

SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

# Diasporic geopolitics, rising powers, and the future of international order

Fiona B. Adamson<sup>1</sup>  and Enze Han<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of London, London, UK and <sup>2</sup>Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China

**Corresponding author:** Fiona B. Adamson; Email: [fa33@soas.ac.uk](mailto:fa33@soas.ac.uk)

(Received 22 May 2023; revised 20 November 2023; accepted 12 January 2024)

## Abstract

This article examines ‘diasporic geopolitics’ as a significant factor in the future of global politics. Whereas discussions of global order in IR have been highly spatialised, we instead highlight the extent to which different regions of the world are entangled via ongoing migration processes, and their legacies in the form of global diasporas. We examine the significance of these interconnections by focusing on rising powers and their relations with the existing international order. Major migration-sending states such as China, India, and Turkey are now aspiring great powers that seek to exert global influence in international affairs. In this context, their diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation, with diasporas increasingly understood as important assets for promoting sending states’ geopolitical agendas and great power ambitions. We examine three mechanisms by which such states exert power transnationally via their diaspora engagement policies. States can treat ‘their’ diasporas as economic assets that facilitate trade and foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of ‘civilisational’ politics; and as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed. We conclude by discussing the implications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years.

**Keywords:** China; civilisational politics; diaspora; geopolitics; India; rising powers; transnationalism; transnational repression; Turkey

## Introduction

Over the past century, significant international migration flows have led to the formation of global diaspora populations that create enduring connections between and across states.<sup>1</sup> Combined with the rise in power of some major migration-sending countries, this has led to a transformation in how these states engage with diaspora populations outside their territories. What will the impacts of this be for the future of world politics over the next 50 years? We propose that ‘diasporic geopolitics’ is set to play a significant role in the future of international relations as rising powers increasingly seek to exert influence in international affairs via mechanisms of diaspora engagement that harness the power of populations abroad. These transnational forms of power projection, which have been identified by a number of scholars of diaspora politics, have been understudied in mainstream International Relations (IR) yet are of great consequence for thinking about the future of international order.

In this article, we examine global processes of migratory entanglement, how they have developed, and what they may portend for the future of international relations over the next 50 years.

<sup>1</sup>Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2023).

We argue that increases in state capacity and geopolitical ambitions have led to a transformation in how rising powers engage with diaspora populations outside their territories. Countries such as China, India, and Turkey have been major migrant-sending states but have now become more economically developed. States which once viewed their diasporas primarily as a source of migrant remittances in order to promote domestic economic development increasingly take a broader foreign policy view of diaspora engagement. As aspiring great powers that seek to exert regional and global influence, these countries' diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation that has wide-ranging impacts on states within which such populations reside. More and more, diaspora populations are understood to be important assets in promoting rising powers' geopolitical agendas.<sup>2</sup>

While recent years have seen a burgeoning literature on rising powers, particularly on a set of countries that have aspirations to great power status, there has not been an overall assessment of how diaspora governance policies in these countries have changed as a result of their changing power capabilities, and what the implications of this are for understanding the future of global order.<sup>3</sup> In this context, we argue that diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation in line with the heightened capabilities of states. Such processes are not entirely new in world politics, but they are still understudied and poorly understood in IR, and are of particular significance for understanding how states will exercise power and influence (and experience the exercise of power and influence) over the next 50 years.

This article seeks to fill an important gap in the IR literature by exploring in greater detail 'diasporic geopolitics' and its implications for understanding the future of global politics.<sup>4</sup> In doing so, we seek to answer the following questions. What are the dominant features of rising powers' diaspora governance policy changes? How might such policies reshape the contours of geopolitical competition in an increasingly entangled global order? In order to do so, we bring together insights from diaspora studies and International Relations theory, focusing on state diaspora engagement dynamics as a central area of inquiry. In addition to identifying an important set of policy issues, answering these questions is of theoretical significance, since it necessitates bringing together insights from both statist and transnational paradigms in order to examine how migration patterns shape and intersect with state power projection strategies.

In the rest of this article, we examine these issues in the following manner. First, we build on the interdisciplinary literature in migration and diaspora studies to develop an 'entangled' view of power politics that focuses on diaspora engagement policies as a transnational expression of state power, arguing that the aims and objectives of diaspora engagement policies change over time in relation to a state's capacity and geopolitical ambitions. We then identify three mechanisms by which rising powers exert power transnationally via their diaspora engagement policies: as economic assets that facilitate trade and foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of 'civilisational' politics; and as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed as a means of managing and promoting states' public image abroad. For each of these mechanisms, we provide examples from three rising powers that have also been major migrant-sending states – China, India, and Turkey. We conclude by discussing the implications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years, arguing that the field

<sup>2</sup>On diasporas as assets, see Yehonatan Abramson, 'Securitizing the nation beyond the state: Diasporas as threats, victims, and assets', *European Journal of International Relations* (2023) (online first, <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661221151036>).

<sup>3</sup>See, e.g., Vikash Chandra, 'Rising powers and the future international order', *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 22:1 (2018), pp. 10–23; Oliver Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the Future of Global Order*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020).

<sup>4</sup>We use the term 'diasporic geopolitics' rather than other terms (such as 'human geopolitics' or 'biopolitics') to describe the spatial and entangled geopolitical motivations and effects of such policies. In our view, this term more accurately describes current transnational dynamics and distinguishes them from previous iterations of geopolitical competition over populations (such as the League of Nations minority treaties or Nazi *Lebensraum* policies discussed by Gamlen [pp. 6–7]). See Alan Gamlen, *Human Geopolitics: States, Emigrants, and the Rise of Diaspora Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

has relied on an oversimplified view of the spatial aspects of power politics, including the extent to which states are interconnected via global migration processes.

### Migration, diaspora engagement, and transnational power politics

Global inequalities, colonial histories, and forms of uneven and combined development have spurred migration flows which have created enduring connections across states in the form of transnational social ties, but also transnational forms of governmentality, such as the diaspora engagement policies of migration-sending states.<sup>5</sup> For many states outside the Global North, emigration has played a significant factor in their economic development, with states relying on out-migration as a source of remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI).

In the process, states have established institutions and policies to govern 'their' diasporas abroad.<sup>6</sup> State diaspora management policies can vary depending on where diasporas are located and the political interests of the sending state.<sup>7</sup> State policies can range from providing diaspora members with VIP status and encouraging remittances and investment, to promoting dual citizenship and voting from abroad.<sup>8</sup> Such state diaspora programmes have often been viewed as a benign form of 'migration governance' in which states respond to norms promoted by international organisations to design diaspora policies for the purposes of facilitating more efficient and stable migration management and economic development.<sup>9</sup> Yet others have noted that the reasons behind state interests in engaging their diasporas can vary, producing different types of diaspora engagement policies – from a focus on harnessing remittances, to building 'global nations', to enhancing a state's soft power and ability to engage in public diplomacy, to a focus on policing and surveillance.<sup>10</sup>

The management of emigration by post-colonial and other states as part of their developmental strategies points to the extent to which *emigration* management has also created incentives for the emergence of transnational state structures – leading to de facto forms of interstate entanglement.<sup>11</sup> As Collyer notes: 'For home governments, emigration creates a mismatch between techniques of governmentality and techniques of territoriality that must be addressed if they are to retain

<sup>5</sup>There is now a vast interdisciplinary literature on state diaspora engagement policies, as discussed in this section. For early work, see, e.g., Michel S. Laguerre, 'State, diaspora, and transnational politics: Haiti reconceptualised', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 28:3 (1999), pp. 633–51; Rachel Sherman, 'From state introversion to state extension in Mexico: Modes of emigrant incorporation, 1900–1997', *Theory and Society*, 28:6 (1999), pp. 835–78; Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, 'Diaspora politics: Ethnic linkages, foreign policy, and security in Eurasia', *International Security*, 24:3 (1999), pp. 108–38; Fiona B. Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou, 'Remapping the boundaries of "state" and "national identity": Incorporating diasporas into IR theorizing', *European Journal of International Relations*, 13:4 (2007), pp. 489–526; Yossi Shain, *Kinship & Diasporas in International Affairs* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007).

<sup>6</sup>Michael Collyer, 'Introduction: Locating and narrating emigration nations', in Michael Collyer (ed.), *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1–24; Alan Gamlen, 'The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination', *Political Geography*, 27:8 (2008), pp. 840–56; Alexandra Délano and Alan Gamlen, 'Comparing and theorizing state–diaspora relations', *Political Geography*, 41 (2014), pp. 43–53; David FitzGerald, 'Inside the sending state: The politics of Mexican emigration control', *International Migration Review*, 40:2 (2006), pp. 259–93.

