friendly with missionaries at the beginning of the uprising, Bishop Courmount had also reported that the Arab leader had received Father Le Roy in a friendly manner, but had become a bit suspicious and bitter as a result of the British naval cooperation with the Germans against the Arabs.⁴⁵ The German Evangelical Lutheran Mission Inspector, Büttner had also admitted that the indiscretion of the German East African Company was the main cause of the rebellion, saying:

'He who wants to colonize must be on good relationship with the inhabitants of the country, and especially in Africa nothing can be achieved without the cooperation of the African.'⁴⁶

Even Euan Smith, the British Consul-General in Zanzibar who had admiringly contrasted the 'vigor^u and energy of the Germans' with 'the absolute want of initiative' of the Imperial British East African Company, was prepared to concede that the subordinate officials of the German East African Company 'were ill-equipped by nature or training to deal with the Oriental character'.⁴⁷

44. Courmount to CSsp., 1.1.1889, 197^A Zanguebar XII, CSsp. Archives, Paris.

45. Courmount to CSsp. 11.1.1889, loc. cit.

46. Büttner to Bismarck, 13.1.1889, DZA Potsdam, RKA 733.

47. See Galbraith, J.S., op. cit., p.149.

It is also striking that the Arab/Swahili interpretation of the rebellion expressed in a Swahili poem by the Swahili poet Hemedi bin Abdallah bin Masudi el Buhriy agrees with the explanation of Bishop Smythies that the German had treated the coastal communities as a conquered people, whose religion and traditions were to be treated with contempt. Hemedi had summed up the Swahili view of the German occupation graphically in the following words:

'Where the European had taken
There is no room for others.'⁴⁸

This view is certainly borne out by the fact that Major Hermann von Wissmann, who was sent out in March 1889 by the German Government⁴⁹ as Imperial Commissioner charged with responsibility^{for} suppressing the Bushiri rebellion had preferred a policy of military confrontation to one of diplomatic negotiation, for what the Germans wanted was not a compromise with the coastal people, but their total military subjugation.⁵⁰

Although the Bushiri rebellion was essentially a coastal affair, its ripples had affected the interior of German East Africa, particularly areas where there were coastal influences. The Bondei country, lying in the immediate hinterland of the Pangani coast was even affected by the crisis which had precipitated the rebellion. The Rev. J.P. Farler of the UMCA Magila station had reported shortly before the outbreak of the rebellion that:

48. Hemedi bin Abdallah bin Masudi el Buhriy, Utenzi wa vita vya Wladachi Kutalamaki Mrima, 1307 A.H. Stanza 601, pp. 76-77.

49. Euan Smith to Salisbury, 2.4.1889, Fo 403/118, P.R.O. London.

50. Portal to Salisbury, 24.6.1889, FO 84/1979, P.R.O. London; Smythies to Penny, 24.4.-1.5.1889, UMCA, MSS.I, U.S.P.G. Archives, London; and Müller, F.F., op. cit., p.429. British consular and missionary reports which Müller was unable to exploit throw a great deal of light on the Swahili resistance to the German occupation.

'the country is most unsettled; there are talks all over the coast of making a clean sweep of all Europeans, and there are a section of the Bondei, who are under coastal influences, trying to stir up the rest to drive us out, as they say but for our opening up the country the Germans would never have heard of Bondei.'⁵¹

As soon as the Coastal rebellion had broken out, the German tobacco plantation at Lewa in Bondei was attacked and destroyed by supporters of Bushiri, who was settling an old score with Friedrich Schroeder, its notorious director.⁵² The German trading station and cotton plantations in Korogwe in the Luvu district were similarly destroyed.⁵³ Bishop Smythies, who visited Korogwe on his way to Vuga, in Usambara, in January 1889, reported that the Germans at the station had incurred native hostility because they always had driven them away from their premises 'with some severity', adding that 'If you want to conciliate people in Africa, you must have a baraza, where people may come and go as they like, and sit and talk as long as they like.'⁵⁴ In fact, the English Bishop had chosen to undertake the journey at this particularly difficult period to prove to the African peoples of the Pangani valley that not all Europeans were as bad as the Germans.

A few months before the Bishop's journey, Usambara had already contracted the anti-German fever. In September 1888, shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion in Pangani, Chief Semboja had

51. Farler to Penny, 7.5.1888, UMCA Box A1(vi), USPG, London.

52. Friedrich Schroeder was reported to have interfered with the harem of Bushiri. See Müller, F.F., op. cit., p.244.

53. Peters, C., op. cit., p.97.

54. Central Africa, Journal of the UMCA, Vol.VII, 1889. Letter of 29.1.1889 from Bishop Smythies, pp. 49-51.

intercepted the caravan passing through his village of Masinde to meet the German ivory merchant, Hans Meyer in Gonja, dispersing the porters and confiscating their loads. Although it is obvious that he had done this to express his support for his Arab/Swahili friends and agents on the coast, the Kilindi chief had tried to conceal his real motive by simply saying that the caravan had merely 'acted on orders received from the Sultan of Zanzibar, by whom the men were said to have been recalled on account of the rebellion which had just broken out at the coast.'⁵⁵

During his journey along the Pangani valley, Bishop Smythies had seen the danger of the anti-German feeling developing into a general anti-European movement in the interior. At a place near Kwasigi, he said his party had been accosted 'rather insolently' by 'a man from the coast who was waiting for a caravan to come up' who said that 'they had orders to prevent any Europeans going that way'.⁵⁶ This evidence shows that the Arab/Swahili had been trying to seal off the interior from the Germans long before the arrival of von Wissmann, and that anti-German propaganda in the interior had started in full swing. The Bishop himself saw the effect of this propaganda at Makuyuni, not far from Vuga, where he said he and his men had 'found the people very disagreeable and inclined to be hostile' ...⁵⁷ Only the explanation that the party had been specially invited by Chief Kimweri bin Semboja himself had prevented the people from stopping him from travelling towards Vugha. The tense and rather explosive situation along the Pangani valley, as

55. Meyer, H., Der Kilimandscharo, Berlin, 1900, pp. 44-45.

56. Central Africa, vol.VII, 1889, p.49.

57. Ibid.

well as the inability of the German East African Company to restore order on the coast, compelled Bishop Smythies to repeat the demand he had once made in December 1888⁵⁸ that the British East African Company should replace the German Company as the ruler of the Pangani coast, and that the boundary of the British East African protectorate should be extended from the Umba river down to the Luvu, thus incorporating Usambara, Bondei and a section of the Zigua in the British sphere.⁵⁹

The demand for a new boundary delimitation in East Africa at this time is rather surprising, especially as it was made after the issue had been finally disposed of by an international agreement between Britain and Germany in November 1886. When it was first made in December 1888, Bishop Smythies had thought it was a practical necessity, as he believed the Germans would not come back after their disgraceful exit from the Pangani coast at the beginning of the Bushiri rebellion. But when it was repeated in March 1889, Major von Wissmann, the German Imperial Commissioner, had already arrived in Zanzibar with his troops, with the determination to crush the rebellion.⁶⁰ It is clear therefore, that what had forced the Bishop to ask the committee of the UMCA to exert pressure on the British Parliament and public opinion in favour of a new boundary adjustment was, not the possibility that the Germans would no longer come back, but the fear that his mission stations in Bondei, the Luvu, and

58. Smythies to Penny, 3.12.1888, UMCA, MSS.I. USPG, London.

59. Smythies to Committee of the UMCA, 30.3.1889, loc. cit.

60. Ibid. Smythies himself reports the arrival of Capt. von Wissmann in Zanzibar.

and southern Usambara would be endangered by the impending German military action.

To support his demand, Bishop Smythies advanced three major arguments. The first was that the Umba river was unsuitable as a boundary, as 'it has none of the characteristics of a natural line at all (for) it is a mere narrow ditch separating the Wadigo, who live on both sides of the border.' But that, unlike the Umba, the river Luvu 'has all the requisites of a dividing line', as it forms the boundary line between two different tribes, the Bondei and the Zigua'.⁶¹ The second was that the district between these two rivers should be British, as the UMCA, a British missionary organization, had been working there for twenty-five years before the German intervention and that the Umba was first chosen as the boundary line, without reference to the mission, and on account of the hostility of a Government official to the mission.⁶² The third was that the mission could never expect to make progress under the administration of the German Company, which, he said, had an entirely different idea of liberty and the rights of individuals from those which were current among Englishmen, adding that the Company had claimed they had set aside the Congo Agreement in East Africa.⁶³

Although these arguments seem perfectly reasonable, in spite of the Bishop's understandable anti-German feelings, they were of no significance in shaping British policy in East Africa, as the British Government had already decided upon a policy of naval

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

cooperation with the Germans to suppress the Bushiri rebellion, which at this time had a dangerous potential of becoming a general anti-European movement in East Africa.⁶⁴ And significantly, it was this Anglo/German naval cooperation, expressed in the blockade of the coastal ports⁶⁵ as well as in the imposition of an arms embargo on both British and German East Africa⁶⁶, that helped the Germans to break the back of the coastal resistance through von Wissmann's successful naval bombardments of the main ports of Tanga, Pangani and Bagamoyo.⁶⁷

The virtual collapse of the Arab/Swahili resistance on the coast by August 1889 had had the effect of shifting the centre of the rebellion away from the coast to the interior, where Bushiri had hoped to organise an anti-German resistance among the Bantu peoples. But, like his plan for an anti-German coalition on the coast, Bushiri's dream of cutting the Germans away from the interior could not be realized on account of the suspicions of the Bantu chiefs of the interior. As far as the Pangani valley was concerned, Bushiri had tried to involve chief Semboja of Masinde actively in the anti-German resistance, even before the bombardment of his stronghold in Pangani early in July 1889.⁶⁸ However, while Semboja was

64. See Acker to C.S.Sp. 14.1.1889, and Courmount to C.S.Sp. 11.1.1889. 197A, Zanguebar XII, C.S.Sp. Archives, Paris.

65. For British and French missionary criticisms of this Anglo/German naval blockade see Smythies to Penny, 19.11.1888, UMCA MSS.I., USPG London, and Courmount to C.S.Sp., 11.1.1889, C.S.Sp. Archives, Paris.

66. Deutsches Kolonialblatt (DKB) 1.4.1890, pp. 19-20.

67. For details of von Wissmann's campaigns on the coast see Müller, F.F., op. cit., pp. 428-459.

68. The dispersion of Hans Meyer's caravan by Semboja in September 1888 was not authorised by the Sultan of Zanzibar, as the Shambaa chief had claimed, but had been influenced by Bushiri from Pangani. See Michahelles to Bismarck, 22.10.1888, DZA, Potsdam RKA 404 ⁴⁻⁶.

sympathetic to the Arab/Swahili cause, he had remained suspicious of the political ambitions of Bushiri⁶⁹ and consequently had refrained from any direct military intervention. Instead of cooperating with Bushiri, he had seen the wisdom of making peace offers to his Kilindi rivals, Kibanga and Kinyashi, so that the country could present a united front against the Germans, whose intervention he certainly had regarded as a threat. According to the Reverend H.W. Woodward, who reported Semboja's dramatic peace offers from Magila in August 1889, Kibanga and Kinyashi had refused to make peace with him, for 'they say it is only because he (Semboja) thinks the Germans intend to demand compensation ~~with him against the Germans.~~ ^{for Semboja's robbery...}⁷⁰ This rejection of Semboja's peace offers is an interesting example of the influence of pre-colonial politics on the reaction to colonial rule, for it shows that Kibanga and Kinyashi were determined to exploit the new situation created by the German intervention to the disadvantage of their rival.

Semboja's attempts to stop the Usambara civil war which had ravaged the country since 1869 cannot, however, be explained entirely in terms of his desire to forge a united front against the Germans, whose military campaigns on the coast he knew would be extended into the interior. They must also be seen as a reaction to the political situation created by the Bushiri resistance, which had encouraged dissident Shambala elements, who were tired of the rule of the warring Kilindi factions, to enrol in the army of Bushiri

69. Müller, F.F., op. cit., p.169. Kimweri bin Semboja was even reported to have detained coastal agents in Vugha. See Smythies to UMCA Clergy, 20.2.1889, UMCA MSS.I, USPG London.

70. Central Africa, vol VIII, Nov. 1889. p.169.

because they preferred him to Semboja as their ruler.⁷¹ For Semboja had clearly realized that he was threatened by two opposing forces, Bushiri and the Germans, and that to be able to face his external enemies, he needed peace at home. But as the suspicions as well as the ambitions of his Kilindi rivals had made peace impossible, he felt the only course open to him was to adopt a policy of neutrality in the conflict between the two. This was why he had not informed the Germans about the arrival of the fugitive Bushiri in Usambara in November 1889,⁷² hoping that by doing so he would be able to save his territory from the ravages of Bushiri and from eventual German military subjugation.

While Semboja was still hopefully clinging to this policy of strict neutrality, his Kilindi rivals had quickly adopted a realistic policy of cooperation with the powerful Germans who could subdue the Arab/Swahili communities on the coast, hoping thereby to be able to destroy their arch-enemy, Semboja. As von Wissmann was still frantically hunting for Bushiri, and needed all the support he could get from the neighbouring chiefs, Kibanga and Kinyasi, and many of the Bondei chiefs loyal to them, went down to Tanga to declare their support for the Germans. They made the desired impact; and were immediately 'reckoned as men of the German Government, their leader Kibanga receiving a handsome sword and joho (cloak) from Major Wissmann'.⁷³

The alliance of the Kibanga faction with von Wissmann now meant the isolation of Semboja; and it was this that encouraged the Imperial Commissioner to send Dr. Roehus Schmidt with a body of

71. Müller, F.F., op. cit. p.386.

72. Ibid., p.448.

73. Central Africa, vol. VIII, 1890, p.27.

troops to Masinde in February 1890 to obtain his submission and reopen the caravan route leading to Kilimanjaro.⁷⁴ Apart from the Zigua leader, Bwana Heri, who was still at large, the only serious obstacle to the German occupation of the Pangani hinterland after the execution of Bushiri on December 15, 1889 was the powerful Semboja of Masinde. Now that the Germans were in a much stronger military position, especially as they could count on the support of the friendly Kibanga faction in the event of a conflict with Semboja, it was decided to deal with Semboja,⁷⁵ before turning attention to Bwana Heri.

On his way to Masinde, Rochus Schmidt made efforts to reestablish German power in Bondei by stopping first at Lewa, where he posted ten soldiers under the command of Lt. von Behr as protection for the German tobacco plantation, which had just been reactivated.⁷⁶ From there, he advanced towards Masinde, which was reached on February 6, 1890. Realizing the hopelessness of his situation, Semboja unconditionally capitulated to the invading forces, thus allowing Dr. Schmidt to dictate and impose the terms of peace.⁷⁷

Understandingly, the first terms of peace were the recognition by Semboja of German suzerainty, and the payment of 1000 rupees

74. For Dr. Rochus Schmidt's personal account of his expedition to Usambara and southern Pare see Schmidt, R., Geschichte des Araber Aufstandes in Ost-Afrika, Frankfurt a. Oder, 1892, pp. 174-175.

75. Semboja had probably sent a peace delegation to von Wissmann in Pangani, for Schmidt says 'he wanted a friendly agreement with us'. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.175.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., and Müller, F.F., op. cit., p.451.

in cash and about 2,800 rupees worth of ivory as compensation for the 'illegal' detention and confiscation of the loads of Dr. Hans Meyer and Dr. Oscar Baumann in September 1888. Since Semboja had voluntarily surrendered after declaring his loyalty to the German authority, Schmidt had wisely decided that it would be useful to exploit the authority of such a powerful chief in the interest of the German administration. As Semboja had appeared to be in control of western Usambara and southern Pare,⁷⁸ where he could show that two of his sons were already installed as chiefs, Rochus Schmidt gave him responsibility for the administration of these areas subject to the supervision of Lt. Ramsay, the German officer at the new German military station established at Masinde. For his services, Semboja was to be paid a monthly stipend of 100 Rupees or about 150 Marks.⁷⁹ Thus, he was able to turn what his rivals had thought was going to be a humiliating defeat into virtual victory, as he was also able to secure German recognition for his son Kimweri, who was king in Vugha. In fact, so completely was he able to win the confidence of Dr. Schmidt that the latter had not even asked him to surrender the fire arms in his possession.⁸⁰

The consequences of this pro-Semboja political settlement were far reaching. It meant German recognition of the preeminence or paramountcy of Semboja in Usambara and the southern Pare plains

78. Baumann, O., Usambara und seine Nachbarngebiete, Berlin, 1891, p.204.

79. Müller, F.F., op. cit., p.451.

80. Semboja was not questioned about the fire arms in his possession until February 1891, when Major von Wissmann allowed him to keep about 500 guns for self defence. See von Wissmann's report of his Kilimanjaro Expedition in Deutsches Kolonialblatt (DKB) No.7, April 1891, p.151.

under Shambaa settlement. Since the political ambitions of Semboja had been one of the major obstacles to peace in Usambara, because most of the Kilindi chiefs as well as their Shambaa subjects were opposed to his usurpation of the Kilindi political leadership, this settlement meant the virtual end of the protracted Usambara civil war in his favour; for any opposition to Semboja would henceforth be regarded as an opposition to the German authority. The irony of the whole situation was that the Kibanga faction, who had first declared their support for von Wissmann, and who were the faction entitled by tradition to political leadership in Vugha through Kinashi, the dispossessed heir of Simbamwene Shekulwavu, were only given subordinate positions after Schmidt's return to the coast.⁸¹ Kibanga was appointed chief of Bondei, from where he was later removed to Handei in East Usambara. Kinyashi, the legitimate king, was to stay in his village of Hundu in the same area. It appears the German had not been particularly impressed with the Kibanga faction, for they knew that they were chiefs who lacked power and influence. The strong Semboja seemed to have commanded more respect. However, by backing Semboja, Dr. Schmidt had made the wrong choice, for the Shambaa who hated him were soon to transfer this hatred to the Germans themselves.

Before returning to the coast where his troops were being anxiously expected for the projected attack on Bwana Heri, Dr. Schmidt had travelled northwards along the Pangani valley to Gonja in southern

81. Central Africa, vol. VIII, 1890, Letter of March 19, 1890 from the Rev. W.H. Woodward of Magila, p.71.

Pare, a caravan centre which had since about 1880⁸² been ruled on Semboja's behalf by his son Mwasi. The military expedition's visit was intended to serve two major purposes. First, it was aimed at demonstrating the fact of German military presence in an area where Chief Semboja had exercised considerable political influence in the decade before the German intervention. For example, by the time of Dr. Schmidt's visit in February 1890, Semboja's sons were in effective control of two important caravan centres on the two routes leading to Kilimanjaro, Gonja in the east and Buiko in the West.⁸³ Another equally important caravan centre at Kihurio, which had originally been founded by Semboja with the help of his Zigua agent Kihungwi, had by now been independent of Masinde, since Kihungwi had resented Semboja's attempt to control the trade of all southern Pare through his son Mwasi at Gonja.⁸⁴ It was therefore necessary for Dr. Schmidt to show that German military power was now backing Semboja as a warning to chiefs like Kihungwi, who might be inclined towards rebellion. Secondly, the expedition was to serve as escort for Otto Ehlers, the Moshi agent of the German East African Company, and Lt. von Eltz, the newly appointed German military station officer for Moshi, who were then on their way to Kilimanjaro to reestablish the German station which had been abandoned shortly after the outbreak of the coastal rebellion in Pangani.⁸⁵ While these Kilimanjaro

82. Oscar Baumann, who was in Gonja in August, 1890, says the settlement had come under Mwasi about ten years before his visit. See Baumann, O., op. cit., p.211; and Extract from the Nationale Zeitung, Berlin, 14.8.1890, DZA Potsdam, RKA 404¹⁴.

83. Kimambo, I.N., The Political History of the Pare of Tanzania, Nairobi, 1969, pp. 173-174.

84. Ibid., pp. 200-201; and Extract from the Nationale Zeitung, 14.8.1890, loc.cit.

85. See Otto Ehler's Report to the General Meeting of the German East African Company, 28.2.1889, DZA Potsdam, RKA 408.

travellers continued on their journey from Gonja, Dr. Schmidt and his men returned to the coast via the Umba river route⁸⁶ without making any attempt to discover the true political situation in southern Pare.

Unlike Bondei or Usambara, which had felt the direct impact of the Bushiri rebellion, Kilimanjaro was not directly affected by the crisis on the coast. However, in spite of the efforts of Otto Ehlers, to prevent Mandara from knowing anything about the outbreak of the rebellion and the imposition of a naval blockade on the East African coast, news of the happenings at the coast had reached him though Masinde and Mombasa. The carriers of the news from Masinde were members of the Moshi deputation which Mandara had himself sent to Semboja at the German Agent's request, to enquire about Dr. Meyer's caravans and 'to report on the reason for its detention'. From these men, Mandara had heard 'that Semboja had retained Meyer's things till matters should be settled at the coast, not as appropriating them straight off'.⁸⁷ He was also told that 'there had been a general massacre of all Europeans at Mozambique, Kilwa, Pangani, and Pemba, some 200 having perished'.⁸⁸ From Mombasa had probably come the rumour, which was circulated by Mandara's Swahili friends, that General Mathews of Zanzibar had been killed by Mbaruk, the fugitive Mazrui opponent of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Although he was still reported to be friendly with Europeans, in spite of the

86. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.175.

87. Taylor to Price, 22.10.1888, G3.A5/0, CMS. London.

88. Ibid.

opposition of his Swahili advisers, Mandara would not give them a free hand 'from fears about the political stability of a tamed Mochi'.⁸⁹

In fact, what seemed to have mattered in Uchagga, while fighting was going on at the coast, was the politics of survival which engaged all the attention of the various rival chiefs. For example, the agelong conflict between Sina of Kibosho, then the most powerful chief on Kilimanjaro, and Mandara of Moshi, then the most diplomatic, was being complicated by the rise of a new chief, the young Marealle of Marangu, who like his brother-in-law Mandara, knew the advantages of outside connexions.⁹⁰ Thus, while the Germans were busy suppressing the Bushiri rebellion, Mandara was also busy trying to check the ever growing power of his rival, Sina of Kibosho, especially in Machame⁹¹ and in the buffer state of Uru,⁹² and also trying to put an end to the growing independence and political confidence of the ambitious Marealle.

A few weeks before the arrival of Otto Ehlers and Lt. Von Eltz in Moshi in February 1890, Mr. Morris, of the CMS Moshi station had reported a conflict between Mandara and Sina over Uru.⁹³ He had also mentioned the invasion of Marangu by Mandara of Moshi, because Marealle was said to have assisted Kibosho's attack on Uru. Morris, however, said that there was no truth in the report of

89. Ibid.

90. Morris to Lang, 27.1.1890, G3.A5/0 1890, CMS London.

91. Meyer, H., op. cit., pp. 247-248; and Stahl, K., History of the Chagga Peoples of Kilimanjaro, London, 1964, pp. 120-123.

92. Taylor to Price, 22.10.1888, and Morris to Lang, 7.10.1889, G3.A5/0 1889, CMS London.

93. Morris to Lang, 27.1.1890, G3.A5/0, 1890, CMS London.

Marealle's intervention against Uru, explaining that it was simply a pretext used by Mandara 'to reduce a man in whom he saw a possible rival, and one who had been patronized of late by several Europeans'⁹⁴. During the invasion, which was also undertaken by Mandara's 'four subject states Uru, Mbokomo, Kiru & Kilema', Marangu villages and food crops were destroyed, and all captives 'brutally murdered on the spot and their bodies mutilated.'⁹⁵ Marealle himself was said to have escaped death by taking refuge in Mamba. It was not surprising, therefore, that he had tried to prevent the German party from proceeding to Moshi by spreading the rumour of Mandara's death.⁹⁶ This was the first attempt at a political coup d'état by Marealle, and though it was not successful, it marked the beginning of the young chief's manoeuvres for preeminence on Kilimanjaro.

When the two German officials finally arrived in Moshi on February 19, 1890, they found a sick Mandara,⁹⁷ caught between the desire to preserve the independence of his chiefdom by keeping the whitemen at bay, and the pressing necessity of maintaining his power and prestige among other Chagga chiefs by exploiting the presence of the same whitemen. For while he was unwilling to give the German officials a nice reception, because the presents they

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid. This report was also confirmed by Madame French-Sheldon, the British lady, who was the first European woman to visit Kilimanjaro. See French-Sheldon, M., Sultan to Sultan, London 1892, p.358.

96. DKB, No. 5, June 1890, p.81; and The Consett Guardian, 25.10.1889, G3.A5/0, 1889, CMS London.

97. Before his arrival in Kilimanjaro, Otto Ehlers had heard the rumours of Mandara's death in Zanzibar and had, in fact, sent a telegram to Berlin about it. See Otto Ehlers to the Kaiser, 1.11.1889, DZA Potsdam, RKA 385.

had brought from both the German Kaiser and the German East African Company had not included firearms, but were simply what he called 'Makorokocho-rubbish'⁹⁸, he had subsequently signed with them an agreement which, practically reduced him to the level of a paid agent of the German Company, for fear that the Germans might move away and establish their station in another chiefdom. Under this agreement, made on February 26, 1890, Mandara formally recognised the German protectorate over Kilimanjaro, and accepted the German flag which was to fly every day in his court-yard. The Germans, in turn, recognised his paramountcy over the whole of Uchagga, and guaranteed him a monthly stipend.⁹⁹

Thus, the whole of Kilimanjaro, like Usambara and Southern Pare, was considered to have been brought under German rule through the agency of one man, Mandara, whose friendly cooperation the Germans - first Jühlke and then Ehlers - seemed to have considered vital to the establishment of a permanent German administration. It was in furtherance of the policy of wooing Mandara that Otto Ehlers, who had taken a number of Moshi men to Berlin in December 1888 to dazzle them with the wonders of the white~~man~~'s civilization, had returned with loads of presents to buy his friendship.¹⁰⁰ According to the Rev. A.J. Steggall, the CMS missionary at Moshi, it had taken the German delegation two days to present these gifts which were, apart from 'a diamond and ruby ring worth £50', 'mostly mechanical

98. Steggall to Lang, 26.2.1890, G3.A5/0, 1890, CMS. London.

99. Otto Ehlers to the Kaiser, 25.5.1890, DZA Potsdam, RKA 385; also Morris to Lang, 7.3.1890, G3.A5/0, 1890. CMS London.

100. Morris to Lang, 7.3.1890, loc. cit.

toys, models and fancy articles'.¹⁰¹ Although the Germans had carefully left out gums because, as Ehlers told Mandara, 'it is not good to wage wars'¹⁰², they had also included a large number of alcoholic drinks, which the CMS missionary believed 'would make Mandara a worse man than before'¹⁰³ and most certainly hasten the death of the sickly Moshi chief.

This policy of buying Mandara's friendship with huge presents was criticised by Hans Meyer, who had himself visited Kilimanjaro in 1889 and was therefore able to assess the true political situation in the Chagga states. Far from subscribing to the official German view that Mandara was the paramount ruler of Kilimanjaro, Meyer had reported he was just one out of many, and that he was himself struggling for survival, threatened in the west 'by the brave and energetic Sinna of Kibosho' and in the east 'by a second powerful rival, the young and honourable Marealle, chief of Marangu'.¹⁰⁴ While agreeing that such presents were quite in order for powerful native sovereigns 'such as those of Uganda and Lunda', he had warned that 'with a small potentate like Mandara, whose dominions have an area of not more than thirty square miles, and whose subjects number about three thousand, they only do harm'.¹⁰⁵ It was his belief that 'the gifts sent by the Emperor will only serve

101. Steggal to Lang, 26.2.1890, Ibid.

102. Letter in Swahili from Mandara to H.M. the Kaiser, 14.3.1890, DZA Potsdam, RKA 385. Mandara had complained about the worthless gifts sent him and had asked for cannons.

103. Steggal to Lang, 26.2.1890, loc. cit.

104. Meyer, H., Across East African Glaciers, English translation by Calder, E.H., London, 1891, p.102.

105. Ibid.

to increase Mandara's arrogant pretensions'.¹⁰⁶ Meyers' words were prophetic: Before the year ran out, the ambitious and cunning Mandara had successfully precipitated a crisis which was to weaken his leading rival, Sina of Kibosho, and confirm him (Mandara) as the unchallenged paramount chief of all the Chagga- something which he would not have succeeded in doing without German assistance.

It must be pointed out, however, that it was the Germans who had first tried to exploit his power and influence to extend their control over other Chagga chiefdoms. When the German military station was established at Moshi towards the end of February 1890, the station commandant, Lt. von Eltz, had with him only a very small force of twenty Sudanese soldiers,¹⁰⁷ which was hardly strong enough for the defence of the station itself. It was therefore clear from the start that the station would depend entirely on the goodwill and co-operation of Mandara, whose influence was to be used for the extension of German control over all other Chagga chiefs. For some time before the arrival of the Germans, Mandara's overlordship had been recognised unconditionally by the chiefs of Uru, Mbokomu, Kirua and Kilema in eastern Kilimanjaro.¹⁰⁸ Marealle of Marangu, who had tried to put himself up as a rival, had been ruthlessly subdued; and Malamya, the chief of Mamba, who had given him refuge had been punished severely by a joint invasion of Moshi and Kilema warriors.¹⁰⁹ It was therefore comparatively easy for the German station commandant to bring

106. Ibid.

107. Morris to Lang, 7.3.1890, G3.A5/0, 1890, CMS London.

108. Morris to Lang, 27.1.1890, Ibid.

109. Ibid.

these chiefs under the control of the Moshi station through the already established influence of Mandara.

In western Kilimanjaro, however the situation was different. As the most powerful chief in this area was not Mandara but his rival Sina of Kibosho,¹¹⁰ the established German policy of working through the former was to run into very serious difficulties. Although Sina had personally wanted a peaceful relationship with Europeans generally,¹¹¹ a situation was to be created which would give him 'no other alternative but to assume a posture of defiance to the Germans'. The author of this situation was Mandara, who was determined to use the German to pull his chestnuts out of the fire before they could understand the true political situation in Uchagga. In order to execute this plan to destroy Sina, which he had once revealed to Mr. Morris of the CMS Moshi,¹¹² Mandara had most certainly influenced von Eltz, sometime in March 1890, to issue an order to Sina that he should place himself under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Uru,¹¹³ an obscure chiefdom, which was then subject to Moshi, but which had for sometime been the raiding ground for the warriors of Kibosho.¹¹⁴ For Mandara knew that such an order was bound to lead to his rival's rejection of German rule and consequently invite German

110. Meyer, H., op. cit., p.102; and Stahl, K., op. cit., p.174. It is no doubt a serious omission that Kathleen Stahl had not made use of the records of the CMS Chagga mission, which would have greatly illuminated her pioneer study of Chagga history.

111. Meyer, H., op. cit., p.245.

112. Morris says Mandara had boasted that he intended 'to treat Sina and the Wa-kwaso likewise'. Morris to Lang, 27.1.1890, loc. cit.

113. Volkens, G., Der Kilimandscharo, Berlin, 1897, p.361.

114. Taylor to Price, 20.10.1888, G3.A5/O, 1889, CMS London; also Stahl, K., op. cit., pp. 178-179.

military attack on Kibosho. As the calculating chief of Moshi had expected, Sina had reacted violently to this order, which clearly showed that there was no hope for him and his people under the new German administration. Rather than accept German rule and be controlled by his inferiors, the chiefs of Uru and Moshi, Sina had demonstrated his rejection of German rule by flying the flag of the Sultan of Zanzibar, not knowing that the Sultan himself had not been able to stand up to the Germans.

However, before Sina's final showdown with the Germans at the beginning of September 1890, there is evidence that von Eltz was himself aware of the power of Kibosho in the west of Kilimanjaro; for instead of establishing any serious relationship with Ngamini, the legitimate chief of Machame, who had been expelled by Kibosho warriors and was then an exile in Moshi, he had wisely recognised the de facto chief Shangali, Sina's protégé, who was then 'a mere boy'¹¹⁵. If the German officer had thought that he was simply being realistic in his approach to the Machame crisis, he would soon be left in no doubt that the crisis was an extension of the struggle for power between Sina and Mandara, with the balance tilting in favour of the former. For, when he visited Kibosho in the company of Bishop Courmont and Father Le Roy of the French Holy Ghost Fathers mission early in September 1890, Sina made it clear that he would not stop attacking Ngamini and his ally Mandara nor remove his warriors from Machame until both Mandara and Ngamini had stopped all acts of hostility towards him and Shangali in Machame.¹¹⁶ In

115. Stahl, K., op. cit., pp.122-123.

116. Le Roy, Au Kilima - Ndjaro, Paris n.d. (1890), p.289.

fact, it was this Machame crisis, coming after the relationship between Sina and the Germans had already been strained as a result of von Eltz's indiscretion, that had forced Sina to take a position of outright hostility to the Catholic missionaries the German officer brought with him. For he was probably aware of the fact that these same missionaries were in touch with the fugitive Ngamini in Moshi.¹¹⁷ During the brief, but extremely hostile, reception which he grudgingly gave von Eltz and the missionaries, he left them in no doubt about his opposition to the German policy of building up the power of Mandara at his expense, saying that 'he did not see at all why that king (meaning Mandara) should have everything'.¹¹⁸ The Reverend A.J. Steggal of the CMS Mission at Moshi who had reported on Sina's rejection of von Eltz's efforts to get him to accept the German overlordship and 'to make peace with Mandara' had made it clear that the chief of Kibosho had strongly resented the hoisting of the German flag in his vassal chiefdom of Machame without his consent. This was why he had invaded 'the ill-governed and easily conquered' chiefdom shortly after the departure of the German Commander and the Catholic missionaries, to pull down and burn the German flag.¹¹⁹ But instead of seeing Sina's hostility as a justifiable reaction of a wronged chief against a wrongly conceived administrative policy, the German officer had wrongly interpreted it as an act of rebellion.

What is interesting about this incident is that it was not von Eltz himself who was the first to report Sina's hostility to Von

117. Ibid., p.269. The Catholic missionaries had visited Ngamini before going to Sina in Kibosho.

118. Steggal to Anbusther, 23.9.1890, in Euan Smith to Salisbury, 28.11.1890, FO 84/2066, PRO London.

119. Ibid.

Wissmann, the German Imperial Commissioner, at the coast; for the news of the incident had already reached him at Pangani through a report by Keith Anbrusther the British Agent in Taveta before the arrival of von Eltz's official report.¹²⁰ This British report which had been sent afterwards to Sir Francis de Winton, the Administrator of the Imperial British East African Company in Mombasa had been based on a letter received from the CMS Moshi missionary Steggal,¹²¹ who had been alarmed by the anti-European posture assumed by Sina during and after the visit of von Eltz and the two Catholic missionaries to Kibosho, and had feared that he would almost certainly attack Moshi if action was not immediately taken to stop him. The safety of the CMS missionaries was therefore the primary consideration of Francis de Winton when he communicated this information to Euan Smith who had then passed it on to Wissmann in Pangani. But as the safety of these missionaries was also tied up, at this time, with the survival of their host Mandara, the British Agent was unwillingly serving the interest of the chief of Moshi, who stood to gain politically from the mortification of his rival, Sina.

The report of Sina's rebellion, coming from a man like de Winton, and raising once again the touchy question of the safety of foreign missionaries on German territory, must have influenced von Wissmann to decide on military action, especially as it was probably through the British Agent that he learned that the chief of Kibosho 'had scorned the power of the whiteman'¹²². He must also have seen a link between the reported hostility of Sina and

120. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.244.

121. Euan Smith to Salisbury, 28.11.1890, loc. cit; also Bennett N.R. 'The British on Kilimanjaro, 1884-1892, Tanzania Notes and Records, Sept. 1964, p.240.

122. Deutsches Kolonialblatt, No.8, April 15, 1891, p.186. Report of 8.3.1891 from Major von Wissmann to the Reichkanzler.

the coastal rebellion which he had just suppressed, as Sina, like the coastal Arab/Swahili 'rebels', had preferred the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar to that of the Germans.¹²³ And just as he had taken strong military action to subdue the coastal rebels, von Wissmann, whose assorted troops needed new fields of military activities to prevent them from becoming unruly, especially after their victorious campaigns against Bwana Heri, began to put his troops in readiness for a military expedition to Kilimanjaro.

During the preparation for this expedition, there arrived in Pangani in December 1890 a report from Lt. Stentzler, the newly-appointed station commander for Masinde, that chief Kihungwi of the caravan centre of Kihurio in southern Pare had refused to recognise the German authority, and was in open rebellion.¹²⁴ Since the maintenance of effective German authority along the Pangani-Moshi route was vital to the success of his Kilimanjaro expedition, von Wissmann had to decide on a quick military solution of the southern Pare problem on his way to Moshi.

The rebellion of Kihungwi was, like the reported hostility of Sina of Kibosho, essentially a German creation, arising out of their ignorance of the political situation in the country. By making Semboja of Masinde the overlord of southern Pare, Dr. Rochus Schmidt had in February 1890 created an explosive political situation without himself knowing it; for apart from the caravan centres at Gonja and Buiko, which Semboja had controlled through his sons,¹²⁵ most of southern Pare was outside his control. The mountain districts

123. Ibid.; and Stahl, K., op. cit., p.178.

124. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.244.

125. Kimambo, I.N., op. cit., pp. 173-174.

of this region had never at any time recognised his overlordship. On the contrary, it was Sekiondo, the chief of the Mamba district, whose son, Sekimanga, was chief when the Germans arrived, who had given the first Shambala colonists permission to settle on the Pare plains.¹²⁶ Therefore, if anyone was to be given the authority to administer southern Pare, it should have been Sekimanga not Semboja.

Even in areas of southern Pare under Shambala settlement, the claims of Semboja had not always gone unchallenged. For example, the caravan centres of Mwembe and Kisiwani on the eastern route to Kilimanjaro had been founded by Fungo Mwanamata and his brother Kaduri, who were political enemies of Semboja in Usambara before their migration into southern Pare.¹²⁷ Their hostility to Semboja had indeed increased in intensity as a result of their expulsion from their first settlement in Gonja by Mwasi, a son of Semboja.¹²⁸ In Kihurio, the settlement the Masinde chief had himself founded with both Shambala and Zigua settlers to control the caravan traffic in southern Pare, effective control was now being exercised not by him but by Kihungwi his erstwhile Zigua agent, who had in 1889 successfully repulsed an invasion by Semboja and his son Kimweri of Vuga, and had since then remained practically independent.¹²⁹ Baumann, who visited Kihurio early in September 1890 on his way to Kilimanjaro mentioned the independence of Kihungwi from Semboja,¹³⁰ whom he said Dr. Schmidr ought not to have recognised as the overlord

126. Ibid., p.171.

127. Ibid., p.175.

128. Ibid., p.173; and Baumann, O., op. cit., p.211.

129. Baumann, O., op. cit., pp. 193-194; Central Africa, vol.VII, 1889; Letter of 29.1.1889 from Bishop Smythies; and Kimambo, I.N., op. cit., p.170.

130. Extract from the Nationale Zeitung, 14.9.1890, DZA Potsdam, RKA 404¹⁴.

of northern Usambara and southern Pare because he was an usurper and a highway robber. He had then warned that both Masinde and Kihurio, including other areas under Semboja's control, were in danger of depopulation resulting from wholesale emigration if the German policy of recognising the paramountcy of Semboja was not changed.¹³¹

It was not quite three months after Baumann's warning that the conflict between Semboja and Kihungwi became a German problem, as the former, trying to use the German to accomplish what he had failed to do before their arrival, accused the latter to Lt. Stentzler, the German station Commander of refusing to recognise the German authority. Since Kihungwi would not come to Masindeto collect, through Semboja, the certificate confirming him as chief as other chiefs were then doing, the German officer, ignorant of the past feud between him and Semboja, had interpreted Kihungwi's refusal as an act of rebellion, and had duly reported the matter to his superior in Pangani.¹³² Like von Eltz of the Moshi station, Lt. Stentzler had genuinely believed that what was at stake was the establishment of German authority, and could not have imagined that he was just being used by the man whose claims ^{to Paramountcy depended on} military power. Thus like Mandara of Moshi, Semboja was able to use the Germans to settle old political scores.

When Major von Wissmann reached Masinde with his troops on January 20, 1891, he discovered, as he was later to do in Moshi, that the existence of the German military station depended on the cooperation of Semboja who, inspite of his previous opposition to

131. Ibid.

132. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.244.

the Germans, had worked out a fairly stable relationship with Lt. Stentzler and his deputy, Warrant officer von Stranstz and their small force of twenty soldiers.¹³³ And Semboja, who had no illusion about the military power of the Germans and their determination to crush any resistance, had warmly received von Wissmann and his troops, and had provided them with an ample supply of food and other necessities needed for the journey across the dry Masai steppe. He had also given the German Imperial Commissioner about 1,500 guns and some auxiliaries to assist with the campaign against Kihungwi.¹³⁴ This demonstration of loyalty had evidently impressed von Wissmann, who responded by allowing him to keep 500 guns for self defence,¹³⁵ an unprecedented concession which was a measure of the confidence which Semboja had encouraged the German officer to repose in him during his seven-day stay in his village. And considering this extraordinarily friendly relationship between him and von Wissmann, it is to be expected that the latter would easily confirm the report of the 'rebellion' of Kihungwi, which had originally been based on the charges made against him by his former overlord, Semboja.

However before leaving Masinde for Kihurio, von Wissmann had taken pains to strengthen the defences of the German station by seeing to the construction of a permanent fort. He also increased the number of its Sudanese soldiers from twenty to forty.¹³⁶ By

133. DKB, No.7, April 1891, p.151.

134. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 29.2.1891, Report on von Wissmann's Kilimanjaro Expedition by the paper's Zanzibar correspondent, Eugen Wolf, DZA Potsdam, RKA 750⁸.

135. DKB No.7, April 1891, p.151.

136. Ibid.

doing this, he had probably realized that Semboja's friendship would not by itself guarantee the permanent establishment of German authority in Usambara, especially as most of the Kilindi chiefs were in active opposition to him. It was this need for the establishment of an effective German authority that had made him organise a meeting of the neighbouring chiefs at Masinde, asking them to cooperate with the German station Commander and even advising them on matters of personal hygiene.¹³⁷ The presence of such a large number of troops - there were four companies - must have convinced even the most sceptical of the Shambala chiefs that the Germans had to come to stay, and that it would be suicidal to oppose them.

The journey to Kihurio was made in the company of Lt. von Eltz, the Moshi station commander, who had arrived in Masinde on January 22, 1891 to brief his chief on the 'rebellion' of Sina of Kibosho.¹³⁸ It was certainly a striking coincidence that the preparations for a military assault both on Kihungwi and Sina were discussed and finalized at the comparative safety of the Masinde station. But, unlike Sina, who was to offer the German military expedition a remarkably tough resistance, Kihungwi, a much lesser chief, with comparatively smaller resources in arms and man power, could not offer any resistance at all. Instead, he wisely adopted a policy of conciliation by quickly despatching a peace delegation¹³⁹ to meet the invading Germans, pleading that he was not against them but against the overlordship of Semboja. But as von Wissmann had

137. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 8.3.1891, DZA, Potsdam, RKA 750⁸.

138. DKB. No.7, April 1891, p.151.

139. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.245; Baumann, O., op. cit., p.204.

already decided that southern Pare should be administered through Semboja in Masinde, his fate was already sealed. Therefore, after a show of German military power, Kihungwi was deposed and his brother Shangari was appointed chief in his place.¹⁴⁰ To keep a watchful eye on the activities of the new chief, von Wissmann then appointed as akida, one Kivuma, whom Rochus Schmidt calls 'an obedient son of Semboja'¹⁴¹, who was expected to keep both Semboja and the German officer at Masinde fully informed of developments in Kihurio in particular and in south Pare in general.

The deposition of Kihungwi and the appointment of a pro-Semboja akida in Kihurio had meant much more than Semboja had himself anticipated in 1889 when he tried to reestablish his control over his agent there. It now involved the extension of his control not only over other Shambala settlements in southern Pare but also over indigenous Pare chiefs of the area, whose predecessors had given the Shambala permission to settle and trade on the plains below their highland chiefdoms. Although von Wissmann had not visited these indigenous Pare chiefs, for he had expected Semboja to use his vast commercial political influence in southern Pare to bring them under the control of the Masinde administration, nevertheless the news of his visit to the plains below, particularly to Kihurio and Gonja had spread like bushfire, demonstrating that a new factor had entered Pare politics, and that to survive they must take account of it.¹⁴²

140. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.245; and Kimambo, I.N., op. cit. p.200.

141. Ibid; DKB No.7, April 1891, p.151.

142. For example, the Wasangi leaders of Usangi in northern Pare were reported to have invited a German officer of the Wissmann Expedition to help restore them to their chiefdom from where they had been expelled by the rival Wambaga. As a result of this intervention, Usangi had been divided into two, the north under Naguvu, the Wambaga leader, and the south under Makoko, the leader of the Wasangi. See Kimambo, I.N., op. cit. p.212.

Perhaps, no one in southern Pare knew more than Fungo Mwanamata and his brother Kaduri, who had long opposed Semboja's attempts to control the whole of southern Pare plains, that they must ingratiate themselves with the Germans in order to preserve themselves from the fate which had befallen Kihungwi. Thus, when the German troops under von Wissmann reached Kisiwani on January 26, 1891, they were given such a friendly reception by Kaduri that they felt completely relaxed enough to celebrate the German Kaiser's birthday there on the 27th.¹⁴³ And when the German military expedition was leaving for Kilimanjaro the following day, the friendly chief supplied them with the necessary provisions for the journey through the dry, uninhabitable country between Kisiwani and Lake Jipe.¹⁴⁴ German friendship with Kaduri, which was later extended to his brother Fungo Mwanamata at Mwembe¹⁴⁵ now meant that Semboja's control over the whole of southern Pare would not be absolute and that the competition between them and Semboja would still continue in spite of the German intervention.

Before arriving at Moshi in February 7, 1891, von Wissmann met with opposition from two closely related tribal groups who were to give the German administration a lot of trouble in the future. These were the Masai¹⁴⁶ and the Warush,¹⁴⁷ whose raids were then making caravan traffic very difficult between northern Pare and Kilimanjaro. He was more successful with the latter, whom he surprised at Arusha Juu on February 3, taking two of their young warriors as hostages

143. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.245.

144. Ibid., p.246.

145. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 21.4.1891, DZA Potsdam, RKA 750²⁸.

146. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.246; and DKB No. 7, April, 1891, p.151.

147. Ibid.

and forcing their elders to sue for peace by paying their ransom in cattle. Von Wissmann had reciprocated their friendly gestures by allowing two of his officers to enter into blood brotherhood with their elders.¹⁴⁸ This peaceful submission of the Warush, against whom von Eltz said he had previously been contemplating military action,¹⁴⁹ had saved the German expedition the trouble of military campaigns in Arusha, thus helping to conserve their energy for the forthcoming crucial battle with Sina of Kibosho.

At Moshi, the German expedition was warmly received by Mandara and his two sons Meli and Kirita, who gave von Wissmann a present of three ivory tusks, thirty goats, and some cattle.¹⁵⁰ So completely overwhelmed was the Imperial Commissioner by Mandara's hospitality and friendship that on February 8, at a meeting at the chief's palace, attended by vassal chiefs like Marealle of Marangu Funba of Kilema and Kisariki of Uru, he pronounced the Moshi chief as the paramount ruler of all the Chagga.¹⁵¹ At this meeting, the German plan to attack Kibosho was put before the chiefs, who promised to assist the German effort with auxiliaries. But, as the Germans would soon discover, not all these chiefs would be willing to fulfil their promises, as they feared they would be attacked by Sina if he should eventually succeed in defeating the invaders.

However, when the two-day assault on Sina began on Feb.12, the German military expedition of four companies, strengthened by 400

148. Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.247.

149. Ibid.

150. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 1.4.1891, DZA Potsdam, RKA 750¹⁷; and DKB No. 7, April 1891, p.151.

151. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 2.4.1891, DZA Potsdam, RKA 750¹⁸.

armed auxiliaries from Moshi¹⁵² and assisted by Kisarike of Uru, a protege-turned-enemy of the chief of Kibosho,¹⁵³ who guided the German troops under Lt. Zissewiss to Sina's fortress, was able to defeat the brave warriors of Kibosho. After the Wakibosho had been put to flight mainly by sheer force of superior military technology, von Wissmann said he had sent Mandara's warriors in pursuit to capture prisoners and collect booty, which consisted of '50 prisoners, mostly women, about 2000 cattle 3000 goats and a few other articles.¹⁵⁴ But in spite of the military humiliation of the Kibosho, von Wissmann was greatly impressed by their bravery which contrasted sharply with the cowardice of the Moshi warriors, who had only waited to reap the harvest of German military victory. It was certainly in consideration of this gallant resistance of the Wakibosho and their chief that he decided to accept Sina's unconditional surrender without imposing any further punishment, as the chief had already suffered a loss of about two hundred dead and about sixty wounded as opposed to the German loss of four dead and fifteen wounded, among whom was a German non-commissioned officer, Nowack.¹⁵⁵

Although the Imperial Commissioner had been magnanimous enough to let him continue in office as chief, he could not be sure that he would remain loyal to them if left on his own. Therefore, he had decided that an akida should be appointed to supervise him

152. DKB. No.8, April 15, 1891, p.186; and Schmidt, R., op. cit., pp. 247-248.

153. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.186.

154. DKB. No.8, April 15, 1891, p.187. But Rochus Schmidt and Eugen Wolf, who were also present give higher figures. See Schmidt R., op. cit., p.254 and Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 15.2.1891, DZA Potsdam, RKA 750²¹.

