EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN LIBYA 1942-1952: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE AIMS, METHODS AND POLICIES OF THE BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

by

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ABSTRACT

Unlike Cyrenaica, where educational development under the B.M.A. was modelled upon the system operating in Egypt, that adopted in Tripolitania at the start of the British Administration in 1943 had no such correlation. Instead the former Italo-Arab Schools merely continued with the Arabic Language replacing Italian without the support of modern textbooks, curriculum or examinations.

Also unlike Cyrenaica, where the British Government assured the population that there would be no return of Italian rule, Tripolitania continued until the mid-forties under the expectation that Italian sovereignty might be returned to the territory. Consequently, the B.M.A. was unable to adopt a similar pattern of educational development for Tripolitania until the future of the territory was clear.

The final adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1948 came too late to effectively enable the educational system operating in Egypt to be put into practice in the territory before Independence in 1951. Nonetheless, despite political uncertainty, inadequate resources of money and teachers, the B.M.A., in Tripolitania was able to make significant progress between 1943 and 1951 in reversing the neglect of Arab education which it had inherited from the former Italian regime.

In the latter respect, it more than fulfilled the requirements made of it by International Law, despite the severe budgetary restraints imposed by the policy of Care and Maintenance, which restricted its role in education as in other areas of activity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing and preparation of this thesis over more than ten years has necessarily involved meeting and corresponding with a wide range of persons, many of whom were directly or indirectly involved in the setting up and administration of the B.M.A.'s in either Libya or East Africa. The need to establish contact with such personnel while they were still alive has necessarily delayed the final result. The time was, however, well spent not only from an interest point of view, but also in enabling me to considerably widen the written sources by obtaining additional information, much of it in the form of correspondence; or through interviews with the people concerned. Most of all this has provided unique insights, much of which could not have been obtained from the perusal of official documents or secondary source material. This has also provided access to unpublished M.S. and other material not in public repositories.

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Richard Pankhurst, of Addis Abeba University, Ethiopia, for his kind and steadfast support throughout the whole of this period. Arranging for supervision meetings, when both parties were employed overseas was entirely due to his hospitality and patience, without which the final result could not have been achieved. May I also thank the staff at the London University Higher Degrees Office for their attention to my many queries; the staffs at Durham University, Middle Eastern Department; the Maraff Library, Tripoli; the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University; and the many other libraries and repositories in Britain and Italy whose assistance was so invaluable in completing this work.

Finally, I must thank those participants, both major and minor, of the former B.M.A's but for whose contributions the final result could not have been achieved. According to their former rank, may I thank Brigadier Travers Blackley and his wife for their hospitality and invaluable assistance; Mr E.V. de Candole, for his hospitality and profound grasp of the issues involved; Sir Maurice Lush, Sir Dennis Cumming and Sir Norman Anderson for their comments, correspondence and unfailing interest and assistance.

Also amongst the major players, I must especially thank Major A.J. Steele-Greig, whom I was fortunate to be able to extensively interview at his home in St. James, Barbados, and for a long correspondence until his most recent illness. The former "Sheikh Lea" and his wife who put me in touch with a range of minor but not unimportant players and contributors, such as A. Theobald, C. Tracey, R.A. Hodgkin, P.M. Holt, and many others too numerous to mention for whose remarks, letters and advice I remain grateful.

Lastly, I must thank my many friends, colleagues and contacts, who in a range of different institutions and places, have endured my long interest and fascination with this topic, which must frequently have been of considerably less interest to them.. These include my mother,

Agnes Allen, Julian Peach and Ian Richardson, Mr Tom Grogan of Cardinal Manning School and many former employers who were so generous in allowing me to use their time and facilities in producing the finished result.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Born at Warrington in the county of Lancashire on 29th June 1937, I was initially educated locally, before attending Le Botler Grammar School until aged sixteen, when I enrolled at the Liverpol College of Technology where I obtained City and Guilds First Class three years later.

Instead of at this point entering the family business, as my parents wished, I became a Catholic and commenced studies for the Roman priesthood at Campion House, Osterley Park. Doubts about my vocation and National Service however intervened before I could complete my studies, with the result that I spent 1958-60 with the 28th Field Ambulance then at Hohne in West Germany. Following demobilisation, I enrolled at Nottingham University, graduating in 1964 in History, English and Philosophy.

Needing to find employment quickly, my career in the schools began immediately and I took up several teaching positions over the next few years. In 1972, however, I left my position in History at St. Thomas Aquinas Grammar School to start work as a foreign language teacher at King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah. This reorientation towards the Arab World then gathered pace with three years at Tripoli University, followed by three years as a research student at Kings College, London University, where in 1980 I was awarded an M.Phil. in Education.

Again needing a job, in December 1979, I resumed my Middle-Eastern teaching career with a post at Jeddah Port, followed after a year by three years at Azzawia Training Centre, Tripoli, after which I returned for several years to King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah. It was during this latter period that I developed the present Ph.D. project with numerous visits and interviews with survivng members of the British Military Administrations. 1988, however again saw me back in England, where I recommenced my school mastering career first at the London Oratory, then at Cardinal Manning Boys' School, where I became Librarian and Head of History, taking early retirement with the closure of the school on 19th July 1991.

In 1987 having resolved to retire to the Mediterranean, I acquired a house South of Valencia, near Gandia and I am at present commuting between there and Ras La Nuf Refinary Libya, where I continue to teach English, until the villa has been adapted for educational purposes. As I am at present also preparing papers on educational developments under the Kingdom and Jamahiriyah, hopefully an educational history of Libya will eventually conclude these researches.

"We have arrived at a milestone in the war.
We can say: one continent redeemed ! "
(Sir Winston Churchill in his speech to the United States
Congress at the close of the North African Campaigns.)

"The greatest need of the country was for educational
development. Even in the early days the B.M.A. had
endeavoured to supply this."
(P.G.Sandison. Unpublished Memoirs.)

"A very cogent fact to remember, too, is that while there
are only a few hundred individuals at the university level,
there must be nearly 300,000 at the primary stage of
Libyan education."
(W.F.Vietmeyer, Primary Teacher Training, July 1965 -15 November, 1969)

"The trouble with history is it's like a mole - it burrows
away month after month and year after year without anyone ever
noticing very much."
(Russian Dissident, circa 1984.

"The Libyan Arab People have endured harsh sufferings from the
reactionist, ideological domination, Eastern and Western invasion
and infiltration."
(Ministry of Information and Culture, Tripoli, L.A.R.,
1st September Revolution Achievements, 5th Anniversary, 1969 - 1974, The Cultural Aspect:
Cultural Revolution, p.13.

ABBREVIATIONS:

A.C.S. - Archivo Centrale dello Stato, Roma.

A.P.C.D. - Atti Parliamentari, Camera dei Deputati

A.S.M.A.I. - Archivo Storico ex-Ministero dell'Africa Italiana (Ministero degli Affari Esteri), Roma.

B.M.A. - British Military Administration

B.U.C. - Bollettino Ufficiale del Ministero delle Colonie e successivamente Bollettino Ufficiale del Ministero dell'Africa Italiana

B.U.Cir. - Bollettino Ufficiale del Governo della Cirenaica

B.U.L. - Bollettino Ufficiale del Governo della Libia

B.Pers. - Bollettino del Personale del Ministero delle Colonie

B.U.T. - Bollettino Ufficiale del Governo della Tripolitania

BUSTA - Busta

C.D.I.A. - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Comitato per la Documentazione delle activitata italiane in Africa, L'Italia in Africa

C.S.C. - Consiglio Superiore Coloniale

Cart. - Cartone

D.G. - Decreto governatoriale (Colonial Governor's decree)

D. Lgt. - Decreto Luogotenentiale (vice-regent's decree)

D.I.S.A. - Direttorio Scuole Italiane All'Estero

O.L. - Ordinamento legislativo della Libia, Ministero delle Colonie, 1914

P.C.M. - Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri

Stralc. - Stralcio (cuttings)

R.D. - Regio Decreto (Royal Decree)

G.H.Q. - General Headquarters

S.C.A.O. - Senior Civil Affairs Officer

D.C.C.A.O. - Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer

D. of E. - Director of Education

C.C.A. - Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

CONTENTS

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B) Central State Archives (E.U.R.) Rome

C) Education Library of the Maraff (Tripoli)

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E) Oriental Library, University of Durham (Durham)

Chapter One
Establishment and Consolidation of British Military Rule in Tripolitania and the Resolving of the Libyan Independence Question

1. Chief Civil Affairs Officer and the Organising of Civil Affairs Branch G.H.Q.

While immense care and attention went into the planning and military assault upon Mussolini's African Empire, almost no thought at all was paid to the question of how such territories were to be governed, once the Duce's yoke had been cast off. Moreover, even less attention had been focused upon the ultimate fate of the Italian territories, whether as colonial appendages of Italy still, or as some-day independent states in their own right. The latter solution had already been agreed in the case of Ethiopia before the War had commenced, but nothing had been determined as far as the political future of Libya was concerned.

At the start of the war, attention was concentrated rather upon how territories were to be governed as they came under Allied domination. The military leaders were largely unconcerned about the second issue - the ultimate fate of the Italian colonies, once the war was won - which was seen as a political matter of concern only to civil governments. The former question was viewed as a system of semi-independent units, vaguely referred to as the "British Administration".

Unfortunately, very little was known of military administrations that could still be considered relevant in 1941 since all the known information was dated and of little practical use. Lack of relevant hindsight could be said to be the main problem facing Sir Phillip Mitchell in 1941 when he was instructed by the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, Lord Wavell, to take over the direction and control of the then Italian Empire. This had surprisingly fallen to the Allies in less than a year.

Essentially Mitchell's task lay in establishing at Cairo or Nairobi, as circumstances might dictate, an intermediary-type organisation, primarily to liaise with the government, Civil Service, Army and the various sections of the British Military Administration itself. As such, Mitchell's Cairo Political branch exercised a sort of quasi-control even though primarily designed as an information-passing body rather than as an independent controlling entity.

In addition to this communicatory and supervisory role, Political Branch G.H.Q. was also required to evolve policies for the individual B.M.A.s under its control. The task of implementing the policies, however, was largely left to the administrations themselves, even though Cairo was still theoretically in charge of their affairs. This is an important point when I come to educational matters as it implies that, while policy was formulated or at least determined in Cairo or London, its implementation was left to the individual B.M.A.s

themselves. This probably goes a considerable way in explaining why educational policies pursued in Bengasi were decisively different in both aim and content from those followed up in Tripoli and why neither territory ever liaised on the matter.

Finally, Mitchell's Cairo body was entrusted with both the creation of future administrations in Cairo and the setting up of them, once the territories for which they were destined had been effectively cleared of enemy troops. Thus Mitchell's role was both theoretical as well as practical since not only did he have to be kept well-posted with ideas, decisions and policies of both a military and civil complexion, but he was also responsible for ensuring that they were carried out in the territories concerned, once the B.M.A.s were formed.

Gradually, however, the needs of day-to-day administration would require that all information of relevance to the central government in London be collated in the form of an annual report to be produced in the individual territories themselves, before being passed on by Mitchell to the Government in London. To deal with this aspect of Political Branch's work, a special body known as Military Operations (M.O.11) was created by the War Cabinet.

By following these procedures, administrative direction and control of all "Occupied Enemy Territory" in Africa was effected at the highest levels of both army and government command structure. Mitchell's own status was determined by his title as Chief Government Affairs Officer, Middle East Command. This assumed that his position and function, though essentially of a non-military nature, was still integral to the full functioning of the military machine. Yet in all matters, it was clearly understood that administrative requirements must always be subordinate to military priorities. Hence, all personnel in the B.M.A. were required to be fully combative, if so required by the military command, and the B.M.A.s themselves would initially at least be fully supported by the military machine upon which they to a large extent depended for their daily requirements.

Throughout the virtual ten-year span of their existence, the B.M.A.s were kept informed by Mitchell, via the Deputy Chief Administrators, of all government and other decisions affecting their day-to-day existence. Such matters would range from impending visits by royalty and other dignitaries, to changes in policy or other important busines that might be determined in London. All this responsibility and control required continuous support from a bureaucracy specially created by Mitchell to cope with the mass of administrative detail destined for either the London government or the administrative systems operating in the various conquered territories themselves.

Mitchell's bureaucracy developed rapidly in Cairo with offices springing up to deal with a multitude of related administrative functions such as law, police accounts, to name but a few, in almost exact replication of the administrative functions of the individual B.M.A.s. Personnel to man this additional bureaucracy were recruited primarily from the services or

colonial service as such - especially for the higher appointments, such as Mitchell himself, who had been a former High Commissioner.

The delay in obtaining government approval for Mitchell's umbrella administration, which was not rubber stamped until the end of September 1941, resulted in many last minute appointments as the need to create B.M.A.s almost in exile increased with the imminence of actual conquest itself. To cope with these pressures, Political Branch's umbrella organisation consisted in the main of four departments headed by a Controller of Finances, Controller of Medical and Social Services, a legal Advisor and a G.S.O.I. in charge of the overall running of the secretariat.

The full system, which envisaged the provision of almost exact replicas of the B.M.A.s when they were eventually set up between 1942 and 1943 was never in fact implemented, due to the difficulty in recruiting or retaining the relevant personnel. This resulted in the merging of the work of the Medical and Services Departments with that of Finances and Accounts. All matters of a political nature, however, were handled by Mitchell himself, who also took all administrative decisions relating to the appointment of higher grades or affecting the running of Political Branch itself.

Political Branch in Cairo was also responsible for policy and planning but as it did not contain an educational office it could not have devised policies as such for either Tripolitania or Cyrenaica. It would, however, have conferred approval itself on matters, such as the adoption or non-adoption of the Egyptian curriculum, which step was full of political overtones and implications for Libya and the British role there.

Basically, however, Mitchell's role was that of implementer rather than originator, Field Marshall Wavell having already decided the aim, scope and model of the B.M.A.s under his control before Mitchell's appointment as Chief Civil Affairs Officer. Mitchell, however, was a man not without ideas of his own, tending to view the various B.M.A.s with the eyes of a former colonial officer. As such he often saw them as individual colonial governments being directly responsible to a centrally based High Commission which was, of course, Cairo Political Branch. Moreover, as education was such a grey area, it cannot be discounted that Mitchell himself was directly involved in determining its shape and orientation in Libya itself. Approval, for example, for the employment of Egyptian teachers, especially in Tripolitania would have come through his office, and he must also have had a clear understanding of the political ferment at that time affecting much educational activity in Egypt too with its possible implications for Libya under the B.M.A.s and even after.

The main question facing both Wavell and Mitchell to some extent too was what model to base the future government of ex-Italian Africa upon? According to Rennell of Rhodd, "as soon as the prospect of Cyrenaica falling into our hands was revealed to General Wavell, his mind had turned to Palestine and Syria in 1918-1919. The administration of these areas, including the Transjordan together with Iraq (or Mesopotamia as it was then called) and

Tanganyika, provided indeed the only modern experience of military government of occupied enemy territories" (1)

So, the models anticipated by Wavell for North and East Africa following the Italian and German defeats would be solely based upon an imperfectly perceived historical precedent.This, however, was not just a case of history repeating itself, as might be first supposed, as the earlier models in Africa and the Middle East had not simply accorded with International Law, but had indeed emanated from it. Thus the anticipated models of diplomatic art and bureaucratic skill were as much legal as historical ideas, albeit interpreted in the light of British military and colonial experience, rather than of any other individual power, such as France.

Moreover, the proposed administrations were to be conducted in the name of and under the authority of the Army Commander and in accordance with the law as set out in the Hague Convention of 1907. (2) A further reason, other than that of mere convenience, became also apparent at this point, since obedience to the Hague Rules in 1914 implied of necessity, administration by those laws in existence at the start of the occupation, except where the Army Commander thought otherwise. "By extension," Rhodd adds, "since military governments are not designed or intended to administer a country on much more than a care and maintenance basis, consistent with the needs of an occupying power. (3)

In this respect, Britain was particularly anxious to avoid being seen as adding to her Empire by assuming a further colonial role which she certainly did not want vis-a-vis the former Italian colonies, whether in Libya or anywhere else in North Africa at this time. Whether Britain wanted to establish a zone of influence in Libya to offset an anticipated decline of influence in Egypt is another question beyond the scope of this thesis. It was however repeatedly announced right at the beginning of the B.M.A.s - and throughout their longer than anticipated existence - that the regimes replacing the former colonial governments were temporary and solely designed to give way to civil administrations, as soon as circumstances permitted. The nature of "civil administrations" was similarly referred to in the vaguest of terms, the bottom line being that it was not the responsibility of the B.M.A. to deliberate upon such matters, being rather that of other authorities, whoever they may be.

