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Seed and Cloud as Metaphors of Liberation in Buddhist and Pātañjala Yoga: An Intertextual Study

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This dissertation is dedicated to Gerald James Larson.

CONTENTS

Abstract

Abbreviations……8

Introduction…… 9
0.1 Literature review…… 14
0.1.1 Buddhist elements in Pātañjala yoga
0.1.2 Introduction to the texts
0.2 Joining the dots: 'classical yoga' and 'Buddhist yoga'…… 31
0.2.1 'Classical yoga'
0.2.2 'Buddhist yoga'
0.2.3 Defining 'yoga'
0.3 Method: Textual analysis…… 42
0.3.1 Intertextuality
0.4 Plan for the dissertation…… 49

1 Mind, meditation, and the metaphor of cultivation…… 52
1.0 Classical Indian metaphor theory…… 52
1.1 Conceptual metaphor theory…… 55
1.1.1 Domain-mapping
1.1.2 Selective editing
1.1.3 Structural metaphor
1.1.4 Complex metaphor
1.1.5 Primary metaphor
1.1.6 Orientational metaphors and image-schemas
1.1.7 Metaphoric entailment
1.1.8 Creative metaphor and commonplace metaphor
1.2 Metaphors and soteriology…… 64
1.3 Metaphors and meditation…… 69
1.3.1 Yoga as a metaphor
1.4 *Bhāvanā:* the metaphor of cultivation in classical Indic soteriology…… 75
1.4.1 Socio-regional background of crop cultivation
1.4.2 Regions and rice-farming
1.4.3 Rice-farming in texts
1.4.4 Techniques of rice cultivation and their relevance to soteriology
1.4.5 Wild rice and cultivated rice
1.4.6 Labour: a basis for the metaphor of *bhāvanā*?
1.4.7 The tension between cultivating and stopping growth
Chapter conclusions

2 Seed and substratum: eliminating the *kleśa*s in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*……105
2.1 The metaphors of *kleśa*…… 110
2.2 *Pratisaṃkhyā* and *prasaṃkhyāna*…… 119
2.2.1 *Pratisaṃkhyā*: contemplative disjunction in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

2.2.2 *Prasaṃkhyāna*: contemplative discernment in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*
2.2.3 *Prasaṃkhyāna* and *pratisaṃkhyā* as related soteriological terms
2.3 The seed of *kleśa*…… 128
2.3.1 The seedless state
2.3.2 The dormant seed
2.3.3 Destroying the power of the seed by burning it
2.4 Mental substratum (*āśraya*) as seedbed of *kleśa*…… 144
2.5 Divergent Jain metaphors: resin, ladder, door…… 150
2.6 Debate, doctrine, and dialogue…… 153
2.6.1 Larson's 'old problem': Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism
2.6.2 The ontological debates
2.6.3 An ontological argument with metaphoric underpinnings
Chapter conclusions

3 Cultivation, clouds, and the 'other' *yogaśāśtra*: the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*…… 180
3.1 Historical textual formation of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra.*…… 180
3.1.1 Structure of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*
3.1.2 Dating of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*
3.1.3 The proto-layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*
3.2 Early yogācāra…… 186
3.2.1 What does yogācāra mean?
3.2.2 Sarvāstivāda yogācāra
3.2.3 What was early yogācāra practice?
3.3 Path systems of yogācāra in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra.*…… 199
3.3.1 *Śrāvakabhūmi*
3.3.2 *Bodhisattvabhūmi*
3.3.3 *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*
3.3.4 *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*
3.4 *Pratipakṣabhāvanā*: the cultivation of the counterstate…… 207
3.4.1 *Pratipakṣabhāvanā* in Pātañjala yoga
3.4.2 *Pratipakṣabhāvanā* in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*
3.4.3 The conceptual metaphors of *pratipakṣabhāvanā*
3.4.4 Yoga as an antidote: ethical precepts as cures
3.4.5 Yoga is a path: the *bhūmi*s and the *mārga*
3.4.6 Yoga is clear vision: errors of perception and the visual field
3.5 *Dharmamegha:* the revision of a superlative metaphor…… 237
3.5.1 Patañjali's *dharmamegha*
3.5.2 *Dharmamegha* in Buddhist sources
3.5.3 *Dharmamegha* as a dead metaphor
3.5.4 Patañjali's paralogical metaphor: the raincloud without any rain
3.5.5 *Dharmamegha* as cessative liberation
3.5.6 Factors of literary style: from hyperbole to understatement
Chapter conclusions

Conclusion………272
Research summary
The value of conceptual metaphor theory in soteriological study
The category of classical yoga

Bibliography…… 285
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources

Appendices
Appendix 1: A note on translating *prasaṃkhyāna*…….... 324
Appendix 2: A mirrored argument form in PYŚ and AKBh…….... 330
Appendix 3: Structure of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*…….... 337
Appendix 4: A note on *smṛti*…… 338

Tables
Table 2.1: PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1…….. 137
Table 2.2: PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 2.36…….... 140
Table 2.3: PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94…….. 171
Table 2.4: PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94…….... 172
Table 2.5: PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94…….. 172
Table 3.1: The *kleśa*s and their counterstates in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* 212
Table 3.2: Patañjali's seven stages of wisdom…….... 230
Table 3.3: Asaṅga's seven stages of contemplation…….... 231

Abstract:
Conventionally, the label 'classical yoga' has been aligned to, and sometimes conflated with, the text of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, produced in the 4th-5th century. Yet if we broaden the scope of inspection to a wider textual corpus from the same period, we can identify a richer and more complex discourse of classical yoga, which is also employed in Buddhist traditions and which is semantically entangled across religious boundaries. In particular, this study focuses on dialogic interaction between three contemporaneous texts via the use of shared metaphorical systems to explain theories of liberation. There are a number of close correspondences, hitherto unexplored, between the soteriology of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and both the Sautrāntika positions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the earliest textual layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. I draw on conceptual metaphor theory to demonstrate how yoga, yogācāra, and Sautrāntika constructed their soteriology under the broad metaphorical banner of *bhāvanā qua* cultivation. *Bhāvanā* is a complex orientational metaphor that was adapted by these different religious traditions because it could encompass both 'cessative' and 'aspirational' aspects of yogic practice, as reflected in the spatially polarised metaphors of the seed in the earth and the cloud in the sky. There are also close overlaps in the ontologies of these three textual traditions. The dialogic relationship between Brahmanical and Buddhist yoga soteriology indicates a need to re-assess which texts are included under the rubric of 'classical yoga' and to foreground the role of yogācāra and its *śāstra* in this category.

Abbreviations

AKBh	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*
AKK	*Abhidharmakośakārikā*
AN	*Anguttara Nikāya*
BG	*Bhagavad Gītā*
BhāvBh	*Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*
BoBh	*Bodhisattvabhūmi*
Bybh	*Buddhasenayogācārabhūmi*
Bv	*Buddhavaṃsa*
DBS	*Daśabhūmikasūtra*
DDS	*Damoduoluo chan jing* / *Dharmatrāta Dhyānasūtra*
DN	*Dīgha Nikāya*
Ja	*Jātaka and Jātak' -aṭṭhakathā*
It	*Itivuttaka*
MB	*Mahābhārata*
MDh	*Mānavadharmaśāstra*
Mil	*Milindapañha*
MN	*Majjhima Nikāya*
MuU	*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*
MVB	*Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra*
NAS	*Nyāyānusāra*
NySBh	*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*
Pd	*Paramatthadīpanī*
Pv	*Pettavathu*
PP	*Prakaraṇapāda*
PrU	*Praśna Upaniṣad*
PYŚ	*Pātañjalayogaśāstra*
ṚV	*Ṛg Veda*
Saddhsu	*Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*
SamāBh	*Samāhitabhūmi*
Śbh	*Śrāvakabhūmi*
SKK	*Sāṃkhyakārikā*
Sn	*Sutta Nipāta*
SN	*Saṃyutta Nikāya*
SNS	*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*
SPS	*Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*
SYCB	Saṅgharakṣa's **Yogācārabhūmi*
SvU	*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*
TAS	*Tattvārthasūtra*
Vin	*Vināya Piṭaka*
Vism	*Visuddhimagga*
Viv	*Vivaraṇa*
Vv-a	*Vimānavatthu-aṭṭhakathā*
YS	*Yogasūtra*
YBh	*Yogasūtrabhāṣya*
YĀBh	*Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*
YVc	*Yogaviṁśikā* commentary by Yaśovijaya

Introduction

The category of 'classical yoga' is most often associated with, or sometimes conflated with the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali,[1] a text referred to in this study as part of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and dated from the 4th to early 5th century CE.[2] This dissertation argues that we should widen the discursive context of the category of 'classical yoga' beyond the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (PYŚ) to incorporate elaborations of yogic liberation from other contemporaneous texts, such as the Buddhist *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) and the *Yogācārabhumiśāstra* (YĀBh). Once we have agreed that the meaning of the

[1] For examples of the commonplace identification of classical yoga with Pātañjala yoga, see Feuerstein (1979 viii-xiii); Potter 1983: 243; Whicher 2000; and Burley 2007: 3.

[2] Maas has argued that the *Yogasūtra* and its commentary the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* together comprise a single text under the title *Pātañjalayogaśāstra,* compiled and composed by Patañjali around 325-425 CE (Maas 2006; 2008a; 2009; 2010a; Maas 2013: 57-68). Maas argues that the *sūtras* are partly compiled from older sources and partly composed by Patañjali (Maas 2014a). His assertion of a single author of the *Yogasūtra* and its *bhāṣya* is in agreement with observations by Jacobi (Jacobi 1930:584) and Bronkhorst (Bronkhorst 1985:203f). Maas' arguments are thus generally summarised: 1. Historical references to the title *Yogabhāṣya* (or variants thereof) are limited, as are references to an author named Vyāsa. 2. There is no manuscript transmission of the *bhāṣya* independent of the *Yogasūtra*. 3. Śankara's commentary, the *Vivaraṇa*, which Maas dates to the 8th century CE, does not refer to Vyāsa or a separate author of the *bhāṣya*. 4. Al-Bīrūnī's 11th-century translation and Bhoja's 11th-century *Rājamārtaṇḍa* commentary both treat the text and commentary as a unified whole by one author. 5. The grammar and style of the commentary author's voice (3rd person singular present passive) may indicate that this writer is also the composer of the *sūtras*. 6. There is a basis for analysing some *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* passages as syntactically and grammatically interconnected. 7. Vyāsa means 'editor, arranger' and is a conventional authorial name/designation of the period. 8. The contemporaneous *sāstra* structure was often comprised of *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, and summary passages to form a whole. Maas also considers the argument that Vindhyavāsin may have been the author of the *bhāṣya*, or both the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* (2013:62), a view previously espoused by Bronkhorst (1985:206) and Larson (1989). Given these arguments, Maas' framing of the text provides a useful working hypothesis in the current academic field within which we can evaluate the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali and its *bhāṣya*. See further discussion on pp24-25 of this dissertation.

term 'yoga' in the 4th-5th centuries cannot be located solely in the Brahmanic-Hindu continuum and that the practice of yoga evolved from a common *śramaṇa* background of asceticism (Bronkhorst 2007; Samuel 2008), we can then posit that the discourse of yoga was employed by various communities in a dialogic environment. As Bronkhorst puts it:

> the history of Indian philosophy, even in its early phases, is more than the story of a number of unrelated schools of thought. Quite on the contrary, it consists of a web of interrelated developments, in which thinkers participated who, even though from different backgrounds and without much sympathy for each other, shared several presuppositions and questions. It is also clear that many of these thinkers were aware of each others' ideas, even across the boundaries of school, religion, and, we may assume, geography (Bronkhorst 2006: 302).

Indeed, Bronkhorst and many other scholars from Senart (1900) and de La Vallée Poussin (1937) to Maas (2014) and Wujastyk (2016) have all contributed to a shift in scholarship on the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* towards a more integrated approach to religious context. However, given the breadth of the textual material available from the early common era, there is scope for further systematic analysis. My broad aim is to situate the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* in a dialogic context with Buddhist material and to illuminate the integral role of such dialogue in the conceptual formation of classical yoga soteriology through metaphors in the 4th-5th centuries CE.

The specific question at the heart of this research is one that Larson posed in his 1989 essay 'An Old Problem Revisited, the Relation Between Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Buddhism.' Although I consider this essay in Chapter 2, I would like to outline the problem here: given the self-identification of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* as a text of Sāṃkhya philosophy, why does it contain so few Sāṃkhya terms and so many apparently Buddhist terms? (Larson 1989).[3] Larson addressed this problem competently by reconstructing a

[3] Larson's later succinct formulation of the problem is: 'What is striking is that all of these common terms used in the YS and Buddhist textual environments are totally absent in Sāṃkhya textual environments' (Larson and Bhattacharya 2008: 43).

series of documented oral debates that occurred between Sāṃkhya and Buddhist teachers, which, he argued, produced the shared terminology. Within the texts themselves, we can find evidence of such debates in the direct refutations of rival religious positions. Furthermore, I argue, there is a subtle layer of dialogic interaction that is embedded in the conceptual expression of the texts. I highlight the role of metaphors in determining how the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, a text that is evidently doctrinally Sāṃkhya, could nonetheless share its body of technical soteriological terminology with another school of thought, in this case Buddhist.

I focus on a synchronic 'slice' of textual history, that of the 4th–5th centuries CE. However, I supplement this with a diachronic understanding of text and context from the preceding centuries. Thus the broad historical scope of this study is the first half of the first millennium CE. As Witzel explains, the period from approximately 200 BCE to 300 CE was a time of great social change in India, and was both 'turbulent' and 'productive' (Witzel 2006: 457). There were invasions by the Greeks, the Śakas, and the Kushanas, producing a threeway cultural fusion of Vedic tradition, Mauryan integration, and new external influences (Witzel 2006: 457). Olivelle refers to this period as a time 'between the empires', meaning that it was between the empires of the Maurya dynasty (c. 322-187 BCE) and the Gupta dynasty (c. 320-550 CE) (Olivelle 2006). The specific focus of this study falls within the time of Gupta rule, a dynasty characterised by relative peace and prosperity and often termed a 'golden age' for Indian civilisation. In Witzel's view, the Indian 'classical age' only began properly with the dawn of the Gupta era (Witzel 2006: 457). However, we should be aware that labels such as 'classical period' and 'golden age' become problematic when investigated in any detail.[4] Prior to and during the Gupta dynasty, Buddhism thrived and witnessed a growth in the number of monasteries and followers

[4] I discuss this point in section 0.2.1.

due to a surge in patronage.[5] The period during which the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* was composed (circa 324-425 CE) was not only during the so-called 'golden age' of India's intellectual output, but also during the ascendant age of Buddhism. This provides a context for the hypothesis of conceptual influence between Buddhist soteriology and Patañjali's text.

By the 4th-5th centuries CE, proto-systems of 'yoga' had already been established in the Brahmanic and Sāṃkhya traditions. In the second half of the 1st millennium BCE, nascent systems of yoga and meditation emerged in both the *Upaniṣad*s and in the two sections of the *Mahābhārata* that deal with yoga, the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Śānti Parvan* – these accounts all describe yoga in relation to Sāṃkhya.[6] We do not find consistent accounts of yoga in Brahmanism prior to the late principal *Upaniṣad*s. The word 'yoga' in Vedic culture was both generic and polyvalent. Even if there were strands of Vedic culture that reflected ascetic identities (such as the *muni*, the *vrātya*, the *yati*),[7] it is likely, as Bronkhorst has pointed out, that the most intense development of yoga as an ascetic practice geared towards spiritual liberation occurred in the *śramaṇa* (renouncer) communities of the north eastern part of the Indic region (Bronkhorst 2007). These *śramaṇa* communities evolved around the mid-1st millennium BCE, possibly as a reaction towards increased urbanisation, and it is from these communities that the religions of Buddhism and Jainism emerged. By the start of the common era, there were several formative and co-existing strands of yoga that were entangled. In addition to the Brahmanic strands of yoga described in the *Upaniṣad*s and the *Mahābhārata*, there was a concurrent Buddhist

[5] After 500 CE, in a pattern mirroring the fragmentation of political systems and the increasing reification of social systems, patronage of the monasteries began to lessen, and religious legitimation of new dynasties became more strongly associated with Hindu and Jain deities than with the Buddha (Fogelin 2015: 215-224).

[6] For Sāṃkhya in the *Upaniṣad*s, see Bakker 1982. For early yoga and Sāṃkhya, see Schreiner 1999. For yoga in the *Mahābhārata* see Bedekar 1960-61 and 1968; Brockington 2003 and 2005; White 2009. For yoga in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, see Malinar 2007 and 2012.

[7] Respectively, the silent one, the one who has undertaken a vow, and the striver.

discourse of yoga[8] called yogācāra.[9] This was developed in early Mahāyāna meditation *sūtra*s and comprehensively described in Asaṅga's 4th-century treatise, the *Yogācārabhūmisāstra*.

The titular labels that a text grants itself are not always a guarantee of a text's thematic focus. For example, the *Yogasūtra* mentions yoga only three times and the *Yogabhāṣya* eight,[10] in contrast to the contemporaneous Buddhist *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* which mentions yoga more than 50 times (many of which references are to 'yoga discipline' specifically). Likewise, while the importance of the Sāṃkhya frame of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* should not be underemphasized, neither should it be overplayed. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the text with which the *Yogasūtra* is conventionally aligned, mentions yoga only once. The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* refers to Sāṃkhya in its chapter colophons (in the title *Sāṃkhyapravacana*) and only twice more in the commentary text[11] – and not at all in the *sūtra*s themselves. In focussing more broadly on the soteriology of yoga, this dissertation includes a text such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which (unlike the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*) does not purport to espouse a theory of yoga. However, even if the topic of the AKBh is not designated as 'yoga',[12] a close

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[8] Running in parallel to these developments was the growth of another ascetic religion, Jainism, which shared practices, as well as philosophical and soteriological ideas, with yoga and yogācāra, although not the nomenclature.

[9] I identify early yogācāras as Buddhist yoga adepts in the first centuries of the common era and I distinguish them from the later Yogācāras who by the 5th-6th centuries had become established as a discrete philosophical school within Mahāyāna Buddhism. I discuss this distinction fully in Chapter 3.

[10] Indeed, given the purported goal and means of Patañjali's method, one can imagine a number of other fitting titles for his text, such as the *Kaivalya-sūtra*, the *Nirbījasamādhi-sūtra* or the *Dharmamegha-sūtra*.

[11] This occurs in the fourth *pāda*, considered by some scholars to be an interpolation, at PYŚ 4.15 and 4.21.

[12] If we expand our understanding of the semantic field of yoga, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* describes a related technique of *visaṃyoga* (mental disjunction) more than 40 times (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation for more detail).

reading of metaphors reflects a shared conceptual basis between the PYŚ and the AKBh in theorizing practices that lead to spiritual liberation. A complex of botanical and agricultural metaphors recurs across the AKBh, the PYŚ, and the YĀBh, respectively representing Sautrāntika, yoga, and yogācāra positions. This scheme of metaphors forms part of the broader soteriological paradigm of *bhāvanā*, or cultivation, as a primary means to spiritual liberation. In particular, I highlight conceptual symmetry between the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda ideas in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and argue that this points to an entwinement of these two bodies of thought (Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda) in early yogācāra, as reflected in the first layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. The resulting picture is of a yogic soteriology that is dialogically constructed across sectarian lines, and compels us to review the issue of why, in scholarship, classical yoga is still predominantly categorised as Brahmanic soteriology.[13] Going forward, it also requires us to reassess what we include in the category of 'classical yoga' within the study of South Asian religions.

0.1 Literature review

In this section I survey the existing scholarship on the presence of Buddhist themes in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. I then contextualise the three selected texts of this study in their current fields of scholarship.

0.1.1 Buddhist elements in Pātañjala yoga

There is a longstanding scholarly record of attempting to explain the Buddhist elements in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, which I will summarise here. Senart was the first western scholar to identify Buddhist elements in the *Yogasūtra*[14] (Senart 1900). He argued that the presence of Buddhist ideas and terms did not indicate an 'external' element in the *Yogasūtra* (YS),

[13] For example: Potter 1983; Whicher 1998; Burley 2007; Larson and Bhattacharya 2008.

[14] I preserve the distinction between the *Yogasūtra* and the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* in this section, and elsewhere, in order to accurately reflect how other scholars have used these titles in their analysis and approach.

because Buddhism itself evolved out of a proto-yoga tradition (Senart 1900: 348). The Buddha did not disavow the methods of his Brahmin teachers Udraka Rāmaputra and Ārāḍa Kālāma – he simply refined and improved their techniques, which were, most likely, Sāṃkhya-based (Senart 1900: 347). Although Senart did not deny that Sāṃkhya and yoga are both ancient and interrelated, he rejected the idea that yoga is a subordinate discipline, preferring to see the two doctrines as separate (Senart 1900: 346). In contrast, he argued, yoga and Buddhism were alike in that they shared ethical and practical concerns, as opposed to Sāṃkhya's more abstract metaphysics. Senart identified structural correlates between the YS and Buddhism, including: *yamas/niyama*s (restraints/observances) with *śīla* (ethical conduct) of Buddhism; *vairāgya* (non-attachment); the doctrines of impermanence and suffering; and the focus on the elimination of *saṃskāras* (mental impressions). Senart classified these ideas as part of a common heritage in India (Senart 1900: 349). Oldenberg was the first to highlight the gap between the terminology of Pātañjala yoga and Sāṃkhya. His *Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus* proposed new ideas about the role of the *dhyāna*s as a transmission from proto-yoga to Buddhism, and of Sāṃkhya as the vehicle that conveyed this transmission (Oldenberg 1923). Keith proposed that we can only understand the quasi-theistic notion of *īśvara* (Lord) in the *Yogasūtra* in the light of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Keith 1932: 434). And Heiler posited that yoga and Buddhism evolved from the same root, with Buddhist meditation heavily indebted to yogic methods (Heiler 1922: 43-51).

De La Vallée Poussin drew on Senart's work to argue further that Buddhism was influenced by a proto-yoga tradition. And, like Senart, he claimed that the relationship between yoga and Sāṃkhya, although ancient, was not exclusive (de La Vallée Poussin 1937: 224). De La Vallée Poussin believed that early Buddhism drew on a 'pure' tradition of yoga that was free from metaphysics – he calls this 'Buddhist yoga' (de La Vallée Poussin 1937: 226). In many respects, early Buddhism is the only lens through which we can view the proto-yoga tradition, which, apart from the *dhyānas*, has otherwise

been lost (de La Vallée Poussin 1937: 230). De La Vallée Poussin located the origin of these elements of meditation not within Buddhism but in a shadowy historical realm of archaic-magic practices. Complementing Oldenberg's work, he claimed that the first three *pāda*s of the *Yogasūtra* contain more than 100 'Buddhist' terms, 50 of which can be directly traced to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.[15]

Another scholarly approach to account for the Brahmin-Buddhist 'mix' of the PYŚ has been to identify sections of the *Yogasūtra* as Buddhist interpolations. Deussen initiated this type of analysis (Deussen 1914: 509-543),[16] which subsequently remained focused on two particular sections of the *Yogasūtra*. Hauer (Hauer 1958), Frauwallner (Frauwallner 1973), and Oberhammer (Oberhammer 1977) all classified the *aṣṭāṅga* section (YS 2.28-3.7) as closely related to Buddhist thought.[17] The other section of the *Yogasūtra* identified as having Buddhist 'origins', in part or total, is the fourth *pāda*. Keith, Deussen, Dasgupta, Hauer, and Frauwallner discuss this *pāda* (particularly YS 4.16-21) as responding to the consciousness-only (*cittamātra*) positions of Yogācāra[18] thought. Although such structuralist 'hacking' of texts has now been abandoned, the point remains that the PYŚ is a composite text.

In the late 20th century, the vexed relationship of the *Yogasūtra* and Buddhism was revisited anew. There was a shift from making broad and

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[15] Larson agrees with this analysis citing the examples of *śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā, ṛtambharā, bīja, vāsanā, kleśa, āśaya, nirodha, dharma, lakṣaṇa, avasthā, bhūmi, dharmamegha, samāpatti, pratipakṣabhāvanā* (Larson and Bhattacharya 2008:42).

[16] Deussen identified four core and originally independent texts that were combined in the *Yogasūtra*: YS 1.1-16, 1.17-51, 2.1-27, and 2.28-3.55. All of the other sections, including the fourth *pāda* were, in his view, newer textual supplements.

[17] Although Oberhammer ranks the *aṣṭāṅga* portion as secondary in the four methods he identifies, he concedes that it is still oriented to the goal of Sāṃkhya, the attainment of discerning knowledge (*vivekakhyāti*) (Oberhammer 1977: 210-211).

[18] I preserve the spelling of upper-case Yogācāra to reflect how previous scholars have used this term generally. See footnote 9.

general comparisons across 'terminology' (such as de La Vallée Poussin) or structural analyses (such as Deussen) to specific contextual investigations of a particular *sūtra*. Klostermeier's 1986 essay 'Dharmamegha samādhi: Comments on Yogasūtra IV, 29' traced the primary context of Patañjali's term *dharmamegha* to Buddhist sources. Cousins' 1992 paper, '*Vitakka/vitarka* and *vicāra*: stages of *samādhi* in Buddhism and Yoga' argued that the use of the terms *vitarka* and *vicāra* in both Buddhism and Brahmanism reflects an interconnection between the two traditions that has gone largely unacknowledged (Cousins 1992). Cousins surveyed the register and common usage of *vitarka* and *vicāra* in Buddhist canonical literature. He then compared this discursive and paradigmatic usage with that in the *Yogasūtra*, noting the similarity between the yogic *saṃprajñāta samādhi* (cognitive concentration) and the Buddhist *rūpa-jhānas* (the *dhyānas* in a progressive formula) (Cousins 1992:147).

Wezler's 1987 study of the *Yogabhāṣya* (YBh) examined the commentary to YS 2.28, which includes a list of nine causes (*kāraṇāni*) elaborated in relation to 'the methods of yoga'. He infers that *śāstra* references in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* point to prior philosophical teaching systems. From the way in which the nine causes are contextualised by the editor of the YBh, Wezler deduces that they belong to a system that is not compatible with Sāṃkhya. He, then, suggests that the author of the YBh is drawing on Buddhist models of ten causes, as found in Vasubandhu's *Madhyhāntavibhāgabhāṣya*[19] and Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Such lists appear also, in modified form, in the *Sarvitarkādibhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, two of the 'books' of the *Yogācārabhūmiśastra* (Wezler 1987: 356; 375). In making modifications to the Buddhist list of causes, Patañjali consciously chose to employ the term *viyoga* (disjunction), which appears in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* but not in the *Madhyhāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (Wezler 1987: 374). Overall, Wezler agrees with Frauwallner (Frauwallner 1973) that Sarvāstivāda Buddhism influenced the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, but adds that Yogācāra also played a role.

[19] The *Madhyhāntavibhāga* is attributed to Asaṅga and the *bhāṣya* thereon to Vasubandhu.

In a full-length study, Yamashita surveyed a range of Buddhist terms, ideas, and quotations contained in both the *Yogasūtra* and *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* (Yamashita 1994). Noting that the ontology of the YS differs from that of Sāṃkhya (Yamashita 1994: 1), Yamashita observed fragments of Sarvāstivāda texts in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*. He traced the theory of the appearance and disappearance of *dharmas* (the theory of change, or *tirobhāvāvirbhāva-vāda*) in *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* 4.12 to the Buddhist *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Somewhat confusingly, however, the passage describing this doctrine also appears in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, where Vasubandhu cites it as a view of the Sāṃkhya teacher Vārṣagaṇya (Yamashita 1994: 46-55). According to Yamashita, Vasubandhu presents the *Yogasūtra*'s definition of *pariṇāma* (change/transformation), and Patañjali had previously used the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda position to construct his own theory of change: *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* 3.50 and *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* 3.13 are almost identical in wording. Less convincingly, Yamashita identifies several terms in the *Yogasūtra* as distinctly Buddhist, notably *citta* and *kliṣṭa* (Yamashita 1994: 65; 82), and he also proposes that the *samādhi* of the YS is similar to both *samādhi* in Sarvāstivāda and *manaskāra* in Yogācāra (Yamashita 1994: 126). Yamashita compares the term 'yoga' in the *Yogasūtra* to the *samādhi* of the Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) and the *samāpatti* of the Sarvāstivāda. Although some of Yamashita's broad claims were not substantiated (and represented a return to the terminological generalisations of earlier scholarship), this study provided interesting clues and directions that called for further research.

More recently, Sarbacker devoted a chapter on Buddhism and classical yoga in *The Numinous and the Cessative in Indo-Tibetan Yoga* (Sarbacker 2005). He concludes that there is an overlap between *samādhi* in Pātañjala yoga and *samādhi* in Buddhist conceptions of *śamatha*. Sarbacker also claims that the four *samāpatti*s of *samprajñāta samādhi* in the first *pāda* of the PYŚ correspond to the four Buddhist *dhyāna*s (Sarbacker 2005: 77-78). Although Sarbacker's chapter does not engage substantially in primary analysis, it

does identify some key conceptual correspondences. Wujastyk's analysis of the foundational āyurvedic treatise the *Carakasaṃhitā* (c. 1st-2nd century CE) identifies an 'archaic' eightfold yogic path to liberation that 'owed its origins to Buddhist traditions of cultivating *smṛti*' (Wujastyk 2012: 36). Furthermore, Wujastyk's 'Some problematic Yoga Sutras and their Buddhist Background' examines three Pātañjala *sūtra*s that appear to have their origins in Buddhist texts or discourse (Wujastyk 2016). Wujastyk's analysis in this article provides a valuable template for close, comparative reading.

Today, the foremost scholar of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is Philipp Maas, whose 2014 article 'Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and the Yoga of Patañjali' embarked, again, on analysis of the PYŚ and the AKBh. Maas examines two passages from the AKBh (*Yogasūtra* 3.13 and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 5.25) that reflect interaction between proponents of Sāṃkhya-Yoga on the one hand and Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda schools of Śrāvakayāna Buddhism on the other. Maas concurs with the view that the *Yogasūtra* contains polemics against the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism (which are unpacked for us by Saṅkara's *Vivaraṇa* commentary) (Maas 2013: 73).[20] He disputes Frauwallner's view that YS 3.13 presents a poor imitation of an original Buddhist verse (Maas 2014b: 1). Rather, Maas argues, Patañjali combined the Sarvāstivāda theories in a novel way to transpose them from a Buddhist position (conditioned factors are subject to transitoriness) to a Sāṃkhya-yoga position (the transformation of substance has a permanent substratum even through time). Positing direct engagement with Buddhist philosophers, Maas shows that *Yogasūtra* 3.13 rewords Vasubandhu's passage, reworks Dharmatrāta's theory of the momentariness of conditioned factors in the *Vibhāṣa*, and modifies the theories of Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra, and Buddhamitra (Maas 2014b: 6). In Maas' view, Patañjali's 'reformulation was probably used as a polemic device in order to out-match the Buddhist anti-substantialist positions' (Maas 2014b: 6).

[20] See Gelblum 1992 for the argument that the *Vivaraṇa* also unpacks polemical encounter within the Brahmanical tradition – specifically Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika.

A counterargument to the thesis of Buddhist elements in the *Yogasūtra* comes from Burley, who refutes the notion that Patañjali's fourth chapter, 'Kaivalya Pāda', positions itself as realist in contrast to the idealist Yogācāra school. Burley proposes that the framing of Patañjali's fourth *pāda* as an anti-idealist polemic was due to a later commentarial interpretation. The first writers to identify polemics against Buddhism in the PYŚ were the commentators Vācaspatimiśra (9th-10th century CE) and Vijñānabhikṣu (15th-16th century CE) (respectively *Tattvavaisāradī* 4.14 and *Yogavārttika* 4.14). It was they who argued that the idealists identified by Patañjali at YBh 4.14 are the Vijñānavādins (Yogācāra). Burley concludes that Vācaspatimiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu misinterpreted Patañjali's text and that the anti-Buddhist interventions of subsequent commentators resulted in a 'philosophical vendetta […] at the expense of accurate exegesis' (Burley 2007: 90).

Recently, there have been some distinctive hypotheses on the relationship of the PYŚ to Buddhism. In the introduction to his 2012 French translation of the *Yogasūtra* and *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, Angot argued that the *Yogasūtra* was mostly written by a Buddhist author, and that the last *pāda* and the commentary was written by a Hindu named Vyāsa in the 6th/7th century, as a hostile Brahmanic takeover of a Buddhist text (Angot 2012: 24-34). Elsewhere, Squarcini asserted that the *Yogasūtra* is a Buddhist work that has an 'interdiscursive' relationship with the Brahmanical tradition, albeit primarily polemical (Squarcini 2016: XLIX). Squarcini's translation of the *Yogasūtra* includes an 'intertextual' index, which links words and phrases from the *Yogasūtra* to Buddhist texts (Squarcini 2016: 179-189). However, as it is currently just a list of references without further analyses of these connections it merits expansion. Both of these scholarly accounts dwell at one end of the spectrum of views on Pātañjala yoga as either Buddhist or Brahmin. Despite their relative marginality in current classical yoga scholarship, we cannot discount these arguments of a Buddhist identity for 'Patañjali', although we cannot accept them wholesale either.

In the broader context of socio-politics, culture and ideology, there have been landmark works by Bronkhorst (Bronkhorst 2007), Gombrich (Gombrich 1988; 2006), and Samuel (Samuel 2008). These scholars have produced important contextual research on the interrelation between Buddhism and Brahmanism, and Buddhism and yoga. In particular, Bronkhorst has written several major studies on the Brahmanic-Buddhist dynamic, covering a breadth of historical angles.[21] His broad thesis is that the ascetic tradition of yoga evolved uniquely in the *śramaṇa* (renouncer) communities of a north-eastern region, which he terms Greater Magadha. In his view, therefore, the main facets of yoga emerged in the *śramaṇa* religions of Buddhism and Jainism. Subsequently, the Brahmanic community co-opted the practice and theory of yoga and made modifications to it in line with their own religion (Bronkhorst 2006: 302). According to Bronkhorst, the concepts of rebirth and karma were invented in the *śramaṇa* communities and the import of rebirth and karma into Brahmanism created

[21] There have also been a number of important intertextual studies conducted on the intersecting conceptual spheres of Buddhism and Brahmanism as attested in specific Brahmanic texts, such as the *Bhagavad Gītā*. Upadhyaya's valuable, if dated, textual study of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, locates the text in the 4th century BCE and argues that the Gītā was strongly influenced by early Buddhist teachings, but necessarily differed in its metaphysics because of its acceptance of the belief in a permanent self, as opposed to the Buddhist doctrine of non-self (Upadhyaya 1971). Lindtner connected the idea of *lokasaṃgraha*, which is central to the *Bhagavad Gītā*'s thought, to *saṃgrahavastu*, which occurs in Mahāyāna texts (Lindtner 1995). Both concepts relate to a concern for the prosperity of the world and diverge somewhat from the śramaṇic emphasis on a disdain for the social world. Lindtner argues that this idea may have been emphasized in the *Bhagavad Gītā* because of the 'humanitarian' emphasis in Mahāyāna texts. Tripathi posits an early dating for the *Bhagavad Gītā*, c.400 BCE, and argues that it was composed in part to counter the renunciatory views of the *śramaṇa* schools. Tripathi examines several technical terms such as *karman*, *brahmanirvāṇa*, *svadharma*, and *paradharma* as clues that reflect an integrated Brahmanic critique of Buddhism, and an affirmation of worldly life (Tripathi 1997). Malinar situates the *Bhagavad Gītā* in a broad ideological context that includes early Buddhism. Her treatment of the contents of the *Bhagavad Gītā* reveals many references to, and parallel ideas with, Buddhist intertexts (Malinar 2007).

a divide between those who adhered to these views (Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika) and those who did not (Mīmāṃsā and Lokāyata). Bronkhorst's overall position is that *dhyāna* in the *Yogasūtra* is a Buddhist technique, as is the use of *smṛti* to denote mindfulness (as opposed to the Brahmanic context of indicating non-*śruti* texts) (Bronkhorst 1993:95). He states that Buddhist meditation is especially visible in the 'Samādhi Pāda' of the *Yogasūtra*, namely 1.17-20 and 1.46-51 (Bronkhorst 1993: 74).[22] Bronkhorst has also noted a striking parallelism between the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* and the *Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya* in describing the *tanmātra* (subtle element) as an atom (Bronkhorst 2006: 306 fn 18).

To sum up: a significant body of scholarly work has been produced on the relationship between the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and Buddhist salvific thought. However, in many cases similarities between the two traditions have been broadly sketched and are not underpinned by systematic analysis. In other cases, excellent fine-tuned textual analysis is nonetheless limited in scope (to a single passage or a few *sūtra*s) and can only draw limited conclusions. Furthermore, the analysis of Patañjali's interaction with Buddhist thought has concentrated exclusively on either the *Yogasūtra* (e.g. de La Vallée Poussin 1937) or the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* (e.g. Frauwallner 1973 or Wezler 1987). In contrast, this dissertation evaluates the *Yogasūtra* and the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* together as a unitary composition, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, an approach that by itself offers unprecedented access to the integrated conceptuality of Patañjali's text. Furthermore, this study seeks to generate new perspectives on the entanglement between Patañjali's discourse and that of contemporaneous Buddhism by engaging in systematic analysis using fresh methodology – literary intertextual analysis combined with conceptual metaphor theory.

[22] A controversial aspect of Bronkhorst's work is his thesis that Buddhism did not evolve out of, or in reaction to, Vedic Brahmanism, but rather had its own distinct origins. See for example his denial of any relationship between the Buddhist notion of no-self and the Vedic ideas of *ātman* (Bronkhorst 2007).

0.1.2 Introduction to the texts

The three main texts of this study are the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Here, I highlight key issues in current scholarship pertaining to their historical production.

Patañjali and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*

Although scholarship has predominantly regarded the *Yogasūtra* and the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*[23] as separate texts, authored respectively by Patañjali and Vyāsa[24] at least a century apart, this study treats the two texts as part of a single whole, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*.[25] This position is in line with Maas' analysis of the text as a unitary composition by one editor (or group of

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[23] Other common titles for the *Bhāṣya* include the *Vyāsabhāṣya*, *Yogabhāṣya*, and (its own self-given title) *Sāṃkhyapravacana-bhāṣya*.

[24] Most scholars have regarded the *Bhāṣya* as separately authored from the *Yogasūtra* and have attributed its authorship to Vyāsa, dating the commentary to around the 5th-6th century CE. In Larson's view, the *Bhāṣya* may have been composed by the Sāṃkhya author Vindhyavāsin and reflects polemical interaction with Buddhist thinkers (Larson 2012: 74). Whicher argues that the *Bhāṣya* was authored separately and later by Vyāsa, and postdates the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (Whicher 2000:49). Gelblum and Pines speculate that the *Bhāṣya* that we have today may not be the original version (Gelblum and Pines 1989). This is suggested by discrepancies in two later renderings of the *Bhāṣya*. First, the *Bhāṣya* cited in Śaṅkara's *Vivaraṇa* commentary is not the same as that traditionally named as Vyāsa's. Second, al-Bīrunī's (973-1050 CE) Arabic translation of the *Kitāb Pātañjala*, albeit an abridgement, seems to refer to a different commentary than the one we have. Angot states that Vyāsa's commentary replaced an earlier, ecumenical commentary, and that Vyasa's *Bhāṣya* is a response by Brahmins to attacks from Jains and Buddhists (Angot 2012). Angot further drives a wedge between the two texts by asserting that Patañjali's references in the first three *pāda*s of the YS neglect the Vedas entirely, and that Vyasa's *Bhāṣya* draws on the *Purāṇas* (Angot 2012). Raveh writes of the 'gap' between Patañjali and Vyāsa, most notably in the *Bhāṣya*'s elision of explanations of some of the *siddhi-sūtra*s in the 'Vibhūti Pāda' (Raveh 2012: 12).

[25] Several scholars have pointed out that Vyāsa is, most likely, not a proper name as it literally means 'compiler' or 'arranger' and is thus either a misattribution, misrendering, or a corruption (Larson 2012: 74; Maas 2013). Burley adds that Vyāsa must be taken as a legendary figure, since it is also to him that the Vedas, *Mahābhārata*, *Purāṇas*, and *Brahmasūtra* are also attributed (Burley 2007: 29).

editors). Maas argues that the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* texts were produced together at the same time and estimates the date range for the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* as 325-425 CE (Maas 2013: 57-68). Although Maas has provided new and compelling evidence to support this argument, this view has, in fact, been circulating in scholarly circles since the 19th century. In his 1883 introduction to his translation of the *Yogasūtra*, Mitra already noted that the name Vyāsa rarely appears in the colophons of the manuscripts, and Mitra referred to the combined *sūtra-bhāṣya* text as the *Yogaśāstra* (Mitra 1883: lxx-lxxvi). In 1930 Jacobi proposed the idea that the YS and YBh comprise a unitary composition (Jacobi 1930: 584). Yet it was Bronkhorst's 1985 article 'Patañjali and the *Yoga Sūtras*' that was instrumental in fleshing out the detail of this argument. It is evident, Bronkhorst argued, that Patañjali was also regarded as the author of the *Bhāṣya* because of the way that subsequent commentators referenced the text – including Śaṅkara, Devapāla, Vācaspatimiśra, and Śrīdhara (Bronkhorst 1985: 204). To underline his point, Bronkhorst analysed some grammatical, syntactical, and semantic interconnections of the *Yogasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*. Subsequently, Maas expanded Bronkhorst's analysis and consolidated the evidence for the argument that the text of the *Yogasūtra* forms one text with its *Bhāṣya* (Maas 2006). Maas synthesized previous arguments and highlighted the following points (Maas 2013):

> 1 The convention of the *sūtra* genre at the time was to provide an auto-commentary (*svopajñavṛtti*). The *śāstra* structure typically comprised *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, and summary passages to form a whole textual unit.[26]
>
> 2 There is no manuscript transmission of the *bhāṣya* independent of the *Yogasūtra*.

[26] We see this convention reflected in the other two main texts under consideration in this study. Together, the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* and the *Abhidharmakośakārikābhāṣya* are regarded as a unitary composition and referred to as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, authored by Vasubandhu. Similarly, the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* is presented as a unitary text comprised of core teachings called *bhūmi*s (foundations) and accompanied by an auto-commentary of sorts (also called the supplementary section), the *Saṃgrahaṇī*.

3 The first commentary, Śaṅkara's *Vivaraṇa* (circa 8th century CE),[27] does not refer to Vyāsa or to a separate author of the *Bhāṣya*.

4 Al-Bīrūnī's 11th-century translation and Bhoja's *Rājamārtaṇḍa*, an 11th-century commentary, both refer to the *Yogasūtra* and *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* as a unified text by one author.

5 In places, interconnected grammatical structures may indicate that the *Bhāṣya* author is also the compiler of the *Yogasūtra*.

In this dissertation, I accept that Maas' work has reassigned the status of the *Yogasūtra* and *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* to that of a joint text. I will therefore refer to it as the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, produced, most likely, in the 4th-early 5th century.[28]

The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is widely held to be the first systematised account of yoga.[29] Although the PYŚ is preceded by nascent descriptions of yoga in the Brahmanic texts, these accounts are by no means systematic. Burley argues that some form of textual systematization, now lost, must have existed before the YS. The way in which the text declares itself an 'exposition' (*anuśāsana*) at its beginning points to 'a pre-existing body of teaching' (Burley 2007: 27). Larson and Maas, on the other hand, concur that yoga only came into existence as a systematic philosophy around the time of the

[27] The arguments as to whether or not the *Vivaraṇa* can be attributed to Śaṅkara and dated this early are both controversial. For the claim that the *Vivaraṇa* was a c. 8th –century composition by Śaṅkara, see Leggett (1992) and Harimoto (1999). For the counterargument that the text is as late as the 11th-14th century, see Gelblum (1992), Rukmani (2001), and Larson and Bhattacharya (2008).

[28] There are, nonetheless, some aspects of Maas' argument that could be further investigated. For example, the commentator Śaṅkara does not positively state that there was one only author, and still refers to the *sūtra*s and the commentary separately. Furthermore, Al-Bīrūnī's is an unusual translation, as it is largely paraphrased and does not include the fourth *pāda*. Additionally, Maas' proofs of syntactic interdependence between *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* passages are limited in number.

[29] Related to the question of whether yoga existed in any recognizably systematic form before the PYŚ is the debate as to whether yoga can be counted as a separate school of thought from Sāṃkhya.

composition of the YS (Larson 2008: 27; Maas 2013). Maas proposes that an author, or group of authors, combined older textual material with new compositions to create the *Patañjalayogaśāstra* (Maas 2013: 69).[30]

Asaṅga, yogācāra, and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*

Tradition considers the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* to be the work of a single author, aligned with Mahāyāna Buddhism in general and the Yogācāra school of philosophy in particular. The Sanskrit and Tibetan sources name the author as Asaṅga, while the Chinese translations refer to him as Maitreya. Until recently, some scholars such as Wayman argued for a single author in line with Buddhist tradition (Wayman 1989). However, current scholarship accepts that Asaṅga was a compiler or editor of different strata of material (e.g. Schmithausen 1987: 13-14, 184-185; Kritzer 2005: 13-17).[31] Given the vast size of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, the notion of a unified text with singular authorship is highly unlikely. For a long time, the standard scholarly view was that the Yogācāra school was founded by the half-brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, who gave Yogācāra its characteristic ideas and composed many of its key texts. However, this view has now been updated with more complex and nuanced analyses. Skilling notes the 'murky and tangled' details of the authorship of both Vasubandhu and Asaṅga and

[30] As with so many of the early Indic texts, there are also debates about the identity of the 'author' Patañjali. For a long time, the primary debate was whether the *Yogasūtra* author Patañjali was one and the same as the grammarian Patañjali who wrote the voluminous *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, a grammatical treatise that can be dated to the 2nd century BCE. This led to much earlier datings for the *Yogasūtra*. Recent scholarship has separated the two Patañjalis and recognises that the latter Patañjali may be an attribution to the name of the grammarian in order to consolidate the authority and lineage of the yoga text. Larson argues that the so-called *yogāṅga* section of the *Yogasūtra* (YS 2.28-3.5) may have been written by the grammarian Patañjali, leading to the misattribution of the whole work to a certain 'Patañjali' (Larson 2012: 75).

[31] Skilling refers to Asaṅga as 'Asaṅga' to remind us that we are not referring to one historical author, but rather that the name is merely a placeholder for an editorial process over generations that produced the text that we now call the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* (Skilling 2013: 783). In a similar vein, we might refer to 'Patañjali' in this way in order to shake us out of our comfort zones of simplistic authorial designations.

critiques the way in which scholars continue to neatly classify both authors as founders of a single tradition. It is problematic that both writers 'are still described in purportedly authoritative literature as 'founders' of 'the' Yogācāra tradition (a similar fate is also suffered by Nāgārjuna with 'the' Madhyamaka') (Skilling 2013: 773 fn 3).[32] Although Kragh notes that there are structural similarities between the YĀBh and several other texts attributed to Asaṅga, '[i]n truth, the legendary notion that the YBh was composed by a single author is fraught with serious philological difficulties' (Kragh 2013b: 34-35). Ganeri underlines this point by observing that śāstric commentaries 'were shorn *by their own authors* of almost all significant autobiographical, social, or political context'; these texts designate their own status as *apauruṣeya* ('authorless') (Ganeri 2011: 66; italics author's). It is generally accepted that the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* pre-dates the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.[33]

There have been further recent shifts in scholarship on yogācāra. First, as I have noted, there is a distinction between yogācāra (early and ascetic) and Yogācāra (later and philosophical). Deleanu, for example, differentiates between the early stages of yogācāra around the beginning of the common era, in which ideas and practices were emerging, and a later philosophical school of Yogācāra which by the time of the 5th-6th century was formalised around a set of doctrines (Deleanu 2006).[34] In the 4th-5th centuries, then,

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[32] 'The meaning of 'founder' in Indian Buddhist (or even Indian, or even Buddhist) tradition and the weight in historical analysis of retrospective labels with their implications of agency are ripe for investigation' (Skilling 2013: 773 fn3).

[33] For a different, and controversial, view on dating, see Gold, who places the AKBh before the YĀBh: 'Vasubandhu uses the term *yogācāra* (lit. "practitioner of yoga") in only two instances in the AKBh, and in both cases he is clearly referring to practitioners of yogic meditative exercises, *not* to any philosophical school. This textual fact alone suggests to me that Vasubandhu's AKBh was most likely written before Asaṅga's magnum opus, the *Yogācārabhūmi*' (Gold 2015: 10. Italics are author's).

[34] Buescher suggests the title Yogācāra to refer to the earliest strands of this school of thought and the compound Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda to differentiate a later, more developed strand (Buescher 2008:2).

> [t]here is strong reason to doubt that the term "Yogācāra" had its later, doxographic meaning – referring to a particular philosophical school (Gold 2015: 3).

Second, as Lusthaus points out, most of the distinctively Yogācāra ideas had already appeared in the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* around a century before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu lived. He concludes that the standard claim that the two brothers are the founders of Yogācāra is a 'fictitious' one (Lusthaus 2002: 7). Third, although the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* has been categorised as a quintessentially Mahāyāna text, the majority of the content of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* is, in fact, Śrāvakayāna with nascent strands of Mahāyāna (Deleanu 2006; Kragh 2013a). Furthermore, the predominant characterization of mature Yogācāra philosophy is that it privileges a 'mind-only' or idealist understanding of the world. According to this view, the perceived world is 'representation-only' (*vijñaptimātra*) or 'thought-only' (*cittamātra*) – thus proposing the constructive role of the mind and rejecting a mind-independent objective reality. However, Lusthaus has challenged this representation of Yogācāra as idealist: 'Yogācārins treat the term *vijñapti-mātra* as an epistemic caution, not an ontological pronouncement' (Lusthaus 2002: 5-6).[35] Although I do not engage with the question of whether Yogācāra is idealist, this dissertation, in line with recent scholarship, focuses on early yogācāra as distinct from mature Yogācara and views yogācāra as closely aligned with Śrāvakayāna and not simply Mahāyāna thought.

[35] "*For Yogācāra 'mind' is the problem not the solution.* What is reduced in consciousness is not simply and purely consciousness itself […] Thus the key Yogācāric phrase *vijñāpti-mātra* does not mean (as is often touted in scholarly literature) that 'consciousness alone exists,' but rather that 'all our efforts to get beyond ourselves are nothing but projections of our consciousness'" (Lusthaus 2002: 5-6. Italics are author's). For a critique of Lusthaus's position see Schmithausen 2005 and Stuart 2015, 1: 282-305.

Vasubandhu and the *Abhidharmkośabhāṣya*

Vasubandhu is dated to the 4th-5th century, and he produced a vast output of some twenty works.[36] Gold calls Vasubandhu 'one of the most important Buddhist philosophers of all time' (Gold 2015: 5), 'perhaps the greatest Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha' (Gold 2015: 1). Scholars have long debated the identity of Vasubandhu, and such debates are relevant to this study since they help us to understand Vasubandhu's sectarian affiliations.

The most basic disagreement is over whether the AKBh is a straightforward Sarvāstivāda text or whether it represents a Sautrāntika challenge to the orthodox positions. There is a divergence beween the *kārikā* text, which introduces orthodox Vaibhāṣika views, and the *bhāṣya* text, which presents debates in which the Sautrāntikas refute the Vaibhāṣika propositions (Kritzer 2005: xxxii).[37] A related issue has been the theory of 'two Vasubandhus' to account for his earlier and later texts, which appear to be from doctrinally different schools.[38] It has since been largely accepted that there was one Vasubandhu who composed Abhidharma works in his early career and Yogācāra works in his later career (Skilling 2000).[39] Vasubandhu's identity is also bound up with the traditional identities of

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[36] Kritzer gives a useful account of the controversy over the texts that can be attributed to Vasubandhu (Kritzer 2005: xxiv-xxvi).

[37] Gold argues that in terms of the textual convention of *kārikā* and auto-commentary, this is an 'extremely unusual disjunction' (Gold 2015: 3).

[38] The theory of 'two Vasubandhus' was put forward in 1951 by Frauwallner. He proposed that there were two distinct Vasubandhus who were mistakenly merged over time. This accounted for the divergent dates of the works attributed to Vasubandhu. Schmithausen re-appraised the 'two Vasubandhus' theory by showing that there were consistent aspects to Vasubandhu's total output. For example, the later 'mind-only' works – the *Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi* and the *Triṃśikāvijñaptimātratā* – share common ideas with the earlier Sautrāntika positions of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Schmithausen 1967). For a summary of the scholarship that has successfully resolved date discrepancies of Vasubandhu's lifespan, as well as further historical context, see Anacker 1984: 7-24.

[39] See Kritzer 2005 xxvii-xxx for a review of numerous scholarly positions on the affinity between the Sautrāntika positions in the AKBh and later Yogācāra texts.

schools of Buddhism. 19th and 20th-century scholarship drew clear lines of division between Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra. This meant that the oeuvre of Vasubandhu, which seemed to span all three schools, appeared to be philosophically inconsistent.[40] Tradition accounted for this discrepancy in Vasubandhu's output with a standard story: Vasubandhu trained in the Vaibhāṣika tradition and composed the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* (AKK) as a treatise of what he learned, but after some time, in which Vasubandhu's doctrinal views changed, he composed the auto-commentary, which criticized aspects of that Vaibhāṣika system.[41] Another story proposes that Vasubandhu converted to Mahāyāna because it was his brother Asaṅga's dying wish. Gold argues that these 'doxographic identities' of Vasubandhu (Sarvastivāda, then Sautrāntika, then Yogācāra) are, in fact, later inventions (Gold 2015: 19).[42] On the whole, contemporary scholarship now accepts that there was one Vasubandhu who produced a philosophically and doctrinally varied output over time.[43] Skilling traces a tentative chronology from a Sautrāntika phase in Vasubandhu's output (the AKBh) to a later Mahāyāna phase (Skilling 2000: 309-310). A further issue has been the question of Vasubandhu's relationship to Asaṅga, which has bearing on the textual interrelationship of their two flagship texts, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. Kritzer argues for a

[40] Gold argues that the only evidence for identifying multiple Vasubandhus is the ascription of the name 'Vasubandhu' to three half-brothers, Vasubandhu, Asaṅga and Viriñcivatsa (Gold 2015: 11, 18). They shared the same father but had different mothers, and *vasubandhu* means 'good kin' (Gold 2015: 20).

[41] For more on the identity and affiliation of Vasubandhu and the likelihood of the *bhāṣya* as an autocommentary, see Kritzer 2005: xx-xxii; Park 2014: 1-29; and Gold 2015: 1-20.

[42] For Gold, '"Sautrāntika" was not definitely attested as a doctrinal school before Vasubandhu, and "Yogācāra" definitely postdated him' (Gold 2015: 5). However, Gold cautions us to maintain the difference between Yogācāra and Mahāyāna, as a broader scholastic classification: 'Paramārtha's Chinese biography mentions Mahāyāna, but not Yogācāra, as Vasubandhu's final scholastic identity' (Gold 2015: 3). Gold further asserts that 'it is a mistake to set up a teleological directionality for Vasubandhu's works, with the Yogācāra system as its ultimate end' (Gold 2015: 19).

[43] For more on the scholastic affiliations of Vasubandhu's output, see Anacker 1998.

strong interrelation between the AKBh and the YĀBh and offers the first systematic comparison of passages between the two texts.[44]
This dissertation works from the premise that the Vasubandhu who produced the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* was, at that time, affiliated to Sautrāntika thought. I also accept the intertextuality of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* and that the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* is the earlier text. (See Chapter 3 for more on the YĀBh).

0.2 Joining the dots: 'classical yoga' and 'Buddhist yoga'

There is somewhat of a scholarly divide between those who study 'classical yoga' and those who study 'Buddhist yoga'. To date, much of the scholarship on classical yoga has focused on the place of yoga within Brahmanical and early Hindu traditions. In this study I demonstrate that integrating the findings of contemporary scholars in Buddhist studies within current research in classical yoga scholarship generates a richer understanding of the discourse of classical yoga and of the character and evolution of yoga soteriology in the early common era. There is much analysis in the

[44] Although the standard interpretation was to categorise the AKBh as a text that Vasubandhu wrote *before* he converted to Mahāyāna, Kritzer turns the standard theory on its head to argue that Vasubandhu was using the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* as a source text for the AKBh (Kritzer 2005: xii). In Kritzer's view, this explains the Sautrāntika critique of orthodox Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda in the AKBh. Kritzer's reasoning is as follows. Vasubandhu was a Yogācārin all along, even when he wrote the early AKBh. 'Sautrāntika' is merely a label that Vasubandhu devised to name his Yogācāra-inflected criticisms of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Kritzer's conclusion is that the AKBh is not a Sarvāstivāda work at all but constituted a covert Yogācāra work that disguises itself as a Sautrāntika production. To flesh out Kritzer's conclusions a little more, he argues that the AKBh postdates the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, and that Vasubandhu invents the term 'Sautrāntika' to denote positions taken from the YĀBh that he prefers to the orthodox Sarvāstivādin positions. Kritzer argues that Vasubandhu only borrows ideas such as *bīja* (seed) that are not radically at odds with the Abhidharma content, but leaves aside contradictory ideas such as *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness). The name 'Sautrāntika' simply means that these views are a more accurate interpretation of the sūtras than the Abhidharma interpretation – and Sautrāntika thus refers to the position of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.

scholarship on yogācāra and Sautrāntika that, when used to contextualise the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, can yield fresh and interesting insights about Pātañjala yoga. Although, tendentially, Brahmanic yoga and Buddhist yogācāra have been kept apart in scholarship as discrete religious entities, this study attempts to illuminate the textual cross-overs between the two forms of soteriological practice. I acknowledge that there is a danger of conflating 'yoga' and 'yogācāra' and so I aim to retain distinct labels for the two branches of practice. As 'yoga' is of greater antiquity in texts (being a Vedic term, albeit polysemous) I also use 'yoga' as a general label. This general label 'yoga' refers to a body of ascetic soteriological practices that co-originated in the *śramaṇa* and Vedic communities. By the 4th-5th century the practice and understanding of 'yoga' had evolved into distinct streams, such as yogācāra and Pātañjala yoga. I use the term 'Pātañjala yoga' to describe the formula of yoga contained in the PYŚ, rather than allowing this specific type of yoga to be a synonym for 'classical yoga'. Pātañjala yoga, then, is not more definitive than yogācāra as a form of yoga, and I challenge the idea that the *Yogasūtra* contains an *ur*-yoga-system that must be revered as 'original'. Nor do I reserve the category of 'classical yoga' for Pātañjala yoga; as a category in the history of South Asian religions, 'classical yoga' encompasses all forms of yoga in the classical period,[45] including yogācāra.

0.2.1 'Classical yoga'

It is important to acknowledge that the category 'classical yoga' is not natural or self-evident, but rather was shaped by the interplay of divergent cultural forces, motivations, and ideologies. 'Classical yoga' is a Eurocentric category of Indian religions that has maintained intellectual currency from 19th-century Oriental scholarship to present-day contexts. Singleton has addressed historical factors in the affirmation of the *Yogasūtra* as a classical text in order to make it 'a fit participant in an explicitly European hermeneutic and philosophical colloquy' (Singleton 2008: 82). However, to

[45] In this dissertation, I refer to the classical period as covering the era of the production of the *sūtra*s and *śāstra*s of classical Indian philosophy, approximately 2nd century BCE to 5th century CE.

date, scholarly critiques of the category of 'classical yoga' have been limited.[46]

'Classical yoga' contains diverse semantic strands as a historical, religious, and philosophical signifier. There are at least two cultural processes – one external, one internal – that informed the emergence of the category of 'classical yoga'. As an 'external' Orientalist label, 'classical yoga' was partly derived from and reinforced the 'internal' philosophical categorization of yoga within Indian textual culture. The Orientalist understanding of 'the classical' intersected with Indian value systems of 'high culture', including the intellectual privileging of *śāstra* literature in Sanskrit, medieval doxographies of the philosophical systems, the representation of the Gupta period as a 'golden age', and 19th-century Indian nationalist narratives.[47] As a Eurocentric label, the 'classical' served several functions: a mode of periodization, a means of alignment to a canon of texts, and a value-laden aesthetic cultural category. All of these attributions are problematic. First, the very assumptions of periodization of Indian history are controversial.[48] Second, the identification of 'classical' yoga was part of a larger 19th-century enterprise of categorising and labelling religion. This was fuelled by the Enlightenment emphasis on disciplinarization of knowledge, by 'neo-classical' fashions in Europe, and by the forces of colonialism.[49] And, third,

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[46] Although I acknowledge the limitations of the term 'classical' here with reference to yoga, I continue to use this label as a generic convention within contemporary scholarship and I offer some preliminary critique. The history of this label deserves further research.

[47] White 2014 provides a historical overview of the construction of the *Yogasūtra* as a 'classical text' in European scholarship.

[48] See Franco: 'There is no consensus even about the broad outline of the historical development of Indian thought as reflected in its diverse divisions into periods […] when we come to Indian philosophy we do not even have an established terminology upon which to disagree. No one would know, for instance, what I have in mind if I speak of "Indian Philosophy in the classical period," or "in the medieval period", or "in the scholastic period"' (Franco 2013: vii-1). Admittedly, he does overstate his point.

[49] Smith explains the centrality of taxonomy to the Enlightenment project of creating disciplines of knowledge: 'The classical system of taxonomy was a monothetic, definitional

we must question the very validity of the European parameters of the 'classical' for Indic history.[50] As King puts it: 'as the age of European imperialism has faded, so increasingly has the belief that European worldviews and epistemologies constitute a normative (and potentially universalizable) way of understanding the world' (King 2011: 38).

The usage of the label 'classical yoga' within the Indian and Orientalist contexts has rested on the following premises:
1. 'Classical yoga' has been associated with one text, the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali. A plethora of studies on classical yoga focus on this one text alone.
2. The *Yogasūtra* has been conventionally identified as the first systematized account of yoga. This distinguishes it and elevates it from pre-systematic accounts.
3 The *Yogasūtra*, and thus 'classical yoga', has been associated with the Brahmanic-Hindu religious continuum.
In order to broaden the application of the category 'classical yoga', this study proposes a revision of these premises to produce the following assertions:
A. 'Classical yoga' can refer not only to the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* but also to the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* and to other soteriological texts in the early common era concerned with aspects of yoga.
B. The first systems of yoga discipline are found in a range of texts in the early common era, including yogācāra texts.
C. The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and other texts of classical yoga reflect input and influence from Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Jainism in combination.

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enterprise which held that all members of a given taxon invariably shared common features while differing from other, closely adjacent taxa by a single, definitive feature. This system had its roots in classical Greek theories of logic and definition and is associated with the eighteenth century works of Linneaus' (Smith 1982: 3).

[50] European classicism is, in itself, not an infallible category and the Indian historian Thapar highlights the implicit biases in this Eurocentric periodic category. She refers to the myths of 'high cultures' and 'golden ages' in European classicism, and posits the likelihood of a plurality of classical periods in any regional history (Thapar 2003: 280-282).

0.2.2 'Buddhist yoga'

In Buddhist studies, the label 'Buddhist yoga' is not widely used.[51] Rather the significance of the term 'yoga' in Buddhist texts is often absorbed into the general lexicon of spiritual practice. Tzohar, for example, translates the title *Yogācārabhūmi* as 'Levels of Spiritual Training' (Tzohar 2018: 9). A recent examination of yogācāra in Buddhism is Kragh's formidable edited volume, *The Foundation For Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and its Adaptation in India, East India, and Tibet*. This impressive study runs to almost 1500 pages and provides an in-depth account of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* and its reception history. Yet of the 35 essays that analyze the subject matter of the text as 'yoga discipline' (yogācāra)[52], none aligns yogācāra with the contemporaneous Pātañjala yoga. Kragh restricts his analysis of yoga to 'the Buddhist parlance of the time' (Kragh 2013b: 30). However, it is problematic to suggest that the meaning of the term 'yoga' in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāśtra* pertains only to Buddhist contexts.[53] Furthermore, Kragh dissociates yogācāra from modern yoga practices of *prāṇāyāma* and *āsana* (Kragh 2013b: 30). However, neither are these techniques the topic of Pātañjala yoga. Indeed, the majority of Patañjali's text is a philosophical treatise on meditation – as is the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. Yet by referring to a transhistorical notion of yoga as *āsana-prāṇāyāma*, scholars of Buddhism[54] can reify the idea that there is a

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[51] An exception is Cleary's title *Buddhist Yoga* for his translation of the 3rd-century *Saṃdhiniromocanasūtra* (which is also embedded in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*); in the introduction he refers to it as 'a complete classical sourcebook of Buddhist yoga' (Cleary 1995: vii). Cleary perhaps overstates his case, because the *Saṃdhiniromocanasūtra* treats the topic of yoga only in part and not in the whole of the text.

[52] For a discussion of the meaning and translation of yogācāra, see 3.2 of this dissertation.

[53] ''Yoga' refers to Buddhist practice in general 'covering its entire spiritual path, with special emphasis on the practice of meditation' (Kragh 2013b: 30). For his definitions of generic yoga in a Buddhist context, Kragh is drawing on: Deleanu 2006: 26 and Schmithausen 2007: 213.

[54] In his studies of the history of yoga, White also runs the danger of dehistoricising and decontextualising 'yoga' as a term by presenting it as an empty signifier that can be filled with an endless range of unrelated meanings: 'its semantic field – the range of meanings of

singular form of non-Buddhist yoga and also subtly superimpose later forms of *haṭha* yoga onto Pātañjala yoga.[55]

Overall, it is reductive to restrict the semantic field of 'yoga' to Brahmanic or Buddhist discourse. Indeed, it is difficult to isolate any term as precisely or definitively 'Buddhist' and not also 'Jain' or 'Brahmanic' (see respectively *jhāna*, *jhana*, *dhyāna*)[56] – such was the degree of interaction, conversion, and confluence between these religious communities. Moreover, Sanskrit was a shared language for scholastic writing between Buddhists (Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna) and Brahmins – and, from the time of Umāsvāti, for Jains too.[57] However, restricting a study of yoga to the 'classical' form of Patañjali or to a discrete Buddhist context is not unusual within the study of religions. This is, of course, reflective of how field-specialists within the study of religions have worked historically; religions and texts have been viewed as clearly delimited entities. However, if we upscale our object of study from the religious text to religious discourse, we will see that discourse (being intertextual) cannot be so easily fenced off.

An effective methodology to address the limitations of disciplinary streamlining in the study of religious texts is intertextuality. This approach impacts upon the categorisation of religious practice. In 'Nets of Intertextuality: Embedded Scriptural Citations in the *Yogācārabhūmi*', Skilling highlights the difficulties of categorising schools of thought and proposes the importance of dialogue, or even what he calls 'polylogue':

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the term 'yoga'– is so broad and the concept of yoga so malleable, that is has been possible to morph it into nearly any practice or process one chooses […] 'Yoga' has a wider range of meanings than nearly any other word in the entire Sanskrit lexicon' (White 2012: 2).

[55] Although the topic of *āsana* is discussed briefly in the PYŚ, at 2.46-48, it refers only to seated postures for staying in meditation, rather than the complex postures of later *haṭha yoga*, which first appear in texts from the 10th-11th-century onwards (Mallinson 2019).

[56] In Pāli, Prakrit, Sanskrit.

[57] Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* is the first Jain work to be written in classical Sanskrit. Balcerowicz assigns the TvS to 350-400CE (Balcerowicz 2008; 34 fn23). Dundas and Bronkhorst place it c. 4th century (Dundas 1992; Bronkhorst 2006: 290).

> From a wider perspective, the unabashed intertextuality of Mūlasarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra is part of a long process in the history of North Indian Buddhist ideas – a continual dialogue or polylogue (Skilling 2013: 783).

He debunks the categorical separation of Buddhist 'streams' such as 'Mainstream versus Mahāyāna' and declares: 'There was no Mainstream, there were only many streams' (Skilling 2013: 783). In accordance with his argument that there was not a monolithic Buddhism nor discrete Buddhist schools, I argue that there was not a singular tradition of classical yoga. Texts are not enclosed units of language and meaning but are rather entwined discussions within a wider field of discourse – and the discourse of yoga in 4th-5th-century India was an entangled one. Thus when we look back historically from such a removed vantage point how can we even be sure which living communities were the dominant proponents of the discourse of yoga? Perhaps it was the Buddhists.

0.2.3 Defining 'yoga'

Classical 'yoga' is perhaps better understood as a soteriological discourse rather than a specific term or entity. It has always been a polysemous word. 'Yoga' in the Vedic sources gradually migrated from archaic generic meanings (loosely clustered around ideas of application, purpose, effort, conjoining, activation) towards an emerging set of specific soteriological meanings focussed on meditation. In the c.6th-4th century BCE, the Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini's list of verbal forms contains two for the root '*yuj*': '*yuji*' denotes 'joining' or 'uniting' (cognate with the English 'yoking') and '*yuja*' denotes 'concentration' in the sense of *samādhi*.[58] By the early common era, 'yoga' had a wide semantic field and could simultaneously signal a range of meanings, including apparently antonymic ones, such as 'bondage' and

[58] For a discussion of this distinction in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, see page 73, fn 35 of this study. For more on the verbal root *yuj* in the Vedic context, see Oguibenine 1984 and Oguibenine 1998: 199-222.

'liberation from bondage'.[59] Let us survey how these dual and conflicted meanings of yoga are reflected in classical sources in the more abstract concepts of 'conjunction' and 'disjunction'.

There are multiple definitions of yoga in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*; yoga is not just cessation (as in YS 1.2), but also ultimately disjunction (*kaivalya*).[60] *Bhāvanā* (cultivation) is also an important context for Patañjali's yoga, which entails practices of activation and application, such as those recounted in the 'path' formulas of *aṣṭāṅga yoga* and *kriyā yoga*.[61] In

[59] Perhaps the tension between these two definitions can be explained by considering the ancient context of the term *yogakṣema* in the Vedas. *Yogakṣema* was used to describe the pastoralist lifestyle in which there were cycles of mobilisation or activation (*yoga*) of a community followed by periods of rest or cessation (*kṣema*) – thus communities lived in rhythmic cycles of movement and rest (Proferes 2007: 23). *Kṣema* is derived from the root √*kṣi*, meaning 'to possess'. This gave rise to the sense of possessing the land and to the terms *kṣema* (settling, rest) and *kṣetra* (field). *Kṣatriya* (indicating 'governing' or 'endowed with sovereignty') is also derived from this root. Oberlies also highlighted the fluctuation between mobilisation and cessation in pastoralism and asserted that this *yogakṣema* lifestyle shaped not only the social but also the religious life of the Vedic tribes. 'Diese *yóga* + *kṣéma*-Lebensweise prägte das soziale und religiöse Leben der vedischen Stämme' (Oberlies 1998: 337). For a description of this way of life, Oberlies cites RV 7.82 4-5 and RV 4.33.10. According to Oberlies, one major factor that compelled moving on was the competition for pasture between growing numbers of tribes. 'Die Siedlungsweise der vedischen Stämme beschreibt der *Ṛgveda* selbst – darauf wurde bislang in der Diskussion, ob die vedischen Stämme nun *Nomaden*, *Halbnomaden* oder aber seßhafte Viehsüchter waren, nicht geachtet – als *yóga* (+) *kṣéma*, als "Anschirrung" und "Sich-Niederlassen", als eine Fluktuation zwischen Kampf, Weiterzug und friedlicher Seßhaftigkeit' (Oberlies 1998: 334-335). In the two trends of religious life, *yoga* was accompanied by the Indra-Marut religion and *kṣema* by the Āditya religion, the former strand focussed on battle and the latter on order (Oberlies 1998: 338-345).

[60] Pātañjala yoga relies on a strict dualist metaphysics that requires an epistemological and, eventually, ontological act of disjunction via the perception of the difference between *puruṣa* (pure consciousness) and *prakṛti* (pure materiality).

[61] The PYŚ offers three distinct paths towards this goal. The beginners' method of *aṣṭāṅga yoga* contains eight progressive ethical, practical and meditative stages towards *samādhi*, or concentration. The path of *kriyā yoga* is for one whose mind is still disturbed, and the explication of this method focuses on elimination of the *kleśa*s (afflictions). The most

Abhidharma Buddhism, disjunction is a key technique for liberation. This school focuses on acts of systematised mental disjunction (*visaṃyoga*) from undesirable and impure factors (*āsravas*) and afflictions (*kleśas*). These are divided into sub-sets such as the *yogas* (factors of bondage) and *oghas* (the floods). The *Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra*, an earlier textual forerunner of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, makes a distinction between 'the possession of conjunction' (*saṃyogaprāpti*) with the afflicted mental states (*kleśas)* and the 'possession of disjunction' (*visaṃyogaprāpti*) from those states, with the former being the problem and the latter the solution. [62] Kumoi traces one of the earliest uses of the term 'yoga' to the *Suttanipāta* where it means conjunction to a set of attachments, an early version of the *kleśas*.[63] The Jain *Tattvārthasūtra (*c.5th-century) defines yoga as conjunction. In this text, 'yoga' is understood as the activity of body, speech, and mind that binds the soul to *karman*, action:

> *kāya-vāṅ-manaḥ-karma yogaḥ* (TvS 6.1; Jain 1992: 167)
> The action of the body, speech and mind is [called] yoga.

Here, the *Tattvārthasūtra* uses 'yoga' to denote 'active connection' (specifically physical action), in accordance with the canonical Jain usage of

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advanced technique pertains to forms of *samādhi* that offer both cognitive and non-cognitive approaches to meditation. (For more on path structures in the PYŚ, see section 3.4.5 of this dissertation).

[62] See MVB 157 T 27.797a2ff and MVB 155 T 27.788b19ff, cited in Cox 1992: 88.

[63] *hitvā mānusakaṃ yogaṃ dibbaṃ yogaṃ upaccagā sabbyogavisaṃyuttaṃ* [*taṃ ahaṃ brūhi brāhmanaṃ*][63] Whosoever, after leaving human attachment (yoga), has overcome divine attachment, and is liberated from all attachment, [him I call a Brāhmaṇa]' (*Suttanipāta* 641 = *Dhammapada* 417) (trans. Kumoi 1997: 409). Elsewhere, the phrase 'liberated from attachment' (*sabba-yogehi vippamutta*) implies 'the state of being liberated from all afflictions' (Kumoi 1997: 409). Here the method of total detachment appears to be assigned a Brahmanic identity. In the Buddhist canon, yoga also appears with the prefix *pra-* to denote application in the sense of preparatory practice. For example, we find this definition in the commentary to *Saṃyutta Nikaya* 2 pp 131 ff: *yogo ti payogo* – 'Yoga means preparatory practice'. *Prayoga* is also a key term in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, where it is one of the five main paths of practice (Gethin 2007: 336), and in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, where it appears frequently to indicate the fervent levels of application required in spiritual practices.

the term: 'yoga' is the activity that binds the soul to *karman,* entailing spiritual captivity.[64] The *Tattvārthasūtra* proposes *yoga-nirodha*, the cessation of yoga, as the path to liberation.[65] Thus *yoga-nirodha*, or the cessation of the conjoining activity called yoga, is the goal of classical Jain practice. This cross-sectarian range of examples illustrates that the term yoga was widely used in the classical period to mean both conjunction and disjunction: yoga was both a desirable state to be joined to *and* an undesirable state to be disjoined from.

Another way of getting to grips with the semantic field of yoga is to examine its synonymic context. In the Buddhist setting, Gethin notes:

> Terms such as *bhāvanā* (bringing into being), *brahma-cariya* (the holy life), *magga* (path), *paṭipadā* (way) and *yoga* (striving) are all terms which seem to entail a notion that is loosely covered by the English 'spiritual practice' (Gethin 2007: 18 fn 70).

I suggest that the three main synonyms of yoga in the 4th-5th centuries were *samādhi* (concentration), *bhāvanā* (cultivation), and *dhyāna* (absorption) – terms that are all related to meditation. Kragh proposes that in yogācāra we find a restricted meaning of yoga as *samādhi*[66] – more so than in other traditions.[67] Interestingly, the opening of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* also presents a key definition of yoga as *samādhi*.

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[64] *sa aśravaḥ* (TvS 6.2; Jain 1992: 168). 'This [activity] is *āsrava* [inflow of karmic matter].' *sakaṣāyatvāj jīvaḥ karmaṇo yogyān pudgalān ādatte / sa bandhaḥ* (TvS 8.2; Jain 1992: 217). 'The soul attracts particles of matter, which are fit to become karma, because it (the soul) is affected by passion. This is bondage.'

[65] In the scheme of liberation, the last two divisions of pure meditation (*śukla dhyāna)* aim at the total elimination of *karma* via *yoga-nirodha*.

[66] Here, Kragh refers in particular to the *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā*, an independent commentary on the YĀBh written by Yaśomitra in the 6th century (Kragh 2013b: 30). This definition of yoga as *samādhi* appears in the Tibetan version, which in a proto-form may be ascribable to Jinaputra in the 5th-6th centuries. However, there is also a Chinese version of the *Yogācārabhūmihvyākhyā*, which does not contain this definition of yoga. For more on the variant versions of the *Yogācārabhūmihvyākhyā*, see Deleanu 2006: 248 and 250-251.

[67] Hirakawa notes that the term 'yoga' rarely appears in Buddhist Āgama or Abhidharma texts and yet in *Abhidharma* texts, concentration or *samādhi* is defined as the state in which

atha yogānuśāsanam

athety ayam adhikārārthaḥ. yogānuśāsanaṃ śāstram adhikṛtaṃ veditavyam. yogaḥ samādhiḥ (PYŚ 1.1; Maas 2006: 1-2)

Now, the exposition on yoga.[68]

'Now': this has the meaning of topic. It should be understood that a treatise of instruction in yoga is specified. Yoga is *samādhi*.

Thus the definition 'yoga is *samādhi*' was in circulation in the 4th-5th century in both the PYŚ and in Buddhist sources.[69] Another synonym for yoga is *bhāvanā*. Gethin clarifies the close relation between 'yoga' and '*bhāvanā*' in Buddhist literature:

> Curiously it is difficult to find a precise equivalent of the term 'meditation' in Buddhist technical terminology. The two principal candidates are *bhāvanā* and *yoga* (Gethin 1998: 174).

Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the way in which the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* define yoga as *bhāvanā*. A third synonym for yoga is *dhyāna*. Deleanu highlights the interconnectedness of the terms *dhyāna* and yoga by demonstrating how *dhyāna* came to denote a genre of yogācāra texts. Between the 1st-6th century CE, 'we witness the production of numerous meditation treatises and manuals both in the Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna traditions' (Deleanu 2006: 157). Chinese Buddhists coined terms such as '*chan jing*' (meditation scripture), '*chan dian'* (meditation writ) or '*chan yao'* (meditation summary) to describe this 'meditation genre'. *Chan*, of course, is a rendering of *dhyāna*. Seyfort Ruegg referred to the Sarvāstivādin meditation treatises as 'the Dhyāna texts' or 'the Yoga texts' (Seyfort Ruegg 1967: 160). Kumoi argues that in the early Buddhist texts 'there is no clear difference' between the terms *jhāna*, *samādhi* and *yoga*: in Chinese sources, yoga practice is synonymous with three sinitic terms, *ch'an-ting* (*jhāna*), *san-mei* (*samādhi*), and *yü-ch'ieh* (*yoga)* (Kumoi 1997: 417). Equally, Brahmanic texts such as

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the mind is concentrated on one object (*citta-eka-agratā*), a term which he argues has approximately the same meaning as 'yoga' (Hirakawa 1990: 217).

[68] In this paper, *kārikā*s and *sūtra*s are printed in bold and followed by *bhāṣya* text in non-bold. Printed line numbers are included, unless unnumbered, in which case lines are stated per page.

[69] For a discussion of *samādhi* as a general term for meditation, see Adam 2002: 33-74.

the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* frame yoga as *dhyānayoga* (Bedekar 1960-61; Brockington 2003). The later principal *Upaniṣads*, which begin to foreground a discipline called 'yoga', use the term *dhyāna* to describe the practice of yoga.[70] To sum up: when analysing yoga discourse in the common era, we are compelled to consider not only the term 'yoga' itself but also standard synonyms such as *samādhi*, *dhyāna*, *bhāvanā* – and, of course, yogācāra. Therefore, a text does not have to refer explicitly to 'yoga' for it to share the same discourse or episteme as the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*.

0.3 Method: Textual analysis

This dissertation is based on textual analysis; it examines śāstric works in Sanskrit from the field of Indian religions and philosophies. To a degree, it is interdisciplinary in that it examines soteriology and philosophical ideas within religious texts using tools of literary criticism, literary theory, and cognitive linguistics. The tools of textual analysis include intertextual theory from literary studies, conceptual metaphor theory from cognitive linguistics, close reading from philology and literary criticism, and translation of primary sources in Sanskrit.[71] I have also aimed to provide a limited material historical contextualization of a theory of *bhāvanā*. The dominant analytical tool that I use is conceptual metaphor theory, which is derived from cognitive linguistics. Within a delimited corpus, I identify several intertextual passages that have been unexamined to date, in order to

[70] SvU 1.10-11, 14; MuU 3.1.8; PrU 5.1.3-5.

