

THE COUNCIL OF INDIA, 1858 - 1919.

by

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ABSTRACT.

This thesis deals with the constitutional development and the working of the Council of India from 1858 to 1919.

The first chapter deals with the formation of the Council and its development until 1869, giving a picture of the cordial relation then existing with the Secretaries of State. The second sketches the development of the Council to 1895 showing how influential it was in helping to shape the policies of the Government of India in Calcutta and London. The third chapter is concerned with the gradual decline in influence of the Council down to the passing of the Act of 1919.

The following three chapters describe in some detail various aspects of the policy of the Council. 'The problems of Civil Service Policy' deals with the Indianisation of the Civil Service and the active part played in this by the Council. The next considers the activities of the Council in the development of the economic policy of the Government with special reference to land revenue, cotton duties and the relations of the Government with the Presidency Banks.

The last chapter deals with the members of the Council and emphasizes their ability and variety of experience. As a supplement to this chapter there is an appendix in the thesis containing the records of service of the 95 members

of the Council. There is also a list giving the periods of service of the members.

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FOREWORD.

There is no published work dealing in detail with the Council of India, though opinions have occasionally been expressed on the subject and references made to it especially in Dodwell's Sketch of the History of India, Malcolm Seton's India Office, The Cambridge History of India Vol.vi, Ilbert's Government of India and Strachey's Administration of India. Such references, however, have been incidental to a discussion of the work of the India Office. Although Malcolm Seton and John Strachey, in particular, were in a privileged position to discuss the work of the Council they did not give much space to the matter. Moreover, the many published biographies of Secretaries of State and of the members of the Council make only passing reference to the Council.

Recent research work such as Dr. Rudra's The Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and several research theses in the University of London touch briefly on the Council, but have made no significant contribution to the subject.

This present thesis has aimed at giving an account of the constitutional growth of the Council and of its work and policy, essentially based upon study of the Council's papers and of the correspondence of the Secretaries of State

for India, Northcote, Kimberley and Hamilton, and of the Viceroy, Lawrence, Lytton and Ripon.

The prevailing view of the Council's position has hitherto been that the intention of the Act of 1858, to give control to the Council over the Secretary of State was never realised, and that on the contrary the Secretary of State 'concentrated power' in his own hands. Professor Datta for example has gone so far as to assert that the Secretary of State was in a position to 'ignore his Council on all vital matters'.

This thesis develops the view that the Council exercised a substantial control over the Secretary of State in the nineteenth century. Even secret questions with which the Council was constitutionally not supposed to be concerned were after 1874 usually referred officially to its Political Committee, and this general position of influence lasted until at least the last decade of the nineteenth century.

The Council's important financial functions, as laid down in the Act of 1858, were exercised with success. It is true that on decisions relating to war and to Imperial policy generally its influence was slight, but these questions formed only a fraction of its work. On Indian financial policy it exercised influence both on policy and detail.

The Secretary of State rarely felt in a position to flout the opinion of the Council. Its members were able to write dissenting and critical minutes, which could be, and usually were, called for in Parliament. On occasion, as in 1879, a difference between the Secretary of State and his Council could be made the basis of an attack on the Secretary of State by his political opponents. *

The amending Act of 1869 did not have such effect upon the subsequent work of the Council as is generally held. The opinion has hitherto been that the independence conferred on the Council in 1858 was materially impaired by the Act of 1869. This is not justified by events; indeed the Council between 1869 and 1895 exerted a greater influence than before.

It was perhaps inevitable that with the gradual transfer of the emphasis in government from London to India - especially in the period of the viceroyalty of Curzon, the Morley-Minto Reforms, the Act of 1919 - the influence of the Council of India should decline until with the transfer of power in 1947 the Council finally disappeared.

CHAPTER ONE.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA, 1858-1869.

The Mutiny of 1857 gave the death blow to the Company's rule. The structure which had until then withstood so many onslaughts appeared to be crumbling. Popular indignation, ever seeking an excuse and demanding a victim for many national disasters, with 'some justice and much injustice' - chose the Company as its victim.

The Company was held responsible for the sorrows and sufferings following the Mutiny. Its administration in India was considered rotten, benefiting none and doing more harm than good to the country. Its home administration, too, was criticized as a 'double government', inconvenient, injurious and irresponsible and as a system of most annoying checks and counterchecks, peculiarly ill adapted to fix the affection and loyalty of the native races of India. The simplification of the system was therefore considered necessary for good government, and all parties were agreed that the functions of the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors should be replaced by the administration of the Crown. Of this the Company was informed. At last the Company's administration was to be replaced by that of the Crown.

A new structure was to be built up. It was the general opinion that the association of the Queen's name with the

Indian administration would impart strength and secure a more ready obedience to the law, and also gratify the native princes of the country. In order to guide and control the Indian administration and to keep it in touch with Imperial policy, it was accepted by all parties that the place of the President of the Board of Control should be taken by a member of the Cabinet who would act as the organ of that body with reference to all matters relating to India, and would be responsible to Parliament and public. This would enable men of high standing and ample experience in England to hold the position.

Considering it unwise to change the whole system, it was decided to take measures for the simplification of the existing form of government. The Court of Directors had much experience quite essential to the governing of such great territories occupied by many different races, professing diverse religions. A senior statesman in the English political world could not be expected to possess that detailed local knowledge which was necessary for the good administration of India; rather, it was considered that the Government of India by a Parliamentary minister would be a complete failure. It was felt to be essential that some safeguard should be provided.

✓ Parliament could not be expected to serve this purpose for it was too much occupied with other matters, and was too ignorant of the real state of India and its varied wants to

be able to interfere with advantage. Moreover, there was the possibility that those with knowledge might be overborne by members who knew little about India. What was wanted was a body, outside Parliament and not influenced by political exigencies, composed of persons who had resided and served in India for some years and who might be supposed to possess the required knowledge to advise the Secretary of State on all matters pertaining to Indian administration. It would also prevent the policy of the Indian Government from changing every time a minister might be promoted or otherwise replaced. Parliament also wanted, at any rate, some say in the new administration and was very ready to accept responsibility for handling Indian problems. There was agreement among the members in Parliament on these broad lines. There was difference of opinion, however, on the proper adjustment of power of such a council vis-a-vis the Secretary of State.

The history of the Parliamentary debate on the future constitution of India, from 9 February 1858 to 2 August 1858 when the India Act received the Royal assent, is in essence the working out of this answer. Parliament was very anxious to lay the foundations of a really good government of India. Derby, the Prime Minister, in July 1858 adverting to the same feeling said that during the

whole of his experience in Parliament he 'had never known a question which has been treated by the House with more patience, with more deliberate attention, with greater temper'.¹

The first proposal put before Parliament for constituting a council was made in the petition of the East India Company on ~~the~~ 9 February 1858.² The council was to be so constituted as to be independent of the minister. This would enable it to express its opinion on every Indian subject and to press that opinion on the minister whether acceptable to him or not. In case of the minister's overruling the council's opinion, he was to record his reasons for so doing. Initiative was to lie with the council. The petition wished to substitute for the Court of Directors a comparable body.

At the same time Palmerston, the Prime Minister, outlined the plan of his Government for the proposed council on 12 February 1858.³ The council for the affairs of India was to be appointed by the Crown. It was to consist of eight members appointed for eight years, two to retire by rotation every second year. Councillors were to be either Directors of the East India Company, or to have served for a certain period in India either in a civil or military capacity, or to have been

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1. Hansard, Vol. cli, p.1450.
 2. Ibid. Vol. cxlviii, Appendix.
 3. Ibid. pp.1277-92.

connected with the local administration. There was to be a president whose decision would be final, but in case of differences of opinion with the president, the councillors could record their opinion. In matters involving increased expense out of the Indian revenue, it would be necessary for the president to obtain the concurrence of four councillors. As a safeguard against being drawn into the arena of party politics, and also to save the president from embarrassment in Parliament because of their presence, members of the council were to be prohibited from sitting in Parliament. The functions and powers of the Secret Committee, which had hitherto governed matters demanding great discretion and secrecy, were to be vested in the president, as the responsible minister of the Crown.

Though the Government made provision for a check on the Secretary of State and the Imperial Government from abusing the Indian treasury, and tried to make the council independent by giving its members an eight year tenure and the right of dissent, their exclusion from Parliament and the fact that they were to be nominated made for a weak council rather than a strong one. What Palmerston really wanted in the council was 'assistors' and nothing more¹

1. The Marquis of Lorne, Viscount Palmerston, pp.185-6.

Disraeli rightly thought that the councillors would have no influence, that 'none would be commended - none would be looked on as assiduous and energetic but those who are his assiduous supporters and those who are active to accomplish the purpose of the Government'.¹ It was feared that although the members of the council would be chosen in the first instance from the Court of Directors, the office of councillor would eventually become a political one, given for party purposes. Even then contrary to general expectations the proposal obtained the large majority of 145. Palmerston achieved a great triumph. Had he not been defeated on the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, there was every chance that India would have been governed by a president from London.²

Derby came into power with Disraeli as Leader of the House of Commons and Ellenborough as President of the Board of Control. Disraeli on 26 March outlined Ellenborough's plan for the constitution of the new council which it was proposed should replace the old Board of Control and Court of Directors.³ The council was to consist of eighteen

1. Hansard, Vol. cxlviii, p.1704.

2. E. Ashley, The Life of H.J.T. Viscount Palmerston, Vol.ii, pp.142-7.

3. Hansard, Vol. cxlix, pp.818-33.

persons, nine Crown nominees, the rest elected. Even those nominated were to be selected as representing the various aspects of Indian affairs, chosen in the interests of India, without consideration of political bias or influence. Of those elected, five were to be from London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast, and were to be returned by the Parliamentary voters of those cities. The remaining ^Xfive were to be elected from Britons who had resided in India for fifteen years. Only people, who had resided in India or had business interest there, were eligible to vote for the proposed members. When elected, members were to remain in office for six years.

A power of veto on any proposal of the council was to rest with the president, but it was stipulated that his reasons for exercising this power at any time must be set forth in writing. The councillors were to be entitled to record any dissenting opinion in a special minute book. This was intended to act as a check on the president. Provision was also made for the Secret Committee. Unlike Palmerston's proposal the council was to have no control on Indian finance.

Ellenborough's intention in proposing this elective system for the councillors was to remove the Government of India as far as possible from the vicissitudes of ignorance

or party intrigue. He said 'I did, and I do desire to give the Minister who may have charge of India a council, so independent, so respectable, so influential, and with so great a hold upon the country, as by their support to afford him great strength in resisting the pressure which might be put upon him'.¹ He wished to 'lay the foundation of a government which should enable us to make India happy, strong and powerful and which should connect her for ever with this country'.

✓ Ellenborough, however, overshot the mark. Whereas Palmerston had represented one extreme point of view, ✓ Ellenborough now represented the opposite, and what Parliament wanted was a compromise, incorporating the best of both policies. Members were as alarmed by the possibility of the Imperial Government's abuse of its prerogatives, especially with regard to finance, as they were of a council sufficiently independent to thwart the Cabinet minister, misuse their position and prove a clog in the wheel. They 0/ wanted the council to enjoy a certain independence - but not too much of it. Members elected to represent interests like those of Manchester could hardly be expected to be strictly impartial, but would, on the other hand, be likely to try to influence the administration unduly. It would have also

1. A.H. Imlah, Lord Ellenborough, p.251.

led to canvassing and all its related evils which the members detested. It was 'too complicated to be carried out'.

The outcry against this fantastic scheme was general.¹ Even the great towns and the radicals whose support the Bill was particularly calculated to command were loud in their disapproval. Bright called it 'claptrap' and Roebuck denounced it as a 'great sham giving the colour of popular support to the really despotic character of the Government to be established',² a Bill worthy of a 'fertile and ingenious brain of an Abbe Sieyes than of a practical statesman'. Palmerston said that whenever a man was seen laughing in the streets he was sure to have been discussing the India Bill. Even the Queen was against it.³ It was evident that the Bill would not pass.

The feeling in Parliament was that both these Bills offered less protection than was given by the Court of Directors to the interests of the people of India. In particular, there could be no security unless a limitation was placed on the powers of the Crown as to the use of the Indian treasury and the Indian army. If India was to be justly governed said Mangles, a Director of the East India Company, and future member of the Council of India, it was

1. The Times, 6 April 1858, p.7.

2. Imlah, Lord Ellenborough, p.250.

3. T. Martin, The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort, Vol.v, pp.200-2.

obviously essential that there should be an independent non-political body to 'stand as fender' between the Imperial Government and Parliament on the one hand and the India Government on the other.¹ What was wanted, said Willoughby another Director, (later to become a member of the Council of India), was a council, well experienced and sufficiently independent to enable them to apply all the knowledge they possessed to the proper performance of their duties, 'undeterred by the frowns, and unseduced by the smiles of the minister';² The demand was for a balance of power, a council composed of able men, possessing knowledge without power, influence without responsibility, complete subordination and perfect independence. Neither the Bill presented by Palmerston, admirable for its simplicity, nor the Bill of the Derby Government with all its complications, provided in the council an answer to all these requirements.

At this stage Ellenborough, Chairman of the Board of Control, resigned on 10 May 1858, in consequence of the resentment aroused by the terms of his despatch to Canning about the Oudh Proclamation. He was succeeded by Stanley to whom fell the task of finding the right

1. Hansard, Vol.cxliv, p.2066.

2. Ibid. Vol.cl, p.2046.

solution to this complicated problem of the Home Government.

Stanley had seen the reception accorded by Parliament to the two preceeding Bills. To save the Cabinet from an awkward situation, Disraeli at the suggestion of Russell drafted a resolution on the broadest principles which the majority of the House could reasonably be expected to approve. In this way he hoped to ascertain the temper of the House on certain points which he dared not himself initiate.

The resolution proposed in the House of Commons on 30 April, provided for a Secretary of State responsible to the Crown for the conduct of Indian administration, assisted by a council of not more than eighteen, and not less than twelve.¹ Some years of service in India was an essential qualification for the membership of this council. Again it was proposed that some members be nominated by the Crown while others be elected.

Stanley thus offered a compromise between the two previous Bills, but members of Parliament objected strongly to anything approaching popular election. They were at the same time unwilling to have the whole council nominated. There was also a difference of opinion as to the filling of vacancies. The resolution was withdrawn. In its place

1. Ibid. Vol.cxl ix, p.860.

Stanley introduced 'The Government of India Bill' on 24 June.

This Bill was framed with the feelings of the House well known and well in mind. 'The principle of the Bill', in the words of Stanley was the 'transfer of the Government of India from the East India Company to the Crown, the administration of Indian affairs by a responsible minister with a proviso that the members shall be assisted by a council'¹. This explanation did not satisfy the zeal of the members of Parliament. They were apprehensive lest the Bill should leave the Secretary of State too strong. He would be all supreme in other matters as well as in the financial field; he could order the outlay of money without the concurrence of a single member of the council. Gladstone, Russell and others urged strongly that there should be some financial check.

Finding so many stalwarts in the Commons in favour of such control, and unanimous in their distrust of the efficacy of the financial review by Parliament, which Stanley contemplated, the Government proposed a clause stating that the Secretary of State was not to be able to dispose of any part of the revenue of India without the consent of the majority

1. Ibid. Vol.cli, p.316.

of the council. This significant power to be wielded by the council became later another bone of contention. During the debate the members also objected to the Crown's unrestricted power over the Indian army, a power which they feared might be misused, as indeed it had been in the past. So another clause, No. 55, was added. This clause Gladstone privately hoped would assure to Parliament the ultimate control over any future Palmerston.¹

Thus after five months of heated discussion including two major debates, 'An Act for the Better Government of India' received the Royal Assent on 2 August 1858.² This Act formed the basis of the Government of India from London until 1920. By this Act, incorporating as it did all the best suggestions that had so far been made in Parliament, it was hoped that the conduct of administration would be nearly as perfect as could be expected. The Act was not the handiwork of one party. It was the result of compromise, and though it was passed by a Conservative Government it had written all over it the doctrines of the Manchester School, which was very influential at that time. A balance of power was created leaning, however, more to the side of the Secretary of State. ✓

The Act made provision for the appointment of a

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1. J. Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, p. 593.
 2. 21 and 22 Vict. C. 106.

'Council of India' of fifteen members. The majority of them were to be men who had served or resided in India for at least ten years, and had not left the country more than ten years before their appointment. Future appointments or elections were to be so regulated that at least nine of the members of the Council should have these qualifications. Of the fifteen members eight were to be nominated by the Crown and seven were to be elected by the Court of Directors. Future vacancies among elected members were to be filled by the Council itself by election in a separate meeting convened for that purpose. All members were to hold office during good behaviour, removable only on petition by both Houses of Parliament. Members of Parliament were not to be eligible to serve on the Council. They were to receive £1,200 per annum with £500 as pension after ten years service.

Former proposals had not made sufficient provision for ensuring that the council be informed of everything taking place in the Indian administration, thus enabling it to keep an eye on the direction of business by the Secretary of State. Now, however, it was arranged that the Council should meet once a week, five forming a quorum. Special meetings could also be called when necessary. For the more efficient conduct of business, the Council was to be divided into committees. All orders, both those to be sent to India and

those made in England were to be submitted to the Council or retained on the table for the period of one week except urgent orders which could be sent without previously intimating the Council but for which too the Secretary of State had soon after to give reasons. In the event of a majority decision against an order of the Secretary of State, he, before rejecting this decision, must record his reason for so doing. The same privilege was granted to members who could record their opinion in a minute book kept for that purpose.

The Council was given control of the expenditure of the revenue of India, both in India and in England and some other powers for which the concurrence of the majority was essential. No grant or appropriation of any part of such revenues, or any other property coming into possession of the Secretary of State in Council by virtue of the Act, was to be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting of the Council. Control of the making of contracts etc. was also given to the Council. Regulations for the appointment and discharge of officers in India were to be made with the concurrence of the Council; similarly with regard to the Home establishment. So also for the restoration of any officer removed or suspended by any authority in India. The

councillors of the Governor-General and of the lieutenant-governors, except the Law Member were to be appointed by the Secretary of State in Council.

Parliament, however, did not wish to make the Council so strong as to thwart the Secretary of State and prevent him from conducting affairs which the Cabinet and Parliament might agree were of Imperial importance. It was, therefore decided that he could overrule the Council, and the initiative of any fresh line of action rested with him. In case of special urgency the Secretary of State should have the power to issue orders and communications without previously informing the Council. The functions previously exercised by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors were to be continued. Negotiations with Indian states or foreign powers, answers to very confidential despatches from the Government of India, and all matters relating to peace and war, were to be regarded as 'secret' and the Secretary of State would be solely responsible for the handling of such affairs. In dealing with such questions he was empowered to act without informing or consulting the Council. He had the sole right of bringing business before the Council, and choice of methods for submitting it. He was empowered to summon it at such time, and in such manner and with as much or as little notice as he should see fit,

provided at least one meeting was held every week. He had two votes; moreover, he was sole adviser to the Crown as to the exercise of its prerogative.

Parliament also reserved certain powers for itself. Expenditure on military operations beyond the Indian frontier could not be made without the consent of both Houses of Parliament. It was to be informed of military operations undertaken by India. Loans etc. could not be raised without its approval. Besides, the Secretary of State had to give an annual report of the accounts and a statement of the 'moral and material progress' of India for Parliamentary approval.

The 'Act for the Better Government of India' being a compromise, incorporated the best provisions of the two previous proposals, a 'wise and well-digested measure ripe with experience'.¹ In creating the Council of India, it was Parliament's intention to furnish the Secretary of State with the best possible advice for the conduct of Indian affairs, and to erect a buffer between Parliament and the Imperial Government, including the Secretary of State, on the one hand and the Government of India, on the other. Final authority, however, was vested in the Secretary of State as he alone was responsible to Parliament for the conduct of Indian administration. At the same time the

1. The Letters of Queen Victoria. I Series, Vol.iii, p.373, Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 24 June 1858.

Council, by various devices such as the life tenure of its members, self-election and financial powers was made sufficiently independent to exert a restraining influence on the Secretary of State. In all respects where Imperial questions were concerned or where Parliament was deeply interested, the Bill provided that the conduct of Indian affairs by the Cabinet Minister would be 'critically and effectually' reviewed. The triumvirate was established, Parliament, the Cabinet and the Council, to act as a counterpoise to each other. This was calculated to provide the best safeguard for Indian interests. Thus it was thought that by this Act of 1858 a balance, lacking from previous proposals, would now be attained.

This Bill, however, left open a number of questions. Could the financial veto of the Council be effectively used where the Cabinet had decided upon a policy which involved considerable expenditure out of the Indian revenues? It also conflicted with the declaration of Derby that the 'Government of India must be on the whole carried on in India'. Such and many other loop holes were left. As in the case of any written constitution its actual working must be tried out before these ambiguities could be cleared up.

To Stanley, the last President of the Board of Control, and the first Secretary of State for India (September 1858-

- June 1859), fell the very important and responsible task of inaugurating the new system of Indian Government. Like the procedure adopted by the Court of Directors, he divided the Council into three committees.¹ All despatches were prepared by the secretaries of the department. Only after each one had been fully considered by the appropriate committee was it sent on to the Secretary of State. In this way the committee and the Council were able to exercise great influence in the conduct of Indian affairs. By the time the papers reached the Secretary of State, the committee members had pledged themselves to the views which they had already approved, thereby ensuring that the Secretary of State should see the question in hand from the view-point of his councillors.² Thus in most cases it was the Council of India which influenced the Government's policy in its administration of Indian affairs. Even the conduct of business and the selection of the chairmen of the committees was left to the members themselves.³

In his conduct of the Indian administration Stanley, the Secretary of State, showed great ability, indefatigable

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1. C.H. Philips, The East India Company, pp.13,20-1; M.C.I. Vol.i, pp.3-4.
 2. A. West, Sir Charles Wood's Administration of Indian Affairs, pp.11-2.
 3. M.C.I. Vol.i, p.4; Original Despatches to India from the different Departments, September 1858 to June 1859.

industry and real business acumen, and his success was speedily and generally recognised. A staunch supporter of the Council of India, he allowed it to have the major share in the guidance of the Indian administration. So much was this the case, in fact, that he was criticized as being the 'Minister of the Council' rather than that of 'the Queen'.¹

Stanley was very firm in 'maintaining the authority of the Council of India over Indian affairs'.² This became very evident over the question of the reorganisation of the army. During the time of the East India Company there were two distinct armies in India, one employed and trained by the Company in India, the other the Imperial army, trained and controlled by the Crown. After the abolition of the Company the question of the reorganisation of the army arose. In 1858 a Royal Commission was appointed to consider whether the European forces in India should be exclusively Royal artillery and cavalry and infantry of the Line, or partly of this description, and partly a local force. The opinion of the Commission was nearly equally divided. Eventually, however, it reported in favour of an exclusively Line army.

1. The Letters of Queen Victoria, I Series, Vol.iii, p.386, Disraeli to Prince Albert, 18 November 1858.

2. W.E.H. Lecky, A Prefactory Memoir of the XVth Earl of Derby Vol.i, p.xx.

The members of the Council of India, on the other hand, were opposed to the replacement of the local army by an Imperial one, and in a long memorandum to the Queen justified their position.¹ In the opinion of the Council a local European army, fully at the disposal of the Government of India, would be more economical. Moreover, the officers and men in such an army would be more able to identify themselves with the country and its inhabitants, thus providing a source from which officers could be drawn for various employments. Members of the Council appealed for a 'long established rule'.²

Queen Victoria, on the other hand, was emphatically against the creation of a European army as distinct from the army of the Crown. Such an army would, she maintained, be freed from the proper control of the 'constitutional monarchy' and would be entirely independent of Parliament. The establishment of such an army would confer unconstitutional powers on the 'Indian Council' and the Government, and it would be raised and maintained in antagonism to the regular army of the Crown. The Queen was firmly resolved that this she 'would not sanction under any form'.³

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1. Martin, The Life of The Prince Consort, Vol.iv, pp.309-12.
 2. Ibid.
 3. The Letters of Queen Victoria, I Series, Vol.iii, pp.404-5, Queen Victoria to Derby, 5 February 1859.

Between Queen Victoria and her Secretary of State, Stanley, there was growing dissension on this question. The Queen complained that Stanley was giving undue weight to the opinion of his Council vis-à-vis those of the Sovereign, and she threatened an open breach between her minister and herself.¹

Stanley's continued opposition to the Queen over this matter made him increasingly popular with the Council, which naturally felt that he was upholding its views and interests and co-operating with it fully in endeavouring to retain its control over army appointments and other military affairs.² This question was not decided in accordance with the wishes of the Queen during Stanley's secretaryship.

Stanley's tenure of office, however, was brief. He had acted as Secretary of State for less than a year when the Conservatives went out of office and Charles Wood took his place in June 1859 and continued in office for the long period of nearly seven years until February 1866.

With Stanley's removal from office the way was open for the passage of a measure providing that the whole of the European forces employed in India should form part of the Queen's army, disposable for general service. This was effected in 1860 against the wishes of the Council.

1. Ibid. pp.388-9, Queen Victoria to Stanley, 20 November 1858
2. C.F. Greville, The Greville Memoirs, Vol.viii, p.216.

The task of reorganising the Indian administration, begun by Stanley, was continued by Wood. Wood's long secretaryship, combined with his single mindedness, great knowledge, patience and judgment and his experience on the Board of Control made this period a most formative one in the early part of the Crown's administration.

In Wood's opinion the procedure of administration which he found in force at the India Office was defective. The system left by Stanley gave the Council greater authority and more initiative than that exercised by the Secretary of State himself. The new Secretary of State felt that he was left too much in ignorance of the views and opinions of his departmental heads, and that he was seeing things only through the eyes of the Council which was, in fact, becoming an executive rather than a consultative body.¹

This state of affairs was not at all in accordance with Wood's ideas. By assuming to himself the initiatory power, placing the office on the usual footing of that of a Secretary of State, 'and reducing the Council to the position of advisers', Wood felt he could remedy this defect. To achieve this he changed the whole procedure of dealing with office business. From the latter part of 1859 onwards the despatches were prepared, as before, by the secretary of the department and, after consideration by one of the Under-Secretaries, were now, instead of going to the committees

1. Hansard, Vol.clvi, p.753, 9 February 1860.

of the Council as formerly, submitted to the Secretary of State who, after making such alterations as he thought fit, referred them to one of the committees.¹ The draft, when considered and, if necessary, amended by the committee, was now returned to the Secretary of State, and sent on by him to the Council in such shape as he might determine for final consideration and decision. This procedure enabled the Secretary of State to become prime mover in the conduct of Indian administration and left the Council as a weighty adviser.²

Wood also changed Stanley's system of allowing the committee members to choose their own chairmen. The chairmanship of a committee was a very important and responsible post involving seven or eight hours of work daily.³ Henceforth the occupant of the chair was to be nominated by the Secretary of State.⁴

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1. Original Despatches to India, 1859-60; Kimberley Papers, Report of the Special Committee on India Office Procedure, 9 February 1886. The whole scheme was drawn up by Northbrook when he was the ^{Acting} Under-Secretary of State for India in 1860 under Wood.
 2. Many years later recollecting his secretaryship at the India Office Wood wrote to Ripon: 'I had on becoming Secretary of State.... to break in the old Directors from becoming masters, into becoming advisers. You know, as well as anybody, how I succeeded' - Ripon Papers, Add.MSS. No.43598, Halifax to Ripon, 11 January 1883.
 3. Hansard, Vol.cxcv, p.1089, 19 April 1869, Lawrence - a member of the Council during Wood's tenure of office.
 4. M.C.I. Vol.3, p.593, 3 November 1859.

Formerly the Council had consisted of three committees. This was now altered. It was divided into six committees, viz. Finance, Public Works, Military, Political, Revenue and Public. Every member was expected to serve on two committees, the appointments to these committees being determined by the special qualifications and experience of the members available.¹

Although thus making some radical changes in the method of procedure, yet Wood made full use of his Council. He made use of the 'experienced advice and ready assistance' of his veteran councillors in the conduct of Indian administration during his long and formative secretaryship. Over and above the formal reference of documents to the committees he consulted his councillors individually and very often. Chairmen of the committees were requested to confer with him about papers awaiting their consideration, and when 'there were matters of more than ordinary difficulty', writes his private secretary West, 'he would himself attend the committees and take part personally in their discussion'.² This informal and courteous treatment made his councillors friendly to him and 'removed many stumbling blocks from the path, which might have caused trouble, if opinions had been placed on record in a full committee before an

1. Ibid. pp.594-5.

2. West, Sir Charles Wood's Administration of Indian Affairs, p.17.

opportunity had occurred for the discussion and interchange of ideas on the subject with the Secretary of State'.¹ The result may be seen in the dissent book of the Council of India which for this period is a big volume of blank sheets.²

Wood was very tactful in dealing with his Council - so much so, that only on one occasion was he involved in a major controversy. This arose over the question of the discontinuance of a local European army. The Queen, as we have seen, was most interested in this question and pressed her views strongly. Wood speaking of his differences with his Council said that it had been 'four in number in four years and they occurred on the most trivial and unimportant matters'.³

With these exceptions Wood carried with him the majority of the Council on all the varied measures which were inaugurated and carried into effect both at home and in India. Indeed, such complete agreement existed between them that a complaint was made in the House of Lords in the session of 1863 that they never heard what the Council was doing.⁴ In Parliament, Wood expressed publicly the obligation under which

1. Ibid.

2. Dissents by Members of Council, 1859-66.

3. Hansard, Vol.clxxii, p.785, 14 July 1863.

4. Ibid. Vol.clxix, pp.1797-1803.

he felt to all the members of the Council for the cordial and harmonious manner in which they worked with him. He felt, he said, 'very grateful to the Council.....it would have been impossible for him to go on without their assistance'.¹ Later in the House of Lords, as Lord Halifax, he said his firm conviction was 'that any Secretary of State who fairly and honestly discharged his duties would never experience the slightest difficulty with regard to his Council'.² Nevertheless privately he wrote to B. Frere, 'one of the evils of the old Indians in my Council is their disposition to interfere in smaller matters, such as they had been used to deal with when in India....but I have always to check this disposition'.³

Wood tackled this very ably and the close co-operation between the Secretary of State and the Council of India established by Stanley was continued by Wood, and it was generally accepted that the system had worked in Argyll's phrase 'very well indeed',⁴ the Council playing its important role in helping the Secretary of State in the conduct of Indian administration, and influencing the policy of the India Office and the Government of India.

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1. Ibid. Vol.clxxii, p.785.
 2. Ibid. Vol.cxcv, p.1085, 19 April 1869.
 3. J. Martineau, Sir Bartle Frere, Vol.1, p.447.
 4. Hansard, Vol.clxxii, p.1800.

The long secretaryship of Wood was followed by the brief tenure of less than six months of Earl de Grey (February-July 1866). Grey's term of office was not very significant. He felt, he wrote to Lawrence, that he had 'only time to begin to form his views on some of the many important and difficult questions' connected with India when he was leaving.¹

De Grey was succeeded by Cranborne, whose term of office was also a short one, lasting from July 1866 to March 1867. Nevertheless, his secretaryship marks a new trend in the conduct of business by the Secretary of State. Brilliant, impulsive, Cranborne did not approve of the authority conferred by the Act of 1858 upon the Council of India. Agreeing that the financial veto of the Council acted as a 'protection' against any mishandling of the finances of India by the Secretary of State, he yet felt that this 'extravagant power' kept the Secretary of State in 'tutelage'. It enabled the Council, he thought, 'to interfere with every other measure on the plea that it involved money questions..... and makes them an incubus upon the Minister'.² His daughter writes 'He had not been at the India Office more than a few months before he was taking the legal opinion of the

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1. Lawrence Papers, Vol.iii, Grey to Lawrence, 27 June 1866.
 2. Hansard, Vol.cxciv, p.1074, 11 March 1869. He, however, treated the councillors with 'great courtesy and consideration' - Parliamentary Papers, 1867, Vol.1, paper 271, Dissent by J.W. Hogg, 26 April 1867.

Attorney-General as to the extent of his power to overrule the decisions of his Council'.¹

What the cause of this reaction of Cranborne was we are not sure, but Argyll (his successor) later said, it was because of Council's opposition to Cranborne's proposed Burma-China Road survey.² He ignored the Council at times. For the first time a Secretary of State for India decided upon the reversal of a major point of policy without informing the Council. This was on the question of the appointment of a new ruler of Mysore.³ He was more assertive than any of his predecessors in office and he believed in pushing his way through rather than in allowing himself to be pushed. Derby's advice to Cranborne at the time of the latter's assumption of office that he would 'have a Council to advise but who he must take care do not control him' was quite unnecessary.⁴

If the Constitution for India, adopted in 1858, had, on the whole, worked well during the periods of office of the first four Secretaries of State, this was also true of Stafford Northcote and his successor Argyll who followed them.

The harmonious relationship maintained between

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1. Lady G. Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, Vol.i, p.205.
 2. Hansard, Vol.cxcvi, p.700.
 3. Lawrence Papers, Vol.iii, Cranborne to Lawrence, 3 November 1866.
 4. A.L. Kennedy, Salisbury, p.52.

the Council and the Secretary of State under previous holders of the office continued. Argyll said that there had been no single instance in the working of the Act in which 'antagonism had reached the point of complete rupture'.¹ The Act had made provision for the overruling of the Council by the Secretary of State when its opinion clashed with that of the Cabinet or that of Parliament. This power was, in fact exercised on occasion, as in the case of Mysore, and also in the case of the amalgamation of the army of the Company and the Crown in 1860. It was, however, used with restraint and the general tendency of the Secretaries of State was to get Council's support. Northcote in the same vein wrote to Lawrence '.....I should like to have their support.....in anything I may propose, though I should not scruple to act on my own judgment, if necessary'.² With the two major exceptions quoted whatever was done between 1858 and 1869 was done with the concurrence and advice of the Council.

The financial veto of the Council in this period was not abused in any way. Argyll, the Secretary of State in 1869 said that 'during the years this power of veto had been in operation, the very important question of expenditure in India had been brought under the consideration of the

1. Hansard, Vol.cxcv, p.1834.

2. Northcote Papers, Letter Book ii, Northcote to Lawrence, 28 October 1867.

Secretary of State in Council; there had been an expensive war; the construction of great public works involving great outlay of money, and yet during those ten years, there had been no hitch or difficulty felt by the Secretary or the Council with regard to their respective powers'.¹

Even the power of sending secret orders which the Secretary of State inherited from the Board of Control was used with restraint. Northcote stated that any proposed action was always brought before the Council, and that probably only on two important occasions, had this power been used.² Certainly it was not used to withhold information from the Council.

Northcote, too, did not fail to express his admiration for the Council and the work it was doing, and he tried to dispel some apprehensions currently held. 'An impression prevails in some quarters', he said 'that the Council are more or less useless, and even of an obstinate character..... (It is) not only an ungenerous but a very untruthful account of the matter.....Combined with the amount of work they do as departmental officers, they afford most valuable assistance as advisers to the Secretary of State'.³ The Council to him

1. Hansard, Vol.cxcv, p.1835.

2. Ibid. Vol. cxcl, pp.1880-1; Secret Despatches to India, Vol.1.

3. A. Lang, Life, Letters and Diaries of Sir S. Northcote, Vol.1, p.271.

was 'as eyes to the blind and feet to the lame'¹ It was obvious that it could not fail to influence his policy.

Despite this generous tribute to the Council, Northcote was not, however, fully satisfied with the Act of 1858. A believer in the devolution of power, it was his opinion that the control of the Council over the Government of India should be relaxed. He expressed this opinion privately to Lawrence, and said that the Council had too strong a grip on the financial activities of the Government of India.² The power it wielded was quite justified as regards the restriction on expenditure originating in England. There the Council was acting as a check upon the Secretary of State who might be disposed to be reckless, or the Council on the other hand, might be acting in support of the Secretary of State against his colleagues or against Parliament when pressure was brought to bear on him to spend Indian money on objects of British rather than of Indian interest. The Burma-China Road survey was a case in point.³ This principle, however, Northcote felt, should not apply to expenditure proposed by the Government of India.

This idea did not appeal to Lawrence, the Viceroy who wrote back 'I strongly recommend that the present financial

1. Hansard, Vol.cxc, p.366.

2. Northcote Papers, Letter Book ii, Northcote to Lawrence, 25 November 1867.

3. Ibid.

check of the India Council should be maintained. The control is very valuable. During the five years that I sat in that Council, I do not recollect a single case in which the Secretary of State had not a majority, when he discussed a matter of importance. There is perhaps no question connected with India, on which both English and Native opinion is so strong and unanimous as this'¹

To make the India Government more independent of the control of the India Office, Northcote felt that it was imperitave^a that the Governor-General and the governors should have a considerable voice in the appointing of their own councillors, and that the Council's supreme authority in that respect should be taken away. Again, although he had the utmost respect for the Council, he considered it most unsatisfactory that old members, sometimes practically invalids, should continue in office, thus preventing the Secretary of State from getting vigorous, active and up-to-date advice?² He could not tolerate an effete council - a council very much in the position of a 'conclave of cardinals with a dying Pope'. The remedy would be to limit the tenure of the members.