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1 Lord Rennel of Rhodd K.B.E.,C.B., *British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa During the Years 1941 - 1947*, London, 1948, H.M.S.O., p.23.

2 *Ibid.*, p.10.

3 *Ibid.*, p.21.

II. Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer and the Organisation of Military Government in Occupied Territories.

As with the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and his administration in Cairo, so with the various deputies in the territorial entities about to be set up, the blue-print of historical precedent was to be closely adhered to, albeit as interpreted by Field Marshall Wavell. It was understood therefore that occupied enemy territory would be divided up into provinces and finally subdivided into districts and even subdistricts. A senior civil affairs officer (S.C.A.O.), usually with the rank of Lieut. Colonel, would normally be placed in charge of a province and be responsible for its administration on a day-to day basis. This pragmatic arrangement, however, did not depart from the general principle of overall control as far as the "general directions on policy" were concerned by the higher authority. (4)

In the latter respect, the D.C.C.A.O. had to assist him on his staff a number of technical officers adept in the fields of finance, law, medicine, police and the like. Each of these had special departmental officers undertaking duties in their respective spheres in the various territories comprising the B.M.A.

There does not, however, appear to have been an office dealing with educational matters or any identifiable individual with such responsibilities. Instead, responsibility for education was an entirely local matter devolving via the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer for the territory concerned to the Director of Education appointed by him. This did not of course eliminate entirely responsibility or involvement in education by Political Branch G.H.Q. which continued overall control of the operations of all the B.M.A.s as before - at least in theory.

The individual Director of Education, like the individual Director of Medical and Veterinary Services or Finance and Accounts, for example, was therefore more-or-less entirely responsible for the running and affairs of his department to the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the territory and no other person. In the case of Tripolitania, therefore, the Director of Education, Major A.J. Steele-Greig, was directly responsible for his actions to the D.C.C.O. of the territory, initially Brigadier Maurice Lush, by whom he was first appointed and, following Lush's vacation of the office, by his successor, Brigadier Travers Blackley. Finally, the D.C.A.O.'s secretary would normally be a senior staff officer (S.S.O.I).

Despite the existence of this tidy hierarchical pyramid, stretching as it did from the technical personnel in the field to the C. in C. himself, it was understood that the problems being dealt with were essentially those of a "colonial type government." (5) At the earliest stages, a "mixed regime" had been considered, owing "allegiance" to both the War Office and

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4 *Ibid., see Appendix II: Notes on the Military Government of Occupied Enemy Territory IV Organisation of Military Government*, pp.565 - 566.

5 *Ibid.*, p.24.

the Colonial Office. This had however been ruled out for financial reasons. Instead, a purely military-type of organisation was favoured in which the personnel were "commissioned in H.M. Forces with Mitchell being given the rank of Major General".(6)

This so-called military machine was very different from its Italian predecessor, though that too was controlled from the centre, and to a far greater degree than the B.M.A.s. The latter was more professional and bureaucratic in spirit and nature, producing endless reports for the benefit of the authorities in Rome, which were for the most part either destroyed or buried without trace by post-war Italian governments, leaving only the most innocuous for the historians to browse through in the state archives.

The system devised by Mitchell for Wavell was never in any absolute sense a "military machine", the personnel being military only in name, even if in theory liable to be called upon to perform military duties, were not in any real sense soldiers. Neither were they "colonial officers" as such, though Mitchell came to his post with a colonial background, having been the erstwhile Governor General of Uganda. Yet despite such discrepancies the B.M.A.s "more resembled colonial governments" than any other kind of government, except perhaps "for the existence of two political branches", requiring that "administrative matters would have to be referred by a colonial governor to the Colonial Office". Instead, under the B.M.A., administrative matters were under the nominal control of the C.in C. (7)

1. Establishing Military Government (1943 - 1946).

Inherent in any set of military ideas must be the notion of a planned operation: the establishment of the B.M.A.s during the years 1941 - 1943 in the former Italian Colonies well illustrates this maxim. The general programme of the planned operation had been laid out as succinctly as possible in "Notes on the Military Government of Occupied Enemy Territory" (8) which was issued to all officers involved in the operation. It would be helpful therefore, while elaborating the essential "three phases" of this operation, to adhere to the plan implicit in this document. The following is a short paraphrase of the essential steps involved in each phase, followed by a rough description of events so prescribed.

1. First Phase: the Embryo State.

During Phase One of the Military Government's existence, government for official purposes is only regarded as being "in embryo state" as the "State of war" itself still obtains in the territory about to be occupied. At this stage, personnel are attached to Army H.Q. for the purpose of advising the military commanders on all matters concerning the regulation of the civil population. They had the task of ensuring that the civil population did not attempt to interfere

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6 *Ibid.*, p.25.
7 *Op. Cit.*, p.295.
8 *Ibid.*, p.559 - 583.

with the military operation and that the resources of the country were turned to the benefit of the invading army. In this way, they were to act for and in the name of the C. in C. to whose army they were attached.

As the army penetrated into enemy territory, civil affairs officers were to be detached from the military H.Q. and released into back areas so as to take charge of the embryo military government. During Phase One, the D.C.C.A.O. was to remain attached to the H.Q. of the commander of the whole operation. He was only to move forward with the C. in C., hence the whole personnel for the future B.M.A.s of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including the Director of Education, Major A.J. Streele-Greig, though he was only an infantry officer at the time, arrived in their respective territories in Montgomery's van. The duties of the D.C.C.A. were carefully laid down and designed to meet all of the requirements of his position, from the drafting of necessary proclamations, and the setting up of military courts to both communicating with the C.C.A.O. in Cairo and the officers and men comprising the new "embryo state". (9)

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In historical terms, the establishment of military government first in Cyrenaica and then in Tripolitania was by no means as effortless as this prescription of official duties for the operation might seem to imply. On the contrary, the setting up of the B.M.A.s in Libya was greatly complicated by the military situation during which the British Army advanced three times before being finally victorious. In this process, it had withdrawn twice, so necessitating in Cyrenaica three attempts at setting up an Administration and one in Tripolitania.

The institution of the first B.M.A. in Cyrenaica derived from the impetus of Wavell's rapid advance in December 1940 into Libya's eastern province of Cyrenaica. Little attention had been given, however, to the establishment of an administration there apart from the gathering together at Maadi on the Egyptian Delta of a nucleus of personnel earmarked for such a purpose. The sudden fall of Benghazi early in the February of1941 led Brigadier Longrigg to commence setting up his administration in the former Italian capital of the eastern provinces. Unfortunately, during its brief existence, Longrigg's small staff was too preoccupied with the restoration of law and order to be able to exercise any of its prerogatives and before very long abandoned the operation and joined Wavell's retreating army in April 1941.

The interim between the first and second occupation of Benghazi was occupied by the drawing up of preliminary arrangements in Cairo for a further institution of military

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9 *Op. Cit.*, Appendix II, Section IV, *Organisation of Military Government*, p.564 - 9.

government in Cyrenaica. Having been designated Chief Administrator for a second time on 14th October, 1941, Longrigg began in this capacity to build around him a further nucleus of personnel for a future skeleton administration of the province.

Thus when Benghazi fell for a second time into British hands during Auchinleck's advance of December 24th 1941, administrative personnel were at least available under Longrigg to set up a second military government in Libya's eastern province. At this point, however, the military situation was still extremely precarious for the British and Longrigg was still unable to begin any effective start to the administration of the scattered province. Indeed after barely a month, the British forces were again obliged to withdraw to Cairo as the Germans launched a successful counter-attack on 2nd February 1942. (10)

Between February 1942 and the third and final establishment of Longrigg's administration in Benghazi on 11th November 1942, B.M.A. Cyrenaica was given was given the task of taking care of the refugees fleeing into Egypt from the now completely devastated Eastern Province. Combined with this function was the important task of reorganising the Cyrenaican Police Force. Meanwhile Rommel had been halted at El-Alamein and rendered unable to renew his threat to Egypt. Moreover, the failure of the German attack on the Alam Halfa position threw them into complete retreat. From now on the B.M.A. could be officially established in Cyrenaica while the final routing of German forces in the sister province of Tripolitania enabled a similar administration to be established there too.

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B.M.A. Tripolitania, in what was still in terms of International Law, despite the success of British arms, the western province of Italy's colony of Libya, though it had been declared by Mussolini to be an integral part of "metropolitan Italy", passed de facto under British rule on 15th December, 1942. Legally, this had been effected when Montgomery signed the eleven initial proclamations at Eighth Army H.Q. near Agedabia, declaring British occupation of Tripolitania and the methods whereby it would be applied. (11)

Previous to this date, Brigadier Maurice Lush had been delegated Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, a position similar to those he had held previously in Ethiopia and Madagascar. A provisional war office establishment was also formally approved, a third of the staff for which had already been posted by 31st December 1942, as is apparent from the following:

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10 G.H. Becker Jnr., *The Disposition of the Italian Colonies 1941 - 1945.*, University of Geneva, February 1952, p. 42.

11 *Annual Report, B.M.A. Tripolitania*, 1943, p. 10.

Entitlement			Posted Strength		
Officers,	O.R.s,	Inspectors	Officers,	O.R.s,	Inspectors
B.M.A. Tripolitania:					
132	224	-	53	65	-
Tripolitanian Police:					
33	4	49	8	-	9
Tripolitanian Prisons:					
2	1	10	1	-	1
Total:					
167	229	59	62	65	10

(12)

The morale of the new administration was undoubtedly high and we are told by official commentators that "they had the experience of engaging in a well-planned enterprise". (13) Moreover, nothing was left to chance, the personnel, many of whom had been drafted from either the Colonial or Military Services. Such a body of personnel had been carefully selected rather than hastily gathered from any available source.

Accommodation for the new personnel was provided in a special camp outside Cairo, where they were trained as a specially organised unit for service in Libya. As such, "Notes on The Military Government of Enemy Occupied Territory", (14) became virtually their "Vade

12 *Ibid.*, p.10.
13 *Ibid.*
14 See, *supra*; note 4, p. 9.

Mecum". Additional instruction was provided in the form of courses in both Italian and Arabic, along with lectures by personnel in possession of relevant experience in the administration of occupied territories, recently gained in former Italian East Africa especially. Finally opportunity was provided for the special study of particular territoriesd - most namely those to which personnel were already delegated. (15)

Otherwise, the virtual absence of enemy resistance, though a rally was expected on the border of Tunisia, enabled the military government of Tripolitania to be instituted in accordance with the blueprint for phases one, two and three, as outlined in the manual, virtually without a hitch. Certain priority areas were, however, given particular care and attention, such as the establishing of internal security to a high level, which was seen to be a matter of utmost importance by Brigadier Lush. This for a short time at least resulted in an emphasis upon direct as opposed to indirect rule which was no doubt more convenient in the administrative sense to the high command.

The Italians, however, had favoured indirect rule, with the territory being divided into two prefettura, one being based in Tripoli and the other in Misurata. (16) Instead of this system, Lush decided that the more direct control could be achieved by allocating authority to six senior civil affairs officers based in Tripoli, Misurata, Homs, Garia, Zuara and Hon. The officers for these posts were selected in Dewcember and each was then placed in charge of a civil affairs team, comprising both administrators and departmental staff who were then to be trained and organised to a "military formation". (17)

The first of these teams left Maadi on the Delta on 23rd December, 1942, under the command of Lt. Col. Lowth, M.C., with orders to report to H.Q. 30 Corps by 9th January at Sirte, just as the Eighth Army was preparing for the final advance on Tripoli. The remaining teams followed at approximately weekly intervals. Thus as each major centre of population fell to British troops, another civil affairs officer would be despatched from Lowth's team to take charge of the civil administration and, along with him, such units of the Sudan Defence Forces, as had been detailed to act as a force of occupation.

These arrangements had been well thought through and were found to work well in practice. The various outbreaks of looting that occured in the interval between the Axis withdrawal and the British advance were quickly brought under control as the occupation gradually became more effective. Military courts were set up at Misurata (28th January) and Tripoli (2nd February). Further additional battalions of the Sudan Defence Force were also made available for police duties pending the organising and training of a new civil police force. By such effective and timely measures, law and order was restored in Libya's western

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15 *Op. Cit.*, P.268.
16 *Ibid.*
17 *Ibid.*

province and the respect of the local population, whether Arab, Italian or Jew, assured for at least the immediate future. (18)

18 *Ibid.*, p. 270.

ii. Phase two: defence against internal and external aggression and the consolidation of military government in Tripolitania.

During "Phase Two" of the official handbook, issued only to officers,(19) it is indicated that military government should "emerge from its embryo state and commence to function as a co-ordinated whole under the immediate direction and active control of the DCCAO". (20) When this has occured, the DCCAO, who in Tripolitania was Brigadier Maurice Lush, would cease to be merely advisory but operate in an executive capacity with his whole staff.

In "Phase Two", therefore, military commanders would be relieved of any responsibility for military government in the local sense. Moreover, during this phase, "the laws of the country, as modified and supplemented by proclamation" were to be at all times enforced. Similarly, "the civil police force becomes primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order; judicial machinery for both civil and criminal matters is provided; imports and exports are controlled; taxes, customs, excise duties and municipal rates are collected; trade and industry are encouraged and directed into channels beneficial to the occupant; exchange dealings are regulated; transport services are restored; public utility undertakings are reopened; financial control is exercised on a budgetary basis; civilian medical services are resumed; special attention is devoted to the administration of the native inhabitants; and control and supervision is exercised over tribal organisations." (21)

However, even the main objective during Phase Two is to return, as far as possible, normal circumstances - or at least the status quo ante bellum - the handbook continues to emphasise that "military considerations remain paramount": the :policy of the military government will therefore be shaped primarily to secure every advantage for the occupying army", It follows that emphasis must be placed therefore upon the character of the kilitary commander who remains ultimately responsible to the commander in chief for the pursuance of military government, even if this responsibility declines with the successful establishment of military government. Finally, the DCCA becomes the executive head of the Military Government by virtue of a special warrant issued tohim for this purpose by the commander-in-chief. (22)

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19 *Op. Cit.*
20 *Ibid.*, Pp. 569 - 571.
21 *Ibid.*
22 *Ibid.*, pp. 569 - 570.

As is observed by Rennel of Rhodd, "the objectives of the Admnistration followed the textbook", by which he meant the "Notes on the Military Government of Occupied Enemy Territory" which had already been referred to. (23) The nature of this process was well summed up in the Annual Report of the first year of the Administration as "while the overriding demands of the Army engaged in active operations required quick administrative action in specific matters, such as those already mentioned, the general policy of the Administration in its wider aspects was gradually being implemented." (24)

Thus, while in the law the obligations of the occupying power were seen to be limited by International Law itself, in practice the demands of the war effort would require the stimulation of the whole productive capacity of the country to the ultimate end of winning the war against the Axis poers. While therefore the tasks of administering justice and collecting revenues, to take just two possible examples, may be kept in clearly defined limits, there still remains scope amd indeed demand for constructive work in the fields of agriculture, trade and industries. (25)

During Phase Two of Military Government and the first year of the military occupation itself, the territory was therefore required by forcr of military exigencies to become the main base for the pl nning and eventual invasion of Sicily. In pursuance of this goal, the Military Government had to aim at providing all the facilities required for the invasion itself. This also required that the productive capacity of the country be stimulated to aid the war effort.

In line with such aims, work was at once commenced upon the clearing of the mines and other obstacles from Tripoli harbour to facilitate the unloading of ships containing military suppplies even though the Public Works Department had not yet been set up. Work was also begun on the repair of buildings requisitioned by the Army and Administration, very few of which did not require some degree of attantion on account of the bombing blast.

Furthermore, power and pumping stations, roads and railways, all needed to be brought up to the right level of military serviceability. It was also important to ensure that the country's very resources of whatever category should be placed at the disposal of the military as well. The virtual absence of all kinds of stocks on the market required that the controller of civil supplies should acquire an immediate declaration of all the stocks being held by merchants. "The result", noted Rhodd, from about 250 firms, was "Flour 4.5 tons, sugar 5 tons, soup materials 46 tons, oil 30 tons. In addition, the farmers' cooperative held 100 tons of wheat flour, 280 tons of wheat grains; and a stock of edible oil." (26)

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23 *Op. Cit.*, p. 270 and Notes on Military Government.
24 *Annual Report B.M.A. Tripolitania*, p. 12.
25 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
26 Rennel of Thodd, *Op. Cit.*, p. 273.