[71] For a discussion of the relationship between cognitive metaphor theory and literary metaphor theory, see Fludernik 2011. She argues that the main differences are 1. literary metaphor focuses on poetic language while conceptual metaphor focuses on natural language 2. literary metaphor analyses specific and unique literary occurrences while conceptual metaphor analyses systematic usage and 3. literary theory accounts for metaphor with a theory of creativity, while cognitive approaches lack an explanation for creativity. She traces the initial hostility between the two theories and a gradual convergence (Fludernik 2011: 5-13) in which they 'have begun to communicate in a fruitful and mututally beneficial manner' (Fludernik 2011: 12). Petterson calls this hybrid approach 'cognitive literary studies' or 'cognitive literary theory' (Petterson 2011: 106-109).

illuminate shared conceptual schemes that were constructed using metaphors. Through a detailed analysis of a small number of metaphors, I demonstrate the value of conceptual metaphor theory in understanding yoga as a discourse[72] and as a conceptual scheme rather than (only) as a practice-based entity. My study provides evidence for dynamic intertextuality on the basis of shared conceptuality.

The text at the centre of this dissertation is the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. It formed the initial focus and served as the basis for the questions that led to explorations of other texts. I began by reading the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* 'proximally' alongside the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The AKBh then lead me to the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, since the two texts are intertextually related. Due to the length of some of these texts (the YĀBh and the AKBh are both voluminous works), this study cannot be comprehensive. Yet it nonetheless adopts a systematic approach to showing how key metaphors operate in the soteriology of these texts. My analysis to the texts has been relational. Thus although the PYŚ is at the centre of this study, it is also somewhat absent in that I only consider it in connection to the AKBh, the YĀBh and other texts. In evaluating the relations between texts, I adopt an 'intertextual' approach from literary studies, discussed below. I hope that the programmatic

[72] If intertextuality is the presence of inter-relationships between a prescribed corpus of texts, then discourse is the broader, non-textual linguistic and conceptual milieu within which those texts were produced. The term 'discourse' in this paper draws on two theoretical frameworks. Firstly, in the domain of semiotics and literary criticism, discourse denotes: 'any coherent body of statements that produces a self-confirming account of reality by defining an object of attention and generating concepts with which to analyse it (e.g. medical discourse, legal discourse, aesthetic discourse)' (Baldick, 2001: 68). In this case, the body of statements is about 'yoga'. Secondly, 'discourse' refers culturally to language as a system that has a constitutive relationship with the social reality in which it was produced. Thus text cannot be separated from context. For further discussions on 'discourse' in a semiotic analysis of religion, see Yelle 2013: 2-23. For a linguistic-cultural contextualisation of 'discourse' and an interesting analysis of the history of the use/misuse of the term in an academic context, see Sawyer 2002.

provided here may be relevant more broadly as a development of traditional philological approaches to historical South Asian religious texts.

Where applicable, I conducted digital and database searches to identify units or fragments of separate texts that may be related. In my research, I drew on multi-file search software tools such as TextWrangler, and online databases such as the Digital Corpus of Sanskrit. Of course, there must be some sort of baseline by which we can measure discursive interaction. Many terms, such as 'karma' or '*samādhi*' are simply part of a generally co-mingled field of discourse. I therefore worked from a more complex baseline of precise units of textual interaction. This included coherent syntactic fragments, whole syntactic utterances, citations/quotations, and structural conceptual parallels. Rather than identifying 'origins' of terms or syntactic units, I have suggested 'primary' usage and contexts. For critical editions of the PYŚ, I relied on Āgāśe 1904 and Maas 2006, and I consulted translations by Woods (1914), Rukmani (1981), Leggett (1990), Larson and Bhattacharya (2008), and Angot (2012). Any translations without citation are my own.

One of the limitations of this study has been its scope. Any intertextual investigation of a historical time period throws up ever more interesting textual candidates for consideration. Additionally, the shared nature of metaphors across soteriology means that the investigation of a single metaphor opens doors to many other unexpected texts. Therefore I have had to exclude relevant texts (such as the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and the *Tattvārthasūtra*) that would provide interesting context for future close study. I have also been limited in my assessment of Buddhist primary sources in that I have focused only on Sanskrit texts and not on Pali, Tibetan or Chinese. Study of the YĀBh is still at a crucial stage in that critical editions of many parts are unavailable in Sanskrit. Most specifically, I have been limited in my evaluation of the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* in that I have been unable to consult the only critical edition that is in preparation, by Sugawara, and have therefore relied on his published extracts from the critical addition combined with his summaries in translation (Sugawara 2013).

0.3.1 Intertextuality

As a *śāstra* text, the primary function of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* was to serve as a compendium, to pull together all existing knowledge on the field of 'yoga' in a synthetic manner, to add to it, and to situate it in an authoritative religio-philosophical lineage or tradition.[73] Indeed, Indic texts of the *śāstra* genre could only bolster authority by aligning themselves to textual precedent (oral or written). As Deleanu notes in relation to the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the oldest stratum of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*: 'The very *raison d'être* of the *śāstra* literature, to which the *Śrāvakabhūmi* belongs, is to comment upon and clarify the sacred intertextuality' (Deleanu 2006: 156). Skilling underlines this point: 'a deliberate function of technical literature (*śāstraprayojana*) is also to reinterpret, reformulate, reinvigorate, and revivify' (Skilling 2013: 772, fn 1). In the production of *śāstra*, originality was not an authorial goal. Skilling has highlighted the inherence of intertextuality to the śāstric format, decribing the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* as 'thickly referential' (Skilling 2013: 782). Intertextuality, then, is built in to *śāstra*, not only as a way to reference other groups' concepts, but also to facilitate the very purpose and function of the text.[74] However, there are literary differences in the intertextuality of the AKBh and the YĀBh. Skilling suggests that, for Vasubandhu, citations were 'part of a fabric of exegetical debate – a type of metaphysical shadowboxing inherited from much earlier traditions' (Skilling 2013: 783). In contrast, Asaṅga's citations 'are more

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[73] The *śāstra* genre provided a comprehensive and authoritative guide to a specific field of knowledge, such as law, grammar, or medicine.

[74] 'One of the striking features of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is its intimate relationship to *sūtra* literature. This takes several forms, from allusion, cross-reference, and direct citation, to paraphrase, reformulation, and recapitulation or summary. The latter is a building block throughout the *Yogācārabhūmi*, so much so that this elephantine work may reasonably be described as an encyclopedia or digest' (Skilling 2013: 772). Skilling then identifies a different and 'innovative stylistic device' present in the YĀBh, which he calls 'embedding'. This is 'a variety of indirect citation in which a canonical passage is set seamlessly, with little or no change within a larger text unit, with the result that it becomes a natural part of the progression of thought' (Skilling 2013: 772).

statements of authority, of pontification, seamlessly integrated into the flow of logic and exposition' (Skilling 2013: 783).[75]

While this study adheres to Maas's position that Patañjali's *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* texts form a single *śāstra*, I do not propose that the PYŚ is entirely coherent or integral from a conceptual or literary standpoint. To acknowledge from a historical viewpoint that the author of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* 'intended' it be a unified text, as was the convention of *śāstra*, is not tantamount to asserting that the text is, from a literary perspective, unified.[76] Many scholars have noted the gap between the historical authorial intention of unity and the readerly experience of literary disunity. Indeed, they have made 'fragment maps' of the different textual parts of the *Yogasūtra*.[77] Having accepted that Patañjali is a redactor rather than an 'author' in the modern sense of the term (Maas 2006), one may expect a close reading of the PYŚ to reveal subtle 'seams' in the text. This is because it stitches together existing texts (oral or written) or text fragments with new and revisionary insights. Such visible seams might take the form of structural and semantic overlaps, repetition, non-sequiturs, and conceptual contradictions, such as would typically occur in the textual combination of compound source material. In addition to the intra-textual seams, we might also expect to see signs of textual interaction with other religious material, old and new – not only Brahmanical but also Buddhist and Jain. The religio-

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[75] Skilling himself uses the metaphor of nets to indicate how concurrent strands of thought can be connected and entangled (Skilling 2013).

[76] Equally, just because a *sūtra* or *kārikā* text is at odds with its *bhāṣya* in places does not mean we have to discard the idea of unitary authorship – there can be a time gap in which knowledge, affiliation, or motivation changed. The presence of 'Buddhist terminology' in Patañjali's *bhāṣya* may indicate that it was generated at a later point after the author was exposed to different ideas or was engaged in particular polemical debates in which there was a new emphasis on specific points or topics.

[77] For the argument that the text is visibly 'fractured', see the schematic textual divisions of Deussen (1914: 509-510), Dasgupta (1922: 229), Hauer (1958: 221-230), Frauwallner (1973: 344-345), and most recently Angot (2012). I discuss these positions in my literature review.

philosophical milieu was one of vibrant dialogic interaction, and rival schools often critiqued each others' positions vigorously. When we consider the dialogic nature of lived philosophy together with the way in which *śāstra*s partly functioned as syntheses of prior textual knowledge, our reading approach cannot be other than 'intertextual'. Simply put, intertextual analysis helps us to access and understand the dialogic forum in which the discourse of yoga was co-constructed in the classical period. I select literary intertextuality as an appropriate theoretical approach rather than 'adaptive text reuse' from the digital humanities. This is because adaptive text reuse can have a more quantitative aspect to it, as attested in some of the recent large-scale European projects on adaptive text reuse via digital analysis.[78]

Both Irwin and Meek have argued that intertexuality in the study of religions should not just be a 'stylish' or uninformed way of talking about allusion and influence (Irwin 2004; Meek 2014). Intertextuality refers to more than shared or related passages between texts, more than the borrowing and reshaping of ideas. It allows us to access the rich semantic, conceptual, and discursive field of 'yoga' in the classical period. Intertextual reading posits that meaning is co-constructed in a dialogic literary network.[79] The theory of intertextuality, as proposed by the literary

[78] In the South Asian context, see, for example, these two projects: Electronic Text Reuse Acquisition Project (http://etrap.gcdh.de/) and Fragments of Indian Philosophy (http://nyaya.oeaw.ac.at). For a comprehensive and up-to-date study of adaptive text reuse in a South Asian context, see Freschi and Maas 2017.

[79] This paper will reference core principles of intertextuality. The first is the rejection of the empirical view of language as a transparent window onto reality in favour of language as having a constitutive capacity in the apprehension of reality. The second principle is a challenge to the idea of 'originality' by asserting that no text can be 'free', or independent, of other texts. Equally, a text cannot be free of the larger cultural and ideological structures within which it sits. Finally, intertexuality offers the possibility of reading texts in conjunction with each other without needing to identify the markers of influence, i.e. causality and directionality. In the acknowledgement that it is often difficult to pinpoint

philosopher Kristeva, is an approach to analyzing texts that sees meaning not as fixed or precisely locatable, nor simply reflecting authorial intention. Rather meaning is discursively and relationally co-constructed between texts by a non-fixed number of authorial agents. Intertextual analysis is typically synchronic and highlights how a lexeme shifts around semantically (is transposed) between texts.[80] Drawing on the work of the philosopher and literary critic Bakhtin on 'dialogism' and 'polyphony' in texts, Kristeva first used the term 'intertextuality' to describe how one or more sets of signs are 'transposed' onto others between texts (Kristeva 1980: 65). Most famously, she described a text as an '*intersection of textual surfaces* rather than a *point* (a fixed meaning)' [author's emphasis] (Kristeva 1980: 65) and she defined a text as a mosaic of citations that dynamically absorbed and transformed other texts.[81]

To a degree, this intertextual study brings concepts into the foreground at the expense of authorial, textual, and even religious identities. Investigating the selected texts as intertextual requires accepting the fluidity of some technical concepts of liberation, which can be at odds with how scholars tend to discretely assign concepts and doctrines to specific traditions (e.g. Yogācāra contains 'x' doctrine and Madhyamaka contains 'y'). Certainly, identity labels were a historical reality in India and doxography was central to the medieval scholarly enterprise, but labels can nonetheless create the illusion of the exclusive intellectual ownership of bodies of thought. As Buescher states:

> [T]echnical concepts (and texts embodying them) are always to be understood within larger units of contextual structures providing

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which text came first in this period of Indian history, this study advocates the benefits of focussing on processes of text production and how meanings were constructed.

[80] In the context of Buddhist studies, Tzohar also argues for the necessity of balancing synchronic and diachronic approaches in intertextual analysis of this period, partly due to the lack of specificity in datings for Indian texts, which undermines diachronic approaches (Tzohar 2018: 12-13).

[81] Kristeva: 'tout texte se construit comme mosaïque de citations, tout texte est absorbtion et transformation d'un autre texte' (Kristeva 1969: 146).

> their depths of meaningfulness, and within textual frameworks of assimilation and differentiation, both in synchronic and diachronic perspectives. Yet to locate a Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda text within a genre (as a specific horizon circumscribed by identifiable modes of elaboration) entails the task of demarcating it as pertaining to a distinct tradition in some way, and at some point(s?), to develop a specific set of characteristic technical terms for forming the constituents of new reflective models of philosophical understanding (Buescher 2008: Preface X).

Such acknowledgement of 'messy' and 'implicated' philosophies is not always reflected in the ways that Indian religions are categorised.

0.4 Plan for the dissertation

This study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter sets out a broad framework for the application of conceptual metaphor theory in the study of the history of South Asian religions. It focuses on the complex metaphor scheme of *bhāvanā* (cultivation). The next two chapters engage in close, intertextual readings that demonstrate how conceptual metaphors are used by three contemporaneous texts (the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*) to construct a shared soteriology. In particular, I analyse two structural metaphors, the seed (in the PYŚ and the AKBh) and the cloud (in the PYŚ and the YĀBh), which form polarised conceptual brackets for the larger image-schema of *bhāvanā*. These insights about metaphor are used to illuminate a particular strand of dialogue between Pātañjala yoga, the Sautrāntikas, and early yogācāra.

Chapter 1 outlines the principles of conceptual metaphor theory, in which metaphor is understood as instrumental to cognition, is often based in sensorimotor experience, and is logically entailed. Conceptual metaphor is beyond the merely linguistic and is part of thinking itself. It is one of our main tools for reasoning about the world. Thus, metaphors are not superficial ornamentation in language but are expressions of deep, unconscious conceptual structures. After advancing the argument that metaphor is central not only to soteriology but also to meditation in

particular, this chapter examines significant differences in the way that metaphor functions in the śāstric texts of Buddhism and Brahmanism. I then demonstrate the applicability of conceptual metaphor theory to Indic soteriology by showing how the central yogic technique of *bhāvanā* (cultivation) can be analysed using this tool. I situate *bhāvanā* within a material-historical context of agricultural practices in order to assess whether it was a creative or commonplace (dead) metaphor in the 4th-5th centuries. Finally, I evaluate whether a shared basis of sensorimotor experience can account for a shared conceptuality of yoga between the different classical Indian religions.

Chapter 2 begins with an analysis of two intertextual passages from the *Pātañjalayogśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which, to my knowledge, have been hitherto unexplored (PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1). These passages act as a gateway to the topic of *kleśa* (mental affliction) in relation to yogic soteriology. This chapter establishes that *kleśa* forms the nexus around which bondage and ultimate liberation are theorised in both Pātañjala and Sautrāntika soteriologies (and, of course, in Buddhist thought more broadly). Both systems explain *kleśa* using a specific botanical growth model. I argue further that Patañjali's text adopts the conceptual metaphors of Sautrāntika soteriology as recounted in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. I then attempt to account for this conceptual interaction by outlining the conditions of debate in which these texts were produced. These conditions were intellectually dialogic and possibly geographically proximal. This fostered an environment of inevitable conceptual interaction. The chapter concludes with two further intertextual passages (PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.95a-b) in which the form of a Buddhist argument on ontology appears to be reproduced and revised in the *Pātāñjalayogaśāstra*.

Chapter 3 turns to early Buddhist yogācāra and its connection to the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools. Drawing on chronological evidence, it posits that the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is not the first preserved systematized account of yoga, since we find systems of yogācāra in earlier Buddhist texts.

It examines the intertextual relationship between the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* through their shared definition of yoga as *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, the cultivation of the counterstate. A superlative metaphor for the liberated state, *dharmamegha* (cloud of dharma) appears in both Pātañjala yoga and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. This chapter argues that Patañjali co-opted this term from Buddhist sources and revised it paralogically for polemical effect, and according to literary convention.

My study concludes that the metaphoric nature of soteriology contributes to the conceptual fluidity between the systems of Pātañjala yoga, Sautrāntika, and yogācāra. Patañjali's use of the seed metaphor to account for *kleśa* adheres closely to Sautrāntika convention, but his adoption of the high-profile metaphor of *dharmamegha* entails substantial semantic inversion of Buddhist contexts. The soteriology of *bhāvanā* is highly accommodating of both doctrinal revisionism and convergence because it subsumes within it two opposing theories, one of cessation and one of growth. Such paraconsistent logic is facilitated in conceptual metaphor by selective editing (highlighting and hiding qualities) in the process of creating metaphors. This allows shared metaphors to be assigned different values, i.e. doctrinal values. My analysis of intertextual soteriology has an impact upon the way we view and constitute the category of 'classical yoga'; it requires us to open up and redefine this religious designation to include texts and philosophies beyond the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*.

Chapter 1. Mind, meditation, and the metaphor of cultivation

Intertextuality provides a frame in which to examine shared discourses between communities; we might say that intertextuality is a literary reflection of lived 'interdiscursivity' (a concept discussed by Squarcini 2016). Within the phenomenon of shared discourse, I examine how metaphors are employed across religious communities to create interlinked theories of soteriology that both produced and were facilitated by a milieu of vigorous public debate and argument. First, I review aspects of conceptual metaphor theory that aid us in understanding how metaphors work. Next, I consider the role of metaphors within soteriology, specifically with regard to meditation, to argue that soteriology is necessarily constituted by conceptual metaphors. Finally, I sketch a broad picture of the soteriological thinking around *bhāvanā* (cultivation) in the early common era. *Bhāvanā* was a complex orientational metaphor that was mapped from the domain of botanical cultivation. It was predominantly part of Buddhist discourse, and Patañjali enfolded aspects of Buddhist *bhāvanā* into his śāstric system of yoga.

1.0 Classical Indian metaphor theory

Classical Indian poetics had its own theory of metaphor, as part of the classification of stylistic devices known as *alaṃkāra-śāstra*. The earliest formal works on Sanskrit poetics were Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* and Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, both c. 8th century (Tzohar 2018: 5 fn 5). Prior to these systematizations of literary devices was Bharata's treatise on aesthetics, the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Although references to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* first appear in the 4th century CE, the text may have been in circulation as early as the 2nd century (Pollock 2003: 42 fn 5). However, as Pollock points out, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* deals primarily with the topic of drama (Pollock 2003: 42 fn 5). More relevant to the philosophical discourse that I am scrutinizing are accounts of

metaphor that we find in the śāstric works of the grammarians. Pāṇinī's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* describes four grammatical aspects of comparison: *upameya* or *upamita* (the subject of comparison), *upamāna* (the comparand), *samānya* or *samānadharma* (the property of similarity), and *sāmānyavacana* or *dyotaka* (the grammatical indicator of comparison) (*Aṣṭādhyāyi* 2.1.55.6; 2.3.72; 3.1.10; cited in Patton 2008: 49). Yet there is no extant formal or consistent theory of metaphor (or even of figurative language more generally) in Indian literature – philosophical or otherwise – from the early common era (Tzohar 2018: 5; 25). Indeed, any theory of metaphor from poetics is of limited relevance to this study. Since I look at philosophical rather than self-consciously literary texts, I examine metaphors that are often subtly embedded in the texts, rather than being deliberately and showily crafted according the rules of *alaṃkāra-śāstra*.

The challenge of discussing Indian theories of metaphor in the early common era is underscored by the lack of a scholarly consensus on a Sanskrit equivalent for the word 'metaphor'. In his study of metaphor as a 'theory of meaning' in Sthiramati's Yogācāra (c. 6th century), Tzohar settles on *upacāra* as the best term to denote metaphor in philosophical discourse. However, he acknowledges that this is an uneasy equivalence, since *upacāra* refers to both metaphor and metonomy (Tzohar 2018: 25). He suggests that *upacāra* does not denote metaphor specifically and is better understood generally as 'the referential mechanism' underlying all figurative language (Tzohar 2018: 25).[1] Other scholars have proposed *lakṣaṇā* as an appropriate term for metaphor (e.g. Kunnjuni Raja 1977). Another contender for the Sanskrit equivalent of metaphor is *rūpaka*, which is discussed as a figure of speech in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Sharma translates *rūpaka* as 'metaphor' in his study of the *Mahābhārata* (Sharma 1964). However, Covill suggests that a more accurate translation for *rūpaka* is 'a simile lacking a word indicative of comparison (excluding compound-based similes)' (Covill 2009: 13). Nonetheless, in her study of the Buddhist *mahākāvya Saundarananda* by

[1] For a different account of *upacāra* in relation to Abhidhamma access concentration, see Gethin 2007: 333-335.

Aśvaghoṣa (c. 2nd century),[2] she groups *rūpaka* (which she reluctantly translates as metaphor) and *upamā* (similes) under the banner 'conceptual metaphor' (Covill 2009: 20).

The application of conceptual metaphor theory is especially relevant to this study, because the metaphors that I analyse are not employed primarily for ornamental literary effect, but are rather used to construct concepts (such as *saṃsāra* (bondage) and *mokṣa* (emancipation). These concepts are then combined to create conceptual systems – systems of salvific thought. As a theory of the existential problem of humanity and how to solve that problem (i.e. to become liberated), soteriology is an abstract and conceptual endeavor. Hence analytical tools that help us to apprehend its very conceptuality are useful. Yet despite its potential effectiveness, the application of conceptual metaphor theory to ancient or classical Indian material has, to date, been limited.[3] In his pioneering study of visual metaphors in Mahāyāna Buddhism, McMahan draws on conceptual metaphor theory to decode the way in which knowledge is understood in relation to sight and seeing (McMahan 2002: especially 55-82). Covill's study of a core group of metaphors in Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* is underpinned by conceptual metaphor theory and supplemented by historical material analysis (Covill 2009). In an investigation of Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacārita*, Patton also employs conceptual metaphor theory, and asserts that '[c]onceptual metaphor theory is a broader category under which the specifics of metaphorical figures of speech, simile, *upamā*, *rūpaka*, and so on, might be a subset' (Patton 2008: 54).

[2] Covill refutes the argument that there is evidence of *alaṃkāra-śāstra* in the works of Aśvaghoṣa. She argues that theories of stylistic device did not exist in the early centuries of the common era (Covill 2009).

[3] For overviews of general studies of metaphor in Buddhist scholarship, see Colvil 2009: 25-30 and Tzohar 2018: 3-7. For an overview of studies of metaphor in Vedic and early Hindu studies, see Patton 2008: 49-51.

The necessity of examining both Brahmanic and Buddhist texts together is highlighted by Tzohar's detailed study on metaphor in Yogācāra, in which he concludes that Yogācāra metaphor was produced in a 'cross-sectarian context' (Tzohar 2018: 11). Tzohar found that the earliest self-conscious use of the term *upacāra* was not in the early Mahāyāna sūtras, but in the Abhidharma literature, particularly the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and in the non-Buddhist philosophical texts of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya.

1.1 Conceptual metaphor theory

A metaphor is an aspect of figurative speech, which is conventionally contrasted with literal speech. Until recently, metaphor was traditionally understood through the classical rhetorical theory of Aristotle. Aristotle asserted that a metaphor involves a comparison between a literal object and a metaphoric object with a hidden simile. Thus a simile is 'Achilles is like a lion', while a metaphor is 'Achilles is a lion' with the comparative 'like' removed although nonetheless implied. Metaphor is closely related to metonomy, in which one thing or term stands in for another. Using metonymy, 'lion' stands in for Achilles entirely, as in the phrase 'Come and speak with the lion'. However, in recent decades the theory of metaphor has advanced in many disciplines (such as a linguistics, literature, and philosophy). This dissertation relies on an understanding of metaphor that is derived more from cognitive linguistics than from classical rhetoric. Conceptual metaphor theory (part of a broader approach of cognitive metaphor theory)[4] was initiated by Lakoff and Johnson in 1980 (Lakoff and Johnson 1980),[5] who proposed two fresh ideas: firstly that metaphors are an

[4] Cognitive metaphor theory has flourished in recent years and expanded to include definitions of metaphor as not only conceptual, but also linguistic, socio-cultural, neural, and bodily (Kövecses 2006: 126). This dissertation focuses on conceptual metaphors that are expressed linguistically in texts.

[5] Lakoff and Johnson's key work *Metaphors We Live By* in 1980 paved the way for conceptual metaphor theory within cognitive linguistics. This theory was further developed in Lakoff 1987 and Lakoff and Turner 1989. Subsequent key scholars include Gibbs (e.g. Gibbs 2017) and Kövecses (e.g. Kövecses 2005; 2006; 2015). One of the earliest uses of the label 'conceptual metaphor theory' was by Deignan (Deignan 2005).

inherent cognitive reflex and not a linguistic one[6] and secondly that metaphors are not only analogous but also contingent. According to this approach, figures of speech – such as metaphor and metonomy – are not just about conveying ideas and nor are they ornamental literary devices. Rather, metaphors are unconscious and reflect how thinking and thought are fundamentally structured. Metaphors, then, are not a property of language or words, but are a property of concepts, i.e. we cannot form concepts without metaphors. As Lakoff and Johnson put it: 'our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3).[7] Next, I will define and explain some of the core principles of conceptual metaphor theory and dwell on those aspects that are most salient for this dissertation.[8]

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[6] Other key shifts in the 20th century study of metaphor have included Richards' poetics, which proposed metaphor as a product of the interaction between the vehicle and the tenor (Richards 1936) – which in cognitive metaphor theory is replaced by the source domain and target domain. Black expanded the theory of metaphor beyond words to fields of association (Black 1962). In his speech-act theory, Searle proposed that in order to understand how metaphors are produced we have to distinguish between word or sentence meaning and utterance meaning (Searle 1985).

[7] A recent study that employs contemporary philosophy of language to examine classical Buddhist sources is Bronkhorst 2012. Drawing on Charles Peirce's semiotics and Terrence Deacon's evolutionary linguistics, Bronkhorst utilizes the framework of symbolic representation (understanding how signs relate to each other systematically in order to communicate about the objective world) and also incorporates Freudian psychoanalysis to construct a psychological theory that can be used to analyse Buddhist meditative absorption. Bronkhorst does not, however, discuss concepts – which he acknowledges must be distinguished from symbolic representations (Bronkhorst 2012: 13 fn 6) – and nor does he discuss metaphors in any detail.

[8] For a useful summary of some critiques of conceptual metaphor theory over the years, see Egge 2013. These limitations include downplaying the role of culture, miscalculating how children acquire metaphors, identifying metaphors as neural structures, and the intersection with empirical cognitive research.

1.1.1 Domain-mapping

Lakoff and Johnson introduced the idea that metaphor is produced by 'domain-mapping'. This is the cognitive process by which one area of life (a domain)[9] is conceptualized in the terms of another, with the properties transferred from one domain to the other (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). People construct concepts, particularly abstract ones, by mapping their knowledge of more concrete domains to more abstract domains. Kövecses offers the following definition: 'A conceptual metaphor is understanding one domain of experience (that is typically abstract) in terms of another (that is typically concrete)' (Kövecses 2017: 13). Thus two unconnected spheres of life are drawn together in a metaphor. Using the stock example of 'Achilles is a lion', the two domains are: 'the specific man called Achilles' and 'a lion'. In the domain-mapping, the qualities of the source domain (the lion) are 'transferred' or 'mapped' to the target domain (Achilles), so that, although it is not explicitly stated, Achilles is understood in the terms of a lion: a hunter, powerful, fierce, a wild creature, with a mane, deadly, etc.[10] The process of connecting two domains in metaphor can be partially accounted for by similarity. Kövecses offers a further example: the human life cycle (target) conceived of as a plant cycle (source).

> In both domains, there is an entity that comes into existence; it begins to grow and reaches a point in its development when it is strongest; then it begins to decline; and finally it goes out of existence (Kövecses 2017: 18).

However, in conceptual theory, metaphor is understood to operate primarily not on the basis of analogy, as in the classical understanding, but often because the target and source domains are *not* alike. Domains are frequently connected by convention rather than inherent likeness. In my study of domain-mappings in soteriological metaphors, I focus primarily on the mapping of attributes from the domain of agricultural cultivation to the domain of spiritual cultivation. In this domain-mapping, religious striving,

[9] 'A domain, or frame, is a coherent organization of human experience' (Kövecses 2017: 24).

[10] Metaphor was also theorized by Eco in the domain of semiotics, and he called this process of combining two different entities in metaphor a 'new semantic coupling' (Eco 1979). Semiotics is the study of meaning-making in systems of signs, such as language.

particularly meditation, is conceptualised in the terms of crop cultivation. Such domain-mapping produces a conceptual pattern, and this study seeks to provide evidence of shared conceptual patterns between Brahmanism and Buddhism.[11]

1.1.2 Selective editing

As Lakoff and Johnson point out, there are limits to the efficacy of a metaphor, and these are inherent in the nature of metaphor itself. The structuring of one concept using the qualities (semantic features) of another concept can only ever be a partial and not a complete process; otherwise there would be a total identification between two 'objects':

> when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphor, we mean that it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not in others (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 13).

This means that the features of one domain are selectively edited in order to map them most effectively to the other domain. This editing entails highlighting some qualities of the source domain and hiding others. For example, in the selective mapping from a lion to Achilles, many inappropriate qualities are edited out, such as possessing a tail, or four legs.

1.1.3 Structural metaphor

Lakoff and Johnson identified types of metaphor that functioned differently. The simplest form is that of the structural metaphor. A structural metaphor is the basic association of two domains via mapping of qualities (e.g. Achilles and the lion).

1.1.4 Complex metaphor

Structural metaphors can be combined to create compound or complex metaphors. An example of a compound metaphor is PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A

[11] Kövecses makes a distinction between metaphor as process and metaphor as product: 'The cognitive process of understanding a domain is the process aspect of metaphor, while the resulting conceptual pattern is the product aspect' (Kövecses 2017: 13).

JOURNEY,[12] which contains more than one metaphor. This compound is created by combining several related structural metaphors: LIFE IS A JOURNEY (commonly expressed as 'children need a good start in life' or 'death is the end'), PURPOSE IS DESTINATION (e.g. 'getting one's career on track'; 'finding one's direction in life') and DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS ('life is full of obstacles'; 'life has bumps in the road').

1.1.5 Primary metaphor

Primary metaphors are those that are generated by sensorimotor experience.[13] An example of a primary metaphor is INTENSITY IS HEAT. This primary association is initially created by the sensorimotor experience of an increase of temperature in the body during intense emotional experiences. This primary association is then extended to apply to specific emotional experiences, such as ANGER IS HEAT or DESIRE IS FIRE. Examples of everyday expressions that express the underlying conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT are: 'you make my blood boil', 'letting off steam', 'he blew up at me', 'she lost her cool', 'hothead', etc. Examples relating to DESIRE IS FIRE include: 'burning up with desire', 'the fires of passion', 'love fizzled out', 'the spark of attraction' etc.[14]

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[12] Following the convention of cognitive metaphor scholars, I will use these schematic phrases in capitals to show when I am referring to a cognitive metaphor. As Gibbs explains: 'The schematic phrase LIFE IS A JOURNEY represents only a convenient summary description of the rich set of mental mappings that characterize the complex relationship between target (LIFE) and source (JOURNEY)' (Gibbs 2017: 18).

[13] Lakoff and Johnson call this type of metaphor a 'primary metaphor'.

[14] Although I will not examine them in this study, it is worth noting that in recent years the theory of a visceral basis to conceptual metaphor has been extended in emerging neural theories: 'metaphor is an extended consequence of topographic neural mappings' (Gibbs 2017: 31). In other words, neural networks are activated by everyday experience. 'Metaphorical mappings are physical neural maps that bind sensorimotor information to more abstract ideas as part of the neural ensembles existing in different regions of the brain […] Metaphor is a natural development of the way that neural systems work with recurring mappings, predictable inference patterns, and emergent properties' (Gibbs 2017: 32-33).

1.1.6 Orientational metaphors and image-schemas

Another type of metaphor is an orientational metaphor. An orientational metaphor is complex (not simply structural) and expresses a whole system of concepts with regard to another system. Furthermore, orientational metaphors have a spatial dimension (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14). This spatial aspect is expressed by developing metaphoric 'directions' for concepts. The classic example is that happy is conceived as 'up' and sad as 'down'. Thus the linguistic expressions 'I am feeling upbeat' or 'I am feeling downcast' are part of a larger orientational metaphor that expresses a whole system of feelings. These orientational metaphors create largescale interlocking systems such as ethics, emotions, and values.[15]

Many conceptual metaphors (both ones based on similarity and ones that are primary metaphors) are based on 'image schemas' (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987). An image-schema is the practical knowledge drawn from the physical domain (the body or the environment) and is based on 'recurring patterns of embodied experience' (Gibbs 2017: 23). An image-schema, then, is a preconceptual structure governed by bodily logic. Two common image-schemas are 'verticality' (which produces the metaphors HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN) or 'source-path-goal' (which produces LIFE IS A JOURNEY).

> Image schemas can generally be defined as dynamic analog representations of spatial relations and movements in space (Gibbs 2017: 23).

The orientational metaphors HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN are initially produced by sensorimotor experience,[16] but are then extended to produce

[15] Kövecses discusses six prerequisite functions of a human conceptual system:
1. Providing a complete mental representation of immediately accessible experience 2. Allowing for the representation of nonimmediate experience 3. Being accessible to a large number of its users 4. Making sense of the world 5. Enabling making inferences from the representations used. 6. Allowing for productivity and creativity (Kövecses 2015: 32-34).

[16] The visceral experiences of feeling good or happy include the corners of one's eyes and mouth turning up, while the visceral experiences of feeling bad or unhappy include one's posture slumping downwards.

abstract statements: 'good is up' and 'bad is down', 'more is up'[17] and 'less is down'; 'unknown is up' and 'known is down'; or 'virtue is up' and 'sin is down' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 19-20). Although the scope of these conceptual schemes is complex,

> [t]here is an overall external systematicity among the various spatialization metaphors, which defines coherence among them (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 18).[18]

In earlier years, conceptual metaphor theory highlighted the apparently universal quality of such 'coherence'.

> Since the human body and the brain are predominantly universal, the metaphorical structures that are based on them will also be predominantly universal. This explains why many conceptual metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEEING, can be found in a large number of genetically unrelated languages (Kövecses 2017: 18).[19]

However, recent scholarship has conceded that observations about metaphoric systems cannot be universalized, but must rather be analysed uniquely from context to context and culture to culture.[20] It is important to

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[17] Examples of 'more is up' include: 'prices are high', 'his shares skyrocketed' and 'productivity is way up'. Examples of 'down is bad' include: 'fallen from grace', 'I feel down', 'the slippery slope to ruin'.

[18] Most recently, Fauconnier and Turner have innovated around the theory of orientational metaphor to theorize 'conceptual blending' (Fauconnier and Turner 2003). This proposes a process of conceptual integration by looking at how metaphoric and metonymic structures are combined and blended to create new structures called blends and, at the largest scale, mega-blends or hyper-blends. We will, in places, consider how the generic patterns from different metaphors can be coalesced into a new conceptual whole, but I will not consider conceptual blending (also called conceptual integration theory) in any depth in this study. Kövecses has also significantly advanced conceptual metaphor theory and refers to large systemic conceptual metaphors as 'interlocking metaphor hierarchies' or large 'hierarchically-organized systems of metaphors' (Kövecses 2017: 19).

[19] Examples of the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor include 'I see your point', 'clarity of thought', 'gain insight' and 'point of view'. Egge makes the point that knowledge is also mapped as physical manipulation – 'grasping' or 'getting' an idea – and as storage – 'filling one's mind' or 'retrieving information' (Egge 2013: 93).

[20] For a study of the universality-variation issue in metaphors see Kövecses 2005.

acknowledge that culture plays as much of a role as bodily experience in shaping metaphors (Kövecses 2017: 19).[21]

Orientational metaphors are often deeply embedded in acts of communication and can be difficult to identify. For the purposes of this study, I will explore two complex orientational metaphors that describe 'a state of spiritual captivity' and 'a state of spiritual liberation'. I argue that these two systems are polarized by the directions of 'down' and 'up', with 'down' metaphors denoting spiritual captivity in relation to 'up' metaphors that denote spiritual liberation.

1.1.7 Metaphoric entailment

Cognitive metaphor theory maintains that a conceptual metaphor can influence or affect reality because of the way that we extend metaphors. For example, let us consider the common cross-cultural metaphor ANGER IS HEAT[22] or ANGER IS A FIRE, derived from the experiential sensation of raised temperature in the body during the mood of anger. The real-world knowledge that a fire can be extinguished produces the expectation that anger, like a fire, can be extinguished or quenched (it is not an eternal or incessant phenomenon). The conceptuality of ANGER IS HEAT can be logically extended to produce ANGER CAN BE QUENCHED. Thus conceptual metaphors have real-world consequences:

> A major consequence of the idea that metaphors are conceptual in nature, i.e. that we conceive of certain things in metaphorical ways, is that, since our conceptual system governs how we act in the world, we often act metaphorically (Kövecses 2017: 17).

In a conceptual metaphor, the possibilities of logical extension in the target domain are determined or shaped by the parameters of the source domain (and often informed by sensorimotor experience). Domain-mapping, then, is

[21] Image-schematic knowledge, knowledge derived from body and environment, is supplemented by propositional knowledge, knowledge derived from the meaning of sentences (descriptive or theoretical meaning, such as 'Computers must have hardware and software').

[22] For a detailed study of this metaphor, see Lakoff 1987: 380-415.

inferentially determined, is underpinned by an unconsciously reasoned process, and is logically entailed.[23] To connect this example to the context of South Asian religion, we can identify the central 'problem' of Buddhism as the 'fire' of suffering. The solution to this suffering is *nirvāṇa*, which literally denotes the quenching of a flame. Thus this soteriological strand of Buddhism is underpinned by the primary metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT, which is extended to SUFFERING IS FIRE, while the solution to this problem is logically entailed as LIBERATION IS THE QUENCHING OF FIRE. The elements of Buddhist practice designed to facilitate liberation are constructed in relation to the metaphorical concepts.

Furthermore, Kövecses emphasizes that the analogical reasoning of metaphor is often underpinned by a syllogistic structure.

> Emotions are forces
> Love is a natural force
> [Therefore] Love is the wind[24]

Conceptual metaphor is informed by processes of reasoning: not only can conceptual metaphors be driven by analogical reasoning (in the mapping from the source to the target domain), but they are often underpinned by syllogistic structures of deductive reasoning and are therefore subject to logical entailment. Lakoff and Turner also note that in metaphor image-schemas 'the spatial logic of the image-schema is preserved by metaphorical mappings and becomes abstract logic in the nonspatial target domains' (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 100). This constraint produces logical consistency and is called the 'invariance principle' (Lakoff and Turner 1989).

1.1.8 Creative metaphor and commonplace metaphor

A standard distinction in the analysis of metaphors is that between creative metaphors and commonplace metaphors (or 'live' and 'dead' metaphors).

[23] Kövecses calls this 'metaphoric inference' or 'entailment' of the target source (Kövecses 2017).

[24] This example utilizes the three-step syllogism from the European tradition of logic. In Indian logic, the syllogistic model includes two further stages of reasoning to produce the five-step syllogism. For more on Indian logic, see Matilal 1985.

Creative metaphors are those that are generated in a 'live' context, while commonplace metaphors are those that have become 'lexicalised' or 'conventionalized' through repeated use over time, and so no longer have a conceptual link to the original metaphoric context. These commonplace metaphors become so engrained in our thinking that we no longer notice them. The linguistic expressions 'a local *branch* of this organisation' and '*cultivating* business relationships' draw on tree and agriculture metaphors, while 'the *workings* of the mind' draws on the metaphor of the mind as a machine. These dead metaphors are so far removed in time from the historical contexts in which they were created that they are no longer perceived as metaphors but as literally descriptive language. Metaphors, then, play a role in the diachronic development of language, and the transition from a creative metaphor to a commonplace metaphor is one that can be traced (Allott 2010: 122). Therefore analyzing literary metaphors can support speculations about chronologies of texts, as a kind of supplement to the more explicit evidence of doctrinal developments (or manuscript dating). The change from live to dead metaphors is also a process that we see in the transition from oral to written texts. The process is 'fossilization' of discourse; what began as oral teachings, mnemonic scriptures, epic recitation, and live debates is frozen in time when committed to the written form. We would, then, expect to see many dead metaphors in written texts derived from oral culture. I will draw on this distinction between creative and commonplace metaphors in Chapter 3 to analyse two contrasting treatments of the metaphor of '*dharmamegha'* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.

1.2 Metaphors and soteriology

Soteriology is the theory or study of religious doctrines of 'salvation'. Although 'salvation' itself is an inherently Christian concept,[25] soteriology is an attempt to encapsulate the theories by which different religions attempt to define goals or 'success'. The end goals of different religions can be entirely at odds with each other; the aspiration in Christianity towards 'a

[25] The key soteriological paradigm in Christianity is 'redemption'.

world without end' is in fact the very problem that Indic soteriology seeks to solve – escape from prolonged living in the form of reincarnation (Collins 2010: 31). Statements such as the Buddhist 'All life is suffering' or the Brahmanic 'The self is misperceived' or the Jain 'The soul is in bondage' are formulations of an existential problem to which the various soteriologies are applied. Thus meditation, yoga,[26] and other types of practice are abstracted from the concrete context of a problem (in this time, in this place, for this person) and are offered as independent and universal units of knowledge that represent solutions (true for all people, in all places, in all time). In his study of Theravada Buddhism, Gombrich defines soteriological religion as a matter of individual beliefs which are only secondarily connected to systems of ethics and right practices (Gombrich 1988: 26, 41). However, if we acknowledge the centrality of metaphor in soteriology, this undermines the notion that soteriology is a matter of individual belief; a metaphorical system can only operate in language on the basis of shared conceptuality. Viefhues-Bailey describes the role of metaphors in religion:

> Far from describing different types of religious entities, they are heuristic devices helping us organize the various functions that religious symbols and practices can and do play in the lives of practitioners (Viefhues-Bailey 2017: 252).

Thus belief in the efficacy of a particular soteriology is not simply a matter of private belief but one of shared conceptuality, as reflected in interwoven discourses of liberation within and between religious communities.

Since soteriology is particularly replete with abstract concepts such as self, soul, god, heaven, afterlife, etc. it follows that it should be a realm that is dense with conceptual metaphor. As Kövecses states, the typical direction of domain-mapping is from concrete to abstract i.e. from that which we know about to that which we do not know about:

> In our effort to understand the world, it makes a lot more sense […] to conceptualise the cognitively less easily accessible domains in terms of the more easily accessible ones (Kövecses 2017: 13).

[26] All yoga in this period is soteriological, although not all soteriology is yogic.

In other words, in dealing with the hidden (the self), the unknown (post-death states; god), the invisible (the soul), and the utopian (heaven), soteriology is always directed towards the temporally and spatially absent, the not-here and the not-now. Soteriological thinking is an aspiration towards immateriality and immortality and, as such, is a domain that is entirely abstract – there is no way to conceive of it other then through the concrete.

Metaphor in soteriology is not optional or ornamental, and we would be mistaken to think that a metaphor such as Patañjali's *dharmamegha* (cloud of dharma), used to describe a meditative state, is merely aesthetic embellishment. Of course, on a linguistic level such elaborate description – in the Mahāyāna corpus in particular – does add aesthetic value to a text. However, metaphor is also a structural expression of the deep semantic field of classical Indic soteriology. To put it another way, soteriology in this period is structured by the binary domain-mapping of metaphor and is given meaning through metaphors. A theory of human liberation is one that is, by definition, aspirational towards a state of emancipation or freedom (such as freedom from rebirth) and spiritual liberation is conventionally defined in terms of lightness, elevation, escape, release, unboundedness, unfettered, unchained, unconditioned, etc. Thus a theory of liberation can draw on different paradigms of what it means to be 'free' in human terms, and this can only be understood in the context of what it means to be 'not free'. Examples of such binary paradigms are chained/unchained; locked up/ released; censored/freedom of thought; weighed down/flying; burdened/unburdened. These paradigms share the idea that freedom is a movement from a contained or fixed state to a state that is in some way unbounded. If we add a theistic dimension to the aspirational character of soteriology, we then tap into notions of magnitude and amplitude, e.g. super-being, superpowers, supernatural, heavens, cosmos, unknown, infinite, light, unlimited beneficence, all-knowing, etc. Together, these strands of soteriological thinking (the aspirational aspect of liberation and the magnitude of the theistic) combine unboundedness with amplitude to

produce metaphors related to the largest known phenomena in the environment. In the 4th-5th centuries, such phenomena were natural, such as the sky, the ocean, mountains, etc. In chapter 3, I argue that *dharmamegha*, the cloud of dharma, is one such metaphor that specifically denotes 'cloud' but also connotes 'sky'. If the domain of the sky is typically used as a metaphorical direction for states of 'liberation', then it is to be expected that the ground becomes a metaphor for corollary states of captivity.

The everyday domain of firm-groundedness is in marked contrast to the projection of religious aspiration towards liberation. In soteriological terms, the metaphorical aspiration is to escape gravity and to do the materially impossible, to fly. Thus the two main metaphors of this study – the seed in the soil (to explain captive states of karma) and the metaphor of the cloud in the sky (to explain expansive states of liberation) – are in no way ornamentation, but are integral to soteriological thinking itself. Such a claim cannot be made universally across time and culture, but it certainly holds some currency in the 4th-5th century Indic region in which the dominant mode of existence was still agricultural. Collins argues that the presence of logical contradictories in Buddhist soteriology (such as conditioned existence and unconditioned existence) is because

> Buddhist soteriological thought requires both sides of the opposition 'conditioned/unconditioned' for its unification of everyday life to be systematic, to constitute a single universe (Collins 2010: 17).

However, I argue that beyond the function of contradictories to make up a 'whole', the spatial opposition of sky and earth metaphors in Indic soteriology reflect more about the experiential basis of actual lived conditions in an agricultural domain. Thus the development of an 'upward' aspiration towards a sky-based existence reflects an imbalanced rather than a whole or totalizing view of life. For most of the population in the early common era, actual life was located on the ground in earthly toil, and the projection of celestial aspiration reflects that life was one-sided, and not as Collins argues, whole.

In the South Asian religions of the classical period, soteriology was conceptualized primarily as attainment of 'liberation'. The metaphor SUCCESS IS LIBERATION was then used as a basis on which to construct other more complex metaphors. Jainism, Hinduism and Buddhism all share a theory of emancipation, or *mokṣa*, from a wheel of *saṃsāra*, or earthly existence (characterized by suffering and rebirth). Although these religions present diverse technical understandings of *mokṣa*,[27] nonetheless 'liberation' in some form is the key concept of Indic soteriology.[28] I argue that any doctrine of liberation is, by definition, metaphorical. In speaking of 'liberation of the soul' or 'escape from *saṃsāra'* or 'transcendental freedom' one is necessarily evoking metaphorical concepts such as the soul is 'caged', or the soul is 'bound' to a 'wheel' that rotates, or that the soul can somehow fly 'up' once 'unfettered'.[29] Key paradigms in Buddhism include enlightenment as 'awakening' (*bodhi)*, the attainment of 'fruition' (*phalasamāpatti*), the 'path' (*mārga*) and, most famously, *nirvāṇa* as the quenching of a flame due to lack of fuel.[30] In all of the soteriological systems in this period, bodily practice is merely preparatory, while some form of meditation holds the key to liberation. Once we accept that soteriology itself is intrinsically metaphorical, then meditation, as the salvific method *par excellence*, is also by definition a metaphorical act.

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[27] Such as *nirvāṇa* in Buddhism, *samādhi* in yoga and Buddhism, or *kevala* in Jainism and *kaivalya* in yoga and Sāṃkhya.

[28] The doctrines that lead to the goal of 'liberation' may be very different, resting on concepts of sight, insight, knowledge, vision, discrimination, perception, scriptural reflection, authority, etc and are closely linked to *pramāṇa*, the valid bases of knowledge. Another important soteriological metaphor is that of 'finding the true self', which is derived from the basic metaphor HAPPINESS IS FINDING A HIDDEN DESIRED OBJECT.

[29] The creative etymologising of the term *nirodha* (characterizing the Third Noble Truth) by Buddhist writers highlights the background conceptuality of such metaphors. Breaking the word down, *ni* is said to signify absence and *rodha* to signify 'prison'; *nirodha* therefore means lack of confinement in the prison of *saṃsāra* (Collins 2010: 91-92).

[30] See Collins for an investigation of *nirvāṇa*'s expression through four images: quenching of fire, ocean, dry land, and the city. *Nirvāṇa* itself as the extinguished flame contains other paradigms, such as hot/cool, movement/stillness, and presence/absence (Collins 2010 79-99).

1.3 Metaphors and meditation

In the principal *Upaniṣad*s, there is an evolution in the terminology used to denote the act of contemplation, with a shift in usage from *upāsana* in the early *Upaniṣad*s to *dhyāna* in the later *Upaniṣad*s.[31] The root √*ās* in *upāsana* denotes both 'to venerate' and 'to take as' which can mean to:

> take one thing to be the same as another. The term thus establishes equivalences between components of different spheres (Olivelle 1998: 314).

It seems, then, that the early act of contemplation or *upāsanā*, rooted as it is in Upaniṣadic correspondences between self and cosmos, is a metonymic act, in the sense of substituting one thing for another. Roebuck highlights the associative dimension of *upāsana*, which renders it structurally similar to *bandhu* (relationship) and *upaniṣad* (connection):

> Often the seeker is advised to contemplate something as a symbol or embodiment of something else, as in the first words of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*: 'One should contemplate the syllable OṂ as the Udgītha' (Roebuck 2000: xxi)

However, *upāsana* and *dhyāna* are not identical actions. If *upāsana* is metonymic (and, as we can see in the above example of oṃ, at times synechdochal), then *dhyāna* is metaphoric, in that it deals with conceptual metaphors such as 'levels' of attainment, 'stages' of progress, the 'path' of practice, 'awakening' from spiritual sleep, and so forth. Indeed, if we accept that 'mind' itself is a concept (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 61), then meditation, which uses the mind to investigate the mind, is a reflexively conceptual act.

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[31] *Upāsana* occurs some 230 times in the *Upaniṣad*s. The vast majority of these references are in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, but the term is nonetheless evenly distributed throughout the corpus in that it appears in every text apart from *Kaṭha* and *Īśā*. (**BU** 1.4.15; 1.5.13; 2.1.2-13; 4.12, 3-7; 5.8.1; 6.2.15. **CU** 1.1.7-8; 1.2.2-14; 1.3.2-3, 6-8; 1.5.3; 1.9.2-3; 2.1-10; 2.21.4; 3.13.1-7; 3.14.1; 3.18.1; 3.19.4; 4.3.7; 4.5.3; 4.6.4; 4.7.4; 4.8.4; 4.11.2; 4.12.2; 4.13.2; 5.10.1, 3; 5.12-18; 7.1.4-5; 7.2.1-2; 7.3.1-2; 7.4.2-3; 7.5.2-3; 7.6.1-2; 7.7.1-2; 7.8.1-2; 7.9.1-2; 7.10.1-2; 7.11.1-2; 7.12.1-2; 7.13.1-2; 7.14.1-2; 8.12.6. **TU** 1.6.2; 1.11.4; 2.5; 3.10.3-4. **AU** 3.1. **KsU** 2.6-7; 3.2-3; 4.2-18. **KeU** 1.4-8; 4.6. **SvU** 6.5-6. **MuU** 2.2.3. **PrU** 1.9.) *Dhyāna*, in contrast, makes its first appearance relatively late in the corpus: in *Śvetāśvatara*, *Muṇḍaka* and *Praśna Upaniṣad*s.

Stuart's analysis of the path of meditation in the Buddhist meditation *sūtra* *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* (*Saddhsu*) (2nd-4th century CE) concludes that there is a 'central importance of simile and metaphor in the meditative process' (Stuart 2015, 1: 197). He notes 'the fundamental role of simile and metaphor in the *Saddhsu*'s contemplative program' to allow the practitioner to maintain 'the traditional distinctions between material and immaterial categories' (Stuart 2015, 1: 162). This analysis hints at the binary structure of domain-mapping in conceptual metaphors: only two domains can be related at once, although later domains can of course be added by accretion (as in the case of complex or orientational metaphors). The fundamental structure of metaphor, however, is binary. If we accept that acts of meditation are structured by metaphor, it follows that the structure of meditation is also binary.

Many forms of meditation that we encounter in early Brahmanic and Buddhist texts can be described as 'binary' in structure because meditation is often performed 'upon' something else, thus linking two domains (the source and the target), often that of the mental sphere and that of the objective sphere. Objective or cognitive forms of concentration require an object of focus – be it a mantra, a *maṇḍala*, an image, or an icon. Techniques such as *vitarka* (scrutiny of an object) and *vicāra* (comprehension of an object)[32] rely on mapping the qualities of an object to the domain of the mind in order that the object be fully known. This is sometimes described as the mind taking the form of the object; in this case the mind is understood to have an impressionable plasticity (e.g. PYŚ 1.1; YS 1.4). Other meditative methods, such as idealist forms of later Yogācāra, theorise that the direction of domain-mapping is the other way round: idealism understands the object as a mapping of the qualities that already reside in the domain of the mind to create the domain of external reality. However, Saṅgharakṣa's **Yogācārabhūmi* (which I discuss in Chapter 3) includes metaphorical

[32] These terms are widely used in the PYŚ, AKBh, and YĀBh.

mapping from body to mind: in the practice of yoga, the mind becomes supple and loses its hardness and becomes adaptable (SYCB 23, 215; Demiéville 1951: 413). In this case, the qualities of suppleness, softness and adaptability are mapped to the domain of the mind from the domain of the body. Saṅgharakṣa's **Yogācārabhūmi* continues this mapping from body to mind in meditation practice: the body sits straight, and the mind is not slack (SYCB 8, 195-196; Demiéville 1951: 404). Another binary mapping occurs in the process of deity visualization, which is present in both early Mahāyāna and the *bhakti* of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. By mapping qualities from the deity to oneself, one instantiates the presence of the divine (McMahan 2013: 152-158). But this is also a bi-directional process in that human attributes were mapped to the Buddha or deity in the first place in order to create these anthropomorphic images.[33]

Meditation is an act or process. The act of meditation rests on reified conceptual metaphors such as the four *dhyāna*s as 'stages', *mārga* as a 'path', or *nirbīja samādhi* as 'seedless' concentration. Thus meditation is a metaphor – the mind does not 'really' contain seeds, nor does the mind ascend ladders or steps, or become released from a confined space. But once the mind cognizes and visualizes its own meditative experience in terms of

[33] To date, the most significant studies of cognitive metaphor theory in relation to Brahmanic meditation have been done in the field of tantric studies (see Timalsina 2016; Hayes and Timasina 2017). This is partly due to the important role of visualization in tantric meditation. In the later tantric uses of *bhāvanā*, the theories of meditation were directed to the relationship between reality and the imagination. In his examination of Śaiva Siddhānta, Sanderson outlines the binary domains of the imaginative mind and reality and the role of meditation in connecting the two: 'The thinking which the theorists of the Siddhānta had in mind was not the cognition of a fact but a kind of mental work which produces a result through effort. It is seen as imagination with the power to cross from the imaginary (*kālpanikam*) to the real (*satyam*), so transcending the dichotomy between these domains which marks the world on which ritual works' (Sanderson 1995: 42). Kiss points to the binary structure of domain-mapping in later tantric *bhāvanā*: 'It is a meditative process during which the yogin visualizes an object, mostly a deity, and usually tries to identify himself with it. This practice is an indispensible part of tantric ritual and yoga in general' (Kiss forthcoming: 65).

these qualities, it then processes the results of meditation in similar terms. Thus following an act of meditation, one might conceptualise that the 'weeds in the mind have been uprooted', or that one's 'mind is lighter in weight', or that the 'mind has been cleared of cloudy material'. Yet none of these changes have taken place materially. Nonetheless the perception that they have is consequently translated back into real-world action: speaking more coherently, making good decisions, having a calm attitude, etc. The point here is that domain-mapping is not just a one-way process – from mind to world or world to mind – but is a constantly accruing process of bi-directional reification of experience in relation to concepts. To step away from meditation for a moment, let us return to a generic conceptual metaphor, such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which is frequently used to structure theories of 'spiritual progress'. If one understands life in the terms of a journey (i.e. maps the qualities of a journey to a life), one might think of life as having a start and end point, having a destination, being consequential and linear, being subject to diversion and delay, containing the possibility of getting lost, requiring a map, being full of adventure or danger, and whatever else is understood by the experiences of 'going on a journey'. Understanding life in these terms then affects how one lives one life. Similarly, understanding meditation in conceptual terms (which is unavoidable) in turn affects how one lives one's life. Meditation then is an act (a process) of translating a conceptual metaphor into experience that effects real-world change. At the very least, such change takes place at the sensorimotor level of the individual body and at a wider level such change takes place in individual actions, social conventions, and cultural agreements.

1.3.1 Yoga as a metaphor

The central metaphor at the heart of this study is, of course, yoga itself. In its early Vedic context, the concept of yoga was structured by a range of metaphors generated in the context of the pastoralist lifestyle of *yogakṣema*,

a cyclical lifestyle of 'application' and 'rest' (or 'activation' and 'cessation').[34] Another related example is how 'yoga' is conceptualized in relation to the domain of the horse, which Witzel refers to as a 'prestige animal'.[35] Many of the early metaphors used to construct practices of yoga reflect this early material context: the chariot, the charioteer, holding the reins, reining in, yoking to the plough, tying the horse to the post, etc. Even the common understanding of yoga as 'joining' or 'union' is a metaphor: it originally derives from the Vedic and epic image of *yogayukta*, 'joined to application' (of the animal to the plough) but which in soteriological terms comes to refer to the martial image of being 'hitched to a chariot' in White's interpretation (White 2009: 38-121), or 'yoga-harnessing' in Fitzgerald's translation (Fitzgerald 2012). This hitching is what the dying warrior is said to do in the Vedas as he travels to the gateway of the sun to ascend to heaven and thereby seeks liberation from redeath (White 2009: 38-121). In early contexts, yoga is also understood as meditative 'concentration' (*samādhi*).[36] What was understood by *sam+ā√dhā* ('to put together') cannot, of course, be fully known.[37] However, we can speculate that there may be a connection to the common English translation of *samādhi* as 'concentration', which carries the sense of squeezing matter together, or distilling a material

[34] For a discussion of *yogakṣema*, see fn 59 in the 'Introduction' to this dissertation.

[35] See Witzel 2012: 287 for a discussion of the 'sun horse' in Eurasian myth.

[36] In Pāṇini's grammar treatise the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (c.6th-4th century BCE), the list of verbal forms contains two for the root '*yuj*': '*yuji*' denotes 'joining' or 'uniting' (cognate with the English 'yoking') and '*yuja'* denotes 'concentration' in the sense of *samādhi*. Both forms are discussed in the augment rule 7.1.71 (Vasu 1980 II: 1342). The oldest extant commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (c. 7th century CE), underlines this distinction: 'the KV makes it clear that the verbal base *yuj-* meant in the present rule is not the homonymous base *yuj-* mentioned in the Dhp. 4.68 [*Dhāṭupāṭha*] in the sense of *samādhi* 'concentrating the mind'. The example quoted is *yujam āpannā ṛṣayah* 'the *ṛṣi*s are sunk in contemplation'' (Joshi and Roodbergen 2003: 144). The *Dhātupāṭha* is the list of verbal roots that accompanies the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* – although we cannot be fully certain that it contained all of the verbal roots at the time of Pāṇini or if some were added later (Bronkhorst 1981: 335).

[37] For a discussion of the early semantic field of *samādhi*, see Adam 2002: 33-74.

essence in high strength.[38] Concentration is accompanied by purity (both in the sense of material density and high-strength) in that concentration is the opposite of dilution and dispersion; and this notion of material purity complements concomitant notions of ritual purity (clean and unclean).[39]

These two simple understandings of the word yoga (as 'union' or 'concentration') reveal two underlying 'root' metaphors.[40] The metaphor of YOGA IS UNION maps the qualities of control (tight reins prevent the escape of the animal and ensure compliance) and harnessing power (yoking the animal to the plough is an effective agricultural strategy that yields high gains). The metaphor of YOGA IS CONCENTRATION maps the quality of compressing material in space (pulling together against the forces of dispersion) and the quality of purifying liquid materiality (strengthening the material essence of a substance). These basic metaphors then become the

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[38] The *Oxford Dictionary of English* gives three primary meanings for 'concentration': 1. 'Dealing with one particular thing above all others', 2. 'A close gathering of people or things', 3. 'The relative amount of a particular substance contained within a solution or mixture or in a particular volume of space' (*Oxford Dictionary of English* 2010).

[39] These metaphorical traces in the English term 'concentration' provide an interesting starting point for investigating an early semantic field for 'yoga' in relation to ritual, medicine, and alchemy, which all featured the applied use of substances and liquids. However, the focus of this present study remains, more narrowly, on the key metaphors of botanical cultivation. For those interested in looking at the broader medical context of Buddhism, Salguero offers an interesting analysis of conceptual metaphors in Buddhist medicine and highlights the way that five key metaphors were both preserved and strategically revised in Chinese translation to maximize their cultural reach: 1. THE BODY IS A COLLECTION OF PARTS, 2. HEALTH AND DISEASE ARE REWARDS AND CONTRIBUTIONS, 3. THE DHARMA IS MEDICINE, 4. DEITIES ARE HEALERS, 5. HEALING IS AN OCCULT POWER (Salguero 2014: 67-95). As he states: 'While these certainly do not encompass the sum total of all Buddhist references to medical knowledge, each metaphor lies at the foundation of a complex edifice of dependent metaphors, similes, imagery, symbols, and other patterns of language that include many of the most basic and influential Buddhist medical ideas' (Salguero 2014: 68).

[40] The term 'root metaphor' was elaborated by Turner (Turner 1974: 25-26) who took the label from Pepper (Pepper 1942: 91-92). See also Ortner's 'key metaphor' (Ortner 1973: 1338-46) and Fernandez' 'organising metaphor' (Fernandez 1991: 5).

ground for building more elaborate conceptual schemes, such as soteriology and philosophy. For example, Sāṃkhya philosophy draws on the metaphor of YOGA IS CONCENTRATION to elaborate the idea that the mind is material and is part of Prakṛti (material reality) and that practice should concentrate the dispersed *tattva*s back into one compressed reality, *mūlaprakṛti* (primordial matter). Another example is the Upaniṣadic description of yoga as control of unruly sense faculties that must be reined in or tied.[41] By the 4th-5th centuries CE, the term yoga itself had layers of accretion of metaphorical meaning that had built up from the ancient period and in which simple structural metaphors had been combined to create a complex conceptual system.

Since domain-mapping in metaphor is a fundamentally binary way of thinking, this model can be seen to shape the emergence of dualist metaphysics such as *brahman-ātman* or *prakṛti-puruṣa*. These core binary pairings in the conception of 'self' in relation to universe are metaphors. Mapping the self to the cosmos (as in *ātman-brahman*) is a fundamentally metaphorical act of understanding the abstract (cosmic *brahman*) through the concrete (personal self, *ātman*). Even though the dualist relationship of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* purports to be categorical separation, analysing this binary in terms of conceptual metaphor helps us to see the associative as well as the differential aspects of the relationship.

1.4 *Bhāvanā*: The metaphor of cultivation in classical Indic soteriology

In broad terms, the process of domain-mapping can be seen at work in the classical Indic connection of two spheres: the domain of religious practice geared towards liberation and the domain of agriculture. In this metaphorical linking, the domain of liberation (success in religious practice) is conceptualized in the terms of agricultural success: preparing the soil,

[41] For examples of yoga as restraint, reining, and tying see CU 6.8.2, KaU 3.3-4, 5.12-13, 6.10-11, and Sv 2.15.

sowing seeds, nurturing the seed with water and light, tending the crop, harvesting the crop, enjoying the fruits of the harvest, and experiencing abundance. This domain-mapping produces the conceptual scheme of *bhāvanā*, spiritual cultivation. *Bhāvanā* is a complex orientational metaphor that describes the practices that lead to liberation and it is in ample evidence in all three of the texts that I examine: the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. I establish a context for the development of religious praxis termed '*bhāvanā'* in the first half of the 1st millennium CE in India by establishing that the image-schema of *bhāvanā* is derived from the practical knowledge of agricultural cultivation. In particular I focus on rice cultivation practices and argue that these are central to the soteriological metaphors of *bhāvanā*.

Bhāvanā is the nominative form of a causative stem from the verbal root √*bhū*, meaning 'to be' or 'to become'. The causative form of √*bhū* is *bhāvayati*, 'to cause to come into being' or 'to bring into being'.[42] Given the causative sense of *bhāvanā*, 'cultivation' is an apt translation because it reflects the agency entailed in acts of cultivation. There are two main strands in the semantic development of *bhāvanā* during the early period, both of which represent 'production': immaterial production and material production. In the immaterial sense, *bhāvanā* refers to production in the mind – of ideas, visions, notions, views, etc. – what Collins refers to as 'mental culture' (Collins 1982: 111).[43] Important though this first sense of *bhāvanā* is, it is a second strand of meaning, that of material production, on which I will focus more closely in this dissertation. *Bhāvanā* also has in its ancient Vedic use a nuance of 'to grow, to thrive, to prosper' and this

[42] Turner's *A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages* gives the Pali equivalent of Sanskrit *bhāvayati* as *bhāvēti*, 'produces, begets, cultivates' (Turner 1966: 540). Turner traces the earliest usage of *bhāvayati* to the *Atharva Veda* with the meaning 'causes to be'.
[43] Early references cited by Collins are to deepening insight into the doctrine of right view, e.g. *Majjhima Nikāya* i.287, 401, iii.22, 52, 71; *Dīgha Nikāya* i.55.

meaning is largely derived from the context of botanical cultivation.[44] According to Monier-Williams' analysis, *bhāvanā* stems from both √*bhā* 'to see' and √*bhū* 'to be' – and this accounts for the bifurcation in meanings of *bhāvanā*. I therefore suggest that we distinguish between the two semantic fields by referring to (a) *bhāvanā* as the production of 'seeing' i.e. conjuring up visually, imagining, 'producing from thin air', and (b) *bhāvanā* as the production of 'growth' from a soil with the right conditions.[45] The acknowledgement of this dual conceptuality of *bhāvanā* reflects both the emphasis on seeing/mental creation in meditation and on the paradigm of labour to produce growth in religious discipline. Frauwallner, too, notes a difference between the Buddhist understandings of the term *bhāvanā* in the earlier Sūtrapiṭaka and the later Sarvāstivada texts (Frauwallner 1995: 158). The earlier use of the term carries a meaning of 'bringing forth' or 'practice' and is one of the seven limbs of enlightenment or *bodhyaṅgāni* (Frauwallner 1995: 158).[46] Frauwallner assigns the later Sarvāstivāda usage of *bhāvanā* a meaning of 'contemplation' (Frauwallner 1995: 158). However, even though Frauwallner's thorough examination of the *bhāvanāmārga* is in relation to doctrinal precepts, his analysis also reflects that the conceptuality of this new liberatory path structure rests upon the metaphor of agricultural cultivation. The 'completely new' doctrine of the *bhāvanāmārga* depends on the elimination of specific *anuśaya*s (Frauwallner 1995: 174) – a term that Frauwallner does not translate, but

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[44] Mayrhofer 1963: II.486. Mayrhofer here is citing Gonda, who discusses the argument that the 'primary sense of *bhū*- is not "to be, to exist", but "to grow, to thrive, to prosper"' (Gonda 1956-57: 299). Böhtlingk and Roth also give a primary meaning of causative *bhavayati* as creative: 'in's Dasein bringen, in's Leben rufen, erzeugen, hervorbringen, bewirken, schaffen' (Böhtlingk and Roth 1865-1868: 317).

[45] We might also add another strand of meaning related to the production of 'being' and broadly referring to the ethical production of virtues and qualities. However, this is a topic for discussion on another occasion.

[46] Here, Frauwallner is analyzing the *Sabbāsavasutta* in the *Majjhimanikāya* and lists the seven as: *dassanā*, *saṃvarā*, *paṭisevanā*, *adhivāsanā*, *parivajjanā*, *vinodanā* and *bhāvanā pahātabbā* (Frauwallner 1995: 159). See MN ii I 10-17; AN iii 96-99 (cited in Frauwallner 1995: 228 fn15).

which comes to mean 'seed' in Sarvāstivāda texts subsequent to Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmasāra*. Frauwallner recognises that the older and more simple canonical context of *bhāvanā* is reformulated by Dharmaśrī to make a new and complex orientational metaphor: 'the new doctrine presents a complete and uniform conception instead of the separate, disconnected approaches in the old canon' (Frauwallner 1995: 174). In this new scheme, *bhāvanā* as the notion of cultivation can begin to recast the *anuśaya* as a bad seed (even if not explicitly labeled as such) that must be eliminated to reap 'the fruit of asceticism' (Frauwallner 1995: 175).[47]

Bhāvanā also relates to other derived forms of √*bhū*, such as *bhūmi* (ground, foundation),[48] *bhūti* (wellbeing, thriving, prosperity) and *bhāva* (state, condition). The most important of these three terms for our discussion is *bhūmi*, which denotes the material 'ground, soil, earth' but also the abstract 'foundation, stage'. In Buddhist soteriology, the *bhūmi*s, as stages on the path (*mārga*), form a key component of the broader image schema of *bhāvanā*. Cultivation in our sources often means 'mental cultivation' in particular, in which case *bhāvanā* can be a synonym for meditation or, indeed, yoga.[49] However, I will translate *bhāvanā* as 'cultivation', partly to reflect that it can

[47] Turner goes further to explain the Pāli meaning of *bhāvanā* as 'applying one's mind to' in contrast to the Sanskrit meaning of 'causing to be' and 'imagination' (Turner 1966: 540). In his view, the Pāli meaning, then, would seem to pertain distinctly to the mental realm or to non-material realms only. On the other hand, Hacker has argued that the difference in understanding between mental cultivation and material production is non-existent: 'From ancient times, there has been in India the conviction that mental representations, if reaching a high degree of intensity, are capable of bringing about a reality not only on the psychological level but in the domain of material things' (Hacker 1972: 118). Of course, the supernatural capacities, *ṛddhi*s and *siddhi*s, exist at the threshold of the immaterial and the material worlds.

[48] In Vedic sources, *bhūmi* was a synonym for *pṛthivī* (Mayrhofer 1963: II.513).

[49] In later periods, *bhāvanā* takes on different nuances, but nonetheless stays closely allied to meditation practice. For example, in tantra *bhāvanā* is synonymous with other terms for meditation, such as *bhāva*, *dhyāna*, and *smaraṇa* (Kiss forthcoming: 65).

designate a wider set of practices beyond meditation, and partly to keep its metaphoric function in the foreground.[50]

Although the *Veda*s and *Upaniṣad*s used ecological cycles as a structuring principle for notions of redeath and rebirth, the most specific systematic development of *bhāvanā* is to be found in Buddhist texts. According to Frauwallner, the formal distinction between the path of vision (*darśanamārga*) and the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) was innovated in Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmasāra* (Frauwallner 1995: 192), which 'represents the earliest dogmatics of the Sarvāstivāda' (Frauwallner 1995: 151) and predates the canonical Sarvāstivāda *Jñānaprasthāna* (Frauwallner 1995: 152).[51] The distinction between *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga* is also central in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh 6.25-29) – and this is not surprising given that, in Frauwallner's estimation, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 'is ultimately nothing but an extended reworking of the Abhidharmasāra' (Frauwallner 1995: 152). In Sarvāstivāda thought, the two paths lead to abandonment: *darśanamārga-heya* and *bhāvanāmārga-heya*. *Darśana* is abandonment that can be achieved by cognizing the four noble truths and *bhāvanā* is mental cultivation, or repeated contemplation thereupon.[52] The primary component of cultivation was meditation and it enfolded both *śamatha* (tranquility) and *vipaśyana* (insight). This path was focused on *samādhi* – thus *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* was also known as *samādhija-prajñā* (Dhammajoti 2009: 338). The complete eradication of the *kleśa*s (afflictions) and their *vāsanā*s (traces) occurs only at the

[50] For a related discussion of translating *samādhi* as 'meditation', see Adam 2002: 33-74.

[51] In this text the older canonical doctrine (in the Sūtrapiṭaka) of *āsravāḥ* is replaced with a new doctrine of *anuśayāḥ*, and, as part of this reformulation, a new distinction is crystallised between *darśana-* and *bhāvanāprahātavayā anuśayāḥ:* 'According to this doctrine, the *darśanaprahātavyāḥ* are *anuśayāḥ* which are eliminated by beholding the 4 Noble Truths during the liberating process of cognition. *Bhāvanāprahātavyāḥ* are *anuśayāḥ* which are eliminated by the repeated realization of the knowledge gained' (Frauwallner 1995: 157-158). I discuss the terms *anuśaya* and *āsrava* in Chapter 2.

[52] In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, although *bhāvanā* and *darśana mārga*s are paired, they are part of the larger fivefold collection of paths (see Gethin 2007: 336-337).

vajropasamādhi (diamond concentration) stage of *bhāvanāmārga*. The afflictions abandoned at this stage are more persistent and tenacious than the ones abandoned in the *darśanamārga* (Dhammajoti 2009: 338).

In the Mahāyāna schemes of the *daśabhūmi*s (the ten stages) (see Chapter 3), the first *bhūmi* corresponds to *darśanamārga* and the next nine to *bhāvanāmārga* – indicating that the *bhūmi*s themselves are closely related conceptually with *bhāvanā*. In Saṅgharakṣa's **Yogācārabhūmi*, there is a telling simile that explains the distinction between *śamatha* (tranquility) and *vipaśyana* (insight):

> Or, again, *śamatha* is just like the act of a harvester who grabs the ears [of wheat] with his left hand, while *vipaśyana* is like the act of cutting [them] with a sickle in his right hand.[53]

Here, the agricultural simile[54] is that of harvesting the crop, by cutting – *śamatha* gives access to the harvest, but only by *vispaśyana*, or cutting, can one obtain it. In metaphors, too, the qualities of labour and hard work are mapped from agriculture to spirituality. Thus *bhāvanā* is understood as mental 'work' and spiritual 'labour', and certainly reflects adherence to a gradualist path rather than subitist. Cultivation of plants can never be a sudden or immediate process, but is rather a long-term investment, a waiting process that relies on consistent provision of the right conditions for growth.[55] Indeed, the outcome of cultivation (i.e. plant maturity or fruit) is never guaranteed and often requires skill and knowledge, accrued over successive cycles, to get right. In contrast, subitist soteriology is anything

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[53] 'ou encore, l'apaisement est pareil à l'acte du moissonneur qui saisit les épis de la main gauche, la contemplation à l'acte de les couper à la faucille de la main droite' (SYCB 22, 211c-212a; Demiéville 1951: 409). T606, T607.

[54] These similes appear in a section of illustrations, which are perhaps designed to appeal to audiences of different socio-economic backgrounds e.g. merchant, farmer, etc. The other two examples relate to gold-dealing and to the human skeleton.

[55] In a later illustration of this point, Sharf discusses the *mārga* treatises of 'Buddhist modernism', which he identifies as three Buddhist texts from the 9th century. One of these, Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama* proposes the gradualist path and refutes the Chinese Chan doctrine of sudden enlightenment (Sharf 1995: 236).

but 'hard work'. This alignment to gradualism continues early understandings of yoga, which reflect the cumulative approaches of asceticism and *tapas*. In the 6th-8th centuries CE, the Jain author Haribhadra's *Yogabindu* lists fives stages of yoga, and the second stage is cultivation (*bhāvanā*) (Chapple 2003: 1-14). In contrast, the later subitist approaches of tantra, Chan, Advaita Vedānta, or rāja yoga propose divine grace, initiation, visions, *śaktipat*, the guru, and so forth as functions that replace the idea of 'hard work' and one's own agency in the attainment of liberation. In order to understand this concept of 'work' and other technical concepts that are deeply embedded in *bhāvanā*, let us now turn to some historical background on the context of agricultural cultivation around the turn of the common era.

1.4.1 Socio-regional background of crop cultivation

We have established that basic conceptual metaphors arise from bodily experience in physical environments and from pre-conceptual structures (e.g. up/down) derived from visceral human practices. We have also established that *bhāvanā* is a gradualist soteriology steeped in ideas of 'hard work'. In our texts, *bhāvanā* is not simply a structural metaphor but rather a complex scheme of metaphors. This scheme is composed of two complementary soteriological and ontological metaphors: CAPTIVITY IS [BEING] GROUNDED (as reflected in images of the seed) and LIBERATION IS [BEING] SKYWARD (as reflected in the cloud of dharma). These inferences are made not only on the basis of sensorimotor experience, but also by mapping the system of botanical cultivation to create a new conceptual scheme of spiritual cultivation. *Bhāvanā* as a system of spiritual cultivation is designed to facilitate 'fantastical' escape from the ground, such as flight to heavens, merging in the sun, or becoming a cloud. Thus the realm of hard labour and toil on the ground is left behind. These soteriological metaphors of cultivation emerged against a backdrop of material agricultural practice and change. In assessing the possible connections between the metaphorical complex of *bhāvanā* and actual agrarian communities in which such metaphors may have been generated, this study focuses on two regions in northern India: the Gangetic Plain (the Eastern part of which includes

Greater Magadha) and the northwestern frontier region, which includes Kashmir and Gandhāra. I focus on these two regions since they were particularly important in the development of the religious strands that we are following: Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, yogācāra, Sautrāntika, Pātañjala yoga, and Sāṃkhya. Understanding the historical context of agricultural cultivation improves our understanding of how the scheme of spiritual cultivation was formed and what the underlying analogical reasoning is.

Samuel uses the label 'Second Urbanization' to refer to the growth of cities in South Asia during the first millennium BCE and to distinguish it from the first phase of urbanization, which was associated with the Indus Valley civilization (Samuel 2008: 41). Urban settlements began to grow in number and size from around 500 CE (Samuel 2008: 42).[56] Although much of the region was still heavily forested, there were sizeable agricultural communities on cleared land. This second half of the first millennium BCE was a period of significant religious developments that witnessed the formation of the *Upaniṣad*s and the beginnings of Buddhism and Jainism. Two regions are regarded as central to this process. The first is the Gangetic Plain, which Bronkorst identifies as the location for the emergence of the *śramaṇa* (renouncer) communities, Buddhism, Jainism, and the *Upaniṣad*s (Bronkhorst 2007). The second region is the north and northwestern area that corresponds to modern-day Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab, in which the Vedic tradition flourished (Samuel 2008: 48). Hopkins refers to this division as that between the Eastern Gangetic Plain and Kuru-Pañcāla (Hopkins 1999). It was also on the northwestern frontier, in Kashmir and Gandhāra, that Sarvāstivāda Buddhism, Sautrāntika, and early yogācāra

[56] The earliest forms of religion in India predate the Second Urbanization and are found in predominantly agricultural regions. This is evidenced in the form of female figurines that may be associated with fertility cults. Terracotta figures and plaques that date from the Mauryan Period, but which have been found all over north and northeast India from present-day Pakistan to Bengal, point towards a predominantly agricultural society (Samuel 1998: 107). Samuel argues that such iconographic material, which may be referred to as the religions of the *yakṣa*s (guardian deities) is most evident in Buddhist sites and is heavily present in Gandhāra and also around the Gangetic Plain (Samuel 2008: 109-110).

flourished in the early common era. Although Patañjali's regional affiliation is a matter of debate, the intellectual proximity of his text to these traditions may suggest a regional proximity.