155. Ibid.

and report on him directly to the German officer at Moshi. The man appointed was Shundi, a caravan trader and friend of Mandara,¹⁵⁶ who had joined the German expedition between Tanga and Pangani.¹⁵⁷ Apparently, he had been well-known to both Major von Wissmann and Capt. Johannes, the officer for Pangani, and had been recruited for the expedition because of his influence with Mandara and many Chagga chiefs as well as for his usefulness as a Swahili interpreter. The imposition of a pro-Moshi akida on Kibosho, as well as von Wissmann's order that Sina should surrender two Uru districts then under him to his rival, Mandara¹⁵⁸ not only emphasized his loss of independence to the Germans but also underlined his virtual subjection to Moshi - something which he had originally tried to prevent. Therefore, the acceptance of German authority tied up as it was with the recognition of the paramountcy of his enemy, Mandara had made German rule particularly detestable to Sina, especially as he was then the only Chagga chief forced to bear the burden of alien akida control. In time, he too was to appreciate the value of diplomatic rather than of military response to the German intervention.¹⁵⁹

The military subjugation of Kibosho was a personal triumph for Mandara who, besides taking over the control of the two Uru districts Sina was forced to surrender, also gained enormous prestige

156. Taylor to Price, 22.10.1888, G3.A5/0, 1889, CMS London.

157. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 19.1.1891, DZA Potsdam, RKA 7506.

158. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 15.2.1891, loc. cit.; and Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.255.

159. For example, he avenged his defeat in August 1892 by co-operating with the Germans to subdue chief Meli of Moshi. See Von Schele to Caprivi, 1.9.1892, DZA Potsdam, RKA 283⁷⁹⁻⁸⁴; also Stahl, K., op. cit., p.208.

throughout Kilimanjaro as a result of his collaboration with the Germans, who had proved themselves strong enough to conquer the hitherto invincible chief of Kibosho.¹⁶⁰ So deep was the impression which the submission made on other Chagga chiefs that they all began to send delegations to von Wissmann at Moshi to declare their loyalty to the new German administration. As a demonstration of their recognition of the German authority, these delegations also brought presents of ivory and cattle to Moshi and took back with them the German flag.¹⁶¹ Even the chiefs of Arusha Juu were also reported to have sent a peace delegation to Major von Wissmann at Moshi, for they were unwilling to engage in combat with such an army that could subdue the powerful Sina of Kibosho.¹⁶² This apparently spontaneous demonstration of loyalty by Chagga chiefs and those of the neighbouring Arusha had not, however, prevented the Germans from taking punitive action against 'some vassal chiefs of Mandara' who had not fulfilled their promise of sending their warriors to assist in the attack on Kibosho.¹⁶³ This was certainly to show that the new administration expected the chiefs to keep their promises in future and to remain absolutely loyal.

After strengthening the defence of the German fort in Moshi by completing its fortifications, Major von Wissmann left for the coast on February 26th. Passing again through Arusha Juu where, as he reported, his expedition had made 'a lasting impression

160. Bulletin-Général de la Congrégation du Saint Esprit, 1891, 93, vol. 16, p.797.

161. DKB No. 9, 1st May 1891, p.205.

162. Ibid.; Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.255.

163. DKB; No. 9, 1st May 1891, p.205.

on the people',¹⁶⁴ his party had moved down to Kisiwani through Kahe. Between these two caravan centres, the expedition had again encountered the Ssongonei Masai who were openly robbing caravans.¹⁶⁵ From the safety of Kisiwani, where he was again well received by Kaduri and his brother Mwanamata, the old enemy of Semboja of Masinde, von Wissmann had sent back a company of troops under the command of Dr. Bumiller to clear these Masai from the caravan route. Although they were successful in driving away the Masai, Bumiller's men had met with serious opposition and had returned with a loss of two dead and several wounded.¹⁶⁶

Bumiller's victory over the Masai was ^{partial} one; for, on hearing that the German expedition was moving down to Pangani they had boldly affronted Masinde, and sent the German officer there a declaration of war. Major von Wissmann therefore had no alternative but to send back two companies of troops under Captain Johannes to clear the Pangani valley of all Masai so that caravans could travel without molestation.¹⁶⁷ The CMS missionary Steggal reported the arrival of this anti-Masai expedition in Moshi on March 31, 1891 with a number of captive Masai women and children, whom he claimed 'were not too well treated by their Nubian guards'.¹⁶⁸ He said that after some of these captives had been ransomed with ivory by their friends, the rest were divided among the Holy Ghost Fathers mission

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid. This band of the Masai had on February 19, 1891 attacked a German caravan led by Baron von Langfeld, who was then on his way to Moshi to join Major von Klissmann. See Schmidt, R., op. cit., p.255.

166. DKB. No. 9, 1st May 1891, p.206.

167. DKB. No. 11, 1st June, 1891, p.243.

168. Steggal to correspondents in England, April 1891, G3.A5/O 1891, CMS London.

and the CMS Moshi station, the latter getting twenty two captives in all.¹⁶⁹ This military expedition succeeded in exploding the myth of the invincibility of the Masai, who for the first time learned to respect the power of the Germans. Thus, by April 1891,¹⁷⁰ when Major von Wissmann was recalled to Germany to make way for von Soden, the first Governor of the new German Protectorate of East Africa, which had come into being since the beginning of January,¹⁷¹ German authority had been established along the Pangani valley, with the fort at Masinde serving as an intermediate station between Pangani and Moshi.

Considering the manner by which the Pangani valley region had come under German occupation, one inevitably comes to the conclusion that Major von Wissmann's combination of diplomatic strategy with military action was the most decisive factor. It is however possible to overemphasize the contribution which the German alliance with the supposedly friendly chiefs like Semboja and Mandara, or the force of German arms, had made to the imposition of German rule. For these chiefs had seen the German intervention simply as the continuation of their pre-colonial politics and regarded their collaboration with the Germans as a new weapon to be used to achieve what had before then proved unattainable. It is also difficult to see how the Germans could have succeeded militarily if they had fought opponents at the same level of military technology or with equal access to arms supply ; for the two major groups Major von

169. Ibid.

170. DKB, No.11, 1st June 1891, p.241.

171. Müller, F.F., op. cit., pp. 509-510.

Wissmann had to fight, the Masai and the Wakibosho, largely depended on bows and arrows which were hardly adequate to face four companies of regular troops armed with rifles, machine gun, and even a canon, as in the battle at Kibosho. In fact, what had proved decisive at Kibosho was the German use of canon fire.¹⁷²

Although guns had usually been imported into the East African interior by Arab/Swahili traders before the German intervention, these had never been in large quantities as the suppliers themselves had tended to control the trade for fear that the Bantu chiefs might become too powerful for them to deal with.¹⁷³ This rather limited supply of arms was virtually stopped on February 24, 1890, when Major von Wissmann and George Mackenzie, the Administrator of the Imperial British East African Company, signed in Zanzibar an Anglo/German arms control agreement¹⁷⁴ to restrict the importation of arms into the East African interior so as to prevent a recurrence of armed revolts like those of Bushiri and Bwana Heri. As a result of this agreement, arms in the German sphere could be sold at the main ports and only at the official headquarters of German officials, who were instructed to sell arms to leaders of caravans not as articles of trade but only as a means of protection. Even then, each caravan going into the interior was allowed only 11b of gun powder per person.¹⁷⁵ This arms embargo, which was further tightened up after

172. Schmidt, R., op. cit., pp. 252-253.

173. Burton, R.F., The Lake Region of Central Africa, London, 1860, p.308.

174. DKB, No.2, 1st April, 1890, pp. 19-20.

175. Ibid., p.19.

the 1908/1909 Brussels Arms conference,¹⁷⁶ was evidently a decisive factor in the extension of German control not only in the Pangani valley region but throughout what was German East Africa.

176. Loth, H., Griff nach Ost Africa, Berlin, 1968, p.93.

Chapter 4

The Politics of Survival: The Evolution of German Administrative Policy, 1891 - 1901

The Wissmann Commissariat was not only concerned with the suppression of the coastal rebellion and the effective occupation of German East Africa but also undertook the creation of an administrative system aimed at ensuring peace and security. The vital need for the introduction of an effective administrative system, based on the power of the military, had been expressed in consular reports from Zanzibar a year or two before the outbreak of the rebellion,¹ but it was only after the military subjugation of the rebels and the execution of its ringleader, Bushiri, that Major von Wissmann could think of establishing an administrative system. At that time, only a military system of administration could guarantee security in German East Africa in view of the tense political situation created in the interior by the Bushiri rebellion. This was why even before the coast was effectively pacified, the Imperial Commissioner had sent military expeditions into the interior to establish German authority. In the Pangani valley region, two important expeditions under Lt. Dr. Rochus Schmidt and Lt. von Eltz had secured the establishment of German authority in Usambara and Kilimanjaro respectively in February and March 1890.² For the first time, a German military station for Usambara and Southern Pare was established at Masinde,

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1. Arendt to Bismarck, 6.3.1886, RKA. 396;
Arendt to Bismarck, 14.2.1887, RKA. 397.
 2. Schmidt, R., Geschichte des Araber Aufstandes in Ost-Afrika, Frankfurt a. Oder, 1892. pp. 174-175; Deutsches Kolonialblatt. (DKB) Nr.7, April, 1891, p.151.

the capital of Chief Semboja, whose son, Kimweri, was king in Vugha. The Kilimanjaro station at Moshi, which had been established by Otto Ehlers, an agent of the German East African Company in August 1887 was transformed from a commercial station to a military post.³ The two military stations at Masinde and Moshi, which controlled the Pangani valley region, remained under the supervision of the Imperial Commissioner at Pangani until the beginning of August 1890, when this informal administrative system received official sanction.

Under the system introduced by an order of the acting Imperial Commissioner, Dr. Karl Wilhelm Schmidt on August 5, 1890, German East Africa was divided into two provinces, the northern province extending from the Anglo/German boundary in the north to the Rufiji in the south, and the southern province covering the territory south of the Rufiji.⁴ The southern province was divided into three military districts of Kilwa, Lindi and Mikindani, the commandants of which were to be supported by four expeditionary corps. The northern province was made up of the five main military districts of Tanga, Pangani, Saadani, Bagamoyo, Dar es Salaam and the Rufiji delta, and five military stations of Muoa, Masinde, Kilimanjaro, Mkwaja and Mpwapwa. While the Masinde station in Usambara was placed under the jurisdiction of Pangani, the Kilimanjaro station at Moshi was independently administered under the direct supervision of the Imperial Commissioner.⁵ Under this new arrangement, the Masinde station came under the command of Lt. Stentzler who was responsible to Capt. Johannes, the Commandant of

3. Otto Ehlers to H.M. Kaiser, 25.5.1890, RKA 385.

4. DKB. Nr. 12, 15th September, 1890, p.221.

5. Ibid.

Pangani.⁶ The Moshi station remained under Lt. von Eltz, the founder of the Kilimanjaro military post.⁷ The two military stations at Masinde and Moshi were further strengthened by the Imperial Commissioner himself early in 1891 in the course of his Kilimanjaro expedition, during which permanent military forts were constructed in both places.⁸ Thus by April 1891, when Major von Wissmann was relieved of his duties as Imperial Commissioner, the basis of the German administration in the Pangani valley region, which was to remain essentially unchanged until the turn of the century, had been firmly laid.

The main functions of the military stations under Wissmann were the extension of German authority and influence in the adjoining areas and the protection of caravans against slave raids and robberies, particularly of the pastoral Masai. In the discharge of their functions, the Commandants were instructed to employ more diplomacy than force,⁹ instructions which most of the largely inexperienced and young officers were unable to carry out. This was not only because of the hostility of the native peoples under them but also because of the deterioration of their behaviour under tropical and invariably, isolated conditions.¹⁰ In the case of the Masinde and Moshi military stations, German influence was to be

6. Ibid., p.223.

7. Ibid.

8. DKB. Nr. 7, April, 1891; p.151. DKB. Nr. 11, 1st June 1891, p.241.

9. Supplement to DKB., 1892-96, Chapter 4, 'Die Entwicklung unserer Kolonien' in Africa and Sudsee,' p.22.

10. Dr. Steubel, who served as a military doctor in Pangani during this period noticed the effects of the tropical climate on the behaviour of German (European) officers. See Steubel, W., Arzt und Soldat in drei Erdteilen Berlin, 1940, p.77.

established through the agencies of Semboja and Mandara, who were proclaimed the paramount chiefs of their respective areas. This entirely pragmatic policy of supporting, or building up, chiefs friendly to the German administration, no matter what their pre-colonial status had been, was to remain essentially the basis of the German administrative system until the beginning of the 20th century.

The appointment of the 'pacifist'¹¹ Julius von Soden as Governor of the new German East African protectorate in the place of Major von Wissmann, as well as the creation of a separate post of Commander of the protectorate forces, under Colonel Von Zelewski,¹² were, indeed, an indication that Berlin was in favour of a reappraisal of German administrative methods in East Africa, especially as the Wissmann administration had been strongly criticised for its militarism and racism.¹³ Although von Wissmann had defended his administrative system, specifically justifying his support for Chief Semboja against the advice of Oscar Baumann and Hans Meyer,¹⁴ it soon became clear that the Wissmann system could not long survive unmodified.

However, the expected change did not begin in Usambara, where it was considered vital to the establishment of a stable administration, in view of the past hostility of Chief Semboja to

11. Wright, M., Local roots of policy in German East Africa, in Journal of African History, vol.IX., No.4 (1968), p.624; Miller, M., 'The subjugation of Chief Meli of Moshi' in Tanganyika. Notes and Records (TNR), No. 57, Sept. 1961, p. 208; Steggal to Mother, 19.5.1892, CMS. London, G3.A5/0, 1892.

12. Steggal describes him as 'a man of peace'.

13. For the criticisms of the Wissmann administration by Michahelles the German Consul in Zanzibar and Oscar Baumann, the Austrian geographer and diplomat, see Müller, F.F. Deutschland - Zanzibar - Ostafrika, Berlin, 1959, p.452.

14. Extract from the Deutsches Wochenblatt n.d.(1891), DZA, RKA 404³⁰.

the Germans, and, more importantly, of the opposition of Kibanga and Kinyashi to his paramountcy. Rather, it began in Uchagga in Kilimanjaro, where a fairly stable administration was in the process of being established after the submission of Sina of Kibosho in February 1891. Here, the author of the change of policy was not von Soden, the Imperial Governor in Dar es Salaam, but Carl Peters, the pioneer of German colonization in East Africa, who, after the transfer of the administration of the territory by the German East African Company to the crown, was appointed the Imperial Commissioner for Kilimanjaro by the German Kaiser.¹⁵

The creation of the Kilimanjaro Commissariat was itself a novel policy - an experiment in civil administration - reflecting Berlin's new emphasis on the demilitarization of the administration in areas where the political situation appeared peaceful and stable.¹⁶ The Kilimanjaro region was considered suitable for development as a civil district because the defeat of the powerful Sina of Kibosho, as well as the submission of other Chagga chiefs and those from the neighbouring Arusha, had given the Germans an impression that the whole region was now conquered and ready for colonization. It was certainly not a mere coincidence that von Götzen, then of the German Embassy at Rome, who was on an exploratory tour of the highland regions of Usambara and Kilimanjaro to assess their suitability for German settlement, arrived in Moshi at the same time as Carl Peters on July 23, 1891.¹⁷

15. Loth, H., Griff nach Ostafrika, Berlin, 1968, pp.22-23.

16. A civil administration was installed on the Coast after the suppression of the Bushiri rebellion. See Tetzlaff, R., Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung, Berlin, 1970, p.36.

17. DKB. Nr. 21, November 1891, p.461.

However, for this experiment to succeed, it required not only the cooperation of the Imperial Commissioner with the civilian Governor in Dar es Salaam and the local commandant of the Kilimanjaro military station, but also the development of peaceful relations with the Africans under his administration. But these did not develop; for, as a result of the undefined nature of the authority of the Imperial Commissioner in relation to that of the Governor, Carl Peters had felt he could wield the same powers which Major von Wissmann had exercised.¹⁸ This caused conflicts not only between him and von Soden in Dar es Salaam¹⁹ but also with Lt. Bronsart von Schellendorf, the Commandant of the Kilimanjaro Military station.²⁰ Carl Peters, who held even more racist views²¹ than von Wissmann, was temperamentally unsuited to the task of developing a civil administration among the Chagga,²² whose politics he made no efforts to understand, as he was only committed to a policy of preparing Kilimanjaro for German settlement.²³ Since the Germans and not the native Africans were to be the main beneficiaries of his administration, the Imperial

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18. Report of proceedings at Munich Court No.1, 2.7.1907 on the libel action against Gruber Martin, Editor of Munich Post, DZA. Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters, Nr.60, p.53.
 19. Extract from 'Der Tag', 26.3.1906, Nachl. C. Peters, Nr. 52, p.28, DZA, Potsdam.
 20. Extract from the 'Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung', 24.2.1897, Nachl. C. Peters, No. 51, DZA Potsdam.
 21. For example, he was reported as saying at Taveta, in British East Africa, that he would like to see the natives on the mountain replaced by Chinese labourers working under European colonists' Steggal to Lang, 24.2.1891, CMS. Archives, London, G3.A5/0, 1892.
 22. Even von Soden agreed that Dr. Peters was highly temperamental. See Bennett, N.R., 'The British on Kilimanjaro, 1884-1892', TNR No. 63, Sept. 1964, p.241.
 23. Steggal to Lang, 24.2.1892, CMS Archives, London, G3.A5/0, 1892.

Commissioner was determined to adopt an administrative policy calculated to strengthen the German position at the expense of the native Chagga. This led to the reversal of the established policy of making the chiefdom of Moshi the centre of the German administration in Kilimanjaro and its chief, Mandara, the paramount ruler of the Chagga.

The decision to transfer the seat of the German administration from Moshi to Marangu was certainly not influenced by the hostility and the obstructionist activities of Mandara, which were the basis of the Braun proposals of October 1888.²⁴ For Mandara had moved from a moderate position of reluctant cooperation with the Germans in 1890 to one of total commitment early in the following year during the period of von Wissmann's invasion of Kibosho. The diplomatic chief of Moshi was even reported to have accorded Carl Peters a warm reception on his arrival in Moshi with Lt. Graf von Götzen in July 1891.²⁵ But the new German overlord was determined to evacuate the German station at Moshi for a different set of reasons. Since he was primarily concerned with the security of the German administration, Carl Peters had wanted a place overlooking the British post at Taveta, which would also control the routes to Ugweno in northern Pare and Rombo in eastern Kilimanjaro.²⁶

Besides, he did not want the growing power of Mandara to stand in the way of his plan to transform Kilimanjaro into a German settlement.²⁷ This was why he had picked on Marealle of Marangu,

24. Taylor to Price, 19.8.1888, CMS. London, G3.A5/0 1888.

25. DKB. Nr. 21, 1st Nov., 1891, p.461.

26. DKB. Nr. 21, 1st Nov., 1891, pp. 456-457. Report of the Imperial Commissioner, Dr. Peters to von Soden.

27. Steggall to Lang, 24.2.1892, G3.A5/0, 1892, CMS Archives, London.

who was known to be friendly with Europeans, but whose power was insignificant, as he had virtually been reduced to a position of vassalage by his father-in-law, Mandara.²⁸ Although the chief of Marangu had given Carl Peters a rousing reception when the latter visited his chiefdom for the first time in August 1891,²⁹ the choice of Marangu as the seat of the German Kilimanjaro administration cannot be entirely explained, as Kathleen Stahl had done, in terms of Marealle's adroit diplomacy, as Carl Peters himself had clearly emphasized the strategic importance of Marangu.³⁰ In fact, this decision to move out of Moshi for reasons quite different from what had forced Herr Braun to recommend it in October 1888 underlines the differences in the character and methods of the two German administrators. To Taylor, the CMS missionary, who was privileged to observe both men at close quarters, Braun was the 'capable and practical man with a genius for managing natives and for colonization',³¹ while Peters was the ruthless and racist administrator,³² whose policy was 'to depopulate Kilimanjaro so as to make room for European settlers ...',³³

The transfer of the seat of the German administration from Moshi to Marangu in August 1891, which also implied the rejection

28. Morris to Lang, 27.1.1890, CMS. London G3.A5/O 1890.

29. Stahl, K., p. at p.322.

30. DKB., No. 21, Nov., 1, 1891, pp. 456-457.

31. Taylor to Price, 20.10.1888, CMS, London. G3.A5/O 1888.

32. August Bebel on the impeachment of Dr. Peters in the Reichstag DZA Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters Nr. 60, pp. 11-12.

33. Steggal to Lang, 24.2.1892. CMS. Lond. G3.A5/O 1892.
Tucker to Lang, 9.3.1892.

by the Imperial Commissioner of the paramountcy of the chief of Moshi in Uchagga, was to start a chain of events which ultimately led to the German military conquest of Moshi and the consequent abolition of the Kilimanjaro Commissariat. Although he clearly got the message of Carl Peters' decision, Mandara managed to maintain peaceful relations with the German administration till his death in October 1891.³⁴ He was even reported to have instructed his eldest son and successor, Meli, then a young boy, whose age was given variously as 14³⁵ or between 17 and 18,³⁶ to cooperate with the Germans.³⁷ Peace in Moshi, where only a small German post was maintained, had then enabled Carl Peters to mount expeditions for the extension of his administration over some parts of Rombo with the active cooperation of Marealle.³⁸

Rombo, lying east of Marangu and consisting of not less than twenty weak units, which had developed out of the ruins of the early 19th century kingdom of Orombo of Keni, 'the first of the great conquerors on Kilimanjaro',³⁹ was, indeed, the right type of territory for Marealle to make his debut with the Germans. Before the German occupation, he had shown a great deal of interest in the area, which then provided raiding grounds for the armies of Sina of

34. Steggal thinks it occurred on October 16, 1891. Steggal to Land, 5.12.1891, CMS London, G3,A5/O 1891.

35. Ibid.

36. C. Peters to von Soden, 18.11.1891, RKA 385.

37. Ibid; DKB. No. 2, 15th Jan. 1892, p.81.

38. DKB, No. 22, Nov. 15, 1891, pp. 488-489; and DZA, Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters, Nr. 60, p.50.

39. Stahl, K., op. cit., pp. 325-326.

Kibosho and Mandara of Moshi.⁴⁰ Apart from raiding the poorly defended Rombo statelets for slaves and cattle,⁴¹ Marealle had also tried to establish a permanent political influence in the area through his friendship with its two most important chiefs, Kinabo of Mkuu and Malamya of Usseri.⁴² However, his ambition to control the whole of the area could not be realized because of the greater political and military influence exercised by Sina of Kibosho,⁴³ and Mandara of Moshi. But now that Sina's influence had been considerably reduced as a result of his recent military humiliation by the Germans, and as Mandara could no longer exercise any serious influence on account of his illness, Marealle was in a good position to exploit his alliance with Carl Peters to achieve his ambition in Rombo.

Carl Peters must have seen Rombo as an ideal region for German settlement. This was not only because of the absence of big chiefdoms which could make his colonizing efforts difficult, but also because its sturdy people, who had long served as the slaves of the powerful Chagga chiefs,⁴⁴ could be made to continue their subservient role as labourers on the plantations of German settlers. For he openly admitted that his motive for leading military expeditions to Rombo in August and September 1891 was to establish German influence and to prepare the way for trade and settlement.⁴⁵ Although

40. Morris to Lang, 7.3.1890, CMS London, G3.A5/0 1890.

41. Taylor to Price, 22.10.1888. CMS London G3.A5/0 1888; and Morris to Lang, 7.3.1890.

42. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.325; and Meyer, H., Across East African Glaciers, London, 1891, p.113.

43. Kinabo and Malamya were both vassals of Sina of Kibosho, Stahl, K., p.325 and p.352.

44. DKB. No. 22, Nov., 15, 1891, p.488.

45. Ibid. pp. 488-489.

he was probably aware of the interest of Marealle in Rombo, he could not have seen himself as promoting Marealle's ambition, but as exploiting it in the interest of his administration.

Marealle was, however, the first to benefit from the German military intervention in Rombo, as he was now able to extend his overlordship over Mkuu and Usseri, whose chiefs had previously been subject to Sina of Kibosho. Since Kinabo of Mkuu and Malamya of Usseri were strong supporters of Sina, they had not taken kindly to the humiliation of their overlord by the Germans and had consequently been reluctant to accept German authority. But while Kinabo could easily come to terms with Carl Peters with the assistance of the intermediary of his friend, Marealle, Malamya, a much older man, was unable to do so. For a pro-German party under Matolo, a young supporter of Marealle, had already taken advantage of the situation to ask for German intervention.⁴⁶ The result was the replacement of Malamya by Matolo as the chief of Usseri.

Success in Mkuu and Usseri in August 1891 encouraged Carl Peters and his friend Marealle to extend their joint enterprise into Rombo Mkulia. Two German expeditions, assisted by the warriors of Marealle and chiefs friendly to him like Kinabo of Mkuu and Malamya of Mamba, brought the disunited and unorganised Rombo statelets under the German administration. During the first expedition early in September 1891, during which a German non-commissioned officer, Schubert, and two Swahili askari were killed in an Ambush,⁴⁷ Carl

46. Ibid, p.488; and Supplement to DKB. 1894, Appendix I, p.2. Matolo now listed as the chief of Usseri.

47. DKB. Nr. 22, Nov. 15, 1891, p.490; and DZA, Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters, No. 60, p.46. Report of the DZA, Potsdam, Nachl. proceedings of the libel action against Gruber Martin, Editor of the Munich Post in the court of Munich I; 2.7.1907.

Peters employed a scorched-earth policy to reduce the Warombo to submission. The second expedition, sent towards the end of the same month, was witnessed in action by Captain Bateman, the visiting British representative at Taveta.⁴⁸

Although his political influence had been greatly enhanced by the extension of the German administration to Rombo, Marealle was still a small chief in Uchagga. Therefore, his next political move was to scheme for a leading position in Chagga politics, as he had just succeeded in doing in Rombo. Two golden opportunities presented themselves to him in quick succession around the same time. The first which enabled him to become the overlord of Vunjo was his conflict with Malamya of Mamba over a Mamba girl called Ndekocha, whom he had brought to Marangu to live with him contrary to the wishes of her father.⁴⁹ Since Ndekocha had refused to marry Marealle, but had instead escaped to Malamya whom her father had wanted her to marry, the relationship of the two men had been strained; and when on the orders of Carl Peters, the girl was again returned to Marangu, she was now made to live at the German station as the Imperial Commissioner's maid-servant because Marealle would no longer have her. It was now from the Marangu station that she again escaped to

48. DKB. No. 24, Dec., 15, 1891, pp. 549-550.
Documentary evidence does not support Stahl's claim that Marealle had asked Ndekocha to flee to Mamba. See Stahl, K., op. cit. p. 322, Cf.

49. Report of the proceedings of the libel action against Gruber Martin, Editor of the Munich Post in the Court of Munich I. 2.7.1907, DZA, Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters. No. 60, and RKA 281 p.97ff. Minutes of an inquiry into the background of the causes of unrest in Kilimanjaro region. 18.8.92.

Malamya in Mamba at the end of November 1891 with two other girls, one of whom was a girl from Moshi called Suria, who had been given to Dr. Peters by Mandara as a maid-servant.⁵⁰ Since Malamya had not immediately reported the arrival of the fugitive girls in his chiefdom, his action was interpreted by Carl Peters as a sign of disloyalty, especially as Marealle had earlier accused him of plotting with the people of Moshi to start another revolt.⁵¹ Although Malamya had escaped serious punishment during his first encounter with a German military expedition by quickly surrendering the fugitives and paying a fine of ten oxen and fifteen goats,⁵² Marealle, who was bent on securing his deposition had later influenced Carl Peters to replace him with his brother Kóimbere, because he was reported to have said that he would fight the Germans who 'are not strong after all.'⁵³

Another equally unique opportunity for Marealle, to strike for leadership in Kilimanjaro, was the refusal of the young chief Meli of Moshi, who had just succeeded his father Mandara, to visit the German station at Marangu to clear himself of a charge of anti-German activities.⁵⁴ Since Meli was not particularly friendly with Europeans,⁵⁵ Marealle who hoped to humiliate the young chief as

50. Both girls were said to be Carl Peter's mistresses, see August Bebel on the impeachment of Dr. Peters in the Reichstag, 13.3.1896, DZA, Nachl. C. Peters, No. 52, p.1.

51. Extracts from Peter's Diary, DZA, Nachl. C. Peters, No. 60. p. 74.

52. Minutes of an inquiry into the background to unrest in Kilimanjaro region. RKA 281 p.98 ff.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., and Tucker to Portal, 8.2.1892.

55. He was not like by Europeans, and this was probably why he too disliked them. See Fosbrooke, H.A., ed. 'Life of Justin' in TNR, No. 14, 1955, p.49, and Steggall to Lang, 5.12.1891. CMS. Lond. G3.A5/0, 1891.

Mandara had once humiliated him,⁵⁶ encouraged the Imperial Commissioner to believe that the chief of Moshi was indeed planning a rebellion. Determined to prevent what he believed was an impending anti-German revolt, Carl Peters then informed the English Church Missionary Society's station at Moshi of his intention to 'propose to the German Government to crush these people (of Moshi) by war in order to have peace in the Kilimanjaro district.'⁵⁷

In preparation for this military invasion of Moshi, which he asked the missionaries to keep secret, he said he was withdrawing his outpost from Moshi in order to strengthen his defences in Marangu, and consequently he requested them to move to Marangu where he could 'guarantee safety of property and life', which he said he was 'unable to do in Moshi.'⁵⁸ Such was the weight of Marealle's influence, that Carl Peters would not accept the CMS missionaries' plea that, far from planning a rebellion, Meli was very loyal to the German administration. Instead, he tried to find fault with them by accusing one of them, Dr. Baxter, of helping to arm the people of Moshi,⁵⁹ as the missionary would not accept his invitation to move his mission to Marangu. Thus, before he left Kilimanjaro on January 28, 1892, to take part in the work of an Anglo/German boundary commission, Carl Peters, as a result of his unrelenting determination to crush the people of Moshi, had created a potentially explosive situation, the consequences of which were to rock the foundations of the German administration and change the course of German policy in Kilimanjaro for over a decade.

56. Morris to Lang, 27.1.1890, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1890.

57. Dr. Peters to Dr. Baxter, 24.1.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0 1892.

58. Steggall to Lang, 28.1.1892, Ibid.

59. Ibid.

While the CMS authorities were trying to exert pressure on the central administration in Dar es Salaam to prevent a military invasion of Moshi,⁶⁰ which their resident missionaries believed was part of a German plan unfolded by Carl Peters 'to depopulate Kilimanjaro to pave the way for a German settlement',⁶¹ the situation in Kilimanjaro deteriorated under Lt. von Bülow, who had arrived in Marangu at the end of January 1892 to act for the Imperial Commissioner.⁶² In fact, the choice of von Bülow was an indication that the central government, or indeed Colonel von Schele, the Commander of the protectorate army,⁶³ intended to support Dr. Peter's tough line against Moshi, for he (Bülow) had already proved himself a ruthless administrator in Usagara, where he had earned the nickname, 'the man with bloody hands'.⁶⁴ Instead of working for a peaceful settlement of the crisis, which Governor von Soden would have preferred, in view of his promise to Gerald Portal, the British Consul-General in Zanzibar, that he would take steps to prevent warfare,⁶⁵ Lt. von Bülow immediately began to prepare for war.

The first stage of his preparation was the strengthening of the Marangu station on the orders of Colonel von Schele, who

60. Portal to Salisbury, 14.2.1892 with enclosures Tucker to Portal 8.2.1892, PRO Lond. FO 84/2230.

61. Steggal to Lang, 24.2.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

62. DKB, No.8, April 15, 1892, p.237.

63. Ibid. As Commander of the army under whom von Bülow now served, Colonel von Schele must have influenced his appointment.

64. Arendt to Bismarck, 14.2.1887, RKA 386; and Steggal to Lang, 24.2.1892. CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

65. Bennett, N.R. 'The British on Kilimanjaro, 1884-1892' in TNR, No.63, Sept. 1964, p.241.

in February 1892 despatched to Kilimanjaro the First Company of his army then stationed in Masinde in Usambara.⁶⁶ The arrival of his company of 160 mixed African troops⁶⁷ under the overall command of three non-Commissioned and two Commissioned German officers, including von Bülow himself and Lt. Wolfrum his deputy, was followed by the resumption of work on the construction of the Marangu station begun by Carl Peters in August 1891. Colonel von Schele, who must have shared the Imperial Commissioner's anxiety about the security of the Marangu station, also ordered the construction of a military post between the Masinde post and Kilimanjaro, preferably at Gonja,⁶⁸ to act as support for the Kilimanjaro station. During this first stage, which was between the departure of Carl Peters at the end of January and the Kirua incident towards the end of April, 1892, Meli of Moshi reacted to German preparations for war by responding more favourably to the CMS missionaries, offering, for the first time to build a house near his own, where he and his attendants would be taught Christianity,⁶⁹ in the hope that friendship with the mission would save him from the impending doom.

The second stage began with the Kirua incident of April 26, 1892, during which a German Sudanese soldier was killed by a man from Kirua on the border between Moshi and Kirua.⁷⁰ The CMS missionaries' account of this unfortunate incident, does not support Stahl's

66. They were mainly Sudanese, and Swahili. See Steggal to Secretary, CMS, Equatorial Africa Mission, 22.6.1892, CMS Lond. 63.A5/O 1892.

67. Ibid.

68. DKB. No.8, April 15, 1892, p.237.

69. Steggal to Lang, 24.2.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/O, 1892.

70. Steggal to his mother, 19.5.1892. Ibid.

interpretation, based exclusively on oral traditions, that the attack on the German Sudanese soldiers, or indeed, the killing of one of them, was actually organised by Mawalla,⁷¹ an agent of Marealle, who had wanted to implicate Moshi in order to speed up German military action. The CMS missionaries' account, based on first hand reports from the scene of the incident, which were also confirmed by the story of the surviving Sudanese soldier, Fadalla Adam,⁷² who stayed the night at the Moshi CMS station, gives a rather different picture. Far from being pre-arranged as Stahl would have us believe, the incident had occurred spontaneously, the actual killer of the other Sudanese soldier being 'one of the Wakirua', who was avenging the shooting of one of his companions by that soldier.⁷³ The two versions also differ in some other essential points of detail. For the soldiers were not on their way to Moshi but to Kibosho.⁷⁴

However, the fact that the incident had occurred on Moshi territory was enough to convince Lt. von Bülow, who was then on safari in Upare,⁷⁵ from where he was hurriedly summoned to Marangu, that Meli was guilty of complicity in the murder, as he had already believed, like Dr. Peters, that Moshi was planning a rebellion to overthrow the German authority. Giving no credence to the missionaries account of the incident and completely rejecting the attempts by the Rev. A.J. Steggal, who visited him at Marangu on May 17, 1892,

71. Stahl, K., op. cit., pp. 262-263.

72. He, too, was killed during the abortive invasion of Moshi by Lt. von Bülow in June 10., 1892. Johannes to von Soden, 30.9.1892, TANZANIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES (TNA) G1/18.

73. Baxter to von Bülow, 16.5.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892; and Steggal to his mother, 19.5.1892, Ibid.

74. Ibid; and Stahl, op. cit. pp. 262-263.

75. Steggal to his mother, 19.5.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

to mediate in the crisis,⁷⁶ von Bülow refused to negotiate with Meli.⁷⁷ He even accused the CMS missionaries of encouraging the chief in his rebellion by making him go, not to the German station at Marangu which was nearer, but to the English station at Taveta, where he was reported to have said that he was 'weariad of the Germans'.⁷⁸ It was most probably after he had successfully misled von Bülow into believing his own distorted account of the tragic incident that Marealle boastfully put out the story, which has now become part of the tradition of the Chagga, that it was he who had actually planned the attack in order to implicate Meli.⁷⁹

The Rev. A.J. Steggal, who describes the tension that followed von Bülow's refusal to negotiate with Meli, says a visiting English Officer, one Major Kenrick, was nearly killed at Moshi on May 18, 1892 in an ambush laid against the expected German invasion. He also reports that in spite of this tense situation, Meli was still tactful enough to allow 'a party of 14 warriors from Kiwoso (Kibosho) and Arusha', who were accompanied by 'a single German soldier' to pass through his chiefdom to the German station at Marangu unmolested on May 21, 1892.⁸⁰ But instead of reciprocating Meli's gestures, von Bülow forced him into a position of defiance by imprisoning his envoy at the Marangu station on May 22, 1892.⁸¹ Only

76. Tucker to Portal, 7.6.1892, Ibid.

77. Lt. von Bülow even imprisoned Meli's envoy who was later killed by German troops while he was trying to escape. Smith to Rosebery, 2.11.1892 in Portal to Rosebery, 23.11.1892, PRO Lond. FO 84/2234.

78. Lt. von Bülow to Dr. Baxter 16.5.1892, CMS Lond.G3.A5/O 1892; copy also in RKA 750, p.35.

79. Stahl, K., op. cit., pp. 262-263.

80. Steggal to his mother, 19.5.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/O 1892.

81. Ibid.

the inadequacy of arms and other military equipment, which were then being expected from the coast, but which the CMS missionaries fervently hoped the Governor at the Coast, 'who is a man of peace' would refuse,⁸² delayed von Bülow's invasion of Moshi till June 10, 1892. When this 'unprovoked' invasion was finally launched, 'it lasted only seven hours'. For the 'ridiculously small force' of sixty Nubian Soldiers and fifty Swahili porters, commanded by Lt. von Bülow and Lt. Wilhelm Wolfrum were quickly and completely routed in an ambush prepared by the numerically superior Moshi warriors, who were, according to a contemporary account, using German military methods and procedure.⁸⁴ In their disorderly retreat, Lt. Wolfrum was killed at Moshi, and von Bülow who was badly wounded, later died at Marangu.⁸⁵

The defeat of this German military expedition, which the CMS missionaries considered 'richly deserved', at once put an end to German rule, though temporarily, in Kilimanjaro, as the survivors, under the leadership of a German non-commissioned officer called Bartel, who was himself wounded during the invasion, immediately abandoned the Marangu station and hurriedly returned to the coast.⁸⁶ Carl Peters' plan of using Marealle to serve the political ends of the German administration had backfired! Far from being used, Marealle had himself successfully exploited the fears of the Germans about the

82. Ibid.

83. Steggal to Secretary, Diocese of East Equatorial Africa, 22.6.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

84. Fosbrooke, H.A.ed. 'The Life of Justin', TNR, No.14, 1955, p.50.

85. Extract from the Times of London, 12.8.1892. Steggal's account of the German defeat published by his father, the Rev. Fred Steggal, Vicar of Consett. CMS. Lond. G3.A5/0. 1892.

86. Governor von Soden says von Bülow was afraid of being attacked by Meli if he did not attack him first. Von Soden to Steggal, 12.7.1892. CMS Lond. G3.A50/, 1892.

security of their station to feather his own political nest. But instead of reaping the harvest of German military victory, which he had expected, he was now to bear alone the burden of their defeat. But while the victorious Meli gloated over his victory, and became hostile to all Europeans, including the friendly CMS missionaries, Marealle, who clearly realized that Germans were bound to return in much greater strength, removed all their valuables to Mkuu, the chiefdom of his friend and vassal Kinabo, for safekeeping.⁸⁸

The tragedy which befell the German administration in Kilimanjaro clearly brought into the open the conflict between the desires of the Governor in Dar es Salaam for the establishment of a stable administration based on the maintenance of 'friendly and peaceable relations with the whole population',⁸⁹ and the determination of the local administrators in Marangu to secure total submission to German authority by all means. In fact, the military men who took over from the absent Carl Peters were no worse than the Imperial Commissioner himself, from whom they had inherited their problems and prejudices. Had von Bülow heeded the advice of Julius von Soden, that he should 'never go to war but in the utmost necessity or in the case of self-defence',⁹⁰ instead of believing all the rumours spread around by Marealle about the hostile intentions of Meli, the disastrous military invasion of June 10, 1892 would not have taken place. But now that it had taken place with damaging consequences to German national prestige, a return to the system

88. Stahl, K., op. cit., pp. 265-266. Marealle was also said to have provided the messenger which took the Alsatian Holy Ghost missionary. Father Blanchard's letter to the coast to explain the political situation and to ask for the return of the Germans. - Ibid.

89. Von Soden to Steggal, 12.7.1892; CMS. Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

90. Ibid.

of military administration begun by von Wissmann, seemed imperative in spite of the renewed attack on the military dictatorship which had precipitated the conflict.⁹¹ In fact, the German defeat on Kilimanjaro and that of von Zelewski's military expedition to Uhehe, as well as the general unrest in the interior of German East Africa in 1892, were later blamed on the pacifist policy of Julius von Soden by Dr. Rochus Schmidt, one of the military commanders under the former Imperial Commissioner, Major von Wissmann.⁹²

During the period of 51 days when, thanks to the diplomacy of Marealle and the gullibility of the German administrators, the Chagga were again free from foreign rule, Meli attempted to make his chiefdom the premier Chagga state. For, soon after his victory, he was reported to have sent envoys to other Chagga chiefs to recognise him as their paramount chief.⁹³ All were said to have done so, with the exception of Marealle and Sina, the latter however, sending him some presents in cattle 'as a demonstration of his peaceful intentions.'⁹⁴ Although Marealle had escaped punishment, because he was able to deceive Meli into thinking that the Germans were still at Marangu,⁹⁵ Fumba of Kilema, a former vassal of Mandara, who, because of the influence of the Alsatian Holy Ghost Fathers tried to remain faithful to the Germans, was compelled to submit to Moshi and 'to pay a large tribute as a sign of his vassalage.'⁹⁶

91. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 25.7.1892, RKA 751, p.31.

92. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 20.10. 1892, RKA 751, p.52.

93. Bulletin-Général, Journal of the Congrégation du Saint Esprit, vol.16, 1891-1893, p.798.

94. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 9.8.1892, RKA 751, p.36.

95. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.266.

96. Bulletin-Général, vol.16, 1891-1893, p.798.

Meli also tried to force Fumba to expel the Holy Ghost Fathers, but as he could not get him to do this, he decided to punish the missionaries himself by sending his warriors to raid their mission station to remove all their valuables.⁹⁷

During this period of his greatness, when the teenaged Meli suddenly achieved maturity, his advisers were not the old counsellors of his father, Mandara, who must have been well tutored in diplomacy, but men of his own age,⁹⁸ the exuberant and confident youth, who thought that all things were now possible. His chief adviser was described by the missionary Steggal as 'one who has made several journeys to the coast and has not been improved by the same',⁹⁹ implying that he was still uncivilized. It is probable however, that this chief adviser, who must have encouraged Meli not to visit Marangu to negotiate personally with the German administration, had been influenced by Arab/Swahili coastal resistance to German rule. The fact that Meli asked the visiting CMS Bishop Tucker if some of his men could accompany his caravan to Mombasa,¹⁰⁰ apparently to make contacts with English officials, was an indication of the pro-British feelings of the young chief and his advisers, which was no doubt a reaction against German support for Marealle.

Although the CMS missionaries had strongly denied the charge that they had encouraged Meli to revolt, emphasizing that their 'influence at Mochi is exerted in the direction of reconciling the people to German rule',¹⁰¹ it is obvious that Meli had seen in them an alternative ally in his opposition to the Germans, as he and

97. Ibid, p.799, and Steggal to CMS, 3.8.1892, G3.A5/0, 1892.

98. Diocese of Equatorial Africa, Occasional Paper No.10, p.6, Extract of Bishop Tucker's letter from Moshi, 19.2.1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

99. Steggal to Lang, 5.12. 1891, Lond. G3.A5/0, 1891.

100. Tucker to Lang, 7.6. 1892.

101. Tucker to Portal, 7.6. 1892, Ibid.

advisers could not understand that the two European groups had different clearly defined goals, the English missionaries, evangelization, and the Germans colonization. Nor could they have known that the government of the missionaries at Moshi had recognised the right of the Germans to the occupation of their country. The confusion in their minds regarding the roles of the two European groups could be explained by the fact that the English missionaries also flew their own national flag on Sundays - something which had been criticised by the German journalist, Eugen Wolf in February 1891, when he accompanied the Wissmann expedition to Kilimanjaro.¹⁰²

Just as the Germans were unable to understand that their presence was being exploited by Marealle so was it difficult for the English missionaries to believe that Meli had seen them as potential allies in his conflict with the Germans. In fact, they too, like the Germans, had lent their ears to rumours emanating from anti-German groups concerning the determination of the Germans 'to exterminate the blackman'¹⁰³ or 'to depopulate Kilimanjaro'¹⁰⁴, and had begun to make their own contingency plans for the establishment of an industrial mission 'at the hill of the Warombo', in the British territory not far from Moshi, where the Chagga remnants of German extermination would be given 'an asylum'.¹⁰⁵ The missionaries would certainly have been withdrawn from Moshi before the fateful German invasion of June 10, 1892, but for Bishop Tucker's objection on the ground that the mission station would serve as a place of

102. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 2.4. 1891, RKA 750, p.20.

103. Steggal to Lang, 21.5. 1891, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

104. Steggal to Lang, 24.2. 1892. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

refuge for displaced peoples, especially women and children.¹⁰⁶ It was again this consideration for the protection of the people of Moshi that influenced the CMS missionaries, particularly the Rev. A.J. Steggal, to plead with the German Governor in Dar es Salaam for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Kilimanjaro.¹⁰⁷ The Governor, Julius von Soden, had reacted favourably to Steggal's peace move, saying that peace would be achieved if Meli 'could be persuaded to submit to Johannes, whom they know as a quiet and peaceful man' and guarantee that his people and other chiefs would 'abstain from hostility'.¹⁰⁸

The path to a negotiated peace was, however, blocked by the intransigence of the over-confident Meli and his band of youthful advisers. For when peace negotiations began on July 31, 1892, after the arrival of the German military expedition, under Colonel von Schele, the protectorates army chief and then acting Governor, Meli refused to accept the German conditions for peace. Steggal, who negotiated on his behalf at Marangu was surprised at this, for he felt the conditions 'were not hard and ought to have been accepted'.¹⁰⁹ These peace conditions included the surrender of the arms and equipment abandoned by the defeated German troops in June and 'peaceable admission' into Moshi of Captain Johannes, the new German Officer for Kilimanjaro, with his Company of about 120 soldiers.¹¹⁰ He even refused the German offer to send delegates

106. Tucker to Lang, 7.6. 1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892.

107. Von Soden to Steggal, 12.7. 1892, Ibid.

108. Ibid. Johannes was the German officer who took over the administration of Kilimanjaro from Carl Peters after the German military invasion of August 1892.

109. Steggal to CMS, 3.8. 1892, CMS Lond. G3.A510, 1892.

110. Ibid.

for negotiations either at Marangu or at Kilema, but instead became 'jocose, obstinate, insolent and boastful'.¹¹¹ And when through the advice and insistence of Steggal, he was finally persuaded to negotiate, Meli, on August 6, sent to Marangu one Kibanga, described as 'a young fellow of no authority in Mochi',¹¹² showing the levity with which he treated the question of peaceful negotiations. And when negotiations were almost over, and a treaty, drawn up by the German officers, was sent to him for his 'marks', he suddenly instructed the Rev. A.J. Steggal 'to tell the Germans that none of their things would be restored until Meliari, the Chief of Morang, who protected German property after the recent fighting, came to Mochi'.¹¹³ Since this demand, which the mediating missionary believed was made 'with murderous intent', had once been refused by the Germans¹¹⁴ who did not want to surrender their friend and ally to a common enemy, it was clear that Meli wanted war not peace. And since the Germans were determined to reestablish their administration and restore their lost prestige, war became inevitable.

Although all negotiations had been terminated on August 10th, the German invading force, made up of five companies of 566 African troops and twenty-three German officers,¹¹⁵ did not attack Moshi until two days later, since the German commanders wanted to mobilise support for their action in other Chagga chiefdoms hostile to Moshi. When the invasion began on August 12, the Germans were able to defeat Meli with the assistance of Chagga auxiliaries from

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. DKB. Nr.19, October 1, 1893, p.449.

Marangu, Mamba and Kibosho.¹¹⁶ Marealle was commissioned to raid Moshi's vassal state of Kilema in order to prevent her from coming to the aid of Meli. The 800-strong warriors from Kibosho sent by Sina followed upon the heels of the invading troops and raided the Moshi folk of livestock, recovering most of the cattle taken by the people of Moshi from Kibosho during the German invasion of February 1891.¹¹⁷ Sina was thus able to repay Meli for the collaboration of his father, Mandara, with the Germans during the German conquest of his chiefdom in February 1891.

The Germans' efforts to reward their allies at the expense of the 'rebellious' people of Moshi were reflected in the peace conditions they now imposed on the defeated Meli. These conditions, obtained in negotiations between Kiboko,¹¹⁸ probably Steggal's Kibanga,¹¹⁹ acting for Meli and the Swahili Fundi or Shundi, representing the Germans, provided for Meli's unconditional recognition of the German authority and the payment of war compensation in cattle and ivory.¹²⁰ They also included a political settlement. The chiefdom of Uru, which Sina had lost to Mandara in February 1891 was now returned to Kibosho.¹²¹ Although this restora-

116. The full report of this invasion is given by Col. von Schele in von Schele to Caprivi, 1.9.1892, RKA 283/79 - 84, also in Smith to Piggot, 21.8.92, Ibid.