<sup>7</sup>Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Why do states develop multi-tier emigrant policies? Evidence from Egypt', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41:13 (2015), pp. 2192–214; Maria Koinova, 'Beyond statist paradigms: Sociospatial positionality and diaspora mobilization in International Relations', *International Studies Review*, 19:4 (2017), pp. 597–621.

<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., Adamson and Demetriou, 'Remapping the boundaries'; Gamlen, *Human Geopolitics*; Katrina Burgess, *Courting Migrants: How States Make Diasporas and Diasporas Make States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

<sup>9</sup>Alan Gamlen, 'Diaspora institutions and diaspora governance', *International Migration Review*, 48 (2014), pp. S180–217.

<sup>10</sup>Francesco Ragazzi, 'A comparative analysis of diaspora policies', *Political Geography*, 41 (2014), pp. 74–89; Liza Mügge, 'Ideologies of nationhood in sending-state transnationalism: Comparing Surinam and Turkey', *Ethnicities*, 13:3 (2013), pp. 338–58; Laurie A. Brand, *Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>11</sup>Michael Collyer and Russell King, 'Producing transnational space: International migration and the extra-territorial reach of state power', *Progress in Human Geography*, 39:2 (2015), pp. 185–204; Fiona B. Adamson, 'Entangled migration states: Mobility and state-building in France and Algeria', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 50:3 (2024), pp. 597–616.

influence on their emigrant populations.<sup>12</sup> The governance of diasporas abroad thus represents a spatial extension of state power and control that complicates our understandings of how state power operates in international affairs.

Much of contemporary migration management – whether it be diaspora engagement or processes of migration policy externalisation and ‘remote control’ – exhibits a degree of spatial entanglement in the form of transnational state structures – structures that may not always conform with the spatial expectations of the Westphalian model.<sup>13</sup> Certainly, not all diasporic communities themselves identify with the concerns of their states of origin, and there can be significant variations especially over generations. However, from the point of migration-sending states, gaining the loyalty of the diaspora is exactly the purpose of such forms of migration management. These transnational state practices that embrace ‘co-nationals’ and diasporas beyond the state suggest the need to theorise the state beyond the constraints of a territorially based methodological nationalism in which North and South inhabit separate geographical spheres, but also to better understand the various ways in which states exercise (transnational) forms of power in world politics.<sup>14</sup>

It has been well documented in the literature on migration governance that states frequently ‘harness the power of migration’ and use migration flows as forms of leverage in their relations with other states.<sup>15</sup> Yet just as states engage in forms of ‘migration diplomacy’, so too have they been shown to leverage diasporas as a means of engaging in forms of ‘diaspora diplomacy.’<sup>16</sup> Indeed, diaspora engagement policies can be used as a means of state power projection and, as Gamlen has noted, constitute a type of ‘human geopolitics.’<sup>17</sup> Such engagement policies are in effect an extra-territorial extension of state power into the territorial and juridical space of other states.<sup>18</sup> This impacts not just on diaspora and emigrant communities living abroad, but also on the states in which such communities reside.

For example, state diaspora engagement policies can include attempts to actively mobilise constituencies abroad or alternatively to exercise control over them – resulting in what has been termed a ‘contested embrace’ of diasporas.<sup>19</sup> Such practices affect not only the target populations themselves, but also the societies and politics of the states in which they reside, challenging traditional notions of state sovereignty. This has often been understood in the literature as a spill-over effect of policies that are primarily motivated by domestic interests in controlling populations abroad.<sup>20</sup> We argue, however, that in many cases diaspora policies can also be seen as forms of ‘diasporic geopolitics’ that states employ as part of broader strategies of exerting geopolitical power and influence

<sup>12</sup>Michael Collyer, ‘Transnational political participation of Algerians in France. Extra-territorial civil society versus transnational governmentality’, *Political Geography*, 25:7 (2006), pp. 836–49.

<sup>13</sup>Thomas Lacroix, ‘The transnational state and migration: Reach, flows and policies’, *Political Geography*, 94 (2022), p. 102571. On ‘remote control’, see also Aristide R. Zolberg, ‘The archaeology of remote control’, in Andreas Fahrmeier, Oliver Faron, and Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North-Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period* (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp. 195–222; Fiona B. Adamson, ‘Re-spatialising migration governance: From “multi-level” to “entangled”’, *International Migration*, 61:6 (2023), pp. 3–14.

<sup>14</sup>Peggy Levitt and Rafael de la Dehesa, ‘Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: Variations and explanations’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 26:4 (2003), pp. 587–611.

<sup>15</sup>Fiona B. Adamson, ‘Crossing borders: International migration and national security’, *International Security*, 31:1 (2006), pp. 165–99; Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy*, 1st ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas, ‘Migration diplomacy in world politics’, *International Studies Perspectives*, 20:2 (2019), pp. 113–28.

<sup>16</sup>Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Fiona McConnell, ‘Conceptualizing “diaspora diplomacy”: Territory and populations betwixt the domestic and foreign’, *Progress in Human Geography*, 43:2 (2019), pp. 235–55; Liam Kennedy (ed.), *Routledge International Handbook of Diaspora Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2022).

<sup>17</sup>Alan Gamlen, *Human Geopolitics: States, Emigrants, and the Rise of Diaspora Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

<sup>18</sup>Collyer, ‘Transnational political participation of Algerians in France’; Collyer and King, ‘Producing transnational space.’

<sup>19</sup>Jaeun Kim, *Contested Embrace: Transborder Membership Politics in Twentieth-Century Korea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).

<sup>20</sup>Marcus Michaelsen and Johannes Thumfart, ‘Drawing a line: Digital transnational repression against political exiles and host state sovereignty’, *European Journal of International Security*, 8:2 (2023), pp. 151–71.

beyond the state. In the following section, we discuss this in more detail, suggesting three mechanisms of diasporic geopolitics used by rising powers, with examples from countries that have also traditionally been migration-sending states.

### Rising powers and mechanisms of diasporic geopolitics

As many countries outside the Global North have experienced rapid growth over the past decades, some of them have become significant global players with regional and global ambitions. In this context, state diaspora engagement policies need to be understood as having an outward-looking and foreign policy agenda as much as an inward and domestic capacity-building agenda. Although many states have developed diaspora engagement policies, the policies of rising powers are of special significance due to their growing state capacity and geopolitical ambitions.<sup>21</sup> Increasingly, they are engaging in forms of ‘diasporic geopolitics’ as a means of projecting power and exerting influence abroad, with shifting policy aims, instruments, and audiences that extend beyond the harnessing of remittances or the protection of populations abroad.

Historical migration flows have helped to constitute existing global diaspora communities, and they are evidence of interstate entanglements that often fall under the radar in mainstream IR. Global communities that are the object of contemporary state-led diaspora engagement policies have their origins in earlier periods of forced displacement and imperial conquest, including colonial plantation economies that relied on slavery and indentured labour.<sup>22</sup> Others have their origin in mid-20th-century patterns of labour migration, including post-colonial movements from ex-colonies to former metropolises and post-World War II patterns of low-skilled economic migration. An additional layer of diaspora populations includes recent and contemporary migrants, émigrés, and citizens living abroad – in this sense, there is no single definition of what constitutes a diaspora.<sup>23</sup> The term ‘diaspora’ therefore needs to be understood as a category of practice used by states (and other actors) to constitute particular groups as ‘diasporic.’<sup>24</sup> In our discussion, we focus specifically on the cases of China, India, and Turkey as a means of providing a focused way of tracing historical trajectories of entangled histories of migration; the emergence of state-led diaspora engagement policies; and the concomitant transformation of such policies in tandem with the growing capacity and geopolitical ambitions of states that are widely considered to be rising powers.

China can be thought of as one of the historically largest migrant-sending states, with tens of millions of overseas Chinese. Starting in the mid-19th century, there was significant outbound migration as a result of European imperial powers opening up Chinese port cities, and Chinese labour was exported to plantations and mines in the Caribbean, North America, Southeast Asia, and beyond.<sup>25</sup> Warfare and revolutions in the first half of the 20th century not only sped up the pace of emigration but also set up competing political regimes in Taipei versus Beijing that vied

<sup>21</sup> While there have been general studies of diaspora engagement policies (e.g. Gamlen, *Human Geopolitics*), and case studies of individual states (e.g. Latha Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)), we are unaware of work that focuses specifically on the relationship between a state’s rising power and its diaspora engagement policies, nor work that explicitly compares the policies and approaches of China, India, and Turkey as rising powers.