In considering the north and northwestern frontiers as important centres for yoga in the first part of the 1st millennium CE, as well as intellectual melting pots for shared ideas, there are two main regions under discussion: the Kashmir region and the region directly to its west, Gandhāra. Gandhāra was the site of Taxila, an urban centre that was active from about 500 BCE – 200 CE (after which the population declined). In modern terms, Gandhāra is located around the Peshawar Valley on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was an important site for both Hindus and Buddhists – but especially Buddhists. We know that Dharmarakṣa (a Kushan) lived in Gandhāra in the 3rd century CE and he is credited with translating into Chinese one of the early meditation sūtras (*Damoduoluo chan jing*) that form part of the first layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. Although Kashmir is the most well-known site of Abhidharma, Gandhāra was known as the seat of the western masters of Abhidharma: 'the main Sarvāstivāda movement in force in Gāndhāra was that of the Vaibhāṣikas' (Anacker 1984: 12). A number of late Sarvāstivāda thinkers are known to have dwelt in the Gandhāra region. These include Dharmaśrī, Ghoṣaka, and Dharmatrāta, as well as the later commentators Saṅghabhadra, Skandhila, and Yaśomitra. Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmasāra* (*Abhidharmahṛdaya*) was a likely source for the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. In the centuries prior to Vasubandhu, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmapiṭaka and the *Vibhāṣā* were produced in the Kashmir region. Vasubandhu was born in Gandhāra but studied in Kashmir for four years around 342-346 CE . In Chapter 2, I outline the importance of a debate held in 376 CE at Ayodhyā at the court of Candragupta II (Vikramāditya). This debate occurred between the Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin and Vasubandhu's teacher Buddhamitra. Vasubandhu later rebutted Sāṃkhya in a debate and in his work the *Paramārthasaptati* (Anacker 1984: 11-16). Larson suggests that Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* may be connected to this series of debates, and this argument strengthens the

hypothesis for associating the PYŚ with the northwestern region. Katō makes a contrary argument: by noting the biographical references made to Sthavira in the **Nyāyānusāra*, Katō concludes that the purported founder of Sautrāntika, Śrīlāta, 'was from a region to the east of that of Saṅghabhadra' (Cox 1995: 41) and that during Saṅghabhadra's period 'the area of primary opposition to the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins had shifted from the west, as it had been several centuries earlier, to the east' (Cox 1995: 41). There were, of course, trade routes from the north/northwest regions to the Gangetic Plain, in particular to the states of Kosala and Magadha (Hopkins 1999 48-52; unpublished typescript cited in Samuel 2008: 50). So we must account for free movement. However, given the specific regional intensity of Sarvāstivāda traditions, including Sautrāntika and early yogācāra, in Kashmir and Gandhāra, combined with the evidence of rice-practices in the northwest, which all our texts reference, one can suggest that Pātañjala yoga evolved in regional proximity to the Buddhist traditions.

1.4.2 Regions and rice-farming

Rice-grain is the primary example of a crop seed cited in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (see below). Therefore the regions in which rice-cultivation occurred are of interest to this study. In narrowing my focus on *bhāvanā* to rice-farming in particular, I am indebted to Potter,[57] who noted an elegant co-ordination of the image of the seed with the image of irrigation in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*:

> We have, then, in the Yoga account a rather carefully worked-out theory concerning the mechanics of karma and rebirth, which is made available to the non-philosopher through appeal to the model of rice-farming (Potter 1983: 248).

While acknowledging that metaphors are a fundamental way to construct and apprehend abstract concepts and theories, I disagree with Potter's assessment of the model of rice-farming as a 'dumbing-down' of philosophy for laypersons. As I have argued, metaphors are not ornamental, nor in this

[57] I am also indebted to Dr Theodore Proferes, who suggested exploring the paradigm of *bhāvanā* more systematically in relation to agriculture.

case for the purpose of simplifying or conveying information, but are rather integral to soteriology in this period. The basis of such metaphors was, most likely, experiential.

In the northwestern areas (such as Kashmir and Gandhāra) the earliest crops grown were wheat and barley, while rice-farming was established early in the Central Gangetic Plain (correlating partly to Greater Magadha), the Bengal Delta regions and South India (Pejros and Shnirelman 1998: 384-385).[58] The northeastern region – with its coastal belt, river valleys and deltas – provided ideal conditions for growing rice (Sattar et al 2010: 225-226).[59] As Chakrabarti and others have noted, the Gangetic Valley had a uniquely 'fertile alluvium', which was especially suitable for the wetland and irrigation methods required by rice-farming in this period (Chakrabarti 1995: 169). Another argument for identifying the Gangetic Plain as the first site of rice-farming lies in the issue of iron. Iron tools start to appear in agriculture from the fourth century BCE (Bailey and Mabbett 2003: 84), and the first uses of iron have been traced to the Gangetic Plain, where there were rich iron deposits. The development of iron led to effective tools, such as the plough, that enhanced farming practices (Gombrich 1988: 37). Rice was introduced to the northwest only after the development of irrigation sometime during the 3rd-2nd millennium BCE (Sattar et al 2010: 228).[60] Although the earliest evidence of rice-cultivation was in the Gangetic Plain, by the time of our historical analysis, it was certainly well established in the northwestern regions too. In fact, Gandhāra also had a reputation as a fertile agricultural region (Anacker 1984: 12).

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[58] The earliest location for rice cultivation was the Ganga Valley by 3000 BCE (Bellwood: 2004: 87).

[59] However, Gombrich points to the counterargument that although the Gangetic Plain has ideal fertile soil (an alluvium belt) for rice-farming, the type of profuse vegetation there may also have been harder to clear for farming (Gombrich 1988: 37).

[60] See also Sharma 2010: 5-6 for more on the migration of rice cultivation across northern India.

Since rice-farming first thrived in the Gangetic Plain, it may indicate that this was a relevant 'live' or 'creative' context in which the rice-grain metaphor was generated to explain the seed in relation to karma and *kleśa*. This would support Bronkhorst's thesis of Greater Magadha as a location for the general emergence of karmic theory. Although the first major urban centres (during the Second Urbanization) included the regions of the Central Gangetic Plain and the Northwestern Borderlands, the largest early urban centre was in the Gangetic Plain (Allchin 1995). The surplus of rice production in the Gangetic Plain may have led to the growth of urban centres there:[61] surplus food generated by rice-farming facilitated the stability and prosperity that economically fuelled the new political states and urban centres (Gombrich 1988: 37). To sum up: the Gangetic Plain was the earliest location of both rice-farming and large urban centres during the Second Urbanization. There is also evidence of the northwest as a location for thriving rice-farming. This establishes a possible generative and geographical context for seed metaphors in *bhāvanā* as being specifically rice-seed metaphors.

1.4.3 Rice-farming in texts

Sattar et al provide a useful history of rice-farming in India as reflected in textual history (Sattar et al 2010). The Vedas mention different types of rice and cooking methods. One of the techniques of cooking was parching, *parivapa* (Sattar et al 2010: 230). Many classical *sūtra* texts deal with rice within the context of ritual, offerings, and household duties. The grammarian Pāṇini describes rice frequently in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, including the cultivation of rice in water-immersed fields. He even coined the grammatical term '*bahuvrīhi*' (a type of word compound) from the concept of a high-yield rice grain. In the early centuries BCE, Parashara wrote a treatise on agriculture called the *Krishi Parashara*, which presents much technical

[61] 'With the shift of the centre of Indian civilization to the middle Gangetic valley that has a warmer climate, higher rainfall and more fertile land; rice was now a more productive cereal than barley that had been the staple food of Aryans when they were in the Indus basin or in the upper Gangetic valley' (Sattar et al 2010: 231).

information about rice-growing including information about types and purity of seeds, availability of water, and managing pests. Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* (2nd century BCE -3rd century CE) offers advice on growing *śāli* and *vrīhi*, different types of rice grain, when the rains commence (Sattar et al 2010: 233), while the foundational āyurvedic text *Caraka Saṃhitā* (c. 1st-2nd century CE) discusses medicinal properties of rice. By the early common era, Brahmanic śāstric literature included numerous technical accounts of rice-farming.

We also find many technical descriptions of rice-farming in relation to meditation in the texts that we are examining. For example, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* explains that the elimination of *kleśa* in the mind is like the process or burning rice seed by fire, using the example of *vrīhi*, a particular type of rice grain.

> *ato 'gnidagdhavrīhivad abījībhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate / upahatabījabhāve vā laukikena mārgeṇa*
> (AKBh 2.36; Pradhan 1975: 63, 20-21)
> So when the substratum has come to be without the seeds of afflictions, like rice that has been burnt by fire, someone is called 'one who has abandoned defilements' – or when [the substratum has] seeds that have been damaged by the ordinary path.[62]

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* also refers to the *śāli* form of the rice seed when the Sautrāntikas recount their ontological concept of *bījabhāva* (the state of the seed) (I discuss *bījabhāva* in Chapter 2):

> *ko' ayam bījabhāvo nāma. ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ yathānubhavajñānajā smṛtyutpādanaśaktir yathācāṅkurādīnāṃ śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktir iti*
> (AKBh 5.1; Pradhan 1975: 278, 22-24).
> By 'seed' one should understand a certain capacity to reproduce the *kleśa*, a power belonging to the person engendered by the previous *kleśa*. In this same way, there exists in a certain person the capacity of producing a certain consciousness of memory, a capacity engendered by a consciousness of perception; in this same way, the capacity to produce rice, which belongs to the plant, the shoot, the stalk, etc. is engendered by the rice seed (trans. Pruden 1988 3: 770).

[62] I discuss the burnt rice seed in detail in Chapter 2.

Indeed, such is the prevalence of rice-seed imagery in the AKBh that the concept of *kleśa* is introduced almost entirely in these terms. In the chapter on the *anuśaya*s (the latent seeds of afflictions), *kleśa* is described as accomplishing ten actions to ensure its longevity, which include: making its own roots solid to prevent them from becoming broken, reproducing itself, adapting to the field conditions, engendering its own offspring, causing misrecognition of what it fundamentally is, bending the mind (down) towards the wrong object or towards rebirth, causing a falling away of the good, and becoming a bond in itself (AKBh 5.1). I suggest that these are all qualities that are mapped from the domain of the wild rice species, the very enemy of the cultivation of the 'tame' or 'good' rice species (see below).
As we will see in the next chapter, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, too, contains many references to *kleśabīja* as a rice seed, including this elaborate description of the irrigation of rice paddies in relation to causality (PYŚ 4.3):

> ***nimittam aprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ varaṇabhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavat* || YS_4.3 ||**
> *na hi dharmādi nimittaṃ tatprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ bhavati / na kāryeṇa kāraṇaṃ pravartyata iti / kathaṃ tarhi, varaṇabhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavat / yathā kṣetrikaḥ kedārād apāṃ pūrṇāt kedārāntaraṃ piplāvayiṣuḥ samaṃ nimnaṃ nimnataraṃ vā nāpaḥ pāṇināpakarṣaty āvaraṇaṃ tv āsāṃ bhinatti tasmin bhinne svayam evāpaḥ kedārāntaram āplāvayanti tathā dharmaḥ prakṛtīnām āvaraṇadharmaṃ bhinatti tasmin bhinne svayam eva prakṛtayaḥ svaṃ svaṃ vikāram āplāvayanti / yathā vā sa eva kṣetrikas tasminn eva kedāre na prabhavaty audakān bhaumān vā rasān dhānyamūlāny anupraveśayituṃ, kiṃ tarhi mudgagavedhukaśyāmākādīṃs tato 'pakarṣati* (PYŚ 4.3; Āgāśe 1904: 177-178).
> **The cause is not the impelling drive itself, but it makes a breach in the retaining barrier of the natures, as does a farmer (for irrigation).**
> Righteousness, etc., though cause, cannot be the impelling drive of the natures. What happens, then? It makes a breach in the retaining barrier as does a farmer. The farmer, to irrigate a terraced field by flooding it with water from another (higher) field, does not take the water in his cupped hands, but makes a breach in its retaining barrier; when that is breached, the water pours into the lower field of itself. Similarly, righteousness breaches unrighteousness, the retaining barrier of the natures. When it is breached, the natures flow out into their respective forms.

> Then again, a farmer in his field cannot force the nutrients of water or earth into the roots of his rice. What does he do, then? He removes weeds like *mudga*, *tinduka*, *gavidhuka* and *śyāmāka*. With these gone, the nutrients enter, of themselves, the roots of the rice (trans. Leggett 1990: 367-368)

This passage describes contemporaneous techniques for irrigating the land and removing common weeds to preserve rice cultivation. In order to understand the conceptual significance of these technical accounts of rice-farming in relation to meditation in both the AKBh and the PYŚ, let us now turn to some historical material detail.

1.4.4 Techniques of rice cultivation and their relevance to soteriology

The cultivated Asian rice species is called *Oryza sativa* or *O. sativa* (Sharma 2010: 1). Rice itself comes in many variant forms. The husk can be fawn, yellow, golden, or purple; the grain type can be short and round or long and slender; the colour can be white, chalky, red or black; some plants mature in 70 days and some in 180 days (Sharma 2010: 2). Such details become significant when considering the descriptions in our texts, which contain accounts of how long rice takes to mature (as an analogy of how karma matures), how a grain of rice can be dehusked to render it non-fertile (in relation to rendering the *kleśa*s impotent), how a rice seed is parched to destroy its potency (again, in relation to destroying the *kleśa*s) and how a farmer irrigates a tiered rice-field (to explain causality itself). Since the properties of the domain of rice farming were mapped to techniques of spiritual cultivation, we can only improve our semantic decoding by getting to grips with the original creative context in which such metaphors were generated. For example, if we fundamentally misunderstand what is meant by 'scorching a rice-seed', both the method and its significance, we may miss a vital detail in what is meant by scorching the seed of *kleśa* to attain liberation. When translators choose how to render technical rice-farming terms in the *Pātañjalyogaśastra*, for example, it is important to know that *tandula* is dehusked rice (Sattar et al 2010: 231), that *śāli* is usually a late maturing or transplanted plant, while *vrīhi* is an early maturing variety (Sattar et al 2010: 233). Such technical distinctions have semantic bearing

on the theories that are put forward about *kleśa* and karma. e.g. a dehusked grain is one that has less chances of self-reproducing. See, for example, this technical elaboration of the three primary *kleśa*s (*lobha*, *dveṣa*, *moha*) in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*:

> It is monks, as with seeds that are undamaged, not rotten, unspoiled by wind and sun, capable of sprouting and well embedded: if a man were to burn them in fire and reduce them to ashes, then winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by a swiftly flowing stream, then those seeds would have been radically destroyed, fully eliminated, made unable to sprout and would not be liable to arise in the future. Similarly, it is, monks with actions done in non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion. Once greed, hatred and delusion have vanished, these actions are thus abandoned, cut off at the root, made barren like palm-tree stumps, obliterated so that they are no more subject to arise in the future (AN 1.135; Nyanoponika and Bodhi, 1999: 50).

Additionally, technical rice terms and descriptions may also provide some hints about the geographical contexts for our texts; for example, there was a special type of *mahāśāli* rice (a large grained variety) that was only available in Magadha (Sattar et al 2010: 234).

1.4.5 Wild rice and cultivated rice

We have already noted that the cultivated form of rice in India is called *O. sativa*. However, there was also a wild rice, *O. nivara*,[63] which was the likely progenitor of rice in South Asia. It is my contention that differences in how these two types of rice were perceived are reflected in the soteriology of *bhāvanā* in the early common era.

Sharma notes the key properties of the wild rice called *O. nivara*: it acquired an 'annual habit, self-pollination, gregarious habit, synchronous flowering and seed setting, higher seed productivity and bolder seeds' than cultivated rice (Sharma 2010: 5). Wild rice was therefore difficult to control and was regarded as a weed (Armpong-Nyako and De Datta 1991: 101). If one

[63] Sanskrit: *nīvāraḥ*. According to Monier-Williams, *nīvāraḥ*, indicating wild rice, is discussed in the Vedas and the *Mahābhārata*.

assesses the growth pattern of wild rice as 'habitual', 'self-producing' and 'bold', these are all qualities used to characterize the negative patterns of the mind, or *kleśa*. Furthermore, wild rice's pattern of simultaneous 'flowering' and 'seeding' is characteristic of the cycle of karma as containing the seed of future action in the present action. Thus wild rice was a plant that was especially bold and self-sufficient in its reproduction and was a direct threat to cultivated rice. The wild rice-seed provided a useful metaphor through which to express anxiety about the uncontrolled growth of negative habit in the human personality. In the agricultural field, the contrast between cultivated order and wild divergence from such order was visibly stark: 'When rice is seeded or transplanted in rows, it is easy to differentiate wild rice growing between the rows' (Armpong-Nyako and De Datta 1991: 101).

Understanding growth patterns of rice is useful for decoding the soteriological theory of how *kleśa*s thrive automatically. Even amongst desirable rice plants, there were two growth periods: vegetative growth (stems and leaves), followed by generative (reproductive) growth (Matsubayashi et al 1968: 34). A key feature of wild rice (*O. nivara*) is that its seeds are highly dormant (Armpong-Nyako and De Datta 1991: 101). Wild rices 'are adapted to the environment of cultivated rice, are competitive, and have grains that are highly dormant and shatter easily' (Armpong-Nyako and De Datta 1991: 101). The seed dormancy of wild rice means that it can lie undetected for a long time and then suddenly springs up. Furthermore, since the grain husk breaks easily, the grain inside is rapidly freed and, because it contains its own seed, it can quickly propagate again. Therefore the farmer has to continuously eliminate wild rice seed in favour of cultivated seed. After the rice harvests, there were various techniques to kill wild rice-seeds, such as burning or flooding the field, to prevent germination (Armpong-Nyako and De Datta 1991: 101). While cultivated rice plants have to be deliberately germinated with various fertilization techniques, wild rice is self-germinating.

However, even in cultivated rice plants, reproductive growth has a negative aspect after the harvesting period. Thus when rice was harvested, the grain had to be 'parched' or 'scorched' in order to remove its germination potential. This ensured that the lifespan of stored rice was extended and the food supply was preserved. The higher the moisture content in rice, the greater the perishability (Matsubayashi et al 1968: 65). The method of scorching is as follows. Rice must be dried, usually in the sun. Subsequently, it is smoked, parched (slow roasted), or scorched in a container over fire. This destroys the inner germ or seed and stops the seed from sprouting or germinating during storage (conjuring up the Buddhist image of *ālaya-vijñāna* as the 'store' or 'storehouse' consciousness). The chaff (hull or husk) is threshed (loosened) and then winnowed (falls off). The sterile hard rice kernel is what remains.

I have explored these technical dimensions of how wild rice growth threatens cultivation because similar features may be identified in the way in which *kleśa* is theorized in the PYŚ and the AKBh. In its latent form *kleśa* is a dormant seed, *kleśa* is self-propagating, *kleśa* is described as having a root system, and the seed of *kleśa* must be eliminated by scorching. In spiritual practice, eliminating *kleśa* is the *raison d'être* of *bhāvanā*, just as in rice-farming, eliminating wild rice is the very basis of rice cultivation. Therefore, in the metaphor 'seed of *kleśa*' (*kleśabīja*) the domain-mapping uses not just any seed as the source but specifically the rice-seed. Cultivated rice was also associated with irrigation methods, as described in PYŚ 4.3 (see above).[64] Water-based rice-growing was a more intensive method of cultivation that required more labour and more workers (Stein 1998: 60).

[64] According the Global Rice Science Partnership, cultivated rice is 'extremely sensitive to water shortages' and, if there is not an easily-flooded lowland region, other techniques must be developed in case there is not sufficient rainfall (http://ricepedia.org/rice-as-a-crop/how-is-rice-grown retrieved July 29, 2017). Johl points out: 'Irrigation is often proposed as a solution to the problems of arid and semi-arid areas' (Johl 1980: 1). During the prosperous Gupta period of the 4th-5th centuries the population multiplied, creating a greater need for digging irrigation wells, which was a responsibility of the state (Sattar et al 2010: 234).

Water-based cultivation also led to a simultaneity between desirable and undesirable types of rice growth:

> In the case of a direct-sowing on submerged fields, the germination of rice seeds and the emergence of weeds takes place almost at the same time (Matsubayashi et al 1968: 454).

There is one further technical point to be made about roots. Wild rice in water-logged fields *appears* to have a root system. Each year, the old stalks wither and disappear under the water, and when new growth comes up it seems as though there is a perennial root system, even though there is not. In fact, the wild rice reseeds itself anew each year. This may explain why certain texts (e.g. PYŚ 4.3) describe a root system for rice cultivation and may reflect that they were writing in a region where rice-cultivation occurred in irrigated conditions. Stepping back to consider the broader role of irrigation, Shaw notes that 'the control of water harvesting and irrigation facilities was not only a means of political legitimization for local rulers, but also formed a central component for the Buddhist sangha's propagation strategies' – in that technological know-how was shared between different regions in South Asia (Shaw 2007: 31). She describes the link between the Sanchi dams (built 3rd- 2nd century BCE) and wet-rice cultivation[65] as well as the 'ostentatious display of water-harvesting facilities at second-century-BC rock-cut monasteries in western India' (Shaw 2007: 58). Quite simply, rice was 'part of the wider cultural package that accompanied the spread of urban culture and new religious values' across India (Shaw 2007: 32).[66]

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[65] For a detailed discussion of rice cultivation in relation to irrigation technology in Sanchi see Shaw 2007: 233-258.

[66] If we wished to extend the argument about the significance of wet-rice farming in our texts, we might tie it to geography. Shaw states that in the Gangetic Valley area 'agricultural production appears to have been based on wet-rice cultivation from at least the mid-third millennium BCE' (Shaw 2007: 43). This predominance of wet-rice farming in the north of the subcontinent may be used as an argument for the association of the PYŚ (and its irrigation descriptions) with the north rather than the south. Furthermore, analysis of early Brahmanical and Buddhist texts 'shows that rice was not only central to the Gangetic valley diet; it also had a wide range of ritual, medicinal and economic uses […] More indirect references to paddy fields and rice cultivation in Buddhist texts, either as the backdrop to particular narratives or as a metaphor for Buddhist practices, suggest that in eastern India

This consideration of rice cultivation methods in the early common era highlights that in agricultural terms there was an existential anxiety about taming wild patterns in nature, preventing self-germination of weeds, and maximizing the lifespan of food harvests. Indeed, as Schmithausen points out, in the *Manobhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, *dauṣṭhulya* (badness or evil) is characterized as the seed or plant that is beyond cultivation: *dauṣṭhulya* is 'unwieldy' and has a 'lack of controllability'. It can be 'permeating' (-*anugata*), 'infesting' (-*upagata*), or 'sticking in' (*sannviṣta*) the basis of personal existence (Schmithausen 1987: 66-67).[67] As we will see in Chapter 2, the dormancy and the self-propagation of the seed of *kleśa* are central problems in both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. The struggle that we witness in the metaphoric depiction of meditation during the classical period reflects a wider struggle between 'nature' and 'culture', between the attempt to bring wild areas of land under control for cultivation, and thus to control the means to create an agricultural surplus, a necessary condition for urbanization. I suggest that this is the generative context in which the metaphorical complex of *bhāvanā* was created. Thus the existential anxiety about food supply was transferred to the domain of the inner self and reproduced as an existential anxiety about cultivating the inner mind and impulses to ensure the survival of the 'self' or 'soul'.

1.4.6 Labour: a basis for the metaphor of *bhāvanā*?

As Lakoff and Johnson put it, there is an 'inseparability of metaphors from their experiential bases' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 19). In this section I argue that there is an inherent logic to using cultivation as a metaphor to describe the spiritual path, which is reflected in the prevalence of *bhāvanā* as a religious paradigm in early common era. Although the theory of karma

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the earliest Buddhist *saṅgha*, along with the earliest city dwellers, grew up within a predominantly rice-growing culture' (Shaw 2007: 251).

[67] There is a sense in which the theory of rebirth itself is connected to the idea the self-generating plant.

was integrally constructed using metaphors of cultivation (seed and fruits), there were also other dominant metaphors for the mechanisms of karma: for example, the wheel of saṃsāra (as a cyclical force) or the metaphor of liberation (as the crossing of an ocean with, or without, a boat or raft).[68]

Let us briefly examine one of these metaphors: that of the wheel. The wheel metaphor, in fact, refers to a complex of related metaphors used to conceptualise karma. For example, the *bhavacakka*, the wheel of existence, is associated with the twelve links of dependent origination (as its spokes) and is referred to in the *Visuddhimagga* as having 'no known beginning'.

> *bhavacakkam aviditādīni idaṃ,*
> *kārakavedakarahitaṃ, dvādasavidhasuññatā suññaṃ.*
> *Sātataṃ samitaṃ pavattatī ti veditabbaṃ*.
> (Vism XVII; Rhys Davids 1975: 576, 19-21)
> Becoming's Wheel reveals no known beginning;
> No maker, no experiencer there;
> Void with a twelvefold voidness, and nowhere
> It ever halts; forever it is spinning.
> (trs. Ñāṇamoli 2010: 598).

A near-synonym to *bhavacakka* is *saṃsāracakka*, the wheel of rebirth, which is also constructed conceptually by mapping qualities from the domain of the chariot wheel, such as the spoke, axle, hub, and rim. In this passage, again from the *Visuddhimagga*, the process of domain-mapping is visible in the syntactic structures. Only the Buddha can smash the spokes of this wheel:

> *Yañ c'etaṃ avijjābhavataṇhāmayanābhi puññādi-abhisankhārāraṃ jarāmaraṇanemi āsavasamudayamayena akkhena vijjhitvā ti bhavarathe samāyojitaṃ anādikālappavattaṃ saṃsāracakkaṃ, tassānena Bodhimaṇḍe viriyapādehi sīlapathaviyaṃ patiṭṭhāya saddhāhatthena kammakkhayakaraṃñāṇapharasuṃ gahetvā sabbe arā hatā ti arānaṃ hatattā pi ARAHAṂ. Atha vā saṃsāracakkan ti anamataggaṃ saṃsāravaṭṭaṃ vuccati; tassa ca avijjā nābhi mūlattā, jarāmaraṇaṃ nemi pariyosānattā, sesā dasadhammā arā avijjāmūlakattā, jarāmaraṇapariyantattā ca*
> (Vism VII; Rhys Davids 1975: 198, 15-30).

[68] See, for example, *saṁsārasāgara* as the ocean of transmigration at Ja iii.241.

> Now, this wheel of the round of rebirths with its hub made of ignorance and of craving for becoming, with its spokes consisting of formations of merit and the rest, with its rim of ageing and death, which is joined to the chariot of the triple becoming by piercing it with the axle made of the origins of cankers (see M I 55), has been revolving throughout time that has no beginning. All of this wheel's spokes (*ara*) were destroyed (*hata*) by him at the Place of Enlightenment, as he stood firm with the feet of energy on the ground of virtue, wielding with the hand of faith the axe of knowledge that destroys kamma—because the spokes are thus destroyed he is accomplished (*arahanta*) also (trs. Ñāṇamoli 2010: 188-189).

Similarly, one allegorical etymology of *arahant* (the noble one) is *saṃsāracakkassa arānaṁ hatattā*, the 'breaker of the spokes of the wheel of transmigration' (Pd; Hardy 1901: 106, 1-2). Another important context for the wheel metaphor is the wheel of power or sovereignty, such as *dhammacakka* (the wheel of dharma), *cakkavatti* (the turner of the wheel, or sovereign earthly ruler), and *Brahmacakka* (the doctrine of the Buddha).[69]

From the preceding examples, the primary generative context for the wheel metaphor in relation to karma appears to be that of the chariot or carriage: *rathacakka*.[70] See, for example:

> *Yathā nāma rathacakkaṃ pavattamānam pi eken' eva nemippadesena pavattati, tiṭṭhamānam pi eken' eva tiṭṭhati, evam eva ekacittakkhaṇikam sattānam jīvitam, tasmiṃ citte niruddhamatte satto niruddho ti vuccati* (Vism. VIII; Rhys Davids 1975: 238, 14-18)
> Just as a chariot wheel, when it is rolling, rolls [that is, touches the ground] only on one point of [the circumference of] its tire, and, when it is at rest, rests only on one point, so too, the life of living beings lasts only for a single conscious moment
> (trs. Ñāṇamoli 2010: 233).

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[69] For typical examples, see *dhammacakka* at Vin i 11f and Vv-a 249, 5; see *cakkvatti* at Ja i 252 and ii 268, 269); and *Brahmacakka* at MN i 69; AN ii 24, iii 9,417. Wiltshire argues that the concept of *dhammacakka* is overlaid on the older Brahmanic notion of *brahmacakra*, the cycle of creation, in an act of discursive appropriation (Wiltshire 1990: 265).

[70] The potter's wheel is also a common metaphor, although the qualitative connotations are somewhat different.

In this context, the carriage or chariot appears to be associated with harmonious movement, stability, and balance, although the quality that is most often stressed is that of continuous rotation. However, there is another less common generative context for the wheel metaphor in which *cakra* appears to be associated with machinery. So, for example, in the compound *yantacakka*, a *yanta* (Skt. *yantra*) is a formation – in this instance a mechanical formation – and the *cakka* is the wheel that drives it. In the *Jātaka*s, we encounter a description of the Buddha's piety as being like the tremendous force of the wheel of an oil mill (P. *telayantacakka*; Skt. *tailayantracakra*) or a sugar mill (P. *ucchuyanta*; Skt. *ikṣuyantra*).

> *Ettakā yeva te loke ye dhammā bodhipācanā,*
> *tat' uddhaṁ n' atthi aññatra, daḷhaṁ tattha patiṭṭhaha'.*
> *Ime dhamme sammasato sabhāvasarasalakkhaṇe*
> *dhammatejena vasudhā dasasahassī pakampatha.*
> *Calatī ravatī puthavī uchhuyantaṁ va pīḷitaṁ;*
> *telayante yathā cakkaṁ evaṁ kampati medinîti*
> (Ja i.25, 339; Fausbøll 2000: 25, 175-177).
> These are all the conditions in the world that bring Buddhaship to perfection;
> Beyond these are no others, therein do thou stand fast.
> While he grasped these conditions natural and intrinsic,
> By the power of his piety the earth of ten thousand worlds quaked.
> The earth sways and thunders like a sugar mill at work,
> Like the wheel of an oil-mill so shakes the earth
> (trs. Rhys Davids 2000: 26).

In this description of a mill, the rotating wheel of the mill produces an earth-shaking thunderous force, altogether different to the chariot wheel and far more deadly.[71] Another example of a mill wheel that features in this period is the *jalayantracakra*, the wheel that raises water. These mechanical metaphors express the idea of a giant rotating force that is harmful and can potentially crush one. Underpinning this notion is the category of the *saṃyojana*, the fetters that bind one to the wheel of transmigration

[71] For another reference to the sugar mill, see Mil 166, and for *yantracakra* see *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 2, 132.

(*saṃsāracakra*).[72] These fetters vary in number but suggest an unpleasant fate whereby one is crushed under the force of a rotating wheel[73]. In this context the 'cessation' of liberative attainment can only be the cessation of the unrelenting turning wheel.[74] There is further research to be done on identifying how the material context of these mills – oil, sugar, water – and the prevalence of related metaphors in literature can indicate approximate geographical locations for the production of specific texts. However, central though the wheel of saṃsāra and the raft of liberation were to religious thought, they were not used as the basis to elaborate an entire soteriology technically in the way that *bhāvanā* was. What, then, were the specific factors that initiated the dominance of the cultivation metaphor in this period?

Despite the Second Urbanization, agriculture was still at the centre of daily experience for the majority of the population in India in the early common era. A primary feature of crop cultivation that was mapped to spiritual cultivation was that of 'work': arduous striving and hard labour. Success in both endeavours, farming and spiritual practice, require 'labour': labour in the fields and the labour of ascetic efforts. The association of spiritual practice with labour may be rooted in the lifestyles and living conditions of the early forest-dwelling *śramaṇa* (renouncer) communities. The inception of these ascetic communities in the northeastern region is widely understood as a reaction against the beginning of the Second Urbanization. The *śramaṇa*s adopted remote rural environments and engaged in extreme bodily practices. This combination of bodily mortification and punishing natural environments meant that religious existence was certainly 'hard

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[72] For discussions of the *saṃyojana* in Pāli texts, see: Vin i.183; SN i.23, v.241, 251; AN i.264, iii.443, iv.7; MN i.483; Sn 62, 74, 621; Ja i.275; ii.22; Nett 49.

[73] For a discussion of the fetters as a subset of the influxes (*āsrava*s), alongside the afflictions (*kleśa*s), see chapter two of this dissertation.

[74] The metaphor MIND IS A MACHINE is also evident in this conceptual system in the notions of cognition and cogitation as the 'turning' of the mind or in Patañjali's description of *cittavṛtti nirodha*, the cessation of the 'turnings' of the mind.

work' in the sense of corporeal 'labour'. This is reflected in the meaning of the word *śramaṇa* itself, which denotes 'striver'. Forest-dwelling, which relied on hunter-gatherer techniques and alms-seeking for food, would have been a lifestyle replete with anxiety about food supply.

There were manifold early Buddhist examples of the metaphor of botanical cultivation[75] in a positive context.[76] In the *Petavatthu*, we are told: 'like fields are the *Arhata*; the givers are like farmers. The gift is like the seed, (and) from this arises the fruit' (Pv 1.1; trs. Collins 1982: 219). Elsewhere, for laypersons: 'doing good deeds, which bring rebirth, what is given to the monkhood is rich in fruit' (SN i 233; AN iv, 292; trs. Collins 1982: 219).[77] The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* states: 'Gifts to those who in this world are worthy of gifts [i.e. monks] bring great fruit, just like seeds sown in a good field' (SN i, 233; trs. Collins 1982: 219)[78]. As Collins outlines, the image of an 'unsurpassable field of merit' (*anuttara puññakhetta*) is used to describe the Buddha, advanced monks, and the institution of monkhood as a whole.[79] Religious striving is said to depend on morality (*śila*) just as seeds and plants depend on the earth (*Milindapañha* 75-76). Elsewhere, this teaching is framed as the seed of faith, the root of morality and the shoot of meditation and insight (SN i 172f; Sn 12f; SN-a i 250; Sn-a 144). In one particularly striking image, monkhood is a field in which the seed of the Dharma is planted. Monks are thus like seedlings that require nurturing; and if they do not see the Buddha,

[75] This metaphorical complex is not necessarily referred to as *bhāvanā*, but rather contains the key markers of agriculture: planting, ripening, maturing, harvesting, etc.

[76] I rely here on the important references laid out by Collins in his discussion of 'vegetation imagery' in early Buddhist texts (Collins 1982: 218-224).

[77] *karotaṃ opadhikaṃ saṅghe dinnaṃ mahāphalan iti.*

[78] See an extended version of this in AN iv, 237.

[79] For this epithet in relation to the Buddha, see SN i 167; Sn 486; It 98; in relation to advanced monks, see MN i 446; AN i 244, ii 113, iii 158, 248, 279, 387, iv 10, 292; Mil 416; Pv iv I; in relation to the institution of monkhood, see DN iii, 5, 227; MN iii 80; S i 220, v 343, 363, 382; AN ii 34, 56; It 88.

they wither away for lack of water (MN 1.457; SN 3.91-92 and 4.314).[80] These are all positive early accounts of the function of the seed, and, as Collins observes, appear to situate monasticism and the religious life in parallel to the secular life of agriculture (Collins 1982: 219). There may therefore have been a cultural impetus to endorse the value of monkhood in relation to secular life.

However, other early Buddhist contexts portray the labour of cultivation as a negative phenomenon. One passage suggests that monkhood might offer a pleasurable escape from the endless labour of toiling the soil. In a conversation in which two young men discuss becoming monks, they describe the household life as an endless cycles of sowing, irrigating, ploughing, tending, harvesting, and so on (Vin ii 180-181). This attitude reflects the lure of newly emerging urban life in contrast to the traditional conditions of rural life. It also hints at a paradox: that although spiritual progress is represented by the paradigm of botanical cultivation, it is the very cyclical rounds of cultivation that represent the type of existence from which the religious aspirant wishes to escape. As Collins spells out: '*saṃsāra* is a life of constant agriculture, planting seeds and reaping their fruit, while *nirvāṇa* is the abandonment of such a life' (Collins 1982: 220). This is reflected in the urban metaphor of liberation as the 'city of nirvāna'.[81] For some monks, the escape from *saṃsāra* was viewed as an escape to the urban centre, away from the hard toil of the fields in which cultivation was not symbolic but literal.[82]

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[80] For further references to metaphors of botanical cultivation in Pāli texts, see Chapter 2, fn 27 of this study.

[81] In a Sutta entitled 'City' in the *Saṃyutta Nikāyā*, the Buddha describes a person who wanders through a jungle forest and sees an ancient road, an old straight path that has been travelled by persons in ancient times. At the end of the road, he sees an old royal city that is somewhat dilapidated. The city is then rebuilt so that it becomes rich and prosperous and crowded with people (Collins 2010: 89).

[82] See also Shaw's discussion of rice in relation to the virtue of *dāna* and the 'passive' versus 'active' models of Buddhism (Shaw 2007: 33).

The question then arises: why did Buddhist thinkers not simply characterize religious striving in the terms of urban experience, if it was the more privileged type of existence? There are several possible answers to this question. First, we have to consider the hypothesis that *bhāvanā* was an earlier śramaṇic metaphor that effectively became a 'dead' metaphor in the strands of Buddhism that thrived in urban centres. Nonetheless, the paradigm of *bhāvanā* still served as an explanatory tool to recruit new converts to Buddhism, because of continuous social migration between rural centres and cities. Another hypothesis is that, in the interests of social order, there may have been a need to 'justify' the work of monks in secular terms so as to retain a valid social and ethical basis for the value and output of monastic 'labour' – without the paradigm of *bhāvanā*, it may have been difficult to 'account' for monks' material and economic 'non-productivity' in society. This latter theory seems highly relevant when we read in the Buddhist canon the story of a layman who complains that while he works hard in the fields, the Buddha does nothing. In response to their complaints, the Buddha explains:

> 'My seed is faith, austerity the rain; insight is my yoke and plough, my pole modesty, mind the strap; mindfulness my plough-share and goad; … energy is for me the ox which bears the yoke, drawing on towards rest from work' (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* 1.172f and *Sutta Nipāta* 12f; cited in and trans. Collins 1982: 221).[83]

In the religious context then, the value of communal labour was transposed to the realm of the individual; the external domain of the tended field was internalized to the 'field' of the mind.[84] This was partly due to the everyday

[83] There is also a story in which the Elder Sammuñjani sees the forest ascetic Revata sitting in solitude, cross-legged and thinks that he is an idler. Revata reads his thoughts and reproaches him (*Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* iii.168 f; cited in Malalasekera 1938 II: 754; 1065).

[84] This internalization of labour is also reflected in the internalization of the ritual as discussed in Upaniṣadic contexts. In the internalization of ritual, the public domain of priestly work, the ritual, is appropriated at an individual level via mind/body practices perceived to generate power. Collins discusses how 'Buddhism drew on Brahmanical ideas of 'constructive activity' […] and on the renouncers' introjection of sacrificial motifs into individual consciousness' (Collins 1982: 223). I would add that the introjection occurred

visceral experiences of agriculture as a generative context for *bhāvanā*, but also due to a more strategic need to justify monastic (non)production in secular economic terms.

1.4.7 The tension between cultivating and stopping growth

A fundamental paradox in the elaboration of the *bhāvanā* paradigm in the classical era is that although in society growth was good (growth = harvest; rural surplus leads to urban growth), in the yogic meditation practices discussed in our texts the emphasis is on stopping growth: Patañjali's maxim of *cittavṛttinirodha* or his paradigms of *asaṃprajñāta samādhi* (non-cognitive concentration) and *nirbīja samādhi* (seedless concentration); the Abhidharma techniques for *kleśanirodha*; Buddhist tranquility practices of *śamatha* or the higher *samāpatti* of *nirodha*. Why then is *bhāvanā*, a paradigm that purports to be about cultivated growth, so preoccupied with non-growth? I have already accounted for this paradox, in part, by highlighting the agricultural tension between wild and cultivated rice growth in order to argue that there was a material anxiety about uncontrollable proliferation in the new ascendance of culture over nature. But the tension between growth and non-growth is also related to meditation itself.

A primary orientation of meditation in the texts that we are surveying is towards cessation. Cessation in these texts is presented metaphorically as the cessation of growth – cessation of the growth of the seed or the cutting of plant roots. Specifically, this checking of undesirable growth pertains to the *kleśa*s and karma.[85] Textual prescriptions of meditation also share a

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not just at the level of action or ritual action, but also in the terms of communal work and labour.

[85] There are also numerous examples in the early Buddhist canon. The tree of desire grows unless it is chopped at the roots (*Saṃyutta Nikāyā* 2.87-89). Birth, old age, and death are like weeds and creepers that cannot be stopped (*Vishuddimagga* 15.58). A related image, though not one that advocates cessation of growth: just as sap flows when someone cuts a tree, so when the sense objects enter the mind one becomes obsessed with the three *kleśa*s (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* 4.60). The three primary *kleśa*s are weeds (*Dhammapada* 24.356-59).

common metaphoric tension between the image of the ground (where seed and roots reside in the substratum) and the image of the sky, (where the liberating *dharmamegha*, the cloud of dharma, resides). The phenomenon of growth is identified as occurring at ground level and is generally depicted as a spiritual hindrance. In contrast, liberation occurs at the sky level, whereby the unboundedness of the sky represents freedom from limits and weight, as well as freedom from growth itself. In our texts, the seed (*bīja*) metaphors denote states of spiritual captivity and *dharmamegha* denotes an atemporal state of spiritual liberation. A cloud is elevated, high, unreachable, and does not touch the ground; therefore the realm of the seed (growth) and the realm of the cloud (non-growth) are polarities that do not meet. In short, meditation can be both cessative and aspirational at the same time – at some point, mundane mental activity must be ceased to facilitate a 'higher' goal. Cultivation itself is a paradigm that references both growth and non-growth in equal measure and therefore provides logically substantiated reasoning to construct a conceptual scheme of spiritual cultivation.

Chapter conclusions

Metaphors are integral to conceptuality, and since soteriological thinking is inherently conceptual, it cannot happen without metaphors. In the sharing of conceptual metaphors, different religious groups can scaffold an experiential field, such as 'meditation', with identical metaphors (drawn, for example, from agricultural cultivation). However, it is not necessary to reproduce the semantic value of that metaphor because selective editing (of the qualities) in domain-mapping can facilitate different semantic values, while retaining logical integrity. This means that Patañjala yoga, Sautrāntika, and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma can all use the metaphor of *bhāvanā* to conceptualise the process and outcomes of meditation, even though the content of that meditative experience is described differently by each school – and so they can shuttle between theories of growth and non-growth, theories of meditation as productive and non-productive.

The investigation of a material context for the metaphor of *bhāvanā* has shown that the reasons for the employment of the metaphor of cultivation to conceptualise spiritual practices and attainments were many and complex. I hope to have demonstrated that the semantic and structural dimensions of the metaphor of *bhāvanā* extend beyond the experiential to social and economic aspects. In the elaborate metaphorical system of *bhāvanā*, there was a transference of qualities from the domain of botanical cultivation to soteriological acts, so that forms of religious striving through meditation and asceticism were framed in the terms of labour. During the period under investigation, religious success was primarily measured using the markers of sustenance and longevity, i.e. food production. Sautrāntika and Pātañjala authors and proponents may have co-existed in a geographically proximate or similar environment in which there was anxiety about food supply – relating to rice-cultivation being overrun by wild rice, to a shortage of water supplies, or to the maintenance of expanding urban centres. At a basic level in the 4th-5th centuries CE, there was, then, a link between soteriology (religious survival) and food production (existential survival).

In the religious paradigm of *bhāvanā*, growth can take two forms: either wild proliferation that is difficult to control and is potentially dangerous, or controlled cultivation that yields the right fruits. Yet they are both forms of cultivation, one negative that requires eliminating the wrong growth and one positive that nurtures the right growth. *Bhāvanā* then is not paradoxical, but adequately expresses and encompasses both of these growth forms in one paradigm. This is why *bhāvanā* was so successful conceptually: it could 'contain' the two the dominant soteriological approaches to liberation in the classical period, 'the cessative' and the 'aspirational'.[86]

[86] Other, related ways of framing this division include Larson's two systems of philosophy: the *ṣaṣṭitantra* tradition of knowledge and the Abhidharma tradition of cessation (Larson 1989: 134). Sarbacker analyses two currents in Indo-Tibetan yoga as the 'numinous' and the 'cessative' (Sarbacker 2005).

Chapter 2. Seed and substratum: eliminating the *kleśa*s in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

In this chapter, I examine several key ways in which the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* shares its discourse of liberation with a particular strand of Buddhist Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the Sautrāntika positions recorded in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. I examine how the botanical image of the seed and its seedbed is used to explain the concept of *kleśa* (affliction) within a wider theory of karma. In particular, the intertextual passages from PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1 demonstrate the shared use of conceptual metaphor. The PYŚ foregrounds the concept of *kleśa* as an important component in its theory of liberation. As we will see in the ensuing readings, Patañjali constructs a particular metaphor of *kleśa*, KLEŚA HAS A SEED, using many qualities of the metaphor that we find in the Buddhist sources. This includes specific extensions of the metaphor KLEŚA HAS A SEED that we find in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, notably: 1. the seed can only be destroyed by scorching it to destroy its germination potential and 2. the seed is a potent form that resides in a seedbed or substratum. The specificity of the domain-mapping that occurs in the botanical metaphor of *kleśa* points to significant conceptual interaction between the Pātañjala and concurrent Buddhist soteriologies. I explore how this is expressed in a metaphorical scheme centred on *prasaṃkhyāna* and *pratisaṃkhyā* (forms of contemplative reflection), *kleśa* (affliction), *kleśabīja* (seed of *kleśa*) and *āśraya* (mental substratum, comprised of the seed of *kleśa*). Then, I consider the philosophical context for intertextuality – that of oral debate – and show how this is reflected in two further intertextual passages, PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94, which share an argument form in relation to ontology and the seed.

The Abhidharma tradition of Buddhism was part of the Śrāvakayāna (Mainstream) school and was a scholastic approach that sought to

systematise the teachings (the Dharma) of the early Buddhist sūtras.[1] Abhidharma, which emerged in the centuries after the Buddha's life, developed highly technical terminology and schemes to present the Buddhist teachings in a more comprehensive and objective way. It reflects an analytical style of doctrinal exegesis and it innovated complex taxonomies to classify the constituents or factors of reality (*dharmas*). The textual tradition of Abhidharma is called the Abhidharmapiṭaka[2] and it forms one of the three *piṭakas* or 'baskets' of the Buddhist canon.[3] The Abhidharmapiṭaka highlights in detail the components of soteriology and the stages on the *mārga* (path) to attain the goal of enlightenment.[4] The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmapiṭaka contains seven texts that were compiled in Kashmir around the 2nd century CE.[5] The commentarial tradition consists of three commentaries, collectively called the *Vibhāṣā*. The longest and most

[1] Abhidharma is characterised as a scholastic tradition centred on ontology, but the importance of insight meditation to Abhidharma should not be overlooked (Cousins 1996: 51; Stuart 2015, 1: 245). Although in the early centuries of the common era, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma expounded dharma theory in the context of philosophical enquiry, the tradition is also marked by insight meditation practices upon the nature of those dharmas. The production of the early Mahāyāna meditation sūtras and the Abhidharma treatises is contemporaneous in the early centuries and it is reasonable to presuppose some degree of mutual influence (Stuart 2015, 1: 244).

[2] The Mahāyāna tradition sometimes refers to the Abhidharmapiṭaka as the Śāstrapiṭaka.

[3] The other two *piṭakas* are the Sūtra and the Vinaya.

[4] Some scholars believe that each of the schools of early Buddhism had its own Abhidharma texts, but only three Abhidharma collections are extant: the Theravāda Abhidharma, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and the Dharmaguptaka Abhidharma.

[5] The seven books are the *Prakaraṇapāda*, *Vijñānakāya*, *Dharmaskandha*, *Prajñaptiśāstra*, *Dhātukāya*, *Saṅgītaparyāya*, and *Jñānaprasthāna*. They are all extant in Chinese, apart from the *Prajñaptiśāstra*, which is partially extant in Chinese and fully extant in Tibetan. Although each book was attributed to an individual author, the Vaibhāṣikas claimed that, ultimately, these texts contained the words of the Buddha, a point that the Sautrāntikas disagreed with. The central text of the group was the *Jñānaprasthāna*, while the other six books were satellites. The *Jñānaprasthāna* introduces soteriological schema, together with a detailed description of the afflictions (*kleśas*).

famous of them is the *Mahāvibhāṣā,*[6] which establishes the orthodox doctrinal positions for the Sarvāstivāda school that came to be known as Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika. The label Vaibhāṣika (for those who follow the *Vibhāṣā*) was used interchangeably with the label Sarvāstivāda (Kritzer 2005: xxi).

Within the Sarvāstivāda textual tradition, Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*[7] sits as a late work and is perhaps the culmination of the Abhidharma comprehensive summaries.[8] The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* consists of two parts: the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* presented in verse form and the longer auto-commentary or *bhāṣya*.[9] The text presents the orthodox Vaibhāṣika doctrines but situates them in a debate with a rival group called the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas were apt to win most of the debates.[10] The discourse of this text is less obviously intermingled with the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* than the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* in that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not declare itself to be a text about yoga. However, like the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is

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[6] Although the name *Mahāvibhāṣā* is not actually attested in the literature, this is how it is most commonly referred to (Kritzer 2005: xxi, fn23).

[7] The name *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is used to refer to both the *kārikā* and *bhāṣya* texts combined. For a discussion of authorship and production, see 0.1.2.

[8] After Vasubandhu, there were no further Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma treatises, only commentaries on those treatises. Although the AKBh purports to be a summary of the commentarial *Mahāvibhāṣā*, scholars now think that it drew on the *Abhidharmasāra* (also called *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*) by Dharmaśrī. See Kritzer 2005: xxi for more detail on where the AKBh fits into the broader scheme of Abhidharma literature. For more on the *Abhidharmasāra*, see Frauwallner 1995: 137-140 and Willemen, Dessein and Cox 1998: 255-269.

[9] In total, there were eight Sanskrit commentaries on the AKBh, now preserved in the Tibetan Bstan-'gyur, the collection of commentaries to the Buddhist teachings, including Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha* (Kritzer 2005: xxii).

[10] Some later Vaibhāṣika commentators rejected the *bhāṣya* since, in their view, it contained philosophical positions that were incompatible with orthodox Sarvāstivāda.

concerned with the path to liberation and the graded levels of meditative attainment.[11]

The Sautrāntikas

The Sautrāntikas were a group loosely affiliated to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Buddhist community, but distinguished by their doctrines.[12] Their literary works (such as the *Sautrāntikavibhāṣā*) have been lost, and we have only the representations of them that exist in other texts, particularly from the debate in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Because many of the Sautrāntika positions in the AKBh concur with the later Yogācāra positions, some scholars have characterized Sautrāntika as 'a kind of bridge between Hīnayāna Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna Yogācāra' (Kritzer 2005: xxvii). The Sautrāntikas defined themselves in opposition to the Vaibhāṣikas,[13] who relied on the authority of the *Vibhāṣa* tradition,[14] an orthodox interpretation of Abhidharma scholasticism. In contrast, the Sautrāntikas saw themselves as adhering more closely to an earlier textual tradition, that of the Buddhist sūtras (P. *sutta*s), which they believed more accurately represented the truth of the Buddha's teachings. There is still a great deal about the identity and beliefs of the Sautrāntikas that remains unknown,[15] and the first reliable

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[11] The AKBh is divided into nine chapters in total: the first eight contain *kārikā*s and commentary, and the ninth is a prose chapter.

[12] Other names for the Sautrāntikas include Saṁkrāntivādin, Sūtrāntavādin, Sauryodayika, Dārṣṭāntika, and Sūtraprāmāṇika (Lamotte 1988: 25).

[13] As Sanderson points out, the rivalry between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas goes back at least to the 2nd century CE when Nāgārjuna presented the current Buddhist theories on karma and retribution in the *Karmaphalaparīkṣa* (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 17.2-20) (Sanderson 1994: 41).

[14] The *Vibhāṣa* are commentaries on the *Jñānaprasthāna*, one of the seven canonical texts of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. The Vaibhāṣikas take their name from the title of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*. For more detail, see Willemen et al 1997: 177-229.

[15] Deleanu suggests that one could be a Sautrāntika in terms of scholastic views and hermeneutical approaches, but still be an orthodox Sarvāstivādin in the sense of adopting different perspectives from the Vaibhāṣika establishment and authority (Deleanu 2006: 159). Hwang 2006: 86-102 gives a detailed account of the Sautrāntika theories that we know about.

reference to them as a distinct group occurs in the AKBh (Cox 1995: 38).[16] The founder of Sautrāntika is taken to be Śrīlāta,[17] who is said to have composed the *Sautrāntikavibhāṣā*, a lost work that has been partly reconstructed from the *Nyāyānusāra*, a commentary by a Kashmiri Sarvāstivāda scholar Saṅghabhadra in c. 420-480 CE.[18]

Notably, there is a longstanding debate as to whether the Sautrāntikas were identical to the Dārṣṭāntikas, another outlying group. The literal meaning of Dārṣṭāntika is 'user of simile[19]/examples', an appellation that is relevant to our discussion of metaphors. The confusion between the two groups was already there in the early sources. In one Chinese source, Dārṣṭāntika is the name for a Sautrāntika teacher, while elsewhere the label indicates a dissident group within Sautrāntika (Kritzer 2005: xxvi). Cox suggests that Dārṣṭāntika may have been a pejorative name for the Sautrāntikas (Cox 1995: 37-41). Most scholars now see the two groups as connected, if not the same.[20] For Deleanu the Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika designation simply signals a divergent position from the orthodox Vaibhāṣika one and although the authors and redactors of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* expressed such divergent views, they were still (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins (Deleanu 2006, 1: 159). Deleanu casts

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[16] There are two references to the Sautrāntikas in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, but this is thought to be a retrospective label applied by the Chinese translator (Cox 1995: 38). See also Gold 2015: 3 and Kritzer 2005: xxvii. Stuart argues that in the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* (2nd-4th century CE) 'a number of philosophical concepts in the text seem to correlate with a putative "Sautrāntika position". Thus, the text may be one of the few historical documents extant that presents an actual work of masters connected to the somewhat elusive Sautrāntika school' (Stuart 2015, 1: 6 fn6).

[17] Unless we equate Sautrāntika with Dārṣṭāntika whose founder is traditionally revered as Kumāralāta.

[18] The *Nyāyānusāra* and other sources state an identity between Śrīlāta and Sthavira.

[19] The name Dārṣṭāntika is derived from √*dṛś*, to see, and *tānta*, an example or simile.

[20] Deleanu, for example, argues that the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas basically propose the same philosophical positions (Deleanu 2006: 214 fn 69). See also Park 2014: 1-42 and 59-64 for an overview of recent theories on the Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas, as well as more about Vasubandhu's representation of these groups.

the Sautrāntika/ Dārṣṭāntika position as a set of 'scholastic views' or an 'interpretive pattern' that represented 'hermeneutical freedom' (Deleanu 2006, 1: 159-160). For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to note that the AKBh seems to treat the two names almost synonymously (Kritzer 2005: xxvi). In the AKBh, there are 19 positions attributed to the Sautrāntikas, all of which Vasubandhu agrees with (Kritzer 2005: xxvii)[21] and only two positions to Dārṣṭāntika, with which Vasubandhu disagrees (Cox 1995: 39).[22] By observing that the Sautrāntikas appear to win most of the debates in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, many scholars now characterise Vasubandhu as a Sautrāntika (or at least assert that he agreed with the philosophical positions of the Sautrāntikas).[23] The reasons for the lack of concordance between the *kārikā*s and *bhāṣya* has been the subject of much speculation (see 0.1.2).[24]

2.1 The metaphors of *kleśa*

The word *kleśa* (P. *kilesa*) is derived from the root verb √*kliś*, which means 'to distress' (Whitney 1895: 27). A *kleśa* is a negative mental state (such as

[21] See also Gold 2015: 3.

[22] It is important to note that some of the Sautrāntika ideas in the AKBh appear in 'a less developed form' as Dārṣṭāntika ideas in the *Vibhāṣā* (Kritzer 2005: xxviii). Park asserts that many of the passages in the AKBh which are said to have been influenced by the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* are, in fact, derived from the Mainstream (Śrāvakayāna) Buddhist Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika tradition that preceded Vasubandhu (Park 2014).

[23] Gold argues that Vasubandhu coined the label Sautrāntika to name his own philosophical positions. Subsequently, according to Gold, the name Sautrāntika took on a separate life and came to denote other positions (Gold 2015: 25). Gold argues that this divergence is not illogical and constitutes the detail of a total 'worldview' which is unique to Vasubandhu; it is deliberately constructed in this way (Gold 2015: 25). This argument, however, has been critiqued by Franco (Franco 2017).

[24] In the manner typical of commentaries, the *bhāṣya* includes an objection, *pūrvapakṣa*, before returning to establish the *siddhānta*, the accepted position. However, 'what distinguishes [Vasubandhu's] commentary is that the *siddhānta* position from the root verses quite often appears to *lose* the debate. Even when the *siddhānta* is restated as though proven at the end of a given line of argument, the best arguments with unmet objections have often been those put forward as a *pūrvapakṣa'* (Gold 2015: 24).

anger or ignorance) and the term appears widely in the PYŚ, the AKBh, and the YĀBh to denote a set of factors that must be eliminated in order for an adept to make spiritual progress. The *kleśa*s are also a driving force in the theory of karma, for they are reinforced through past actions and must be eradicated in order to achieve liberation from the cycle of karma. In line with most scholars of classical yoga, I have chosen to translate *kleśa* as 'affliction', which sticks closely to its etymological roots, but other common translations are 'defilement', 'taint', 'passion', 'contaminant', and 'blemish.'[25] From its core semantic field of bodily 'distress', 'injury' or 'pain' we can deduce that the original context of *kleśa* was medical discourse. *Kleśa* is an important and recurring term in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Even from PYŚ 1.1 the *kleśa*s are situated in the initial outline of the soteriological path.

> *yas tv ekāgre cetasi sadbhūtam arthaṃ dyotayati, kṣiṇoti kleśān, karmabandhanāni ślathayati, nirodham āmukhīkaroti, sa saṃprajñāto yoga ity ākhyāyate* (PYŚ 1.1; Maas 2006: 4-5, 8-11).
> But when the mind is one-pointed, that [*samādhi*] which illuminates an existing (real) object, destroys the *kleśas* [and] loosens the bonds of karma; it conduces towards cessation. That *saṃprajñata* [*samādhi*] is called yoga.

In the opening chapter, we encounter the statement that the mental modifications, or *vṛtti*s, can be both afflicted and unafflicted (*kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ*) (YS 1.5).[26] Patañjali later characterises the five *kleśa*s as erroneous

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[25] Anacker discusses this term in Buddhist studies: 'The Sanskrit root '*kliś*' means 'to be afflicted, to be tormented, to suffer,' and a *kleśa* is accordingly 'an affliction, pain, anguish, suffering'' (Anacker 1984: 146-147). He also challenges the appropriateness of the translation of 'defilement' for this term: '*kleśa* has never meant, either in Sanskrit or for any people in direct contact with Indian masters, "defilement", as it is usually translated.' (Anacker 1984: 146-147).

[26] Anacker suggests that in Buddhist discourse the *kleśa*s are linked to knowledge and not to ethics. For example, he argues that although the *kleśa*s are 'bad' in that they entail suffering, they are 'not necessarily unbeneficial' and thus not 'ethically reprehensible' (Anacker 1984: 147). Thus there is: 'an entire category of factors which are categorized as afflicted, but which are ethically beneficial (the *kuśalasāsrava*s), and another which is similarly afflicted, but ethically indeterminate (the *nivṛtāvyākṛta*s, "obstructed but in determinate events") […] So 'attachment may sometimes be beneficial, and doubts, remorse, and aversion, though afflicted, may have good results' (Anacker 1984:147).

cognitions, *viparyayā* (PYŚ 2.3). In order to evaluate the significance of the concept of *kleśa*, I will now sketch the role of this term in early Buddhist and Brahmanical sources in order to demonstrate that the primary discursive context was Buddhist.

In canonical and classical Buddhism the *kleśa*s are frequently formulated through two metaphors: KLEŚAS ARE UNWHOLESOME ROOTS and KLEŚAS ARE POISONS. The three primary *kleśa*s are called the three roots (*trimūla*) or the three poisons (*triviṣa*), and the standard formula is: attachment (*rāga/lobha*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and delusion (*moha*). These three unwholesome roots (*akuśalamūla*) have counterparts in the wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla*): *alobha*, *adveṣa*, *amoha*. The unwholesome roots are to be countered with respective contemplations on *aśubha*, *maitrī*, and *prajñā*. In KLEŚAS ARE UNWHOLESOME ROOTS, the qualities of roots are domain-mapped to *kleśa*s, so the *kleśa*s are conceived as difficult to remove, penetrating the soil at depth, unseen, produced over a period of time from a seed or bulb, etc. In the canonical sources a common technique for elimination of the *kleśa*s is that of 'cutting off' the roots (e.g. AN 3.404).[27] Although the generative

[27] The image of the tree is also used to describe a person who is still standing if the roots have not been properly cut (*Dhammapada* 3.56 *and Saṃyutta Nikāya* 4.60). The AKBh also contains a discourse about the 'good' or wholesome roots. There are four *nirvedabhāgīyakuśalamūla*, or the wholesome roots of spiritual penetration. These are the four aspects of the direct path of preparation, *prayogamārga*; heat (*ūṣman*), summit (*mūrdhan*), receptivity (*kṣānti*), and highest worldly dharma (*laukikāgradharma*). The *nirvedabhāgīya*s open access to the path of *darśana*. This model is part of the larger Vaibhāṣika scheme of *kuśalamūla*: 1. *puṇyabhāgīyakuśalamūla*, or wholesome roots associated with merit, and which lead to rebirth in higher or heavenly realms 2. *mokśabhāgīyakuśalamūla*, wholesome roots associated with liberation, which lead to *parinirvāṇa*, and 3. *nirvedabhāgīyakuśalamūla* (which are sometimes also called the *catvāri kuśalamūlāni*). There are also other models of *kuśalamūla* in Buddhism, such as the tenfold *cittasaṃprayuktasaṃskāra* (formations associated with the mind) or the threefold *alobha*, *adveṣa* and *amoha*, the opposites of the three main *kleśa*s. Jaini argues that the Sautrāntika theory of *bīja* or seed is partly formulated in response to the Vaibhāṣika root theory (Jaini 1992: 101-102). According to Jaini's argument, Vasubandhu introduces the idea that the *kuśaladharma* also needs to be eliminated (as well as the *akuśaladharma*) because of the

context for the metaphor of roots is botanical, the context for poisons is less clear.[28] In the KLEŚAS ARE POISONS metaphor, the qualities of poisons are domain-mapped to *kleśa*s, so that *kleśa*s are injurious, dangerous, potentially fatal, require an antidote, etc.

Indeed, there is a third metaphor related to the afflictions that would appear to provide a missing link between these metaphors of roots and poisons: that of *doṣa*, indicating 'fault' or 'defect'. In early āyurvedic texts the three *doṣa*s are the principle causes of disease in the body: *vāta* (wind), *pitta* (bile), and *śleṣman* (phlegm). This āyurvedic model is also taken up in classical Buddhist medical texts such as Dharmakṣema's *Sutra of Golden Light (Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra)*.[29] As Salguero states, in the *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra* there is a clear mapping of the three *doṣas*[30] onto

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following problem: if every moment is discontinuous, how would a person with a bad thought (*akuśala*) ever conceive of a good thought (*kuśala*) as there can be no causal link from moment to moment? The new theory is that there are two kinds of *kuśala dharma*s. The first is acquired by effort such as meditation and is *prāyogika*. The second category is subtle, is acquired without effort, and persists through subsequent existences (*upapattilābhika*). These latter *kuśaladharma* are never destroyed, and are the *mokṣabhāgīyakuśalamūla* or simply the seeds of *mokṣa*: *mokṣabīja*.

[28] The generative context of this metaphor may be botanical in that some undesirable (i.e. 'bad') plants yield poisons, but it may also indicate poison in other contexts such as medical (e.g. snake/insect poison) or even alchemical in the sense of ingestion. In the Vedic texts, *viṣa*, indicating 'poison', can refer to a range of contexts, such as virus, impurity, or venom (Monier-Williams 1899: 995), thereby indicating an early discursive context relating to medical healing. In the Pali texts, *viṣa* as poison of various sorts is discussed at, for example, MN I 316; Sn 1; AN ii 110; Mil 302.

[29] As Salguero explains, the 'textual core' of the *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra* is thought to have been composed in Sanskrit during the first centuries CE, although Dharmakṣema's Chinese translation is the earliest suriving version (Salguero 2017: 30).

[30] *Dosa* (Skt. *doṣa*) is common in the Pāli sources, e.g. *snehadosa* at Sn 66. *Dosa* also stands in for one of the three *mahākleśa*s, *dveṣa* 'aversion' (P. *disa*) (see SN i 98; MN i 47, 489; AN i 134, 201, ii 191, iii 338). Interestingly, to bring the concept of *doṣa* out of the medical context and back to botanical cultivation, we find *khettadosa* in *Milindapañha* 360 as 'the blight of the field' and the *Dhammapada* elucidates that the three *doṣa*s are the 'roots' of what is bad and that they are 'weeds' in the 'field' of mankind (*Dhammapada* 3, 56-59). The

the three *kleśa*s: 'There is […] a frequent connection made between the physical *doṣa* and the three mental and emotional poisons (*vāta* being equated to greed, *pitta* to hatred, and *śleṣman* to ignorance) (Salguero 2017: 30). Sharfe 1999 offers a comprehensive analysis of the *doṣa*s in early Brahmanical and Buddhist medical sources and suggests a close correspondence between *doṣa* and *viṣa* in some sources, e.g. the formulation of the three *doṣa*s as 'bile, poison, and wind (*pitta-viṣa-māruta*)' (*Caraka Saṃhitā* Sūtra-sthāna 26.43.1; cited in Scharfe 1999: 620) rather than the standard bile, phlegm, and wind. To sum up, the semantic blend from *doṣa* to *kleśa* is relatively straightforward to trace,[31] but the blend that occurs between *kleśa* and *viṣa* is more difficult to identify; one can speculate that since 'poison' (*viṣa*) is closely connected with 'defect' (*doṣa*) in the medical discourse, when the *doṣa*s are overlaid onto the *kleśa*s, the *doṣa*s carry with them a blended metaphor of *viṣa*. This eventually creates a new hyperblend of the three concepts (*doṣa-viṣa-kleśa*), all gradually compacted within the term *kleśa*. It may also be the case that the confusing slide between these three terms is partly a product of semantic slippage or extension in translation. Salguero notes that while *doṣa* was often translated using Chinese terms for 'fault' or 'defect' (thus accurately representing the āyurvedic context), 'poison' was also strategically chosen as an effective translation for cultural transference, being more resonant for Chinese audiences (Salguero 2010: 58). We encounter a similar 'slipperiness' in the translation of *kleśa* in modern-day English-language scholarship. For example, Groner, the translator of Hirakawa 1990, and Gombrich both translate '*tridoṣa*' as 'three poisons' (Hirakawa 1990: 204, 306; Gombrich 1996: 66-67), while Salguero translates *kleśa*s as 'poisons' (Salguero 2017: 30). Therefore when scholars choose 'three poisons' to translate the *mahākleśa*s or the *tridoṣa*, there can occur both semantic slippage and metaphorical blending of the accidental and deliberate varieties.

Buddha is referred to as *tridoṣāpaha* (destroying the three *doṣas*) in *MahāVyutpatti* 71. The *tridosā* are described at *Milindapañha* 43 and 172; DA i.133.

[31] See Chapter 3 fn 80 of this dissertation for a further outline of the complex relationship between *doṣa* and *kleśa*.

Gombrich argues that these two common metaphors for *kleśa* (roots and poisons) are not the earliest. The *kleśa*s are also represented in Buddhism as the three fires. Since fire in Buddhism is presented negatively to explain the condition of suffering, *nirvāṇa* is the extinguishing of the fires of the passions (*āsravas*), of which *kleśa*s are a subgroup.[32] This metaphor is KLEŚA IS FIRE or the closely related KLEŚA IS FUEL FOR FIRE. When the *kleśa*s no longer provide fuel to the fire of suffering, it goes out and liberation is attained. Gombrich argues that over time the original metaphoric context of *nirvāṇa* (as quenching fire) was forgotten. In this forgetting, the three fiery *kleśa*s were reconceptualised as 'the three poisons'[33] while *nirvāṇa* itself was largely replaced by the metaphor of *bodhi* as 'awakening' (Gombrich 1996: 66-67).[34] Gombrich also proposes that because the primary *kleśa*s in Buddhism number three, this corresponds to the three fires of the Brahmin householder (the eastern, western and southern fires) (Gombrich 1988: 17-20). Thus the emancipatory concept of *nirvāṇa* was constructed in opposition to the central concept of Brahmanism, the ritual fire. The soteriological basis of Buddhism renders the literal sacred fires of Brahmanism into dangerous fires of delusion, greed and desire, which must be extinguished. Against such an intense dialectical backdrop, we cannot view the theory of *kleśa* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* as merely incidental.

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[32] Different traditions invented different schemata for the *kleśa*s. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, for example, the Vaibhāṣikas counted ten *kleśa*s and regarded them as identical to the *anuśaya*s, which Willemen et al translate as 'contaminant': *āhrikya*, *anapatrāpya*, *styāna*, *kaukṛtya*, *mātsarya*, *īrṣyā*, *auddhatya*, *middha*, *krodha*, and *mrakṣya*. The Sautrāntikas, however, separated the two concepts and numbered the *anuśaya*s as only eight (Willemen et al 1997: 31). For the Sautrāntika, the *anuśaya* was the seed of the affliction and the *āsraya* was the seedbed. I will unpack this distinction later on in this chapter.

[33] As discussed above, although Gombrich refers to the 'three poisons' in English, the Sanskrit equivalent that he cites is *doṣa*, 'fault', specifically *tri-doṣa*.

[34] In this act of metaphoric revision, Gombrich claims, *upādāna*, which literally meant 'fuel' in the original metaphor of the three fires, now became understood in the abstract sense as 'attachment' or 'grasping'.

A variation on KLEŚA IS ROOT is: KLEŚA IS SEED. The metaphor of *kleśa* as a bad seed is developed at length from early Buddhist sources. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* specifies that bad actions are those informed by greed, hatred and delusion – the three primary *kleśa*s. This is accompanied by two images that are relevant. The first image is that the seeds of *kleśa* are like those planted in fertile soil with abundant rain, and the second is that only by burning and throwing away the seeds of *kleśa* can the bad fruits be stopped (AN 1.134-135, cited in Collins 1982: 298 fn 6). These image are vital to my analysis; in Chapter 3, I discuss the condition of abundant rain in relation to *dharmamegha*, and in this chapter, I discuss the condition of scorching the seed in relation to *kleśabīja*. The underlying root metaphor for KLEŚA IS A SEED is: THE LIFE CYCLE IS A PLANT CYCLE (a child is a 'young sprout'; a pregnant woman is 'in full bloom'; someone in old age 'withers away').

The metaphors that I have outlined – KLEŚA IS A ROOT / POISON / SEED / FIRE – are not all compatible. While KLEŚA IS/HAS A ROOT and KLEŚA IS/HAS A SEED map qualities from the same domain (botanical cultivation), KLEŚA IS POISON and KLEŚA IS FIRE map different, contradictory qualities. However, as Lakoff and Johnson state, multiple metaphors for the same concept can either be part of the same image-schema (root and seed are part of a larger botanical image-schema) or they can offer alternative ways of conceptualisation, as long as they share one or more entailments. While the metaphors KLEŚA IS POISON and KLEŚA IS FIRE share the entailment '*kleśa* is dangerous', KLEŚA IS [BAD] SEED and KLEŚA IS [STUBBORN] ROOT share a different set of entailments, most obviously '*kleśa* is unseen' (beneath the surface) and '*kleśa* is unwanted growth'. However, all of these conceptual metaphors share at least one entailment: that *kleśa* is an undesirable factor that must be eliminated.[35]

[35] In his analysis of conceptual metaphor theory in relation to the *Dhammapada*, Egge notes that 'passions' or *āśrava*s are configured by different metaphors: *aśrava*s are 'plants that may quickly become overgrown, currents that threaten to carry people away, and fetters that may ensnare' (Egge 2013: 97 fn 33). What is entailed in all three metaphors, however,

In contrast to the proliferation of technical discussions of *kleśa* in Buddhist soteriology, the appearance of *kleśa* in Brahmanic soteriology is relatively sparse. The term *kleśa* appears briefly in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*[36] and is employed generically in the *Bhagavad Gītā*.[37] We find the term more frequently in the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, where it is used to denote four primary *kleśas* of *lobha* (greed), *krodha* (anger), *rāga* (attachment), and *dveṣa* (aversion).[38] These are clearly counterparts to the

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is that *aśravas* are dangerous. This underlying concept of 'danger' is derived from the sensorimotor experience of being caught in overgrown thicket, or being in a strong current, or being physically trapped. Egge concludes: 'Therefore, metaphors are motivated not by the perceived similarity between the inherent structures of source and target domains, but by the perceived similarity between our pragmatic relationships with source and target domains' (Egge 2013: 98).

[36] *jñātvā devaṃ sarvapāśāpahāniḥ kṣīṇaiḥ kleśairjanmamṛtyuprahāṇiḥ / tasyābhidhyānāttṛtīyam dehabhede viśvaiśvaryaṃ kevala āprakāmaḥ* (ŚvetUp 1.11). 'When one has known God, all the fetters fall off; by the eradication of the blemishes, birth and death come to an end; by meditating on him, one obtains, at the dissolution of the body, a third – sovereignty over all; and in the absolute one's desires are fulfilled' (verse and translation Olivelle 1998: 416-417).

[37] In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the term *kliṣṭa* appears in a general context: *dīyate ca parikliṣṭaṃ tad dānaṃ rājasaṃ smṛtam* (BG 17.21; Bolle 1979: 190). And *kleśa* appears twice in apparently generic contexts: *kleśodhikataras teṣāṃ avyaktāsaktacetasām / avyaktā hi gatir duḥkhaṃ dehavadbhir avāpyate* (BG 12.5; Bolle 1979: 146). And: *niyatasya tu saṃnyāsaḥ karmaṇo nopapadyate / mohāt tasya parityāgas tāmasaḥ parikīrtitaḥ / duḥkham ity eva yat karma kāyakleśabhayāt tyajet / sa kṛtvā rājasaṃ tyāgaṃ naiva tyāgaphalaṃ labhet* (BG 18.7-8; Bolle 1979: 196).

[38] The *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* also discusses the *kleśa*s in relation to the PYŚ: *tadarthaṃ yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāro yogāc cādhyātmavidhyupāyaiḥ || tasyāpavargasyādhigamāya yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāraḥ/ yamaḥ samānam āśramiṇāṃ dharmasādhanam, niyamas tu viśiṣṭam/ ātmasaṃskāraḥ punar adharmahānaṃ dharmopacayaś ca/ yogaśāstrāc cādhyātmavidhiḥ pratipattavyaḥ/ sa punas tapaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānaṃ dhāraṇeti/ indriyaviṣayeṣu prasaṃkhyānābhyāso rāgadveṣaprahāṇārthaḥ/ upāyas tu yogācāravidhānam iti* (NySBh 4.2.46; Sastri 1984: 239). This passage refers to *prasaṃkhyāna* as a practice and explains it as contemplation on the sense objects, which leads to the abandonment of the two major *kleśa*s: *rāga* and *dveṣa*. The dating for Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (the first *bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyāsūtra*) is debated,

Buddhist trio. However, in none of these contexts is *kleśa* presented in relation to the seed (*bīja*) and its substratum (*āśraya*). Even though the PYŚ is conventionally associated with Sāṃkhya, we do not find the term *kleśa* in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SKK). We do, however, find a similar idea of a threefold causal basis of suffering (internal, external, and supernatural causes). The opening lines of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* declare that the goal of the Sāṃkhya method is to remove the three inflictions of suffering: *duḥkhatrayābhighātā* (SKK 1). This Sāṃkhya notion of 'infliction' or 'injury' (*abhighātā*) is closely related to the idea of *kleśa* as 'affliction, 'distress' or 'harm'. Patañjali also reproduces Sāmkhya's account of forms of suffering related to delusion. Both the SKK and the PYŚ list *tamas*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra*, and *andhatāmisra* as forms of delusion, but only Patañjali's text equates them to the five *kleśa*s.[39] Broadly speaking, *kleśa* is not prevalent in Brahmanic discourse in the way that it is in Buddhist soteriology. More common in Brahmanism is the related concept of *doṣa* or 'fault', in the sense of physical or mental defect within āyurvedic medical discourse.[40]

To sum up: *kleśa* is a prevalent term in classical Buddhist soteriology. However, Brahmanism has its own technical elaboration of *doṣa* as a fault.

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but as we must place it after the PYŚ, Potter's estimation of 425-500 CE seems appropriate (Potter 1997: 239).

[39] Here is the list of forms of confusion (perplexity) from the SKK: *bhedas tamaso 'ṣṭavidho mohasya ca daśavidho mahāmohaḥ / tāmisro 'ṣṭādaśadhā tathā bhavaty andhatāmisraḥ*. 'There are eight kinds of dullness, and also of perplexity, ten kinds of great perplexity; depression is eighteenfold, as is intense depression' (SK 48; trs. Burley 2007:174). And here is Patañjali's closely concordant list: *seyaṃ pañcaparvā bhavaty avidyā. avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ kleśā iti. eta eva svasaṃjñābhis tamo moho mahāmohas tāmisro 'ndhatāmisra iti. ete cittamalaprasaṅgenābhidhāsyante* (PYŚ 1.8). 'Of this there are five varieties: ignorance (*avidyā*), egoism (*asmitā*), attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and fear of death (*abhiniveśaḥ*) are the *kleśa*s. These are also given their own names: darkness, delusion, great confusion, great darkness, and total darkness. These will be named by means of their connection to the impurity of the mind.'

[40] For more on the evolution of *doṣa* as a medical paradigm in relation to Pātañjala yoga, see Maas 2008b.

Since they both literally denote bodily distress, both *kleśa* and *doṣa* appear to have been generated in medical discourse and were later blended with the botanical metaphor.

2.2 *Pratisaṃkhyā* and *prasaṃkhyāna*

In order to provide a full context for my discussion of soteriological metaphors, it is necessary to firstly elucidate some detail on how *kleśa*s fit into the soteriologies of the PYŚ and the AKBh.

2.2.1 *Pratisaṃkhyā*: contemplative disjunction in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

While the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not identify an entity or practice called 'yoga', in its discussion of the unconditioned factors of existence (*asaṃskṛta dharmas*), it posits a technique called *visaṃyoga* (disjunction)[41] that entails cessation via analysis[42] (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha).*[43] This

[41] In his Buddhist-Hybrid dictionary, Edgerton translates *visaṃyoga* as 'dissociation' or 'severance'. It is a synonym for *nisṛjā*, which is '(religious) abandonment (of worldly things)' (Edgerton 1953).

[42] Esler defines *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* as 'cessation due to deliberation' […] the definitive eradication through deliberation (*pratisaṃkhyā*) of the latencies (*anuśaya*) producing new existences' (Esler 2016: 341). Edgerton's Buddhist-Hybrid dictionary gives the meaning of *pratisaṃkhyā* as 'careful (point by point) consideration'. This translation refers to both an analytical component ('careful consideration') and an enumerative aspect ('point by point') (Edgerton 1953). But it is somewhat unwieldy and so I will use the translation 'analysis' to translate *pratisaṃkhyā* as many Buddhist scholars do and also because I wish to differentiate it from Patañjali's *prasaṃkhyāna*. In his list of the *lakṣaṇa*s that pertain to the seven *saṃbodhi-aṅga*s, Gethin includes *paṭisaṃkhāna*, which he translates as 'judgement' and which corresponds to the *bodhi-aṅga* of *upekṣā* (equanimity) (Gethin 2007: 161). Gethin points out that the term is used occasionally in the Nikāyas in the context of 'insight or wisdom' but concludes: 'What precisely is intended by *paṭisaṃkhāna* in the context of *upekkasambojjhaṅga* is unclear; 'reviewing' or 'balanced judgement' might be appropriate' (Gethin 2007: 162). I have been unable to ascertain whether this Pāli term is the equivalent of *pratisaṃkhyā*, but it would appear to be semantically related.

[43] From the explanation, we are to understand 'by *pratisaṃkhyā* cessation can be attained' (AKBh 1.5; Pradhan 1975: 4, 1-2). To expand the description, it is cessation due to analysis

contemplative technique generates insight (*prajñā*)[44] and is equivalent to cessative liberation (*nirvāṇa)*. Specifically, *visaṃyoga* is the disjunction of the *kleśa*s (afflictions) from the mind (*citta)*[45] (AKBh 1.6; Pradhan 1975: 4, 7-8). The primary three *kleśa*s of *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion), and *moha* (illusion/ignorance) form part of the set of impure factors (*sāsrava dharma*s), which belong to the conditioned state.[46] Therefore to attain an unconditioned state, one must be free of the *kleśa*s. Depending on whether one takes the Vaibhāṣika or the Sautrāntika position, *visaṃyoga* can result in mere cessation of the *kleśa*s (for the Vaibhāṣikas) or total elimination thereof including any latent forms, or *anuśaya*s (for the Sautrāntikas).