117. Ibid., and Miller M., 'The subjugation of Chief Meli of Moshi' Translation from A. Becker's Aus Deutsch - Ostafrikas Sturm - und Drangperiode, TNT, No.57, Sept. 1961, p.203.

118. Stahl, op. cit., p.267.

119. Steggal to Lang, 5.12. 1891, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1891.

120. Von Schele to Caprivi, 1.9. 1892, RKA 283 pp. 83-84.

121. Ibid., and DKB. No.21, 1st Nov. 1893, p.491.

tion appeared to indicate that the Germans were now beginning to understand the true political situation in Uchagga, the condition placing Moshi's two vassal chiefdoms of Kirua and Kilema under Marealle¹²² was not particularly based on any considerations of Chagga politics but on the desire to reward a loyal ally. As a result of these territorial gains, Marealle who had in September 1891 also acquired enormous political influence in Rombo, following his collaboration with Carl Peters, now became a major power in Eastern Kilimanjaro.

Apart from this political settlement, the primary objective of which was to weaken the power of Moshi, Colonel von Schele also imposed other more humiliating conditions on Meli and his people. He ordered the defeated chief to surrender all the weapons in his possession, some of which would later be given back for defence purposes only. He told him to leave the hill on which his palace was built and move to an approved site near the one proposed for the new German military station where he must build only a simple hut, not a fortified stronghold. In addition, the people of Moshi must not only provide labour for the construction of the new German station and for the transportation of supplies and equipment from Marangu to Moshi, but also supply food free of charge to the station 'partly as compensation and partly as punishment' in accordance with the instructions of the German station Commander.¹²³

Two important decisions involving administrative changes in Kilimanjaro were taken by the German authorities in East Africa

122. Ibid.

123. Von Schele to Caprivi, 1.9. 92, RKA 283. pp. 83-84 and DKB, No.21, 1st Nov. 1893, p.491.

and in Berlin soon after the submission of Meli. The first taken by Colonel von Schele, was the decision to transfer the seat of the German administration in Kilimanjaro back to Moshi from Marangu and to station the 1st Company of the protectorate army there permanently under Captain Johannes after the return of the main body of the expedition to the coast.¹²⁴ This decision was certainly an admission that Carl Peters had made an error of judgment when he moved the German headquarters from Moshi to Marangu in August 1891. The second decision, made by the Imperial Government in Berlin, in reaction to Colonel von Schöle's report on the political situation in Kilimanjaro, was to relieve Carl Peters of his Kilimanjaro commission, although he still retained his title of Imperial Commissioner and the income attached to it more or less on a sinecure basis.¹²⁵ This decision, made by the Director of the Colonial Department, Dr. Paul Kayser, a friend of Carl Peters, was also an admission that Peters had failed as an administrator. The abolition of the Kilimanjaro Commissariat, which marked the end of an experiment in the development of Kilimanjaro as a civil district, was itself a mere formalization of the military administration already established by Capt. Johannes.

The two immediate problems facing the new military administration in Kilimanjaro were the maintenance of peace among the rival Chagga chiefs and the establishment of effective control along the Pangani valley route from Masinde in order to protect caravans bringing essential supplies from the coast to the German.

124. Kayser to Peters, 10.10. 1892, DZA, Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters, No. 421³. Von Schele to Caprivi, 1.9., 1892, RKA 283.

125. Kayser to Peters, 10.10. 1892, DZA, Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters, No. 421³.

military station still at Marangu.¹²⁶ To solve the first problem, Capt. Johannes asked the central authorities in Dar es Salaam for the urgent despatch of more arms and ammunition to strengthen his company of 130 troops who, he said, were hopelessly inadequate to ensure the security of the German military station.¹²⁷ But since he realized that the mere use of force could not ensure the success of his administration, even if his troops were adequate for the defence of the station in the event of an attack, the commandant tried to strike at the root of the current political crisis in Kilimanjaro by arranging a reconciliation between Meli and his enemy Marealle. Volkens, an agricultural officer at Marangu, who was an eye witness of the German invasion of Moshi in August 1892 says Meli was invited to Marangu and made to 'drink Pombe (beer) with Marealle from one vessel'.¹²⁸ It is no doubt, striking that a military officer like Capt. Johannes could appreciate the need for reconciliation even between a defeated rebel and a German ally, which a civilian administrator like Carl Peters was unable to understand. Although he initially suspected Meli of pro-British feelings even after the German Government had forced the closing down of the CMS mission at Moshi,¹²⁹ for he was reported to have sent his men to sell their ivory to the British at Taveta, where they were said to have been in contact with the Rev. A.J. Steggall,¹³⁰ Capt. Johannes asked the once-defeated Sina of Kibosho to persuade the

126. The Moshi station was not ready for occupation until later in 1893.

127. Johannes von Soden, 16.11. 1892 and 13.2. 1893, TANZANIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES, (TNA), G1/18.

128. Volkens, G., op. cit., p.126.

129. For details of the closing down of the CMS Chagga mission see Tucker to Portal, 8.9.92., CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892 and Soden to Portal, 4.9.92., in Portal to Rosebery, 11.9.1892.

130. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892 and 8.12. 1892, TNA, G1/18.

sulky young chief to enter into friendly relations with the German administration.¹³¹ He also made peace between the Alsatian Holy Ghost Fathers and their host, Chief Funba of Kilema, whom he said was a supporter of Meli and was not particularly reliable as he too had been defeated along with his young overlord during the invasion of August 1892.¹³²

His next task after making sure that his home base was fairly secure was to lead military expeditions to Kisiwani and Mwembe (mwanamata) in the Pare plains to clear the caravan route of the pastoral Masai who were then openly robbing caravans bound for Kilimanjaro.¹³³ In order to establish effective German military presence along the caravan route from Masinde to Kilimanjaro, he immediately asked for the strengthening of the military post just established at Kisiwani and Mwembe with more Swahili troops, and the establishment of two additional ones at Arusha Juu and Kihurio, so that both the Kisiwani and the Masinde station could be relieved of some of their responsibilities.¹³⁴ His concern to avoid unnecessary conflicts with the people under his administration was also reflected in his demand that more emphasis should thenceforth be laid on the recruitment of Swahili troops to replace the unruly Sudanese, whom he said were more prone to acts of brutality.¹³⁵ His opposition to the further engagement of Sudanese troops was influenced by the case of one Fadalla Adam, a Sudanese askari in the service of Lt. von Bülow, who, before he was himself killed during the abortive invasion of Moshi in June 1892, had shot dead a Marangu porter without just cause.¹³⁶

131. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892, Ibid.

132. DKB No.21, 1st Nov. 1893, p.491.

133. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892 and 15.12.1892, TNA, G1/18.

134. Johannes to von Soden, 15.12. 1892 and 7.3. 1893, Ibid.

135. Johannes to von Soden, 7.2. 1893, Ibid.

136. Johannes to von Soden, 30.9. 1892. Ibid

Besides, he considered the Swahili 'more intelligent, less clumsy in various skilled jobs than the Sudanese and particularly good at building stations'.¹³⁷ Since his duties as commander of the 1st company involved the constant movement of troops between Marangu and Masinde before the Moshi military station was completed, Capt. Johannes also preferred the Swahili who were used to safaris, to the Sudanese who hated them.¹³⁸ Above all, the need to maintain better and easier communication everywhere within his area of jurisdiction dictated the employment only of those whose language was well understood by the local people and who could therefore be relied upon to provide a useful information service.¹³⁹ These well-reasoned arguments prove conclusively that he was aware of the part the Sudanese troops had played in the disaster of June 10th and reflected his determination to modify the policies of his predecessors, Carl Peters and Lt. von Bülow.

The German station Commander also displayed characteristic foresightedness and wisdom in his handling of the problem of transporting supplies and equipment from the coast to the military posts under his supervision. Instead of using force to secure porters from among the Shambaa, the Pare and the Chagga, who he himself said were mountain dwellers who dreaded going down the plains for fear of catching malaria, he asked his superiors in Dar es Salaam to help with the recruitment of porters from the coast, while he himself tried to obtain some from among the Kamba who were used to portage.¹⁴¹ He was anxious to prevent chiefs like Semboja at Masinde and Mwanamata

137. Johannes to von Soden, 7.2. 1893. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.; and 15.12.92, TNA, G1/18.

141. Ibid.

at Mwenbe and his brother at Kisiwani, who had been very loyal from turning hostile because they resented the recruitment of their people for portage service.¹⁴² He was particularly careful not to do anything that would again trigger off a rebellion in Uchagga. He would even not use his troops as porters, not only because the Sudanese themselves hated portage, but because the tense political situation on Kilimanjaro after the defeat of Meli still required the maintenance of constant battle readiness.¹⁴³ Rather than use force to secure porters, Capt. Johannes unsuccessfully experimented with the use of Masai donkeys to bring supplies across to Kilimanjaro from the Kisiwani military post.¹⁴⁴ Since the transportation of German supplies and equipment was being carried out mainly by porters not native to this region, he was wise enough to appoint as 'Caravan leader' or 'transport officer', the experienced Swahili Fundi or Shundi, who in addition to his post as a political agent, was also charged with the responsibilities of forwarding goods from Kisiwani to the Kilimanjaro military station.¹⁴⁵

It is perhaps appropriate at this juncture to discuss the introduction of Akida administration into the north-east of the German East African Protectorate, since in those early years, the recruitment of labour for portage and for plantation work was one of the most important functions of Akidas. The Akida system, which was essentially government through agents, was not a German creation but an administrative system developed since the middle of the 19th

142. Ibid.

143. Johannes von Soden, 7.2. 1893 and 31.5. 1893, Ibid.

144. Johannes to von Soden, 31.5. 1893, Ibid.

145. Ibid.

century by the officials of the Sultan of Zanzibar to control the Bantu tribes in the immediate hinterland of the coastal city-states under the Zanzibar empire.¹⁴⁶ It was only taken over by the German authorities after the suppression of the Bushiri rebellion, when, in a gesture of reconciliation, the Arab aristocracy were restored to their former political importance as rulers, but now under the supervision of German officials.¹⁴⁷ The first German Akida in the hinterland of the Pangani coast was Abdallah bin Hemedi, an Afro-Shirazi Swahili, whose father was a Persian artillery officer in the service of Seyyid Barghash of Zanzibar.¹⁴⁸ Before entering the German service in January 1891,¹⁴⁹ he had lived and worked in Usambara and Bondei for more than twenty years, serving first as a clerk and Akida under Kimweri the Great before his death in 1869, and then serving the two Kilindi factions in the civil war that broke out after his death.¹⁵⁰ Having been brought up in the court of the Sultan of Zanzibar, he was well known to the leading Arabs

146. Wright, M., Local roots of policy in German East Africa, in Journal of African History, vol. ix, No. 4 (1968), p. 624; Iliffe, J., Tanyanyika under German rule, Oxford 1969, p. 13.

147. Ibid.

148. Khalidi Kirama, 'Biographical notes on Abdallah bin Hemedi' in Habari za Wakilindi ed. J.W.T. Allen, The Kilindi East Africa Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1963. pp. 9. 112. Kirama, who was himself a German akida in Bondei, says Abdallah's mother was Fatuma, a slave from 'an important family of Kilwa Kivinje', whose father Mkwinda came from the Masananga tribe of Malawi. Ibid. p. 9.

149. Smythies to Travers, 24.1. 1891, UMCA MSS1.

150. For details of his activities in Usambara and Bondei before the German intervention see Habariza Wakilindi, pp. 132-133; 145-146; p. 188; and p. 209; Anderson - Morshead, H.E.M. The History of the Universities Mission to Central Africa, 1859-1909, Lond. 1909, p. 197.

aristocrats on the coast, and he was particularly friendly with a former Liwali of Pangani, Suleiman bin Abedi al Hinawy.¹⁵¹ It was with the latter's assistance and that of his other friend Mwariko, a favourite slave of Sultan Barghash that he had arranged on behalf of the Kibanga faction the expulsion of Kilindi chiefs from Bondei in the early years of the Usambara civil wars.¹⁵² Since then, the Bondei headmen (Jumbe) to whom he was well known, had remained practically independent of Kilindi rule but subject to the control of the Liwali of Pangani through his representative, the Commander of the Sultan of Zanzibar's fort at Mount-Tongwe.¹⁵³

After von Wissmann had failed in his attempt to administer Bondei through the agency of the friendly Kilindi chief Kibanga, soon after the suppression of the Bushiri rebellion because the Bondei were opposed to the restoration of Kilindi rule, Abdallah, who was essentially a mercenary,¹⁵⁴ was appointed akida for Bondei with his seat at Segi, two miles north of Muheza.¹⁵⁵ This was apparently because of his special knowledge of the country and connections with the leading Bondei headmen. His reputation among the people as an accomplished soldier, one 'who is not afraid to penetrate uninhabited and overgrown country.'¹⁵⁶ must also have reached von Wissmann who

151. Habari za Wakilindi, p.188.

152. Ibid, p.227, pp. 230-231.

153. Farler to Penny, October 1887, USPG Lond. UMCA Box A4 (vi)

154. He had deserted Semboja to fight for Kibanga and Kinyashi. See Habari za Wakilindi, pp. 131-132.

155. Ibid. p.11. Kirama says it was Kibanga who introduced him to the Germans.

156. Ibid. p.10.

was known to have great respect for tough fighters. He immediately proved a good choice, the UMCA missionaries resident in Magila (later Msalabani) bearing eloquent testimony to his intelligence and fairness as an administrator. For example he, a Muslim, was reported to have appointed a UMCA Christian convert as the Jumbe of Ndume village, and that only with the prior approval of Bishop Smythies.¹⁵⁷

However, by April 1893, Abdallah was no longer the only Akida, as Bondei had now been divided into three administrative zones, each supervised by an Akida. Abdallah bin Ahmed (Hemedi), based at Sega, was in charge of Middle Bondei. Akida Fresh at Kwa Marimba was responsible for North Bondei, and Jumbe Ali Magofa at Mkuzi was akida for South Bondei.¹⁵⁸ Each of these administrative zones was a collection of villages ruled by their own headmen. Since there was an acute shortage of European personnel, these akidas not only performed police duties but also exercised magisterial jurisdiction over cases from the petty courts of the village headmen.¹⁵⁹ And since the system could not be effectively supervised by the few available German officers, who were themselves largely inexperienced, it tended to degenerate into an instrument of oppression, even in these early years.¹⁶⁰

The circumstances which forced the Germans to adopt the akida system in Bondei had not yet existed in Usambara where the political influence of the Kilindi chiefs was still strong in spite of the civil war. But although no akida was appointed, Abdallah

157. Farler to Penny, October 1887, loc. cit.

158. Von St. Paul to KG. 24.4. 1893, TNA, G1/84.

159. Ibid.

160. For an early criticism of German local administration in the interior of East Africa see Extract from Le Bosphore Egyptien 3.6. 1894, DZA, RKA 237/2 p.71.

was made the Kadi (Judge) of all the Muslims in Usambara and Bondei, in addition to his administrative duties as the Akida of Segu.¹⁶¹ The creation of a separate judicial administration for the Muslims, which was an extension of the German policy of conciliating their Arab/Swahili Muslim subjects on the coast after the suppression of the Bushiri rebellion, was to have two important consequences for the social and political development of Usambara. First, it would tend to weaken the power of the chief. This tendency the Germans themselves hoped to use for administrative purposes, as options were thenceforth open to any Shambala dissatisfied with Kilindi rule to place himself above the traditional judicial sanctions operated by the Kilindi chiefs. It would encourage the growth of Islam, which had been slow since the middle of the 19th century,¹⁶² at the time when Christian missionaries were beginning to open up the country.¹⁶³

For administrative purposes, Usambara was split into two zones, which reflected the division within the ruling Kilindi clan as well as the direction of German economic interests. Eastern Usambara, where the German East African company had in 1892 - at Derema - established coffee, cacao and plantations,¹⁶⁴ was administered by Kibanga and Kinyashi under the direct supervision of the Tanga District Office. Western Usambara, still largely untouched

161. Von St. Paul to KG. 24.4. 1893. loc. cit.

162. The Usambara civil war, which had been exploited by Arab/Swahili provocateurs, had not helped the cause of Islam, which had begun to attract adherents in the region of Kimweri the Great See Krapf, J.L.; Travels, Researches and Missionary in Eastern Africa, Lond. 1860, p.367; and Magila Record Book, 1875-1888, p.24.

163. Peace now made it possible for the UMCA to expand into Southern Usambara and for the Bethel Mission in Mlalo since 1891 to extend its activities in Western Usambara.

164. 'Die Entwicklung unserer Kolonien, Beilage 1892-1896, DKB, Anlage - iv, p.24.

by German economic activities, was administered with southern Pare up to Kihurio through Semboja and his son Kimweri, the King in Vugha under the close supervision of the Commandant of the Masinde military station.¹⁶⁵ Although the aim of this measure was to minimize contact between the two rival Kilindi factions in the East and West, especially when the administration had not yet considered the time opportune for the restoration of the rightful heir to Vugha¹⁶⁶ it still left some pockets of opposition within each administrative area. For example, the anti-Semboja Chief Sikinyassi of Mlalo was in the Western Usambara district of Masinde, in which the paramountcy of the Semboja dynasty was still recognised. Likewise, Jumbe Hungura, a brother and supporter of Semboja, as chief of Maramba, was now subject to the overlordship of Kibanga. But while Semboja and his son Kimweri, deterred by German military presence in Masinde, managed to steer clear of open conflict with the German authority,¹⁶⁷ Hungura took advantage of the fact that Eastern Usambara was policed from Tanga to make trouble. He not only refused to recognize the overlordship of Kibanga but flouted the authority of the Germans themselves as they would not grant his request to move from Maramba to settle in the Bondei country.¹⁶⁸

Hungura was, in fact, accused of many crimes, ranging from slave raids on the Digo and the Bondei to obtaining money from

165. Von St. Paul to KG. 24.4. 1893, loc. cit.

166. Von St. Paul to KG. 21.4. 1893. TNA, G1/15.

167. Kimweri bin Semboja, however, incurred the displeasure of the Germans by refusing the Bethel missionaries permission to establish a station in Vugha. See P. Doring, Morgendämmerung in Deutsch - Ostafrika, Berlin, 1900, p.82.

168. Von St. Paul to KG, 21.4. 1893. Loc. cit.

German plantation managers for purposes of labour recruitment without bringing any of the men. Although the German Court in Tanga had fined him on several occasions on these counts he would not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court but 'listens only to the verdict of Semboja or Kimweri.'¹⁶⁹ Since he had repeatedly failed to come down to Tanga for a meeting with the German District Officer, a punitive expedition, under the command of non-commissioned officer Kamp, had to be sent to arrest him or 'take the village of Maramba and burn it' in the event of any resistance.¹⁷⁰ In the encounter between this expedition and Hungura's men on April 9, 1893, the village of Maramba was burned but Hungura, whose warriors suffered heavy casualties, fled into the mountains.¹⁷¹ Von St. Paul, the Tanga District officer, believed that Hungura's action was influenced by Semboja and Kimweri, whom he says 'had hitherto behaved so carefully and in such a manner that we could not accuse them of anything.'¹⁷² He had, in fact, reported that the refusal of Hungura to give himself up would 'give rise to a possibly welcome opportunity for settling accounts once and for all with the ruling family of the Wakilindi.'¹⁷³ Even the Governor himself, Julius von Soden, had agreed with this view, saying he hoped 'to be in a position from July onwards to proceed successfully against these chieftains.'¹⁷⁴ But fortunately for Semboja and his son, Hungura in May 1893, sent his son and "akida" to the Tanga District Office to beg for forgiveness and request

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. The report of the Maramba Expedition 17.4.1893 by Kamp enclosed in von St. Paul to KG. 21.4. 1893. Loc. cit.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. KG to BA Tanga, 2.5. 1893, TNA. G1/15.

permission to come down to Tanga to see Von St. Paul. Both men were reported to have offered themselves freely as hostages, and Hungura's son was lodged with the Wali of Tanga.¹⁷⁵ The peaceful resolution of this crisis apparently made it impossible for Governor von Soden to 'proceed' against the Semboja dynasty before he himself left East Africa.¹⁷⁶

In southern Pare, the experiment with akida administration begun by von Wissmann was carried forward by Governor von Soden, during whose regime the southern Pare plains came under a more permanent occupation by the creation of a military post in Kihurio,¹⁷⁷ and the strengthening of the existing one at Kisiwani¹⁷⁸ by Captain Johannes the Commander of the 1st company of the Protectorate Army. It was from these military posts that the influence of the German administration spread to the Pare hills, compelling the indigenous chiefs, and to seek the new government's recognition through the Shambaa and Zigua settlers on the plains below.¹⁷⁹ Apart from the fact that these settlements were the first to come into contact with the German, their chiefs were good Swahili and Kipare speakers,¹⁸⁰ useful in intermediaries between the German administration and the Pare

175. Von St. Paul to KG. 9.5. 1893, Ibid.

176. Unfortunately some of the documents relating to this incident are missing from German records.

177. Johannes to von Soden, 7.2. 1893, TNA, G1/18.

178. Ibid.

179. For the development of these settlements in the second half of the 19th century see Kimambo, I.N., The Political History of the Pare of Tanzania, Nairobi, 1969, pp. 170-188.

180. Ibid. p.203.

chiefs. Since Captain Johannes, who was until 1895¹⁸¹ responsible for the security of Upare was a supporter of policy of using Swahili speakers not only as agents of the government but also as porters and soldiers,¹⁸² the chiefs of the Swahili speaking Shambala and Zigua settlements on the plains came to acquire a political importance unrelated to their actual strength or influence.

In these early years, German control of the Pare plains was exercised through the agency of the two rival families from Usambara which had completed for the control of the trade of Upare in the immediate pre-German period - the Semboja and Mwanamata families.¹⁸³ From the Semboja family came the first German akida in Upare. Akida Kivuma of Kihurio, as well as the chiefs of the important caravan centres at Gonja, and Buiko, Mwasi and Mputa - all sons of Semboja.¹⁸⁴ The Mwanamata family controlled Kisiwani and Mwembe, and later secured the control of the same caravan centre for Kanyama, a son of Mwanamata, in December 1892, with the help of Captain Johannes.¹⁸⁵ The support given by the German administration to these two families not only brought conflicts between them and the chiefs of other settlements but also with the Pare chiefs on the hills. For example, Mtindi of Tanda hill in Hedaru, who had resisted the control of Akida Kivuma

181. DKB. No.2. Jan.15 1896, p.36.

182. Johannes to von Soden, 31.5. 1893, TNA, G1/18.

183. For the competition of these families for the control of Southern Pare plains see Kimambo, I.N.; op. cit., pp. 171-173 and 174 - 177.

184. Mputa of Buiko was transferred to Vugha as Jumbe in November 1893 after the death of his brother Kimweri, see Notes and Commentaries on political Events in Masinde (West Usambara) and the Wakilindi Dynasty of Vugha from 1892-1898 (Masinde Notes) TNA, MF5.

185. DKB. No.4, February, 1893, p.94.

had to be punished by the German administration from Masinde for trouble making.¹⁸⁶ Also an indigenous Pare chief, Sebonde of Kihurio, who had refused to come to terms with the new administration was deposed and hanged for treason.¹⁸⁷

The important political roles played by these alien 'settlers' under the early German administration encouraged people in southern Pare who had no traditional right to chieftainship to approach the German authorities for certification of recognition as chiefs. These people, like Kuku in Chrome and Madafa in Mshewa,¹⁸⁸ were political upstarts who had risen to prominence as a result of the disintegration of the traditional Pare political organization in the second half of the 19th century which was a consequence of the aggressive economic competition of the time. Since they appeared to be in effective control of their areas,¹⁸⁹ they were recognised as chiefs by the German administration which was anxious to extend its influence over a wide area at minimal expense.

In northern Pare, where traditional Pare chieftainship was still strong, in spite of the civil wars of the second half of the 19th century, the German administration from Moshi decided, as in Uchagga, to use the chiefs as the agents of the administration. The separation of Usangi from Ugweni was not only recognised but was the division within each of the two chiefdoms. The division of Ugweni into two chiefdoms, the south under Ndoile and the north under Ngowi,¹⁹⁰

186. Masinde Notes, TNA, MF.5; and Thurnwald, R.C. Black and White in East Africa, Lond. 1935, p.38.

187. Masinde Notes, loc. cit.

188. Baumann who met Madafa in 1890 was highly impressed by his effectiveness in stopping all acts of brigandage and call him 'a real Pare chief' - Baumann, O., Usambara and Seine Nachbarn-gebiete, Berlin, 1891, p.209, and p.211.

189. Kimambo I.N., op. cit., pp. 194-195.

190. This Ngowi was probably the Marisa mentioned by Kimambo -

was recognised by Captain Johannes, who also brought the two sections of Usangi under Makoko after the death of Naguvu of the Wambaga clan late in 1892.¹⁹¹ However, with the intervention of Marealle in favour of the Wambaga clan, Magwero was restored as chief of one of the two sections of Usangi, the other section remaining under Makoko.¹⁹² Since Capt. Johannes realized that the Wambugu of Northern Pare belonged to a distinct tribal group, he gave them a chiefdom of their own - the Danda chiefdom,¹⁹³ administered by their own chief, who was subject to the supervision of the officer commanding the Kisiwani military post.

The Arusha/Meru region also, like northern Pare, a periphery of the Kilimanjaro administration inhabited by the Masai, the Warush and the Wameru, whose traditional political constitutions were essentially republican, presented the German authorities with a special problem. As the main organ of traditional government was not the chief but the council of elders,¹⁹⁴ who usually elected one of them-

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191. Makoko of the Wasangi clan had earlier been restored to a section of Usangi either by an officer of the Wissmann Kilimanjaro Expedition or by Lt. von Bülow since the latter was reported to have visited Upare in April 1892 while acting for Carl Peters on Kilimanjaro - Stegall to mother, 19.5. 1892, CMS Lond. G3.A5/0, 1892. He had subsequently been driven out by Naguvu of the rival Wambaga clan, who later died in a dug-out (to in 1892 during a punitive expedition to Usangi by Capt. Johannes See Fosbrooke, H.A. 'The Defensive measures of Captain Tribes in North-East Tanganyika', TNR. No.35, July, 1953. p.6 and Kimambo, I.N., op. cit. p.214.
192. Makoko was still listed as chief of the whole of Usangi in 1894 Supplement to the DKB, 1894, Appendix I, Magwero was probably restored later or not in 1893 as claimed by Kimambo. Kimambo, I.N., op. cit., p.215.
193. Supplement to DKB, 1894, App. I.
194. Coke, C.M., 'Arusha under the Germans,' Arusha Regional Book, TNA, MF 61.

selves as their spokesmen or leader, Capt. Johannes who wanted someone with whom he could easily deal tried to convert this elected leader into a chief. It is particularly revealing that the chiefs so created in this region in October 1893¹⁹⁵ were instructed in their duties by the ubiquitous Swahili Fundi,¹⁹⁶ who was said to have given them their Chagga titles of Mangi. These first German-made Arusha/Meru Mangis were Kiriassi for Arusha chini, Galassoni for Kahe, Matunda for Meru, Merai, Masinde and Rabaito for Arusha juu.¹⁹⁷ The Masai, always on the move between Mt. Meru and Mt. Kilimanjaro and sometimes between British and German East Africa, could not be easily dealt with, although Capt. Johannes in the same year recognized their clan leaders Sendeyo, the great ritual leader, and Lekundayo, Mako, Moro, Tulito and Nziga as their chiefs.¹⁹⁸

In Kilimanjaro, where Chagga chieftainships were among the strongest in the north-east, the problem was not the absence of easily recognizable traditional authorities which could warrant the creation of artificial ones as in Arusha/Meru, but was one of how to harness the enormous power of chiefs to the service of the German administration. It was essentially the need to prevent the use of chiefly power against the administration that the Swahili Fundi was appointed Akida by Major von Wissmann in February 1891 to keep an eye on the activities of the defeated Sina of Kibosho. The extension of his functions to cover the supervision of Meli of Moshi after his submission in August 1892 was also dictated by the same need.

195. Supplement to the DKB, 1894, Appendix I, pp. 3-4.

196. Coke, C.M., 'Arusha under the Germans', loc. cit.

197. Supplement to DKB. 1894, Appendix I., pp. 3-4.

198. Ibid. p.4.

However, in these early years of the German administration, Fundi's akida functions were quite different from those of the Bōndei, for although he was normally resident near Sina's palace in Kibosho,¹⁹⁹ he never directly administered a particular piece of territory - a job which the German administration under Capt. Johannes chose to leave in the hands of the Chagga chiefs, who also had their own akidas or agents. For example, an influential akida of Sina of Kibosho was one Kipale (Kibale), a man from Teita.²⁰⁰ Fundi, described variously as the 'confidence man',²⁰¹ or 'the right hand man',²⁰² of Captain Johannes, was however, much more than an informer paid to spy on a hated chief, as Stahl's interpretation of his role in Chagga politics tends to suggest.²⁰³ He was everywhere in the Kilimanjaro district, in Uchagga where he was said to have entered into 'blood brotherhood' with several chiefs who also gave him women as wives and in whose villages he built his own houses,²⁰⁴ in Upare, where he helped Captain Johannes to organise the transportation of goods from Kiswani to Kilimanjaro;²⁰⁵ in Arusha/Meru where he instructed the tribal leaders in the duties of mangiship.²⁰⁶ He was also reported as liaising between

199. Journal of Kibosho 9.7. 1893. C.S.Sp. Paris; Stahl, K., op. cit., p.189 and p.194.

200. Journal of Kibosho, 7.9. 1893; CSsp. Paris.

201. Ibid, 29.9. 1893.

202. Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf's plan of operation of the Kilimanjaro Handel-undLandwirtschaft Gesellschaft, 11.2. 1899 RKA 462 p.69.

203. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.133; pp. 189-190.

204. Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf RKA 462. p.69.

205. Johannes to von Soden, 31.5. 1893, TNA, G1/18.

206. Cokes, C.M. 'Arusha under the Germans', loc. cit.

chiefs and Catholic missionaries who wanted land for mission purposes not only in Uchagga²⁰⁷ but also in Arusha.²⁰⁸ He also featured in the plans of Fritz Bronsart Schellendorf's Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company in 1899,²⁰⁹ a year after he had left German administrative service in Kilimanjaro after considerably enriching himself²¹⁰ not only through his commercial activities - for he was in the first place a trader - but through his functions as an agent of the German administration.

During his first tour of duty as the commandant of the Kilimanjaro station,²¹¹ apart from the security of the Caravan route from Masinde to Kilimanjaro and the construction of the new military station at Moshi, Captain Johannes, under whom the Swahili Fundi operated, was faced with the major problem of creating a workable system of local administration, in which his administrative policy would reflect the realities of Chagga politics. The solution which he found to this problem, and which was based on his personal understanding of Chagga politics, involved the rejection of the previous policy of staking the whole existence of the German administration on the political fortunes of a single chief.²¹² Although he was personally friendly with Marealle of Marangu, whom he singled out for special

207. Journal of Kibosho, 29.9. 1893. CSsp. Paris.

208. Ibid., 31.7. 1896.

209. Fritz Bronsart von SchellendorfRKA 462, pp. 69-70.

210. Journal of Kibosho, 10.12. 1898. CSsp. Paris. The Swahili Fundi left Kilimanjaro finally for the coast in Dec. 1898.

211. He left Moshi on leave in Germany early in August 1894 after a two-year tour of duty. See Journal of Kibosho 30.7.1894.

212. Lt. von Eltz had recognised Mandara of Moshi's paramountcy. Carl Peters had allied with Marealle.

favours,²¹³ on account of his past record of unshaken loyalty to the German administration, Capt. Johannes was determined to make himself, not Marealle or any other chief, the paramount ruler of the ever-competing and constantly intriguing Chagga Chiefs. One interesting piece of evidence shows that he was already thinking of establishing his supremacy over the Chagga chiefs by employing the indigenous system of cattle clientage. Contrary to the instructions of the governor that the cattle which the German Administration had acquired during the previous military expeditions on Kilimanjaro be maintained by the troops of the 1st Company based at Moshi as a single herd, Capt. Johannes decided to distribute them among the leading Chagga chiefs whom he said were the only people capable of giving them the proper attention they needed. Although the reason he gave to support his action was mainly military, for he says cattle-rearing would interfere with the training of his troops, he also clearly admitted that the chiefs would benefit from his decision, as they would be entitled to milk the cows and take their offspring.²¹⁴ Captain Johannes must have hoped that by contributing to the economic prosperity of these chiefs he would be linking both their economic and political fortunes with those of his administration.

Since his study of the Chagga political scene revealed the existence of three major chiefdoms - Moshi and Kibosho - which had competed for supremacy in the immediate pre-German period, and Marangu,

213. For example, he asked Governor von Soden to send a double-barelled gun to Marealle for bird shooting. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892, TNA, G1/18.

214. Johannes to von Soden, 31.5. 1893, TNA, G1/18.

whose chief, Marealle had just risen to prominence as a result of his friendship with the Germans, Captain Johannes decided on the creation of three 'spheres of influence'. Each of these fell under the control of the chiefs of Kibosho, Moshi and Marangu respectively, and corresponded with the area where each of them was exercising political control by August 1892.²¹⁵ In these 'sphere', each of which also represented a geographical area²¹⁶ - Kibosho in the West, Moshi at the centre, and Marangu in the east - each major chief was recognised as an overlord, reserving the traditional right of exacting tribute from his vassal chiefs, but ultimately responsible to the commandant of the military station for the maintenance of law and order within his own sphere.

In the West, Sina of Kibosho directly ruled his own chiefdom of Kibosho and the three subordinate districts of Kindi, Kombo and Mweka, which were administered on his behalf by his own akidas. In addition he also exercised 'sovereignty' over Shangali in Machame, Makungu in Narumu and Ngalami, Nkunde and Maimbe, each of whom ruled one of the three divisions of Kibongoto (Siha).²¹⁷ Machame and Kibongoto had been areas of Kibosho influence before the German intervention, and Shangali of Machame and Maimbe of central Kibongoto were, in fact, proteges of Sina.²¹⁸ He was also the overlord of Uru, a

215. The terms of unconditional surrender imposed on Meli and his vassal chiefs Fumba of Kilema and Kitingati of Kirua had drastically reduced the territorial influence of Moshi. See von Schele to Caprivi, 1.9. 1892, RKA 283.

216. For the division of Uchagga into administrative areas by Capt. Johannes in 1893. See Volken, G. Der Kilimandscharo p.246; and Supplement to DKB 1894, Appendix I. pp. 2-3.

217. Ibid.

218. Sina had personally installed Shangali in Machame after the expulsion of Ngamini. See Le Roy. Au Kilimanjaro, Paris, n.d. p.289 and Stahl, K., op. cit. p.122. Maimbe like Sina belonged to the same Orio clan. Ibid, pp. 72-73.

chiefdom which had been a bone of contention between him and the late Mandara of Moshi, and which Meli was ordered to restore to him in August 1872. Here, also, the chief, Kisarike was his protégé before he turned traitor to team up with Mandara and the Germans in 1891.²¹⁹ The fact that the chief of Kibosho was allowed till his death in 1897 to remain in control of this vast territory, which represented almost half the habitable area of Uchagga, even in spite of the intrigues of his rivals,²²⁰ was an indication of the political realism of Capt. Johannes, who had himself been uneasy about Sina's vast political influence.²²¹

In the centre, Meli administered his own chiefdom of Moshi and the two subordinate districts of Mbokomu and Tela, which he controlled through his akidas.²²² Since the new administrative divisions were created soon after his defeat in August 1892, when he not only lost Uru to Kibosho but was compelled to recognise Marealle's overlordship over the chiefsoms of Kirua and Kilema, which were areas of Moshi influence before the German intervention, it is understandable why his own sphere was the smallest. In fact, throughout the remaining part of 1892, while Sina and Marealle increased their popularity with the administration on account of the roles they played in the German

219. Ibid., p.186.

220. Meli, who was not happy over the loss of Uru in August 1892, was always spreading anti-Kibosho rumours in order to bring Sina into conflict with Capt. Johannes and other German officials. See Journal of Kibosho, 28.8. 1894 and 27.8. 1895, CSsp. Paris.

221. Evangelisch-Lutherisches Missionsblatt (Leipzig) 1897, p.370.

222. Volkens, G., op. cit., p.246; Supplement to DKB, 1894. Appendix I. p.2.

invasion of Moshi, Captain Johannes was still very suspicious of Meli and continued to report unfavourably about him to the governor in Dar es Salaam.²²³ But in spite of the Commandant's initial suspicion, Meli fulfilled, though rather slowly, all the conditions of submission imposed on him and coöperated with the administration during the construction of the new military station at Moshi.²²⁴ As soon as Capt. Johannes moved to Moshi late in 1893, confidence was gradually restored between the two, and by 1895 the chief of Moshi was counted among the most loyal chiefs in Kilimanjaro.²²⁵

In the east, the new star was Marealle of Marangu, the main beneficiary of Capt. Johannes's Kilimanjaro administration. He was not only confirmed as the overlord of Kirua and Kilema, whose chiefs Kitingati and Fumba had been made his vassals after the defeat of Moshi in August 1892, but was also given charge over the chiefdoms of Mamba, Msae Juu and Chini, Kondeni and Mwika.²²⁶ Although he had now succeeded, with German assistance, in raising his chiefdom from her position of comparative weakness to one of superiority over her other eastern neighbours,²²⁷ Marealle's territorial influence in Uchagga was still smaller than that of Sina of Kibosho. However, Capt. Johannes succeeded in balancing Sina's power in the

223. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892; 8.12. 1892, TNA, G1/18.

224. Miller, M., 'The subjugation of chief Meli of Moshi', loc. cit. p.209.

225. Widemann, A., 'Die Kilimandscharo-Bevölkerung' Petermanns Mitteilungen, Gotha, 1899, p.122.

226. Volkens, G., op. cit. p.246; Supplement to DKB, 1894, Appendix I.

227. For the position before the German intervention, see Stahl, K., op. cit., pp. 285-307.

west, with the addition of the vast territory of Rombo to Marealle's sphere of influence. For, while Chief Matolo of Usseri was recognised as a major chief in his own right, exercising control over both Usseri and Ngasseni the rest of Rombo was made subject to the authority of chief Kinabo of Mkuu, who was himself a vassal of Marealle.²²⁸

Two kinds of reaction - one non-violent and the other violent - occurred at this time to this German political settlement in Uchagga. The first, which was non-violent, was the temporary abdication of chief Fumba of Kilema late in 1893 in favour of his son Mabruku, whom Volkens described as a 'sturdy youth of about 15 or 16.' For the old chief had not only resented his subjection to the young Marealle but had also been irritated by the constant demands made on him for cattle.²²⁹ The second and violent reaction, came from Chief Sengua of Mashati in Rombo, who sometime before May, 1894, had refused to recognise the German - imposed overlordship of Marealle. During the expedition May 6-8, 1894, when both Marealle and Kinabo had personally come to Moshi to persuade Capt. Johannes to undertake,²³⁰ the people of Mashati were suppressed and their villages raided by Chagga warriors from Moshi, Kibosho and Marangu, who were acting as auxiliaries to the German troops. Chiefs Sengua of Mashati juu and Mlangu of Mashati chini were now forced to accept Marealle's overlordships exercised on his behalf in Rombo by Kinabo of Mkuu.

Peace in Rombo was again disturbed in the following September, when two German scientists, Dr. Lent and Dr. Kretschmer were

228. Supplement to DKB. 1894. Appendix I, p.3.

229. Volkens, G., op. cit., p. 133.

230. DKB, No. 17, 1st Aug., 1894, p.403.

attacked and killed in the district of Kirua.²³¹ Although this incident was probably an accident²³² like the murder of the Sudanese soldier on April 26, 1891 by a man from the other Chagga chiefdom of Kirua near Moshi, especially as the Catholic missionaries in Kibosho had earlier commented on their suspicious behaviour,²³³ Marealle who was always looking for such an opportunity to crush his enemies, had exploited it to further strengthen his control over Kirua. For, during the punitive expedition led by Lt. Eberhardt, acting Commandant of Moshi in the absence of Capt. Johannes who was then on leave in Germany, Chief Leikturu of Kirua was deposed and hanged in Moshi. His chiefdom was then divided between two chiefs, Leikibona and Lerona,²³⁴ who had voluntarily accepted German rule in December 1893.²³⁵ The disgrace of Leikturu must have served as a warning to the chiefs of Rombo that anyone who dared to oppose Marealle would do so at his own peril.

The virtual acceptance of the German administrative arrangements in Uchagga by the end of 1894, and with it the paramountcy of Captain Johannes himself, was followed in 1895 by efforts to extend effective German control over the neighbouring region of Arusha/Meru. Although the Masai, the Warush and the Wameru had accepted German rule through their 'spokesmen' or leaders in October 1893, the absence of a permanent military post²³⁶ in the area had not made the influence

231. Supplement to the DKB, 1895 Annual Report for 1895, p.89.

232. Stahl believes that this had also been planned by Marealle to discredit chief Leikturu. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.327.

233. Journal of Kibosho, 17.1. 1894, CSsp. Paris.

234. Supplement to the DKB 1895, Annual Report for 1895, p.89.

235. DKB, No.17, 1st Aug. 1894, p.404.

236. The Arusha post which Johannes had asked for in December 1892 was not established. Johannes to von Soden, 15.12. 1892, TNA, G1/18. However the area between Kisiwani and Arusha was supervised by non-commissioned officer, von Witzleben based at Kisiwani - Johannes to von Soden, 7.2. 1893, Ibid.

of the administration felt and consequently, the Masai and Warush raids into Uchagga and north Pare had continued unabated. In spite of their obligation to the German administration to maintain peace and order, the Masai and Warush leaders were unable to stop these raids, which were mostly organised for cattle-stealing. For, the rinderpest epidemic, which had broken out in 1892, had destroyed most of their own herds, thereby causing considerable distress among a people whose subsistence depended mainly on their livestock.²³⁷ As these raids which almost invariably also involved the stealing of women,²³⁸ threatened the security of his administration, Capt. Johannes was compelled to protect his Chagga subjects by organising an invasion of Arusha/Meru with the support of all his Chagga chiefs.

The occasion for this invasion was provided by an appeal from Masinde, the pro-German chief of Arusha Juu, to Moshi for support against molestation by his fellow chiefs because of his refusal to take part in a raiding expedition to Irangi.²³⁹ During this invasion, which lasted from October 7 to 14, 1895, Captain Johannes, assisted by Lt. Merker and 80 troops of the 1st. Company, who were also supported by 1,500 Chagga auxiliaries from Moshi, Uru, Kibosho, Machame and Kibongoto,²⁴⁰ was able to reduce the peoples of Arusha/Meru

237. Both CMS and UMCA missionary reports in 1892 mention large scale social distress among the Masai as a result of this rinderpest epidemic. See Diocese of East Equatorial Africa, Occasional paper, No.11, 12.4. 1892, CMS Lond., G3.A5/O 1892, and Central Africa, No.117, Sept. 1892, p.135. Letter from Native Teacher, Henry Nasibu to H.W. Woodward of Magila.

238. DKB. VII., No.2, Jan. 15, 1896, p.45.

239. Johannes to KG., 19.10. 1895, RKA 287; and DKB, vol.VII, No.2, Jan. 15, 1896, p.45.

240. Ibid.

to submission. About 300 Chagga women and children enslaved in the area were liberated and allowed to return to their own homes.²⁴¹

The successful execution of this invasion, apart from confirming the German Commandant in his new role as the paramount ruler and protector of the Chagga, also yielded the German administration a handsome profit.²⁴²

As a result of Capt. Johannes's activities on Kilimanjaro, the Moshi military station was upgraded in November 1895 to first class status by the new Governor, Major von Wissmann, along with those at Mpwapwa, Tabora, Langenburg as well as the new ones to be established on Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria, so that it could get priority treatment in matters relating to supplies and equipment.²⁴³ The jurisdiction of this upgraded station was extended in January 1896 when, on the closing down of the Masinde military station and the integration of the whole of Usambara with the Tanga district, Upare including the Kisiwani post, was placed under the Kilimanjaro administration,²⁴⁴ Shortly afterwards, the Kisiwani post, which had hitherto been manned by Sergeants Sommer and Lemboke with twenty-five African troops²⁴⁵ was also upgraded by the transfer there of the former commander of the Marangu sub-station, Lt. von Marwitz,²⁴⁶ and

241. Ibid.

242. Capt. Johannes says the cost of mounting the expedition was only 450 rupees, but that over 150 cows, 250 goats and 300 rupee worth of ivory were collected. Ibid.

243. DKB. VII, No.2, 2, Jan. 15, 1896, p.36.

244. DKB. VII No.8, April 15, 1896, p.214.

245. DKB. VII, No.10, May 15, 1896, p.280.

246. DKB. VII, No.13, July, 1896, p.404.

the Marangu station dwindled in significance.²⁴⁷ While the strengthening of the Kisiwani post, which Capt. Johannes had been demanding since February 1893²⁴⁸ was certainly in response to the danger posed to the administration by the raids of the Warush and the Masai, who in 1894 were still reported to be demanding hongo (tolls) from caravans bound for Kilimanjaro,²⁴⁹ the down-grading of the Marangu station was a reflection of the confidence of the German authorities in the ability of the friendly Marealle to maintain peace in his area.

The contrast between the strengthening of the Moshi military station and the closing down of the one at Masinde underlines the difference between the political development of Kilimanjaro and that of Usambara under the German administration. For, unlike Capt. Johannes, who had had to organise several military expeditions to bring unwilling Chagga and Arusha/Meru Chiefs under the control of his administration, successive German commanders at Masinde, from Lt. Ramsay who founded it in September 1890²⁵⁰ to Lt. Storch, who recommended its abolition in 1895,²⁵¹ did not face any serious problems with the Kilindi chiefs. For, apart from Hungura of Maramba, these chiefs remained generally peaceful and loyal.²⁵² The German

247. From the end of August to Nov. 1, 1896, Sergeant Lembcke, was stationed in Marangu. DKB. VII, Oct. 15, 1896. p.634 and VII, No.2. Jan.15, 1897, p.36.

248. Johannes to von Soden. 7.2. 1893, TNA, G1/18.

249. Fosbrooke, H.A. ed. 'Life of Justin', TNR. No. 14. 1955, pp. 32-33.

250. Extract from the Kolonial Handbuch, 12.10.1899, TNA, G54/31, p.14.

251. Storch to KG, 30.4. 1895, RKA 404, and DKB. VI, No.15, Aug. 1, p. 379.

252. Von St. Paul to KG. 21.4. 1893, TNA, G1/15.

administration had itself contributed to peace in Usambara by clearly separating the jurisdiction of Semboja in Masinde and his son in Vugha from that of their main rivals Kibanga and Kinyashi in Handei, East Usambara.²⁵³ For, while the Germans were prepared to tolerate the Semboja dynasty, they were unwilling to restore the traditional constitution without restoring the rightful heir to Vugha. Their attitude seemed to have been to make the best of the existing situation as long as their economic and political interests were not compromised.

The establishment of a stable administration in Usambara by November 1893, when Kimweri bin Semboja died at Vugha²⁵⁴ encouraged von St. Paul, the District Officer at Tanga, who also looked after the political administration of Usambara, to propose the restoration of Kinyashi to Vugha in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the Shambala and the removal of the Masinde station to Vugha so that it could serve as a substation for 'upper Usambara'.²⁵⁵ Although these proposals were not immediately accepted because Semboja was still a major force to be reckoned with,²⁵⁶ it is clear that the German authorities in Dar es Salaam themselves wanted a change of policy in Usambara. For example, the appointment of Mputa, another son of Semboja who was then the chief of Buiko in Southern Pare, as successor to his brother Kimweri in Vugha was not as a king but simply as a minor chief (Jumbe).²⁵⁷ Even then, it was only considered a temporary administrative measure pending the final determination of the issue

253. Masinde Notes.

254. Ibid.

255. Ibid.

256. Ibid. Semboja is said to have pleaded against the installation of Kinyashi on the ground that he was still young.

257. Ibid.

of succession to Vugha by the Central government.²⁵⁸

The change in the direction of German policy away from the Semboja dynasty was influenced not only by the administration's growing confidence but also by the subtle opposition of Semboja and his family to the Germans. For although both Semboja and his son Kimweri in Vugha had cooperated openly with the German Commandants at Masinde, they had become suspicious of German intentions towards them and had therefore remained secretly hostile. For example, Kimweri had refused to cooperate with the Bethel missionaries, who had since April 1891 established their first mission station in Usambara at Mlalo, and was even reported to have attacked chief Sikinyashi of Mlalo for allowing them to settle in his chiefdom.²⁵⁹ Although this hostile attitude was interpreted by the German missionaries as opposition to Christianity,²⁶⁰ it was just a reaction against what Kimweri, who had been very friendly with Bishop Smythies of the UMCA, and who would certainly have welcomed a mission at Vugha, regarded as support for his enemy. He must certainly have known that Sikinyashi, who had personally invited the missionaries to settle in his chiefdom,²⁶¹ intended to use them to political advantage. Kimweri's policy was continued by his brother and successor Mputa,²⁶² whom the German authorities would not confirm in office as King in Vugha. In

258. Ibid; Governor von Soden had hoped to be able to effect this before he left East Africa in 1893. KG to BA, Tanga 2.5, 1893, TNA, G1/15.

259. Johanssen, D. Führungen und Erfahrungen in 40 Jahrligen Missionsdienst Band I, Bethel bei Bielefeld, n.d. p.59; and Wohlrab, P., Usambara: Werden und Wachsen einer heiden - Christlichen Gemeinde in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Bethel bei Bielefeld, 1915, pp. 29-30; p.56.