The army, however, was not in direct need of these items which the Administration proceeded to distribute to hospitals, orphanages and prisons along with a special loaf of 50 grammes to Tripoli City. General work conditions, food shortages and the need to save shipping made agricultural production the prime consideration. In this respect, it was readily noted that Tripolitania "has always been and will always remain a deficiency area in most agricultural commodities, and policy has always been directed towards the maximum production of the three basic crops - cereals, oil bearing crops and vegetables. Little can be done to stimulate yields from vines, almonds, dates and citrus, beyond improving cultivation methods." (27)

Yet agricultural production in Tripolitania was continuing to increase and was considerabley greater than a year before. Both commercially and industrially, Tripolitania was also dependent upon imports and as with agriculture, the productive capacity of the country was quite meagre. Brief mention, however, must at this point be made of the efforts of the Middle Eastern Supply Centre which had begun operations in Tripoli in March.

The Centre's objective was to increase Middle Eastern resources primarily to facilitate the war effort, while at the same time providing for the basic needs of the indigenous population of the area, an aim which following the ending of hostilities shifted to welfare and allied organisations. At this time, the work of the Centre was of the greatest importance for Tripolitania since the latter became part of a comprehensive plan for the area as a whole. Without the work of the Middle Eastern Supply Centre, it is doubtful if a territory such as Tripolitania, with its meagre natural resources and virtual lack of exports, could have managed to sustain itself following the withdrawal of Italian sibsidies, let alone through the terrible droughts of 1946 - 1947. (28)

The undertaking of constructive work in agriculture, trade and industry, initially to facilitate the war effort, was undoubtedly of some benefit, as far as the recovery and future development of the country was concerned. Phase Two, however, also required the implementation of a policy of Care and Maintenance in accordance with International Law, but at this stage Care and Maintenance was not the primary concern of the Aministration.

Finance and Legal Affairs were also from the start of the B.M.A. regarded as of paramount importance in the running of the country. As such they represented a highly diversified sphere of administrative activity, the former, along with the Accounts (again originally set up in Cairo in the December of 1942). These Departments were closely followed by those of Banking, Exchange, Currency, Social Insurance, Cost of Living Indices, Revenue and various other related activities. Customs and Excise, once a sub-department of Finance, quickly took over control of the corresponding Italian Department of Customs and Excise in Tripoli.

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27 Annual Report, 1943, *Op. Cit.*, p.30.
28 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Similarly, the Legal Department, also pre-assembled in Cairo and later Maadi, during the uncertain months of 1941, took over its Italian namesake in Tripoli. Complex in structure it was no less diversified in form, being responsible for the supervision of British, Italian, Moslem and Jewish courts, the issuing of proclamations, required by the C. in C. and at the conclusion of Phase Two. The DCCAO , as well as the task of reviewing all legislation operating in the territory, also had to ensure such legislation fitted into the requirements of the B.M.A. Overlordship of the important and disputatious land registry was also the responsibility of the DCCAO. Legal affairs generally during this period included a vast volume of work, such as the drafting of orders, regulations and notices, the giving of opinions to other departments in relation to their various activities and the advising of the Administration generally upon a host of day-to-day matters.

A further requirement of this fledgling administration was the Department of Police and Prisons which General Montgomery had provided for in his proclamation No. 4 of 15 December explicitly authorising the creation of a Tripolitanian Police Force. It was at 10.00 hours on 23rd January, 1943, that representatives of this force, in the form of the Commissioner of Police and two other police officers entered Tripoli with Brigadier Lush and established police headquarters at the offices of the Polizia Africana Italiana.

This new creation was responsible during the year and subsequently for the existing police forces in Tripolitania, the establishment and training of a new police force, administration, crime, Italian registration, immigration and prisons. Legal Affairs, Finance and Police were the most important arms of the Administration; but during Phase Two in 1943, the remaining arms of the Administration were set up in Tripoli and the provinces. These were to include Road Transport, with responsibility for police vehicles and public transport too. This also included providing drivers to the Administration in Tripoli, works and public utilities departments with wide-ranging responsibilities for roads, railways, harbours, gasworks, power stations and stores supplies.

Further branches of the Administration included Medical Control, demographic colonisation schemes (included with agriculture), trade supplies (at this point vitally concerned with rationing and price control), custodianship of enemy property, registration and management of wide-ranging Italian assets, Labour (at this time basically concerned with the manning for military rather than civilian needs), education for Arabs, Italians and Jews, as well as the children of British expatriates, postal services, press and propaganda, which was mainly to do with press and public relations. (29)

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29 *Ibid.*, throughout pp. 1 - 117.

iii. Phase Three: establishment of military government on a permanent basis under the control of the Administration of Brigadier Travers Blackley.

During this phase of military government, the "military problem" was soon to become "subordinate to civilian needs". It is therefore emphasised that the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, who had been specially selected "for his experience in military methods" is at this point "entrusted with full responsibility for the military government of the country". To mark this change in status, the DCCAO now becomes "Chief Administrator". Furthermore, the senior combatant officer's title changes to "O.C. of Troops". Again the comparison is with a British colonial dependency where the distinction between two relatively autonomous civil and military spheres of activity and jurisdiction is maintained, the "military authorities" neither controlling or interfering in the affairs of the government, "except in the case of grave internal disorder". Yet, despite civilian matters being in the ascendancy during Phase Three, the government was to remain essentially military in character, deriving its authority and legality from "conquest by force of arms".

Within this kind of context, however, the Chief Administrator's position was recognised as being purely "transitory" with no inherent rights, his task throughout this final stage, which was to be of unusually and unexpectedly long duration in Libya, that of "restoring the territory to a state of settled government on as normal a basis as was consistent with the exercise of powers limited to the purpose of war, the maintenance of order and safety and the proper administration of the territory".

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If it is difficult to fix with any degree of historical exactitude the ending of the First and Second Phase of Military Government, there can be little doubt that the successful inauguration of the B.M.A. during its early stages was in no small part due to the energy and leadership of Brigadier Maurice Lush, appointed in November 1943 as Chief Civil Affairs Officer at H.Q., Fifteenth Army Group. "Under him", the official report for 1943 states, "the Administration took control quickly and smoothly and thereby gained the confidence of Italian, Jew and Arab alike". (30) (31)

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30 *Ibid.*

31 *Annual Report*, 1943, p.14.

The direction of the Administration, however, in November 1943 devolved upon Lt. Colonel W.J. Miller who was Chief Secretary. (32) Phase Three of the operation can fortunately be more easily dated, with Brigadier T. Blackley's designation as Chief Administrator of Tripolitania during 1944, instead of as before Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer. (33) It is to Travers Blackley that the effective consolidation - if not development - of Lush's administration is due. This was rather a question of good sense and firm management than any employment of "force majeure" since both adequate resources of money and manpower were conspicuously lacking both before and after the ending of the war in 1945.

III. The Issue of Libyan Independence and the Consolidating of Military Rule (1944 - 1945).

i. Action by the United Nations in Resolving the Diplomatic Impasse over Libya.

In a sense, Libya as a country or political entity between 1942 and 1949 ceased to exist. As such it could neither determine its own destiny nor could the B.M.A. do this for it. Neither could it adequately develop since the policies of Care and Maintenance practised by the B.M.A. were carefully limited by international statutes for merely restoring and maintaining the status quo ante bellum. Even fulfilling these limited goals was extremely difficult in the circumstances then obtaining in Libya and the fabric of the country especially in the capital was rapidly falling into decay. To check this drift only the most basic repairs could be carried out as business confidence continued to wane on the prevailing uncertainty over the future of the country.

In more than one respect, therefore, Libya reverted to what it had been like before the Italian era had commenced - a geographical expression rather than a country set in a stagnant economy that was woefully inadequate to serve the needs of a developing country. Explanations of this state of affairs are not difficult to locate: though Italy had lost the war and her former colonial empire, yet these former colonies remained Italian in name at least, so retaining a status that was entirely ambivalent at each relevant point of the political and economic compass.

The essential power of deciding upon the future of the former Italian colonies, including Libya, fell of course to the victors rather than the vanquished, though the desires and aspirations of the latter still counted as plans for the reconstruction of Europe were developed.

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32 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

33 Annual Report, 1944, p. 43, neither the day nor the month are given.

In this process, the wishes of the native inhabitants, as in colonial times, and indeed under the Ottomans too, scarcely mattered at all. How Libya ended up as a national entity at all therefore requires some explanation, following as it did from the decisions of the victorious powers of America, Russia, Great Britain and France in the immediate aftermath of the war itself.-

As the "cold war" gained momentum, rivalry between the powers continued, as in the colonial era itself to find expression in Africa, and was in a sense fuelled by the uncertainty surrounding the future of the former Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somalia and Libya. It was then generally understood by the concerned parties that these territories had never possessed much economic value, though the Italians had discovered in the colonial era itself the presence of oil in Libya but had done nothing to exploit it for politico-economic reasons. Furthermore, whereas the prestige value of colonial dependencies contributed to national status before 1945, it counted for little following the end of the war itself, though was still a factor in the calculations of the political forces in mainland Italy. For the most part, however, the post war world with its austerity budgets and ration cards, saw colonial dependencies as a drain on national resources that might be more profitably used in relieving economic misery at home. Hence, colonies became unpopular politically and colonial powers like Britain and France now actively sought to relieve themselves of the burden of empire as soon as the opportunity arose.

The pressure of the cold war, however, interposed on the desire to shed colonial dependencies with new strategic thinking that converged along the old familiar lines, and issued in an era of neo-colonialism in which zones of interest replaced old colonial boundaries. Italy's former African empire lay in the location of each territory along a "strategic life line to the approaches of the Mediterranean and the focal points of the Near East". (34) In this respect, Libya "being closer to the areas East-West conflict, became the most important of the three colonies from every angle, and specially from the point of view of strategic considerations". (35)

Thus in the circumstances of 1945, America, Britain, France and Russia had a strong and natural interest in securing their options in the Middle East, North Africa and East Africa, if only as a corollary to existing power rivalries and in particular the East-West conflict now heavily tinctured by cold war attitudes and rhetoric. For these reasons, therefore, no easy solution could be found for the future of the former Italian territories and indeed "the failure to agree on any solution finally obliged the Big Three (America, Britain and Russia, later joined by France) to hand the issue over to the United Nations where it was eventually settled by chance". (36)

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34 Becker, *Op. Cit.*, p. 72.
35 *Ibid.*
36 *Ibid.*, p. 67.

A) The Libyan Issue before the Big Four.

Although militarily Italy had lost all her African territories by 1942 and was knocked out of the Second World War itself in 1944, any direct discussion between the Allies of the future of the former Italian colonies was avoided until the defeat of Germany in 1945. Despite this, the subject was cautiously broached at Yalta in the Crimea and later at San Francisco. This was not unmarked since when the Big Three met at Potsdam during the summer of 1945, Stalin stated that he would like "to discuss the question of trusteeship" and added that the USSR "would like some territory of the defeated states." (37)

To this, Britain could not reasonably object as Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had already unilaterally committed Britain to handing over Cyrenaica to his protegee, the Sayed Mohammed Idrid El-Senusi in 1942, and again in 1944 when, in answering to a House of Commons question, had stated Britain's opposition to the return of the colonies to Italy. (38) In fact, however, as must subsequently become apparent, Britain, especially under the post-war labour Government, was far from immutably opposed to the return at least of Libya's western province of Tripolitania to Italy, and was certainly in favour of Italy retaining strong ties and influence in the country. (39)

Once the war was finally over, the Council of Foreign Ministers, appointed by the governments of the USA, Britain and the USSR, later joined by France, met in London during September, 1945, to discuss and arrange the agenda for the Paris Peace Conference which was intended to settle all important territorial and other claims still outstanding from the war. At the London Conference, the question of the disposition of the Italian Colonies, including Libya, was for the first time officially brought out into the open and placed on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference.

The London Conference demonstrated very clearly that agreement on this issue, as upon many other issues, would be exceedingly difficult to arrive at and drawn out, as each of the Poweres had clearly defined interests at stake. This was the most serious problem facing a speedy and effective solution as collective agreement seemed the only method open to the Powers for a settlement of the issue before them. (40)

Unable to reach consensus in London, the Council of Foreign Ministers met again in Paris in the Spring of 1946, where they endeavoured to put the finishing touches to final preparations for the eventual Peace Conference itself. Until this point, the USA had advocated collective trusteeship for the former Italian colonies. France, however, desired the situation in

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37 *Ibid.*
38 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
39 *Ibid.*, p. 161.
40 *Ibid.*, pp. 84 - 5.

the colonies to revert to the status quo ante bellum. Britain supported the USA, but the USSR opposed the American plan, fearing it would strengthen the Western Powers in an area of vital strategic interests. Meanwhile, Italian hopes for the restoration of the whole or part of their former empire were by no means dead and received both tacit and overt support from the USSR and France. (41)

The realisation that the only way out of this emerging deadlock and arriving at a measure of agreement over the disposal of the former Italian colonies hinged upon the question of the degree of compensation that Italy might receive now began to find expression in the Council of Ministers. That any form of compensation which would involve the ceding to Italy of possibly Tripolitania would be highly unpopular amongst the native population was not a factor affecting the deliberations of the Big Four. Prior to any moves on this issue, however, an important measure of agreement was arrived at between the USA and the USSR over a number of procedural matters affecting the former Italian colonies. This had the result of finally opening up the war for holding the long-awaited peace conference itself. (42)

The failure by the Council of Ministers to find agreement over the disposal of the Italian colonies had the effect of delaying the opening of the Peace Conference scheduled for Paris by nearly a year. When finally convened on 29 July, 1946, the question was studiously avoided. Instead, the far more important and pressing European settlement issues were attended to. The draft proposals of the Italian Peace Treaty were, however, accepted, so depriving Italy of all sovereignty in her former colonies, though the Italians still continued to hope that their influence and control might eventually be restored. The Peace Treaty with Italy left the Big Four only a further year to resolve the question at issue. (43)

This deadline was only just met with the Big Four's deputies not being able to meet for the purpose of discussing and drawing up recommendations on the dispoal of the former Italian Colonies until 3 October, 1947. Once again the agreed venue for the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four to meet was London, where the same issue had been discussed two years before. In the meantime, the Peace Conference at Paris had merely shelved the subject, with prospects for its solution in 1948 being as unpromising as ever and time for finding a panacea running out fast. (44)

The seemingly intractable nature of the problem was once again admirably demonstrated when the Foreign Ministers met once again at London, where a full two months were spent wrangling over procedural matters connected with sending a Four Power Commission to the former colonies. The Commission was intended to furnish the Deputies with necessary information on the former colonies in connection with which they were for the most part

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41 *Ibid.*, p. 80. Also, see Becker, p. 113, for clarification of French aims vis-a-vis spport for Italy at this stage of the Italian Plan.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 90.

43 *Ibid.*

44 *Ibid.*, p. 104.

completely ignorant. In particular at this late stage, information was looked for on the views and aspirations of the native inhabitants themselves who had never been even considered before this point. (45)

The deputies also judged it important to obtain the views of nineteen "interested governments" upon the future of the Italian Colonies, for the examination and discussion of which, the London Conference was reconvened in February, 1948. Once this task had been got out of the way, the Deputies finally began to draft out their own recommendations for the Council of Foreign Ministers set to meet before 15 September, 1948. This was the last date for the issue to be resolved by the Big Four.

Completed by 1 August, 1948, the Report compiled by the deputies did little more than emphasise existing disagreements between the USSR and the Western Powers and indeed amongst the Western Powers themselves. (46) "In substance", writes Becker, "the recommendations of the Deputies to the CFM offered little or nothing towards finding a solution to the problem, but simply accentuated the fact that the Big Four were almost as far from agreement on a means of disposing of the Italian Colonies as they had been in 1945". (47)

On Libya, the United States and Britain both proposed that Cyrenaica be placed under the United Nations trusteeship with the United Kingdom as the administering authority. The last provision on the joint proposal recommended that a decision on the future of Tripolitania and the Fezzan be postponed for one year. France agreed with the final section of the joint proposal, but preferred to have a decision on Cyrenaica also postponed for a year. (48)

B) The Issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Not surprisingly, when the representatives of the Big Four met at Paris between 13 and 15 September, 1948, finally to determine the fate of the Italian empire, they were as far away from agreement as when they had first met to determine the issue at London in 1946. Time, however, had irretrievably caught up with them and failure to agree signified failure to solve the problem which was at this point referred by them to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Once put up for discussion by the third session of the General Assembly on 21

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45 *Ibid.*, pp. 113 - 114.
46 *Ibid.*, p. 135.
47 *Ibid.*
48 *Ibid.*, p. 137.