Pratisaṃkhyānirodha is equivalent to *visaṃyoga*[47] and entails an act of analysis or understanding by reviewing the content of the four noble truths (AKBh 1.5; Pradhan 1975: 4, 1).[48] The disjunction that is produced by such

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in meditation of the real nature of phenomena. *Pratisaṃkhyānirodha* applies specifically to the elimination of each of the *kleśa*s that is associated with the three *dhātu*s, or realms of existence: *kāmadhātu* (sensuous realm), *rūpadhātu* (material realm), and *ārūpyadhātu* (immaterial realm).

[44] *duḥkhādīnām āryasatyānāṃ pratisaṃkhyānaṃ pratisaṃkhyā prajñāviśeṣas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ* (AKBh 1.5; Pradhan 1975: 4, 1-2). '*Pratisaṃkhyāna* of the four noble truths of suffering, etc. is *pratisaṃkhyā* (analysis), i.e. a special kind of *prajñā* (insight). By means of that, *nirodha* can be attained'. In Buddhism *prajñā* is 'practical knowledge' (Lusthaus 2002: 164). It is the breakdown of the factors of sensation and experience, and these factors are called *dharma*s (Lusthaus 2002: 164).

[45] The mind, in this context, is a series of aggregates.

[46] *ity etad ākāśādi trividham asaṃskṛtaṃ mārgasatyaṃ ca anāsravā dharmāḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / na hi teṣv āsravā anuśerata iti*. 'The three unconditioned [things] of *akāśa* etc. and the truth of the path are pure dharmas because the afflictions do not stick to them' (AKBh 1.4; Pradhan 1975: 3, 19-20).

[47] This assertion is made repeatedly from the first chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: ***pratisaṃkhyānirodho yo visaṃyogaḥ /*** *yaḥ sāsravair dharmair visaṃyogaḥ sa pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ* (AKBh 1.5; Pradhan 1975: 3-4). 'Cessation via analysis is disjunction. Disjunction from the defiled *dharma*s is cessation via analysis.'

[48] The four noble truths are: the truth of suffering, the truth of the cause of suffering, the truth of cessation, and the truth of the path of cessation. *Pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is

analysis not only leads to a cessation of the *kleśa*s, but is also prerequisite for the state of *nirvāṇa*, or cessative liberation.[49]

> *yo dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ gacchati asau nirvāṇaṃ śaraṇaṃ gacchati pratisaṃkhyānirodham* (AKBh 4.32; Pradhan 1975: 216, 28-29)
> He who takes refuge in the dharma takes refuge in *nirvāṇa*, or *pratisaṃkhyānirodha.*

This gives us an indirect equivalence: if *visaṃyoga* is *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* and *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is *nirvāṇa*, then *visaṃyoga* is also *nirvāṇa*. Indeed, *nirvāṇa* is defined as the cessation of the afflictions and of suffering.[50]

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, disjunction (*visaṃyoga*) takes place not just once, but repeatedly. Thus *visaṃyoga* or *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* must take place separately with each *kleśa*.

> ***visaṃyogalābhas teṣāṃ punaḥ punaḥ*** (AKBh 5.62; Pradhan 1975: 321)
> The acquisition of disjunction from them occurs many times.

There are as many cessations as there are afflictions to be abandoned. The condition in which *kleśa*s are perpetuated makes *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* non-absolute, but rather a provisional, continuous, and repeated process. It can thus be regarded as a form of contemplative practice. In contrast, for the Sautrāntikas, *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is the extinction of the latent forms of affliction (*anuśaya*) and the extinction of the future arising of life (*janman*) (AKBh 2). For them, there is an additional quality of permanence to the extinction of the *anuśaya* – once it is eliminated there will be no further

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particularly identified with the third noble truth, the truth of cessation: *'pratisaṃkhyānirodho yo visaṃyoga' iti nirodhasatyaṃ*. 'Saying "cessation via analysis is disjunction," indicates the truth of cessation' (AKBh 6.1; Pradhan 1974: 327, 14).

[49] The theory of *visaṃyoga* as the disjunction of the *kleśa*s from *citta* also recurs in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. See, for example, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which explains that *visaṃyogaphalam* is *kleśanirodha*: *āryāṣṭāṅgasya mārgasya kleśanirodho visaṃyogaphalam* (BoBh 1.8; Wogihara 1930-36: 102, 24-25). See another example of this theory at SamāBh 2.4.4.2.1.4.2; Delhey 2009: 154.

[50] See AKBh 4.32: *svaparasaṃtānakleśānāṃ duḥkhasya ca śāntyekalakṣaṇātvāt* (Pradhan 1975: 216, 29-30). 'Because [*nirvāṇa* and *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*] have for their sole characteristic the pacifying of the continuous afflictions and suffering of oneself and others.'

arising of that *anuśaya.*[51] According to the Sautrāntikas, only the higher paths represent the result of disjunction (*visaṃyogaphala*) and are *nirvāṇa* without remnant (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa)*.[52] And what is this remnant? It is the trace of past karma that contains the seed of future karma – only *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* (=*visaṃyogaphalam*) marks the attainment of this seedless state.

We should, at this point, have a clear sense of how privileged and important a term *pratisaṃkhyā* is in the *Abhidharmakośa*'s discourse of liberation.[53] It is situated within a network of equivalences (*visaṃyoga* = *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* = *prajñā* = *nirvāṇa*). It refers to a contemplation that entails reflecting on enumerated content in sequence, such as the four noble truths. For the Sautrāntikas, it eliminates the *kleśa*s and their seed.

2.2.2 *Prasaṃkhyāna*: contemplative discernment in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*

In the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, Patañjali uses the term *prasaṃkhyāna* to denote a form of contemplation that relates to the *kleśa*s.[54] I argue that the way in

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[51] For the Vaibhāṣikas no *kleśa* could be truly destroyed because of their unique ontology of a dharma existing simultaneously in the past, present, and future.

[52] The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* adheres to the late Sarvāstivāda path-structure and delineates four graded paths: *prayogamārga*, *ānantaryamārga*, *vimuktimārga*, and *viśeṣamārga* (preparatory, successive, liberating, and special) (AKK 6.65; Pradhan 1975: 381). *Visaṃyoga* is instrumental to *ānantaryamārga*, but also provides a bridge to *vimuktimārga*. *Vimukti* is the attained state of liberation from the afflictions (*visaṃyogaprāpti*). Additionally, two overarching paths of knowledge and cultivation, *darśana* and *bhāvanā* – which were characteristic of late Sarvāstivāda (Cox 1992: 75) – are integrated with the basic fourfold path-structure so that, at a certain level of attainment, *bhāvanā* has *visaṃyoga* as its result: ***svargāya śīlaṃ prādhānyāt visaṃyogāya bhāvanā*** (AKK 4.123; Pradhan 1975: 274, 4). 'Essentially, the precepts have heaven for their result; meditation has disconnection for its result.' (Trans. Pruden 1988-90 Vol 2: 705).

[53] In Buddhist texts of this period, *pratisaṃkhyāna* can also appear as a more general term for contemplation, as in contemplating one's food while one eats.

[54] See discussions of *prasaṃkhyāna* pertaining to seven different *sūtra*s, albeit primarily located in the *bhāṣya*: PYŚ 1.2, 1.15, 2.2, 2.4, 2.11, 2.12, **4.29**, 4.29.

which he employs the term *prasaṃkhyāna* resembles the Sautrāntika soteriology of the AKBh. Let us first trace the conceptual link between *prasaṃkhyāna* and the *kleśa*s in Patañjali's text. Pātañjala yoga also posits a theory of *kleśa*. The five *kleśa*s are ignorance, egoity, attachment, animosity, and clinging to life (***avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ***, YS 2.3), although they are also defined using a threefold formula (*lobhakrodhamoha*, YS 2.34). In the fivefold model, *avidyā* is a field (*kṣetra*), which is the propagative ground (*prasavabhūmi*) of the other four *kleśa*s. In total, there are five states in which the *kleśa*s may exist and they are all explained via the idea of plant propagation: 1. dormant (*prasupta*) 2. attenuated (*tanu*) 3. cut (*vicchinna*) 4. sustained (*udāra*) and 5. burnt (*dagdha*), the last of which is the ideal state (PYŚ 2.4). Even though the metaphysical framework is different, Pātañjala yoga, like the contemporaneous Buddhist soteriology, also describes a meditative technique to cut off from the *kleśa*s: cognitive concentration (*saṃprajñāta samādhi*).[55] Furthermore, diminishing the *kleśa*s is one of the two stated goals of *kriyā yoga* (the yoga of action), one of the main path structures of the PYŚ.[56] The growth of *samādhi* is proportional to the non-growth of the *kleśa*s. As long as the roots of *kleśa*s exist, the seeds will mature in the form of birth, duration of life, and experience (YS 2.13). Destroying the *kleśa*s produces cessation (*nirodha)*, which leads not to cessative liberation (*nirvāṇa)* in this case but to the epistemological and ontological isolation (*kaivalya*) of pure consciousness (*puruṣa)* from materiality (*prakṛti),* the central teaching of Sāṃkhya.

In the PYŚ, one of the chief means of tackling the *kleśa*s is a mental process called *prasaṃkhyāna*. This is a specific form of meditation or *dhyāna* (PYŚ

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[55] *yas tv ekāgre cetasi sadbhūtam arthaṃ dyotayati, kṣiṇoti kleśān, karmabandhanāni ślathayati, nirodham āmukhīkaroti, sa saṃprajñāto yoga ity ākhyāyate* (PYŚ 1.1; Maas 2006: 4-5, 8-11). 'But when the mind is one-pointed, that [*samādhi*] which illuminates an existing (real) object destroys the *kleśas* [and] loosens the bonds of karma; it conduces towards cessation. That *saṃprajñāta [samādhi]* is called yoga.'

[56] ***samādhibhāvanārthaḥ kleśatanūkaraṇārthaś ca*** (YS 2.2) (Angot 2012: 379). 'It [*kriyā yoga*] has the purpose of cultivating *samādhi* and the purpose of attentuating the *kleśas.'*

2.11) and is also called the *dhyāna* of the cloud of dharma (*dharmameghadhyāna)*:

> *tad eva rajoleśamalāpetaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhaṃ sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātimātraṃ dharmameghadhyānopagaṃ bhavati. tat prasaṃkhyānam ity ācakṣate dhyāyinaḥ* (PYŚ 1.2) (Maas 2006: 5-6, 6-8).
>
> When that very [*sattva*] is established in its own form, without the least measure of *rajas*, being merely the cognition of the distinction between *sattva* and *puruṣa*, it is conducive to *dharmameghadhyāna*. Those versed in *dhyāna* (*dhyāyinaḥ*) call this [*dharmameghadhyāna*] '*prasaṃkhyāna*'.

As a form of *dhyāna*, *prasaṃkhyāna* is a higher practice that is pursued after the goals of *kriyā yoga* have been attained: *kriyā yoga* can attenuate the *kleśa*s but the practice of *prasaṃkhyāna* will be required to render them impotent (PYŚ 2.2, 2.11). In the final stage, however, the technique of *prasaṃkhyāna* must also be abandoned, and, as long as the presence of *vivekakhyāti* remains unwavering, *dharmamegha samādhi* (the *samādhi* that conduces to the cloud of dharma) will arise (YS 4.29). This is the final liberation.

To summarize: *prasaṃkhyāna* is a form of object-centred meditation that can lead to cognitive concentration, *saṃprajñāta samādhi*.[57] It is an act of contemplation that eradicates the *kleśa*s and produces the ultimate form of discriminating discernment (*vivekakhyāti*) – of *prakṛti* from *puruṣa*.[58] We

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[57] Additionally, destruction of the *kleśa*s is categorised as part of *saṃprajñāta samādhi* at PYŚ 1.2 (Maas 2006: 3, 5-7), and if *prasaṃkhyāna* is a specific meditational technique to destroy the *kleśa*s, then that, too, must be part of *saṃprajñāta samādhi*. Furthermore, *dhyāna* belongs to *saṃprajñāta samādhi:* YS 1.39 includes *dhyāna* at the end of a list of object-centered methods, and the four *samāpatti*s of *dhyāna* take gross or subtle objects (PYŚ 1.44; Maas 2006: 76, 11-12).

[58] For the view that *prasaṃkhyāna* and *vivekakhyāti* are synonyms, see Sundaresan 1998: 67 and Endo 2000: 79. However, I argue that the two terms are distinct in meaning. In the cited passage above (PYŚ 1.2), *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātimātraṃ* (only discernment of the difference between *sattva* and *puruṣa*) is a description of *prasaṃkhyāna*. This is not identical to *vivekakhyāti* (discriminating discernment), because although both terms

have established, then, that in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra prasaṃkhyāna* is a key soteriological technique that destroys the *kleśa*s.

2.2.3 *Prasaṃkhyāna* and *pratisaṃkhyā* as related soteriological terms

Patañjali's *prasaṃkhyāna* and Vasubandhu's *parisaṃkhyāna* are related, and belong to the same semantic and conceptual family.[59] These terms broadly refer to a contemplative act of reviewing distinct principles with analytical or discriminative application in order to gain understanding (knowledge).[60] Although the content of the contemplative act differs in Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions, the approach or vehicle of meditation is comparable. Equally, the structural function of this contemplation (its role and placement within a broader soteriological scheme of karma theory) is also resonant. There is an enumerative aspect to an act of *pratisaṃkhyā* or *prasaṃkhyāna*, which is inextricably part of the analytical act. *Pratisaṃkhyā* and *prasaṃkhyāna* indicate both seeing and counting at the same time (either the Four Noble Truths, or *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*) and are structured by the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. However, *pratisaṃkhyā* carries a specific sense of the sequential consideration of a group of factors (the four noble truths), which is not conveyed by *prasaṃkhyāna*. Additionally, while the doctrinal content of both forms of contemplation is, of course, entirely different, they share the goal of destroying the *kleśa*s.

Within Buddhist literature, this function of destroying the *kleśas* by disconnecting from them is consistent and long-standing. Cox notes the absolute primacy of destroying the *kleśa*s in late Sarvāstivāda soteriology:

> later Sarvāstivādin texts do not present either the practice of concentration or the acquisition of knowledge as the ultimate religious goal, but rather as means for abandoning and preventing

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indicate the same perceptive state, one is provisional (*sattva* from *puruṣa*) and one is ultimate (*prakṛti* from *puruṣa*).

[59] In the Brahmanical tradition, there is another related term: *parisaṃkhyāna*. For more detail on this point, and a fuller discussion of the meaning of *prasaṃkhyāna*, see Appendix 1.

[60] From early Sarvāstivāda texts, e.g. the *Vijñānakāya*, the path of vision (*darśanamārga*) can take the four noble truths as its object (Cox 1992: 75-76).

the future arising of defilements (Cox 1992: 66).[61]

Stcherbatsky speculated that the *pratisaṃkhyā* of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is identical with the *prasaṃkhyāna* of the *Yogasūtra*. Although reductive, his argument is worth considering in that he asserts that only the prefix *prati-* expresses an orthodox Sarvāstivāda doctrinal point – that each disjunction from *kleśa* must occur individually on a separate basis (Stcherbatsky 1991: 51 fn 1). However, it is not clear that a singular approach to each *kleśa* is necessarily excluded from Patañjali's *prasaṃkhyāna*. Although the PYŚ does not state explicitly that the *kleśa*s must each be treated singly, we are told that their nature is to arise one at a time (PYŚ 2.4; Angot 2012: 381, 9-11) and therefore, presumably, they must be dealt with accordingly. Furthermore, in the PYŚ the phrase '*vivekadarśana-abhyāsa'* (PYŚ 1.12; Maas 2006: 40, 6-7) indicates a practice (*abhyāsa*) of discriminating discernment (*vivekakhyāti*), and thus implies the repeated application of the technique of *prasaṃkhyāna* to achieve this state.[62] Such repeated application also implies that *kleśa*s must be addressed individually. Additionally, the *prasaṃkhyāna* of the PYŚ appears to entail not the provisional *kleśanirodha* adhered to by the Vaibhāṣikas, but rather the permanent destruction of the *kleśa*s adhered to by the Sautrāntikas; in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* the *kleśa*s must be utterly 'destroyed' (*hata*) (PYŚ 4.30; Angot 2012: 723).

To sum up: Vasubandhu's *pratisaṃkhyā* and Patañjali's *prasaṃkhyāna* both produce disjunction from the *kleśa*s by reflecting on enumerated content

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[61] Even in the earlier canonical *Prakaraṇapāda* – one of the seven texts of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Piṭaka, composed by Vasumitra around the 2nd-century CE – *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is the means to the ultimate goal of *saṃyojanaprahāna* (abandonment of fetters), the *saṃyojana*s (fetters) being another sub-category of *kleśa* in Buddhism (PP 7 T 26 (1542) 719a55ff, cited in Cox 1992: 95 fn 24.)

[62] *vivekadarśanābhyāsena kalyāṇasrota udghāṭyate, ity ubhayādhīnaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* (PYŚ 1.12; Maas 2006: 22, 6-7). 'It (the stream towards evil) is cut off; the stream towards what is wholesome is produced by the practice of the knowledge (*darśana*) of discrimination.' *Viveka* here appears to stand in for *vivekakhyāti*.

during contemplation so as to correctly perceive reality. In the way that *pratisaṃkhyā* produces cessation (*nirodha)*, so is *vivekakhyāti* a form of ultimate *nirodha* in that it produces the cessation of false identification with, and therefore disjunction from, materiality.[63] The doctrinal or methodical significance of the two prefixes '*prati-*' and '*pra-*' is not entirely clear. However, the *Abhidharmakośa*'s soteriological continuum from *pratisaṃkhyā* to *nirvāṇa* shares semantic and structural form with the Pātañjala yoga continuum from *prasaṃkhyāna* to *kaivalya* – they both entail the destruction of the *kleśa*s. It is only by reading the PYŚ intertextually that we glean these insights of the semantic and technical delimitations of the term *prasaṃkhyāna* in Pātañjala yoga. The visceral action of removing unwanted roots and seeds from soil is used to structure the idea that a *kleśa* in the mind is difficult to uproot and that, even when it appears to be removed, a persistent root or seed may regrow and have to be pulled up again. Equally, seeds and roots that are embedded in soil are unseen and difficult to find. The sensorimotor experiences of cultivating the soil are used to construct a conceptual system of spiritual cultivation in which cultivation is understood as repetitive and hard work. This specific conceptual metaphor of *kleśa* as a botanical plant/seed/root is of course part of the scheme of karma. In karma theory, the proposition that each action has a consequence is structured via the metaphor that the end product of a plant (its fruit, flower) is directly concomitant to the conditions of growth – i.e. intensive cultivation produces a high yield and non-intensive cultivation produce a low yield. The metaphors of *kleśa*, then, are part of the wider conceptual metaphor system of karma theory, which also governs *bhāvanā*.

[63] I acknowledge here that *vivekakhyāti* is an epistemological state and not ontological, while *kaivalya* is ultimately ontological.

2.3 The seed of *kleśa*

The general karmic metaphor that you reap what you sow (that the seed matches the fruit) is of course common to all Indic religions.[64] Nonetheless, it is important to differentiate some distinct contexts: namely seed growth as a positive phenomenon[65] contrasted with seed growth as a negative phenomenon.[66] Furthermore, I wish to distinguish between a general

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[64] See, for example, *Saṃyutta Nikāya* 1.1.27: 'like the seed that is sown, so is the fruit that is harvested. The doer of good (plants and reaps) good, and the doer of bad, bad. When the seed is sown and planted, you shall experience the appropriate fruit' (trans. Collins 1982: 220). The canonical Jain *Uttarādhyana* 7.20 states that all beings will reap the fruit of their actions.

[65] There is commonly a positive context for the image of the seed in Brahmanical sources, connoting the rewards of good actions: 'the objects given to Brahmins become treasures in the next world, and there is no end to the fruits produced by the seed-like gifts sown in the land-like Brahmins and cultivated with the plough of the Vedas' (*Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* 2.32.2f; cited in Gonda 1965: 225). Generally, within Brahmanic literature, the metaphor of the seed is used to illustrate the theory of birth and rebirth, as well as the nature of the true self in invisible potential form. See, for example, BU 3.9.28 for the analogy of a human life to that of a tree, which comes from a seed. The seed image also appears in CU 6.11.12 in the analogy of how tiny the essence of the self (*ātman*) is. For the image of the manifest springing from the unmanifest, see MB 12.211.1 (in Wynne 2009: 336). See also three contrasting meanings of the term *bīja*, collected together in one passage: to indicate 'soul' (*jīva*), karmic seed that prompts the sense faculty into action, and procreative seed i.e. semen (MB 12.213.10-15 in Wynne 2009: 351-353). For seed meaning 'divine source of all lifeforms' see BhG 7.10, 9.18, 10.39, 14.4 (Bolle 1979). The *Sānti Parvan* also contains references to *prakṛti* as 'the great receptacle of seed properties' (*bīja dharmāṇāṃ mahāgrāha*) (MB 12.308 Appendix I: 29A line 22; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 16: 2075, 22) and to *prakṛti* as being *bījadharma* or 'having the quality of seed' (MB 12.308 Appendix I: 29B line 303; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 16: 2083, 303). There are many other similar examples in the *Mahābhārata*.

[66] Although this chapter deals with *bīja* in relation to karma and *kleśa*, it must be noted that the image of the seed was also employed to challenge the Sarvāstivāda theory of dharma. Both the Sautrāntika positions of the AKBh and the YĀBh broadly refute the key Sarvāstivāda doctrine – the idea that past, present and future dharmas all really exist. Specifically, the YĀBh denies the real existence of the Sarvāstivāda concepts of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* and *avijñaptirūpa* and refers instead to the operations of the *bīja*s to explain phenomena (Kritzer 2005: xix).

karmic theory of seed and a particular and detailed theory of seed in relation to *kleśa*, that of the Sautrāntikas.[67] Furthermore, we see that the elaboration of the seed of *kleśa* (*kleśabīja*) in Buddhist sources is more prolific and technical than in Brahmanical.[68] Here I argue that *kleśabīja* is a

[67] Within Buddhist Studies, some prior studies have been done on the role of the seed in soteriology and I will draw on these. Collins analysed the image of the seed in 'Theravāda Buddhism' under the rubric of 'vegetation imagery' in relation to 'conditioning, consciousness, and time' and particularly in relation to notions of selfhood (Collins 1982: 187-188; 218-224). As Collins reminds us, images of botanical growth are used to express causal theory with seeds/roots representing causality and ripening/fruits representing effect (Collins 1982: 218). Hwang 2006 usefully theorizes metaphor and literalism in the doctrinal history of *nirvāṇa* and, most recently, Park has produced an important study that elucidates how the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas elaborated their unique theory of the seed (Park 2014).

[68] Yet there are two specific technical uses of the burnt seed image in the *Mokṣadharma* section of the *Śānti Parvan* (Book 12 of the *Mahābhārata*) that are worth noting: *bījāny agnyupadaghdhāni na rohanti yathā punaḥ, jñānadagdhais tathā kleśair n'ātmā saṃpadyate punaḥ*. 'Just as seeds burned by fire will not sprout again, so too will the self not be reborn when its defilements are burned by gnosis.' (MB 12.211.15, trans. Wynne 2009: 341)
In this passage, the seeds of *kleśa* are burnt by *jñāna*, which is redolent of the *jñānāgni* of PYŚ 4.28 (Angot 2012: 721, line 1), where it appears as a synonym for *prasaṃkhyāna*. Yet in this second passage from the *Śānti Parvan,* the specific technical function of the seed as a residue of *karma* is identified as a Buddhist theory: *avidyākarmatṛṣṇānāṃ ke cid āhuḥ punarbhave, kāraṇaṃ lobhamohau tu doṣānāṃ tu niṣevaṇam. avidyāṃ kṣetraṃ āhur hi, karma bījaṃ tathā kṛtam. tṛṣṇāsaṃjananaṃ sneha: eṣa teṣāṃ punarbhavaḥ. tasmin vyūḍhe ca dagdhe ca, citte maraṇadharmiṇi, anyo 'nyāj jāyate tam āhuḥ sattva saṃkṣāyam.* 'Some say that greed, delusion, and the habitual tendency towards other vices are the cause of the rebirth of ignorance, *karma* and thirst. These – the Buddhists – say that ignorance is the field, the act committed is the seed and the arising of thirst is the moisture necessary for its germination: this, for them, accounts for rebirth. When the seed that causes an existence develops and is burned away, and since the mind is characterised by death, another body is born from another seed: that, they say, constitutes the dissolution of a living thing.' (MB 12.218.30, trans. Wynne 2009: 391-393). The author of the *Śānti Parvan* goes on to critique and refute this Buddhist position. (Wynne's translation is from the Vulgate.) Although the passage does not refer to the Buddhists by name, this passage occurs in a longer section of polemical attacks on other schools of thought. This section can be understood to attack the Buddhist position on non-self and non-continuity of consciousness after death. Later texts such the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* refer to *nirbījam* and *bījapraroha*, the germination of the seed.

uniquely Sautrāntika metaphorical elaboration within Sarvāstivāda Buddhism, and that Patañjali co-opts this image from the Sautrāntika discursive sphere.

The metaphorical power of *prasaṃkhyāna* in the PYŚ is not restricted to the image of 'discriminating vision'. It is also explained using the metaphor of fire. We are told that the fire of *prasaṃkhyāna* sterilizes the diminished *kleśa*s 'like fire, during the process of roasting sterilizes seeds'.

> *pratanūkṛtān kleśān prasaṃkhyānāgninā dagdhabījakalpān aprasavadharmiṇaḥ kariṣyati iti* (PYŚ 2.2; Angot 2012: 379).[69]

By observing the shared image of fire between *tapas* (asceticism) and *prasaṃkhyāna*, Endo associates *prasaṃkhyāna* with the *tapas* of *kriyā yoga* (Endo 2000: 78).[70] However, as we have noted, *prasaṃkhyāna* is not part of *kriyā yoga*, but is rather an advanced practice beyond *kriyā yoga* (PYŚ 2.2, 2.11). *Kriyā yoga* is only suitable for the practitioner whose mind is still in an active state (PYŚ 2.1). Where Endo's analysis falls short is in focusing solely on the image of fire, and not on the image of the seed. Thus he conflates the heat of *tapas* with the fire of burning the seed, an image attached to *prasaṃkhyāna*. Indeed, *prasaṃkhyāna* contains two different metaphors of sterilisation: one is purificatory (sterilising impurity) and the

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But this text is, as we have seen, directly picking up on the discourse of the PYŚ: ***tadabhāvaś cāpavarge*** / *tasya buddhinimittāśrayasya śarīrendriyasya dharmādharmābhāvād abhāvo 'pavarge/ tatra yad uktam* ***apavarge 'py evaṃ prasaṅga*** *iti, tad ayuktam/ tasmāt sarvaduḥkhavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ/ yasmāt sarvaduḥkhabījaṃ sarvaduḥkhāyatanaṃ cāpavarge vicchidyate tasmāt sarveṇa duḥkhena vimuktir apavargaḥ/ na nirbījaṃ nirāyatanaṃ ca duḥkham utpadyata iti* (NySBh 4.2.45; Thakur 1997: 279). And: *svapakṣarāgeṇa* ***caike*** *nyāyam ativartante, tatra*: ***tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat*** / *anutpannatattvajñānānām aprahīṇadoṣāṇāṃ tadarthaṃ ghaṭamānānām etad iti* (NySBh 4.2.50; Thakur 1997: 281).

[69] For the same image, see PYŚ 2.4 and 2.13.

[70] Noting the long history of *tapas* in the *Mahābhārata,* in which it is 'believed to bring about a magical power symbolized by heat' (Endo 2000: 78), Endo concludes of the *Yogabḥāṣya*: 'it seems reasonable to suppose that the author of the *YBh* had in mind that *prasaṃkhyāna* has a magical power similar to that of *tapas*' (Endo 2000: 78).

other is non-propagative (sterilising potency).[71] The non-propagative status of the seed is, in many ways, more significant than the image of purificatory fire.

This image of the seed of *kleśa* is crucial in the intertextual discourse of classical yoga in the 4th-5th centuries. As we have noted, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* the Sautrāntika account of liberation insists that *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* (=*visaṃyoga*) is not just the cessation of the *kleśa*s*,* but also the destruction of the latent form of *kleśa*, the *anuśaya*, which stops the production of all future seed (*bīja*) of affliction.[72] As in Patañjali's text (see above), the image of the burnt seed of *kleśa* that cannot sprout (*na prarohasamartha*) also appears in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:

> *āśrayo hi sa āryāṇāṃ darśanabhāvanāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyāṇāṃ kleśānāṃ prarohasamartho bhavati /ato 'gnidagdhavrīhivad abījībhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate / upahatabījabhāve vā laukikena mārgeṇa / viparyayād aprahīṇakleśaḥ*
> (AKBh 2.36 c-d; Pradhan 1975: 63, 20-21)
> For the substratum of the Noble Ones is thus transformed due to the capacity of the paths of seeing and cultivation, such that there is no recurrence of the germination potential of the *kleśa*s to be abandoned by those [two paths]. So when the substratum has come to be without the seeds of afflictions, like rice that has been burnt by fire, someone is called 'one who has abandoned defilements' – or when [the substratum has] seeds that have been damaged by the ordinary path. In other circumstances, someone is one who has not abandoned the *kleśa*s.[73]

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[71] Endo also glosses over the primary nature of *tapas* as physical asceticism in contrast to *prasaṃkhyāna* as mental discipline. Furthermore, *tapas* is austere practice that leads to heat, while *prasaṃkhyāna* is described as fire itself.

[72] Kritzer notes the central role of seed theory in Vasubandhu's rejection of orthodox Vaibhāṣika positions: in several contexts 'statements by Vasubandhu explicitly or implicitly rely on the idea of *bīja* in giving explanations that deviate from Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy' (Kritzer 2005: xxxv).

[73] The image of the burnt seed also appears in the commentarial section of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. As Kritzer states: 'The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* compares seeds burned by fire, which are permanently

Both the Pātañjala and Sautrāntika soteriologies, then, rely on a seedless state of *kleśa*. And both refer to a technique of burning the seed of *kleśa* in order to sterilise its potency.

2.3.1 The seedless state

In Sautrāntika discourse, the destruction of the *anuśaya* (the latent form or seed of *kleśa*) is due to the presence of insight, *prajñā*. Patañjali's *nirbīja samādhi* (presented in the first chapter of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*) also requires the presence of *prajñā* to achieve the seedless state. This *prajñā* – specifically, truth-bearing insight (*ṛtaṃbharā prajñā*)[74] – eventually leads to the destruction of all latent imprints of *karma*, which are called *saṃskāra*s.[75]

> ***tasyāpi nirodhe sarvanirodhān nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ*** (YS 1.51)
> (Maas 2006: 158)
> When that [special *saṃskāra*] is ceased, as a result of everything being ceased, the *samādhi* is without seed.

For this line of enquiry, it is essential to render *nirbīja* literally (at YS 1.51) as meaning 'without seed', rather than translate it as 'without object', as some scholars have done.[76] Those who render *nirbīja* metaphorically to mean 'without object' do so in order to make the state of *nirbīja samādhi* correspond to the other paradigms in the first *pāda* of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, in particular to correlate it to *asaṃprajñāta samādhi*, non-cognitive or objectless concentration.[77] While I must concur that *nirbīja*

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rendered unproductive, with the seeds of internal dharmas that have been destroyed by the *ārya'* (paraphrase in translation of original Tibetan, Kritzer 2004: 53).

[74] See PYŚ 1.2, 3.50, and 4.29 for clarification that even the *vivekakhyāti* produced by *prajñā* must be abandoned.

[75] PYŚ 4.28-4.29 also clearly states that all *saṃskāra*s must be completely eliminated.

[76] For examples of scholars who translate the *nirbīja* of 1.51 as 'objectless', see Āraṇya 1983: 116 and Raveh 2012: 130. Larson translates *nirbīja* as 'without content' in Larson and Bhattacharya 2008: 167 and as either 'seedless or objectless' in Larson 2012: 96. Bryant translates *nirbīja* as 'seedless' but in his commentary on the *sūtra* interprets this as meaning 'not focused on any aspect of an object' (Bryant, 2009:164). For a different discussion of *nirbīja* see Maas 2009: 274 fn32.

[77] For example, see Larson and Bhattacharya 2008: 27.

samādhi is a non-cognitive state in which the practitioner no longer engages in objective cognition, this does not account for the technical meaning or function of the seed within this process.[78]

The overall semantic field of *bīja* in the PYŚ is 'seed of *kleśa'* rather than 'seed of cognition', or 'object' (e.g. PYŚ 2.2, 2.4, 2.11, 2.13).[79] Thus the primary meaning of *nirbīja* in *sūtra* 1.51 refers not to the absence of an object in concentration, but to the concentration that contains no seed, that *samādhi* which is devoid of any future generative seed of *kleśa* and the resulting karma, as the later commentator Śaṅkara explains.[80] The *bhāṣya* makes this point clear by explaining how the karmic imprints, *saṃskāra*s, are prevented from future arising. The end of the material function of mental operation (*adhikāra*) can occur only after the generation of the mental imprints of isolation (*kaivalya)*, which have the effect of sublating all other *saṃskāras*:

> *tasmād avasitādhikāraṃ saha kaivalyabhāgīyaiḥ saṃskāraiś cittaṃ nivartate* (PYŚ 1.51) (Maas 2006: 160-161, 11-12)
> Due to this, when its function[81] comes to an end, the mind ceases together with those *saṃskāras* that are conducive to *kaivalya*.

Eventually, these *kaivalya*-inducing imprints will also cease to exist because they contain no seed.[82] There is a parallel here with the Sautrāntika theory

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[78] Although PYŚ 1.2 and 1.18 argue for an equivalence of *nirbīja* and *asaṃprajñāta* and PYŚ 1.46 relates *sabīja* to external object, it does not give us free license to interpret '*nirbīja'* as 'objectless'. 'Seed' meaning 'object' occurs in only two passages of the PYŚ out of some 40 occurrences of *bīja*. See the next footnote.

[79] Apart from its primary technical context as the seed of *kleśa* there are, additionally, other contexts in which the term *bīja* is employed generically in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*: the seed of omniscience (YS 1.25); direct perception as the seed of inference and testimony (PYŚ 1.42; Maas 2006: 70, 9-10); the external object of meditation (PYŚ 1.46, Maas 2006: 78, 2-4; PYŚ 2.23, Angot 2012: 460, line 11); the origin of life as semen (PYŚ 2.5; Angot 2012: 384, line 5), the seed of error (PYŚ 4.23; Angot 2012: 712, line 8).

[80] See Saṅkara's *Vivaraṇa* (circa 8th century CE) on PYŚ 1.2: 'The *samādhi* in this state of inhibition is the seedless. The meaning is, that here the seed is gone; in this all the seeds of taint and so on are gone' (trans. Leggett 1990: 63).

[81] *Adhikāra* is here understood as 'appointed role'.

that, in order for disjunction (=cessation) (*visaṃyoga)* to occur, the latent form of *kleśa* (the *anuśaya,* which contains the seed) must also be eliminated.

2.3.2 The dormant seed

Hwang argues that the Sautrāntikas make a unique innovation to the Buddhist theory of the two *nirvāṇa*s (enlightenment and final liberation at death)[83] in order to elaborate their theory of causality (Hwang 2006: 90-97).[84] The Sautrāntikas highlighted a distinction between

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[82] Maas points to a further relevant passage that occurs in PYŚ 1.2, 9–13, where the cessation of *vivekakhyāti* leads to a state in which only *saṃskāra*s remain in the *citta* (*tadavasthaṃ saṃskāropagaṃ bhavati. sa nīrbījaḥ samādhiḥ*) and to PYŚ 2.10: *te pañca kleśā dagdhabījakalpā yoginaś caritādhikāre cetasi pralīne saha tenaivāstaṃ gacchanti* (personal communication 7/12/16). In my view, both of these instances underline the link between *prasaṃkhyāna* and *vivekakhyāti*: when *prasaṃkhyāna* burns the seed of *kleśa*, the function of the mind is brought to an end, a process which creates the condition for *vivekakhyāti* to arise and to produce the *kaivalya saṃskāra*s (the karmic impressions that are conducive to *kaivalya*).

[83] In the early canon, the theory of the two *nirvāṇa*s was characterized as the *nirvāṇa* of the afflictions (*kleśa*s) which still contained a remnant of attachment and the *nirvāṇa* of the aggregates (*skandha*s), which had no remnant of detachment (Collins 2010: 41). In what is regarded as the Buddha's first sermon after Enlightenment, he explains the third noble truth, the cessation of suffering, as 'fading away without remainder' and 'cessation' as synonyms for nirvāṇa (Collins 2010: 65).

[84] To be clear on the development of *bīja* as a Sautrāntika idea, we also need to clarify the chronology of the AKBh and the YĀBh. This is because the YĀBh predates the AKBh and although credited as a Mahāyāna work is in the majority a Sarvāstivādin treatise with newly emerging Mahāyāna ideas. Thus when Kritzer identifies the concept of *bīja* as important to the YĀBh he is right in asserting that the first textual developments of *bīja* occur in a Yogācāra text in relation to *ālayavijñāna*, the YĀBh, although not yet in a systematic way; that would come later in the AKBh (Kritzer 2010: xix). Although their texts are not extant, the Sautrāntikas had a unique elaboration of the theory of the seed and Vasubandhu clearly attributes this theory to them (AKBh 5.3; Pradhan 1975 278). Kritzer's study highlights how the AKBh utilises arguments from the YĀBh to reject Vaibhāṣika ideas: 'In Chapter Two, Vasubandhu relies on the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* for his statement that *bīja*s are nothing other than *nāmarūpa* or the *āśraya* […] He explains many of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*s in terms of *bīja*s, and in almost every case, a similar explanation can be found in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the

sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu, as *nirvāṇa* with remainder of karmic deposit and of life (*janman*), and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*, as *nirvāṇa* that is devoid of remnant of karmic deposit and of arising of future life (Hwang 2006: 92).[85] To explain the idea of karmic deposit, the early Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas shifted the emphasis from *kleśa* to the idea of a latent form of *kleśa* (a dormant seed), which they called *anuśaya* and made their doctrinal cornerstone (Park 2014: 464-469; Hwang 2006: 90-97).[86] As Park has noted in his study of the the seed in relation to karmic theory in early Buddhism:

> this sequential model of causation based on the botanical imagery of seed growth is a characteristic marker by which to discern the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika affiliation (Park 2014: 311).

At this point, *anuśaya* was not a common term in the Buddhist canon and as Hwang states: 'this small terminological shift seems to be the key to understanding how nirvana was explained in the Sautrāntika system' (Hwang 2006: 92). The metaphor model used by the Sautrāntikas to anchor these doctrinal distinctions was that of the seed, or *bīja* (Hwang 2006: 93). As Cox points out, it was typical of later Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts to engage in 'heated sectarian controversy' over 'the possibility of a distinction between latent and active defilements' (Cox 1992: 69). In the *Abhidharmakośābhāṣya* this argument plays out between the Vaibhāṣikas, who deny that there are any latent afflictions, and the Sautrāntikas, who

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Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūm' (Kritzer 2010: xxxv). We cannot therefore overlook the importance of *bīja* in the YĀBh; it is, rather like the concept it denotes, there in latent form. It emerges in a more fully developed way in the later AKBh. Although this dissertation concentrates on the development of seed theory by the Sautrāntikas in the AKBh, other scholars have pointed to the importance of seed theory in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāśtra*. See Schmithausen 1987: 21 for detail on the seed theory in the commentarial *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. See also Yamabe 2017b for agreement with Kritzer that Mahāyāna seed theory evolved in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*; although this seed theory is cited in a summarized form in the AKBh, it is not derived from the Sautrāntikas.

[85] In other schools the remainder can also refer to *skandha*s or to conventional reality.

[86] Other Buddhist groups such as the Vibhajyavādins (a northern Indian Abhidharma school) also developed and innovated the theory of the seed of karma and *kleśa* in slightly different ways (Park 2014: 456).

maintain a dual distinction between the manifest affliction, the *paryavasthāna*, and the latent affliction, the *anuśaya*.[87] Thus Patañjali's discussion of concentration as being with seed and without seed (*sabīja* and *nirbīja samādhi)* is particularly resonant of the specific debates happening in Sautrāntika circles during the 4th-5th centuries.

The argument for such resonance is supported by comparing the two following passages, which define the seed state of *kleśa*. Patañjali claims that dormancy (*prasupta*) is when the *kleśa* remains in a seed state (*bījabhāva*) and is not awakened (*prabodha)*. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the Sautrāntikas define the dormant *kleśa* as a seed in similar terms.

[87] See Park 2014: 433 fn 896 for a summary of the main positions in this debate.

Table 2.1: PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1

Pātañjalayogaśāstra	***Abhidharmakośabhāṣya***
tatra kā ***prasuptiḥ****? cetasi śaktimātrapratiṣṭhānāṃ* ***bījabhāv****opagamaḥ. tasya* ***prabodha*** *ālambane* ***saṃmukhībhāvaḥ*** (PYŚ 2.4; (Angot 2012: 381, 2-3)	*prasupto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyate / prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam / kā ca tasya* ***prasuptiḥ*** */ asaṃmukhībhūtasya* ***bījabhāvā****nubandhaḥ / kaḥ* ***prabodhaḥ*** */* ***saṃmukhībhāvaḥ*** */ ko 'yaṃ bījabhāvo nāma. ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśopādanaśaktiḥ* (AKBh 5.1; Pradhan 1975: 278, 20-24)
Of these [modes of existence], what is dormancy? It is the having of the seed state (*bījabhāva*) of those [*kleśa*s] that remain in the mind in potential-form only (*śaktimātra*). Its awakening means that it is becoming present (face-to-face)[88] with regard to an object.	The dormant *kleśa* is called *anuśaya*. The opposite is [the *kleśa* in] an awakened state. And what is its dormancy? It is a series of seed states (*bījabhāvānubandha*) of [an affliction] that has not become present. What is awakening? The becoming present (face-to face). And what is it that is called the seed state (*bījabhāva*)? The capacity of *kleśa* to be productive in one whose self is generated by *kleśa*.

[88] What is being emphasized is the notion of contact with an object: becoming present here is the condition of contact that creates the awakening. It should be noted that *saṃmukhībhūta* or *–bhāva* is a technical term in Buddhist meditation for a face-to-face meeting with the Buddha, e.g. in this passage from the BoBh: *yad bodhisattvaḥ tathāgata-kāyaṃ vā tahtāgata-caityam vā saṃmukhībhūtam adhyakṣaṃ pūjayati. iyam asya saṃmukha-pūjety ucyate* (BoBo 1.16; Wogihara 1930-1936: 231, lines 13-15). 'Regarding this [topic], the act of worship that a bodhisattva performs while standing face-to-face before a tathāgata's body or a tathāgata shrine, and while [either of them] is perceptible to his or her own senses, is called "face-to-face"' worship' (trans. Engle 2016: 388).

The passages seem to echo each other, and although I am wary of asserting a direction of influence, it is worth noting that the metaphor of the seed in Buddhist soteriology was technically employed even before the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.[89] The *Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra* (1st-2nd centuries CE, and of which the AKBh is a summary)[90] records that the Vibhajyavādins reject the possibility of retrogression for an *arhat*: [91]

> The Vibhajyavādins further say that *anuśaya* is the *bīja* of *paryavasthāna*. The *anuśaya* is *cittaviprayukta* in its intrinsic nature. The *paryavasthāna* is *cittasaṃprayukta* in its intrinsic nature. *Paryavasthāna* arises from *anuśaya*. Retrogression results from the manifestation (*saṃmukhībhāva*) of *paryavasthāna*. The *arhat*-s have already abandoned the *anuśaya*-s; the *paryavasthāna*-s not arising, how can an *arhat* retrogress? Hence they (the Vibhajyavādins) assert that it is logical that there is no retrogression (MVŚ 313a; trs. Dhammajoti 2009: 340). [92]

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[89] Collins notes that the 'idea of consciousness as 'seeded' or 'seedless' is important in all Buddhist thought' (Collins 1982: 223). He cites the *Milindapañha* 146: *abījam viññāṇam kataṃ* 'consciousness rendered seedless'.

[90] Although legend relates that Vasubandhu went to Kashmir to study the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, more precisely the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is now thought to have been composed partly on the basis of the **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, attributed to Dharmatrāta, early 4th century CE (Willemen et al 1997: 271).

[91] The key doctrinal difference between this Vibhajyavāda position and that of the Sautrāntikas is that for the Sautrāntikas the *anuśaya*s, as seeds, are not real, existent entities or *dravya* but are potentialities.

[92] Cox also translates this passage: 'Contaminants [*anuśaya*] are the seeds of manifestly active defilements. Contaminants are, by nature, not associated with thought; manifestly active defilements are, by nature, associated with thought. Manifestly active defilements are produced from contaminants. [Even if it were said that] one retrogresses from arhatship due to the present operation (*saṃmukhībhāva*) of manifestly active defilements, since manifestly active defilements would not arise when the contaminants have been abandoned, how could one be said to have retrogression?' (*Mahāvibhāṣā* 60 T 27.313a1ff; cited in Cox 1992: 70). Cox also invites comparison with a passage from the *Nyāyānusāra* by Saṁghabhadra (NAS 45 T 29.598c16ff). Both works are extant only in Chinese and so I have been unable to access them directly.

This *Mahāvibhāṣa* passage is one that gives rise to the AKBh's later discussion of the seeds of *kleśa* and how they manifest.[93] A similar passage also appears in one of the commentarial sections of the 4th-century *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*:[94]

> There the active (**samudācarita*) and manifest (**saṃmukhībhūta*) *kleśa* is called *paryavasthāna*. Its seed, which has not been abandoned (**aprahiṇā*) or destroyed (**asamudghātita*), is called *anuśaya* or *dauṣṭhulya*. Since it is [in a] dormant [state] (*aprabuddha*-[*avasthā*]), it is *anuśaya*, and since it is in the awakened state (**prabuddhāvasthā*), it is **paryavasthāna* (trs. Park 2014: 436).[95]

It seems that this particular elaboration of the seed of *kleśa* as having latent and manifest forms is a Buddhist one and that Patañjali is drawing on such descriptions, if not on the text of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* itself. Both texts assert that a *kleśa* has latent and manifest states and map these properties fom a botanical domain. The properties 'latency' and 'manifestation' are then logically extended to propose that seeds can be 'dormant' and 'awake'. The domain-mapping in this metaphor is so specific that it points towards one author utilising the words of the other.

2.3.3 Destroying the power of the seed by burning it

In the above comparison of PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1, there is one other technical term that merits consideration. The above passage from the PYŚ includes the term *śaktimātra* ('by power/capacity alone') in relation to the seed. The term *śakti* is also used in the Sautrāntika theory of the seed as a synonym for *sāmarthya*, which indicates the potential of the seed. These terms are central in explaining the ontology and causality of Sautrāntika.

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[93] See also the Dārṣṭāntika passage in the same *Vibhāṣā*. They assert the difference between latent and manifest *kleśa*s. The Dārṣṭāntikas say: 'Wordlings are not able to cut off latent dispositions (**anuśāya*). They are merely able to subdue their outbursts or manifest activity ([…] *paryavasthāna*)' (*Vibhāṣā* T1545.264b; trans. Park 2014: 427 fn 888).

[94] This passage of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is commenting on the *Savitarkādibhūmi*.

[95] Park's translation is based on the Tibetan of Yamabe 2003:233. See Yamabe 2003 and Kritzer 2005: 273 for the argument that this passage is the forerunner of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* passage. Kritzer outlines a series of other passages in the YĀBh that describe the manifest and latent form of *kleśa* in relation to the seed (Kritzer 272-277).

Interestingly, the PYŚ also refers to this highly technical concept of *bījasāmarthya*. This passage occurs in a description of dormant *kleśa*s as seeds and how they are rendered impotent:[96]

Table 2.2: PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 2.36

Pātañjalayogaśāstra 2.4	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 2.36
*satāṃ **kleśānāṃ** tadā bīja**sāmarthyaṃ dagdham** iti viṣayasya saṃmukhībhāve 'pi sati na bhavaty eṣāṃ prabodha ity uktā prasuptir **dagdhabījā**nām **aprarohaś** ca* (PYŚ 2.4; Angot 2012: 381, 6-7).	*āśrayo hi sa āryāṇāṃ darśanabhāvanāmārga**sāmarthyā**t tathā parāvṛtto bhavati, yathā **na** punas tatpraheyāṇāṃ **kleśānāṃ praroha**samartho bhavati /ato 'gni**dagdha**vrīhivad abījībhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate / upahata**bīja**bhāve vā laukikena mārgeṇa / viparyayād aprahīṇakleśaḥ* (AKBh 2.36 c-d; Pradhan 1975: 63, 20-21)
Since the potential of the seeds (*bījasāmarthyam*) is then burnt up in those remaining (*satām*) *kleśas*, even though there is direct (face-to-face) encounter with the object, they [the *kleśas*] do not awaken – thus is described dormancy and the non-germination of the burnt seed.	For the substratum (*āśraya*)[97] of the Noble Ones is thus transformed (*parāvṛtti*) due to the capacity of the paths of seeing and cultivation, such that there is no recurrence of the germination potential of the *kleśa*s to be abandoned by those [two paths]. So when the substratum has come to be without seeds of *kleśa*s, like rice has been burnt by fire, someone is called 'one who has abandoned *kleśa*s' – or when [the substratum has] seeds that have been damaged by the ordinary path. In other circumstances, someone is one who has not abandoned *kleśa*s.

[96] The remaining *kleśa*s here could refer to the other four *kleśa*s that 'grow' in the field of the master *kleśa*, ignorance (*avidyā*). Like the Sautrāntikas, Patañjali posits that the *kleśa*s must be tackled one by one and are not eliminated at once (see the rest of PYŚ 2.4).

[97] Yamabe translates *āśraya* in this passage as 'body' and 'our personal existence centred on the body' (Yamabe 1997: 198).

In Sautrāntika, the *śakti* or *sāmarthya* of the seed refers to the capacity or potential of the seed to produce future afflictions in an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) (AKBh 5.2). The *śakti* or *sāmarthya* is intricately bound up with the concept of *bījabhāva* (which features in both the compared passages above: PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1).[98] This 'capacity' or 'potential' of the seed forms a key doctrinal point in the Sautrāntika theory of causality within the doctrine of momentariness.[99] For the Sautrāntikas:

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[98] This notion of *bījabhāva* was used to explain karma in relation to ontology: *ko'ayam bījabhāva nāma. ātmabhāvasya kleśajākleśotpādanaśaktiḥ yathānubhavajñānajā smṛtyutpādanaśaktir yathācāṅkurādīnāṃ śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktiriti* (AKBh 5.1; Pradhan: 278 22-24). The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* of the YĀBh presents a different way of presenting the accumulation of the seed as *āśraya* which accounts for the continuation of a personality through time: *ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo / bālana eṣo mayi na prakāśi mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ* (SNS 5.7; quoted in Sthiramati's commentary on *kārikā* 15 of Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*; cited in Aramaki 2013: 421) 'Then, at this occasion, the Bhagavān spoke the following verse: The pursuing subconsciousness – deep and subtle, and having been cumulative of all seeds [of evolution] – transmigrates like a flood. This I do not teach to the uninitiated, because they should not conceptualise it as a self' (trans. Aramaki 2013: 421).

[99] The transformation of the series (*saṃtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa*) of the seed replaces the Vaibhāṣika notion of *prāpti*, or acquisition, the idea that *visaṃyoga* (disjunction) is a *dharma* to be possessed like any other. Instead, the Sautrāntikas posited a series of momentary karmic seeds that reproduce themselves over time. This idea is also essential to the notion of the continuity of the *ālayavijñāna* (store consciousness) that first appears in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. We cannot, of course, speak of an entirely unified theory of *bīja* in a text as stratified as the YĀBh. Deleanu points out that after the most refined presentation of *ālayavijñāna*, there is a different passage that describes a theory of seeds 'which holds that the mind and body contain their own seeds (*bīja*) as well as the seeds of each other' (Deleanu 2006: 177). This body/mind frame does not refer to *ālayavijñāna*, and the text goes on to say that the theory was devised before *ālayavijñāna* had been taught. And so Deleanu concludes that this must be 'a redactional remark which attempts to harmonise the old (but apparently still influential) *bīja* concept with the new *ālayavijñāna* theory' (Deleanu 2006: 177). This older theory of the mind and body containing seeds of each other is similar to the doctrine presented in the AKBh at 72, 19-24 where it is attributed to the 'old masters' (*pūrvācārya*) and later considered to be a Sautrāntika view (Deleanu 2006: 227 fn 169). For a related discussion, see Schmithausen 1987a 271-272, fn131; 353 fn 495. Yamabe argues for seven distinct uses of the term *bīja* in

> This seed-state itself arises from another, previous defilement and contains the power to produce a subsequent defilement, thereby forming a series (*bījabhāvānubandha*) that belongs to the material basis (*ātmabhāva, āśraya*) of a sentient being (Cox 1992: 73).

Park points out that *bījabhāva* was a technical Sautrāntika definition of *anuśaya*, and that Vasubandhu uses it to emphasize 'the agency or ontological basis of these seeds' in relation to the notion of *āśraya*, as the ontological basis of mind (AKBh 2.36) (Park 2014: 452-453).[100] The seed with its connotations of potential and contiguous states allows the Sautrāntika concept of karma and retribution to be different to the Vaibhāṣika concept.[101] Using these technical concepts of the power and potential of the seed, the Sautrāntikas rejected the Vaibhāṣika notion that the action continues to exist at the same time as the effect (the 'three times' theory).

We have observed that *kleśa-bīja-anuśaya-āśraya* emerges as a metaphorical scheme through which the Sautrāntika discourse of liberation is constructed.[102] This scheme is also present in the PYŚ, albeit in a condensed form (as befits the sūtra genre). Such is the dominance of *kleśabīja* in the discourse of the *Pātañjalayogaśāśtra*, that, at points, the text defines yoga as the destruction of the *kleśa*s and its seeds: it is the light of yoga that destroys the darkness of the *kleśa*s (PYŚ 3.51)[103] and *kaivalya* is achieved by one in

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the YĀBh: 1. seeds of future life 2. seeds of *kleśa*s 3. seeds of *karma* 4. seeds of good *dharma*s 5. seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s 6. seeds of *rūpa* 7. seeds of all *dharma*s (Yamabe 2018).

[100] These understandings of *āśraya* might shed further light on the notion of *saṃtāna* in YS 2.5 as an unbroken series of moments in relation to *karmāśaya*: *eṣā catuṣpadā bhavaty avidyā mūlam asya kleśasaṃtānasya karmāśayasya ca savipākasyeti* (PYŚ 2.5; Angot 2012: 384, 20-21). 'This *avidyā* is fourfold and is the root of the flow (*saṃtāna*) of *kleśa*s, the karmic substratum, and retribution.'

[101] As Sanderson puts it: 'The action is to the effect as the seed is to the fruit: between the two lie processes of gradual transformation [*pariṇāma*]' (Sanderson 1994: 42).

[102] Waldron suggests that the 'very suggestive' metaphor of *bīja* leads to the development of the model of mind centered on *ālaya-vijñāna* (Waldron 2003: 73).

[103] *kleśatimiravināśī yogapradīpaḥ* (Angot 2012: 653, 13)

whom the seeds of *kleśa* have been burnt (PYŚ 3.55).[104] As discussed, the image of the burnt seed is a recurrent one in the PYŚ and is the only way to destroy the capacity (*sāmarthya*) of the seed to reproduce across time. Now that we have enriched our understanding of how the metaphor of *kleśabīja* works in Pātañjala yoga we can return to *prasaṃkhyāna*: if *prasaṃkhyāna* destroys the seed, it must lead to *nirbīja samādhi*, the *samādhi* that is seedless.[105] In addition to a specific association of *kleśa* with *bīja* and the use of a specific contemplative technique to eradicate such seeds (*prasaṃkhyāna*), Patañjali's text has recourse to a range of other related technical concepts that appear in Sautrāntika:

- the distinction between latent and manifest *kleśa* with the blended concept of dormant and awake seeds (*prasupti*, *prabodha*)
- the potency of the seed (*bījasāmarthya*; *śakti*)
- the state of the seed *(bījabhāva)* in sequence that forms the ontological basis of mind (*āśraya*)
- the necessity of burning the seed (*dagdhabīja*) to make it non-germinating (*apraroha*)

There can be little doubt that the discourse surrounding *kleśa* in Patañjali's and Vasubandhu's texts is an integrated one. While the conceptual metaphor of *bīja* within *karma* theory is not unique to Sautrāntika, they had a particular elaboration that was distinct, even within Buddhist discourse.[106] Thus the technical metaphors that we see in the PYŚ around *kleśabīja* are

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[104] *na hi dagdhakleśabījasya jñāne punar apekṣā kācid asti* (Angot 2012: 663, 4-5)

[105] On the basis of what I have presented so far, it is possible to argue that *nirbīja samādhi* and *dharmameghasamādhi* are synonyms for the same state: 1. *prasaṃkhyānadhyāna* is a synonym for *dharmameghadhyāna*, 2. *dharmameghadhyānā* and *dharmameghasamādhi* cannot be synonyms because in both the *aṣṭāṅga* yoga method and within Buddhist schemes of meditation, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are treated as different stages, 3. *dharmameghadhyāna (=prasaṃkhyānadhyāna)* logically leads to *dharmameghasamādhi* and not to another type of *samādhi* 4. *dharmameghadhyāna (=prasaṃkhyānadhyāna)* leads to the *samādhi* that is seedless 5. therefore the *samādhi* that is seedless (*nirbīja samādhi*) is *dharmameghasamādhi.*

[106] Collins argues that in the Mainstream discussions of continuity of mind the preferred metaphor was that of a stream or river and not that of a seed (Collins 1982: 225-261).

closer to Sautrāntika than anything we encounter in Brahmanical sources. On this basis, I conclude that Patañjali was aware of and drawing on Sautrāntika metaphorical discourse and in particular had access to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.[107]

2.4 Mental substratum (*āśraya*) as seedbed of *kleśa*

There is one final point to explore in relation to the seed of *kleśa*: the Sautrāntika theory of seed also relates to the idea of a psycho-physical 'substratum' or *āśraya*, a concept that Patañjali develops in a way that is concordant with the Sautrāntika position.

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, both *āśraya* and *āśaya* are key concepts, respectively denoting 'mental basis/substratum' and 'intention/disposition'. According to the Sautrāntikas, when the *kleśa*s are eliminated, the mental basis, the *āśraya,* also disappears. This is because there is a semantic continuum between the term for latent affliction, *anuśaya*, and the term for the basis, the *āśraya*.[108] Let us look more closely at the semantics. Although *āśraya* and *āśaya* are derived differently in Sanskrit,[109] the two terms are

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[107] As part of his overall thesis that the AKBh works from the YĀBh, Kritzer argues that the *bīja* innovation in Buddhism occurs in early yogācāra. Vasubandhu only borrows ideas like *bīja* from the *Yogācārabhūmi* which are not radically at odds with the Abhidharma content, but leaves aside radically contradictory ideas such as *ālayavijñāna* (Kritzer 2005). This argument cannot be overlooked and I will address the role of early yogācāra in the next chapter.

[108] In the Sautrāntika school, the term *āśraya* was used to refer to the substratum of existence that exists independently of momentary existence and which provides the physical support for *citta* (thought) and *caitta* (function of mind). This idea was critiqued within Buddhism for being dangerously close to idea of *ātman*. *Āśraya* was also used in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* to refer to *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, the transformation of the basis (which is the mind, the path, and the proclivities) and which transforms an ordinary person, a *pṛthagjana* into an *ārya*, a noble person. The key transformation in *āśrayaparāvṛtti* is the abandoning of the *kleśa*s (*kliṣṭamanas*).

[109] As follows: *ā*-√*śri* (*ā* + 'to resort') for *āśraya*, and *ā*-√*śī* (*ā* + 'to lie') for *āśaya.*

semantically related.[110] Furthermore, as Edgerton points out, in Buddhist-Hybrid Sanskrit, *āśaya* (disposition) and *anuśaya* (latent affliction) are near-synonyms. *Anuśaya*[111] is glossed in Abhidharma by the term *bīja*. Indeed, the very quality of latency (*anuśaya*) is an attribution of the seed form.[112] Collectively then, the *anuśayas*, which are in fact seeds, form the substratum (mental basis), or *āśraya,* and cause *kleśas*.[113] The substratum is therefore a seedbed.[114] This semantic continuum between *anuśaya-āśaya-āśraya* in the

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[110] See the Critical Pāli Dictionary (Trenckner et al 1924-1948; 1960). In Pāli, the Sanskrit *āśaya* is *āsaya*, while *āśraya* is *assaya*. The Pāli *āsaya* is defined as '1. abode, lair, dwelling place; seat; place of origin; (metaphorically) basis, support, refuge; receptacle' (Trenckner et al 1960 Vol. 2: 237). The Dictionary entry states that both *āsaya* and *assaya* are 'semantically related' (as are the Sanskrit *āśaya* and *āśraya*). The meaning of *āśraya/āsaya* therefore overlaps with *āśraya/assaya*; the Critical Pāli Dictionary gives the meaning of *assaya* as 'support' (Trenckner et al 1924-1948 Vol. 1: 522).

[111] Frauwallner traces the inception of *anuśaya* as a doctrine to the development of the distinctive pairing of *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga* in the *Abhidharmasāra* (Frauwallner 1995: 154). He argues that the concept of *anuśaya* underpins the two new paths of *darśana* and *bhāvanā* and is a reworking of the older canonical concept of *āsrava* (Frauwallner 1995: 155). In the older canon (*Sūtrapiṭaka*) *anuśaya* represents something like 'bad inclination' but in the *Abhidharmasāra* Dharmaśrī reformulates *anuśaya* to have a more flexible meaning (Frauwallner 1995: 155). The new *anuśaya*s are increased in number, now include the five *dṛṣṭayāḥ*, and are assigned as states to be abandoned on the *bhāvanāmārga* and the *darśanamārga*.

[112] This may partly explain the creative etymology used to define the word *anuśaya* as 'subtle' – because it comes from *aṇu*, meaning 'atom'. This definition is offered in the *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and in Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* (Cox 1992: 96 fn 32). The *Mahāvibhāṣa* describes several etymologies for the term *anuśaya*: *aṇu* as atom and *anuśerate* to mean 'adhering closely' and later 'growing'. These were both used to reason that *anuśaya* is intrinsic with thought. But a third etymology was *anubadhnanti* (binding), used 'to refer to those contaminants that are dissociated from thought' (Cox 1992: 71).

[113] *Anuśaya* is identified as the cause of *kleśa* in the AKBh: ***aprahīṇād anuśayād viṣayāt pratyupasthitāt ayoniśo manaskārāt kleśaḥ*** (AKK 5.33; Pradhan 1975: 305, 17-18) 'A *kleśa* arises due to non-abandoning of the *anuśaya*, from the encounter with an object, and from non-thorough focus.'

[114] Nagao notes that in Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā, āśraya* is explained as *ālayavijñāna*, which has the characteristics of *vipāka* (maturation) and *sarvabījaka* (universality of seeds). 'The

Abhidharmakośa means that the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.[115]

In the discourse of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, the terms *āśraya* and *āśaya* are also significant, although *āśaya* is by far the more prominent term.[116] *Anuśaya* appears in a limited context in the PYŚ (and only in relation to the *kleśa*s),[117] but it is possible that *āśaya*, a near-synonym, stands in for it because, as Edgerton states, occurrences of *anuśaya* in Sanskrit are rare, making it 'essentially a Buddhist word'.[118] As in the Buddhist literature, there is also a degree of semantic fuzziness between the terms *āśaya* and *āśraya* in the Buddhist-inflected discourse of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*.[119] In the PYŚ, *āśaya* appears most often in the compound *karmāśaya* and is a term that is conceptually resonant with the Sautrāntika *āśraya* as the 'karmic

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word *ālaya* here has meanings similar to those of *āśraya* […] Thus *ālaya* is a "basis" where the effects (*vipāka*) of all the past are stored and from which the future originates. Accordingly, *ālaya* is *āśraya'* (Nagao 1991: 79).

115 Potter argues that the Sautrāntika use of seed comes first and is elaborated afterwards by the Yogācāra school, who 'retain the agricultural analogy of seeds and sprouts, fleshing out talk of a "dependent" nature in terms of seeds laid down by our awarenesses; a seed, perfumed by the trace created in the awareness which caused it, conditions a subsequent act in the future' (Potter 1996: 61). From recognizing that the seed theory was analogical and by grappling with the many questions that seed theory threw up, the Yogācāras arrived at the idea that there must be a place where the seeds are stored: storehouse-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).

116 *Āśaya* appears four times as frequently as *āśraya* in the PYŚ, around 40 times, usually in the compound *karmāśaya*, but also as *saṃskārāśaya*.

117 In the context of *sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ. duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ* (PYŚ 1.11; 2.6, 2.8). *Rāga* and *dveṣa* are two of the primary *kleśa*s in Brahmanic and Buddhist discourse.

118 Cox notes that *anuśaya* is the word used least frequently for affliction in the Buddhist *sūtra*s (Cox 1992: 96 fn 30). She points to Frauwallner's argument: because *anuśaya* was 'loose in meaning and infrequently used in the *sūtra* […] it became the convenient focus of Abhidharma elaboration' (Cox 1992: 96 fn 30, citing Frauwallner 1971: 75ff).

119 For recent research on the distinctively Buddhist terminology of parts of the PYŚ see Angot 2012, Squarcini 2016, and Wujastyk 2016.

substratum' or 'mental basis'. *Karmāśaya* is the substratum of karmic deposits, and *āśaya* is stated as the cause of *kleśa*:

> *kleśahetukāḥ karmāśayapracaye kṣetrībhūtāḥ kliṣṭāḥ* (PYŚ 1.5) (Maas 2006: 16-17, 4-5)
> The afflicted [*vṛttis*], having *kleśa*s as their cause, are the fields of operation in respect to the accumulation of karmic deposits.[120]

In the way that *āśraya* in the *Abhidharmakośa* indicates the latent ontological basis of mind (*citta*) that gives rise to *kleśa*, *āśaya* in the PYŚ is used to indicate the substratum of mind (*citta*) in which the latent form of *kleśa* dwells and thus the seed of future action. In this respect, Patañjali's text seems to be in dialogue with a proto-Yogācāra notion of *āśraya*[121] that had already been put forward in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (3rd-century CE) as the 'storehouse consciousness' or *ālayavijñāna*.[122] Additionally, like the

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[120] However, another passage describes the causal link as the other way round, from *kleśa* to *āśaya*: *kleśamūlaḥ karmāśayo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭajanmavedanīyaḥ* (PYŚ 2.12) 'Having *kleśa*s as its root, the *karmāsaya* is to be experienced in the present birth as as well as future ones'.

[121] Nagao terms *āśraya* 'one of the most important terms in the Yogācāra Vijñāna-vāda School of Mahāyāna Buddhism ' (Nagao 1991: 75) and suggests the translations of 'basis', 'support', or 'substratum'. The reasons for its importance are its close association with the terms *ālayavijñāna* and *paratantra-svabhāva* as well as its appearance in *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, the reversal of the basis (Nagao 1991: 75). He analyses a cluster of technical uses of the term *āśraya* in Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara*: namely: '(1) substratum, support, (2) basis, (3) seeking shelter, (4) origin, source, (5) agent or subject, in the grammatical sense, (6) physical body, sometimes the six sense organs, (7) the total of (human) existence, (8) *dharma-dhātu* (sphere of dharma), (9) basis of existence (*āśraya*) which is to be turned around (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*)' (Nagao 1991: 75).

[122] In the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, dated to the 4th-5th centuries, *āśraya* is used to stand in for *ālayavijñāna* (Forsten 2006: 56 FN 124). Schmithausen also argues for correspondence between the term *āśraya* and *ālayavijñāna* (Schmithausen 2007) and he defines *ālayavijñāna* thus: 'the container or storehouse of the latent residues or impressions of previous actions (*karman*) and mind process, or […] the basic layer of mind processes or even the very basic constituent of the whole living being' (Schmithausen 1987: 1). That the two concepts are linked is also reflected in the sixth book of the YĀBh, the *Sacittikā Ācittikā Bhūmi*, in which *nirvāṇa* is without remainder of an existential substratum (*nirupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇadhātu*) because the *ālayavijñāna*, the latent consciousness has ceased. In fact, it is important, to acknowledge a distinction between the ways in which the concept of *āśraya* is treated in the AKBh and in the YĀBh. For example, in the AKBh (232, 25) there is reference

Sautrāntikas, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* posits the complete destruction of the substratum as necessary for liberation:

> *tallābhād avidyādayaḥ kleśāḥ samūlakāṣaṃ kaṣitā bhavanti kuśalākuśalāś ca karmāśayāḥ samūlaghātaṃ hatā bhavanti* (PYŚ 4.30; Angot 2012: 723, 1-2)
> From attaining that (*dharmamegha*), the *kleśa*s of *avidyā* etc. are cut by root and branch and the karmic deposits, good and bad, are destroyed utterly.[123]

It is not only *āśaya* that is discussed in the PYŚ but also *āśraya*, which denotes 'basis' in relation to the karmic 'trace' or *vāsanā*. *Vāsanā* is a 'subtle effect', 'trace' or 'perfuming' within the substratum, and is also a key term in the PYŚ, particularly in the fourth *pāda*:[124]

> *manas tu sādhikāram āśrayo vāsanānām / na hy avasitādhikāre manasi nirāśrayā vāsanāḥ sthātum utsahante* (PYŚ 4. 11; Angot 2012: 687, 6-7)
> On the other hand, a mind with its activity is the substratum (*āśraya*) of traces (*vāsanā*s). For in a mind whose activity has come to an end, the traces, having no basis [*nirāśraya*], cannot remain.

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to an individual who attains abandonment without remainder in the *darśanamārga*: *darśanamārga-vyutthitasyāśeṣa-darśana-prahātavyaprahāṇāt / pratyagrāśraya-parivṛtti-nirmalā saṃtatir* (AKBh 4.56; Pradhan 1975: 232). The *darśanamārga* is the way of intuiting the truths, and the transformation that occurs brings about a new version of consciousness that is pure via the reversal/transformation of the *āśraya*, the existential basis. The process of liberation is when the *kleśa*s have been totally eliminated in both the *darśanamārga* and the *bhāvanāmārga* and when the *kleśa*s cannot rearise: *āśrayo hi sa āryāṇām darśanabhāvanā-mārgāsāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyāṇāṃ kleśānāṃ praroha-samartho bhavati / ato 'gnidagdhavrīhivadavījībhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ityucyate* (AKBh 2.36; Pradhan 1975: 63).

[123] See also, for example: ***tatra dhyānajam anāśayam***. 'For those [minds with powers] that are born of *dhyāna* are without *āśaya*' (YS 4.6). And the statement that, along with absence of *kleśa*, *karma*, and *vipāka*, absence of *āśaya* is a condition of *īśvara*: ***kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ*** (YS 1.24).

[124] Whereas *karmāśaya* is the seedbed that fructifies in this lifetime, *vāsanā*s are more subtle traces of karmic action that will fructify at an unknown point in the future (PYŚ 2.13).

Again, this reinforces that, in concord with the Sautrāntikas, Pātañjala yoga entails the elimination of the basis (*āśraya*).[125] While the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* focuses on the seed (*bīja*) and its power (*sāmarthya*) to account for karma, the predominant images of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* are the basis (*āśraya)*[126] and the trace, *vāsanā* (Park 2014: 377).[127] Thus Patañjali's discourse appears to be aware not only of the core *bīja* metaphor of the AKBh but also of the predominant *vāsanā* metaphor of the YĀBh[128] and with the *anuśaya-āśaya-āśraya* semantic continuum of both Buddhist texts.[129]

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[125] As with other key soteriological terms, *āśraya* is not found to have the same technical meaning in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Rather it appears in a general sense to denote support, but in a metaphysical context: as a function of the *guṇa*s (SKK 12); the unmanifest (*avyaktam*) is a support of the *guṇa*s (SKK 16); the specific is a support of the liṅga (SKK 42); or the support/abode of *prakṛti* (SKK 62). This is a quite specific and consistent use of *āśraya* in a metaphysical sense, and different to *āśraya* as a physical or psychological function in the PYŚ, which is much more aligned to Buddhist denotation of this term.

[126] It is important to note that the *āśraya* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* for example, is not just psychological but also an aspect of the real in that it forms part of the twfold *vastu* theory: 'One is that of entity which exists objectively but is incorrectly reflected in or distorted by our ordinary linguistic conventions or designations (*prajñapti*). The other is the objective basis (*āśraya*) which remains (*avaśiṣṭa*) after all conceptual constructions have been eliminated' (Deleanu 2006: 218). In this second sense, *vastu* is a synonym of 'suchness' or *tathatā*.

[127] Nonetheless, *vāsanā* is not absent from the AKBh, and Waldron points outs the ways in which *vāsanā* (perfuming or after-effect) and *bhāvanā* come to be closely related in the AKBh so that *bhāvanā* in relation to the mind can also mean 'infusing' or 'steeping' (Waldron 2003: 213 fn 103). When *bhāvanā* is used in connection to *vāsanā* as the after-effect, it is being used within a theory of causality.

[128] Later Yogācāra further develops the notion of the seed in relation to karma to differentiate between inner seeds (personal conditioning) and outer seeds (external influences), as well as debating the relationship of *bīja* to *vāsanā* (perfuming) (Lusthaus 2015).

[129] Yamabe argues that there is a specific technical context to *bīja* and *āśraya* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* – i.e. it has a different ontological function. He views it as equivalent to *prakṛti*, *gotra* and *dhātu* (Yamabe 2017a). Yamabe argues that the development of *bīja* theory in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* has two distinct phases: an earlier traditional model in

2.5 Divergent Jain metaphors: resin, ladder, door

The metaphorical overlaps of the Sautrāntika and yoga discourses are not merely generic but rather are specific. To underline this point, it is worth highlighting that in the same period the Jains display a different metaphoric treatment of the *kleśa*s in relation to liberation. Patañjali and the Sautrāntikas envisaged the afflictions (*kleśa*s) as functioning like seeds that grow, but Umasvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*, a 4th-5th-century treatise on Jain soteriology, also has a theory of the 'passions', *kaṣāya*. In classical Jainism, there are four varieties of *kaṣāya*: anger, pride, deceit, and greed (*krodha*, *māna*, *māyā*, and *lobha*, TvS 8.10) (Zyndenbos 1983: 14) – closely mirroring the primary *kleśa*s of Brahmanic yoga and Buddhism. *Kaṣāya* is usually translated by Jain scholars as the 'passions', but it literally means 'resin'. Thus, the source domain of the Jain passions is not that of 'seed in a field', but rather of a sticky plant resin that entraps.[130] Zyndenbos elucidates that the term *kaṣāya* is utilized metaphorically to mean 'that by which karma is stuck to the soul' (Zyndenbos 1983: 15). *Kaṣāya* is primarily associated with *moha* or delusion, which is a kind of 'master-karma' that binds other karmas (Zyndenbos 1983: 15).[131] One is reminded here of the 'master role' of *avidyā*, or ignorance, in Pātañjala yoga and Buddhism as the *kṣetra* (field) of all others. The *kaṣāya* combines with 'yoga' (the attracting capacity of the soul)

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which *bīja* is synonymous with *dhātu* (element) and *gotra* (spiritual disposition) and a later model in which *bīja* is equal to *āśraya*, which he describes as a 'distinct state of the totality of one's existence' (Yamabe 2018). Along with Kritzer, Yamabe views the Sautrāntika model of the seed as a concealed reworking of the Yogācāra model. He also makes a distinction between the seed/sprout metaphor, which illustrates successive causality theory, and two other metaphors that illustrate simultaneous causality, namely the flame and wick and the bundle of reeds (Yamabe 2017b: 11).

[130] More specifically, the *kaṣāya*s operate in relation to karma, which is understood as a very subtle form of matter. The actions of body, speech, and mind attract this karma to the soul and the *kaṣāya*s act as active bonding agents to make karma 'stick' (Wiley 2002: 90). Different types of *karman* give rise to different effects: thus *āyus-karman*s determine lifespan while *nāma-karman*s determine the formation of the body (Wiley 2002: 90).

[131] *Mohanīya-karman*s create false views of reality (*mithyātva*) and produce the four *kaṣāya*s (Wiley 2002: 90).

to produce karmic influxes (*āsrava*), and these produce a state of *saṃsāra*, or spiritual bondage (Zyndenbos 1983: 15). This metaphorical mapping of the domain of 'resin' and its quality of 'stickiness' to explain the workings of the passions is quite different to the seed domain that we have examined.

In relation to *dhyāna*, the Jain theory of liberation also contains metaphors of vision and ascendancy via a ladder. There are obscuring *karman*s, *āvaraṇīya-karman*s, that are associated with the sense organs, and which are explained as factors that obstruct the vision of *dhyāna*. The Jain canon[132] classifies *dhyāna* itself as a ladder to liberation: there are four types (*ārta dhyāna, raudra dhyāna, dharma dhyāna*, and *śukla dhyāna*), which are each further divided into four to create 16 steps.[133] The twelfth step of *guṇa-sthāna* on this 'ladder' is *kṣīna-kaṣāya* – the destruction of the passions.[134] Beyond the *kaśaya*s, there are other metaphors of liberation in Jainism such as liberation as a doorway. This image is found in the *Aṇuogaddārāiṃ*, a Prakrit text from circa 4th-century, which conceptualizes liberation as attained by scriptural knowledge, *śrūtajñāna* (Petrocchi 2016: 236). As the title of the work indicates, its purpose is to elucidate the doors of investigation (*aṇuyoga* in Sanskrit) (Petrocchi 2016: 237).[135] This metaphor of liberation – going through a door that takes you to a better place – is one that we do not, for example, encounter in our yoga schemes and much less

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[132] For example, see *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* i.2.26-28, ii.2.29, i.6.17, *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* i.9.512, 520; *Bhagavati Sūtra* 25.8.802; *Thāṇaṃga Sūtra* 4.1.308.

[133] In the progressive formula of the four *dhyānas*, only the last two steps of *śukla dhyāna*, or pure meditation, (i.e. steps 15 and 16), can lead to *mokṣa* because they constitute *tapas*, which in Jainism is privileged over *dhyāna* as the means to attain liberation. The 16 steps are resonant of the 16 moments of consciousness in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma path scheme.

[134] Incidentally, this ladder scheme of upward ascension affirms the metaphorical direction of liberation as 'up' (See Chapter 1.1.6 of this study).

[135] There are four 'doors', respectively: initial study, assignment by name, exposition, exposition from specific standpoints (Petrocchi 2016: 237).

prominently in Buddhist soteriology.[136] The divergence of Jain soteriological metaphors in this period strengthens the argument of proximal development between Pātañjala yoga and Sautrāntika.

Overall, the Sautrāntika and the Pātañjala discourses of liberation share the following structural components:

1. a disjunction of *citta* from the *kleśa*s
2. cessation due to analysis/discriminative reflection (*pratisaṃkhyā* or *prasaṃkhyāna*)
3. cessation of the latent form of *kleśa* (the dormant seed)
4. the transformative function of and eventual abandonment of *prajñā*
5. the permanence of disjunction and cessation from the *kleśa*s
6. the disappearance of the mental basis, or substratum, when the afflictions are eliminated
7. the centrality of the image of the seed, and its power, to understanding *kleśa* and *karma*
8. access to an unconditioned and liberated state (*nirvāṇa* or *kaivalya*)

In particular the metaphor of the seed rests on the mapping of a specific set of key technical qualities from the domain of agriculture, which I have argued pertain to rice-cultivation specifically (see Chapter 1):

1. *kleśa*s are self-germinating (self-propelling) and so contain their own seeds
2. dormant seeds, which are *kleśa*s in latent form, are dangerous
3. the way to eliminate the seed is to destroy its potential by scorching it[137]

It would, of course, be reductive to claim that the soteriological systems presented in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* are

[136] Buddhism conveys the metaphor of the doors of liberation, but this is not schematized in the same way that botanical cultivation is as the framework for an elaborate soteriology, e.g : *anāsravās tv ete trayaḥ samādhayas trīṇi vimokṣamukhāny ucyante | śūnyatā vimokṣamukham apraṇihitam ānimittaṃvimokṣamukham iti | mokṣadvāratvāt* (AKBh 450.7–8). 'But these untainted concentrations are called the three entrances to liberation: emptiness is an entrance to liberation, as are the wishless, and the signless, because of their being doors to liberation.'