Subsequently, Northcote modified his views with regard

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1. Lawrence Papers, Vol. ix, Lawrence to Northcote, 13 March 1868.
 2. Northcote Papers, Letter Book iv, Letter to E. Macnaghten, member of the Council of India, 26 September 1868.

to the financial powers of the Council and decided to keep those powers unfettered, preferring to 'err on the side of doing too little than of doing too much'.¹ His ideas on the other points, however, were translated into concrete proposals which were eventually brought before Parliament.

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The working of the Council of India until 1863 produced two different impressions on members of Parliament. There were some who felt that the Secretary of State was as despotic as that of 'Alexander and Darius or any other autocrat who ever existed, for, being a member of a Government which ruled by commanding a majority in that House, its shield was necessarily thrown over him'.² Those who shared this view felt that if members of the Council were allowed to sit in Parliament like members of the Court of Directors, this danger could be avoided. On the other hand, there were those who felt that the position of the Secretary of State was weakened by the Council, and who accordingly advocated its abolition. Wood's eloquent testimony as to the usefulness and efficiency of the system, however, effectively silenced the critics for the time being. The question was raised again when the East India Revenue Accounts came up for discussion on 19 July 1866.

1. Ibid. Letter Book iii, Northcote to Lawrence,
9 February 1868.

2. Hansard, Vol.clxxii, p.786, 14 July 1863, Col.Sykes.

Cranborne, who was at that time Secretary of State for India protested against the proposal to alter the constitution of the Council on the grounds of the slackness or unfitness of its members.¹

At the same time, it was felt in all quarters that for the proper conduct of the Indian affairs it was essential that the Council be reinforced with new blood. The Times in a long editorial of 25 April 1868, wrote that 'the knowledge wanted in the Council is the knowledge of India as it is, not of India as it used to be'.² It urged that adequate provision should be made for the infusion of 'fresh blood' in the Council. Northcote's ideas, as we have seen earlier, were also moving with public opinion.

Northcote introduced proposals for changes in the Council. On 23 April 1868, he suggested a twelve year term of office, with increase of salary to £1,500 a year without pension.³ He deprecated any change in the Council's financial power which, he said, 'furnishes a check on any rash and ignorant action on the part of the Secretary of State'. He suggested that the Governor-General be given authority to appoint his own councillors, this being essential for the proper conduct of business. It was,

1. Hansard, Vol. clxxxiv, p.1136.

2. The Times, April 1868, p.9.

3. Hansard, Vol.cxc1, pp.1205-7.

however, necessary that the clause prohibiting the councillors from sitting in Parliament should remain because India's interest could be best served by keeping control in the hands of a body of experts outside Parliament, who would not be influenced by political exigencies and would thus have no party political aim in view other than the good government of India. However, owing to the shortage of time at the disposal of the House, Northcote withdrew the Bill on 27 July 1868, intending to re-introduce it in the next session¹

Following a change of government in Britain, the Duke of Argyll became Secretary of State for India on 8 December 1868. The question of altering the constitution of the Council therefore became his immediate concern, and on 19 April 1869 he introduced in the Lords 'The Government of India Act Amendment Bill' for the reconstitution of the Council of India.² In this Bill it was proposed that Council members should have a ten year tenure and as a necessary corollary, it was provided that a member whose term of office had expired should not be eligible for re-appointment. In very special cases, however, the term could be extended for a further five years. This change,

1. Ibid. Vol. cxiii, pp.1870-1.

2. Ibid. Vol. cxv, pp. 1070-8.

it was hoped, would correct a real defect in the constitution. It would mean the automatic removal of men who had been out of touch with India for a long time, and their replacement by men with more immediate contacts with India and its problems.

However, there were two other points on which there were differences of opinion among the members of Parliament. One was the financial power exercised by the Council which was left vague by the Act of 1858. The other was the system of self-election on the part of the members of the Council. It was agreed that the members who had so far been elected were no less experienced than those who had been nominated, and that they were of equally good standing. Many members of Parliament feared, however, that in the future this power of self-election might be abused. Lawrence, a former member of the Council and Viceroy of India thought that such a system was inherently evil; that gentlemen who aspired to a seat would canvass members for support, and that it was undesirable to encourage this tendency and place councillors in a false position. The nomination of the councillors by the Secretary of State had hitherto been successful and this system would in the long run give greater security for obtaining able men.¹

1. Ibid. Vol.cxcvi, pp.694-5.

Cranborne, now Lord Salisbury, felt that the elective system had been adopted in order to counter possible opposition on the part of the East India Company. This possibility no longer existed and he felt that it would be more consistent with the practice in the other departments of State should these officials be appointed by the Crown;¹ and that the self-elective system conflicted with the great principle, that every person in the service of the state in India should look to the Crown alone for the reward of his services; that a system which encouraged indecent canvassing in the Council, as had often been the case in the Court of Directors, should be brought to an end.

Salisbury moved an amendment to the effect that all future appointments to the Council of India should be by Crown nomination. This amendment was opposed by all the previous Secretaries of State for India. They considered that the elective principle materially contributed to the importance of the office, and the retired Indian Civil Servants agreed with them that the abandonment of the present system would detract from the high estimation in which membership was held. They contended that distinguished men were often induced to accept office on

1. Ibid. p.690.

the Council because of the status it carried rather than out of regard to mere pecuniary considerations. They maintained that the Council's election procedure had worked well for ten years, and had brought forward many men of eminence such as H. Durand, William Erskine Baker, Robert Montgomery and F. Halliday. Wood, now Lord Halifax, said that any measure which would diminish the independence and self-respect of that body was to be regretted as a strong Council was of great service to a Secretary of State, giving him the support requisite for resisting political pressure in England - 'a pressure not always applied in a way conducive to the benefit of the people of India'¹. Grey, another previous Secretary of State for India, considered the change a 'hazardous experiment' not worth trying.

Argyll's plea for the Council of India proved fruitless as, on Salisbury's insistence, the amendment was carried by a majority of thirty-six votes. Derby and Ellenborough voted with Salisbury while the other previous Secretaries of State voted against him.²

Opinion in the House of Lords was also divided on the financial power of the Council. Salisbury maintained that the Secretary of State 'was held in tutelage' by his Council.

1. Ibid. Vol.cxcvi, p.693.

2. Ibid. p.697, 13 May 1869.

Argyll on the other hand, held that the Secretary of State was still the final authority even where matters of finance were concerned. He explained his view at some length; 'It follows from this argument - which I believe to be well founded, both upon the historical facts of the case and the words of the Act - that the Secretary of State is supreme in all matters whatever, except simply such matters as were included under the principle of the financial veto of Pitt - that is, direct grant or appropriation of money to persons, either here or in India, which might be made for the purpose of political jobbery....I need hardly say that it makes the Secretary of State practically supreme in all matters, whether they do or do not cost money'¹. Even if there was some vagueness about the financial power of the Council vis-a-vis the Secretary of State 'it would be better', said the Lord Chancellor, Hatherley, 'to leave' it as it was rather ^{than} to try to define the exact line of demarcation between the cases in which the Secretary of State could act alone and those in which he required the assent of the Council. 'It would be better to have this line drawn by the good sense of the Council and the Secretary of State'².

This apparently satisfied Salisbury, but he still insisted that some clarification of the details of the Act were

1. Ibid. Vol. cxcv, pp.1074-5.

2. Ibid. p.1832.

necessary. Against this Argyll protested. He said that the powers of the Secretary of State ought not to be materially increased. Already it was the greatest power possessed by any minister because it was practically unchecked and uncontrolled, except by his Council - 'he might squander millions before the people of India were aware of the fact; and it was most important that he should be obliged to consult his Council before he dealt directly with matters involving large expenditure'.¹

Argyll's first elucidation of the Secretary of State's power clashed with this explanation. This was at once discerned by Salisbury. He felt that Argyll had claimed for the Secretary of State for India, a power to spend the whole revenues of India by ordering services in India for which the Governor-General should be desired to pay, and then preventing any veto on the accounts when they come home. Argyll's second definition meant that it was impossible to suppose that by the law as it stood the Secretary of State for India could have such extensive power to spend money.²

On Argyll's vehement pleading Salisbury withdrew his amendment which he had made for the clarification of the financial power of the Council. He also withdrew it probably because Parliament was jealous of maintaining its financial power.

1. Ibid. Vol. cxcvi, p. 702.

2. Ibid. p. 703.

Ellenborough, who supported Salisbury on the question of nomination of the councillors by the Secretary of State, now opposed this suggestion. He considered the Council 'an admirable vehicle for conducting public affairs' and saw no reason for this important change.¹ The Bill passed the House of Lords with one amendment and received the Royal assent on 11 August 1869.²

The main provisions of the Government of India Act Amendment Bill were that in future all vacancies in the Council of India would be filled by the nomination of the Secretary of State for India. All such members were to serve a maximum of ten years except in special cases when the Secretary of State could, for reasons of public interest, re-appoint a member for a further term of five years, but he had to give special reasons to Parliament for such extension of the term. Provision was made for resignation and pension after a service of ten years for members who were appointed before 1869, but were deprived of their share in the appointment of the ordinary members of the Governor-General's Council and the members of the Councils of the several presidencies. These appointments were henceforth to be made by the Crown.

1. Ibid. p.689.

2. 32 & 33 Vic. C.97.

The Act took away from the Council of India its power of appointing councillors in India, abolished its right of electing its own members, and deprived the new members of the prospect of pension. Though it left its financial powers intact, it defined them. Hatherley, the Lord Chancellor, said that on the question of high policy the Secretary of State might give what orders he choose¹, irrespective of the finances involved but on all other matters he was subject to the financial veto of the Council. This fitted in with the operation of this power in the ten previous years. The Secretary of State could not make any new loan or sanction any new railway or give and create new jobs etc., without the consent of the Council but where Imperial questions were concerned even if they involved money, the Secretary of State was all supreme; the financial veto of the Council would be ineffective. Legally, however, it was not clarified; thus still it left grounds for argument in years to come.

Two points of importance were not considered in the Act: the limitation of the number of members of the Council/
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Council.

1. Hansard, Vol.cxcv, pp.1832-3.

the length of time since the completion of their service in India. These questions attracted considerable attention later.

Some parts of the Act were good, some open to criticism. It did safeguard the Council from all old members, and this was most necessary for keeping the administration in step with the changing needs of India. Nor did it deprive the Council of its financial power, its main check on the Secretary of State. It also kept its power of supervising the regulations concerning the personnel employed by the Government of India, and the possibility of the extension of tenure of those whose terms had expired, remained.

The members of the Council were, however, now to be nominated.

CHAPTER TWO.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA, 1869-1895.

One would have expected that after the passing of the amending Act of 1869, the Council would have become more manageable. But in fact the event turned out differently. Perry, one of the influential members of the Council of India (1859-82), and a man of whom more will be heard, writing on this subject in 1878 said that though the Act of 1869 weakened the constitution of the Council, it still remained a body of independent and experienced men.¹ In fact, we find the Council asserting its independence to the full, and we must seek an explanation for this partly in the character of the Secretary of State and of the councillors.

Salisbury (as Lord Cranborne) had had a previous term of office as Secretary of State for India (1866-67) when his relationship with his Council had been stormy. It was he who had persuaded Parliament in 1869 to give the Secretary of State for India the power of nominating his own councillors. In his second secretaryship he utilized this power to the full. Thirteen of the fifteen seats in the Council of India happened to fall vacant, and Salisbury took pains to find the best men. The Council in his time included men like Maine, Muir, Perry and R. Strachey, men of established reputation,

1. Dissents by Members of Council, Vol.i, p.291.

known alike for their intellect and experience.

Salisbury's relation with his Council in the beginning of his term of office was good. Differences between the two really started when Lytton became Viceroy in 1876, and sent his proposals for the formation of a Privy Council of India.

Lytton wanted, along with the assumption by the Queen of the title of 'Empress of India' to create a council, which was to be directly under the Viceroy's control and to be composed of Indian princes and high officials.¹ The function of the body thus formed was to be purely consultative; the attendance upon the Viceroy of some or all of the members would be entirely dependent upon a special summons from the Viceroy and the deliberations of the council were not to be public. It was also proposed at the same time to initiate a native peerage for India, in which were to be enrolled the names and ancestry of the ruling chiefs and noblemen. For this a heraldic college at Calcutta was to be established.

The motive behind Lytton's proposal, with which Salisbury heartily concurred, was to strengthen the basis of British rule in India. Salisbury, in agreement with Lytton, felt² that good government might keep the masses loyal to the British administration, but they were mostly inert and to expect active political support from them as a consequence

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1. Political and Secret Letters from India, Vol. 10,
Secret No. 47 of 1876, 5 October.
 2. Lytton Papers, Vol. i, Salisbury to Lytton, 9 June 1876.

and recognition of good government was an optimistic dream.

'Good government avoids one of the causes of hate; but it does not inspire hope' wrote Salisbury.¹

The other section of society which might be induced to be favourably inclined to the Government were the literary class but they could never be relied on. Salisbury considered that in India they were almost certain to be in opposition to the Government in quiet times and rebels in times of trouble. Thus the aristocracy were the only class whose support was worth wooing. It was worthwhile to make an effort to secure their loyalty. 'If they are with us', Salisbury wrote to Lytton 'we can hardly be upset'.²

Besides appealing to Salisbury on these lines, he considered it also useful on other grounds. Like the English Privy Council which performed useful service in a variety of ways through its committees, the proposed council could also be used with particular advantage in those cases where the paramount powers had to be asserted and exercised over Indian princes.³ It would also define and establish the constitutional position of these Indian princes and if they accepted the status of Privy Councillors of the Queen, they

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Original Political and Secret Despatches to India, Vol.2, Secret No.59 of 1876, Minute by Salisbury, 2 November 1876.

could no longer argue seriously that they had international¹ rights as independent sovereigns.

The proposal was not only approved heartily by Salisbury but also by the Cabinet. Lytton was encouraged to proceed along the lines proposed, but at first secretly. It was deemed unwise to let the Council of India know what was in the air until everything was definitely settled. Finally a stage was reached at which the proposal was laid before the Council for their approval. The proposal, however, did not find favour with the Council as a whole and with the Political Committee in particular.²

The committee felt that the proposal was unreasonable.³ It might raise hopes and aspirations in the minds of the new type of Privy Councillors which could not be realised. Besides, the title of Privy Councillor was one of the most dignified in the British constitution. It also pointed out that such a body composed of very varied types of persons would prove unwieldy, inconvenient and at times even dangerous and its exact functions and status could not be accurately defined.

The majority of the members of the Council disliked any

1. Ibid.

2. Lytton Papers, Vol.i, Salisbury to Lytton, 2 November 1876.

3. Original Political and Secret Despatches to India, Vol.2, Secret No.59 of 1876, opinion of H.S. Maine, E. Perry and Others.

display in any form of the circumstances of power. There was a suspicion of jealousy in the attitude of some of the members at the wide grant of honours from which they were to be excluded.

Whatever might be the reasons for their dislike of the proposal, the outcome was that Salisbury was faced with the unanimous opposition of his Council. He could very easily overrule their opposition and approve a proposal which in his own words 'was recommended by the united Government of India as well as by the Cabinet'.¹ But neither he nor the Cabinet thought it wise to do so mainly because Parliament was always suspicious of anything which was done 'over the heads of the Council'.²

The whole situation was precisely explained by Lytton in a letter to the Queen.³ He expressed surprise at his proposals being treated as they were when the measures had previously received the private approval of Salisbury and of Disraeli upon whose cordial support and concurrence he had largely based his plans. He gave what he felt must be the reasons for their rejection. 'The Cabinet' he wrote 'however, seems to be apprehensive that if the Secretary of State were

1. Lytton Papers, Vol.1, Salisbury to Lytton, 29 November 1876.

2. Ibid. 10 November 1876.

3. Ibid. Vol.1, Lytton to Queen, 15 November 1876.

to override the Council in this matter, the disaffected members of it might endeavour to get up a Parliamentary opposition about it, whilst their hostile minutes on it called for, and published, would of course, go far to deprive the measure of its grace and value. It is essential, at the present moment, considering the deplorable unscrupulousness of party spirit and the irritable tension of the public mind, occasioned by inflammatory address of men so eminent, and yet so irresponsible, as Mr. Gladstone, to incur no risk of weakening, or embarrassing your Majesty's Government'.

The idea of an organised Privy Council was abandoned, as well as any title tending to recall the Privy Council in England, but the Viceroy was permitted to declare a certain number of Indian princes, together with some European dignitaries (ex officio) as Councillors of the Empress and beyond the bestowal of that title no formal action was taken.¹ The idea of a heraldic college at Calcutta, too, was given up. Perry's hope that Lytton's original proposal should never see the light was largely fulfilled.²

Lytton had perforce to be satisfied with the compromise. But he never seems to have faced squarely all the possible implications of the formation of such a Privy Council. The original idea was to set up the new council by a Royal edict

1. Original Political and Secret Despatches to India, Vol.2, Secret No.60 of 1876, 20 November.

2. Ibid. Secret No.59 of 1876, Note by E. Perry, 16 November 1876

and not by Act of Parliament. The Law Officers of the Crown were strong in their opinion that this would be unconstitutional. Parliamentary concurrence was deemed to be essential if the proposals were to stand.¹

Though the objection to the scheme might have been exaggerated by motives of self-interest on the part of the councillors, yet there were points to be considered of real moment. And this the members of the Council at the India Office had emphasized. The new council would no doubt take itself very seriously. True it would only be summoned infrequently and then only to deal with specific questions. But the mere existence of a body of Indian notables, now for the first time placed in a position where they would co-operate, would constitute a force to be reckoned with and one which could on occasion prove a serious embarrassment to the Government.

This incident illustrates well the way in which the Council functioned. Another example is provided by their reaction to proposals which Lytton brought forward to reorganise the North-West Frontier. There was at this time considerable unrest in the North-West Frontier and the attitude of the Afghanistan Government was causing anxiety. Lytton felt that the position of the Government of India in the North-West

1. Lytton's letter makes it clear why the Government was unwilling to face the House on this issue.

should be strengthened. He considered that at no time had there been such urgent necessity for care combined with vigour and unity of purpose and action in the North-West.¹ And this he felt could only be secured by placing the responsibilities in the hands of one officer who should be in direct communication with the Viceroy, on whom rested the ultimate responsibility for Imperial policy in India.²

Lytton's proposals involved the abolition of the existing system under which the Punjab Government had always been directly responsible for Frontier officers.

To replace this system, Lytton proposed that the Frontier, or Trans-Indus districts of the Punjab and Sind should be formed into a separate Frontier Government, administered under the direct control of the Government of India by a Chief Commissioner and Governor-General's Agent at Peshawar who should be charged with the general conduct of all Frontier and Trans-Frontier relations.³

This proposal at once struck the Council at the India Office (which had always been very critical of Lytton's Frontier policy) as a means to further a great aggressive movement into Central Asia. As Salisbury told Lytton, the

1. Political and Secret Letters from India, Vol. 14, Political No. 86 of 1877, 17 May, Minute by the Viceroy on the Reorganisation of the Frontier, 22 April 1877.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

councillors thought of him as a 'second Nadir Shah - only bound westward' and one who meditated 'annexing a continent or two to Her Majesty's Dominions whether her advisers liked it or not'.¹ Many members of the Council showed their anxiety and particularly those who had served in the Punjab were unwilling to see the authority of the local Government there lessened.

Salisbury and the Cabinet, however, were supporting Lytton and in the earlier stages of the discussion of this question, the Secretary of State himself was confident that as the proposal had the assent of the Prime Minister, he would approve the proposal even if the Council was opposed.²

The North-West Frontier project was in fact supported by only those members of the Council who knew this part of India little or not at all - Wolseley, Maine, and Rawlinson. From all those who knew it thoroughly, Ellis, Muir, Halliday, R. Montgomery and Wilde, Salisbury met with most tenacious opposition.³ The measures, Salisbury thought, could not be approved in the teeth of a hostile Council especially as it involved expenditure. 'But beyond this' he wrote to Lytton, 'the effect would have been very bad - It would have

1. Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Salisbury to Lytton, 15 November 1877
2. Ibid. Vol.i, Salisbury to Lytton, 30 August 1876 and 6 July 1877.
3. Ibid. Vol.ii, Salisbury to Lytton, 14 August 1877.

exhibited us as supported only by the fighting element in the Council.....and opposed by those with whom Parliament and the public are accustomed to associate the ideas of a long experience in India and moderate counsels. Our moral authority, and especially yours, would have received a very heavy wound'.¹

Salisbury devised again a compromise which was calculated to satisfy both sides.² One more factor in compelling him to adopt this course was the financial stringency of the Indian Government. It was also easier to do so because the Russian danger had for the time abated. ✓

The plan as proposed was that a new functionary, the Trans-Indus Chief Commissioner, would report to the Punjab Government on civil administration, to the Viceroy on foreign policy and to him, too, on border government so long as the Viceroy should think conditions on the border made them desirable; but in quieter times he would report to the local government at Lahore.³

As has been seen, there was opposition from two different groups and for entirely different reasons. Some members of the Council believed that the proposed change

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Original Political and Secret Despatches to India, Vol.3, Political No.119 of 1877, 29 November.

in organisation was only designed to make a base for an advance into Central Asia or at least for an effort to subjugate Afghanistan. The other group consisted of those who had served in the Punjab, and were most unwilling to tolerate any diminution of the authority of the Government in that province and who did not like withdrawing any considerable population from its 'beneficent sway'. This compromise of Salisbury satisfied both the groups.

So after much trouble Salisbury was able to get the approval of the Council of India for his modified proposal. This was a great relief to him. He wrote to the Viceroy 'Ultimately my proposals were accepted unanimously....we shall escape, I hope, any inconvenient dissents which will bring about Parliamentary discussion on Afghanistan'.¹ This settlement, however, did not satisfy Lytton who considered it impracticable.² Salisbury felt he could not do more and was convinced that this was as far as he could go, if he was to carry the Council with him.

At this stage Salisbury was transferred to the Foreign Office and replaced by Cranbrook. Under his secretaryship the question was finally settled with the approval of the

1. Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Salisbury to Lytton, 7 November 1877.

2. Ibid. Vol.iii, Lytton to Salisbury, 8 February 1878.

Council as his predecessor had arranged.¹

Lytton could not suppress his anger at the Council. 'I feel', he once wrote to J. Strachey, a member of his Council in India, 'inexpressibly disgusted by the cackling of the Council at home, and the pusillanimity of a Secretary of State who dare not say Boo to all these geese'.²

It was natural that the Council should not like things to be done behind its back and to be faced with a fait accompli. The avoidance of the Council had been a source of trouble in the past and was one of the causes of friction between Salisbury and his Council, particularly in the latter part of his secretaryship.

The general tendency of Salisbury had been to encourage Lytton to work out with him important questions (like that of the Indian Privy Council and of the North-West Frontier) privately first and when once they were thus settled to send a despatch on them to the India Office officially. Before Salisbury left the India Office he had realised that this was a mistaken method, and he duly warned Lytton that he should keep the Council at home in full knowledge of everything that he contemplated originating, otherwise the soreness at being left out and only being called in

1. Political and Secret Despatches to India, Vol. 5, Political No. 113 of 1879, 16 October.

2. Lytton Papers Vol. ii, Lytton to J. Strachey, 24 October 1877.

to rectify would lead to 'future vexation'.¹ Salisbury also warned the Viceroy that since his own successor would be a novice at the India Office, the new Secretary of State might have some difficulty in managing the Council.

When it is remembered that Salisbury had selected most of his councillors himself, one is surprised to find that in so many important measures he was unable to have his own way. Salisbury's failure to take the Council into his full confidence together with his preoccupation with other engagements outside his secretaryship encouraged the Council to be more assertive and independent. The Parliamentary situation at this time, particularly the presence in the House of men like Lawrence and Campbell who were themselves former members of the Council further complicated the situation. These members of Parliament along with other members of the Liberal Opposition acted as the mouthpiece of the Council. However, Salisbury was able to secure from the Council substantial co-operation in most cases where he wanted it and the occasions where he failed to get his own way, though important, yet were not frequent.

To keep the Council under control Lytton suggested to the new Secretary of State Cranbrook (1878-80), that he should take/
his

1. Ibid. Salisbury to Lytton, 25 May 1877.

councillors more into his confidence as he had done with his own councillors.¹ This could be done, Lytton suggested to Cranbrook, by seeing the members of the Council separately, taking them into timely confidence, and privately discussing with the doubtful ones any question over which a considerable friction might arise. Moreover, such a procedure would prevent the councillors from complaining of being taken by surprise on any question brought before them. He concluded by requesting the new Secretary of State to point out to him privately any personal sins of omission or commission on his part, 'which wholly unconnected with any lines of policy, to the promotion of which I am pledged may have been conducive to apparent feelings of irritation or mistrust which I sincerely regret. I shall be very glad to know of them, and very anxious to repair them'.² The Council during Cranbrook's secretaryship however, was no less restive than under Salisbury.

In 1877 there was a famine in India. A commission was appointed to investigate its cause and to recommend measures to prevent any such recurrence. No suitable man could be found in India for its chairman and it was decided to send R. Strachey, the brother of John Strachey, from the Council of India. Both the brothers were on very good terms with

1. Ibid. Vol.iii, Lytton to Cranbrook, 30 April and 24 June 1878.

2. Ibid. 30 April 1878.

the then Home Government and Cranbrook suggested that Strachey should be allowed to accept the post without forfeiting his seat on the Council. This would have meant that besides getting his usual salary of £1,200 per annum or £100 per mensem, as a member of the Council of India, he would also get about £270 per mensem plus his expenses.¹ This was a very large salary and many members of the Council objected to it strongly as quite unjustifiable.²

Lytton described this attitude of the Council as 'cavilling' and wrote to the Secretary of State: 'I anxiously trust that you will not allow your Council to interfere in matters of this kind which I venture to think is no part of its legitimate business'.³ In fact it was only by using his votes as president and member that Cranbrook was able to carry the proposal. But realising that his ground was weak and would appear so in Parliament he climbed down.⁴

On another occasion Lytton proposed to raise the salaries of the Under-Secretaries in India in the Home, Revenue and Financial Departments from Rs.1,200 a month to Rs.1,500 a month. This would have involved an additional sum of

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1. M.C.I. Vol.40, p.412, 7 May 1878; Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.20, No.227 of 1878, 4 July.
 2. Dissents by Members of Council, Vol.i, pp.231-55, Dissents by E. Perry, H. Norman, R. Montgomery, B.Ellis, R.Dalyell, F. Halliday, A. Cassels and H.S. Maine, May 1878.
 3. Lytton Papers, Vol.iii, Lytton to Cranbrook, 2 June 1878.
 4. Ibid. Cranbrook to Lytton, 1 July 1878.

Rs. 7,200 a year. The Finance Committee, besides thinking this proposal objectionable on administrative grounds, also considered the recommendation to be faulty on financial grounds, particularly at a time when it was becoming necessary to impose additional taxation to meet the expenditure of the state. Lytton's request was refused.¹

Similarly in another case Lytton proposed to appoint two officers, to act respectively as Additional Secretary for Famine Affairs and Personal Assistant to the Viceroy for Famine Affairs, at salaries of Rs.50,000 a year each. The Finance Committee considered that Rs. 42,000 per annum was sufficiently large to enable the Viceroy to obtain adequate assistance in the Secretariate at a time of temporary pressure. The proposal of the Government of India was not sanctioned.²

Lytton complained to Cranbrook of the economical attitude of the Council and wrote that if the Viceroy could not be trusted by those who appointed him to deal rationally in such matters 'it would be fairer to him, to the country and to all concerned to recall him at once'.³

Cranbrook on the other hand did his best to pacify the Viceroy. He felt that the Council would continue their policy of strict economy in spite of anything he might do, and would

1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.20, No.246 of 1878, 18 July.

2. Ibid. No.291 of 1878, 29 August.

3. Lytton Papers, Vol.iii, Lytton to G.Hardy (later Cranbrook), 30 April 1878.

look more at the number of rupees that the Viceroy demanded than at the reasons he gave for asking for them, and that there were members in the Council who were persuaded that there was a tendency in India towards lavish expenditure and that their chief duty was to check it.¹ 'Pray', he wrote to Lytton, 'do not consider that you are exceptionally ill-used and remember that in these money matters the Secretary of State is very helpless'.² Cranbrook did what he could to console the Viceroy by observing: 'The Treasury takes care of both pence and pounds and I doubt whether the Council holds your hands more tightly than that department, besides those of all the high officers of state here. Time and patience bring things round and I hope they may have their influence in your favour'.³

Cranbrook was unable to gain a free hand for the Viceroy in money matters, but in other directions he was more successful. Nevertheless the apprehension which Salisbury had expressed in his warnings to the Viceroy of the difficulties which might arise if his successor did not take the Council fully into his confidence was justified by events. The Council continued to protest at not being kept fully informed

1. Ibid. Cranbrook to Lytton, 4 June 1878.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. 27 May 1878.

of all that was afoot. The feeling of bitterness which Salisbury's reticence had aroused in the Council, instead of abating rather increased, as Cranbrook in spite of warnings, was no more communicative or more tactful than his predecessor.

An important measure, the Vernacular Press Act, was introduced by Lytton and passed by the Legislature in India in 1878 without the knowledge of the Council and the members strongly objected to being kept in the dark until the last moment. They also objected to the way in which the Act had been rushed through the Legislature in Simla when most of the non-official members were absent. In the opinion of the Council it was a measure of very great importance and was a heavy blow to the liberty of the press. And though eventually approving it, nevertheless they were dissatisfied.¹

The Council, too, had all along been against Lytton's Afghan policy and had tried their level best to keep a check on him but without much success. They felt that they were being ignored and, indeed, Lytton was successful in ignoring them. But the setbacks which the Viceroy met in his Afghan policy further strengthened the Council's adverse opinion on it.

Another point also came into prominence. At this time there was considerable difference of opinion in Government

1. M.C.I. Vol.40, p.475, 30 May 1878.

circles with regard to the reduction of the import duties on cotton goods. The Council took great exception to the way in which the reduction was carried out. Most of the members both of the Viceroy's Council and also of the Council of India in London were against the reduction and public feeling in India, too, was vehemently opposed to it. The partial abolition of the duties in face of the financial stringency of the country was, they felt, quite unjustified.

The opposition of the Council was strong but it was ignored. Indeed the councillors began to reach the conclusion that the broad principle of the Government of India which ever since the Mutiny had been followed was being set aside by Lytton. Policies which they disliked were being carried out over their heads. This produced a feeling of bitterness in the minds of the members, and they began to seek other ways of expressing their opposition.

Norman and Muir, two of the councillors, wrote letters to the press, attacking the Afghan policy of Lytton.¹ They had access to information of which the public in England was ignorant. Thus they were able to supply materials to members of Parliament and others who were always looking

1. Lytton Papers, Vol.iii, Cranbrook to Lytton, 30 December 1878, and Vol.iv, Lytton to Cranbrook, 17 January 1879; The Times, 28 January 1879, p.6.

for an opportunity to criticise the policy of the Government. Muir, to Cranbrook's knowledge, was directly instigating the Opposition to attack the Government and 'furnishing' them with 'weapons'.¹ Cranbrook even complained, probably with exaggeration, that all Parliamentary attacks on the policy of the Government of India were the result of such information.² He cited Harcourt and others.

Fawcett, the well-known Liberal member of Parliament, who took an active and sympathetic interest in Indian affairs, moved a motion on 28 February 1879 for the appointment of a Select Committee to enquire into and report on the control exercised over the expenditure of the revenues of India by the Council.² He was joined by Campbell, once a member of the Council of India, who expressed his opinion that by the recent activities of Salisbury, the Council of India was being 'evaded'.³ A little later Harcourt, another front rank Liberal member, attacked Cranbrook for defeating 'altogether the operation of the Council in England as a check upon the activities of the Secretary of State' and observed that if on such matters as Afghan affairs, cotton duties and the Vernacular Press the Secretary of State did not

1. Ibid. Vol.iv, Cranbrook to Lytton, 12 May and 16 June 1879.

2. Hansard, Vol.ccxlili, p.1975.

3. Ibid. p.2017.

think it worthwhile to communicate with the Council, the Government had better begin by saving the salaries of the members of the Council.¹ The feeling was that the ambiguity in the financial powers of the Council needed clarification by the appointment of such a Select Committee. It would enable the Council to exercise its control more effectively.

Fawcett's proposal was opposed by the Government, Northcote, formerly Secretary of State for India and now Chancellor of the Exchequer, pointed out that the views of those who framed the Act of 1858, with regard to the responsibility of the Government of the day in great questions of policy, had been properly acted upon. 'No man', he said 'can serve two mastersIt may be quite right that the Government here should decline responsibility for irrigation works, or other local matters in India, but in questions of war and peace, great turning questions in politics, responsibility must not be thrown upon the members of the India Council. If the views of this country, as expressed by the Government, were to be thwarted by a body like the India Council, however admirable or excellent its members might be in their own line, it would be a state of things which could not last'.² The Chancellor said it would mean that the Council could snap its fingers at Parliament and the Cabinet and could refuse particular expenditure in spite of anything the Government of the House

1. Ibid. Vol.ccxlvii, pp.83-95.

2. Ibid. Vol.ccxliii, pp.2026-7.

could say. He expressed the opinion that the Council should impose a check on the Secretary of State only on questions where Parliament and the Cabinet were unwilling to interfere.

These proposals of Fawcett and others were dropped, but soon afterwards the question of the financial powers of the Council of India was taken up seriously. No Select Committee was appointed, but the Secretary of State privately referred the matter to various prominent men whose opinions he valued. The question was whether wide financial powers should be given to the Council even in matters which would normally be secret.

The considered opinion was that it would not be possible without constitutional deadlock. The Council was not able to resist a minister with a large Parliamentary majority behind him by any process resembling the stopping of supplies. H.S. Maine¹, a member of the Council of India and a jurist of repute, thought that any such power given to the Council and exercised by it would produce before long a combination of both parties to sweep away the Council altogether.² He thought that the real intention of the financial veto of the Council was/ to

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1. The changes in the actual constitution of the Council of India during this period were few. The complication of governing India was steadily increasing and in 1876 the Secretary of State was by Act 39 and 40 Vic.C.7, allowed to appoint not more than three special experts, legal or financial, on the usual tenure of good behaviour; the reasons for these special appointments were to be laid before Parliament. Thus these posts were made lucrative enough to attract men of high standing, possessing special qualifications. Members appointed under this Act were in all only three, viz. H. S. Maine, H. Yule, R. Strachey.
 2. Memorandum on the Act for the Better Government of India,
H. S. MAINE, 8 November 1880

create a check upon the Secretary of State so as to prevent him from distributing the revenues of India at his pleasure among his political creatures and that it did not in the slightest degree interfere with the powers to be exercised by the Viceroy subject to the control of the Secretary of State in Council.

These attacks in Parliament (with the instigation and assistance of some members of the Council) as might be expected, irritated Cranbrook, who wrote to Lytton: 'I often wish that I had seen something of the vast region which I am called upon to administer but I must make the best use I can of the knowledge of others.....The temper displayed towards the Government naturally does not hold out inducements to me to consult those who might give useful assistance but from whom no cordiality of feeling could be expected. It follows that I am to a great extent isolated and have no temptation to call in hostile physicians to treat the case before me'.¹

While these incidents pained Cranbrook, Lytton found them even more vexatious. 'I hope, indeed' he wrote to Cranbrook, even before the latter had expressed the above sentiments, 'that, if easier times are in store for us, they will enable you to signalise² your advisers by putting the existence of

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1. Lytton Papers, Vol.iv, Cranbrook to Lytton, 21 December 1879.
 2. There is no doubt that the word is signalise, but it appears to make little sense.

that troublesome body on its defence. I cannot see how a minister can possibly carry on the work for which he is responsible to the Sovereign and the country (more especially in reference to such a dependency as India) with fifteen subordinates and conscienceless agents of the Opposition actively working against him in his own office'.¹ Lytton, in his exaggerated way, saw the Council of India as a mischievous anachronism, an irresponsible body invested with powers of interference; a collection of old fogeys with all the ignorant prejudices of retired Anglo-Indians.²

He suggested to the Secretary of State a change in the constitution of the Council advising the appointment of Indian officials during the course of, instead of at the close of their careers.³ A period in the Council at an earlier age in life would form, he thought, a preparation for their re-employment in the higher posts in India. Such a Council, Lytton hoped, would work better, for its members would then come to it with fresher minds and fresher information, and increased sense of responsibility, and at least some 'personal inducements' to behave with loyalty to the Secretary of State and the Government of India.⁴ Lytton,

1. Lytton Papers, Vol. iv, Lytton to Cranbrook, 16 June 1879.

2. Ibid. 24 June 1879.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

in short, could see no advantage in an independent Council.

At this time a fresh Parliament was to be elected and both the Secretary of State and the Viceroy were hoping that Disraeli's Government would return with an adequate majority which would enable them to amend the constitution of the Council, but these hopes were not realised. The Conservatives were defeated. Hartington succeeded Cranbrook in April 1880 as the Secretary of State for India in the Liberal ministry.