September, 1948, it ranked as tenth on a list of items up for consideration by the First Committee.

By handing the problem over to the United Nations at this point, the Powers had unwittingly delayed the resolution of the issue still further since this step gave Italy the opportunity of canvassing for support amongst the strongly pro-Italian nations of Latin America. At this point, Britain, which had long regarded the relinquishing of control in Tripolitania to Italy as a valuable fall-back position, once the American and British plan of British trusteeship had failed to get off the ground, now came out openly on the side of Italy.

The resolution of the problem of the future of Tripolitania was becoming a matter of pressing urgency for Britain, since not only the associated financial and political problems of maintaining Care and Maintenance needed urgent solution; but also it was still widely believed that Italy still represented the best chance of bringing back some stability to the area. Thus an apparently new factor entered into the situation with the resolution of the disposition of the Italian Colonies in favour of Italy being looked for by the USSR and the Western Powers. Developments on these lines were, however, now delayed until April, 1949, when a third session of the United Nations was scheduled to meet at New York.

ii. Effect of the Diplomatic Impasse upon the Conduct of Military Administration in Tripolitania during 1949.

By handing over to the United Nations effective responsibility and control for a decision upon the disposition of the former Italian Colonies and in particular Libya, the Big Four had at least opened the door for the Italians again to present their case for the restitution of at least Tripolitania to some form of Italian sovereignty. This, of course, had an immediate impact in Tripolitania itself, where such a move was strongly condemned and resisted by the indigenous population and its leaders. Their demands were for the immediate ending of the B.M.A. and the conceding of national independence. As for the British Government and the Arab population the issue of a return to Italian sovereignty had never really left the political agenda,.it is important at this stage not to gloss over its general significance, in shedding important light upon the general ambivalence of the political, cultural and social conduct of policy in the province under the B.M.A., especially in the educational field.

Despite its appalling record as a colonial power, only slightly better in its treatment of the native population in Libya than the worst excesses in Ethiopia, Italy was still able to derive support for the reimposition of Italian sovereignty in the country from Russia, France and finally Britain too. No doubt the reasons for supporting Italy at this juncture were political, stemming from great power rivalry with its roots in the cold war, but it should at the same time

be seen as lacking in any moral basis, given the clear mandate for national independence expressed by the indigenous population of Libya and conveyed to the Big Four via the Four Power Commission.

As a leading supporter of the Italian case for a renewed mandate in Tripolitania, Russia hoped that by supporting Italy's case, the cause of communism would be greatly helped in the Italian General Elections of 1946. Why Italy should have wanted to return to Libya is not hard to fathom. Although termed a "collection of deserts" and often seen by colonial propagandists and officials as a burden borne by Italy for reasons of historical necessity, Tripolitania in particular represented for Italy a considerable investment in farms and infrastructure spanning more than thirty years of continuous occupation.

No doubt the awareness of considerable, undefined, oil deposits was a factor in fuelling Italian demands, but this was by no means the only or most important element in the Italian desire to retain sovereignty over Tripolitania, which now far from being a "collection of deserts" was a ripe plum waiting to be plucked. The official position, however, was expressed by the then Foreign Minister, Senior Alcide de Gasperi, who in a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes, stated that, "In spite of opinions already expressed by several important influential Italians concerning the possibility of an international administration for the colonies, Italy wished to retain her sovereignty over Libya and Eritrea but would accept Italian trusteeship over Somaliland." (49)

This move culminated in the Bevin-Sforza plan whereby Great Britain would have been left to administer Cyrenaica and also continue administering Tripolitania until 1951 with the help of an international advisory council. From 1951 onwards, however,Italy would become the administering authority in Tripolitania but under a system of international trusteeship. France, however, who had continuously supported the Italian case and opposed any form of national independence in Libya, would, according to the Sforza plan, have received a trusteeship in the Fezzan.

More generally, it was decided that Libya as a whole could expect to be made independent after ten years if the General Assembly considered such a move to be appropriate. In support of its own case for trusteeship over Cyrenaica, Britain did not see the necessity of making concessions to Arab states who opposed the Bevin-Sforza initiative. Neither would Britain make concessions to Asian countries who favoured collective trusteeship. Instead, Britain chose to make concessions to the large pro-Italian block in the United Nations to avert any possible deadlock.(50)

In this tortuous and sometimes conflicting saga, whereby Great Britain, ally of the USA, having won the war in the Middle East against Italy and Germany and ruled Libya in all but name for more than six years by means of a "Military Administration", it is not difficult to

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49 *Op. Cit.*, p.126.
50 *Ibid.*, p. 161.

recognise the hand of the policy makers. It must in this respect be recognised that British concern was to retain control and influence in Libya for at least the foreseeable future either through retaining one or both of the Mediterranean provinces. In this way Britain hoped to maintain a military presence close to the Suez Canal and across the highway that connected North Africa with Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. In this respect, the espousing of the Sayed Mohamed Idris, as future king of a United Libya, must inevitably be seen as a last ditch attempt by Britain to retain some form of control over the area. As it was, however, by putting forward Idris as the future leader of the whole of Libya, not only did Britain forfeit any control over Cyrenaica, but also indeed over Tripolitania too, since it was unlikely that this sickly and ageing figure would retain control for long over a territory that had never subscribed to Senusi control. This must have been one of the biggest policy blunders in the history of the British Empire in modern times!

Meanwhile, in Tripolitania itself, the United Nations meeting in April and May not surprisingly caused considerable political interest amongst both Arab and Italian sections of the population there. The mood indeed in the province amongst all sections of the population was very intense - "the entire population feeling that its future was in the balance". (51) When the Bevin-Sforza agreements were revealed, a series of hostile demonstrations at once took place in the province. This followed the hardening of Arab opinion in 1948 against any return of Italian influence in any form. (52) But to the leaders of native opinion in the province, it seemed that the chances of an "Italian return were greater than they had ever been before." (53) At this point, the B.M.A.'s popularity with the local population sank to its lowest ebb, as the refusal of Britain to assume any form of political commitment in the territory was quite rightly, as it subsequently transpired, only part of the mounting evidence of British support for Italian claims over the territory. (54)

Not surprisingly therefore, the political temperature in Tripolitania rose rapidly and anti-Italian feeling was intensified. The mosques became the scene of violent speeches and petitions were presented to the Administration, protesting particularly against the French support for the return of Italy to Tripolitania as trustees of the United Nations. (55) Between the 8th and 9th of May, when news of the Bevin-Sforza Agreement was announced, and the 17th May, when news was received of its rejection, the Administration came under its most intense pressure from the local population.

One official remarked at this time that "had the proposals gone through, it is hard to see how bloodshed could have been avoided." (56) Yet it was widely recognised in the rejoicing

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51 *Annual Report Tripolitania*, 1949, p. 4.
52 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
53 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
54 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
55 *Ibid.*
56 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

that followed news of the rejection of the Bevin-Sforza plan, that ultimate freedom from what was termed the"Italian Menace" could only be assured by some form of Union with Cyrenaica. (57) If this was so, Britain now had no other alternative but to go along with it, since any opportunity of providing a viable alternative in Tripolitania to a united Libya under the Dayed Idris had now passed. This was perhaps part of the tragedy of the B.M.A. there that, having marched into the province eight years before with drums playing and banners flying, it had then in the manner of its Italian predecessor set about oppressing political development in the territory. As a result, its policies were ambivalent and lacking in any sense of reality or commitment. Thus the opportunity was lost to create a party of the via media under some recognised political figure, such as Ahmed Muntasser, now destined to be prime minister to an ailing and increasingly unpopular monarch.

iii Libyan Independence and the B.M.A.'s Final Phase.

The defeat by a vote of 33 to 17 with 6 abstentions of the sub paragraph on Tripolitania in the Assembly of the United Nations led to the automatic defection from the Bevin-Sforza Agreement of the pro- Latin-American block. A statement in the House of Commons on 6th July, withdrawing British support from the Bevin-Sforza Agreement, along with an official inducement for the Emir of Cyrenaica to pass through Tripolitania in July, calmed Arab opinion on the subject of the territory's imminent independence.

Such optimism was not dissipated when the General Assembly of the United Nations met for a Fourth Session at Lake Success from September to December 1949, where the independence of Libya was finally decreed. The conceding of Independence to Cyrenaica by Great Britain in the summer had put the Italians in an awkward position diplomatically with regard to Tripolitania. America had at this point intervened and insisted upon a ruthlessly practical solution without any further delay. Independence for Libya could not possibly be blocked further by either France or Britain, though both would certainly raise many queries over the method whereby it was to be granted. (58) Yet even at this stage, no party could absolutely guarantee that proposals for the independence of Libya would gain the necessary two thirds majority. It was only following three weeks of further deliberation that the following document was drawn up to recommend:

a) That Libya be established as a single independent and sovereign state not later than 1 January, 1952;

57 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
58 *Op. Cit.*, Becker, p. 173.

b) That a constitution for Libya be determined by representatives of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan;

c) That for the purpose of assisting the Libyan People in the formulation of the Constitution and the establishment of an independent government, there should be a United Nations Commissioner and a Council to aid and advise him;

d) That the Council should consist of ten members, namely the representatives of Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, United States of America, one representative each from the three regions of Libya and one representative of the minorities of Libya;

e) That the administering powers initiate immediately all necessary steps for the transfer of power to a duly constitutional independent government, administer the territories for the purpose of assisting in the establishment of Libyan unity and independence, co-operate in the formation of governmental institutions and co-ordinate their activities to that end;

f) That upon its establishment as an independent state, Libya be admitted to the United Nations. (59)

This motion succeeded because it was essentially a compromise plan which satisfied both the pro-Italian, Latin-American amd the anti-colonial Arab blocs. It therefore directly issued in the setting up of Libya as an independent state on 21 November, 1949.

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The idea that Tripolitania could be returned to the custody of the Italian flag for a second time in its history as a result of what amounted to a fait accompli engineered by Britain and America and sanctioned by the United Nations was an absurdity from the word go. The B.M.A. had been for more than six years little more than a cover for what any impartial observer must have known would never work. Unfortunately, as far as the political and social development of the territory was concerned, they had been six wasted years,and now, as a result of United

59 *Ibid.*, p. 186.

Nations' Resolution, 21 November 1949, two more years were to be allowed "to prepare Libya for independence". (60) The additional two years of Military Administration were ostensibly required to prepare the country for the implementation of a scheme of constitutional development, devised by the United Nations, that bore no relation to the reality of Libya and would quickly turn into a disaster. For this purpose, the Administration was required to "draw up a scheme of constitutional development" along with a special programme for training Libyans for entry into the Civil Service. (61)

The constitutional proposals required the setting up without delay, "a predominantly Libyan Advisory or Administrative Council to be followed in the summer by elections and the progressive transfer of power to a Tripolitanian government." (62) Due, however, to opposition to the proposals within Tripolitania itself, the Administrative Council was not established until the middle of May after which point it continued without impediment. Further delays, however, were experienced over voting qualifications and this delayed the setting up of the National Assembly until November, 1950t, when it consisted of twenty representatives each from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan.

The Assembly resolved on 2 December that "the future state of Libya should be a federal monarchy under the crown of Sayed Mohamed Idris Al Senusi." (63) This measure technically brought to an end the existence of the B.M.A., even though the United Nations Resolution of 1949 had in fact given it a further year to complete its work.

During this final phase, the B.M.A. was to operate in a purely executive capacity, with Mr Adrian Pelt, appointed on 10 December, 1949, as Commissioner in Libya for the United Nations, the principal means by which its decisions were to be implemented. In addition to the existing Administration of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, Pelt was also to work in consultation with the United Nations Council which was "to aid and advise him" and the people of Libya. (64) As Pelt himself stated on his first journey to Libya in January and February 1950, "It is not my function to govern the territory; that remains within the competence of the administering powers, until you assume it for yourselves." (65)

In this final phase of the B.M.A., Commissioner Pelt rapidlu discovered what the Italians and British had known all along, namely that Libya lacked a stable economy, without which Independence would remain extremely fragile - until the discovery of oil changed everything. (66) Pelt also noted that there were not enough Libyans "trained in administrative processes to form the nucleus of a Civil Service." (67) The chief vehicle for dealing with this important

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60 *Annual Report, 1950*, p.
61 *Ibid.*
62 *Ibid.*
63 *Ibid.*
64 *Becker*, p. 196.
65 *Ibid.*, p. 197.
66 *Ibid.*
67 *Ibid.*

issue, the Council for Libya, representing the six governments most vitally concerned with Libya, lacked the capacity for making constructive proposals that might have alleviated the problem. Instead, they appeared to devote most of their time to political wrangling. (68) Egypt and Pakistan in particular conducted an increasingly bitter criticism of the whole constitutional scheme for Libya as it had been devised by Pelt. Their most obvious and telling argument that it was "too elaborate and costly for a desert country of little more than one million inhabitants, whose per capita annual income is about thirty dollars" has a ring of truth about it, even today. (69) In general, the disagreement of the Muslim countries with Pelt's plan, notes Becker, "stemmed from more fundamental causes. Egypt and Pakistan did not consider the plan provided for a really independent state and condemned the scheme as designed to turn Libya into a region completely dependent on Great Britain." (70) It was this kind of propaganda that the new state would find it increasingly difficult to rebut in the years immediately ahead.

The place of Italy, however, in the affairs of the new state was at a decided discount, although Italian schools, Churches and other institutions, including the demographic farms, continued to function, though in an atmosphere which offered no cast-iron guarantee for their future survival. Thus, whereas Italy was to have no political share in the running of the new state, the position of the Italians in the technical, administrative and economic fields was increasingly recognised as important. "Libyanisation", therefore, was to be "tempered by an increasing recognition of the services that foreigners might render to the new state." (71) Meanwhile, the remaining officials of the B.M.A., with usual tongue in cheek, declared these final efforts to inaugurate the new state as "proceeding smoothly." (72)

iv. Conclusion: the B.M.A. in Retrospect.

"Decades or even centuries are the normal measuring span of political evolution, but in Libya . . . . only months have been allowed." (73)

Diverse interpretations of the period of British Military Rule in Libya are as possible as for tthe Italian colonial period that preceded it. Some interpretations will no doubt recognise a certain similarity between both periods which other writers and critics would dismiss with contempt. In this respect, the historian's own views and even ideological commitment is perhaps

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68 *Ibid.*, p. 202.
69 *Ibid.*, p. 209.
70 *Ibid.*
71 *Annual Report 1950*, p. 11.
72 *Ibid.*
73 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

paramount. Both, however, would agree that new light can only be cast upon an era if it is viewed by the writer frankly. Above all, whatever an individual's own belief might be, they should not necessarily turn him into a propagandist for one cause or another. However often this has been said, it needs to be said again for the period under review, in which objective treatment of the historical material is rare if non existant, with distortion for reasons of propaganda almost commonplace.

An attempt to interpret the period in terms of neo-colonialism is understandable if points are sometimes over-stated though few would deny that the factors making up such an interpretation are here in good measure. It would require wearing heavily rose-tinted spectacles not to recognise that the guiding principles of British and American policy in this region were based on self interest stemming as they did from rivalry with Russia and the "cold war". According to this line of argument, Libya lay over the geo-political fault lines of the great East-West divide and therefore must be retained within the western field of strategic interest at all cost. Otherwise, Russia might get a foothold in the Mediterranean region which would not bode well for future stability in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Great Britain was anxious to avoid any further colonial commitments and would have preferred the Italians to more or less continue where they had left off, regardless of whether the Arabs wanted it or not. Official reports to London repeatedly warned that the indigenous population and its leaders were dead set against the reimposition of Italian sovereignty in the region. As, however, has happened on other occasions, the Central Government in Whitehall was much too preoccupied with big power politics and global concerns to pay much attention to the warnings it received from Tripoli.

Maybe they recognised that the rule of Dayed Idris was strictly confined to Cyrenaica and his acceptability in Tripolitania could not be guaranteed. The fact that the Muslim world and Egypt in particular were opposed to his rule was not only a bad omen for the new state, but a factor that made its foundations extremely shaky. Moreover, the tides of nationalism and socialism later compounded with Islam were producing a new climate with which the new state would not be able to deal very effectively.