[137] Another way to destroy the *kleśa* is to cut its roots completely.

identical because, clearly, they are not. There are profound differences in the philosophy and orientation of the two texts.[138] Neither am I claiming to be able to identify a definitive direction of influence in the dialogic resonance, although my suggestion is that Patañjali's text is picking up on the Sautrāntika discourse. The redactor Patañjali was, it seems, deeply engaged with the notion of *kleśanirodha*, destruction of the *kleśa*s via analysis, a distinctly Buddhist approach to liberation. We should be in no doubt as to the unique elaboration of the role of *kleśa*s within Buddhist Abhidharma soteriology.[139] In comparison, there is no such developed theory of *kleśa* and its seed in the classical Brahmanic sources on yoga. It is thus time to shine a spotlight on Patañjali's path of *kriyā yoga* with its theory of *kleśabīja* – which has been overshadowed historically by disproportionate scholarly, religious, and popular emphasis on the *āṣṭāṅga* path structure – and to highlight its centrality to liberation as well as its integral relationship to Buddhist discourse.

2.6 Debate, doctrine, and dialogue

In order to understand how such conceptual sharing might have occurred, it is necessary to paint a picture of the context of debate in the early common era. This section considers the shared culture of debate at the time of production of our texts: an intellectual milieu in which interaction between different schools of thought took place explicitly through refutation. Explicit debates show that the seed metaphor conveys not only karma retribution

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[138] A notable divergence, for example, between the Buddhist discourse of *kleśa*s is that of *upakleśa*, or secondary affliction, a notion that is absent from Pātañjala yoga. The *upakleśa*s stand in distinction to the *mūlakleśa*s (root or primary *kleśa*s) and are variously schematised as 10, 16, or 20 in number according to different schools.

[139] As Lopez notes, the Buddhist scholastic sees 'the very function of the path as the destruction of the *kleśas* and the prevention of their recurrence' (Lopez 2000: 182). Cox argues: 'abandoning defilements is indeed the goal of Abhidharma religious praxis and the organizing principle of its construction of the path' (Cox 1992: 66). Furthermore, within Buddhism, it is Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma that develops the taxonomic classification of *kleśa*s to 'an apex' (Cox 1992: 74).

mechanisms, but also wider technical debates about ontology and causality in relation to karma.

We cannot underestimate the significance of the role of debate in the transmission of ideas between schools of thought in the classical period. As Gombrich reminds us, the Buddha's teachings began in an atmosphere of debate in which the Buddha was necessarily winning over converts from Brahmanism using the 'skilful means' of argument (Gombrich 1996: 1-26). In this respect, debate is built in to Buddhism. In the early centuries of the 1st millennium CE, there was also the broader formal context of philosophical debates at the royal courts (Bronkhorst 2006: 303).[140] The biographical sources[141] claim that Vasubandhu partook in such debates. From these accounts Anacker draws a picture of the intellectuals with whom Vasubandhu may have interacted, citing as possible contemporaries the poet Kālidāsa, the lexicographer Amarasiṃha, and the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Śabara (Anacker 1984: 11). The stakes of philosophical debates were sometimes high, with material consequences such as punishments, beatings, and even death (Anacker 1984: 20). Although debates were initially organized at court where participants from different schools were obliged by the king to engage with each other institutionally, this approach was then embedded in the intellectual milieu so that it became commonplace to critically refine one's own position by engaging with opponents' positions (Bronkhorst 2006: 303).[142]

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[140] Bronkhorst proposes that the whole custom of debate may have been imported by the Bactrian Greeks when they ruled (Bronkhorst 2006: 303). This view has been recently challenged by Pollock, who dismisses the importance of identifying who was the first to develop the art of rational discussion (Pollock 2015).

[141] It is difficult to decipher which of these sources, starting with Paramārtha's 6th-century biography of Vasubandhu, may be hagiographical and therefore not reliable, but they certainly provide a sense of the issues at stake within the debating communities.

[142] It was the [Mūla]Sarvāstivādins who abandoned their Middle Indic vernaculars to take on Sanskrit as their official language (Eltschinger 2017: 310). This was undertaken as part of an attempt to co-opt and disrupt the Brahmins' claims to have a 'monopoly on

If oral debate was an inherent part of intellectual life in the first centuries of the CE, it also filtered into the literary apparatus of the written tradition, albeit less dynamically. The voluminous Sarvāstivāda *Mahāvibhāṣā*, which forms one basis for Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, is itself a systematic record of the debates that occurred in a conference called by the Emperor Kaniṣka c. 1st-2nd century CE (Anacker 1984: 12). Those whose views are quoted include Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Anacker notes: '[t]his tremendous work often reads like a committee report, with widely varying opinions being offered' (Anacker 1984: 12). The *Mahāvibhāṣā* shows acquaintance with Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya, as does Aśvaghoṣa's 2nd-century *Buddhacārita* (Bronkhorst 2006: 290).[143] Vasubandhu refutes both the Sāṃkhyas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas at various points in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*[144] and, most famously, in his *Paramārthasaptati.*[145] The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* closes by claiming that it is a distillation of the key points of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* without the consideration of opponents' views (SKK 72), indicating that these views were explored in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra.* The written *sūtra* format, as Tubbs and Bose remind us, is essentially a remnant from oral presentation structured via logical argumentation, a 'series of signposts in an oral argument' (Tubbs and Bose, 2007: 1). In short, argumentative pluralism is built in to the philosophical texts of the early 1st millennium CE in India and as Pollock states: 'The classicity of Indian philosophy lies precisely in the development of reasoned

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conceptually and formally well-formed language and eloquence' in order that Buddhists might demonstrate 'self-authorisation, didactic skills and superiority in debate' (Eltschinger 2017: 310).

[143] Anacker points out that *asaṃprajñāta samādhi* (non-cognitive *samādhi*), the highest attainment of *samādhi* in the PYŚ, is conventionally accepted by Buddhist authors as a meditative attainment of non-Buddhist schools (Anacker 1984: 70).

[144] E.g. a refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhyas in Chapter 9 of the AKBh 'The Refutation of a Theory of the Self' (Duerlinger 2003).

[145] This text is not extant in Sanskrit. It rebuts the Sāṃkhyas after the Sāmkhya Vindhyavāsin previously won a debate with Buddhamitra. Indeed, the *Paramārthasaptati* is a refutation in 70 verses of the 70 verses of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

argument in the face of wholesale conceptual assaults' (Pollock 2015). The three texts that I examine – the PYŚ, the YĀBH, and the AKBh – were produced within and against this backdrop of formal debate.

The degree to which intellectual identities, such as philosophical standpoints, were strictly tied to religious identities is not always clear. Nicholson has argued that the traditional divisions between *āstika* and *nāstika* is better framed doctrinally as 'affirmer' and 'denier' rather than 'orthodox' and 'heterodox' schools (Nicholson 2010: 176-179). In his view, such school divisions were a medieval doxographic invention that did not necessarily reflect complex doctrinal identities and self-perception in the classical period. Altlhough scholars retrospectively label the classical logicians as 'Buddhist logicians' or 'Nyāya logicians' they may have just viewed themselves as simply 'logicians'. If we regard yoga as a philosophical training, as well as a soteriological one, then the same may have been true of yoga. Perhaps in some respects a yoga philosopher was simply a philosopher, and not necessarily a Brahmin or Buddhist philosopher.[146] On the other hand, the following polemical attack from the YĀBh suggests clear sectarian identities for yoga in a soteriological context. In the commentarial section of the YĀBh, the eighth chapter of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*[147]

[146] That yoga and yogācāra are blended categories is further reflected in typical polemical references to the 'non-attainer'. For example, Buddhist texts often illustrate the unsurpassability of the Buddhist path by measuring it against the limited surpassibility of the non-Buddhist paths. Thus, ironically, the Buddhist path can only be measured by considering the non-Buddhist path and is somehow in direct relationship with that non-Buddhist path (success is inconceivable without a measurable yardstick of failure). For example, Saṅghrakṣa's **Yogācārabhūmi* devotes a whole section to how the non-Buddhists perform the breathing techniques of *śamatha* (Demiéville 1951: 416-417).

[147] The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is an independent work that is quoted in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the YĀBh and is dated to the 3rd century CE (Powers 1993: 4; Schmithausen 2007). The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is often viewed as the first Yogācāra work to outline the key philosophical concepts of the school.

contains detail on yoga practice,[148] as well as a polemic against other ascetics who practice yoga. This is the dialogue between the Buddha and the bodhisattva Maitreya:

> Then, on this occasion, the Lord made these statements: 'This exposition on Dharma and on Yoga, which is without fault, is for the higher good. Those who lean on the Dharma and who practice Yoga vigorously obtain enlightenment.
> Those who, in their own interest, reject Yoga and who, for the sake of liberation, scrutinize the Dharma, are as far from Yoga as the sky is from the earth. […]
> For this reason, abandon refutation and idle debate, and increase your energy. In order to liberate gods and humans, devote yourself to Yoga' (SNS 8: 40).[149]

This passage demonstrates that yoga was claimed by individual religions such as Buddhism, was doctrinally affiliated, and was understood as a branch of the Buddha's *dharma*, or teaching. To underline this point, the chapter closes:

> Then the bodhisattva Maitreya said to the Lord: 'Lord in this sermon of the Saṃdhinirmocana, what does one call this teaching? How it is apprehended?'
> The Lord responded: 'Maitreya: this is 'The teaching of the explicit meaning of yoga' (SNS 8.41).[150]

Such statements highlight that the YĀBh was as concerned with transmitting knowledge and systems of yoga as the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. It also highlights

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[148] The chapter describes how to develop *śamatha* (tranquility) and *vipaśyana* (insight), the two bases of Buddhist meditation.

[149] From Lamotte's French translation of the Tibetan: 'Alors, en cette occasion, le Seigneur dit ces stances: L'exposé du Dharma et le Yoga sans négligence sont un grand bien. Ceux qui s'appuient sur le Dharma et qui pratiquent énergiquement le Yoga obtiennent l'Illumination. Ceux qui, en vue de leur intérêt, rejettent le Yoga et qui, pour leur délivrance, scrutent le Dharma, s'écartent du Yoga comme le firmament s'écarte de la terre. […] C'est pourquoi, abandonnant toute querelle et toute parole oiseuse, stimule ton énergie. Pour sauver les dieux et les hommes, consacre-toi au Yoga' (SNS 8: 40; Lamotte 1935: 235).

[150] 'Alors le bodhisattva Maitreya dit au Seigneur: Seigneur dans cette prédication de Saṃdhinirmocana, comment appeler cet enseignement? Comment faut-il le prendre? Le Seigneur répondit: Maitreya, c'est l' "Enseignement de sens explicite sur le Yoga"' (SNS 8.41; trans. from Tibetan, Lamotte 1935: 236).

how the YĀBh sets itself up as *the* authoritative exposition on yoga discipline.

Similarly, the PYŚ contains a polemic against a Mahāyāna doctrine referred to as *cittamātra*, or mind-only.[151] The *sūtra*s in question are generally understood to be PYŚ 4.14-23.[152] These *sūtra*s address the relationship between *citta* and the external object, entailing a refutation of a Buddhist position.[153] In my view, the *bhāṣya* to *Yogasūtra* 4.23 leaves little doubt that it is a specific polemic against the yogācāra doctrine and refers to an author such as Vasubandhu or Asaṅga. The Yogācāra philosophical position was referred to by different names *vijñānavāda* (consciousness doctrine), *vijñaptimatratā* ([the doctrine that] there is nothing but representation) and *cittamātratā* ([the doctrine that] there is nothing but mind). The first exposition of the doctrine of *vijñapti* or *cittamātra*[154] is commonly traced to Vasubandhu's works: *Vimśatikāvijñaptimatratāsiddhi*, *Triṃśikāvijnaptimatratā[siddhi]kārikā* and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*. However, Vasubandhu did not coin the terms *vijñapti* and *cittamātra*. Asaṅga also uses

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[151] Notably, Burley mounts an attack on the theory that these *sūtra*s engage with Buddhist ideas in any way: this section of the fourth *pāda* 'exhibits no signs of being directed against Yogācāra or any other form of Buddhism' (Burley 2007: 82). He posits that this attribution of anti-Yogācāra polemicism is merely a mistaken view of the subsequent commentators perpetuated over time and that the passage is entirely concordant with the internal 'non-realist' position of the *Yogasūtra* itself.

[152] For example, Woods (Woods 1914) identifies the polemical section as YS 4.14-23 and Burley (Burley 2007) as YS 4.14-22.

[153] There is another, complex discussion of *cittamātra* at PYŚ 4.10, which I do not have space to unpack here. *vṛttir evāsya vibhunaś cittasya saṃkocavikāsinīty ācāryaḥ. tac ca dharmādinimittāpekṣam. nimittaṃ ca dvividham --- bāhyam ādhyātmikaṃ ca. śarīrādisādhanāpekṣaṃ bāhyaṃ stutidānābhivādanādi, cittamātrādhīnaṃ śrāddhādy adhyātmikam. tathā coktam --- ye caite maitryādayo dhyāyināṃ vihārās te bāhyasādhananiranugrahātmānaḥ prakṛṣṭaṃ dharmam abhinirvartayanti. tayor mānasaṃ balīyaḥ* (PYŚ 4.10). Here, *cittamātrādhīnam* means dependent on the mind only and *śrāddhādi* refers to the five qualities listed at PYŚ 1.20, *śrāddha*, *vīrya*, etc.

[154] In the early yogācāra context, *cittamātra* and *vijñaptimātra* were near synonyms (Willis 1979: 33).

the term *cittamātra* in association with the theory of eight consciousnesses set forth in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* portion of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, as well as in his works the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*.[155] Indeed, the earliest use of the phrase '*cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*' occurs in a Sanskrit text no longer extant but which was translated into Chinese in 179 CE, the **Bhadrapālasūtra* (Schmithausen 1973: 246-247).[156] This phrase subsequently appeared in both the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (Rahder 1926: 49, 74)[157] and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (Lamotte 1935: 90-91).[158] Given the specificity of *cittamātra* as a label associated with early yogācāra, it is reasonable to assert that Patañjali is refuting this school when he says that those who believe that this world is mind-only (*cittamātra*) are pitiable in their delusion.[159]

2.6.1 Larson's 'old problem': Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism

When examining the debates between Pātañjala yoga and the contemporaneous schools of Buddhism, any investigation must necessarily include the philosophical school of Sāṃkhya[160] to which the PYŚ purports to adhere. Although many scholars have discussed the possible relationships

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[155] For background on the term *cittamātra* see, Wayman 1965, Rahula 1972 and Willis 1979: 20-36.

[156] In the **Bhadrapālasūtra*, the visualization of the Buddha face-to-face indicates that the Buddha is nothing but mind (*cittam eva*).

[157] In the *Daśabhūmikasūtra: cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidātukam* (Rahder 1926: 49). Schmithausen points out that the same phrase occurs in the *Lokottara-parivarta* in the 'Buddhāvataṃsaka' (Schmithausen 2009: 141). The *Lokottara-parivarta* is a component of the *Avataṃsakasūtra* of which the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* is also a chapter.

[158] Willis asserts that a proper understanding of the doctrine of *cittamātra* should also include the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Willis 1979: 26).

[159] *tad anena cittasārūpyeṇa bhrāntāḥ ke cit tad eva cetanam ity āhuḥ / apare cittamātram evedaṃ sarvaṃ nāsti khalv ayaṃ gavādir ghaṭādiś ca sakāraṇo loka iti. anukampanīyās te / kasmāt / asti hi teṣāṃ bhrāntibījaṃ sarvarūpākāranirbhāsaṃ cittam iti* (PYŚ 4.23; Angot 2012: 712).

[160] For a history of Sāṃkhya, see Larson 1969: 75-153 and Larson and Bhattacharya1987: 3-42.

between Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, such studies can be supplemented and extended by further specific textual analysis. The arguments vary. Warder asks whether Sāṃkhya evolved not from the Vedic and Brahmanic traditions as largely supposed, but rather from within the non-Vedic *śramaṇa* tradition (Warder 2000: 32-34). This view is echoed by Bronkhorst, who adds Vaiśeṣika to the mix; he believes that because systematic thinking began in Sarvāstivāda Buddhism (Bronkhorst 2006: 290), philosophical systems such as Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika were closer to Buddhism than Vedic religion (Bronkhorst 2013: 360). In particular, Bronkhorst views Vaiśeṣika as influenced by Sarvāstivāda ontology, and Sāṃkhya as influenced by the culture of Greater Magadha. Other scholars argue for an opposite direction of influence, i.e. that Buddhism may have evolved from Sāṃkhya (Garbe 1896: 12; Keith 1918: 20-28; Jacobsen 2008: 10).[161] Chakravarti, too, argues that the Vaibhāṣikas (the orthodox Sarvāstivādins) 'were more or less influenced by Sāṃkhya' in their ontology and speculates that 'the influence of Sāṃkhya upon the Abhidharma literature was brought about by scholars who had been previously adherents of Sāṃkhya' (Chakravarti 1975: 99 fn 2). Chakravarti, then, posits an influx of Sāṃkhya scholars into Abhidharma at some point in time. Whatever the truth of these claims, we can certainly agree that ontological taxonomy is central to both Sāṃkhya, with its scheme of the *tattva*s, and Abhidharma Buddhism, with its complex classifications of the *dharma*s.[162] Yet, as Bronkhorst emphasizes, something does not quite add up about the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* in relation to the textual impressions left by its predecessors in the school of thought.

> Various early authors – most notable among them Bhartṛhari, Dharmapāla, and Mallavādin – attribute to Sāṃkhya a position which differs from the one which finds expression in the surviving Sāṃkhya works. According to them, Sāṃkhya looked upon substances as being

[161] Johnston makes the contrary argument by pointing out that suffering only comes to the fore in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, whereas it is there from the beginning of Buddhism (Johnston 1974; 1937: 21-24). However, this argument does not stand up given that we have hardly any evidence for Sāṃkhya thought before the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

[162] For more on categorization and ontology in Indian philosophy, see Frazier 2014.

collections of qualities (Bronkhorst 2006: 288).[163]

It is clear that Sāṃkhya itself was in transition during, or just before, the period of the composition of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Bronkhorst argues that systematic Sāṃkhya underwent 'important changes' during the 2nd-4th centuries CE, which he terms the 'preclassical' period (Bronkhorst 2006: 288). Given that this transition overlaps with the window of time during which the *Pātāñjalayogaśāstra* was compiled, it makes it increasingly problematic to state that the PYŚ is a Sāṃkhya text, when we cannot be sure where Sāṃkhya itself stood at this point in time.

Larson's 1989 essay 'An Old Problem Revisited: the Relation Between Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Buddhism' still provides a rigorous investigation of the intellectual identity of the author of the *Yogasūtra* and its *bhāṣya*. In assessing the relationship between Sāṃkhya and Buddhist philosophy in the 4th-5th centuries, this present study must also revisit Larson's 'old problem'.[164] Although the first surviving work of Sāṃkhya is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, produced in the 4th century CE, Larson believes that the lost *Ṣaṣṭitantra*[165] was the first systematic presentation of Sāṃkhya philosophy.[166] In speculating about the authorship of this lost treatise, he

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[163] To expand this point: The 'collection of qualities' seems to have existed in accounts of the *tattva*s in pre-classical Sāṃkhya and the classical five subtle elements (*tanmātra*s) 'which in classical Sāṃkhya would seem to make up for the five qualities of preclassical Sāṃkhya and may have undergone a major change in the way they were conceptualized, from atomic to omnipresent' (Bronkhorst 2006: 288).

[164] Larson has added detail to this piece of research in the comprehensive *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* volume on yoga (Larson and Bhattacharya 2008), although the core arguments are the same. I will draw on both publications to reproduce his argument.

[165] Frauwallner tried to reconstitute passages from the lost *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya from citations in other works, especially the 6th-7th century *Yuktidīpika*, a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (Frauwallner 1958). See Steinkellner 1999 for an update of Frauwallner's work.

[166] The title *Ṣaṣṭitantra* refers to the 60 categories, or *padārtha*s, outlined in this branch of Sāṃkhya. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's classical *Sāṃkhyakārikā* purports to be a summary of this lost work.

alights on Vārṣagaṇya as the most probable agent (Larson 1989: 133).[167] Thus the Sāṃkhya work of Vārṣagaṇya around the 2nd century CE would have roughly coincided with the commentarial output of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Larson 1989: 133). The parallel that Larson draws between Sāṃkhya and Abhidharma is not in terms of doctrine but rather the structural tendency towards systematic enumeration.[168] Larson identifies three main strands of thought within the *Yogasūtra*: '(1) one or more Sāṃkhya traditions, (2) one or more Buddhist traditions, (3) an emerging philosophical Yoga tradition that is compiling various older ascetic and religious strands of speculation' (Larson and Bhattacharya 2008: 43-44). He concludes:

> the *Yogasūtra* is heavily dependent upon Buddhism and probably via the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika formulations as set forth in [the AKBh] (Larson 1989: 133-134).

Larson and Bhattacharya identified the following as the specifically Buddhist strands of the PYŚ: the philosophy of *nirodha-samādhi* with a focus on meditation and altered states of awareness; the principle means of knowing as *pratyakṣa* or perception; a pluralist ontology; a naïve realist epistemology (like Sarvāstivāda) or representationist epistemology (like Sautrāntika and later Yogācāra); and a rejection of any notion of substantive transcendence, unlike Sāṃkhya (Larson and Bhattacharya 2008: 44). Larson extrapolates that because the terms of *ṣaṣtitantra* are largely absent from the *Yogaśūtra*, while many more terms from Abhidharma Buddhism appear, 'there were two streams of early systematic philosophizing in India, namely Ṣaṣtitantra of Sāṃkhya and the Abhidharma of Sarvastivāda and Sautrāntika' (Larson 1989: 134). He names the two streams of soteriological thought in this period as the *vijñāna* (knowledge-based) philosophy of Sāṃkhya and the *nirodha-samādhi* (cessative concentration) philosophy of Abhidharma

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A different presentation of the content of the *Ṣaṣtitantra* appears in the medieval *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā*.

[167] The other candidates whom he rules out are Kapila and Pañcaśikha (Larson 1989: 132).

[168] Larson cites Garbe's earlier characterization of this as 'pedantic enumerations' (Larson 1989: 133).

(Larson 1989: 136).[169] In sum, the foundational work of Sāṃkhya (the lost *Ṣaṣtitantra*) was produced in the heyday of Abhidharma commentarial output in the 2nd century and appears to share some philosophical features.

Larson uses the historical records of debates to explain why an apparently Brahmanical work, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, contains so many Buddhist terms. According to Larson's hypothesis, Vindhyavāsin was the real 'author' of the *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, which somehow became mistakenly attributed to the grammarian Patañjali and re-named as the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* (Larson 1989: 135). Larson thus identified three different interpreters of the Sāṃkhya *ṣaṣtitantra* tradition: Vārṣagaṇya as the author of the lost *Ṣaṣtitantra*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa as author of the later *Sāṃkhykārikā*, and Vindhyavāsin (of whom no proven works are extant), who innovated around Sāṃkhya philosophy in dialogue with the Buddhists and possibly wrote the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* (Larson 1989: 134).[170] Regarding the debates that occurred, this is how Larson sets up the order of events (Larson 2008: 41-42):

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[169] Like Larson, Bronkhorst argues for two strands of thought in the early centuries CE, naming them as two epistemes: one is atomistic and the second is onto-linguistic. The first episteme, atomism, was imposed on Buddhism by the Sarvāstivāda school and 'is characterized by the belief that reality is thoroughly atomistic. Not only does the material world consist of identifiable ultimate constituents; also processes, which by their nature extend over stretches of time, can be analyzed into successions of momentary occurrences' (Bronkhorst 2006: 291). Thus anything in the world can be reduced to these constituents and also the nature of the causal relationship between them is unidirectional so that 'earlier momentary occurrences determine the immediately following ones' (Bronkhorst 2006: 291). The second episteme, which succeeds and more or less replaces the first (with some overlaps), is 'the conviction of a close and inseparable connection between language and reality' (Bronkhorst 2006: 291).

[170] Larson places these three figures in date order of Vārṣagaṇya in the 2nd-3rd centuries CE, Vindhyavāsin in the late 4th century and Īśvarakṛṣṇa 'as a younger contemporary of Vindhyavāsin' (Larson 1989: 135). Vindhyavāsin composed the *Ṣaṣṭitantravṛtti*, of which only fragments survive in other works (Larson 2012: 74).

1. In the 1st-2nd century CE, Vārṣaganya creates the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, based on an older version of this text.[171]
2. Sometime in the 4th century CE (300-350), Īśvarakṛṣna creates the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, which purports to be a summary of the views of Vārṣagaṇya.
3. Vindhyavāsin, a Sāṃkhya teacher and follower of Vārṣaganya, becomes involved in a bitter debate with the Buddhist Buddhamitra, one of the teachers of Vasubandhu. Vindhyavāsin wins and receives a prize from the king.[172]
4. Vasubandhu is enraged that his teacher lost the debate and launches a successful attack on Sāṃkhya in the form of an oral debate and a subsequent treatise, the *Paramārthasaptati.*[173]
5. Vindhyavāsin then revises Sāṃkhya to address Buddhist ideas and to defend it against new attacks. He not only influences the redactor of the *Yogasūtra*, but also creates the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* (the *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*) to systematize and update yoga philosophy while also incorporating popular Buddhist language and ideas (Larson and Bhattacharya 2008: 39).

In short, Larson postulates that the *Yogasūtra* and its *bhāṣya* emerged from a dialogue between the Sāṃkhya thinker Vindhyavāsin and the Buddhist Vasubandhu. It was Vindhyavāsin who was responsible for the radical philosophical hybridity of the PYŚ and not Patañjali, who was merely a textual compiler in the shadows.[174] At the end of his article, Larson points

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[171] Larson draws on the *Yuktidīpika* to reconstruct the positions of Vārṣagaṇya or his followers and speculates, along with Chakravarthi (Chakravarti 1975), that the positions attributed to Pañcaśikha in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* should in fact be credited to Vārṣagaṇya. From one example of misattribution, Larson extrapolates that all of the long quotations attributed to Pañcaśikha were actually from Vārṣagaṇya.

[172] Both the *Yuktidīpikā*, the earliest commentary on the *Sāṃkhykārikā*, and the Chinese tradition confirm that there was a debate between Vindhyavāsin and Buddhamitra, a teacher of Vasubandhu (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 141; Larson 1989: 134-135).

[173] The king was Chandragupta the Second at Ayodhyā who gave Vasbubandhu 300,000 pieces of gold (Anacker 1984: 21).

[174] Vindhyavāsin 'conflates' the two types of philosophy to create '*vijñāna*-cum-*nirodha-samādhi* philosophy' which creates 'the hybrid classical yoga philosophy' (Larson 1989: 136).

towards the need for further understanding of the triadic relationship between yoga, Sāṃkhya, and Abhidharma, and this is still a valid entreaty.

I concur that while Larson's broad assessment of the interaction between Sāṃkhya and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma is correct, there are several aspects that must be probed further, namely the ways in which this interaction occurred and the reasons why it occurred. Larson does not appear to distinguish between Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika thought, even though Sautrāntika positions are distinct soteriogically. Additionally, I would like to extend Larson's dialogic 'mix' by including the vital ingredient of early yogācāra, which itself contained strands of Sarvastivāda and Sautrāntika theories and practices of yoga. Larson's identification of the Buddhist component of the *Pātañjalayogaśāśtra* as 'Buddhist psychology and/or meditation theory' also merits rethinking. Such an analysis is somewhat limited because the PYŚ also includes Abhidharma and Sautrāntika philosophy, such as ontology and epistemology. Overall, when assessing the intellectual, and particularly the soteriological, components of the PYŚ, we are looking at a dense myriadic web of confluences and interactions that probably took many configurations: such as the *Upaniṣads* influencing Sautrāntika influencing yogācāra influencing Patañjali influencing yogācāra back again, and so on, with ideas constantly moving back and forth across religious demarcations. To further demonstrate that debate was an important context for conceptual exchange, I turn now to other examples of intertextuality.

2.6.2 The ontological debates

To date, the focus of the philosophical interaction between Pātañjala yoga and Buddhist traditions has focused primarily on epistemology.[175] Sparham argued briefly that yogācāra draws on proto-Sāṃkhya models of mind regarding a permanent mental substratum, which is then refashioned in yogācāra as the notion of *ālayavijñāna*, storehouse-consciousness (Sparham

[175] See Burley 2007: 82-90.

1993: 9-10). However, this dissertation highlights polemical interactions that have been less well examined, those in the domain of ontology. Ontological positions form a necessary basis for soteriology, theories of existential liberation, and are partially expressed using metaphors such as the seed, which proved particularly effective for constructing theories of being, becoming, and transformation.

We have discussed Vārṣaganya as an important Sāṃkhya thinker from around the 2nd century CE who may, or may not, have been the author of the lost *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. Vārṣagaṇya was also known to the Buddhists, as is evident from both the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. In the *Savitarkādibhūmi* – one of the books of the *Yogācārabhūmi*śāstra – Vārṣagaṇya is named as an adherent of the *satkāryavāda* doctrine, the doctrine that the effect pre-exists in the cause. This doctrine, central to Sāṃkhya ontology and casuality, holds that the effect pre-exists in the cause in a potential state and that change is then merely a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of what was already there.[176] Here, the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* is called the *hetuphalasadvāda* (the doctrine of the existence of the effect in the cause).[177]

> *hetuphalasadvādaḥ katamaḥ | yathāpi iha ekatyaḥ*[178] *śramaṇo brāhmaṇo vā evaṃdṛṣṭir bhavaty evaṃ vādī nityaṃ nityakālaṃ dhruvaṃ dhruvakālaṃ vidyata eva hetau phalamiti tadyathā vārṣagaṇyaḥ*
> (*Savitarkādibhūmi,* VI 38; Bhattcharya 1957: 118.14-119.2).

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[176] Burley, following Davies (Davies 1894), rejects this common interpretation of the doctrine as referring to material cause and asserts that it makes a metaphysical point: 'it is not a cause in any straightforward sense of the word that is being talked about here. Rather it is the unmanifest ground of the manifest categories […] The part that the *satkāryavāda* seems to be playing in that project is to propose that anything manifest must have an *unmanifest* ground.' Thus he reads SKK 9 as 'containing a transcendental argument for the existence of unmanifest *prakṛti'* (Burley 2007: 96). On this point, see also Halbfass 1992: 56.

[177] According to Mikogami, this is the more general term in Indian philosophy for the assertion that an effect appears from its cause (Mikogami 1969: 443).

[178] *Buddhist-Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary* (Edgerton 1953).

> What is the doctrine of the existence of the effect in the cause? It is just as when some *śramaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa* holds this view or says this: the result exists (*vidyata*) in the cause solely as the eternal in eternal time or the perpetual in perpetual time. Such a one is a Vārṣagaṇya follower.

Indeed, Mikogami points out that the way in which Asaṅga systematically refutes the Sāṃkhya theory of *satkāryavāda* is closely mirrored by the structure of the argument in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, which defends this very position (Mikogami: 1969: 445). Mikogami concludes that the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* refers to the earlier work of Vārṣagaṇya (*Ṣaṣṭitantra*), that predates the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The author of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (Īśvarakṛṣṇa) subsequently used Asaṅga's critique (in the YĀBh) to strengthen his own position (Mikogami: 1969: 447). The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* also makes reference to the followers of Vārṣagaṇya. The Sautrāntikas accuse the Vaibhāṣikas of running dangerously close to the Vārṣagaṇyas, i.e. the Sāṃkhyas, with their theory of dharma and temporality.[179] The Sautrāntikas also criticize the Vaibhāṣika notion of 'the

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[179] *tasmādayamapyahetuḥ /sadālambanatvādvijñānasyeti / yadapyuktaṃ phalāditi /naiva hi sautrāntikā atītāt karmaṇaḥ phalotpatti varṇayanti / kiṃ tarhi / tatpūrvakāt saṃtānaviśeṣād ity ātmavādapratiṣedhe saṃpravedayiṣyāmaḥ / yasya tu atītānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti tasya phalaṃ nityamevāstīti kiṃ tatra karmaṇaḥ sāmarthyam / utpādane sāmarthyam / utpādas tarhy abhūtvā bhavatīti siddham /atha sarvameva cāsti / kasyedānīṃ kva sāmarthyam / vārṣagaṇyavādaś caivaṃ dyotito bhavati / "yad asty asty eva tat / yan nāsti nasty eva tat / asato nāsti saṃbhavaḥ / sato nāsti vināśa" iti* (AKBh 5.26; Pradhan 1975: 300-301, line 21 onwards). 'This is also said to be due to fruition. The Sautrāntikas do not describe the production of fruition to be due to past action alone. Why? Because it [production of fruition] is due to the particular sequence [continuum] that comes from the prior [action] – which I will make known as the refutation of the doctrine of self. But for one for whom past and future are substantially real (i.e. the Vaibhāṣikas) the fruit is said to be eternal – how does the action have momentum/potential (*sāmarthya*)? When there is production, there is momentum. In that case, production (*utpāda*) is resultant (*siddham*), after having been non-existent (*abhūtvā*). Then there would be only existence – in which case where [is the need for] momentum? Thus, one would [adhere to] the doctrine of the Vārṣagaṇyas, as illustrated: 'Only what exists, exists; Only what doesn't exist, doesn't exist; What is not real does not arise; What is real does not perish.'' I have here favoured the translation of 'momentum' over 'potential' for *sāmarthya* to illustrate the technical

three times'[180] as sounding like 'pre-existence' and coming dangerously close to the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda*.[181] In both Buddhist passages above, the name Vārṣagaṇya stands in for the Sāṃkhyas, and in both cases the particular doctrine of *satkāryavāda* is singled out for polemical attack. This reflects interaction between the Abhidharma and Yogācāra schools with the ontology of Sāṃkhya, on which the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* purportedly bases its soteriology.

Vārṣagaṇya is only referred to once in the PYŚ and in relation to ontological matters.[182] However, the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* is discussed indirectly in PYŚ 2.15 commentary in relation to *upādāna* (grasping/cause) and self.[183]

> *tatra duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāro heyaḥ. pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ. saṃyogasyātyantikī nivṛttir hānam. hānopāyaḥ samyagdarśanam. tatra hātuḥ svarūpam upādeyaṃ vā heyaṃ vā na bhavitum arhatīti hāne tasyocchedavādaprasaṅga upādāne ca*

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understanding of the potential or capacity as that which propels the entity through time in a sequence. In Buddhism, *ātmavāda* is the mistaken notion of a permanent self; it is also called *satkāyadṛṣṭi*. The false notion of self is often the fourth of the four attachments, the *upādāna*. *Upādāna* is also the ninth of the twelve links of dependent origination.

[180] The belief that an entity exists simultaneously in the past, present, and future.

[181] The context of this refutation of the Sarvastivāda three time periods is discussed fully in Maas 2014.

[182] *apare tu varṇayanti --- ye 'ntyā viśeṣās te 'nyatāpratyayaṃ kurvantīti / tatrāpi deśalakṣaṇabhedo mūrtivyavadhijātibhedaś cānyatve hetuḥ. kṣaṇabhedas tu yogibuddhigamya eveti ata uktaṃ / mūrtivyavadhijātibhedābhāvān nāsti mūlapṛthaktvam iti vārṣagaṇyaḥ*. PYŚ 3.53. 'Therefore it has been said, "Since there is no difference as to limitation-in-extent or by reason of intervening-space or of species, there is no distinction in the [primary] root [of things]". So says Vārshagaṇya' (trans. Woods 1914: 291).

[183] The meaning of *upādāna* is unclear in this passage, as *upādāna* can have different technical meanings in Buddhist and Brahmanic philosophical discourse. There are four *upādāna*s, or forms of grasping, in Buddhism and the fourth attachment is to a notion of false self, while in both Buddhism and Brahmanism *upādāna* can refer to a material cause. However, the *Mahābhārata* uses *upādāna* to indicate 'the act of taking to oneself; appropriating to oneself' (Monier-Williams 1899), suggesting an overlap with the meaning of 'grasping'.

> *hetuvādaḥ. ubhayapratyākhyāne śāśvatavāda ity etat samyagdarśanam* (PYŚ 2.15; Angot 2012: 421)
> Of these, *saṃsāra*, because it contains great suffering, is to be escaped. The cause of that which is to be escaped (i.e. suffering) is the conjunction of *pradhāna* [unmanifest Prakṛti] with Puruṣa. Escape (*hānam*) is when there is absolute cessation of the conjunction. The means of escaping is correct seeing. In correct seeing, the intrinsic nature of the one who escapes is not something that should be accepted or rejected: if it is rejected the consequence is the doctrine of its (*tasya*)[184] annihilation, and if accepted (*upādāne*) the doctrine that is has a cause. When both [doctrines] are denied, the doctrine that it is eternal [follows]; this is correct seeing.[185]

This passage argues that self is an eternal given and is not something that is 'caused' (which is in line with Sāṃkhya theory). The passage functions as a refutation: two other doctrines are referred to and rejected, that the self can be annihilated or caused. The broader context of the passage appears to be a response to Buddhist doctrine in two ways. The first way is to refashion the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism: suffering, the cause of suffering, cessation, the path. This Buddhist frame is filled with Sāṃkhya doctrinal content. Patañjali's second dialogic response appears to be a reference to the Buddha's rejection of two 'extreme' views: one the *ucchedavāda*, the doctrine of annihilation, and the other the *śaśvatavāda*, the doctrine of an eternal self.[186] Thus Patañjali appropriates the Buddha's critique of the two extremes and makes it a critique of Buddhism itself. Often, schools did not have to be explicitly named in textual refutation; it was enough to refer to their doctrines alone.

The nature of philosophical debate in the classical period means that we cannot regard our three texts as anything less than intertextual. If

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[184] Lit.:'the doctrine of a cause of it (*tasya*).

[185] I am grateful to Professor Rupert Gethin for his assistance in translating this passage.

[186] The Buddha rejected two extremes. The first was *ucchedavāda*, the doctrine of annihilation, in which there is no fruition of karma or rebirth and in which the individual is completely annihilated at death. The second 'extreme' position rejected by the Buddha was *śāsvatavāda*, the doctrine of eternalism. Patañjali's passage, however, accepts the doctrine of *śāśvatavāda*.

philosophical authors were not referring to each others' work via processes of refutation and co-option, they would have been going against the intellectual grain. Such sparring dialogues only partially reflect the need to distinguish one's position on the basis of difference. Rather, debates were used to explore the weaknesses in one's own argument in order to strengthen it for the next round. In the centuries preceding the final redactions of our three texts (PYŚ, YĀBh, AKBh), i.e. in the 2nd-3rd centuries, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma was flourishing, and the first (preserved) systematization of Sāṃkhya was taking place in Vārṣagaṇya's work. It seems likely that Sāṃkhya and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma co-evolved in a milieu of debate, and this is certainly reflected in both schools' emphases on ontological categorisation. Debate, then, was an environment in which difference cloaked similarity; on the surface these schools refuted each other, but in the detail of the debate they co-constructed their own concepts in partnership with their opponents.

2.6.3 An ontological argument with metaphoric underpinnings

Here I briefly examine one example of a mirrored argument form between the PYŚ and the AKBh by comparing two passages, from PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94. Both passages examine a set of arguments that explain ethical causality in relation to rebirth. The argument in both texts is similar in terms of form and sequence, although not in terms of the doctrinal content or conclusion reached. Both arguments are also connected to the metaphor of the seed and the substratum as a means to explain karmic repercussion in relation to transmigration. The formal similarity of these two passages suggests intertextual borrowing.

Both the PYŚ and the AKBh share the form of an argument within a doctrinal discussion of karma. The Pātañjala argument occurs in the second *pāda*, in which the PYŚ's most dense discussions of karma theory occur, and which opens with how *kriyā yoga* is used to eliminate *kleśa* (affliction) in relation to *karma* and *vipāka* (maturation of karma). The argument form is part of a longer discussion on *karma* and how the roots and substratum of *kleśa*

sustain patterns of karmic retribution across life and beyond death. In the AKBh the relevant passage occurs in chapter 4, which is dedicated to the topic of karma. Vasubandhu's argument is part of a discussion on how the doctrine of action works according to various scriptural sources.

Although the conclusions of each argument form differ, the structure of each argument is strikingly similar. See Appendix 2 for the full text of the passages. Each passage opens by laying out the four assertions in a similar way:

Table 2.3: PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94

***Pātañjalayogaśāstra* 2.13**	***Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 4.94**
kim ekaṃ karmaika*sya* ***janma****naḥ kāraṇam / athaikaṃ karmānekaṃ* ***janmākṣipatī****ti. dvitīyā vicāraṇā / kim anekaṃ karmānekaṃ janma nirvartayati /* ***athānekaṃ*** *karmaikaṃ janma nirvartayatīti* Is a single karma the cause of one birth? Or does one karma (action) project (*ā√kṣip*) [187] multiple births? The second deliberation: does multiple karma (action) produce (*nirvartayati*) multiple births, or does multiple karma (action) produce one birth?	***kimekaṃ karma ekameva janmā kṣipati*** *atha naikam api / tathā kim ekam api karmaikaṃ* ***janmā kṣipaty atha anekam*** */* Does one karma alone project one birth, or also multiple [karmas]? Likewise, does one karma produce one birth [alone] or also multiple [births]?

Let us first sum up the four assertions that are contained in these propositions and their sequence:

[187] I have chosen the term 'project' to translate *ākṣipati* in this instance because this is a technical term in Sarvāstivāda karma theory and this is the common translation in Buddhist studies. Aligning translations between fields of study allows us to compare the ideas of the two argument forms in the PYŚ and the AKBh more clearly.

Table 2.4: PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94

PYŚ	**AKBh**
A. One karma –» one birth	A. One karma –» one birth
B. One karma –» multiple births	D. Multiple karmas –» one birth
C. Multiple karma –» multiple births	A. One karma –» one birth
D. Multiple karma –» one birth	B. One karma –» multiple births

Although the four assertions are identical, they are grouped and sequenced differently. Patañjali's argument contains four discrete propositions that are alternatives. Vasubandhu's argument expresses two main propositions, each of which contains a combined assertion. We might map it thus:

Table 2.5: PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94

PYŚ	**AKBh**
A *or*	(A *or* D) or (A *and* D)*
B *or*	*or*
C *or*	(A *or* B) or (A *and* B)
D*	

* = conclusion (*siddhānta)*

Patañjali's text offers a straightforward choice between four propositions: A or B or C or D (with D as the valid statement). Vasubandhu's argument presents a more complex choice between the propositions A, D or A, B in two different combinations and completely omits assertion C (multiple karmas project multiple births).

Let us now briefly sum up the conclusion of the two argument forms. Patañjali's argument is structured to lead to the conclusion: multiple karmas lead to one birth. But this simplicity belies a complexity. Those multiple karmas are congealed into a single karmic entity (*karmāśaya* or karmic store) to produce a single birth. So Patañjali's concluding statement includes two assertions: one karma leads to one birth *and* multiple karmas (congealed) lead to one birth. This is remarkably similar to the conclusion of

Vasubandhu's argument: one karma leads to one birth *and* multiple karmas lead to one birth. This is a complex position and both Patañjali and Vasubandhu use metaphors to formulate it conceptually. In another part of PYŚ 2.13, Patañjali uses the metaphor of a fisherman's net to illustrate how diverse, accumulated *vāsanā*s might be knotted together into a single mind-entity that can 'capture' information for the next life. In contrast, Vasubandhu's metaphor is that of a painting: a painter might sketch out a form, but s/he then fills it or fleshes it out with details. Similarly, as a result of karma a person receives a 'sketched' outline form of rebirth broadly concurrent with one's previous life-form, but the conglomerated karmic store determines the details and qualities of that new rebirthed form. The above analysis of the two passages strongly suggests that Patañjali and Vasubandhu were referring to a common argument form. This probability is further increased by the way in which Patañjali prefaces his opening with *tatredaṃ vicāryate* ('in this respect it is deliberated'). This could suggest an argument that was already in the public sphere and adds to the mounting evidence that the PYŚ post-dates the AKBh.

This argument form also appears in the 1st-2nd-century CE Abhidharma *Vibhāṣā*[188] (on which the AKBh draws and from which the Vaibhāṣikas take their name).[189] Patañjali may have been responding to the *Vibhāṣā* passage or to the form in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. I will now explore further details of comparison between the above passages to show that Patañjali's 2.13 is richly peppered with the technical terminology of Sarvāstivāda

[188] See the *Vibhāṣā* by Xuanzang TD 27, p. 98a11. The *Vibhāṣā* is extant only in Chinese translation, in three versions. The first two are partial and the latter complete: the *Vibhāṣāśāstra* of Saṃghabhūti from 383CE, T28 1547; the *Vibhāṣaśāstra* by Buddhavarman from 437CE, T1546; and the Abhidharma *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra* by Xuanzang (602-664CE) T27 1545 (See Takeda and Cox 2010).

[189] MVB 19 p. 98a11ff., 20 p. 99a23ff.j *Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra* T27 1545. Cox points out that the same passage also appears in the *Spuṭārthā Vyākhyā* by Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 424.26ff.) and in the *Nyāyānusāraśāstra* by Saṅghabhadra c. 4th century, which is extant in Chinese only (NAS 43 p. 585b20ff.j).

karma theory and indeed appears to be directly refuting positions in the AKBh.

Ākṣepaka karma and *paripūraka karma*

On closer inspection the frame of the argument form is somewhat deceiving, because it is less about singular/plural karmic effects and more about how particulars and universals are generated in karmic action. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the precise context of the passage is that of the two types of karma: *ākṣepaka karma* and *paripūraka karma*. Dhammajoti translates these two terms as 'projecting' and 'completing' *karma*s while Cox translates as 'skeletal' and 'fleshing out' (Cox 1995: 110). This refers to the relationship of genus and the specific in the qualities that determine rebirth. So while *ākṣepaka karma* projects a single birth, other karmas, of the *paripūraka* type, are responsible for determining the specific qualities of that rebirth: such as lifespan, identity, wealth, etc. In particular, *ākṣepa* is a term that is specifically associated with the Vaibhāṣikas. As part of their theory of action as eternal (existing across the three time periods), they assert that in the moment in which action is completed, it 'projects' (*ākṣipati*) or 'grasps' (*pratigṛhṇāti*) its result (Lamotte 1988: 21). These two terms, *ākṣepaka* and *paripūraka*, are synonymous with the terms *ekakarma*, 'single act', and *anekakarma*, 'various acts' (Radich 2010: 36).[190]And so Patañjali's argument not only refers to single and plural (*eka* and *aneka*) acts and rebirths, but also to the theory behind these terms: single acts determine a rebirth, but multiple acts determine the specific qualities of a rebirth. The specific technical use of the term *ākṣepaka* in Sarvāstivāda karma theory suggests that Patañjali's use of the term *ākṣipati* in his argument is not incidental.

In the AKBh a karma (action) may have determinate maturation (*niyatavipāka*) or indeterminate (*aniyatā*). In the case of determinate maturation (certainty) there are three possibilities: *dṛṣṭsadharmavedanīya*,

[190] He cites the example of Buddhavarman's *Vibhāṣāśāstra* T1546: 28.82b16.

experienced as a phenomenon in this life, *upapadyavedanīya*, experienced in next life, and *aparaparyāyavedanīya*, experienced after a number of rebirths (AKBh 4.49).[191] We find a similar discussion in PYŚ 2.13.[192] Furthermore, both chapter 4 of the AKBh and chapter 2 of the PYŚ discuss the immediate and thus determinate (*niyata*) maturation of intense *kleśa*s (*tīvrakleśa*).[193]

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[191] "*dṛṣṭadharmavedanīyam upapadyavedanīyamaparaparyāyavedanīyaṃ cetyetattrividhaṃ karma niyatamityetaccaturvidhaṃ karma bhavati" sahāniyatavedanīyena* (AKBh 4.49; Pradhan 1975: 226 line 25-26).

[192] *yas tv asāv ekabhavikaḥ karmāśayaḥ sa niyatavipākaś cāniyatavipākaś ca. tatra dṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasyaivāyaṃ niyamo na tv adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasyāniyatavipākasya kasmāt. yo hy adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyo 'niyatavipākas tasya trayī gatiḥ. kṛtasyāvipakasya nāśaḥ, pradhānakarmaṇy āvāpagamanaṃ vā, niyatavipākapradhānakarmaṇābhibhūtasya vā ciram avasthānam iti. katham iti, adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasyaiva niyatavipākasya karmaṇaḥ samānaṃ maraṇam abhivyaktikāraṇam uktam. na tv adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasyāniyatavipākasya. yat tv adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyaṃ karmāniyatavipākaṃ tan naśyed āvāpaṃ vā gacched abhibhūtaṃ vā ciram apy upāsīta, yāvat samānaṃ karmābhivyañjakaṃ nimittam asya na vipākābhimukhaṃ karotīti. tadvipākasyaiva deśakālanimittānavadhāraṇād iyaṃ karmagatiś citrā durvijñānā ceti. na cotsargasyāpavādān nivṛttir ity ekabhavikaḥ karmāśayo 'nujñāyata iti.* (PYŚ 2.13; Angot 2012: 406-407). 'But that single existence from karmic store (*karmāśaya*) is (both) determinate maturation and indeterminate maturation. This rule (*niyama*) only [applies] to the determinate maturation of the experience of the present life (*dṛṣṭajanma*), but not the indeterminate maturation of the experience of the past life (*adṛṣṭajanma*). Why? Because that [*karmāśaya*] which is indeterminate maturation (of) past lives can take three courses: destruction of the unmatured karma, mixed in within primary karma, or for a long time in the condition of being overcome by primary karma which is of determinate maturation. Why? Because death is said to be the general (equal) cause of manifested karma that is thus experienced in future births and is determinate in maturation – but not of the indeterminate maturation experienced in future births. However, karma of indeterminate maturation experienced in future births might be destroyed or mixed or it might be overpowered and abide for a long time – as long as a similar cause of manifest action does not make it disposed to maturation. Thus the maturation that is not fixed by time, space, and cause is a course of karma that is variegated and difficult to understand. Due to the fact that this is a special rule, the general rule is not broken. Thus *karmāśaya* is officially known as pertaining to a single existence.'

[193] ***tīvrakleśaprasādena sātatyena ca yatkṛtam /guṇakṣetre ca niyataṃ tatpitrorghātakaṃ ca yat*** (AKBh 4.54; Pradhan 1975: 231). 'That [action] which is done

And both chapters discuss karma as black or white in various combinations.[194]

The discourse of the two sections of the AKBh and the PYŚ that I have compared are overlapping to the extent that they appear to be in dialogue. Topic by topic, both passages draw on the same philosophical discourse of ontology, karma theory and ethics, using a shared pool of technical terms for karma, most notably *eka*/*aneka* for *ākṣepaka*/*paripūraka*, but also *niyata*/*aniyata* and *kṛṣṇa*/*śukla* to describe karmic effects. The PYŚ makes the argument on the basis of the karmic repercussions of single and multiple actions on rebirth. The AKBh makes the argument on the basis of how rebirth is produced via universal and particular characteristics that lead to homogeneous and heterogeneous aspects of transmigration.

These discursive correspondences suggests one of two things: either that both texts are crystallisations of the same milieu of live debate or that one author is consciously making intertextual revisions to the other's text as a form of refutation. A text that expresses refutation is an interesting case in

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through intense *kleśa* or through intense faith continuously is determinate, with regard to the field of qualities and the murdering of a father.' And: *tathā tīvrakleśena bhītavyādhitakṛpaṇeṣu viśvāsopagateṣu vā mahānubhāveṣu vā tapasviṣu kṛtaḥ punaḥ punar apakāraḥ sa cāpi pāpakarmāśayaḥ sadya eva paripacyate* (PYŚ 2.12; Angot 2012: 403). 'Likewise, the evil *karmāśaya*, made by repeated offence – by means of intense *kleśa* towards the fearful, the diseased, the wretched, or by attaining confidence, or towards worshipped saints or ascetics – it too fructifies immediately.'

[194] ***kṛṣṇaśuklādibhedena punaḥ karma caturvidham*** (AKBh 4.59; Pradhan 1975: 234). 'Action is of four types: black, white, and so on.' And: *tatra kṛtasyāvipakvasya nāśo yathā śuklakarmodayād ihaiva nāśaḥ kṛṣṇasya. yatredam uktam. "dve dve ha vai karmaṇī veditavye pāpakasyaiko rāśiḥ puṇyakṛto 'pahanti tad icchasva karmāṇi sukṛtāni kartum ihaiva te karma kavayo vedayante."* (PYŚ 2.13; Angot 2012: 407) 'There the destruction of unripened karma is like the destruction of black [karma] due to the increase in white karma. In which case (*yatra*) it is said: 'Deeds are to be known as twofold; of which a heap of meritorious deeds beat off one of evil (deeds); so choose to do good acts alone in this life; the poets have instructed this as karma.' There is also a later discussion of the four karmas as black, white, etc. in PYŚ 4.7.

literature. In live debate, there are always two sides and hence two audiences (in favour and against), but in textual accounts of such debates the audience is necessarily reduced to a single presence, the reader. In the case of the PYŚ, the intended audience of the text were Brahmin yogins (PYŚ 2.30-2.33). However, if the refutational flavor of the PYŚ was to be truly effective and appreciated, a point-by-point reference to the stock arguments forms of Abhidharma could have only been 'victorious' if the audience were already familiar with that context. It leads to the question as to whether Patañjali's *sūtra* text was aimed at Brahmins who also knew the Abhidharma texts or whether there was a wider literary-scholastic audience of Buddhists who were able to read, consult or listen to the *Pātañjalayogaśāśtra*. Given the point-by-point correspondence of the PYŚ to the Sarvāstivāda soteriological discourse in the 4th-5th centuries, one can suggest that its function was partly to serve as a record of structured refutations of Buddhist karma theory and *mārga* systems. Patañjali appears to co-opt certain argument forms, conceptual metaphors and rhetorical structures from the Buddhists, and then to replace the metaphysics with those of Sāṃkhya. Whatever the truth of the intertextual borrowing, Patañjali was certainly familiar with the concepts of the Buddhist Sarvastivādin milieu – and we must assume that his audience was too.

Chapter conclusions

In the early common era, there was a common culture of debate and intellectual exchange, a basis for conceptual sharing between different philosophical schools. The concept of an ontological substratum (*āśraya*) that was consistent over time was employed by Sāṃkhya and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, imbued with different theories to account for constituency, change, and non-change. Furthermore, the mirrored argument form in the PYŚ and the AKBh on the relationship between actions and rebirth reflects shared conceptuality in the theories of causality. As this chapter has illustrated, within a dialogic context of soteriology, conceptual metaphor was more easily transferable between traditions than doctrine. In some ways, metaphors are used to 'smuggle' in doctrines and philosophical

positions from other schools. Yamabe makes the point that in the earlier model of *bīja* theory in Yogācāra, *bīja* is synonymous with *hetu* (cause) (Yamabe 2018). Therefore the use of conceptual metaphors also engages philosophical positions: *āśraya* structures concepts of ontology and *bīja* engages with causality. Patañjali does not appear to subvert the logic or system of the Sautrāntika seed metaphor in any way, but retains the same technical explanations (a seed must be made non-germinant by burning it in fire, etc.).[195] This demonstrates that the Sautrāntika seed metaphor is not at odds with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda* because they share the same entailments. The intertextual examples that I have examined between the PYŚ and the AKBh demonstrate that the majority of the technical discussions of the seed take place in Patañjali's second *pāda*, leading to the conclusion that this portion of the text has a particular basis for interaction with the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika sphere. My suggestion is that the early part of Patañjali's second pāda was either an independent text incorporated into the PYŚ or exists as a specific point-by-point response to a Buddhist orator such as Vasubandhu or to a text such as his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

In investigating a body of discourse called 'classical yoga' we must view beyond doctrines to wider conceptual and intricate metaphoric contexts. A practice does not have to be explicitly labelled 'yoga' for it to share the same

[195] In fact, although the two schools (Pātañjala and Sautrāntika) utilize a near-identical metaphoric mapping of the seed image to explain the doctrine of causality in relation to karma and *kleśa*, it might be said to be inherently more suited to Patañjali's doctrine than to Sautrāntika. A seed, after all, provides a logical example to explain that the 'effect pre-exists in the cause'. For the Sautrāntikas, however, the seed image has to be delicately treated to make it support the complex idea that a cause is an unrelated sequence of events connected only via a force of impetus that creates a homogeneity that is only perceptible and not substantial. Although Patañjali's soteriological metaphor of *kleśabīja* appears to be drawing on a unique Sautrāntika discourse within the AKBh, there is another sense in which Sautrāntika ontology itself could be understood to be reproducing aspects of Sāṃkhya ontology.

discourse or episteme as the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. In exploring the discourse of classical yoga, it is useful to think about soteriological path structures rather than an overall 'entity' called yoga; this can aid us in identifying subtle but structural interconnections between distinct religious traditions. This chapter has presented a few examples of the many shared metaphors and paradigms in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.* The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* presents a soteriology that it does *not* call yoga and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* presents a discursively similar soteriology that it *does* call yoga. Next, I will examine how these two texts share an overlapping discourse with the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.

Chapter 3. Cultivation, clouds, and the 'other' yoga *śāstra*: the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*

This chapter argues that since the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* have their final redaction in the c.4th century CE and are self-labelled *śāstra*s about yoga, we have two classical *yogaśāstra*s. Furthermore, historical contextualization shows that the earliest layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* predate the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and contain systematized accounts of yogācāra (yoga discipline). Therefore there are detailed, non-Brahmanical accounts of yoga that precede Pātañjala yoga.

First, I detail the historical textual formation of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* and consider what was meant by the label yogācāra in its earliest context. Second, I analyse the ways in which the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* construct their soteriologies, one subtle and one obvious, using shared conceptual metaphors. I focus on two examples: the cultivation of the counterstate (*pratipakṣabhāvanā*) and the cloud of dharma (*dharmamegha*).

3.1 Historical textual formation of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*

The *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* is a complex text, both in its constitution and in its formation. By establishing a chronology for this text in relation to the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* it can be argued that Patañjali may have been aware of the prior textual tradition of yogācāra.

3.1.1 Structure of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*[1]

The *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* consists of two parts: the *Maulī Bhūmi* (The Basic Section) and the '*Saṃgrahaṇī* (The Supplementary Section).[2] The *Maulī Bhūmi* contains 14 'books' that describe 17 stages, or *bhūmi*s, of yoga

[1] Appendix 3 provides a structural outline of the sections of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.

[2] These are the translations are used by Kragh 2013b.

discipline (*yogācāra*).[3] Each book is divided into sections titled *yogasthāna* (topic of yoga).[4] The supplementary section contains four parts that comment on the books, as well as on other topics, and includes an independent work called the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*. One of the four sections of the *Saṃgrahaṇī*, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, contains additional materials on the books of the *Maulī Bhūmi*.[5] The three further supplementary sections are the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (which explains the content of the Tripiṭaka),[6] the *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī* (which classifies and explains synonyms found in the Buddhist *sūtra*s) and the *Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* (which describes the principles for interpreting scripture). The *Maulī Bhūmi* is partially extant in Sanskrit, while the majority of the *Saṃgrahaṇī* is extant only in Chinese and Tibetan.

3.1.2 Dating of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*

The dating of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* is complex, given that the text is so extensive. As a *śāstra*, or treatise, it typically collates different units of knowledge into a coherent whole. The prevailing view among scholars is that the YĀBh was compiled over a substantial period of time.[7] The organization of the material in the YĀBh and the absence of a self-conscious frame or map that lays out the contents is 'evidence that the work was not compiled on the basis of a unitary plan but grew gradually from separate textual units and materials' (Deleanu 2006: 155).[8] Most scholars now date

[3] As explained previously, I distinguish between *yogācāra* as an earlier designation for yoga practitioners in the first centuries CE and Yogācāra as the name of the established school of Buddhist philosophy by the 5th-6th century. I will discuss the nuanced meanings of yogācāra further on in this chapter.

[4] A topic (*sthāna*) signifies a division containing a series of doctrinal points (Kragh 2013b: 103).

[5] For a detailed breakdown of the four *Saṃgrahaṇī* sections, see Delhey 2013.

[6] The Tripiṭaka is the early Buddhist canon.

[7] See 0.1.2 'Introduction to the Texts'.

[8] See Deleanu 2006: 154 for a summary of scholarly positions in concord with this view.

the final redaction of the YĀBh to the 4th century CE (e.g. Kragh 2013b: 26).[9] This locates the final text to approximately the same period as the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, which Maas dates between 325-425 CE (Maas 2013) – and he has recently suggested that c.400 CE might be the more likely date in that range (Maas 2018). Yet parts of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* most likely predate the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra.* The earliest two layers of the YĀBh are the books titled *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*,[10] which date to the 3rd century CE if not before,[11] while another early layer is the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*.[12] Given that the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* present systems of yoga discipline, I argue that the earlier

[9] Indeed, if Asaṅga is to be credited as the author/compiler, then the YĀBh must be dated to Asaṅga's lifetime, which spanned from the late 4th to the early 5th century (Kritzer 2005: xviii).

[10] Deleanu dates the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* to c.230-300 CE (Deleanu 2006: 195).

[11] Among the first scholars to identify the chronological formation of the YĀBh was Schmithausen, who used the absence of any reference to the innovative Mahāyāna concept of *ālayavijñāna* (store consciousness) to identify the earliest parts of the text (Schmithausen 1987). In Schmithausen's view, the absence of *ālayavijñāna* and other core Mahāyāna concepts demonstrates that these three layers of the YĀBh precede the advent of Mahāyāna proper. Accordingly, Schmithausen identified the next chronological layer of text as the rest of the *Maulī Bhūmi* combined, because it contains a smattering of references to *ālayavijñāna* but no reference to the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, an independent text that discusses *ālayavijñāna* and which became a key text of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The third and newest layer, in Schmithausen's analysis, is the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, which contains the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*. More recently, Aramaki put forward a revised hypothesis about the structure of the YĀBh, arguing that while books 10-14 (including the BoBh and the ŚBh) constitute the oldest layers of the YĀBh, the first six books represent the newest layers, and the threefold complex of *Śrutamayī-*, *Cintāmayī-* and *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmi*s represents a bridge between the 'old' and 'new' blocs (Aramaki 2013: 427-428). See also Kritzer for a view of the possible chronologies of the layers (Kritzer 2005: xviii). In contrast, Wayman attributed the whole text to Asaṅga and built the layers up as chronological events in Asaṅga's life (375-430 CE, starting at 395 CE) (Wayman 1960).

[12] The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is quoted in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* apart from its prologue and its colophons (Powers 1993: 4). Powers (Powers 1993: 4) and Schmithausen (Schmithausen 1976) date the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* to no earlier than the late 3rd century because it refers to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* (*The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*s). Deleanu dates this text to 300-350CE (Deleanu 2006: 195).

systematization of yoga discipline appears not in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, but in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.[13] In this discussion of what comprises a 'system' of yoga discipline, I am not including early proto-systems such as those we see in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the *Sānti Pārvan*, and parts of the *Upaniṣad*s. I am defining a 'system' as labeled stages of practice arranged into a coherent whole that offers a discrete and sequential path structure to liberation. In the Brahmanic sources, this would include the *ṣaḍaṅga yoga*[14] of the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* (MU 6.18), generally dated to the start of the Common Era. However, this *ṣaḍaṅga* system – although an important template for Patañjali's later *aṣṭāṅga yoga* – contains only a skeletal frame without any details. As we will see, the early layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* contain systems of yoga discipline that are expounded in detail.

3.1.3 The proto-layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

In tracing the early development of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, we encounter two meditation treatises that are extant only in Chinese, but which appear to have been translated from, or modeled on, a Sanskrit work called the **Yogācārabhūmi*.[15] This work, now lost, is thought to have been an early forerunner of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. Scholars refer to it as **Yogācārabhūmi* to distinguish it from the later and much longer śāstric redaction of the 4th century.[16] In fact, if the **Yogācārabhūmi* can be said to contain an earlier part of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, it relates to the two books that I have highlighted: the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

The two Chinese meditation manuals that were based on a work called the **Yogācārabhūmi* are the *Xiuxing dao di jing* (*Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa)[17] and the *Damoduoluo chan jing* (*The Meditation* (dhyāna)

[13] For more on the dating of the YĀBh, see Deleanu 2006: 183-196 and Delhey 2013.

[14] The six *aṅga*s are *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇā*, *tarka*, and *samādhi*.

[15] The following contextualization of the **Yogācārabhūmi* is indebted to Deleanu 2006.

[16] For more on the **Yogācārabhūmi*, see Demiéville (1951), Deleanu (2006), and Yamabe (2013).

[17] This is Stuart's' translation of the title (Stuart 2015, 1: 15). T606.

Scripture [Taught] by Dharmatrāta) (Demiéville 1951).[18] The earliest of these two works, the *Xiuxing dao di jing,* is based on the work of Saṅgharakṣa, a Sarvāstivādin patriarch who lived around the end of the 1st and beginning of the 2nd century CE (Deleanu 2006: 157)[19] and appears to contain one of the earliest instances of the term *yogācāra* (Deleanu 2006: 195). An Shigao partly translated this text into Chinese in the 2nd century and Dharmarakṣa made a fuller Chinese translation in 284 CE. This meditation treatise is a Sarvāstivādin text, which contains 'a Mahāyānist fragment' that 'appears to be an appendix added to the original text of the **Yogācārabhūmi* in China' (Deleanu 2006: 157). The other meditation treatise, the later *Damoduoluo chan jing,* was authored by the Sarvāstivādin Buddhasena (but based on the teachings of Dharmatrāta),[20] who is usually described in Chinese sources as 'one of the most famous Buddhist meditation masters active in Kashmir around the end of the 4th and beginning of the 5th century' (Deleanu 2006: 158).[21] Buddhasena's treatise was translated into Chinese by Buddhasena's disciple, Buddhabhadra, in 413 CE, as the *Damoduoluo chan jing*. The existence of these two texts (*Xiuxing dao di jing* and *Damoduoluo chan jing*), each containing an early prototype of the YĀBh, demonstrates that a tradition of Buddhist meditation called yogācāra had been established in India by the early 2nd century CE.

The proto-*Yogācārabhūmi* (**Yogācārabhūmi*) was not the only text that was outlining systems of yogācara in this early period. The content of the

[18] This is Deleanu's translation of the title (Deleanu 2006: 157). T618. This text is also referred to as the *Dharmatrāta Dhyānasūtra* (DDS).

[19] Stuart dates the *Xiuxing dao di jing* to the 1st century CE (Stuart 2015, 1: 15). An Shigao partially translated this text into Chinese in 148 CE as the *Dao di jing*, making this the *terminus ante quem*. Demiéville dated An Shigao's partial Chinese translation of the *YĀB to around the 2nd century CE (Demiéville 1951: 343-347). For a discussion of the influence of the *YĀBh and the *Dao di jing* on another portion of the YĀBh, the *Manobhūmi*, see Yamabe 2013.

[20] Hence it is also sometimes called the *Dharmatrātadhyanasūtra*. According to Lamotte, Dharmatrāta wrote a *Yogasamasanasūtra* that has been lost (Lamotte 1988: 696).

[21] Stuart dates the *Damoduoluo chan jing* to the 4th century CE (Stuart 1, 2015, 1: 15).

Damoduoluo chan jing partly correlates with that of the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* (*Saddhsu*) a 2nd-4th century CE yogācāra meditation treatise that was also Sarvāstivāda with Mahāyāna leanings (Stuart 1, 2015; 264).[22] As Stuart sees it, the *Damoduoluo chan jing* partly draws on the material preserved in the *Saddhsu*. The *Damoduoluo* contains references to the fulfillment of the *bhūmi*s in conjunction with the ten levels of meditative practice, which can be connected to texts such as the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* or the *Mahāvastu* (Stuart 1, 2015: 265).[23] Furthermore, Saṅghabhadra transmitted to China the legends of four early Kashmiri yoga practitioners, Sarvāstivādin masters who lived between the 1st and 3rd centuries CE – Vasumitra, Maitreyaśrī, Saṅgharakṣa, and Dharmatrāta.[24] Besides the two Chinese yogācāra meditation treatises, these other transmissions illustrate that a strand of soteriological thought called yogācāra was established in Indian Buddhism by the 2nd century. Therefore, systematised yogācāra meditation treatises were in circulation up to two centuries before the final redaction of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* in the 4th century. As Deleanu puts it:

> Since Saṅgharakṣa appears to have been active around the end of the 1st century and the beginning of the 2nd century […] and his **Yogācārabhūmi* (compiled ca. 100) reflects an already developed stage in the codification of the yogic theory and practice, it would seem that the ascetic tradition crystallised in this work had already existed for at least one century. It is not excluded, however, that the roots of the Sarvastivādin yogic tradition might go even further back in time (Deleanu 2006: 243 fn 261).

Therefore it is reasonable to assert that Patañjali may have been aware of a prior text or tradition of meditation called *yogācāra*. Furthermore, given that the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* appears to textually revise certain passages from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (see Chapter 2 of this study) and that the

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[22] Stuart dates the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* to between 150 and 400 CE but asserts that parts of Chapter 2 could be older.

[23] The *Damoduoluo chan jing* refers to the ten stages, the *daśabhūmi* (DDS 11.8; trs. Chan 2013: 383).

[24] The stories of these masters were recorded by Dao-An, a Chinese master (Demiéville 1951: 364-6; Lamotte 1988: 696-698).

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya revises passages from the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*,[25] Patañjali may also have been aware of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. Moreover, as the **Yogācārabhūmi* was composed in Sarvāstivādin circles, this suggests a line of Sarvāstivādin influence that is shared between the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* in relation to yogic soteriology.

3.2 Early yogācāra

Here I assert that yogācāra is not a generic term for any spiritual practice in Buddhism, but pertains to a specific identity and set of techniques. I then highlight the relationship between Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and yogācāra. Finally, I consider what we know about the technical details of the discipline of yogācāra.

3.2.1 What does yogācāra mean?

The nuanced meaning of the term *yogācāra* is still under debate. In contrast to the later doxographical use of Yogācāra to refer to a philosophical school, the early uses of this term are more shadowy. The key questions in the debate are whether the term is generic, whether it can be associated with any specific concepts of 'yoga', and whether it refers to 'practice' or 'practitioner'. While Silk argued that yogācāra was a generic word for spiritual practice (Silk 2000: 303), there is a growing consensus that yogācāra has a specific meaning. It is, of course, possible to acknowledge that some connotations of *yogācāra* were not fixed without resorting to the extreme position that the term meant nothing in particular. Buescher underscores this point:

> At some time, the notion of yogācāra referred very generally to anyone practicing any stage of a non-visionary path; later, in a different context, it designated an expert in visualization techniques; at one place it is restricted to refer to a Śrāvakāyana monk; in another milieu, a *yogācāra* is *the* bodhisattva per se, etc. (Buescher 2008: 13 fn3)

[25] See Kritzer 2005.

For Davidson the earliest meaning for yogācāra was, quite simply, 'yogin' (Davidson 1985: 127). Kragh follows this line of reasoning: depending on context, *yogācāra* means '*yoga* practitioner' and secondarily means '*yoga* practice' (Kragh 2013b: 30). Kragh even goes so far as to define the 4th-century usage of the term in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* as 'School of Yoga Practitioners' (Kragh 2013b: 23). Deleanu asserts that 'yoga' in the compound yogācāra carries not just the generic meaning of 'application' or 'purpose' but reflects that the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* was closely connected to a 'yogic milieu' which denoted Buddhist groups that practiced specialist spiritual cultivation (Deleanu 2006, 1: 158-159). In the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* (*Saddhsu*) the narrative framing of the text[26] means that the *sūtra* 'can be read as a text detailing the making of a yogācāra' (Stuart 2015, 1: 109). In the *Saddhsu*, yogācara communities referred to themselves as having a practice of 'yoga': a yogācāra monk is described as *yogam āsthitaḥ*, established in the practice of yoga (Saddhsu 7.12.7; trs. Stuart 2015, 1: 176).[27]

Stuart traces the evolution of 'the common term yogācāra […] as a Sanskritized form of the canonical Middle Indic term yoggācariya' (Stuart 2015: 227). In the Pāli canon the term *yoggācariya*[28] denoted animal trainer or horse charioteer (Stuart 2015, 1; 229), a familiar image that we also encounter in the Brahmanic literature (see section 0.2.3). Although in the early Pāli canon the use of *yoggācariya* seems to be 'a master of training' (Stuart 2015, 1: 232), the term comes to mean not just practitioner of yoga

[26] There are three narrative frames; the middle frame focuses on a master yogācāra and reflects on how an ordinary monk becomes a yogācāra.

[27] See Silk 1997 and Silk 2000. For further discussions on the term '*yogācāra'* and its expression in early sources, see: Demiéville 1951; Buescher 2008 10-15; and Deleanu 2012.

[28] The discussions about the word *yogācāra* must also consider the related Pāli word *yogāvacāra*. The 2nd-century *Milindapañha*, for example, contains 207 occurrences of this Pāli term (Seton 2009: 35). For more on *yogāvacāra*, see Silk 2000.

but also master of yoga.[29] Rejecting Silk's assessment of yogācāra as a generic term, Stuart argues that the *Saddhsu* demonstrates the use of the term yogācāra 'in a precise way, to refer to a specific type of meditation practitioner, with a specific set of practices and a mastery of karma' (Stuart 2015, 1: 226). Given that the ideal subject of the *Saddhsu* is a yogācāra, the identification of this subject as a yogin reinforces the connection between the two terms:[30]

> *yo nādatte 'śubhaṃ karma śubhakarmarataḥ sadā*
> *candrāṃśunirmalaratir yogī bhavati tādṛśaḥ*
> (*Saddhsu* 4.2.24.3)
> He who, not taken up with unwholesome action,
> constantly delights in wholesome action,
> is one who delights in purity, [which is like the cool] rays of the moon.
> Such a person is a practitioner[31] (trs. Stuart 2015, 1: 377).

This dissertation assumes a working definition of yogācāra as indicating 'one who practices a discipline of yoga'. *Yogācāra* in the YĀBh, then, appears to have been a general appellation for Buddhist practitioners of yoga in the way that yogin was a general label for those practicing in Brahmanic circles. Deleanu, for one, wants to keep the terms yogin and yogācāra separate and proposes that yogin should denote a Brahmanic yogin and yogācāra a Buddhist ascetic (Deleanu 2006: 35 fn 4). In the interest of clarity I will follow this convention.[32]

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[29] The term *yoggācariya* also appears in the Second Minor Rock Edict of Aśoka in the form of *yūg*[y]*ācāriyāni*. Stuart comments that this reference is to non-Buddhist religious practitioners (Stuart 2015, 1: 233).

[30] This passage from the *Śrāvakabhūmi* shows how yogācāras were also referred to as yogins: *tatra labdhamanaskārasya yoginaḥ / evaṃ parīttaprahāṇaratipraviṣṭasya tadūrdhvaṃ dve gatī bhavataḥ / ananye / katame dve tadyathā / laukikī ca lokottarā ca / tatrāyam lokottarayā veti* (ŚBh S 14A.3-7b; Wayman 1960: 125).

[31] Although Stuart has translated *yogī* as 'practitioner', I would venture that it means yoga practitioner more specifically.

[32] Nonetheless as Deleanu points out: 'the ŚrBh does not, however, seem to make a doctrinally relevant distinction between these two words' (Deleanu 2006: 35 fn 4). Silk agrees with this point, discounting any sectarian limits on the term 'yogācāra' (Silk 1997: 233).

3.2.2. Sarvāstivāda *yogācāra*

The **Yogācārabhūmi* was first composed in Śrāvakayāna[33] circles, specifically Sarvāstivāda,[34] even though the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* was later designated as part of Mahāyāna tradition.[35] Centuries before Yogācāra was identified as a distinct school of philosophy (in the 5th-6th century), there were already yogācāra communities in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma stream of Śrāvakayāna Buddhism. Deleanu argues that the early yogācāra scribes of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* were straightforward adherents of Sarvāstivāda doctrines (Deleanu 2006: 169). Indeed, the very title of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* reflects its Śrāvakayāna affiliation. It is evident, then, that yogācāra, as a strand of Buddhist meditative practice, emerged within the Sarvāstivāda tradition.

> Already in the 1st century CE, a tradition of Sarvāstivāda *yogācāras*, with its own theoretical and praxis-related peculiarities, commences to be active in the production of meditation treatises and manuals (Deleanu 2006: 161-162).[36]

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[33] This study will use the term Śrāvakayāna to refer to the school of Buddhism formerly called Hīnayāna, but also referred to by contemporary scholars as Mainstream. This school includes the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma tradition.

[34] As noted above, the two translations of the **Yogācārabhūmi* into Chinese still have a recognisable 'Śrāvakayānika core' with some Mahāyānist elements (Deleanu 2006: 158).

[35] Early Mahāyāna is conventionally divided into two schools, Nāgārjuna's 'nihilistic' Madhyamaka school with its doctrine of *śūnyatā* (emptiness) and Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's 'idealist' Yogācāra school with its doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* (store consciousness). Recent and contemporary scholarship has problematized the neat divisions of schools, founders, and doctrines, and we must accept that the emergence and interaction of the 'schools' was more dynamic, messy, and complicated than this. See section 0.1.2.

[36] Deleanu clarifies this point: 'if we exclude the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmiviniścaya* as well as the few sporadic Mahāyāna accretions and elements, the rest of the *Yogācārabhūmi* could have evolved and remained a *śāstra* within the 'Lesser Vehicle' spectrum […] The *Yogācārabhūmi* became a fundamental treatise of one of India's major Mahāyāna traditions in spite of the fact that a large part of it contains or presupposes no teachings peculiar to the Great Vehicle' (Deleanu 2006: 182). Kragh agrees that the YĀBh became 'in its final redacted form, a virtual Mainstream Buddhist discourse with an imperative Mahāyāna slant'. See also Kritzer 2005: xix-xx, who concurs with this analysis. However, Stuart suggests that Deleanu, in characterizing the YĀBh as predominantly Śravakayāna in tone 'may very well have overlooked the incipient *vijñānavāda* ideas that

Yamabe also supports this argument, noting that the close connections between the **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa (*Xiuxing dao di jing*), An Shigao's *Dao di jing* and the YĀBh suggest that '*yogācāra* meditators were forming their own, somewhat distinct circle within the general Sarvāstivāda community' (Yamabe 2013: 601). Later on, these Sarvāstivāda yogācāras became influenced by the *bodhisattva* path or the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (Deleanu 2006: 170).[37] Although yogācāra communities emerged within Sarvāstivāda, an enhanced focus on yoga discipline became a key marker by which Mahāyāna sought to distinguish itself from Śrāvakayāna Buddhism (Kragh 2013b: 25).

In summary, it is an overstatement to characterize the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* as a Mahāyāna text. Early *yogācāra* practice was liminal, existing at the threshold of Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna.[38] The 4th-century *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* contains not just one model of yoga, but rather at least two: one indebted to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma scholasticism and one intent on forging an innovated and applied concept of yoga discipline, yogācāra. This characterization of yogācāra as partly Sarvāstivādin in origin is relevant to our consideration of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. As I argued in Chapter 2, there are overlaps and interactions between the

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are present in texts such as the **Yogācārabhūmi* of Buddhasena' (Stuart 2015, 1: 280), i.e. the *Damoduoluo chan jing*.

[37] Although *yogācāra* was initiated in Sarvāstivāda circles, when we take into account the self-representation of the YĀBh, the highest system of yoga depicted is ultimately characterized as Mahāyāna yoga. This is because the ultimate attainment in the path structure is that of the *bodhisattva*, the quintessential Mahāyāna ideal and the figure who embodies fully realized and compassionate Buddhahood. The YĀBh focuses on the mainstream practices of *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha*, but 'its overall objective seems to be to present a coherent structure of Buddhist *yoga* practice with the Mahāyāna path of the *bodhisattva* placed at the pinnacle of the system' (Kragh 2013b: 25).

[38] We must also acknowledge that the term yogācāra began to appear in both Śrāvakāyana and Mahāyāna sources from the first century CE onwards (Deleanu 2006: 224 fn 142). As Kragh points out, the YĀBh seeks to strike a balance between Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhist practice and 'endeavours to juxtapose and align these meditational systems of *yoga'* (Kragh 2013b: 29)

Pātañjalayogaśāstra and the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. All this points to a strong role for the Sarvāstivāda school of Śrāvakayāna Buddhism in the formation of early yoga. To put it another way, we might argue that at least some of the roots of classical yoga are firmly planted in the Sarvāstivāda tradition and its inherently scholastic and doctrinal character.

Early yogācāra was affiliated with the northwest region of India. The legendary yogācāra masters are described as hailing from Kashmir (Demiéville 1951: 364-366). Given the association of early yogācāra with Sarvāstivāda thought, this is no surprise; the Kashmir Valley also formed the central region for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika tradition that produced the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Buescher 2008: 11 fn 3).[39] The 2nd-century *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣaśāstra* refers to Sarvāstivāda meditation practitioners[40] – yogācāra or yogācārya – on some 140 occasions (Deleanu 2006: 213 fn 61).[41]

> Thought not a school apart, the *yogācāras* seem to have constituted a distinct group or groups, and the scholastic masters (*vaibhāṣika*) usually mention their views with much respect (Deleanu 2006: 158).