<sup>22</sup> See, e.g., Audie Klotz, *Migration and National Identity in South Africa, 1860–2010* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Fiona B. Adamson, ‘Sending states and the making of intra-diasporic politics: Turkey and its diaspora(s)’, *International Migration Review*, 53:1 (2019), pp. 210–36.

<sup>24</sup> Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “identity”’, *Theory and Society*, 29:1 (2000), pp. 1–47; Stéphane Dufoix, *Diasporas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Francesco Ragazzi, ‘Governing diasporas’, *International Political Sociology*, 3:4 (2009), pp. 378–97.

<sup>25</sup> Adam McKeown, ‘Chinese emigration in global context, 1850–1940’, *Journal of Global History*, 5:1 (2010), pp. 95–124.

for loyalty among the overseas Chinese community during the Cold War.<sup>26</sup> After the opening up of the Chinese mainland in the late 1970s, new waves of emigration occurred, with Chinese students and labour migrating to Western countries. These new migrants, the so-called *xinyimin*, often have stronger ties with the contemporary Chinese state and society and a more complex diasporic engagement with China.<sup>27</sup>

A similarly long historical trajectory of emigration characterises India, dating back to religious and merchant trading communities in the pre-colonial era, but then entering a new phase during the colonial period as India became a source of indentured labour, with extensive intra-imperial migration to other colonial territories, such as Ceylon/Sri Lanka, the Caribbean, South and East Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. India witnessed a wave of post-colonial migration to the UK, but also increasing migration to North America, first of low-skilled labour with the relaxation of US immigration restrictions in the 1960s, and increasingly including high-skilled labour from the 1990s with a surge in high-tech industry migration from the beginning of the 21st century, with 75 per cent of all US H1-B visas being awarded to Indians by the 2018.<sup>28</sup> Estimates suggest that the global Indian diaspora could include 20 million individuals over 110 countries.<sup>29</sup>

Turkey's history of emigration similarly dates back to its imperial past, with intra-imperial migration throughout the period of the Ottoman Empire, and then significant emigration during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including both economic migration and forced migrations of minorities.<sup>30</sup> During the mid-20th century, there was labour migration from Turkey to European states, as well as to states in the Middle East, as Turkey encouraged the export of labour as part of its overall economic development strategy, sending migrant workers to Germany and other states in Western Europe as part of a managed labour recruitment and 'guestworker' policy.<sup>31</sup> Since the 2010s, there has been a wave of educated middle-class emigration from Turkey to Europe, the United States, and elsewhere that occurred in the context of increasing domestic autocratisation following state suppression of protests in 2013 and additional repressive measures following a 2016 coup attempt.<sup>32</sup>

Each of these states has seen a shift in its diaspora policies in line with their growth in capacity, power, and geopolitical position and has increasingly viewed their diasporas as foreign policy assets. We identify and provide examples of the effects of increasing power and global ambitions on three recognised mechanisms by which states can exert power transnationally via their diaspora engagement policies: by treating populations abroad as economic assets that facilitate trade and foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of 'civilisational' politics;

<sup>26</sup>Enze Han, 'Bifurcated homeland and diaspora politics in China and Taiwan towards the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45:4 (2019), pp. 577–94.

<sup>27</sup>Hong Liu, 'New migrants and the revival of overseas Chinese nationalism', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14:43 (2005), pp. 291–316.

<sup>28</sup>Daniel Naujoks, *Migration, Citizenship, and Development: Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ari Hoffman and Jean Batalova, 'Indian immigrants in the United States', *Migration Policy Institute* (MPI) (7 December 2022), available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states>; 'Three-fourths of H1B Visa Holders in 2018 are Indians: US report', *The Economic Times* (20 October 2018), available at: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/visa-and-immigration/three-fourths-of-h1b-visa-holders-in-2018-are-indians-us-report/articleshow/66289772.cms?from=mdr>.

<sup>29</sup>Devesh Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 33.

<sup>30</sup>Adamson, 'Sending states and the making of intra-diasporic politics'; Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman emigration to America, 1860–1914', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 17:2 (1985), pp. 175–209; A. Deniz Balgamiş (ed.), *Turkish Migration to the United States: From Ottoman Times to the Present* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).

<sup>31</sup>Kemal Kirişçi, 'Turkey: A country of transition from emigration to immigration', *Mediterranean Politics*, 12:1 (2007), pp. 91–7; Philip L. Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe: With Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1991); Fiona B. Adamson, 'Migration governance in Turkey', in James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley (eds), *Understanding Global Migration* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022), pp. 367–84.

<sup>32</sup>Chiara Maritato, Kerem Öktem, and Anna Zadrožna, 'Introduction – A state of diasporas: The transnationalisation of Turkey and its communities abroad', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 21:2 (2021), pp. 105–20.

and as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed as a means of managing and promoting states' public image abroad. While the exact circumstances and strategies of diaspora engagement vary to some extent across cases – in line with their differing histories, migratory trajectories, regime types, and other factors, they nevertheless also demonstrate striking parallels in the growing significance that diaspora engagement policies have taken on as an aspect of their foreign policy and power projection strategies.

### *Diasporic geopolitics and economic power: Trade and foreign direct investment*

Numerous countries strategically engage with their diaspora communities, often adopting an instrumental approach focused on fostering economic growth.<sup>33</sup> This pragmatic approach primarily stems from the recognition of the substantial contributions made by diasporas in the form of economic remittances, with many countries heavily dependent on the financial inflows sent by their diaspora populations residing abroad. A vast body of literature examines the pivotal role diasporas have played in driving economic development within various states, with global remittances from migrants and diasporas estimated at US \$529 billion in 2018 – more than the total overseas development aid (ODA) provided globally that year and coming close to total foreign direct investment (FDI).<sup>34</sup> By actively managing and nurturing these relationships, countries seek to leverage the economic potential of their diasporas as a means to bolster their own development endeavours.<sup>35</sup>

For rising powers, however, economic strategies of diaspora engagement are not only directed to internal national economic development agendas, but are also a means of asserting economic influence abroad. Extensive research has delved into the mechanisms through which diaspora individuals and communities foster connections between their countries of origin and settlement, particularly by facilitating transnational business activities and investments.<sup>36</sup> Enterprising individuals, often referred to as 'diaspora entrepreneurs', possess the unique ability to bridge geographical divides, enabling the flow of capital, expertise, and knowledge between the diaspora's adopted homes and their countries of origin, thereby promoting economic growth and facilitating mutually beneficial partnerships.<sup>37</sup> Many governments recognise and actively encourage the growth of diasporas as agents of transnational economic influence and as actors that are able to forge vital linkages across migratory national boundaries.<sup>38</sup>

This pattern can be seen in the case of China's economic development strategy since the late 1970s, which has been heavily reliant on investments by overseas Chinese communities throughout the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>39</sup> Beijing has devoted considerable resources to soliciting investments from overseas Chinese and has formulated laws to institutionalise the diaspora's legal privileges in

<sup>33</sup>See Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsurapas, 'The migration state in the Global South: Nationalizing, developmental and neoliberal models of migration management', *International Migration Review*, 54:3 (2020), pp. 853–82.

<sup>34</sup>Rina Agarwala, *The Migration-Development Regime: How Class Shapes Indian Emigration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), p. 1. Dilip Ratha, 'Remittances on track to become the largest source of funding in developing countries', *World Bank Blog* (18 April 2019), available at: [<https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/remittances-track-become-largest-source-external-financing-developing-countries>].

<sup>35</sup>L. Joyce Zapanta Mariano, 'Doing good in Filipino diaspora: Philanthropy, remittances, and homeland returns', *Journal of Asian American Studies*, 20:2 (2017), pp. 219–44.

<sup>36</sup>Liesl Riddle, George A. Hrivnak, and Tjai M. Nielsen, 'Transnational diaspora entrepreneurship in emerging markets: Bridging institutional divides', *Journal of International Management*, 16:4 (2010), pp. 398–411; T. L. Hill and Ram Mudambi, 'Far from Silicon Valley: How emerging economies are re-shaping our understanding of global entrepreneurship', *Journal of International Management*, 16:4 (2010), pp. 321–7; David Leblang, 'Familiarity breeds investment: Diaspora networks and international investment', *The American Political Science Review*, 104:3 (2010), pp. 584–600.

<sup>37</sup>Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, *Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs: The In-Between Advantage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

<sup>38</sup>Annalee Saxenian, 'Transnational communities and the evolution of global production networks: The cases of Taiwan, China and India', *Industry and Innovation*, 9:3 (2002), pp. 183–202.

<sup>39</sup>Nicholas R. Lardy, *China in the World Economy* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1994).

the areas of social welfare and economic well-being.<sup>40</sup> In this sense, the Chinese government has given significant credit for the contributions its diaspora has made for the homeland's economic development during the past few decades.