Finally, what of the retiring B.M.A. personnel themselves? To what extent if at all can they be held responsible for a regime which was in so many respects a cover up for the maintenance at whatever cost of British and American interests in the area? This is obviously a difficult question to answer and, although surviving personnel were quick to deny that there was ever any blood on the carpet, none of the leading protagonists ever received a knighthood for their services. Was it simply a question of doing a good job in difficult circumstances, which was the opinion of many former B.M.A. personnel as they packed their bags for good in 1950, or did they really believe they were doing the right thing?

The idea that 'decades or even centuries are the measuring span of political evolution" rings hollow when compared with the eight years, when they were in reality only helping the Italians to regain their sovereignty in the territory. Could not these years have been used to better purpose by Blackley and the British Government? Instead, we are led to believe that the B.M.A. only had from the date of the passing of the United Nations Resolution of 1949 to prepare Libya for independence. Before this time, of course, the territory was governed in accordance with International Law via Care and Maintenance, but this had not prevented, as was often pointed out by Arab critics of the B.M.A., Britain from unilateral political action in Cyrenaica.

In a more positive sense, however, whereas the B.M.A.'s political achievement in Tripolitania was a complete failure and there is no doubt this failure sadly limited what could be achieved on the educational front, on the administrative targets a great deal was accomplished. This was nowhere more apparent than in the final two years allotted by the United Nations for the preparation of the country for independence. The constitutional work for the Administrative Council was greatly to the B.M.A.'s credit, whatever one may think of the new Libyan Constitution itself.

Other measures, such as the training of Libyans for the Civil Service are more difficult to judge, since Libyanisation as such had commenced several years before. The main effort, however, education will be dealt with in the ensuing pages. At a more practical level, the B.M.A.'s activities were many and various, from medical and veterinary services to agricultural development, where its main achievement lay in feeding the country during the years of paralysing drought that occurred after 1945.

As it is only the task of this thesis to produce an interpretative account of educational developments under the B.M.A., a more comprehensive review of its failures and achievements is beyond the current brief.

Chapter Two: Educational Policy and the British Administration

1. Anomalous Position of the B.M.A. vis-a-vis Policy Making Decisions.

The British Administration, officially set up in Tripolitania on 15th December, 1942, (1) but not in fact before 23rd january, 1943, when British troops entered Tripoli, (2) was intended to be a purely temporary régime until such a time as the territory could be handed over to its proper governors. Who these would be was not known though it was generally assumed that Tripolitania would be returned to Italy, while Cyrenaica would remain under British control, though with its own ruler, the Seyid Idris Al-Senusi. These, however, were areas of no direct concern to the military authorities, at least in the immediate aftermath of Great Britain's victory over the Axis Forces in the deserts of North Africa.

In the meantime, the B.M.A., as it was known as, was to rule in accordance with the Hague Convention, while deriving its effectual powers from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle Eastern Land Forces, whose headquarters were in Cairo. In this respect, its position turned out to be quite "unique" in History as no "temporary military government" ever had "such a long life" or "to deal with so many and such a diverse range of problems", as one commentator put it. (3)

The B.M.A. therefore found itself faced with a situation, as its advocates would frequently claim, not of its own devising, and with the prospect of having to govern Tripolitania for "an indefinite length of time in a difficult post-war period when its future would have to be decided." (4) No light had been thrown during the war on the possible fate of the territory, other than Eden's announcement as Foreign Secretary that "H.M.G. would never allow the Senusi of Cyrenaica to again come under Italian rule." (5) (6)

As far, however, as the rest of Libya was concerned, the situation was hedged by the belief that the Italians would most probably be reinstated in the west and the Fezzan would go to France. This after all had been the pattern in most disputes involving European powers in recent history. Such presuppositions appeared to be strengthened followin g Mussolini's resignation on 25th July. 1945, and Italy's decision to "purge all its leaders" and completely reorientate her policy both at home and abroad." (7)

Logically, such a volte-face implied a return educationally in the former Italian colonies, such as Libya, to the policies of pre-fascist days, known as the Statutes of Libya upon which

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1 See *supra*, p. 7.
2 *Ibid.*
3 R. Sandison, unpublished M.S. on Tripolitania and its recent history.
4 *Ibid.*
5 *Ibid.*
6 *supra.*, p. 29.
7 *Op.Cit.*, p.87.

fascism had reneged when it took office in 1922. (8) It should therefore not be forgotten, when explaining British restoration of the former Italian educational system in Tripolitania where it had survived the war almost completely intact that in 1943, Italy was recognised by the Allies as a "co-belligerent" since her "resistance forces" in the North of Italy at least, worked with the allied armies and she was to be allowed, in Churchill's memorable phrase, "to work her passage home." (9)

In education, as in much else concerning their administration of Libya, the Italians wished profoundly "to draw a veil over the history of the previous twenty years." (10) Unforunately, this was impossible as the Duce had left his mark indelibly stamped on the fortunes of the country for good or ill, and libya following his régime would never be the same again for both Arabs and Italians. This had the effect of placing the B.M.A. in an extremely ambivalent position when it came to the policy matters as it was "pledged to support the laws and institutions obtaining in the territory at the time of occupation." (11) Yet, barely seven months after it had undertaken this task, Italy "denounced the spirit which had animated their whole structure." (12) Furthermore, as soon as hostilities in Europe ceased two years later, the United Nations pledged themselves to root out Fascism and Nazism from the face of the earth and propose plans for the "democratic re-education" of Europe. (13)

The B.M.A.,therefore, was in the "anomalous position" of appearing to be "bound" to maintain and administration which even its originators did not wish to keep intact. On the other hand, its temporary nature did not suit it for the "Herculean task" of "cleansing the Fascist Augean stables". (14) which, had it possessed the determination and energy to achieve, would have provided Libya with a modern and up-to-date educational system, such as was provided for the Arabs of Cyrenaica by the B.M.A. there.

Had Britain wanted to provide the Arabs of Tripolitania with a brand new educational system, it would have had to make a clean sweep of all the Italian legislation enacted since October 1922, but, in practice, it was unable to undertake such a change. (15) Initially, however, the B.M.A. repealed the most obvious Fascist legislation and removed the most blatant emblems of the Mussolini régime. It also disbanded the Gioventu'Araba del Littorio, whereby Arab youth had been enrolled in the Fascist Party, as an inevitable prelude to entry into the armed forces, lower ranks of the civil service, or other minor roles, which were the only channels of advancement opened to them by the Fascist régime.

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8 See, L.A. Appleton, *Italian Educational Policy Towards Muslims in Libya.* Unpublished M. Phil. Thesis of London University, 1980.
9 *Op. Cit.*, p. 87.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 88.
11 *Ibid.*
12 *Ibid.*
13 *Ibid.*
14 *Ibid.*
15 *Ibid.*

The educational statues of the Fascist régime, however, were left intact by the B.M.A., yet another indication of Britain's political intentions regarding the future of the territory with regard to Italy. The Italians had no hesitation defending their educational role in Libya before the United Nations, arguing that the fact that there were no secondary schools for Arabs in Libya had not legally prevented Arabs from attending the Italian secondary schools there. (16) Meanwhile, so as not to be seen openly to be taking sides or appearing to favour Italians over Arabs, the B.M.A. instituted a "non-fraternisation ban" on 13th August 1946, which upset many Italians who thought the British were turning against them, when in fact the reverse was the case. (17) (18)

ii. The B.M.A. treads a via media.

Perhaps one of the most important indications of Britain's future intentions for Tripolitania right at the start of the B.M.A. lay in A.J. Steele-Grieg's appointment as Chief Education Officer for Tripolitania by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Brigadier Maurice Lush. Lacking in any teaching qualifications or experience, even in a school, but fluent in Italian and with a strong leaning towards the Italy of Mussolini, Lush saw Steele-Grieg as "the right man for the job." (19) As a student in Italy, Steele-Grieg had been a member of the University Fascist Association, something which may have been mandatory for Italian students, but must have been a voluntary response to the situation on the part of Steele-Grieg. Lush would have been aware of his record and presumably could have had the pick of the young Arabists of the time as Director of Education for Tripolitania, if this had been his intention. (20)

Clearly, the appointment of an Arabist with an Arab-phile policy in education would at this point not have fitted in with the British Government's possible plans for the territory. If Tripolitania was to be returned to Italy, the difficult and delicate role exercised by the Director of Education would be an important factor in producing this result, hence the appointment of A.J. Steele-Greig to the post of Director of Education Tripolitania, with the rank of Major as a title he insisted upon to the end of his life. The lesser position of Assistant Chief Education Officer was given to the completely insignificant Captain N. F. Pengelly, but the most important man in the trio was undoubtedly the Director of Italian Schools, Cav. Sig. Fulvio Contini.

The appointment of these three men to educational positions, which in a normal developing country would have implied great trust and responsibility for the future of the educational service as such, instead underlines the uncertain and transitional nature of Tripolitania at this

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16 see, *infra*, pp. 139 - 145.
17 *Op. Cit.*, p. 88.
18 *B.M.A. Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943*, p. 64.
19 Brig. Maurice Lush r'td to Appleton.
20 Major A.J. Steele-Grieg r'td to Appleton, Interview, Barbados, Jan. 1983.

time. Commentators have sought to emphasise the strange social and psychological ambience of Tripoli in particular at this time, in which Fascism, although oficially banished, still lingered on in so many forms. Moreover, few if any new ideas percolated into the territory, with all intercourse having been cut with the main supplier, metropolitan Italy. (21)

It was this all-pervading uncertainty in the day-to-day situation that "paralysed initiative" in the Administration, where everybody except perhaps the Arab politicians "marked time." (22) There is no evidence of any serious attempt to produce an educational policy relevant to the needs of the Arabs, other than speculation, such as "whether the geographical position of Tripolitania, with its traditional connections with European civilisation, demanded education for the population to be based upon a European system. Either that or it should be grounded upon the traditional Arab schools, in respect of which the curriculum should include subjects such as Arithmetic. (23) These timid proposals which recall the educational laws of the Bertolini and Colosimo era at the former Italian Colonial Ministry. (24) are the only mention of educational policy to appear in all official reports for B.M.A. Tripolitania. One can therefore only assume that further discussion of the educational issue was declared to be taboo in official circles, Steele-Greig being merely left to get on with it, and take the rap if things went wrong, as indeed they were bound to do. Educational parlance could not however be entirely eliminated from the records or at least consideration of what it might involve; but instead of "policy", the expression "good colonial practice" became the catchword of those engaged in educational matters. (25) In the latter respect, Steele-Greig was himself to concede - "development" at the Educational Department was conducted "under very trying conditions" of "year planning" which was made even more dificult in the case of the "native schools" since it was far from clear at the time "what their future might be." (26)

iii. Arab Resentment at the seeming Italo-phile policy of the B.M.A.

The lack of any long-term policy on education for the indigenous population under the B.M.A. quickly communicated itself to the Arabs of the province. It was well known that Fascism had done nothing to prepare the mass of the population for the modern world, having instead communicated little more than a "region of vague ambition" which expressed itself in the desire for more improved educational services. (27) The fact that Libya had restricted contact with Europe through the medium of Italy alone, meant "self-appointed leaders of public opinion" (a

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21 Sanderson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 88.
22 *Ibid.*
23 *Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943*, p.
24 L.A. Appleton, *Op. Cit., Chapter Two: Direct Rule and the Government Schools, 1911-1919*, pp. 26 - 65.
25 B.M.A. Tripolitania, *Annual Report*, 1943, p.
26 A.J. Steele-Greig, *History of Education in Tripolitania*, Tripoli, 1948, p.8.
27 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

phrase often used in the B.M.A. with regard to its detractors) turned to the Arab League Organisation, especially in Egypt, where many Tripolitanian exiles had fled, for help and advice. (28) This inevitably resulted in dependence upon the only source of educated opinion available to them, namely the graduates of Al-Azhar University, who were strongly imbued with Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism. As soon as permitted, these exiles from Egypt, Tunis, Turkey and Syria began trickling back, "hoping that a new era was about to begin." (29) These people, who had in the intervening years come into close contact with the rest of the Arab world, "brought back news of changes in it which had only dimly been appreciated by the Tripolitanians, virtually cut off for twenty years from everything that was not Italian." (30) Once returned, they were determined to exert themselves to the utmost to ensure that their country did not again fall under Italian rule through obtaining the self-government so long denied them. As early as September, 1944, occured the first of a series of political disturbances in Tripoli that betokened a new awareness of political and social affairs in the province. These disturbances resulted in the deaths of "one hundred and thirty unfortunate Jews" which forced the B.M.A. to recognise finally the hopelessness of trying to maintain the status quo ante bellum in Tripolitania. (31) It in particular made the authorities realise the need for a far less restrictive and "negative policy", even in the face of uncertainty about the future which the meeting of the four foreign ministers in September had done little to settle. (32) As a result, "planning" took on a more positive note at the Department of Education, despite the Director's misgivings at Libyan recruitment into the Administration. (33)

iv. A more positive response to Arab educational needs.

The realisation amongst the B.M.A. personnel that the ending of war in Europe and even the signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy, required a more positive attitude to preparing Libya for the future, produced several important changes between 1946 and 1949 at the level of educational planning in the territory. Planning in 1945 had in the Arab sector been primarily concerned with the reopening of the former Italo-Arab schools converted by the B.M.A. into lower elementary schools, teaching Arabic, Religious Instruction, Arithmetic, and Physical Training. In conjunction with the emphasis upon elementary education, an anti-illiteracy campaign had been started in the summer of 1945 aimed exclusively at Arabs. (34) In October 1946, a tentative move had been made in the field of Arab Secondary Education, with

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28 *Ibid.*
29 P.J. Sanderson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 89.
30 *Ibid.*
31 *Ibid.*
32 *Ibid.*
33 A.J. Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 41.
34 *Ibid.*

the opening in Tripoli of a secondary school with 81 boys, the first of such schools since Turkish times. (35) These changes can be said to indicate the emergence of an educational policy of sorts for Libyans in Tripolitania and could not have been conceived by the B.M.A. at its onset in 1942. However, by 1945 it was considering a new initiative, no doubt generated by the circumstances confronting it, and backed by the developing realisation, that the Administration could find its stay in the territory considerably prolonged into the future, so it had become almost a quasi-government, albeit reluctantly. Various factors can be noticed in bringing about this change in orientation on the part of the B.M.A., both inside and beyond the frontiers of the territory, apart from the emergemce of a forceful Arab opinion.

v. External influences upon policy.

The arrival in the Spring of a working party, under the Presidency of Sir Bernard Reilly, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., O.B.E., who had been sent by the War Office to enquire into the conditions in Tripolitania, was not without implications for educational developments in the territory. Although Steele-Greig merely observed that the working party expressed a " most sympathetic opinion on Education", (36) it is more than likely that Steele-Greig's replacement, as Director of the Educational Department, was mooted at this time. (37) Certainly the Commission made various recommendations which, according to Steele-Greig, were "incorporated into the activities of the department." (38) The recommendations in question concerned the general improvement and expansion of both primary and secondary education and a scheme for trainees, known as the "Trainees Scheme". (39) The idea behind the scheme was the training of a number of Arab boys who could later be "absorbed into the various departments of the Administration." In this way, Libyans would be given a chance to take part in the "working" of the territory. (40)

A further step forward towards the idea of a general educational policy resulted from the visit of the Four Power Commission of Enquiry on March 5th 1948. (41) The function of the Commission was to supply deputies of the C.M.F., then meeting in London, with the necessary data relating to the eventual disposal of Tripolitania, particularly with regard to the views and aspirations of the local population. (42) This was important for educational developments under the B.M.A., the planning of which had,, until this date, been solely determined by the Care and Maintenance policy or in deference to the wishes of the Italian

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35 Ibid., also, see L.A. Appleton, Op. Cit., p.
36 *Op. Cit.*, P. 41.
37 Steele-Greig interview, Barbados.
38 *Op. Cit.*, p. 41.
39 *Ibid.*
40 *Ibid.*
41 *B.M.A., Annual Report*, 1948, p. 10.
42 Becker, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 113 - 114.

population of the territory. This had been guided by the former Inspector of the Eastern Province, Professor Fulvio Contini, and the Italo-phil Steele-Greig, which would have been good enough if all things had been even. Unfortunately, the Arab population had neither say nor influence upon educational policy and was for the first time consulted on such matters by the Four Power Commission.