Furthermore, in terms of the emergence of Mahāyāna, Demiéville argues that there were yogācāra Maitreya cults in the Northwest region in the early centuries of the CE (Demiéville 1951). Of course, we must be prepared to think beyond an exclusive association with the northwest because the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣaśāstra* also mentions 'Northern yogācāras',

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[39] The Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang, who visited India between 629-645 CE, observed that Sarvāstivādin monasteries only existed in the northwest region and the upper north Ganges Valley. Another Chinese pilgrim Yijing, who was a Sarvāstivādin and visited between 671-695 CE, noted that this sect was dominant only in the northwest and in the region now called Indonesia.

[40] As Deleanu points out: 'It is impossible to ascertain how these *yogācāra*s were organized. They may have been one single unitary group or loosely connected groups' (Deleanu 2006: 217 fn 92).

[41] See also Davidson 1985: 126ff for the analysis that Hsüang-tsang's translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* (around 150 CE) contains 60 instances of the word *yogācāra* and that almost all bar three refer to 'master meditator'.

'Southern yogācāras' and 'yogācāras everywhere'.[42] Deleanu's assessment is that these regional groups were not doctrinally different, but rather 'the difference between these groups refers to a gloss of a linguistic nature' (Deleanu 2006: 213 fn 62). Generally, however, we can assert that Kashmiri Sarvāstivāda yogācāras played a major role in the formation of the early *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and that early yogācāra developed in the northwest.

3.2.3 What was early yogācāra practice?

We have established that there were early yogācāras who were adherents of the Sarvāstivāda tradition. Let us now try to understand who they might have been and what they practised. What did the yoga practice in the YĀBh entail?

The 'yoga discipline' of yogācāra primarily denoted systems of meditation. This is evident in the general yogācāra literature of the period and specifically in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. In his translation of the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*, a Sarvāstivāda meditation sūtra, Stuart renders yogācāra as not only 'meditation practitioner' (Stuart 2015, 1: 6) but more specifically 'master of yoga' (Stuart 2015, 1: 37). Yogācāra denoted 'a master practitioner whose spiritual presence can be interpreted as an instantiation of the power of the Buddha in the world' (Stuart 2015, 1: 30-31). In the *Saddhsu*, yogācāra is a meditative practice of discernment (*prajñā*) (Stuart 2015, 1: 227), specifically in relation to the laws of karma, with one gaining a level of omniscience comparable to the Buddha's. Furthermore, the yogācāra are depicted as a unique group with elevated status: not only does the Buddha state that he does not see anyone other than his yogācāra disciples (*yogācāo macchrāvakaḥ*) (Stuart 2015, 1: 61), but the Buddha himself was originally a part of this community (Stuart 2015, 1: 235). Buescher suggests that there was a distinctive visionary quality to the practices called yogācāra that developed in north-west India

[42] AMVibh T27.704b27-cl.

(greater Kashmir, Gandhara, Afghanistan, Gilgit) (Buescher 2008). Schlingloff concurs, providing a summary of the visionary experiences of the yogācāras described in the Kyzyl Yoga fragment found in Central Asia, which dates to circa 5th-century CE[43] and which may originally have come from Kashmir (Schlinghoff 1964: 28-56). This includes visual meditative exercises related to the four elements (*dhātu-prayoga*), repulsion towards the physical (*aśubha-prayoga*), the aggregates (*skandhaparīkṣā*), aspects of the dependent co-arising model (*pratītyasamutpāda*), the four immeasurables (*apramāṇās*), as well as contemplations (*anusmṛti*) of the Buddha, the dharma, etc.[44]

The *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* refers to the existence of exclusive communities of yogācāras who were not just ordinary meditation practitioners but rather an advanced or elite class of 'rigorous meditators, whose commitment to *yoga* practice was extraordinary and incessant' (Kragh 2013: 31).[45] At the outset of the **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa (1st-2nd century), we are provided with definitions of both 'yogācāra' and 'yogācārabhūmi':

> Definition of *yogācāra*: the practice of cultivation and the exercises. Definition of *yogācārabhūmi*: one who is practicing the practice, this is the ground of practising (SYCB 182 b29-182c14).[46]

Here we have an instance in which yogācāra refers not a practitioner but to the practice itself. Specifically, the **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa supports these definitions with two prescriptions of what one should refrain from (anger, lust, etc.) and what one should cultivate (kindness, chastity, etc). In

[43] Dating from Buescher 2008.

[44] See also Ruegg 1967: 157 and Demiéville 1951, in which he discusses *buddhānusmṛti* as a characteristic feature of yogācāra in relation to Saṅgharakṣa and Buddhasena.

[45] There are complex taxonomies of practitioner in the YĀBh, including hierarchical rankings in terms of social status (householder, ascetic, solitary disciple, monk/nun), ability (novice, intermediate, advanced), and overarching path affiliation (*śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha*, *bodhisattva*). As we shall see, the goal of yogācāra depends on which path structure one takes: the path of the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha*, or the *bodhisattva*.

[46] 'Définition de yogācāra: "Pratiquer la culture et les exercices." Définition de yogācārabhūmi: "Ce que pratique le pratiquant, c'est la la terre du pratiquant" (trans. from Chinese, Demiéville 1951; 398).

practice, there are two steps of meditation: *śamatha* is contemplation of impurity (*aśubha*) and controlled breathing techniques, and *vipaśyana* is contemplation of emptiness (Demiéville 1951: 399). (For more on the YĀBh specifically, see 3.3 below).

In terms of lifestyle, many yogācāras were ordained monks.[47] Yogācāra often appears in the phrase '*yogācāra bhikṣu*' ('yoga practitioner monk' is Kragh's translation). This not only suggests that many such meditation adepts were ordained, but also that the intended audience of the YĀBh were monks and nuns who formed 'a circle of meditation savants' (Kragh 2013b: 31). Kragh asserts that the monastic component of the yogācāra's identity may in fact be a central feature in the YĀBh, irrespective of whether yogācāras in the earlier periods were so inclined (Kragh 2013b: 31).
The section on general meditative objects in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* ends by explaining how a monk who is a yoga practitioner should practise the next set of foci. He is referred to using the common epithet '*bhikṣur yogī yogācāraḥ'*, a label that combines three states of monk, yogin, and practitioner of yoga. Buescher points out that *bhikṣur yogī yogācāraḥ* is a 'standing phrase' in works such as the *Revatasūtra*, which is quoted in the ŚBh (Buescher 2008: 11).[48] All three nouns appear in the nominative case and are apposite, indicating that *bhikṣu*, *yogin*, and *yogācāra* were three distinct categories. Silk suggests that, in this phrase, *yogin* is a synonym for *yogācāra bhikṣu* (Silk 2000: 302-303). However, I concur with Stuart, who most plausibly translates the phrase as 'meditator monk, a yoga practitioner' (Stuart 2015, 1: 281) – thereby making *bhikṣur yogī* a gloss for *yogācāra*. Thus a yogācāra was conventionally a monk-yogin.

[47] The second *yogasthāna* of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* contains an exposition of the word 'person' or *pudgala* in relation to practice, listing labels used by the Buddha. The types of practitioner include *śramaṇa* (renunciant), *brāhmaṇa* (Brahmin), *brahmacārin* (celibate one), *bhikṣu* (monk), *yati* (ascetic, striver), and *parivrājaka* (itinerant mendicant). On the whole, however, the context of the yogācāra is specifically that of a monk. For the contrary view, that a *yogācāra* is not necessarily a monk, see Silk 2000: 304-305.

[48] See also this example, from the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* (early centuries CE): *bhikṣubhikṣuṇyupāsakopāsikā yogino yogācārā* (SDhPu 6,12 cited in Buescher 2008: 11).

There are many theories as to how Mahāyāna ideology arose within Buddhism. One argument is that Mahāyāna emerged as an orthodox response among ascetic forest monks to restore what they saw as a purer form of Buddhism.[49] This locates the roots of Mahāyāna yoga in forest-dwelling monastic asceticism. Whatever the outcome of the larger debates regarding Mahāyāna, the texts depict the yogācāra as a forest-dweller, which is a synonym for any isolated place, not necessarily a forest as such (Harrison 2003; Stuart 2015, 1: 227). The feature of isolation is a basic condition of asceticism. The **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa describes the yogācāra as engaging in solitary meditation in his hermitage (*araṇya*) under a tree (SYCB 24. 219a-b; Demiéville 1951: 419) and, in another chapter, in his hermitage or in an isolated place (SYCB 7.190, 12-16c; Demiéville 1951: 401). In its account of the practice of cultivation (*bhāvanā*), the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* explains how adverse conditions arise in different types of practitioners: householders (*āgārika*), renunciants or ordained persons (*pravrajita*), and those who have entered into solitude to practise yoga.[50] This very statement implies that yoga is not practised by a householder, an ordained monk, or a renunciate – but that yoga discipline is reserved for a different class of practitioner. The *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* also describes how the yogācāra enters deep seclusion with tranquility practices, and attains mastery through devotion to ascetic austerity. These higher stages of isolated ascetic austerity indicate that the most advanced levels of *yogācāra* were uniquely demanding and not conducive to the social life of the householder or even an ordained monk in a monastery. The

[49] There is not space here to fully address the range of scholarly positions regarding the 'origins' of Yogācāra doctrine. Buescher usefully maps out three important theses, setting his own research on the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* against Lindtner's on the proto-*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and against Schmithausen's theories (Buescher 2008: 4-6). For other recent in-depth discussions, see Boucher 2008 and Drewes 2010 and 2018, who have respectively argued for and against the forest hypothesis to account for early Mahāyāna.

[50] This is explained in the seventh segment of the BhāvBh, which describes the *bhāvanāmārga* (the path of cultivation) as part of the higher path of practice (*lokottaramārga*). One 'lives in a remote and secluded place' (*prāntāni ca śayanāsanāni pratiniṣevate*) (Sugawara 2013: 806).

Śrāvakabhūmi extols the *arhat* Revata (ŚBh 2.8b.4-5c; Wayman 1960: 86), who was declared by the Buddha to be 'foremost among the forest-dwellers' (*araññakānaṃ*) (*Aṅguttara Nikāya* i.24) and who delighted in solitude and was described as sitting cross-legged (Malalasekera 1938 II: 753-754). The conditions for yoga discipline are as follows: a state of retreat; isolation in a desolate place; sitting all day in seated posture; cultivating one-pointedness of mind (*cittaikāgratā*), and attaining *samādhi*, which is a stream of mind characterized by bliss whose focus is an object of constant mindfulness. Again, it is clear that this level of isolated yoga practice is not compatible with social living. The picture emerges of a meditation practice that relies on intensely continuous cultivation and an ascetic lifestyle in isolated conditions. This point is underlined in the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* in which a yogācāra is a forest-dwelling ascetic monk who practices sense control. However asceticism in itself is not the goal but rather the lifestyle that facilitates the practice of pure meditation:

> He whose mind delights in
> abodes of groves and forests,
> or in beds of grass in the charnel ground,
> such a person is a [true] monk
> (Saddhsu 5.2.12.9; trs. Stuart 2015, 1: 461).[51]

The opposite state of yogācāra meditation is *kausīdya* (indolence), hinting at the role of austerity in this lifestyle:

> Skillful in the practice of meditation,
> far removed from indolence,
> he who practices for the benefit of beings
> is known as a forest monk
> (Saddhsu 5.2.12.17; trs. Stuart 2015, 1; 463)[52]

To sum up: another defining feature of yogācāra was isolated asceticism away from the daily activities and routines of the monastery setting.

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[51] *vanāraṇyavihāreṣu śmaśānatṛṇasaṃstare | ramate yasya tu mano bhikṣur bhavati tādṛśaḥ*

[52] *dhyānādhyayanakarmaṇyaḥ kausīdyaṃ yasya dūrataḥ | hitakārī ca sattvānām āraṇyo bhikṣur ucyate*

In assessing the identity of the ideal subject and audience of the YĀBh, we must not overlook the frame of the text itself. Who produced the voluminous *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* (now that we have put to one side the notion of a single author)? Hakamaya argues that the YĀBh must have been compiled by monks who were scholars as well as meditators (Hakamaya 2013). Stuart depicts the yogācāras as a 'textual community' that was involved in the production and transmission of texts (Stuart 2015, 1: 227). Scholarly credentials would certainly have been required, given the erudite nature of the Sarvāstivāda content of much of the YĀBh. Indeed, Kragh points out that the YĀBh appropriated the authoritative prestige of the large Abhidharma treatises 'by imitating their literary guise' (Kragh 2013b: 46). Such literate and learned scribes were perhaps one and the same as the forest meditators. In short, we should not assume that yogācāras were 'mere' practitioners of yoga, devoid of philosophical speculation. Deleanu asserts that, whenever necessary, yogācāras could become 'part-time Ābhidhārmikas' to discuss their own doctrines (Deleanu 2006: 217 fn 91).

There has been much written on the identity of the *pūrvācārya*s in the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, but we can be sure that some of the references are to yogācāras.[53] The AKBh also contains references to *pūrvayoga*, which is generally taken as referring to 'ancient yoga' (Hirakawa 1963: 241) and also to *pūrvacārya*s, the 'old masters'.[54] Deleanu posits that in the AKBh the label *pūrvācārya*, 'masters of yore', refers specifically to the Sautrāntikas, and that some positions attributed to the Sautrāntikas in the AKBh also appear in the YĀBh. Indeed, there is a body of scholarship on the likely doctrinal influence of the Sautrāntikas on the philosophical orientation of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (Deleanu 2006: 159). Nishi, for example, proposed that individual groups of yogācāras identified their philosophical views as belonging to Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika (Nishi 1975). In his commentary on the AKBh, Yaśomitra (commenting on AKBh 3.15c) equates the two terms and refers to '*pūrvācāryā yogācārā āryāsaṅgaprabhṛtayaḥ*',

[53] For a summary of scholarship on this issue, see Park 2014.

[54] There are three references to *yogācāra* in the AKBh: AKBh 3.15, 4.4, and 6.10.

which means '[The expression] 'earlier masters' [refers to] the Yogācārās, starting with the noble Asaṅga and so forth' (trans. Skilling 2013: 773 fn3).[55]

The elite status of yogācāras as advanced practitioners may also point to initiation and secrecy. Arguing that the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* distinctly reworks Nāgārjuna's two truths for a new audience, Aramaki suggests that 'a bodhisattva yogācāra is an expert in the secrets of mind, conception, and consciousness' (Aramaki 2013: 420). Being an expert in 'supreme truth' allows the yogācāra to teach on the mundane or conventional truth of *citta*, *manas,* and *vijñāna*. What qualifies the yogācāra to access supreme truth is initiation, which then enables him/her to teach to uninitiated *bodhisattva*s (Aramaki 2013: 421). Yogācāras were also granted special status due to their supernatural powers. A passage from the *Mahāvastu* warns bodhisattvas of being distracted on the path by yogācāras who constantly dwell in meditation (Senart 1882-97: 1.120). Stuart suggests this association with supernatural powers was also a defining feature of early yogācāras and set them apart: 'certain folks were threatened by yogācāras precisely because they were practitioners with supernormal status' (Stuart 2015, 1: 304). This is evidenced by a passage from Buddhasena's **Yogācārabhūmi*:

> [From] one lofty state to another, he gradually controls the mind. Flying and transforming as he likes, unhindered, he is called a yogācāra due to the strength of his subtle and wondrous powers (Bybh CBETA, T15, no 618, p 319a25-27; cited in and trs. Stuart 2015, 1: 304).

Therefore the elite ranking of yogācāras may have reflected not only their mastery of techniques, their privileged association with the Buddha, and their learned status, but also the fact that some were initiated and were perceived to have supernatural capacities.

[55] The crediting of Asaṅga as the founder of Yogācāra can be traced to 6th-century commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośakārikā*, such as the *Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* by Yaśomitra. Other doxographical uses of the label yogācāra occur in the 6th-century commentaries of Sthiramati and Bhavya (Buescher 2008: 14).

To sum up: the yogācāras of the YĀBh were conventionally monks, but they were not everyday monks. They formed a special class of advanced practitioners who spent extended periods in meditation in austere conditions of isolated retreat. They were focused on cultivating *prajñā* and their meditative practices sometimes had a visionary quality. These yogācāras were also connected to a learned and philosophical community that recorded and systematized these practices of advanced meditation in texts. They may have undergone special initiation and were perceived to hold secret teachings and to possess extraordinary powers. Finally, they appear to have been concentrated in the northwest regions, particularly Kashmir. Doctrine aside, in this profile of the yogācāra, the main distinguishing features from the yogin of Patañjali's *yogaśāstra* are that a yogācāra was a monk and may have emphasized techniques of visualization. While Patañjali's yogin was a Brahmin, the other features of yogācāra identity (asceticism, isolation, scholasticism, mastery of meditation, possessing supernatural powers, residing in the northwest, etc.) can be regarded as shared aspects of identity.

3.3 Path systems of yogācāra in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*

It is beyond the scope of this work to provide an indepth analysis of the entire *Maulī Bhūmi* or the *Saṃgrahaṇī*.[56] Rather this study engages selectively with three books of the YĀBh that are available in Sanskrit and which discuss the topic of yoga in ways that prove most relevant for an intertextual analysis with the PYŚ. In particular, I focus on the earliest two books of the YĀBh, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, since their

[56] One of the challenges in working with the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* is its sheer size. The number of components that make up this overall text (14 books and four supplementary sections) mean that the nature of the scholarship on this text is still somewhat fragmented, with gaps in critical editions and translations. Although completely extant in Chinese and Tibetan, not all parts of the YĀBh have been preserved in Sanskrit. In the past decades, more fragments and manuscripts have been discovered in Sanskrit, which makes engagement easier, but relatively few critical editions have been produced recently. For an overview of the state of YĀBh philology in Sanskrit, see Delhey 2013.

presentations of yogācāra predate the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Additionally, I consider the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*, not only because of its intertextuality with the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, but also because, as a manual on meditative cultivation, it details a precise and unique discipline that is pertinent to Pātañjala yoga. Lastly, I highlight aspects of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* (embedded in the *Saṃgrahaṇī*), which also contains key discussions of yogācāra. Since each of these books or parts of the YĀBh started out as an independent meditation treatise, each textual unit contains its own system of yogācāra, or yoga discipline.

3.3.1 *Śrāvakabhūmi*

The *Śrāvakabhūmi* is the second largest book in the Basic Section (*Maulī Bhūmi*); only the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is longer. Along with the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, it is one of the two oldest layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, and in this sense it is a key book in assessing the early formation of yogācāra. Versions of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* were in circulation independently before being incorporated into the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.[57] The *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* are interlinked, with the BoBh generally thought to be dependent on the ŚBh. Along with the *Pratyekabuddhabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* forms one text in a sequential trio that describes the 'vehicles' of Buddhism. As we have noted, the YĀBh is not a Mahāyāna text in the majority of its content, and so, contrary to expectation, the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* paths of practice are given just as much space, context, and importance as the

[57] Although the **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa is 'not a direct textual prototype of the *Śrāvakabhūmi'* it is nonetheless 'one of its distant 'forefathers'' and 'probably represents the same ascetic current which led to the birth of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*' (Deleanu 2006: 158). We do not know if *Śrāvakabhūmi* was the original title of the text, and Deleanu suggests that it may even have been called *Yogācārabhūmi*: 'It is not excluded that what is now the *Śrāvakabhūmi* may have first been called *Yogācārabhūmi* in the sense of 'levels or ground of spiritual praxis' […] and as new related texts and parts kept on being compiled the title of *Yogācārabhūmi* was employed for the whole corpus' (Deleanu 2006: 221-222 fn 126).

bodhisattva path, which is nonetheless the ideal path.[58] In these texts combined, then, we encounter a particular strand of yogic ascetic thought from the early centuries CE.

As the name suggests, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* is a work dedicated to the Śrāvakayāna spiritual path, and the ideal is the attainment of arhatship (in contrast to the *pratyekabuddha* or *bodhisattva* ideal). The *Śrāvakabhūmi* is a technical book that explains the *saṃbhāra*s (requisites) for practice in great detail. It contains two parallel paths, the mundane path (*laukika mārga*) and the supramundane path (*lokottara mārga*). The mundane path consists of eight attainments (*samāpatti*s) and the supramundane path is comprised of contemplation of the four noble truths and knowing them as they are in reality (*yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti*).[59]

The second *yogasthāna* opens with a series of questions about yogācāra:

> *katamā śikṣā / katame śikṣānulomikā dharmāḥ katamo yogabhraṃśaḥ katame yogāḥ katamo manaskāraḥ kati yogācārāḥ / katamad yogakaraṇīyaṃ katamā yogabhāvanā katamad bhāvanāphalam* (Śbh 7A.9-2a; Wayman 1960: 83)
> 'What is the instruction (*śikṣā*)? What are the natures consistent with the instruction? What is the breakdown of *yoga*? What are the *yoga*s? What is the mental orientation (*manaskāra*)? How many are the practitioners of yoga (*yogācāra*)? What is the business of yoga? What is the intense contemplation of yoga (*yogabhāvanā*)? What is the fruit of intense contemplation?' (trans. Wayman 1960: 83).

The *yogasthāna* then goes on to answer these questions in turn, providing technical definitions, and an overall definition of yoga as consisting of four elements: 1. faith (*śraddhā*) 2. aspiration (*chandas*) 3. perseverance (*vīrya*) and 4. application of spiritual methods (*upāya*: *tatra yogaḥ katamaḥ / āha / caturvidho yogaḥ / tadyathā śraddhā chando vīrye upāyaś ca* (Śbh 9B.7-7b; Wayman 1960: 92). It also describes three different kinds of yoga

[58] However, the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins in the AKBh and some works by Asaṅga also judge the *śrāvaka* path as inferior and the *pratyekabuddha* path as middling in comparison to the bodhisattva path, although both produce personal liberation.

[59] Literally: 'He knows it as it is.'

practitioners who make up the seven steps of the path of contemplation (*manaskāra*). The first is the beginner (*ādikarmiko yogācāraḥ*) who has not yet achieved one-pointedness and is practising the lowest level of contemplation, *manaskāra*. The second is the adept (*kṛtaparicaya*), who is more developed and practices the second to sixth levels of *manaskāra*. The third is one who has transcended *manaskāra* (*atikrāntamanaskāra*), and has reached the seventh level or fruit of the practice. The final goal of *śrāvaka* meditation is a twofold process: the old basis of existence ends, *āśrayanirodha*, and a transformed one replaces it, *āśrayaparivarta*. As we saw in Chapter 2, this process of the destruction of the ontological substratum, or *āśraya*, is also central to the process of mental liberation in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*.

3.3.2 *Bodhisattvabhūmi*

The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) is the culmination of the three books that deal with the types of practitioners from the three vehicles or *triyāna*: *śrāvaka*s, *pratyekabuddha*s, and *bodhisattva*s (with the *bodhisattva* belonging to the Mahāyāna vehicle). Together with the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, this is one of the oldest parts of the YĀBh, and it is the longest book. The goal of *yogācāra* for the *bodhisattva* is personal liberation while alive, in which one remains embodied in order to work tirelessly for the liberation of all sentient beings, achieved through teaching. This yoga is crystallised in the practicing of the six perfections of *dāna* (generosity), *śīla* (moral conduct), *kṣānti* (patience), *vīrya* (vigour), *dhyāna* (meditation) and *prajñā* (wisdom or insight).[60]

The BoBh contains a sevenfold path of stages (*bhūmi*s), which is offset against 13 abodes (*vihāra*s). The seven *bhūmi*s are:

1. *gotrabhūmi* (stage of innate potential)
2. *adhimuktacāryabhūmi* (stage of firm conviction)
3. *śuddhādhyāśayabhūmi* (stage of superior aspiration)
4. *caryāprattipattibhūmi* (stage of correct practice)

[60] …*dāne 'pi prayujyate śīle kṣāntau vīryem dhyāne prajñāyām api prayujyate iti* (BoBh 1.1)

5. *niyatabhūmi* (stage of certainty)
6. *niyatacaryābhūmi* (stage of determined practice)
7. *niṣṭhāgamanabhūmi* (stage of arrival at the ultimate)

This progressive path is correlated to a better-known system of *bhūmi*s, the *daśabhūmi* (ten *bhūmi*s), which also appear in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (see 3.4.5 and 3.5.2 below). In this correlation, the seventh stage in the above path, *niṣṭhāgamanabhūmi,* is understood to correspond to the 10th stage of the *daśabhūmi*s, the *dharmameghabhūmi* (the stage of the cloud of dharma), which represents the apex of attainment and enlightenment itself. However, scholars regard the two soteriological systems in the BoBh (the sevenfold *bhūmi*s and the tenfold *bhūmi*s) as independently co-evolved.

3.3.3 *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*

The *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* is book nine of the YĀBh. Sections of the BhāvBh are based on the content of the *Śrāvakabhūmiḥ*, the earliest layer of the entire YĀBh (Sugawara 2013: 847; von Rospatt 2013: 854) and both books recount a path of seven stages of contemplation (*manaskāra*). The *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* may originally have been an independent work that was revised to fit in with the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, after being joined to them (Sugawara 2013: 849). Like the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (and most of the YĀBh), the orientation of the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* is Śrāvakayāna.[61] Whereas the *Śrāvakabhūmi* presents the seven stages of contemplation more doctrinally, the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* is concerned with the practical details (von Rospatt 2013: 854). Within the structure of the YĀBh, the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* is grouped with two other books and occupies the last place in a threefold exposition: the *Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ*, the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ*, and the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*. Together, the three texts reflect a path structure of listening, reflecting, and practice – representing a continuum from absorbing teachings to implementing them correctly.

[61] Von Rospatt reminds us that there are no traces of the *bodhisattva* ideal in this book, no substantial treatment of *śūnyatā* nor of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* (von Rospatt 2013: 854). However, this does not mean that the book is unaware of the Māhayāna context; indeed, it cites the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

As its title suggests, *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* explains the foundation (*bhūmi*) of meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*), which is defined as yoga.[62] The BhāvBh foregrounds the obstacles to meditation and the appropriate counterstate, *pratipakṣa,* for each case. Yoga is defined as the cultivation of the counterstates to the obstacles, *pratipakṣabhāvanā*. The BhāvBh presents four sequential stages of *yogabhāvanā*, or cultivation of yoga: the conditions for cultivating yoga (*yogabhāvanāpada*), the foundation for the cultivation of yoga (*yogabhāvanopaniṣat*), the cultivation of yoga (*yogabhāvanā*), and the result of cultivation, *bhāvanāphala*. This fourth stage bifurcates into two paths, worldly purification and supramundane purification. The worldly and supramundane outcomes mirror the two *mārga*s of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* – the *laukikamārga* and the *lokottaramārga* – but the ŚBh is a more comprehensive treatise. In the BhāvBh, the four stages of *yogabhāvana* are mapped within a wider structure of seven book segments.[63] The four stages are as follows:

1. *Yogabhāvanāpada*

The initial conditions for cultivation, *yogabhāvanāpada,* are tenfold.[64] Each of these ten conditions is itself a counterstate for a converse condition (i.e. finding a good teacher is the counterstate for not having a good teacher), but also, specifically, the condition of the *pañcāntarāyaṇi karmāṇi* (the five

[62] The *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* is not yet available in a critical edition and I therefore base my reading on the detailed summary of contents provided by Sugawara and on the extracts from the critical edition published therein (Sugawara 2013).

[63] The titles of these seven segments are, respectively: *abhinivṛtti saṃpat, saddharma-śravaṇa saṃpat, nirvāṇa pramukhatā, vimukti paripācinyāḥ prajnāyāḥ paripākaḥ, pratipakṣabhāvanā, sarvākāra laukikī viśuddhiḥ, and sarvākāra lokottarā viśuddhiḥ*

[64] Five conditions pertain to the self: being born human, in a good country, with healthy body and mind, free of the five obstacles (*pañcāntarāyaṇi karmāṇi*) and not believing in bad teachings (*adhimuktyanāvaraṇasaṃpat*). And five pertain to the external: finding a good teacher, receiving instructions from that teacher, receiving teaching on the highest meaning, attaining permanent understanding, and sustaining oneself with donations.

obstructive acts or obstacles) is remedied by *karmānāvaraṇa-saṃpat*, the perfection of being free of the obstacles (*anāvaraṇa*) of karma.[65]

2. *Yogabhāvanopaniṣat*

The basis of the cultivation of practice, *yogabhāvanopaniṣat*, is described in three *aṅgas*, which deal with listening to the genuine Dharma, the benefits of listening, and the proper absorption of the teaching via listening.[66]

3. *Yogabhāvanā*

The next *sthāna*, or topic, deals with the ensuing *yogabhāvanā*, the cultivation of practice. This section recounts the ten obstacles (*vipakṣa*)[67] to *yogabhāvanā* and their antidotes (*pratipakṣa*) [see below].[68] These obstacles apply to three different classes of practitioner: two obstacles apply to the householder (*āgarikāvasthā*), four obstacles apply to the ascetic (*pravrajitāvasthā*) and four obstacles apply to the solitary disciple who cultivates in seclusion (*praviviktasya pratisaṃlayanayogabhāvanāvasthā*). As the entire section on countering obstacles is titled *yogabhāvanā*, we can propose that the cultivation of yoga *is* the countering of obstacles.[69] In short, *yogabhāvanā* is *pratipakṣabhāvanā*.[70]

4. *Bhāvanāphala*

The next and final phase of practice yields the fruit of cultivation (*bhāvanāphala*). As with the ŚBh, there is a bifurcation of the outcomes into

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[65] Here, the *pañcāntarāyaṇi karmāṇi* refer to the five standard *nivaraṇa*s.

[66] Theodore Proferes has pointed out that this threefold structure of soteriology is also present in Vedānta. This topic deserves further investigation.

[67] Not all of the obstacles are explained, however. Only three are unpacked in detail (the first, third, and seventh): the awareness of foul things, the awareness of misery and the awareness of splendor.

[68] This same list is also found in the ŚrBh 268 (12)-270 (14).

[69] The segment that concentrates on the antidotes is itself titled '*Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*'. It is, as Sugawara puts, it 'the core part of the entire book' (Sugawara 2013: 800).

[70] *Yogabhāvanā* is also presented in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* as step four of the twelfth segment of the second *yogasthāna* (topic of yoga). There are two types of cultivation: 1. *saṃjñābhāvanā*, cultivation of notions, and 2. *bodhipakṣyā bhāvanā*, the cultivation of the 37 factors of awakening. For more on the 37 factors, see Gethin 2007.

purification at the mundane level (*laukika*) and purification at the supramundane level (*lokottara*). At the mundane level, the focus is on *samādhi* (concentration), which is broken down into three steps: the acquisition of *samādhi* (*samādhilābha*), the fulfilment of *samādhi* (*samādhiparipūri*), and the mastery of samādhi (*samādhivaśitā*). At the supramundane level the four noble truths are realized via a reflective process called *abhisamaya* (*satyābhisamaya*).[71] The mind must be suitably frightened or stirred (*cittasaṃvigna*) and steadied (*cittashithi*), with all obstacles countered and all *anuśaya* (seeds of *kleśa*) eliminated. Then ensues final liberation.

3.3.4 *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*

Related to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (SNS), an independent text that is quoted in its entirety (bar its prologue and colophons) in the supplementary section of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* that discusses the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The SNS is seen as pivotal in the advent of Mahāyāna thought in that it announces itself as the third 'turning of the wheel of dharma' and elaborates the core doctrines of *ālayavijñāna* (store consciousness), *trisvabhāva* (the three aspects), and *vijñāptimātratā* (appearance-only). This short work[72] is extant only in Chinese and Tibetan.[73] This text has a chapter dedicated to yoga and shares the ten-fold path system of yogācāra that we find in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (with an 11th stage added, the *tathāgatabhūmi*). It posits its yoga path as superior to all to other yogas in polemical fashion (see section 2.6 of this dissertation).

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[71] *Satyābhisamaya* is the 'realization of the four noble truths'.

[72] The SNS is considered to be stratified, either with clusters of chapters representing older and newer layers or with individual chapters representing prior independent texts (Matsuda 2013: 938). Aramaki suggest that chapters 5-8 constitute the oldest layer and a conscious attempt to form 'a new *Mahāyānasūtra'* (Aramaki 2013: 411).

[73] Matsuda has edited two fragments, written in Buddhist-Hybrid Sanskrit and in Sanskrit (Matsuda 2013). Other Sanskrit sections are available as quoted in Buddhist works such as Kamalaśīla's *Third Bhāvanākrāma* and Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya*.

If we follow Maas' dating for the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (325-425 CE),[74] then, the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* were all significantly earlier meditation treatises that contain the first systematised accounts of yoga discipline. All three *Bhūmi*s focused on in this study – the ŚBh, the BoBh and the BhāvBh – map out a systematic frame of ten *pratipakṣa*s (counterstates) to corresponding obstacles, and in the case of the ŚBh and the BhāvBh correlate this tenfold frame to a sevenfold path.[75] In the case of the BoBh and the SNS the tenfold path is itself constituted by a *pratipakṣa* to remove a *kleśa*. The most detailed presentation of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* in the YĀBh occurs in the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*.

3.4 *Pratipakṣabhāvanā*: the cultivation of the counterstate

In this section I bring Patañjali's *yogaśāstra* back into focus in order to demonstrate the presence of shared conceptual metaphors in the systems of yogācāra and yoga. I consider how the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* present a definition of yoga as *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, the cultivation of the counterstate.[76] Both the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* employ the notion of the counterstate as that which removes factors that impede liberation. This counterstate is designated as the *pratipakṣa* or *vipakṣa*, which both mean 'opposite'. *Pratipakṣabhāvanā*, then, is the systematic application of a counterstate in order to negate an unwanted factor, and each sequential application (of the counterstate) marks a stage on the path. Since *pratipakṣabhāvanā* is not a common paradigm in Brahmanic throught and it is a key soteriological paradigm in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, I argue that Patañjali's inclusion of this term is drawing on Buddhist sources.

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[74] Maas has recently narrowed down this date range to c.400 CE (Maas 2018).

[75] Although both the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* deal with the obstacles to the path (*mārga*), the treatment in the ŚBh is more ideal, while the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* appears to be more gounded in real-life examples.

[76] I use the neutral terms 'state' and 'counterstate' to denote the binary of problem/solution (which in soteriology reflects the ultimate binary of captivity/liberation).

Pratipakṣabhāvanā explains the elimination of *kleśa* (affliction), not by using the seed model (as in burning the seed of *kleśa* to eliminate germination potential), but rather using the binary model of factor/counterfactor. Within this conceptual frame, there are three distinct structural metaphors that appear in both the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*:

YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE (= *KLEŚA* IS A POISON)

YOGA IS A PATH (= *KLEŚA* IS AN OBSTACLE)

YOGA IS CLEAR VISION (= *KLEŚA* IS AN OBSCURATION)[77]

Scholars of Buddhism frequently translate the term *pratipakṣa* by using a medical term – that of the 'antidote'[78], 'remedy' or 'cure'. However, I argue that, in relation to all of our texts, such blanket usage of the term 'antidote' for *pratipakṣa* (or *vipakṣa,* a common synonym) is unsuitable because it foregrounds the medical paradigm of disease/remedy (YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE) at the expense of the other two structural metaphors (YOGA IS A PATH; YOGA IS CLEAR VISION) that also govern the topic of 'unwanted states and how to remove them'.[79] Instead, I propose that *pratipakṣabhāvanā* may be best translated by examining the metaphoric context of each use. These structural metaphors are combined to create the conceptual scheme of *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, which is, in turn, a constituent part of the larger and more complex image-schema of *bhāvanā* (spiritual cultivation). As I have discussed in Chapter 1, *bhāvanā* is an orientational metaphor that centres

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[77] There is also a fourth structural metaphor, YOGA IS PURIFICATION (= *KLEŚA* IS A DEFILEMENT), which constructs yoga as a purifying force that eliminates pollution, illness, or toxicity. However, given the complex contexts of ritual, medicine, and alchemy from which it derives, I must reserve that discussion for another occasion, and focus the analysis of this study more specifically on the context of botanical cultivation. (For a preliminary consideration of this topic, see fn 80 of this chapter). As the discussion in this present chapter shows, the contexts of the path (on the earth), (the field of) vision, and the (plant) antidote are all closely interwoven with metaphors of cultivation.

[78] For the translation of *pratipakṣa* as 'antidote', see, for example: Hanson 1998: 241; Mejor 1999: 114; Kragh 2013: 99; von Rospatt 2013: 789, 791-792, 794, 801; Woo 2014: 501.

[79] Of course *kleśa*s are not the only spiritual problems that require counterstates; in Buddhist discourse, the problem can also be framed as *āvaraṇa* (obscurant) or *nivaraṇa* (hindrance) and in Patañjali's text as an *antarāya* (obstacle).

on the agricultural image-schema of cultivating the soil. In this section, I narrow my analysis of *bhāvanā* to examine systematic accounts of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* as the yogic means to liberation.

3.4.1 *Pratipakṣabhāvanā* in Pātañjala yoga

The concept of *pratipakṣa* is vital in the soteriology of Pātañjala yoga. In Patañjali's path of *kriyā yoga* (the goal of which is to reduce the *kleśa*s), the overcoming of the *kleśa*s[80] is, by definition, the application of positive counterstates to eradicate the negative states of the *kleśa*s.[81] Patañjali foregrounds *pratipakṣabhāvanā* as a technique for success.[82]

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[80] *Kleśa* is not a prevalent term in Brahmanism, but we do find the related term *doṣa*, a 'fault' that can be remedied by a counterstate. The term *doṣa* itself is mapped from āyurvedic discourse, where the 'doctrine of the three humours, or *tridoṣa-vidyā*, teaches that the three semi-fluid substances are present in the body and regulate its state' (Wujastyk 2003: xvii). The three humours are wind (*vāta*), bile (*pitta*), and phlegm (*kapha* or *śleṣman*). The term *doṣa* migrated from medical discourse to soteriology. For further discussion, see Wujastyk 2012. See also Maas 2014a for an analysis of the paradigm of medicine in relation to soteriology in the PYŚ, focusing on PYŚ 2.14, 45-49. Furthermore, in the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* (2nd-3rd century CE) the section on yogic meditation describes the stages of yoga as counterstates: *dahyante dhmāyamānānāṃ dhātūnāṃ hi yathā malāḥ | tathendriyāṇāṃ dahyante doṣāḥ prāṇasya nigrahāt | prāṇāyāmaidaheddōṣān dhāraṇābhiśca kilbiṣam | pratyāhāreṇa saṃsargān dhyānenānīśvarān gūṇān* (MDh 6.72; Olivelle 2005: 608). 'He should burn away his faults by suppressing the breath, his taints by concentration, his attachments by the withdrawal of senses, and his base qualities by meditation' (MDh 6.72; trs. Olivelle 2005: 152). Being linked to defects of the body and their remedies, this metaphor maps qualities from the medical domain. Interestingly, however, the counterstate for eliminating the *doṣa*s in the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* is not a remedy or antidote but rather the application of intense heat to destroy impurity. This image of intense heat to remove a problematic factor in the self is one we examined in Chapter 2 as the fire necessary to remove the germinating impulse of the seed. The image of heat or fire in the body itself is linked to *tapas*, but also to the medical context of fever, as a potentially healing force.

[81] The Mīmāṃsā school also utilized the concept of the counterstate, specifically in relation to the notion of *śakti* (force, power, or efficacy). The Mīmāṃsakas conceived of a counterforce to *śakti*, which they termed a *pratibandhaka*. Matilal translates *pratibandhaka* as 'antidote' although it generally refers to an opposing force (Matilal 1985: 289).

[82] In compound with *pratipakṣa*, Patañjali's text uses the neuter form *bhāvana* while the Buddhist sources employ the feminine form *bhāvanā*. I have been unable to identify a clear

> *pratipakṣabhāvanād dhetor heyā vitarkā / yadāsya syur aprasavadharmāṇas tadā tatkṛtam aiśvaryaṃ yoginaḥ siddhisūcakaṃ bhavati* (PYŚ 2.35; Angot 2012: 498)
> When, for [the yogin], the contrary ideas that are to be abandoned become of sterile quality as a result of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* of the cause, then there arises for the yogin power (*aiśvarya*) caused by that, and it is an indication of success (*siddhisūcakam*).

This explanation weaves in the notion of sterility and non-propagation (*aprasava*) as the purpose of *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, reflecting that the obstacles are forms of the *kleśa*s, the seeds of which must be destroyed to succeed in yoga. In this example, Patañjali's elaboration of the counterstate is another expression of the theory of the elimination of the seed and we are returned, again, to the notion of dialogue with the Sautrāntikas. The path of *kriyā yoga* – the path that exterminates the *kleśa*s by countering them – is often overlooked in scholarship on Pātañjala yoga. I argue that it has as important a place in Patañjali's exposition of yoga as does the well-known *aṣṭāṅga* system.[83] *Kriyā yoga* therefore merits greater analysis.[84] It is in the exposition of *kriyā yoga* that *pratipakṣabhāvanā* is most clearly elaborated as a means to eliminate the *kleśas*:

> *tanutvam ucyate pratipakṣabhāvanopahatāḥ kleśās tanavo bhavanti* (PYŚ 2.4; Angot 2012: 381, line 12-13).

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difference in meaning between the two from the Monier-Williams or Edgerton dictionaries (Monier-Williams 1899; Edgerton 1953). In translated passages of the PYŚ, I retain the neuter noun, but in general discussion I use the feminine noun.

[83] For accounts of the historical 'isolation' of *aṣṭāṅga yoga* from Pātañjala yoga as a whole, see De Michelis 2005 and White 2014.

[84] Although Pātañjala yoga is often conflated with *aṣṭāṅga yoga* as its only path structure, the PYŚ contains several path structures with their own stages. In addition to the well-known *aṣṭaṅga* path of eight stages, Patañjali expounds a lesser-studied *kriyā yoga* path and a complex *nirbīja samādhi*. The *kriyā yoga* path has only three components (*tapas*, *svadhyāya*, *īśvarapraṇidhāna*), but *samādhipāda* outlines a complex system of *samādhi* with several branching, paired, and non-consecutive stages including: *nirbīja*/*sabīja samādhi*, *saṃprajñāta*/*asaṃprajñāta samādhi*, and the four *samāpatti*s. It is not my intention to map the path structure of *samādhi* here as others have attempted to do (See Literature Review in Chapter 1), because Pātañjala yoga is a syncretic path structure that combines aspects of other path structures and it cannot therefore necessarily be synthesized into a coherent conceptual whole.

> The *kleśas* become diminished when they are damaged by the cultivation of a counterstate (*pratipakṣabhāvana*). This is the definition of diminishment.

The outome of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* is cessation.[85] The importance of the paradigm of state and counterstate is also evident in a more subtle way in the nine obstacles or *antarāya*s, each of which is neutralized with a counterstate.[86] (I discuss the *antarāya*s further along.) In order to understand the context of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, we must turn to the Buddhist sources of the period.

3.4.2 *Pratipakṣabhāvanā* in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*

In the soteriologies under review in this study, *kleśa* is the key factor that opposes spiritual liberation.[87] The negative *kleśa* must be overcome using a

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[85] *yathaiva pratipakṣabhāvanāto nivṛttas tathaiva svavyañjakāñjanenābhivyakta iti* (PYŚ 2.4; Angot 2012: 381, lines 20-21). 'Just as cultivation of the counterstate produces cessation (*nivṛtta*), so do they (the *kleśas*) become manifest by revealing their character.' See Chapter 2 of this dissertation for a discussion of manifest and unmanifest *kleśa*s in relation to the seed of *kleśa*.

[86] Furthermore, the paradigm of state/counterstate is also present in more implicit ways. At the end of Patañjali's *samādhipāda*, seedless *samādhi* itself (i.e. *nirbīja samādhi*, the ultimate *samādhi*) is explained using the binary paradigm of state/counterstate. Certain types of mental imprints (*saṃskāra*s) act like counter-agents that cancel or sublate the active mind (*vyuthāna-citta*) (PYŚ 1.51, lines 6-7; Maas 2006: 86). 'By means of the *saṃskāras* conducive to *kaivalyam* along with those produced by the *samādhi* of ceased activity (*vyutthānanirodha*), the mind becomes dissolved in the ground of materiality (*prakṛti)* herself.'

[87] For more information on the *kleśa*s, see Chapter 2 of this study. To recap some salient points here: in early Buddhism, the *kleśa*s form a subset of the general class of obstacles called the *āsrava*s (the contaminants or impurities). The class is called *āsrava* (impurities) and other subsets include the *yoga*s (yokes) and the *ogha*s (floods). The *kleśa*s are commonly grouped as three, but they also appear in extended formulas. The *kleśa*s and their respective counterstates correspond to the nine levels of *saṃsāra.* These nine levels are spread across the three spheres of existence, the three *dhātu*s: one level in *kāmadhātu* (realm of desire) and four levels each in *rūpadhātu* (realm of form) and *arūpyadhātu* (formless realm). The elimination of *kleśa*s is essential to liberation. Both the four stages of the noble person (*āryapudgala*) and the ten stages of a *bodhisattva* are defined by this elimination.

technique of systematically applying the appropriate counterfactor or counterstate, generally known as the *pratipakṣa*. The concept of *pratipakṣa* is widely employed in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.[88] In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, there is a fivefold scheme in which each *kleśa* can be removed by a specific oppositional contemplation designed to negate it.

Table 3.1: The *kleśa*s and their counterstates in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*[89]

***Kleśa* (affliction)**	***Pratipakṣa* (opposing contemplation)**[90]
Rāga (passion)	*Aśubhabhāvanā* (cultivation of the unattractive)
Dveṣa (animosity) or *vyāpāda* (malice)	On the *brahmavihāra* of *maitrī* (compassion)
Moha (delusion)	On *pratītyasamutpāda* (12-fold chain of dependent origination)
Vitarka (discursive thought)	*Ānāpānasmṛti* (mindfulness of breathing)
Asmimāna (ego)	On the 18 *dhātu*s (sense fields)

In the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*, *pratipakṣabhāvanā* is the very definition of yoga. The *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* puts forward four stages of yoga and defines the third stage, *yogabhāvanā* (the cultivation of yoga), as

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[88] The metaphor of counterstates for the *kleśa*s is also present in Saṇgharakṣa's **Yogācārabhūmi*: 'In fact, the five desires are also five destructions. Each of them should be properly treated by administering the right antidote.' (DDS 11.13; trans. Chan 2013: 381).

[89] For example, this passage illustrates the conceptual symmetry between *vipakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*: *vipakṣaprātipakṣikaśca virodhaḥ / tadyathā 'śubhabhāvanā-kāmarāgayoḥ maitrībhāvanā-vyāpādayoḥ karuṇābhāvanāvihiṃsayoḥ bodhyaṅgāryāṣṭāṅgamārgabhāvanāyāḥ sarvakleśānāñca traidhātukāvacarāṇām asmiṃstvarthe utpattivirodha evābhipretaḥ* (BoBh 1.8; Wogihara 1930-1936: 98 line 17-21). See also this passage: *iha bodhisattvo yena yenopakleśenātyarthaṃ bādhyate. tasya tasyopakleśasya prahāṇāyānurūpaṃ pratipakṣaṃ bhajate / kāmarāgasya pratipakṣeṇāśubhāṃ bhāvayati / vyāpādapratipakṣeṇa maitrīm / mohapratipakṣeṇedaṃpratyayatā-pratītyasamutpādaṃ bhāvayati / vitarkapratipakṣeṇānāpānasmṛtim / mānapratipakṣeṇa dhātuprabhedaṃ bhāvayati / idamevaṃbhāgīyaṃ bodhisattvasya anurūpaṃ vīryam ity ucyate* (BoBh 1.12.21-27; Wogihara 1930-1936: 204-205).

[90] It is also worth noting that of the Buddhist *pratipakṣa*s listed here, the PYŚ also advocates the counterstates of *maitrī* (YS 1.33) – within the context of the paradigm called *brahmavihāra* in Buddhist studies [see footnote 122 in this chapter] – and *prāṇāyāma* (PYŚ 1.34, 2.52). See section 3.4.5, which discusses these in the sevenfold path of wisdom.

pratipakṣabhāvanā (the cultivation of the counterstate). In this sense, the text presents yoga as a set of techniques (solutions) to overcome obstacles (problems) (see 3.3.3 below). *Pratipakṣabhāvanā* also forms the core practice of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, in which the four classes of meditative objects are presented as counterstates to the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*):

> ***tatrāvaraṇaviśuddhiḥ katamā*** | *āha* | ***caturbhiḥ kāraṇair evaṃ*** *samyakprayukto yogī āvaraṇe svañcittaṃ pariśodhayati* | ***svabhāvaparijñānena, nidānenādīnavaparijñānena, pratipakṣabhāvanayā ca*** (ŚBh 3.12A.2.4-5; Shukla 1973: 398)
> How many types of purifying the obstacles are there? It is said that there are four causes which, when correctly applied to the obstacles by the yogin, purifies his own *citta*: perception of his own form, the 12 interdependent links (*nidāna*), perception of danger (*ādīnava*) and cultivation of the counterstate (*pratipakṣa*).[91]

Both the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmi* contain a list of ten *vipakṣa*s,[92] which are countered with *pratipakṣa*s.[93] These are all ideational cultivations (*saṃjñābhāvanā*), which I translate here as contemplation:

1. contemplating the notion of unattractiveness (*aśubhasaṃjñā*)
2. contemplating impermanence (*anityasaṃjñā*)
3. contemplating the suffering found in what is impermanent (*anitye duḥkhasaṃjñā*)
4. contemplating selflessness regarding suffering (*dukhe 'nātmasaṃjñā*)
5. contemplating an attitude of disagreeability to food (*āhāre pratikūlasaṃjñā*)
6. contemplating indifference to anything worldly (*sarvaloke anabhiratisaṃjñā*)

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[91] This refers to the contemplation of the three marks of existence, which together with contemplation of *śūnyatā* make up the paradigm of the four *ākāra*s.

[92] See Sugawara for the thesis that the BhāvBh is an independent work that is modified to fit with the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (Sugawara 2013).

[93] Chapter Eight of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the chapter on yoga, describes the ten counterstates that eliminate the bondage of the *kleśa*s: "Bhagavan, when [Bodhisattvas] eliminate the ten kinds of signs, what are the signs that they eliminate? From what signs of bondage are they liberated?" "Maitreya, eliminating the sign of the image, the focus of *samādhi*, one is liberated from the signs that are the signs of the afflictions; these [signs] are also eliminated. Maitreya, know that the emptinesses are, in actuality, antidotes to the signs. Each [emptiness] is also an antidote to any of the signs" (SNS 8; Powers 1995: 191).

7. contemplating images of light (*ālokasaṃjñā*)
8. contemplating an attitude of detachment (*virāgasaṃjñā*)
9. contemplating cessation (*nirodhasaṃjñā*)
10. contemplating death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*)[94]

Each *pratipakṣa* governs not just one obstacle but groups and sub-groups of obstacles. Therefore, there are more obstacles than *pratipakṣa*s. For example, there is the *vipakṣa* 'obstacle to expertise in yogic contemplation' (*yogamanasikārākuśalatā)* which is the lack of expertise in yogic contemplation that occurs when one is not eager to listen and thus not inquisitive (BhāvBh 142b5-a1; von Rospatt 2013: 858).[95] This is countered by cultivation of foul objects (*aśubhasaṃjñābhāvanā*). Another obstacle is laziness and indolence (*ālasyakausīdya*) in applying oneself to the constant cultivation of wholesome dharmas (*kuśaladharmabhāvanāsātatyābhiyoga*) (BhāvBh 142a3; von Rospatt 2013: 858). This obstacle has as its counterstate the contemplation that regards the impermanent as entailing suffering (*anitya duḥkhasaṃjñābhāvanā).* From this range of examples in the YĀBh, we can see that *pratipakṣabhāvanā* is a central technique to liberation.

3.4.3 The conceptual metaphors of *pratipakṣabhāvanā*

Let us now examine the three structural metaphors of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* to demonstrate conceptual sharing between the PYŚ and the YĀBh. *Pratipakṣa* has a general meaning of 'opposing side',[96] and this semantic breadth allows it to be a 'container' for different structural metaphors. Each metaphor develops the basic idea that every state has a counterstate (or every force

[94] BhāvBh section 5 summarised in Sugawara 2013: 800-802. This list also appears in the second *yogasthāna* of the Śbh (Śbh 2.9B-6.3; Shukla 1973: 270).

[95] Von Rospatt is using Sugawara's unpublished edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Yogācārabhūmi* manuscript microfilmed by R Sāṃkṛtyāyana in Tibet in 1938 (von Rospatt 2013: 871).

[96] *Pratipakṣa* literally means 'the opposite side, opposition' and in this sense can even mean 'obstacle' (Monier-Williams 1899). Its synonym *vipakṣa* literally means 'an opponent, counter-statement, counter-instance' (Monier-Williams 1899).

has a counterforce). In this way, '*yoga*' and '*kleśa*' mirror each other as opposing states or forces.

YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE (= *KLEŚA* IS A POISON)

YOGA IS A PATH (= *KLEŚA* IS AN OBSTACLE)

YOGA IS CLEAR VISION (= *KLEŚA* IS AN OBSCURATION)

Each structural metaphor has an underlying root metaphor.

YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE relies on BAD FEELINGS ARE POISONS.

YOGA IS A PATH relies on LIFE IS A JOURNEY and DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS.

YOGA IS CLEAR VISION relies on KNOWING IS SEEING.[97]

Each of these structural metaphors demonstrates the process of domain-mapping: a counterstate can be conceived of as the remedial force of an antidote to a poison (YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE), or the physical force that moves a material obstacle out of the way (YOGA IS A PATH), or the physical force that moves a material obscurant out of the field of vision (YOGA IS CLEAR VISION). In each of these cases, the basic idea is that a physical object must be removed: a poison from the body, an obstacle from the path, or an obscurant from the field of vision. Indeed, PYŚ 1.30 is striking in that it appears to acknowledge the prevailing choices of metaphors available in conceptualizing yoga as a counterstate. It offers three ways of understanding the obstacles (problems) to yoga: impurities of yoga (*yogamala*), opposites of yoga (*yogapratipakṣa*), and impediments to yoga (*yogāntarāya*).

3.4.4 Yoga as an antidote: ethical precepts as cures

The conceptual metaphor YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE rests on the root metaphor that BAD FEELINGS ARE POISONS. In literal terms, negative psychological states are not poisons, of course, but their metaphorical designation as such is reflected in everyday utterances such as the English phrases 'he was poisoned by jealousy' or 'love is the cure'. In our Sanskrit texts, yoga is understood as a remedy or cure for negative psychological, emotional, or

[97] See Chapter 1 of this study for more background on these and other root metaphors.

ethical states. As an example, I will now look at how ethical precepts are understood as antidotes in *pratipakṣabhāvanā*.

In Patañjali's preparatory stages of *aṣṭāṅga yoga* the ethical precepts of the *yama*s (restraints) and *niyama*s (observances) are presented as positive counterstates to neutralize unwanted behaviours.[98] Because these ten ethical precepts are only understood in relation to the violations or transgressions that they counter, I propose that the *yama*s and *niyama*s are presented within the paradigm of state/counterstate. Indeed, Patañjali presents the ethical precepts as *pratipakṣabhāvanā*. When the five *yama*s are introduced at YS 2.32, they are defined as counterstates to their obstacles.[99]

> *yatredam uktaṃ tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo 'py antarāyābhāvaś ceti / eteṣāṃ yamaniyamānām* (PYŚ 2.32)
> ***vitarkabādhane pratipakṣabhāvanam*** || YS_2.33 ||
> On this it is said: and then for one who has mastered turning the thoughts inwards, the obstacles (*antarāya*) cease to exist.

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[98] In general, the binary opposition of state and counterstate is vital to the theory of karma: *yatredam uktam 'dve dve ha vai karmaṇī veditavye pāpakasyaiko rāśiḥ puṇyakṛto 'pahanti tad icchasva karmāṇi sukṛtāni kartum ihaiva te karma kavayo vedayante*' (PYŚ 2.13). 'In which case (*yatra*) it is said: 'Deeds are to be known as twofold; one heap of good deeds destroys one by [one of] evil deeds; so choose to do good acts alone in this life; the poets have instructed this as karma'. Yoga and yogācāra also share discourses of state/counterstate as the colours black/white. For example, Patañjali references white karma shortly after his list of the nine obstacles (*antarāya*s) (PYŚ 1.3), and his explanation of one of the remedies, contemplation of the four *brahmavihāra*s [see footnote 122 in this chapter], is: *evam asya bhāvayataḥ śuklo dharma upajāyate. tataś ca cittaṃ prasīdati. prasannam ekāgraṃ sthitipadaṃ labhate* (PYŚ 1.33). The ŚBh also frames the *pratipakṣa*s in terms of black and white karma. There are nine types of practice that produce white karma and their opposites produce black karma: *tatra navavidhaḥ śuklapakṣasaṃgrītaḥ / prayogas tadviparyayeṇa ca navavidhaḥ / krṣṇapakṣasaṃgṛhīto yoginā veditavyaḥ* (ŚBh 13.B.1-3c; Wayman 1960: 116). The nine types of 'white' practice produce *samādhi* while their opposites hinder *samādhi*.

[99] For example, the *niyama* of *saṃtoṣa* is defined: 'contentment due to fulfillment with what is proximate is being satisfied with the resources at hand and not wishing to obtain more' (*saṃtoṣaḥ saṃnihitasādhanād adhikasyānupāditsā)*. Thus, contentment is a counterstate to its implied opposite, greed.

Of these *yama*s and *niyama*s:
When there is obstruction by discursive thought, [there should be] cultivation of the counterstate (*pratipakṣabhāvana*).

The commentary to YS 2.33 then gives instruction on how a Brahmin should practice *pratipakṣabhāvanā* – it is the practice of the *niyama*s. For example, in the case of harm, *himṣā*, yoga offers a meditation to access its counterstate, *ahimṣā*:

> *evam unmārgapravaṇavitarkajvareṇātidīptena bādhyamānas tatpratipakṣān bhāvayet. ghoreṣu saṃsārāṅgāreṣu pacyamānena mayā śaraṇam upāgataḥ sarvabhūtābhayapradānena yogadharmaḥ. sa khalv ahaṃ tyaktvā vitarkān punas tān ādadānas tulyaḥ śvavṛtteneti bhāvayet. yathā śvā vāntāvalehī tathā tyaktasya punar ādadāna iti* (PYŚ 2.33; Angot 2012: 489).
> Thus, being harassed by the intensely blazing affliction that opposes and that is the decline out of the path, one should cultivate the counterstate of that: 'Being roasted on the terrible embers of *saṃsāra*, I have attained refuge. *Yogadharma* arises by means of bestowing safety to all beings.' One should cultivate: 'However, having abandoned the contrary ideas (*vitarka*),[100] I accept (*ādadāna*) similar ones again, by means of acting like a dog.[101] In the way that a dog licks up its own vomit, so do I again take up [those contrary ideas]'.

The implication here is that one keeps regurgitating and redigesting foul things until they are countered with an antidote. The next instruction is to repeat the above *pratipakṣa* meditation technique for the remainder of the *yama*s and *niyama*s.[102] The example given is a person who has contemplated murder; his cultivation of the opposite (*pratipakṣabhāvānā*) should be the contemplation of his own death, so that his waking hours become a living

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[100] *Vitarka* in this instance means 'opposite' or 'contrary' idea, rather than 'discursive thought' or 'apprehension' of an object as it does elsewhere in the PYŚ.

[101] Philipp Maas has suggested that this refers to transgressive ascetics who behaved in the manner of ascetics (personal communication 12.7.18).

[102] ***vitarkā hiṃsādayaḥ kṛtakāritānumoditā lobhakrodhamohapūrvakā mṛdumadhyādhimātrā duḥkhājñānānantaphalā iti pratipakṣabhāvanam*** (YS 2.34; Angot 2012: 491). The contrary ideas, violence and so on, done or caused to be done or condoned, preceded by greed, anger or delusion – mild, medium, or intense – all result in endless suffering and ignorance. This is the cultivation of the counterstate (*pratpakṣabhāvanā*).'

hell. In all of these examples, *pratipakṣabhāvānā* is suffused with images of physical suffering or affliction: such as burning in fire, reconsuming vomit, or contemplating one's own death. These images of pain, distress, and disease in the body point to the generative context for the metaphors of *pratipakṣabhāvānā*: the medical domain of affliction and cure.[103]

In yogācāra, and in early Buddhism generally, the precepts for ethical behavior (*śīla*) are presented as counterstates (*pratipakṣa*s) to ethical failings.[104] Furthermore, a key technique of *pratipakṣabhāvānā* is the visualization of unpleasant aspects of the body: *aśubhabhāvanā*. The nature of the antidote in Patañjali's examples – visualizing oneself in degrading and foul terms – is not dissimilar to the Buddhist practice of *aśubhabhāvanā*, of visualising the human body as unpleasant or terrifying.[105] *Aśubha* was a practice that focused on contemplation of various bodily states as unattractive, disagreeable, impure, or in various stages of decomposition – what Deleanu refers to as 'vividly imaged samsāric horror' (Deleanu 2006 1: 21).[106] In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, *āśubha* is prescribed as the counterstate for sensual craving and for the character type in whom greed

[103] See fn 3 of this chapter.

[104] See, for example, the five precepts (*pañcaśīla*) undertaken by Buddhist laity: refraining from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, consuming intoxicants.

[105] We also witness similar techniques in the yogācāra *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*, in which the three basic meditation techniques are the contemplations of *aśubha*, *maitrī* and *pratītyasamutpāda*, respectively designed to counter the three *kleśa*s of craving, hatred, and ignorance (Stuart 2015, 1: 74 fn 111). One of the contemplations prescribed by the *Saddhsu* to overcome ignorance is visualising a greedy dog eating its own tongue, not dissimilar to Patañjali's image of the greedy dog consuming its own vomit.

[106] One of the forerunners of Asaṅga's YĀBh, the *Damoduluo chan jing* (Buddhasena's **Yogācārabhūmi*) reflects this paradigm of the antidote: 'Therefore, from the initial practice of the mindfulness of the body to the ultimate stage, this meditation of impurity taught by the Buddha is of paramount importance. All the seeds of greed and desires can be eradicated from the bottom by applying the right antidotes. It is also essential to be disgusted with the world which will cure, in a split second, all the remaining defilements of the world' (DDS 11.22; trs. Chan 2013: 387).

predominates (Chan 2013: 102).[107] The practice of *aśubha* is a central meditation technique in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* in its account of *yogabhāvanā*, which prescribes *aśubha* meditation for those afflicted by the *kleśa* of desire (*rāga*) (ŚBh 9B.9-1a; Wayman 1960: 96). In the BhāvBh *pratipakṣabhāvanā* is employed to frighten the mind so that the practitioner will see that saṃsāra is terrible and that nirvāṇa is sublime.[108]

To sum up: Patañjali's technique of conjuring up an opposite and unpleasant image to neutralize a *kleśa* is resonant of a core meditative technique in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* called *aśubhabhāvanā*. Patañjali's text shares with the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* a definition of yoga as the visualization of meditative counterstates to neutralize unwanted ethical states in the self (*pratipakṣabhāvanā*). In Pātañjala yoga and yogācāra one can visualize an unpleasant image of the body, in order to obtain a 'remedy' or 'antidote' for ethical disease in the body-mind complex. This structural metaphor maps qualities from the domain of medicine to ethics, so that yoga is understood as curative or healing.

3.4.5 Yoga is a path: The *bhūmi*s and the *mārga*

Spiritual progress is often conceived of as a journey, not just any type of journey but a specific route with a purpose, goal, and a clearly defined end destination. The conceptual metaphor YOGA IS A PATH is based on LIFE IS A

[107] 'The meditations on conditional causation involve the contemplations on the link of ignorance (*avidyā*) and sensation (*vedanā*). The purpose is to eradicate ignorance (*avidyā*) and replace it by wisdom (*prājñā*). As regards the two links of craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and grasping (*upādāna*), which are, indeed, the contamination caused by the attachment to purity, the meditations on impurity definitely provide the perfect antidote for that' (Chan 2013: 114).

[108] The seventh segment of the BhāvBh describes the supramundane path and advocates two techniques for attaining *samādhi*; terrifying the mind (*cittasaṃvigna*) and steadying the mind (*cittasthiti*). Terrifying the mind is necessary in order to be freed from *saṃkleśa*.

JOURNEY, which in turn is derived from the image-schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (based on embodied or visceral experience).[109]

The conceptual metaphor SPIRITUAL PROGRESS IS A PATH is also one that we find, of course, in Brahmanism. Here, the *Śānti Parvan* identifies the connection between yoga and the *mokṣamārga*:

> *sa punar yogam āsthāya mokṣamārgopalabdhaye*
> For one who is established in yoga there is attainment of the *mokṣamārga* (MB 12.319.006a; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 16: 1802).

However, in Brahmanic asceticism, although the wandering ascetic follows a path with a destination (*mokṣa*), it is not always a defined path but rather can be entirely undefined. The Buddhist path, in contrast, is often rigidly defined, precisely mapped out, and definitively sign-posted at every step and stage. Gethin points out that in the Nikāyas, 'Buddhist thought is about the Buddhist path' and that there is an inextricability between the concept of path (*mārga*) and the concept of spiritual development as *bhāvanā* or *yoga* (Gethin 2007: 18).[110] The best-known metaphor used to describe Pātañjala yoga is not that of the path but that of *aṅga* or limb, associated with *aṣṭāṅga yoga*.[111] This draws on a different root metaphor THE WHOLE IS A BODY (as in

[109] Common examples of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor include 'a child needs a good start in life', 'death is the end' or for purpose is destination: 'finding one's direction in life' or 'getting oneself on track'. For more on these root metaphors, see Chapter 1.1.6.

[110] Gethin also highlights two understandings of the path in the AKBh in which it either 1. culminates in the 37 factors of awakening (*bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā*) or 2. is composed of the 37 factors as successive stages (Gethin 2007: 23). However, he also points out that scholars can place too much emphasis on definitions of Buddhist path structures as successive, which results in the exclusion of other possible interpretations, such as simultaneity of attainments on the path (Gethin 2007: 210-212).

[111] *Aṅga* is traditionally translated as 'limb' of yoga, but scholars such as Sanderson (e.g. Sanderson 1999: 7 fn 25) and Birch (e.g. Birch 2011: 540) have respectively argued for a technical translation of 'auxiliary' or 'ancillary', in order to convey the concept of support or means to an overall process, as opposed to a spatial metaphor of locatable parts that make up a bigger structure. However, it is debatable as to whether this interpretation of yoga as 'means' within a process can be justified without distorting the content of the *aṅga* metaphor, which in the Brahmanic context often indicates a spatial or bodily domain. It should be noted that *aṅga* is not exclusive to Brahmanic schemes of yoga; Gethin analyses

'body of thought', 'body of work', 'body of the state' or 'body of knowledge') and is expressed in *Maitrī Upaniṣad*'s outline of *ṣaḍaṅga yoga*. The logical drive of the *aṅga* metaphor is different to that of the *bhūmi*/*mārga*: whereas the end goal of the *aṅga* metaphor is to express the relationship of a part to whole, *bhūmi*s presuppose the structure of a path and a journey to a destination. The *aṅga* metaphor conceptualises 'a sum total' while the *bhūmi* conceptualises 'an ultimate destination'. These metaphors cannot be said to be overlapping because they do not share the same entailments. This indicates that Patañjali's text is a composite of different conceptual systems. Patañjali's *aṣṭāṅga yoga* appears to be drawing on older conceptual systems in the Vedas and *Upaniṣad*s that rely on THE WHOLE IS A BODY: such as the cosmic dismemberment of bodies as a positive, generative process as in the 'Puruṣa Sūkta' of the *Ṛg Veda* (RV 10.90) or the correlations of one's body (part) to the cosmic body (whole) in the *Upaniṣad*s – expressed not only in *bandhu*s (connections), but ultimately in the *ātman-brahman* correspondence. *Kriyā yoga*, on the other hand, is closer to the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda and yogācāra systems of *mārga*. Such is the predominant interpretation of *aṅga* as the key metaphor in Patañjali's system of yoga that scholars have overlooked how Patañjali also uses the conceptual metaphors of *bhūmi* and *mārga* to construct an understanding of yoga as *bhāvanā*. If we look beyond *aṣṭāṅga yoga*, we see that the issue of what constitutes the system of Pātañjala yoga is considerably more complex. Next, I highlight how Patañjali's conceptual metaphor YOGA IS A PATH intersects with the Buddhist equivalent YOGĀCĀRA IS A PATH.

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the seven *bodhy-aṅga*s (Pāli: *bojjhaṅga*s) or 'factors of awakening' that form part of the bigger scheme of the 37 *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā*, the 'dharmas that contribute to awakening' (Gethin 2007: 146-189), as well as the eight *margāṅga*s that make up the Noble Eightfold Path. I suggest that the early Buddhist *aṭṭḥaṅgika-magga* / *aṣṭāṅgika-mārga* is *already* an accretion or blend of two different concepts: *aṅga* as part of a whole and *mārga* as path with stages. When these two concepts are combined into one, there are internal contradictions in the entailments.

The very title of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* itself expresses the idea that yogācāra is a path. *Bhūmi* literally means 'ground', 'soil' or 'foundation', and the qualities of this domain are mapped to soteriological practice to convey the concept of 'stage' or 'step' in a progressive sense. The *bhūmi*s, then, are the stages or steps that make up the path of practice, the *mārga*. In both Mahāyāna and Sarvāstivāda Buddhist discourse, the *bhūmi*s are not only stages to liberation but also stages that contain *kleśa*s.[112] Thus the notion of path structure is conceived in terms of *bhūmi*s and is integrally related to *kleśa*. The attainment at each *bhūmi* is the removal of a *kleśa*, which is an obstacle or impediment that obstructs progess on the path.[113] The

[112] The concept of *bhūmi* is first elaborated in the Abhidharma sources, such as Kātyāyanīputra's *Jñānaprasthāna*, one of Abhidharma's seven canonical treatises. In this text, there are ten stages or *bhūmi*s of practice divided into a lower and a higher level: the first four *bhūmi*s comprise the lower path of *bhāvanābhūmi* and the upper path is called *darśanabhūmi* (Potter et al 1996: 117). In this Abhidharma scheme, the tenth level is *aśaikṣabhūmi* (*aśaikṣa* here refers to the adept who is no longer a pupil) and *nirvāṇa* is the fruit of the ten *bhūmi*s. Additionally, in the Abhidharma commentarial tradition, Ghoṣaka's *Mahāvibhāṣā* (circa 2nd century) has a tenfold scheme with *prāptaphala* (the attainment of fruition) as its tenth stage. A ten-*bhūmi* scheme also appeared in the *Mahāvastu*, a late canonical work of the Mahāsaṅgikha school that recounts legends of the Buddha. In the more elaborate theories of Mahāyāna, the *daśabhūmi*s are associated with *bhāvanā* rather than *darśana*.

[113] For example, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh 2.26-28), the *kleśamahābhūmika* lists the following *kleśa*s (which are congruent with those in the older *Vibhāṣā)*: *moha* or *avidyā* (delusion or ignorance), *pramāda* (heedlessness), *kauśīdya* (sloth), *aśrabdhi* (lack of confidence), *styāna* (lethargy), *auddhatya* (excitedness) These afflicting factors are countered by the ten *mahābhūmika*s or great stages (of attainment): *vedanā, cetanā, saṃjñā, chanda, sparśa, mati, smṛti, manaskāra, adhimokṣa, samādhi/dhyāna* and also the ten *kuśalamahābhūmika*s, the ten great stages of virtue (*śraddhā*, *vīrya*, *upekṣā*, *hrī*, *anapatrāpya*, *alobha*, *adveṣa*, *ahiṃsā*, *praśrabhdhi*, *apramāda*). The ten *kleśamahābhaumikāḥ* are also listed in the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* (Stuart 2015, 2: 310-311) and are followed by the *parīttabhaumikā*, the 'limited mental states' which act as antidotes (Stuart 2015, 2: 310-312). These terms are distinct from other related set of factors, such as the *akuśalabhūmika* or the ten *upakleśabhūmika*s, which refer to different qualities and affects: *krodha* (anger), *mrakṣa* (hypocrisy), *mātsarya* (selfishness), *īrṣyā* (envy), *pradāsa* (spite), *vihiṃsā* (violence), *upanāha* (vengefulness), *māyā* (deceit), *śāṭhya* (craftiness), *mada* (arrogance). In Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*, he lists nine

Daśabhūmikasūtra, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Saṃdhiniromocana Sūtra* all mark the ten *bhūmi*s by the removal of an obstacle. The ten obstacles also appear widely in contemporaneous literature such as Vasubandhu's *Vijñāptimatratāsiddhi*, in which the ten stages of the bodhisattva path (*daśabhūmi*) are correlated with ten obstacles. The functional counterstates[114] at the ten *bhūmi*s are typically the six *pāramitā*s (perfections) plus more (e.g. *dāna, śīla, kṣānti, vīrya, dhyāna, prajñā, upāya, praṇidhāna, bala* and *jñāna*). As we saw in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, spiritual progress is not always conceptualized as a path; it can also be a ladder, a doorway, an awakening, a quenching of a flame, etc. Therefore, when we come across two soteriologies – Buddhist and Pātañjala – that specify spiritual progress as a *bhūmi* or set of *bhūmi*s (a *mārga*), we should regard this as significant.

Aside from three explicit references to *mārga* in the PYŚ,[115] there are also several conceptual references that reflect technical overlaps with the

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*kleśa*s: 2.2-3a (and later in this text he also accepts six, as he does in the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*). Potter offers a useful overview in 'The Buddhist Way to Liberation' in Potter et al 1996: 59-72.

[114] I am not referring to the term *pratipakṣa* here, but to the structural function of the *pāramitā*s within the tenfold scheme of the *bodhisattva* path to act as the requisite counterstates to the obstacles. Even if not explicitly termed *pratipakṣa*s, the *pāramitā*s fulfill this soteriological function.

[115] The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* refers to the concept of path in three instances. The first is a negation of the path: *unmārga*. *Unmārga* is the wrong path, which denotes having gone astray. It is the consequence of the blazing fires of *saṃsāra* that carry one out of one's path (PYŚ 2.33). At 2.26 the path to liberation is described as the means of cessation, the burnt seed: *sā vivekakhyātir aviplavā hānopāyaḥ. tato mithyājñānasya dagdhabījabhāvopagamaḥ punaś cāprasava ity eṣa mokṣasya mārgo hānasyopāya iti* (PYŚ 2.26; Angot 2012: 467). 'Discriminating discernment, being unwavering, is the means to cessation. From that (discriminating discernment) comes the acquisition of the state of burnt seed of false knowledge and furthermore of non-propagation. This path of liberation is the means of cessation.' The other instance of *mokṣamārga* is the state one attains on hearing it (*śravaṇa*) when the seed of the knowledge of the difference (*viveṣadarśanabīja*) begins to grow (*viveṣadarśana* being a synonym for *vivekakhyāti*). In this passage, *mokṣamārga* appears to be comprised of distinct stages: *yathā prāvṛṣi tṛṇāṅkurasyodbhedena tadbījasattānumīyate*

yogācāra discourse. The most basic observation is Patañjali's concept of the pinnacle of yoga practice as *dharmamegha*. In Buddhist soteriology, *dharmameghabhūmi* is the culmination of *bhāvanāmārga* (the path of cultivation); the tenth *bodhisattvabhūmi* is the *dharmamegha*. And so if Patañjali includes *dharmamegha* as the superlative outcome of yoga, it means that his text is, on some level, a *mārga* text that focuses on *bhāvanā* or cultivation as the means (I discuss the case of *dharmamegha* in detail below in 3.5). Patañjali's delineation of the path of yoga also intersects with that of the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*. In the BhāvBh, the seventh aspect of cultivation stresses the 'complete purification of all supramundane aspects', which is also the fourth stage of yoga, the *bhāvanāphala*.[116] The final component of *bhāvanāphala* contains three stages of samādhi:

> *samādhilābha* (the acquisition of concentration)
> *samādhiparipūri* (the fulfilment of concentration)
> *samādhivaśitā* (the mastery of concentration).[117]

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tathā mokṣamārgaśravaṇena yasya romaharṣāśrupātau dṛśyete tatrāpy asti viśeṣadarśanabījam apavargabhāgīyaṃ karmābhinirvartitam ity anumīyate (PYŚ 4.25; Angot 2012: 717). 1. the bristling of the hairs on the body and the eyes fill with tears 2. accompaniment by the seed of perception of the difference 3. investigation of the nature of self-existence 4. rejection of the self 5. perception of the difference and of the self as Puruṣa, accompanied by cessation of investigation of the self.

[116] This fourth stage entails: 1. realization of the four noble truths (*satyābhisamaya*) 2. removing obstacles hindering the aforesaid realization of truths (*abhisamitasatyasya antarāyavivarjanam*) 3. focusing the mind on pleasant objects in order to gain clairvoyance (*kṣiprābhijñātāyai prāmodyavastumanasikāraḥ*) 4. practising the path of contemplative cultivation (*bhāvanāmārganiṣevaṇā*) 5. attaining the path of complete purification plus its fruits/results and benefits (*saphalānuśaṃsā suviśuddhamārgaprāptiḥ*) (BhāvBh 7; Sugawara 2013: 804-805).

[117] Entering *samādhi* means attaining the stage immediately preceding the first *dhyāna*: one must attain one of the main (*maula*) *dhyāna*s and finally master *samādhi* (*samādhivaśitā*), which then allows one to enter and exit the *dhyāna*s at will. There are 20 obstacles (*antarāya*s) that hinder the initial *samādhilābha*, entry into *samādhi* – and the appropriate counterstates are prescribed. Next, the fulfillment process (*samādhiparipūri*) is one of entering deep meditation in isolation by focusing on tranquility practices. Finally, the mastery of concentration is attained by practicing ascetic austerity to devote onself to the

We find echoes of these threefold stages of *samādhi* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, when it refers twice to *samādhilābha* and *samādhiphalam* as a pair of attainments or stages.[118] A third instance in Patañjali's text discusses *samādhilābha* in terms of failure:

> *alabdhabhūmikatvaṃ samādhibhūmer alābhaḥ* (PYŚ 1.30)
> The state of non-attainment of the stages (*bhūmi*) is not attaining the stage of *samādhi*.

If there is non-attainment in the stage (*bhūmi*) of yoga that is *samādhi*, there is overall failure. Here, *samādhibhūmi*, which indicates attainment, echoes the *samādhivaśitā* of the BhāvBh.[119]

The ninefold path

A further account of Pātañjala yoga as a counterstate to obstacles on the path occurs in the formulation of the nine *antarāya*s: disease, stupor, doubt, negligence, idleness, non-abstention, confused knowledge, non-attainment of the stages (*bhūmi*s), and incapacity to remain/endure (YS 1.30). The nine *antarāya*s or obstacles (connoting impediments) are first introduced at YS 1.29 as an outcome of *īṣvarapraṇidhāna* (devotion to *īśvara)*.[120] The commentary explains that when the nine obstacles are removed, one can

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practice. In this sense, isolated ascetic practice is clearly privileged as the highest practice, representing the culmination of the four stages of yoga.

[118] In a discussion of *asaṃprajñāta samādhi* (non-cognitive concentration), *samādhilābha* is clearly set out as a goal: *samādhilābhaḥ samādhiphalaṃ ca bhavatīti* (PYŚ 1.21). '*Samādhi* is obtained, and there are the fruits of *samādhi*.' And the commentary to the next *sūtra* explains how effort can be mild, medium, or intense: *tasmād adhimātratīvrasaṃvegasyādhimātropāyasyāpy āsannatamaḥ samādhilābhaḥ samādhiphalaṃ ceti* (PYŚ 1.22) 'Due to this distinction even among the closer [means], he who is zealously intense is the most near, and *samādhi* and the fruits of *samādhi* are obtained.'

[119] This third example, framed in the negative as *alabdha* (non-attainment) rather than *labdha* (attainment) of *samādhi*, occurs in the commentary on the nine obstacles (*antarāya*).