260. Doring, P., Morgendämmerung in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Berlin, 1900 p.82.

261. Wohlrab, P., op. cit., p.29.

262. Doring, P., op. cit., p.82.

fact, his opposition to the German missionaries in Western Usambara contrasts rather sharply with the enthusiastic cooperation given by Kibanga and Kingashi to German companies then moving into East Usambara in search of land for the establishment of plantations.²⁶³

The refusal of Mputa to cooperate with the Bethel missionaries, who, in February 1895, established a mission station at Ngasi opposite Vugha, was certainly his undoing. For in spite of the order of Lt. Storch, the anti-Semboja officer at Masinde,²⁶⁴ that he should allow his people to trade freely with, and work for, the missionaries, he had persisted in his opposition. By doing this he had played into the hands of the German administration, which had even contemplated the deportation of his father to Tanga before his death in March 1895.²⁶⁵ What Lt. Storch now wanted was a pretext to eliminate a man, whom he said was 'most unpopular and as much a usurper as his father Semboja.'²⁶⁶ This was soon found in April 1895 when Mputa was said to have killed one Mpinda, son of Akida Shunda Madagala of Gare, who had unlawfully slept with a woman in the royal harem.²⁶⁷ Although the king was acting within the bounds of customary law which provided the death penalty for such an offence, the German administration, applying another set of laws foreign to the Shambala, simply

263. For example, Kibanga sold 400 hectares of land to the Usambara Kaffebau Gesellschaft for only 100 Rupees in December 1893 see RKA 445, pp. 137-146.

264. Lt. Storch had believed the rumours that the locust invasion of Usambara in 1894 was caused by Semboja who had wanted to drive the Europeans away by means of hunger. See Mitteilungen aus der Deutschen Schutzgebiete, Band 8, 1895, p.319.

265. He was suspected of planning a conspiracy with the Masai - Masinde Notes ...

266. Ibid.

267. Storch to KG; 30.4. 1895, in KG to KA, 21.6. 1895, RKA 404⁵¹⁻⁵³; and DKB. VI, No.15, Aug.1, 1895, p.380; Feierman, S., 'The Shambaa' in A. Roberts ed. Tanzania before 1900, Nairobi, 1968, p.13.

regarded the execution as an act of murder. Mputa, who was promptly arrested on April 25, 1895, was tried the following day on a six count charge of murder, robbery and obstruction to the German mission.²⁶⁸ He was condemned to death for murder and hanged on April 30, 1895 in an open assembly at which almost all the Kilindi chiefs were present on the orders of Lt. Storch.²⁶⁹ This execution was used by the German administration to emphasize the fact that they were now the undisputed masters of the country and that German laws would now take precedence over customary law.

The execution of Mputa was followed by a return of the principle of legitimacy which Semboja had upset after the death of Kimweri the Great in 1869; for Lt. Storch immediately proposed to the government in Dar es Salaam the restoration of Kinyashi to Vugha in accordance with the Kilindi law of succession and the appointment of Kihio, one of the sons of Semboja, who was described as 'a quiet and intelligent man, who is without blemish,'²⁷⁰ as the chief of Masinde. The commandant then backed up his proposals with the confident assertion that by the appointment of the two men, the protracted discord in Usambara would be at an end and consequently, the Masinde military station would no longer be needed, thus allowing for the conversion of the area into a civil district.²⁷¹ These proposals were endorsed by the Governor,²⁷² and Lt. Storch who was instructed to instal Kinyashi immediately proceeded to Msasa to find the superstitious young man unwilling to accept the high office because of

268. Storch to KG. 30.4. 1895, in KG to KA, 21.6. 1895, RKA 404⁵¹⁻⁵³. He was also accused of murdering a Chagga man. Ibid.

269. Ibid; and P. Doring op. cit., p.82.

270. Storch to KG. 30.4. 1895, loc. cit.

271. Ibid; and DKB VI, No.15, Aug. 1., 1895. pp. 379-380.

272. KG to KA, 21.6. 1895, RKA 404.

his fears of dying there like his father and grandfather.²⁷³ He therefore had to appoint Kibanga, whom he said possessed 'the greatest authority among the Wakilindi' and who was 'obviously devoted to the Germans',²⁷⁴ as regent. So careful was he to follow tradition that Lt. Storch first had to instal a son of Kibanga at Bumbuli before the installation of Kibanga himself at Vugha in June 6, 1895 'in the presence of many Kilindi Chiefs and the happy Shambala who had warmly welcomed the decision'.²⁷⁵

The return to the principle of legitimacy also meant the restoration of the traditional Shambala constitution, which made other Kilindi chiefs outside Vugha subject to the administrative control of the king - Simbamwene - at the royal capital - something which the German administration never allowed the Semboja dynasty. Kibanga, who was now charged with the administration of a section of the Bondei and the Usambara country up to Gonja in southern Pare, was reported to have assumed the title of Kimweri.²⁷⁶ However, the restoration of the traditional constitution was not complete until the reluctant Kinyashi was finally persuaded to accept office in Vugha in September, 1895.²⁷⁷

Simbamwene Kinyashi, a political realist, knew much better than the simple Shambala folk, who still cherished the memories of the strong rule of his great-grandfather, Kimweri the Great,²⁷⁸ that, in spite of the restoration of the traditional constitution, the days

273. Storch to KG, 7.6. 1895, Ibid; and Doring, P., Morgendämmerung in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Berlin, 1900, p.83.

274. Storch to KG, 7.6.1895, RKA 404, VI, No.5. Aug.1., 1895, p.380.

275. Ibid.

276. Ibid.

277. Lushoto District Book, TNA, MF.9.

278. Wohlrab, P., op. cit., p.54.

of Kilindi royal absolutism were over. The circumstances of his installation must have made it clear to him that to survive he must not only cooperate with the German District Officer in Tanga and the Commander of the Masinde Police post but must also establish a close relationship with the Bethel missionaries and the managers of the German plantations in Usambara.²⁷⁹ Knowing very well the role played by the Bethel missionaries in the event which led to the execution of his predecessor, Mputa, he was particularly anxious to court their friendship by paying frequent visits to their mission station at Ngasi, and by always seeking their advice.²⁸⁰ As a result of his close association with these missionaries, Kinyashi himself was able to read and write within a short time after his installation.²⁸¹ And just as his friendship with the missionaries had brought him personal advantages, his cooperation with the German plantation managers in the field of labour recruitment also offered him the opportunity of making money²⁸² as well as winning the confidence of the Germans generally. However, as a result of his role as a recruiter of labour, he lost not only the respect of his people whom he delivered in their hundreds over to the plantations but also the admiration of the Bethel missionaries, who criticised him for his greed and lack of consideration for the people among whom the

279. By 1895 there were no less than six German coffee plantations in Eastern Usambara, four of them belonging to the German East African Company. See Annual Report in the development of German East Africa, Supplement to DKB, 1895, pp. 51-53.

280. Doring, p., op. cit., p.83.

281. Ibid.

282. Wohlrab, P., op. cit; p.55.

worked.²⁸³

The unsuitability of a man of such weak a character as Kinyashi to rule Usambara during the transitional period between the abolition of the Masinde military station in 1895 and the creation of a new civil district of Wilhelmstal in 1898,²⁸⁴ which was a period of economic and political experiment in Usambara, was highlighted by the particularly unfavourable socio-economic conditions of the time. For example, the year of his accession had followed the outbreak of the devastating locust invasion of 1894, which had reduced many parts of Bondei and Usambara to starvation, thereby causing acute social distress, which both the UMCA and the Bethel Missionaries had desperately tried to relieve.²⁸⁵ Hardly had the people recovered from its after-effects when another occurred again in 1898, this time followed by a severe drought which caused large-scale famine and unprecedented human suffering.²⁸⁶ This depressing social situation was even made worse by the outbreak in both Bondei and Usambara of a jigger epidemic²⁸⁷ which made it impossible for people to leave their homes to work for wages to pay for the hut tax, which the government had just introduced. In fact, the collection of the tax in the new civil district had to be postponed until 1899 on account of the unfavourable social and economic situation.²⁸⁸

283. Ibid.

284. Runderlass No. 2768, 25.2. 1898, RKA, 221.

285. Ibid., p.52; and Central Africa, vol XIV, 1896, p.29.

286. Wohlrab, P., op. cit., pp. 60-61; Zanzibar Gazette, March 20, 1899; Central Africa, vol,XVII, No. 197, May 1899; p.69.

287. Wohlrab, P., pp. cit. pp. 60-61, Central Africa, Vo. VIII, June 1899, p.85.

288. DKB, C, No.5, 1899, p.167.

Instead of working out a relief programme similar to those of the missionaries, the new district administration, under pressure from the managers of the German plantations whose labour demands were insatiable, tried to exploit the situation by asking people in need to work for wages on the plantations.²⁸⁹ In Usambara, the peoples' resentment of the German attitude was vented on Kinyashi, who was not only powerless to protect his people against maltreatment but also contributed to their exploitation for personal gain.²⁹⁰ Such was his unpopularity among his people that he could not exercise his functions without the support of the Swahili Akida Joho, who had been posted to assist him in 1895.²⁹¹ Although opposition to him was generally passive because the Shambala feared the Germans who supported him, an open rejection of his authority was made in 1896 by Jumbe Shatu of the sub-chiefdom of Mshihui, an area with a long tradition of resistance to Kilindi rule.²⁹² But as Shatu's action conflicted with the German policy of administering the Shambala through the ruling Kilindi clan, the 'revolt' was suppressed, Shatu was deposed and his area given over to a close relation of Kinyashi. Once again, an outside power had intervened on the side of the Kilindi to secure the submission of the people of Mshihui.

In the following year, there also occurred in the Southern Pare section of the old Masinde military district now being administered with Usambara from Tanga, another anti-German revolt in Hedaru led

289. Central Africa, vol.XVII, No.198, June 1899, p.85.

290. Wohlrab, P. op. cit., pp. 54-55.

291. Masinde Notes.

292. Ibid; For the resistance of Mshihui to Kimweri the Great early in the 19th Century see Burton, R.F., Zanzibar, City Island and Coast vol.2, Lond. 1872, pp. 192-193

by Chief Mntindi of Tanda. Before this revolt, Mntindi had been very uncooperative with the Kilindi Akida of Kihurio, Kivuma bin Semboja, who also had responsibility for the supervision of the area, and had once been punished for trouble-making.²⁹³ He had thereafter moved from the position to that of cooperation by assisting the Bethel missionaries, who wanted to forestall the Trappists in Upare, to build a mission station in Tanda in 1897. But since Christian evangelization meant the decline of their ritual power and influence, the Pare diviners in Tanda decided to frustrate the efforts of the Bethel missionaries. They therefore took advantage of the absence of the resident missionary, Pastor Roehl to link the mission station with the outbreak of a cattle disease called mtuchi,²⁹⁴ then ravaging the area. As his people were already suffering from famine, Mntindi was easily persuaded to give the diviners permission to destroy the mission house. When this incident was reported by Akida Kivuma to the Masinde military police post, an expedition was sent to punish the 'rebels' of Tanda. However, Mntindi was wise enough not to offer any resistance, appearing before the invading force in a woman's dress. This act of submission saved him from deposition, for he was simply fined and pardoned.²⁹⁵ The submission of Mntindi, further strengthened the position of Akida Kivuma, who now took advantage of his almost absolute powers to despoil the people until he himself was removed from office in 1898 and a new Akida, Komba, appointed in his place.²⁹⁶

293. Thurnwald, R.C., *Black and White in East Africa*, Lond. 1935, p.38.

294. Kimambo, I.N., *op. cit.* p.219.

295. Thurnwald, R.C., *op. cit.*, p.38, and Kimambo, I.N., *op. cit.* p.219.

296. Kimambo, I.N., *Ibid.*

The famine which partly influenced the revolt in Tanda and forced the new civil administration in Wilhelmstal to postpone the collection in the district for a year²⁹⁷ was virtually over by 1899. As a result of good harvests, commercial activities were able to resume in the fifteen fortnightly markets of the district.²⁹⁸ Economic revival then made the collection of the hut tax a fairly easy exercise.²⁹⁹ Thus, by 1900, when a new factor entered the political scene of Usambara in the arrival of the settler-prince, Tom von Prince, the hero of the Hehe wars, Usambara appeared to be on the threshold of an era of peaceful development under the Germans.

The last four years of the 19th century were a period of escalating unrest in Kilimanjaro, beginning with an anti-Masai expedition in February 1896 and ending with the execution of nineteen Chagga and Arusha/Meru chiefs and other leading men on the charge of conspiracy with the Masai to overthrow the German authority in March, 1900.³⁰⁰ In fact, the dissatisfaction of the Masai and kindred peoples, the Warush and the Wameru with German rule, which provides the background to the conspiracy charge of 1900, was a result of constant German military harassment, during which they not only lost their captive Chagga wives but large numbers of their cattle and stocks of ivory to the Chagga warriors and their protector,

297. DKB. X., No.5, 1899, p.167.

298. DKB. XII, No.10, May 15, 1901, p.356. Annual Report from the Wilhelmstal District.

299. Stuhlmann to KA, 21.11. 1900. RKA 1053.

300. Report of the Privy Councillor Haber on the political situation in Kilimanjaro, 5.3. 1904, RKA 700, p.95 ff.

Capt. Johannes. To these warlike peoples, who had before the German intervention been the martial superiors of the Bantu peoples of the interior,³⁰¹ German rule which aimed at crushing the strong in favour of the weak was unjust and must be resisted.

The expedition of February 1896, following in the wake of an earlier one to Arusha ~~Juu~~ in October 1895,³⁰² was directed against the 'Sendeyo Masai', who, instead of complying with an earlier order by Capt. Johannes that they should settle on the dry Nanya plateau, had moved down to the Serengeti plains and built their kraals north of Lake Manyara.³⁰³ Their ritual leader, 'Sendeyo of Loita, a younger brother of Lenana of Navaisha',³⁰⁴ was determined to migrate back to British East Africa from where he had originally come, rather than obey the order. Since Capt. Johannes considered that the proposed migration would greatly damage German economic interests as the 'huge herds of the Masai would be lost' and 'the ivory trade in which they played a significant role of middlemen be considerably diverted',³⁰⁵ he decided to outflank them by cutting them from the rich ivory producing centre at Mbugu (Mbugwe) where they had once attacked a German expedition from the Mpwapwa military station.³⁰⁶ Having successfully done this by entering into friendly agreement

301. Koenig, O., The Masai story, Lond. 1956, pp. 40-42.

302. Johannes to KG., 19.11. 1895, RKA 287.

303. DKB, VII, No.10, 1896, p.287.

304. Hardinge to Salisbury, 5.6. 1897 in British Ambassador to Baron von Rotenham, 16.7. 1897, DZA, RKA 288¹⁵⁵⁻¹⁵⁶.

305. DKB. VII, No.10, 1896, p.286.

306. Ibid. p.287, Katadu, the leading chief had obtained a letter of recognition from the more distant Mpwapwa station. Ibid. p.286.

with the Mbugu chiefs Katadu and Matakeko, he then had a military confrontation with the Masai, whose leading chief Sendeyo, on February 19, 1896 sent a peace delegation to him asking permission for his people to return to their former settlement at Kisongo.³⁰⁷

The proud Masai were still undecided as to whether to move from the well-watered and game-filled Serengeti plains to the desolate Many plateau when there occurred in Arusha in the following November a savage German punitive expedition, during which most of their kindred Warush and Meru warriors were killed to avenge the death of the two Lutheran missionaries, Ovir and Segebrock, who were killed in Meru in October 1896.³⁰⁸ The circumstances surrounding the murder of the two unsuspecting missionaries show that an anti-German resistance had been building up since the expedition of October 1895. In July 1896, only the prompt intervention of the Swahili Fundi had saved the Catholic missionaries, who wanted land for a mission station in Meru, from being attacked.³⁰⁹ Although Matunda, the chief of the Wameru was himself personally friendly with Europeans, and had in fact, warmly received the visiting Lutheran missionaries, he had warned them that 'there were many people in Meru who would not allow any European to live in their district',³¹⁰ Capt. Johannes, who was then on his way to Ubugwe had previously warned them against the establishment of a mission station in Meru at that time on security grounds. But believing in the friendly

307. Ibid. p.287.

308. DKB. VIII, No.5, March 1897, p.131.

309. Journal of Kibosho, 31.7. 1896, CSsp Paris. Fundi advised the missionaries to pay up rather than argue with the owners of the land they wanted, and then refer the matter to the administrative in Moshi.

310. DKB.VII, No.2, Jan.15, 1897, p.44.

disposition of the natives, the missionaries had refused to heed the warning.³¹¹ The result was the attack on them by Meru warriors, who were anxious to keep out the Europeans, whom they feared, would not only abolish slavery but also 'take over their country and farmlands'.³¹² After the attack on these missionaries, the warriors, assisted by their Warush allies, also made an attempt to kill both Capt. Johannes and his assistant, Lt. Merker, who had camped with their troops not more than 200 meters away.³¹³ This tragic incident forced Capt. Johannes to return hurriedly to Moshi to rally his own Chagga warriors to the defence of the German authority.³¹⁴

On October 31, 1896, a massive punitive expedition, made up of 95 African troops of the 1st Company normally resident at Moshi and about 10,000 Chagga auxiliaries drawn from among the warriors of Kirua Kilema, Marangu, Mwika, Rombo and Usseri under the leadership of their overlord, Marealle, the warriors of Moshi under Meli, and warriors from Uru, Kibosho, Machame and Kibognoto under their own chiefs,³¹⁵ left Uchagga to crush the opposition of the peoples of Arusha/Meru who were themselves hoping 'to break the power of the whiteman'.³¹⁶ Capt. Johannes had decided upon a quick military suppression of the revolt because he feared that temporary success would encourage the Warush and Wameru Warriors to undertake more daring raids not only on the first group of German ostrich farmers just about to move into the area but also on all European stations in Kilimanjaro.³¹⁷ With the assistance of the friendly

311. Ibid; p.43.

312. Ibid; p.131.

313. Bulletin-Général, 1895-1896, vol.17, p.831.

314. DKB. III, No.5, March 1, 1897, p.132.

315. Ibid.

316. Ibid.

317. Ibid., p.130.

Warush chief Masinde of Arusha Juu, who was reached on November 6, the other influential Warush chief, Merai, was compelled to make peace. After this, the expedition then moved to Meru, which was reached on November 15. Rejecting Matunda's peace overtures, Capt. Johannes ordered his troops, supported by the Chagga warriors, to undertake punitive raids on the villages of the fleeing Wameru.³¹⁸

During these raids, which lasted from November 15 to 17, 1896 the Chagga warriors were said to have captured 3000 cattle and 5,500 goats and sheep as booty, a greater part of which was given to them by the German Commandant in consideration of their participation in, and losses suffered during, the expedition.³¹⁹ Apart from the 'war compensation' of 30 frasila of ivory which he obtained from the Warush and the Wameru, Capt. Johannes was unable to achieve a substantial military victory, as the cold rainy season bringing fever and dysentery, forced him to return quickly to Moshi. Matunda and his warriors were still at large, and the danger to the German administration was not yet over. The immediate beneficiaries of the expedition were the Chagga, who besides their booty in cattle and other livestock also took back with them about 500 Chagga women held captive in the Arusha/Meru region.³²⁰ It was not until February 1898 that the two powerful chiefs of Arusha juu, Merai of Ilboru and Ndaskoi of Ilvurkai, came to Capt. Johannes 'with presents' to offer their submission, thus cutting off their support from the Wameru.³²¹

318. Ibid., p.131.

319. Ibid.

320. Ibid.

Just as German military action had driven a wedge between the Warush and the Wameru, so had it created a division within the Masai; for a section of the Masai from Ngorongoro, who had decided to carry out Capt. Johannes's instructions, had come with the delegation from Arusha juu to complain that the Sendeyo Masai had pulled out of the area to settle in the forbidden region of Seregenti.³²² It was now clear that Sendeyo, whom Arthur Hardinge, the British High Commissioner for East Africa, had earlier reported as making contacts with his elder brother Lenana of Navaisha with a view to organising an anti-German revolt 'in revenge for their having chastised the Arusha Masai and their allies',³²³ wanted a confrontation with Capt. Johannes. Although Lenana was said to have refused to get himself involved in the conspiracy because of the arrival in Navaisha of British troops just returning from Uganda, Sendeyo still hoped to get the support of the Warush warriors for his anti-German resistance, which the British authorities believed would 'assume the form of an attack ... on the native allies of the Germans in the late disturbances'.³²⁴

Since this vital information, which was collected by Mr. Ainsworth, the British sub-Commissioner in Ukamba, was passed orally to the German Governor in Dar es Salaam,³²⁵ Capt. Johannes must have been warned of the dangerous situation, which was even made worse by the refusal of the Meru to make their submission. Although he must have known that the Chagga would be real targets

322. Ibid.

323. Hardinge to Salisbury, 5.6. 1897 in British Ambassador, Berlin to Baron von Rotenham, 16.7. 1897, RKA 288.

324. Ibid.

325. Ibid.

of Masai attack because of their active support for the German administration, the German commandant would not take any chances even with these people themselves because of the realization that the friendship of most of them particularly Moshi and Kibosho, who had been subjugated militarily, was not particularly genuine.³²⁶

An incident which occurred in the night of December 21/22, 1899, when a group of Warush warriors, acting in collusion with some men of Moshi and Kibosho, attempted a surprise attack on the Moshi military station in the middle of the night,³²⁷ was enough to convince the already suspicious Capt. Johannes that the chiefs of Moshi and Kibosho were indeed involved in treasonable conspiracy with the Masai and the Warush to overthrow the German authority. Since preparations for the introduction of the hut tax were then in progress, and as tax revolts were then taking place in the southern parts of the protectorate,³²⁸ this incident had easily been linked with anti-tax resistance.³²⁹

However, German missionary reports which were not always favourable to the chiefs of Moshi and Kibosho did not bear out either Capt. Johannes's theory of the involvement of Meli of Moshi and Molelia of Kibosho and their vassal chiefs in the conspiracy, or Stahl's interpretation based exclusively on oral Chagga traditions

326. Journal of Kibosho, 30.7. 1894, CSsp. Paris. The Catholic missionaries say they had learned 'not to put too much stock in displays of affection, friendship and goodwill' by the natives.

327. Johannes to Government, 3.3. 1900, DZA, RKA 290 and Bulletin General, 1899-1900, vol.20, p.664.

328. It was specifically compared with the revolt of the Yao leader, Machemba in Lindi. DKB. XI, Nov.15, 1900. Report of the Colonial Department to the Kolonialrat, p.864.

329. KG to KA, Report on the political situation in Kilimanjaro, March 1900, RKA 290^{50ff}.

that it was a stratagem used by Marealle to make himself the undisputed paramount chief of Kilimanjaro. It is particularly significant that the Catholic missionaries in Kibosho, who had themselves checked on the situation, and had earlier been critical of the young Molelia for leaning too heavily on his young advisers just as Meli had done in 1892,³³⁰ could not believe they were in any serious danger and had therefore refused to move to the Moshi military station.³³¹ The Lutheran missionary Müller based at Nkarungo in Machame did not believe that chief Shangali of Machame was involved in the conspiracy, and it is inconceivable that Marealle would have deliberately involved such man whom Stahl herself says had become his friend after the death of Sina in 1897.³³² Although Meli, unlike Shangali, had no missionary to intervene on his behalf, since the stain of a former revolt was still on him, Fassmann the resident Lutheran missionary at Moshi, expressed deep regret at his execution. For Meli, who had generously given land free of charge to the Lutheran mission in 1896,³³³ and was reported to have shown 'a lively interest in lessons', was a man on whom the Lutheran missionary says his mission could rely for friendliness and support.³³⁴

In fact, not only Meli but all Chagga chiefs were at this time cooperating with the German missionaries by allowing them to

330. Bulletin-Général, 1899-1900, vol. 20, pp. 663-664.;

331. Ibid, pp. 664-665.

332. Stahl, K., op. cit., pp. 135-136.

333. Land purchase agreement between Meli and the Evangelican Lutheran Mission, 25.4. 1896, TNA, G9/31.

334. Extract from the Evangelican - Lutheran Missionblatt, DKB.XI No. 15, August 1, 1900, p.584.

run schools in their palaces,³³⁵ for they saw their support for Christian education as a new weapon in their perennial struggle for power and influence. But unlike other Chagga chiefs who could have either a Catholic or a Protestant mission in his chiefdom, Marealle, the friend of Capt. Johannes and the most favoured of all the chiefs in terms of territorial influence and preferential treatment, was allowed to have missionaries of the two confessions in Marangu. He was therefore already enjoying the best of the two worlds of German official and missionary support. He was already a great chief, much greater than any other by any standards, especially since the death of Sina of Kibosho. He therefore needed no stratagem to achieve a political status he was already enjoying. It is, however, possible, as has been shown in the case of the murder of the German Sudanese soldier in Kirua near Moshi in April 1891, or in the killing of the two German scientists in Kirua-Rombo in May 1894, that Marealle had exploited the tragic situation to practical political advantage after Capt. Johannes had satisfied himself about the involvement of the suspected chiefs.

Faced, as he believed, by danger from two different fronts - the Arusha/Meru and the Chagga - Capt. Johannes had to adopt a cautious policy of divide and rule, which had hitherto yielded his administration rich dividends in Uchagga. Since he could not defeat the warlike peoples of Arusha/Meru without the cooperation of the Chagga warriors, and as any precipitate action in Uchagga at that time would not make this possible, he was careful enough to defer the trial of the

335. For the development of schools for chiefs see Eggert, J., Missionsschule und Sozialer Wandel in Ostafrika, Bielefeld, 1970, pp. 181-184; and DKB, IX, May 1, 1898, p.237, for school in Molelia of Kibosho's place.

suspected chiefs until they had all helped him to break the resistance of the Arusha/Meru peoples. It was only after this had been achieved by the end of February 1900 that he could then deal summarily with fifteen Chagga chiefs and notables, including Meli and Molelia, who were condemned to death along four chiefs from Arusha/Meru.³³⁶

The execution of these chiefs on March 2, 1900 was followed swiftly by a political settlement both in Uchagga and Arusha/Meru which did not really help the cause of peace. Capt. Johannes, who now discovered that his balance of power policy had been disturbed by the weakness of Moshi under Meli's successor, Salema, and the decline in the power of Kibosho under the new chief Sianga, whose installation Marealle of Marangu had personally supervised,³³⁷ saw the need of creating a new overlord in the west to balance Marealle's power in the East. The obvious choice was Shangali, a friend of Marealle, who had been proved loyal to his administration by no less a figure than the German Lutheran missionary Müller. Shangali was now made the overlord of Siha (Kibongoto) and Kindi,³³⁸ areas formerly subject to Kibosho. While he himself was directly responsible for the administration of Kindi, he depended on chief Sinare, who had just taken over from the executed Ngamini of Kibongoto, for the administration of the three former divisions of Siha.

336. Johannes to Government, 3.3. 1900, DZA, RKA 290; Report of Privy-Councillor Haber on the political situation in Kili-manjaro, 5.3. 1904, DZA, RKA 700^{95ff}; 'History of the chiefs of Wameru', an extract from 'Notes written by Simon, Native Clerk in Arusha Boma,' Arusha Regional Book, TNA, MF. 61.

337. Journal of Kibosho, 3.3. 1900, CSsp. Paris.

338. Supplement to DKB. 1894, Appendix I, p.2.

This pro-Shangali settlement was opposed in Siha by Mwanga, the chief of Samake, who had succeeded the former chief Maimbe, a kinsman of the late Sina of Kibosho, and in Kindi by the two akida, Mkirida and Ringia, who had administered the area since the reign of Sina.³³⁹ The refusal of Mwanga in Samake to recognise the overlordship of Sinare at once sparked off a crisis which also involved Mkirida and Ringia in Kindi, who were also against their subjection to Shangali. Since Kibosho under Sianga was in no position to help, Mwanga appealed to the Warush for assistance. Fortunately for him, the Warush themselves were not happy with the political settlement in their area after the March execution; for contrary to their traditions, Capt. Johannes had created a special chiefdom in Ilvurkai for one Saruni, the product of an irregular union between a Warush woman and an Arab trader from Bagamoyo, who had won his friendship by supplying provisions to his troops during their expeditions to Arusha juu.³⁴⁰ The result was a military confrontation in May 1900 between this anti-German coalition and the German administration, which again necessitated another military expedition to Arush/Meru, where Mwanga had taken refuge.³⁴¹ This was undertaken early in July with the support of Shangali and his warriors, who on their return from Arusha were also able to secure the arrest of Kingia of Kindi and the submission of Makungu of Naruma, who were at this time accused of conspiracy against the German authority.³⁴²

339. DKB. XI, No.19, Oct. 1, 1900, p.760; and DKB XI, No. 24, Dec.1, 1900, p.940.

340. Extracts from 'Notes written by Simon, Native Clerk, in Arusha Boma,' Arusha Regional Book, TNA, MF. 61.

341. DKB. XI, No.19, Oct.1, 1900, p.760.

342. DKB. XI, No. 24, Dec. 1, 1900, p.940.

Considering Shangali's activities during the period after the tragic execution, it is difficult to accept Stahl's contention that he had immediately decided on abdication.³⁴³ Admittedly, he like most other chiefs, had been frightened by the execution which clearly showed that the chiefly office was now a risky business. In fact, chief Bararia of Mwika had during the same period fled to the British territory to prevent his enemy Marealle from involving him in the alleged conspiracy.³⁴⁴ Shangali, however, appeared to have relished his new role as a great chief, and Stahl herself says he had attended Sinare's installation in Siha.³⁴⁵ He was even reported as refusing the compensation which the administration wanted to pay him for securing the arrests of Kingia and Makungu, explaining that he was simply doing his duty.³⁴⁶ His abdication in August 1901 was certainly not influenced by the dawn execution of March 1 1900 as Stahl suggests, but by the attitude of the new pro-settler administration of Lt. Merker, who unlike his predecessor, did not favour a policy of creating overmighty chiefs like Marealle and Shangali. Since he is said to be a weak³⁴⁷ man who did not have either the courage of a Sina or the devious character of a Marealle, it was he who benefited most from the execution in terms

343. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.137.

344. The Lutheran Missionary in Mamba, whom Bararia had once befriended, had in 1897 believed Marealle's story that Bararia was planning a revolt, but had later discovered that this was false. See Abel to KG, 7.4. 1906, TNA, G9/31.

345. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.75.

346. DKB. XI, No.24, Dec.1, 1900, p.941.

347. Stahl, K., op. cit., p.132.

of territorial gains that was the first to collapse under pressure from an uncooperative people and a hostile administration. The fall of his more powerful friend, Marealle, was also a matter of time.³⁴⁸

It is easy to criticize the highhandedness with which Capt. Johannes had dealt with the case of the suspected chiefs, whose execution has remained a black spot on his otherwise paternalistic Chagga administration. One should imagine how great his disappointment must have been at the thought that the Chagga chiefs who had benefited so much from his military expeditions against the Masai and the Warush could have turned round to conspire with the same people to overthrow his authority. By acting with such brutal swiftness against the alleged conspirators, he had impressed upon the bewildered Chagga that he was also capable of extreme barbarity in spite of his amiable and genial character, especially when vital German interests were at stake. And the Chagga, as well as the peoples of Arusha/Meru who were now to be held in check by a new military post in Meru under Lt. Függer,³⁴⁹ seemed to have learned their lesson; for no serious opposition to German rule in these areas occurred thereafter. The departure of Capt. Johannes from Kilimanjaro in 1901 was indeed the end of an old era, in which administrative action depended mainly on the exigencies of native politics, and the beginning of a new one, in which the local administration was to respond more and more to the needs of the incoming European Settlers.

348. European settler pressure later forced Marealle to flee into the British territory in 1904 and to abdicate on his return. See Report on the Missionary Sihanz, Section B., 25.12. 1904, TNA, G9/31.

349. KG to KA, 18.10. 1900, RKA 290,^{64ff}; and DKB. XII, No.1. Jan. 15., 1901, pp. 9-10.

Chapter 5

Economic and Social Development during the period of Pacification, 1891-1901

The virtual collapse, by December 1889, of the Bushiri rebellion,¹ which had made the peaceful exploitation of the commerce of the German sphere impossible for the German East African Company, had enabled the Imperial Commissioner Major von Wissmann to embark upon his next strategy of stimulating the economic revival of the ports on the German Coast as well as the rehabilitation of the German East African Company. His first step towards the revival of the bustling commercial life of the coastal ports of German East Africa was the urgent appeal he sent out in June 1889 to the British Indians who had fled to Zanzibar during the Bushiri rebellion to return to their posts, particularly to Bagamoyo,² which was then the most important port on the East African coast.³ This appeal was based not only on the assurances

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1. The capture and execution of Bushiri had broken the back of the Coastal resistance to the German occupation, See Chpt. 3.
 2. Portal to Salisbury, 7.6. 1889, F.O. 84/1979 Public Records office, (PRO), London.
 3. By 1886 Bagamoyo was 'the principal port for the arrival and departure of ivory caravans, See Mangat, J.S., A history of the Asians in East Africa, c. 1886-1945, Oxford, 1969, p.26. By 1890, this port was the largest on the East African Coast, with a population of 15,000 compared with only 4,000 in Dar es Salaam. Pangani was the next - Entwicklung und Ausbeutung: Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte Deutsch - Ostafrikas, 1885-1914, Berlin (East) 1970, p.267.

which he had given to them on his arrival in Zanzibar in March 1889,⁴ but also on his realization that any plans for the economic recovery of the East coast must necessarily take into consideration the long-established commercial influence of the Indian merchant brokers, who controlled the long-distance caravan traffic of the East African interior. Although most of these Indian traders had sustained great losses during the rebellion, since their commercial links with the German East Africa Company had exposed them to danger as the allies of the Germans,⁵ the pacification of the coast and the assurances given by Major von Wissmann, that their persons and property would be adequately protected soon encouraged them to trickle back to the coastal ports of the German protectorate. By January 1891, when the headquarters of the Wissmann Commissariat was moved from Pangani, the nerve centre of the defunct Swahili rebellion, to Bagamoyo,⁶ the bustling centre of East African trade, scores of Indian merchants, including the influential Sewa Hajee,⁷ had again reestablished themselves on the coast as the masters of the East African trade.

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4. In an interview with Colonel Euan Smith, the British Consul - General and at a 'mass meeting of British Indian subjects' Major Wissmann had explained that he had received strict orders from the German Emperor and Prince Bismarck to protect and foster British interests and commerce to the utmost extent of his power within the German sphere'. Euan Smith to Salisbury, 2.4. 1889, F.O. 403/118 PRO, London.
 5. Kirk had in March 1886 expressed some concern about British Indian subjects being used to foster the economic development of 'a rival nation'. Kirk to Salisbury, 11.3. 1885, F.O. 84/1773 PRO, London.
 6. Euan Smith to Salisbury, 27.1. 1891, F.O. 84/2052 PRO, London.
 7. By January 1891, he was already engaged in the business of recruiting porters for the Wissmann administration in Bagamoyo. See Kallenberg, F., Auf dem Kriegspfad gegen die Massai, Munchen, 1892, p.45.

The pacification of the coast and the return of the Indians were quickly followed by efforts to reopen the caravan routes of the interior to commerce through a policy of effective military occupation. Between January 1890 and March 1891 a total of four military expeditions were sent to the Pangani Valley region to open the area to trade and settlement. The first two under Lt. Dr. Rochus Schmidt and Lt. von Eltz in February 1890 had secured the establishment of German military stations in Masinde, Usambara, and at Moshi in Kilimanjaro.⁸ For the first time, chiefs like Sedenga of Mkaramu in Luvu and Semboja of Masinde who had refused to have any dealings with the German East African Company were compelled to recognise the German overlordship. But although the German military station for Usambara was established at Masinde to keep both Semboja and his Masai friends in check, Korogwe continued to remain as the centre of German commercial activities in the Usambara area. In Kilimanjaro, the Moshi depot of the German East African Company, which had been abandoned as a result of the outbreak of the Bushiri rebellion was again reactivated by Otto Ehlers, who with the cooperation of Lt. von Eltz succeeded in obtaining Mandara's support.⁹ The last two expeditions under Major von Wissmann and Captain Johannes in January - February and March 1891 respectively, not only secured the submission of the powerful Sina of Kibosho but also succeeded, for the first time, in breaking the Masai domination of the caravan routes in the upper Pangani valley.¹⁰ Under the

8. For details of these two expeditions see chp. 3.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

protection of the military administration established by Major von Wissmann, the agents of the German East African Company could then begin the exploitation of the flourishing ivory trade of the new German protectorate.

However, in their attempt to tap the trade of the northern part of German East Africa, the German East African company had to contend with vigorous competition from the Imperial British East African Company of Sir William Mackinnon; for while Major von Wissmann was fully preoccupied with the task of suppressing the Bushiri rebellion and pacifying the interior, the agents of the British Company had decided to take advantage of German difficulties to 'attract' Arab/Swahili traders who normally operated along the Pangani valley routes to the British-controlled port of Mombasa.¹¹ The competition between the two rival chartered companies was not only for the control of the same ivory trade, whose main centre was in the Masai district of Baringo, which the British believed was within their sphere of influence,¹² but was also for the acquisition of the prize territory of Kilimanjaro. Since the northern boundary of the German and British spheres was not clearly defined until July 1890, the attempts by the agents of the British Company to exploit the trade of the region was essentially an extension of British competition for the political control of Kilimanjaro. In fact, the hostility of Sir William Mackinnon to the German East African Company over the Kilimanjaro question had become a source of embarrassment to the British Government in their efforts to

11. Salisbury to Euan Smith, 8.1. 1890, F.O. 84/2058. PRO, London.

12. Salisbury to Malet, 26.3 1890, F.O. 84/2030. PRO, London.

achieve an understanding with the Germans on the settlement of the 'hinterland' question in East Africa.¹³

Although George Mackenzie, the Administrator of the Imperial British East African Company, had completely rejected Major von Wissmann's accusation, made early in January 1890, that British agents had tried to 'induce ivory Caravans which were on their way to Pangani to change their course for Mombasa, by the promise of large rewards,¹⁴' it is obvious that he was only too willing to exploit the Arab/Swahili opposition to the German occupation. For example, Jumbe Kimemeta, the distinguished Pangani Swahili trader, whose caravan von Wissmann had specifically accused emissaries of the British Company of diverting to Mombasa while on its way to Pangani from Kilimanjaro,¹⁵ was a former deputy-Governor of Pangani, who had himself played a prominent role in preparing Mandara of Moshi for the acceptance of the anti-German Kilimanjaro expedition of General Mathews on behalf of Seyyid Barghash of Zanzibar in May 1885. Therefore, as a confirmed opponent of German rule, Jumbe Kimemeta must have welcomed the prospect of trade with the British, who were themselves opposed to the Germans, and who had shown more tact than their German counterparts in their treatment of the Arab aristocracy when they took over the administration of the ports in the British sphere on lease from the Sultan of Zanzibar in September 1888. For, unlike the authorities of the German East African company, Mackenzie had allowed the Sultan's flag to be retained and the Arab governors (Wali) on the coast

13. Salisbury to Malet, 6.5. 1890, F.O. 84/2030. PRO, London.

14. Salisbury to Euan Smith, 8.1. 1890, F.O. 84/2052, and Salisbury to Malet, 26.3. 1890, F.O. 84/2030. PRO, London.

15. Ibid.

to retain their appointments under the supervision of his officials.¹⁶

Since Major von Wissmann's accusation had been made at a time when the Arab/Swahili peoples on the German Coast had not yet been reconciled to German rule, especially as the campaign against Bwana Heri was still in progress, Mackenzie's explanation that Jumbe Kimemeta had 'unsolicited' brought his caravan to Mombasa¹⁷ was nearer the truth if not the whole truth. For, besides his political opposition to the Germans, Kimemeta had also stood to gain by selling his ivory at Mombasa if only to avoid the prohibitive German duty of ten percent.¹⁸ But if there is no reason to doubt the fact that like other Swahili traders opposed to the German occupation, Jumbe Kimemeta had sought out the British at Mombasa, his decision 'to make that port his headquarters'¹⁹ instead of the German-controlled port of Pangani must have been influenced by the British company's agents; for Mackenzie had himself made it clear that one of his chief objects was to attract as much trade as he 'legitimately' could to the ports within the British sphere, since both the German and British Governments had agreed that neither 'should restrict the subjects of the other from bonafide

16. Gregory, J.W., The Foundation of British East African, London, 1901, p.130.

17. Salisbury to Malet, 26.3. 1890, F.O. 84/2030. PRO, London.

18. Rosebery to Cracknell, 24.2. 1894, F.O. 107/16. Regarding 'the alleged imposition of differential duties in the German Sphere' brought to his attention by one W. Ewing of Glasgow through his Member of Parliament, Sir Charles Cameron, Lord Rosebery says the German duty was ten percent 'on all arrivals'. Ibid. This was double what it used to be before the German intervention.

19. Salisbury to Malet, 26.3. 1890, F.O. 84/2030. PRO, London.

trading operations within the sphere assigned to it'.²⁰

As nothing could legitimately be done to stop the commercial competition from the Imperial British East African company, especially as the British Government had believed that commercial rivalry was 'not incompatible with a firm political alliance',²¹ Major von Wissmann was determined to pursue an imaginative policy of reconciliation calculated to win the confidence of the coastal commercial and political elite so as to promote the economic recovery of the German coast. The political concessions he made to the coastal aristocracy and the amnesty he granted in April 1890 to Bwana Heri,²² himself a celebrated caravan trader well-known like Jumbe Kimemeta in the East African interior, helped to create the peaceful atmosphere vital to commercial revival. By the end of 1890, the economic recovery of the German coast was of such proportions as to raise eyebrows in Zanzibar.²³ Euan Smith, the British Consul-General in Zanzibar, had in fact, expressed fears that the commercial prosperity of the ports in the German sphere would endanger the position of Zanzibar as the emporium of East African trade if strong measures were not taken to prevent this,²⁴ as this commercial boom had largely depended on the efforts of British Indians, particularly at Bagamoyo. Although he did not

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Muller, F.F., Deutschland,-Zanzibar-Ostafrika, Berlin, 1959, p.451.

23. C.S. Smith to Anderson, 26.5. 1891, F.O. 84/2052. PRO, London.

24. Ibid.

share these fears, his deputy, Charles Smith, agreed that the economic recovery of the coastal ports of German East Africa had been due to the blessing given by the German authorities to the 'binding system' operated since pre-colonial times by Indian merchant brokers, who were now convinced that they could 'do with a smaller margin under German rule'²⁵ than under the less efficient pre-colonial Arab administration. It is, no doubt, interesting that this economic recovery had occurred at a time when the rival Imperial British East African company was fruitlessly involved in Witu, where the local Sultan had bitterly opposed the transfer of his island sultanate from the German Witu Company to its administration as a result of the Anglo/German Agreement of July 1, 1890.²⁶

However, to give the whole credit for the commercial revival of the German coast during this period to the operations of British Indian merchants would be to underrate the contributions made by the agents of the German East African company, who were now able to expand the scope of their activities in the interior under the protection and influence of the German military stations. The authorities of the German company, anxious to change the course of East coastal trade from Bagamoyo through Zanzibar to India in favour of direct exports to Germany had successfully introduced its own Rupee currency early in 1891 to replace gradually those from British India.²⁷ Although trade still continued to flow

25. Ibid.

26. Gregory, J.W., op. cit., pp. 141-142; Muller, F.F., op. cit., p.327.

27. Euan Smith to Salisbury, 26.2. 1891, F.O. 84/2052. PRO, London.

along the traditional lines, this was certainly a significant step in the direction of cutting the age-long commercial links of the ports within the German sphere from the mainstream of Indian ocean trade.

Major von Wissmann's policy of developing the commerce of German East Africa by encouraging the participation of the British Indians and the local Swahili merchant class was continued by his successor, the civilian Governor, Julius von Soden, under whose administration the participation of German commercial interests also significantly increased. In fact, by the end of 1891, efforts had been made to keep the trade of the Pangani valley region firmly in German hands. For example, the Kilimanjaro administration under the temporary command of Baron von Witzleben had early in July 1891 taken action to prevent the diversion of the Chagga ivory trade to the port of Mombasa through the British Company's post at Taveta. According to the English missionary Fraser based at the Church Missionary Society's mission station at Taveta, a Swahili trader from Mombasa had been executed at the German station on the charge of slave trading, a charge which his friends at Taveta had believed was fabricated.²⁸ This was certainly a convenient way of dealing with commercial competition from the agents of the rival British Company, since the Congo Agreement of 1885 on free trade had forbidden the exclusion of the subjects of other powers from participation in legitimate trade.

28. Fraser to Mathews, 23.7. 1891 in Portal to Salisbury 23.11. 1891, F.O. 84/2150. PRO, London.

Baron von Witzleben's opposition to the participation of Arab/Swahili traders from British East Africa in the exploitation of Kilimanjaro trade was also continued by Carl Peters, who, however, managed to establish a fairly friendly relationship with Charles Bateman, the agent of the Imperial British East African company in Taveta.²⁹ In fact, these two men had in October 1891 concluded two agreements on behalf of their respective governments - one, delimiting the boundary between the German Kilimanjaro district and British Taveta so as to eliminate border disputes, and the other a commercial agreement calling on their two governments to abolish the 'levying of inland duties in Dschagga and Taveta and on the German-English Frontiers in East Africa' in the interest of rapid economic development.³⁰ Although these two agreements were not ratified by the British and German governments, since none of the two men had been given the power to do so, the sentiments expressed in them regarding Anglo/German cooperation in the economic development of East Africa were shared both by the German Governor, Julius von Soden and the British Consul-General in Zanzibar, Sir Gerald Portal.³¹ Considering the strained relationship, in the previous year, between Major von Wissmann and George Mackenzie not only on the question of Anglo/German commercial competition in the Kilimanjaro area but also on the explosive issue of the

29. Bateman had assisted Carl Peters to obtain the submission of the people of Rombo Mkulia, for which he had been criticised by Fraser who says the Wqrombo had become anti-British as a result of his involvement. Fraser to Mathew 3.10. 1891, in Portal to Salisbury, 23.11. 1891, F.O. 84/2150.

30. Copies of the two agreements are enclosed in Portal to Salisbury, 1.11. 1891, F.O. 84/2150. PRO, London.

31. Portal to Salisbury, 18.11. 1891, F.O. 84/2150. PRO, London.

importation of fire arms through the German sphere by ~~Charles~~ Stokes for sale in British Uganda,³² the understanding reached between Carl Peters and Charles Bateman was indeed a breakthrough.

Before Carl Peters left his post at Marangu in February 1892 for what he thought would be a short time, plans had already been made for a more intensive German commercial exploitation of the Kilimanjaro trade. The German East African company had in December 1891 concluded an agreement with the export company of D. Knoop of Bremen which would enable the latter send caravans into the interior of the protectorate, starting with the Kilimanjaro region.³³ These plans were, however, frustrated by the political unrest which followed his departure.³⁴ Although it was fairly easy to restore, in August 1892, the German political and military prestige damaged by the abortive invasion of Moshi by Lt. von Birlow earlier in June, the damage done to German trade could not be so quickly repaired, as the defeated Meli of Moshi continued to maintain the commercial links he had already established through the agency of the Rev. A.J. Steggal with the Taveta station of the Imperial British East African Company.³⁵ Hamilton, the Taveta representative of the British Company was even reported to have made a six-day commercial tour of the Kilimanjaro district early in December 1892.³⁶

32. Salisbury to Malet, 19.11. 1890, and Smith to Salisbury 5.12. 1890, F.O. 84/2030. PRO, London.

33. Deutsches Kolonialblatt, No. 2, 15th Jan. 1892, p.78.

34. For the details of this see Chp. 4.

35. Captain Johannes says Meli had sent his men to sell ivory at Taveta, Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892, TANZANIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES (TNA) G1/18.

36. Johannes to von Soden, 15.12. 1892, TNA G1/18.

Increased British trade with Kilimanjaro resulting from the temporary abandonment of the German military station at Marangu between June 10 and July 31, 1892 again disrupted the friendly relationship which the German Kilimanjaro administration had managed to establish with that of British Taveta. Unable to prevent the British from participating in the legitimate trade of Kilimanjaro, the German authorities complained that British agents had imported large quantities of arms and ammunition for sale to the natives of German East Africa.³⁷ They also demanded and did secure, the removal from Taveta of the former CMS resident missionary at Moshi, the Rev. A.J. Steggal,³⁸ whom Capt. Johannes had accused of inducing Meli of Moshi to sell his ivory to the British Company's representative in that district.³⁹

The situation in the lower Pangani valley was different. As this area was much nearer the centre of German power on the coast, and therefore under a much more effective military occupation, it was relatively more peaceful than Kilimanjaro. Since it was also not an ivory producing region, it had not attracted the attention of the British Company, which had produced conflicts in Kilimanjaro. The problems which faced the German administration here were of a different kind. Instead of commercial competition between rival German and British companies for the control of the export trade in

37. Rosebery to Rodd, 27.1. 1893, F.O. 107/1.

38. Rosebery to Rodd, 6.3. 1893, Ibid.

39. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892, TNA, G1/18.

ivory as in Kilimanjaro, there was competition between German trading firms⁴⁰ and British Indian traders for the control of the local distributive trade. And unlike Kilimanjaro, the disadvantages which the Germans suffered here were not political but primarily economic; for German firms, which as a rule sold German products, were unable to compete successfully with Indian traders whose goods - mainly textiles and beads - imported from British India were much cheaper but at the same time more desired by Africans than the more expensive but superior German wares.⁴¹ By May 1892, this commercial competition had already led to conflicts between Germans and Indians in Tanga. For example, the Indian merchants of Tanga, in a letter to the German Governor on May 30, 1892 had complained about the hostility of 'a German merchant named Shilughi' who was reported to have beaten up Indian traders on several occasions 'at their shops before [sic] their family',⁴².