However, as a result of China's own economic growth, Chinese diaspora overseas have also become key conduits through which Chinese investments abroad are channelled. China's transformation into an FDI source-country has led to changes in patterns of diaspora engagement. For example, reorganisation of existing business associations have been carried out to meet new opportunities provided by increasing economic connections with China.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, the Chinese state has set up new platforms to liaise with and facilitate economic cooperation with diasporic economic entities. At the same time, many countries with large Chinese diaspora populations also promoted such interactions to take advantage of Chinese economic engagement.<sup>42</sup>

The relationship between Chinese diaspora settlement and economic engagement has been observed empirically, with evidence suggesting that the presence of a large Chinese diaspora in a host country increases the probability of Chinese investment in that country.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, a diaspora presence has been found to positively facilitate bilateral trade flows with China.<sup>44</sup> This is likely due to the intimate kinship ties and greater access to strategic information that diaspora networks have in their host countries, which allow them to contribute to this positive economic effect.<sup>45</sup> Overall, these findings highlight the importance of diaspora networks in promoting economic ties between China and other countries.<sup>46</sup>

Through diaspora business networks, the Chinese state seeks to advance its economic interests in these countries. For instance, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in many countries can act as a formal business lobby on behalf of the Chinese government and is used to cultivate relationships with high-ranking officials in host countries as well as with business communities at large. Indeed, we can think of this as a form of informal diplomacy carried out through diaspora business communities.<sup>47</sup>

India's trajectory has been similar in many respects. Migration and remittances have had a significant impact on India's economy over the past several decades, with India being the largest recipient of remittances in the world, bringing in a total of \$76 billion in 2019.<sup>48</sup> However, the diaspora has also been used as a way of enhancing India's trade networks, particularly in the IT and diamond-cutting industries. An official emigration and diaspora strategy has gone hand in hand with India's embrace of neoliberalism and open markets, with a shift in policies over time to what Agarwal refers to now as India's 'CEO Migration-Development Regime'.<sup>49</sup> The government

<sup>40</sup>Min Zhou and Xiangyi Li, 'Remittances for collective consumption and social status compensation: Variations on transnational practices among Chinese international migrants', *International Migration Review*, 52:1 (2018), pp. 4–42.

<sup>41</sup>Na Ren and Hong Liu, 'Southeast Asian Chinese engage a rising China: Business associations, institutionalised transnationalism, and the networked state', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48:4 (2022), pp. 873–93.

<sup>42</sup>Yos Santasombat, 'Chinese capitalism and economic integration in Southeast Asia', Trends in Southeast Asia, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore (2018).

<sup>43</sup>Bas Karreman, Martijn J. Burger, and Frank G. van Oort, 'Location choices of Chinese multinationals in Europe: The role of overseas communities', *Economic Geography*, 93:2 (2017), pp. 131–61.

<sup>44</sup>Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzo and Robert Rudolf, 'The trade facilitation impact of the Chinese diaspora', *The World Economy*, 43:9 (2020), pp. 2411–36.

<sup>45</sup>Lisha He, Mia M Bennett, and Ronghao Jiang, 'The uneven geography of real estate investment by mainland Chinese state-owned and private enterprises in the U.S.: Local market conditions, migration, and ethnic networks', *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 54:4 (2022), pp. 653–75.

<sup>46</sup>Yutian Liang, Zhengke Zhou, and Yi Liu, 'Location choices of Chinese enterprises in Southeast Asia: The role of overseas Chinese networks', *Journal of Geographical Sciences*, 29:8 (2019), pp. 1396–410.

<sup>47</sup>Ho and McConnell, 'Conceptualizing "diaspora diplomacy".'

<sup>48</sup>Eva Loreng, 'Engaging the diaspora: The changing policies of the Indian government', *International Journal of Social Science and the Humanities*, 1:2 (2020), pp. 1–10; Agarwala, *The Migration-Development Regime*, p. 2.

<sup>49</sup>Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad*; Agarwala, *The Migration-Development Regime*.

has increasingly treated Indians abroad as 'India's greatest export, widely understood to represent the country's comparative advantage in the global marketplace'.<sup>50</sup>

Diaspora communities provide a means of matching up demand for products or services with potential suppliers and are also key in providing information about local consumer and market preferences. Groups such as the Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), a network of high-tech entrepreneurs, have been able to forge transnational connections between high-tech clusters in the United States, such as Silicon Valley, and various bases in India, such as Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, and Delhi. Additionally, hubs for the global diamond trade, such as Antwerp in Belgium, have become closely linked with diamond-processing hubs in Mumbai and elsewhere due to the diasporic connections that link the mining, processing, and marketing sectors, with the Gujarati Pulanpari Jain diaspora playing a key role.<sup>51</sup>

Delhi has encouraged such activities by setting up the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC), which was designed to promote knowledge exchange and links across businesses as a way of encouraging investment.<sup>52</sup> Even before becoming prime minister, Narendra Modi was skilful at instrumentalising the diaspora as an agent of commercial diplomacy. As chief minister of Gujarat, he drew upon the global Gujarati diaspora for purposes of commercial diplomacy – operating outside of the Ministry of External Affairs through initiatives such as the Protocol of Cooperation between Gujarat and Russia's Astrakhan region, which 'built upon the Gujarati diaspora's two-century long links with that region'.<sup>53</sup> With the growth of an elite Indian diaspora in the United States and elsewhere, the diaspora itself has become increasingly organised, setting up institutions to facilitate interaction and networking with Indian business leaders, entrepreneurs, and government officials, thus further increasing the influence of India's global economic networks.<sup>54</sup>

Turkey is another example of a state that has seen a shift in approach to its diaspora from a source of remittances and economic development to an opportunity for it to extend its influence abroad. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s, the Turkish state either ignored its diaspora, viewed it as a temporary phenomenon, or treated it as a source of foreign currency, there has been a change over time to the current policies of treating the diaspora abroad as a source of potential foreign policy influence. In 2010, a formal Office for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) was established in Turkey. The office combined elements of earlier policies that had been aimed at Turkish citizens abroad in Europe as well as Turkish 'ethnic kin' in the Balkans or the Former Soviet Union.<sup>55</sup>

Part of the government's diaspora strategy has included utilising the diaspora as a means of increasing Turkey's presence and influence in Europe and elsewhere.<sup>56</sup> This has included an explicit strategy of leveraging the diaspora as a tool of state economic and lobbying power – to make (in the words of a member of the YTB Advisory Committee) 'the Turkish diaspora among the most influential diasporas in the world' and to engage in forms of 'diaspora diplomacy'.<sup>57</sup>

Starting from the 1960s and 70s, Turkey encouraged the export of labour as part of its overall economic development strategy. Turkey signed a bilateral labour agreement with Germany in 1961, thus making organised labour migration an aspect of its foreign relations. Similar agreements were signed with Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands (1964), followed by agreements with France

<sup>50</sup> Agarwala, *The Migration-Development Regime*; Ajantha Subramanian, 'Making merit: The Indian Institutes of Technology and the social life of caste', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 57:2 (2015), pp. 291–322 (p. 291).

<sup>51</sup> Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy*: see chapter 4.

<sup>52</sup> Loreng, 'Engaging the diaspora'.

<sup>53</sup> Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy*, p. 274.

<sup>54</sup> Agarwala, *The Migration-Development Regime*, p. 226.

<sup>55</sup> Kerem Öktem, 'Turkey's new diaspora policy: The challenge of inclusivity, outreach and capacity', Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University (August 2014).

<sup>56</sup> Damla B. Aksel, 'Kins, distant workers, diasporas: Constructing Turkey's transnational members abroad', *Turkish Studies*, 15:2 (2014), pp. 195–219.

<sup>57</sup> Aksel, 'Kins, distant workers, diasporas'; Ayca Arkilic, *Diaspora Diplomacy: The Politics of Turkish Emigration to Europe* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2022).