It was a great pity for the Libyans that the visit of the Four Power Commission was a political issue long before it reached the territory, since the Soviet Union "with an eye on the Italian elections wanted the Libyan report to be made public before the elections so that the Italian Communists could exploit the fact that the Soviet Union was willing to return Libya to Italy." (43) The Commission spent about six weeks in Tripoli (44) and, although rioting preceded its arrival in Tripoli, leading to the arrest of an "extreme nationalist leader, named Ali Fikki Hassan", (45) there can be no doubt that the energy of the security forces enabled the Commission to canvass a wide body of opinion within the territory. (46) On this account, the results were not surprising with a large body of Arab opinion unanimous fore the return of Italian sovereignty. (47) The Commission, however, in its Libyan report was primarily concerned to play down the desire of the Arab population for indpendence from Italy and this disappointed the native population who quite naturally expected a different attitude from the members. (48) Despite such limitations on the part of the members, the Commission was still able to reach "agreement" on several "important questions." (49) These are summarised by Becker, as the belief that "none" of the three colonies was ready for independence; that the majority of the inhabitants were "illiterate" and "completely lacking in political understanding". (50) The Commission was also agreed that the colonies lacked the necessary wealth to support independent status and that each colony was badly in need of "outside help both financial and technical for its basic needs and future development." (51)

vi. Four Power Commission - implications of visit for educational development of Arab population.

The visit of the Four Power Commission of Enquiry was seen by the Italian party both inside the territory, in Italy itself, and amongst Italy's various supporters, such as France and the Soviet Union, as a chance to maximise whatever opportunity it presented to gain credence for

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43 Ibid.
44 *Op. Cit.*, p. 10.
45 *Ibid.*
46 *Ibid.*
47 *Ibid.*
48 *Ibid.*
49 Becker, *Op. Cit.*, p. 117.
50 *Ibid.*
51 *Ibid.*

the Italian case to retain Tripolitania as a sovereign Italian possession. In all this, education was judged as a most sensitivc issue, yet of immense propaganda value if used adroitly. Throughout the tortuous politics surrounding the Italian campaign to retain Tripolitania, Italy's supporters in the territory had a reliable and invaluable ally in Steele-Greig, as the Director of Education, who set out to present both his own efforts and those of his Italian predecessors in a most favourable light. Steele-Greig's premise emphasised that both Italy and the B.M.A. had done all they possibly could for the educational developmment of the Arab Moslem inhabitants of Tripolitania; but they were still a long way behind and that it would be the task of future policy-makers to prepare the country for self-rule. These views were initially expressed by Steele-Greig in his Short History of Education in Tripolitania of 1946, (52) later amplified into a more extended treatment of the subject, and published by the B.M.A. Press in 1948, as History of Education in Tripolitania - from the time of the Ottoman Occupation to the fifth year under British Military Occupation. (53) The 1946 edition was explicitly intended to serve the information needs of the War Office Working Party which visited the territory in the Spring of 1947 and the Four Power Commission of Enquiry of 1948. (54) The second and larger work was prompted by a variety of factors associated with the increasing pre-eminence of education as a sounding board for general discussion of the territory and its future. There was also the general dearth of published material yet a need to satisfy enquiring minds and fend off criticism of himself and the Administration's educational policy. (55) Also, the publication by the B.M.A. in October, 1947, of P.J. Sandison's Italian Rule in Tripolitania - a critical study with documents (56) a work harshly critical of Italian Educational Policies lauded by Steele-Greig, (57) pointed to a wind of change amongst administrators as a class and seems to have prompted Steele-Greig's, otherwise unchanged, second history the following year. (58)

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52 A.J. Steele-Greig, *A Short History of Education in Tripolitania*, Tripoli, 1946.

53 A.J. Steele-Greig, *A History of Education in Tripolitania - from the time of the Ottoman Occupation to the fifth year under British Military Administration*, Tripoli, 1948.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

55 *Four Power Commission of Enquiry, Education*, p. and A.J. Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 8.

56 P.J. Sanderson, *Italian Rule in Tripolitania - a critical study with documents*, B.M.A. Press,, Tripoli, 1947.

57 Teobaldo Filesi, *Un Documento D'Incomprehensione e Inquistizia i Memoriale Sandison, I Dritti Del Scuola*, Tripoli, 1 May, 1948.

58 A.J. Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit., Part II Education under Italian Occupation 1911 - 1943*, pp.17 - 23. Subsequent quotes are taken from the 1948 edition.

Chapter Three. Educational Policy and the British Military Administration 1947 - 1950:

1. Wind of Change.

The propaganda importance of A.J. Steele-Greig's 1946 publication was immediately recognised by the Italians as a form of British government approval of their own educational policies throughout the colonial period and especially after 1922 when Libya became part of Mussolini's Fascist Empire. (1) At a time of great delicacy in the negotiations for the hoped and awaited return of Tripolitania to the full sovereignty of the Italian flag, Steele-Greig's apparent official endorsement of all their own propagandists had said repeatedly over the long years of colonial rule was of considerable assistance to the Italian cause and given full press coverage in Italian, English and Arabic, too.

Steele-Greig's work, however, was not just a statement of propaganda for the B.M.A. and the Italians, it also represented what he himself believed and stood for as Director of Education for Tripolitania. Without any attempt at providing a relevant context or subjection to critical evaluation, he had merely collected for presentation the authorative statements on Arab education from such noted Italian protagonists and propagandists as Dr. Angelo Piccioli, Andrea Festa, Mario Tortenese and others of the same disposition and persuasion. (2) This involved acceptance of the following premise - the Arabs were essentially anti-Western - socially, culturally, politically and in the religious sense too - and following from the experience of other colonial powers, such as Britain and France, were not cut out for either assimilation or development in any sense understandable by a Western Power. Essentially, the only option open to Libya, it was seen, was some version of what the world now understands as "apartheid", though this word was never used and indeed Italian colonialism, for all its mistakes and faults, lacked a racist connotation to its policies in Libya. Instead, what was practised in Libya by the Italians was rather a form of "cultural separatism" in an attempt to isolate the Arab population from the Italian colonists and from the Arabs of Arab world beyond the frontiers of Libya. Educationally, it had been decided over a good many years and experiments the best way to preserve what the Italians termed as their "civilising mission" to the Libyans was to allow them to develop in their own way in their own schools. These schools would teach therefore, alongside the Italian language, Arabic, Arab History, Arithmetic and the Koran. An adjustment to the system in 1936 provided the means whereby

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1 *Quando Non Scrive per Propaganda, L'Istruzione Publica in Libia E L'Opera Meritoria Degli Italiani Un Documento Ufficiale.* As this source was part of a collection of press cuttings, specially loaned to the author by Major A.J. Steele-Greig, no other title, date or author is provided. However, it is almost certainly from the *Corriere Di Tripoli*, possible from 1946.

2 A.J. Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., *Part II. Education During the Italian Occupation 1911-1943*, pp. 17 - 23.

selected candidates were enabled to attend the School of Higher Islamic Studies in Tripoli. This was to provide entry to the traditional professions, such as Muft, Cadj or school-teacher and also to certain minor positions in the government service.

Such a policy was bequeathed to the B.M.A. by the former Italian Administration of Tripolitania and, it must be added, it was also the policy put into practice by the B.M.A. more or less unchanged until the middle years of its dispensation, when changes were forced upon it by the changed political situation in the territory and beyond. During this period, the Arabs were seen by the B.M.A. as essentially "a problem child with a growing inferiority complex" who "had Italy won the war would have been destined to be "lower class Italian citizens dependent on their masters for such scraps of amenities and graces of the modern world they cared to throw them." (3) Steele-Greig viewed the future of Arab education in Libya in a similar way to his Italian predecessors, especially Dr. Angelo Piccioli, (4) and was apparently as anxious as they were to establish how "it is far from easy to graft the modern system of education onto the social structures of Tripolitania." Steele-Greig viewed the Arab mentality as being divorced from the requirements of "modern education" based as it must be upon "modern psychology" which to the Arabs "is not acceptable. . or even understood" since they regard the other sex as something improper." (5) Yet despite such doubts and misgivings for the future, even Steele-Greig recognised that things would have to be different if only on account of the B.M.A. having "no long-term policy" that could be implemented. (6) Unfortunately, by the time these words were published in 1946 and 1948, it was already too late for the B.M.A. to set up - if it could indeed - a system of education adequate for Libya's needs and the challenge of Independence. Such a policy would have had to be initiated in 1942 or 1943 for it to have had enough impact by 1948 to make sense of independence and the modern world into which Libya was emerging. Belatedly, if rather sadly, the Director of Education seemed to realise that new wine could no longer be poured into old bottles, and set about the search for a Director of Education more in touch with the mood of the moment than Steele-Greig had proved to be.

ii. Care and Maintenance modified.

It had been clearly recognised from the outset that the legislative, judicial, administrative and political powers exercised by the Chief Administrator were roughly similar to those given to a

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3 *Ibid.*

4 Steele-Greig quotes Piccioli, a noted Fascist educator in Libya, from 1924 -1928, after which he joined the Ministry of Propaganda in Rome - "The main problem of the Education Department is the schools for Arabs . . . one of the most difficult problems a European power can face and on which depends the political future of the colony. A colonising power must decide if it will be better to govern people who are their inferiors or prepare them for the day when they must be treated as equals." *Ibid.*, p. 24.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

colonial governor. (7) Thus Brigadier Blackley in such a role for almost the whole period of military rule, beside the power of life and death, had also the means to organise and shape the administration in a variety of ways, if only within the terms of "Care and Maintenance", if he had chosen to exercise the options open to him which are not to be over-estimated in the circumstances and financial constraints of the time. In this respect, as far as the educational policy was concerned, Blackley seems to have followed the policy of least resistance until around 1947,when he decided upon a new course of action. Until then, he preferred to leave the educational desk almost exclusively in the hands of Steele-Greig and Fulvio Contini who as has been shown allowed the policies of pre-B.M.A. Tripolitania more or less uninterrupted sway. Such policies were, however, shorn of their fascist trappings, with the basic curriculum in Arabic, all Italian teachers in the former Italo-Arab schools having departed for Italy at the outbreak of hostilities in 1940. In retrospect, the sins of such a situation were clearly those of omission rather than the reverse. Blackley accepted Steele-Greig from his predecessor, Brigadier Lush, and if an opportunity to prepare Tripolitania for independence was missed, nobody was aware of it, least of all the chief protagonists who thought they were doing a good job. (8) With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to criticise those in power at the time from exercising imagination, objectivity or even enthusiasm when we might have been no better ourselves or even worse.

Diluted Italian policies in education were, however, clearly outdated by 1945, if not before. Yet even by then, there was as yet no decision in sight over the future of Tripolitania despite the obvious need of the B.M.A. to modify its "Care and Maintenance" policy. An increasingly frustrated and critical Arab political and social opinion inside and outside the territory was not alone in expressing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. Both the War Office Working Party of 1947 and the Four Power Commission which followed it reacted to the increasingly critical tone of affairs if not being in respose to it. By 1947 some of the fruits of change were evident in the setting up of secondary schools for Libyans in Tripoli and Zawiar, something the Italians had never done and an act in itself quite contrary to the spirit of "care and maintenance" which had done so much to prolong the inequalities of the Italian colonial system. These tentative steps were quickly followed by the introduction of teacher-training programmes for Libyans begun by a Sudanese teacher at Brigadier Blackley's own behest - a rare instance of his intervention in the world of Steele-Greig and Contini, (9)- unfortunately, an initiative that had more to do with the efforts of the War Office Working Party and the efforts of Blackley's chief in Cairo, Brigadier Sir Duncan Cumming, than events in Tripolitania. (10)

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7 B.M.A., *Handbook on Tripolitania compiled from official sources*, Tripoli, April, 1947, p. 43.

8 B.M.A., *Annual Report*, 1950, p. 7.

9 Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p.

10 Appleton/Steele-Greig, Interview, Barbados, Jan. 1981. Steele-Greig on this occasion confided that the "Libyanisation Project" was the brain child of the late Sir Duncan Cumming, then Chief Civil Affairs

It is arguable that such measures were essentially palliatives rather than cures and do not deserve to be regarded as reforms as such, which they probably were not, given that the B.M.A. was not a reform-constituted body. Moreover, they were much too slight to have any radical effect upon the passage of events in Tripolitania at this time. They could therefore easily have been introduced years before and it is sad to say they appear only to have been brought about by outside pressure upon the Administration. In this respect something clearly had been wrong which should have been put right at an earlier stage but was not for reasons to do with the personalities concerned. On the other hand, the realisation that educational change or the pace of educational development in Tripolitania which had been held up for so many years by the policies of Italian fascism, could not be forestalled any longer even by an Administration run on a policy of Care and Maintenance had fianlly penetrated the mind of the estblishment and something had to be done about it in the shortest amount of time. Such a rude awakening in 1947 made further revision of policy inevitable. Especially, since the view was now held in the ranks of the Administration itself that a reimposition of Italian rule would not be tolerated by the Libyans and would result in civil strife. (11) If the odds were now seen to be weighted against any reimposition of Italian rule, then those who had interpreted their mandate in the light of its imminent arrival, could find themselves out on a limb. In these circumstances, a Direcor of Education with his head in the Arab world rather than the fast disappearing world of Italian colonialism was required to rechart the educational horizon in Tripolitania.

iii. Attempts to rechart the course.

With such ends in mind and unbeknown to the Director of Education, Major A.J. Steele-Greig, the Chief Administrator, during the summer of 1947 while the latter was on leave, began confidential sounding amongst his former "cronies" and associates of the Sudan Colonial Service to find a replacement for Steele-Greig with impeccable Arab antecedents. (12) Obviously, not only had Steele-Greig offended the Arabs but he committed the unpardonable sin of embarrassing the Administration too. He must therefore be replaced with a person as Arab-phile as he had been Italo-phile - no easy achievement given the Administration's uneasy past and uncertain future though, of course, the carrot could always be held out that he might be taken on by the incoming régime - whoever or whatever that might be which was far from clear in 1947.

Officer at Cairo G.H.Q.. It was not therefore the direct result of any initiative of the Department of Education in Tripoli, though listed under education in the B.M.A.'s Annual Reports of 1947, 1948 and 1949. At any rate, Steele-Greig did not think very much of the project which he judged a failure.

11 Annual report, B.M.A., 1947, p. 13.

12 From Farrell to Cox, 14 December 1949. Though difficult to date exactly, Blackley appears to have begun actively canvassing for a replacement in 1947 and had fixed upon Scott by the summer of 1949.

These moves were to lead in 1948 to Steele-Greig's demotion to rank of mere Deputy Director of Education. (13) Shocked and furious at such brusque treatment and in particular at being "stabbed in the back" while being on leave (the news had been communicated to him from Tripoli by letter) he bitterly contemplated resignation. This mood, however, did not last and once back in Tripoli, he was urged by his friends "not to be such a fool" but to accept the new offer of a diminished role. (14) Time-server as he was it was inevitable that this would be his ultimate response to a situation beyond his control. No one in the higher echelons, it appears, came to his rescue and one must assume he had few aids at such levels.

In parenthesis, it is clear Blackley and Steele-Greig had never enjoyed a good working relationship and social ties did not exist. Undoubtedly, the decision at Lake Success, to make Libya an independent state, proved a catalyst in the situation. But for this Blackley would have allowed Steele-Greig to soldier on to retirement, whenever the B.M.A. came to a logical or historical close, which he was to do in any case despite his diminished position. (15) However, in the changed circumstances, in not only Tripolitania but in Cyrenaica too, though the latter was much better prepared and more advanced than the former, it is clear the Chief Administrator needed a man with considerable experience of the Arabs who spoke Arabic fluently and knew what kind of education to relate to their needs. Moreover, as the contract could not be for more than two years or until the end of 1951, when the B.M.A. was to be wound up, it would be most suitable to a retired person or one comtemplating the end of his career. A retired colonial servant was what was being looked for - and preferably from the Sudan service at that. Time, however, was fast running out, and after several formal and informal communications, the former Sudan educationalist, Arabist, poet and Colonial Civil Servant, G.C. Scott, finally accepted the challenge - and indeed it was a challenge - and agreed to come out of retirement and head the Education Department in Tripoli for the prescribed two years that the B.M.A. still had left to do.