This competition with Indian and a few Greek traders⁴³ who sold the cheaper goods desired by Africans was, in fact, the most important obstacle to the development of German trading operations along the Pangani valley up to Kilimanjaro. For, as soon as an area

40. One of these, Karl Perrot & Co, later Die Westdeutsche Handels and - Plantagen Gesellschaft of Wiesbaden and Tanga, had started trading operations in Tanga and Bondei. See Fosbrooke, H.A. *Life of Justin in Tanganyika Notes and Records*, (TNR) No. 14, 1955, p33 - 'Forward by Sir Claude Hollis.' The German East African Company also had a depot at Korogwe. See Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892, TNA, G1/18.

41. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892, TNA, G1/18.

42. Indian Merchants of Tanga to the Governor, 30.5. 1892, TNA, G1/15.

43. By February 1891 a Greek trader was already operating a booming trade in alcoholic drinks at Lewa. See Kallenberg, F., op. cit., p.61.

was opened up by the military, it was quickly moved into by these enterprising Indian and Greek traders, who unlike the German firms, knew what the people wanted and readily supplied them. Soon after the re-establishment of the German administration in Kilimanjaro, Capt. Johannes had complained to the central authorities in Dar es Salaam that the textiles and beads sent to him to barter with the natives had not been accepted because they preferred the cheaper and more colourful ones which could only be obtained from the Indians at Korogwe.⁴⁴ Also, Claude Hollis, who had in 1894 opened a depot of the German firm of Karl Perrot in Moshi, had stated that his firm could not make any impact among the Chagga even with the active cooperation of the German military administration because the goods he had brought up for sale were those 'the firm wanted to get rid of, not those required by the natives.'⁴⁵ To be able to compete successfully with Indian traders German trading firms had to import cheap products from British India. The result was that a regular traffic developed between German East Africa and the Indian sub-continent, operated by the German East African Line which had been founded in 1890 with an annual imperial subvention of 900,000 Marks.⁴⁶ The increasing dependence of the German firms on imports from India was to turn German East Africa, by the turn of the century, into a vast market for British and Indian goods to the consternation of German capitalists who wanted the protectorate to be developed as a

44. Johannes to von Soden, 16.11. 1892, TNA, G1/18.

45. Fosbrooke, H.A., Loc. cit., p.33.

46. Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.75.

market for German industrial products.⁴⁷

Apart from commercial competition with local Indian and Greek traders, German firms also had to contend with illegal, private, trade, particularly in salt and Samli (Ghee) by African askari, in German service. When Governor von Wissmann attempted to regulate commerce in the interior of the protectorate in January 1896, he had to ask German officers to suppress this trade in addition to his two other instructions prohibiting trade by barter in areas controlled by the well-established military stations as in Masinde and ordering Indian and Greek traders to sell their goods at the same prices as those offered by the German traders.⁴⁸ This circular, followed by another one in May, creating wild-life reserves - one of which was between western Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru⁴⁹ - in which permits were required for hunting purposes, was an attempt to give the Germans a much better control of the lucrative ivory trade. Although the permit costing 5 rupees required of African hunters was certainly low when compared with that costing 20 rupees⁵⁰ required of German hunters, the chances of fair competition between Africans and Germans had been greatly reduced by the stringent restrictions imposed on the importation and use of fire arms by the German authorities.⁵¹ The result was the progressive decline of the Swahili-controlled caravan traffic in the Pangani valley.

47. Ibid., p.76 and DKB. 1900, p.185. Only one-sixth of the textile products sold in German East Africa came from Germany.

48. DKB. VII, No. 7, 1st April 1896, p.184.

49. DKB. VII, No. 12, 15th June, 1896, p.340.

50. Ibid; pp. 340-341.

51. DKB. No. 9, 1st May, 1891, 206, Euan Smith to Salisbury, 15.2. 1891, F.O. 84/2052.

Before the creation of these extensive game reserves, private German ivory merchants, usually former officers of Major von Wissmann's Commissariat army, who had not elected to join the new protectorate army in April 1891, had been active in the interior. For example, one former non-commissioner officer, Koether, who had established a trading depot at Mwanza towards the end of 1893, in cooperation with another German trader called Sixtdorf, to tap the trade of the East Lake region,⁵² had also operated successfully at Ubugwe, a Bantu enclave and ivory centre, west of Mount Meru, controlled by the Sendeyo Masai.⁵³ Since these Masai were a break-away group from their parent body in British East Africa, the military expeditions of Captain Johannes to stop their raids and get them to settle permanently on German territory was not only important politically but also economically. The German commandant had himself made it clear that the chief motive of his anti-Masai expedition in 1895 was to prevent them from migrating into British East Africa with their vast stocks of ivory and enormous herds of cattle.⁵⁴ Equally, he had taken decisive military action to prevent Lenana, the Masai leader in British territory from attacking with impunity his brother Sendeyo and forcing his followers to recognise his overlordship.⁵⁵ The permanent separation of the two Masai groups

52. Austen, R; North-Western Tanzania under German and British Rule, p.36. Gray, R.F., The Mbugwe Tribe; Origin and Development; in TNR, No. 38, March 1955, pp. 39-40.

53. DKB, V11, No. 10, 15th May, 1896, p.286.

54. Johannes to Kg; 19.10. 1895, Deutsches Zentralarchiv, (DZA) Potsdam, RKA 287; and Dkb; V11, No. 2, Jan. 15, 1896, p.45.

55. Hardinge to Salisbury, 12.10. 1898, F.O. 107/97.

was therefore the consequence of his efforts to keep the trade of the Kilimanjaro region within the borders of the German protectorate.

The extension of the British Uganda railway to Voi early in 1898 was, however, to change the course of Kilimanjaro trade away from the Pangani Valley to the new and much quicker lines of communication through the British territory to the port of Mombasa. Ironically, it was Captain Johannes himself who had taken the initiative to promote this change, especially as portage had always been one of the perennial problems facing his administration, and as the German railway along the Pangani valley had yet to reach Korogwe at the foot of Usambara range.⁵⁶ Determined, to take advantage of the cheap and reliable transport offered by the British railway, he had undertaken the construction of a highway linking Moshi with the British border at Taveta, along which a Greek contractor was already engaged by February 1898 in running 'a set of bullock cartsto the point on the Uganda railway which the road eventually strikes'⁵⁷. Such was the volume of German trade along this British railway that by 1900 the traffic between Moshi and Mombasa had increased ten-fold,⁵⁸ leading to the commercial prosperity of the port of Mombasa and the corresponding decline of the caravan traffic along the Pangani valley and the impoverishment of the ports of Tanga and Pangani.

56. This railway was extended to Korogwe in 1902. See Tetzlaff, R., op. p.64.

57. Hardinge to Salisbury, 27.2. 1898, F.O. 107/91.

58. DKB. X11, No. Lo, 15th May, 1901, p.356.

But what the Germans lost in Kilimanjaro they gained through increased trade with Uganda. The cause of this was two-fold. Traders operating in Uganda, in their attempt to avoid the payment of duties to the British authorities in the interior, had resorted to carrying their goods across the German border, where no duties were paid until their arrival on the coast. Secondly, it was still considered 'cheaper to forward goods to Uganda by the German route from Saadani and Pangani⁵⁹ and vice versa, especially as porters returning empty-handed to the coast would 'carry loads for a mere bagatelle'⁶⁰. However, the picture was to be significantly altered with the opening to traffic in March 1901 of the Uganda railway on Lake Victoria, as the trade of the north-west of German East Africa was itself to be gradually diverted north-eastwards to the port of Mombasa.⁶¹

It is, no doubt, interesting to compare the influence of the railway on the development of Moshi and Korogwe, which were during this period the two main commercial centres in the interior of north-east of German East Africa. For both the British Uganda railway as well as the German Usambara railway, the construction of which was begun from Tanga in October 1891,⁶² had stimulated the growth of a cosmopolitan population of traders, workers and settlers. While the settlers in both were Europeans - mainly Germans and Greeks - and the African workers mainly Nyamwezi, Manyema and Sukuma,⁶³ in

59. Hardinge to Salisbury, 12.10. 1898, F.O. 107/97.

60. Ibid.

61. Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.82.

62. Ibid., p.63; and

63. DKB. X, No. 4, 1899, p.124; and Central Africa, vol. XX, July 1902, p.125.

Moshi the traders were usually Indians, Greeks and Italians⁶⁴ and in Korogwe, mostly Indians and Swahili.⁶⁵ One equally significant contrast, deriving from the proximity of Korogwe to the coast was the development of Muslim influence in the lower Pangani valley and the relative absence of Islamic propaganda in Moshi.⁶⁶ According to the Rev. W.H. Kisbey of the UMCA mission station in Korogwe, who had at this time appealed for money in England for the building of a large church in the town to counter what he called 'the paralyzing hand of Mohammedanism,' the first ~~mosque~~ mosque in Korogwe had been built shortly after the opening of the railway.⁶⁷ Just as the extension of the Usambara railway to the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro in 1912⁶⁸ was to lead to the creation of a new settlement at New Moshi, its extension to Korogwe in 1901/2 had created an entirely new situation in which the town, whose first weekly market had been established under English missionary influence in 1892⁶⁹ was now completely swamped by the influx of Muslims from the coast.⁷⁰

The spread of Islam along the new lines of communication being laid for rapid socio-economic development at this time posed problems both for the European missionaries then struggling to open

64. DKB. X. No. 4, 1899, p.124.

65. Central Africa, vol. XX, July 1902, p.125.

66. Father Schneider who gave a fairly comprehensive social picture of Moshi at the end of 1898 did not mention the fact of Muslim propaganda. See DKB. X, No. 4, 1899, p.124.

67. Central Africa, XX, July, 1902, p.125.

68. Iliffe, J., Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912, Oxford, 1969, p.208.

69. Central Africa, No. 14, June 1892, p.79.

70. Central Africa, XX, July, 1902, p.125.

up the country to Western civilization and to the German administration whose measures had indirectly helped the Islamic advance.

For example, Major von Wissmann's policy of using Muslim subordinates at the various levels of the administration as soldiers, political agents (akida) and porters, and developed during the period of his commissariat, had continued with some modifications⁷¹ throughout this period, until it came under scathing attacks at the German Colonial Congress of 1902.⁷² But before it became an issue at the Colonial Congress, which subsequently strongly recommended its abolition in favour of a policy of favouring the recruitment of Christian officials, German missionary views on the question had been articulated by the Evangelical Mission inspector, Dr. Schreiber.⁷³ According to him, Germany should take advantage of British colonial experience in India, where the policy of religious neutrality before 1857 had led to the tragedy of the Sepoy mutiny, and should learn from the mistakes of the Dutch in Java, where a pro-Muslim policy had resulted in a wide-spread Muslim revolt not only in Java but also in Sumatra and the whole of the East Indian archipelago.⁷⁴

Although the recruitment of Muslim, Swahili speaking officials had been justified purely on administrative grounds,⁷⁵ since

71. The Muslim Sudanese had gradually been replaced with Swahili as soldiers and policemen. See Johannes to von Soden.

72. See The Proceedings of the German Colonial congress, Berlin 1902.

73. Missions Inspektor Dr. Schreiber, 'Der Islam and Europaische Kolonization' in Beitrage Zur Kolonialpolitik, No. I. 1899-1900, pp. 258-260.

74. Ibid.

75. Eggert, J., Missionschule and sozialer Wandel in Ostafrika, Bielefeld, 1970, pp. 69-70.

this helped to solve the problem of communication with the peoples of the interior, it could not be doubted that it was a great impediment to missionary work of Christian evangelization and the spread of the western culture through western education. It was also potentially dangerous to the stability of the administration, as Islam tended to nurture anti-European feeling.⁷⁶ It is certainly no accident that African chiefs tried to express their disenchantment with the German administration during this period by flirting with Islam. A significant example of this tendency was in Kibosho, where the defeated Sina, reacting to the cooperation between Captain Johannes, the Commandant of the Moshi military station and Father Rohmer, the resident Catholic missionary, who had repeatedly treated him with gross disrespect and utter contempt, had tried to give his support to Islam.⁷⁷ Sina's move towards Islam must have been influenced by his observation of the differences between the character and methods of the representatives of the two rival religions in Kibosho, the conciliatory Muslim akida Fundi and the contemptuous, ill-mannered Catholic Father Rhomer.⁷⁸ For, the former, who had taken up residence in Kibosho under the most unfavourable circumstances had within a short time succeeded, unlike the latter, in winning the trust and confidence of the suspicious chief of Kibosho.⁷⁹ In fact, it was the hostility of Father Rhomer that again

76. Hellberg, C.J., Missions on a Colonial Frontier west of Lake Victoria trans. Eric Sharpe, Upsalla and London, 1965, pp. 103-104.

77. Capt. Johannes had ordered Sina to give land and children to the Catholic Mission. See Journal of Kibosho, 1.10. 1893, C.S. s p. Paris.

78. Ibid., 4.8. 1894, While visiting Sina, Father Rhomer was reported to have shouted that the chief, who was rather slow in coming out to receive him, 'should show his ugly face'.

79. Sina had given him one of his daughters as his wife. See Johannes to Government, 19.3. 1897, TNA, G8/99.

forced Sina's son and successor, Molelia to abandon his earlier support for Christianity in favour of the pro-Muslim leanings of his father.⁸⁰

In Usambara, local administrative measures had also indirectly influenced opposition to Christianity. In his report of March 1900 on the progress of the work of the Bethel mission in Usambara, Pastor Johanssen asserted that Chief Kinyashi of Mlalo had complained that 'his duties as an official of the government' had made it difficult for him to devote his attention to Christian education, and that forced labour for road construction was a stumbling block to the acceptance of Christianity not only in his chiefdom but in other parts of the district.⁸¹

Government policies were, however, not to blame for all the ills of the missions. Apart from culpable acts of indiscretion sometimes committed by the missionaries themselves - like attempting to acquire land without going through the proper channels or without making adequate financial compensation,⁸² or showing disrespect to chiefs⁸³ - the emphasis laid on total commitment to western civilization had not made it easy for Africans who still cherished their own customs and traditions to embrace Christianity. Although the condemnation of child-murder among the Zigua of Korogwe by the UMCA in 1893⁸⁴ could be justified on humanitarian grounds, their

80. Kieran, J.A., 'The Holy Ghost Fathers in East Africa, 1863-1914' Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1966, p.311.

81. DKB. XI, No. 14, 15th July, 1900, p.554.

82. Journal of Kibosho, 31.7. 1896, C S. sp. Paris; and DKB VI11, No. 2, 15th Jan. 1897, p.44.

83. See the case of Father Rhomer in Kibosho. Journal of Kibosho, 4.8. 1894, C S sp. Paris.

84. Central Africa, XI1, 1894, pp. 8-9.

attack on the innocuous initiation rites of the Bondei,⁸⁵ and on their traditional polygamous system of marriage and widow-inheritance, had created problems even for genuine converts.⁸⁶ To make things more difficult for the Christians in a largely heathen environment in which they still had their roots, the conferences of Bondei Christians between 1895 and 1898 had prohibited not only the marriage of Christians according to Bondei rites but also the attendance of 'superstitious ceremonies connected with the burial of the dead'.⁸⁷

On the contrary, far from insisting on the need for total commitment to Islam and Arab culture, the protagonists of Islam had always tried to emphasize much more strongly than the Christian missionaries the functional aspects of their religion. In both Usambara⁸⁸ and Kilimanjaro they had used their position as clerks and makers of war-charms to further the interests of their religion. The CMS missionary Fitch, whom Mandara of Moshi had in August 1887 asked for a piece of paper to be used by his Swahili friends for making war charms 'to be tied on his warriors to save them when on a raid'⁸⁹, throws some light on this subtle method of islamic

85. Central Africa, XI, 1893, p.28. At Magila, a young Christian teacher was 'publicly censured on Sunday for attending the initiation ceremony of his fiance.

86. Central Africa XI, 1894, p.56, and No. 181, Jan. 1898, pp. 15-16.

87. Central Africa, XLV, 1896, p.8, and No. 181, Jan. 1898, pp. 15-16.

88. Krapf, J.L., Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours in Eastern Africa, London, 1860, p.391.

89. Fitch to Lang, 12.8. 1887, CMS London, G3. A5/0, 1887.

influence when he says:

'It is this way these Swahili get such command over natives. The natives have all a firm belief in witchcraft and the efficacy of charms and to this belief the Mohammendans pander and no wonder they can at times make many so-called converts; for there is not much difference after all between their Mohammedanism and native heathenism.'⁹⁰

Apart from the fact that the Muslims tended to cater for what Africans considered as their immediate temporal needs, Islam was not associated, as was Christianity, with European conquest and domination,⁹¹ nor had it tried to interfere with the basic traditional institutions of the people like slavery, polygamy, ancestor worship and the system of chiefly rule. Indeed, efforts had always been made to present it as a religion of freedom in opposition to Christianity,⁹² and in some cases with justification. For in spite of the valuable relief and education work carried out by Christian missions like the UMCA and the Bethel mission in Usambara and Bondei during the period of acute socio-economic and political crisis in the last decade of the 19th century,⁹³ they were sometimes as guilty as the European settlers both in their acquisition of land needed for African cultivation and in their maltreatment of those working for them.

For example, in Kilimanjaro as in Western Usambara, missionaries were the pioneers of plantation agriculture which soon

90. Ibid.

91. Richter, D.J. Tanganyika and its Future, London 1934, p.54.

92. Kieran, S; op. cit., pp. 361-362.

93. See Chp. 4, pp.

created the problem of African landlessness, with the attendant socio-economic and political troubles. As early as April 1891, the Holy Ghost Fathers at Kilema had acquired, with the support of the German Commandant, Lt. von Eltz, large banana plantations,⁹⁴ which certainly belonged^{to} some families in the chiefdom. In October 1893 and August 1895, the Holy Ghost fathers at Kibosho had pressed the reluctant Sina, to make large grants of land to them for plantation work,⁹⁵ particularly for the growing of coffee. In April 1896, Meli of Moshi, carrying out one of the conditions imposed upon him when he surrendered to the German forces in August 1892, had to grant to the Lutheran Mission a piece of land, with all its bananas and other crops, previously belonging to four families.⁹⁶ By 1899, the German Trappist Mission in Western Usambara, which had started work only in 1897 had already acquired 200 hectares⁹⁷ of land, on which there were more than 5,000 Coffee trees.⁹⁸ Their missionaries, like other European settlers just moving into the mountains, were not averse to employing force to secure African labour; for they had believed that 'as long as the native dislikes work, he would also dislike religion ... '⁹⁹. The Bethel missionaries had even

94. Steggal to Lang, 13.4. 1891, CMS Lond. G3 A5/0 1891.

95. Journal of Kibosho, 3.10. 1893 and 22.8. 1895, CS sp. Paris.

96. Land Acquisition Agreement between Chief Meli and the Lutheran Mission, 25.4. 1896, TNA, G9/31.

97. Extract from Land Acquisition Agreement, 30.4. 1904, TNA, G9/36.

98. DKB. X1, No. 19, 1st October, 1900, p.759.

99. Ibid.

continued to use whips on their African workers including women, long after this had been made illegal by the central government.¹⁰⁰ The result was that they easily became the targets of African opposition especially as their settlements, unlike the strongly fortified military stations, were weak enclaves in a potentially hostile pagan environment.¹⁰¹

African ritual leaders, afraid of losing their traditional religious and political influence,¹⁰² were not slow to exploit the unpopularity of the Christian missionaries to their own advantage. In Usambara and Upare, anti-missionary opposition had been expressed in the resurgence of the Upepo (Spirit) cults. A few months after the establishment of the Bethel mission station at Mlalo, Chief Sikinyashi, who had warmly received the German missionaries in July 1891,¹⁰³ had suddenly turned hostile when he discovered that the Christian ideology would undermine his ritual position as a rain-maker,¹⁰⁴ and consequently destroy the basis of Kilindi rule in Usambara.¹⁰⁵ The same conflict between African ritual power and the ideology of the new religion was also at the root of the 'revolt' of Mntindi of Tanda in the Hedaru district, of Southern Pare in

100. Extract from the Usambara Post, 18.4. 1914, DZA Potsdam, RKA 5380/201-202.

101. Abel to KA. 21.1. 1907, TNA, G9/32, 22.

102. For the socio-political importance of the Shambala traditional spiritual leaders see Wohlrab, K., Die Christliche Missions predigt unter den Schambala, Tubigen, 1929, p.50.

103. Johanssen, D; Fuhrung und Erfahrung in 40 jar Missionsdienst, Bethel, n.d., p.59.

104. Ibid; p.63 and Wohlrab, P., Usambara: Werden und Wachsen einer Heiden - Christlichen Gemeinde in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Bethel bei Bielefeld, 1915, p.35.

105. For the connexion between Kilindi ritual power and their political ideology see Winans, E.V., Shambala: The Constitution of a Traditional State, California, 1962, p.94.

in 1897.¹⁰⁶ It is even interesting that it was the famine which had influenced Mntindi to give the Tanda diviners the permission to destroy the Bethel mission station that had also stimulated the revival of the Upepo cult in Bumbuli, Usambara, in 1899 in opposition to the evangelization work of Pastor Roehl of the local Bethel mission.¹⁰⁷ The result was that by the end of the 19 century, the Christian missions - particularly those from Germany - could only achieve a very limited success in this region as a result of increased Islamic propaganda as well as the strengthening of the pagan cults.

It is, in fact, possible to explain the progress made by each of the Christian missionary bodies operating in this region both in terms of their attitude to the people among whom they worked as well as their relationship with the local German administration. One might begin by comparing the achievements of the UMCA and the Bethel Mission, the two missionary bodies which shared Bondei and Usambara between them until the arrival of the Trappist Mission in Western Usambara in 1897. By end of 1900, these two missions, each of which had four main stations¹⁰⁸ and several substations,

106. For the details of this crisis see Chp. 4.

107. Wohlrab, P., op. cit., pp. 65-69.

108. The Bethel Mission's (The Evangelical Missionary Society for German East Africa, Berlin 111) stations in Usambara were Hohenfriedberg Bethel, Vuga and Bumbuli. Those of the UMCA were at Magila, Mkuzi, Misozwe in Bondei, and Korogwe in Luvu. See Beilage (Supplement) to DKB, X1, No. 21 1st Nov., 1900, p.1. and p.3.

the former in Bondei and the Luvu, the latter in Usambara, had achieved different results. While the UMCA had succeeded in making a total of 763 baptised Christian converts the Bethel mission could only lay claim to 157.¹⁰⁹ It is also significant that unlike the former which had ordained two African clergy, the Revs. Petro Limo and Samuel Sehoza, who were themselves fully in charge of two of the four stations of the mission, the latter had not produced any African pastor but had simply managed with 'native assistants',¹¹⁰.

Such a comparison of the achievements of the two rival Protestant missions may, on the face of it, seem unfair since the UMCA had had a head start of several years before the Bethel mission. It would help, however, to point out that although the UMCA had started work in Magila in 1868, it was not until 1875 that the mission station there was permanently established by the Rev. J.P. Farler.¹¹¹ The civil war between rival Kilindi factions, which had broken out soon after the death of Kimweri the Great in 1869, was then in progress not only in Usambara but also in Bondei. Since the general political insecurity which it had created was a great impediment to missionary work, especially as Bondei was then the centre of operations of the weaker Kilindi faction under Kibanga, valuable time which could have been used for missionary work had been taken up with trying to arrange a reconciliation between warring factions.¹¹² It was only with the assistance of Seyyid

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Coupland, R., op. cit., p.361.

112. Report of Events, UMCA, Magila, 1875-1880, pp. 21-22.

Barghash, the Sultan of Zanzibar, that Bishop Smythies could get the more powerful Semboja faction to spare Magila from their regular raids on the territory of their rivals in Bondei.¹¹³

Nor had the anti-European feeling engendered by the ineffective German occupation of the Pangani Coast and interior between 1885 and 1888 helped the cause of the mission. On the contrary, it had exposed it to danger and possible destruction by 'a section of the Bondei under coastal influences',¹¹⁴. It was not until after the suppression of the coastal rebellion and the pacification of the Pangani valley region between 1888 and 1890 that the peaceful expansion of the UMCA could begin.

Coincidentally, this was the time when the German Bethel Missionaries arrived in Usambara to begin their work among a people already pacified, and with the assistance of the German military commandant at Masinde. By 1891, therefore, the two Protestant missions had even chances of development. If anything, the chances of the Bethel Mission, a body sponsored by the influential leaders of the German colonial movement,¹¹⁵ appeared even better,

113. Bishop Smythies had visited Kimweri bin Semboja at his war camp at Mkalamu on 7th July, 1884, with a letter from Seyyid Barghash. See Anderson-Morshead, A.E.M., The History of the Universities Mission to Central Africa, 1859-1909, 1909, pp. 197.

114. Farler to Penny, 7.5. 1888, USPG London, UMCA box A1 (vi).

115. 'It had distinguished patronage, including high-ranking state officials, generals, officers of the German East African Company (Carl Peters and Carl Juhlke of the original prospecting party among them).' Groves, G.P., The Planting of Christianity in Africa, vol. 111, 1878-1914, London, 1955, p.74.

especially in terms of a much stronger financial backing at home and better support in East Africa from the local administration than the UMCA, a private British mission, could ever have.¹¹⁶ And unlike the UMCA, whose fight against paganism had been complicated by the spread of Islam^{1c} propaganda from the coast, the Bethel missionaries in Usambara had suffered, at least until the end of the century,¹¹⁷ no such distraction from Islamic competition.

To understand why the UMCA made such great progress and the German Bethel Mission so little, one must take a close look at the position taken by these two bodies in relation to the socio-economic problems of this area, which came to be known as Tanganyika, particularly on the vexed issues of land and labour. The reactivation by the German East African Plantation Company of its tobacco plantation at Lewa in Bondei, and its experimental cotton plantation at Korogwe in Luvu in February 1890,¹¹⁸ had been followed by the commissioning

116. In contrast, the patronage of the UMCA was composed mainly of academics and clerics connected with the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin and Durham. See Anderson-Morshead, A.E.M. History of the UMCA, 1859-1909, vol. 1, London, 1909, pp. 4-9.

117. The Rev. W.H. Kisbey writing in July 1900 from the Korogwe station of the UMCA says a Muslim teacher had been send around 1898 by the Muslims of Saadani 'to propagate the tenants of Islam among the Zigua living in the Kologwe district' in competition 'with the work of the Mission in this district. Central Africa, vol. XVlll, 1900, p.172. In contrast, Muslim expansion did not begin seriously in Usambara until after the Maji revolt of 1905. See Becker, C.H. Materials for the understanding of Islam in German East Africa, English Translation edited by B.G. Martin, in TNR, No. 68, 1968, p.38 and p.42.

118. Schmidt, T., Geschichte des Araber Aufstandes in Ost-Afrika, Frankfurt a Ocler, 1892, p.175, and Kallenberg, F., op. cit., p.68.

of Dr. Oscar Baumann, the Austrian explorer and diplomat by its parent body, the German East African Company, to inquire into the prospects of developing the highland regions of the north-east for European plantation agriculture and settlement. His glowing reports about the availability of rich and well-watered agricultural land¹¹⁹ at once led to the proliferation of German plantation enterprises on the Tanga coast and its immediate hinterland, in Bondei and East Usambara.¹²⁰ The emphasis was on the production of tropical products like tobacco, cotton, coconut, vanilla, and later coffee, Indian rubber and sisal, to supplement the existing export trade in ivory and gum copal.

Between 1890 and 1895, a total of five plantations were established on or near the Tanga coast.¹²¹ The German East African Plantation Company had two coconut palm plantations at Muoa and Ngassini. Two other coconut palm plantations were established at Mtambwe and Potini respectively by von Bülow and Herr Schlunke. The District officer for Tanga, von St. Paul also had his own vanilla plantation in Tanga. In Bondei, the German East African Company, in addition to its tobacco plantation at Lewa, established four more plantations: a tobacco plantation at Magila; Indian rubber at Muheza, coconut palm at Kikogwe and Bushiri village. Karl Perrot's West German trade and Plantation Company had a cotton plantation south of

119. Baumann, O., Usambara and seine Nachbargebiete, Berlin 1891, chp. 1X.

120. Jahresbericht über die Entwicklung von Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1895 in Supplement to DKB., 1895 pp. 51-53.

121. Ibid.

Bombwera between the Rivers Sigi and Mkulumuzi. In East Usambara, three German companies competed with one another for the production of coffee: the German East African Plantation Company with plantations at Derema, Nguelo, Merue and Lunguza; the Usambara Coffee-growing Company at Bulwa; and Herr Mishmal's Rhenish-Handei Plantation Company in Ngua, South Handei.¹²²

This was, indeed a period of uncontrolled capitalist enterprise - a period of high hopes but of little economic achievement, during which German plantation owners not only scrambled for the acquisition of land but also competed fiercely with one another for the recruitment of African labour. Before the government itself could step in to impose some restrictions on indiscriminate land acquisitions and labour recruitment late in 1895 and early 1896,¹²³ the initial optimism of German plantation owners regarding the possibility of making easy money through the cultivation of tropical crops had started to give way to sober economic calculations. For example the failure of tobacco in Bondei had forced the German East African Plantation Company to shift its emphasis in this area to the production of coffee, coconut palms, Indian rubber and sisal, which were by the turn of the century the main cash crops of the protectorate.¹²⁴ The initial success achieved in coffee growing in East Usambara, had led to the establishment of two other companies - the Sigi - Plantation Company and the Sakarre Coffee

122. Ibid; also *Die Entwicklung unserer Kolonien*, Supplement to *DKB*, 1892-1896, Appendix IV, pp. 24-25; and Tetzlaff, T., *op. cit.*, p.56.

123. These are discussed in a latter section of their chapter.

124. Paasche, H, *Deutsch-Ostafrika*, Hamburg, 1913, p.206.

joint-stock Company - in 1897 and 1898 respectively, to participate in coffee production in Usambara.¹²⁵ But even here, the results achieved by the various companies had not justified their vast financial investments; for apart from local problems of drought, disease and poor terrain which had adversely affected production,¹²⁶ the plantation managers also had to face problems of price fluctuations abroad and labour shortage in the protectorate.¹²⁷

The vast sums of money spent on the recruitment of workers from outside the protectorate in the first few years had constituted a drain on their financial resources and had limited their chances of making profits. The importation of the first batch of twenty-two Chinese and Javanese labourers from the East Indies in June 1892¹²⁸ had been based on the calculation that, since they were already experienced in the growing of tobacco, these workers would prove more useful than the Africans of Bondei and Usambara, who were not only inexperienced but also hated plantation labour. But by 1895, the importation of foreign workers from the East Indies had proved a costly failure, as many of the 'coolies' were not strong enough to withstand either the rigours of the cold climate of Usambara or the

125. Ibid, pp. 224-227.

126. Extract from 'Koloniale Zeitung', 22.1. 1901 in DZA, RKA 447/148; and Wohltmann, F.: 'Die Aussichten des Kaffeebaues in den Usambara-Bergen; in Der Tropenpflanzer, vo. 6 (1902), p.613.

127. Most, C, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Deutsch-Ostafrikas' in Kolonial Abhandlungen, Berlin, 1906, p.9.

128. Ibid.; and Cowley to Imperial Commissioner', Tanga, 8.5. 1895, DZA Potsdam, RKA 115.

brutal treatment of German Plantation managers.¹²⁹

Informing the District Officer for Tanga of the high mortality rate among these plantation labourers at Derema, East Usambara, W.H. Cowley mentions 'a death-rate of 36 per cent' among those recruited in 1892 and of 31 per cent among those 'who arrived here since July 1894.'¹³⁰

The failure of the experiment with labour importation forced the German companies to turn their attention to the exploitation of the labour resources of the protectorate itself. They were now compelled not only to seek new resources of labour outside the immediate plantation district, - particularly among the Nyamwezi and the Sukuma of the north-west,¹³¹ but also to intensify their pressures on the local Bondai and Shambala. This new emphasis on the exploitation of African labour was based on the views of the two leading Germans connected with the administration of the protectorate in its early years - Carl Peters and Major von Wissmann. While agreeing that the importation of Asian coolies was desirable in the initial stages, Major von Wissmann, who became Governor in 1895, wrote that 'in the final analysis it is with African labour that the German planters were going to work.'¹³² But unlike Wissmann, who had expressed some concern about the maltreatment of

129. Supplement to DKB, 1895, p.53.

130. Cowley to 'Imperial Commissioner' Tanga, 8.5. 1895, DZA Potsdam, RKA, 115.

131. By August 1895 Nyamwezi workers were already working at the German East African plantation company's cotton plantation at Kikogwe in the Pangani delta. See Wissmann's report to the Colonial Department, DKB vi, No. 19, 1st October, 1895, p.480.

132. Ibid.

workers by German managers, Carl Peters had taken a far more extreme, and indeed, racist view, of the same problem. In his opinion, what was at the root of the labour shortage was not 'the proper handling of the natives', as Wissmann had believed, but the fact that:

'The African has for a thousand years been so used to a form of slavery that it now appears to him today reasonable and natural The categorical imperative of Kant has no influence over the native son of palms and the banana world The result is that he is not bound by contract but by chains'.¹³³

His recommendation that Africans must be made to work in the interest of world trade and of their own 'cultural uplift',¹³⁴ was nothing strange as the first German Colonial Congress in 1886 had resolved that 'German Missions Evangelical and Catholic alike, should be encouraged to take an active part in the realization of a national colonial programme',¹³⁵ which, of course, included economic development. Since Carl Peters himself was a founding member of the Evangelical Missionary Society for German East Africa, established in the same year, the missionaries of the society were already aware of their role in this regard. It is therefore against the background of this role that their failure to speak out in support of the Africans against maltreatment, and injustice in these early years

133. Peters, C., Das Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Schutzgebiet, Munich and Leipzig, 1895, p.40.

134. See Extract from Die Finanz-Chronik, 2.11. 1901, DZA, RKA, 118; and Extract from the Times of London, 30.9. 1901, DZA, Nachlass C. Peters, No.52.

135. Hellberg, C.J., Missions on a Colonial Frontier west of Lake Victoria, English Translation by Eric Sharpe, London 1965, p.92.

must be viewed. And it was exactly this identification of the missionaries with the economic interests of Germany in this district that made it impossible for them to achieve significant results; for it was difficult, as ever, to serve both God and mammon. Explaining why the Bethel Missionaries had not been able to achieve 'outstanding successes,' von Stuemmer, the District Officer for Wilhelmstal, in a report on the activities of both the Trappist and Bethel missions in West Usambara in April 1898, says inter alia:

'...the natives are too far removed from Christianity; but as enquiries on my part have shown, it is not their intention to achieve brilliant successes. They proceed according to the principle that they are going to "preach salvation" to the people, but whether they will accept the offer is not in the hands of the missionaries. Up till now only a few have accepted.'¹³⁶

He then compares the attitude of the German missionaries with that of the British on the problem of combining evangelization with the training of Africans for agricultural and industrial work. He says that on the Bethel Mission Station at Mlalo the 'leisure hours are not spent as I saw in the English missions at Taveta and Korogwe, merely in playing football and cricket,' but on learning a trade.¹³⁷ Bishop Smythies of the UMCA was no doubt referring to the kind of problems facing the German missionaries when he declared in November 1892 that missionaries working in Africa must avoid two kinds of

136. Von Stuemmer to KG, 1.4. 1898, TNA, G9/36.

137. Ibid.

danger: the danger of 'degenerating into traders and acquiring large estates' as well as the 'the danger of becoming a chief.'¹³⁸

In contrast to the Bethel missionaries, who had remained largely unresponsive to the major socio-economic problems facing the people among whom they worked - the problems of land and labour - the UMCA had played the role of useful intermediaries between the Bondei and the local German administration. During the first, unsettling, years of transition to colonial rule, when the German administration was desperately finding its feet and was therefore only too willing to use force to maintain its authority, they had played a positive role in protecting the people against exploitation and maltreatment. In 1891 and 1892, they had secured from the German District Officer in Tanga natives forced into the service of either the German administration or of its subordinate officials.¹³⁹ In 1893, Bishop Smythies, during his visit to Vugha, had encouraged a Shambala chief 'at a village near Bumbuli' to take their complaints against forced labour by private Germans to the District Officer in Tanga.¹⁴⁰ During the famine and the jigger epidemic which raged in Bondei and Usambara between 1894 and 1899,¹⁴¹ the UMCA not only carried out laudable relief work' like their Bethel counterparts but also provided employment

138. Central Africa, No. 119, Nov. 1892, p.116.

139. Smythies to Travers, 24.1. 1891, USPG, London; UMCA MSS. I; and Central Africa, No. 117, Sept. 1892, p.134.

140. Smythies to Travers, 17.10. 1893, USPG, London; UMCA MSS. I.

141. Central Africa, vol. XIV, 1896, p.29; and XVII, No. 197, May 1899, p.69; also Zanzibar Gazette, March 20, 1899.

for Bondei Christians to prevent them from being forced by necessity, as the administration had hoped, to apply to the plantation managers for work.¹⁴² This was not an anti-German measure, but a purely humanitarian one, as most of these people were already too weak and therefore physically unsuitable for the rigorous plantation work. Even the German Governor, Edward von Liebert - had expressed his 'warmest acknowledgements for the meritorious work of (UMCA) Mission stations in the neighbourhood of Tanga' by assisting 'those in the famine-stricken country in a most praise-worthy way by the employment of a large number of persons.'¹⁴³

It is not surprising, therefore, that UMCA missionary work had expanded rapidly during this period not only throughout Bondei but also in the neighbouring Luvu and southern parts of Usambara.¹⁴⁴ Such was the success of the mission that even women who had proved more difficult to convert now came forward in large numbers to embrace Christianity.¹⁴⁵ A significant result of the spread of Christianity was the corresponding expansion of missionary education. In Southern Usambara, one chief, Kelenge, was said to have built a school and teacher's house before appealing to the UMCA in Magila to send a teacher to his village.¹⁴⁶ This expansion continued until 1902 when the pro-settler administration of Governor von Götzen, in an attempt to exploit it to solve the labour problem imposed a tax on

142. Central Africa, vol. XVII, No. 198, June 1899, p.85.

143. Central Africa, vol. XVII, No. 202, Oct. 1899, p.198.

144. Central Africa, vol. XVIII, 1900, pp. 44-45.

145. Central Africa, vol. XVIII, 1900, p.83.

146. Ibid, pp. 43-44.

children's dormitories in the villages,¹⁴⁷ so as to force parents to work for wages to keep their children in schools. It is, no doubt, a commentary on the failure of the German local administration to win the confidence of the people that the schools they established in Bondei under Swahili muslim teachers were unable to achieve results comparable to those of the UMCA, who had to take over the running of some of these Government schools.¹⁴⁸

Perhaps if the German missionaries had been as positive in their support for the people among whom they worked, the land and labour reforms introduced by Major von Wissmann would have come much earlier and would have been much more strongly enforced.¹⁴⁹ It was to von Wissmann's credit that the first step in the long and arduous journey towards social and economic reforms in the protectorate was taken during his term as Governor. By starting first with the problem of labour before looking into the aggressive land acquisitions of German plantation owners, he had assessed correctly the order of priorities in social and economic reforms. For, in these opening years, the most important immediate problem facing the African communities was not land shortage - although the loss of land to the newcomers was greatly resented - but forced labour both for private work on German plantations and public work, for road construction and portorage. In the plantation district of Bondei and Usambara the civil wars of the second half of the nineteenth century and the famine

147. Central Africa, vol. XX, Oct. 1902, p.176.

148. Central Africa, vol. XX, June 1902, p.105.

149. See Haber to Gotzen, 12.1. 1905, RKA 118/2.

which had followed them had devastated the country and reduced the African population, thus leaving rich agricultural lands vacant.¹⁵⁰ The Bondei in particular were already accustomed to 'foreigners' establishing plantations (Shamba) in their country. For, shortly before the German occupation, a number of wealthy Zigua and Swahili had acquired large landed estates in Bondei.¹⁵¹ But unlike the new German plantation managers, who had not discriminated between slaves and free men in their recruitment and treatment of workers, these earlier 'settlers' had only employed the labour of their slaves to work their Shamba.¹⁵²

Major von Wissmann's approach to the problem of labour was ambivalent. While urging in August 1895 that Africans working on European plantations should be humanely treated,¹⁵³ he had to issue an order in March 1896 prohibiting the recruitment of African workers for service outside the protectorate.¹⁵⁴ This order was particularly aimed at stopping the migration of the Nyamwezi into the neighbouring British East Africa and the Belgian Congo.¹⁵⁵ But while the recruitment of labour by German managers was still conducted by methods not

150. Muller, F.F., op. cit., p.94.

151. Memorandum on Dr. Juhlke's "treaties" made with the natives of East Africa, 6.11. 1885, in Kirk to Salisbury, 21.11. 1885, F.O. 84/1729.

152. Ibid.

153. DKB. VI, No. 19, 1st October, 1895, p.1480.

154. DKB. VII, No. 10, 15th May, 1896, p.280.

155. Extract from the Berliner Tageblatt, 28.10. 1895, DZA, RKA 128/131. About 600 Nyamwezi workers were said to have migrated to the Belgian Congo.

dissimilar to slave raids,¹⁵⁶ and while workers including those recruited from distant Nyamwezi and Usukuma were still subjected to the most inhuman treatment,¹⁵⁷ this migration continued in spite of the prohibitive 'fine of 3,000 rupees or three months imprisonment or both' imposed by Governor von Wissmann. The reforms introduced by the acting-Governor, von Bennigsen in December 1896 were therefore a logical extension of von Wissmann's policy since they struck at the root of the main cause of labour migration. The Labour Ordinance of December 27, 1896 not only restricted the length of contracts between European employers and coloured workers to a one-month period but also made it obligatory for all employers of labour to provide free medical treatment and a two-day holiday for their workers during the contract period. In addition, they were required to show clearly in the contract the agreed amount of pay and board.¹⁵⁸ Perhaps the most important, and obviously revolutionary, aspect of the ordinance was the provision that a worker was entitled to break the contract unilaterally

'if the employer commits a breach of contract; if through maltreatment by the employer of one of his European or coloured overseers the worker's life is endangered; if without regard for the worker's health unpleasant hardships are imposed on him by the employer'¹⁵⁹.

156. In spite of the labour reforms, this was still the case when Dr. Dernburg visited the protectorate in 1907. See Extract from Statement by Herr Dernburg to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, February 18, 1908, in Memorandum on the Administration of the German Colonies, with Special Reference to the Treatment of Natives, Appendix 7, F.O. 371/2860.

157. Hofmeister to Kayser, 22.5. 1895, DZA, RKA 7249,⁴⁷. He complained that Germans resident in the protectorate regarded the Africans as animals who could only be guided by the whip.

158. DKB. VIII, No. 6, 15th March, 1897, p.161.

159. Ibid.

These labour reforms were themselves part of the efforts of the Colonial Department in Berlin, as a result of mounting public and private criticisms of the German colonial administration¹⁶⁰ to set out some guidelines on the treatment of the coloured, population in their African colonies. For example, a circular, had been issued, in April 1896, which for the first time excluded Arabs, Indians and females of all ages and children under the age of sixteen from corporal punishment.¹⁶¹ In addition, Africans sentenced to imprisonment in chains were not to be kept for more than two weeks. Those sentenced to corporal punishment must not receive more than twenty-four lashes at a time. Before the administration of this punishment, a European doctor must be present to certify that the offender was in good physical condition; and no caning was allowed within a period of two weeks after the execution of a corporal punishment.¹⁶² Although it is impossible not to criticise the racist undertone of this circular, it was nonetheless a step forward on the road to social justice culminating ultimately in the more comprehensive reforms of Dernburg and Rechenberg between 1907 and 1911.

Consideration for the future needs of the African population

160. Extracts from Le Bosphore Egyptien, 3.6. 1894, and The Standard 7.7. 1894, RKA 237/2 in which the French Explorer, M. Lionel Declé had strongly criticised German military administration, particularly in the north-west of the protectorate, saying the word 'Wadachi' (the Swahili word for Germans) meant 'bad people' to the natives of Mwanza, whose cattle were stolen, women raped, and men shipped by German officers and their African troops. Also Hofmeister to Kayser, 22.5. 1895, Loc. cit.

161. DKB, VII, No. 9, 1st May, 1896, pp. 242-243, and DZA, RKA, 5498, 6.

162. Ibid.

was also partly responsible for the promulgation of the Imperial Decree of November 26, 1895, which declared as crown land all land in German East Africa, which was not already privately owned or under African cultivation,¹⁶³ so as to control the speculative land acquisitions of German companies and private settlers. Not only was it now impossible for anyone 'to purchase or lease for longer than fifteen years from a native any rural land whatever, or any urban land of more than 2½ acres',¹⁶⁴ the acreage of previous purchases or leases, especially in East Usambara was considerably reduced after a government inquiry into land acquisitions in the area in 1896'.¹⁶⁵ Land Commissions, usually made up of the District Officer and local chief or Akida, operating mostly on an ad hoc basis, were now responsible for examining applications for land leases or purchases and recommending their approval or rejection to the Governor after the needs of the local African population had been taken into consideration. The general rule was to give Africans 'at least four times the existing cultivated area',¹⁶⁶.

This land reform had two basic weaknesses. The District Officers or Station Commanders who controlled the land commissions themselves tended, as a rule, to support the claims of German companies and settlers. For example, in Kilimanjaro, Captain Johannes

163. Meek, C.K., Land Law and Custom in the Colonies, London, 1949, p.101.

164. Iliffe, J., Tanganyika under German rule, 1905-1912, Cambridge, 1969, p.127.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid, p.128.

had in 1897 supported the application of the Kilimanjaro Ostrich-Farming Company of Bronsart von Schellendorf, a former officer in the protectorate army, for the acquisition of large slice of territory between Mount Meru and Western Kilimanjaro without taking into consideration the needs of the Wameru for pasturage.¹⁶⁷ Even District officers themselves were not free from land speculation as the vast claims of the father of von St. Paul to land in Korogwe in 1896 had proved.¹⁶⁸ Not only was land reserved for Africans still subject to reallocation either to German settlers or to the Government after the payment of what was considered an adequate compensation,¹⁶⁹ but even the land not reallocated quickly proved inadequate to support the growing African population and their shifting method of cultivation. The result was not only the admixture of German plantation settlements and African villages but the rise of a squatter class of landless African peasants living on the fringes of the German settlements, and depending almost entirely exclusively on them for their existence. This situation was to lead to the creation of the feudal kind of relationship which developed between German settlers and Africans during the regime of von Gotzen.¹⁷⁰

The apparently humanitarian motives which had inspired the half-hearted land and labour reforms carried out during the governorship

167. Johannes to KG, 30.8. 1898, TNA, G8/99.

168. Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.58.

169. Ibid, p.127.

170. This development is discussed in the next chapter.

of Major von Wissmann were practically at a discount under the regime of Edward von Liebert, whose primary, and indeed, consuming preoccupation, was the exploitation of the economic resources of the protectorate in order to make its administration independent of the Reichstag.¹⁷¹ Appointed governor only a few months after the trial of Carl Peters by the Imperial Disciplinary Court at Potsdam in April 1897 had exposed German colonial administration to ridicule,¹⁷² he was, no doubt, convinced that only the independence of the colonial administration from imperial subsidies could prevent the kind of situation which had influenced it. As soon as he arrived in East Africa, therefore, his energies were immediately directed towards making the protectorate financially self-supporting. To achieve this objective, he was prepared to make concessions to those who could make significant contributions to the economic development of the protectorate. It was his desire to integrate the African communities more quickly with the mainstream of economic development that led him to issue the house and hut tax ordinance in November 1897.¹⁷³ The importance he attached to economic development could be seen from his establishment of communal councils in 1898, mainly on the coast and in the settled plantation areas to serve the political interests of the commercial and planter classes - both German and coloured (Indians and Arabs).¹⁷⁴ This shows

171. Bald, D., Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1900-1914, Munich, 1970, p.53.

172. For details of this trial see 'Memorandum on the Administration' of German Colonies, with Special Reference to the Treatment of Natives, Section XII, F.O. 371/2860; and DZA Potsdam, Nachl. C. Peters, No. 52.

973. Amri ya Serikali, 4.11. 1897, TNA, G3/43.

174. Bald, D., op. cit., p.37.

that he was certainly in favour of those wielding economic power exercising political influence, irrespective of their racial or religious background.

Applied to the north-east of the protectorate, Edward von Liebert's economic policy meant the encouragement of German settlement in the highland regions of Usambara, Upare and Kilimanjaro as well as the extension of the commercial influence of Indian merchants and their Arab/Swahili clients. It also involved inducing the African communities, through taxation, to enter the cash economy by the cultivation of cash and food crops and by the provision of labour on German plantations.¹⁷⁵ His policy of encouraging German settlement had been based on his belief that the protectorate's economy would be boosted by European plantation agriculture. This was why he had signed an agreement in October 1897 with Dr. K. Beerwald, a representative of the German-African Agricultural Company, promising to assist the company and its settlers with land required for agricultural purposes in Kilimanjaro, Uhehe, or wherever the climatic conditions favoured European settlement.¹⁷⁶ He was particularly anxious to see Kilimanjaro brought under German settlement like Tanganital and this was why he had given his support to the plan of the Kilimanjaro Ostrich Farming Company of Lt. Brosart von Schellendorf to acquire an extensive

175. For the official German view on taxation during the Governorships of Edward von Liebert see Stuhlmann to KA, 21.11. 1900, DZA, RKA 1053/2.