[120] As a result of this devotion, the obstacles are eliminated: *kiṃ cāsya bhavati* ***tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo 'py antarāyābhāvaś ca*** (YS 1.29; Angot 2012: 312) 'And what else occurs to him? **Then [there is] acquirement of thoughts turned inwards [upon one's self] and also the obstacles disappear.'**

perceive one's own form as *puruṣa*. Here, the obstacles are directly linked to the state of *cittavṛtti*; when the obstacles exist, the *citta* is still modified, or fluctuates. Conversely, *samādhi* is attained when the *citta* is steady. This description is reminiscient of the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*'s account of how *cittasthiti* is attained in the mind when the obstacles (*antarāya*) to realization of the truth (*satyābhisamaya*) are removed (BhāvBh 7; Sugawara 2013: 804-805). Patañjali's nine *yogāntarāya*s (impediments to yoga) (YS 1.31)[121] are followed by nine practices that consitute counterstates to dissolve these obstacles. I propose that the *antarāya*s at 1.31 are directly linked to the set of practices that surround them (PYŚ 1.29-1.39): the *antarāya*s are obstacles (impediments) on the path and can only be removed by the application of a set of yogic techniques that act as counterforces to impediments (moving them off the path). These are *pratipakṣa*s:

- devotion to īṣvara (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*) (YS. 1.29)
- one-pointed concentration (*ekatattvābhyāsaḥ*) (YS 1.32)
- the four *brahmavihāra*s[122] (YS 1.33)

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[121] This next *sūtra* lists a set of physical symptoms that accompany the obstacles, namely: pain and dejection, trembling limbs, and irregular breathing cycles (YS 1.31). The commentary to this *sūtra* concludes: *athaite vikṣepāḥ samādhipratipakṣās tābhyām evābhyāsavairāgyābhyāṃ niroddhavyāḥ* (1.31). 'These are the distractions, the opposites (counterstates) to *samādhi*, which are to be ceased by practice and dispassion alone.' The context of the obstacles thus shifts somewhat from YS 1.29-1.31. The obstacles are introduced at 1.29 as a phenomenon that disappears upon practice of *īṣvarapraṇidhāna*, but in 1.31 the distractions (byproducts of the obstacles) are said to disappear as a result of *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya.* Although *īṣvaraprāṇidhāṇa* can be said to be a component of *abhyāsa*, it is not particularly associated with *vairāgya*, and, indeed, may even be said to be the opposite of dispassion (because the cultivation of devotion to a lord is not a state of dispassion).

[122] Patañjali does not use the term *brahmavihāra* (abode of Brahma), as the Buddhists do, to refer to *maitrī*, *karuṇā*, *muditā*, *upekṣā*, but Patañjali does refer to them as the *vihāra*s: *tathā coktam -- ye caite maitryādayo dhyāyināṃ vihārās te bāhyasādhananiranugrahātmānaḥ prakṛṣṭaṃ dharmam abhinirvartayanti* (PYŚ 4.10; Angot 2012: 685). These four meditations or mental states are also discussed at PYŚ 3.23. Therefore I use a common term from Buddhist studies, the *brahmavihāra*s, to refer to the standard model of practising *maitrī*,

- breath control (YS 1.34)
- object-centred sense redirection (YS 1.35)
- sorrowless luminosity (*viśoka jyotiṣmatī*) (YS 1.36)
- contemplation on dispassion (*vītarāgaviṣayam cittam*) (YS 1.37)
- knowledge of dream and sleep (YS 1.38)
- absorption (*dhyāna*) (YS 1.39) (subdivided into four *samāpatti*s)

This list, linked by the particle *vā* (or), is clearly presented as a list of optional practices in Pātañjala yoga and they are the *pratipakṣa*s to the nine obstacles,[123] constituting a path structure of nine stages. The paradigmatic context of these optional practices in *samādhipāda* can only be properly clarified by relating them to similar paradigms in Buddhist texts. Both the BoBh and the PYŚ agree that the desired state is *anāvaraṇa* (without obstruction).[124]

Another way to frame this argument is to look at the role of *bhāvanā* in this run of *sūtra*s (YS 1.29-39) and beyond. In my above list of nine counterstates, the term *bhāvanā* appears as follows: *bhāvanā* describes *japa* (muttering) of the syllable *oṃ* (YS 1.28, YSBh 1.28); the obstacle (*antarāya*) of carelessness (*pramāda*) is the lack of cultivation (*abhāvanā*) of the practice directed towards *samādhi* (*samādhisādhana*) (PYŚ 1.30); and the

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karuṇā, *muditā*, *upekṣā*. These four are also called the four immeasurables (*catvāry apramāṇāni*) in Buddhism, but given that the term *brahmavihāra* also has an early context in Brahmanism, this term seems more appropriate in relation to Patañjali's text. For a full-length study of this topic see Maithrimurthi 1999.

[123] Most of these practices also appear in the YĀBh in a comparable context of counterstates to the obstacles. For example, in early Buddhist formulations, *ekāgratā* is a counterstate to the three poisons (*triviṣa*) or *kleśa*s (to *rāga* in particular); the *brāhmavihāra*s (see previous footnote) – either in full or partly – appear as counterstates to *dveṣa* or *vyāpāda* in the ŚBh, the BoBh, and the BhāvBh; mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpānasmṛti)* appears as an antidote to *vitarka*.

[124] See PYŚ 3.41 and 3.45 where *anāvaraṇa* appears to describe space (*ākāśa*) that is unobstructed and thus allows the free expression of the *siddhi*s. In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *anāvaraṇam* appears in particular as the counterstate to *jñeyāvaraṇam*, the obstacle to knowledge.

cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the four *brahmavihāra*s clarifies the mind (YS 1.33). These three instances alone are enough to illustrate that the context of Patañjali's 'nine' alternative practices is related to that of *pratikpakṣabhāvanā*, cultivation of the opposite states to the obstacles. If we require further evidence, the remainder of the instances of *bhāvanā* in the PYŚ (beyond *samādhipāda)* underline this point. *Bhāvanā* appears in the following chapters in these contexts: the cultivation of *samādhi* (YS 2.2); cultivation of the opposites (*pratipakṣabhāvanā*) (YSBh 2.4; YS 2.33; YS 2.34 and YSBh 2.34); cultivation of the *brahmavihāra*s (YSBh 3.33); the fourth stage of yoga practitioner, the one who has gone beyond cultivation (*atikrāntabhavanīya*) (YSBh 3.51); firm cultivation of a narrated counterstate (YSBh 3.51); and ceasing meditation on one's own self (*ātmabhāvabhāvanānivṛttiḥ*) (YS 4.25 and YSBh 4.25). Across these contexts in the PYŚ, *bhāvanā* consistently refers to the cultivation of particular mental states in meditation that lead to *samādhi*. In many ways, *bhāvanā* is the central technique of Patañjala yoga; there seems to be little to this yoga that is not *bhāvanā.*

The sevenfold path

In yoga and yogācāra, it is not only the paradigm of the obstacles that overlaps but also the positive description of the path structure iself. Another of the lesser studied path structures in the PYŚ is that of the sevenfold path of the yogin (PYŚ 2.27; 3.51). This sevenfold path of wisdom, offset against four levels of practitioner, bears structural resemblance to the *Śrāvakabhūmi*'s sevenfold stages of wisdom, offset against three levels of practitioner.

In PYŚ 3.51 we saw how the yogin is tempted by the gods to partake in heavenly delights. In this case, the counterstate is a narrated contemplation that directly addresses the details of the heavenly mirage one by one in

order to 'neutralise' them.[125] The contemplative counterstate to the false allures of heaven appears within an exposition of the four stages of yoga:

- the beginner (*prathamakalpika*)
- the honeyed state (*madhubhūmika*)
- the light of knowledge (*prajñājyotis*)
- one who has surpassed what is to be cultivated (*atikrāntabhavanīya*) (PYŚ 3.51).[126]

Within these four stages, the inclusion of a *yogabhūmi* (the *madhu-bhūmika* of yoga) hints at the *yogācārabhūmi* literature. Furthermore, in Patañjali's scheme, the fourfold level of practitioner is correlated to the sevenfold path stages, the *saptavidhā.* Only by advanced cultivation (*atikrāntabhavanīya*) can one reach the final stage of wisdom (*prāntabhūmiprajñā).*

[125] Two short first-person narrations are presented. The first is the narration of the gods who are jealous of the yogin's accomplishments and who try to lure the yogin with temptations of beautiful women, a wish-fulfilling tree, and immortality (PYŚ 3.51). The second narration is the voice of the yogin, who counters the temptations of the gods with opposite images. The gods present alluring, sensual delights of heaven; the yogin's counter-narration presents the scorching fires of saṃsāra and the virtues of asceticism. As in the previous example of self-narrated contemplation to create a counterstate (the niyama of *ahiṃsā* at PYŚ 2.33, see above), the primary image here is, once again, fire.

[126] *catvāraḥ khalv amī yoginaḥ prāthamakalpiko madhubhūmikaḥ prajñājyotir atikrāntabhāvanīyaś ceti / tatrābhyāsī pravṛttamātrajyotiḥ prathamaḥ / ṛtaṃbharaprajño dvitīyaḥ / bhūtendriyajayī tṛtīyaḥ sarveṣu bhāviteṣu bhāvanīyeṣu kṛtarakṣābandhaḥ kṛtakartavyasādhanādimān. caturtho yas tv atikrāntabhāvanīyaḥ / tasya cittapratisarga eko 'rthaḥ / saptavidhāsya prāntabhūmiprajñā* (PYŚ 3.51; Angot 2012: 653).

Table 3.2: Patañjali's seven stages of wisdom (PYŚ 2.27)[127]

1	What is to be escaped has been fully examined.	*parijñātaṃ heyaṃ nāsya punaḥ parijñeyam asti*	Fourfold freedom from knowledge of anything left to be done
2	The causes of what is to be escaped have dwindled and do not need to be destroyed.	*kṣīṇā heyahetavo na punar eteṣāṃ kṣetavyam asti.*	
3	The cessation by *nirodhasamādhi* is directly perceived.	*sākṣātkṛtaṃ nirodhasamādhinā hānam.*	
4	Perfection of discriminating perception.	*bhāvito vivekakhyātirūpo hānopāya iti.*	
5	Buddhi has completed its function.	*Caritādhikārā buddhiḥ.*	Threefold freedom of the mind
6	The guṇas turn towards dissolution (like rocks falling from a mountain) and along with them comes everything else The guṇas, dissolved, do not reappear.	*guṇā giriśikharataṭacyutā iva grāvāṇo niravasthānāḥ svakāraṇe pralayābhimukhāḥ saha tenāstaṃ gacchanti.na caiṣāṃ pravilīnānāṃ punar asty utpādaḥ prayojanābhāvād iti.*	
7	In the state beyond the guṇas Puruṣa is solitary and self-illuminating.	*etasyām avasthāyāṃ guṇasaṃbandhātītaḥ svarūpamātrajyotir amalaḥ kevalī puruṣa iti.*	

Not only do the first four stages appear to reference the paradigm of the four noble truths,[128] but Patañjali's fourth and highest level of practitioner, the *atikrāntabhavanīya*, is resonant of the highest stage of practitioner in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, *atikrāntamanaskāra*.

[127] PYŚ 2.27; Angot 2012: 468.

[128] The paradigm in each case being: problem, cause, cessation, means of cessation.

Table 3.3: Asaṅga's seven stages of contemplation (ŚBh 3.28.2.1.1-8)[129]

1	Contemplation perceiving characteristics	*lakṣaṇapratisaṁvedī manaskāraḥ*
2	Contemplation leading to/characterized by conviction	*ādhimokṣiko manaskāraḥ*
3	Contemplation engendering separation	*prāvivekyo manaskāraḥ*
4	Contemplation comprising delight	*ratisaṁgrāhako manaskāraḥ*
5	Contemplation of enquiry	*mīmāṃsā manaskāraḥ*
6	Contemplation attaining fulfilment of the practice	*prayoganiṣṭho manaskāraḥ*
7	Contemplation representing the fruit of the fulfilment of the practice	*prayoganiṣṭhāphala manaskāraḥ*

On the supramundane path of the *Srāvakabhūmi* there are three stages[130] of practitioner:

- *ādhikarmikaḥ* (the novice),
- *kṛtaparicayaḥ* (the adept)
- *atikrāntamanaskāra*, the one who has gone beyond contemplation.

In the ŚBh, only the highest stage of practitioner, the *atikrāntamanaskāra*, can attain the seventh stage of contemplation (*manaskāra*), which is the end goal, the fruit of the culmination of the practice (*prayoganiṣṭhāphalo manaskāraḥ*) (ŚBh 3.15).

The structural correspondences in these two schemes between the levels of practitioner and the seven levels of contemplation are striking.[131] The

[129] The English translations of the stages draw on Deleanu 2006 1: 29-30.

[130] There are also four types of person on the mundane path, but they are less relevant here: the person outside of Buddhism; one who follows doctrine but has weak aptitude due to previous practice of calm; one who has keen aptitude but whose roots of virtue are not mature; a bodhisattva who desires to attain *nirvāṇa* in a future life but not in this present one: *catvāras tadyathā / sarva itobāhyakaḥ / iha dhārmiko 'pi mṛduḥ / pūrvaśamathacaritas tathā tīkṣṇo 'py aparipakvakuśalamūlaḥ / bodhisar(t)vaś cāyatyāṃ bodhim anuprāptukāmaḥ* (ŚBh 12A.3-7b; Wayman 1960: 125).

classification of seven levels of wisdom is typical of the early Buddhist and Abhidharma-style classification in this period.[132] The sevenfold path to *prajñā* is present in the PYŚ but is not evident in other Brahmanic texts on yoga. The PYŚ and the YĀBh thus share a path structure of seven-stage yoga training that has as its most advanced level the *atikrāntamanaskāra* (ŚBh) or the *atikrāntabhāvanīya* (PYŚ), both of which paths have as their goal the attainment of *prajñā*.

In sum: Pātañjala yoga and yogācāra both propose a seven-stage path of the adept and a correlative technique to remove impediments on the path, *praktipakṣabhāvanā*.

3.4.6 Yoga is clear vision: errors of perception and the visual field

The metaphor YOGA IS CLEAR VISION rests on the root metaphor SEEING IS KNOWING. In this model, the undesired factor is that which obscures vision,

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[131] In yogācāra, the stage of *atikrānta* is particularly associated with the *bodhisattva* and is a frequent qualifier of *bodhisattva* status in the BoBh. Somewhat puzzlingly, however, in the PYŚ the focus is not on the *atikrānta* stage; the gods are only jealous of the Brahmin in the honeyed stage, the *madhubhūmika*, and thus the narrated contemplation (a counterstate) takes place at the honeyed stage, which is explained as equivalent to the state of YS 1.48 in which *ṛtambharaprajñā* (truth-bearing wisdom) is produced. *Madhu* is mentioned elsewhere in the PYŚ in the image of sense-control, the senses being like the bees that follow the king bee wherever he goes (PYŚ 2.54; 3.38).

[132] For example, the Theravādin path structure is of seven levels of purification, which culminate in *prajñā*: 1. purification of morals 2. purification of mind, including pure meditations and realization of the eight *samāpatti*s (attainments) 3. purifying views 4. transcending doubt 5. knowledge and vision of the correct path over the incorrect 6. knowledge and vision of the correct method of salvation and 7. purification of wisdom (Hirakawa 1990: 205-206). The Sarvāstivāda interpret these seven stages as three degrees of the wise and four degrees of favourable roots (Hirakawa 1990: 208), while adding on three paths: the path of insight (*darśana mārga*), the path of meditation (*bhāvanā mārga*) and the path in which there is nothing left to be learned (*aśaikṣa*). These last three stages are called the 'three degrees of the worthy' but cannot be approached unless the practitioner has undertaken practices to purify his body (Akira 1998: 208-209). Together the seven stages make up the *prayoga*, or preparatory steps, for the path of insight. For a summary account of the Sarvāstivāda path structure, see Gethin 2007: 335-337.

either in the form of a 'block' in the field of vision, or as the limiting condition of darkness (producing *avidyā*, *moha*, *mithyājñāna*, etc.). This is an epistemological model, which was generated to theorize how knowledge operates. This model deals with cognition, ignorance, and knowledge and is often expressed as veiling/unveiling the truth or covering/uncovering the light of knowledge, e.g. 'the lamp of yoga' PYŚ 3.51.

Yoga as the correct type of vision is, of course, central to Sāṃkhya soteriology, in which one is liberated by perceiving the true self as Puruṣa (and not falsely perceiving the self as Prakṛti). However, there is at least one other instance of the conceptual metaphor YOGA IS CLEAR VISION, which intersects specifically with a Buddhist paradigm. Patañjali's account of kriyā yoga contains a discussion of *pratipakṣa* in relation to the four errors of perception. These four misperceptions constitute the foundation of ignorance (*avidyā*), the master *kleśa* from which the other *kleśa*s spring:

> ***anityāśuciduḥkhānātmasu nityaśucisukhātmakhyātir avidyā*** || YS_2.5 ||
> ***Avidyā* is [seeing] permanence, purity, happiness, and perception of self in impermanence, impurity, suffering, and non-self.**

This paradigm appears to refer to 'the four errors' or misperceptions (*viparyāsa*) of Buddhist thought.[133] These four misperceptions also appear in the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*, where they are accompanied by contemplations that are designed to counter the four errors of perception regarding the nature of reality.[134] According to these errors, the conditioned

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[133] These four errors also appear in Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmasāra* as part of the four *smṛthyupasthānāni*: 'The disciple at first contemplates the body (kāyāḥ) according to its characteristics as impure, impermanent, suffering, and non-self' (Frauwallner 1995: 162). Contemplation on the body is followed by the same formulaic consideration applied to sensation, mind and elements.

[134] Three of the four errors are included in the BhāvBh's list of the ten antidotes (see above 3.4.3). For example, the third *vipakṣa* is laziness and indolence (*ālasyakausīdya*) in applying oneself constantly to the cultivation of wholesome *dharma*s (*kuśaladharmabhāvanāsātatyābhiyoga*) (BhāvBh 142a3; von Rospatt 2013: 858). This obstacle has as its antidote *anitya duḥkhasaṃjñābhāvanā*, the contemplation that regards

nature of *saṃsāra* is misunderstood as permanent, pure, blissful, and self – the same formula that we find in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. So what is the rationale behind these four errors in Buddhism? The four misperceptions began as the three marks of existence (*trilakṣaṇa*) in the early teachings of the Buddha: *anitya*, *duḥkha* and *anātman* – all conditioned things are impermanent, all conditioned things are therefore unsatisfactory, and all knowable things are not-self (e.g. *Dhammapada* 277-279). The three marks, however, are perverted by the delusion (*moha*; *avidyā*) of the human mind, which can only be corrected by apprehension of the noble truths and practice of the noble eightfold path.[135] When the three *lakṣaṇa*s (*anitya*, *duḥkha*, *anātman*) were extended, the fourth component was 'impurity', understood as *aśuci* or *aśubha*. In fact, it is the addition of *aśubha* that causes the perversion of the three *lakṣaṇa*s into the four misperceptions. However, *aśubha* meditation can also restore the true perception of the three *lakṣana*s – the truth of the body as impermanent, filled with suffering, and characterised by non-self.

Yogācāra philosophy adds *śūnyatā* (emptiness) as a fourth element (instead of *aśuci* or *aśubha*), to indicate that it is the essential teaching underlying the

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the impermanent as entailing suffering: *anantaraniruddham cittaṃ navotpannena navotpannena manasikaroti yathābhūtam anityādhibhir ākāraiḥ* (BhāvBh 7-1-B-1; Sugawara 2013: 830) 'whereupon one focuses on the mind as it truly is in its various aspects of impermanence and so forth, as [the mind] continuously ceases and arises newly again and again' (trans. Sugawara 2013: 830).

[135] In Buddhist contexts, *bhāvanā* (meditation/cultivation) is split into *śamatha* and *vipaśyana*. *Vipaśyana* is direct apprehension of the three marks of existence. *Vipaśyana* leads to *prajñā*, insight, while *śamatha* leads to *samādhi* and then to *dhyāna* (absorption) and to special powers, *abhijñā*. In practice, the two were combined. *Śamatha* produces *dhyāna*, but *dhyāna* is then made the object of *vipaśyana* meditation by reflecting on how *dhyāna* contains the three marks of existence of the phenomenal world: *anitya*, *duḥkha* and *anātman*. (Although less commonly, *vipaśyana* can also be used alone, without *śamatha*, by analysing the three marks of existence in ordinary mental phenomena.) Together with the four noble truths, the three marks of existence form the doctrinal basis of early Buddhism.

three marks. We see the inclusion of *śūnyatā* in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*,[136] which describes the paradigm of the four forms in the *lokottara mārga* (supramundane path): the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya*) (the first of the four noble truths) is inspected through the four *ākāra*s of *anityatā* (impermanence), *duḥkhatā* (suffering), *śūnyatā* (emptiness) and *anātmatā* (non-self or non-substantiality).[137] However, in another instance the formula is cited with *śuci* (ŚBh 10A.3-2a; Wayman 1960: 98).[138] In all of these cases, the error in perception is mistaking the unwanted state for the desired state. So how does Patañjali propose that clear vision be attained? It is not by removing the obscurant in the field of vision, nor by increasing the light. Rather we return to the technique of the counterstate as a cultivated visual image that negates its opposite. For example, Patañjali's description of the state of impurity contains the false belief that a woman is beautiful:

> Because in the impure, purity is perceived. It is as when a young girl, like the curved moon, might lead [one] to love with her limbs as if

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[136] These four errors appear in the earlier **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa in its tenth chapter called 'Avoiding Mistakes'. The text explains the four mistakes as taking: the impermanent for permanent, suffering for pleasure, the non-self for self, and the empty for the real. The yogācāra guards oneself against these, and meditates upon upon their opposites, the fundamental inexistence (of all permanence etc.). Then one recognizes that he one is capable of obtaining these, as well as the four fruits and the quality of the Buddha. 'Bref exposé, agrémenté de comparaisons, des quatre méprises: prendre l'impermanent pour le permanent, la douleur pour le plaisir, l'impersonnel pour le personnel, le vide pour le réel (litt. "le plein"). Le *yogācāra* s'en gardera et méditera au contraire sur l'inexistence foncière (de toute permanence, etc.); il se reconnaître alors capable d'obtenir lui aussi les quatre fruits et la qualité de Buddha' (SYCB 10.198b-199c: Demiéville 1951: 405-406). See also the BoBh: *tathā sarvasaṃskāreṣvanityasaṃjñāmanitye duḥkhasaṃjñāṃ duḥkhe 'nātmasaṃjñāṃ nirvāṇe cānuśaṃsasaṃjñāṃ bhāvayati* (BoBh 1.16; Wogihara 1930-1936; 236, lines 8-12).

[137] *Caturbhir ākārair duḥkhasatyasya lakṣaṇaṁ pratisaṁvedayate/ tadyathā 'nityākāreṇa duḥkhākareṇa śūnyākareṇa anātmākareṇa ca* (ŚBh 3.29.1.1.1; Deleanu 2006 1: 31).

[138] It is also worth noting that the Mahāyāna *tathāgatagarbha* traditions reclaimed the four qualities as those of transcendent Buddha-nature (the *guṇapāramitā*s). Both the *Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra* and the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* contain the idea that buddha-nature is possessed of four transcendental qualities: permanence, bliss, self, purity – the identical formula to Patañjali's.

> made from honey and nectar, known as if her appearance has burst forth (*bhittvā*) from the moon; with eyes like the petals of the blue lotus, she consoles the living world with alluring gestures and glances. Of whom and to what is the relationship? Thus there exists in impurity the erroneous idea of purity (PYŚ 2.5).

This erroneous perception is countered with a quoted verse that illustrates the *aśubha* state of the body, which is in fact impure (*aśuca*) and disgusting to the utmost degree (*paramabībhatsa*):

> "Because of its state, its origin (seed), its excitation/strength, its emissions, its death, and its assignation to [becoming] pure, paṇḍits know the body to be impure" (PYŚ 2.5).[139]

It is difficult to arrive at any other conclusion than Patañjali's formula is a response to the Buddhist doctrine of the four errors, in which *aśubhabhāvanā*,[140] a distinctly visual form of meditation,[141] is a counterstate to the problem of misperception. Of course, the doctrinal underpinnings in the PYŚ and the YĀBh are different, in that Sāṃkhya proposes a world that *is* permanent and has a fixed self. Yet both texts share a paradigmatic presentation of the four errors of perception using the structural metaphor YOGA IS CLEAR VISION.

The above comparison of intertextual metaphors and paradigms shows that Pātañjala yoga and yogācāra shared a view of *yogabhāvanā*, or yogic cultivation, as the application of a counterstate to an unwanted state. Both the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* promote practices that are designed according to common understandings of goal and process. What is one doing in yoga discipline? One is remedying the self of psychological poisons (YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE), applying oneself in forward motion towards an end destination (YOGA IS A PATH), and increasing the clearness of one's mental perceptual field (YOGA IS CLEAR VISION). In the seed

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[139] "*sthānād bījād upaṣṭambhān niḥsyandān nidhanād api / kāyam ādheyaśaucatvāt paṇḍitā hy aśuciṃ viduḥ*" (PYŚ 2.5)

[140] In section 3.4.4 we saw how *aśubha* meditation also utilises the metaphor YOGA IS AN ANTIDOTE. Such is the visual experience of bodily disease/decay that it can be used to map qualities from both the domain of medicine (antidote) and of vision (visual horror).

[141] For further discussion, see Appendix 4.

metaphors examined in Chapter 2, we also saw the mechanism of the counterstate at work: for example, in the injunction to uproot bad growth in the self and to replace it with good growth, or to replace the propagative seeds of *kleśa* with ones that are sterile. In combination, these conceptual metaphors centred on 'yoga' and 'kleśa' created a conceptually integrated scheme, *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, the cultivation of the counterstate.

The conceptual models of SEED/ANTIDOTE/PATH/VISION are not exclusive and demonstrate some conceptual inconsistencies – but they do share a common entailment: an unwanted factor can only be removed by applying the *appropriate* counterstate. In this sense, we may think of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* as a practice of applying an appropriate counterstate continuously or repeatedly. Overall, the presentation of yoga as the overcoming of the obstacles appears to draw on two different strands of ascetic-philosophical thought. We are returned again to the notion of at least two traditions compounded in the PYŚ – and reminded of Sarbacker's categories of the numinous and the cessative (Sarbacker 2005). One paradigm of 'obstacles' is epistemological and appears to be more archaic: it is the discourse that frames the obstacle in terms of knowledge and ignorance and terms it *āvaraṇa*, the obstruction of vision. The other discourse is ontological and appears to be a more recent innovation: it is the discourse that frames the obstacles as impediments to progress on the path, and it conceives of the problem as *antarāya* (obstacle), specifically a physical impediment. In the PYŚ the context of the *antarāya*s appears to be closely connected to that of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* and the *mārga* soteriology of classical Buddhism, while the context of the *āvaraṇa*s is more closely associated with Sāṃkhya philosophy, which rests on liberation as correct or clear perception.

3.5 *Dharmamegha*: the revision of a superlative metaphor

The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* concludes with a description of the pinnacle of yoga practice: a state of *samādhi* called *dharmamegha*, cloud of dharma. This term is also important in Buddhist yogācāra, and more broadly in Mahāyāna soteriology, where it represents the apex of attainment and the superlative

statehood of a bodhisattva (one whose aim is to become a buddha). Patañjali appears to adopt this key metaphor from a Mahāyāna context and to revise its meaning. In this section, I lay out four possibilities that can account for the intertextuality and the stark contrast between the ways in which the two classical *yogaśāstra*s employ the superlative[142] metaphor of *dharmamegha*. Working from the premise that the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* post-dates the early layers of the YĀBh and therefore reworks the Buddhist metaphor, I demonstrate that Patañjali's *dharmamegha* can be analysed as 1. a dead metaphor, 2. a paralogical revision for polemical effect, 3. logically concordant with Buddhist soteriology, or 4. a product of literary style. From among these factors, I suggest that Patañjali's strikingly empty metaphor of *dharmamegha* is largely a result of literary style and polemical revision due to doctrinal necessity.

3.5.1 Patañjali's *dharmamegha*

Scholars of classical yoga have long debated the meaning of the term *dharmamegha* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*,[143] and the detail of the debate has been focused on what '*dharma*' means.[144] One of the key reasons for the

[142] In grammar, superlative is a term that indicates the highest degree of comparison between two or more objects. The comparative degree is applied by comparing two objects, whereas the superlative is applied to comparing more than two (Schertzer 1986: 37). It is also used in everyday expression to indicate the best of a series of possible states.

[143] See, for example, Klostermeier 1986 and Rukmani 2007.

[144] For a discussion of the 'dauntingly broad semantic range' of *dharma* in Indian religions, see Olivelle 1999: xxxvii-xliii. In Brahmanism, *dharma* is the continuum of cosmic and social order derived from the content of Vedic injunctions and includes both an ontological and a normative dimension. In Buddhism *dharma* can mean universal law (both physical and moral), the body of Buddha's teaching (as one of the three 'jewels' or *triratna* of Buddha, *dharma*, *saṃgha*), and the constituent building blocks of reality. On the whole, most translators of the PYŚ have opted to interpret *dharma* as referring to an ontological category e.g. 'the Raincloud of [knowable] things' (Woods 1927: 341) or 'raincloud of essences' (Koelman 1970: 234). The other typical translation has been to render *dharmamegha* as 'raincloud of virtue' (e.g. Mitra 1883: 203; Bangali 1976: 110; Rukmani 1981-1989, 4: 121). Less common is the translation of *dharma* to indicate teaching or body of knowledge, such as Skorupski's 'doctrine-cloud' (Skorupski 2009: 67).

ongoing discussion is the polyvalence of the term *dharma*. Furthermore, Patañjali does not expound *dharmamegha*'s meaning in any detail, and we do not find this term in Brahmanical sources. It should be added that neither do the sub-commentators of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* shed much light on *dharmamegha* as a technical term. In combination, these factors point to *dharmamegha* being an uncommon term in Brahmanism in the early Common Era. I suggest that we may approach the doctrinal denotation of this term in a more fruitful way by considering what *megha* (cloud) means; it is only by elucidating the metaphoric function of *megha* in *dharmamegha* that we can arrive at a better understanding of the meaning of *dharma* in this compound.

In the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, there are two brief discussions of *dharmamegha*, which appear at the beginning and the end of the text. In itself, this positions these discussions as a conceptual 'bracket' that frames the entire text. The first discussion takes place within the quintessential definition of yoga and the second discussion takes place in the concluding definition of liberation. In the first discussion, centred on *dharmameghadhyāna,* the meaning of dharma appears to be 'virtuous or religious conduct'. In the second discussion, centred on *dharmameghasamādhi*, the primary meaning appears to be liberating knowledge.[145]

The first instance of *dharmamegha* occurs in the definition of *dharmameghadhyāna* (the absorption of *dharmamegha*). This occurs in the *bhāṣya* to the second *sūtra*, the well-known *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* (yoga is the cessation of mental fluctuation). The discussion explains how the mind

[145] While the ontological theory of *dharma* as 'building block of reality' is certainly present in the PYŚ, I argue that it does not inform the *primary* meaning of *dharma* in Patañjali's *dharmamegha*. For an example of *dharma* as ontological unit, see the commentary to PYŚ 4.33, which moves from a characterization of *dharma* as infinite knowledge into a related discussion of *dharmin*s, properties. *Dharmin* is a key philosophical term to indicate the unchangeable property of a thing. See Maas 2014 for a full discussion of the transformation of *dharma* theory in the PYŚ.

must be sequentially purified of any vestige of the three *guṇa*s (*tamas*, *rajas*, and *sattva*).[146]

> *tad eva rajoleśamalāpetaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhaṃ sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātimātraṃ dharmameghadhyānopagaṃ bhavati. tat paraṃ prasaṃkhyānam ity ācakṣate dhyāyinaḥ*
> (PYŚ 1.2; Maas 2006: 5-6, 6-8).
> When that very [*sattva*] is established in its own form, without the least measure of *rajas*, being merely the cognition of the distinction between *sattva* and *puruṣa*, it is conducive to *dharmameghadhyāna*. Those versed in *dhyāna* (*dhyāyinaḥ*) call this [*dharmameghadhyāna*] the highest '*prasaṃkhyāna*'.

The passage describes the highest level of meditative attainment in which concentration is so restricted that it perceives just one thing: the difference between the *sattva guṇa* (the ontological state of balance) and *puruṣa* (the state of pure consciousness). Concentration can only reach this stage by being devoid of any trace of *rajas* (*tamas* long since having been eliminated). This restricted perception of the 'difference' also represents the state of being established in one's own form, i.e. recognizing one's true nature as *puruṣa*. Additionally, the passage reveals that *dharmameghadhyāna* is also called *prasaṃkhyāna* (enumerative reflection)[147] and confirms the enumerative aspect of *prasaṃkhyāna* in discerning discrete objects, in this case two objects (*sattva* from *puruṣa*).[148] *Dharmameghadhyāna*, then, is a meditative technique that generates the capacity to discern the ultimate ontological distinction between *prakṛti* (principle of materiality) and *puruṣa* (principle of pure consciousness). Based on the analysis of Chapter 1 in this dissertation, we can see that the underlying metaphor for this technique of liberation is KNOWING IS SEEING.

In Patañjali's text there is no explanation of the term *dharmamegha* itself and what it means beyond the label. However, in the preceding contrasting

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[146] The three *guṇa*s (qualities) are part of Sāṃkhya ontology and are *tamas* (density), *rajas* (dynamism), and *sattva* (balance).

[147] For a discussion of how to translate *prasaṃkhyāna*, see Appendix 1.

[148] *Sattva* here represents the subtlest and purest aspect of one's own mind, which must also be abandoned when one realises that it belongs to *prakṛti* (the principle of materiality).

two descriptions of a *citta* (mind) that is pierced by either *tamas* or *rajas*, *dharma* is mentioned twice. In the case of *tamas*, the four characteristics of the mind are: lack of *dharma*, false knowledge, attachment, and weakness.[149] In the case of *rajas*, the four characteristics are *dharma*, knowledge, detachment, and strength.[150] The two paradigms mirror each other. I suggest that using *dharmamegha* to denote the presence of *sattva* represents a logical progression (beyond this mirroring). Notably, *dharma* is the only one of the four characteristics carried forward into the description of a mind with *sattva*. In such a framework, *dharma* continues the semantic denotation of the prior two sentences and means 'religious conduct' or 'virtuous behaviour'.[151] The connection to the cloud image indicates an exceptionally elevated, i.e. ideal, state of *dharma*. With regard to *dharma*, then, *citta* has three expressions, which match the three *guṇa*s: lack of *dharma* (*tamas*), presence of *dharma* (*rajas*), and exceptional *dharma* (cloud of *dharma*) that surpasses convention (*sattva*).

Patañjali's second reference to *dharmamegha* occurs at the end of the *śāstra*, where it is discussed in more detail.[152] This description is of the highest attainment of yogic concentration, or *dharmameghasamādhi*. Here, we learn that *dharmameghasamādhi* is equivalent to the *samādhi* that is without seed of *saṃskāra* (mental imprint):

> ***prasaṃkhyāne 'py akusīdasya sarvathā vivekakhyāter dharmameghaḥ samādhiḥ*** ||
> *yadāyaṃ brāhmaṇaḥ prasaṃkhyāne 'py akusīdas tato 'pi na kiṃcit prārthayate. tatrāpi viraktasya sarvathā vivekakhyātir eva bhavatīti*

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[149] *tad eva tamasānuviddham adharmājñānāvairāgyānaiśvaryopagaṃ bhavati* (PYŚ 1.2).

[150] *tad eva prakṣīṇamohāvaraṇaṃ sarvataḥ pradyotamānam anuviddhaṃ rajomātrayā dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryopagaṃ bhavati* (PYŚ 1.2).

[151] With regard to the individual mind, *dharma* most appropriately refers to virtuous attitude or religious conduct and not to *dharma* as 'ontological unit' or 'body of teachings', the other two most common meanings for *dharma*. The inclusion of *dharma* in a list of other human and mental qualities further reinforces that this is how we should read it in this context.

[152] PYŚ 4.29; 4.31-32.

saṃskārabījakṣayān nāsya pratyayāntarāṇy utpadyante. tadāsya dharmamegho nāma samādhir bhavati (PYŚ 4.29)
For one who is without investment even in enumerative reflection (*prasaṃkhyāna*), *dharmameghasamādhi* arises from complete discriminating discernment (*vivekakhyāti*).
When this Brahmin is without investment even in *prasaṃkhyāna*, then he does not strive whatsoever. Therefore one who is completely devoid of attachment thereto [to *prasaṃkhyāna*] has only discriminating discernment. Because of the destruction of the seed of *saṃskāra*, no other ideations arise. Then, there arises the *samādhi* that is called *dharmamegha*.

The state of seedless *samādhi* was explained at PYŚ 1.51 and was called *nirbīja samādhi*. This would appear to confirm that *dharmameghasamādhi* and *nirbīja samādhi* are synonyms.[153] As we have noted, the opening of the PYŚ presents *dharmameghadhyāna* as equivalent to *prasaṃkhyāna* (enumerative reflection). Now it is explained that when even this technique of *prasaṃkhyāna* is abandoned (the act of perceiving the difference between *sattva* and *puruṣa,* i.e*. dharmameghadhyāna*), one attains the ultimate state of *dharmameghasamādhi*. We have, then, a simple progression that can be expressed in two ways: to say that *prasaṃkhyāna* leads to *nirbīja samādhi* is equivalent to saying that *dharmameghadhyāna* leads to *dharmameghasamādhi*.[154] The state of *dharmameghasamādhi* is further characterized as a state of infinite knowledge:

> ***tadā sarvāvaraṇaṃalāpetasya jñānasyānantyāj jñeyam alpam*** ||
> Then for one who is free from the impurity of all obscuration due to infinite knowledge, that which is to be known is little (PYŚ 4.31).

This description of the cloud of *dharma* as infinite knowledge supports the reading of *dharma* in this instance as 'body of teaching/doctrine'. Additionally, *dharmameghasamādhi* is also a state in which change and

[153] For a fuller description of the image of the seedless state at PYŚ 1.51, see section 2.3.1 of this study.

[154] The progression of *dharmamegha* from a state of *dhyāna* to one of *samādhi* represents the typical sequence from absorption to concentration, such as we see in both Pātañjala and Buddhist schemes of meditation.

transformation are brought to a halt (PYŚ 4.32).[155] If, as we are told in PYŚ 1.1, yoga is *samādhi*, then the superlative state of yoga is *dharmameghasamādhi*. This is a liberated state of cessation.

From these two accounts of *dharmamegha* in the PYŚ we can assert that *dharmamegha* can be both ethical-ontological (the virtuous condition of *sattvaguṇa*) and epistemological (the condition of unlimited knowledge) and that *dharmameghasamādhi* is a superlative state of cessation.

3.5.2 Dharmamegha in Buddhist sources

In contrast to the dearth of sources for the term *dharmamegha* in Brahmanical sources,[156] there is an abundance of references in Buddhist literature.[157] *Dhammamegha* is discussed in the Pāli canon in both the

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[155] ***tataḥ kṛtārthānāṃ pariṇāmakramasamāptir guṇānām*** || *tasya dharmameghasyodayāt kṛtārthānāṃ guṇānāṃ pariṇāmakramaḥ parisamāpyate na hi kṛtabhogāpavargāḥ parisamāptakramāḥ kṣaṇam apy avasthātum utsahante* (PYŚ 4.32) **'Then the guṇas have accomplished their purpose when the sequence of transformation is fully completed.** Due to the emergence of the cloud of *dharma,* the *guṇa*s have accomplished their purpose and the sequence of change is fully completed, for [when] experience and emancipation are done, the sequences complete, they [the *guṇa*s] cannot bear to continue for even a moment.'

[156] Although cloud images are common in the *Mahābhārata*, the term *dharmamegha* does not appear, and the contexts of the cloud metaphor can be general and varied. The verses MB 12.304.18-27 explain the characteristics of the yoga adept in terms of similes – the first two are familiar because we encounter them in the PYŚ, the lamp and the cloud: *nivāte tu yathā dīpo jvalet snehasamanvitaḥ / niścalordhvaśikhas tadvad yuktam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ / pāṣāṇa iva meghotthair yathā bindubhir āhataḥ / nālaṃ cālayituṃ śakyas tathā yuktasya lakṣaṇam* (MB 12.304.19-20; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1680). 'But as a lamp in a windless place, filled with oil, will burn with the motionless up-rising flame, in the same way, the wise describe the disciplined (Yoga-adept). As a stone, struck by water-drops coming from a cloud, cannot be disturbed, such is the mark of the disciplined (Yoga-adept)' (Trans. Edgerton 1965: 327). This raincloud image is not one of *dharmamegha*, but rather serves a different function to illustrate the non-responsive nature of a stone-like yogin.

[157] In Buddhism, the abstract concept of *dharma* is frequently represented via metaphors. For example, in the late-canonical *Buddhavaṃsa* (1st-2nd century BCE) we are told how the future Buddha will enlighten all beings. This is explained with three metaphors: the

Apadāna and the *Buddhavaṃsa*, both containing biographical stories about the Buddha.[158] For example, the *Apadāna*[159] states:

Dhamma-ship, the Dhamma-mirror, and the Dhamma-medicine (Collins 2010: 183). Each of these metaphors contains dense clusters of association, e.g. the ship as a vehicle for safe passage, the mirror as reflecting self-knowledge and awareness, and medicine as a healing tool. *Dharmamegha* is perhaps just one of the myriad metaphors in Buddhism that attempt to scaffold the meaning of terms like *dharma*. Nonetheless, whatever its origins, *dharmamegha* was picked up and amplified in a certain strand of Mahāyāna literature.

[158] This is according to the *Pāli Tipiṭakaṁ Concordance* (Woodward et al 1973, Vol 2: 413). These texts both occur in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, the fifth and last division of the *Sutta Piṭaka*.

[159] The *Apadāna* also contains an interesting discussion of *dhammamegha* in relation to procreative fertility: *Yathāpi padumaṃ nāma sūraraṃsena pupphati / tath'; evāhaṃ mahāvīra buddharaṃsena pupphito. // Yathā balākayonimhi na vijjati pumā sadā / meghesu gajjamānesu gabbhaṃ gaṇhanti tā sadā. // Ciram pi gabbhaṃ dhārenti yāva megho na gajjati / bhārato parimuccanti yadā megho pavassati. // Padumuttarabuddhassa dhammameghena gajjato / saddena dhammameghassa dhammagabbhaṃ agaṇhi'haṃ. // Satasahassaṃ upādāya puññagabbhaṃ dharem ahaṃ / nappamuccāmi bhārato dhammamegho na gajjati. // Yadā tuvaṃ Sakyamuni ramme Kapilavatthave / gajjasi dhammameghena bhārato parimucc' ahaṃ. // Suññataṃ animittañ ca tathāpaṇihitam pi ca / caturo ca phale sabbe dhamme 'va vijaṭāy' ahaṃ. //* (*Apadāna*, Therāpadāna 1.6.70-76; Lilley 1925-27 Part 1: 42) 'And just as a lotus flower blooms due to the rays of the sun, so too do I, O Great Hero, bloom because of the Buddha-rays. Just as male birds are not always found mating with the female cranes [but only] when the clouds do rumble do they take them to their wombs, and for much time they stay pregnant — as long as the clouds don't thunder — then they are freed from that burden when the clouds are raining [again], [so] when the Dhamma-cloud thundered of Padumuttara Buddha, due to that Dhamma-cloud's loud sound I [then] conceived a Dhamma-womb. Serving for a hundred thousand [aeons] I bore that merit-fetus. I was not freed from that burden; the Dhamma-cloud did not thunder. But when you, Sage of the Śākyas did thunder from your Dhamma-cloud in lovely Kapilavastu, I was set free from that burden. [Then] I explained the whole Teaching and also its four fruits, which are: emptiness, the absence of marks, suchness, intentionality' (trs. Walters 2017: 87-88). The association between *dhammamegha* and Padumuttara, the 10th of the 28 Buddhas (Malalasekera 1938 II: 136), is reinforced in Chapter Four: *Vāsavaṃ viya vassantaṃ dhammamegham anāsavaṃ / sāradādiccasadisaṃ raṃsijālākulañ jinaṃ* (*Apadāna*, Therī-Apadāna 2.17.98; Lilley 1925-27 Part 2: 537). 'The Victor, like autumnal son, surrounded by garlands of rays, without constraints, that Dhamma-cloud rained forth like the king of the gods' (trs. Walters 2017: 1034). Padumuttara appears to be related to

dhammameghena vassante sabbe hontu anāsavā
ye'ttha pacchimakā sattā sotāpannā bhavantu te
(*Apadāna*, Buddhāpadānam 68; Lilley 1925-27 Part 1: 5)
While the *dharmamegha* rains, may all contaminations cease; may [people] live according to their perfections, may they become stream-enterers.

In the *Buddhavaṃsa*, the Buddha is described both as being the agency of *dhammamegha* and as having a causative relationship to *dhammamegha*. As the agency of the cloud, the Buddha rains the showers of dharma:

so pi patvāna sambodhiṃ santārento sadevakaṃ
abhivassi dhammameghena nibbāpento sadevakaṃ
(Bv 17.2; Jayawickrama 1974: 68)
After he had attained Self-Awakening and was causing the world with the devas to cross over, he rained down from the cloud of Dhamma making the world with the devas cool (trs. Horner 1975: 67).

We also encounter the causative sense:

dhammameghaṃ pavassetvā temayitvā sadevake
khemantaṃ pāpayitvāna nibbuto so sasāvako
(Bv 21.26; Jayawickrama 1974: 81)
Having made the cloud of Dhamma rain down moistening the world with the devas (Bv 21.26; trs. Horner 1975: 80).

Beyond the Pāli canon, *dhammamegha* appears in relation to yoga in the 1st-2nd century *Milindapañha*, in which the Indo-Greek king Menander poses questions about Buddhism. The example of *dharmamegha* appears in a long list of similes self-consciously presented to construct the paradigms of right behaviour for the earnest yogin. Using the structure of simile, the text lists five qualities of the cloud (*megha*) that the *yogin yogāvacāra* is said to possess.[160] The cloud is also understood to be a raincloud, and the five

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Paduma (Malalasekera 1938 II: 131). There is one further discussion of *dhammamegha*, again in relation to Padumuttara: *Guṇānaṃ āyati bhūto ratanānaṃ va sāgaro / pajjunno pi va bhūtāni dhammameghena vassati* (*Apadāna*, Therāpadāna 54.530.4; Lilley 1925-27 Part 2: 468), 'Like the ocean for gems, he is the future for the virtuous; like a rain-cloud for living things, he rains by the cloud of Teaching' (trs. Walters 2017: 887). Since both Paduma and Padumuttara Buddha are described as engendering a shower of lotuses, it is not clear why they should be directly connected with *dhammamegha*.

[160] *Yathā, mahārāja, megho uppannaṃ rajojallaṃ vūpasameti, evameva kho, mahārāja yoginā yogāvacarena uppannaṃ kilesarajojallaṃ vūpasametabbaṃ. Idaṃ, mahārāja,*

qualities of rain – settling, cooling, nurturing, protective, and abundant – are mapped to the yogin. The passage explains that *dharmamegha* is a fruit of *yogācāra* (Pāli: *yogāvacara*), or yoga discipline, and its function is to provide sustenance and nourishment to the world.[161]

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meghassa paṭhamaṃ aṅgaṃ gahetabbaṃ. Puna ca paraṃ, mahārāja, megho pathaviyā uṇhaṃ nibbāpeti, evam eva kho, mahārāja yoginā yogāvacarena mettābhāvanāya sadevako loko nibbāpetabbo. Idaṃ, mahārāja, meghassa dutiyaṃ aṅgaṃ gahetabbaṃ. Puna ca paraṃ, mahārāja megho sabbabījāni virūhāpeti evam eva kho mahārāja yoginā yogāvacarena sabbasattānaṃ saddhaṃ uppādetvā taṃ saddhābījaṃ tīsu sampattisu ropetabbaṃ, dibbamānusikāsu sampattisu yāva paramatthanibbānasukhasampatti. Idaṃ maharaja meghassa tatiyaṃ aṅgaṃ gahetabbaṃ. Puna ca paraṃ maharaja megho ututo samuṭṭhahitvā dharaṇitalaruhe tiṇarukkhalatāgumbaosadhivanappatayo parirakkhati evam eva kho maharaja yoginā yogāvacarena yoniso manasikāraṃ nibbattetvā tena yoniso manasikārena samaṇadhammo parirakkhitabbo, yoniso manasikāramūlakā sabbe kusalā dhammā. Idaṃ mahārāja meghassa catutthaṃ aṅgaṃ gahetabbaṃ. Puna ca paraṃ mahārāja megho vassamāno nadī taḷākapokkharaṇiyo kandarapadarasarasobbhaudapānāni ca paripūreti udakadhārāhi evam eva kho mahārāja yoginā yogāvacarena āgamapariyattiyā dhammameghamabhivassayitvā adhigamakāmānaṃ mānasaṃ paripūrayitabbaṃ. (MP; Trenckner 1962: 410-411).

[161] Klostermeier also translated this passage in an article that was key in highlighting Buddhist textual sources for the image of the cloud within the context of *yoga*/*yogācāra*: '1. As the rain-cloud settles the dust on the road, so the *yogin*, by means of his yoga practice, should settle the dust of afflictions (*kilesarajojallam*). 2. As the rain-cloud allays the heat of summer, so the *yogin*, through his practice of friendliness (*mettābhāva*), should reduce the heat of the whole world (*nibbāpetabo*). 3. As the rain-cloud makes all kinds of plants grow, so the yogin should make faith (*saddhā*) arise and grow. 4. As the rain-cloud affords protection in the hot season to vegetation, so the *yogin*, by virtue of mindfulness (*manasikāra*), should protect the *samaṇadhamma*. 5. As the rain-cloud, when it opens up, fills brooks and streams and wells and lakes, so the *yogin*, by virtue of his yoga life (*yogāvacarena*) well-grounded in the scriptures (*āgamapariyattiyā*), should open the 'raincloud of dharma' (*dharmamegha*) and make it pour down fulfillment to the minds of those who are desirous of learning (trs. Klostermeier 1986: 257-258). However, in his translation of the term *dharma*, Klostermeier comes down on the side of *dharma* as ontological factor. Making an anachronistic leap, he translates *megha* as ''field' in the sense of modern physics': '*Dharmamegha samādhi* would then be a condition in which the dharmas, which on a lower level of consciousness have been perceived as differentiated into a great number of specific dharmas, now are perceived in their (unified) dharma-character' (Klostermeier 1986: 260). However, in turning '*megha*' (cloud) into a spatial

> ‘Revered Nāgasena, when you say five qualities of the rain-cloud must be adopted, which are these five qualities that must be adopted?’
> ‘As, sire, the rain-cloud allays dust and dirt that are arising, even so, sire, the yogin, the earnest student of yoga must allay the dust and dirt of the defilements that are arising. This, sire, is the first quality of the rain-cloud that must be adopted.
> And again, sire, the rain-cloud cools the heat of the earth; even so, sire, the yogin, the earnest student of yoga must cool the world with the devas by the meditation of loving-kindness. This, sire, is the second quality of the rain-cloud that must be adopted.
> And again, sire, the rain-cloud makes all seeds grow; even so, sire, the yogin, the earnest student of yoga, having in all creatures generated faith, should sow the seed of faith for (achieving) the three attainments: the deva-like and the human attainments and the attainment of the bliss of nibbāna, the ultimate goal. This, sire, is the third quality of the rain-cloud that must be adopted.
> And again, sire, a rain-cloud, arising in due season, preserves the base of the *dharaṇīruha* (tree), the grasses, trees, creepers, bushes, medicinal plants and forest-trees; even so, sire, the yogin, the earnest student of yoga, having produced careful attention must, by means of that careful attention, preserve the Dhamma of recluses, so that all skilled states are rooted in careful attention. This, sire, is the fourth quality of the rain-cloud that must be adopted.
> And again, sire, the rain-cloud in raining down fills rivers, reservoirs, lotus-ponds and gullies, crevices, lakes, water-pools and wells with showers of water; even so, sire, the yogin, the earnest student of yoga, having rained down the rain-cloud of Dhamma for the mastery of the tradition, should perfect the mind (of others) for the spiritual realisations they are longing for. This, sire, is the fifth quality of the rain-cloud that must be adopted. And this, sire, was said by the Elder Sāriputta, the General under Dhamma:
>
> > ‘Seeing folk capable of being awakened
> > Even be they a hundred or a thousand yojanas (distant),
> > Approaching them at the right moment
> > The Great Sage awakens them’
>
> (MP 7.56; Horner 1963-1964 Vol 2: 291-292).

In comparison to the previous canonical examples, *dhammamegha* here is associated not with the Buddha, but with the agency of ‘the earnest yogin’

‘field’ to make it match an ontological interpretation of *dharma*, Klostermeier does the term an injustice and overlooks its metaphoric importance for Patañjali.

who takes centre-stage in book seven of the *Milindapañha*. The rich detail provided by this simile is worth noting because in a simile the process of domain-mapping from source to target is more evident that in a metaphor, which is a more compressed linguistic and cognitive form. When we review the literary use of this metaphor further along, we must consider that the qualities so explicitly outlined in this simile are not always so explicit in a metaphor. It is also important to note that passages similar to this appear elsewhere in the Pāli canon, although not with reference to *dhammamegha* (e.g. *Saṃyutta Nikāya* ii 32).

Despite the early context for *dhammamegha* in Pāli sources, the most well-known texts for discussions of *dharmamegha* in Buddhist literature are the early Mahāyāna sutras, particularly the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (DBS), both dated to the early centuries CE.

The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* is often identified as the first sūtra of the Mahāyāna corpus, proclaiming, as it does, the new vehicle. The text was produced in phases from circa 1st century BCE to 3rd century CE, and within the earliests layers of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* are the verse sections in chapter five.[162] Chapter five, which deals with medicinal herbs ('*Oṣadhī-parivarto nāma pañcamaḥ*'), contains extraordinarily detailed descriptions of the rain of true dharma. Although the compound *dharmamegha* does not appear in this chapter, this *sūtra* offers the first extended association of the Buddha with a raincloud of dharma.

> *dharma-rājā ahaṃ loka utpanno bhava-mardanaḥ* |
> *dharmaṃ bhāṣāmi sattvānām adhimuktiṃ vijāniya* || 1 […]
> *yathā 'pi Kāśyapā megho loka-dhātūya unnataḥ* |
> *sarvam onahatī cāpi chādayanto vasuṃdharām* || 5
> *so ca vārisya saṃpūrṇo vidyun-mālī mahā'mbudaḥ* |
> *nirnādayanta śabdena harṣayet sarva-dehinaḥ* || 6

[162] The fifth chapter contains both prose and verse sections, both of which describe the cloud of dharma. The point here is that the verse sections are the earliest layers of the text, dated to the beginning of the first millennium and therefore predating Patañjali's *sūtrabhāṣya*.

emeva buddho 'pi ha loki Kāśyapa
utpadyate vāri-dharo va loke || [16ab]
(SPS 5.vv1, 5-6, 16; Wogihara and Tsuchida 1934: 117-118).
The King of Dharma I am, who arose in the world to crush becoming;
Dharma I teach to beings, after I have discerned their dispositions.
It is like a great cloud which rises above the earth,
Which covers up everything and overshadows the firmament,
And this great cloud, filled with water, wreathed with lightning,
Resounds with thunder, and refreshes all the creatures.
Just so, O Kasyapa, the Buddha also
Arises in this world just like a rain-cloud (trs. Conze 1954: 139-140).

The emphasis and repetition of the association between the Buddha and the raincloud over the course of this chapter is a new statement of doctrine. But it is not yet formulaic or standardised; in these verses the most frequent word used for cloud is *megha*, also giving rise to *mahāmegha* or 'great cloud'. However, other terms for (rain)cloud are also used: *mahā'mbudaḥ* (Wogihara and Tsuchida 1934: 117, v6a), *vāridhara* (Wogihara and Tsuchida 1934: 118, v16b), and *varṣam* (Wogihara and Tsuchida 1934; 120, v26d and 121, v36a). Interestingly, when *varṣam* appears, it is in the compound *dharmavarṣam*, and so the closest we get to *dharmamegha* in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* is *dharmavarṣam*. (I will return to this point below).

One of the central features of this rain of *dharma* is that it nourishes all equally:

saṃtarpayāmī imu sarva-lokaṃ
megho va vāriṃ sama muñcamānaḥ |
(SPS 5.v24; Wogihara and Tsuchida 1934: 118)
I refresh this entire world
Like a cloud which releases its rain evenly for all
(trs. Conze 1954: 140).

This assertion is fundamental to the new Mahāyāna doctrine of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*. The text has to justify why the true teaching (or the new vehicle) has only been revealed now and not previously – and to do so the text locates agency on the part of the disciples and not on the part of the Buddha himself. The argument proceeds thus: even though rain falls

equally on seeds, some seeds turn into flowers and some into trees – it depends upon the capacity of the seed itself.

> *mamāpi co varṣatu dharma-varṣaṃ*
> *loko hy ayaṃ tarpitu bhoti sarvaḥ* |
> *yathā-balaṃ cānuvicintayanti*
> *subhāṣitaṃ eka-rasaṃ pi dharmam* ||
> *tṛṇa-gulmakā vā yatha varṣamāṇe*
> *madhyā pi vā oṣadhiyo yathaiva* |
> *drumā pi vā ta ca mahā-drumā vā*
> *yatha śobhayante daśa-dikṣu sarve* ||
> *iyaṃ sadā loka-hitāya dharmatā*
> *tarpeti dharmeṇ' imu sarva-lokam* |
> *saṃtarpitaś cāpy atha sarva-lokaḥ*
> *pramuñcate oṣadhi puṣpakāṇi* ||
> (SPS 5.vv36-38; Wogihara and Tsuchida 1934: 121)
> When I rain down the rain of the Dharma,
> Then all this world is well refreshed.
> Each one according to their power takes to heart
> This well-preached Dharma, one in taste.
> As when it rains the shrubs and grasses,
> The bushes and the smaller plants,
> The trees and also the great woods
> Are all made splendid in the ten regions;
> So the nature of Dharma always exists for the weal of the world,
> And it refreshes by this Dharma the entire world.
> And then, refreshed, just like the plants,
> The world will burst forth into blossoms (trs. Conze 1954: 140).

This indicates that the true dharma has been available all along, but that a lack in the capacity of the disciples resulted in the lack of yield. The image of this just rain of dharma provided by the Buddha is central to the text's strategies of validation for its new doctrine.

The other key source in early Mahāyāna for the raincloud of dharma metaphor is the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.[163] Although not explicitly a text about

[163] Although the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* was initially an independent text, it was later absorbed into a large compilation, the *Avataṃsakasūtra* (early centuries CE). It was first translated into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa in the 3rd century CE (Schmithausen 2016: 401). Although the ten stages (*daśabhūmi*) are also represented in other Mahāyāna texts such as the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (which discusses *dharmamegha*) and the *Śūraṅgamasūtra*, this paper will

yoga, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* employs the discourse of yoga. This text describes the ten *bhūmi*s or stages[164] of attainment in the *bodhisattva* path to liberation, and the tenth *bhūmi*, the *bodhisattvabhūmi*, is also called *dharmameghabhūmi* (the stage of the cloud of dharma). At the second level of the *daśabhūmi*s, we are told about *yogaḥ karaṇīyaḥ* (the aim of yoga):

> *tata uttarataraṃ pariśodhitāḥ sarvākāraparišodhitatvād yāvad daśabalabalatvāya sarvabuddhadharmasamudāgamāya saṃvartante tasmāt tarhy asmābhiḥ samābhinirhāre*[165]
> *sarvākāraparišodhanābhinirhāra eva yogah karaṇīyaḥ*
> (DBS 2P: Rahder 1926: 26).
> They [the adepts] are even more highly purified than that as a result of being purified of all forms when (*yavād*) they acquire (*samvartante*) full knowledge of every buddha-dharma, the power of the ten balas. So therefore we should perform yoga on [balanced realization; *samabhinirhāra*], realization of the purification of all forms. Thus is yoga to be done.

Unlike in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, we do not find discussions of *dharmameghadhyāna* or *dharmameghasamādhi*, but rather *dharmameghabhūmi*. *Dharmamegha* represents the 10th *pāramitā* (perfection), which is perfection of knowledge (*jñānapāramitā*), and this *bhūmi*, the tenth stage in the *bodhisattva* path,[166] is also called the

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focus on the more obvious line of transmission from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* to the *Yogācārabhūmiśāśtra*.

[164] The ten *bhūmi*s are: *pramuditā*, *vimalā*, *prabhākarī*, *arciṣmati*, *sudurjayā*, *abhimukhī*, *dūraṃgamā*, *acalā*, *sādhumatī*, *dharmameghā*. The DBS maps the ten *bhūmi*s against the six perfections (*pāramitā*).

[165] According to Edgerton's Buddhist-Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, *abhinirhāra* means accomplishment, production or realization, often in relation to the mind, self, vows, etc. (Edgerton 1953). I have been unable to discern the meaning of the prefix *sam-* to *abhinirhāra*.

[166] Elsewhere, in the *Ratnameghasūtra* it is suggested that a bodhisattva may need to be a yogācāra, practitioner of yoga discipline. The *Ratnameghasūtra* contains information on how a bodhisattva should practice ascetic activity. Silk translates this passage from the Tibetan: 'if people are endowed with ten qualities they are noble bodhisattvas […] [if they] are yogācāras who abundantly contemplate emptiness' (Silk 2000: 297). Schopen notes that although this text was only translated into Chinese in the 6th century CE, it 'is quoted three

abhiṣekabhūmi, the level of anointment or coronation. The *bodhisattva* is like an ocean that can soak up the infinite amount of knowledge that rains down like a deluge from a raincloud.

> *tadyathāpi nāma bho jinaputrāḥ sāgaraṇāgarājameghavisṛṣṭo mahān apskandho na sukaro 'nyena pṛthivīpradeśena soḍhuṃ vā sampratyeṣituṃ vā svīkartuṃ vā saṃdhārayituṃ vā anyatra mahāsamudrāt / evam eva bho jinaputrā ye te tathāgatānāṃ bhagavatāṃ guhyānupraveśā yad uta mahādharmāvabhāsā mahādharmālokā mahādharmameghās te na sukarāḥ sarvasatvaiḥ sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhaiḥ prathamāṃ bhūmim upādāya yāvan navamībhūmipratiṣṭhitair api bodhisatvais tān bodhisatvo 'syāṃ dharmameghāyāṃ bodhisatvabhūmau sthitaḥ sarvān sahate sampratīcchati svīkaroti saṃdhārayati* (DBS 10H; Rahder 1926: 89)
> Oh you jinaputras, just as a great mass of water (*apskandha*) that is poured (*visṛṣṭa*) from a cloud of the ocean serpent-king is not easily borne (*soḍhum*), desired, claimed and drawn in by any other region of earth (*pṛthivīpradeśena*) than the great ocean (*mahāsamudra*), thus, oh jinaputras, those who are entered in the secret of the divine buddhas – which is the revelation of the great dharma, the light of the great dharma, the cloud of the great dharma – this is not easily done (*sukara*) by all beings, by all who are *srāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha*, or even by all *bodhisattva*s established in the first stage up to the ninth stage. It is the *bodhisattva*s established in this bodhisattva stage called *dharmamegha* who bear, desire, get and possess all of it (*sarvān*).

In the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, then, *dharmameghabhūmi* is the pinnacle of the path of practice for a bodhisattva. It represents innumerable *samādhi*s, infinite knowledge, and abundant growth.

The term *dharmamegha* is also discussed in two sections of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*: in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) and in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (SNS). I will discuss the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* here, and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* in a section further along. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* draws on the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* for its ten-fold scheme.[167] At

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times in the *Sūtrasamuccaya* which might be by Nāgārjuna' around the 2nd century (Schopen 2006: 346).

[167] The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* states states this explicitly in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*:

dharmameghabhūmi, the *bodhisattva* becomes omniscient like a cloud that produces rain to provide sustenance to the world.

> *paripūrṇabodhisattvamārgaḥ suparipūrṇa-bodhisambhāraś ca sa bodhisattvaḥ tathāgatānām aṃtikād dharmameghabhūtām atyudārāṃ duḥsahāṃ tadanyaiḥ sarvasattvais saddharmavṛṣṭim sampratīcchati / mahāmeghabhūtaś ca svayam anabhisaṃbuddhabodhir abhisaṃbuddhabodhiś ca aprameyānāṃ sattvānāṃ saddharma-vṛṣṭyā nirupamayā kleśarajāṃsi praśamayati / vicitrāṇi ca kuśalamūlaśasyāni virohayati vivardhayati pācayati tasyāṃ bhūmāv avasthitaḥ / tasmāt sā bhūmir dharmameghety ucyate / tenaiva cārthena paramo vihāro draṣṭavyaḥ* (BoBh 2.4.12 Wogihara 1930-36: 354-355)
>
> The bodhisattva who has completed the bodhisattva path and fulfilled all requisites for awakening, [being] near the *tathāgata*s, immediately desires a rain of true dharma, grand and unbearable for all beings other than him, being the cloud of dharma. That [bodhisattva] consists of (*bhūta*) a great cloud [that] automatically (*svayam*) [contains both] the awakening by non-enlightenment (*anabhisambuddha*) and the awakening by enlightenment and causes to be settled the particles of dust of the *kleśa*s of countless (*aprameya*) beings by means of an incomparable rain of true dharma. While established in this stage [ground], he causes the diverse virtuous roots of grain [corn] to sprout, grow and mature. This is the reason why this stage is called *dharmamegha*. And it is only by means of this that the supreme abode is experienced.

The bodhisattva enters into deeper meditation, acquiring endless *samādhi*s and limitless powers, and overcomes even the most subtle trace of the *kleśa*s (afflictions). The cloud has a beneficial function in that it produces growth, proliferation and propagation of virtue.[168]

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vistaranirdeśataḥ punar yathāsūtram eva daśabhūmike pramuditabhūminirdeśam ārabhya. yāś ca daśabhūmike sūtre daśa bodhisattvabhūmayaḥ (BoBh; Wogihara 1930-1936: 332, line 21). 'Moreover, the elaborated teaching according to the sūtra is in the *Daśabhūmika*, commencing with the instruction on the stage of joy. And those ten [stages] in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* are those of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.'

[168] *Dharmamegha* also appears as one part of a threefold cluster called *mahādharma* which enfolds *mahādharmamegha* along with two other dharma complexes: *mahādharmāvabhāsā,* (the revelation of the great dharma), *mahādharmālokā,* (the light of the great dharma) and *mahādharmameghā* (the cloud of the great dharma).

Of course, the vibrant elemental imagery of the raincloud is not unique to Buddhist sources. In Vedic ritual, rainfall is one of the frequently cited objectives of the fire sacrifice. Furthermore, the fire of *tapas* produces power in the ascetic, 'which may manifest itself as a sexual and fecundating energy which when released generates rainfall, fertile fields, and biological offspring' (Kaelber 1989: 144).[169] The Vedic deities such as Soma, Agni, Varuṇa and Indra were all closely associated with water. As Proferes states: 'these gods reside in water, generate rain, or set the cosmic stream free to flow to earth for the benefit of humankind' (Proferes 2007: 78). In its description of the anointing or *abhiṣeka* of the king, the *Ṛg Veda* carries the image of the unction waters as a raincloud (*abhravarṣa*, lit. 'cloud-rain') of *soma* pouring down on earth (ṚV 9.88.6), streaming with light and splendour.

> *ete somā ati vārāṇy avyā*
> *divyā na kośāso abhravarṣāḥ,*
> *vṛthā samudraṃ sindhavo na nīcīḥ*
> *sutāso abhi kalaśāṁ asṛgran* (ṚV 9.88.6)
> These pressed soma juices, like heavenly buckets of cloud-rain, streamed at will through the heavenly wool strainer into the vessels like rivers downwards to the sea (trans. Proferes 2007: 94).

Water forms a central part of the rituals of *abhiṣeka*, coronation, in the form of sprinkling of liquids and water (Davidson 2002: 123; Proferes 2007).[170] And, as Proferes has argued, royal power provides a key paradigm for early Indic soteriology (Proferes 2007).[171] Significantly, a synonym for *dharmameghabhūmi* in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* is *abhiṣekabhūmi*. The *abhiṣekabhūmi* was used to explain the Buddha as the Dharamarāja (king of

[169] As atmospheric heat causes raindrops, so ritual asceticism (either by the priest or the ascetic) causes sweat, regarded as a 'homologue of the raindrops' (Kaelber 1989: 145). Also, see Kaelber 1989: 19-20 for examples of ascetic mantra and food practices to generate rain.

[170] The meaning of the root √*sic* is 'to pour out' or 'to sprinkle'.

[171] For a discussion of the intersection of fire, water, and light in Vedic metaphors of sovereignty, see Proferes 2007: 77-113.

dharma) in the final birth of a *bodhisattva*.[172] One can suggest that archaic Vedic metaphors, such as the *abhravarṣa*, could have formed the basis for the Buddhist elaborations of *dharmameghavarṣa*[173] and *dharmameghabhūmi.*[174] In sum, although the context for the technical term *dharmamegha* is, as far as we know, Buddhist (and specifically early yogācāra within Mahāyāna), the Buddhists themselves were, most likely, drawing on earlier Vedic images of fertility and cosmogony in the *abhiṣeka* of the king.

To sum up so far, neither *dharmameghadhyāna* nor *dharmameghasamādhi* appear in the Buddhist sources that I have examined; rather we find the compound *dharmameghabhūmi* in the Mahāyāna literature. However, given that the depiction of *dharmamegha* in the *Yogaācārabhūmiśāstra* contains elimination of the *kleśa*s, the attainment of infinite knowledge, and is related to ultimate *samādhi*, it is reasonable to make a link to the other *dharmamegha* that shares these features – that of Patañjali. However, in contrast to the qualitative abundance and the abundant quality of the Buddhist *dharmamegha*, Patañjali's metaphor is fairly devoid of qualities. Using conceptual metaphor theory, I will now present four different analyses that can each, in part, account for Patañjali's unique treatment of the term *dharmamegha* in relation to Buddhist sources.

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[172] In Buddhism, the *abhiṣeka* rite formed a central part of early Buddhist mythology and ritual, used to describe the exalted position of *cakravārtin*, the universal ruler of Buddhist mythology (Davidson 2010: 186).

[173] The Mahāyāna *Gaṇḍavyūha*, the 39th chapter of the *Avatamsakasūtra* (from the early CE and which also contains the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*), refers to the *dharmameghavarṣa*: *yogācārāṇāṃ bodhisattvānāṃ sarvadharmasvabhāvatalanirghoṣaṃ nāma dharmameghavarṣaṃ* (Suzuki and Idzumi 1949: 94.13-14). Due to the constraints of this study, I have been unable to consult this text, but it would make another interesting point of investigation for future research.

[174] Indeed the *Apadāna* refers to the Vedic god of rain, Parjanya, in relation to *dhammamegha* e.g. *Apadāna*, Therāpadāna 54.530.4; Lilley 1925-27 Part 2: 468. See footnote 156 in this chapter.

3.5.3 Dharmamegha as a dead metaphor

One argument that can explain the two variant metaphorical treatments of *dharmamegha* in yoga and yogācāra is that of the standard distinction between creative and commonplace (dead) metaphors, underpinned by a passage of time. Dead metaphors are those that have been divorced from their original domain associations over time and have simply become a name or semantic placeholder for a thing or state. Interpreting a dead metaphor effectively becomes disambiguation. It is possible that by the 4th century, the original domain qualities of the Buddhist term *dharmamegha* had been 'forgotten' by Patañjali (as they would be eventually by Patañjali's sub-commentators; see below). This would suggest a passage of time from the Buddhist 'active' generation of *dharmamegha* to Patañjali's 'dead' usage. According to this argument, by the time of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, *dharmamegha* was a moribund metaphor and not much more than a 'label', abstracted from its metaphorical context. However, given the approximate and close datings of all of the texts under discussion, this argument is not robust.

3.5.4 Patañjali's paralogical metaphor: the raincloud without any rain

Metaphors have their own logical entailments,[175] partly determined by the sensori-motor experience of the world we live in.[176] The logical entailments of a cloud are qualities such as 'spatially elevated, water-producing, visible, etc.' and not 'bright green, underground, and made of bricks'. The term 'paralogical' can be used to describe a metaphor in which there appears to

[175] Cognitive metaphor theory accounts for contradiction within metaphors by means of the mechanism of selective editing (highlighting and hiding qualities) and for contradictions in a conceptual scheme by demonstrating that apparently contradictory metaphors can share entailments (See 1.1.7 of this dissertation).

[176] If we accept that metaphors are cognitive, they are largely determined by sensori-motor experiences, and thus the logic of bodily processes is carried over into metaphors and applied to abstract conceptual domains. '[I]mage-schemas, which arise recurrently in our perception and bodily movement, have their own logic, which can be applied to abstract conceptual domains. Image-schematic logic then serves as the basis for inferences about abstract entities and operations' (Johnson 2005: 24).

be 'a logical conflict of central meanings' (Kamber and Macksey 1976: 871).[177]

Functionally, Patañjali's *dharmameghasamādhi* closely resembles the Buddhist *dharmameghabhūmi* as a superlative state: it is the goal of practice that provides endless knowledge and ultimate liberation. However, Patañjali strips back the metaphoric content of the Buddhist *dharmamegha*, so that the conceptual significance of the cloud is quite different; whereas the Buddhist cloud of rain represents cultivation of growth, Patañjali's cloud represents cessation of growth. In mapping the qualities of '*megha'* to the domain of liberation, Patañjali selectively edits the qualities in order to revise the *dharmamegha* metaphor for polemical effect.

In the early Mahāyāna context, *dharmamegha* is an elaborate metaphorical cluster to indicate vastness, abundance, a higher state, nectar from 'above', the cooling and extinguishing of flames of affliction, and primarily the stimulation of roots of virtue and demerit to sprout, grow, and ripen. The image of the cloud is effective in this context because it is interwoven with the image of water as 'rain' or the 'ocean'. Notably, the flow of abundance is in two directions, from above (from the cloud to the ocean or earth) and from below (from the ocean to the cloud). This reflects the *bodhisattva* emphasis on teaching (sharing knowledge), in which the bodhisattva receives the rain of knowledge from the *tathāgata*s and then, in turn, rains knowledge to mortals.

In the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, however, there is no such description of what the cloud of dharma contains, no image of a 'rain of abundance' or an 'ocean of knowledge'. It is as though the name '*dharmamegha'* is co-opted from Buddhist sources, abstracted for its symbolic or functional value, and divested of its obvious metaphoric content. But perhaps it is the very

[177] Elsewhere, Beardsley used the term 'paralogical' to describe metaphors that bear no trace of similarity; they are like idioms that cannot be explained, only learnt (Beardsley 1958).

sparseness of Patañjali's image that is itself most interesting, because it contains a logical twist. Patañjali's inclusion of the term *dharmamegha*, if indeed it is co-opted, may be an active critique of the 'other school' of yoga, the rival yogācāra. Patañjali, then, not only divests *dharmamegha* of its qualitative content, but also subverts its metaphoric logic, or entailments – and hence conceptual power – by imbuing it with the notion of lack rather than abundance. Far from expressing fecund growth by nurturing and cultivating the seed, Patañjali's *dharmamegha samādhi* is *nirbīja samādhi*, the state in which all traces of the seed of future *kleśa* have been eradicated. Here, the cloud of dharma presides over the negation of the seed, and the goal is to cut any growth by root and branch:

> *tallābhād avidyādayaḥ kleśāḥ samūlakāṣaṃ kaṣitā bhavanti kuśalākuśalāś ca karmāśayāḥ samūlaghātaṃ hatā bhavanti*
> (PYŚ 4.30; Angot 2012: 723)
> From attaining that (*dharmamegha*), the *kleśa*s of *avidyā* etc. are cut by root and branch and the karmic substrata, good and bad, are destroyed utterly.

Hence Patañjali's *dharmamegha* metaphor is a raincloud without any rain.

The cessative and negating functions[178] of Patañjali's *dharmamegha* are continued in the interpretations of the sub-commentaries. In the earliest commentary on the PYŚ, the c. 7th-8th-century *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*,[179] Śaṅkara does not elaborate on YS 4.29 (the only *sūtra* to refer to *dharmamegha)*, but does explain the term as the maturing of correct vision.[180] Yet the *Vivaraṇa* to YS 4.30-31 carries a set of interesting metaphoric entailments that belong to the cloud of dharma. Overall, Śaṅkara's treatment of *dharmamegha* continues Patañjali's spartan

[178] We must be clear that Patañjali does not map the potential negative qualities of a cloud, such as 'gloomy' or 'destructive'. Patañjali's *dharmamegha* has a negating function but is not a negative image in itself, being a superlative attainment.

[179] See section 0.1.2 for more on the debates about the authorship of this text.

[180] *tasya dharmameghanāmnaḥ samādheḥ samyagdarśanapākābhirūpasya* (Viv. 4.30; Sastri and Krishnamurthi 1952: 363)

presentation to elaborate a further act of qualitative erasure, one that is progressively unfolded.

While Patañjali abstracts the raincloud image to divest it of rain, thus committing a logical inversion[181] of the original metaphor, Śaṅkara takes this process several steps further. He describes a rain of negation, rain as ontological isolation, an impotent ocean, and the eventual erasure of the cloud itself. Let us now look at how he does this:

1. Firstly, Śaṅkara reinstates the image of rain in the cloud metaphor: 'Its name is *dharmamegha* because it rains the utmost *dharma* called *kaivalya* (isolation)'.[182]
2. The rain, according to Śaṅkara, is the dharma of *kaivalya* (isolation) – which denotes dharma as an ontological state.[183] In Sāṃkhya, this ontological state of *kaivalya* is characterized by subtraction (of the material world from consciousness, which is separate) rather than abundance (in the material world). This contrasts with the Buddhist rain of infinite abundance.
3. Next we encounter an image of a body of water. Śaṅkara likens sattvic knowledge (the highest form of knowledge in the material realm) to an ocean, which brings to mind the ocean of knowledge of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. However, unlike that image, Śaṅkara's image of the ocean is one that is devoid of potency because it is a great ocean (*mahodadhi*), motionless (*nistaraṃga*) isolated, unchangeable (*avikriya*), still, empty, not capable of perceiving anything.

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[181] The logical inversion of a metaphor is to render its conventional meaning antonymic by using selective editing (highlighting and hiding) to map qualities that contravene a conventional semantic field. Thus in the Buddhist metaphor 'liberation is a raincloud', the properties of the raincloud are mapped to the domain of spiritual liberation – following the convention that a raincloud is good because it provides abundant rain. In Patañjali's metaphor this conventional meaning is logically inverted to claim that a raincloud is good because it has no rain.

[182] *kaivalyākhyaṃ paraṃ dharma varṣatīti dharmameghaḥ iti saṃjñā* (Viv 4.29; Sastri and Krishnamurthi 1952: 363).

[183] My understanding of Sāṃkhya's *kaivalya* is that it is not just an epistemological distinction but ultimately an ontological one (i.e. one resides in the state of *puruṣa*).

4. Finally, the resulting state of *sattva* is as if the sun stands in the middle of a clear sky with all clouds vanished (Viv 4.31).[184] Here we see the active erasure of the cloud image itself. In Śaṅkara's final interpretation, the cloud has been dispelled.[185]

In his explication of *dharmamegha*, Śaṅkara steers Patañjali's process of negation to its logical conclusion, so that *dharmamegha* becomes a cloud of dharma without a cloud.

Although it is beyond the scope of this study to fully consider later historical commentaries, it is interesting to note that the subsequent medieval sub-commentators appear to have followed Śaṅkara's interpretation of *dharmamegha* to mean 'absence of cloud'. The 10th-century Bhojarājā connects *dharmamegha* to Patañjali's image of irrigation (PYŚ 4.3) and follows Śaṅkara's reading of *dharmamegha* as resulting in a sky that is free from clouds (Mitra 1883: 203-204). Vācaspatimiśra (9th-10th century) elaborates further on the metaphor by asserting that a cloud-free sky increases available light: 'For just as in autumn when the rays of the moon are freed from a dense veil [of cloud], and when they are brilliant in all directions, the light is so endless.' This light leads to endless knowledge (Woods 1927: 342).[186] Śaṅkara thus initiates a change in the primary metaphoric function of *dharmamegha* from water-producing to light-producing, and this interpretation is consolidated in the commentaries of Bhojarājā and Vācaspatimiśra. In the medieval sub-commentaries, the original metaphoric import of *dharmamegha* as a positive image has been

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[184] *aśeṣajñeyaviṣayatvamambaratalamadhyavartino jaladharanirodhanirgatasya kheriva* (Viv 4.31; Sastri and Krishnamurthi 1952: 365).

[185] Jacqueline Suthren-Hirst has pointed out the potentially positive *value* of the sky with a vanishing cloud (as in a pleasant post-rain state) (personal communication 2.7.2018). It is worth emphasizing again my differentiation between negative and positive 'values' and 'functions' in these literary descriptions (see fn 172).