From the evidence we cannot say that the Council had a personal grudge against Lytton. They were not party men nor did they possess the traditional loyalty of Civil Servants to whatever party was in power. The councillors were pursuing the policy (implicit in the Act of 1858) of keeping a check on the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. They looked upon themselves as guardians of India's interests even though the final authority lay with others. Conservative Secretaries of State and Viceroys had had to face their criticism, and the Liberals who followed found themselves in the same position.

The Council at the India Office was by nature a cautious body, as indeed it was intended to be. The members scrutinised carefully any proposals which they felt were either a departure from past precedents or likely to establish new ones. It was prudent and careful over details. It was

in such a spirit that it approached every proposed change whether made by Lytton, as already seen, or by his successor Ripon.

Ripon wished to promote reforms in many fields of Indian administration and a reform in the organisation of the army was one of them. The Afghan war had convinced Ripon that the system of military organisation, with the three presidential armies in India, each with its own Commander-in-Chief, was defective. A lack of proper co-ordination had been responsible for a notable reverse in the war, the catastrophe of Maiwand. Though in the war, the presidential armies were under the Commander-in-Chief of India, still he had no control on the selection of the commanders of the presidential armies who fought in the field. Often officers appointed by the presidency governments were inadequate, and on this issue Ripon quarrelled with the Bombay Government. This led to double administration and divided responsibility which was detrimental to the efficiency of the army.

To remove these imperfections in the system, the Viceroy suggested the reorganisation of the whole army administration. In 1879 a commission was already sitting on army economy. Ripon found that many of the recommendations fitted in with his present aim and he proposed to make them the basis of his reforms in army administration. The office of Commander-

-in-Chief in each of the three presidencies was to be abolished along with the control from the presidency government. The Supreme Government was to be the controlling authority of all the armed forces in India.

The proposal was coldly received in London, both at the Horse Guards and at the India Office. The Council of India was unanimously against such a measure. The members were apprehensive lest the proposal when put into practice might lead to overcentralisation and so burden the Government of India with a mass of business which it would be unable to grapple with.¹ It was essential, they thought, to maintain the individuality of the armies in the different parts of India and to respect their peculiarities and prejudices. A single unified control would make this difficult. The proposal was also objected to on political grounds. The Madras and Bombay armies had remained faithful while the Bengal army had been in active rebellion during the Mutiny. A principal cause for this difference had been - so it was thought - the fact that the armies were serving under separate governments, which made for a difference in attitude. Again, it was easier for a body of native troops to feel a loyalty to an authority in their own district and with which they were in direct contact than

1. Original Military Despatches to India, Vol. 59, No. 203 of 1881, 16 June.

a remote control in Calcutta of which they had no immediate experience. Besides in the event of a recurrence of rebellion, the great advantage of instant action might be lost if the local governments were not in a position to command their own local armies, without reference to a central authority.¹

Ripon however was pressing Hartington to overrule his Council and not to let them 'parnellise too much'.² 'What is the use of a Liberal Government', he wrote to Hartington 'so far as India is concerned, if it is to give itself up bound hand and foot to the guidance of a set of old gentlemen, whose energies are relaxed by age, and who, having excellent salaries and no responsibility, amuse themselves by criticizing the proposals and obstructing the plans of those who have the most recent knowledge of the real state of India'.³

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1. Perry objected to this proposal on different grounds. He considered it expedient to avoid centralisation as much as possible, and to preserve the separate entities of Madras and Bombay. 'We can', he wrote to Ripon 'hardly expect that we shall remain in India for ever, and our object should be, and I think is so to govern these of different races as to enable them, some day or the other, to govern themselves'. - Ripon Papers, Add. MSS. No.43596, E. Perry to Ripon, 27 May 1881.
 2. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS. No.43611, Ripon to Hartington, 6 June 1881.
 3. Ibid. Add.MSS. No.43612, Ripon to Hartington, 14 September 1882.

Hartington agreed with Ripon that a change in army administration would have to be made sooner or later, but in the face of the opposition of the Queen, of the Duke of Cambridge and of his own Council, he did not consider himself strong enough to sanction the proposal. To implement Ripon's proposal an Act of Parliament would be needed and Hartington was convinced that he could not carry the bill in the teeth of an opposition known to be supported by an unanimous Council.¹

The outcome was that the opinion of the Council prevailed and the proposal was shelved for the moment. The attitude of the Council in this case, however, cannot be commended. The members were too conscious of only one side of the question and had not appreciated how quickly conditions of government were changing in India. But little by little as they came to realise this measures were approved over a long course of years which gave the Supreme Government more and more control over the three presidential armies. Finally, in 1893, an Act of Parliament was passed and under this Act the unity of command of the three armies was effected as from 1895. Ripon's prophecy that a time would come when the strength of public opinion based on the experience of the defects of the system would force the India Office

1. Ibid. Hartington to Ripon, 6 April 1882.

to approve such a proposal thus came true.

Hartington on the whole did not show much enthusiasm in support of Ripon. He liked business to proceed smoothly and tried to avoid as far as he could any estrangement between himself and his Council. He explained to Ripon his reasons for not interfering too much with his Council.¹ It was, he felt, a very important part of the administrative machine. It possessed under the law the power of seeing and discussing every despatch which went out from the India Office, except the secret ones, and this enabled it to exercise its influence. But this legal status was not all. It was the weight of experience which the members carried which compelled respect.

The regular staff of the India Office - the secretaries of the different departments and their subordinates - had not the necessary local knowledge of the several Indian provinces to conduct the business without the assistance of the experience which the members of the Council possessed. 'The Council therefore', wrote Hartington, 'is far more than a consultative body, whose sanction was necessary to a policy, and to measures prepared and elaborated by an independent external department'.² Its assistance was

1. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS. No.43612, Hartington to Ripon, 7 September 1882.

2. Ibid.

necessary for the preparation of the departmental business itself.

Hartington agreed that this was not a good system; as it gave too much administrative work to a deliberative and irresponsible body and diminished the responsibility of the regular departmental officers. But at that time the prospect of reforming the system was very meagre. There was no alternative but 'to work as well as we can with the existing materials; and if you want to obtain the approval of the Home Government to your policy in any branch of administration, you must try to secure the co-operation of the Council as well as that of the Secretary of State'.¹ In the same context he wrote that though he had the power of veto over the decision of his councillors yet this was something which could not be frequently and habitually resorted to and should 'be reserved for very clear and also very important questions of principles'.²

No Secretary of State before Hartington had been so conciliatory to his Council and none had been more yeilding and had shown more willingness to defer to their opinion. Hartington did not stand in a strong position. Party feeling ran high and there was more than usual activity on the part of

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

Opposition members who were looking for a chance to badger the Secretary of State for India.¹ Hartington himself had little knowledge of Indian affairs. Many and various were the matters concerning India which cropped up and which demanded his attention and he openly expressed the opinion that he could not form any worthwhile opinion till he had consulted his Council.² He had no hesitation in admitting that he knew little of the many decisions for which he was responsible.³

Wood, now Lord Halifax, thought that the reason for the assertiveness of the Council during Hartington's secretaryship was that he was unpunctual in his attendances at the Council and kept the members waiting, which provoked them; and whilst waiting they talked matters over amongst themselves, and so prepared themselves to take, instead of following the lead; and that Hartington was quite content to accept the situation.⁴ Whatever might be said about Hartington, one thing is certain - his Council never became hostile as it had been in Cranbrook's time.

It was natural that this attitude of Hartington should exasperate Ripon and by the end of Hartington's secretaryship

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1. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS.No.43595, E.Perry to Ripon, 9 July 1880.
 2. Ibid. Add.MSS.No.43611, Hartington to Ripon, 31 August 1881.
 3. Ibid. 17 February 1881.
 4. Ibid. Add.MSS.No.43598, Halifax to Ripon, 11 January 1883.

October 1882, the Viceroy was expressing the view that had it ever 'entered into his head that the Viceroy of India had become in practice the subordinate of the India Council in Downing Street', he 'would not for a moment have thought of accepting the (viceroyalty)'.¹

In December 1882 Kimberley succeeded Hartington. Kimberley, Halifax and Ripon were great friends. Ripon wanted to caution Kimberley against his Council in order to avoid the position under Hartington and this task of tutoring Kimberley was handed over to Halifax. He took the first opportunity as did Ripon.² However, Kimberley fared no better than Hartington for he too was conscious of efficiency of the Council and of his own lack of knowledge of Indian questions.

The Government of India proposed to start an agricultural college at Cawnpore and wanted to appoint S.A. Hill as professor of agriculture there. The Council of India objected to the proposal. A despatch from the India Office was sent in which the opinion was expressed that an all India college of agriculture would not be suitable under existing conditions.³ As an alternative it was suggested that local colleges of agriculture should be formed in the different provinces to cater for the varying circumstances

1. Ibid. Add.MSS. No.43612, Ripon to Hartington, 2 October 1882.

2. Ibid. Add.MSS. No.43598, Halifax to Ripon, 11 January 1883.

3. Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.3, No.60 of 1882,
28 September.

and conditions of agriculture in different parts of India. Later on the Government of India changed its proposal accordingly but still pressed for the appointment of Hill, now as an agricultural chemist to the Government of India. But the Council replied that insufficient reasons had been shown for the appointment.¹

Ripon was insistent in his demand for the approval of the proposal but again the Secretary of State found himself unable to press a point against the advice of his Council. Kimberley explained to the Viceroy that he was faced with the old difficulty that the Secretary of State had very little power in ordinary matters, and that the opinion of a new comer like himself was not likely to have much influence with the Council. And that even if he supported the Viceroy's policy it could not be taken to mean that it would be supported by the India Office.²

This opinion of Kimberley appeared to Ripon to be very 'unsound doctrine' and one which struck at the root of the Parliamentary responsibility of the Secretary of State.³ 'They are advisers', reminded Ripon, 'not masters and it is unconstitutional that by becoming masters

1. Ibid. Vol.4, No.10 of 1883, 8 February.

2. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS. No.43613, Kimberley to Ripon, 24 January 1883.

3. Ibid. Ripon to Kimberley, 17 February 1883.

they should overrule the Secretary of State and relieve him of his just responsibility'.¹ Ripon's pleading was unsuccessful, the appointment was not approved and he had to accept with 'a good grace' what was approved by the Council of India.²

With Ripon's general desire to extend local self-government in India the Secretary of State and his Council agreed. The Council, however, cautioned the Government of India not to proceed too rapidly because conditions in India varied so much between one province and another. In the Central Provinces, for instance, it was particularly felt that control from above could not yet be relaxed to any marked degree. The people were not yet sufficiently advanced to be able to exercise any considerable control over their own affairs. These criticisms the Viceroy did not like and he expressed his annoyance that there should be cautionary advice on proposals which had been heartily supported by the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet.³

The reason for Kimberley's reluctance not to be unmindful of the Council's criticism was the usual one.

1. Ibid.

2. Kimberley Papers, Vol.ii, Kimberley to Ripon, 4 April 1884.

3. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS.No.43613, Ripon to Kimberley,
26 December 1882 and 21 May 1883

As Northbrook (now First Lord of the Admiralty) pointed out the great thing was to avoid a collision with the Council. 'Of this,' he wrote to Ripon, 'the Tories who are prowling about looking out for any opportunity for attack, would at once take advantage to the detriment of us all'.¹

On occasion the refusal of the Council to concur with both the Secretary of State and the Viceroy put them in an awkward position. They both had to act in a number of cases as the Council suggested and not as they themselves wanted. There was one occasion when even the Cabinet was placed in a difficulty? Ripon had proposed an amendment to the Ilbert Bill, providing that a European on trial before a native district magistrate or session judge was to be entitled to claim trial by jury, of which half were to be Europeans. This amendment had been agreed to, though with some hesitation by the Cabinet. But to the Council this decision was, in the words of one of its members, 'a practical surrender' and it was inclined to oppose the despatch from the India Office sanctioning the Bill. It was, it will be remembered, the rule for a despatch from the India Office formally to approve and

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1. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS.No.43598, Northbrook to Ripon, 8 June 1883.
 2. Kimberley Papers, Kimberley to Lord Chancellor, 2 February 1884, and Lord Chancellor to Kimberley, 4 February 1884.

confirm any bill passed in India. In such a case the Secretary of State could, of course, overrule his councillors. But such an act was a difficult matter and best avoided. It would involve placing the dissent on record, and of this Parliament might take notice and this again might lead to an embarrassing position for the Government in the house. Kimberley, the Secretary of State, was anxious to avoid these complications and a way out was found by sending no despatch at all, and in effect the amendment was allowed in India without official sanction from the India Office. ✓

After this Kimberley appears to have wished to bring the Council under control. At first he thought that a way out might be to weaken the Council by reducing its numbers, but he changed his opinion later as it was feared that a diminution of numbers would rather increase the standing of the Council.¹ Sometimes as Mallet, the Permanent Under-Secretary, said to his chief, the action of a powerful enemy 'could be neutralized by dividing the enemy' which would be less easily achieved with a small Council.² Openly to weaken it constitutionally by getting through Parliament a new act taking away its financial veto was considered impracticable. Probably there was also a fear that Parliament would not be willing to see the undoing of its work,

1. Ibid. Kimberley to Mallet, 3 March 1884.

2. Ibid. Mallet to Kimberley, 28 February 1884.

achieved after so much deliberation in 1858. The only alternative, as Hartington had observed on an earlier occasion, was to introduce gradually into the Council men whose ideas would be more in harmony with the Government. For the moment the question was dropped.

But by now Kimberley had learnt much about Indian affairs and had acquired a feeling of confidence in his handling of the councillors. He wrote to Mallet, Under-Secretary of State for India, 'I am beginning to understand them (the Indian questions) a little and I am proportionally stronger, but I shall probably be turned out of office before long, and then another Secretary of State may be appointed who will have to learn his business'.¹ Later on in the same spirit he expressed his feelings to the Viceroy.² Kimberley's fear came true. After some months, in June 1885, he was succeeded at the India Office by Randolph Churchill, a Conservative.

Sir W. Churchill, writing about his father's secretaryship at the India Office (June 1885-February 1886), says that any apparent laxity of control by Parliament on the Secretary of State was, however, 'corrected by the Council of India - a body consisting of gentlemen of long and distinguished service

1. Ibid. Kimberley to L. Mallet, 3 March 1884.

2. Ibid. Vol.ii, Kimberley to Ripon, 11 September 1884.

in the East - with whom the Secretary of State was by law compelled to act and by whose decisions he was in many matters of the highest importance absolutely bound'.¹

In the same context he writes that his father himself after his first experience of a meeting of the Council said to a friend that he had felt 'like an Eton boy presiding at a meeting of the Masters'.²

Randolph Churchill, however, was a very different minister from Hartington. Arthur Godley, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India for 26 years between 1883 and 1909, said that no Secretary of State ever showed greater skill and address in the discharge of his duties.³ He tells us that his treatment of the Council was characteristic and in a degree peculiar to himself. For sometime, and until he had mastered the method of procedure and the idiosyncracies of the individual members, he took no part in debates, but sat in his presidential chair + absolutely silent. As soon, however, as he began to feel at home, he adopted a method to which he strictly adhered, as long as he was at the India Office. Having gone carefully through the list of agenda, he would decide some

1. W.S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, Vol.1, p.474.

2. Ibid. p.476.

3. Ibid. pp.476-7.

days beforehand which were the subjects in which he desired to use his influence. He would then send for the papers on these subjects and would study them most thoroughly. Then, when the day of meeting arrived, having thus mastered his brief, and possessing the immense advantage of a natural readiness, his powers of speech and his Parliamentary training, he would intervene with decisive effect, and rarely, if ever, failed to carry his point. Godley goes on to say that the other subjects - those which he had deliberately left unstudied - he never touched, relying entirely upon those members of Council who were specially qualified to deal with them.¹

In February 1886 Randolph Churchill was succeeded by Kimberley but only for some months (February to August 1886). The experience of his first secretaryship and particularly the attitude of his Council had left recollections which were not very happy. Soon after his return he set about looking into the working of the Council with a view to reforming it, in particular, in financial powers.² But these activities do not appear to have led to clarification of any new points, nor did they result in any immediate constitutional changes in the power of authority of the Council in financial matters.

1. Ibid.

2. Kimberley Papers, A printed report on the Financial Power of the Council, 1886.

During this secretaryship a special committee consisting of Arthur Godley, Permanent Under-Secretary, G.R.C.Harris, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, H.S.Maine and R. Strachey, two members of the Council reported on India Office procedure.¹ Their recommendations were interesting. They reported that speaking generally no serious delay resulted through the constitution of the office. They suggested that the Secretary of State should make much use of his power of 'laying papers on the table' at the Council. They also recommended that he should make more use of the powers he already possessed of sending orders to India as 'Urgent' without first consulting the Council and that it should not be binding on him always to record his reasons for doing so, though of course he might consult the members privately in such cases. The number of the members of Council should be reduced and their financial power should be clearly defined.

Another significant point which the committee recommended was that the statutory provision compelling the Secretary of State to call a meeting of the Council once a week should be abolished, and that the power of recording dissents should be abolished or strictly controlled. To the special committee/
it appeared

1. Ibid. Report of the Committee on the India Office Procedure, 9 February 1886.

that the practice of writing dissents was cumbrous and useless; that it might, in certain circumstances, be worse than useless, and that when the Secretary of State, having heard the opinions of the Council had given his decision, the matter should be at an end. They suggested such an alteration of the clause authorising this recording of dissent as would give to members of Council the power of recording dissents only when the Secretary of State had, under the clause in question, caused his own opinion to be recorded. O

Had this recommendation been implemented the restraint which the Council had exercised until then would have been swept away. Their report does not seem to have been acted upon except that it might have assisted in some ways in the passing of the Act of 1889, which is referred to later.

After Kimberley's second secretaryship Richard A. Cross was appointed to the India Office (August 1886 - August 1892). Godley described him as a chief who had no particular enthusiasm for the work at the India Office and who seldom did anything that he was not obliged to do.¹

During his secretaryship an Act in 1889 came into force under which the Secretary of State was allowed to refrain from filling vacancies until the number of councillors had fallen to ten.² The object of this was to enable the

1. Lord Kilbracken, Reminiscences, p.174.

2. 52 and 53 Vic. C.65.

Secretary of State to effect a saving on the Indian revenue. However, this was not passed without criticism in Parliament.¹ It was considered as an effort on the part of the Secretary of State to whittle away the control of the Council of India. What was thought objectionable was not so much the reduction of the number of members of the Council as leaving to the discretion of the Secretary of State for the time being the final decision in the matter. This placed an additional power in the hands of the Secretary of State and strengthened his position vis-a-vis his Council.

During the long secretaryship of Cross, no less than seven vacancies occurred. Between 1874-78, Salisbury under similar circumstances appointed his own councillors. He, however, chose outstanding and distinguished men and in spite of the fact that they owed their membership to him they were not unwilling to stand up to him if they saw fit. Cross, however, seems to have taken less trouble to find such men for the vacancies. Though he selected men like A.C. Lyall and J.B. Peile,² nevertheless his Council could

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1. Hansard, Vol.cccxxxviii, p.1371-2 and Vol.cccxxxix, pp.231-62.
 2. Other Members were O.T. Burne, R. Hardie, A.J. Arbuthnot, C.A. Turner and A. Alison.

not stand comparison with the Council of Salisbury. The Council carried less weight and so its authority declined. ⁰

In 1893 Kimberley succeeded Cross and was now Secretary of State at the India Office for the third time. He inherited Cross's Council and appears to have been kind to their defects. He gave another reason for the decline in the Council's influence. 'My Council' he wrote to Lansdowne¹, who was now Viceroy, 'which was intended to be a buffer is losing weight, not, I think, from any faults of of the members, though they are sometimes obstructive and injudicious in dealing with questions which are likely to provoke Parliamentary opposition and criticism. The cause of the decline of their influence is the jealousy with ⁰ which the House of Commons regards them. Far from making to strengthen the institution, itself a Parliamentary creation, the utmost suspicion is shown in their interference, and I shall never be surprised to see them swept away'.

Formerly members had been eager to use support for the Council as a means of attacking the Government and there had always been many members, only too ready to take up the cudgels on the Council's behalf. But at this time the line Parliament was taking on Indian affairs - e.g. on the cotton duties, the method of selection for the Civil

1. Kimberley Papers, Vol.ii, Kimberley to Lansdowne,
12 October 1893.

Service and other measures ,was in direct opposition to the advice of the Council and the councillors were only likely to get a rebuff if they attempted to lobby for support.

The general opinion seems to have been that the Council was now unnecessarily and fussily intrusive. (

CHAPTER THREE.THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA, 1895 - 1919.

In the later part of the 19th century the Council's influence had been declining. We can see how much weaker the Council had become when we compare the secretaryship of Hamilton at the India Office (1895-1903) with that of his predecessors Hartington and Kimberley. Hartington and Kimberley had a tougher Council to deal with and we find that they hardly ever praised their councillors, who presumably were more often than not a source of annoyance.

Hamilton, on the other hand, praised and defended his Council, and did not consider it as at all a pugnacious or fussy body. It is true that Curzon disliked Hamilton's Council alleging that he could not tolerate the opposition of the councillors, 'who' as he put it, 'having trembled at the nod of the Viceroy for the greater part of their lives' should 'with impunity dance a hornpipe upon his prostrate frame'.¹ He said he felt like giving them a 'stiff broom'. Hamilton was quite clear that Curzon had had his own way to a greater extent than any man who had held the office of Viceroy before him.² This was not because the Council wholly liked all Curzon's proposals but because most of the councillors

1. Hamilton Papers, Vol.xxix, Curzon to Hamilton, 7 March 1901.

2. Ibid. Vol.vii, Hamilton to Curzon, 19 June 1902.

at the India Office were not prepared to stand up even to Hamilton. In intellect most of them could not stand comparison with those who had been in the Council of India even fourteen or fifteen years back.¹

Writing about his Council, Hamilton said that it gave way on big questions and rarely proved obstructive. He was fully satisfied with the whole system. He doubted 'if any other system could be devised likely to give less trouble or as free a hand to the Secretary of State and to the Viceroy as they now enjoy under the present system'.² Had Curzon been the Viceroy of India when Ripon was, there could have been a real crisis, resulting probably in the resignation of the Viceroy, or less probably in a statutory provision clearly subordinating the Council to the status of a body of advisers only. However, by the time Curzon left, he had got the approval of the Council to most of his proposals.³ There were, however, exceptions. For example, the Viceroy did not get his own way over a proposed loan to Persia, nor over a proposed compensation

1. R. Strachey, J. Strachey, H.W. Norman.

2. Hamilton Papers, Vol. vi, Hamilton to Curzon, 22 August 1901.

3. Ibid. Vol.vii, Hamilton to Curzon, 19 June 1902.

to a Cooper's Hill engineer.¹ But on these questions of difference with the Viceroy, Hamilton was in agreement with the Council.

One is left with the definite impression that by the end of Hamilton's secretaryship the Council had become weak and was declining in importance. But the Council was still empowered by statute to question the policy of the Viceroy and interfere in the activities of the Secretary of State. The financial veto it still had, and still exercised with success, and though comparatively weak, it was still far from being a mere rubber stamp. Even this slight independence and the statutory provision making the Council an important and compulsory part of the Home administration were not liked by the Secretaries of State.

Hamilton's secretaryship was followed by successive Secretaries of State who had no good word for the Council. The Times commenting on the subject wrote that the attempt to undermine the power and authority of the Council began as soon as the Liberal Party entered office in 1905.² From

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1. Curzon wanted to advance a considerable sum as loan to Persia without any substantial security, but the Council desired that the southern part of Persia should be obtained as a security. As regards compensation to a Cooper's Hill engineer, the Council refused to give a lump sum to a widow whose husband had not realised his expectations of promotion during his life time.
 2. The Times, 29 June 1914, Editorial.

the moment Morley became Secretary of State for India, at the end of that year, he set himself to belittle and to counteract the functions which the Council was intended to exercise. In his endeavours to restrict the influence of his Council and to convert his own office into an 'uncontrolled autocracy', to quote from The Times, he 'sometimes went to lengths which were almost unconstitutionaland in his later years at the India Office most of the councillors became mere ciphers'.¹ J.H. Morgan (Morley's secretary at the India Office) said that 'no more autocratic Secretary of State for India ever reigned in Whitehall; none ever consulted his Council less'.² Curzon called him one of the greatest though the most enlightened despots that the India Office had ever seen.³ Though many a time he was opposed by the Council, but invariably he had his own way.⁴

In Morley's secretaryship some changes were also made in the constitution of the Council.⁵ He saw the Council as a representative of India. In 1907 for the first time, two Indians were appointed to the Council of India. The size of the Council was increased to fourteen members while

1. Ibid.

2. General J.H. Morgan, John Viscount Morley, p.32.

3. India Parliamentary Debates, Lords, p.119, 7 July 1914.

4. John Morley, Recollections, Vol.ii, pp.177,216,248,278-84, 293,317,321.

5. 7 Edward vii, C.35.

their tenure of office was cut down to seven years and salaries from £1,200 to £1,000 per annum. Members were not to have left India more than seven years earlier, a change which was to give the Secretary of State the opportunity of using recent experience.

The proposal was received with approval both inside and outside Parliament. The introduction of two Indian members was an event of great interest. There were, it was felt, matters - for the most part intangible and indefinable - which touched Indians deeply, and which could best be appreciated by a native born Indian. There were aspects of life in India on which it was unwise to rely exclusively on the advice of Britons, however quick their intelligence and however keen their observation. The appointment to the Council of India of Indian members was calculated to remedy a real deficiency in the Council.

Morley was succeeded by Crewe in 1910. Crewe followed in the footsteps of his predecessor. He took great liberties and was continually by-passing his Council by private telegrams and secret orders.¹ The systematic evasion of the Council was reaching its climax. His Under-Secretary Montagu was permitted a degree of influence at the India Office rarely exercised by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Montagu held a poor opinion of the Council and his ideas

1. India Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1914, pp.70-2, 165.

always moved in the direction of a smaller, merely advisory body.¹

During the first world war, the Indian Government undertook responsibility for the Mesopotamian campaign. Austen Chamberlain was then Secretary of State for India. He concentrated the affairs of the campaign entirely in his own hands at the India Office and the Council was not kept informed. The campaign itself was badly managed and resulted in the defeat of the army. A commission was appointed to report, and its conclusions reflected very unfavourably on the India Office system and severely condemned the substitution of private telegrams from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy for telegrams which would have as a matter of course been communicated to the Council of India.² A fierce attack in Parliament was made on Chamberlain, who had to resign. This was a warning to any future Secretary of State not to evade the Council. This happened, however, at a late period in the Council's history and parallel events leading to the Act of 1919 brought about a great change in the Council's statutory position.

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By the beginning of the 20th century representative institutions in India had made fair progress. There was a central and there were provincial legislatures with elected

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1. The Times, 6 July 1914, E.S.Montagu's letter to the Editor.
 2. Mesopotamia Commission Report, 1917, p.102, cd.8610.

members taking an active interest in the administration.

The Indian National Congress had also shown interest in the Council of India.¹ It wanted to see its abolition or at any rate the modification of its constitution to make it more representative of Indian public opinion. It also wanted a reduction of the power of the Council. A delegation of the Indian National Congress waited on Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, on 11 May 1914.² The Congress proposed a Council of nine members, three of them to be Indians elected by the non-official Indian members of the central and provincial Legislative Councils; three were to be members of some standing in English public life, unconnected with India; and only three to be retired Anglo-Indian officials. It was also held that the Council should be advisory only.

Soon after the delegation from Congress had waited upon Crewe, he brought before the House of Lords an outline of his own proposals for changes in the constitution of the Council.³ These proposals were extensive indeed; if passed the importance of the Council would have been practically extinguished. They met with opposing arguments which are of interest as throwing light on the principles by which

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1. Reports of the Indian National Congress, 1885, 1894, 1913 and 1914.
 2. The Times, 12 May 1914, p.7.
 3. India Parliamentary Debates, pp.60-73, 30 June 1914. This proposal, however, was not well received by Indians - The Times, 3 June 1914, p.7.

the Government of India had been guided for many years, and which were now at stake.

Under Crewe's scheme the Council was to consist of not less than seven members, and not more than ten. To obtain the views of an independent section of Indian opinion it was contemplated making it a statutory obligation that two Indians should invariably sit on the Council of the Secretary of State. The selection of the two Indian members was to be from a list of Indians drawn up by the non-official members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council and the Legislative Councils of the different provinces. It was proposed that the salary should revert to £1,200 per annum, in addition to any pension, either civil or military, which a member might be enjoying, with an addition of £600 a year for Indian members. It was proposed to extend the list of matters which were to be considered as secret by adding questions affecting the internal tranquility of India, or the interests of India in any other country or the peace and security of any other part of His Majesty's Dominions. It also provided for certain changes in the rules for the conduct of business by the Council. Committees were to be abolished and every member was to be assigned to a department.

Crewe's proposal met with fierce opposition on the grounds that it was the greatest blow yet aimed at the independence of the Council. Curzon, the Viceroy of India

from 1899-1904, defended the Council, which was somewhat surprising, when one recollects his attitude of impatience with the Council in the past.¹ In an exhaustive speech, he described the Bill as a bad bill, framed upon radically unsound principles, virtually making the Council an impotent and costly sham. Abolishing the committees and putting members in charge of departments would deprive the Council of its advisory character and thrust on its members administrative functions. The abolition of the weekly meeting of the Council would increase the power of the Secretary of State at the expense of the Council, depriving it of the power of collective action and responsibility. Limiting the quorum to three was nothing but an 'unblushing grab at power'. The proposed provision authorising the Secretary of State in Council to issue regulations for the future transaction of business were so wide that the Secretary of State might withhold anything from the cognizance of Council and settle matters departmentally or in any way he pleased. They might enable him to dispense with the consent of the majority of the Council. The safeguard proposed of laying such rules before Parliament was no safeguard at all. The extension of the category of secret orders meant withdrawing from the Council an

1. Ibid. pp. 77-98.

enormous number of questions covering the whole range of Government. The Council of India would know nothing unless the Secretary of State chose to inform it. This was autocracy pure and simple which Curzon thought would not only be a blunder but a crime. If the Council needed reform it was not in the direction of reducing its powers, but by relieving it of the enormous mass of unimportant detail that had to be referred home from India. In all this Curzon had gone to the heart of the problem.

Most of the Lords who had had anything to do with India supported Curzon. Viscount Midleton (St. John Brodrick), once the Secretary of State for India, felt that the Act would make the Secretary of State an autocrat among autocrats.¹ Arthur Godley, now Lord Kilbracken, made an extravagant comparison between the Council and the pilot of a ship.² The captain of the ship might be an excellent navigator but for local knowledge he is compelled by law to depend upon a pilot. If compulsory pilotage has been found necessary at sea, it was no less necessary at the India Office.

Both in India and in Britain, in and outside Parliament, Crewe's proposal was criticized. Crewe's proposal to bring two elected native Indians to the Council also met with some opposition,³ mainly on the ground that election to the

1. Ibid. p.153.

2. Ibid. p.152.

3. The Times, 29 June 1914, Editorial.

Council was inappropriate. It was a body of experts.

The Times, criticizing the Bill, expressed the opinion that it would transform 'Crewe into a great Mogul in a frock coat'.¹ It objected to the Bill because it destroyed the heart of the Indian system, the wise principle on which British control was built up.

By 96 votes to 38 the House of Lords decided not to proceed with the Bill.² Morley's appeal to the House not to reject it as it would shatter the expectations that had been aroused in India was not heeded.

The progress of political events soon made changes in the working of the Council quite inevitable and brought about a state of affairs not unlike that which would have been created had Crewe's measure been passed. The growing control of the executive in the various provinces by the local legislatures, and the increasing influence of the legislature upon the executive in the Government of India made it necessary that the ultimate control over all governments in India, which had so far always been exercised by the authorities at home, must henceforth pass more and more into Indian hands. Thus the movement towards responsible government in India implied inevitably

1. Ibid.

2. India Parliamentary Debates, Lords, p.166, 7 July 1914.

a corresponding change in the constitution of the controlling agency in England. So long as the people of India were content to leave their government in official hands, the system was well suited to the needs of the country, but now more was needed than the system could provide. It also became more necessary to satisfy Indian political aspirations.

On 20 August 1917, in the House of Commons, Montagu, the Secretary of State for India announced on behalf of the British Government the policy 'of the increased association of Indians in every branch of the administration with a view to the progressive introduction of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'.¹ This policy found expression in the Montagu - Chelmsford Report which recommended the formation of a committee in London to consider how far the India Office should be reorganised in harmony with the changes that they proposed in the structure of the Indian Government.²

Following upon this the Crewe Committee was appointed to report on Home administration of Indian affairs. Its findings were announced on 21 June 1919.³ As might have been expected Crewe took up his former proposals.. The committee recommended the appointment of a purely advisory

1. India Parliamentary Debates, pp.445-7.

2. Report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, p.235, cd.9109.

3. Report of the Committee on the Home Administration of India, 1919, cmd.207.

committee of six to twelve members to hold office for five years in place of the Council of India. The power and authority with regard to the Government of India, so far vested in the Secretary of State in Council, should be transferred to the Secretary of State alone. The abolition of the Council as it then stood was recommended.

The joint Select Committee of Parliament which considered the Act of 1919, disagreed with the Crewe Committee on the question of the abolition of the Council of India.¹ It considered that at any rate for some time to come, it would be absolutely necessary for the Secretary of State to be advised by persons of Indian experience and that if no such Council existed, the Secretary of State would have to create an informal body. Therefore it thought it much better to continue a body which had behind it all the advantages of tradition and authority. It advocated a five year term of appointment for the councillors and the introduction of more Indians into the Council. However, unlike the Crewe Committee, it recommended, in addition, the appointment of a Standing Committee of Parliament to discuss Indian questions.

The Government of India Act of 1919, framed on the recommendation of the joint Select Committee, was passed by Parliament and received the Royal assent on 23 December 1919.²

1. Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, Vol.1, pp.10-11, 17 November 1919,
 2. 9 and 10 Geo.V.C.101. Coll.No.203.

The Act modified the constitution of the Council of India considerably. Henceforward the Council was to number between eight and twelve, half of whom were to have an Indian residential qualification; appointment was for five years. The salary was restored to £1,200 and Indian members were to get an extra £600. Members of the Indian Civil Service who served on the Council were to count the time so served for the purpose of their pensions.

The Act introduced revolutionary changes in the procedure for the conduct of business. The necessity for a quorum of the Council for transacting business was not insisted upon. The old procedure of sending to India through the Council every despatch was dropped. In the conduct of business at the India Office, much discretion was left to the Secretary of State. The compulsory participation of the Council in the administration was not re-enacted. In place of regular weekly meetings, the Council was to meet at least once a month.

The control of the Council, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, over the provincial governments in India was limited. The Secretary of State in Council was divested of his authority over 'transferred subjects', save for such purposes as arbitrating between two contending provinces, safeguarding Imperial interest etc. The

appointment of a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses of Parliament further affected the influence of the Council, as did also the appointment of a High Commissioner in London.¹

The Council of India's control over Indian expenditure other than that relating to 'transferred subjects' and its control over 'reserved subjects' still remained, though in practice this, too, was limited by a delegation of power to the Central Government in India. The Act, however, left intact its control over making major business contracts and issuing rules and regulating matters connected with the Civil Services, and in particular, regulating the general conditions under which the more important officials served.

In other respects the Government of India Act of 1919 considerably diminished what was left of the powers of the Council. Statutory effect was given to the constitutional position of the Council. It remained a body with certain limited financial powers and control of the Civil Service. These powers too, by gradual delegation were whittled away.

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1. Incidentally to the High Commissioner was transferred responsibility for sale and purchase of stores, other than military, on behalf of the Indian government. He similarly acted as agent for the Government of India in a number of other ways.

In 1937 the Council was finally abolished and was replaced by a smaller advisory body which naturally, ceased to exist when India and Pakistan achieved independence in 1947.

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To sum up, the Council of India's history can be divided broadly into three phases. The first was that of the ten years of Wood's secretaryship and Lawrence's viceroyalty. In this period the Council certainly maintained its influence but more as a body of well experienced advisors working under a Secretary of State who knew the problems and how to get the best out of them. The willingness of Lawrence to seek and take advice assisted this process.

After 1869, the position begins to change. The Council had manifested some traces of independence during the terms of Cranborne, Northcote and Argyll. But it was not till the latter half of Salisbury's secretaryship 1876-78, that the Council became really insistent on maintaining its own point of view, especially on the question of the creation of the Privy Council of India and the reorganisation of the North-West Frontier. Matters became acute in Cranbrook's secretaryship (1878-80), during which some of the members of the Council went to the extent of allying themselves with the Parliamentary Opposition and giving them information which formed a basis for attacks on the Government.

When the Liberals succeeded the Conservatives in 1880,

the Council continued to contribute a major share in guiding the policy of the India Office. The two Secretaries of State in this Government, Hartington and Kimberley (1880-85), allowed themselves to be guided by their Council. This was the more surprising because the Act of 1869 had appeared to make the Council subservient.