(1965) and Australia and Sweden (1967).<sup>58</sup> These arrangements were a common feature of labour migration during the period, and labour remittances came to play a significant role in Turkey's economy. Between 1973 and 1975, for example, official labour remittances equalled between 93.7 and 99.8% of exports in Turkey.<sup>59</sup>

However, since the early 2000s remittances have been less significant – making up less than 0.2% of Turkey's GDP, as Turkey's economy boomed due to an export-oriented policy that made it one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. At the same time, the Turkish diaspora has achieved significant economic success in Europe, with an estimated 140,000 businesses started in Europe by Turkish-origin individuals, with annual revenue of more than \$70 billion. Instead of remittances, finances flowed in the opposite direction as Turkey's economy grew and Turkey placed increased emphasis on making links with its diaspora, with Turkey's official diaspora organisation spending approximately \$17 billion on over 1,000 civil society projects in 70 countries between 2011 and 2020.<sup>60</sup> The YTB has also been involved in supporting Turkey's broader strategy of becoming a global economic player through increased aid, trade, and investment. For example, according to the Turkish government, its trade volume in Africa expanded from \$5.4 billion in 2003 to \$34.5 billion in 2021.<sup>61</sup> Accompanying this growth in trade has been a greater involvement of Turkey's YTB diaspora agency, which also administers thousands of scholarships for African students for study at Turkish universities.<sup>62</sup>

### **Soft power: Cultural promotion and civilisational politics**

A second mechanism of diasporic geopolitics is the use of soft power and 'civilisational' forms of politics, which have become an increasingly popular strategy in global politics for rising powers seeking to contest the dominant international order, with 'civilisationalism' emerging as a form of counter-hegemonic ideology.<sup>63</sup> Countries such as China, India, and Turkey have crafted strategies that draw on civilisational and cultural identities as a means of positioning themselves as influential players on the global stage. This strategy can be used to construct, create, and mobilise a global diaspora among long-standing putative 'diaspora populations' that are not technically citizens, as well as more generally to enhance their global standing and exercise influence. Cultural and ideational capital not only fuels national pride but also serves as a source of soft power, enabling countries to exert influence, attract tourism, and forge diplomatic ties. Through a deliberate emphasis on their cultural heritage, rising powers can project an image that goes beyond economic or political might, asserting forms of ideational and moral power in ways that often rely on populist tropes as a means of positioning themselves as influential actors shaping the course of global affairs.<sup>64</sup>

In China's case, its government emphasises its 5,000 years of history, with its language, writing system, philosophy, and art forming the core of its civilisational identity. The Chinese government has prominently featured these cultural attributes in its public diplomacy campaigns overseas.

<sup>58</sup> Ahmet Akgündüz, 'Labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe (1960–1974): An analytical review', *Capital & Class*, 17:3 (1993), pp. 153–94.

<sup>59</sup> Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 390–1.

<sup>60</sup> Ayca Arkilic, 'Explaining the evolution of Turkey's diaspora engagement policy: A holistic approach', *Diaspora Studies*, 14:1 (2021), pp. 1–21 (pp. 2, 8).

<sup>61</sup> Türkiye–Africa Relations, Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: {<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>}.

<sup>62</sup> Serhat Orakçi, 'The rise of Turkey in Africa', *Al Jazeera Center for Studies* (9 January 2022), available at: {<https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/rise-turkey-africa>}.

<sup>63</sup> Gregorio Bettiza, Derek Bolton, and David Lewis, 'Civilizationism and the ideological contestation of the liberal international order', *International Studies Review*, 25:2 (2023), p. viad006.

<sup>64</sup> Gözde Böcü and Nidhi Panwar, 'Populist diaspora engagement: Party-led outreach under Turkey's AKP and India's BJP', *Diaspora Studies*, 15:2 (2022), pp. 158–83; Kate Sullivan de Estrada, 'What is a vishwaguru? Indian civilizational pedagogy as a transformative global imperative', *International Affairs*, 99:2 (2023), pp. 433–55.

Most recently, the Chinese government proposed a Global Civilisation Initiative, with a vague reference to supposedly Western imposition of values or models on others. Specifically, it argues that ‘the future of all countries are closely and increasingly connected. And tolerance, coexistence, exchanges and mutual learning among different civilizations play an irreplaceable role in advancing humanity’s modernisation process.’<sup>65</sup>

In recent years, China has actively promoted its civilisational politics through various concepts, including *Tianxia* (all under heaven), and the China Dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The concept of *Tianxia* has been central to China’s political philosophy for centuries. It refers to the idea of a unified world order under the leadership of the Chinese emperor. In modern times, the concept has been reinterpreted to refer to China’s vision of a community of shared destiny, where all nations are interconnected and interdependent.<sup>66</sup> Emphasising a world of harmony, *Tianxia* has also been used to promote China’s global ambitions and to counter Western-style democracy and human rights norms.<sup>67</sup> When this concept is applied to relations with the diaspora, it gives credence and legitimacy to the Chinese government’s claim over the diaspora as part of the effort to reassert China as an empire, with the diaspora as the natural subject of such a renewed world order.<sup>68</sup>

The China Dream, or the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, is another concept that has been heavily promoted by the Chinese government in recent years. It refers to the idea of restoring China’s historical greatness, and to overcoming the country’s past humiliations at the hands of foreign powers, and thus has been used to promote national unity and pride both within the country as well as among its diaspora. The revitalisation of the Chinese nation is closely linked to Beijing’s management of diaspora relations, as overseas Chinese communities are seen as a key source of support and influence for the country. In a speech given by President Xi Jinping in 2014, he specifically appealed to the diaspora for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation: ‘For Chinese people both at home and abroad, a united Chinese nation is our shared road, the profound Chinese culture is our shared soul, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is our shared dream.’<sup>69</sup>

However, this emphasis on past glory is also intertwined with a sense of victimhood, with past diasporic persecution and national humiliation by foreign powers being used as rallying cries for the diaspora.<sup>70</sup> The idea of Chinese victimhood is rooted in the country’s long history of colonialism and imperialism, particularly by Western powers. This history is frequently invoked by the Chinese government to rally domestic support and to shape its foreign policy. For the diaspora, this emphasis on victimhood is used as a rallying cry to build a sense of national pride and to encourage loyalty to the Chinese state, but it also represents Beijing’s new commitment to protect its overseas kin at a time of China’s renewed great power status. As such, these concepts are closely tied to the Chinese government’s management of its diaspora relations. The Chinese diaspora are not only tasked with active promotion of China’s success on the global stage but are also expected to be agents of Chinese civilisation in the rest of the world.<sup>71</sup>

Another dimension of China’s self-perception as a civilisational state is its appeal to mutual-ity in great civilisations, with countries such as Greece, India, Iran, and such.<sup>72</sup> For example, in Chinese diplomatic language towards Greece, there is an emphasis on the two nations’ shared

<sup>65</sup> ‘Global civilization initiative injects fresh energy into human development’, *Xinhua* (19 March 2023), available at: [http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/19/content\\_85177312.htm](http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/19/content_85177312.htm).

<sup>66</sup> Tim Winter, ‘Geocultural power: China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, *Geopolitics*, 26:5 (2021), pp. 1376–99.

<sup>67</sup> Matthieu Burnay and Eva Pils, ‘Weaponizing citizenship in China: Domestic exclusion and transnational expansion’, *State Crime Journal*, 9 (2020), pp. 4–28.

<sup>68</sup> Klaas Dykmann and Ole Bruun, ‘China’s pledge to civilise “all under heaven”’, *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 50:2 (2021), pp. 227–47.

<sup>69</sup> Xi Jinping, ‘The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is a dream shared by all Chinese’, 6 June 2014, available at: [http://subsites.chinadaily.com.cn/npc/2021-12/03/c\\_687833.htm](http://subsites.chinadaily.com.cn/npc/2021-12/03/c_687833.htm).

<sup>70</sup> William A. Callahan, *China: The Pessimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

<sup>71</sup> Pál Nyíri, ‘The yellow man’s burden: Chinese migrants on a civilizing mission’, *The China Journal*, 56 (2006), pp. 83–106.