[186] *yathā hi śaradi ghanapaṭalamuktasya caṇḍārciṣaḥ paritaḥ pradyotamānasya prakāśānantyāt prakāśyā ghaṭādayo+alpāḥ prakāśante, evam apagatarajastamasaś cittasattvasya prakāśānantyād alpaṃ prakāśyam iti* (*Tattvavaiśaradi* 4.31: Āgāśe 1904: 203, lines 17-19)

forgotten to such a degree that the cloud becomes the obstacle to the light, the factor that obscures knowledge, rather than the producer of knowledge as rain. However, the last of the classical commentators, the 15th-16th-century Vijñānabhikṣu, returns to the centrality of water in the form of rain: *dharmamegha* is so-called because it rains or pours down the dharma that completely destroys the remainder or root of all afflictions and actions.[187] This train of commentarial revisions continues Patañjali's treatment of *dharmamegha* as a negating principle.[188]

According to this assessment, Patañjali's *dharmamegha* is a polemical, and perhaps even ironic, revision of a core Mahāyāna metaphor; Patañjali grafts the signature Buddhist term *dharmamegha* onto his own Sāṃkhya-inflected system in full knowledge of its flagrant polemic effect. The significance of inverting the metaphoric value reflects that he is also inverting its soteriological value: Patañjali takes the abundantly rain-filled *dharmamegha* that symbolizes social sharing and converts it to an empty *dharmamegha* that symbolizes internal cessation. With its emphasis on teaching for the benefit of all humankind, Buddhist *dharmamegha* thus stands in stark contrast to the Sāṃkhya ontological divorce from the material world.[189] Given that the co-option of terms and concepts was common between rival

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[187] *kleśakarmādīnāṁ niḥśeṣeṇonmulakaṁ dharmaṁ mehati varṣatīti dharmameghaḥ* (*Yogavārttika* 4.29; Rukmani 1981-1989, 4: 122).

[188] Outside of the Brahmanical textual tradition, however, *dharmamegha* appears to have been associated with Patañjali. In c. 8th century CE, the Jain author Haribhadra Virahāṅka produced several important texts on yoga: in Sanskrit the *Yogabindu* (with auto-commentary) and the *Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya*, and in Prakrit the *Yogaviṃśikā* (with a Sanskrit auto-commentary) and the *Yogaśataka*. Yaśovijaya's 17th-century commentary on the *Yogaviṃśikā* refers to *dharmamegha* as the name applied by those who follow Patañjali to the state of cognitive cessation (*ayaṃ ca dharmameghaḥ iti pātañjalair gīyate*) (YVc 20). It is even described in terms of the burnt seed of *vṛtti* (*vṛttibījadāha*) – indicating that the soteriology of Patañjali was very much associated with the two metaphors of the burnt seed and the cloud of dharma.

[189] This may also be a trace of the Brahmanical soteriology of apophasis (negative theology): that the ultimate principle, *brahman*, cannot be understood via presence but only inferred via absence.

religious groups in the classical period, the argument that Patañjali's *dharmamegha* was an intentional paralogical revision of metaphor is a strong one.[190]

[190] We must also consider that the logical inversion of *dharmamegha* is not the only polemical instance in the PYŚ. There are at least two other critiques of specifically Mahāyāna doctrines. The first is *cittamātra* (which I have discussed in section 2.6.2) and the second is Patañjali's description of the pleasures of heaven (PYŚ 3.51) which appear to refer to Mahāyāna concepts. The false promises of the gods to lure the yogin to heaven include divine sight and hearing (*divye śrotracakṣuṣī*) and obtaining a diamond-like body (*vajropamaḥ kāya*), both of which are familiar motifs used to describe the bodhisattva in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* where they characterise *dharmameghabhūmi*: the *bodhisattva* is described as having a *vajropamaḥ samādhi* (e.g. BoBh 3.6; Wogihara 1930-1936: 405, line 16), and the acquisition of the divine ear and sight are the core elements of the fivefold divine powers obtained on the path. These two powers also appear further on in the third *pāda* of the PYŚ in the list of the *siddhi*s. It seems that the 'celestial gods' are being used as a vehicle in which to critique, once again, the faulty promises of the Buddhists, as we saw previously in the example of the four *ākāra*s, or misperceptions (see section 3.4.6). The diamond body or diamond *samādhi* is an important metaphor in Mahāyāna. In the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* the 10th stage of *dharmamegha* is superceded by an ultimate eleventh stage: the *tathāgatabhūmi*, in which the last subtle remnants (that remain at the 11th stage) of *jñeyāvaraṇa* and *kleśāvaraṇa* are completely eradicated by the diamond-like samādhi (*vajropasamādhi*). The *vajropasamādhi* is also the culmination of the *bhāvanāmārga* in the Sarvāstivāda path scheme (Gethin 2007: 337). Although Patañjali's text does not show awareness of this superlative level of the diamond samādhi, he does discuss the diamond form of the body: ***rūpalāvaṇyabalavajrasaṃhananatvāni kāyasaṃpat*** *darśanīyaḥ kāntimān atiśayabalo vajrasaṃhananaś ceti.* (PYŚ 3.46; Angot 2012: 643) '**Perfection of the body is beauty of form, strength and diamond hardness.** And it is made to appear as beautiful, unsurpassed in strength, and diamond-hard.' Interestingly Śaṅkara does not comment on this *sūtra*. However the *bhāṣya* commentary to the previous *sūtra* describes the body in terms of hardness – although it does not use the term diamond. The 'perfections are the body' and 'the earth with its hardness does not oppose the movements of the yogin, for his body can penetrate even rock; waters with all their wetness do not moisten the yogin; fire does not burn him with its heat, nor does the wind which makes all bow, move him; in space, which by nature obstructs nothing, he becomes hidden, becoming invisible even to perfected beings' (trs. Leggett 1990: 349). This passage, of course, is referring to the five elements.

3.5.5 *Dharmamegha* as cessative liberation

According to this argument, Patañjali's *dharmamegha* does not carry entailments that contradict Buddhist soteriology, but rather *dharmamegha* is logically concordant with a slightly variant scheme in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, in which the superlative state on the path to liberation is not 'abundance' but 'cessation'.

There is a least one other description in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* that comes close to representing *dharmamegha* in terms of cessation. In the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,* the seventh[191] chapter refers to the ultimate form of yoga discipline, which is Buddhist yoga. This chapter contains the ten *bhūmi*s that we find it the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, with *dharmamegha* as the tenth stage. However, it also includes an 11th *bhūmi* beyond the 10th to represent the superlative state, *tathāgatabhūmi*, 'the stage of realization of enlightenment' (Cleary 1995: 62).[192] As in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'*s description of *dharmamegha* is as a cloud of vast expansion, conveying a sense of infinitude (SNS 7; Cleary 1995: 72).[193] However*, dharmamegha* is now separated from the *bodhisattvabhūmi*, which replaces it as the superlative state. This innovated 11th stage is a state of permanent cessation, and the qualities mapped to this *bhūmi* express negating functions: the elimination of the *kleśa*s, non-attachment, and non-obstruction of realization (SNS 7; Cleary 1995: 72). From this observation one can speculate that Patañjali's *dharmamegha* echoes not the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* or the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* but rather the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* by combining the 10th and 11th levels

[191] Depending on the critical edition that one consults, this can be the seventh or eighth chapter.

[192] We also find this scheme in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, in which the 10th stage of *dharmamegha* is superceded by the eleventh stage, the *tathāgatabhūmi* (See fn 184).

[193] 'The tenth stage is called cloud of teaching because the gross body is as vast as space and the spiritual body is fulfilled, like a great cloud that can cover all' (trans. Cleary 1995: 72). Here Cleary translates *dharmamegha* as 'cloud of teaching'.

of attainment into a single concept: a *dharmamegha* that produces not abundance but cessation.[194]

In the PYŚ, *dharmameghasamādhi* is equated with *nirbīja samādhi*, which is the state of cessation of *kleśa* (*kleśanirodha*) in which all traces of the seed of future *kleśa* have been eradicated (PYŚ 4.29). Generally in the PYŚ, the botanical image of the seed is one that is clearly framed in terms of non-germination.[195] There is therefore no need of an image of 'rain' to accompany the seed, as this would in fact be counter-productive to the soteriological entailments of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Within a soteriology of cessative liberation, then – possibly shared with texts such as the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* – Patañjali's *dharmamegha* is logically concordant, and its entailments are selectively edited to make it so.

In summary, this argument posits that Patañjali does not deliberately invert the metaphor for polemical effect, but is rather drawing on the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*'s version of *dharmamegha*, and – resonant of Sarvāstivāda or Sautrāntika – constructs a concept of liberation as strictly cessative. Due to the demonstrable interaction between the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, we cannot rule out this line of reasoning. However, given the relative paucity of information on the *bhūmi*s in the SNS and the prevalence of theories of cessation in Buddhist literature as a whole, there would be no need to tie Patañjali's soteriology specifically to the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, rather than to another text. The argument that Patañjali's *dharmamegha* draws on the SNS does not stand up to scrutiny. There is, then, one further, and stronger, argument to be laid out

[194] Schmithausen has pointed out that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* is older than the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (Schmithausen 2016: 401). Thus one can argue that Patañjali's text and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* are both referencing older Sarvāstivādin yogācāra concepts of *dharmamegha* that may be grounded in Sautrāntika thought regarding the permanent negation of the seed and all its carriers.

[195] As we saw in Chapter 2, in the PYŚ, the botanical image of the seed that is sterile draws on the Sautrāntika discourse on the matter.

in order to understand how Patañjali's *dharmamegha* relates to contemporaneous Buddhist contexts.

3.5.6 Factors of literary style: from hyperbole to understatement

Patañjali's apparent inversion of the metaphoric value of *dharmamegha* may be a product of literary form. Literary style itself not only affects the way metaphors are employed but it can also amplify doctrinal difference. The richly evocative cosmological descriptions of Mahāyāna Buddhist treatises co-evolved with the invention of writing (Harrison 2003), whereas Brahmanic *śāstra*s are a more faithful transmission of oral culture (we return to Tubbs' and Bose's description of the *sūtra* format as 'signposts in a line of oral argument'.) I argue that the descriptive structures of Mahāyāna Buddhist writing are more elaborate and can more effectively exploit the literary potential of metaphors.

In the textual culture of early Mahāyāna, literary style became more complex and innovative than that of oral texts.[196] Indeed, the invention of writing may have *partly* provided the impetus and vehicle for doctrinal developments in Buddhism that led to Mahāyāna.[197] The Mahāyāna writers displayed specific literary techniques to hone and express doctrinal concepts: for example, conveying 'eternity' and 'infinity' through syntagmatic extension.[198] As a result, the Buddhist accounts of *dharmameghabhūmi* in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* are hyperbolic, so as to become almost almost unprocessable in the cognitive domain (Flores 2008: 14). In terms of source and target, the Mahāyāna literary style exaggerates the structure of metaphor, repeating and multiplying the qualities of the target domain to enhance meaning. Thus

[196] On the relationship of early Buddhist Pāli canonical suttas to mnemonic functions in oral culture, see Allon 1997.

[197] This thesis was put forward by scholars such as Harrison (2003), but has recently been refuted by Drewes (2010; 2018).

[198] Collins uses the term 'infinite extension' (Collins 2010: 25) to describe the way in which eternity is portrayed or understood in Mahāyāna texts.

a basic doctrinal statement such as: 'The Buddha is infinite' becomes 'The Buddha is immeasurably infinite, projected across the sky a million trillion times, in countless infinite directions, in myriad images of forms upon forms for all eternities upon eternities, with innumerable qualities,' etc.[199] This literary style is not just about embellishment. It is the use of particular literary devices to formally express the doctrine of infinitude: the layering of synonyms upon synonyms generates chains of signifiers that appear to be without end. Furthermore, the stylistic use of synonymic saturation *is* the doctrine of infinitude in experiential form for the text's consumer, whether through reading, listening, or imagining.

The Mahāyāna literary style contrasts significantly with the literary style of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. The Brahmanical *sūtra* genre of compressed aphorisms[200] belongs to oral textual culture and was designed for memorization. Hence, it is formally minimal. Patañjali's metaphor is *only* superlative, and is not linked to any numbered levels or stages of attainment, as in the Buddhist scheme. I propose that, by virtue of a literary style that rests on compression, Patañjali's *dharmamegha* is 'super-compressed' and takes all ten levels of the *dharmameghabhūmi* scheme and squashes them into one. Synechdochally, *dharmamegha* is a part that stands in for the whole:[201] the superlative stage in itself signifies the whole scheme of ten stages (and therefore *dharmamegha* stands in for the whole of *bhāvanā*, as not just any part but the *best* part). For audiences in the living tradition of the 4th century CE, the context would have been obvious – that of the Buddhist scheme of the *daśabhūmi*s. Today's readers, however, have to painstakingly unpick the densely compressed threads of meaning. There is

[199] This is a paraphrase of typical literary style in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.

[200] It has been argued that the word *sutta* in the Buddhist *sutta* genre was derived from Vedic *sūkta* (hymn) and not *sūtra* (thread/aphorism), and so, like the *sūkta*s, the Buddhist *sutta* genre is characterised by extolment and hyperbole and not conciseness (e.g. Norman 2006: 135).

[201] Synechdoche is a special instance of metonymy. In metonymy, one thing stands in for another, while in synechdoche, a part of one thing stands in for the whole of that thing.

often an 'enigmatic' quality to a *sūtra* text because so much is left unsaid (and without living oral transmission has been lost to history).

There is one other instance of understatement in Patañjali's *dharmamegha*. Patañjali describes the infinite knowledge of *dharmamegha* by referencing what is *not* accessed: the unaccessed knowledge is likened to fireflies in the sky (PYŚ 4.31). In Patañjali's image, the ineffability of infinite knowledge is not conveyed (as in the Mahāyāna texts) with metaphors of infinity but with a counter-intuitive simile of extreme finitude. The infinity of the knowledge gained is demonstrated negatively: that which remains unknown at the level of *dharmamegha* is like fireflies in the sky, i.e. insignificant. Although Patañjali's account of *dharmamegahasamādhi* shares a theory of infinite knowledge with the yogācāra attainment at *dharmameghabhūmi*, the metaphor is framed in the negative. Such apophatic soteriology is reified by the compression of literary form, creating an ellipsis at the heart of the text.

There is one further aspect of paralogical revision: the inversion of the significance of the 'vision' of *dharmamegha*. Although the yoga and yogācāra presentations of infinite knowledge are framed differently, both accounts are anchored in the root metaphor of vision (KNOWING IS SEEING). The soteriology of Sāṃkhya rests on the correct vision (i.e. knowledge) of the ultimate ontological distinction (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*). Equally, Mahāyāna visionary meditation gravitates around florid images of the Buddha. Yet these are two divergent notions of vision: Patañjali's vision of *dharmamegha* is the perception of an unseen reality (*puruṣa*), while the yogācāra vision is of the majestic spectacle of proliferating *buddha*s without end. It is perhaps then no surprise that underlying the construction of negative metaphors in Patañjali's text is a doctrine of negative vision: the goal of Sāṃkhya is to see the unseen (the non-material).

Both the *sūtra* and the Mahāyāna *śāstra* formats gesture towards the ineffable. They simply do it in opposite ways: Patañjali approaches the ineffability of *puruṣa* through silence and apophasis, while the verbose

proliferation of Mahāyāna texts signal that even an infinite number of synonymic descriptions could never suffice to express the unbounded state of Buddhahood.[202] These issues of style both reflect and generate doctrinal differences between yoga and yogācāra. There appears to be no precedent in Buddhist thought for abstracting *dharmamegha* from the ten-fold (or sometimes 11-fold) scheme of *bhūmi*s in order to treat it in isolation in a meditation treatise. Thus Patañjali's appropriation of *dharmamegha* is already radical – in that he leaves behind the other nine steps and indeed the whole paradigm. If it is the case that Patañjali merely abstracts the superlative state, this is itself a hostile paradigmatic revision.

In their theory of 'partial mapping' Lakoff and Johnson insisted that domain-mapping could never be a totalising enterprise or it would result in simple identification. Hence domain-mapping is always partial, in that there is selective editing (highlighting and hiding). Neither Patañjali nor the Mahāyāna scholars mapped *all* the qualities of a cloud to the theory of liberation. In order to make *dharmamegha* work at all, they had to exclude a whole host of other properties (e.g a cloud can also be gloomy, destructive, beyond reach, etc.). As we have seen, Patañjali's *dharmamegha* is more of a semantic placeholder than a 'productive' metaphor that maps domain qualities of rain, elevation, fullness, unattainability, ephemerality, abundance, etc. Indeed, Patañjali's metaphor contains little domain-mapping of qualities – most are hidden and not highlighted.

In my concluding assessment, Patañjali's strikingly empty metaphor of *dharmamegha* is largely a result of literary style and polemical revision due to doctrinal necessity. It is not a result of deliberate harmonization with Mahāyāna soteriology or the ambiguity of dead metaphor. Because of the specific use of the term *dharmamegha* in Buddhist texts from the 2nd-

[202] Although *bodhi* is framed in this way in our selected Mahāyāna texts, earlier conceptions of nirvāṇa were apophatic. As we have noted, the very concept of *nirvāṇa* is itself constructed using the negative. The literal meaning of *nirvāṇa* is 'extinguished' or 'quenched', as in the notion of a fire quenched due to lack of fuel (see section 2.1).

century CE onwards, it can be stated with some confidence that Patañjali adopts the term *dharmamegha* from this context for polemical effect. The nature of this revision is paralogical; selective editing highlights the qualities of a raincloud to support a doctrine of apophasis and a soteriology of cessation. The revision of the *dharmamegha* metaphor was also compounded by factors of literary style, in particular the predominant feature of the Brahmanical *sūtra* genre, compression. What is less easy to clarify is the Buddhist textual sources on which Patañjali may have drawn. However, due to their association of *dharmamegha* with yoga discipline (yogācāra), we can point to the early layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* (the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*) and to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, all of which predate the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. This tracing of the metaphoric import of *megha* in *dharmamegha*, using conceptual metaphor theory, provides a fresh starting point for revisiting the meaning of *dharma* in *dharmamegha*.[203]

Chapter conclusions

By categorizing the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* as a *yogaśāstra*, I have put forward the necessity of acknowledging that there were prior systems of yoga to Patañjala yoga. If Pātañjala yoga post-dates early yogācāra – and it does – this strengthens the argument that Patañjali knowingly references key yogācāra paradigms, in particular the understanding of yoga as the cultivation of the opposites, *pratipakṣabhāvanā*. The structural and textual parallels that I have outlined in this chapter in relation to a theory of yoga as *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, suggest that Patañjali may have had access to earlier independent yogācāra texts in circulation, such as the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* or the early **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa.

[203] For example, it can prepare us for a consideration of *dharma* in this compound as a metaphor in itself. Of the three primary meanings of *dharma,* 'cosmic building block' and 'body of teaching' are both metaphorical. In contrast, 'religious conduct or virtue' is more descriptive.

Differences in literary style may cause us to overlook shared conceptual metaphors that are right before our eyes, such as *dharmamegha*. Nonetheless, there does appear to be a doctrinal basis for the differing religious interpretations of the metaphor of *dharmamegha* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Yogācarabhūmiśāstra*. Following the logical entailments within the orientational metaphor of *bhāvanā*, the contrasting presentations of *dharmamegha* in yoga and yogācāra relate to the image of the seed. In the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* the emphasis is on *dharmamegha* as the rain that nurtures positive seed growth; it cultivates the seeds of virtue. In the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* the emphasis is on the cloud that governs cessation and not growth. Here, the attainment of *dharmamegha* indicates that seed growth has been stopped. Therefore, in order to understand the function and meaning of *dharmamegha* in the PYŚ, we also need to understand the correlative meaning and function of the seed. Together the seed and the cloud comprise mirror metaphors that constitute a theory of liberation. Trying to understand one metaphor in isolation only gives us half of the frame of *bhāvanā*. In the orientational metaphor of *bhāvanā*, the 'up' of *dharmamegha* has a corollary in the 'down' of *bhūmi,* or foundation. The conceptual metaphorical systems of the seed in the earth and the cloud in the sky combine to make up the bigger orientational metaphor of *bhāvanā*.[204] Interestingly, in his study of the universality and cultural variation of metaphors, Kövecses identifies three structural metaphors for 'happiness' that recur across languages and serves as the basis for more

[204] The layers of metaphor in the Buddhist concept of *dharmameghabhūmi* appear to denote temporal/chronological stratification. There are at least three distinct metaphorical layers: the cloud (*megha*), the level/foundation or ground (*bhūmi*), and *dharma* itself, which is also arguably a metaphor. *Dharmameghabhūmi* is certainly a mixed metaphor: how can a cloud be a foundation or ground? Ironically, even as it becomes doctrinally important as the xenith, *dharmamegha* is already approaching the status of a commonplace metaphor by the early Mahāyāna period: because it is blended with the metaphor of *bhūmi*, the (earthly) foundation of the cloud of *dharma* is paradoxical to its core, entailing as it does that a cloud is an earthly stage. This is one paradox that Patañjali avoids; by linking *dharmamegha* to the more abstract terms of *dhyāna* and *samādhi*, he does not suggest that *dharmamegha* is also an earthly foundation. Patañjali's *dharmamegha* remains abstract and aloft.

complex metaphors:[205] HAPPINESS IS UP, HAPPINESS IS LIGHT, and HAPPINESS IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER[206] (Kövecses 2010: 195-197). *Dharmamegha* can be said to reflect all three of these core metaphors. In analyzing soteriological concepts as metaphors, we can propose that theories of spiritual progress are simply variations on common cognitions such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY or the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image-schema. Such analysis can support the demystification of religious conceptuality and expose the reasoning that lies behind it.[207]

The logical inversion of *dharmamegha* may have a logical conclusion: Patañjali's *dharmamegha* is a negating counterstate of nullification (of growth of *kleśa*) that produces a permanent state of non-propagation, or sterility in the seed. Thus while Mahāyāna *dharmamegha* nurtures positive growth and Pātañjala *dharmamegha* checks negative growth, both are aspects of cultivation in the agricultural domain. In this sense, Patañjali blends a Sautrāntika metaphor (the sterilized seed of *kleśa*) with a Mahāyāna metaphor (the liberating cloud of dharma) to render the cloud sterile (i.e. rain-free) – all in the name of liberative cessation.

[205] The languages in the study were English, Hungarian, Japanese, Chinese, Zulu, Wolof, and Tahitian.

[206] Common expressions include: he is on cloud nine, he was on a high, his spirits are high, he looked upbeat, I was in seventh heaven. 'Light' is reflected in sayings such as: his face brightened up, he has a sunny personality, he was beaming. 'Fluid in a container' is evident in metaphors in which the body is typically the container. Common sayings include: his heart is filled with happiness, his heart overflowed with joy, he was brimming over (Kövecses 2015: 160). Kövecses argues that because metaphors are connected to bodily experience, metaphors may reveal patterns about universal conceptual processes (Kövecses 2005).

[207] Along similar lines, we could also analyse yogic concepts such as *kuṇḍalinī* and *prāṇa* as variations of HAPPINESS IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER and HAPPINESS IS UP.

Conclusion

Research summary

This dissertation has addressed the research question of why a significant proportion of the technical terminology in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* appears to be Buddhist, given that the PYŚ self-identifies as a Sāṃkhya treatise. The primary answer that I have put forward relates to reframing yoga as a soteriological discourse, rather than simply a practice 'entity'. I have examined intertextual passages that share technical terms – such as *kleśabīja*, *āśraya* and *dharmamegha* – and demonstrated that such technical terms are, in fact, conceptual metaphors. An analysis of how these metaphors work in context reveals that metaphors lend themselves to conceptual sharing in a way that doctrine does not. Therefore, conceptual metaphors can provide evidence of intertextuality.

In particular, Patañjali uses conceptual metaphors that are primarily employed in Buddhist soteriology, in schemes of *bhāvanā* (cultivation). I suggest that Pātañjala yoga fuses Sāṃkhya philosophy (doctrine) with Buddhist soteriology (conceptual metaphors) and that Pātañjala yoga is infomed as much by Buddhist discourse as it is by Sāṃkhya or Brahmanism. Furthermore, the intertextual passages that I have analysed suggest that Patañjali's text post-dates both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, pushing its date to the early 5th century CE – in line with Maas' recent dating (Maas 2018). Indeed, the way in which Patañjali's text revises prevalent Buddhist metaphors confirms that the *Pātāñjalayogśāstra* also post-dated a range of texts located to the 2nd-3rd centuries – such as the **Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. Patañjali's text was likely produced in an intellectually proximal milieu to these Buddhist texts, if not also geographically proximate.

The entanglement of the PYŚ with Buddhist discourse is even more pronounced when we consider its relationship to Sāṃkhya discourse. While the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* utilises the discourse of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* – even if it is sparing in its discussion of certain key terms such as *liṅga* (mark) – the reverse cannot be claimed. There is little to suggest that the redactor of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* was familiar with the discourse of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. The SKK does not refer to *citta*, *āśaya* or *karma*, not to *kleśa*, *nirodha*, or *bīja*, and not to *dharmamegha* or *pratipakṣabhāvanā*. This suggests not only a passage of time between the composition of the SKK and the PYŚ, but also that the redactors moved in different discursive spheres. The so-called 'hand-in-glove' relation between Pātañjala yoga and Sāṃkhya is not such a close fit after all. Patañjali uses the metaphysical and soteriological frame of Sāṃkhya to construct his text, and this frame is fleshed out with a discourse and concepts that are more closely allied to Buddhist thought. In particular, the intertextual evidence that I have identified is concentrated in the second *pāda* of the PYŚ, indicating that this chapter has a special basis of interaction with Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and yogācara thought. Perhaps this points to an independent text (incorporated by Patañjali) or represents a specific refutation of a Buddhist text (oral or written), but it certainly reflects the myopic distortion of Eurocentric categorization that perpetuates 'essentialist and hermetically sealed conception[s] of mutually exclusive 'religions'' (King 2010: 110).

Even in asking the question of why a 'Sāṃkhya' text reflects 'Buddhist' technical terminology we are making some skewed assumptions about the identity of religio-philosophical communities in this period as stable, discrete, or fixed. Although labels such as 'Sāṃkhya' for Patañjali's text and 'Buddhist' for Sautrāntika are necessary and historically evident as identifying categories, they can also reduce the probable and palpable complexity and fluidity of such identities. Thus Patañjali's text is not exclusively a work of 'Sāṃkhya', early yogācāras are not exclusively 'Mahāyāna', and Sautrāntikas simply refuse to wear any label easily. The conceptual canvas of 4th-5th-century yoga, as reflected in shared metaphors,

was more imbricated than such labels convey. If anything, we see the thread of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma as a constant in all of these 'schools' for the following reasons: the early layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* largely consist of Sarvāstivāda thought, the Sautrāntikas define their dissidence against Sarvāstivāda precepts, and Patañjali incorporates Sautrāntika concepts through his use of *kleśabīja* metaphor and aspects of yogācāra thought through the use of metaphors that pertain to the conceptual complex of *bhāvanā* (cultivation). Classical religious and philosophical identities were undoubtedly less fixed that we expect when we attempt to frame them from contemporary perspectives. Yet it is not only the present that bears this burden of distortion; in many ways medieval doxographic and scholarly divisions of schools in India also elided the permeability of conceptual boundaries in the classical period (Nicolson 2010). Indeed, the very conditions and processes of the culture of debate that I outlined in Chapter 2 demonstrate the inevitability of 'inter-conceptuality' in the construction of any philosophical position or school; one could only safeguard the solidity of one's own position by incorporating the weaknesses and strengths of the opponent's position.

In order to demonstrate the soteriological dialogue between Pātañjala yoga and Sautrāntika, I examined specific intertextual passages (primarily PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1; PYŚ 2.13 and AKBh 4.94). The PYŚ and the AKBh share a conceptual scheme centred on the necessity of eliminating *kleśabīja* (seed of affliction). Forming part of the larger spatialised agricultural metaphor of *bhāvanā*, the *kleśabīja* metaphor is oriented to the earth (and the direction of 'down'): *kleśa* has a pernicious latent seed that is self-propagating, that thrives unseen in the *āśraya* (substratum), and whose germination potential can only be destroyed by scorching. The PYŚ shares this conceptual metaphor with the AKBh not only in these botanical details but also ontologically in the casual theory of how a seed's continuity in time is propelled by *sāmarthya* (capacity). These close correlations and word-for-word mirroring between the Pātañjala and Sautrāntika metaphors of *kleśabīja* and *āśraya* cannot be explained away as a general karmic theory of

seed in classical soteriology, such is its acute technical specificity. Patañjali's and Vasubandhu's conceptual understanding of *kleśa* contrasts with the strikingly different metaphoric treatment of the concept of 'affliction' in other contemporaneous texts, such as the Jain *Tattvārthasūtra*. This dissertation concludes that the conceptual metaphor of *kleśbīja* in Patañjali's soteriology was adopted from Sautrāntika discourse, which was itself innovative within Buddhist soteriology. Specifically, Patañjali drew on the textual content of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (the only detailed record of Sautrāntika positions that is now extant). Such intertextuality may reflect a shared forum of live oral debate at court or adaptive reuse of texts. I propose that the intertextual passages that I discuss in Chapter 2 demonstrate that one author was deliberately revising the words of the other.

If, indeed, Patañjali was reproducing a strand of Sautrāntika discourse, why would that have been the case? After all, the Sautrāntikas have an affiliation with Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (albeit a dissident one), and we have no evidence that Patañjali was a Buddhist and indeed sufficient evidence to suggest that he was not. Such evidence includes the self-labeling of the *Pātañalayogaśāstra* as Sāṃkhya and the identification of its audience as Brahmins. The answer to Patañjali's 'intellectual identity' is likely to be more complex than the binary divisions of Buddhist/Brahmin, and may lie further back in time in the nascent period of yogācāra at the beginning of the first millennium CE. When Patañjali created his system of yoga in the early 5th century, he was absorbing not only Sautrāntika concepts but also the wider yogācāra discourse in which they existed. Since the early yogācāras were in some measure connected to the Sautrāntikas (see section 3.2 of this dissertation), it is reasonable to suggest that there was a transmission of ideas about yoga from yogācāra to Sautrāntika.

The textual resonance between the AKBh and the PYŚ, then, is not fully explained by the standard 4th-century religious refutations between Brahmanism and Buddhism, but must also be located in an older and more

culturally submerged conceptual field of yoga doctrine, a shared episteme between yoga and yogācāra (and other groups too, such as the Jains). This dissertation has highlighted the importance of including yogācāra in any formulation of 'classical yoga'. Not only were there early systematisations of yogācāra that predate the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and of which Patañjali may have been aware, but the YĀBh's self-styling as a *yogaśāstra* may have provided the very impetus for Patañjali to create a rival *yogaśāstra* in the Brahmanical tradition. Interestingly, the 5th-century *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana refers to Patañjali's text as the *yogaśāstra* on yogācāra, indicating that perhaps in the immediate period following the composition of the PYŚ, yoga and yogācāra were perceived to be linked (NySBh 4.2.46; Thakur 1997: 280),[1] or even that yogācāra was the dominant discourse.

So how do we get from early yogācāra to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma? In the formative period of yogācāra at the beginning of the 1st millennium CE, there was an influential Sarvāstivāda community of practicing yogācāra-philosophers. These Sarvāstivāda yogācāras, who also included Sautrāntikas, played in a role in the formation of the early layers of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, formed around the 2nd century CE. Yamabe and Kritzer suggest that the Sautrāntika positions in the AKBh are merely crystallised versions of earlier seed theory in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. Thus Patañjali's use of the seed metaphor refers not just to the AKBh but also potentially to the broader realm of Sautrāntika ideas that were forming in early yogācāra. In particular, early yogācāra defined yoga as *bhāvanā* and included a specific technique of *bhāvanā* as *pratipakṣabhāvanā* (cultivation of the counterstate). The PYŚ includes the paradigm of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* in constructing a *bhāvanāmārga*, a path of cultivation. Indeed, the presence of

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[1] ***tadarthaṃ yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāro yogāc cādhyātmavidhyupāyaiḥ*** **||** *tasyāpavargasyādhigamāya yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāraḥ/ yamaḥ samā āśramiṇāṃ dharmasādhanam, niyamas tu viśiṣṭam/ ātmasaṃskāraḥ punar adharmahānaṃ dharmopacayaś ca/ yogaśāstrāc cādhyātmavidhiḥ pratipattavyaḥ/ sa punas tapaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānaṃ dhāraṇeti/ indriyaviṣayeṣu prasaṃkhyānābhyāso rāgadveṣaprahāṇārthaḥ/ upāyas tu yogācāravidhānam iti* (*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 4,2.46; Sastri 1984: 239).

key conceptual metaphors from *bhāvanā* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* – e.g. *bīja*, *āśraya*, *dagdhabīja*, *samārthya*, *dharmamegha* – all drawing on botanical cultivation, suggest a key role for yogācāra in the formation of classical yoga discourse as a whole. It is important to acknowledge, then, that at least some of the roots of Pātañjala yoga lie in yogācāra, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and Sautrāntika as much as they do in Sāṃkhya and the Vedic tradition.

Dharmamegha provides a particularly visible example of a shared conceptual metaphor between yoga and yogācāra. This metaphor is employed in both Patañjali's text and the YĀBh to denote the highest level of attainment, or liberation itself. This superlative metaphor is not subtly embedded in Patañjali's text, as in the case of *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, but is an example of the conspicuous borrowing of metaphor. Given the precedence and preeminence of the *dharmamegha* metaphor in Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriology from the canonical sources onwards, the borrowing was most likely by Patañjali. Patañjali's inclusion of *dharmamegha* provides further evidence that Patañjali was engaging with not only the discourse of *bhāvanā* but the path structure itself, *bhāvanāmārga*, of which *dharmamegha* was the pinnacle (or destination). Since *dharmamegha* was a key metaphor in the yogācāra path scheme of *bhāvanā* (cultivation), in engaging with the discourse of cultivation, it was imperative that Patañjali reference this concept, which represented the goal of liberation. In the end, he chose to co-opt the term. A synchronic analysis suggests that the value of the soteriological metaphor of *dharmamegha* was inverted by Patañjali for ironic effect not only to signal the polemical appropriation of its conventional schematic prominence in Buddhist texts, but also to invert its doctrinal meaning as a semantic coup. From the primary Mahāyāna context of abundant rainfall and existential sustenance, *dharmamegha* was inverted to denote existential cessation (annihilation).

This doctrinal revisionism (from the numinous to the cessative, to use Sarbacker's terms) was enhanced by the markedly different literary styles of

the two *yogaśāstra*s. I highlighted the creative influences and limits of classical literary style in the expression of soteriological metaphors. Patañjali's stylistically conservative *sūtra* format dictates that metaphorical expression is, like the overall literary style, elliptical and condensed. In contrast, the metaphorical expression of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is systematic and extensive, adhering to the taxonomical style of Abhidharma treatises, while the flamboyant Mahāyāna soteriological elaborations are partly bound up with the innovation of writing, which led to highly stylized, colourful, and exaggerated use of metaphor. Thus the differences we perceive in soteriology between the traditions of yoga and yogācāra are not only doctrinal but also literary, because literary formats affect and shape how conceptual metaphors are used.

The development of a detailed discourse of *bhāvanā* in Indic soteriology was a Buddhist endeavor; their enterprise is reflected not only in the Buddhist canon but also is elaborated at great length in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. *Bhāvanā* is a complex orientational metaphor that encompasses both the seed theory of *kleśa* and the *dharmamegha* image – respectively signifying non-liberation and liberation. The seed metaphor explains causality in relation to liberation and the cloud metaphor explains liberation itself as a state of trans-causality. Together these two structural metaphors bracket the metaphor of *bhāvanā*, by indicating two value-symbolic 'directions' of 'up' (liberation) and 'down' (captivity). The core metaphors of *bīja* and *dharmamegha* bifurcate the paradigm of *bhāvanā* into the activity of nurturing growth and the activity of stopping growth (cessation). The integral relationship of these two metaphors in the PYŚ is reflected in the fact that a synonym for *dharmameghasamādhi* (the concentration of the cloud of dharma) is *nirbīja samādhi* (seedless concentration); the cloud state of liberation is contrary to the state of possessing a seed. The lived context for the generation of the metaphor of *bhāvanā* may have been rice-farming, which our texts use as the main context of 'the seed'. This makes sense because in rice-farming there was an equal emphasis on eliminating negative factors (weeds, wild rice) and cultivating positive factors

(cultivated rice) in order to attain success (harvest) and longevity. Therefore in religious discourse the complex metaphor of *bhāvanā* thrived; it could express equally the bases of the two main approaches in Indic soteriology – planting the right seeds and destroying the bad seeds. Yoga in the classical period then was a twofold discipline: not just nurturing the correct factors but also eliminating the incorrect ones. Although contemporary culture has become used to defining the path of yoga in the PYŚ as the cultivation of positive factors – particularly in relation to the aṣṭāṅga path of *prāṇayāma*, *āsana*, *samādhi*, and so forth – Patañjali's text equally enjoins the adept to eliminate the negative factors. The prime target for elimination is the *kleśa*s, but also the ethical failings countered by the *yama*s and *niyama*s. A key technique in the process of elimination is the negating or sublating application of a *pratipakṣa* (counterstate). The end goal of Pātañjala yoga can be expressed in two ways and has two names: *dharmamegha* and *nirbīja*, both of which metaphors emphasise the concept of cessation.

In the PYŚ, the metaphysical division of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* into content and contentlessness (a Sāṃkhya doctrine) is matched by a soteriological frame divided into the numinous and the cessative. And so Larson's assessment of the PYŚ as a hybrid text is correct. It is not *either* Sāmkhya *or* Sautrāntika, *either* Brahmanic *or* Buddhist, *either* yoga *or* yogācāra, but in all cases *both*. The *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is a text that deliberately blends conceptual schemes, partly due to the conditions of courtly debates, partly because of proximal development alongside Buddhist communities in the northwest region, and partly because there existed equally strong traditions of yoga in both Brahmanism and in Buddhism at this point in history. Yogācāra (and its early entwinement with Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika) can no longer be pushed into the background of classical yoga studies, but should rather be brought into the foreground to help us better understand the variegated picture of classical yoga in the 4th-5th centuries CE.

The value of conceptual metaphor theory in soteriological study

There is also something to say about the methodological value of this dissertation. It is fruitful to look beyond the designation of *sūtra* and *śāstra* texts as 'receptacles of doctrine' and to acknowledge them as fully-fledged literary works in their own right. Furthermore, utilizing conceptual metaphor theory can expose the systematic organization of soteriological thought by enabling us to identify and explain features of soteriology that are embedded in dense texts and religio-philosophical frameworks – and to see hitherto unseen connections. In soteriological systems, conceptual metaphors form the background of the thought and not the foreground[2] – thus we have to dig deep into the texts (with close readings) to find conceptual systems. The resulting analysis can reveal much about the dialogue between Buddhist and Brahmanical thinkers –this study has highlighted that between yogācāra and yoga philosophers. We have established that Patañjali was interacting dialogically with the Sautrāntika philosophical positions of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as well as the early ideas of Sarvāstivāda yogācāra. This was conducted not through doctrinal exchange but through soteriological metaphors. Why metaphor? One reason for the easy transference of metaphor is that metaphors are ideological (Lakoff 1991).[3] The inherent tendency to edit domain-mapping (highlighting some features of the source domain while hiding others) means that a metaphor is malleable and therefore an effective tool of persuasion. Often communicated unconsciously, conceptual metaphors can be powerful, and ideological tools were useful in an environment in which religious rivalry and conversion were commonplace.

However, there is another even more important reason for the inherence of conceptual metaphor in interreligious dialogue: soteriology itself is a metaphorical enterprise. Soteriological goals such as 'liberation',

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[2] Deignan makes this point more generally: 'conceptual metaphors form the background to our conceptual systems rather than the foreground' (Deignan 2005: 15).

[3] In this paper, Lakoff argues that metaphors are used in public discourse for ideological impact in times of war.

'redemption', 'enlightenment' and so on are abstractions that can only be understood through conceptual metaphors. The integral basis of soteriology as metaphorical lent itself to dialogic interaction and engendered an environment of fluid conceptual exchange between religio-philosophical communities concerned with yogic liberation in the 4th and 5th centuries. Indeed, the borrowing between the classical texts themselves reflects the disruptive liminality of conceptual metaphor. The very use of metaphor was a chief defining characteristic of being a Sautrāntika. As Cox remarks, 'Dārṣṭāntika', user of similes or examples (*dṛṣṭānta*), was likely a pejorative term for the Sautrāntikas (Cox 1995: 38). The Dārṣṭāntikas were attacked for their tendency to use examples from the everyday world to explain the teachings of the Buddha; such discourse and reasoning were criticized as being invalid and without authority (Cox 1995: 38). This perhaps points to the creative aspect of metaphor: mapping qualities from one domain to another not only leads to editing (which can have an ideological basis) but inevitably brings new connotations, not welcomed by all. Such creativity would have been seen as a challenge to orthodoxy. Thus shared metaphors facilitated a process of conceptual appropriation that could be as powerful as direct refutation. Hence Patañjali did not need to refute the doctrine of *dharmameghabhūmi*, he could simply co-opt and revise it, thereby diluting its superlative status in the Buddhist context. Similarly, Patañjali did not have to acknowledge the value of *bhāvanāmārga* as a soteriological scheme; he could effectively co-opt constituent metaphors and embed them in a non-Buddhist soteriology. Literary intertextuality and conceptual metaphor theory show that conceptual sharing does not reflect an identity of ideas; it simply indicates co-constructive dialogue. For example, although Vasubandhu and Asaṅga share textual passages, they use the same material 'to different ends' (Skilling 2013: 773). The same point applies to how the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* interacts with these texts; the conceptual metaphors can be appropriated while their doctrinal content is left behind.

From the outset of this dissertation, I established that metaphors are not 'merely' conceptual or linguistic but also have a material dimension. They

often derive from bodily experience of the world and are, in turn, used to construct and determine bodily experience of the world, as well as cultural frames of belief from religion to politics to ideology. As Kövecses states: 'Many conceptual metaphors are "realized" in social and cultural reality […] Therefore, the study of these conceptual metaphors is important in the study of society and culture' (Kövecses 2006: 142). In his studies of the early common era, Deleanu has referred to the 'semiotic horizon' of a text and the need to try to reconstruct an approximation of the semiotic codes in existence when the text was produced: 'Clarifying the original semiotic horizon of the text is as important as rendering the denotations of its words' (Deleanu 2006: 16). I would add that clarifying the *metaphoric* horizon of a text is equally important.

To sum up, the basis for the borrowing of conceptual metaphor is threefold: 1. soteriology itself, dealing as it does with abstract material states, can only be communicated through conceptual metaphor 2. the domain-mapping in metaphor allows for both similarity and dissimilarity (highlighting and hiding), which reflects an inbuilt conceptual and hence ideological malleability that was useful in religious rivalry and 3. conceptual metaphors can only be generated in lived, bodily, experiential contexts, which members of these religious communities shared to a degree and which facilitated the common understandings of metaphors, such as the technical significance of the specific imagery of the rice seed. Differences in religio-philosophical debate could only be articulated on the basis of shared conceptuality.

The category of classical yoga

This dissertation's analysis of intertextuality and shared conceptuality has broader implications for the category of classical yoga within the study of religions. I have highlighted the multiplicity of path structures offered in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. By foregrounding such plurality within Patañjali's soteriology I have sought to redress the uneven scholarly focus that there has been on the path of *aṣṭāṅga yoga* historically. Specifically, I have highlighted the importance of the *kriyā yoga* path and its focus on

eliminating the *kleśa*s. There is more than one path structure in the PYŚ and several are indebted to the Buddhist soteriological schemes of Abhidharma that elaborated the concept of *mārga* in such dense technical detail. Certainly, the PYŚ also incorporates the Vedic *mokṣamārga*, but its other path structures – such as the threefold *kriyā yoga*, the sevenfold path of wisdom (*saptavidhā*), the ninefold path of *pratipakṣabhāvanā*, or the threefold stages of *samadhivāsitā* – owe much to Buddhist soteriology.[4]

In our present world of globally commodified yoga culture, it has become customary to regard yoga as an 'entity' with a distinct identity – a set of practices and beliefs. However, during the classical period, I argue, there was no 'entity' called yoga. The term itself signaled a body of discourse comprised of numerous soteriological concepts that were transposed and redefined between religious communities. Thus yoga was, to a degree, as much a discourse as a practice – and an erudite one at that. Acknowledging the influence of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and yogācāra on Pātañjala yoga directs us to approach the PYŚ as an elite philosophical and literary work, rather than a practice manual.[5] The primary function of this *sūtra* text was to contribute to the scholastic and philosophical codification of *śāstra* and not to teach adepts how to 'do' yoga. This study situates classical yoga in the terms of discourse and soteriology, and not only as an ascetic form of body-mind practice, as is often the case in scholarship. Due to the relationship between soteriology and ontology, this reconfiguration enhances our apprehension of yoga in the 4th-5th centuries as a philosophical school. Indeed, with our contemporary understanding of yoga as a 'practice' we may have missed a beat: practice is only the means to liberation, but classical yoga itself is a soteriological enterprise that privileges the end goal. I have noted the existential struggle of 'growth vs. cessation' in the paradigm of *bhāvanā*, understood through botanical metaphors. Kaelber notes the archaic function of elemental metaphors in Vedic asceticism: 'Through an

[4] This is to say nothing of the *aṣṭāṅga* path that some scholars have also identified as Buddhist in origin (see Literature Review).

[5] This point is also made by Mallinson and Singleton 2017: xii.

asceticism that "overcomes" nature, man is able to control nature' (Kaelber 1989: 144). Similarly, in classical yoga the focus on elimination (of the undesirable factor) is a focus on control. Yoga, then, may be better understood via the term 'discipline', with its connotations of control, rather than the term 'practice', which is often replete with contemporary associations. Such emphasis on control reflected the wider social changes of urbanization and related agricultural patterns of cultivating the wild.

This study has laid the groundwork for further systematic analysis of Buddhist and Jain texts in relation to the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and of the paradigm of *bhāvanā* in relation to yoga. It also suggests a way forward for the continued integration of research findings from Buddhist Studies and Hindu Studies in order to deepen, widen and pluralize scholarly definitions of classical yoga. I have critiqued how the category of 'classical yoga' itself has conventionally referred to the *Yogasūtra* by positing that there was not one but two landmark *yogaśāstra*s in the 4th-5th century CE. There is therefore a questionable basis for continuing to privilege the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* over the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* as the definitive *śāstra* on yoga. Indeed, as a voluminous compendium, the latter provides far more detail on the social and ethical dimensions of yoga (not to mention philosophical) than the former. Taking into account Maas' convincing reassignment of the textual unity and name of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, along with the necessity of accepting the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* on its own terms as a *yogaśāstra*, we can now assert that there were two *yogaśāstra*s in the classical period and open up the label of 'classical yoga' to think beyond Pātañjala yoga. The category of 'classical yoga' should therefore be widened to include conceptual understandings of yoga as *yogabhāvanā*, described not only in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, but also in many other Buddhist texts such as the *Milindapañha*, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*, and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, which all deal with classical yoga in considerable and systematic detail.

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Appendix 1: A note on translating *prasaṃkhyāna*

Prasaṃkhyāna is generally translated as 'reflection' or 'meditation'. However, I argue that there are technical connotations of the term, which should not be elided.[1] I will firstly consider the Brahmanic context of *prasaṃkhyāna*, and then suggest that any translation should take into account the connotations of the semantically and conceptually related Buddhist term *pratisaṃkhyā*. Patañjali's *prasaṃkhyāna* cannot be said to be a core term of classical Sāṃkhya as it is notably absent from the *Sāṃkhyakārika*. Neither does the term appear in the proto-yoga formulations of the *Upaniṣad*s or the *Bhagavad Gītā*.[2] *Prasaṃkhyāna* does not occur in the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (another key early text on yoga), although there are limited instances of *prasaṃkhyā*, in a non-meditative context, to denote enumeration or reflection.[3] However, the term *parisaṃkhyāna* is found in the *Mahābhārata* in relation to Sāṃkhya, and this is worth considering.

There are different scholarly views as to the basic meaning of *sāṃkhya,* derived from the root √*khyā* ('to make known', 'to be named') and the prefix '*sam*-'. Larson gives a useful overview of two main interpretations among

[1] Examples of translations of *prasaṃkhyāna* that are somewhat general and elide its technical meaning include: 'omniscience' (Āraṇya); 'elevation' (Feuerstein and Rukmani), 'enstatic elevation' (Sundaresan 1998: 68-69), 'meditation practice' (Leggett). More fittingly, Oberhammer translates *prasaṃkhyāna* as '*Betrachtung*' (contemplation or reflection) (Oberhammer 1976: 139).

[2] According to Jacob's *A Concordance to the Principal Upnishads and Bhagvad Gītā* [sic] the terms *prasaṃkhyā* and *prasaṃkhyāna* do not appear in the *Upaniṣads* or the *Bhagavad Gītā* (Jacobs 1963).

[3] *padātināgabahulā prāvṛṭkāle praśasyate / guṇān etān prasaṃkhyāya deśakālau prayojayet* (MB 12.101.022; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 13: 472) and *evam eṣa prasaṃkhyātaḥ svakarmapratyayī guṇaḥ / katham cid vartate samyak keśāṃ cid vā na vartate* (MB 12.212.039; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1178).

western scholars, which I will recount here (Larson 1969: 1-3). While Jacobi opted for a meaning of 'counting' or 'enumeration', Oldenburg preferred the idea of 'examination' or 'calculation' in the analytical sense, and Jacobi argued for a combination of these meanings: analysis of enumerated factors, which refers to the ontological categories (*tattvas*) of Sāṃkhya. Eliade echoed this interpretation of enumerative analysis but asserted that it specifically referred to the ultimate soteriological distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Edgerton interpreted *sāṃkhya* as denoting logical reasoning itself, ratiocination. Citing a range of examples from the *Śānti Parvan*, in which the primary meaning appears to be enumeration (of sense objects, ontological categories, and doctrines),[4] Larson concludes:

> the term "sāṃkhya" refers primarily to the idea of "number" or "enumeration" but […] it also signifies those who reason or analyse by means of the enumeration of the categories (Larson 1969: 3).

I agree that this basic meaning of *sāṃkhya* in a philosophical context carries the primary denotations of 'analysis' and (ontological) 'enumeration', with a third less evident sense of 'ratiocination'. At the same time, however, I acknowledge Chakravarti's reminder that *sāṃkhya* is a complex term with subtle shades of meaning – he rejects any translation of 'enumeration' as not only simplistic but incorrect (Chakravarti 1975: 1-2). Furthermore, there is a limitation in Larson's analysis in that, from the textual examples he highlights, he does not note any difference between *sāṃkhya* and *parisaṃkhyāna*. However, although we cannot be precise about how the prefix '*pari-*' alters the meaning of *sāṃkhya*,[5] the addition of the prefix '*pari-*'

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[4] Larson lists as examples MB 12.290.5; 12.294.42; 12.308.79-80 (Larson 1969: 3).

[5] As with all Sanskrit prefixes, there is a range of meanings attached to '*pari-*'. According to Monier-Williams, '*pari-*' in *parisaṃkhyāna* enhances the meaning to indicate a fullness, roundness, or totality to the act of analysis or enumeration (Monier-Williams 1899). Sundaresan (Sundaresan 1983) is more confident in asserting the value of such prefixes. In a later Vedānta context, he argues, the prefixes of *prasaṃkhyāna* and *parisaṃkhyāna* in Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* can reflect subtle but key doctrinal differences. While *prasaṃkhyāna* 'carries primary meanings of counting, enumeration, gathering together and summing up', which according to Sundaresan relate to a sense of 'omniscience', *parisaṃkhyāna* has these meanings, but also other specific meanings, namely 'exhaustive

is significant, and *parisaṃkhyāna* is not merely a gloss or synonym for *sāṃkhya*.[6] In the *Śānti Parvan*, Sāṃkhya is the name of the philosophical method,[7] while *parisaṃkhyāna* is the act itself – of analysis, enumeration, or

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enumeration, implying exclusion of any other; limitation to that which is enumerated', 'exclusive specification' and 'correct judgement, proper estimate'. Sundaresan concludes: 'Thus both the terms *parisaṃkhyāna* and *parisaṃkhyā vidhi* seem to derive their meanings from the sense of exclusion attached to the addition of the prefix *pari* to the word *saṃkhyā'* (Sundaresan 1998: 83).

[6] See, for example: *sāṃkhyadarśanam etat te parisaṃkhyānam uttamam / evaṃ hi parisaṃkhyāya sāṃkhyāḥ kevalatāṃ gatāḥ* (MB.12.303.20; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1676-1677) 'This is the knowledge of Sāṃkhya, the utmost, [discriminative] reflection (*parisaṃkhyāna*); thus those Sāmkhya-adherents who, haven undertaken [discriminative] reflection attain [ontological] isolation (*kevala*).' See also this distinction between *sāṃkhya* and *parisaṃkhyāna* as the philosophical subject of knowledge (*sāṃkhyajñāna*) and the act of attaining or implementing reflection/enumeration (*parisaṃkhyāna*): *yogadarśanam etāvad uktaṃ te tattvato mayā / sāṃkhyajñānaṃ pravakṣyāmi parisaṃkhyānidarśanam* (MB 12.294.26; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1634) 'To this extent have I correctly explained to you the teaching of Yoga. I will [now] explain the knowledge of Sāṃkhya, which is knowledge of ways of reflecting/enumerating'. This semantic distinction is underlined again: *sāṃkhyadarśanam etāvat parisaṃkhyānadarśanam / sāṃkhyaṃ prakurvate caiva prakṛtiṃ ca pracakṣate / tattvāni ca caturviṃśat parisaṃkhyāya tattvataḥ / sāṃkhyāḥ saha prakṛtyā tu nistattvaḥ pañcaviṃśakaḥ* (MB 12.294.41-42; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1636). 'The followers of Sāṃkhya practise Sāmkhya and expound *prakṛti* having done *parisaṃkhyāna* correctly on the 24 *tattva*s together with *prakṛti*. The 25th is not a *tattva'* [**prakurute* emended to *prakurvate.* Emendation suggested by James Mallinson and supported by several of the manuscripts collated for the critical edition].

[7] For further clarification that *sāṃkhya* can mean ratiocination itself, see this verse: *saukṣmyaṃ saṃkhyākramau cobhau nirṇayaḥ saprayojanaḥ/ pañcaitāny arthajātāni vākyam ity ucyate nṛpa.* 'O king, speech is said to be these five things of subtlety, reasoning and argumentation combined, deduction, and motive' (MB 308.79; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1716). And for a verse that suggests sāṃkhya as analysis of objects, see: *doṣāṇāṃ ca guṇānāṃ ca pramāṇaṃ pravibhāgaśaḥ / kaṃ cid artham abhipretya sā saṃkhyety upadhāryatām*. 'When considering a particular object, the evaluation one-by-one of [its] good and bad qualities should be known to be Sāṃkhya' (MB 308.82; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1717).

ratiocination, according to context.[8] Specifically, the context of *prasaṃkhyā* in the MB suggests that the addition of the prefix '*pari-*' to *sāṃkhya* adds agency to the concept, so that *parisaṃkhyāna* indicates a process or an act of reflection.

Having considered this background, let us now return to a suitable translation for *prasaṃkhyāṇa*. The translation of 'ratiocination' for Sāṃkhya is somewhat problematic, because ratiocination refers to a reasoning process such as the logical syllogism. Sāṃkhya is not known for its reasoning and syllogisms in the way that Nyāyā is (the logical school of philosophy), but is rather a school that rests on direct perception.[9] I therefore propose that the dual meaning of Sāṃkhya as both 'analysis' (seeing) and 'discernment' (enumerative discrimination) is the more favourable interpretation, which appropriately communicates the epistemological basis and authority of *pratyakṣa* (direct perception). Let me argue this point further. The outcome of *prasaṃkhyāna* is *vivekakhyāti*, which is 'discriminating discernment'. This reflects, firstly, that the ultimate goal of Sāṃkhya is discernment (i.e. being able to grasp what is obscure, resting on a metaphor of seeing and sight), and secondly, that the nature of that discernment is discriminatory at an ontological level (i.e. it perceives a quantitative – specifically a dualist – distinction between *prakṛti* and

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[8] *Parisaṃkhyāna* might be termed a preparatory contemplation within or before *dhyāna*: *evaṃ hi parisaṃkhyāya tato dhyāyeta kevalam / virajaskamalaṃ nityam anantaṃ śuddham avraṇam* (MB 12.304.16; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 15: 1679). 'Having reflected on the list (of powers), one should then meditate on the singular principle, which is free from contamination and impurity, eternal, infinite , pure and whole.' See also: *vibhāgajñasya mokṣas tu yas tv ajñaḥ sa punar bhavet / kapila uvāca / etāvad evāsure dhyānam anuvarṇitam | parisaṃkhyānam api coktam* (MB 12.308.191d@029b.341; Belvalkar 1954, Vol 16: 2084). 'Kapila said: There is liberation for he who knows the division, but he who is ignorant is reborn. Kapila said: Meditation has been described to this extent, o Āsuri. Parisaṃkhyāna has also been taught.'

[9] Although inference (*anumāṇa*) is included as a valid basis for knowledge (*pramāṇā*) in the PYŚ, the highest epistemological authority is conferred on direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), rather than the tools of logic.

puruṣa). Even if one rejects the claim that there is an enumerative aspect to *prasaṃkhyāna* in the PYŚ, both the aforesaid acts of 'discernment' and 'discrimination' (such as are used to explain the soteriological basis of the PYŚ) rely on differentiation (of one thing from another, of correct from incorrect forms), and differentiation necessarily entails some kind of enumerated content, even if it is only binary. I will thus translate *prasaṃkhyāna* as 'discriminative reflection' in the sense of a recollection of, or reflection on, differentiated facts or truths. Like *pratisaṃkhyā*, *prasaṃkhyāna* conveys a sense of enumeration. They are both acts of contemplation with differential reflection.

Prasaṃkhyāna has not been widely discussed as a core term of the philosophical vocabulary of the PYŚ. Rukmani has considered *prasaṃkhyāna* in the PYŚ as a possible synonym for *dharmamegha* (the cloud of dharma) (Rukmani 2007). Bader (1990), Sundaresan (1998),[10] and Endo (2000) have all discussed the supposed co-option of *prasaṃkhyāna* from the *Yogabhāṣya* by Śaṅkara and his adaption of it to create a new technique called *parisaṃkhyāna,* suited to Vedāntic teaching. *Prasaṃkhyāna* is also mentioned in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* in a summary of some ancilliaries of *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 4,2.46; see below). The dating for this text (the first *bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyāsūtra*) is debated, but Potter estimates 425-500 CE (Potter 2004: 239), and it is generally understood to post-date the PYŚ. Endo interprets *prasaṃkhyāna* here as 'the sense of the correct consideration to acquire right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*),

[10] Sundaresan assesses Patañjali's use of *prasaṃkhyāna* in relation to the Vedāntic context, in which Maṇḍana Miśra (circa 7th century CE) refers to it as *prasaṃkhyāna-vāda*, a Vedic injunction to meditate on Brahman as an absolute principle in order to achieve direct realization. Maṇḍana also characterised *prasamkhyāna* as 'continuous contemplation'. Sundaresan thus argues that there is no basic contradiction between rejecting *prasaṃkhyāna vāda* and separately recommending *parisaṃkhyāna* meditation.
It is possible that this sense of the continuous may be drawn from the MB context in which *parisaṃkhyāna* is compounded with the adjective *abhagna*, as in *abhagnaparisaṃkhyāna* (MB 12.325.04; Belvalkar 1954: Vol 16, 1844, 7).

especially right knowledge of the Self' (Endo 2000: 76).[11] *Prasaṃkhyāna*, if designed to acquire *tattvajñāna*, entails knowledge of the *tattva*s, or ontological categories, such as are enumerated in Sāṃkhya. The passage reads as follows:

> **tadarthaṃ yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāro yogāc cādhyātmavidhyupāyaiḥ ||**
> *tasyāpavargasyādhigamāya yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāraḥ/ yamaḥ samā āśramiṇāṃ dharmasādhanam, niyamas tu viśiṣṭam/ ātmasaṃskāraḥ punar adharmahānaṃ dharmopacayaś ca/ yogaśāstrāc cādhyātmavidhiḥ pratipattavyaḥ/ sa punas tapaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānaṃ dhāraṇeti/ indriyaviṣayeṣu prasaṃkhyānābhyāso rāgadveṣaprahāṇārthaḥ/ upāyas tu yogācāravidhānam iti* (*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 4,2.46; Sastri 1984: 239)
> **To that end [there should be] perfection of the self by *yama*s and *niyama*s and through the methods of spiritual practice that result from yoga.**
> For the sake of the acquisition of that liberation [there should be] perfection of the self by *yama*s and *niyama*s. *Yama*s are the same among people of all life stages, i.e. the accomplishment of dharma, but *niyama* is particular for each one. Perfection of the self means destruction of undharmic [quality] and accumulation of dharmic [quality]. Spiritual practice is to be apprehended from the yoga *śāstra*, which consists of *tapas*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyahāra*, *dhyāna*, and *dharaṇā*. The practice of *prasaṃkhyāna* on the sense objects is for the purpose of abandonment of attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). 'Method' means the performance of the practice of yoga.

This passage refers to *prasaṃkhyāna* as a practice (*prasaṃkhyānābhyāsa*) and explains it as contemplation on the sense objects, which leads to the abandonment of two major *kleśa*s: *rāga* and *dveṣa*. Regardless of the content of the contemplation (in this case, the sense organs), this *bhāṣya* is nonetheless helpful in illuminating that *prasaṃkhyāna* in this period was understood to indicate an object-centred contemplative technique that eliminates the *kleśa*s.

[11] An early commentary, the circa-6th century *Nyāyavārttika* (4.2.2) by Uddyotakara, also defines *prasaṃkhyāna* as the discriminating knowledge between the self and the non-self. For a full discussion see Endo 2000.

Appendix 2: A mirrored argument form in PYŚ and AKBh

In this passage from PYŚ 2.13, there are four steps in the argument (which I have highlighted using numbers in brackets, numbering the assertions, and adding 'a', 'b', etc. to show where the assertion is refuted):

> *tatredaṃ vicāryate* --- **[1]** *kim ekaṃ karmaikasya janmanaḥ kāraṇam* **[2]** *athaikaṃ karmānekaṃ janmākṣipatīti. dvitīyā vicāraṇā* --- **[3]** *kim anekaṃ karmānekaṃ janma nirvartayati* **[4]** *athānekaṃ karmaikaṃ janma nirvartayatīti.*
> On this point, it is deliberated: **[1]** is a single karma the cause of one birth? Or **[2]** does one karma (action) project (*ā√kṣip*) multiple births? The second deliberation: **[3]** does multiple karma (action) produce (*nirvartayati*) multiple births, or **[4]** does multiple karma (action) produce one birth?
>
> **[1a]** *na tāvad ekaṃ karmaikasya janmanaḥ kāraṇam. kasmāt? anādikālapracitasyāsaṃkhyeyasyāvaśiṣṭasya karmaṇaḥ sāṃpratikasya ca phalakramāniyamād anāśvāso lokasya prasaktaḥ, sa cāniṣṭa iti.*
> Firstly, **[1a]** it is not that one karma is the cause of one birth. Why? This entails (*prasakta*) the disconsolation of people,[12] due to the lack of a regulation (*aniyamāt*) of the sequence of fruition between the current life karma and that innumerable karma that is residual, having been heaped up over beginningless time; and this is unfavourable.
>
> **[2a]** *na caikaṃ karmānekasya janmanaḥ kāraṇam. kasmāt, anekeṣu karmasu ekaikam eva karmānekasya janmanaḥ kāraṇam ity avaśiṣṭasya vipākakālābhāvaḥ prasaktaḥ, sa cāpy aniṣṭa iti*.
> **[2a]** And neither does one karma cause multiple births. Why? It follows that there would not be time for the fruition of the leftover [karma], since, there being many karmas, each karma singly is the cause of multiple births[13] – and this too is unfavourable.

[12] People are disconsolate because there is no means to account for or to reduce past life karma.

[13] Lit. 'a birth that is not one'.

[3a] *na cānekaṃ karmānekasya janmanaḥ kāraṇam. kasmāt, tad anekaṃ janma yugapan na saṃbhavatīti krameṇaiva vācyam. tathā ca pūrvadoṣānuṣaṅgaḥ.*
Furthermore, **[3a]** multiple karmas are not the cause of multiple births. Why? Since multiple births do not arise simultaneously, it must be said to be only by sequence. And, again, there is the consequence of the previous fault.

[4a] *tasmāj janmaprāyaṇāntare kṛtaḥ puṇyāpuṇyakarmāśayapracayo vicitraḥ pradhānopasarjanabhāvenāvasthitaḥ prāyaṇābhivyakta ekapraghaṭṭakena maraṇaṃ prasādhya saṃmūrchita ekam eva janma karoti. tac ca janma tenaiva karmaṇā labdhāyuṣkaṃ bhavati. tasminn āyuṣi tenaiva karmaṇā bhogaḥ saṃpadyata iti. asau karmāśayo janmāyurbhogahetutvāt trivipāko 'bhidhīyata iti. ata ekabhavikaḥ karmāśaya ukta iti.*
Due to this, **[4]** the accumulation of the karma store of merit and demerit is made between birth and death. Being diverse, and being in the state of a relation (*bhāva*) of primary (*pradhāna*) and secondary (*upasarjana*), manifesting at the moment of death (*prāyaṇa*), having accomplished death by means of one volition (*praghaṭṭa*), congealed, it causes only one birth. And that birth becomes endowed with a lifespan through that karma alone. And, in that lifespan, karma alone produces experience.[14] Due to being the cause of birth, lifespan, and experience, that karma store is designated as threefold fruition (*vipāka*). For this reason the karma store is said to be productive of one [birth].

The corresponding passage from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* occurs at 4.94 (Pradhan 1975: 258-259) and is a somewhat longer discussion. In this passage, the Vaibhāṣikas are the dominant voice, and the Sautrāntikas make their objections:

kimekaṃ karma ekameva janmā kṣipati atha naikam[15] api /
tathā kim ekam api karmaikaṃ janmā kṣipaty atha anekam /
eṣa hi siddhāntaḥ /
[1] ***ekaṃ janmākṣipaty ekam***
ekameva janmākṣipatyekameva ca karma nānekaṃ /[16] janmeti nikāyasabhāgasyākhyā /
tatra hi labdhe jāta ityucyate /

[14] The reaping of the *phala*; consumption of the fruit.

[15] Here, I am reading *naikam* as referring to the subject *karma*.

[16] Theodore Proferes suggested an emendation with a danda to create a new sentence here.

Vaibhāṣikas: Does one karma project one birth alone, or also multiple [karmas]? Likewise does one karma [alone] produce one birth or also multiple [births]?
This is the conclusion/position:
[1] One [karma] produces one birth.
'One karma alone produces one birth alone and not multiple [karmas]'; birth means *nikāyasabhāga* (homogeneous character).[17] Because in attaining [*nikāyasabhāga*], one is said to be born.

[1a] *yat tarhi sthavirāniruddhenoktaṃ* **[2]** *"so 'haṃ tasyaikapiṇḍapātasya vipākena saptakṛtvas trayastriṃśeṣu deveṣūpapanno yāvad etarhi ādye śākyakule jāta" iti /*
tena hy asau samṛddhiṃ labdhvā jātismaraḥ punaranyat puṇyaṃ kṛtavān /
tata utthānaṃ darśayati sma /
yathā manuṣyo dīnārottho 'nena sahasraṃ nirviśya āha ekena dīnāreṇa aham etad īśvaryaṃ prāpta iti /

In this case Sthavira Aniruddha[18] says: 'Through the fruition of one single alms-giving, I have eventually (*yāvad*) been born into the noble Śākya lineage for the first time, having been born (*upapanna*) seven times among the 33 gods."
Because he [Aniruddha], having obtained prosperity (*samṛddhim*) by means of this, having the memory of his births (*jātismaraḥ*), did another meritorious [deed] again, therefore he was demonstrating the starting point: 'Like a man having arisen through a *dinar*, having come into (*nirviśya*) a thousand through this (*dīnārottha*), I attained (*prāpta*) lordship.'

apare tvāhuḥ /
[2a = 3] *tasya taṃ piṇḍapātam adhiṣṭhānaṃ kṛtvā dānacetanānāṃ pravāho mahānutpannaḥ /*[19] *kayācit*[20] *kiñcitphalaṃ parigṛhītamiti /*

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[17] *Nikāyasabhāga* means 'what is common to a class or category' (Edgerton *Buddhist-Hybrid Dictionary*, 1953). This is a technical term from Vaibhāṣika theory and indicates the homogeneous characteristics that are shared by things in the same class. See AKBh 2.41; 2.195-196.

[18] Aniruddha (Skt.) or Anuruddha (Pāli) was one of the Buddha's main ten disciples and a cousin of the Buddha. Traditionally, he attained his noble birth as a result of an act of alms-giving many lifetimes before.

[19] Theodore Proferes suggests the emendation of a danda to create a new sentence.

[4 and 4a] *anekena apy ekam ākṣipyate mā bhūt khaṇḍaśo nikāyasabhāgasya ākṣepa iti /*
[1] *ekena tu karmaṇā kliṣṭasya nikāyasabhāgasyeṣyate karma /*
[5*] ***anekaṃ paripūrakam*** */*
yathā citrakara ekayā vartyā rūpamālikhya vahvībhiḥ paripūrayati /
tathā hi tulye mānuṣye kaścit sakalendriyāṅgapratyaṅgo bhavati varṇakṛtipramāṇabalasaṃpadā vibhrājamānaḥ kaścid eṣāṃ kenacid vikalaḥ /
na ca kevalaṃ karmaivākṣepakaṃ janmanaḥ /

Others, however, say: **[2a = 3]**
Sautrāntikas: Having made this alms-offering, Aniruddha (*mahāt*) produced a stream of resolutions of generosity, in which each fruit was received by someone [one person].
***Vaibhāṣikas*: [4 and 4a]** Multiple [karmas] also produce one birth, otherwise the production of a homogeneous existence would be in fragments.
[1] However karma is accepted (*īṣyate*) as an afflicted homogeneous existence produced by one action.[21]
Multiple [karmas] flesh out[22] **[a single existence].**
In the same way that a painter delineates (*ālikh*) a form with one paintbrush (*vartī*) and fulfills it (vahvībhiḥ), so humans, [although] being of the same class, some are whole (*sakala*) in senses, limbs, and digits and some of them are splendid in their perfection of strength, knowledge, action and colour, while others are defective (*vikala*). And it is not karma alone that produces birth.

kiṃ tarhi /
anyadapi savipākam /
Why, in that case?

[20] I am unsure what the *kayācit* refers to here, being in the feminine, so I have opted for the general 'someone'.

[21] The Vaibhāṣikas are referring to their own position here and restating it.

[22] I am here drawing on Cox's technical translation of *kṣipati* and *paripūrakam* as 'sketch out' and 'flesh [out]' (Cox 1995: 110).

Fruition is also due to other [factors].[23]

Let's now examine the detail of each argument in more depth. Patañjali examines four statements about transmigration in turn. The development of the argument is summarized here:

	***Pātañjalayogaśāstra* 2.13**	
1	One action generates one birth	Rejected
2	One action generates multiple births	Rejected
3	Multiple actions generates multiple births	Rejected
4	Multiple actions generate one birth	Accepted

The terms of the debate would appear to rest on the singularity or plurality of karmic action in relation to how rebirth is determined.

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* passage, the summary of the four propositions to be debated is structurally similar to that of the PYŚ, but the order and range of possibilities being explored is different. Additionally, the literary presentation of issues in the AKBh is more complex because they

[23] The passage continues on to explain how one can escape the production of karmic effects: **nākṣepike samāpattī acitte prāptayo na ca** (AKBh 4.95) *savipākābhyāmapyacittasamāpattibhyāṃ nikāyasabhāgo nākṣipyate / karmāsahabhūtatvāt / prāptibhiśca karmaṇo 'nekaphalatvāt /* **'It [birth] is not produced when there exists the two unconscious absorptions nor the *prāptis*.** Although they produce fruition, the two unconscious absorptions do not produce a homogeneous existence. This is due to their non-coexistence with action [karma]. And the *prāptis* [do not produce a homogeneous existence] due to the multiple [differing?] fruition of action'. See also the argument in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* by Vasubandhu 15-17 (Potter 1996: 581; trans. Anacker) in which there is a similar argument to this. See also AKBh 5.27, which explains how a karma projects ($\bar{a}\sqrt{kṣip}$) and contains reinforcement for the idea that consciousness can continue after a period of cessation due to the seed. This passage also reflects the notion of *śaktiviśeṣa*, the special force that is produced in the awareness-series by a decision – a retributive effect arises due to the transformation of the series that has been altered by this decision.

are embedded within a debate. This table summarizes the development of the argument:

	***Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 4.94**	
1	One birth is produced by one karma alone [and not multiple karmas] **OR**	Accepted by Vaibhāṣika
2	One birth is produced by **both** one karma **and** by multiple karmas	Accepted by Vaibhāṣika
3	One birth is produced by one karma alone [and not multiple karmas] **OR**	Rejected by Vaibhāṣika
4	**Both** multiple births **and** one birth are produced by one karma	Rejected by Vaibhāṣika
5	One bundle of karma and multiple dharmas **fulfil** one birth	Accepted by Vaibhāṣika / *Rejected by Sautrāntika*

As elsewhere in the AKBh, the *kārikā* contains the orthodox Vaibhāṣika position and the *bhāṣya* includes points of Sautrāntika critique. The orthodox Vaibhāṣika position is that one karma projects (*ā√kṣip*) one birth. However, in the *bhāṣya* the Sautrāntikas refute the example of Aniruddha; although Aniruddha purports to have achieved a great birth by means of one single meritorious act of alms-giving (thereby seeming to illustrate the argument that one karma produces one birth), his generation of multiple volitions of generosity, in fact, would generate multiple births rather than one birth. In response, and to restate their conclusion, the Vaibhāṣikas assert that the very basis of the reasoning is askew; one should not be asking *only* about whether one birth is generated by single or multiple karmas, but also about the role of the dharmas. Thus the question of the singularity or plurality of karmas in the causation of rebirth is incompletely formulated, because karma only ever interacts with dharmas. In this way, the Vaibhāṣikas revise the terms of the debate to win their point. By shifting the premise from 'one bundle of karma » one birth' to 'one bundle of karma + homogeneous characteristics » one birth,' the Vaibhaṣikas can have their

cake and eat it: the process of causation of birth is both singular (one bundle of karma) and multiple (homogeneous characteristics), as illustrated in the image of the painter drawing a single outline and filling it with multiple characteristics. In this way, the Vaibhāṣikas open with their position and end with the same position, albeit with an additional premise: one karma produces one birth. However, Patañjali's *siddhānta* – that 'multiple karmas lead to one birth' – is more closely resonant to that of the Sautrāntikas, partly because they focus on karma (and not on dharma) and partly because they are concerned with disproving the Vaibhāṣika position.

Appendix 3: Structure of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*

The *Yogācārabhūmi* consists of the '*Maulī Bhūmih*', which contains 14 books (detailing 17 levels of yoga), and the supplementary sections, the '*samgrahaṇī'*, of which there are four.

The Basic Section (*Maulī Bhūmiḥ*)		
Book	Title	*Bhūmi* (Stage)
1	*Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhumiḥ*	1
2	*Manobhūmi*	2
3	*Savitarkasavicārādibhūmih*: *Savitarka Savicāra Bhūmiḥ* *Avitarkā Vicāramātrā Bhūmiḥ* *Avitarkāvicārā Bhūmiḥ*	3-5
4	*Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ*	6
5	*Asamāhitā Bhūmiḥ*	7
6	*Sacittikā Acittikā Bhūmiḥ*	8-9
7	*Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ*	10
8	*Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ*	11
9	*Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*	12
10	*Śrāvakabhūmi*	13
11	*Pratyekabuddhabhūmi*	14
12	*Bodhisattvabhūmi*	15
13	*Sopadhikā Bhūmih*	16
14	*Nirupadhikā Bhūmiḥ*	17
The Supplementary Section (*Saṃgrahaṇī*)		
	*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (*contains *Saṃdhiniromocana Sūtra)*	
	Vyākhyāsaṃgrahaṇī	
	Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī	
	Vastusaṃgrahaṇī	

Appendix 4: A note on *smṛti*

One of the distinctive features of yogācāra meditation, even in the earliest period, was visualization. This was frequently described as a practice of *smṛti* or recollection, which could take the form of *anusmṛti* or *buddhānusmṛti*, visually recollecting the qualities of the Buddha. Although the type of meditation in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is usually understood in epistemological terms (vision of the correct knowledge of self), we have seen that it does include some techniques of *aśubha*, or visualisation of 'samsāric horrors'. But there is also a role for *smṛti* in Pātañjala yoga – as correct or clear vision in recollection.

Most notably, scholars have focused on two apparently contradictory occurrences of *smṛti* in first pāda of the YS. The first instance lists *smṛti* as one of the five *vṛtti*s (YS 1.6) and the second instance as one of the five *indriyas* (faculties) (YS 1.20). The *vṛttis* of 1.6 constitute ordinary awareness and thus must be ceased in order to attain yoga (*cittavṛttinirodha*), while the *indriya*s at 1.20 are a list of applied techniques by which *asaṃprajñāta samādhi* (non-cognitive *samādhi*) can be attained:[24] *śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā*, a

[24] ***śraddhāvīryasmṛtisamādhiprajñāpūrvaka itareṣām*** || YS_1.20 || *upāyapratyayo yoginām bhavati. śraddhā cetasaḥ saṃprasādaḥ. sā hi jananīva kalyāṇī yoginaṃ pāti. tasya hi śraddadhānasya vivekārthino vīryam upajāyate. samupajātavīryasya smṛtir upatiṣṭhate. smṛtyupasthāne ca cittam anākulaṃ samādhīyate. samāhitacittasya prajñāviveka upāvartate. yena yathārthaṃ vastu jānāti. tadabhyāsāt tattadviṣayāc ca vairāgyād asaṃprajñātaḥ samādhir bhavati*. (PYŚ 1.20) '**For others [asaṃprajñāta is] preceded by śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā.** Faith is total mental serenity. It [faith] protects the yogin like an auspicious mother. For him whose purpose is discrimination (*viveka*), vigour is produced. In one for whom energy has been produced *smṛti* becomes present. When *smṛti* arises, the mind is concentrated (*samādhīyate*) without confusion. In one whose mind is concentrated the discrimination (*viveka*) by means of *prajñā* arises (*upāvartate*). By this (*viveka*?) he knows (*jānāti*) the object really. Thus through practice of these, and through dispassion (*vairāgyād*) whose objects are those, *asaṃprajñātaḥ samādhi* arises.'

progressive formula[25] that follows the four *dhyānas* or *jhānas*.[26] Translators often try to reconcile the two contexts of *smṛti* by translating the first usage at 1.6 as 'memory', the traditional Vedic notion of sacred scripture or recitation thereof, and the second *smṛti* at 1.20 as 'mindfulness', which is the more typical translation for Buddhist texts (e.g. Feuerstein 1979:40; Bronkhorst 1993:95). However, if we accept that the *indriya*s are simply adopted from Buddhist discourses, in which they are frequently utilized, then we do not have to reconcile the two contexts.[27]

Indeed, it is evident that the *indriya*s are being adopted from a Buddhist context because the commentary to YS 1.20 glosses *smṛti* as *smṛtyupasthāna*. *Smṛtyupasthāna* or Pāli *satipaṭṭhāna* means the 'standing near' (*upasthāna*) of mindfulness (*smṛti*), is a staple of the Pāli commentaries, and is discussed by both Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhu (Gethin 2007: 32-33). *Smṛtyupasthāna* was also a yogācāra practice and the topic of an early yogācāra *sūtra* text, the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*. Stuart refers to *smṛtyupasthāna* as 'a well-known term referring to the meditative practice of cultivating awareness' (Stuart 2015: 36). In the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra*, this Sanskrit compound is rendered as 'abiding of awareness' and explained with two definitions: 1. discernment that uses the power of awareness to allow the abiding of the object of attention or 2. the power of discernment that causes awareness to abide upon the object of attention (Stuart 2015, 1: 37 fn 3). The definition is concordant with that which we find in Patañjali's text, which highlights the abiding of concentrated awareness:

> *smṛtyupasthāne ca cittam anākulaṃ samādhīyate*
> When smṛti arises, the mind is concentrated (*samādhīyate*) without inconsistency [confusion] (PYŚ 1.20)

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[25] Bronkhorst asserts that *samādhi* and *prajñā* in the YS are the last two of the Buddhist triad *śīla-samādhi-prajñā* (Bronkhorst 1993:75).

[26] The indriyas themselves form a subset within a larger paradigm called *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*, or states conducive to enlightenment. This larger paradigm contains the four frames of reference, four right exertions, four bases of power, five faculties, five powers, seven *bojjhanga*, and the Noble Eightfold Path. For a discussion of this frame, see Gethin 1998 and 2007.

[27] For example, see *Sāla Sutta* (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* 48.51), *Vishuddhimagga* 4.47-48.

In his conceptual extension of the root metaphor YOGA IS CORRECT VISION, Patañjali utilizes not only the foundational Sāṃkhya concept of liberation as the unobstructed vision of Puruṣa, but also the foundational yogācāra techniques of *smṛti* (recollection), *anusmṛti* (cherished recollection),[28] and *smṛtyupasthāna* (abiding awareness).

[28] PYŚ 2.7 and 2.8 reference the practices of *sukhānusmṛti* and *duḥkhānusmṛti*.