It was not until late in the 19th century, particularly from Hamilton's term, that the Secretary of State's influence became paramount. The Council's financial veto in this period was exercised only when the Secretaries of State consented.

The influence of the Council was diminished. The Secretary of State's power of nomination was tactfully exercised, at the same time the tenure of office had also been reduced to 7 years. Even the calibre of the members had deteriorated as compared with those of earlier years. By this time Parliament had also lost its original interest in the Council. In India, the nationalists objected to the Council. It had few friends left and with the growth of responsible government in India it became outmoded. Necessity had led to its creation in 1858, but by 1919 its purpose was served. After this date it continued in being, but its functions were nominal.

CHAPTER FOUR.

PROBLEMS OF CIVIL SERVICE POLICY.

No account of the Council of India can be complete without referring in some detail to its policy towards the Civil Service. Their attitude particularly to the Indianisation of the Civil Service is of special interest. The Council was a body largely composed of retired distinguished Indian Civil Servants, who were given constitutionally a special say in questions affecting the Civil Service.

Indians were practically excluded from the Company's services except for some judicial and junior posts. This defect in the Company's administration was pointed out by the Parliamentary Committee of 1833. In the same year the Charter Act enacted that colour would not be a bar to the 'holding of any place, office or employment'. The first practical step towards this was taken in 1853 when all appointments to 'writership' were thrown open to competition. In a proclamation, Queen Victoria on assuming the Government of India in 1858 reiterated that all subjects 'of whatever race or creed be freely and impartially admitted/
to offices

in our services'. This marks a turning point in the Indianisation of the Civil Service.

After the abolition of the East India Company, the controlling authority in Britain of the Indian Civil Service became the Secretary of State in Council.

Shortly after the transfer, an inquiry was instituted at the India Office into the general question of the services in India. Much doubt was felt in England as to the wisdom of maintaining the exclusive character of the Covenanted Service which legally barred the Uncovenanted servants' promotion to higher service even though they were well qualified and experienced.¹ This distinction was considered by Uncovenanted Civil Servants as a stigma. The system, too, often deprived the Government of a full use of the special knowledge of some of its servants. It was also felt that the Act of 1793, providing that all vacancies occurring in the civil branch of the service, below the degree of 'councillors', should be filled from among the Civil Servants of the Company, had been widely violated by the Government of India.

The whole question was referred by Stanley to the Revenue, Judicial and Legislative Committee of the Council

1. Hansard, Vol.clxiii, p.665, Stanley.

of India for consideration.¹ The committee reported that with certain exceptions offices so held in 1793 were still held by Covenanted Servants. Many of the duties formerly performed by them, however, were performed by members of the Uncovenanted Service, under a changed system especially directed towards extending the scope of employment to Indians and elevating the functions confided to them. The members of the committee did not consider such appointments illegal and stressed the great advantage of employing Indians in the Uncovenanted Services to a larger extent. Nevertheless, the committee emphasized the importance of maintaining the exclusive nature of the Covenanted Service as a safeguard against jobbery. In exceptional cases, however, the members recommended the appointment of other than Covenanted Servants to posts which were of a special and technical kind.

Stanley did not agree with the committee's recommendation.² He was contemplating the introduction of a measure in Parliament to break this exclusive privilege of the Covenanted Service. But he went out of office with the Government before he could proceed.

Wood, who succeeded as Secretary of State for India

1. M.C.I. Vol.2, pp.805-34, 26 May 1859.

2. Ibid. p.834; Mansard, Vol.clxiii, p.663.

in June 1859, held similar views, and it so happened that the subject arose through a letter from the Government of India on the question of salaries of government servants and of the employment of Indians in the service. There were also a number of memorials from various classes of Civil Servants in India addressed to the Secretary of State. Wood appointed a special committee of the Council of India, consisting of Arbuthnot, Mangles, Macnaghten, Perry and Willoughby, to consider these questions.¹

The committee issued a report on 20 January 1860 in which it expressed the unanimous opinion that it was 'not only just, but expedient, that the Natives of India shall be employed in the administration of India to as large an extent as possible, consistently with the maintenance of British supremacy'.² Agreeing that no positive disqualification existed for the employment of the Indians in the Covenanted Service, the report showed that for all practical purposes, they were in fact excluded because the difficulties involved in Indians leaving India and residing in England for a time, were too great. The report expressed the opinion that 'were this inequality

1. M.C.I. Vol.3, p.560, 27 October 1859.

2. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol.66, No.125 of 1878.

removed, we should no longer be exposed to the charge¹ of keeping a promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope'.

To remove this difficulty the special committee of the Council of India recommended the holding of two simultaneous examinations in England and in India, both being as far as practicable, identical in their nature. All the candidates were to be classified in one list, according to merit. In justice to the Indians, and to give the candidates a wide choice, it suggested that three colloquial Oriental languages should be added to the three modern European languages; otherwise the examination was to be unchanged.

It also suggested a modification of the law of 1793 so as to throw open to Indians all offices in the Departments of Accounts, Audit, Custom and the Post Office except the very highest. The position of Director General of Telegraphs, of the Mint and of the Assay Departments were not to be open to Indians nor was the magistracy in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. But posts in the Salt and Opium Departments and all appointments in the extra or non-regulation provinces were to be open to Indians, whether they were in the Covenanted Civil Service or not.

1. Ibid.

But the committee was divided on the question whether the exclusive nature of the Covenanted Service was to be maintained. The majority considered that the continued maintenance of an exclusive Civil Service, even though it was open to Indians and British alike by competition, was essential to the good government of India. It was a service in which every member must enter at the bottom. The highest posts were filled by selection from those who had evinced the greatest capacity.

The committee finally recommended that in exceptional cases, though very rarely and under very stringent regulations, the Supreme and local governments should be permitted to appoint native-born Indians to all posts exclusively reserved for the Covenanted Civil Service, subject to the confirmation of the Secretary of State in Council and on condition that they had resided in India for seven years and passed examinations in two Indian languages. Any greater relaxation it feared would 'depress the Covenanted Civil Service, and would strike a great blow to the competitive service then on trial - disappointing the just hopes and expectations of those who had entered the service on merit alone'.

There were other members, like Mangles and Macnaghten, who advocated that no appointments hitherto held by

Covenanted Servants should be thrown open.¹ But Perry, thought otherwise. He felt that the maintenance of an exclusive Civil Service could only be secured by much larger powers being given to the Government for the selection of competent Indians, and of Englishmen with special qualifications not ordinarily to be found among Civil Servants. He advocated that this power should be exercised to attract the sons of wealthy talukdars and sirdars. The influence which the families owning lands in India then exercised might be made a source of strength to the Government and great advantages might result.²

After fully considering this report, Charles Wood proposed to the Council the broad outline on which the Bill for giving effect to the committee's recommendation was to be framed. However, it was opposed by the Council and Wood had to exercise his veto.³ The Council, believing in the necessity for giving the maximum opportunity and facilities for Indians in the Government services, thought it to be unwise to break the exclusiveness of the Covenanted Service with vague restriction such as Wood proposed.⁴

1. Ibid. Dissent by R.D.Mangles and E.Macnaghten.

2. Ibid. Special Committee's Report.

3. M.C.L. Vol.5, p.101a, 13 July 1860.

4. Ibid. pp.101a-q, Dissent by E.Macnaghten, R.D.Mangles, Charles Mills, John Lawrence, H.M.Durand and H.C.Montgomery

The Council of India's opposition along with a protest from the Civil Servants in India delayed the introduction of the Bill for almost a year. The remodelled East India (Civil Service) Bill which was introduced in 1861 contained more or less the same restrictions and provisions as the councillors had advocated, and was supported by them.¹

It reserved all the superior administrative and judicial posts for the Covenanted Civil Service, but it gave power to the authorities in India to appoint persons not in the Covenanted Service to all posts other than those mentioned in the schedule in the Act.²

This Bill removed the main bars to the employment of any person well fitted to fill any particular situation in the service and thus gave the Government of India very wide powers for employing Indians. 'One of the principal objects of the Bill', in the words of the first Secretary of State for India, Stanley, was 'to admit the Natives to higher offices than they were now allowed to hold'.³ The prevailing

1. Hansard, Vol.clxiii,p.659, 6 June 1861; A scheduled list of posts for the Covenanted Civil Service open only to competition and rarely to nomination was incorporated in the Bill.
2. 24 and 25 Vic.C.54, 1 August 1861; Even to the scheduled posts appointments could be made in special circumstances on condition that such persons were to have resided at least seven years in India and to pass in a vernacular language etc. Such appointments were to be sanctioned by the Secretary of State and by the majority of the members present at the meeting of the Council.
3. Hansard, Vol.clxiii, p.1045.

opinion in Parliament at that time was that the Indians were being educated on European lines, and to withhold from them employment in the Civil Service, such as their attainments entitled them to, would be dangerous. 'A body of highly educated discontented young men would be more dangerous than an army of mutinous Sepoys' said Layard, a member of Parliament.¹

Nothing was done to implement the recommendation of the committee of the Council to hold simultaneous examinations in England and in India. Probably it was considered to be a very ambitious proposal involving considerable risk. This point never seems to have been raised in the Council where it might have met with the opposition of the majority. It was considered a premature suggestion, and the matter was dropped. Stanley, speaking on the Bill, hoped that there would be no inclination on the part of the Governor-General or governors of presidencies to be 'unduly precipitate' in achieving this object? He thought that it was an experiment and one to be tried very cautiously.

It became evident that in spite of the pressure of the India Office to operate more fully the policy enunciated in

1. Ibid. p.1042.

2. Ibid. p.1046.

1861, the Government of India was lagging behind and Indians were still not being employed to the extent that had been anticipated. In the first four years during which the Act had been in operation, eight senior posts fell vacant to which, under the Act, appointments of Indians would have been possible, but in fact only two were given to Indians.¹

The Government of Bombay in 1864, having found difficulty in providing a competent Covenanted Servant for an assistant judgeship at Ahmedabad, proposed to the Secretary of State the appointment of Gopal Rao Hari, a man of distinguished Maratha family. Wood sanctioned the appointment, but on objections made by the High Court that Gopal Rao Hari had not passed an examination in the vernacular language of the district and had not been subjected to the departmental test imposed on Civil Servants, he was compelled very reluctantly to cancel this but suggested his re-appointment.² Later on, with the backing of the India Office, he was appointed. Also when, in 1865, the Government of India asked the India Office to send men from England to fill vacancies in the Financial Department, the India Office, although sending out men as they had been asked, advised that in future

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1. Parliamentary Papers, 1864, Vol.xlii, Paper 429.
 2. Original Judicial Despatches to Bombay, Vol.3, No.17 of 1864, 17 March.

it would be more desirable to find persons in India to fill such offices.¹

This failure on the part of the Government of India to implement the policy laid down in 1861, became all the more obvious when in his report of 23 August 1866 Davies, (Financial Commissioner on the revenue administration of Oudh for 1865-66), referring to the excellent work done by Rai Azodhia Prasad, Extra Assistant Commissioner, observed that there was 'no greater administrative evil in our system than the manner in which many Native officers of ability are at an early period of life shorn of all incentive to exertion by the bar set to their preferment'.²

Taking notice of this, the Revenue and Judicial Committee of the Council of India took the initiative in May 1867 and added a paragraph to the despatch saying that the subject of the employment of Indians 'is so general, and of such grave importance to the progress of India, having regard to the development of education which is taking place that I (the Secretary of State for India) should desire to see the whole question taken into careful review by your Excellency'.³

Northcote, who succeeded Wood in March 1867 and who was

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1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol. 7, No. 141 of 1865, 16 June. The Despatch was drafted by the Finance Committee.
 2. Collections to Revenue Despatches to India, Vol. 18, No. 33 of 1867, Report of the Financial Commissioner of Oudh on the Revenue Administration of the Province for the year 1865-66.
 3. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol. 15, No. 33 of 1867, 31 May.

interested in this question, pursued the matter further by telling Lawrence, the Viceroy of India, on 24 June 1867, that he was much inclined to think that some plan should be adopted to render it easier in future for Indians to take up appointments in the Covenanted Service.¹ There were two possibilities.

Use could be made of the Gilchrist Foundation, to enable young men to come to England and compete; or a certain number of appointments might be given by competitive examination in India itself, the successful candidates being selected at a somewhat earlier age than was the case with those who were selected in England, and that they should be sent over to England at the expense of the Government to complete their education.

Lawrence thought both suggestions unsatisfactory.² He agreed that the existing arrangements operated as a bar to Indians in any number entering the service, but felt that this was the intention of the framers of the law. Besides, he also thought that the competitive system would be unsuitable for Indians, as it would be dominated by Bengalis, who were often feeble and lacking in administrative and manly qualities. And Indians of other parts of the country would be at a disadvantage although basically they might constitute better

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1. Northcote Papers, Letter Book i, Northcote to Lawrence, 24 June and 15 August 1867.
 2. Lawrence Papers, Vol.viii, Lawrence to Northcote, 17 August 1867.

material. It was also objectionable on the ground of policy. 'We conquered India', he wrote, 'mainly by force of arms, though policy and good government have largely aided us. In like manner we must hold it. The Englishman must always be in the front rank, holding the post of honour and of power as the condition of retaining our rule'.¹ Feeling all this most strongly, he still saw the value and significance of employing educated Indians in as important positions as might be practicable. He particularly approved of the use of suitable Indians of good character for promotion to the rank and emoluments of assistant commissioner and small cause courts judges in the non-regulation provinces.² The Viceroy looked therefore more towards the non-regulation provinces as the field in which to satisfy the legitimate ambitions of Indians who showed qualities of efficiency and leadership.

This proposal was considered by members of the Council as a mere parade of a few 'crumbs' of patronage to be thrown to Indians and one showing no sincere desire to overcome the social, sentimental or legal obstacles preventing the increased employment of Indians.³ Perry disagreed with the

1. Ibid.

2. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.16, No.10 of 1868, Departmental Memorandum.

3. Parliamentary Papers, 1867-68, Vol.1, Paper 178, Dissent by B.Frere, 18 February 1868.

Government of India and reasoned that if an Indian of sufficient competence and trustworthiness could efficiently perform the duties of higher judicial or administrative offices in non-regulation provinces, there was no reason why he could not do so in regulation provinces.¹

The despatch finally sent to India pointed out that there were openings available to Indians in the regulation provinces, no less than in the non-regulation provinces, and that there was a large class of appointments scarcely less honourable and lucrative than those reserved by law for the Covenanted Civil Service - for which the natives of India had certainly a preferential claim, but which, as admitted by the Government of India, had been until then too exclusively conferred upon Europeans overriding the inherent rights of the natives of the country.² It expressed regret that Indian officials, however competent, who had not entered the service by the prescribed channel, could have no claim upon the patronage of the Government.

The Secretary of State could not understand why these posts, hitherto held by Europeans, should not in future be filled by Indians of ability and high character. The despatch concluded with an express injunction to provide,

1. Ibid. Dissent by E. Perry, 8 February 1868.

2. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vo.16, No.10 of 1868, 8 February.

higher and better paid employment for Indians in the regulation, as well as in the non-regulation provinces.

✓ In the meantime, in Parliament Fawcett on 5 May 1868 stirred the feelings of members by attacking the policy of virtually keeping out Indians from the Covenanted Civil Service. As a remedy he advocated simultaneous examinations to be held in India as well as in England.¹ This revived the question once again.

Just three days afterwards, Northcote wrote to Lawrence that, though the proposal of Fawcett was inadmissible, something should be done in the way of establishing scholarships to be competed for in India, and to be tenable for a certain number of years in England.² The age limit should be fixed so as as to admit of the scholars' offering themselves for competition in England or alternatively preparing themselves for other walks of life.

✓ The proposal which Northcote had suggested was at once accepted by Lawrence as 'a happy solution of this very difficult question'.³ He proposed to send nine scholars yearly to England for their education. Each was to be paid £200 a year for three years.⁴ Six out of the nine were to

1. Hansard, Vol.cxc1, p.1843.

2. Northcote Papers, Letter Book iii, Northcote to Lawrence, 8 May 1868.

3. Lawrence Papers, Vol.ix, Lawrence to Northcote, 28 May 1868.

4. Collections to Educational Despatches to India, 1868-69, Vol.12, No.19 of 1868, Letter from Government of India, 7 July 1868.

be nominated by the various local governments from sons of men of good families and status, the other three were to be chosen by open competition from Madras, Bombay and Lower Bengal. An essential qualification was that a candidate should have a good knowledge of English.

The object of the Government in creating these scholarships was not only to afford the students facilities for obtaining a university degree and passing the competitive examination for admission into the Covenanted Service, but also to enable them to pursue the study of law or medicine or civil engineering or otherwise to prepare themselves for the exercise of a liberal profession.

This proposal was warmly welcomed by Northcote, who felt 'it was exactly what (he) wanted',¹ but with great disgust on the part of the Council. The opposition to the scheme was unanimous. Members felt that the Government of India had taken the initiative into their own hands without previously informing the Council of India. They disliked being kept in ignorance of the whole measure till its final stage.

The Council noted that the scheme involved two classes of scholarship.² Firstly those which were offered for open

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1. Northcote Papers, Letter Book iii, Northcote to Lawrence, 13 August 1868.
 2. Original Educational Despatches to India, Vol.5, No.3 of 1869, 8 April, relevant papers attached.

competition and secondly those for which Indians of suitable status were to be nominated. As far as the latter were concerned, the Council commended the proposal. It was doubtful, however, the councillors thought, whether young men from this class could be found at once willing to accept such scholarships, and also able to read, write and speak the English language with fluency and accuracy. Moreover they would be beaten not only by English youths, but by any clever Master of Arts from Calcutta; and all the essential qualifications of position and character 'would go for nothing'. There was also the natural repugnance of men of rank to send their sons across the seas. It was the considered judgment of the Council that at that time as far as this class was concerned the scholarship scheme would prove a failure. /

As far as the other class were concerned, members of the Council felt that the granting of scholarships by competition involved difficulties of another sort.¹ A good education, including the inculcation of that political morality so essential in the public service, was not sufficient. In India the prestige carried by high birth was of the utmost importance and no other qualities, however outstanding,

1. Ibid.

could compensate in the eyes of the public for the lack of high birth. In their opinion it was an admitted fact that Indians of rank were not disposed to regard with complacency the official authority of young men, taken from the masses, educated at the public expense and inferior in all but book learning to themselves. This complacency was increased by the want of tact too often evinced by young Indians of talent and ambition, flushed with academic success, and invested with the powers attached to official position. The members of the Council of India considered therefore that it was not desirable to spend large sums of public money with the object of introducing such men into the service.

Moreover, in the opinion of Argyll, who had now replaced Northcote as Secretary of State, and of his Council, a competitive system for filling higher posts by Indians was not the right way to achieve the end in view.¹ The way out would be to put into operation 'the principle of careful and cautious selection'. Freer employment of Indians in the **Uncovenanted** Service and promotion according to tried ability from that service to the **Covenant** Service would seem to be the line of procedure least beset with difficulties and least open to objection. That would indeed 'be a competitive

1. Original Educational Despatches to India, Vol.5, No.3 of 1869, 8 April.

examination of the best kind.¹

It was emphasized that the Government's first duty towards the people of India was the preservation of the British dominion. For this reason, it was essential to proceed gradually, employing only such Indians as could be trusted, and those only in such offices and in such places as, in the actual condition of things, the Government of India might determine to be really suited.

This communication from the India Office stated unambiguously the policy of the authorities at the India Office, which had up till then not been clearly defined. It was a policy which in effect aimed at the rising middle classes. No special inducements were in future to be held out to Indians to go to England and to compete in the open examination. A good chance for the training of Indians for higher posts in the Government service was thus set aside by this attitude of the Council.

Such approval as the Council and the Secretary of State had given to this scholarship scheme was very tepid,² and with this discouragement the scheme languished and was ultimately abandoned.³ True the first year nine scholarships were granted but none subsequently.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. Vol.4, No.19 of 1868, 23 September, Public Committee's Report and Opinion of Members also attached.

3. Ibid. Vol.5, No.10 of 1869, 15 July.

Nevertheless an Act was passed by Parliament to facilitate the entrance of Indians in higher posts, thus revising a position that had first been established by Cornwallis. The East India (Laws and Regulations) Act, received the Royal assent on 25 March 1870.¹ It repealed the Statutory provision which had reserved certain posts for members of the Covenanted Services and any other Acts which debarred the authorities in India from selecting Indians for high office. It enabled those authorities, notwithstanding any previous law, to appoint Indians to any office in the Civil Service subject to such rules as might from time to time be prescribed by the Governor-General in Council. Such rules would require the sanction of the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the majority of the Council of India.

This Act gave the Government of India very wide powers to put into effect the principles and to fulfil the hopes expressed in the Proclamation of the Queen in 1858. Much depended on the Government in India, which was to draw up the principles on which the provision of the above Act were to be carried out. But no steps, whatever, were taken by the Government of India for the next two years to put the Act into effective operation. The Secretary of State sent a suitable reminder² but still nothing resulted.

1. 33 and 34 Vic. C.3.

2. Original Public Despatches to India, Vol.15, No.34 of 1872, 18 April.

In the meantime reproaches were made against the India Office, both in India and in England, for thwarting endeavours which had been made towards the fuller employment of Indians.¹ Perry placed on record that Parliament had more than once embodied these promises in legislation and 'our Government is continually taunted that we do nothing to perform our promises'.² He drew the attention of the Secretary of State and of the Council to the evils of the policy of holding out large promises to educated Indians without there being any visible attempt at performance.

A communication largely based on Perry's memorandum of 22 August 1872 was sent to India.³ For the guidance of the Government it laid down three principles viz: (1) The maintenance and stability of British rule in India should form the basis of the Government's policy, and that with this in view the great majority of the senior posts must continue to be held by British officials. (2) The appointments of Indians should ordinarily be made in the judicial and rarely to the executive branch. (3) The high pay given to Englishmen to induce them to accept office in a distant land was not prima facie necessary in the case of Indian Civil Servants.

1. Original Public Despatches to India, Vol. 15, No. 113 of 1872, 22 October, Memorandum by E. Perry on the Further Employment of Natives in India, 22 August 1872.

2. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol. 58, No. 131 of 1874, note by E. Perry.

3. Original Public Despatches to India, Vol. 15, No. 113 of 1872, 22 October 1872.

But if reluctant to appoint Indians to executive posts, the India Office had laid down that 'the Uncovenanted service should be principally reserved for the Natives of the country'.¹

After over a year's delay the reminder of the India Office was replied to. The India Government drew up a body of rules laying it down that candidates for nomination to superior offices must have served the Government with distinction in subordinate posts or else must be barristers, advocates, or pleaders of at least ten years standing.²

These rules drawn up to give effect to the Act of 1870 were considered by Salisbury, the then Secretary of State for India, and by his Council as not nearly wide enough, considering the conclusions which had previously been arrived at. It practically deprived the Government of India of the discretion to appoint persons from certain higher classes - thakurs, Rajput landowners and others.³ Limiting these posts to Indians actually born in British India was considered 'extremely capricious'. It would deprive the Government of men like Dinker Rao, formerly the minister of the Maharajah of

1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol. 12, No. 84 of 1870, 10 March.
2. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol. 58, No. 131 of 1874, Public Letters from India, No. 6 of 23 January 1877 and the draft rules.
3. Ibid. Note by E. Perry and other members of the Council and the Report of the Judicial and Public Committee whose members were H. S. Maine, H. C. Montgomery, E. Perry and J. W. Hogg.

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The members considered the best method for appointing Indians to posts in the Covenanted Civil Service would be by simple selection. The system could be protected against abuse not by drawing up rules but by requiring that each appointment should be reported home with a full statement of the special reasons for the appointment, to be confirmed by the Secretary of State in Council. It was also felt that it might seem to give some sort of claim to candidates who fell within the scope of these rules, but whose promotion might on various grounds not be desirable.¹

Ultimately the rules were drawn in the widest possible terms, and provided for statutory appointments to be given provisionally to any natives of India 'of proved merit and ability', whom the provincial governments or the Government of India should nominate, under proper sanction, to offices within their respective jurisdictions, the nominees being required to undergo a term of probation after provisional appointment.²

It was approved as a tentative measure by the India Office.³ But the rules remained practically inoperative and only two appointments were made in the judicial branch.

1. Original Public Despatches to India, Vol.17, No.131 of 1874, 20 August.
2. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol.60, No.66 of 1875, Draft Rules under section 6 of 33 Vic. C.3.
3. Original Public Despatches to India, Vol.18, No.66 of 1875, 27 May.

of the service.¹

In 1876 the problem again cropped up when the question arose of the employment of Gopal Rao Hari Deshmukh to the joint post of judge and session judge of Tunnah in the Bombay Presidency. This appointment was objected to by European officials in Bombay who petitioned the India Office for its cancellation. Salisbury informed the petitioners that the Act of 1870 could not be allowed to remain a dead letter and that the appointment was justifiable.² This had the whole-hearted support of the Council.

This, however, gave the Council the chance of renewing the discussion on the general question of the employment of Indians in the services. In a memorandum, Perry put before the Secretary of State and Council the position as it stood then.³ He explained that although but little outward opposition to this policy had been expressed, there had been much latent resistance to it. This arose from various causes, such as the inherent difficulties of the subject, the class interests of Englishmen, and the vested rights of

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1. Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87, p.25.
 2. Original Judicial Despatches to Bombay, Vol.7, No.4,6, and 8 of 12,19, and 26 April 1877; Lytton Papers, Vol.11, Salisbury to Lytton, 13 April 1877.
 3. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol.66, No.125 of 1878, Memorandum on the Steps Taken by the India Office to Promote the Employment of Natives in the Higher Offices under Government, 9 December 1876.

civilians then in office in India, which had prevented full effect being given to the intention and policy of the Government. He complained that the Government of India had not shown the enthusiasm which was expected of it. He suggested that the number of Covenanted civilians annually sent from England should be diminished as a further inducement to the Government of India to increase the number of Indians employed in the service.

By this time Lytton had become the Viceroy of India and he, too, realised the overpowering necessity of extending the employment of Indians in the administration.¹

He proposed the establishment of a closed native service, separate from the normal Covenanted and Uncovenanted Services, to which was to be transferred 15 per cent of the posts hitherto reserved to the Covenanted Civil Service and also 20 per cent of the posts held by the Covenanted officers.² Certain high posts of the Uncovenanted Service were to be allotted to them exclusively.

This involved closing the Covenanted Civil Service to Indians. This was thought desirable by Lytton on the ground that 'neither at present, nor within any period of time practically calculable, can the highest posts of the Covenanted

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1. Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Lytton to Salisbury, 16 March 1877, and Lytton to E.Perry, 18 April 1877.
 2. Public Letters from India, Vol.22, No.35 of 1878, 2 May.

Civil Service be safely or efficiently filled by them'¹
Such an arrangement he thought was also desirable because of the unwillingness of Englishmen to serve under Indians.

The annual number of competitive appointments would be reduced accordingly to allow room for members of a new special class. The proposed new class of Civil Servants were to get less pay than the members of the Covenanted Civil Service holding similar posts but were to be equal in status and position. Indians of a higher class of society were to be drawn to this service.

In London Lytton's proposals were considered unpractical.² Cranbrook, the new Secretary of State at the India Office, openly declared that he 'certainly would not undertake to introduce any Bill to alter the principles laid down by Statute and Proclamation'.³ Parliament had been taking a keen interest in the further introduction of Indians into the Civil Service and would be quite unwilling to annul its previous decision and to forbid Indians to appear at the Civil Service examination in London. Moreover the Proclamation of the Queen affirming these now readily accepted

1. Ibid.

2. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol.66, No.125 of 1878, note by Perry, Muir, Ellis and others; Lytton Papers, Vol.iii, Cranbrook to Lytton, 26 June 1878.

3. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol.66, No.125 of 1878, note by Cranbrook.

principles of allowing no difference in colour, caste or creed to influence appointments to the public service would have been set at naught by the approval of this new scheme. The course proposed would, too, have been very unpopular with the people of India.

Lytton's idea it was felt could easily be put into effect without any new legislation.¹ The Act of 1870 had given very wide latitude to the Viceroy. The qualification of proved 'merit and ability' in the Act of 1870, which the Indian authorities found a stumbling block against the employment of Indians had been pronounced by the Law Officers of the Crown to be no impediment to the Governor-General in appointing the very class whom Lytton had in mind.

The Government of India modified its plan, and proposed the establishment of a 'Statutory' Civil Service, based on the Act of 1870.² Under this proposal a number not exceeding one-sixth of the numbers appointed by examination in England would be recruited locally in India by members of the provincial governments. Selections would be made after consideration of the position of the candidate's family, of his attainments, and of his efficiency in the service of the

1. Original Public Despatches to India, Vol.21, No.125 of 1878, 7 November.

2. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol.67, No.68 of 1879, Public Letter from India, 1 May 1879.

Government. After two years probation, the Indian civilian would be eligible, equally with his British colleagues, for any Civil Service post except (Rule iii) that of the secretary to government, chief magistrate of a district and commissioner of a division or of customs. Even to these excepted offices Indians could be appointed provided the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council was obtained.

There were one or two points in Lytton's proposals which were criticized.¹ If written instructions were given to the provincial governments not to appoint Indian Civil Servants to certain specified situations of importance, the instructions would certainly become known, and would be considered certainly ungracious, if not actually offensive. It would give rise to invidious comment. To bar Indians permanently from holding posts in future because so far no Indian appeared qualified, was considered to be unjust.

Finally in a resolution the Government of India expressed its opinion that appointments under these rules should, generally speaking, be confined to young men of good family and social position, possessed of fair abilities and education, to whom the offices open to them in the inferior ranks or

1. Ibid. Notes by members of the Council; Original Public Despatches to India, Vol.22, No.68 of 1879, 17 July. It also contains opinions of members of the Council.

Uncovenanted Service, had not in the past proved a sufficient inducement to come forward for employment.¹ Persons who had already proved their merit and ability either in the Government service or in the practice of a profession would not be appointed to the new type of service.

The new rules retained the provision that a proportion not exceeding one-fifth of the total number of civilians appointed by the Secretary of State to the Civil Service in one year should be Indians selected by the provincial governments; that each selection should be subject to the approval of the Governor-General in Council and that the selected candidates should ordinarily be on probation for two years.

Thus after six years of correspondence and continued pressure on the part of the India Office, definite proposals were at last made to give effect to the Act of 1870.

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There were three ways in which special facilities could be given to Indians to compete successfully at the Civil Service examination in London. Firstly, the age of entry for the examination could be raised, secondly subjects might be introduced particularly suited to the interests of Indian students and such subjects could carry high marks; thirdly/
simultaneous

1. Report of Public Service Commission, 1886-87, pp.25-6.

examinations could be held in England and in India.

In 1863 for the Civil Service examination the classical languages of Arabic and Sanskrit, could be offered. These carried a maximum of 500 marks each as against 750 each in Latin and Greek. The age limits were 18 and 22. In the open competition of 1863 Satyendra Nath Tagore, passed the Civil Service examination - the first Indian to do so - securing 72.8% in Sanskrit and Arabic.¹

This fine result caused apprehension in the minds of the Civil Service Commissioners. To allot 1,000 marks to Sanskrit and Arabic according to them was offering Indians 'too great chances' of success.² They recommended that the total marks in the two subjects should be reduced from 1,000 to 700. This was very closely considered by the Council and though there was some difference of opinion, it approved of the recommendation.³

Undoubtedly, one of the motives behind this change, in the words of Herman Merivale (the ^{PERMANENT} Under-Secretary of State for India in 1863) was 'the fear that an inconveniently large proportion of Native candidates might succeed'.⁴

1. Public Home Correspondence, Vol. 19, No. $\frac{3}{48}$, Table of Marks.
2. Ibid. No. $\frac{3}{66}$, Herman Merivale to C. Wood, 3 November 1863.
3. Ibid. Letter to the Civil Service Commission, 4 January 1864, M.C.I. Vol. 12, p. 14.
4. Ibid. Vol. 20, No. $\frac{3}{117}$, Merivale to de Grey, Secretary of State for India, 26 March 1866.

In 1866, this question was again raised, this time on petition of the London India Society. Perry considered Sanskrit to have a better claim than Greek and felt that with reference to Indian administration it was the more useful language of the two. He was supported by Clerk, Baker, Eastwick and Mangles but the majority of the members of the Council of India supported the policy already decided upon in 1863, even though there was not much to be hoped or feared of great accession to the ranks of the Covenanted Civil Service by Indians.¹

The position assigned to Sanskrit and Arabic could not be maintained for long. In Parliament on 5 May 1868 Fawcett moved a resolution to facilitate the entrance of Indians to the Civil Service examination.² And within six weeks, it was settled that the maximum of marks assigned to Sanskrit and Arabic should be restored to 500 each.³

It somewhat increased the chances of Indians, but after some years the India Office took a step which for all practical purposes neutralized this concession.

In the year 1860 the maximum age for admission to the open competition had been lowered from 23 to 22. In 1866

1. Ibid. Letter to London India Society, 19 May 1866, and note by members of the Council; M.C.I. Vol.16, p.391.
2. Mansard, Vol.cxc1, p.1843.
3. Public Home Correspondence, Vol.22, No.³₁₄₇, Letter to the Civil Service Commission, 19 June 1868.

the maximum age of admission was further lowered to 21 and the minimum to 17.

In April 1874 a doubt arose in the minds of some members of the Council of India as to whether the prevailing age was proving advantageous.¹ Maine with the help of Perry drafted a letter to the Civil Service Commission expressing these doubts and inviting them to consider the matter and offer advice.²

The letter expressed the opinion that the original idea of Macaulay's Committee to attract to the Indian Civil Service young men of talent who have passed through a university career before presenting themselves at the competitive examination, had been gradually superseded in favour of the plan of attracting distinguished youths from the public schools, and of encouraging residence at a university after, instead of before, the competitive examination.

The fact was, however, as the letter pointed out, that after the first year or two the university ceased to supply

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1. The Dean of Christ Church in April 1874 had also advocated earlier age for entrance to the Indian Civil Service.
 2. Public Home Correspondence, Vol. 27, No. 3, Confidential Letter to the Civil Service Commission, 206 31 July 1874. In the preceding examination of the Indian Civil Service May 1874 two Indians were successful, both of whom were between the age of 17 - 18, - Ibid. Vol. 26, No. 3.

any large number of successful candidates and nearly all came from the schools and coaching institutions. This also led to the neglect of moral discipline over the youths. It was also felt that the system led to cramming and discouraged the candidates selected from going to a university during the probationary period.

Perry thought a way out would be to lower the maximum age to 18.¹ The Public Committee defended the lowering of the age on the ground that 'competitive tests of general education are better adapted to an earlier period of life than to a later and that the age at which the young civilians now proceeded to India is too advanced'.²

The idea of lowering the age did not find favour with either the Civil Service Commissioners in London, or with the Viceroy of India, Northbrook, whose attitude was shared by many of his colleagues.³ The matter, however, was not allowed to drop. Salisbury and his Council were convinced that their views were well founded and the question was referred to a committee of educationalists sitting

1. Ibid. Vol.27, No. $\frac{3}{206}$, Memorandum by E. Perry, 11 July 1874.
2. Ibid. Paragraph added by the Public Committee in the letter to the Civil Service Commission.
3. Collections to Public Despatches to India, Vol.59, No.47 of 1875, Letter from the Civil Service Commission, 16 March 1875; Public Letters from India, Vol.19, No.57 of 1875, 30 September, and enclosures to the same.

at Oxford. Though there, too, there were doubtful opinions the majority was in favour of reducing the age.¹

It was finally decided that the age limit for the competition in the Civil Service in England was to be from 17 - 19, with a two year probation involving compulsory residence under supervision in an English university.²

This was considered to remove many of the defects which the higher age limit had involved.³ A university education could not be secured for the candidates by any other course and that the consequences of failure in the competition would be more serious at 21 or 22 than at 19. The prudent parents were deterred from reserving their sons for competition until the age of 21 from a fear that, in case of failure, it would be difficult at that period of life to find them another career.

The Council of India also preferred - or, rather clung to - the early age for entry into the Covenanted Service because in their opinion young men adapted themselves better to Indian life, if they went out to India before they had formed habits and made friends at home. It would enable

1. Public Home Correspondence, Vol.27, No.³₂₀₆.

2. Original Public Despatches to India, Vol.19, No.19 of 1876, 24 February.

3. Ibid.

them to get on better with the Indians, and to take a real interest in their life.

Salisbury and his Council, by lowering the age limit, do not appear to have deliberately intended to cramp the progress of Indians in the Civil Service examination.¹

However, there was a widespread belief in India that this was the object of the change and the Indian public opinion became all the more convinced that this was so when they saw its practical operation. Only one Indian candidate had been successful in the competitive examination in London since the age limit had been reduced.