<sup>72</sup> John W. Garver, *China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006).

identity as ancient civilisations, which presumably would transcend contemporary differences in political systems and geopolitical orientation.<sup>73</sup> Similarly, the Chinese ambassador to Ethiopia also declared that China would ‘advocate the respect for the diversity of civilisations. Countries need to uphold the principles of equality, mutual learning, dialogue and inclusiveness among civilisations.’ From here, one can also infer that a task for the Chinese diaspora is to promote people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, and to promote mutual understanding and friendship among people.<sup>74</sup>

India has also been using a ‘civilisational’ discourse in its foreign policy and connecting this with its diaspora. On the one hand, India’s cultural exports range ‘from Buddhism to yoga, Bollywood to Bhangra-rap, classical music to cuisine with the diaspora being viewed as an aspect of soft power.’ A former external affairs minister noted, ‘people of Indian origin are extremely important sources of support for the Indian Government in the execution of its policies through the influence and respect they command in the countries in which they live.’<sup>75</sup> The government views the diaspora as part of ‘Brand India.’ As the Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) put it, ‘as the Indian Diaspora’s Brand increases ... India’s brand increases ... the global Indian is a tool of “soft power”’.<sup>76</sup>

Since 2014, with the coming to power of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the use of civilisational discourses has increased in line with its mobilisation of Hindu nationalism or Hindutva, which views India as essentially a Hindu nation. Prime Minister Modi presents a counter-narrative to Western liberalism by claiming that democracy is rooted in India’s ancient Hindu past. Hindutva and the broader Hindu nationalist movement already had a strong base in the diaspora prior to 2014.<sup>77</sup> Under the BJP, the connections have accelerated between the government, the broader Hindu nationalist movement, or Sangh Parivar, and a range of Hindu associations, such as the World Hindu Economic Forum, which is a transnational religio-business forum founded in 2010 that effectively fuses economic and religious power and identity. In so doing, diaspora entrepreneurs simultaneously participate in the global market economy while also assuming a moral stance and critique vis-à-vis its ‘Western’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ excesses. Similarly to the Chinese promotion of ‘harmony’, Hindu nationalists promote concepts of *Dharma* as a ‘moral philosophy of universal harmony’ and combine knowledge production and community finance with spiritual enrichment.<sup>78</sup> This fits with the broader civilisationalist discourse which seeks to position India as ‘world teacher’ or *vishwaguru*.<sup>79</sup>

Turkey also shares many similarities with China and India in its turn to a civilisational discourse as part of its overall foreign policy strategy. Whereas India has positioned itself as *vishwaguru* or the world’s guru, Turkey, under the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) regime, has positioned itself as the world’s conscience or *dünyanın vicdani*.<sup>80</sup> Turkey’s civilisationalist discourse – in this case, rooted in a neo-Ottoman identity and promoting a Turkish brand of Islam (a Turkish-Islamic synthesis) – has expanded hand in hand with an assertive diaspora policy. Turkey has turned to ‘its’ diaspora as a source of soft power – at the same time as it has been drawing on its imperial past and its identity as a majority Muslim country as a means of projecting a more expansive national identity both at home and abroad.<sup>81</sup> Similar to India, as well, it has seen a fusion of its religious soft

<sup>73</sup> Plamen Tonchev, ‘Sino-Greek relations in Greek and Chinese media, 2020’, Institute of International Economic Relations (March 2021).

<sup>74</sup> ‘Deepening mutual learning, among civilizations for a shared bright future’, *The Ethiopian Herald* (19 March 2023).

<sup>75</sup> Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy*, p. 188.

<sup>76</sup> Agarwala, *The Migration-Development Regime*, p. 137.

<sup>77</sup> Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy*, chapter 8.

<sup>78</sup> Esra Elif Nartok, ‘“Hindu civilization” in business: The World Hindu Economic Forum’s intellectual project’, *International Affairs*, 99:2 (2023), pp. 495–513.

<sup>79</sup> De Estrada, ‘What is a vishwaguru?’, pp. 433–6.

<sup>80</sup> Sebastian Haug and Supriya Roychoudhury, ‘Civilizational exceptionalism in international affairs: Making sense of Indian and Turkish claims’, *International Affairs*, 99:2 (2023), pp. 531–49.

<sup>81</sup> Mügge, ‘Ideologies of nationhood’; Adamson, ‘Sending states and the making of intra-diasporic politics’.

power with a neoliberal economic ideology and approach that empowered a new class of national and global religiously oriented entrepreneurs.<sup>82</sup>

Two cultural institutions – the Yunus Emre Institute, which was created in 2007, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) – have been key players in this regard. Turkey has a long history of promoting cultural and religious identities within emigrant and diaspora communities, including the Diyanet's placement of imams in the diaspora. In the 1990s, there were at least 470 Turkish state teachers in Germany who were sent by the Turkish Ministry of Education to teach Turkish language and history, and Diyanet imams who served at approximately 775 mosques throughout Germany.<sup>83</sup>

Since the early 2000s, however, the role of the Diyanet has expanded greatly as a form of soft power and as a foreign policy tool and has been instrumentalised by the AKP to promote its ideology abroad, including via the Turkish diaspora. Indeed, its expansion coincided with the founding of the YTB – the Diyanet is estimated to have grown to 61 branches in 31 countries, and it is active in organising regional religious forums. Imams are treated by Turkey as diplomats, appointed via a foreign placement exam and following orders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while abroad.<sup>84</sup> Turkey has also established an 'International Theology Programme' which seeks to recruit diaspora members to study at theological schools in Turkey as a way of ensuring the dominance of Turkish approaches to Islam in Europe.<sup>85</sup> Thus, Turkey has actively engaged with its diaspora population as part of its overall 'civilisational' strategy through which it portrays itself as representing and protecting a global Muslim community extending to its diaspora – and beyond.

#### ***Diplomatic power: Lobbying, image management, and political mobilisation/repression***

A final mechanism of diasporic geopolitics used by rising power states revolves around political mobilisation, lobbying, and image management. All states seek to manage their image abroad – and use an array of tools to shape public perceptions of their national identity as part of their overall diplomatic strategy. This can range from 'promotional' to 'obstructive' and can include investing in foreign-facing media or hiring public relations firms that are tasked with image management and promoting positive public perceptions of the state abroad, as well as engaging in direct political activity, such as lobbying foreign governments.<sup>86</sup> Within this context, rising powers are increasingly utilising diaspora populations as an extension of state campaigns of image management, as they acquire sufficient capacity and geopolitical motivation to engage in forms of diaspora diplomacy.

Especially, but not only, in the case of more centralised or autocratic states of origin, diaspora populations can become the object of official government campaigns that seek to encourage pro-regime mobilisations, propaganda, and lobbying. In extreme cases, governments can also seek to repress dissent in the diaspora as part of their image management strategy – something that has occurred in all three cases of China, India, and Turkey. Transnational repression by states towards populations living abroad can replicate and mirror many of the techniques used by autocratic regimes at home, which rely heavily on 'legitimation, repression and co-optation' as the three pillars of stability.<sup>87</sup> The flip side of repressing opposition movements is for states to encourage loyalty.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

<sup>83</sup> Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 107.

<sup>84</sup> Ahmet Erdi Öztürk and Semiha Sözeri, 'Diyanet as a Turkish foreign policy tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria', *Politics and Religion*, 11:3 (2018), pp. 624–48.

<sup>85</sup> Benjamin Bruce, 'Imams for the diaspora: The Turkish state's international theology programme', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46:6 (2020), pp. 1166–83.

<sup>86</sup> Alexander Dukalskis, *Making the World Safe for Dictatorship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 36.

<sup>87</sup> Johannes Gerschewski, 'The three pillars of stability: Legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes', *Democratization*, 20:1 (2013), pp. 13–38; Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Global autocracies: Strategies of transnational repression, legitimation, and co-optation in world politics', *International Studies Review*, 23:3 (2021), pp. 616–44.

<sup>88</sup> Ali R. Chaudhary and Dana M. Moss, 'Suppressing transnationalism: Bringing constraints into the study of transnational political action', *Comparative Migration Studies*, 7:1 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0112-z>.

Therefore, state repression and loyalty encouragement can also potentially create or enlarge internal divisions within the diaspora, at times producing a climate of fear in segments of the diaspora, or even leading to intra-diasporic conflicts and violence.<sup>89</sup>

China, for example, views its diaspora members as public diplomats for its foreign policy agenda. Beijing not only moulds the Chinese diaspora into having a favourable view of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese state but also promotes desired narratives through the diaspora to the rest of the world.<sup>90</sup> Particularly, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office has been incorporated into the CCP's United Front Work Department,<sup>91</sup> which undertakes efforts to co-opt prominent diaspora figures to promote Beijing's political agenda overseas.<sup>92</sup>

Through such diasporic public diplomacy, the Chinese government's goal is to shape public and elite discussions in host countries that are beneficial to China.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, one of the main public diplomacy goals during the Xi administration is to 'Tell China's Story Well' abroad.<sup>94</sup> This is not only a mission that Xi has set for China's domestic propaganda departments but is also mentioned during his speeches at various diaspora work conferences. With a particular focus on diasporic media, i.e. Chinese-language media overseas, the Chinese government seeks to spread its own messages in the diaspora community. At the same time, the Chinese government also targets educational and cultural exchanges among the overseas Chinese community and facilitates their visit to the 'motherland'. Through the promotion of diasporic tourism, Beijing hopes that overseas Chinese can witness and appreciate the significant economic progress and social transformation of the country, thereby conveying those 'real images' of China to combat the perceived biased Western reports on the country.