176. Agreement between General Major Liebert and Dr. K. Beerwald, 5.10. 1897, TNA, G8/104.

estate between Western Kilimanjaro and Mt. Meru.¹⁷⁷ Shortly after his return from his tour of the north-east of the protectorate in February/March 1898, during which he had met the British High Commissioner for East Africa, Arthur Hardinge,¹⁷⁸ he had urged upon the Colonial Department in Berlin, in a comprehensive report,¹⁷⁹ the establishment of German plantation settlements in the four northern districts of Bagamoyo, Pangani, Masinde (Wilhelmstal) and Kilimanjaro. It was during this tour that he created from the Tanga district, a new civil district of Wilhelmstal which occupied the same territorial boundaries as those of the former Masinde military station abolished by his predecessor in January 1896.¹⁸⁰

To assist the economic development of this new district, he authorised increased support for the agricultural research station established at Kwai¹⁸¹ in 1896 to undertake experiments into the cultivation of tropical crops and cattle cross-breeding. At the same time, he also encouraged the various German enterprises to form a union,¹⁸² the Tanga Planter's Union founded in 1898, which was the

177. Agreement between the Governor (represented by Capt. Johannes) and the Kilimanjaro Ostrich farming Company (represented by Adolf Meyer) for the lease of the steppe between Mt. Meru and Mt. Kilimanjaro from 1st April 1896. Signed at Moshi, 15.11. 1897, TNA, G8/99.

178. For Hardinge's report of this meeting see Hardinge to Salisbury, 27.2. 1898; F.O. 107/91; PRO, London.

179. von Liebert to KA, 6.4. 1898, RKA 237/1.

180. Runderlass No. 2768, 25.3. 1898, DZA, RKA 221.

181. DKB, 1896, pp. 12-13; von Liebert to KA, 6.4. 1898, loc. cit., and von Stuemmer to KG, 1.4. 1898, TNA, G3/43.

182. Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.84.

pioneer German settler organisation in the protectorate. To help solve the perennial problems of labour shortage which constituted an obstacle to the economic development of Tanganyika, he successfully tried to secure official support for the recruitment of British Indians both for work on the German plantations and for the extension of the Usambara railway to Korogwe.¹⁸³ However, in spite of the opposition of British Indian authorities, large numbers of Indian workers and traders were unofficially attracted to the protectorate.¹⁸⁴

The introduction of taxation in April in 1898 was certainly part of Governor Liebert's strategy to solve the labour problem. Although neither he nor his deputy, Stuhlmann had admitted it, there is no doubt that it was hoped that Africans would be encouraged to work for wages on German plantations.¹⁸⁵ The tax regulations had in fact, been clearly designed to put a greater burden on those not working for wages. For while a plantation worker was expected to pay only $\frac{1}{2}$ rupee a year, the non-plantation worker in the villages, by virtue of the collective taxation imposed on huts, paid more than 3 rupees a year.¹⁸⁶ The District Officer for Tanga, von St. Paul, who complained about the injustice of this apparent anomaly to the Bondei and the Shambala of Handei not working on European plantations, said 'the average figure of four adult heads per hut had been overestimated' as every married

183. Mangat, J.S., A History of the Asians in East Africa, c. 1886 to 1945, Oxford, 1969, pp. 46-47.

184. Ibid.

185. Stuhlmann says it had been designed to make the natives realize the value of money and to appreciate the importance of working. Stuhlmann to KA, 21.11. 1900, DZA, RKA 1053/2.

186. Von St. Paul to KG, 16.3. 1898, TNA G3/43.

woman lived by herself in one hut with her very small children, with the bigger children living separately, according in their sex, in their own huts.¹⁸⁷ His proposal to remove this injustice by raising the tax of the plantation worker to between 2 and 3 rupees per head was immediately rejected by the Central authorities in Dar es Salaam, who simply asked him to comply with the provisions of the ordinance.¹⁸⁸

The determination of Dar es Salaam to apply pressure on Africans in this district to become plantation workers through a policy of differential taxation was equally matched by the peoples' refusal to yield by trying to evade the payment of the hut tax. According to von Stüëmer, the district officer of the new Wilhelmstal district, the collection of the hut tax in Bondei and East Usambara had stimulated a wave of African migration from these areas to the border of his district, where taxation had not yet been introduced mainly for administrative reasons.¹⁸⁹ In order to check this development, he asked that special arrangements be made for the collection of the hut tax from these new immigrants, which he said he was unable to undertake as his small staff of two European officials was already fully engaged in the construction of roads and buildings as well as in supervisory duties up to Kisiwani in Southern Upare.¹⁹⁰ Although Africans were allowed to pay their tax in kind, a regulation which tended to associate the hut tax with tribute, the report on the

187. Ibid.

188. KG. to BA Tanga (Telegram) 23.3. 1898, TNA, G3/43.

189. Von Stuemmer to Gouvernement, 1.4. 1898, TNA, G3/43.

190. Ibid.

introduction of taxation during the 1898 financial year indicates only very small returns in the northern districts of the protectorate.¹⁹¹ Even the limited success achieved was made possible largely by the use of troops and akidas.¹⁹²

The introduction of taxation meant the extension and intensification of the influence of the administration, which now made the old administrative arrangements totally inadequate. In Wilhelmstal, it marked the beginning of the transition to a coastal type of akida administration, which the German authorities had hesitated to introduce into Usambara. The emphasis on tradition and legitimacy, which had led to the enthronement of Kinyashi in September 1895, was now replaced by a new emphasis on utility and functionalism, especially as the appointment of the Swahili akida Joho had proved a success.¹⁹³ As the power and influence of this akida, backed by the power of the dreaded askari, increased, those of Simbamwene Kinyashi, based on the already weakened traditional sanctions decreased.¹⁹⁴ It was essentially the creation of this rival, more powerful authority of the akida, that led to the collapse of the Kilindi monarchy under Kinyashi in 1902, since it now offered an alternative power base for the traditional rivals of the rulingking.

191. Stuhlmann to KA, 21.11. 1900, DZA, RKA, 1053/2.

192. DKB, X, No. 5, 1899, p.167.

193. Meyer to KG. 12.6. 1899, TNA, G3/43.

194. Ibid. Meyer mentions the increasing influence of the Government Akida over the Shambala chiefs.

In the Southern Pare section of the new district, the introduction of the hut tax in 1899 was also accompanied by administrative changes. The akidat of Kihurio, which had previously controlled the whole of Southern Pare under Kivuma, a son of the late chief Semboja of Masinde, was now strengthened by the creation of two new sub-akidats at Kisiwani and Makanya.¹⁹⁵ Kivuma himself was now replaced by a new akida, Komba, a Pare raised in the Shambala settlement on the plains, where he had learned Swahili, the vital language of culture and administration.¹⁹⁶ Here again, the criterion was utility and not tradition. The removal of the corrupt Kivuma was aimed at giving the administration a new and much better image in this first attempt at intensive government. But as in Usambara, the superimposition of akida rule over the indigenous chieftaincy system was to lead inevitably to the total eclipse of chiefly power.

Although no tax revolts occurred in this district as in the southern parts of the protectorate, an atmosphere of general uneasiness was reported. In West Usambara about 500 Shambala were said to have applied for work to find the money to pay the tax,¹⁹⁷ a record figure considering their usual unwillingness to do plantation work. Those unable to work on the plantations had to pay their tax in kind, by giving up a part of their harvests of mtama or contributing buckets of milk. These exactions were resented at a time, when the people were just recovering from the effects of almost five-years of

195. Kimambo, I.N., The Political History of the Pare of Tanzania, Nairobi, 1969, p.220.

196. Ibid, p.185.

197. Meyer to KG, 12.6. 1899, TNA, G3/43.

famine.¹⁹⁸ The uneasiness was much more pronounced among the Wambugu, where the collection of the hut tax had to be postponed for fear that it might provoke a general uprising.¹⁹⁹ The result of this situation was that by the middle of 1900 less than half of the expected tax returns had actually been collected.²⁰⁰ It had even led to the outbreak of a tax revolt earlier in January in the Rufiji delta, which was only suppressed after some effort by German troops under Capt. Wendt.²⁰¹

The limited economic progress made in the districts of Tanga and Wilhelmstal (Tanganital) was not even possible in Kilimanjaro primarily because of the political unrest in the western periphery of the military district, in Arusha/Meru. It was, no doubt, unfortunate that the first important German economic enterprise in this district - the Ostrich farm of the Kilimanjaro Ostrich Farming Company, had been established in 1896 in the troubled region.²⁰² For example, its agents had to compete with the commercial operations of Shundi, who as akida, also exercised great political influence not only over Chief Matunda of the Meru but also on the Wanderobo of Ubugwe, an ivory centre, where the company had hoped to be able to obtain large numbers of ostriches. This commercial competition subsequently led to a political, and indeed, legal battle between Bronsart von Schellendorf, the company's resident Managing Director at Mbuguni

198. Ibid.

199. Stuhlmann to KA, 21.11. 1900, DZA, RKA, 1053/2.

200. Ibid.

201. Ibid.

202. The Mbuguni station of the Company was established just before the murder of the two Lutheran missionaries in October, 1896. See DKB, VIII, No. 5, 1st March, 1897, p.130.

and both the Moshi Commandant Captain Johannes and his akida, Shundi. Replying to von Schellendorf's allegation that Shundi had used his official position to promote his economic interests in direct opposition those of his company,²⁰³ Captain Johannes says the akida had 'exactly the same right as any other private person to buy products from the natives or to arrange a work quota with any chief'.²⁰⁴

Not satisfied with this explanation or with the Commandant's assurance that he would ensure that Shundi, whom he says was a man of 'honest character,' would not work 'contrary to the interests of the KSB', as he had never done in the past,²⁰⁵ von Schellendorf in March 1897 reported the akida to the Tanga court for abuse of office.²⁰⁶ In his defence of Shundi, Capt. Johannes took great pains to establish the fact that the official was in the first place a trader who had been attracted into the German service by Major von Wissmann and had been of great assistance to several Germans both military and civil, including missionaries. And that while doing his job as akida, Shundi had 'honestly rendered the best of services to the Government'; and that far from wishing to exploit his official position to economic advantage, he had in fact expressed his desire to retire from German service about six months before von Schellendorf's accusations, which he (Johannes) says were 'imaginary and fabricated'.²⁰⁷ After establish-

203. Bronsart von Schellendorf to KG, 1.3. 1897, TNA, G8/99.

204. Johannes to KSG, 9.3. 1897, loc. cit.

205. Ibid.

206. For Capt. Johannes' report on the allegations made by von Schellendorf against Schundi to the Tanga Court, see Johannes to KG, 19.3. 1897, TNA, G8/99.

207. Ibid.

ing Shundi's innocence, the Commandant then explained that his administration had been of great assistance to the company by asking the Wanderobo and the Chagga to catch ostriches and zebras for it and buying ostriches from it on behalf of the Imperial Government. In addition, the best stock of the cattle captured in Arusha had been reserved for the company, which had also been given the right to exploit the limestone mines first discovered by the military station.²⁰⁸ It was this case, which was apparently resolved in favour of the Moshi administration that finally forced Captain Johannes to allow Shundi to retire from the service of the German government.

The departure of Shundi for the coast in 1898 was, however, not to solve the company's problems; for a recurrence of political unrest among the Arusha/Meru in collaboration with the anti-German Loita Masai of Sendeyo,²⁰⁹ made it impossible for its agents to carry on their work at Mbuguni. The result was not only the abandonment of the farm but the bankruptcy of the company itself. In 1899, it was re-organised into a new company, the Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company, which now planned to exploit the vast economic and political influence of the former akida Shundi in Kilimanjaro.²¹⁰ It was hoped that with the support of Shundi, all the chiefs of Uchagga and Arusha/Meru would be made agents of the company, which would thereby be able to prevent the trade of the district from being

208. Ibid.

209. For a full account of this see Chpt. 4.

210. 'Operation plan' of the company, Feb. 1899, DZA, RKA 462, p.69.

controlled by foreigners, especially, Greeks.²¹¹ But before it could settle down, a new crisis engulfing the whole of the district had again occurred, resulting in the execution in March 1900 of 19 chiefs and prominent men from Uchagga and Arusha/Meru. Among these were chiefs Meli of Moshi, Molelia of Kibosho and Ngalami of Kibongoto.²¹² It was the political unrest which had produced the crisis that forced the postponement of the arrangements made for the collection of the hut tax in the district till the second half of 1900.²¹³

The restoration of peace in Kilimanjaro by the end of 1900, which also led to the strengthening of the military administration by the creation of a permanent military post in Arusha, now made it possible for the KTAC to resume its normal operations. However, its headquarters was no longer at Mbuguni but at a new station called Kibohohe in Machame.²¹⁴ And as in Usambara, German missionaries of the two confessions - the Protestant Lutherans and the Catholic Holy Ghost Fathers - actively co-operated with its agents to recruit Chagga workers.²¹⁵ According to the company's official report for 1899, it was this co-operation of the missionaries as well as the support given by Chief Shangali of Machame that enable its Kibohohe station to reduce its original dependence on coastal workers.²¹⁶ The pressures of this station on Shangali for the recruitment of labour later combined with those of the military administration, under the not-too-friendly

211. Ibid.

212. Johannes to KG, 3.3. 1900, DZA, RKA, p.290.

213. DKB, XI, No. 24, 15th December, 1900, p.940.

214. Business Report of the Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company, December 1899, DZA, RKA 462, p.56.

215. Ibid.

216. Ibid.

Lt. Merker, to produce the political crisis, which resulted in his abdication in 1901,²¹⁷ only two years before a similar situation was to lead to the abdication of Simbamwene Kinyashi in Vugha, Usambara.²¹⁸ Thus, in Kilimanjaro, as in Usambara, German attempts at economic exploitation had by 1901 not only failed to achieve significant results but had had the opposite effect of stimulating political crisis and unrest.

217. For a detailed account of the circumstances leading to Shangali's abdication, see Chp. 4,

218. Gordon, R.W., 'Notes and Commentaries on Political Events in Masinde (West Usambara) and the Wakilindr Dynasty of Vuga from 1892-1898, Tairya Regional Book, TNA MF5.

Chapter 6

White Settlement and the Native Question - 1901-1906

The arrival of Count von Götzen in Dar-es-Salaam as Governor and Commander-in-chief in April 1901 marked the beginning of a dynamic policy of European settlement in German East Africa, particularly in its north-eastern region, which his predecessor, Edward von Liebert, had urged upon the Colonial Department in April, 1898.¹ The appointment of the new Governor was itself significant in a number of ways. It had been made by the new Chancellor, Benhard von Bülow, who as Foreign Secretary between July, 1897² and October 1900,³ was responsible for shaping Germany's aggressive policy of imperial expansion in the Pacific.⁴ In East Africa, the appointment meant the development of the protectorate along the lines of his emphasis on Weltpolitik. Von Götzen was certainly the type of man to undertake this new development; for as early as July 1891, when still a military attaché at the German Embassy in Rome,⁵ he had undertaken a fact-finding tour of the north-east of the protectorate and had subsequently reported on its suitability for development

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1. Liebert to KA, 6.4. 1898, RKA 237/1.
 2. Klein, F., *Deutschland, 1897/98-1917*, Berlin(East) 1969, p.53.
 3. Ibid., p.99.
 4. Ibid., and Townsend, M.E., The Rise and Fall of German Colonial Empire, New York 1966, p.227.
 5. Benhard von Bülow was himself once an ambassador at Rome before his appointment to the Foreign Office in 1897. See Klein, F., op. cit., p.53.

as an area for German settlement.⁶ Moreover, as a military diplomat, he was well qualified to handle the explosive political situation created by the introduction of the hut tax by Governor Liebert in 1898, and so make it possible for the protectorate to pay its way.

As soon as he arrived in East Africa, therefore, von Götzen's first strategy was to employ all his skills as a diplomat to try and secure the reconciliation of the people to the German administration. One of his first major tasks was to issue on April 19, 1901, a proclamation, addressed to 'the Arabs, Indians, Swahili and all the peoples of the Coast and the interior', emphasizing the need for peace and orderly progress and stressing the humanitarian aspects of the government's tax policy. According to him,

'The purpose of this tax (the hut tax) is in its uses. Where an area is ravaged by famine, the Government will extend its relief and supply all kinds of crops and assist cultivation until the famine has come to an end'.⁷

He then promised that the tax would be collected with indulgence and compassion, especially where there was famine or locust invasion, and that it would still be possible to work for the government in lieu of it. But while publicly encouraging Africans to believe that they could work off the tax, von Götzen had earlier secretly instructed the District Officers and Station Commanders to insist on cash payment during the 1901/02 financial year. According to Teichmann, the District Officer for Wilhelmstal, who was responding

6. Deutsches Kolonialblatt (DKB) to No.20, 13 Oct. 1891, p.443 and No.21, 1 Nov. 1891, pp. 461-464.

7. DKB XII, No.15, 15 July, 1901, p.515. The Swahili Proclamation of 19.4. 1901.

to this instruction, this would compel Africans to work for wages on German plantations and in this way the plantations would be provided with a permanent work force.⁸

In the north-east, where von Götzen was particularly interested in the growth of a strong German settler community, it meant the adopting of a development policy quite different from that fashioned for the north-west or the south-east, where European settlement was not possible for climatic reasons. For, unlike these two regions, where the aim of von Götzen's administration was to make the African communities cultivate cash crops like cotton and coffee either on their own individual plots, as in the north-west,⁹ or in 'collective farms' as in the south east,¹⁰ the north-east was to be developed as an area of European settlement, where the African population were to exist mainly as wage-earners on the plantations.

The emphasis of the new administration on European as opposed to African development was reflected in its tax and labour policies during the first year of von Götzen's governorship. In Usambara, it led to the institutionalization of the notorious 'Wilhelmstal System', created by Herr Teichmann, the District Officer, who had divided the district into labour recruitment zones, each under a German plantation manager, so as to alleviate the problem

8. Teichmann to KG 18.4. 1901; DZA, RKA 1053 201.

9. Austen R., North-West Tanzania under German and British Rule, pp. 55-56,

10. Loth, H., Griff nach Ostafrika, Berlin (East) 1968, p.50; and Iliffe, J., Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912.

of labour shortage.¹¹ For, von Götzen had himself, in June 1901, instructed that the hut tax shall be collected in cash rather than in kind, and had at the same time emphasized the importance of making labour equal in value to the actual hut tax due.¹² Since Africans not working for wages on European plantations as a rule paid higher taxes,¹³ the implication was that working for Europeans should be made more attractive, and labour tax more oppressive. In Kilimanjaro, a German company, the Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company was in February 1902 given the power to farm the tax of the territory between western Kilimanjaro and Mt. Meru,¹⁴ inhabited by the Masai, the Warush and the Meru. So concerned was the regime of von Götzen with economic exploitation at the expense of the African development, that it imposed a tax on the dormitories of the schools of the Universities Mission to Central Africa in Bondei and Korogwe in July 1902,¹⁵ in order to cash in on the educational explosion then taking place in the two areas.

Von Götzen's determination to speed up the economic development of the protectorate was strengthened by the bitter criticism in October 1902¹⁶ by the German Colonial Congress of the poor results achieved in German East Africa after twenty years of colonial rule. In the north-east, the German settlers, who were already benefiting from a labour-oriented policy of African taxation,

11. Teichmann to KG, 18.4. 1901, DZA, RKA 1053²⁰¹⁻²⁰².

12. Runderlass, 20.6. 1901, RKA 1053²⁷⁵⁺.

13. W. von St. Paul to KG, 16.3. 1898, TNA, G3/43.

14. Police Order No. 133 of 21.2. 1902, TNA G8/100.

15. Central Africa, XX, No.38, October 1902, p.176.

16. Tetzlaff, R., Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung: Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Deutsch-Ostafrikas, 1885-1914, Berlin(East) 1970, p.77.

were to be strengthened numerically, economically and politically. Before 1902, a number of measures had already been taken to encourage German settlement on the highlands from Usambara to Kilimanjaro. In Wilhelmstal, allowances ranging between two and three thousand marks were recommended by Count von Götzen in August 1901 for every German family intending to undertake the right type of settlement.¹⁷ In addition, new settlers were to get a supply of cattle¹⁸ as well as free veterinary service provided by the District Office.¹⁹ They were also to benefit from the results of agricultural research institutes established by the government. For this reason, the botanical research station established at Ubili in 1901 was followed in 1902 by the establishment under Professor Zimmermann, of the Biological-Agricultural Institute in Amani, which now replaced the Kwai research station abolished in 1902.²⁰ This new institute was designed to give practical assistance to plantations, and to private German settlers not only by conducting research into local crops but also by introducing new and more profitable methods of cultivation.²¹ To open Western Usambara to more intensive exploitation by German settlers, the extension of the Usambara railway from Korogwe to Mombo was embarked upon in September 1903.²²

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17. Götzen to B.A., Wilhelmstal, 13.8. 1901, TNA G3/88¹.
 18. Tom von Prince, the German settlers' leader in Usambara benefited under this scheme. See Bald, D., Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1900-1914, Munich 1970, p.58.
 19. B.A., Wilhelmstal to Government, 13.9. 1901, G3/88¹⁴.
 20. Attems, M., Bauernbetriebe in Tropischen Höhenlagen Ostafrikas, London and Munich, 1967, p.37.
 21. Most, C., Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Deutsch-Ostafrikas in Kolonial Abhandlungen, Berlin 1906, p.8.
 22. Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.64; and Gilmann, C., 'A short History of Tanganyika Railways in Tanganyika Notes and Records (TNR) No. 13, June 1942, p.18.

Von Götzen's policy on the economic development of Kilimanjaro was rather different from his policy for Usambara, where his emphasis was on the settlement of individual, private Germans. By confirming, in January 1903, the agreement initiated by Governor von Liebert with the Kilimanjaro Ostrich-farming Company, the predecessor of the new Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company, for the acquisition of the land between West Kilimanjaro and Mt. Meru for the sum of 10,000 Marks,²³ von Götzen had consigned a 20-mile piece of land to a single company. To this acquisition was also added the tax-farming rights already being exercised by the company in the Arusha/Meru area on behalf of the Moshi military station.

What influenced the Governor to take this decision was the unsettled political situation in the Kilimanjaro region, which had since 1891 delayed the opening up of the district to German settlement. For successive German administrators either at the local or central level, from Carl Peters in 1891 to Edward von Liebert in 1897/98, had found their proposals for German settlement in Kilimanjaro frustrated by political unrest and instability.²⁴ The bitter opposition of the Masai, the Warush and the Meru to German rule, especially after the punitive expeditions of both

23. Agreement between the Government of German East Africa and the Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company, 30.1. 1903, DZA, RKA 464; also Stuhlmann to BA, Moshi 25.3. 1903, DZA, RKA 463.

24. For the proposals for German settlement on Kilimanjaro between 1891 and 1898 see (i) Steggall to Lang, 24.2. 1892, G3 A5/0, 1892, CMS Archives, Lond., for those of Carl Peters; (ii) Johannes to von Soden, TNA, G1/18, for those of Capt. Johannes; (iii) DKB No.21, 1st Nov. 1893, for those of Colonel von Schele; (iv) Agreement between Governor Liebert and Dr. K Beerwald, 5.10. 1897, TNA G8/104; and Liebert to KA, 6.4. 1898, DZA, RKA 237/1.

Capt. Johannes and Lt. Merker in 1900 and 1901,²⁵ had made the settlement of private German settlers in Arusha/Meru particularly risky. Moreover the Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company, whose agents had been active in the area since 1896, appeared well-placed to tap its resources. Apart from its commercial schemes for taming zebras to help solve the transportation problem of both German and British East Africa, and for raising ostriches for export,²⁶ its directors also hoped to undertake the establishment of a German settlement in the area on the lines of the British Dominions in Canada and Australia.²⁷ However, this vast concession was later criticised, in November 1905, by the Ost-Afrikanische Zeitung, the organ of the independent German settlers in the protectorate, ostensibly, for violating African rights to land,²⁸ but in reality because it excluded their members from the area.

By the time this criticism was made, it was clear that von Götzen's hopes of developing Kilimanjaro through the Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company had been misplaced. Chronically short of funds to carry on its projects, which had themselves not proved economically viable,²⁹ the Company had not only failed to collect the hut tax from the Masai within its area of jurisdiction,³⁰ but

25. For an account of these expeditions see Chp. 4.

26. Isabella Bronsart von Schellendorf to the Director, KA, Feb. 1902, DZA, RKA 462.

27. Ibid.

28. Extract from the Ost-Afrikanische Zeitung 16.11. 1905, DZA, RKA 463.

29. For example, no market was found for the zebras tamed by the Company. See Fonck, H., Deutsch-Ostafrika, Berlin, 1940, p.441.

30. BA Moshi to Government, 4.4. 1905, Götzen to BA Moshi, 15.5. 1905, TNA, G8/101.

had also been unable to pay the wages of its Chagga, Somali and Nyamwezi workers, amounting to about 9,000 Rupees.³¹ It was only after the intervention of Lt. Abel, the Commandant of the Moshi military station, that the wages were paid, thus averting a potentially explosive situation. So weak was the company's financial position, that it was reported to have secretly declared itself bankrupt in September 1905.³²

In like manner, von Götzen's hopes that the South African Boers, who arrived in Meru in June 1904, would help to solve the security problems of Kilimanjaro,³³ by extending the frontiers of effective German occupation, were to prove illusory. Instead of providing support for the military station, in terms of armed manpower, the Boer settlement had created more problems that it had solved; for German military officers, always in short supply, had been compelled to undertake constant expeditions to the area in order to stop the Masai raiding the settlement for cattle. It was to protect these settlers from Masai raids that Count von Götzen had to decide on the creation of a Masai reserve between Mt. Kilimanjaro and Mt. Meru in 1905.³⁴ Since this measure meant the separation of the Sendeyo Masai from their kith and kin in British East Africa, and their permanent confinement in a region which was inadequate to meet the grazing requirements of their vast herds of cattle, it created bitterness and stiffened their opposition to

31. Abel to Government, 28.11. 1905, TNA, G8/101.

32.

32. Ibid.

33. Götzen to KA, 6.7. 1904, DZA, RKA 1033.

34. Methner, W., Unter drei Gouverneuren, Breslau, 1938, p.152.

German rule. The result was that the Masai raids and German counter-expeditions continued, leading ultimately to the migration of Chief Sendeyo and a majority of his followers to British East Africa with all their cattle.³⁵ Nothing more clearly demonstrates the differences between German and British colonial methods than their different approaches to this common Masai problem. For, although the authorities in British East Africa were also concerned with the establishment of a white settlement, they had refrained from using direct military force to secure, in September 1904, the agreement of Lenana, the great Masai chief, to the creation of two Masai reserves, one south of Ngong and the railway, the other to the northward upon the Laikipia plateau.³⁶

The unrest among the Masai had also sparked off a political crisis in Uchagga. Shortly before the arrival of the Boer settlers, a certain missionary from Mombasa was reported to have tipped off Count von Götzen about an impending Chagga revolt.³⁷ This contradicts Stahl's interpretation, based exclusively on Chagga oral traditions, that it was Herr Merkl the friend of Senguo of Mashati, who gave Moshi this information in order to implicate Chief Marealle of Marangu,³⁸ the overlord of Rombo. For the Moshi Commandant, Capt. Merker, had been informed of this Chagga/Masai conspiracy by the Governor himself through an emergency telegram early in July,

35. Ibid., p.153.

36. Low, D.A., 'British East Africa: The Establishment of British Rule 1895-1912' in Harlow, V., et al., History of East Africa, vol II, Oxford, p.36.

37. Götzen to KA, 6.7. 1904, RKA 1033.

38. Stahl, K., History of the Chagga Peoples of Kilimanjaro, London, 1964, p.334.

1904. In this von Götzen had stated that all the arrangements then being made for the conversion of Kilimanjaro into a civil district had been suspended and that the military station would be strengthened.³⁹ And it was Capt. Merker who then passed on this information to all European residents in Kilimanjaro, including the influential 'Farmer' Merkl.⁴⁰

Nor was Marealle himself directly connected with this conspiracy. He too had learned of the arrival of von Götzen's telegram from his friend, the Lutheran Missionary Sihanz of Mamba,⁴¹ and had tried, without success to secure a confirmation of the information from Farmer Merkl. It was the arrest of 'five suspicious akidas' in Marangu by the German authorities shortly after the arrival of this telegram that had influenced Marealle's decision to flee into British East Africa through Taveta on December 11, 1904, in spite of the fact that an investigation had cleared him of complicity in the conspiracy.⁴² However, before his flight, he was reported to have made contact with the CMS mission station at Taveta, with which the Missionary Sihanz was said to be in regular correspondence. And when he finally decided to flee, it was to the Lutheran mission station in Mamba that he first went, before moving on to Taveta, in spite of the plea of the military authorities at Moshi that he should remain in his chiefdom.⁴³ Lt. Willmann, who reported on this case,

39. Götzen to KA, 6.7. 1904, RKA 1033.

40. Report on the Missionary Sihanz, Section B., 25.12. 1904, TNA, G9/31105-109.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

had believed that the flight had been arranged by the Lutheran Missionary Schanz to bring Farmer Merkl, whom he described as a 'highly respectable man', into disrepute with the central administration and force his expulsion from Kilimanjaro.⁴⁴

An examination of the political situation in Kilimanjaro at the time of Marealle's flight reveals a determined attempt by Capt. Merker to put an end to the chief of Marangu's preeminence in Uchagga. Merker's predecessor, Capt. Johannes, had himself taken a significant step in this direction by ordering the demolition of Marealle's stone house (Boma) immediately after the execution of Meli of Moshi and Molelia of Kibosho with seventeen other chiefs and elders on March 2, 1900.⁴⁵ This meant that no chiefs were to enjoy special privileges which might conflict with, or threaten, German economic and political interests. Only weak chiefs like Sianga of Kibosho, Ngulelo of Machame and Sengua of Mashati, who could provide cheap land or labour for European settlers then trickling into the district, were to be given every possible assistance, even against the opposition of their own subjects.⁴⁶

Capt. Merker was personally interested in terminating Marealle's overlordship in Rombo for two major reasons. First, Marangu's constant raids for cattle and slaves in Rombo had continued to create an atmosphere of tension and hostility, which was a sad reflection on the German administration to whom he owed

44. Ibid., Section C.

45. Johannes to KG, 3.3. 1900, RKA 290.

46. For example, before the arrival of Methner in Moshi in the autumn of 1906, German troops were busy helping Sengua to suppress a popular revolt against his own misrule in Usseri, Rombo. See Methner, W., op. cit., p.120.

his power. Secondly, since the sturdy men of Rombo were the people on whom the European settlers relied most for their supply of labour, any raids which tended to reduce the labour force in the area were considered to be against the best interests of the settlers and the German administration. In fact, Farmer Merkl's hostility to Marealle had developed over the former's opposition to Marangu's raids in Rombo,⁴⁷ especially in Mashati, the chiefdom of his friend Sengua, a former vassal of Marealle. Sengua, who was himself as ambitious as his former overlord, had taken advantage of his friendship with Merkl, to whose coffee and cotton plantations he regularly delivered hundreds of his subjects as labourers,⁴⁸ to make himself the new overlord of the Rombo statelets. And it was Merkl's friendship with Capt. Merker that influenced the decision to terminate Marealle's overlordship in Rombo in his favour.

The involvement of the missionary S~~h~~anz in the flight of Marealle is rather significant, for it throws some light not only on the relationship between the missionaries and the military administration but on the rivalry between the Catholic and Protestant missions. Under Capt. Merker, the accord between the Lutheran mission and the military administration seemed to have broken down over the issue of compulsory school attendance for Chagga pupils, on which the mission would not compromise.⁴⁹ For the Commandant, who was anxious to avoid anything that might provoke a Chagga revolt, had forbidden the Lutheran practice of taking goats and banana as fines from pupils absenting themselves deliberately from schools so as

47. For a report on the conflict between Merkl and Marealle over Rombo see Report on Missionary S~~h~~anz, 25.12. 1904, loc. cit.

48. Ibid.

49. Abel to KA, 21.1. 1907, TNA G9/32.

to prevent a decline in school attendance. Lt. Abel, who succeeded Capt. Merker as Stationschef in July 1905, after a short interregnum, and who was himself accused by the Lutheran missionary Fassmann of Moshi of not helping to compel the Chagga to send their children to school, said that the administration could not use force, as this would mean that the children would no longer be able to help their parents graze their cattle.⁵⁰ But while they would not compel attendance at mission schools, the German military administration had certainly encouraged European settlers to exploit child-labour, particularly in Rombo.

In fact, the main cause of the conflict between Sihanz and the military administration was his opposition to the labour recruitment drives in Rombo of the German settler, Merkl, whose plantations between Marangu and Mamba were then the most successful single German enterprise in Kilimanjaro.⁵¹ Rather than support the Lutheran missionary, who had become an opponent of his administration,⁵² Capt. Merker had thrown his weight behind the German settler, a retired sergeant from the Protectorate army and one of the 'heroes' of the Hehe wars,⁵³ who was said to be making significant contributions to the economic development of Kilimanjaro. Since Sengua of Mashati, the new overlord of Rombo, was also Farmer Merkl's friend, the friendship between Sihanz and Marealle was therefore

50. Ibid.

51. Report on the Missionary Sihanz, Section C., 25.12. 1904, TNA, G9/31.

52. Sihanz was reported to have prevented, by force, the arrest of people who had robbed their traditional authorities in Rombo-Kindi. See Report on Missionary Sihanz, Section A, loc. cit.

53. See Schmiedel, H., 'Bwana Sakkarani: Captain Tom von Prince and his Times', Tanganyika Notes and Records, No.52, March 1959, p.46.

a reaction against the new political settlement. In short, the alliance between the two men was borne out of their frustrations with the German military administration, which was much more concerned with economic exploitation under peaceful conditions than with the real problem of African development.

Marealle's troubles with the pro-settler administration of Capt. Merker must have influenced old Chief Fumba of Kilema to decide upon final retirement⁵⁴ in favour of his young son Kirita in August 1905⁵⁵. The fall of such a great chief, who was once the darling of the German military administration, and to who, he himself had been subjected, had indicated the beginning of a new age to which he felt he no longer belonged. Kirita, a man of the new age, who was a product of the Catholic palace school in Kilema⁵⁶ had appeared to him to be more suited to the task of leading his people to face the challenges as well as the dangers posed by the 'new civilization'.⁵⁷

The conflict between the military administration and the Lutheran mission, which had partly influenced the flight of Marealle, was also reflected in the case of Mbararia, the former chief of

54. He had retired once in 1893 in reaction to his subjection to Marealle by Capt. Johannes. See Chp. 4.

55. Extract of a letter from Father Balthazar of Kilema to Mgr. Le Roy, 1.9. 1906, in Bulletin-Général, 1905/06, vol 23, p.379.

56. Ibid.

57. In a progress report in 1902 on the work of the Holy Ghost Fathers in Kilema, Father Schneider had himself expressed the hope that the people would be strong enough to resist the dangers of European civilization. Bulletin-Général. 1903/04, vol.22, p.119.

Mwika, who had returned to his chiefdom in August 1904 after a five-year exile in Nairobi. Capt. Merker, who believed⁵⁸ apparently from information supplied by Farmer Merkl,⁵⁸ that Mbararia had conspired with two Rombo chiefs, Mlanga of Usseri and Salakana of Mashati to stage an anti-German revolt, asked Dar-es-Salaam to sanction the former chief's deportation to a southern station on the coast.⁵⁹ But when this alleged conspiracy with the British Masai led by Chief Lenana against European rule was investigated by the British sub-Commissioner for Nairobi, it was proved to be non-existent.⁶⁰ The British East African Administration under Sir James Hayes-Sadler was positive about the loyalty of Lenana, and 'appeared not to believe that there was an alliance between the Chagga and the Masai'.⁶¹

The investigation had revealed that the German military administration in Kilimanjaro had exaggerated out of all proportion the number of spears sent by the Chagga chiefs as presents to Lenana, as only ^adozen were actually found, instead of the 120 alleged by the German authorities. Even then, these were considered to be of no special significance.⁶² Mbararia was also cleared of any involvement with the Masai; for it was stated that he 'had formed no relationship with Lenana or any other Masai' and that none of his supporters was then living with the Masai.⁶³ It was on the strength

58. Abel to Government, 7.4. 1906, TNA G9/31.

59. Merker to KG., 22.8. 1904, DZA, RKA 1033.

60. Stuhlmann to KA, 28.10. 1904, loc. cit.

61. Ibid.

62. Brode to KG, 8.10. 1904, DZA, RKA 1033.

63. , Brode to KG., 18.10. 1904, loc. cit.

of these British investigations, the results of which were communicated to Count von Götzen by the German Vice-Consul in Mombasa, Dr. Brode, that Mbararia was then allowed to remain in Mwika as a private citizen, with a stern warning that he should refrain from any kind of political agitation.⁶⁴

The return, late in 1905, of Marealle from Nairobi, where he had been found a home by the British authorities,⁶⁵ seemed to have encouraged the supporters of Mbararia to begin an agitation for his restoration as the chief of Mwika. This agitation had received the blessing of Pastor Althaus of the Lutheran mission station in Mamba, who had apparently taken over from the missionary Shanz. Althaus, who had himself believed in 1897 that Mbararia was involved in an anti-German conspiracy,⁶⁶ was now convinced that the former chief should be restored to power; for the decline in school attendance at the Lutheran school at Mwika after his flight had shown that it was his personal influence that had made his subjects to send their children to school.⁶⁷ The significant progress made by the school after his return⁶⁸ was a conclusive proof that he was a great supporter of Christian education. In fact, he was reported to have attached himself to a CMS mission school during his exile in British East Africa.⁶⁹ Since Count von Götzen, who had

64. Abel to Government, 7.4. 1906, TNA, G9/31.

65. For the comments of Sir Frederick Jackson who handled the negotiations for his return see Jackson, F., Early Days in East Africa, London, 1930, p.120. Jackson, however, got his date wrong.

66. Abel to KG, 7.4. 1906, TNA, G9/31.

67. See Eggert, J., Missionsschule und sozialer Wandel in Ostafrika, Bielefeld, 1970, p.189.

68. Ibid.

69. Brode to KG, 18.10. 1904, DZA, RKA 1033.

personally arranged the return of Marealle, had also promised to see that he was reinstated,⁷⁰ it was felt that the same treatment should be given to Mbararia.

However, in spite of his obvious large following, which Lt. Willmann, who investigated the complaints made against him by the incumbent chief, reckoned at three-quarters of the total population of Mwika,⁷¹ Mbararia was not reinstated. On the contrary, he was ordered to leave the chieftdom to settle in a place of his choice in Meru.⁷² Lt. Abel, the Moshi Commandant, was unwilling to reinstate him, not only because the circumstances of his case were quite different from those of Marealle, who had been absent only for a few months and was, of course, no longer interested in the chieftainship, but because this would mean another victory for the Lutheran mission over the military administration. Already, the withdrawal of Capt. Merker from Kilimanjaro soon after Marealle's flight,⁷³ which was intended to show that Dar-es-Salaam disapproved of his native policy, had been interpreted by the Chagga themselves as a victory for the Lutheran missionaries, who had consistently opposed him. Lt. Abel himself says that, shortly after his arrival in Moshi in July 1905, he was informed by the native Chagga assistants at the military station that the mission was more powerful than the Station chief, and that 'if the Station chief no longer pleases the

70. Jackson, F., op. cit., p.21.

71. Abel to KG, 7.4. 1906, TNA, G9/31.

72. Ibid.

73. The Farmer Merkl was apparently asked to leave Kilimanjaro, for he was no longer there when Methner arrived in Moshi as District Officer in September 1906. See Methner, W., Unter drei Gouverneuren - 16 Jahre Dienst in deutschen Tropen, Breslau, 1938, p.181. The three German settlers in Kilimanjaro at that time were Richter, Domke and Sauerbrunn.

mission, they write a letter to Germany and he is recalled, as had happened in the case of Capt. Merker.⁷⁴ Determined to reassert the authority of the military administration over the mission, Lt. Abel even asked the central authorities in Dar-es-Salaam to give him permission to prosecute Pastor Althaus for criminal libel over his reports on the case of Usararia.⁷⁵ But the Central Government, unwilling to be dragged into a controversy which would only bring adverse publicity in Germany, refused to grant his request, saying that there was nothing illegal in the missionary's reports on the matter.⁷⁶

Another interesting case shows that even a friendly relationship between a German settler and a Lutheran missionary was capable of leading to conflicts with the military administration, especially where it also involved a friendly association with the Chagga. This was the case involving the German trader, Herr Sauerbrunn, a joint-~~proprietor~~ of the commercial firm of Domke and Co., accused in 1905 by the Kilimanjaro military administration of evading the payment of custom duty on his imports.⁷⁷ What is significant about this case is that this trader had been arrested on the orders of Dr. Grofhausen, the acting Commandant of Moshi, soon after the arrival of a report from the Tabora military administration about his apparently unauthorised commercial dealings with the native chiefs.⁷⁸ According to the Lutheran Pastor Bleicken, who was his neighbour in Kibognoto, the centre of his operations, the motive

74. Abel to KA, 15.1. 1907, TNA, G9/32

75. Abel to KG, 7.4. 1906, TNA, G9/31.

76. Government to BA, Moshi, 10.5. 1906, TNA, G9/31.

77. Bleicken to District Court, Tanga, 6.1. 1906, TNA, G9/32.

78. Ibid.

of the military officials was to tarnish Sauerbrunn's reputation and ruin his business. In a memorandum sent in January 1906 to the Tanga District Court, where the trader was being tried, Bleicken says it was common practice for all Europeans in the district, including the Greek traders, to pay duty on their goods weeks or even months after collecting them from the Moshi customs shed. He therefore considered it malicious to single out the German trader whom he described as a scrupulously honest man who was held in high esteem by the Chagga, for special prosecution.⁷⁹

In a separate letter to Count von Götzen,⁸⁰ Pastor Bleicken struck at the root of the conflict between the civilian settlers and the military authorities. He challenged the right of the military administration, and in particular, that of the military doctor Grofhausen to exercise legal jurisdiction over Europeans.⁸¹ Claiming that it was the intention of the military authorities to scare away good settlers from the district for selfish reasons, he stated that the fears of the former Commandant, Capt. Merker, of a general insurrection of the Chagga were 'deliberate and unfounded'.⁸²

Considering the friendly relationship between Capt. Merker and farmer Merkl, it is difficult to believe that the former was opposed to German settlement in Kilimanjaro. There is no doubt, however, that the military officers at Moshi had resented the additional strains imposed by their having to provide for the security of private, civilian Germans, including missionaries, living in isolated settlements among the 'unfriendly' Chagga.⁸³ Where a settler

79. Ibid.

80. Abel to Government, 23.10. 1906, TNA, G9/32.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Abel to Ka, 15.1. 1907, TNA, G9/31.

was a retired military officer like Merkl, who was not only capable of defending himself, but also shared the values of the military administration, it was relatively easy to establish a friendly relationship. But where he was a civilian trader on friendly terms with the anti-administration Lutheran mission and with the potentially hostile Chagga, then his activities were bound to lead to conflicts with the military administration anxious to prevent this friendly relationship being used against it.

Pastor Bleicken's criticism of Capt. Merker was not limited to the maltreatment of the German trader, Sauerbrunn. The missionary had also criticised the injustice meted out to one 'Akida Mansa' of Iraqw (Iraku),⁸⁴ who had apparently opposed the former commandant's political settlement in 1902 in favour of Isara, the head of the Iraqw ritual leaders since 1899.⁸⁵ Bleicken's criticism, in fact, explains why a revolt later erupted among this essentially acephalous people in April 1906.⁸⁶ To the German military administration anxious to create a chiefly system on the Chagga pattern,⁸⁷ it was simply a tax revolt, as the majority of the Iraqw, under their popular leader, Darago, would not pay their tax to the pro-German Isara. But to the Iraqw themselves it was a struggle to preserve the sanctity of their traditional republican system.

The opposition of the Lutheran mission to the Kilimanjaro military administration had obscured another equally significant

84. Abel to Government, 23.10. 1906, TNA, G9/32.

85. Iliffe, J., Tanganyika under German rule, 1905-1912, Cambridge, 1969, p. 162.

86. Ibid., pp. 162-163.

87. In March 1904, Haber had reported adversely on the chiefs created by the Kilimanjaro military administration among the acephalous peoples of the Arusha/Meru region. See Report of the Privy Councillor Haber on the political situation in Kilimanjaro, 5.3. 1904, DZA, RKA 700.

conflict between the Protestant Lutheran missionaries and the Catholic Holy Ghost Fathers. What was basic to this conflict was not doctrinal antagonism but the differences in their approach to the question of relationship with the government. For although the Catholic missionaries had, like their Protestant rivals, tended to criticise the abuses of the military administration,⁸⁸ they had, nevertheless, always tried to avoid an open confrontation with it. They seemed to have preferred a policy of intercession on behalf of the Chagga to one of direct confrontation with the military authorities. For example, in July 1904, Father Dürr of Kibosho had gone to the military station at Moshi to plead for the release of Chief Kisariki of Uru, who had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in chains, apparently for some misdemeanour in his chieftdom.⁸⁹ Earlier in 1902, the Holy Ghost Fathers had acquired a 532 hectare piece of land in Kilema, to prevent it falling into the hands of European settlers who would not care for the needs of the people.⁹⁰ Having done this, they had then thrown it open to the people of Kilema to cultivate their subsistence crops and to graze their cattle. By April 1913, when a German settler, Herr Flicker, applied to the government for a part of it, only 4 hectares of this land was actually under the direct occupation of the mission itself.⁹¹ However, they had not always worked in the best interests

88. For example, the Holy Ghost Fathers had believed that the Chagga would have joined the Maji Maji rebellion if it had been more successful. See Kieran, J.A.P., 'The Holy Ghost Fathers in East Africa, 1863-1914, Ph.D. Thesis, (Unpublished) University of London, 1966, p.313.

89. Journal of Kibosho 18.7. 1904. CSsp Paris.

90. BA Moshi to Government, 11.4. 1913, G8/205.

91. Ibid.

of the Chagga. For example, in 1901, not long after the infamous dawn execution of March 1900, which the Chagga had partly blamed on them,⁹² they had shown their reluctance to help the Chagga grow coffee, an important cash crop, which they themselves had introduced into the district, for fear it might lead to the spread of disease.⁹³ If they had had their way, coffee growing would have been restricted only to European planters, thus blocking the chances of the Chagga for rapid economic development.

The friendship between Farmer Merkl and Father Balthasar of Kilema, which must have influenced the Catholic opposition to coffee growing by the Chagga, had been based on their common hatred for the Lutheran missionary, Pastor Sihanz. According to Lt. Abel, who had reported on this enmity between Sihanz and Balthasar, the Lutheran missionary had on two occasions tried to discredit the Catholic mission in the eyes of the Chagga. On one occasion, Sihanz was said to have given a Catholic Chagga teacher at Kilema the impression that he was being exploited, and had tried to lure him to the Lutheran school in Mamba with the promise of much better pay. On another occasion the Lutheran missionary was reported to have said that the education being offered at the Catholic school was inferior, so as to attract its pupils to his school in Mamba.⁹⁴ This rivalry between the missionaries of the two confessions, which had earlier expressed itself in their competition for mission fields not only in Uchagga but in Meru in 1896⁹⁵ and north Pare in 1899/1900,⁹⁶

92. Kierkegaard, J.A., op. cit., p.311.

93. Ibid., p.254; and Fonck, H., Deutsch-Ost-Afrika, Berlin, 1910, p.531.

94. Abel to Government, 7.4. 1906, G9/31.

95. See Bulletin-Général, 1895/96, vol.17, pp. 831-832, and vol.19, 1898/99, p.514.

96. For the reports of early Protestant Lutheran and the Catholic Trappist activities in Upare, see DKB XI, No.6, 15th March, 1900, p.214, and No.18, 15th Sept. 1900, p.712

had been stimulated by Count von Götzen's educational policy. For, shortly after his arrival in East Africa, the new Governor had let it be known that it was his intention to involve the mission schools much more than before in educational development.⁹⁷ This was hardly surprising, as the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, charged with the responsibility of voting colonial budgets, had in February 1900 called for government assistance for mission schools and the recruitment of subordinate officials from among the native Christian population.⁹⁸ Since the danger of Islamic expansion had again led to bitter attacks on the recruitment policy of the East African administration in the Colonial Congress of 1902,⁹⁹ Count von Götzen had had to issue a circular in July 1903 asking all the District Officers and Station Commanders to give the products of mission schools preferential treatment in recruitments into the administrative service and the armed forces.¹⁰⁰ This pro-mission policy not only encouraged the missionaries to expand their educational work but also meant that the influence of each Christian missionary body would now be determined by the number of its graduates in the service of the government.