All this created great dissatisfaction in the minds of educated Indians who felt that they were being deprived of the privilege which Parliament had deliberately granted them. At such a young age Indians could not be expected to acquire an adequate knowledge of English. Ripon, the Viceroy of India, was persuaded by petitions and public feeling to move in this matter.²

Ripon was himself convinced that the only way to meet this growing dissatisfaction amongst the Indians was by facilitating

1. Salisbury personally appears not to have liked the increasing number of Indians successfully competing in the Civil Service examination but this does not seem to have any connection with his decision to lower the age limit - Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Salisbury to Lytton, 13 April 1877; Please also see footnote 2 on p. 141.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol.lviii, paper C.4580.

their chances of success in London by restoring the age limit to what it was before 1876 and not by improving the Statutory Civil Service.¹

Ripon told J.K. Cross, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India that unless the Government was prepared to afford to the growing body of Indians educated in Western learning and ideas, legitimate openings for their aspirations and ambitions, 'we had better at once abolish our universities and close our colleges, for they will only serve to turn out year by year in ever-increasing numbers men who must inevitably become the most dangerous and influential enemies of our rule'.²

The arguments of Ripon, however, in no way convinced Kimberley, who was then Secretary of State for India. Kimberley, after 'most deliberate consideration' of the whole question came to the conclusion that it would not be advisable to alter the age limit and to return to the old system.³ The Statutory system, which was a concession to the Indians for the Civil Service, in his opinion had not failed and it would not be justifiable to reverse changes introduced

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1. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS. No.43614, Ripon to Kimberley, 19 February 1884.
 2. Ibid. Ripon to Cross, 3 April 1884.
 3. Ibid. Kimberley to Ripon, 4 April 1884.

so short a time ago, when no distinct proof could be adduced that any serious detriment had resulted from it.

Moreover he felt that ' the English civilians must always be the backbone of our whole Indian administration. If he were not,' he continued, 'we never should have acquired and Indian Empire nor would there be any prospect that we should continue to hold it, if the efficiency of the English element, and I must add its predominance, were weakened'.¹ He was also not convinced that the reduction of the age limit had absolutely closed the door for Indians. 'Considering the precocity of Indian youths, it is not easy to understand why they should not compete just as well as formerly'.²

The policy of the India Office did not in any way facilitate the solution of the question. The growing agitation in India against the virtual closing of the competitive service went on, and increased in volume. The Indian National Congress which had come into existence in 1885, joined in the agitation with vigour. More emphasis was laid on competitive examination in London, not so much on sentimental grounds as because the Indians were now not satisfied with subordinate posts, and with the method of nomination for higher posts. To achieve that they had been

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

demanding simultaneous examinations in England and in India and the raising of the age for entry.

The failure of the Statutory Civil Service which had been intended as a way out, aggravated the position. The chief defect of this system was that it included no test whatever of the intellectual qualifications of the persons selected, or of their fitness for the discharge of official duties. And also as the nomination of members of the Uncovenanted Service was discouraged, Statutory candidates were not able to bring forward the results of practical administrative experience in lieu of proved intellectual acquirements.

The system dissatisfied all classes. The educated classes disliked it as it gave no scope whatever for them. The competitive civilians regarded their Statutory colleagues in the service as a 'direct and bitter insult'. The public, on the other hand, felt little confidence that men appointed under this system of nomination would be able to discharge efficiently their administrative and judicial functions.

The system also failed to attract men of good family and fair education, for members of the upper classes showed no eagerness to join it. The Statutory Civil Service had not the prestige of the Covenanted Civil Service; it was regarded as inferior. Many who joined it might have easily

joined the Uncovenanted Service. In actual fact it did not lead to increased employment of Indians as it was hoped. Up to the year 1886 only 48 Indians had been appointed under this rule.

The growing agitation in India together with the failure of the Statutory Civil Service gave the India Office as well as the Government of India some concern. The Government of India corresponded with the local governments in order to get their opinions on the general question of the employment of Indians. Nothing conclusive came out of it. This led Kimberley in 1886 to suggest to the Government of India the appointment of a commission of inquiry to consider the whole question of recruiting Indians to superior offices under the Crown and to report on the reasons for discontent amongst them with the existing position.¹ The commission was expected to devise a scheme which, it might reasonably be hoped, would possess some elements of finality.

In the meantime the local governments had been allowed a wide discretion in the nomination of candidates.² Each local government had in fact, from 1884, been permitted to choose its candidates in any manner that might appear to it

1. Public Despatches to India, Vol. 7, No. 65 of 1886, 15 July; M.C.I. Vol. 57, pp. 19-20, 13 July 1886.

2. Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87, p. 26.

desirable with the sole proviso that, in the case of candidates whose merits and abilities had not already been proved by employment in the public service, special regard should be paid to educational attainments. The rules contained in the Resolution of 1879 had at the same time been declared to be in abeyance; and it had been left to the provincial governments to select candidates from the Uncovenanted or the learned professions, and to institute a test of limited competition among nominated candidates or to follow any other mode of selection that might be thought suitable.

The Public Service Commission which was appointed had for its president Charles Aitchinson, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; it also included five Indians. The commission submitted its report in December 1887.¹

The commission was firm in its opinion that it was quite essential to maintain the Covenanted Service as it was, where entrance was only possible by examination conducted in London. It justified this recommendation on the ground that the Covenanted Civil Servants were called upon to discharge very wide and serious responsibilities requiring very high qualifications and special training.

It was against holding the examination in India, and opposed any alteration of condition merely to facilitate the entry of one qualified class of British subjects more.

1. Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87.

than others. However, it appreciated the grievance of Indians as to the age limit and had no hesitation in recommending that the existing limits should be raised in the case of Indian candidates and that it should be 19 and 23 respectively.¹

To accelerate the admission of the Indians into the superior posts the commission also recommended that the Covenanted Civil Service should be reduced to a 'corps d' élite' by limiting its members to those necessary to fill the chief administrative appointments of the Government and also some smaller appointments.² These junior posts were expected to serve as a ground of training for junior officers. It recommended the abolition of the Statutory Civil Service and in its place the formation of a Provincial Civil Service which was to contain 108 posts of the Covenanted Civil Service and also a number of higher posts held by Uncovenanted Service.³ A number of junior posts held by Uncovenanted Service were to be relegated to a third service, called the Subordinate Civil Service.

The letter from the Government of India containing the above recommendation of the Public Service Commission was received by the Council at the India Office with misgiving

1. Ibid. pp.54-5.

2. Ibid. pp.66-7.

3. Ibid. pp.71-2.

and led to a division among its members. The letter was referred to a special committee of the Council. This committee favoured the raising of the age limit, but the majority of the members of the Council were against it.¹ *KW*

They feared that the raising of the age as far as the English candidates were concerned would lead to cramming,¹ would discourage the public schools from sending up candidates for the examination, and would lead to the abandonment of the probationary course. They reiterated the objection that younger people could adjust themselves to the circumstances of the country and the people more readily than those who entered the service later in life.²

Stewart, a member of the Council, thought the formation of the Provincial Service, in addition to the facilities afforded by the Act of 1870, did ample justice to the claims of Indians and that it was no longer necessary to disturb the existing arrangements.³ The main duty of the Government of India was to govern with a due regard to the sentiments and habits of the Indians and to treat with justice and consideration their legitimate claims and aspirations but only

1. M.C.I. Vol.63, pp.70,183, 23 July and 28 August 1889.
2. Dissents by Members of Council, Vol.ii, pp.247-74, Dissents by J. Peile, A.Arbutnot, P.Lumsden and D. Stewart, September - October 1889.
3. Ibid. pp.271-2.

so far as the latter did not conflict with the requirements of good government.

Arbuthnot, felt that it would be 'pitiable' to bow down and to accede to the demands of the Indians, for fear that non-competence would produce a bad political effect in Britain. In the not very far distant future, he thought, it might lead to the outnumbering of the English elements in the service by Indians and thus would place the Government of India in a position of great administrative embarrassment. The Government would be practically compelled, either to employ Indians in positions which ought to be filled by Englishmen, or to set aside in the case of the former the ordinary rules of official promotion.¹

There were other members of the Council who were opposed to these proposed changes on other grounds. Lumsden expressed a doubt as to whether the time had yet come when the Government could safely enter on a speculative political measure of so far reaching a character.²

9. R.A. Cross, the Secretary of State for India (1886-1898), found himself subject to political pressure in Britain and to a permanent demand in India and felt bound to reject the advice of his Council.³

1. Ibid. p.259.

2. Ibid. p.270.

3. M.C.I. Vol.63, p.183, 28 August 1889.

The outcome was that the Statutory Civil Service was abolished and in 1892 two services were established. Two lower types of post in the Uncovenanted Service (posts known as 'Tashildars' in the executive branch and 'Munsif' in the judicial branch) were transferred to the Subordinate Civil Service. The higher Uncovenanted posts of 'deputy collector' and 'subordinate judge' were transferred to the newly created Provincial Service. One-sixth of the executive and judicial posts reserved for the Covenanted Service-now named the Indian Civil Service - were also transferred. The transfer of these posts was to be gradual. The age limit for the Civil Service examination was raised to 23. ✓

These measures did not satisfy Indians. The demand for simultaneous examination was steadily and persistently pressed. The supporters of the Indian National Congress in Parliament were finally successful in passing through the House of Commons on 8 June 1893, a resolution moved by H.W. Paul and supported by an Indian member of the house, Dadabhai Naoroji, in favour of simultaneous examinations to be held in England ✓ and in India, the result to be classified in one list according to merit.¹ ✓

The members of the Council of India were bitter on the activities of Parliament and considered this resolution as most/ dangerous?

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1. India Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1893, pp.337-74.
 2. Dissents by Members of Council, Vol.ii, pp.279-308, Dissents by J. Strachey, A.Arbutnot, P.Lumsden, J.Peile, D.Stewart and A.Lyall, June, 1893.

Like them members of the House of Lords also vehemently
 — objected to the resolution. Salisbury earnestly hoped that
 the Council of India in a matter of such importance would
 'be true to the trust which Parliament has reposed in them'
 and would decline to revolutionise the Government of India
 unless they were quite convinced in their own minds that
 the steps they were taking were correct.¹

Even after these protests from the Council and the former
 Secretaries of State, the despatch to India transmitting
 the resolution could not have been stopped since it had been
 passed in the Commons. The utmost that could be done was
 to tone down the despatch in a way which foretold that the
 resolution of the House of Commons would not be acted upon.

The response of the Government of India was what one would
 have expected. Landsdowne, the Viceroy of India, opposed
 the proposal for holding examinations in India and the matter
 was dropped.

But the agitation in India went on. In 1887 the total
 posts carrying a salary of 200 rupees a month and upwards
 were 8,840 out of which 66 per cent were held by Europeans and
 Anglo-Indians and only 34 per cent by Indians. In 1897 the
 same type of posts were 9,880 in number of which 63 per cent

1. India Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1893, pp.388-9.

went to Europeans; and in 1903 out of 10,553 such posts 62 per cent were held by Europeans and Eurasians.¹ In the Indian Civil Service itself, the proportion of Indians was very limited indeed.

The British authorities, then, were slow in facilitating the Indianisation of the service. The feeling was expressed by George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India. He wrote to Curzon, the Viceroy, that the presence of such large numbers of Indians in appointments above a certain grade 'always fills me with apprehension as regards the future' and that all the educational influences at work in India tend to widen rather than to narrow the inlets into the administrative service.² He felt that 'one of the greatest mistakes that ever was made was' the inclusion in the Proclamation annexing India 'of the principle that perfect equality was to exist, so far as all appointments were concerned, between Europeans and Natives'.³

Both in Britain and in India officials expressed a lack of confidence in the efficiency of the Indian Civil Servants,⁴ and this ground of inefficiency and the maintenance of the/
British

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1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, 1917, pp.509-10, p.8382.
 2. Hamilton Papers, Vol.v, Hamilton to Curzon, 17 May 1900.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid. Vol.xvii, Curzon to Hamilton, 23 April 1900.

system of administration in India made the progress of Indianisation very slow.

In the meantime the numbers of Englishmen competing for the Indian Civil Service was falling. It was found necessary to re-examine the conditions of salary, pensions, leave etc. This led to the appointment of a Royal Commission on the Public Services in India in 1912 with Lord Islington as Chairman. At that time, of the posts carrying salaries of 200 rupees a month or more Indians held 42 per cent and Europeans 58 per cent.

The Islington Commission reported that the existing system had failed to admit a sufficient number of Indians into the Indian Civil Service. It rejected the idea of simultaneous examination but recommended that provision should be made to ensure that there should be a minimum of 25 per cent of 'statutory' natives of India in the higher posts, i.e. that 189 posts out of 755 should be filled by them. Forty district and session judgeships should be set aside to be filled by recruitment from the Bar, and forty-one superior posts (fifteen executive and twenty-six judicial) for offices of the Provincial Civil Services. The balance of 108 were to be filled by direct appointment in India, at the rate of nine a year, by nomination and seven on the result of a competitive examination to be held in India, the candidates

so selected being required to undergo a probation for three years in England at the expense of the Government. For administrative convenience it suggested that the age limits of the candidates should henceforward be $17\frac{1}{2}$ and $19\frac{1}{2}$.¹

Effect was not given to these and other recommendations of the commission, as it was considered undesirable to make important changes during the war in Europe. Before the report could be taken into serious consideration, the facts on which it was based had materially changed. On 20 August 1917, the Secretary of State for India announced in the House of Commons that the policy of His Majesty's Government was of 'an increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration'.

In the next year the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on constitutional changes was published. It expressed the view that changed conditions warranted an increase in the proportion of Indians in the service. The Islington Commission figures already under discussion were not considered high enough and the proposal was now put forward that 33 per cent of all the superior posts should be held by men recruited in India.² The intention was that this proportion should be increased by $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent annually until it reached 48 per cent. By then a new commission would have been appointed to re-examine

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1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, 1917, pp. 161-74, cd.8382.
 2. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, p.253, cd.9109.

the whole situation.

These proposals were adopted in 1920. After that year the figure was increased annually by $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent as proposed and under this scheme the figure of 48 per cent was reached in 1930 - in actual fact the figure was slightly higher. From 1922 Indian Civil Service examinations were also held in India.

This report of 1919 on Indian constitutional reform was carefully studied by the members of the Council of India. The Council unanimously and heartily supported the general policy of the report and felt that on the whole the proposals recommended were those best adopted to ensure safe and steady progress in the desired direction.¹

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For years the Council of India had stressed the policy that Uncovenanted Service should be the monopoly of the Indians and the Covenanted or the Indian Civil Service should be mostly reserved for the British. Even for those Indians who were to be given higher posts of Covenanted Civil Service the method of nomination was preferred to that of competition. Amongst Indians high born were given precedence. This appeared necessary if efficiency and British control of the administration in India were to be assured. In this attitude

1. Ibid. pp.299-300.

the Secretaries of State for the most part concurred. The Council in this matter played an important role and up to 1919 had been able to direct to a large extent the policy of the Government.

The Council was closely concerned with this problem. In the first stages of this question the influence of the Council was more progressive than that of the Government of India. And for whatever was done in this period the Council was largely responsible. At a later stage, however, the Council along with the Government of India became reluctant to proceed further. It was feared that if the speed was to continue, before very long Indians might occupy posts of greater importance than might be politic. Here the Cabinet came to regard the matter as one of major policy and assumed the initiative. It defined the conditions under which the further extension of the employment of Indians should be permitted and encouraged.

CHAPTER FIVE.

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC POLICY.

India being so largely dependent on Britain, the problems of the two countries especially in economic matters were closely linked. The industrial and technological revolution in Britain had its repercussion in India. To Britain, India was on the one hand a source of raw materials and on the other an outlet for her manufactures. The two countries had interests therefore in common but all their interests were not identical and Britain as the paramount power was in a position to assert her authority and in some ways unduly to foster her own interests.

It was in this context that the Council's concern with economic policy in India became significant. It has been seen that the Council was an independent body appointed expressly to guard Indian interests. Of the Council, some members had commercial interests, being themselves business men; others were past Indian administrators, men who had faced similar problems while in India.

To cover the whole economic field in this period is impossible and we shall therefore confine our attention mainly to three aspects of Indian economic activity in which the Council played an important part, namely questions of land revenue policy, of tariff policy in relation to

cotton duties and of finance policy in relation to the Presidency Banks.

The Indian Mutiny deeply influenced the Indian administration in its plans for the future. Stanley, the first Secretary of State for India, and his Council were soon called on to consider future land revenue policy and they were anxious to do so in a way that would prove advantageous to British rule in India.

There was much uncultivated land in India lying unused. Stanley suggested to the Government of India in December 1858 that they should forward a proposal for the Secretary of State's approval under which such lands could be sold to men who would be willing to cultivate them and who were anxious to secure land at a reasonable price.¹ This proposal included a suggestion that purchases might contain a guarantee that the land should be free from future taxation; that is, that the purchase price should include not only the price of the land but also the redemption price of any future land revenue.

Canning, the Viceroy, proposed to carry Stanley's plan a great deal further. He wished to divide all the unassessed and unclaimed lands throughout British India into two classes: land which was encumbered with jungle and land which was not,

1. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.7, No.2 of 1858, 31 December.

and to sell the lands of each class at a uniform price per acre, without any regard to their situation or to their presumed fertility.¹ The redemption of land revenue was also authorised, both on lands permanently settled and on lands temporarily settled; and the price to be paid was fixed at 20 years purchase of the existing assessment.

When this proposal was sent to the India Office, it was referred to a special committee of the Council of India and was there fully discussed.² A despatch approved by the special committee was sent in which anxiety was expressed as to the results of this proposed capitalisation of land revenue.³ It was not easy to see how the money so received was to be invested. It might be spent, leaving no source of revenue to replace the tax thus abolished. This would have a serious adverse effect on the security of the public debt. The despatch, however, proposed the sale of waste lands by auction and the redemption of land revenue in special cases, such as land intended for houses, factories ✓ and plantations.

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1. Collections to the Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.10, No. 14 of 1862, Revenue Letter from Government of India, 21 October 1861, and the Regulation of the Government of India.
 2. M.C.I. Vol.9, p.32, 3 July 1862; Hansard, Vol.clxvi, pp. 2147-8.
 3. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.10, No.14 of 1862, 9 July.

Land in India could be settled by the Government under two main and different methods. Under one, the holder would hold his land permanently so long as he paid his rent. Under the other, his security of tenure by contract would last only for a few years, at the end of which time there would be no guarantee of continuance. The despatch stressed to the Government the great advantage of the former method. The system of renting under which the occupier of the land had security was a middle course between purchase outright and short and uncertain tenure.¹ It was hoped that this would achieve the main objects aimed at by Stanley and at the same time would be free from objectionable features. It would increase the loyalty of the people to the Government and to the British connection and it would also be an inducement to invest capital in land.²

This policy of encouraging the occupant of land by giving him a sense of security was strongly supported by all the Council members except two, Mangles and H. Montgomery.³

1. Ibid.

2. The communication from the India Office also argued that purchase outright might be preferred by European capitalists but it would not suit the agricultural class generally, who only required permanency of tenure and fixity of rent. And they would in most cases have great difficulty in finding the necessary purchase money. Moreover capital would be better employed in improving the land than in purchasing the fee simple.

3. Ibid. Dissent by R.D. Mangles and H. Montgomery.

Mangles thought the plan unsatisfactory from the wider point of view of the state.¹ If rents were fixed, they could not be increased at the Government's discretion in order to raise money for the revenue. He considered that the taxing authorities should have power to raise rents as an alternative to imposing new and unpopular taxes. The raising of money in this way for the public purse was in accordance with what Indians had been used to and so was not likely to be a cause of complaint.

On the other hand Lawrence - a distinguished member of the Council and who later became Viceroy - was staunchly in favour of the more permanent type of settlement.² He recommended perpetual settlement because it would further encourage the investment of money in the land, and would give still greater security. It was very desirable that facilities should exist for the gradual growth in India of a middle class, connected with the land, without dispossessing the yeomen and peasant proprietors. What was really wanted was to give the intelligent, the thrifty, and the enterprising among them, the opportunity of improving their own conditions by the exercise of such qualities,

1. Ibid. Dissent by R.D. Mangles, 3 July 1862.

2. Ibid. Opinion by J. Lawrence, 5 July 1862.

and this could best be done by freeing the land-holder from any anxiety as to further and uncertain demands from the Government. 'When such men acquire property, and are in a thriving state', he felt 'they are almost certain to be well affected to the Government, and will use their influence, which would generally be considerable, in its favour.....It is on the contentment of the agriculturists, who form the real physical power in the country, that the security of the British rule, to a large extent depends. If they are prosperous, the military force may be small, but not otherwise'.¹

The majority of the councillors were of Lawrence's opinion, and Wood, who had become Secretary of State, agreed with them and recommended the general adoption of the system.²

However, in India conditions were fast changing. Administrative expenses were rapidly increasing, large sums of money were being spent on development plans, viz. on railways and public works such as ^{the} Godaverri navigation project, which inevitably necessitated increases of revenue.³

1. Ibid.

2. M.C.I. Vol.9, p.32; Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.10, No.14 of 1862, 9 July.

3. Financial Statement of the Government of India, 1864; Parliamentary Papers, 1866, Vol.111, Paper 374; Statement showing the Moral and Material Progress of India, 1864-65; Hansard, Vol.clxxvi, pp.1808-25.

The revenue system in India was faulty and needed overhaul. Industrial and trading interests and those interests which could contribute to the revenue were unwilling to be taxed and they were powerful enough to be obstructive. The Government turned to exploit other sources. A most important source of revenue was an export duty on opium but this was not a reliable source of income. There was also an excise duty on salt, which was a useful contribution. It is important to remember that Britain was adhering to a free-trade policy and that it would have hardly been consistent with this to have established any large scale import duties in India. Consequently, such duties as existed did not make a very large contribution to the revenue.

These considerations emphasised the importance of the revenue derived from land. 'For this reason' Wood wrote to Lawrence in October 1864, 'do not facilitate a permanent settlement when there is any reasonable prospect of an increase of assessment'.¹

The Council, however, did not think that the financial position in India was so severe as to make them change their minds on this land question and they still adhered to the idea of the permanent settlement but now with certain precautions.²

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1. Lawrence Papers, Vol.i, Wood to Lawrence, 15 October 1864.
 2. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.13, No.11 of 1865, 24 March.

Wood's opinion was modified accordingly and five months later he was writing to Lawrence that in view of the decision of the Council he should with the precautions specified 'make at once a permanent settlement if you can from henceforward and for ever'.¹

After this policy of the India Office to proceed with the permanent settlement scheme had been put into operation, reports came from India which suggested that there were grave disadvantages from the point of view of the revenue in these proposals. The value of land was increasing and any permanent arrangement meant a loss to the Government. The financial position was felt to be serious and by 1867. Cranborne, then Secretary of State, was writing to Lawrence, who was then Governor-General, that permanent settlement should not be proceeded with as civil expenses were increasing and as the value of money was falling relative to the necessities of life.² The Government wanted more elasticity in the revenue. The advantages of the permanent system were recognised at a time when it was believed that taxation would be easily devised which would tap, and bring into the exchequer, a due proportion of the agricultural wealth which it was expected that the permanent settlement scheme would create. 'That

1. Lawrence Papers, Vol.ii, Wood to Lawrence, 10 March 1865.

2. Ibid. Vol.iv, Cranborne to Lawrence, 2 January 1867.

system of taxation'said Cranborne 'appears still to be a philosopher's stone to Indian financiers', and therefore he wrote 'it is natural that many who were formerly enthusiastic for the permanent settlement should now be beginning to feel reluctant to part with the possible increase in the land revenue'.¹

Lawrence on the other hand was still firmly supporting the extension of the system as he felt that its political advantages would be very great and would even counter-balance the direct loss of revenue.² But to the Secretary of State and his Council the economic factors loomed larger than the political and it was considered that no further loss in revenue could be borne. So in 1867 the Council changed its policy and with one dissentient recommended that no estate should be permanently settled, in which the actual cultivation amounted to less than 80 per cent of the total area.³ Secondly, no permanent settlement should be concluded for any estate to which canal irrigation was, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, likely to be extended within the next twenty years; and the existing assets of which

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. Vol.viii, Lawrence to Cranborne, 21 January 1867.

3. M.C.I. Vol. 18, p.275, Clerk dissenting; Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.15, No.15 of 1867, 23 March.

would thereby be increased in the proportion of 20 per cent.

Northcote, who was by this time the Secretary of State, accepted this policy of limiting the permanent settlement but he was opposed by Muir, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Province.¹ He considered it did not sufficiently protect the interest of the Government, and that it could not be applied in that form without leading to most serious and certain injury to the future interests of the public. As a result, Argyll, who followed Northcote in 1868, recommended the suspension of all proceedings towards the permanent settlement of any district pending a reconsideration of the whole question.²

The policy, though it had been initiated by the Council of India, was fast being modified by the Council itself as a result of the adverse reports on its application. The income from land receipts between 1861 and 1881 in the temporarily settled areas had risen about $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. There had, no doubt, been at the same time considerable increase in the land values in the permanently settled areas, - an increase which the Government by their own decision were not permitted to share.

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1. Collections to Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.29, No.24 of 1871, Minutes by W. Muir.
 2. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.19, No.24 and 26 of 1871, 20 and 27 July.

It had been expected in 1862 that the fixity of the Government demands on the landowners would lead to more considerate treatment by them of their tenants, and would thus promote the prosperity of the cultivators generally. This had not worked out in practice, as reports from Bengal showed. The cardinal flaw in the whole scheme in practice was this: The Government had rented out land under the settlement scheme mainly to the bigger landlords without their being in the contracts any instruction relating to the passing on of advantages to the cultivators. The hope entertained that this permanent settlement would be advantageous to the landowners was also falsified as was shown by what happened to zamindars in Bengal, most of whom were ruined within a generation.

Nor was the political benefit expected of it realised. In place of siding with the Government, the beneficiaries of the permanent settlement, the zamindars, actively supported the nationalist movement. In 1879, for example, they waited on Lytton to protest against the decision of the Government of India to abolish import duties on cotton goods. It was natural the Viceroy would not appreciate this. 'It does' Lytton wrote to Cranbrook 'therefore seem to me, I confess, a monstrous impertinence on the part of these gentlemen,

who owe their unacquired and unmerited wealth, entirely to the favours of the British Government.....to come forward on such a question as this and publicly lecture the Government of India'¹.

The fiscal policy of the Government of India, too, had materially changed since 1862. Import duties as such had been abandoned; the income tax had been abolished; salt tax, license tax, stamp tax and revenue from excise were neither yielding substantial revenue nor had any prospect of doing so. There were therefore few existing taxes the proceeds of which would be likely to be considerably augmented by the possible increase of wealth arising from the introduction of the permanent settlement of land. The general dislike of the imposition of any new tax further complicated the situation.

Considering all these points the Council in 1883 abandoned the policy which they had initiated in 1862.² ✓ Nevertheless the underlying idea was not lost sight of.. A majority of the members of the Council believed that it was of basic importance to maintain unity of interest between the Government and the landed proprietors and to avoid offending their feelings. This also became evident

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1. Lytton Papers, Vol.iv, Lytton to Cranbrook, 12 May 1879.
 2. Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.4, No.24 of 1883, 22 March; M.C.I. Vol.50, p.222.

when questions of policy arose on tenants rights. ✓

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Broadly speaking there existed two different schools of thought on land tenures in India, the one in favour of a landed aristocracy, the other in support of peasant proprietorship.

Lawrence, when he was Viceroy, felt that the rights of the tenant in the state of Oudh had been sacrificed by Canning in favour of the talukdars and he ordered an investigation into the question. But the very fact of setting such investigation afoot was, irrespective of the merits of the case, unpopular among the talukdars.

The Council of India had viewed this act of Lawrence with disfavour. The general feeling was that it would be a matter of deep regret if in carrying out these measures, any reasonable cause of complaint was given to the talukdars, and it was urged that the question should be solved without hurting their feelings.¹

The whole question led to heated discussion in the Council. J. Hogg, felt that this step on the part of Lawrence was a breach of faith. It had been hitherto believed that the Government should not interfere in such matters as it would create a feeling of uneasiness, not only in

1. Original Political Despatches to India, Vol.8, No.3 of 1865, 10 February; M.C.I. Vol.13, p.137.

Oudh but throughout India.¹ He preferred to see the relations which had existed between talukdars and ryots going on smoothly as they had done for centuries, governed by mutual convenience, mutual interests, and the usages of Indian society rather than to see stringent laws introduced by Government founded on English notions of landlords and tenants.

Most of the members, though believing in the existence of the rights of tenants in Oudh, did not wish to create discontent among talukdars. Wood himself held strong views and cautioned Lawrence more than once not to be insistent in putting his views into action.²

In the upshot J. Strachey, who was at the time the Revenue Commissioner in Oudh, produced a solution without offending the talukdars.³ The talukdars agreed to grant certain privileges to one class of cultivators - namely, those ancient proprietors of the soil, who although they had lost all proprietary rights still occupied land in their ancestral villages, on condition that the Government

1. Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Vol.xl, Paper 62, Dissent by J.Hogg, 21 February 1865.
2. Lawrence Papers, Vol.i, Wood to Lawrence, 1 September 1864.
3. Collections to Political Despatches to India, Vol.89, No.40 of 1867, Memorandum on Rights of Occupancy in Oudh by J. Strachey, 20 August 1866; Original Political Despatches to India, Vol.10, No.40 of 1867, 16 March, Departmental Memorandum on the Occupancy Right in Oudh.

on its part would agree not to confer any new rights on them. This settlement was received by members of the Council of India with relief.¹

Lawrence was also involved in a similar kind of problem in the North-West Provinces. At the first settlement in the Punjab all the existing rights in land were recorded and any tenant found to have been in occupation of a piece of land for 12 years was given hereditary rights.² When the second settlement was made by Prinsep, it was found out that out of 60,000 proprietary tenures before recorded only about 16,000 really fulfilled the condition and only those should have been registered valid. The superior landlords had begun to assert their claims against the tenants taking advantage of this mistake that had been made by the Government.³ This was the situation that Lawrence wished to clear up, and he took the line of proposing a bill to confirm the validity of the first settlement.

In the India Office the question was reviewed. Northcote, after consulting the Revenue and Judicial Committee and the rest of the Council was clearly of opinion that the

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1. Ibid. Draft by the Committee and one which was finally sent.
 2. Collections to Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.25, No.80 of 1869, pp. 7, 22-3..
 3. Parliamentary Papers, 1870, Vol.liii, Paper 159, Memorials from Chiefs, Landholders etc.

whole question required further examination. More information from the Punjab was needed before legislative action could be taken with confidence.¹ But before a despatch to this effect could be sent, a telegram was received from the Viceroy giving the information that the Bill had been passed. Since the matter had gone so far the succeeding Secretary of State, Argyll, and his Council allowed the decision to stand. Argyll was unwilling to assert his authority to overrule the Government of India.

The Council members nevertheless were annoyed with this action of Lawrence and did not fail to express their feelings.² Most considered Prinsep's investigation trustworthy. 'Whatever may be the case in some parts of India', they said, 'proprietaryship as a rule, never did exist in the Punjab, any more than it did in Oudh, where also Lawrence, erroneously as it turned out, thought it to be found'.³

A similar controversy arose during Ripon's viceroyalty. He was anxious to secure to the tenants, especially in Bengal and Bihar, the right of occupancy of which he considered they were being deprived. He also contemplated introducing

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1. Original Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.15, No.46 of 1867, 31 August.
 2. M.C.I. Vol.23, pp.316,322,441,-18, 23 September and 28 October 1869.
 3. Parliamentary Papers, 1870, Vol.liii, Paper,159, Minute by E.Perry, 30 October 1869.

legislation giving occupancy rights to ryots cultivating 'raiwari' lands. Provided a tenant was in active occupation of the land, Ripon did not propose that his tenure should depend upon how long he had been there. There was to be no twelve-year rule.

This was a very wide and liberal proposal of which, however, the Council of India did not approve. The members of a special committee to whom the question was referred by Hartington, who had now become Secretary of State, were of opinion that the plan of attaching certain occupancy rights to the holders of certain land irrespective of the status of the occupants themselves, went further than was necessary; that it gave something which had never been asked for and that it would create great alarm and opposition among the big landowners which could easily be avoided.¹

Ripon's plan was therefore considerably altered by the Council to make it less sweeping. A compromise was finally reached. Every resident ryot was to be declared to have a right of occupancy and a resident ryot was declared to be any cultivator who held any land in the village or estate in which his lands had been situated for twelve years. On these principles the Act was finally passed.²

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1. Ripon Papers, Add. MSS. No.43612, Hartington to Ripon, 15 December 1882.
 2. The Acts passed by the Governor-General of India in Council, No.viii of 1885, The Bengal Tenancy Act.

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In addition to considering the question of tenure and rights in land, the Council had always been concerned with proposals for taxing it. In 1877 for example famine relief measures and other demands on the public purse were causing anxiety. To meet this unexpected pressure, Lytton proposed among other taxes, a land cess of 2 per cent on the rental.

This, however, did not prove acceptable to the Council.¹ The members considered the taxes on land a sound source of revenue but were anxious not to put too heavy a burden on cultivators. Lytton brought forward proposals which he hoped would satisfy the Council.² A licence tax on the non-agricultural class was to be imposed, graded according to the particular case. This new scheme was accepted by the Council, although the minority against it was substantial.³

This proposed land cess had been objected to by the members of the Council because they did not believe that land was a reasonable further source of revenue. Half the revenue derived from the land already went to the

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1. Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Salisbury to Lytton, 25 October 1877.
 2. Ibid. Lytton to Salisbury, 23 November 1877 and Lytton to G. Hamilton, 7 December 1877.
 3. M.C.I. Vol.39, pp. 284-5.

Government. In addition to this 18 per cent was earmarked as a local cess. As one member of the Council, R. Montgomery, pointed out, if a further 2 per cent were to be taken from the gross income, it would amount to 4 per cent of the Government assessment, making a total deduction of 22 per cent.¹

Another member, Muir, thought that the moneyed and professional classes were getting favoured treatment vis-à-vis the landed class, because they could make their voices heard.² Whereas the 'agricultural communities in India are inarticulate, patient, and enduring; they may be ground to the dust without their crying being heard at all. The goose is laying golden eggs; let us be satisfied, and not by fresh and arbitrary imposition on the land, endanger the chief mainstay of our prosperity'.³ He cautioned the Government that further land taxation would shake confidence in the fixity of the existing revenue settlement, depreciate landed property, divert capital from the soil, check improvements and arrest the tide of agricultural prosperity.

The members of the Council of India were aware of the fundamental importance of land and of land revenue in the Indian economy. They had the interest of the peasants duly

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1. Dissents by Members of Council, Vol.i, pp.162-5, Dissent by R. Montgomery, 16 November 1877.
 2. Ibid. p.154, Dissent by W. Muir, 19 October 1877.
 3. Ibid. p.211, 26 March 1878.

in mind, but they were above all cautious lest a radical policy might antagonise the big landed interests. They tried to balance political and economic interests. They served as an initiating and moderating body, and their influence was all the greater not only because of their knowledge of the subject but also because of the frequent changes in the office of Secretary of State. As the debate on the policy of permanent settlement had shown they were not inflexible but ready to modify their policy if the basic facts changed.

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Revenue from land formed, of course, only one item in the Indian budget, What had to be taken in land revenue depended on what could be got from elsewhere. Another important source of revenue was of course the duties on cotton piece-goods, twist and yarn.

Unlike the land taxes, this revenue directly affected the interests of British business men, particularly the large Manchester cotton houses. How far, then, were the interests of India to be balanced against those of Manchester? This question was further complicated since Britain pursued a free-trade policy.

By the close of the Company's administration the import cotton duties consisted of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent ad valorem upon cotton twist and yarn and 5 per cent upon other manufactured cotton.

In view of the unfavourable financial position of the Government of India on account of the large expenditure on the Mutiny, the duty on cotton twist and yarn was raised in March 1859 from $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to 5 per cent and the duty on piece-goods was raised from 5 to 10 per cent. Some other luxury goods paid an import duty of 20 per cent.¹

This adjustment of duties proved to be a mistake for it resulted in a drop of revenue by about one half and it also bore heavily on the consumers. Realising this, Wilson, the Finance Member of the Government of India, in February 1860 secured the reduction of the import duty on luxury goods from 20 per cent to 10 per cent; at the same time the duty on cotton twist and yarn was raised from 5 per cent to 10 per cent.² Thus now the import tariff consisted of a uniform rate of 10 per cent ad valorem.

In 1861 the duty on imported twist and yarn was reduced from 10 to 5 per cent on the initiative of Wilson's successor, Laing. This involved a loss to the Government of £40,000.³ In 1862 there was an overall surplus in the budget and this enabled Laing to lower the duties on imported cotton twist

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1. Parliamentary Papers, 1859, Vol.xxiii, Paper 81, pp.8-9.
 2. Financial Statement of the Government of India, 1860-61, pp.19-21.
 3. Ibid. 1861-62, p.56.

and yarn still further to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and on cotton piece-
goods to 5 per cent.¹

For the next twelve years - 1862 to 1874 - there was no change in the import duties on manufactured cotton goods, twist and yarn.