There is no doubt that by all ostensible criteria, Cuthbert Scott was the right man for the job and Travers Blackley rightly considered himself extremely lucky to have secured his services at such a delicate and fateful time in the B.M.A.'s history. (16) Scott's appointment as well as his attitude to his new work both before its commencement and following its completion, cast an important light on the B.M.A.'s educational policy for Tripolitania in the final three years. Regarded by his contemporaries as an "outstanding Sudan Civil Servant"

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13 Of the Scott appointment to replace him as Director of Education, Tripolitania, Steele-Greig writes, "This was one of many Blackley blunders Blackley never received a knighthood following his resignation in 1951 and it came about like this. While I was on leave in the U.K., B. wrote to me, saying he had upgraded the post of D. of E. to Grade I, , but he was appointing a new man to take over the job and hoped I woujd carry on as Deputy. Of course I immediately resigned but was then persuaded by many not to be so foolish and returned to Tripoli, to find a certain G. Scott had taken over. . ." Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, Aug. 6th 1982.

14 *Ibid.*

15 From C. Cox to K. Dickens Esq., no address, Colonial Office, London, 9th Dec. 1949.

16 From C. Cox to T.R. Blackley, Colonial Office, London, 8th Dec. 1949.

who in the thirties and forties had "consciously pointed educational development towards independence," (17) he would no doubt in different circumstances and different times have done much for Tripolitania. Yet as was quite simply pointed out at the time of his appointment, the Mediterranean is quite a different place from the Sudan, (18) and there is every reason to suppose that he was a very sick man when he left retirement for his final appointment. (19) Otherwise, he was of similar generation, background and training to Blackley himself, both having begun their careers in the colonial office as district commissioners in the West Sudan, where the former became an Arabic scholar of repute. (20) Scott had then after several years left the political service to become a full-time inspector of education, eventually going on to become Warden of Gordon College and becoming, during the final years of the war, a key figure in founding Khartoum University. Prior to taking up his Libyan appointment, he had, as semi-retired, been completing research on the adaption of intelligence tests to an Arab environment. (21)

The final two years of B.M.A. educational strategy for Tripolitania, under the not particularly active direction of Cuthbert Scott, who now functioned better as a "guru" than the active embodiment of any set of educational ideals, was far from happy and witnessed few if any new intitatives to what was now a tired and virtually redundant Administration. Originally intended as a three-year posting to have commenced early in 1948, bureaucratic confusion and delays had already resulted in the loss of one "valuable year" by the time Cuthbert Scott finally arrived in Tripoli, delayed until January, 1949. (22) Furthermore, it was still unclear, despite

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17 Mr G.C. Scott, Times Obituary Column, Time of London, 1978. Robin Hodgkin writes, "in the thirties and forties, he was a tremendous influence on scores of young Sudanese and young British recruits to the educational service - such as me." Mr Hodgkin goes on to add, however, that he was widely regarded in the Sudan service as an "unreliable wet. . . and he would often be seen walking about wearing sandals", a clear reference to having "gone native". Hodgkin to Appleton, Bareppa House, nr. Falmouth, 13.8.1983. Steele-Greig's opinion seems to reinforce this - "he spoke Arabic, which I didn't, but was not at all liked by the LIbyan staff, and did not last very long." Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, 6th August, 1982.

18 Farrell to Cox, Tibur, Castletownsend, Co. Cork, 14 Dec. 1949.

19 In his final days as Warden of Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum, Scott had complained to Cox of being "tired of administration. . . .and cracking up under the tremendous strain." Scott to Cox, 3 short letters, written July and August, 1944. Perhaps it is no small coincidence that the "Tripoli job" followed almost immediately after his retirement from the Sudan, giving him little chance to recuperate from the strain of his former post. This verdict is confirmed by his old friend and former colleague, Alan Theobald, who writes, "I knew he did not enjoy the experience Tripolitania and I believe he had some sort of nervous breakdown, although I know no details." Quoting Scott in the same correspondence, Theobald writes of him, ". . .they kept sending me experts to advise me on this and that, when all I needed was money." Theobald to Appleton, Leicester, 22nd October 1984.

20 Although Cuthbert Scott left no written legacy, he was a formative influence on many important tracts and primers on the Sudan. More particularly, he was associated with the setting up of *Bakht er Ruda*, the most effective means, whereby the British spread education in backward rural areas of the Sudan through the training of elementary schools teachers. There is no evidence, however, that he attempted to implement such ideas under similar circumstances in Tripolitania. Theonald to Appleton, Op. Cit.

21 *G.C. Scott, Op. Cit.*

22 The Annual Report of 31st December,1949, lists Scott as "Grade I, Director of Education - to arrive from the U.K" and Steele-Greig as "Grade II C.E.O.", Annual report 1949, p. 71.

excellent Arabic, that his ignorance of Libya could be redeemed other than by communication with Blackley as Steele-Greig refused even to speak to him although he was still Deputy Director. For some, however, Scott's ignorance of the country was conceived as an advantage, since he would be able to make a clean start without any preconceptions about the place. (23) In this, Steele-Greig's silence was probably a mixed blessing though officially designated as "advisor on educational matters" it is clear the latter still basically ran the show or so he maintained. (24) Scott and all those concerned with his appointment were however in no doubt that he had been called to a "thankless task" for which there would be no laurels but which nonetheless had to be done "excellently". (25) Moreover, he would be on his own as it had been decided at G.H.Q. Cairo not to call on the direct support of either the Colonial or Foreign Office in case it be misinterpreted by others. (26) Obviously, the circumstances were not favourable for making a new appointment to so important and sensitive a post (27);and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Blackley had procrastinated too long over the removal of Steele-Greig, given this was deemed by him to be necessary. Not surprisingly, it was belatedly recognised that Cuthbert Scott would "have difficulty in effecting any change" whatever. (28) It was also recognised that although there was much in the "Sudan System" that was "admirable" in its place, that place was "not in the Mediterranean region". (29) Furthermore, as Scott's mentor, Jerome Farrell, would often remind him, "It is barely possible to put education on the right track within two years with some faint hope that the track will not be torn up", as elsewhere in the Arab world, following the granting of independence. (30) Basically, as Cox concurred with Farrell, Scott would have little chance "to do much in Tripolitania at the present time, except to improve relations with the Arab population, at which he is likely to do better than anyone I can think of." (31) Also, it was clear that Scott would have "little money in the two years at his disposal, but it will be something if he gets across a feeling of good will, combined with sound educational ideas and practice." (32) It was thus

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23 Farrell expressed his willingness to help Scott with advice, but averred that "he might prefer to be unhampered by other people's views?". Farrell to Cox, 14.12.1949.

24 Steele-Greig, in unforgiving vein, mercilessly describes "Scott" as "no good for the job, never having had any experience in Education, but could speak Arabic. He really had no policies and just kept on taking advice from me". It is likely here, however, that he was lumping Scott with Cyril Lea, who certainly had no experience of education before becoming D. of E. in Tripolitania. Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, 7th August 1988.

25 Cox to Dickens, Colonial Office, London, 9th Dec. 1949.

26 *Ibid.*

27 Farrell to Cox, Tiburi, Castletownsend, Co. Cork, 14th Dec. 1949.

28 *Ibid.*

29 *Ibid.*

30 Farrell's remarks on the fate of British educational efforts following the grant of independence, makes the "contemplation of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon", he adds, "not encouraging", *Ibid.*

31 Cox to Farrell, Colonial Office, London, 19th Dec. 1949.

32 Technically, the reason for Scott being on such a short financial rein lay in Blackley's submission of estimates for 1950, immediately prior to appointment of the new D. of E. Also, "neither Blackley nor F.O.A.A.T. seemed anxious", adds Farrell, "to face supplementary estimates." Farrell to Cox, Tibur, 14th Dec. 1949. Also, see Cox to Farrell, Colonial Office, 19th Dec. 1949.

made abundantly clear that the last thing the Administration needed at this point was someone who would try to push through desperate last-minute changes to the system as it had developed under "Care and Maintenance" or in any way "rock the boat" despite appearances to the contrary.

Instead, what was needed was a communicator or diplomatic-type figure who would seek to improve relations not with the Italians, as had been Steele-Greig's initial role, but the Arabs. This is more or less in accordance with Steele-Greig's own estimation of Cuthbert Scott, viewing him rather as a talker than as a doer and consequently to be despised, Steele-Greig seeing himself in the former role as the man of action par excellence. This view of the new Director of Education appears to have accorded with his brief tenure of office in Tripoli, as he achieved nothing of real substance for the year he was "D. of E." in Steele-Greig's accepted parlance, though he probably improved Anglo-Arab relations somewhat.

Yet even in the latter role, doubts are expressed, as Arabs are often surprised and even suspicious of people who speak their language with fluency and all Scott's experience had been garnered in the Sudan. Hence, Steele-Greig was probably right when he recorded that Cuthbert Scott was not liked by the Arabs at the Department of Education, though such an estimate of Scott cannot be entirely divorced from some degree of personal prejudice, perhaps natural in the circumstances.

However, further conjecture is pointless since at this point the post of Director of Education Tripolitania was handed over by Travers Blackley to another of his former "pals" in the shape of the ex-Sudan Colonial Service retiree, Cyril or "Sheikh" Lea. This appointment, however, like that of Cuthbert Scott was also a disaster, as Lea only survived in the post for a year though should have had his contract extended for at least a further term. (33)

iv. The dawn of the advisor-era and the demise of the B.M.A.

Cuthbert Scott's appointment in the final years of the B.M.A. to what can only be described as a communicatory rather than a constructive role in Tripoli, perhaps only serves to underscore the ending of one era and the dawning of another. As such, it marks the phasing out of the neo-colonialist-type policies associated with Steele-Greig and carried out by his friend and

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33 Steele-Greig adds that "Scott was an old buddy of Blackley in the Sudan, who had just retired, on reaching the age limit 50 in the Sudan Colonial Service, he had been in agriculture there possibly a reference to Scott's interest in rural education and knew nothing about education, jobs for the boys...." Scott's failure to survive very long as D. of E. led Blackley to "get hold of Lea, Ex-Sudan Service, Administration, I think, definitely not education confimed by contact with Cyril Lea, as Lea retired shortly before.", Steele-Greig to Appleton, Aug. 6th, 1982. Cyril Lea, known to his friends as "Sheikh Lea", had only worked ifor two years, 1933-1935, as Chief Inspector of Schools, Northern Sudan, whereas Cuthbert Scott had a distinguished record as an educator in the Sudan. "Sheikh Lea" took up his appointment as D. of E. on 30.1.1952 and lasted until the end of the year, when he was suddenly dismissed by the recently appointed Libyan Minister of Education, a former Al-Azhar graduate. Sheikh Lea to Appleton, Details of Education and Experience.

confidant, the redoubtable Cav. Fulvio Contini. The inertia, however, associated with the passing of the B.M.A. ensured the survival of the Steele-Greig empire in Tripoli, so to speak, even to the very doorstep and threshold of the independence era itself.

It is therefore Steele-Greig, for all his qualities and faults, who must be regarded as the creator of popular education in Tripolitania in the post-colonial era, even if what he built can mainly be regarded as forming a bridge from Fascism to the self-determination that emerged after 1951. In this respect, Steele-Greig can be seen as not only getting the schools going, but also as presiding over their expansion too. This could not be said for obvious reasons of Cuthbert Scott who, while possessing executive powers, was primarily called upon to communicate and advise. Scott recognised this, seeing himself as the harbinger of the advisor-era - "the North African sky is black with aeroplanes carrying American experts," he confided sourly on leaving Tripoli to his former colleague, Cox. (34)

The problem was, as Scott's final comments infer, that although Britain and America, along with the United Nations, both would become increasingly involved in the funding of educational development in the years following Libyan independence, Scott had the unfortunate experience of lacking the essential funding for new projects. Blackley had already made this clear to him on his appointment, since the estimates for the year had already been submitted to London, before Scott's arrival in Tripoli. (35) Hence Scott's whimsical remark to a friend, "Whenever I ask for money, they simply send me more experts." (36) At this stage, any changes that occurred did not originate in Scott's mission, but were those "implemented by the United Nations Commission, helping to prepare for independence and paid for by the American Point Four Funds building schools, training teachers and finally introducing the Egyptian system". (37)

Thus in the final months of the B.M.A.'s existence in Tripolitania, Adrian Pelt, as the United Nations Commissioner to Libya, managed to get the B.M.A. and the Libyan Consultative Committee to agree on the introduction to the territory of the Egyptian system, so aligning Tripolitania with its sister province of Cyrenaica, where it had been going since the B.M.A.'s original inception there in 1942. (38) There is no doubt that this wise measure

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34 Scott also confided to Cox that although he "didn't regret taking your advice to go to Tripoli....neither did I regret leaving it when the two years were up." He believed that now , the Libyans would have "to make their own mistakes" though commiserated upon the fate of Sheikh Lea who "had a frightful time with a pig-headed minister from Al-Azhar, who crowned a career of folly and failure by sacking him." It seems clear from this letter that Scott had nothing to say in favour of Steele-Greig who had still managed to survive on in an advisory role at Tripoli. Not surprisingly Scott places the blame for the state of education in Tripolitania on Steele-Greig. He did not hesitate to describe his predecessor as being responsible for the state of education in Tripolitania and education as being "in a mess" and Steele-Greig as "the lazy time-server British who made all the mistakes under the old B.M.A. It's sad to think," he adds, "of those wretched children. But there's nothing we can do about it...." Scott to Cox, Yarmouth, Isle of Wight, 28th June, 1953.

35 See *infra*, p. 41 and footnotes re 32

36 Theobald to Appleton, *Op. Cit.*

37 Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, July 22nd, 1984.

38 *Annual Report, B.M.A., Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 8.

stood Cyrenaica in much better stead on the advent of independence by which time the Eastern province had almost ten years experience of a fully comprehensive system for which there had been no parallel in Tripolitania. Had the same policy been adopted for a similar period in Tripolitania, the province would have immensely benefited from such a measure. As a result, Tripolitania would have stood in a much better position politically, culturally and in every other way, on the eve of independence. Why this system was not adopted in Tripolitania is a mystery that cannot be easily explained, though it is hoped that the ensuing chapters will in some measure shed a modicum of truth on the issue.

Chapter Four Elementary Education: Phase One 19423 - 1946

I. Introduction: the Choice of a system for Tripolitania

> "It is against the background of frustration and muddled hopes and fears, now accentuated by the growing realisation of the poverty of the country, that a system of Arab education has been built up in Tripoli." (1)

The term "elementary education" is of its nature extremely broad in meaning being variously understood to imply education in the essential elements prior to proceeding to either secondary education proper or some kind of vocational education or training. In an Arab or Moslem context such as Libya the essential elements are invariably seen to consist of the Arabic Language and the Koran, to which has been added in more modern times , Arithmetic, History, Geography and Physical Education - or in the case of female education, the details of domestic economy. This was the programme, along with the inclusion of the Italian Language, adopted by the Italian colonial government of Libya prior to the setting up of the B.M.A. in December 1942. (2) Unfortunately for the B.M.A., the Italo-Arab schools, as the schools for Libyans were termed, were never really popular with the native populations of the two provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. This was because of the association of these schools with the Fascist Government of Italy and the tendency of these schools to Italianise and to be used as instruments of government propaganda by the Fascist authorities. (3) Therefore the British Government via G.H.Q. Cairo had little hesitation in suppressing the Italo-Arab schools in both provinces without having recourse to any form of promulgation. (4) In which case the B.M.A.s of the two provinces were quite free at their inception to make a fresh start in their two respective spheres of control with the vexed question of education. This was in marked contrast to the situation obtaining in other areas and services where the military regimes were bound by International Law to preserve the status quo ante bellum even if this was contrary to the best interests of the indigenous populations of the territories.

The choice of a future pattern of education for both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was to some extent simplified by the Italian failure in either province - or the Fezzan - to develop a comprehensive system of education for the Arabs during thirty years of colonial rule in Libya. Only elementary schools had been permitted for Arabs and the traditional Kuttabs were not

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1 Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, 1948, p. 34.

2 See R.D. 21 giugno 1928, n. 1698. Norme reflettenti l'istruzione primaria per i musulmani della Tripolitania e della Cyrenaica, B.U.T., 19,1147.