An interesting case, which highlights the rivalry between the Catholic Trappist Benedictine mission and the Protestant Bethel mission in West Usambara, also shows how a missionary could use the

97. There is a reference to his in Hofmann to KG, 14.6. 1901, TNA, G9/36.

98. See Eggert, J., op. cit., p.71.

99. See the Proceedings of the German Colonial Congress, 1902, Berlin, 1903.

100. Götzen to BA and NS., 13. 7. 1903, TNA, G9/31.

influence of his supporters or former pupils in government service to the embarrassment of the local administration. In May 1903, one Kiramba, a Shambala from Gare, had accused a Trappist missionary, presumably one Brother Dionysius, for threatening him 'with proceedings at the District Office if he would not give them (the Trappists) his daughter'.¹⁰¹ For this he had been sued by the Trappist Mission for malicious libel. But before the case came up for hearing on May 13th 1903, before von Pirch, the German magistrate for Wilhelmstal, Brother Dionysius had brought him to the District Office and had extracted a withdrawal of the alleged libelous statement, from him, under the threat of securing his detention at the military police station. The presiding magistrate was then informed of this withdrawal by Father Erasmus, the Superintendent of the Trappist mission. In court, however, Kiramba told the magistrate that 'he had not retracted his statement' and that 'it was solely out of fear that he had given up the girl to the Trappists'.¹⁰² As a result of this, von Pirch was compelled to rule in his favour in the official record of proceedings. But the magistrate, who was obviously a supporter of the Trappists, did not inform Kiramba of this official ruling, but simply told him that 'his daughter was to remain with the Catholic mission'.¹⁰³ The report of the difference between the official recorded ruling and the verbal pronouncement of the magistrate was then made to Pastor Johanssen of the Bethel mission by the native clerk, Edward, obviously

101. Johanssen to KG, 16.6. 1903, TNA, G9/36.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

a Protestant, who was the Shambala interpreter at the trial.

Protesting to the Governor over the handling of this case, Pastor Johanssen accused both the District Officer and the Trappist missionaries of exerting undue influence. He says his evidence, which would have assisted the court, had been rejected by the District Office, and that Brother Dionysius had intimidated Kiramba to withdraw his statement, which the Trappists knew would damage their reputation. Specifically mentioning two African government officials, Akidas Zahabu and Kivo of Wilhelmstal as witnesses, he accused the Trappist missionaries of interfering with the judicial process, stating that:

'in addition to Kiramba, four other natives had given evidence in two trials at the District Office to the effect that they had had children taken away from them by the Catholic mission. They had not been proved to have spoken an untruth, but the children had not been returned to them'.¹⁰⁴

The rivalry between the Trappist Catholics and the Bethel Protestants had, in fact, begun as soon as the former arrived in Western Usambara in 1897, and the indiscretion of a governmental official had inspired it. For, it was the Director of the Agricultural Research Station at Kwai, Herr Eick, that had led the Trappist missionaries to establish their first mission station at Gare, 'a place which the Protestant missionaries had been visiting for years to preach the gospel'.¹⁰⁵ Although Usambara was later divided between the two missions,¹⁰⁶ the Bethel missionaries had

104. Ibid.

105. Stuemmer to Government, 1.4. 1898, TNA, G9/36.

106. Ibid.

certainly felt the loss of Gare. The support of Herr Eick for the Catholics was also the beginning of the close association between the local administration and the Trappist missionaries. This was because the Trappist mission, operating on the principle that 'teaching the native to work is the beginning of his education',¹⁰⁷ had found it comparatively easy to get along with the local administration which was interested in solving its labour problem. It is, no doubt, significant that von Stuemer, the first District Officer for Wilhelmstal, under whom this close association developed, had strongly disapproved of the Bethel mission's 'secondary' and limited approach to labour, believing that the Trappist approach was 'decidedly of benefit for the cultural development of the blacks'.¹⁰⁸

The support given by the local administration to the Catholics had had the effect of shaking the Bethel missionaries out of their previous complacency and of influencing a change in their attitude to the Shambala. Determined to win their support in the competition with the Trappists, the Bethel missionaries had to develop a new image as the champions of African against an oppressive administration. The co-operation they had received from African officials in Wilhelmstal in their complaint over the raw deal given Kiramba, was, indeed, an indication of the support now being given them by the Shambala. It was, therefore, as champions of the oppressed Shambala that they had protested to Herr Haber in January 1905 against the forced recruitment of workers in the district by German plantation owners and managers.¹⁰⁹

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. Haber to KG, 12.1. 1905. DZA, RKA 118.

At a meeting with this high official,¹¹⁰ who was then investigating labour conditions in Wilhelmstal, Pastors Johanssen, Roehl, Riese and Röseler, 'had expressed the opinion that the Shambala could still be made to work for wages on the plantations without the destruction of their subsistence agriculture'.¹¹¹ They had consequently requested the central government to introduce two significant measures in their interest. First, they wanted the responsibility for labour recruitment, which had been assigned to plantation managers since 1901, and which had turned the district into the planter's paradise, to be returned to the chiefs (Jumbe).¹¹² Secondly, they demanded government approval for the stationing of a missionary on the Ambangulu plantation estate, to prevent the recruitment of the Shambala for forced labour by the agents of the plantation manager.¹¹³ But, instead of acceding to the requests of the Bethel missionaries, the von Götzen administration introduced a more oppressive taxation policy which further strengthened the notorious Wilhelmstal system.

According von Götzen's Poll tax Ordinance of 1905, which came into effect as from the first of April of the same year,¹¹⁴ the previous hut tax of 3/4 Rupee per head was replaced by a poll

110. Haber was then the Secretary to the Götzen administration. He later became Secretary of the East Africa division of the Colonial Department in Berlin. See Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.89.

111. Haber to KG, 12.1. 1905, loc. cit.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. See Amtlicher Anzeiger für Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1905, Nr.9 and Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.210.

tax of 3 Rupees payable by Africans not working for Europeans. Plantation workers, whose taxes were as a rule deducted by their employers, were to pay only 12½ heller per head a month, or a total of about 1½ Rupee a year.¹¹⁵ But if they worked continuously for a period of six months or more on a particular plantation, they were to pay no tax at all.¹¹⁶ And, to compel Africans to work on German plantations, this ordinance was interpreted as usual to the disadvantage of self-employed peasants. Since it was held that the number of wives determined the number of taxable households,¹¹⁷ a self-employed peasant could be made to pay up to six rupees or more, depending on the number of his wives and huts.

The effects of the introductions of this ordinance on the Shambala can be better imagined than described. For, even before it came into force, Hans Meyer, the new District Officer for Wilhelmstal, had in March 1905 reported that Shambala family life was no longer what it used to be, as the young men had to move prematurely out of their parents' huts to make a precarious living for themselves.¹¹⁸ Those who were pressured into working on European plantations had to live in workers' villages, where the kind of family life they were used to at home did not exist.¹¹⁹ Deprived of the usual attention, their fields (Shamba) in the villages, were

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Journal of Kibosho, 8.5. 1904, copy of Notice No.316 issued by Capt. Merker of Moshi, CS&P, Paris. This was the first public statement by a German official in favour of differential taxation.

118. BA Wilhelmstal to Government, 23.3. 1905, DZA, RKA 118.

119. Ibid.

then left at the mercy of the wild pigs, the traditional enemies of Shambala peasant agriculture. Haber, who had earlier reported on the menace of these wild pigs to Shambala cultivation, had strongly recommended government assistance to help stamp it out in order to save the people from the spectre of starvation.¹²⁰ He had at the same time advised Jumbe Kinyashi of Mlalo, whom he described as 'an intelligent and wise man', to build a granary to conserve his chiefsom's maize harvests.¹²¹

The effects of the Wilhelmstal labour system on Shambala political life were equally damaging. The central Kilindi traditional authority, which had never been strong since its reconstitution under Kinyashi bin Shekulwavu in September 1895, had been progressively weakened by the effectiveness of akida rule after the introduction of the hut tax in 1899.¹²² Between 1899 and 1901, when the royal capital of Vugha was completely evacuated as a result of serious outbreaks of fire,¹²³ forced labour both for public works and for plantation development had further helped to destroy the traditional respect of the Shambala for their Kilindi monarch, who was the immediate symbol of German oppression. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kinyashi's decision to abdicate in 1903 had been influenced by his fear of assassination,¹²⁴ which was itself an indication of the

120. Haber to Government, 12.1. 1905, DZA, RKA 118.

121. Ibid.

122. DKB. X., No.5, 1899, p.167.

123. Feiertmann, S., 'The Shambaa' in Rovers, A., ed., Tanzania Before 1900, Nairobi, 1968, p.14; and Wohlrab, P., Usambara: Werden und Wachsen einer heiden-Christlichen Gemeinde in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Bethel-bei-Bielefeld 1915, pp. 60-61.

124. Winans, E.V., Shambala: The Constitution of a Traditional State, California, 1962, p.83.

resurgence of Kilindi factional struggles even under the iron rule of the Germans. And it was exactly the political tension created by these factional struggles that compelled the German administration to abolish the office of the Kilindi paramount chief in Vugha,¹²⁵ which had itself become an anachronism.

However, the collapse of the Kilindi paramountcy in Vugha had not meant the end of Kilindi rule in Usambara; for influential Kilindi chiefs, like Kibanga of Bumbuli and Kinyashi of Mlalo, were still in effective control of their sub-chiefdoms. Since these chiefs were still considered strong enough to serve the ends of the German administration, they were left practically undisturbed. In fact, both Kinyashi and Kibanga were themselves dependent on the two opposing, but equally powerful, forces shaping the course of the German administration in the district - the former on the support of the Bethel missionaries with their headquarters at Mlalo, the latter on the German settlers and plantation companies for whom he provided cheap land¹²⁶ and labour. Of all the Kilindi chiefs, Kibanga had benefited most from German rule, having been chief of Bondei in 1890, chief of Handei, East Usambara, between 1890 and June 1895, regent at Vugha between June and September 1895 and chief of Bumbuli, the most important Kilindi sub-chiefdom, from September 1895 till his death in 1908.¹²⁷

125. Vital records on local events during this period have either been destroyed or lost during the 1st World War. See Notes and Commentaries on Political Events in Masinde (West Usambara) and the Wakilindi Dynasty of Vugha from 1892-1895, Tanga Regional Book, MF5, TNA Dar-es-Salaam.

126. In December 1893 Kibanga had leased a 4000 hectare piece of land to the Usambara Coffee Company for a period of 100 years for only 100 Rupees. See Meinecke to KA, 19.1. 1894, DZA, RKA 445.

127. Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.184.

The retention of these chiefs must not be construed as German support for the principle of traditional chieftainship; for the only principle which had always determined the nature of German administrative action in Usambara was utility. This, in fact, explains why a man like Tupa of Bungu, who was well-known for his opposition to Kilindi rule, was made the akida of his area.¹²⁸ The creation of this mixed administrative system of chiefs and akidas, and the direct intervention of German plantation managers and settlers in the field of labour recruitment, had continued to weaken the power of these chiefs. It was therefore to restore the declining influence of the local chiefs (Jumbe) that the Bethel missionaries at Mlalo asked that labour recruitment should be left entirely in the hands of the chiefs, who would show more consideration for the welfare of their subjects.¹²⁹ But this demand was apparently not met, as it would have meant not only the reversal of German administrative policy in Usambara, but also the dismantlement of the Wilhelmstal system, which was the lifeblood of German enterprise in the district.

The concern of the von Götzen administration to strengthen the economic and political power of the German settler community had also been expressed in the exclusion, in 1904, of coloured representatives from the Communal councils established by Governor Edward von Liebert in the nine civil districts of the protectorate in 1898.¹³⁰ This reversal of Liebert's policy of multi-racial

128. Ibid; and Rohde to Directors of the Kaffee Plantage Sakarre A.G., Berlin, 23.10. 1908, DZA, RKA 701.

129. Haber to KG, 12.1. 1905, DZA, RKA 118.

130. Götzen to KA, 28.12. 1903, TNA G1/130,

development was in response to the growing chauvinism of the German settlers, who had demanded the restriction of the right to representation only to the 'master race',¹³¹ in spite of the fact that the councils receive 50% of the African hut tax and performed the functions of local government. What influenced von Götzen's policy on this issue was not merely the fact that coloured representatives were unable to follow the debates,¹³² but the fact that the government was suspicious of them, particularly the akida members. In Wilhelmstal, where akidas had in June 1903 embarrassed the local administration by giving vital information to its critics on what were supposed to be secret proceedings at the District Office,¹³³ the District Officer had reported to the Central government in Dar-es-Salaam that the representation of Africans by akidas was dangerous.¹³⁴ Since the Kiramba case had proved that akidas could easily identify themselves with the local African population against their German masters, akida representation on the District Councils must have been seen as a dangerous precedent, which could provide a platform for the expression of anti-settler and, therefore, anti-government African opinions.

The month after the historic meeting of Herr Haber with the Bethel missionaries at Mlalo was to see the strengthening of the position of the German settler community in Wilhelmstal, for it

131. For a detailed discussion of Götzen's political and economic concessions to German settlers see Bald, D., Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1900-1914, Munich, 1970.

132. Götzen to KA, 28.12. 1904, loc. cit.

133. Johannsen to KG, 16.6. 1903, TNA, G9/36.

134. BA Wilhelmstal to Government, 16.1. 1904, TNA, G4/89.

was on February 19th 1905 that the extension of the Usambara railway from Korogwe to Mombo was officially opened by Prince Adalbert of Prussia.¹³⁵ During his visit to the district, the Prince who was third in succession to the Imperial throne, had stayed at Sakarrani, as the guest of the Usambara German settler leader, Tom von Prince,¹³⁶ thus demonstrating the support of the German royal family for the development of white settlement in the protectorate. The extension of the railway to Mombo was itself significant for two major reasons. First, it now meant the easing of the transportation problem, which had long proved an obstacle to the economic exploitation of the district, as the product of the plantations could henceforth be cheaply carried down to the coast. Secondly, it ensured the security of the German settlers, since troops could be easily and more quickly moved from the coast in the event of an African revolt. In fact, the new railway terminus at Rombo, which was declared a municipality in October 1904,¹³⁷ was intended to serve as the bridge-head of German economic and military power in the north-east. Its comprehensive plan of eleven large plantations, sixteen European living quarters and an African location with a provision for 120 housing units, which was approved in October 1905, also included its own hotel and inn.¹³⁸ The approval of this ambitious plan at a time when the Maji Maji rebellion against oppressive German rule

135. See Paasche, H., Deutsch-Ostafrika, Hamburg, 1913, p.120 and Schnee, H., Deutsches Kolonial Lexicon, Bd. III, p.532.

136. See Schmiedel, H., 'Bwana Sakkarani: Captain Tom von Prince and His Times' in TNR No.52, March 1959, p.48.

137. Paasche, H., op. cit., p.120.

138. Ibid.

was raging ferociously in the south-east, was indeed, a measure of German confidence as well as an indication of their tight grip on the north east.

The non-involvement of the African peoples of this region in the rebellion was not due to the absence of the same kind of abuses which had precipitated it. Akida rule which was partly blamed for its outbreak¹³⁹ was certainly more intensive in the two settler dominated districts of Tanga and Wilhelmstal. In the latter, where the emphasis on akida rule had become more pronounced since the extension of the Usambara railway to Korogwe in 1902 and the abdication of Simbamwene Kinyashi of Vugha in the following year, four main akidas had been created. These were the akidas of Korogwe,¹⁴⁰ Mombo, Wilhelmstal (Lushoto) and Kihurio in Southern Pare,¹⁴¹ each of which was served by a number of sub-akidas. In Kilimanjaro, where coast-type akidas were not the main instruments of German local government, 'chiefs' created for the acephalous peoples of the Arusha/Meru area were no less resented for their artificiality and lack of traditional authority.¹⁴² Even in Uchagga, where the power of the traditional chiefs had been considerably increased, chiefs performed functions which were no less odious than those of the akidas- the collection of the hut tax and the recruitment of labour both for the German settlers and for the local administration. In fact, the Holy Ghost Fathers at Kilema

139. See Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.181.

140. The first Korogwe akida was one Ngoma, 'a freed-slave', who was later moved to Kihurio. See 'Masinde Notes' in Tanga Regional Book, TNA Dar-es-Salaam and Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.184.

141. BA Wilhelmstal to Government, 9.7. 1906, TNA, G4/87.

142. For official criticism of this policy see 'Report of the Privy Councillor Haber on the political situation on Kilimanjaro, 5.3. 1904, DZA, RKA 700.

had believed that 'Kilimanjaro would have supported the Maji Maji rebels if they had had more success'.¹⁴³

In the north-east, as in the Maji Maji area, the maltreatment of Africans was prevalent. High officials, including von Götzen himself, had supported the right of German employers to use the whip on their African workers in order to maintain discipline.¹⁴⁴ Dr. Stuhlmann, the Governor's second-in-command, was even of the opinion that it would be unfair to deny to German employers of labour the right enjoyed by Arab slave owners.¹⁴⁵ His ideal appeared to have been a master-slave relationship between the German plantation manager and his African labourers. And this Stuhlmann ideal was the normal order of things, particularly in Tanganyika, as evidenced by the report of Dr. Dernburg on his East African tour of July/August 1907. According to this man, who was the first German colonial Secretary, the main consideration of the German settlers was

'to make as much money as possible and keep wages as low as possible'.¹⁴⁶

Also, strongly criticizing the indiscriminate use of the whip by German officials, Dernburg says inter alia:

143. Kieran, J.A.P., 'The Holy Ghost Fathers in East Africa, 1863-1914', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1966, p.313.

144. Götzen to KA, 14.3. 1902, DZA, RKA 5073.

145. Stuhlmann to KA, 18.1. 1903, DZA, RKA 5378.

146. See Secret Report of the Secretary of State in the Imperial Colonial Office Bernhard Dernburg on his colonial tour of 13th July to 30th October, 1907, DZA, RKA 300.

'...In Dar-esSalaam nearly every European carried a whip. I even found one on the table of the principal Pay Office. In the main office of the Usambara railway one lay directly near the ink-stand, thus permitting every European to whip any black that suits his fancy...'147

In March 1905, a few months before the outbreak of the Maji Maji rebellion, Hans Meyer, then District Officer for Wilhelmstal, had complained not only about the excessive demands of the German settlers and plantation managers for labour, but also about bad conditions on the plantations and the starvation wages paid to African workers. He had reported that although the price of a normal daily ration of rice was 14 pesa, the African forced labourer received only 12 pesa a day.¹⁴⁸ But in spite of this, Africans were realistic enough to appreciate the futility of an anti-German revolt. They were close enough to the coast to know the severity with which the German had suppressed the Bushiri rebellion, and to see how greatly strengthened the German military position in the region had been ever since. Perhaps the best demonstration of this African realism was that offered by the mass migration of the Nyamwezi, particularly from their labour camp in Wilhelmstal, into British East Africa. For these migrant labourers, who had been settled in West Usambara in 1905¹⁴⁹ to help relieve the labour pressure on the Shambaa and to solve the problem of labour shortage, considered migration from German East Africa as the most effective way of showing their disapproval of German rule.

147. Ibid.

148. BA Wilhelmstal to Government, 23.3. 1905, DZA, RKA 118

149. See Balance Sheet on Nyamwezi Settlement in Wilhelmstal, 1905, TNA G3/89, p.27.

Hans Meyer, who was sent in April 1905 by the central government in Dar-es-Salaam to British East Africa to investigate this migration which was damaging vital German economic interests, had reported that forced labour, bad conditions on the plantations, the lust of German planters for African land in cultivation by African farmers and poor pay were the main causes of the discontent which had motivated it.¹⁵⁰ From these interviews with some of these Nyamwezi and the Sukuma, thousands of whom were engaged in the British territory as porters, railway workers, sailors and ship-hands, plantation workers, soldiers and police men, his impression was that what they hated most in German East Africa was the indiscriminate use of the whip.¹⁵¹ This impression was also reinforced by the investigations conducted by Dr. Brode, the German Vice-Consul in Mombasa at the time of Hans Meyer's visit, who later said:

'... I cannot help stating that the general impression amongst natives is that their treatment is not so good in German East Africa as in British territory. Often when I asked the Wanyamwezi why they did not remain in their own country instead of living in British East Africa, I heard the reply that they are too severely treated in German East Africa .. Furthermore corporal punishment, which is by far more effective than fines and imprisonment, is adopted more frequently under German jurisdiction than it is by the British authorities.'¹⁵²

Although Hans Meyer had come down very heavily in his report on the excessive use of the whip, he had nevertheless strongly re-

150. Meyer to KG, 2.4. 1906, DZA, RKA 119 also printed in Müller F.F., Kolonien unter der Peitsche, Berlin (East) 1962, pp. 51-53.

151. Ibid.

152. Brode, H., British and German East Africa, London 1911, pp. 94-95.

commended the tightening up of security along the German border to prevent the movement of such vital labour from the protectorate.¹⁵³

The sullen mood of African discontent in this region was therefore unmistakable. It was the realization of this mood that influenced the 'nervous' proposals of Herr Zache, the District officer at Tanga, that Governor von Götzen should authorize the drafting of askari police from 'the three neighbouring districts' for the protection of the plantation district in Usambara shortly after the outbreak of the Maji Maji rebellion.¹⁵⁴ Although the Governor had believed that there was no danger of the rebellion spreading to the north-east, he had nevertheless decided on the expedient of sending Wilhelm Methner, who had previously served as a land Commissioner in Tanganital, and whom the Africans had learned to trust, on 'a meet-the-people' tour of the area.¹⁵⁵ Now that the Maji Maji rebellion had demonstrated that oppressed Africans were capable of united action transcending tribal lines, even in the face of the most terrifying odds,¹⁵⁶ German policy-makers were to show more sensitivity to African problems. And this was to lead to the adoption of a liberal reform programme after the termination of the pro-settler administration of Count von Götzen in April 1906.

153. Meyer to KG, 2.4. 1906, loc. cit.

154. See Methner, W., Unter drei Gouverneuren - 16 Jahre Dienst in deutschen Tropen, Breslau, 1938, p.80.

155. Ibid.

156. See Götzen's account of this rebellion in Götzen, Graf von, Deutsch-Ostafrika im Aufstand, Berlin 1909. See pp. 48-63.

Chapter 7

Reform and Reaction, 1907-1914

It is indeed a paradox that the governorship of Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenberg, which was to see the introduction of liberal reforms into German East Africa, had begun rather inauspiciously with the continuation of the white settlement policy of the previous Gotzen administration. The commitment of the central government in Dar es Salaam to this policy had, in fact, been re-inforced early in May 1906 shortly before the arrival of the new Governor by a directive from the Colonial Department in Berlin urging every possible assistance for the Russian German immigrants then about to set out for Kilimanjaro.¹ Plans for the settlement of these immigrants, who were the victims of Russian anti-Germanism in the Caucasus,² had been laid out under von Gotzen with the support of the German Colonial Society. The chief promoter of this settlement scheme, Pastor Rosenberg, the chairman of the Settlement Committee of the society, had in April 1906 secured the co-operation of Count von Pfeil,³ one of the pioneers of German colonization in East Africa, who had himself believed that such a settlement was 'conducive to the rational development of the protectorate'.⁴ Since this settlement, which was conceived primarily as

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1. KA to Government, Dar es Salaam, 2.5. 1906, TNA, G8/62.
 2. See Report of the Lutheran missionary Krause on these settlers in an extract from the Evangelisches Lutherisches Missionsblatt, No. 24 of 15.12. 1906 in TNA, G8/63.
 3. Rosenberg to von Pfeil, 11.4. 1906, No. 32, Nachlass J. von Pfeil, DZA, Potsdam.
 4. von Pfeil to Rosenberg, 17.4. 1906, No. 32 Nachl. J. von Pfeil, DZA, Potsdam.

a humanitarian venture, was associated with a man like Count von Pfeil, who was an advocate of colonial reforms,⁵ it was comparatively easy for Rechenberg to give it his support.

The support of the Colonial Department and the central authorities in Dar es Sallaam for this settlement had, however, led to the attacks of the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, the leading organ of the settler communities in the protectorate, on a scheme which they believed 'would damage the prestige of the white man'.⁶ Apart from their criticism of the poor status of the immigrants, who had finally arrived in Kilimanjaro at the end of June 1906,⁷ they had quarrelled with the choice of Meru as the place of settlement. To make the scheme a success they had suggested that the immigrants be given land in Uchagga, particularly in Kibosho, Kindi and North Kibognoto where, as they argued, there was vacant land with a good climate and abundant supply of black labour.⁸ Since these suggestions were an indirect attack on the land policy of the central government, whose objective, even under the pro-settler von Gotzen, was to keep European settlers away from land under African cultivation,⁹ they were an indication of the clash that was to ensue between Rechenberg and the settler communities. For what the European settlers wanted was

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5. See Pfeil's article in Koloniale Zeitung, 27.2. 1902 cited in the British Memorandum on the Administration of German colonies, with special reference to the Treatment of Natives, No. 16, War Dept., F.O. 371/2860, PRO, London.
 6. Extract from the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, No. 29 of 1906, TNA, G8/6241.
 7. Abel to German East African Settlement Committee in Berlin, 13.9. 1906, TNA, G8/632.
 8. Extract from the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, No. 29 of 1906, loc. cit.
 9. See Information for Settlers in Moshi District, 1905, in No. 32, Nachl. J. Von Pfeil, DZA.

the commitment of the government to a white settler policy, which would define the roles of Africans only in terms of their ability to supply cheap labour. But since von Gotzen's policy in this respect had already been rejected by the new policy makers in Berlin, who preferred a policy of balanced development,¹⁰ Rechenberg's refusal to fulfill the desires of the settlers was to lead to bitter opposition to the liberal reform programme to be launched by him under the direction of the Colonial Secretary, Bernhard Dernburg.

The blow dealt to the pride of the settler communities by government support for the settlement of the 'poor' Russian-Germans in Meru was softened by Rechenberg's adoption of the plan already made by the Gotzen administration to convert Moshi, along with Tabora and Mpwapa, into civil districts in the autumn of 1906.¹¹ Although he was in a good position to change this decision, the implementation of which had been suspended by the interim administration under Haber,¹² Rechenberg had refused to do so. For he seemed to have preferred a policy which would contribute to the gradual termination of military rule in the protectorate. In Kilimanjaro, where the conflict between the military authorities and the Christian missionaries had been a constant source of embarrassment to the central government, this would no doubt prove a welcome change.

10. Although this had not yet been clearly worked out in 1906, there was a sign of it in Dernburg and Rechenberg's opposition to a discriminatory legislation against Asian traders. See Iliffe, J., *op. cit.*, p.95.

11. Methner, W., *op. cit.*, p.117.

12. *Ibid.*, p.118.

However, while continuing von Götzen's policy on the replacement of military administrations in the interior with settler-controlled communal councils, Rechenberg had refused to abandon the akida system.¹³ For unlike his predecessor, who would certainly have scrapped it, he still considered it a vital administrative instrument, not only on the coast where there were no established chiefs, but also in a district like Wilhelmstal, where von Götzen's economic policies had contributed to the disintegration of traditional political institutions. What he thought was needed to prevent the system from becoming an instrument of petty tyranny was a much closer supervision.¹⁴ Although his ideal was the creation of a modern bureaucracy, the type of which was later developed in the coastal districts as well as in Wilhelmstal, Rechenberg was also prepared 'to administer the interior through the chiefs if these were given literate clerks'.¹⁵ This, in fact, explains why he had immediately appointed Wilhelm Methner, who was then in charge of the political affairs department at Dar es Salaam, a man interested in experimenting with indirect rule through chiefs, as the first District Officer of the new civil district of Moshi. Moreover, continued political unrest in Kilimanjaro, as well as the conflicts between the European settlers and the Christian missionaries, had dictated the need for the appointment of an experienced officer like Methner, who was well acquainted with the problems of the European settlers as well as with African feelings on the land question.

13. Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.181.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p.182.

The arrival of the new District Officer in Moshi towards the end of 1906, when the outgoing military commandant, Lt. Abel, was away in Rombo with the 1st company of the protectorate troops dealing with an anti-Sengua opposition in Usseri,¹⁶ could not have been more opportune. For the unrest in Usseri at once showed how easy it was for Africans to be tyrannized by unpopular chiefs who were enjoying the support of the local administration. Sengua, who had since the fall of Marealle in December 1904 become the overlord of Rombo,¹⁷ had ordered the people of Usseri, who were obviously opposed to his overlordship, to surrender all their arms, spears and bows, ostensibly as a precautionary measure, 'to prevent them from staging a revolt'.¹⁸ Methner, who was himself present in Usseri when the crisis was 'temporarily' resolved, had formed the impression that Sengua had taken this decision not just to provide for the security of the German station but, 'understandably', for his own personal security as well.¹⁹ This crisis must have convinced him of the danger of creating unpopular paramountcies, which were capable of bringing the administration into disrepute with the African population. This was why he had not reinstated Marealle of Marangu as chief in his chiefdom,²⁰ in spite of the promises made to him by von Gotzen. But while not reinstating him, Methner had ensured that there was peace in the chiefdom by appointing Marealle's successor not from among his several enemies but from his own clan.

16. Methner, W., op. cit., p.120.

17. For details of this, see Chp. 6.

18. Methner, W., op. cit., p.120.

19. Ibid., p.121.

20. Ibid., p.142.

The new chief was 'a very influential man, one of Marealle's father's brothers'.²¹ Having appointed him, Methner then made it clear to the councillors during the chief's official installation, that he would like to receive reports about his well-being and that of the other unsuccessful claimants.²² To make things easier for the new chief, Marealle had to move out of Bura, the capital of the chiefdom, to live the life of a simple commoner with one of his many wives, who was a sister of the chief of Moshi.²³

Peace in Uchagga now allowed Methner to devote his attention not only to the problems of administrative reorganization but to those raised by European settlement, particularly in Arusha/Meru. As soon as the civil administration was established, the 1st company of the army, stationed in Moshi since August 1892,²⁴ was moved to Arusha.²⁵ This decision was taken to prevent a conflict between the new civil administration and the military, who had exercised political power for so long, and also to provide adequately for the security of German settlers then moving into the Arusha/Meru region. The Arusha fort, which had been established on the orders of von Götzen in 1904 to keep an eye on the Masai,²⁶ now became not only a sub-station of the Moshi district, but also the new stronghold of the military in the district. Under the command of Capt. Senfrend, and later of Capt. Brentzel who replaced him in 1907, the military authorities

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. See Chp. 4.

25. Methner, W., op. cit., p.122.

26. See Schnee, H., Deutsches Kolonial Lexicon, Band I., p. 84

in Arusha managed to establish a harmonious relationship with the District Officer in Moshi, who was responsible for the political administration of the whole district.²⁷ The transfer of the 1st company from Moshi meant that a police force would have to be created to assist the civil administration in the enforcement of law and order. This was done by the conversion of the older and more experienced members of the army into the new police force. Sixty of these were stationed in Moshi, thirty in Arusha, and twenty in Mbulu.²⁸ This force operated under the command of Major von Prittwitz, who was directly responsible to the District Officer.²⁹

After the completion of these administrative arrangements, Methner turned his attention to the problems of European settlement. In a report to Dar es Salaam in December 1906, in which he called for a well-conceived settler programme, Methner also warned that European settlement in the thickly-populated areas of Kilimanjaro was bound to lead to conflicts between the European settlers and the native Africans.³⁰ In his personal assessment of settlement possibilities in Uchagga, he believed that land could only be found for between 20 and 30 European settlers without interfering with the needs of the Chagga themselves.³¹ He was already aware of the number and nationalities of the eight European settlers then resident in

27. Methner, W., op. cit., p.122.

28. Ibid., p.121.

29. Ibid.

30. Methner to KG, 12.12. 1906, DZA, RKA 701¹².

31. Ibid.

Uchagga, having been Land Commissioner at the time of their arrival. Three of these were Germans, two of whom, Domke and Sauerbrunn, were also active as traders.³² There were also three Italians and two Greeks. One of these Greeks was Meimaridis, a successful transporter, operating an ox-cart service between Moshi and the Voi station of the British Uganda railway, who also had the largest coffee plantation in Kilimanjaro.³³ The other was Filios, also a coffee planter.³⁴

But as he knew practically nothing about the South African Boers who had settled in Arusha in July 1904 when he was on home leave in Germany,³⁵ Methner had to ask Herr Zencke, the officer in charge of the Arusha sub-station for information about them early in February 1907.³⁶ The information he received showed that by the end of February 1907, only three Boer families - those of Messrs Malan, De Wet and Louis Albert - were then living on land allocated to them in Engare Nairobi and Nanyuki in the Masai steppe.³⁷ According to one of these settlers, Louis Albert, who was the only one given a ranger's licence, the settlement had been subjected to constant harassments from the Meru.³⁸ It was the atmosphere of insecurity created by the raids of the people of Meru, and particularly the raw and frontier aspects of life on the European settlement, with which the Boers were already familiar in South Africa, that forced

32. See Bleicken to District Court, Tanga, 6.1. 1906, TNA, G9/32.

33. Methner, W., op. cit., p.181.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p.59.

36. Methner to Arusha Nebenstelle (NBS) 1.2. 1907, TNA, G31/5.

37. Arusha NBS to BA Moshi, 28.2. 1907, TNA, G31/5.

38. Louis Albert to Arusha NBS, 30.3. 1907, TNA, G31/5.

some of the Russian-German settlers to abandon their settlement at Leudorf (Leganga). By October 1907, two of the four families settled there - the Borchens and Schillings - had moved down south to the railway terminus at Mombo to find work.³⁹ They were so completely destitute that Rechenberg had to grant their request to be sent back to Germany,⁴⁰ without even first obtaining clearance from the Colonial Office in Berlin.⁴¹

The difficulties of the Russian-German settlers had, however, not prevented Methner from proceeding with the arrangements to establish a District Council in Moshi. By March 1907, he had proposed to Dar es Salaam the nomination of ten members, the first five of whom would be the permanent members while the other five would serve as replacements.⁴² Among these five, unofficial permanent members were two missionaries, Pastor Althaus of the Lutheran mission at Mamba and the Father Superior Dürr, of the Holy Ghost Fathers' mission at Kibosho.⁴³ Their alternates were Pastor Fokken of the Lutheran mission station at Mkwaranga in Meru and Father Balthasar of the Catholic mission in Kilema.⁴⁴ These missionaries were expected to represent African interests and to place their rich experience in native affairs at the disposal of the Council.⁴⁵ The European

39. BA Tanga to Government, 24.10. 1907, TNA, G8/63.

40. KG to BA, Tanga, October 1907, (Telegram), TNA, G8/63⁶⁵.

41. KG to RKA, 28.10. 1907, TNA, G8/63⁶⁶⁻⁶⁷.

42. BA, Moshi to KG, 8.3. 1907, TNA G4/117¹⁻³.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

settler community was represented by three permanent members, who were all Germans. These were Domke of Kibognoto, Uffert of Arusha and König, the manager of the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company's estate at Kibohöhe in Machame.⁴⁶ Their substitutes were Louis of Weru-Weru valley, Mühl of Arusha and Richter of Rombo. The exclusion of the Italian and Greek settlers, who had long been resident in the district, had appeared even more discriminatory as most of the German settlers appointed to the Council had only recently arrived in Kilimanjaro. Since these proposals were in full accord with the Imperial Decree of 29.1. 1904⁴⁷ as well as with the Governor's circular of 18.4. 1907 on the representation of African interest on the District Councils, they were approved by the central government.⁴⁸ Duly constituted, the Moshi District then met for the first time on August 30, 1907, under the chairmanship of Wilhelm Methner, the District Officer.⁴⁹

Although the records of this Council are incomplete, it is still possible to see clearly that the Council itself was conceived as an instrument of German settler domination. Essentially, it was a place where the conflicting interests of the German settlers, the missionaries and the local administration were harmoniously reconciled. For example, its first meeting on August 30, 1907, was

46. Ibid.

47. Reference to this in Runderlass, 9.2. 1909, TNA, G4/117²⁷.

48. KG to BA Moshi, 31.7. 1907, TNA G4/117⁴.

49. See Minutes of the Moshi District Council, 30.8. 1907, TNA, G4/117¹⁰⁻¹¹.

completely devoted to the needs of the settlers for labour, of the missionaries for free medical services for Europeans, and of the District Office for the collection and spending of the hut tax.⁵⁰

All the members were unanimous in their opinion that this tax should be increased in the following financial year so as to exert pressure on the Africans to work for wages.⁵¹ Under the influence of the settlers, Methner, hitherto considered a liberal, even promised to consider the possibility of introducing a variant of the Wilhelmstal labour card system into some parts of the district.⁵² Considering the fact that this system had by 1905 practically destroyed Shambala peasant agriculture,⁵³ it is hardly surprising that Rechenberg had refused to sanction it, appropriately describing the system as 'a new form of slavery or forced labour'.⁵⁴ So desperate were the German settlers for labour that they secured the co-operation of the missionaries on the Council for the imposition of a tax on native beer (Pombe) in November 1907.⁵⁵ Since beer drinking was popular among the Chagga, it was hoped that this tax would induce them to work for wages to pay for it. It was the same settler pressure that influenced Methner's proposals to stop coffee-growing by the Chagga, which were equally condemned by the Governor as discriminatory.⁵⁶

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. For details of this see Chp. 6., p.267.

54. Rechenberg to BA Moshi, 24.10. 1907, DZA, RKA 120¹⁰⁵⁻¹⁰⁸, also, Iliffee, J., op. cit., p.138.

55. Minutes of the Moshi District Council, 30.8. 1907, loc. cit.

56. Rechenberg to BA Moshi, 24.10. 1907, loc. cit., and Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.170.

Methner's desire to promote the cause of German economic development was further reflected in his decision that commissions paid to chiefs from the hut tax collected in their chiefdoms would henceforth be paid partly in cash and partly in German products like shoes, clothes and building materials.⁵⁷ His motive was to encourage the introduction of German manufactured products into the Kilimanjaro market and prevent the chiefs from spending their money frivolously on 'worthless articles', mostly from British India, sold by the Indian merchants who controlled the Kilimanjaro retail trade.⁵⁸ To execute this decision, he called a Chiefs'Conference in Moshi, apparently early in 1908, during which he made the chiefs indicate the kind of products they desired from a given list. After this had been done, he then assisted the Indian merchants to place an order for them in Germany through the Berlin Chamber of Commerce.⁵⁹ He subsequently ensured that the products the Indians sold were ordered not from Bombay but from Hamburg in Germany.⁶⁰

The third meeting of the Moshi District Council, which took place in July 1908, is of particular interest because of the concern members expressed about the powers of chiefs. Although it was generally agreed that those should be strengthened 'as long as it was not harmful to the natives and the settlers', it was strongly urged that punitive measures should be taken by the District Office against any kind of

57. Minutes of the Moshi District Council, 30.8. 1907, TNA, G4/117⁸⁻⁹.

58. Methner, W., op. cit., pp. 144-145.

59. Ibid., p.145.

60. Ibid.

excesses.⁶¹ The position taken on the abuses of chiefly power must have been influenced by the unrest in Rombo resulting from the tyranny of Sengua. Much as he was unwilling to change the administrative policy of the previous military regime, Methner was compelled to depose Sengua when it became clear that the opposition to him in Rombo was not due to his dependence on the German administration but to the fact that he had taken advantage of this to enrich himself at the expense of his subjects.⁶² After deposing Sengua, for whom a new residence was found in another chiefdom, the District Officer ensured that the successor was one of the ex-chief's many sons, who was considered 'loyal and dutiful'.⁶³ Thus, as in the case of Marealle, power had not fallen into the hands of those hostile to Sengua.

Methner's determination to continue the policy of his military predecessors had also influenced his decision to maintain in power, chief Ndawa of Mwika, who had been appointed in place of the ex-chief Mbararia, alias Ndemassi, in spite of the opposition of the Lutheran missionaries.⁶⁴ The only concession he appeared to have made was to allow Mbararia to return from Meru, where he had been forced to stay as a result of pressure from Lt. Abel, the last commandant of the Moshi Military district.⁶⁵ But soon after his arrival in Mwika to live as a commoner like Marealle of Marangu, a fresh crisis was sparked off

61. Minutes of the Moshi District Council, 13.7. 1908, TNA G4/117²²⁻²³.

62. Methner, W., op. cit., p.149.

63. Ibid.

64. Methner to KG, 6.2. 1908, TNA, G9/32.

65. For details see Chp. 6, p.255.

in April 1907 by the new chief's attempt to recover some of the cattle which the military authorities had allotted to Mbararia in 1906.⁶⁶ As a result of this obvious act of highhandedness, the Lutheran missionary Stammberg had to protest directly to Dar es Salaam, especially as Ndawa had put it out that he had been authorised to do so by the District Office. In the investigations conducted into the incident by the District Administration, it was revealed that the fundamental cause was the struggle for power in Mwika, and that the bitterness of the Lutheran missionaries to the local administration was as a result of sheer determination to secure the reinstatement of Mbararia, who was described as 'an old patron of the mission'.⁶⁷ Although he still stood by his decision not to restore Mbararia, Methner saw to it that the ex-chief was given back 13 cows and 17 calves, which had been confiscated by Chief Ndawa.⁶⁸

His adoption of the native policy of the previous military regime was not merely dictated by the need to ensure administrative continuity but was largely influenced by his own philosophy of native administration. Methner, who seemed to have relished the role of paramount ruler carved for him by the Chagga,⁶⁹ was evidently unwilling to see the prestige of the institution of chieftainship damaged by constant depositions and reshufflements influenced by pressures from

66. Methner to KG, 6.2. 1908, loc. cit.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Methner, W., op. cit., p.143. The Chagga applied to him the greetings only reserved for chiefs.

popular movements which were themselves capable of undermining vital German interests. It was not only necessary that chiefs be seen to owe their power to German support but that a situation of on-going crisis be maintained in order to keep the people divided so as to prevent the emergence of a dangerous anti-German movement.⁷⁰ This was a policy of Divide and Rule par excellence, in the adoption of which Methner's own experience of the Maji Maji rebellion must have had a certain influence.

Although Methner had stated that his native policy, which was based on the need 'to exploit the absolute power of the chiefs in the interest of the German administration',⁷¹ had been influenced by the British concept of Indirect Rule as developed in India and West Africa, his own administrative methods were different. For, under his own system, there were no institutionalized native councils, courts and treasuries, which were the essential ingredients of the British system of Indirect Rule. As District Officer, Methner, like his colleagues in other districts, was the ultimate political and judicial authority in all matters relating to native Africans, subject only to the overall control of the Governor.⁷² Although selected chiefs usually served as assessors in cases brought before the District Officer sitting in his capacity as a civil magistrate, these had no judicial powers of their own whatsoever. What approximated to a

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. For example, the execution of capital punishment required the approval of the Governor. See Methner's view in this in Ibid., pp. 162-163.

native council were the conferences of chiefs,⁷³ which met only ad hoc at the pleasure of the District Officer. It was because of his strong belief that only the District Office should represent African interests that Methner proposed to the central government, in January 1909, that the representation of missionaries on the Moshi District Council should be reduced by half.⁷⁴ These proposals had obviously been influenced by the German settlers, who had since August 1907 formed an exclusive Union of Kilimanjaro Farmers and Planters,⁷⁵ and who were now to secure increased representation on the reconstituted council.⁷⁶ Since the proposals had been made at a time when the usually pro-Government Catholic mission had become increasingly critical of the administration's co-operation with European settlers on the problem of child-labour,⁷⁷ Methner's intention was undoubtedly to strengthen the position of the German settler community. It is even significant that it was the permanent member of the Holy Ghost Fathers' Catholic mission on the Council, Father Balthasar of Kilema, who was reduced to the status of a substitute for the only missionary representative, the Lutheran Pastor Althaus of Mamba.⁷⁸ Although the retention of Pastor Althaus might have been influenced by the fact that he was a Prussian while Father Balthasar was an Alsatian of French nationality,⁷⁹ the District Office had probably wanted to exclude the Catholics from active

73. For the one held in 1908 see Ibid., p.144.

74. Methner to KG, 14.1. 1909, TNA, G4/117²⁷.

75. BA Moshi to KG, 8.8. 1907, TNA, G8/159¹. Methner says the union was 'temporarily' restricted to Germans.

76. Ibid.

77. See Kieran, JAP., op. cit., p.348; and Bulletin-General 1909/10, pp. 744-745.

78. Methner to KG, 14.1. 1909, loc. cit.

79. Ibid.

participation on the settler-dominated Council in view of their bitter disagreement with the European settlers on the problem of labour, particularly child-labour.⁸⁰ In any case, it would be much easier to deal with an isolated opposition from a single missionary representative on the Council than with a combined opposition from two missionaries. For Pastor Althaus was himself a strong opponent of the exploitation of child-labour by Europeans in Mamba.⁸¹

Although these proposals were eventually approved by the central government late in June, 1909,⁸² their implications had caused Rechenberg a great deal of concern. For, shortly after they had been received in Dar es Salaam, he had put out a circular to all the District Officers, drawing their attention to the Imperial Decree of 29.1. 1904, and to his own earlier circular of 18.4. 1907 on the representation of 'native interests' on the District Councils. Stressing that 'on the whole, these interests were better represented by teachers, former officials and missionaries than by planters, traders or businessmen',⁸³ Rechenberg asked that the name and occupation of the member representing these should be indicated when changes were being proposed. It was in compliance with this request that a new list of the members of the Moshi District Council showing their states of origin, and the occupations and interests they represented, was sent to Dar es Salaam from Moshi in March 1909.⁸⁴

80. There were, for example, legal battles between the Holy Ghost Fathers in Kibosho and the European settlers in 1909 over child-labour. See Kieran, JAP., op. cit., p.348.

81. Althaus to BA, Moshi, 5.3. 1909 cited in Eggert, J., op. cit., p.315.

82. KG to BA, Moshi, TNA, G4/117³⁰.

83. Runderlass, 9.2. 1909, TNA, G4/117²⁸.

84. Methner to KG, 15.3. 1909, TNA, G4/117.

The reaction of Rechenberg to Methner's proposals can only be understood within the context of the liberal reforms then being introduced by his administration under the direction of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, the Colonial Secretary in Berlin. Even before Dernburg could formulate his reform policy with particular reference to East Africa,⁸⁵ Rechenberg had quietly been assessing the local economic and political situation. Convinced that the Maji Maji rebellion had been caused primarily by economic factors,⁸⁶ he had refused to implement the decision taken during the last meeting of the Governor's Council under von Götzen on March 26, 1906, to raise the hut tax to 12 rupees per hut,⁸⁷ and this in spite of bitter attacks on the local settler press.⁸⁸ Since the proposals for increased taxation had been designed to help to solve the endemic problem of labour shortage by forcing Africans to work for wages on European plantations and other enterprises,⁸⁹ Rechenberg's refusal was a significant departure from the established policy of developing the economic resources of the protectorate primarily through the agency of the European settlers and plantation companies. For it was hoped that Africans, relieved from the pressures of oppressive and discriminatory taxation, would be able to make their own contributions to the economic development of the protectorate. The failure of European settlement schemes and the poor

85. This did not emerge until after his East African tour of August to October, 1907.

86. Rechenberg to RKA, 1906, DZA, RKA 1056⁵⁵ cited in Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.220.

87. See Extract from the Nationale Zeitung, 10.6. 1906, DZA, RKA 11935.

88. See Extract from the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 7.7. 1906, DZA, RKA 119.

89. See Extract from the Nationale Zeitung, 10.6. 1906, loc. cit.

results achieved by the plantation companies had combined to influence the Colonial Secretary, Dr. Dernburg, to make his famous declaration of policy in favour of developing the economy of the protectorate 'according to its natural resources, its indigenous products, and the natural experience of its native inhabitants'.⁹⁰ Since the African communities produced more than 90% of the total exports of the protectorate in 1906,⁹¹ it would certainly be bad policy to destroy the goose that laid the golden eggs.

The adoption of this new developmental policy meant that the native African population, whom Dernburg considered as 'the most important resource of the colonies and therefore a national asset',⁹² should be humanely treated and given legally guaranteed rights. Before embarking upon his colonial tour in July 1907, he had issued a directive to the colonial governments expressly restricting the power to flog only to public officials.⁹³ Although this was no more than a reactivation of the Wissmann ordinance of 1895,⁹⁴ the enforcement of which had apparently been suspended by the Götzen administration,⁹⁵ it showed his concern for the welfare of the African population. In the same year, he had seen to the promulgation of an Imperial

90. See Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.92.

91. See Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.233.

92. Pierard, R.V., 'The Dernburg Reform Policy and German East Africa', in TNR No. 67, June 1967, pp. 35-36.

93. Ibid. p.36.

94. See Deutsches Kolonialblatt, VII, No. 9, May, 1896, pp. 242-243.

95. For von Götzen's views on corporal punishment see Chp. 6,

Decree prohibiting any further sale of land under African cultivation to European settlers.⁹⁶ This was not merely a protectionist policy, but one calculated to encourage African production of cash crops. And shortly after his return from his East African tour, during which the representatives of the European settler community who met him in Tanga in October 1907 had sought to influence him to introduce stringent measures aimed at forcing Africans to work for them,⁹⁷ Dernburg had issued a directive, in March 1908, asking all officials to impose a 'certain limit between what is required and what is possible to accomplish'.⁹⁸

Under the progressive leadership of the Colonial Secretary, a series of reforms were then introduced in the protectorate by Governor Rechenberg. One of these were land reforms; following the 1907 Imperial Decree on land alienation, Rechenberg had instructed that a proper survey of African-owned land should be carried out especially in Tanganital, where these touched on European plantations. By August 1908, according to a report by Archdeacon Woodward of the Universities Mission to Central Africa's station in Msalabani, native reserves in Bondei had been mapped out 'to the satisfaction of the people'.⁹⁹ Those who had in the past been 'unlawfully deprived of their field and coconut palms have had them restored'.¹⁰⁰ This land reform policy had begun to yield rich dividends during the 1908/9

96. See Pierard, R.V. loc. cit., p.37.

97. See Iliffe, J., op. cit., pp. 84-85.

98. Dernburg to Government, German East Africa, 7.3. 1908, DZA, RKA, 121.

99. See Central Africa, vol. XXVI, November 1908, p.307.

100. Ibid.

financial year, even in spite of the sharp increase in the number of European plantations in the north-east.¹⁰¹ For example, it was reported from the Tanga district during 1908/9 that the Bondei had themselves begun to produce cash crops, recruiting paid labourers from other African communities to increase their production so as to meet the rising demand.¹⁰² In Western Usambara, African production of European potatoes for sale to German officials and other personnel connected with the extension of the Usambara railway had also considerably increased during the same period.¹⁰³ In Moshi district, the bad harvest of 1908/9 and the consequent rise in the cost of living had forced both the European settlers and the native Chagga to compete in the production of maize.¹⁰⁴ The result was that a hundredweight of maize accepted for between 4½ and 6 rupees in 1908/9 was delivered for only 1⅓ rupee in 1909/10.¹⁰⁵

The significance of the production of cash crops by Africans did not lie mainly in the fact that African products accounted for over 7 million Marks of the total export of 13 million Marks in 1909/10, even in spite of the boom in the price of plantation products like Indian rubber,¹⁰⁶ but in the expansion of the cash economy within the

101. Plantations increased from 364 in 1908/9 to 385 in 1909/10. See Die Deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1910/10, Berlin, 1911, p.15.