These duties affected commercial interests in Britain. Pressure was, in consequence, brought to bear on the Secretary of State for India in London, demanding the abolition of these duties. In the year 1862 and thereabouts questions were asked in Parliament and pressure was exerted.² But both Wood, the Secretary of State, and the Viceroy, Lawrence were against the withdrawal of these taxes in unfavourable circumstances. Wood in particular in 1864 bluntly stated that the duties could not be abolished, considering the revenue they brought to the Government.³

Lawrence was equally emphatic. He wrote to Wood's successor, de Grey, that the duties could not be abolished, as they were a source of revenue which could not be compensated for. 'There is the strongest feeling among the Natives' he wrote, 'against any new taxation, and especially against direct taxation. Discontent is sure to follow the

1. Ibid. 1862-63, p.86.

2. Hansard, Vol.clxvi, pp.128-30.

3. Ibid. Vol.clxxvi, pp.1812-3, 1853-4.

imposition of new taxes'.¹

This pressure, emanating largely from Manchester, was resisted for some years but conditions were changing. Louis Mallet, a well-known free-trader had become Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office in 1874. Salisbury was then the Secretary of State for India and he too was in favour of the reduction or abolition of the import duties on cotton goods, twist and yarn. The Council, too, supported free-trade.

Salisbury had been at the India Office for hardly a month before he was being petitioned by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to remove the duties on cotton piece-goods, twist and yarn on the ground that they were proving prohibitory in the case of lower-priced and coarser varieties of yarn and piece-goods, and that they were adversely affecting the purchase of clothes by the poorer classes. It was also pointed out in the petition that as a result of the import duties the number of cotton mills set up in India was on the increase.

This petition was sent by Salisbury to India with the instruction that it should receive careful consideration when financial conditions permitted.² A year later the India

1. Lawrence Papers, Vol.vi, Lawrence to de Grey, 5 March 1866.
2. Original Separate Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.7, No.2 and 5 of 26 March and 8 October 1874.

Office again sent a despatch to the Government of India in support of the above petition.¹ It pointed out that the duties were protective and that this was against the then existing economic principles of free-trade as accepted by Britain.

Before this despatch could reach Northbrook, the Government of India passed the Tariff Act of 1875.² This imposed a 5 per cent import duty on long staple raw cotton, as a protection against the spread of competition in finer cotton goods. No alteration was made in the rate of import duty on manufactured cotton but the method of assessment was changed so that the actual valuation was reduced. This diminished the yield of the duties by £88,000. There had hitherto been a general import duty, covering goods other than cotton, of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. This was now reduced to 5 per cent. All export duties were abolished except those on rice and lac. These remissions were made possible as a result of a surplus in the general budget.

This step of Northbrook, nevertheless, on the whole retained the import duties on cotton piece-goods, twist and yarn. The Viceroy, himself a free-trader, explained that

1. Ibid. No.6 of 1875, 15 July.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1876, Vol.lvi, Paper 56, Telegram from the Viceroy, 5 August 1875.

in India an out and out application of free-trade principles was not practicable.¹ Whatever justification there might have been for the retention of import duties on the part of Northbrook, it placed the Secretary of State in a most embarrassing position. Salisbury had settled views on tariffs. He had more than half committed himself to the abolition of these duties. Northbrook's action also raised difficulties between Salisbury and his Council.

The first reaction that Northbrook's measure produced in the India Office was one of surprise. Salisbury drew up a telegram to be sent to India, in which he took the Viceroy to task for acting as he had without the full support of the India Office. But the Council objected to this attitude. The members thought that the telegram as framed by Salisbury might be taken to commit the Council to an opinion on this new tariff legislation before they had all the papers before them. Accordingly the telegram was altered modifying the tone of disapproval.² At the same time to clear up the position between the authorities at home and in India, Salisbury with the approval of the Council decided to send Mallet to India.³ It was hoped that

1. Ibid. Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India.
2. Ibid. Paper 216, Minute by R. Montgomery, Vice-President of the Council, 19 April 1876.
3. M.C.I. Vol.35, p.246, 30 September 1875.

through the personal touch a common point of view might be arrived at.

But two members of the Council, H. Montgomery and R. Strachey, objected to this procedure of delegating the authority of the Council to any one individual officer, however able. To them it implied a departure from the axiom hitherto recognised that 'India should be governed in India'.¹ Perry thought that such interference from authorities in London in the fiscal measure of the Government of India was a violation of the fundamental principles of good government for India, which would help to make statesmen of mark reluctant to go to India as Viceroy.² These members cautioned Salisbury that such a step was more likely to provoke a crisis than to prevent one and it might deprive India at that important juncture of the considerable abilities and experience of Northbrook.

Members of the Council had opposed Salisbury because they felt that the Secretary of State was not treating Northbrook wisely. Most of the Council members believed in free-trade

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1. Parliamentary Papers, 1876, Vol. lvi, Paper 216, Dissent by H. Montgomery, 5 October 1875 and Minute by R. Strachey, 30 September 1875.
 2. Ibid. Dissent by E. Perry, 2 October 1875. In Parliament two previous Secretaries of State for India, Halifax and Argyll pressed Salisbury to put before the House this dissent of Perry. Eventually after some debate Salisbury very reluctantly agreed to submit it - Mansard, Vol. ccxxviii, pp. 921-6.

and were at one with Salisbury in thinking that the best interests of India lay in the ultimate abolition of the import duties on cotton piece-goods, twist and yarn. It would increase trade and commerce, and end the bitter animosity between the traders of the two countries. On the other hand, they also believed that the duties should be abolished only so far as the financial position of the Indian Government could allow. Total abolition at a time of financial stringency and at the cost of the imposition of new taxes such as a further tax on land, would not only be financially unsound but also impolitic. Thus the differences between Salisbury and his Council were rather of method and opportunity than principles.

Meanwhile the papers concerning the Tariff Act of 1875 had reached the Council of India. These papers made it clear that the expenditure on famine relief and losses due to a fall in the value of silver scarcely permitted the loss in revenue which the further reduction in import duties on cotton piece-goods, twist and yarn would involve, amounting as it would to £800,000.¹ Moreover the imposition of any new direct tax or excise in order to compensate for the loss of the above duties was certain to create irritation in India.

1. Separate Revenue Letters from India, Vol.6, No.3 of 1876, 25 February.

The Government of India had agreed that there was no competition between the traders of the two countries.¹

The demand for British manufactures had steadily increased, notwithstanding the competition which always existed in the lower classes of goods between Indian hand-loom weavers and British manufacturers. The annual value of the imports of cotton twist, yarn and piece-goods had risen from £11,000,000 in 1859-60 to £17,970,000 in 1874-75.

Foreseeing the possibility of a crisis, Salisbury naturally turned to the Council for their opinion and advice. Unanimously it was resolved that in view of the recent legislation of the Viceroy 'the cotton duties must ultimately be abolished, the abolition should be spread over a fixed term of years and in fixing the mode and time of abolition and adjustment necessary thereupon, the permanent necessity of avoiding financial embarrassment must be borne in mind'.²

Salisbury therefore emphasized to the Government of India that these import duties had hitherto operated unequally as between the manufacturers in Britain and in India. A position of equal opportunity was most desirable. The well-being and prosperity of the Empire depended on both these communities and anything likely to promote hostility between them should be avoided.³

1. Ibid.

2. M.C.I. Vol.35, pp.290-1, 19 October 1875.

3. Original Legislative Despatches to India, Vol.18, No.51 of 1875, 11 November.

Northcote^{brook}, by now, on account of the differences between himself and Salisbury on this question (influenced, too, by disagreement on foreign policy) sent in his resignation. He was succeeded by Lytton in April 1876. The new Viceroy went to India primed with a policy conceived in London. With his appointment the outlook changed. He was even more enthusiastic on this question than Salisbury.¹

Salisbury continued to emphasize the necessity for abolishing these import duties as most essential in the interest of both countries. In his opinion it was an object of more immediate interest than the reduction of the Indian debt, or the extension of public works which were not directly remunerative.² Both on political and commercial grounds it was in his mind an object of great importance that the policy of the Government of India on this question should no longer be allowed to remain in doubt.

So long as Salisbury could make the Council of India understand that the abolition of duties on cotton piece-goods, twist and yarn would not embarrass the finances of India, he was able to carry the majority with him. The Council, however, while acquiescing to Salisbury's views,

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1. Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Lytton to Salisbury, 25 April 1877.
 2. Original Separate Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.8, No. 9 of 1876, 31 May.

remained in a critical mood.

Drummond, a member of the Council, felt that in India the most difficult problem was to find out a source of revenue which would not offend the people. In this respect these import duties were unexceptionable. Being indirect ¹ they had the necessary elements of stability and elasticity without offending popular prejudice. In India, where trade competition was largely confined to the bare necessities of life, it was very difficult to apply indirect taxation. For the tax payers the question was of choosing between many evils; paying 'the fraction of a penny more for his cotton cloth, or for his week's consumption of salt, or be exposed to the visitation of the tax gatherer, who whatever his rightful demand, will take from him a week's or perhaps a month's earnings'.²

Ellis, another member, could not believe that it was essential to remit duties on the finer goods; the superior Manchester cloths were purchased only by those who could well afford to pay, and to whom the 5 per cent ad valorem would make no difference whatever. In this class of goods ³ there was no competition between British and Indian manufacturers.

1. Original Legislative Despatches to India, Vol.18, No.51 of 1875, 11 November, Minute by E. Drummond.

2. Ibid.

3. Parliamentary Papers, 1876, Vol.lvi, Paper 333, Dissent by B.H. Ellis, 25 May 1876.

He agreed, however, that the duty on the lower grades of piece-goods, being protective, should be abolished because they might be responsible for the fall in imports of this class.

Cassels suggested that the best way of dealing with the question was to reduce the import duties at the rate of one per cent per annum on piece-goods retaining the duty on yarns unaltered.¹ When the piece-goods duty in this way had been abolished the duty on yarns was to be similarly reduced at the rate of one per cent. By adopting such a course, the Government would give the Indian mill owners plenty of time to adjust themselves to the new position. At the same time the gradual loss of revenue would not be seriously felt by the Government of India, and the yearly reduction in the duties being small would not interfere with the regular course of trade.

Among the members opposed to the immediate abolition, even when a surplus permitted, was Perry, who, was most critical of Salisbury's policy.²

On the other hand, there were members, chief among whom were R. Strachey and H. S. Maine, who were staunch free-traders. In their opinion the best interests of India lay in the

1. Original Legislative Despatches to India, Vol. 18, No. 51 of 1875, 11 November, Minute by A. Cassels.
2. Ibid. Minute by E. Perry.

complete abolition of the import duties on cotton piece-goods, twist and yarn even at the cost of imposition of other taxes, even when India was passing through a moderate financial crisis.¹

Strachey considered that revenue which was not substantially based on the internal resources of the country was clearly precarious. In his opinion it was only through the exclusive development of its own industry and commerce, and the enlargement of its home and foreign markets, that the wealth of India could be substantially increased and there would then be other means available for securing a sufficient public income on a sound basis.

This controversy was not of course limited to the Viceroy, the Secretary of State and the Council of India. In Parliament, too, members financially interested in the cotton trade were urging upon the Secretary of State for India the necessity for the immediate abolition of the duties. An animated debate took place and on 10 July 1877 a motion was passed that 'Import Duties now levied upon Cotton Manufactures imported into India, being protective in their nature, are contrary to sound commercial policy, and ought to be repealed without delay, as soon as the financial conditions of India will permit'.²

1. Parliamentary Papers, 1876, Vol. lvi, Paper 333, Minute by R. Strachey and H.S. Maine, June 1876.

2. Hansard, Vol. ccxxxv, pp. 1085-1128.

This motion had in fact been suggested to George Hamilton, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the India Office, by the Viceroy, Lytton, who felt it would strengthen his hand.¹

It was obvious that this resolution was bound to influence the policy of the Indian Government. But in the face of famine then raging in Madras and Bombay and of the depreciation in the value of silver already mentioned, the change was delayed for sometime.

In March 1878 the Government of India exempted from import duty certain coarser kinds of British cotton goods which were found to be especially subject to competition from similar goods manufactured in India.²

This partial reduction, however, raised new difficulties, so in March 1879 the exemption was carried further and was made applicable to all cotton goods containing no yarn of a higher grade-number than thirty. This meant a loss of £150,000, and by the reduction of the valuation, a further loss of £42,000.³ Lytton took this step, overruling the advice of his Council. ✓

On 4 April 1879 the House of Commons passed another

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1. Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Lytton to G. Hamilton, 24 May 1877.
 2. Parliamentary Papers, 1878-79, Vol.lv, Paper 241, Notification of the Government of India, 18 March 1878.
 3. Ibid. Paper 165, Financial Statement of the Government of India, 1879-80, pp.29-36.

resolution approving the recent reduction in these duties as a step towards their total abolition.¹

The approval of the Council to this new step was only secured by the two votes exercised by Cranbrook, who had by this time succeeded Salisbury. There was a sharp division of opinion. Maine, R.Strachey, Cassels, Foster, Rawlinson and Merewether supported the Indian Government, while Dalyell, Ellis, Halliday, R. Montgomery, Muir, Norman and Perry² were against.

The remission of the duty, however, caused a good deal of practical difficulty to those responsible for collecting the tax. Lancashire manufacturers devoted their attention to the production of goods which would just come within the category of free-goods. On this account the custom revenue yielded by duties on cotton goods declined a good deal more than was expected. It was soon accepted that the maintenance of the remaining duties would be useless.

1. Hansard, Vol.ccxiv, p.435.
2. M.C.I. Vol.43, pp.43-4, 15 July 1879; Dissents by Members of the Council, Vol.i, pp.372-422. The opponents argued that it was highly unjustifiable that there should have been a remission of import duties on cotton goods at a time when there was a deficit in the budget owing to many unforeseen eventualities like the loss in exchange and the war with Afghanistan.. The remission was all the more indefensible when it was considered that new taxes like land cess had to be imposed as a substitute. The members feared a bad political effect in India as a consequence. The supporters of the measure, however, were happy that the bitter controversy had been settled at last.

By 1881 there had been a change of ministry in Britain. The new Secretary of State, Hartington, was as emphatic as his predecessor as to the necessity for getting rid of the remaining duties. Considering how small a revenue the duty now yielded, it was not worth the trouble involved. It was, in Hartington's opinion, inconvenient and injurious and demanded immediate abolition.¹

Ripon, however, was against such a step. He believed with Hartington that the repeal of the remaining duties in the then existing state of Indian finance would not do any financial harm to India; on the contrary it would do good; but he was opposed to it on political grounds. 'I doubt', he wrote to Hartington, 'whether anything of late years has created greater resentment in the minds, especially of educated Natives, than those proceedings (Lytton's) and it is very necessary in dealing with similar questions to take this state of feeling into consideration; it is not one to be slightly disregarded, even though in many respects unreasonable'.² Ripon in other words put his emphasis on the political problem in India.

Northbrook, home from India, was now First Lord of the Admiralty in the Liberal administration; he naturally continued

1. Ripon Papers, Add. MSS. No.43611, Hartington to Ripon, 1 July 1881.

2. Ibid. Ripon to Hartington, 1 April 1881.

to take a keen interest in Indian affairs. He supported Ripon and the Council of India in their opposition to the removal of the duties, and this opposition was successful in¹ delaying this removal for a whole year. Northbrook's reason against the abolition was the same as the Council's in London. In the meantime the opinion of the members of the Council was also changing and they were now all agreed that the duties could not be long maintained and that they should be abolished, as indeed they were in the following year, 1882. Ripon too had by now accepted the changed condition. As a result of a budget surplus of £1,577,000 Evelyn Baring, Finance Member in Ripon's Council, was in a position to announce the abolition of all the remaining import duties on cotton goods.²

The removal of the duties put an end to the controversy for the next twelve years. In 1894, when Gladstone was Prime Minister, Kimberley Secretary of State for India and Elgin Viceroy, the Government of India, in consequence of financial pressure caused mainly by the fall in value of silver, considered fresh taxation to be unavoidable. The least objectionable method by which they could increase the public revenue appeared to them to be the re-imposition of duties upon imports. This

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1. Ibid. Add. MSS. No.43596, E.Perry to Ripon, 7 September 1881.
 2. Parliamentary Papers, 1882, Vol.xlviii, Paper 181, Financial Statement of the Government of India, 1882-83, p.47. The Council of India acquiesced. The only member who dissented was Muir. The councillors had now no criticism to offer since the condition of Indian finance permitted this generosity.

conclusion was supported by the Herschell Committee which reported on the decline in the value of silver and the consequent currency difficulties which the Government of India was experiencing.¹

The Tariff Act of 1875 under which with the exception of the precious metals, almost everything imported into India was subject to a duty of 5 per cent, was with modifications restored. However, Kimberley ordered that cotton goods were to be exempted from this import duty, although he did this against the unanimous opposition of his Council.² One member, Arbuthnot, considered the exemption of cotton goods open to very serious objection both on financial and political grounds. It compelled the Government of India not only to suspend the Famine Insurance Fund, but to budget for a considerable deficit, a deficit likely to be increased by a decline in the value of silver.³ Lyall thought that to impose no duty on cotton goods, a duty which of all the import duties had proved in its time least onerous and most productive,⁴ was a great mistake.

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1. Report of the Indian Currency Committee, 1893, p.15, Collection No. 3270. v 1893.
 2. M.C.I. Vol.72, p.99, 27 February 1894.
 3. Dissents by Members of Council, Vol.ii, pp.318-9, Dissent by A. Arbuthnot, 1 March 1894.
 4. Ibid. p.321, Dissent by A.C. Lyall, 1 March 1894.

Members of the Council generally felt that it was unwise to insist on excluding cotton goods from the schedule when public opinion and public interest in India were decidedly in favour of including them. Such a measure was likely to excite agitation which on every ground it was desirable to avoid. Nothing should be done which would injure Indian confidence in the justice of British rule.¹ They seemed to be moving in the direction of Ripon's views on the problem.

Kimberley, in a letter to Elgin, described the difficulties between himself and his Council, summing up his embarrassment in these words; 'It is one thing to say you will disregard opponents, and quite another to be able to overcome them.... Of course my Council disagreed from the views of the Cabinet, but they look, as is natural, at only one side of the question'.²

But the financial stringency continued and the Government of India felt compelled to re-impose the duty on cotton goods. The Secretary of State, now Fowler, advised the Government of India on 29 May 1894, that if they were forced to impose the duty on cotton goods, it would be advisable to 'ascertain what classes of imported cotton goods competed with Indian manufactures of the same kind and to

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1. Ibid. pp.318-9, Dissent by A.Arbutnot concurred by A.Alison, D.Stewart and H.Rawlinson, 1 March 1894.
 2. Kimberley Papers,^{Vol.ii,} Kimberley to Elgin, 9 March 1894.

consider by what measures any duties that might be imposed could be deprived of a protective character'.¹ This could be secured he thought either 'by exempting from duty those classes of imported goods which clearly competed with Indian manufactures, or by levying on the latter an excise duty, equivalent to the import duty on corresponding goods from abroad'.

The Council of India was evenly divided on the question, and Fowler's views only passed through the Council by the exercise of the minister's casting vote.²

In line with the amendments and suggestions Fowler had made the Government of India in December enacted two measures under which first a 5 per cent import duty was imposed on all cotton piece-goods and yarns, and secondly a corresponding excise duty of 5 per cent was imposed on all yarns of count 20's and above produced in the Indian mills.³

All possible efforts were made to remove any trace of protection in the import duties on cotton piece-goods and yarns, yet the Indian millowners still enjoyed certain privileges

1. M.C.I. Vol.72, pp. 248-9.

2. Ibid. p.249.

3. Ibid. Vol.73, pp. 301-2, 11 December 1894.

over the importers. The Lancashire and Scottish spinners complained that the Indian manufacturers had a substantial advantage over them, since the Indian manufacturers paid an excise duty of 5 per cent on the grey yarn value only, whereas the Lancashire manufacturers had to pay an import duty of 5 per cent on the value of the finished goods, bleached, woven, dyed or printed as the case might be.¹ They argued too, that Indian woven goods, made from yarn just below the excise line, could and would compete with and take the place of imported woven goods liable to a 5 per cent duty. Besides, it was impossible to operate the scheme in a manner fair both to the Indian and to the British manufacturers, on an artificial dividing line at 20's or at any other count.

Hamilton, the new Secretary of State, was in a 'dilemma'.² How was the question to be solved to the satisfaction of both sides! Both interests were strong and well organized and both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State were subject to local pressures which made it all the more difficult to harmonize their respective ideas. Hamilton considered this

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1. Revenue Despatches to India, Vol.16, No.99 of 1895, 5 September.
 2. Hamilton Papers, Vol.i, Hamilton to Elgin, 16 August 1895.

as a most ticklish and dangerous question to deal with. The pressure in Britain was so intense that he felt he could not possibly ignore it.

The result was that the Government of India passed the Tariff Act on 3 February 1896 and removed the duty on yarns of all kinds, and reduced the duty on piece-goods and other cotton manufactured goods from 5 per cent to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent ad valorem. It exempted yarns made in India, and imposed a duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on woven goods of all counts manufactured by Indian mills.¹ It was the first time that an excise duty ✓ on coarser goods was imposed. This secured the approval of the Council, only two members, Peile and Arbuthnot, dissenting.²

To Peile this subjection of the whole of the Indian mill cloth to an excise duty appeared unjustifiable and politically unwise. He felt it meant a tax imposed to facilitate the competition of Manchester goods at the cost of Indian weavers.³ Hamilton justified the step on the grounds that it was the only remedy for ending the bitter

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1. Collection No.276, Tariff Act and the Cotton Duties, p.297.
 2. M.C.I. Vol.76, p.186, 30 March 1896.
 3. Dissents by Members of Council, Vol.ii, pp.352-62, Dissent by J. Peile, 10 April, 1896.

animosity between the two contending industries. It brought them to equality, which was the only course to adopt, if the duty was to be maintained.¹

During the first decade of the 20th century the tariff structure in India remained substantially unaltered; there were a few quite minor amendments, but no change of importance until 1916, two years after the outbreak of the first Great War;² and then the general import duty was raised from 5 per cent to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, import duties and excise duties on cotton piece-goods and other manufactured cotton goods remaining however unaltered at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. In 1917 the duty on imported cotton piece-goods was raised from $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.³

From the above narrative it stands out clearly that the opposition of the Council to any decision of the Government, however persistent and however strong that opposition might be, was unavailing if the Cabinet and Parliament were determined on a line of policy and in this case vested interests in Britain ensured this. The question whether the proposals were really in India's interest or not was secondary.

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1. Ibid. pp.368-78, Minute by G.Hamilton, 14 April 1896.
 2. Vera Anstey, The Economic Development of India, pp.346-7.
 3. Financial Statement of the Government of India, 1917-18, p.68.

The Council looked dispassionately on the question of import duties on cotton goods as well as on land revenue policy. It stood between two different groups, one that of Viceroys like Lawrence and Ripon who were more careful of the feelings of Indians and the other of Secretaries of State who were susceptible to influences and principles at home.

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It is worthwhile ~~out~~ turning to examine the influence of the Council on a subject in which British interests were not so strongly committed, namely the question of the Presidency Banks.

The banking system of India was largely in the hands of three main banks - the Presidency Banks of Bengal, Bombay and Madras. These, though basically commercial joint stock banks, were nevertheless partly financed by the Government.

The formal relationship between the Government of India and the Presidency Banks went back to 1807, when the Court of Directors first considered the desirability of establishing relations with them. The Directors authorised the Government to subscribe to the extent of ten lakhs towards the capital of the Bank of Bengal.¹ Later on the Company became a shareholder in the other two Presidency Banks and subscribed 3 lakhs to the capital of each.²

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1. J.B. Brunyate, An Account of the Presidency Banks. pp.2-4.
 2. Ibid. pp.29-30.

With the transfer of power from the East India Company to the Crown, a new relationship between the Presidency Banks and the Government was established. In 1858 the Government of India, being now a shareholder in the three Banks, had official representatives on their Board of Directors. The Banks issued paper notes and conducted general banking business, their activities being to some extent controlled by the Government.

However, defects in the organisation, particularly in the existing system of the issue of paper notes by the Presidency Banks, were obvious. The Banks issued notes which were only convertible into silver at their head offices. This was a very inconvenient arrangement for the public, who were reluctant to accept paper which they could not readily convert. The Government realised the advantage to the public of a more readily convertible paper currency. It wanted to see a number of branches opened where exchange of paper into silver could be effected on demand. The Banks having shown no willingness to meet the public in this way, the Government decided to issue its own paper currency.

To put this into effect Lushington, the Finance Secretary of the Government of India, in 1859 submitted to the Government a memorandum on the extension of the paper currency.¹

1. Collections to Financial Despatches to India, Vol.10, No.109 of 1859, Note on the Extension of Paper Currency in India by C.H. Lushington, 27 April 1859.

His suggestion was that the Government should issue local notes which were to be receivable at the option of the public and to be convertible at a few large centres conveniently situated. These centres would never be more than 200 miles away from each other. This was far enough, but it was the best that was practicable. The lowest denomination of such notes was to be 10 rupees.

The scheme was well received by the Secretary of State and his Council. But the proposal was not approved immediately, mainly because the Indian money market was very unsettled at the time and it was felt that such a step might add to the excitement and apprehension which then existed.¹ Nevertheless the despatch from the India Office expressed a willingness to sanction such a measure when an opportune time arrived.

The prevailing opinion at the India Office was that the service of an experienced financier would be of considerable advantage at this stage and they selected James Wilson for this purpose.²

Wilson after reaching India immediately set about framing a plan for currency reform. He proposed to take away

1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.1, No.109 of 1859, 4 November.
2. Mansard, Vol.clvi, p.1703.

from private banks the privilege of issuing notes and to transfer the right to a large department under Government officers, entirely dissociated from existing banking institutions on the one hand and from the regular executive authorities on the other.¹

The proposal for Government control over the issue of paper currency appealed to Wood, the Secretary of State,² but he did not like the idea of issuing notes up to three times the amount of the reserve of specie. Wilson's idea was to make the Government paper currency a direct source of profit and with this view, Wood and his Council disagreed.³ In their opinion the principal advantage to the state from a sound paper currency would arise from the benefits it would give to trade and commerce in general.

The India Office transmitted to India what it considered the sound principles on which the paper currency was to be issued.⁴ The amount of notes issued on Government securities

1. Collections to Financial Despatches to India, Vol.5, No.47 of 1860, Minute by James Wilson, 25 December 1859. The cover for these notes was to be one-third in cash and the rest in Government securities. India was to be divided into a number of 'circles of issue,' each circle to have its own notes. The notes were to be payable at the option of the holder either at the local office or at the presidency town in which the circle of issue was situated.
2. The idea of prohibiting private banks from issuing notes however, was not well received in Parliament. In Lords Monteagle criticized it as a 'course pregnant with evil'- Hansard, Vol.clvii, pp.1325-6, 27 March 1860.
3. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.2, No.47 of 1860, 26 March.
4. Ibid.

should be maintained at a fixed sum, within the limits of the smallest amount which experience had proved to be necessary for the monetary transactions of the country and any further issue of notes should only be made with a full specie backing.

Wilson's proposal was modified and the Act XIX of 1861 relating to the issue of notes as finally passed incorporated the suggestion Wood had made.¹ This Act prohibited private and Presidency Banks from issuing notes. Any such issue was to be undertaken henceforth by the Government. India was to be divided into three or more circles. Notes were to be issued from the headquarters of each circle or from an agency. They could be cashed in the presidency town of the circle or at the headquarters of the circle. The reserve was to be equal to the balance of notes in circulation and was to consist of coin, bullion and of Government securities, the last not to exceed four crores of rupees.

No sooner had this decision been taken than complications arose. Wilson died in India and was succeeded by Laing as Finance Member. He concluded on 3 January 1862 an agreement with the Bank of Bengal for five years² under which the

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1. Acts passed by the Governor-General of India in Council, No.xix of 1861.
 2. Enclosures to Financial Letters from India, Vol.63, No.19 of 1862, Agreement with the Bank of Bengal.

Bengal Government was to open an account with the Bank of Bengal in Calcutta, and the cash balances of the Government were to be transferred to the Bank. It was to receive from the Government, as an allowance for managing its account, the sum of £4,360.12s., yearly, besides being reimbursed by the Government for all expenses incurred in the transit of treasure. The Government was to retain at the Bank a monthly average balance to its credit of £700,000, the Bank making the same use of this money as it did that of other clients. If the balance at the end of the month fell below £500,000 the Government agreed to pay to the Bank interest on the difference, the rate of interest being the same as that charged to other clients.¹

The management of the issue of notes was transferred to the Bank.² It was entitled to a commission of $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent per annum on the daily average amount of Government notes outstanding and in circulation through the agency of the Bank. The Government also promised to pay the Bank the

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1. It was further provided that when the monthly average credit balance of the Government was in excess of £700,000, the Directors of the Bank were to keep the excess in cash in a separate room, or, at their own option, to invest it in Government securities, the dividends on such investments being paid to the Bank. The Bank had hitherto been under an obligation to keep cash equal to at least a quarter of all claims outstanding and payable on demand. Under Laing's agreement the Bank was released from this obligation.
 2. Ibid.

cost incurred by the issue of notes. It was permitted to draw bills of exchange and grant letters of credit, for the purpose of remitting funds payable out of India. Laing justified his action by pointing out that the Banks undertook the whole of what might be called the petty detail of¹ issuing and cashing notes.

This agreement concluded by Laing was very coldly received in London.² Wood, who had taken such a close personal interest in the whole subject, was particularly hostile and his feelings of disapproval were fully shared by his Council. Almost all the provisions of the contract were sharply challenged. The payment to the Bank for establishment and for transacting business was considered a complete novelty.³ It had not been the practice of bankers to make any charge to their customers for the transaction of such business. It was feared that the arrangement entered into by the Government had a further tendency to diminish the coin available for conversion of notes.⁴

What appeared to be most objectionable to the India Office was the transfer to the Bank of the right to issue notes.⁵

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1. Collections to Financial Despatches to India, Vol.40, No.103 of 1863, Minute by C.E.Trevelyan, 28 February 1863.
 2. Mansard, Vol.clxvi, pp.548-53.
 3. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.4, No.55 of 1862, 8 April.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

The issue of notes should have been kept quite distinct from any banking establishment. The supply of notes to any bank should be on precisely the same terms as to anyone else. Such a provision was indispensable for the proper conduct and regulation of the paper currency for India. To allow banks associated with Government balances to deal in foreign exchange was also considered unjustifiable.

Wood did not want to go so far as to reject the agreement but the Council was anxious to amend it drastically. The Council after much discussion yielded to Wood's persuasion and passed by a majority of only two votes, a resolution recognising the 'fait accompli'.¹ The Council however considered that so important a step and one so contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the previous instructions and entailing such unnecessary payments and so much loss to the Government ought not to have been made without reference to the India Office and that steps should be taken to set right what had been done.² They looked forward to an eventual revision and were attempting to pave the way to it.

By January 1863, Trevelyan had succeeded Laing as Finance Member in India. The Secretary of State and his Council continued to stress the necessity of separating banking

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1. M.C.I. Vol.8, p.462, 8 April 1862.
 2. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.4, No.55 of 1862, 8 April.

from currency business. They now suggested an alternative plan.¹

Trevelyan, too, was opposed to the transfer of so much power to the Bank of Bengal and the other Presidency Banks. In this he agreed with Wood and differed from his predecessor Laing. He held in the strongest manner the opinion that absolute, instant, never-failing convertibility was an essential feature of a Government paper currency and that this could only be secured by retaining the conduct of this business in the hands of the Government.² He believed that the Banks would not keep the required reserve as security for conversion, and that the over-issue of notes could not be controlled.

In a minute to the Secretary of State he pointed out that it was contrary to the interests of the Bank freely to cash notes at their branches, and that the obligation they had accepted in the matter was not being and could not be fulfilled.³

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1. Ibid. No.158 of 1862, 16 September. It was proposed to appoint a deputy commissioner in such large towns as might be decided upon, and to empower him to exchange notes for coin and vice versa. Notes were to be marked with the name of the circle of issue and to be convertible only within that circle. This suggestion was made to avoid a rush on one centre for the conversion of money.
 2. Collections to Financial Despatches to India, Vol.40, No.103 of 1863, Minute by C.Trevelyan, 9 April 1863.
 3. Ibid.

The Bank of Bengal failed to maintain the required cash reserve at many provincial cities and the 'inestimable privilege of an uniform currency' did not exist.¹ Even the notes of the head office of the Calcutta circle were 'charily' cashed at the branch Banks within the circle. Trevelyan felt that this was no doubt good business from the point of view of the Bank But the Government paper currency ought not to be subjected to such treatment at the hands of Government agents who were paid expressly for the purpose of maintaining it. Trevelyan recommended, therefore that a return should be made to the true principle of a Government paper currency.²

The views of Trevelyan had the full support of the authorities at the India Office. The Council with only one dissentient approved a despatch to the Government of India,³ which stated that it was 'wise to entrust to Government agency, and Government agency alone, the issue of paper as well as metallic money, combining as far as possible both measures in the same department of Government and to leave the Banks, only the exercise of legitimate banking functions'.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. M.C.I. Vol.10, pp.614-5, 9 June 1863.

4. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.5, No.103 of 1863, 10 June.

The despatch also recommended that at the earliest opportunity measures should be taken to carry out these instructions viz: firstly, that the notes in Calcutta should be issued by the commissioners at the mint, and that facilities for verifying the notes and exchange of notes for bullion, and vice versa should be established there. Secondly, that at certain places which need not exceed five or six in the Upper Provinces of Bengal, offices should be established for the issue and exchange of notes.

Wood also pressed the Government of India to work for an agreement with the Bank of Bengal to give up this right to handle the note issue. He expressed his willingness to view favourably any proposal made for this purpose and was even ready to pay compensation for the loss resulting from the withdrawal of $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent on the currency business and to continue to entrust them with the Government balances.¹ However, he refused to give up the condition on which alone in his opinion any bank could be entrusted with Government business, that it should be debarred from dealing in foreign exchange.

The Government of India entered into correspondence with the Presidency Banks on these terms. The Bank of Bengal

1. Ibid.

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agreed to give up the note issue etc., on certain conditions.
Wood rejected some of the terms which the Bank had asked
for. To have accepted the arrangement that the Bank should
be allowed to handle at its own discretion any Government
money beyond 70 lakhs would have involved locking up these
balances, whereas it was essential they should be kept fluid.²
Also if the Government had deposited with the Bank a crore
in excess of the 70 lakhs stated, this excess should be
handled for the public benefit and not just for the profit
of the Bank.

The lines were broadly laid down on which any further
discussion with the Bank should be considered.³ The
circulation and management of issue of notes were to be at
once removed from the control of the Bank. As compensation
it was proposed that the sum of £18,750 per annum should be
paid to the Bank up to March 1867. At the same time the
annual payment of Rs. 43,606 per annum for establishment

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1. Collections to Financial Despatches to India, Vol.42, No.1 of 1864, Financial Letter from India, No.112 of 7 September 1863. The conditions were that the Bank should be left free to use up to 70 lakhs of the Government balances for banking purposes as before; the next crore above that the Bank might be allowed to invest, and any excess over that would be set aside in cash for the exclusive use of the Government. The Government on their part were to engage not to call for any part of the amount invested except in case of actual requirement and after due notice.
 2. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.6, No.1 of 1864, 4 January.
 3. Ibid.

charges should be continued. The Bank was to act as bankers to the Government on an understanding that there should always be a minimum balance of £700,000. This was to be shown in the Bank's accounts as a Government balance and could be withdrawn by the Government in case of it being actually required without any payment to the Bank for withdrawal. The Bank would be permitted within certain limits to make use of any excess over £700,000 of the Government balance but it was to give up dealing in foreign exchange.¹ The Bank would be appointed to manage the public debt for which they would be paid a fixed sum. Similar arrangements were also to be made soon after with the Bank of Bombay and the Bank of Madras.

After exchange of views agreements were finally concluded with the Banks in 1866 for a period of twelve years based on the direction previously given by the India Office.² Under the new agreement the Banks were deprived of the function of note issue and were to cease dealing in foreign exchange.

1. Ibid.

2. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.7, No.88 of 1865, 7 April and Collection to the same, Vol.46; J.B. Brunyate, An Account of the Presidency Banks, pp. 90, xii. £700,000 was to be maintained by the Government as its balance at the head office of the Bank of Bengal. The Government agreed to pay interest on the difference, if the amount fell below the minimum of £450,000. In the case of the Bank of Bombay, the maximum was £400,000 and minimum £250,000; in that of the Bank of Madras £250,000 was the maximum and £200,000 was the minimum.

On the other hand, they were given the management of the registered public debt for which service they were to be paid £400 per £1,000,000 of debt. In the final agreement, Wood's stringent restriction regarding the use by the Banks of the Government balances was not included. The Banks were allowed to use Government balances under certain restrictions.

This agreement with the Banks of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay settled satisfactorily the controversy which had been started by Laing.¹

Wood, soon after this agreement was made, left the India Office and his successors did not show the same keen interest in these banking questions nor had they his special knowledge of the subject, but the Council provided continuity of policy. Wood's efficient policy had always found support in the Council and after his departure the Council put on his mantle.