Similarly, the Chinese government often seeks to rally support from its patriotic diaspora to push back against perceived Western provocations on core national security issues. This tactic involves leveraging the Chinese diaspora to organise demonstrations and protests against policies or actions seen as detrimental to China's interests. These efforts have been particularly pronounced in recent years, as China has become more assertive on the global stage and faced increased criticism and pushback from Western powers, such as on issues relating to Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

For example, when a citywide protest movement was ongoing in Hong Kong in 2019,<sup>95</sup> the Chinese government organised counter-protests in major cities around the world, using social media and other online platforms to coordinate with overseas Chinese communities.<sup>96</sup> These demonstrations were often marked by a strong pro-China message, with participants waving Chinese flags and singing patriotic songs. Another example of China leveraging its diaspora to support its political agenda is its ongoing campaign to push back against criticism of its treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. Chinese embassies and consulates around the world have organised events and demonstrations aimed at promoting a positive view of China's policies in the region and have worked to discredit reports of human rights abuses.

<sup>89</sup> See, e.g. Adamson, 'Sending states and the making of intra-diasporic politics'.

<sup>90</sup> Kendrick Chan and Chris Alden, 'The diaspora: China's United Front work and the hyperlink networks of diasporic Chinese websites in cyberspace', *Political Research Exchange*, 5:1 (2023), p. 2179409.

<sup>91</sup> Jiaqi M. Liu, 'When diaspora politics meet global ambitions: Diaspora institutions amid China's geopolitical transformations', *International Migration Review*, 56:4 (2022), pp. 1255–1279.

<sup>92</sup> Takashi Suzuki, 'China's United Front work in the Xi Jinping era: Institutional developments and activities', *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*, 8:1 (2019), pp. 83–98.

<sup>93</sup> Audrye Wong, 'The diaspora and China's foreign influence activities', in Lucas Myers (ed), *Essays on China and U.S. Policy* (Washington DC: Wilson Center, 2022), pp. 568–595.

<sup>94</sup> Bates Gill, 'China's global influence: Post-COVID prospects for soft power', *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:2 (2020), pp. 97–115.

<sup>95</sup> Heike Holbig, 'Be water, my friend: Hong Kong's 2019 anti-extradition protests', *International Journal of Sociology*, 50:4 (2020), pp. 325–37.

<sup>96</sup> Edmund W. Cheng, 'United Front work and mechanisms of counter-mobilization in Hong Kong', *The China Journal*, 83 (2020), pp. 1–33.

In addition to mobilising the diaspora to support its political agenda, Beijing has also been accused of engaging in transnational repression against members of these communities who are critical of the Chinese government. This can take many forms, including harassment, intimidation, and even abduction of individuals who speak out against China's policies or actions. Chinese embassies often function as 'important nodes of coordination and communication in the effort to silence critical voices' but also as part of an externally facing government organisation that promotes China's image abroad via the nationalist mobilisation of business and student associations.<sup>97</sup>

For example, in recent years, there have been numerous reports of the Chinese government pressuring overseas Chinese communities to censor speech critical of the Chinese government, or to report on the activities of fellow community members. In some cases, Chinese authorities have even used legal or extra-legal means to target individuals and to intimidate and harass them and their relatives.<sup>98</sup> Beijing has been accused of kidnappings to arrest and deport individuals – for example, in 2015 a number of Chinese-born booksellers in Thailand and Hong Kong were kidnapped and deported to China after they had published material containing information that the Chinese government deemed sensitive.<sup>99</sup> As one US citizen of Uighur descent argued: 'I'm exercising my rights under the US Constitution as an American citizen', but 'the long arm of the Chinese government's domestic repression directly impacts the broader Uighur diaspora community, including in the United States'.<sup>100</sup>

India has also viewed its diaspora as a significant factor in its image management and public diplomacy strategies, especially under the BJP government, where Modi has explicitly spoken of the Indian diaspora as being an 'ambassador' for India.<sup>101</sup> Kapur has noted that 'India's cultivation of its diaspora has followed a realist logic' with a focus on the diaspora in wealthy democracies, as opposed to countries such as Myanmar.<sup>102</sup> In the first three years as prime minister, Modi made more than 49 visits to countries, holding numerous large rallies for diaspora members in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The BJP has also mobilised the diaspora through an extensive network of Hindutva organisations attached to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and has multiple affiliated organisations across at least 80 countries.<sup>103</sup>

The BJP's extensive use of social media and technology has resonated with the high-tech Indian diaspora in the US and elsewhere.<sup>104</sup> As the Indian American population has grown in both size and stature, it has come to play an important role as a bridge between the United States and India, influencing the development of US–Indian relations, and has developed as a lobbying force with the establishment of the Congressional Caucus for India in 1993 and the subsequent establishment of the US–India Political Action Committee.<sup>105</sup> In the process, there has been a shift away from an Indian foreign policy focused on third world solidarity and the 'people' of the Global South, to a focus on the 'people' of the global diaspora – especially those located in states in the Global North.<sup>106</sup> Like China, India has also been accused of engaging in transnational repression, with

<sup>97</sup>'Out of sight, not out of reach: The global scale and scope of transnational repression', Freedom House, Washington, DC (2021).

<sup>98</sup>Saipira Furstenberg, Edward Lemon, and John Heathershaw, 'Spatialising state practices through transnational repression', *European Journal of International Security*, 6:3 (2021), pp. 358–78; Tsurapas, 'Global autocracies'.

<sup>99</sup>Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 'Interpol is helping enforce China's political purges', *Foreign Policy* (21 April 2017).

<sup>100</sup>Edward Wong, 'Uighur Americans speak against China's internment camps. Their relatives disappear', *The New York Times* (18 October 2018).

<sup>101</sup>Johannes Plagemann and Sandra Destradi, 'Populism and foreign policy: The case of India', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 15:2 (2019), pp. 283–301.

<sup>102</sup>Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy*, p. 271.

<sup>103</sup>Böcü and Panwar, 'Populist diaspora engagement'.

<sup>104</sup>Arijit Mazumdar, 'India's soft power diplomacy under the Modi administration: Buddhism, diaspora and yoga', *Asian Affairs*, 49:3 (2018), pp. 468–91.

<sup>105</sup>Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy*, pp. 194–6.

<sup>106</sup>Plagemann and Destradi, 'Populism and foreign policy'.

Canada claiming in 2023 that India has carried out assassinations on its soil, and the United States issuing safety warnings to Sikh activists.<sup>107</sup>

Turkey has also set about to mobilise its diaspora as a tool of diplomacy. Similar to India, it has engaged in populist forms of mobilisation as a means of enhancing its image abroad, and has treated its diaspora as ‘ambassadors for Turkey’.<sup>108</sup> Like Modi, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has also made it a priority to organise rallies amongst diaspora communities in Europe.<sup>109</sup> Turkey has also engaged in forms of transnational repression of some segments of the diaspora whose voices and demands do not fit with the government’s official narrative.<sup>110</sup>

Along with the official diaspora engagement agency (the YTB), the Turkish state has established two additional agencies focused on public diplomacy, including the Union of International Democrats (UID), which focuses on the political mobilisation of overseas Turks by organising rallies and supporting lobbying activities, and the Directorate for Communications, which focuses on the management of Turkey’s image abroad.<sup>111</sup> The UID’s own materials emphasise its role in ‘fulfilling a bridge function between Turkey and host countries’ and in promoting ‘peaceful conditions between nations through cooperation’.<sup>112</sup> In addition, Turkey established a ‘Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship’ which focused on emigrants abroad as ‘strategic and social capital’.<sup>113</sup>

These agencies target particular segments of the diaspora (namely, supporters of the government) while simultaneously marginalising other segments of the diaspora, such as ethnic and religious minority and opposition groups, including Kurdish and Alevi political actors, as well as Islamic groups, such as the severely repressed Gülen religious movement. Indeed, the latter’s status has changed significantly over time: in the 1990s and 2000s, it was a force of Turkish soft power overseas, working closely with the government in establishing and running schools, universities, and business associations. Following a 2016 coup attempt, however, the government engaged in a campaign of transnational repression against this group and co-opted many of their cultural and soft power activities.

Turkey’s significance as a member of NATO, a candidate for membership in the European Union, and a linchpin in the EU’s migration management strategy has given Turkey substantial leverage in its relationship with Europe, which has at times been exercised via reference to its diaspora. In May 2022, for example, Erdoğan suggested that Turkey would not support Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO, listing a number of conditions they would have to meet, which included taking a harder line towards some Kurdish groups operating within Sweden, further evidence of the extent to which geopolitical interests have become entangled with its diaspora policies.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>107</sup>Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ‘FBI warned prominent US Sikhs of threats after murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar’, *The Guardian* (26 September 2023), available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/26/indian-government-sikh-activist-hardeep-singh-nijjar-murder-canada-fbi-warning>.