102. Ibid., p.14.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., p.16.

protectorate. This expansion was also greatly assisted by European investment capital, which was expended on labour recruitment for plantation development and railway construction;¹⁰⁷ this in turn helped to stimulate socio-economic development and differentiation among Africans. The result was not only the creation of a class of African labourers but also of an incipient African planting aristocracy, particularly in Moshi district, as also in Mwanza and Bukoba in the north-west, where Africans had begun to grow coffee in large commercial quantities.¹⁰⁸ Competition between this class of African cash crop producers and the European settlers led to conflicts between the latter and the central government in Dar es Salaam, whose policies had encouraged this development.

Since Rechenberg's land policy had not prevented European settlers from acquiring 'crown land' for plantation purposes, conflicts between him and the settler communities and their associations¹⁰⁹ were not particularly over land but mainly over labour questions and the treatment of African workers. For between 1908 and 1910 the following hectares of land were made available for plantation development in the north east:¹¹⁰

107. Ibid. In 1909/10 28,512 workers were employed in Tanga, Wilhelmstal (Lushoto) and Pangani districts alone.

108. See Austen, R., North-West Tanzania under German and British Rule, New Haven and London, 1968, p.98, and in Iliffe, J., op. cit., pp. 169-170.

109. For these settler associations, See Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.84.

110. See Table II.1^A, Statistics Section, in Die Deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1910/11, Berlin, 1912, pp. 66-67.

	<u>Freehold</u>	<u>Leasehold</u>
1. Tanga	- 25 Grants - 12,385 hectares	68 Grants - 31,928 hectares
2. Wilhelmstal 18	" - 10,539 "	74 " - 23,557 "
3. Moshi	- 27 " - 4,131 "	61 " - 30,841 "

In fact, apart from their opposition to Rechenberg's administrative reforms of April 1909, the objective of which was to destroy their political power and privileges by the abolition of the communes and the centralization of governmental authority in Dar es Salaam,¹¹¹ the most potent source of conflict was the labour question. Paradoxically, the aim of the Labour Ordinance of February 27, 1909, which regulated working conditions on German plantations,¹¹² was not only to provide for the welfare of African workers but also to prevent the collapse of European plantation agriculture as a result of mass desertion by African labourers. In his reply to the criticism of the sections of this ordinance which provided for board, paid holidays and a six-month contract for African workers by the powerful Association of German East African Plantations of Berlin, Rechenberg had warned that

' ... once plantation work has been discredited, it will be difficult to recruit workers in the interior, and no government regulations would have any effect as soon as the view had gained ground in the populated districts of the interior that work on one's shamba was more lucrative than work on the plantations'.¹¹³

111. For details of this see Bald, D., op. cit., pp. 75-93, and Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.89.

112. For the provisions of this ordinance see Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1909, pp. 367-370.

113. Rechenberg to Wegener, n.d. (1909) TNA, G8/161¹⁰⁻¹³.

Although this Association later agreed with the Governor that 'it was in the interest of the Government as well as the plantations' for working conditions to be regularized, it had refused to accept the provision guaranteeing the right of workers to demand payment on Sundays, the officially declared day of rest, arguing that this 'would jeopardize profitability'.¹¹⁴

The opposition of the Territorial Economic Association of German East Africa (Wirtschaftliche Landesverbände von Deutsch-Ostafrika), founded in Dar es Salaam on June 18, 1909, by the representatives of the 'independent' settler communities,¹¹⁵ to these labour reforms was even more reactionary.¹¹⁶ Although this association was worried about profitability, like that of the big plantation proprietors in Berlin it was chiefly concerned with the principle that the protectorate should be developed exclusively in the interest of the white settler population.¹¹⁷ Believing that the development of European plantation enterprise and not of African peasant agriculture should be the goal of economic planning, it demanded that the return to the system of forced labour as well as the extension of the workers' contract period from six months to three years.¹¹⁸ In order to compel Africans to work on the plantations for wages, it called for the

114. Association of German East African Plantations to Rechenberg January 1910, TNA G8/16123-24.

115. See Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.171, and Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.238.

116. For example, the Usambara Post, the organ of the settlers in the northern districts called them 'a premium on laziness'. See Usambara Post, 20.3. 1909.

117. See Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 26.6. 1909.

118. Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.238.

raising of the poll and hut tax from three to twelve rupees,¹¹⁹ just as Count von Gotzen had intended to do before his departure from East Africa in April 1906.¹²⁰

The combined, and indeed, bitter opposition of the European settler communities in the protectorate and their patrons in Germany did not, however, prevent Dernburg and Rechenberg from proceeding with their reform programme. For example, by the end of the 1909/10 financial year, two of the District Commissions provided for under section 19 of the Labour Ordinance of February 27, 1909 to supervise labour relations, had been established in the north-east.¹²¹ The Muheza commission, which was the first to be established in Tanganital, was followed in February 1910 by another at Mombo, which controlled Wilhelmstal.¹²² According to the 1909/10 report on these commissions, in which it was stated that within a short period of two months the Mombo Commission had 'undertaken a considerable reduction in the labour contracts of the plantation workers', the complaints of Africans centred mainly on non-payment of wages and arbitrary and wrongful dismissal.¹²³

Rechenberg's concern for justice and fair play, which was reflected in his labour reforms, was also extended into the field of penal reforms. A few weeks after issuing the controversial Labour

119. Ibid.

120. See Extract from the Nationale Zeitung, 10.6. 1906, DZA, RKA 11935.

121. Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1909/10, Berlin, 1911, p.17.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

Ordinance, he had sent out a circular to all his officials explaining their role as conciliators between the African worker and his European employer, and asking that the interests of both parties be equally protected.¹²⁴ In fact, Rechenberg would tolerate no discrimination against any race or group, believing that

' ... in all legal matters, the principle is valid that a satisfactory solution can be expected only on the basis of absolute honesty vis-a-vis Europeans as well as vis-a-vis natives'.¹²⁵

This principle of fairness was the basis of his new penal code of September 28, 1909, which gave Africans the same legal rights as Europeans.¹²⁶ He was particularly opposed to the extreme harshness of German penal justice. For example, he had issued a circular in November 1908 describing as 'undesirable' the five-year prison-in-chains sentence for African criminals on the grounds that 'a chain-punishment of one year is five times longer than an imprisonment of the same period in Europe.'¹²⁷ As his local officials would not easily abandon it, Rechenberg had to order that this brutal punishment should be dispensed with entirely except in the case of criminals sentenced to life imprisonment.¹²⁸ His concern for the welfare of African prisoners was also demonstrated by his directive that local conditions be taken into

124. Runderlass, 1.4. 1909, DZA, RKA 121¹⁶⁰.

125. Rechenberg to Wegener n.d. (1909) TNA, G8/161¹³.

126. See Minutes of the Association of German East African Plantations of Berlin, 2.2. 1910, TNA G8/161¹⁵⁻¹⁶, in which members had complained that this new code did not give European officials enough protection.

127. Runderlass, 9.11. 1908, DZA, RKA 5118¹⁸⁻¹⁹.

128. Runderlass, 15.12. 1909, DZA, RKA 5076²⁹.

consideration when sentences were being imposed, as prisoners usually became sick and sometimes died even when serving short sentences in cold climates or in other unsuitable conditions.¹²⁹ To enforce these reforms, Rechenberg had to rely on the co-operation of his local officials, including the military, over whom central control was very tenuous.¹³⁰ However, he had always tried to assert his authority, as in June 1911, when he came out very strongly against military authorities in the interior exceeding their authority by inflicting corporal punishment on chiefs and akidas without reference to the central government in Dar es Salaam.¹³¹ To ensure that Africans received justice before German magistrates in cases between them and Europeans, he ordered that reports of such cases, particularly those dealing with the maltreatment of Africans, be sent to Dar es Salaam.¹³² It was in compliance with this order that the Judge of the Tanga District Court, Dr. Hier, reported the conviction in December 1911 of two Europeans - the settler Thiele of Arusha¹³³ and the railway foreman Fregin of Tengeni, Usambara¹³⁴ - for extreme cruelty to Africans.

In the north-east, this period of liberal reforms was, surprisingly, the period when African opposition to German rule was more vigorously expressed than ever before. For the period 1907 to 1912 was, indeed, one of continuous unrest; and though African

129. Ibid.

130. Methner even mentioned rivalry between civil and military administrators. See Methner, W., op. cit., p.122.

131. Runderlass, 19.6. 1911, DZA, RKA 5498⁵³⁻⁵⁴.

132. Reference to this in Dr. Hier to KG, 8.12. 1911, TNA, G1/64.

133. Ibid.

134. Dr. Hier to KG, 15.12. 1911, TNA, G1/64. Fregin was reported to have poured caustic soda water on his 'boy'.

opposition was sometimes restricted to particular groups or even to sections within these groups, it nevertheless demonstrated the need for a cautious policy if a general, anti-German, rebellion like the Maji Maji was to be avoided. The forms in which this opposition or resistance was expressed, however, differed from district to district or even from locality to locality, depending on the local socio-economic and political conditions prevailing at a given time.

In Pare, where German rule had never been strong because the area was not only outside the major regions of white settlement¹³⁵ but was also at the periphery of two administrations, it was expressed in tax revolts. The first, and probably the most serious was the Kahe revolt of 1907, led by a Pare ritual leader, whom Methner described as 'an extremely popular Mganga', who not only refused to pay his own tax but prophesied that the payment of taxes to the government would stop altogether in no distant future because the white men would simply move away.¹³⁶ This revolt, which had occurred at a time of socio-economic distress caused by famine,¹³⁷ again demonstrated the importance of Pare ritual leaders in times of crisis,¹³⁸ and was, indeed, indicative of how very little impact German rule had made on Pare institutions. For in spite of their official status as the local

135. By 1906, the only European plantations in Pare were established in the south in Kihurio. See Methner, W., op. cit., p.158.

136. Ibid., p.159.

137. This famine also affected Uchagga. See Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Sudsee, 1909/10, Berlin, 1911, p.14.

138. The Tanda revolt of 1897 in the Hedaru district of Southern Pare had occurred under similar circumstances. See Kimambo, I.N., op. cit., p.219.

agents of the German administration, the Kahe chiefs had supported their people during the revolt,¹³⁹ although it was clear that they were unable to control it. However, chiefs had themselves led another tax revolt in Middle Pare, refusing to allow the Indian tax collector, Ramchandra, to do his work, thus forcing Methner to lead a punitive expedition to the area.¹⁴⁰ The Pare chiefs had always been aware of their vulnerability as the local agents of German rule. This was why the Chief of Ugweno¹⁴¹ had resisted the temptation, offered by Methner, that he should make himself the overlord of north Pare; for he was unwilling to help the Germans 'pull their chestnuts from the fire',¹⁴² and consequently bring on himself the peoples' hatred of German rule.

Unlike the Pare, who were far away from the main centres of German economic and political power, the Shambala were very much aware of the realities of this power and could therefore not risk any open confrontation with the German administration. Instead of resorting to open violence to demonstrate their opposition to German rule, they had adopted a realistic strategy of passive resistance in which they exploited both Islam and traditional rituals as powerful instruments of anti-colonialism. Although Islamic influence had penetrated into Usambara before the advent of the Germans, it was not until after 1905 that it could achieve a major breakthrough among the Shambala. And,

139. Methner, W., op. cit., pp. 160-161.

140. Ibid.

141. This was Ndoile, who was then regent for the infant Marisa. See Kimambo, I.N., op. cit., p.

142. For example, Shambala muslims had since 1893 been placed under the judicial authority of a muslim Kadi, who until 1905 when he was transferred to Tanga as Liwali, was Abdallah bin Hemedi. See Chp. 4.

undoubtedly, German administrative and economic policies had greatly contributed to it.¹⁴² It is particularly significant that Kinyashi of Mlalo who was until 1905 a great patron of the Bethel mission in Usambara,¹⁴³ had by 1908 become a Muslim.¹⁴⁴ Considering the depressing socio-economic conditions in Usambara against which the Bethel missionaries had themselves protested in January 1905, it is hardly surprising that this 'intelligent and wise chief' had done this to demonstrate his opposition to a system which offered his people no hope for the future. So rapid was the spread of Islam in the district that the alarmed Bethel missionary Wohlrab reported thus for the year 1908:

'In North Usambara, Mohammedanism is developing more and more strongly. The traders in the larger places are nearly all Mohammedans, as well as a majority of the chiefs. Whoever has to do with the traders and these chiefs is closely connected with Mohammedanism. In Mlalo, there is a bigger community of Mohammedans, to which Chief Kinyassi belongs, and of which the mwaliimu (preacher) is the trader, Isihaka. ~~he is its mwaliimu~~. At Kitivo, at the foot of the mountains, big propaganda is supposed to be going on. In Mtai, hitherto untouched by Mohammedanism, a Mohammedan chief has been installed, who also exercises control over the entire northern area.'¹⁴⁵

In 1909, 'a large number of people' were reported to have celebrated the Ramadhan festival in Bungu, apparently under the leadership of the

143. See reference to this in Haber to KG, 12.1. 1905, DZA, RKA 118.

144. Becker, C.H., 'Materials for the understanding of Islam in German East Africa', trans. ed. B.G. Martin, Tanzania Notes and Records (TNR) No. 68, 1968, p.42.

145. Ibid.

the brother of Tupa, the akida of the area, who was said to have built a mosque there for religious worship.¹⁴⁶ So intense was the force of this Islamic propaganda that the Bethel mission had to send Pastor Langheinrich to Bungu to preach to the people to accept Christianity rather than Islam.¹⁴⁷ In 1910, Islamic propaganda was also extended to Mlungui 'by a trader from the coast'.¹⁴⁸

The role played by traders from the coast in the Islamization of Usambara during this period is rather significant, as it shows the connexion between the expansion of trade through the improvement of communications and the spread of Muslim propaganda. For this period of Islamic expansion had followed upon the extension of the Usambara railway from Korogwe to Mombo,¹⁴⁹ which brought the Shambala into contact not only with thousands of workers from the coast and other parts of the interior¹⁵⁰ but also with Islamic literature carried by the Muslim traders from the coast. According to an official report on the expansion of Islam in German East Africa during 1912/13, in which Muslim traders from the coast, soldiers and domestic servants (boys) were said to have been the active agents of the Islamization process, most of the Muslim literature found was of Sanussiyya origin, but some were also traced to Cairo, Mecca and the Kufra oasis.¹⁵¹

146. Wohlrab, P., Usambara: Werden und Wachsen einer heiden - Christlichen Gemeinde in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Bethel-bei-Bielefeld, 1915, pp. 76-77.

147. Ibid., p.77.

148. Ibid.

149. For details see Chp. 6., pp. 10-11.

150. According to Rechenberg, 13,000 workers were employed on railway construction in 1909. See Rechenberg to the Colonial Economic Committee, February 1910, TNA, G8/16123.

151. Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1912/13, Berlin, 1914, pp. 19-20.

The acceptance of Islam by Africans in the protectorate did not merely imply the rejection of Christianity as a rival religion; it was also meant to be a rejection of the whole colonial situation in which Africans were only expected to play permanently subordinate roles. In Usambara, for example, Islamic propaganda had been accompanied by hostility towards Europeans.¹⁵² In Bumbuli, the embers of Shambala anti-Europeanism had been fanned by the Kilindi Chief Kibanga and the local akida, who was also a kilindi, both of whom had apparently been disillusioned with German rule. It is, indeed, a striking paradox that the Kilindi, who had played such a leading role in the Islamization process in Usambara had themselves been reported to have been involved in secret ritual oath-takings directed against Europeans.¹⁵³ According to Tupa, the anti-Kilindi akida of Bungu, who had given this information to Herr Rohde in October 1908, the Shambala on the Muhesangulu plantation had been seen secretly preparing the Kilindi war medicine,¹⁵⁴ apparently in readiness for an anti-German uprising. Although Tupa's motive was certainly to discredit his Kilindi opponents who 'fiercely' hated him as an upstart,¹⁵⁵ his action could also be seen as a genuine opposition to the revival of pagan rituals in Usambara at a time of such Islamic ferment, especially as his brother was the head of the Islamic community in Bungu.

However, contrary to Tupa's alarmist reports, Shambala resent-

152. Rohde to the Directors of the Kaffe-Plantage Sakkare A-G, Berlin, 23.10. 1908, DZA, RKA 701⁹¹⁻⁹⁴.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

ment of German rule did not mature into an open armed conflict with the German authorities. It continued to be expressed either in demonstration of support for the Muslims in opposition to the Christianity of the German missionaries, or in clandestine activities, such as the repeated attempts made in 1910 to burn down the house of akida John of Mombo.¹⁵⁶ What is interesting about the incidents at Mombo was not merely the fact that the akida was hated as an agent of the German administration - although this was bad enough - but that their perpetrators had not wanted the money realized from tax collections to reach the District Office in Wilhelmstal (Lushoto). This was why Herr Zenke, the Mombo District Commissioner, acting on behalf of the frightened akida, had asked the District Officer in Wilhelmstal to arrange for tax collections to be put into safe-keeping at the District Office and to provide the akida with financial assistance for the erection of a house with a 'fire-proof' corrugated iron-sheet roof.¹⁵⁷ In the meantime, Zenke had to organise nocturnal patrols by armed police to ensure the security of the person and property of the akida, since these attacks usually occurred at night.¹⁵⁸ It is even significant that the attacks were not just regarded as cases of attempted robbery but as an evidence of sustained opposition to the administration.¹⁵⁹

The only area where organised raids had taken place primarily to rob the European settlers of their property with the intention of

156. District Commissioner, Mombo to BA, Wilhelmstal, 4.11. 1910, TNA G54/31.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

forcing them out of the country was the Arusha/Meru region in the Moshi district. The main organisers of these raids were the Masai, who were violently opposed to German efforts to keep them permanently within the reserves created by Governor von Götzen in 1905 so as to make land available for white settlement between Mt. Kilimanjaro and Mt. Meru. Although Methner had tried to conciliate them by asking their leader, Chief Sendeyo to return from exile in British East Africa¹⁶⁰ and by redrawing the boundaries of their reserves,¹⁶¹ the raids on the settlers had continued. For the Masai, like their chief, who had categorically rejected Methner's overtures, were not only distrustful of the Germans but were unable to accept an existence confined to the poorly-watered reserves,¹⁶² which were inadequate to support their vast herd of cattle. The drought of 1908, which had caused famine throughout the Moshi district,¹⁶³ had been particularly hard on them, forcing them to move out of the reserves in search of water and green grass for their cattle within the territory reserved for white settlement.¹⁶⁴ It was during this period of great distress that the Masai raids on the European settlers increased in intensity and ferocity. Significantly, it was in the region of Ngorongoro, where Methner had once used the troops of the 1st company under Capt. Brentzel to force the Masai back into their reserves,¹⁶⁵ that several raids had occurred in June 1908.¹⁶⁶

160. Methner, W., op. cit., p.153.

161. Ibid., p.157.

162. Ibid., p.155.

163. Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1909/10, Berlin, 1911, p.15.

164. Methner, W., op. cit., p.155.

165. Ibid.

166. Extract from the Usambara Post, No. 28, 11.7. 1908, TNA, G1/139.

As a result of these raids, during which a German settler named Siedentopf was reported to have suffered the loss of a large number of cattle,¹⁶⁷ Sergeant Scheffel, the commandant of the Arusha military post, had to organise a punitive expedition against the raiders. During this expedition, the German non-commissioned officer, who had only a small force of 25 soldiers (askari), had to depend mostly on the assistance of 500 auxiliaries provided by the Iraku, who were themselves victims of Masai cattle robberies.¹⁶⁸

The danger which these raids posed to the security of the whole of the Moshi district had greatly influenced the attitude taken by Methner to the application of the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company,¹⁶⁹ the successor to the bankrupt Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company, for a 15,000 hectare piece of pasture land in the region north of Engare Nairobi in January 1909.¹⁷⁰ While insisting that the claims of the company to such a large slice of territory could not be supported, he had nevertheless recommended to the central government that such a rich company should be allowed to establish an estate in the region for security reasons. He said this was necessary not only because the region was not far from the border of British East Africa but also because the security of the whole district would be

167. Ibid.

168. Ibid.

169. This company was incorporated in Berlin in 1906. For the instruments of incorporation see DZA, RKA 4646.

170. Methner to Government, 19.1. 1909, TNA, G8/102⁸⁴.

weakened if a European settlement was not established there.¹⁷¹ It was his belief that the military border posts at Leitokitok and Longido would provide adequately for the security of such a settlement whenever it was established.¹⁷²

Methner's support for a grant of land to the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company, no matter how limited, was in direct conflict with the wishes of the independent settlers in the protectorate, who were opposed to large land grants to concessionary companies.¹⁷³ It also ran contrary to Count von Pfeil's recommendations to the Colonial Department, in March 1907, that the company's proposals to establish a settlement in Kilimanjaro should not be approved, as such a settlement might provoke a rebellion in the district.¹⁷⁴ These proposals, which were first made in February 1907 not long after the company's incorporation, had included an application for a total of 51,000 hectares of land in Machame, Kindi, Kibosho and Arusha.¹⁷⁵ Half of the proposed land was intended to be used for the cultivation of cash crops like coffee and sisal, and the other half for the settlement of German immigrants.¹⁷⁶ Although Schroeder Poggelow, an influential director of the company, had assured the Colonial Department that there were no dangers involved in these proposals,¹⁷⁷ especially as the areas desired in Chagga had been declared crown

171. Ibid.

172. Ibid.

173. Extract from the Deutsche Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 16.11. 1905, DZA, RKA, 463¹⁰¹.

174. J. von Pfeil to KA, 17.3. 1907, DZA, RKA 464.

175. Wagner to KA, 25.2. 1907, TNA G8/102²².

176. Ibid.

177. Poggelow to KA, March? 1907, DZA, RKA 463.

land by Capt. Johannes in March 1900,¹⁷⁸ Dernburg had refused to approve them. This was why the company had to make the 'moderate' proposals of January 1909, which were only concerned with land for pasturage.

Consistent with the policy of the Rechenberg administration not to make large grants of land without ensuring that those applying for them had the means and the will to develop them,¹⁷⁹ Dernburg had refused to vary the decision of the local administration to grant only a 5,900 hectare piece of good pasture land to the company instead of the 15,000 hectares demanded.¹⁸⁰ Since the shareholders of this company included some of the big names in the German colonial movement like Hans Paasche and former Governor Edward von Liebert,¹⁸¹ who were active both in the Colonial Council and the Reichstag,¹⁸² it is to be expected that they would co-operate with others who had an axe to grind with Dernburg, including the supporters of the independent settlers in the protectorate, to force his resignation in June 1910.

Rechenberg's tough land policy could, however, not prevent

178. Johannes to KG, 3.3. 1900, DZA, RKA 290.

179. For a restatement of this policy see Rechenberg to BA Moshi, 26.2. 1910, TNA, G8/159.

180. Dernburg to the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company, 7.3. 1910, TNA, G8/160³⁷.

181. Carl Peters was also a shareholder. For the membership of the Kilimanjaro Trade and Agricultural Company which in 1906 became the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company, see RKA 463¹⁰⁵.

182. For the opposition in the Reichstag to Dernburg see Pierard, P.V., 'The Dernburg Reform Policy and German East Africa, TNR, No. 67, June 1967, pp. 37-38, and Schnee, H., Erinnerung - Als letzter Gouverneur in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Berlin 1963, pp. 98-103.

the settler rush into Kilimanjaro in 1910 in anticipation of the completion of the extension of the Usambara railway to Moshi.¹⁸³ The exclusion of European immigrants from the thickly populated areas of north Pare, where Rechenberg had ordered the creation of extensive native reserves,¹⁸⁴ had in fact forced the settlers to move into Kilimanjaro, particularly into the Arusha/Meru region. Among those who settled here in 1910 were sixteen Palestinian Germans who had been forced to leave their flourishing settlements in Haifa as a result of oppressive Turkish rule.¹⁸⁵ Nor could the extension of the frontiers of European settlement serve as a deterrent to Masai raids. On the contrary, it had led^{to} conflict between the new settlers and the peoples of the Arusha region, who resented the loss of land on which they were established. For example, the Masai, alarmed at the growing numbers of these white settlers, had in August 1910 enlisted the support of the Warush, the Meru and their kin in British East Africa to attack the new settlements and to rob them of cattle and other supplies.¹⁸⁶ During the punitive expedition mounted by the combined forces of the 1st company and the police in Moshi, 85 cattle reportedly stolen by the British Masai were returned to their owners in Arusha as a result of the co-operation of the authorities in British East Africa.¹⁸⁷ The ruthlessness with

183. See Annual report of the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company for 1910, in TNA, G8/160⁹⁴.

184. See Bald, D., Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1900-1914, Munich, 1970, p.191, and Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.206.

185. Tetzlaff, R., op. cit., p.111, and Hill, M.F., Permanent Way: The story of Tanganyika Railway, Nairobi, 1957, p.76.

186. See Report on administration for 1910/11 in Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1910/11, Berlin 1912, pp. 1-2.

187. Ibid.

which the raids of the Masai and their Warush and Meru allies were suppressed by the German troops explains why the peoples of the Arusha region had remained unreconciled to German rule.¹⁸⁸

Africans were not alone in their criticism of the German local administration in Arusha. Even the Boer settlers, who were themselves notorious for their maltreatment of their African assistants,¹⁸⁹ had complained about the arbitrariness of the 'askari regime' in the areas. According to De Wet, a Boer settler resident at Duruma, German troops (askari) were in the habit of forcibly removing Africans working for Europeans, without any consideration for their contractual obligations, to do public work, even on Sundays.¹⁹⁰ It was this kind of oppressive administration that led to the recurrence of political unrest in Mbulu in March 1912. According to a report from the commandant of the Mbulu military post, a punitive expedition was sent to compel the people of two Iraku villages of Anton and Uo to submit to forced labour for public works. During this expedition, 24 villagers were killed and 140 conscripted for forced labour. Since the two villages were considered very rich in cattle, a fine of 100 cattle was imposed on them as well.¹⁹¹

188. See Kaempfe to Government, 7.8. 1913, TNA, G8/30²⁸⁶. Here the District Officer for Arusha mentioned the refusal of the Arusha peoples to be influenced by European civilization.

189. One had himself reported shooting 'a nigger' in the leg for attempting to steal a calf. See De Wet to NBS Arusha, 11.5. 1907, TNA, G31/5⁴⁶.

190. De Wet to NBS Arusha, 20.1. 1909 and 1.2. 1909, TNA, G31/5¹⁰⁹ and 114.

191. Mbulu NBS to BA Moshi, 1.4. 1912, DZA, RKA 702²⁰¹, also Loth, H., Griff nach Ostafrika, Berlin (East), 1968, p.100.

Although Uchagga, the centre of German power in the Moshi District, was affected by the atmosphere of crisis created by continuous unrest between 1907 and 1912 in the peripheries of the district, the Chagga had themselves remained relatively quiet, apart from the brief demonstration of opposition to Sengua in Rombo in 1908. But the German authorities themselves had realized that beneath this apparent calmness was seething discontent, which the conflicts between the settlers and the missionaries over child-labour in 1909¹⁹² had tended to sharpen. This was why German troops were ordered to show the flag throughout the district in the same year.¹⁹³ However, in spite of their resentment of settler encroachments on their land, as well as the pressures put on them to work on German plantations, the Chagga like the Shambala, were realistic enough to understand that nothing positive could be gained from a strategy of violent resistance. The tragedy of the dawn executions of March 2, 1900 was still fresh in their memories. Rather than react to the settler rush of 1910 to 1912 like the Masai, the Warush and the Meru, by attacking the European settlements, the Chagga, like the Shambala, had instead begun to show more interest in the Islamic movement, to the consternation of missionaries. According to Monsignor Munsch, the first Catholic Vicar-General of Kilimanjaro, Islamic influence in Kilimanjaro had followed in the wake of the

192. For details of these conflicts see Kieran, J.A., 'The Holy Ghost Fathers in East Africa, 1863-1914, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1966, pp. 348-349.

193. Ibid, p.313.

extension of the railway to Moshi in 1912.¹⁹⁴ It is even significant that it was in Kibosho where the Chagga had lost more land to European settlers,¹⁹⁵ and where labour disputes were more intense,¹⁹⁶ that Islam appeared to have secured the first firm foothold.¹⁹⁷ And the patron of the movement there was the new chief Malamya, who had just succeeded his father, Sianga, the lackey of the settlers, who had retired in 1911. For Malamya, like his executed uncle Molelia, had followed the tradition established by the great Sina in the 1890's by demonstrating Kibosho's opposition to German rule by flirting with Islam.¹⁹⁸

As in Usambara, the agents of the Islamic movement were the Swahili traders, whom the panic-stricken Catholic missionaries in Kibosho ordered Malamya to keep out of his chiefdom.¹⁹⁹ But these desperate measures could hardly succeed as these traders were the agents on whom the Hanseatic Kilimanjaro Trading Company, a sister company of the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company, established in 1910, depended for the success of its commercial operations in the district.²⁰⁰ The result of this situation was that the Holy Ghost Fathers had to battle not only with the forces of Islam but also with increasing opposition from the growing European settler community over the recruit-

194. Bulletin-Général, 1913/14, p.331.

195. Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.

196. Kieran, J.A., op. cit., pp. 348-349.

197. Bulletin-Général, 1913/14, p.339.

198. Kieran, J.A., op. cit., p.311.

199. Stahl, K., History of the Chagga Peoples of Kilimanjaro, London, 1964, p.200.

200. See Annual Report of the Kilimanjaro Plantation Company for 1910 in TNA, G8/160⁹⁴.

ment of African labour.²⁰¹

The difficulties of the Catholic missionaries in Kibosho were further complicated, at this time, by the resurgence of pagan rituals. The occasion for this was provided by the initiation ceremony of the ten-year old brother of Chief Malamya in 1912. Although the young prince was a baptised Christian, he had been subjected to this ritual, which the director the Kibosho Catholic mission, Father Bernard Wolff had considered 'a great danger to all Christians'.²⁰² As he regarded the participation of the leading Christians of Kibosho in this ritual as an act of apostasy and a relapse to paganism, Father Wolff had proceeded to excommunicate them, likening them to Judas, the traitor.²⁰³ The severity of his measures was certainly an indication of the strength of the anti-Christian movement in Kibosho, which was not directed against the Catholic missionaries per se, but essentially against the activities of Europeans in the district. For the Holy Ghost Fathers had themselves earlier reported that settler occupation of the land needed by the people of Kibosho for pasturage and the cultivation of their food crops like banana and maize was a major source of discontent.²⁰⁴ Another equally sensitive problem was that of settler pressure for labour, particularly child-labour. It was the realization of the danger which the development of this attitude of anti-

201. See Kieran, *J&A.*, op. cit., p.349.

202. Bulletin-General, 1913/14, p.338.

203. Ibid.

204. Ibid., p.335.

Europeanism posed to Christian missionary and educational work which caused the conference of East African Catholic Bishops held in Dar es Salaam from July 22 to 26, 1912 to pass a series of resolutions condemning the indiscriminate exploitation of African child-labour by European settlers in the protectorate.²⁰⁵ Believing that the Christian mission school was the only means of arresting the advance of Islam, this conference not only strongly urged that schooling be made compulsory and those keeping children away from schools seriously punished, but also demanded that soldiers and policemen be recruited from among the educated Christian population in accordance with the resolution of the Reichstag of February 13, 1900.²⁰⁶

The demands of these missionaries, which themselves show how little progress was achieved in these fields under the liberal regime of Rechenberg, were made shortly after the arrival of the new Governor, Dr. Heinrich Schnee, who was, unlike his predecessor, firmly committed to the advancement of European settlement and of European plantation agriculture.²⁰⁷ Since he was of the opinion that African production of cash crops should be encouraged only in areas where European settlement was not feasible for climatic reasons,²⁰⁸ his developmental policy was, in fact, the restoration of that of

205. Apostolic Vicar, Dar es Salaam, to Government, 31.7. 1912, TNA, G31/9.

206. Ibid.

207. Schnee, H., op. cit., p.118.

208. Ibid.

von Götzen, which had been repudiated by Dernburg and Rechenberg.²⁰⁹ A compromise candidate for the office of Governor,²¹⁰ Schnee, who had seen how the opposition of the German planters and settlers had led to the fall of Rechenberg,²¹¹ was expected to employ all his diplomatic skills to win support for his policies in Germany and East Africa by adopting a conciliatory strategy. And it was to ensure that the new regime started on the right lines that Wilhelm Solf, the new Colonial Secretary, had visited the protectorate in August 1912, within a month of Schnee's arrival.

During this visit, he had toured the north-east of the protectorate, demonstrating the conciliatory approach of the new administration. In an interesting exchange of correspondence between him and the Usambara settler leader, Tom von Prince, who had asked for the retention of the Wilhelmstal labour card system, the doubling of the worker's contract and the recruitment and distribution of workers by the government,²¹² Solf had made it clear that the new regime was going to co-operate with the settlers without completely sacrificing African interests. For, while he would not agree to the retention of the labour cards, he was nevertheless prepared to ask the Governor to look into the possibility of extending the period of contract of workers not recruited locally²¹³ - something

209. Ibid., p.110.

210. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

211. Ibid., pp. 112-113. Wilhelm Solf, the former Governor of the small colony of Samoa had been preferred to Rechenberg, the Governor of the largest German colony.

212. Tom von Prince to Solf, 28.8. 1912, TNA, G8/142⁴².

213. Solf to Tom von Prince, 31.8. 1912, TNA, G8/142³⁸.

which Rechenberg had refused to do.²¹⁴ To win the support of the settlers, he also declared that he was in agreement with the Governor in hoping that government officials would in future see to it that Africans were encouraged to work for Europeans.²¹⁵

The determination of the Schnee administration to woo the European settlers was reflected in the creation, in August 1912, of two more civil districts - Bismarcksburg, which was separated from Ujiji, and Arusha, which was carved out of Moshi.²¹⁶ Apart from the need to put an end to military control in Arusha/Meru, the separation of the area from Moshi had been made imperative by the increase of its European population following the rush of 1910 to 1912.²¹⁷ Besides, it was also necessary for the Governor to win the support of the influential Capt. Leue, the settler leader in Arusha, and chairman of the Settlement Committee of the German Colonial Society, whose Economic Association of Meru (Wirtschaftliches Verein vom Meru) had been founded in 1909 in opposition to other settler unions in Kilimanjaro.²¹⁸

In the north-east, the conciliatory posture of the new administration had had the effect of strengthening the position of the German settlers in their dealings with the local administration, a situation which encouraged them to lay claims to extensive landed estates even within areas reserved for African cultivation.

214. See Rechenberg to Wegener, n.d. (1909) TNA, G8/61¹³.

215. Solf to Tom von Prince, 31.8. 1912, loc. cit.

216. Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1912/13, Berlin, 1914, p.4.

217. Ibid.

218. For the formation of this union see Bald, D., op. cit., pp. 110-112.

In Usambara, the newly-won confidence of the German settlers was reflected in the clash between Tom von Prince on the one hand and the District Officer for Wilhelmstal, Herr Köstlin, and the Bethel missionaries on the other. Although he had never at any time believed that he was subject to the authority of the local District Officer,²¹⁹ Tom von Prince had been greatly emboldened by the 'victory' of the German settlers and their patrons over their enemies Dernburg and Rechenberg to set up himself as the tyrant of Usambara. In February 1912, he and his wife Magdalene, had ordered their Nyamwezi workers to burn the maize crops of the Shambala of the village of Maurui because they would not turn up to work on their estate at Sakkarani.²²⁰ These unfortunate people, who had been bought out of their land in Shashui by Tom von Prince's father-in-law, Lt. von Massow, in September 1906, had been forced to live as squatters on the same land on the condition that they turned up regularly to work at Sakkarani whenever their services were needed.²²¹ Their maltreatment so annoyed Köstlin that he immediately recommended to Dar es Salaam that it was time the 'almightiness' of Tom von Prince was ended.²²² It was the hostility generated by this incident that influenced the District Officer to object strongly to any further sale of land to the settler leader in Shashui in February 1913.²²³ For he held that

219. Ibid., p.60.

220. BA Wilhelmstal to KG, 9.4. 1912, TNA, G8/142⁶⁰.

221. Ibid.

222. Ibid.

223. BA Wilhelmstal to KG, 17.2. 1913, TNA, G8/142⁶⁸.

the creation of a reserve was necessary in Shashui, to put an end to the precarious existence of the Shambala displaced by Tom von Prince in Maurui in the previous year.²²⁴

The conflict between the Bethel missionaries at Mlalo and Tom von Prince was caused by the willingness of the former to offer employment to the Shambala who were deserting the latter's estates at Sakkarani in large numbers on account of non-payment of wages.²²⁵ Since some of these workers had yet to complete their contracts with him, Tom von Prince had used this as an excuse to accuse the Bethel missionaries now under the leadership of Pastor von Bodelschwingh of deliberately encouraging the Shambala to break the law.²²⁶ The District Officer, K stlin, would, however, not blame the missionaries, whom he said had not known that some of the workers were still under contract to von Prince.²²⁷ In their own statement of defence, in which they disclaimed any guilt in the matter, the Bethel missionaries had stressed that it was the desire for a better treatment that had made the Shambala, whom they said were very selective, to come from as far as Mombo to work on their estates at Mlalo.²²⁸ It was to prevent the maltreatment of Africans,

224. Ibid.

225. See the Report of the Inquiry into Tom von Prince's complaints against the Bethel mission, 25.4. 1914, TNA, G8/142¹²⁴⁻¹²⁶.

226. Tom von Prince to the Pastors of the Bethel mission, 4.9. 1913, TNA, G8/142⁹².

227. BA Wilhelmstal to Government, 16.10. 1913, TNA, G8/142⁹⁴.

228. Evangelical Mission to Government, 8.10. 1913, TNA, G8/142⁹⁵⁻⁹⁶.

the type of which was revealed by investigations, in April 1914, into the complaints of Shambala workers formerly in the service of Tom von Prince, that Wilhelm Methner, then acting Governor, had in February 1914 asked district officials to see that the complaints of Africans were carefully investigated and those guilty of maltreating them subjected to the full force of the law.²²⁹

In Kilimanjaro, as in Usambara, the District Officer had also strongly opposed an attempt made by an influential German settler, Herr Flicker, a retired Secretary at the District Office, to initiate a settler invasion of land reserved for the Chagga.²³⁰ Flicker, who, on his retirement in November 1911, had been given a 60 hectare piece of land originally meant for two Italian settlers, Ometto and Fenoglio, had in December 1912 asked for this original grant to be increased to 200 hectares, most of which would come from the Kirua reserve.²³¹ While his application was still in the pipeline, he had again asked for another 790 hectare piece of land in Kilema.²³² The District Officer, who felt Flicker had already had more than enough, as 'a single planter without assistants could not maintain more than a 30 hectare coffee plantation',²³³ had recommended the rejection of these applications. He claimed that to grant them was to set a dangerous precedent, as scores of landless people in Kilema were already living as squatters on the estates of the Catholic mission and as the people of Marangu

229. Runderlass, 22.2. 1914, TNA, G1/86.

230. BA Moshi to KG, 11.4. 1913, TNA, G8/205.

231. Ibid.

232. Ibid.

233. Ibid.

were also complaining that they had nowhere to graze their cattle.²³⁴

While the Schnee administration would not alienate land to European settlers in the African reserves,²³⁵ it was nevertheless unwilling to create such conditions as would make it possible for the African peasant to cultivate the food and cash crops he liked in absolute freedom. Although the tax law had been simplified in August 1912 by the imposition of a common poll tax,²³⁶ the objective of taxation was still to compel Africans to work for wages, especially on the plantations. It was to satisfy the ever-increasing needs of the German settlers and plantation managers for labour²³⁷ that Governor Schnee issued a circular in May 1914 declaring his intention to raise the poll tax from 3 to 6 rupees as from April 1, 1915, in the major areas of European settlement, including the districts of Tanga, Wilhelmstal, Moshi and Arusha.²³⁸ For he believed that only indirect pressures rather than direct force should be applied on Africans to make themselves available for work on the plantations and other enterprises.²³⁹ It was the outbreak of the 1st world war that prevented the introduction of this increased tax.

By 1915, when the protectorate became a theatre of the war, the north-east had become essentially a region of white settlement,

234. Ibid.

235. See Amtliche Anzeiger für Deutsch-Ostafrika, 25.5. 1912.

236. Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1912/13, Berlin 1914, p.6.

237. See Minutes of the Association of German East African plantations of Berlin, 3.11. 1913, TNA, G8/161.

238. Runderlass, 12.5. 1914, TNA, G1/86.

239. Runderlass, 24.4. 1914, TNA, G1/86.

where the African communities were to exist mainly in the reserves, to provide cheap labour for the plantations. In spite of Schnee's disapproval of forced labour, the notorious labour card system developed in Wilhelmstal had unofficially been established in the Moshi district.²⁴⁰ As in other areas of white settlement in the protectorate, the objective of the administration was to see that Africans were fairly treated, not to set them up in economic competition with the European settlers. This was the basis of Schnee's Labour Ordinance of October 1, 1913, which increased the contract period of workers from the six months allowed by Rechenberg to a year or a total of 240 working days, and at the same time provided for improved welfare services like free hospitalization and sick benefits.²⁴¹ The reports of the District Commissioners for Wilhelmstal and Moshi for 1914²⁴² provide clear evidence that the north-east had become a region of exclusive white settlement like the White Highlands of British East Africa. Labour statistics of 1914 relating to the Moshi district, where the Chagga had begun to grow coffee during the Rechenberg administration, are particularly revealing. Of the 18,000 Chagga men considered physically fit to work, 10,589 were engaged as labourers on European plantations, 3,176 worked for the missionary bodies,

240. See Iliffe, J., op. cit., p.138.

241. Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der ["]Sudsee, 1912/13, Berlin 1914, p.21, and DKB, 1913, p.400.

242. For these reports see DZA, RKA 123^{107f} and 124^{164f}.

1,282 were in the service of chiefs, 400 worked as administrative aides and 3,020 were artisans, traders and assistants to Indian traders.²⁴³ Through their elected representatives, who since 1913 had been in a majority on the Governor's Council,²⁴⁴ the European settlers were in a powerful position to achieve practically what they wanted. In fact, it was the opposition of the Colonial Secretary²⁴⁵ and the outbreak of the 1st World War that prevented the reintroduction of the forced labour system which had been abolished by Rechenberg. Thus Governor Schnee's efforts to conciliate the settler communities had led to the virtual enslavement of the African peoples whom he had tried so hard to protect.

Indeed, the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 provided the German settlers under the leadership of war-hawks like Tom von Prince²⁴⁶ a welcome opportunity not only to prove their loyalty to their fatherland, but also to extend the frontiers of the German colonial empire in East Africa.²⁴⁷ However, the British invasion of the northern districts of German East Africa early in 1916, and

243. Report of District Commissioner Freitag on the labour situation in Moshi District. DZA, RKA 124164f.

244. For details of this see Bald, D., op. cit., p.99.

245. Solf to Schnee, 11.4. 1914, DZA, RKA, 124¹¹⁹.

246. For Capt. Tom von Prince's contributions to German war effort in East Africa, see Schmiedel, H. 'Bwana Sakkarani: Captain Tom von Prince and His Times', TNR, No. 52, March, 1959, p.48.

247. For a brief account of the disastrous German invasion of British East Africa, see Methner, W., op. cit. pp. 382-388.

the consequent fall of Kilimanjaro and Upare to the British forces between March and May of the same year²⁴⁸ quickly set in motion the process of the disintegration of German power in East Africa. By September 1916, the whole of the Pangani valley region had come under effective British military occupation, and a provisional civil administration to administer the occupied districts was about to be established.²⁴⁹ This provisional administration, under the leadership of Horace Byatt,²⁵⁰ the Administrator of German East Africa, who later became the first British Governor of Tanganyika, came into operation in January, 1917,²⁵¹ with its headquarters at Wilhelmstal, the bastion of German settler nationalism in the protectorate.²⁵²

During the period of crisis which followed the hurried evacuation of German administrative and military personnel from north to south, the African peoples of the north-east, freed from the rigid German controls, were once again able to express their resentment of European domination. The first to take advantage of German difficulties were the Masai of Arusha, who only a few years earlier had themselves been victims of severe German military harassment.²⁵³

248. For a report on the British conquest of the north-east of German East Africa, see J. Raum to Evangelical Lutheran Mission of Leipzig, 20.8. 1916 in Lay Secretary, CMS London to the Colonial Secretary, 3.10. 1916, PRO, CO 691/3.

249. Bonar Law to Governor of Malta, 2.9. 1916, CO 691/3.

250. Ibid.

251. Byatt to Colonial Secretary, 22.12. 1916 (Telegram), CO 691/1.

252. General Smuts to Colonial Secretary, 19.10. 1916 (Telegram) CO 691/1. Wilhelmstal was suggested as the seat of the provisional administration not only because it was healthy and easily accessible but also because it contained 'the bulk of the enemy's white population'.

253. See Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee, 1910/11, Berlin, 1912, pp. 1-2.

With the support of their kindred groups, the Warush and the Wameru, they resumed their raids on the European settlements in the district, driving off the cattle of the German settlers with the hope of forcing them out of the country.²⁵⁴ So frequent were these raids that the provisional British administration had to deal as ruthlessly with the Masai as the out-going German administration. Not only were expeditions undertaken for the recovery of the cattle stolen, but heavy fines, payable in cattle, were imposed on Masai groups found engaging in predatory activities.²⁵⁵

Among the Bantu peoples, the troubled times helped to revive the importance of African ritual leaders, the traditional opponents of the European missionaries and of Western civilization. In Uchagga, where Monsignor Munsch, the Catholic Vicar-General for Kilimanjaro reported on the dangers of pagan revival during the war, these ritual leaders were confidently predicting the imminent end of European rule in Africa.²⁵⁶ So strong was the force of this pagan revival that even leading Christians, especially teachers began to revert to paganism. A notable example was the case of Ndesika, the chief akida of Uru, who was formerly a teacher at the Uru Catholic School.²⁵⁷ It was in furtherance of the efforts of the Christian missionaries to stem the

254. Byatt to Colonial Secretary, 22.2. 1917 CO 691/4.

255. Ibid.

256. Bulletin-General, 1918/20, pp. 109-110.

257. See Notes by C.C. Dundas on the 'Alleged Chagga/Masai Conspiracy of 1916', Arusha Regional Book, TNA, MF.61.

tide of this pagan revival that Father Daubenberger of the Catholic Mission in Uru deliberately spread the rumours late in 1916, of the Chagga-Masai conspiracy aimed at exterminating all Europeans, including the officers of the provisional British administration.²⁵⁸ For it was his hope that the leading Chagga chiefs who were openly patronizing the pagan ritual leaders would be severely punished by the British authorities and the pagan movement itself would thereby be discredited. However, as the evidence obtained by Sir Theodore Morison, the resident British Political Officer for Kilimanjaro was 'not conclusive enough' to permit the trial of the alleged conspirators by Court Martial on a capital charge, the nine Chagga chiefs accused of involvement in the conspiracy - Ngulelo of Machame, Malamia of Kibosho, Kisariki of Uru, Salem of Moshi, Msame of Mbokomu, Kitingati of Kirua (Vunjo), Kirita of Kilema, Tangi of Keni and Kahumba of Kirua (Rombo) - and twenty-seven other leading Chagga were deported from Kilimanjaro, some to Kismayu in British East Africa and others to Tanga.²⁵⁹ Although most of these chiefs were later allowed to return to their chiefdoms after a subsequent inquiry had proved that the rumours of the conspiracy were without foundation,²⁶⁰ the British administration had shown that it was as open to intrigue as its German predecessor!

258. Ibid. and Byatt to Colonial Secretary, 22.12. 1916, CO 691/4.

259. Ibid.

260. 'Alleged Chagga/Masai Conspiracy of 1916', Arusha Regional Book, TNA, MF.61.

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
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MAINLAND TANZANIA AS PART OF GERMAN EAST AFRICA.



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 - - - - - International Boundary

Scale: 1:5000,000

NORTH-EAST TANZANIA AS PART OF GERMAN EAST AFRICA