The Bank of Bengal had formerly enjoyed the privilege of maintaining drawing accounts with the Bank of England and with Messrs. Coutts and Co., but they had lost this right under the term of this recent contract, which meant that they were deprived of the right of handling foreign exchange. Soon after the new agreement was made the Bank of Bengal began an agitation for the renewal of their privileges.² This

1. Lawrence Papers, Vol.ii, Wood to Lawrence, 3 April 1865.

2. Collections to Financial Despatches to India, Vol.57, No.127 of 1866, Letter from the Bank of Bengal, 20 February 1866.

would have enabled them to make remittances by their own bills and letters of credit to their clients who were holders of Government securities.

The matter was referred to the India Office for decision. The members of the Council of India had a settled opinion on this question. They could not believe that it was safe to allow Banks dealing with Government balances to deal in foreign exchange. To them these two functions appeared incompatible. The reception of this request from the Bank was a foregone conclusion.

But de Grey, the Secretary of State who had succeeded Wood, had other views, which were shared by the Under-Secretary and the India Office officials generally. These functionaries were in favour of removing this inconvenience to the Bank. They suggested that the danger of speculation and misuse could be avoided if the Bank purchased only first class bills, and provided it furnished detailed information to the Government, specifying the rates of exchange and the amount of each Bill, and also by arranging that the Directors of the Bank who held their position as Government nominees should bring promptly to Government notice any departure from the authorised course.¹

1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.8, No.127 of 1866, 4 June, Relevant Papers attached.

The Council of India refused to express their approval of the restoration of the privilege to the Bank and showed that the Bank could easily avoid the inconvenience complained of by issuing post bills payable in India, or by permitting clients to draw upon their bank accounts. In deference to the above views of the Council in general and of its Finance Committee in particular, a despatch was sent to India.¹

At this time there was considerable distress in India owing to the failure of a number of Exchange Banks. This provided an opportunity again for the Bank of Bengal to press the Government to be permitted to deal in foreign exchange.² Lawrence, the Viceroy, also supported the request of the Bank in the interest of its British clients.³

Even with the restrictions recommended, many members of the Council of India, like Mills, Prinsep and Perry, were

1. Ibid.

2. Collections to Financial Despatches to India, Vol.53, No.289 of 1866, Letter from Bank of Bengal to Financial Secretary to Government of India, 1 August 1866.

3. Ibid. Financial Letter from India, No.220 of 6 October 1866. Lawrence recommended that the prohibition be relaxed under the following conditions viz: that the power of purchasing bills should be restricted to a particular department, the Agency Department, and for the purpose of that Department. Secondly that such bills should be drawn on England only, and on banks not in partnership with the drawers. Also that the time limit of such bills should not exceed three months and that returns should be made at regular intervals to the Government reporting the number, amount and date of bills outstanding, with the gross total of assets in the Agency Department of the Bank.

reluctant to approve the request of the Bank.¹ They gave way, however, in view of the strong recommendation of the Government of India, but they pressed for and obtained even more restrictions on this business of the Bank than the India Office officials, including the Secretary of State, liked.² They secured the insertion of a stipulation that no bills were to be drawn on England by the Bank of Bengal, except for the remittance of interest and dividends on Government securities or shares in their custody.³ On the advice of the Council the Bank was warned that in the event of their action leading to any embarrassment to the public under this new authorisation, the concession would be withdrawn.

The question of dealing in foreign exchange cropped up again in 1867.⁴ An arrangement was entered into by the Manager of the Bengal Civil Service Annuity Fund by which the Bank of Bengal guaranteed the payment of annuities to retired Civil Servants in England through the Bank's agent, Messrs. Coutts and Co., at a uniform rate of exchange of one shilling and eleven pence per rupee.

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1. M.C.I. Vol.17, p.570, 13 December 1866.
 2. Collections to the Financial Despatches to India, Vol.53, No.289, of 1866, Original Draft rejected by the Finance Committee.
 3. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.8, No.289 of 1866, 15 December.
 4. M.C.I. Vol.19, p.111; Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.9, No.303 of 1867, 16 August.

The Council of India by a large majority expressed their disapproval of allowing the Bank to remit the annuities to Britain at a fixed rate. To make a contract of this kind which did not allow for the fluctuation of the rupee was regarded as not in accord with either the letter or the spirit of the rules under which the Bank was permitted to operate.

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The Government of India was still closely linked up with these Presidency Banks. The Council was conscious of this. Events were tending towards making it more doubtful of this relationship.

The settlement of 1866 with the Bank of Bengal and other Presidency Banks had hardly been concluded when considerable mismanagement of the affairs of the Bank of Bombay came to light. The Bank's business was so mishandled that by December 1866 it was ruined and virtually in liquidation.

This unfortunate state of affairs of the Bank naturally caused consternation at the India Office. Cranborne was now the Secretary of State for India. The Finance Committee of the Council of India recommended that an inquiry be instituted and that a report be made on measures to be taken for preventing any such recurrence.¹ It also suggested

1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.8, No.290 of 1866, 17 December.

that the whole subject of the Government connection with the Presidency Banks should be reconsidered.

The failure of the Bank of Bombay necessitated fresh arrangements for transacting the banking business of the Government in Bombay. The alternatives were, to open a new Bank of Bombay or to amalgamate the old one with the Bank of Bengal. Of these two alternatives the former was preferred. The question was, what would be the relationship between the new Bank and the Government.

Lawrence was firmly of the opinion that the Government should hold shares in the Bank and should be closely linked with it.¹ For a Bank holding Government balances, he felt it was essential that there ought to be a number of Government officials on its Board of Directors possessed of considerable power and influence. The opinion that a Government auditor would be a sufficient protection of the Government's interest did not appeal to Lawrence. Northcote, on the other hand, held different views. He was afraid of the consequences which might follow if the Government became a shareholder in the new Bank of Bombay but he was willing to go so far as to transfer the Government's banking business to the Bank with suitable restrictions. He

1. Lawrence Papers, Vol.viii, Lawrence to Northcote, 29 June 1867.

was also opposed to the idea of a Government representative in the Bank and in place supported the proposal to appoint a Government auditor.¹

The majority of the members of the Council of India, however, held quite different views. All but three of the members - Arbuthnot, Clerk and Perry-were willing to see the Government as shareholder in the Bank.² Though they thought this had some undesirable features yet, they felt, it was necessitated by circumstances.

A compromise was arrived at by Northcote and his Council. A despatch to India was framed which satisfied the Council of India and the modified draft got the approval of the Council.³ Though forbidding the Government of India to have any shares in the new Bank of Bombay, the despatch mooted a suggestion for the appointment of a Government officer who would have at all times free access to the correspondence and books of the Bank.⁴ Any alterations in the administration of the Bank were only to be made after consultation with the Government. In deference to the wishes of his councillors, Northcote also gave up the idea

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1. Lawrence Papers, Vol.iv, Northcote to Lawrence, 3 June 1867.
 2. M.C.I. Vol.19, p.277, 24 September 1867.
 3. Northcote Papers, Letter Book, ii, Northcote to Fitzgerald, 24 October 1867; M.C.I. Vol.19, pp.371-2.
 4. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.9, No.368 of 1867, 24 October.

of prohibiting members of the Government of India from holding shares in the Bank.¹ However, no reasoning could convince all the members of the Council. Five of them, Hogg, Macnaghten, Eastwick, Prinsep and Frere, were strenuous in expressing their doubts as to the wisdom of this policy.² The support of the Council was by no means unanimous.

The Council of India appeared to be right. Finding that no probability existed for the re-establishment of the Bank unless shares were taken by the Government, Northcote changed his opinion and approved the holding by the Government of shares in the new Bank of Bombay.³ An order was also made for holding in India an inquiry into the causes of the failure of the old Bank and to recommend measures to be taken preventing the occurrence of any such failure in the future.⁴

Though the India Office approved of the Government holding a share in the new Bank of Bombay, nevertheless the disaster which had fallen on the old Bank put the Government in a dilemma. They had to choose (in the words of Perry) between

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1. Northcote Papers, Letter Book ii, Northcote to Fitzgerald, 24 October 1867.
 2. M.C.I. Vol.19, p.372.
 3. Northcote Papers, Letter Book ii, Northcote to Fitzgerald, 18 November 1867. In Parliament, however, members objected to this decision of the Government - Hansard, Vol.cxc, pp.426-38, 2055-8.
 4. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.10, No.68 of 1868, 15 February.

the abandonment of the Government's power of effective control and the possibility of having to share the responsibility of such a disaster as had befallen the Bank of Bombay.¹ Henceforward the efforts of the Council were directed towards finding out a solution of the problem of how to give the Government sufficient control over the Presidency Banks without making it responsible for any mismanagement which might occur.

In the meantime in 1868 Northcote was replaced by Argyll as Secretary of State. The Jackson Committee, (conducting an inquiry into the failures of the Bank of Bombay) had also reported.² This report reinforced the doubts of the Council as to the wisdom of associating the Government too closely with the Presidency Banks. It became clear that even the presence of a Government nominee was not sufficient to ensure stability.

Under these circumstances it was felt that it was a matter for consideration whether measures should not be taken for terminating this 'anomalous and unsatisfactory' connection of the Government with the Presidency Banks in the capacity of shareholder. Perry felt that the question

1. Ibid. No.211 of 1868, 8 May, note by E. Perry.

2. Parliamentary Papers, 1868-69, Vol.xv, Paper 4162, Report of the Commissioners on the Failure of the Bank of Bombay, 10 February 1869.

was ripe for decision, that it ought to be decided by the Home Government, who were in a more independent position to consider it than those on the spot and that the decision ought to be to sever the connection'.¹

While these discussions were afoot, again the Viceroy was changed and Mayo now occupied the office. He was not in favour of terminating the connection and wanted to postpone the discussion until March 1874, when the existing agreements with the Presidency Banks would expire.²

The Council at the India Office was opposed to Mayo's recommendation and with two dissentients resolved that the withdrawal should be so arranged as to inflict as little injury as possible on the shareholders; it was only fair to give some two or three years notice to terminate the existing connection.³ But once the ultimate withdrawal of the Government from active participation in the affairs of the Presidency Banks was agreed upon, the Banks should be notified accordingly and the necessary notice of withdrawal given forthwith.

1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.12, No.32 of 1870, 27 January, note by E.Perry.
2. Financial Letter from India, Vol.87, No.131 of 1871, 16 June and No.275 of 1871, 31 October.
3. M.C.I. Vol.27, pp.138-9, Prinsep and Hogg dissenting, and Vol.28, p.258, Prinsep and Frere dissenting; Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.13, No.259 of 1871, 10 August and Vol.14, Confidential No.123 of 1872, 21 March.

These discussions were facilitated by yet another change in the viceroyalty. Following the assassination of Mayo, his successor Northbrook in 1872, brought an entirely fresh outlook on these questions, and with the support of the India Office, took up the negotiations with the three Presidency Banks.

The Bank of Bombay's inability to let the Government draw 35 lakhs when the amount was needed on account of the extraordinary expenditure on famine relief in 1874 again made the authorities in London very doubtful as to the wisdom of allowing the Banks to use freely the Government balances for their own business.

The Secretary of State and his Council suggested to the Government of India what restrictions should be incorporated in the legislation for the future conduct of the business of the Banks.¹

Eventually the Presidency Banks Act of 1876 was passed.² It regulated the relations between the Banks and the Government. It did away to a large extent with the close relationship which had existed between these Banks and the Government in the past; The Government sold out its shares

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1. Original Financial Despatches to India, Vol.17, No.225 of 1875, 6 May; Collections to the same Vol. 92.
 2. The Acts passed by the Governor-General of India in Council, No.xi of 1876.

in the Banks. Sections of the earlier Acts relating to Government Directors were cancelled and the power to call for information was only conditionally retained. The Government merely aimed at sufficient control for the general security of public transactions, but without responsibility or guarantee.

The Government undertook as before to pay interest to a Bank should its balance at that Bank fall below the agreed minimum. It entered into no formal undertaking as regards maximum, but stated their general intentions for the future: 'It is understood that the Government will ordinarily not leave with the headquarters of the Banks, otherwise than temporarily, more than the following sums - Bank of Bengal 100 lakhs, Bank of Madras 30 lakhs and Bank of Bombay 50 lakhs. But this condition will not be inserted in the contract, which will impose no obligation upon the Government to leave any balances whatever with the Banks'.¹ Henceforth the Government treasuries were to handle a large part of the Government balances which had been handled previously by the three Presidency Banks.

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1. The Presidency Banks were allowed to open branches in other presidency towns but restrictions were imposed on the classes of business to be transacted so that direct competition between the three Banks would be prevented.

Thus up to the year 1876 there had been much anxious attention paid to the activities of these three Presidency Banks in India. There were a few somewhat unimportant changes in the rules governing the transaction of business in 1899 and 1907. The work of the Council in this field after 1876 tended to fade out.

The Council of India had always been very watchful in their attitude towards these Banks as the interest and prestige of the Government were linked with them. When precautionary measures failed to yield the desired results and the relationship proved detrimental to the interest of the Government, the Council directed policy towards the severance of closer relations. In this field of Government's policy the Council's influence was quite decisive, and it was not influenced by the pressure of those interested in the Presidency Banks.

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In discussing these important branches of Indian affairs - land revenue policy, the problem of applying cotton duties and the relationship of the Presidency Banks to Government - one realises that the Council carried great weight in land revenue and banking policy but it was unable to carry a point against the big vested cotton interests of Lancashire, backed by Parliament and the Cabinet.

The Council members clearly had no axe to grind. They did not represent big business; nor had they parliamentary votes to consider. They were experienced and on the whole fair minded and impartial. Moreover - and this was an important function - they were able over a long period to focus attention on any important aspect of policy affecting India in a way that was not possible for any other part of the Home administration.

CHAPTER SIX.THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.

One may distinguish three broad phases in the history of the Council. In the period 1858-69 the Council was active and had as members men of considerable ability. In the second the influence of the Council increased and at the same time its membership consisted of even more eminent men. After 1895 or thereabouts the Council's influence was on the decline, and in fact this coincided with the appointment of members of relatively less eminence and experience.

George Hamilton, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India (1874-78) considered the Council as the Cabinet for India and wrote that 'few Cabinets had contained men of such world-wide reputation, intellect and experience'.¹ It had as its members men of wide and varied knowledge of all sides of Indian administration. The Council was, in fact, a body of specialists discussing and advising on Indian questions as they arose.

The different departments of the Indian Government were well represented, and the army, engineering, finance, Civil Service, commerce, the law and politics all made their contribution. There were always representatives from the big banking and trading interests in London. In the selection of members

1. George Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections (1868-85), pp. 68, 307.

care was also taken to represent the various regions of India.

The 95 members who served on the Council before 1919 were experienced men and were when appointed normally in their fifties or sixties.¹ Of these 95, 55 were civil servants, (three of whom were Indians), 12 business men, 13 army officers, 10 judges or men otherwise connected with the law, one educationist and 4 Indians conspicuous in Indian public life.²

A brief analysis of the membership of the Council reveals that its influence rested on their outstanding merits.

By 1869, 22 members in all had served on the Council. Of whom 16 were civil servants, 3 connected with the law, 2 business men and one army man. Their names are impressive, including John Lawrence, Bartle Frere, H.C. Rawlinson, E. Perry, H.M. Durand and W.E. Baker. Of those who had served as Directors of the East India Company the best known

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1. The average age of members in the three phases was, approximately 55.9, 54.6 and 55 years respectively. Similarly the average in 1869, 1895 and 1919 was 66.1, 64.5 and 57 years.
 2. Some of its oldest members were H.C. Rawlinson (85), H.T. Prinsep (82) and F.J. Halliday (80) all of whom were appointed before 1869. The youngest members were G.J. Wolseley (43), R. Hardie (43) and E. Morison (43). The first two were appointed in the second period of the Council's history, the last one was appointed by Morley.

were F. Currie, H.T. Prinsep, J.W. Hogg and R.D. Mangles.¹

A few details of the careers of some of the councillors serve to emphasize their distinction and experience.

Currie's² varied service in India had extended over nearly 33 years (1820-53). After serving in various capacities in the Revenue and Judicial Departments, he was appointed a judge of the Court of Sadr Adalat in the North-West Provinces. But he gave his greatest service to the Company during the first Sikh war when he was the Secretary in the Foreign Department of the Government of India. After serving for sometime on the Council of the Governor-General he returned to England and became a Director of the East India Company and was its Chairman in 1858. He was one of the seven members of the Council of India elected by the expiring Company and served in it from the age of 59 until he died in 1875.

H.T. Prinsep,³ another of the East India Company's Directors elected to the Council, also distinguished himself early in life. He had been in India for barely five years when in 1814 he was chosen as one of the suite of the

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1. Many of the other members too were outstanding whose names speak for themselves: P.T. Cautley, H.C. Montgomery, R. Montgomery, W.E. Baker, G.R. Clerk and F.J. Halliday.
 2. DNB. Vol.xiii, p.341; The Times, 16 September 1875, p.5.
 3. DNB. Vol.xlvi, p.392; The Times, 14 February 1878, p.6.

then Governor-General's personal party on tour through Oudh and the North-West Provinces. This experience thus gained was of great use to Prinsep in writing 'A History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquis of Hastings' - a book which is generally considered to be the best and most trustworthy narrative of the Nepal, Pindari and Maratha wars. His successful settling of the Raja of Burdwan's complicated landed transactions gave him recognition as one of the ablest men in the service. He was appointed Persian Secretary to the Government (1820-40). At the time of his appointment to the Council he was 65, eventually retiring at the age of 82. He was a very active member particularly in matters relating to the Indian states, and it was he who sponsored the policy of keeping the Mysore State under British control.

The representatives from the Indian administration were even better known. John Lawrence¹ made his great reputation in organising the newly annexed Punjab after the second Sikh war, and in helping to reoccupy Delhi in the Mutiny. This work made him a popular hero. On his return to England he was created a baronet and a Privy Councillor, and was appointed to the Council of India at the early age of 47.

1. DNB. Vol.xxxii, p.267; R.B. Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, 2 Volumes.

In the Council he exercised a considerable influence particularly on questions relating to land tenure and frontier relations, - on the latter of which he was the great exponent of the policy of 'masterly inactivity'. After three years on the Council he returned to India in 1864 as Viceroy.

Bartle Frere¹, who served on the Council during this period, was also well-known as a brilliant Civil Servant. His work on land assessment in the Maratha country was so successful that his system was followed in other parts of India, - in Bombay, Sind, Mysore and Berar. Frere's chief commissionership of Satara and Sind was equally fruitful, especially in the creation of municipal institutions. As a member of the Governor-General's Council he contributed to the success of the financial reforms which are associated with the names of Canning and Wilson. His record as Governor of Bombay justified his reputation. He tried to better the relation between British and Indians which had been undermined by the events of the Mutiny. After 32 years service in India he was appointed to the Council in England at the age of 51. His membership, however, was interrupted by his being sent on a special military mission to Zanzibar to effect the suppression of the slave trade and by his accompanying the Prince of Wales on tour to India in 1875. He left the Council in 1877 on his appointment as Governor

1. DNB. Vol.xx, p.257; The Times, 30 May 1884, p.8; J.Martineau, Life of Sir Bartle Frere, 2 Volumes.

of the Cape and the first High Commissioner of South Africa. In the Council he showed a very special interest in proposals for promoting the health of the Indian army, proposals which originated in the work of Florence Nightingale.

The Council also had among its members men who, had acquired reputations in other fields. One such member was H.C.Rawlinson¹ - an outstandingly brilliant Oriental scholar and at the same time a most distinguished Anglo-Indian statesman - 'a fine specimen of the old school of Anglo-Indian officials, a survival of a great tradition - soldier, scholar and a man of the world'. While serving in many political posts in Persia with distinction he did valuable work in deciphering the cuneiform inscription of Darius Hystaspes at Behiestun. He was appointed to the Council in 1858 at the age of 48 and held this post, with one or two intervals, until his death in 1895 at the age of 84. In the Council he rendered special service because of his experience in Persia. He attended on the Shah of Persia who visited England in 1873 and 1889.

Another member, T.E.Perry², before going to India in 1840 as a judge in the Supreme Court of Bombay, had actively

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1. DNB. Vol.xlvii, p.328; The Times, 6 March 1895, p.8.
 2. DNB. Vol.xlv, p.38; The Times, 24 April 1882, p.9.

participated in party politics in England, being the honorary secretary of the National Political Union of London and one of the founders of the Parliamentary Candidate Society. In India he was very popular with Indians. He joined the Council of India at the age of 53 remaining in office until he was 77. In the Council, he stood out as a firm advocate of liberal treatment for Indians in all fields and never failed to protest against any step which he considered unfair to their interests; so much so that he was called by Salisbury a 'confirmed dissenter'.¹

In the next period of the Council's history (1869-95) there were among its members many men of great international reputation, particularly H.S. Maine, Louis Mallet, W. Muir and R. Strachey. Others like G.J. Wolseley, H.W. Norman, G. Campbell, J. Strachey, A.C. Lyall, H. Yule are hardly less eminent. There were also City bankers like B.W. Currie, whom Arthur Godley, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India (1883-1909) referred to as the man who virtually controlled the finances of India for eight or ten years.²

H.S. Maine³ an eminent jurist, author of 'Ancient Law', 'Popular Government' and many other well-known works, at different times Professor at Oxford and Cambridge - was appointed to the

1. Lytton Papers, Vol.ii, Salisbury to Lytton, 27 April 1877.

2. Lord Kilbracken, Reminiscences, p.165.

3. DNB. Vol.xxxv, p.343, The Times, 6 February 1888, p.8; Sir M.E. Grant Duff, Sir Henry Maine.

Council in 1876 at the age of 49. Before this appointment he had served for seven years as Legal Member of the Governor-General's Council. In the Council in London he took an active interest in legal matters and in the Civil Service. Here he not only influenced the policy at the India Office but also by keeping up correspondence with Indian officials exercised a wide guidance in many legal and other questions like tenancy rights.¹

Louis Mallet² was after, Cobden, the leading authority in his day on commercial policy. He was a great exponent of free trade and of bi-metalism. He occupied the highest post in the Board of Trade and played a great part in the drawing up of commercial treaties with European countries. As a member of the Council and later as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India,³ his influence on the Government of India's

1. Ripon Papers, Add.MSS. No.43597, H.S. Maine to Ripon, 17 August 1882.
2. DNB. Vol.xxxv, p.428; The Times, 18 February 1890, p.5.
3. Other ^{PERMANENT} Under-Secretaries of State for India between 1858-1919 were George Russel Clerk, Herman Merivale, Arthur Godley (later Lord Kilbracken), Richmond Ritchie and Thomas W. Holderness. Except Clerk and Mallet all had had brilliant careers as students and all were very efficient in drawing up reports and drafting correspondence. Merivale, Mallet, Godley and Ritchie had occupied various subordinate posts in Government offices in London before being transferred to the India Office. The Under-Secretaries of State could not attend meetings of the Council unless especially invited but they arranged for its meetings, drew up its agenda and the like for the Secretaries of State. Being the confidential advisers of the Secretaries of State they exercised an influence on the conduct of Indian administration, the extent of which, however, is difficult to tell. The relationship between them and the Council varied. While Mallet considered it irresponsible and interfering, Godley felt it invaluable.

economic policy was considerable. He appears to have been more favourable to the abolition of the cotton duties and other trade barriers than were Salisbury and Lytton.

The scholarly tradition in the Council continued. William Muir¹ author of 'The Standard Life of Muhomet', 'Annals of the Early Caliphate', served on the Council from 1876-85. Earlier in India his Lieutenant-Governorship of the North-West Province was marked by the passing of two enactments for which he was personally responsible, which systematised the land laws and lessened the land assessment. Many new educational institutions were opened and municipalities were established. He was appointed to the Council at the age of 57. Muir was a known opponent of Lytton's Afghan policy. He had important contacts among members of Parliament and the Secretaries of State attached great weight to his opinion and advice.

The army had always been represented on the Council of India and in this period distinctively by G.R. Wolseley and H.W. Norman, the latter of whom later refused the offer of the viceroyalty of India. Wolseley,² the future Commander-in-Chief of the British army, had had wide experience both

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1. DNB 2nd Supplement, Vol.ii, p.659; The Times, 12 July 1905, p.4.
 2. DNB.1912-21, p.586; C.R. Low, - A Memoir of Lieutenant-General Sir G.R. Wolseley.

on the field and in administration. He had taken part in the second Burma War, the Crimean War, the Mutiny, the China War and in the Red River expedition. He was appointed to the Council at the early age of 43.

The Strachey brothers Richard and John were a remarkable pair. Richard¹ as head of the public Works Department and Inspector General of Irrigation in India re-organised the whole Public Works Department and made it efficient. Besides this and starting an adequate forestry service, he also initiated the great policy of systematically extending the railways and canals which have so much enriched the country. It was on his initiative that the principle of raising loans for the construction of public works was started - a policy which was to play a very important role in subsequent development. In the Council in London he served as an expert on these questions as well as on finance and it was he who arranged for the purchase of the East Indian Railway by the Government. Arthur Godley went so far as to say that he was to be credited for having first started in a practical form the idea of placing the rupee on a gold basis.² At the times of his appointment to the Council R.Strachey was 58.

1. DNB.1901-11, p.439; The Times, 13 February 1908, p.12.

2. Lord Kilbracken, p.163.

Between 1869-95 thirty-two new members had been appointed to the Council.¹ To illustrate the range of the Council's interest the following may be mentioned, A. Cassels, R.S.Ellis, R.H.Davies, Bullen-Smith, R.Hardie and A.C. Turner. Cassels was a business man. Ellis had been President of an Indian Sanitary Commission (1866-68) and Secretary to the Government of Madras. Davies was Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in 1871. Bullen-Smith was director of several companies in India and became President of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. R.Hardie was Secretary and Treasurer of the Bank of Bengal for 15 years. Turner was Chief Justice of Madras.

The remarkable level of eminence of the councillors was not maintained in the appointment of later years. The outstanding members of the Council round about 1895 were A.C.Lyall, J.L.Mackay, William Lee-Warner, D.M.Stewart, A.D.Macdonnell and J.B. Peile. But these were succeeded in turn by less well-known members.

Between 1895 and 1919 no less than 41² new members were appointed to the Council.

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1. Of the 32 members 17 were Civil Servants, 4 were business men, 9 army officers, 2 judges.
 2. Amongst the 41 members 22 were Civil Servants, 6 were business men, 3 army officers, 5 judges, one an educationist and of the 7 Indians, 4 had distinguished themselves in public life (3 were Civil Servants).

George Hamilton Secretary of State (1895-1903) wrote that though the Council had as its members in his secretaryship some very distinguished men yet 'they cannot in reputation or intellect, be compared with those who were here twenty-five years back'¹ and 'during my eight years of office it further retrograded'².

The status of the Council received a further set-back in 1907 when Morley was Secretary of State. He introduced changes which involved lowering the salary of the members from £1,200 to £1,000 and shortening their tenure of office from ten to seven years. The introduction of Indian members to the Council, too, appears to have weakened rather than strengthened the Council.

Perhaps the best known of the councillors of this period were C.C.Egerton, W.R.Lawrence, L.H.Jenkins, K.G. Gupta and Aftab Ahmad Khan.³

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1. Hamilton Papers, Vol.v, Hamilton to Curzon, 5 April 1900.
 2. Hamilton, Reminiscences (1886-1906), p.261.
 3. Egerton had participated in the Afghan war, and in the Hazara and Waziristan expeditions besides other campaigns. He was appointed a member of the Council in 1907 at the age of 59 and later was created a field-marshal. Lawrence stood first in the Indian Civil Service examination in 1877. As Settlement Commissioner in Kashmir he did valuable work. He was appointed to the Council in 1907. Jenkins was Chief Justice in Bombay. In 1908 at the age of 49 he was appointed a member of the Council. He helped Morley in drafting the Morley-Minto Reforms.

Among Morley's reform was the introduction of Indian members into the Council. Members were selected from both the Hindu and Muslim communities. Mention may be made of Gupta who passed the Civil Service examination in 1871 and rose to the office of commissioner and a member of the Board of Revenue. He was a member of the Council in 1908. Khan, for seven years a Muslim member of the Council, was a barrister and was associated closely with Muslim education and political activities. He was an enthusiastic member of the All-India Muslim League from its inception and represented a Muhammedan constituency in the Provincial Council of the United Provinces.

Some of the lesser known members were F.C. Le Marchant, P.P. Hutchins, J.F. Finlay, H.S. Barnes and D.W.K. Barr.

Many factors seem to have led to this change in the quality of the membership. Political developments had made progress in India and consequently affected the authority and work of the Council in London. An appointment to the Council was not now attractive enough to encourage men of sufficient eminence to join.¹ The salary had been reduced and the length of tenure curtailed. It might also have been that the Indian Civil Service was itself now less outstanding.²

1. Hamilton Papers, Vol.1, Elgin to Hamilton, 3 September 1895.

2. Ibid. Vol.v, Hamilton to Curzon, 5 April 1900.

CHAPTER SEVEN.CONCLUSION.

The main intention of Parliament in 1858 in creating the Council of India was that it should form a body of experienced men to advise the Secretary of State and that it should serve as a 'watch dog', and keep an informed eye on Indian affairs. The Council was expected to act as a check on the activities of the Secretary of State and the Government of India - to control them in certain fields and to focus the attention of Parliament and Cabinet if in the view of the Council there was anything unsatisfactory in Indian administration.

Final authority rested of course with the Secretary of State who was the representative of the supreme authority in Britain. A body like the Council of India could in no case overrule him if he was supported by the Cabinet and Parliament. Though by the actual terms of its constitution the Council would appear to have had the final word in financial matters, yet in practice it was not so. For Parliament to have created a body with powers above its own and over which it had only a remote control would have been absurd. In actual practice the Council never did override and never could override a Secretary of State,

provided he was supported by the Cabinet and Parliament. The object of these special financial powers backed by the right of writing dissents given to the Council really was to prevent the Secretary of State from misapplying the Indian revenues without the knowledge of Parliament, or by allowing his personal preference to influence the direction of his Indian policies.

If we judge the Council's work in this respect, the establishment of the Council can largely be justified. As far as its advisory functions were concerned, almost all who have discussed the matter seriously have agreed that a better body for the purpose could hardly have been created. That it long withstood attack, both in India and in England, was largely due to its usefulness as an efficient, advisory body. The Secretary of State without a Council would have been very much, in the words of H.S. Maine, 'like a layman of great natural ability brought suddenly into the court of Queen's bench, and set suddenly to administer the Crown's jurisdiction according to his own sense of right and justice'.

It checked the Secretaries of State from rewarding their political creatures, it kept a watchful eye on the terms of various contracts involving Indian expenditure and it was careful in allowing increased expenditure on new undertakings. A high opinion was expressed in 1914 by the Royal Commission on

Indian Finance and Currency as to the ability and skill with which the Council had transacted complicated duties connected with Indian finance.

Much of the business of the Government of India passed in review before the Council, and seeing that the latter consisted of men possessing special experience of Indian affairs, its advice in the great majority of cases was accepted by the Secretaries of State. This was all the more important because Parliament did not possess the necessary knowledge and showed little inclination to acquire it. The annual Statements of the Revenue and Expenditure of India were rarely given detailed examination in Parliament.

The policy and proposals of the Government of India were always fully reviewed, thoroughly discussed and sincerely criticized by the Council. Between 1858 and the passing of the India Act of 1919, there had been great political, administrative and economic development in India, and in this the Council of India had taken a full part. The more ardent among Indian reformers had sometimes chafed under the restrictions placed upon them and often had unjustly put the whole blame on the Council for the conservative policy of the Home Government, but in their anxiety for more rapid progress they were sometimes more aggressive than was politically prudent and administratively sound.

One of the weakest points of the British administration of India was the perpetual sequence of changes in the heads of the executive both in England and in India. Under such changes it was very difficult to maintain continuity of policy. Here the Council exercised a useful function. The councillors, although their knowledge sometimes became out of date yet, to quote J. Strachey, 'often knew more about India than most of the officers of the Government of India itself; they preserved the traditions of administration and the lesson of experience'.

Yet, it is relevant here to indicate certain charges which were levelled against the Council and to note some of its failures. It was criticized and with reason for not standing against the Imperial Government when undue charges were imposed on Indian revenue e.g. for the training of the Indian army for Imperial purposes and for using Indian troops outside India. Again, proposals originating in India had to come before the Council who passed on their comments to the Secretary of State. This led to increased interference from the India Office in the administration of Indian affairs and to the policy 'of telling everything beforehand'. It made the despatch of business slower and the Council's cautiousness and conservatism were liable to cause delay in bringing about reforms in various branches of the administration. But these disadvantages have to be set against the undoubted benefits the Council conferred on India.

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTS OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.

Secretaries of State for India.

	Commencing date of attend- ance at the Council.	Last date of attendance at the Council.
Lord Stanley, (afterwards by succession, Earl of Derby).....	3 Sept. 1858.	14 June 1859.
Sir Charles Wood, (by creation Viscount Halifax).20 June	1859.	15 Feb. 1866.
Earl de Grey and Ripon, (by creation Marquis of Ripon).22 Feb.	1866.	3 July 1866.
Viscount Cranborne, (by succession Marquis of Salisbury).....	13 July 1866.	7 March 1867.
Sir Stafford Northcote, (by creation Earl of Iddesleigh).....	14 March 1867.	7 Dec. 1867.
The Duke of Argyll.....	17 Dec. 1868.	19 Feb. 1874.
The Marquis of Salisbury, (2nd time).....	25 Feb. 1874.	1 April 1878.
Earl of Carnarvon (officiating)16 Jan.	1877.	6 Feb. 1877.
Gathorne Hardy, created Viscount Cranbrook, 14 May 1878, (by creation Earl Cranbrook).....	9 April 1878.	26 April 1880.
The Marquis of Hartington, (by succession Duke of Devonshire).....	30 April 1880.	18 Dec. 1882.
The Earl of Kimberley.....	30 Dec. 1882.	23 June 1885.
Lord Randolph Churchill.....	30 June 1885.	2 Feb. 1886.
The Earl of Kimberley, (2nd time).....	9 Feb. 1886.	27 July 1886.

	Commencing date of attend- ance at the Council.	Last date of attendance at the Council.
Sir Richard Assheton Cross, created Viscount Cross, 19 August 1886.....	11 Aug. 1886.	10 Aug. 1892.
The Earl of Kimberley. (3rd time).....	24 Aug. 1892.	6 March 1894.
H.H. Fowler, (by creation Viscount Wolverhampton).....	13 March 1894.	26 June 1895.
Lord George F. Hamilton.....	9 July 1895.	- - -

Date of acceptance
of Seals of Office.

St. John Brodrick, (by creation Viscount Midleton.....)	9 Oct. 1903.
John Morley, (by creation Viscount Morley of Blackburn....)	11 Dec. 1905.
The Earl of Crewe.....	7 Nov. 1910.
Viscount Morley of Blackburn.....	7 March 1911.
The Earl of Crewe, (by creation Marquis of Crewe).....	25 May 1911.
Austen Chamberlain.....	27 May 1915.
E.S. Montagu.....	20 July 1917.

Members of the Council of India.

	Commencing date of attendance at the Council.	Last date of attendance at the Council.
1. Charles Mills.....	3 Sept. 1858.	21 Sept. 1868.
2. John Shepherd.....	29 Sept. 1858.	4 Oct. 1858.
3. Sir James Weir Hogg.....	3 Sept. 1858.	19 Jan. 1872.
4. Elliot Macnaghten.....	3 Sept. 1858.	2 Nov. 1871.