<sup>108</sup>Zeynep Sahin Mencutek and Bahar Baser, ‘Mobilizing diasporas: Insights from Turkey’s attempts to reach Turkish citizens abroad’, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 20:1 (2018), pp. 86–105.

<sup>109</sup>Böcü and Panwar, ‘Populist diaspora engagement’.

<sup>110</sup>Nate Schenckan, ‘The remarkable scale of Turkey’s “global purge”’: How it became a threat to the rule of law everywhere’, *Foreign Affairs* (29 January 2018), available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2018-01-29/remarkable-scale-turkeys-global-purge>.

<sup>111</sup>Arkilic, ‘Explaining the evolution of Turkey’s diaspora engagement policy’, p. 2.

<sup>112</sup>Böcü and Panwar, ‘Populist diaspora engagement’, p. 170.

<sup>113</sup>Mencutek and Baser, ‘Mobilizing diasporas’.

<sup>114</sup>Dominique Soquel, ‘Will exiled Kurds pay price of Sweden’s NATO entry?’, *Christian Science Monitor* (28 February 2023), available at: <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2023/0228/Will-exiled-Kurds-pay-price-of-Sweden-s-NATO-entry>; Lisbeth Aggestam, Isabell Schierenbeck, and Arne Wackenhut, ‘Sweden, NATO and the role of diasporas in foreign policy’, *International Affairs*, 99:6 (2023), pp. 2367–85.

## Implications for the future of international order

Visions of world order that dominate the study of IR have often been highly spatialised – whether focusing on power distribution across territorial states, global inequalities, or entrenched forms of ‘civilisational politics.’<sup>115</sup> Yet other work in IR has pointed to the possibility of an alternative cartography of global politics as entangled and interconnected.<sup>116</sup> As we have demonstrated here, one such form of entanglement is that which is produced by larger processes of global migration and global diaspora formation. Migration-sending states that are now emerging as rising powers have increasingly moved from using diaspora engagement as a means of securing remittances and promoting domestic economic development to viewing diaspora engagement policies as a transnational means to exert power and geopolitical influence. By leveraging diasporic geopolitics, rising powers such as China, India, and Turkey have managed to enhance their geopolitical strategies and expand their sphere of influence.

The entangled nature of diasporic geopolitics is significant for comprehending and theorising the future of international order. Geopolitical dynamics and power relations are often thought of in regional and territorial terms. However, diasporic geopolitics challenges this notion, as it reshapes the geography of power relations by increasing connections among countries as well as by influencing the distribution of power in the international system. The physical location of diaspora communities, transnational linkages, and the spatial distribution of power all play important roles in shaping the dynamics of diasporic geopolitics, creating not only opportunities for deeper integration but also vulnerabilities.<sup>117</sup>

Since rising powers are likely to continue to engage with their diaspora populations, these spatial dynamics will become increasingly significant for understanding the future of international relations across Global North–South divisions. This has a number of policy implications: there is the potential for diaspora groups to come under pressure from both their state of origin and state of residence and/or for heightened concern regarding the loyalty of particular diasporic groups from rising powers that are viewed as posing significant challenges to the dominance of great powers in the Global North. This perception can lead to mistrust and concerns about divided loyalties, potentially feeding into broader domestic polarisation dynamics.

Moreover, the influence wielded by diaspora communities can be viewed as a form of foreign interference in domestic affairs. Host societies may perceive the involvement of diasporas in political activities, lobbying efforts, or cultural initiatives as an intrusion into their sovereignty. This can trigger nationalist sentiments and protectionist attitudes, with a desire to limit the influence of external actors within their borders.<sup>118</sup> This is certainly the case within the context of China’s rising power and its relations with diasporic communities in the West, with many ethnic Chinese or Asians in general become targets of suspicion and even racial hatred.

<sup>115</sup> See, e.g., Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, *Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); G. John Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’, *International Affairs*, 94:1 (2018), pp. 7–23; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international order’, *International Security*, 43:4 (2019), pp. 7–50; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Ayse Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Gregorio Bettiza, Derek Bolton, and David Lewis, ‘Civilizationism and the ideological contestation of the liberal international order’, *International Studies Review*, 25:2 (2023), available at: {<https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viad006>}.

<sup>116</sup> See, e.g., Alexander Anievas and Kamran Matin, *Historical Sociology and World History: Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Gurminder K. Bhabra, *Connected Sociologies* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); Julian Go and George Lawson (eds), *Global Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Fiona B. Adamson, ‘Spaces of global security: Beyond methodological nationalism’, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 1:1 (2016), pp. 19–35; Fiona B. Adamson and Kelly M. Greenhill, ‘Globality and entangled security: Rethinking the post-1945 order’, *New Global Studies*, 15:2–3 (2021), pp. 165–80.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion’, *International Security*, 44:1 (2019), pp. 42–79; Gamlen, *Human Geopolitics*.

<sup>118</sup> Harris Mylonas and Scott Radnitz (eds), *Enemies Within: The Global Politics of Fifth Columns* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).

At the same time, however, as states seek to project particular images or civilisational identities abroad via their diasporas, there is also the potential for an increase in the use of transnational repression by states as a means of silencing opposition and image management – a tactic that has been used against groups and individuals in the diaspora by Turkey and China and, to some extent, India.<sup>119</sup> This raises broader human rights concerns, as well as posing some fundamental challenges for liberal democratic states.<sup>120</sup>

Finally, there is a tension between top-down and state-led forms of diaspora engagement, and other alternative bottom-up visions of diasporic politics and diasporic imaginaries that may contest and oppose states' use of diasporic geopolitics, and their instrumentalisation of diaspora communities abroad.<sup>121</sup> In all three cases discussed here, there are internal tensions in the diaspora regarding the aims – or even legitimacy – of the state of origin and its geopolitical ambitions. Thus, the dynamics of diasporic geopolitics go beyond the extension of state power projection strategies into other states but also extend to the effects of such processes on local communities and the domestic politics of differently situated states of immigration.

These changes and dynamics all have theoretical implications for how we think about world politics. They suggest that geographically circumscribed notions of the international system are inadequate for understanding the future of global order, and that scholars will need to find new theories to better understand complex forms of entanglement, including the political effects of states' use of transnational and diasporic power projection strategies. Existing work on diaspora politics and diaspora engagement policies in the field provides insights and tools that IR scholars can build on in ways that shed light on the entangled nature of international global order. The future of international order is likely to be much more spatially and culturally complex, 'with Western liberal modernity ... only a part of what is on offer'.<sup>122</sup> Within this context, 'diasporic geopolitics' is set to play a significant role as a means for rising powers to exert economic, cultural, and political power and influence. We have suggested here some mechanisms and patterns that characterise the strategies of rising powers such as China, India, and Turkey. Our analysis presents a framework and a direction for future research and analysis. The necessity of better understanding the full range of ways in which diasporic geopolitics is set to shape international order over the next 50 years means that it will continue to be a significant area of IR research in the future.

**Acknowledgements.** Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Los Angeles, CA, 31 August–3 September 2023; the Annual Meeting of the British International Studies Association (BISA), Glasgow, 20–3 June 2023; the SOAS, University of London workshop 'Diasporic Geopolitics', 15–16 June 2023; and the University of Exeter workshop 'Ideology and the Authoritarian Turn', 13 June 2023. We thank Yehonatan Abramson; Karabekir Akkoyunlu; Rochana Bajpai; Gregorio Bettiza; Gözde Böcü; Yun-Tzu (Angel) Chang; Catherine Craven; Alexander Dukalskis; Lola Guyot; James Hampshire; Randall Hansen; John Heathershaw; James F. Hollifield; Christian Joppke; Oula Kadhum; Marina Kaneti; David Lewis; Daniel Mulugeta; Matthew Nelson; Avinash Paliwal; Shirin Rai; Mikal Woldu; the journal editors, two anonymous reviewers, and other workshop and conference participants for their helpful comments and suggestions.

**Fiona B. Adamson** is Professor of International Relations at SOAS, University of London. Her research focuses on the international politics of migration, diaspora, and global peace and security.

**Enze Han** is Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong. He is an expert on the international relations of Southeast Asia and China's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia.

<sup>119</sup>Dukalskis, *Making the World Safe for Dictatorship*; Böcü and Panwar, 'Populist diaspora engagement'.

<sup>120</sup>Yana Gorokhovskaia and Isabel Linzer, *Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to Transnational Repression* (New York: Freedom House, 2022).

<sup>121</sup>Fiona B. Adamson, 'The growing importance of diaspora politics', *Current History*, 117:784 (2016), pp. 291–7.

<sup>122</sup>Amitav Acharya, 'After liberal hegemony: The advent of a multiplex world order', *Ethics & International Affairs*, 31:3 (2017), pp. 271–85.