	Commencing date of attendance at the Council.	Last date of attendance at the Council.
5. Ross Donnelly Mangles.....	15 Sept. 1858.	30 March 1874.
6. Capt. Wm. Joseph Eastwick.....	3 Sept. 1858.	24 Aug. 1868.
7. Henry Thoby Prinsep.....	3 Sept. 1858.	25 Sept. 1873.
8. Sir Frederick Currie.....	3 Sept. 1858.	30 March 1875.
9. Sir J.P. Willoughby.....	3 Sept. 1858.	25 Jan. 1866.
10. Sir H.C. Rawlinson.....	3 Sept. 1858.	14 April 1859.
	re-appointed	
	8 Oct. 1868.	26 Feb. 1895.
11. Sir R.J.H. Vivian.....	3 Sept. 1858.	27 Oct. 1874.
12. Sir H.C. Montgomery.....	3 Sept. 1858.	7 Nov. 1876.
13. Sir John L.M. Lawrence.....	14 April 1859.	26 Nov. 1863.
14. Sir P.T. Cautley.....	8 Sept. 1858.	21 Sept. 1868.
15. W.U. Arbuthnot.....	3 Sept. 1858.	1 Dec. 1874.
16. Col. H.M. Durand.....	19 Jan. 1859.	28 June 1861.
17. Sir T.E. Perry.....	11 Aug. 1859.	15 Nov. 1881.
18. Col. W.E. Baker.....	8 Aug. 1861.	2 Sept. 1875.
19. Sir G.R. Clerk.....	21 Dec. 1863.	4 Jan. 1876.
20. Sir H.B.E. Frere.....	30 May 1867.	27 Feb. 1877.
21. Sir Robert Montgomery.....	29 Sept. 1868.	19 Dec. 1887.
22. Sir F.J. Halliday.....	8 Oct. 1868.	20 Dec. 1886.
23. Sir H.J.S. Maine.....	16 Nov. 1871.	19 Dec. 1887.
24. Sir Louis Mallet.....	6 April 1872.	16 Feb. 1874.
25. Sir G. Campbell.....	14 May 1874.	30 March 1875.
26. A. Cassels.....	7 May 1874.	29 April 1884.
27. Maj-Gen. E.B. Johnson.....	16 Oct. 1874.	30 Jan. 1877.
28. Maj-Gen. R. Strachey.....	5 Jan. 1875.	26 June 1877.
29.	re-appointed	
	19 April 1879.	2 Oct. 1889.
29. Hon. E. Drummond.....	16 Feb. 1875.	3 Feb. 1885.
30. Sir B.H. Ellis.....	20 July 1875.	7 July 1885.
31. Col. Hy. Yule.....	9 Nov. 1875.	14 May 1889.
32. Maj-Gen. Sir A.T. Wilde.....	11 Jan. 1875.	15 Jan. 1878.
33. Maj-Gen. Sir G.J. Wolseley, (afterwards by creation Viscount Wolseley).....	14 Nov. 1876.	2 July 1878.
34. Sir W. Muir.....	5 Dec. 1876.	15 Dec. 1885.
35. R.S. Ellis.....	17 April 1877.	10 July 1877.
36. R.A. Dalryell.....	6 Nov. 1877.	26 Oct. 1887.
37. Col. Sir W.L. Merewether.....	6 Nov. 1877.	29 Sept. 1880.
38. Lieut-Gen. Sir H.W. Norman.....	26 Feb. 1878.	26 Nov. 1883.
39. Maj-Gen. C.J. Foster.....	23 July 1878.	17 July 1888.
40. B.W. Currie.....	14 Dec. 1880.	
	re-appointed	
	Dec. 1890.	10 Dec. 1895.

	<u>Commencing date of attendance at the Council.</u>	<u>Last date of attendance at the Council.</u>
41. Hon. Sir Ashley Eden.....	2 June 1882.	28 June 1887.
42. Maj-Gen. Sir P.S. Lumsden.....	4 Dec. 1883.	20 Sept. 1893.
43. J.R. Bullen-Smith.....	10 June 1884.	20 Dec. 1886.
44. Sir R.H. Davies.....	10 March 1885.	28 Feb. 1895.
45. Sir John Strachey.....	26 May 1885.	14 May 1895.
46. Gen. Sir D.M. Stewart.....	21 Dec. 1885. re-appointed 16 Dec. 1895.	Died 26 March 1900.
47. Col. Sir O.T. Burne.....	4 Jan. 1887.	21 Dec. 1896.
48. R. Hardie.....	21 March 1887.	9 Feb. 1897.
49. Sir A.J. Arbuthnot.....	1 Nov. 1887.	1 Sept. 1897.
50. Sir J.B. Peile.....	6 Dec. 1887. re-appointed 12 Nov. 1897.	Term expired 11 Nov. 1902.
51. Sir A.C. Lyall.....	17 Jan. 1888. re-appointed 17 Jan. 1898.	Term expired 16 Jan. 1903.
52. Sir C.A. Turner.....	21 Feb. 1888.	18 Jan. 1898.
53. Lieut-Gen. Sir A. Alison.....	5 Jan. 1889.	19 Dec. 1898.
54. Sir Charles H.T. Crosthwaite...	3 March 1895.	Term expired 2 March 1905.
55. Sir Steuart C. Bayley.....	30 Oct. 1895.	Term expired 15 Sept. 1905.
56. F.C. Le Marchant.....	31 March 1896.	Term expired 26 Feb. 1906.
57. Gen. Sir J.J.H. Gordon.....	2 Jan. 1897.	Term expired 31 Dec. 1906.
58. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick.....	24 April 1897.	Term expired 23 April 1907.
59. Sir J.L. Mackay,.....	27 April 1897. (afterwards by creation re-appointed Baron Inchape).....	resigned 12 July 1911.
60. Sir John Edge.....	27 April 1907. 3 May 1898.	Term expired 29 March 1908.
61. Sir P.P. Hutchins.....	3 Aug. 1898.	Term expired 31 July 1908.
62. Sir James Westland.....	27 Sept. 1899.	Died 9 May 1903.

	<u>Date of Appointment.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
63. Lieut-Gen. A.R. Badcock.	26 March 1901.	Died 23 March 1907.
64. Sir William Lee-Warner.	12 Nov. 1902.	Term expired 11 Nov. 1912.

	<u>Date of appointment</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
65. Rt. Hon. Sir Antony P. MacDonnell, (afterwards by creation Baron MacDonnell)...	17 Jan. 1903.	Resigned Jan. 1905.
66. J.F. Finlay.....	10 May 1903.	Resigned 4 Dec. 1906.
67. Sir High S. Barnes.....	9 May 1905.	Resigned 6 Nov. 1913.
68. Lieut-Col. Sir David W.K. Barr.....	16 Aug. 1905.	Term expired 15 Aug. 1915.
69. Sir F.O. Schuster.....	26 April 1906.	Term expired 25 April 1916.
70. Sir T. Morison.....	19 Dec. 1906.	Term expired 18 Dec. 1916.
71. Gen. Sir Charles C. Egerton...	5 Feb. 1907.	Term expired 4 Feb. 1917.
72. Sir W.R. Lawrence.....	16 Oct. 1907.	Resigned 2 March 1909.
73. Sir James J.D. La Touche.....	1 Nov. 1907.	Term expired 31 Oct. 1914.
74. Saiyid Husain Bilgrami.....	11 Nov. 1907.	Resigned 30 Nov. 1909.
75. Sir Krishna Godinda Gupta....	9 March 1908.	Term expired 8 March 1915.
76. Sir Lawrence Hugh Jenkins...	30 March 1908.	Resigned 31 March 1909.
77. Sir James Thomson.....	11 Sept. 1908.	Term expired 10 Sept. 1915.
78. Sir Steyning William Edgerley.....	15 March 1909.	Term expired 15 March 1916.
79. Sir Thomas Raleigh.....	2 April 1909.	Resigned 30 June 1913.
80. Sir Abbas Ali Baig.....	4 June 1910.	Term expired 3 June 1917.
81. Lawrence Currie.....	13 July 1911.	Term expired 12 July 1918.
82. F.W. Duke.....	1 Nov. 1914.	appointed Perman- ent Under-Secretary of State for India 1 Jan. 1920.
83. Raja Sir Daljit Singh.....	9 March 1915.	Resigned 27 June 1917.
84. Sir Charles Arnold White.....	8 June 1915.	Term expired 6 June 1922.
85. Sir Murray Hammick.....	16 Aug. 1915.	Retired 7 Nov. 1921.
86. Sir C.S. Bayley.....	10 Dec. 1915. re-appointed.	Term expired Dec. 1924

	<u>Date of appointment.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
87. Sir W.D. Sheppard.....	17 April 1916.	Term expired 17 April 1923.
88. Sir Marshall Frederick Reid.	28 April 1916.	Resigned 31 Dec. 1919.
89. Gen. Sir Edmund G. Barrow....	29 Jan. 1917.	Term expired 29 Jan. 1924.
90. Sir James Bennett Brunyate..	12 May 1917.	Term expired 11 May 1924.
91. Bhupendra Nath Basu.....	5 Nov. 1917.	Resigned 15 April 1924.
92. Sahibzada Afteb Ahmen Khan...	1 Sept. 1917.	Term expired 31 Aug. 1924.
93. Sir Prabhashankar Dalpatram Pattani.....	8 Sept. 1917.	Resigned 31 Dec. 1919.
94. F.C. Boodenough.....	16 Oct. 1918. re-appointed.	Term expired 15 Oct. 1930.
95. Sir G.O. Roos-Keppel.....	19 Dec. 1919.	Died 11 Dec. 1921.

Viceroy and Governor-Generals of India.

	<u>Assumed charge of office.</u>
Viscount Canning (created Earl Canning).....	1 Nov. 1858.
The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine.....	12 March 1862.
The Rt. Hon. Sir John Lawrence (by creation Baron Lawrence)...	12 Jan. 1864.
The Earl of Mayo.....	12 Jan. 1869.
Lord Northbrook (by creation Earl of Northbrook).	3 May 1872.
Lord Lytton (created Earl of Lytton).....	12 April 1876.
The Marquis of Ripon.....	8 June 1880.
The Earl of Dufferin (created Marquis of Dufferin and Ava)...	13 Dec. 1884.
The Marquis of Lansdowne.....	10 Dec. 1888.
The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine.....	27 Jan. 1894.
Baron Curzon of Kedleston (created Marquis of Kedleston).....	6 Jan. 1899.
The Earl of Minto.....	18 Nov. 1905.
Baron Hardinge of Penshurst.....	23 Nov. 1910.
Lord Chelmsford.....	4 April 1916.

RECORD OF SERVICES OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

ALISON, Sir Archibald - Army, 1846; served in Sevastopol 1855, Mutiny, Ashanti war, Tel-el-Kebir, Egypt 1883; dep. quat. mast. genl. intelligence branch, 1878-82; member C. of I. 1889-98; **general**;

ARBUTHNOT, Sir Alexander John - Madras, 1842; chief sec. Madras, 1863; acting govr., ^{MADRAS} 1872; member govr-gen.'s council, 1875-80; vice-chancellor, Madras and Calcutta universities; member C. of I. 1887-97, author.

ARBUTHNOT, William Urquhart - Madras, 1825; agent to govr., collr. and mag. Vizagapatam, 1842-46; entered mercantile firm, Madras; appointed member C. of I. 1858-74.

BADCOCK, Sir Alexander Robert - Army 1864; served in Bhutan expedition, Hazara campaign, Perak expedition, Sudan, Chitral 1895; commissary genl-in-chief 1890; **general**; member C. of I. 1901-7.

BAIG, Sir Abbas Ali - Bombay statutory civil service, 1882; officiated as 4th presidency mag. 1893; dewan Junagadh state; member C. of I. 1910-17.

BAKER, Sir William Erskine - Bengal engr. 1826; distinguished service in P.W.D; mil. sec. I.O; **general**; elected member C. of I. 1861-76.

BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear - I.C.S. 1872; pol. agent, Quetta and Pishin, 1883; rest. Kashmir; sec. govt. of India, Foreign dept; lieut-govr, Burma 1903; member C. of I. 1905-13.

BARR, Sir David William Keith - Army, 1864; Foreign dept. of India; rest. Hyderabad, 1900; member of C. of I. 1905-15.

BARROW, Sir Edward George - Army, 1871; served in Afghan war, Egyptain expedition 1882, etc; sec. mil. dept. govt. of India 1901; A.D.C. genl. to H.M. the King, 1911; member C. of I. 1917-24.

BASU, Bhupendra Nath - member Bengal legisl. council, 1909; addl. member govr-gen.'s legisl. council, 1916; member C. of I. 1917-24.

BAYLEY, Charles Steuart Colvin - Bengal, 1856; commr. Dacca, 1873; sec. govt. of India, home dept, 1878; member govr-gen.'s council, 1882; lieut-govr, Bengal, 1887; member C. of I. 1895-1905

BAYLEY, Sir Charles Stuart - I.C.S. 1875; under sec. govt. of India, 1885; rest. Hyderabad, 1905; lieut-govr. eastern Bengal and Assam, 1911, and of Bihar and Orissa, 1912; member C. of I. 1915-24.

BILGRAMI, Saiyid Husain - dir. public instruction, Hyderabad, 1887-1902; member C. of I. 1907-09.

BRUNYATE, Sir James Bennett - I.C.S. 1889; spec. duty with International Opium Cttee, 1908; sec. govt. of India, finance dept, 1909; member C. of I. 1917-24; member Indian constitutional relations cttee. 1919.

BULLEN-SMITH, James Richard - additional member gov'r.-gen's. legisl. council, 1869-77; prest. Bengal Chamber of Commerce, and Bank of Bengal; dir. E.I. Railway Co. and B.N.W.R; member C. of I. 1884-87.

BURNE, Sir Owen Tudor - 20th East Devonshire regt, 1855; ordered to India, 1857; private sec. Lord Mayo and Lytton; sec. pol. and secret dept, India Office, 1874; member C. of I. 1887-96.

CAMPBELL, Sir George - India, 1842; wrote official account of Mutiny; judicial and fin. commr. Oudh; judge, high court, Bengal, 1862-66; lieut.-govr. Bengal; member C. of I. 1874-75; Liberal M.P., 1875-92; author.

CASSELS, Andrew - resided India 1843-51; member C. of I. 1874-84.

CAUTLEY, Sir Proby Thomas - Bengal artillery, 1819; employed constructing Doab canal, Ganges canal; appointed member C. of I. 1858-68.

CLERK, Sir. George Russell - Bengal, 1816; British envoy at Lahore, 1842; gov'r. Bombay, 1846-8 and 1860-2; sec. India Board, 1857; permanent under-sec. of state, India; nominated member C. of I. 1863-76.

CROSTHWAITE, Sir. Charles Haukes Todd - India, 1857; chief commr. C.P., 1885; chief commr. Burma; lieut.-govr., N.W.F., and Oudh, 1892-5; member C. of I. 1895-1905.

CURRIE, Bertram Wodehouse - banker, Glyn, Mills, Currie and Co; member International Monetary Conference, Brussels, 1892, and Lord Herschell Currency Cttee; member C. of I. 1880-95.

CURRIE, Sir Frederick - Bengal, 1817; judge, Sadar Adalat, N.W.P; foreign sec. govt. of India, 1842-49; baron; member supreme council; chairman E.I. Co., 1858; member C. of I. 1858-75.

CURRIE, Lawrence - Banker, (son of B.W. Currie); member C. of I. 1911-18.

DALYELL, Sir Robert Anstruther - Madras, 1850; prest. Income Tax Commn. 1865; chief sec; chief commr., Mysore; member legisl. C. of I, 1873-77; member C. of I. 1877-87.

DAVIES, Sir Robert Henry - Bengal, 1844; settlt. offr, Baree Doab, 1851; chief commr., Oudh 1869; lieut.-govr. Punjab, 1871; member C. of I. 1885-95.

DRUMMOND, Hon. Edmond - Bengal, 1831; collr. mag. and salt agent, Feroz, 1852; fin. sec. govt. of India; lieut.-govr., N.W.P, 1863; member C. of I. 1875-85.

DUKE, Sir. Frederick William - Bengal, 1882; lieut.-govr. Bengal, 1911; member C. of I., 1911-20; accompanied E.S. Montagu to India, 1917-18; permanent under-sec. of state for India, 1920.

DURAND, Col. Henry Marion - Bengal engr's., 1828; blew Cabul Gate Ghazni, 1839; private sec. Lord Ellenborough; pol. agent central India agency, 1857; elected member C. of I. 1859-61; lieut.-govr. Punjab, 1870.

EASTWICK, William Joseph - Bombay, 1827; adjt. to his regt; rest. Hyderabad; deputy chairman E.I. Co., 1858; elected member C. of I., 1858-68.

EDEN, Sir.Ashley - Bengal,1852; asst. specl. commr. Santhal insurrection,1855;sec. govt. of Bengal,1860-71; envoy to Bhutan,1863; ~~chief~~ commr. British Burma,1871; lieut.-govr. Bengal 1877; member C. of I. 1882-87.

EDGE, Sir John - called to English Bar (Middle Temple), 1866; ~~chief~~ justice, high court, N.W.P. 1886;vice-chancellor, Allhabad univ.; member C. of I. 1898-1908.

EDGERLEY, Sir Steyning William - I.C.S.1877; under-sec. govt. of India, 1888; ~~chief~~ sec. govt. of Bombay,1904; addl. member govr.-gen's. legisl. council; member C. of I. 1909-16.

EGERTON, Sir Charles Comyn - Bengal Staff Corps,1871; served in Afghan war 1880, Hazara expedition,Waziristan, Suakin 1896, etc; A.D.C to the Queen,1896; member C. of I.1907-17; field-marshal..

ELLIS, Sir Barrow Helbert - Bombay,1843; chief commr. Sind 1857; chief sec. Bombay,1860; member viceroy's council; member C. of I. 1875-85.

ELLIS,Robert Staunton - Madras,1844;addl. member govr.-gen.'s legisl. council,1860-66; chief sec. govt. Madras; Prest. Sanitary Commn,1866; member C. of I. 1872-77.

FINLAY, James Fairbrain - Bengal,1875; asst. commr. Punjab; sec. govt. of India,1892; member govr.-gen.'s council,1907; member C. of I. 1903-06.

FITZPATRICK, Sir Dennis - India,1858; specl. duty England concerning Begum Samru's case,1869; sec. legisl. dept. govt. of India, 1877-85; rest. Hyderabad; lieut.govr. Pujab,1892; member C. of I. 1897-1907.

FOSTER, Charles John - served in campaign in Afghanistan and many local campaigns in India; member C. of I. 1878-88.

FRERE,Sir Henry Bartle Edward - Bombay, 1834; chief commr. Sind, 1850-9; first non-Bengal civilian appointed to viceroy's council,1859; govr. Bombay,1862; member C. of I. 1866-77; accompanied Prince of Wales India,1875; baron; govr. Cape, first high commr. South Africa,1877.

GOODENOUGH, Frederick Craufurd - banker; sec. Hudson's Bay Co. and Union Bank of London; chairman, Barclays and Co. Ltd; member C. of I. 1918-30.

GORDON, Sir John James Hood - Bengal Staff Corps,1861; served in Mutiny, Afridi expedition, 1886; asst. mil. sec. Horse Guards; member C. of I. 1897-1906; general.

GUPTA, Krishna Gobinda - I.C.S,1871; commr. in Bengal,1901; member board of revenue,1905; member C. of I. 1908-15.

HALLIDAY, Sir Frederick James - Bengal, 1824; sec. ~~Sadder~~ Board of revenue; sec. govt. of India,1849; member govr-gen.'s council; lieut-govr. Bengal,1854; elected member C. of I. 1868-86.

HAMMICK, Sir Murray - I.C.S,1875;acting postmr.-gen. Madras, 1886; addl. member legisl. council; chief sec.1906; govr. Madras,1908; member C. of I. 1915-21.

HARDIE, Robert - banker; sec. and treasurer, Bank of Bengal for 15 years; member C. of I.1887-97.

HOGG, Sir James Weir - registrar Calcutta supreme court, 1820-33; chairman E.I. Co., 1846,-52; M.P., 1835-57; baron, 1846; elected member C. of I. 1858-72.

HUTCHINS, Philip Perceval - Madras, 1857; acting sec. revenue dept.; judge high court; member govr. - gen.'s council, 1888-91; sec. judicial and public dept., I.O.; member C. of I. 1898-1908.

JENKINS, Lawrence Hugh - called to Bar, Lincoln's Inn, 1883; chief justice high court, Bombay, 1899-1908; member C. of I. 1908-09; chief justice, Bengal, 1909.

JOHNSON, Sir Edwin Beaumont - Bengal, 1842; served in Sikh wars, mutiny; mil. sec. for Indian affairs, army headquarters, London - 1865-72; member C. of I. 1874-77; mil. member govr.-gen.'s council, 1877; general.

KHAN, Aftab Ahmad - called to Bar, Inner Temple, 1894; active member Indian Muslim League; member legisl. council, U.P. 1909; member C. of I. 1917-24.

LA TOUCHE, Sir James John Digges - I.C.S. (Bengal), 1865; settlement offr. Ajmer, 1871; commr. Upper Burma; addl. member viceroy's legisl. council, lieut.-govr. N.W.P. 1901; member C. of I. 1907-14.

LAWRENCE, John Laird Mair - Bengal, 1830; mag. and collr. Panipat and Delhi, 1844; administrator newly constituted district, Jullundur Doab; chief commr. Punjab, 1853-7; Mutiny; baron, 1858; nominated member C. of I. 1859-63; viceroy of India 1863-9.

LAWRENCE, Sir Walter Roper - I.C.S. 1877; officiated sec. govt. of India; settlt. commr. Kashmir, 1889; accompanied Prince and Princess of Wales to India, 1907; baronet; member C. of I. 1907-1909.

LE MARCHANT, Francis Charles - partner H.S. Lefuere & Co. and a dir. National Provincial Bank Ltd; member C. of I. 1896-1906.

LEE-WARNER, Sir William - Bombay, 1867; asst. commr. Sind, 1876; sec. govt. of Bombay; addl. member viceroy's council, 1893; rest. Mysore and chief commr. Coorg; member C. of I. 1902-12; author.

LUMSDEN, Sir Peter Stark - Bengal army, 1847; asst. pol. agent, Afghanistan, 1857; chief of the staff, 1879; member C. of I. 1883-93.

LYALL, Sir Alfred Comyn - Bengal, 1856; govr. gen.'s agent, Rajpootana; foreign sec. govt. of India, 1878; lieut. govr. N.W.P. and Oudh; member C. of I. 1888-1903; Rede lecturer, Cambridge and Ford lecturer, Oxford; author.

MACDONNELL, Antony Patrick - I.C.S. 1865; sec. govt. Bengal; sec. govt. India, 1887; lieut.-govr. N.W.P. and Oudh; chairman Famine Commn. 1901; member C. of I. 1903-05; permanent under-sec. Ireland; baron.

MACKAY, James Lyle - shipowner; chairman, Bengal chamber of commerce; member viceroy's legisl. council; member C. of I. 1897-1911; specl. commr. for commercial negotiations with China, 1901; peer.

MACNAGHTON, Elliot - served in supreme court of Calcutta, 1823-39; chairman E.I. Co. 1855; elected member C. of I. 1858-72.

MANGLES, Ross Donnelly - Bengal, 1819; sec. board of revenue, lower provinces, 1834; officiating sec., ogvt. of India; M.P. 1841-58; chairman E.I. Co. 1857; elected member C. of I. 1858-74.

MAINE, Sir Henry James Summer - Corpus Professor Jurisprudence Oxford; Master of Trinity Hall and Whewell professor of international law, Cambridge; author of "Ancient Law" and equally other/important books; legal member, govr. gen's. council, 1862-9; member C. of I. 1871-88.

MALLET, Sir Louis - economist; board of trade; principal authority on questions of commercial policy; member C. of I. 1872-74; under-sec. of state for India.

MEREWETHER, Sir William Lockyer - Bombay army, 1841; Sind campaign, 1843; pol. agent, Aden; commanded pioneer force, Abyssinia, 1867; chief commr. Sind; member C. of I. 1877-80.

MILLS, Charles - business man; director E.I. Co; elected member C. of I. 1858-63; baron.

MONTGOMERY, Sir Henry Conyngham - Madras, 1825; chief sec; member of govr.'s council 1855-7; member C. of I. 1858-76.

MONTGOMERY, Sir Robert - Bengal, 1827; commr. Punjab, 1849; chief commr. Oudh; provisional member govr. gen.'s council; lieut. govr. Punjab, 1859; elected member C. of I. 1868-87.

MORISON, Sir Theodore - tutor Maharajah, Chhatarpur, 1886; professor Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College; addl. member viceroy's legisl. council; member C. of I. 1906-16.

MUIR, Sir William - Bengal, 1837; settlement offr, Cawnpore and Bundelkhand; foreign sec. govt. of India; lieut.-govr. N.W.P. 1868; member C. of I. 1876-85; authority on Muslim history - wrote "Life of Mahomet" etc; principal, Edinburgh Univ.

NORMAN, Sir Henry Wylie - Bengal army, 1844; served Sikh war, Kohat Pass etc; A.D.C. Queen Victoria, 1863-9; mil. member govr. gen.'s council, 1870-77; member C. of I. 1878-83; general; govr. Jamaica and Queensland; declined viceroyalty of India, 1893.

PATTANI, Sir Prabhaskar Dalpatram -/Bhavnagar State; Dewan, temporary member executive council, Bombay, 1912-15; member C. of I. 1917-19.

PEILE, Sir James Braithwaite - India, 1856; settled claims of Bhavnagar ruler against British govt. 1859; pol. agent, Kathiawar; acted govr. 1885; vice-chancellor, Bombay Univ; member supreme council, 1886; member C. of I. 1887-1902.

PERRY, Sir Thomas Erskine - barrister, Inner Temple, 1834; chief justice, Bombay, 1840; M.P. 1854-9; nominated member C. of I. 1859-82; author.

PRINSEP, Henry Thoby - Bengal, 1807; Persian sec. to the govt. 1820; member of the council; dir. E.I. Co; elected member C. of I. 1858-74; author.

RALEIGH, Sir Thomas- reader English Law, Oxford; registrar Privy Council; legal member govr. gen.'s council, 1899; vice-chancellor, Calcutta univ; member C. of I. 1909-13; author.

RAWLINSON, Sir Henry Creswicke - Bombay, 1827; pol. agent, Kandhar 1840, Turkish Arabia and Bagdad, 1843-44, envoy to Persia 1865; deciphered cuneiform inscription of Darius Hystaspes; dir. E.I. Co., member C. of I. 1858-59 - 1868-95; assyriologist; baron.

REID, Sir Marshall Frederick - member viceroy's legisl. council, 1914; chairman, Bombay chamber of commerce; member C. of I. 1916-19.

ROOS-KEPPEL, Sir George Olof - army 1886; pol. agent, Khyber, 1899-1908; chief commr. and agent to govr. genl. N.W.F.P; member C. of I. 1919-21.

SCHUSTER, Sir Felix - govr. of Union Bank since 1895; member C. of I. 1906-16.

SHEPHERD, John - Chairman E.I. Co. 1844, 1850; elected member C. of I. 1858-59; deputy govr. Hudson Bay Co.

SHEPPARD, Sir William Didsbury - Bombay, 1884; municipal commr. city of Bombay, 1905; temporary member govr.'s executive council; member C. of I. 1916-23.

SINGH, Raja Daljit - member govr.-gen.'s legisl. council, 1913-15; member C. of I. 1915-17; chief minister, Kashmir.

STEWART, Sir Donald Martin - Bengal, 1840; chief commr. Andaman and Nicobar, 1871; served Mutiny, Abyssinian expedition, Afghan war; made celebrated march to Kabul, 1880; baronet; C.-in-C. India, 1880; member C. of I. 1885-1909; field-marshal.

STRACHEY, Sir John - Bengal, 1842; prest. permanent Sanitary Commn. 1864; chief commr. Oudh, 1866; acting govr.-gen. for a fortnight in 1872; lieut.-govr. N.W.P., 1874; finance member govr.-gen.'s council, 1876; member C. of I. 1885-95; author.

STRACHEY, Sir Richard - Bombay engr. 1836; made scientific explorations in Himalayas; inspector-genl. of irrigation, 1866; member C. of I. 1875-78, 1879-89; prest. Famine Commn. 1878; chairman, E.I. Railway & meteorological council, London, 1893; author.

THOMSON, Sir James - India, 1869; rest. Travancore and Cochin, 1895; acted govr. Madras; prest. excise cttee. 1905; member C. of I. 1908-15.

TURNER, Sir Charles Arthur - chief justice, Madras, 1879; member Indian law commn. 1879, and Public service commn. 1885; vice-chancellor, Madras univ; member C. of I. 1888-98.

VIVIAN, Sir Robert John Hussey - India, 1819; served Burmese war, 1824 and commanded Turkish contingent in Crimea, 1855; dir. E.I. Co; member C. of I. 1858-74; general.

WESTLAND, Sir James - I.C.S., 1861; compotor-genl. and head commr. of State paper currency, 1881; chief commr. Assam; fin. member govr.-gen.'s council 1893; member C. of I. 1899-1903.

WHITE, Sir Charles Arnold - Bar, Inner Temple, 1883; chief justice, Madras, 1899; member C. of I. 1915-22.

WILDE, Sir Alfred Thomas - India 1838; distinguished himself in campaign against Borzdar Baluchies 1857 and others; member C. of I. 1876-78.

WILLOUGHBY, Sir John Pollard - Bombay, 1817, pol. agent, Kathiawar, 1832; chief sec. Bombay, 1845; dir. E.I. Co; member C. of I. 1858-66.

WOLSELEY, Garnet Joseph, Viscount Wolseley - served in second Burma war 1852, etc., commanded expedition against King Koffee of Ashanti, 1873; asst. adjt.-genl. War Office, 1871; administrator and genl. commanding, Natal, 1875; member C. of I 1876-78; C.-in-C. British army, 1895.

YULE, Sir Henry - Bengal engrs, 1838; worked on restoration of irrigation system of Moghuls in N.W.P. 1842-9; sec. to Col. Phayre's embassy to Burma, 1855; member C. of I. 1875-89; author; geographer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

This bibliography includes all the important sources consulted in writing this thesis.

The private papers of the three Secretaries of State, Northcote, Kimberley and Hamilton and of the Viceroy's Lawrence, Lytton and Ripon, covering practically the whole period, have been of invaluable help in writing the three first chapters. Since these contain the private opinions of the chiefs of the Indian administration they throw light on the difficulties and problems they faced. Much is thus known of the influence of the Council on the policy of those in authority and this in no way could have been traced in official papers. In this respect the private papers of the Secretaries of State Kimberley and Hamilton and of the Viceroy's Lytton and Ripon have been especially useful because of the abundance of material and also because they cover the period 1876-1903 which is the period in the Council's history of which previously we have known little.

Also of great value are the notes and committee reports of the councillors. They are scattered in a variety of places, in and with the original drafts of the despatches, in the 'Collections to the Despatches', in the 'Home Correspondence Series'. These papers, most of which have not been hitherto consulted are especially valuable in

throwing light on the work done by the councillors in the different departments at the India Office. They provide evidence not to be found in the private papers. In writing the chapters on the Civil Service and on economic policy, they have been particularly helpful. Though I have looked at the original despatches to India from the Public Works Department, and also from the Military and Educational Departments etc., I have neither used them in the main text of the thesis nor mentioned them in the bibliography. They have, however, enabled me to confirm the opinion that I have formed of the Council's work and influence.

The 'Minutes of the Council' and 'Dissents by Members' have also been of great help, providing an exact picture and making clear the extent of agreement or difference between the various Secretaries of State and their councillors.

1. CONTEMPORARY MATERIAL.

(a) IN MANUSCRIPT.

(1) Private Papers.

British Museum.

Ripon Papers. Vol.ci to Vol.cv (Add.MSS. No.43610 to to Add.MSS. No.43614) - Hartington and Kimberley to Ripon and vice versa; Vol.lxxxvi to Vol.Xc (Add.MSS. No.43595 to Add.MSS. No.43599) - correspondence in England.

Public Record Office.(On Loan).

Northcote Papers. Letter Book i to iv - Northcote to Lawrence, Fitzgerald, Napier, Temple, Arbuthnot, Macnaghten, Prinsep etc.; (Loose) Letters to Northcote from Cranborne, Lawrence etc.

Lytton Papers. Vol.i to v - Salisbury and Cranbrook to Lytton; Vol.i to iv and vi - Letters despatched.

India Office.

John Lawrence Papers. Vol.i to v - Wood, de Grey, Cranborne and Northcote to Lawrence; Vol.vi to ix - Lawrence to Wood, de Grey, Cranborne and Northcote. Hamilton Papers. Vol.i to vii - Hamilton to Elgin and Curzon; Vol.i to xxiv - Elgin and Curzon to Hamilton.

Kimberley Papers. The papers of Lord Kimberley are in the possession of the present Lord Kimberley at Wymondham, Norfolk. Vol.i and ii - Telegrams to and from India; Six volumes of letters from Kimberley to Ripon, Dufferin, Lansdowne and Elgin; Seven volumes of letters from Ripon, Dufferin, Lansdowne and Elgin to Kimberley; (Loose) letters to and from Lord Chancellor, Mallet, Godley, Maine etc.

(2) Official papers in the India Office.

- Collections to Educational Despatches to India - Vol.12.
- Collections to Financial Despatches to India - Vol.1,5, 10, 40, 42, 53, 57, 73, 92.
- Collections to Political Despatches to India - Vol.89.
- Collections to Public Despatches to India - Vol.58, 60 66, 67.
- Collections to Revenue Despatches to India - Vol.10,18,29.
- Dissents by Members of Council - Vol.i to iv (1859-1903)
- Educational Despatches to India (original) - Vol.1 to 6 (1858-79).
- Enclosures to Financial Letters from India - Vol.63.
- Financial Despatches to India (original) - Vol.1 to 42 (1858-1900).
- Judicial Despatches to Bombay (original) - Vol.1 to 7 (1858-79).
- Legislative Despatches to India (original) - Vol.1 to 22 (1858-79).
- ✓ Minutes of the Council of India - Vol.1 to 85 (1858-1900).
- Revenue Despatches to India (original) - Vol.7 to 27 (1858-79), Vol.1 to 21 (copies, 1880-1900).
- ✓ Public Despatches to India (original) - Vol.1 to 22 (1858-79).
- Public Home Correspondence - Vol.19,20,22,26,27,28, (1862-67, 1873-76).
- Political Despatches to India (original) - Vol.1 to 17 (1858-73).
- Political and Secret Despatches to India (original) - Vol.1 to 22 (1874-96).
- Secret Despatches to India, Madras, Bombay, Aden, Muscat etc. - Vol.1 to 6 (1859-73).
- Separate Revenue Letters from India - Vol.6.

Maine, H.S., Memorandum on the Act for the Better

Government of India, Confidential, 8 November 1880.

(b) PRINTED PAPERS.

Acts of Parliament,
 Acts of the Legislative Council of India.
 Collection No.276 - Tariff Acts and the Cotton Duties.
 Financial Statement of the Government of India, 1860-1919.
 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 1858-1883.
 Indian Army and Civil Service List, 1858-1876.
 The India List, 1877-1906.
 The India Office List, 1886-1919.
 India Register, 1820-57.
 India Parliamentary Debates, 1884-1919.

Parliamentary Papers:- On the membership of the Council of India: Vol.xlii paper 23 (1864); xlvii paper 111 (1868-69); xlv paper 58 (1872); lxxiii paper 244 (1877); lix paper 254 (1884); lix paper 127 (1890-91). On Civil Service: Vol.xxiii paper 81 (1859); xlii paper 429 (1864); l paper 178 (1867-68); lviii paper c.4580 (1884-85). On Land Revenue: Vol.liii paper 159 (1870). On Cotton Duties: Vol.lvi paper 216,333 (1876); lv paper 188 (1878-79); lxxii paper 202 (1895). On Presidency Banks: Vol.xv paper c.4162 (1868-69).

Reports:-

- ✓ Report of the Committee on the Home Administration of India, 1919, cmd.207.
- Report of the Indian Currency Committee, 1893, Coll.No.270.
- Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, cd.9109.
- Report of the Indian Expenditure Commission, 1900, Vol.i, Coll.No.278.
- Reports of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1919.
- Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, 1919, Vol.i and ii, Coll.No.203.
- Report of the Mesopotamia Commission, 1917, cd.8610.
- Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87, (Calcutta, 1888).
- Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, 1915, cd.8382.

(c) NEWSPAPERS.

The Times, 1858-1919.

(d) LETTERS.

The letters of Queen Victoria, Vol.iii, (1854-61), edited by A.C. Benson and Viscount Esher; Vol.i, (1862-69), edited by G.E. Buckle.

II LATER PUBLISHED WORKS.

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(London, 1901).
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(Calcutta, 1919).
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Volumes i and ii (London, 1917, 1922).
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- ✓✓ IMLAH, A.H., Lord Ellenborough (London, 1939).
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(London, 1936).
- ✓ KENNEDY, A.L., Salisbury (London, 1953).
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Volume i, (London, 1890).
- ✓ LAWRENCE, SIR W.R., The India we Served (London, 1928).
- LECKY, W.E.H., A Prefactory Memoir of Edward Henry XVth Earl of Derby (London, 1894).
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MARTIN, T., The Life of his Royal highness The Prince Consort.
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From 1859 to 1866 (London, 1867).

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✓ WOLF, L., Life of Lord Ripon. 2 Volumes (London, 1921).

EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS.

Addl.	Additional.
Adjt.	Adjutant.
Asst.	Assistant.
C. of I.	Council of India.
C.P.	Central Provinces.
Co.	Company.
Collr.	Collector.
Commr.	Commissioner.
Cttee.	Committee.
DNB.	Dictionary of National Biography.
Dept.	Department.
Dir.	Director.
Engrs.	Engineers.
Fin.	Financial.
Genl.	General.
Govr.	Governor.
Govr-Gen.'s.	Governor-General's.
Govt.	Government.
I.O.	India Office.
Legisl.	Legislative.
Lieut.	Lieutenant.
M.C.I.	Minutes of the Council of India.
Mag.	Magistrate.
Mil.	Military.
Offr.	Officer.
Pol.	Political.
Postmr.-Gen.	Postmaster-General.
Prest.	President.
Regt.	Regiment.
Rest.	Resident.
Sec.	Secretary.
Settlt.	Settlement.
Speci.	Special.
U.K.	United Kingdom.
Univ.	University.