3 See, De MArco, *Italianisation of African Natives*, New York, 1943.

4 Steele-Greig/Appleton Interview, Barbados, 3 Jan. 1982. Also, Annual Report Tripolitania 1944, p. 5.

included the government system, though subject to periodic inspection, (5) in which respect, they were seen as co-existing alongside the government sponsored Italo-Arab schools. In B.M.A. Cyrenaica, where Mr Eric de Candole, the Chief Administrator's Deputy, with considerable experience of the British Sudan, went in for the Egyptian system. (6) Thus, all primary schools, mainly situated in the towns and villages of the coast and the interior, as well as Benghazi and the principal towns of the coast, were subject to a specially designed four-year programme of vernacular education. (7) This decision to adopt the Egyptian system had considerable advantages for the territory at all the interelated levels of educational development. It was also best adapted on the test of experience to the needs of Moslem Arabs and was capable of immediate implementation without any need for further adaption. As such, it related directly to secondary, vocational, teacher training and even university education, to the inestimable advantage of the Cyrenaican Arabs. Furthermore, by linking the system to Egypt, the B.M.A. at the most critical time for educational development in the territory, had instantly available, trained teachers, curriculum, examination systems, teacher training facilities in Egypt, and experts from a neighbouring country ready and willing to be recruited for the training of native teachers in Cyrenaica. Supplies of suitable text books and other such material for schools were also easily to be obtained. (8) There can be no doubt that the adoption, virtually lock stock and barrel, of the Egyptian system was of great value to Cyrenaica, in preparing for independence under Sayed Idris Al Senusi. It relegated at a stroke the neglect and bad policies of the former Italian regime to the dust-bin of history where they rightfully belonged.

No doubt the adoption of the Egyptian system in Cyrenaica was to a large extent facilitated by the decision of the British Government in January 1942 "that His Majesty's Government are determined that the Senusi in Cyrenaica will not again be submitted to Italian domination" (9) though the principles of International Law were nevertheless to be applied particularly in respect of "enemy property". At which point, the historian, bearing in mind the tragic history of the sister province of Tripolitania, especially where education is concerned, is of necessity obliged to ask if similar provision could not at this point have been made available too? As it was, the Egyptian system was not to be applied in the sister province of Tripolitania until 1952 when the two provinces were finally united under a single Arab flag. Was it the lack of a political decision over the future of Tripolitania in 1942 that was responsible for the Egyptian system not being adopted there, given that the Egyptian system was the best then available and eminently suited for adoption in either province? Without doubt, the decision not to use that system in Tripolitania too was a very important one and, it can be said, accounts to a large

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5 See, Appleton, *Op. Cit.*, p. 312.
6 E.V. de Candole to Appleton, Burley, Hants, 10.10.1980.
7 Annual report, B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
8 *Ibid.*
9 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

extent for the lop-sided, educational development of the two territories under British rule. In fact, there is almost a parallel with 1919, when the Italian Government of the day, with pacification through conciliation in mind, issued the two Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Unfortunately, the government failed to develop the liberal education provisions of these laws for the Northern coastal province because of the "political uncertainty" prevailing there at the time.(10) Or to put it plainly, did Brigadiers Maurice Lush and Travers Blackley ever possess the Egyptian option in 1942 and 1943? Or was this a decision to be taken by the higher echelons - G.H.Q. Cairo or maybe London Government?

One answer to this question is provided by Major Steele-Greig himself as D. of E., for most of the B.M.A., when he asserts that whereas the decision not to continue with the Italian system (for Arabs) was taken at a higher level, the decision what to put in its place was taken by himself. (11) It is certainly difficult otherwise to explain Steele-Greig's opposition to the Egyptian system in terms of Egyptian educational involvement in Tripolitania which he always opposed. At the time he may even have placed himself at variance with Blackley on the issue or at least with the "zeitgeist". On the other hand, it is impossible to exclude political considerations entirely from this decision since they make so much logical sense. These would include whether it was more desirable for Cyrenaicans to be more closely associated with Egypt than with Tripolitania should the latter revert to Italy, as was generally supposed to occur before 1947. Should this happen, then it was desirable that Egyptian influence be kept to a minimum in the territory. Otherwise, the B.M.A. could be said to have pre-mandated Italian claims on the territory.

The latter had by no means been rejected by the Allies either before or after 1942 and had in fact grown more plausible with Italy entering the war on the side of the Allies following Mussolini's flight from Rome. This may cast light upon the true extent of Steele-Greig's real authority at the time - being seen rather as the official of the Military Occupation which had only endowed him with an administrative rather than a policy-making role in the affairs of Tripolitania.

Even if this hypothesis of Steele-Greig's role is accepted, he could still have had control over the curriculum and consequently the recruitment of teachers too. Certainly all communication with him confirms this point, as do his remarks that the reason for not adopting Egyptian teachers was deeply entrenched opposition to them by the population at large.

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10 Appleton, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 192 - 230.

11 Steele-Greig/Appleton, Barbados, Jan. 1982. Further confirmation that the choice of a curriculum was Steele-Greig's, or at least appeared to emanate from him, is provided in his *History of Education in Tripolitania*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 32. For relevant extract, see supra, footnote 30, p. 52.

II. Curriculum or "Syllabus"?

The decision not to adopt the Egyptian or Sudanese system for Tripolitania must have thrown Steele-Greig back on his resources which as an educator or administrator were slight. Neither could the question of devising a suitable curriculum for Tripolitania be viewed as a purely pragmatic matter. Theoretically, the question was put, "whether the geographical position of Tripolitania with its traditional connections with European civilisation demanded that education be based upon a European system, or whether it should be grounded upon the traditional Arab schools, of which the curriculum might be enlarged to include other subjects such as Arithmetic." (12) This was surely going back over old ground whether Steele-Greig was aware of it or not, as Contini certainly was. The question was somewhat simplified by there only being "elementary subjects" to consider. (13) Yet, as observation of developments in Cyrenaica has shown, the term is capable of considerable differentiation, unless divorced from its root definition, as "the essential elements prior to proceeding to either secondary education proper or some kind of vocational education." (14) In Cyrenaica, elementary education implied, besides the "essential elements", two curricula - for primary and rural education in the form of vernacular schools proper. Also, the primary curriculum was more structured than the vernacular curriculum in Cyrenaica, since it was based upon attaining a set of standards. These were expressed as an upper and lower level and as such comprised a fixed number of years after which the pupils were appropriately tested before being allowed to proceed to the next stage. (15) Steele-Greig offers no such differentiation in his eventual choice of curriculum for the schools which in effect hardly differed from the former Italo-Arab schools. Instead, he merely states in what can only be described as amateurish language that "the syllabus was based upon that which existed and was in force in England, viz. language (Italian or Arabic), arithmetic, religion (according to the faith of the pupils), physical training, hygiene, arts (drawing, singing, handwriting, etc), history, geograsphy, science (in the upper classes only), each subject being graded according to the class, French being taught in class 6." (16) The expression "that which existed" must be seen to refer, in the case of Arab education, to that which had existed in Italian times, namely the programmes in force in the former Italo-Arab schools. It is interesting to note that by 1946 the curriculum of the Arab schools had been extended in the province to include Italian again despite such a measure meeting the disapproval of the "extremist political parties." (17) It is far from clear, however, what the reference to "the syllabus..... in force in England" can mean? Obviously the first months of the occupation were a difficult time and it may simply have been inserted into the

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12 Annual Report Cyrenaica 1944, p. 8.
13 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
14 See, *infra*, p. 46.
15 Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
16 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1943, p. 65.
17 Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 42.

Annual Report to satisfy opinion in Whitehall that the Fascist system had been dismantled and replaced by something more familiar. It obviously does not refer to the Italian schools which were obliged by International Law to continue in accordance with the Italian system operating in Italy. (18) Therefore Steele-Greig's remarks must be construed as referring to the schools for Arabs. He had of course been a preparatory school master and this is the kind of syllabus one would expect to find in such a school in the pre-war period. On the other hand, he may be referring to the need to broaden the existing curriculum or syllabus of the Italo=-Arab schools in the light of his English experience - through the addition of a "European language", which could only have been Italian and the introduction of the normal elements of the English curriculum such as Arithmetic, History, Geography, etc.,etc. One must therefore conclude that the B.M.A.'s blueprint for the Arab schools for the duration of the British Administration would be the same as had operated under the former Italian regime but shorn of the elements of Fascist proselytizing.

In respect of both the Italian schools and the Arab schools, the B.M.A. was following International Law for Military Rule in Occupied Territories for Tripolitania. In this respect, the British Government could be criticised for making an exception of the Eastern province or Cyrenaica, where the local population, since the Italian population had left en masse at the commencement of hostilities, was exclusively Arab and got a much fairer educational deal than their Tripolitanian compatriots, who, unlike the Cyrenaicans, had been active on the Italian and German side against the British. Tripolitania would have to wait until 1951 before similar education provision to that operating in Cyrenaica in 1941 could be made for them.

III. School Textbooks and Materials

Having decided not to put the Arab system onto an agreed curriculum as in Cyrenaica, Steele-Greig opted for a simplified syllabus for all elementary schools under his control. (19) A different approach would have to be adopted for the schools of the rural areas and the interior of the territory, though this was not an immediate priority in 1942. For the moment, it was better to concentrate upon the coastal areas in which the Italians had focused their main educational aim for the Moslem population. (20) The results of going it alone at once began to become manifest as no textbooks other than those produced under the Fascist Ministry of Education were available for the Arab schools. This made nonsense of any talk about modelling the Arab schools upon the schools in England (21) since textbooks for such

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18 "The arrangement of the Syllabus for the Italian schools was simple, since the Italian system was good and required little alteration, except for the expurgation of Fascism." *Ibid.*, p. 34.

19 *Syllabus for Arab Primary Schools in Tripolitania.* See Appendix, p. 329.

20 See, Appleton, Op. Cit., Appendix - list of Italian schools for Arabs in Tripolitania, start of School Year, 1939 -

21 See, supra, p. 8122 Annual Report, 1943, p. 66.

purposes, if available which was extremely doubtful in wartime, would clearly not be appropriate, apart from the language problem, for Arab children in a Libyan environment. This is yet another nail in the coffin of the original schemes for the territory hastily drawn up in 1942 which in retrospect must be seen as administrative poppycock.

In such circumstances the only option open to Steele-Greig was to make use of the available school text-books designed for Italian children in the colonial schools. In this his luck was in since "for the teaching of Italian there was a sufficient stock available." (22) In which latter respect he adds, "These had been scrutinised and expurgated of Fascist teaching" and "as there was only a small number of Arab language books available," (23) there can be little doubt that at least initially these books were used for both Italian and Libyan children.

Steele-Greig, therefore, had a problem immediately on opening the schools, a problem it is obvious he would have had in any case, but nonetheless a problem that would not go away but get worse and could only be solved by finding a suitable and easily obtainable supply in another Arab country, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Syria or Lebanon, where educational systems were already relatively well advanced. Fortunately, this solution sems to have been adopted and "in consultation with the Palestinian Inspectors", orders for further supplies of "selected" books were placed in Palestine, Syria and London, though none in Egypt which would have been the most readily available source of supply. (24)

By the end of 1943 about "60% of those ordered," wrote Steele-Greig, "have arrived and have been distributed to the schools." (25) It is far from clear, however, what the texts were that arrived in 1943. Even by 1948, in Steele-Greig's outline of educational developments in the territory, (26) , "The only book of any use to Arab scholars," was described as being, "a primer for the first class." Steele-Greig continues, "There were no Arab text-books on arithmetic, history, geography, etc.,etc., nor any copies of the Koran. Due to the state of war existing in 1943, it was impossible to obtain any from outside, but for the 1945 school year and subsequently, sufficient school books have been purchased from Egypt." (27) Thus by 1945 the authorities had finally turned to Egypt for a supply of suitable books, but still had not opted for the Egyptian curriculum for which they were tailor-made. Furthermore by 1945, in view of the dearth of "Arabic books of educational value" in the territory, a committee was set up "to compile a much needed history and geography of Tripolitania." (28) Unfortunately, none of the manuscripts submitted met with Steele-Greig's approval, apart from the history book. (29)

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22 p. 84.
23 *Ibid.*
24 *Ibid.*
25 *Ibid.*
26 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
27 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
28 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
29 *Ibid.*

Text-books produced outside the territory at best could hardly be expected to meet the needs of Libya's children, as soon became obvious, in the case of history and geography for which special texxt-books would have to be prepared. Again the pivotal problem was the lack of a relevant curriculum in place of which there only existed Steele-Greig's homespun "syllabus". Therefore whatever text-books were acquired from abroad they were bound to appear like fish out of water in so far as they could not relate to the educational purpose for which they were presumably written. Whether Steele-Greig could have rendered educational arrangements in the territory more effective through moving a step in the direction of securing the appropriate curriculum for which the books were originally devised is open to speculation. It seems such a small step to make and one cannot help surmising that had the D. of E. exercised enough pressure in such a direction official acquiescence might have followed; but it must not be forgotten that he was a relatively small fish in the Administration and overall control was exercised in London and Cairo.

IV. The Italian Connection.

Between the arrival of the Eigth Army in Tripoli, 23rd January 1943 and the appointment in June 1943 of Steele-Greig, with the rank of m,ajor, to the position of D. of E. Tripolitania, the Northern province was without any kind of educational authority. (30) During this interlude, the schools of the territory were badly damaged and in some cases completely looted. (31) Consequently, school materials, books, teaching materials, desks, blackboards, tables and chairs were almost non-existant when, in the uncertain circumstances of 1943, the recently appointed D. of E. re-opened the schools. (32) This situation was to a considerable extent mitigated by the discovery of much equipment "walled up in buildings scattered around the territory." Such discoveries of equipment unfortunately did little to redress the situation as most of the material disappeared due to army requisitions of objects such as chairs, pianos and almost everything else of value to the war effort. (33) Fortunately at this point an enormous cachet of school materials was discovered and Steele-Greig was able through the good offices of Cav. Fulvio Contini to gain access to it. (34)

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30 Steele-Greig's initial brief was "to open primary schools for the teaching of pupils through the medium of the Italian and Arabic Language; survey existing school buildings for repairs, etc.; prepare estimates of expenditure and a suitable curriculum; and to screen and appoint teaching and administrative staff." See, *Op. Cit.*, p. 32.

31 Annual Report B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p. 64.

32 *Op. Cit.*, p. 31.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

34 Contini had taken good care of this material consisting of a good two year's of school supplies. Originally the cargo of a ship destined for Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia which had been diverted at the outbreak of war to Tripoli where it had been promptly relieved of its cargo. Steele-Greig to Appleton, Interview, St. James, Barbados, Jan., 1982.

Originally received in Tripoli in 1941, this material, which was quite considerable, had not yet been unpacked when the British expeditionary force first arrived, and though first stored in the town was later removed to Bianchi and Ma'amura. (35) According to Steele-Greig this store in 1943 provided "a sufficient supply of exercise books, pencils, pens, etc., etc., to last well over three years, notwithstanding that large quantities had been requisitioned by the army in 1943." (36) This cache undoubtedly "saved the B.M.A. much money" (37) besides providing the school population with basic materials otherwise virtually unobtainable from England because of the war. In Eritrea and Somalia, for want of equipment, reading, writing and simple calculation had to be performed in sand-boxes. (38) Unfortunately, lucky find as it was, it did not solve the problem of providing suitable text-books for the schools, which was not resolved until 1951.

Even shortages of vital equipment persisted, especially of teachers' desks and cupboards. (39) Moreover, while a considerable amount of damaged furniture was repaired, "there was a lack of equipment", Steele-Greig notes meticulously, "for the doctor's rooms." (40) These shortages of basic equipment were, by the commencement of the new school-year, October 1944, starting to have a telling effect on any further school expansion programmes, "the supply of banches, desks and other furnitire being exhausted." (41) The same trend continued into the 1945 school year, when financial cuts in the education programme, just as the numbers were reaching former Italian levels, reduced further growth expectations, though the Administration considered the targets reached as sufficient for Care and Maintenance. (42) The shortages were, however, beginning to affect the quality of education provided. This was apparent for the school-year 1944 - 1945 when LST 2,300, reserved for the purchase of school texts and equipment, now in short supply as the Italian stores began to run out, had to be "dereserved", causing "so serious a shortage of school equipment that most schools had to be run with both morning and afternoon sessions, which adversely affected attendance." (43) There is no indication in the Annual Report for the School Year 1945 - 6 of any general improvement in the situation, despite other improvements, and one must therefore assume, the original targets having been reached, only a new policy directive would change the situation and produce further expansion so badly neded. (44)

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35 Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 33.
36 *Ibid.*
37 Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, Jan. 1982.
38 Kynaston-Snell to Appleton, Interview at Poole, Dorest on 22 May, 1982. The late Dr. Kynaston-Snell had been Director of Education in Eritrea during the whole period there of the British Military Rule 1940 - 1949.
39 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 33.
40 *Ibid.*
41 *Ibid.*
42 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p. 34.
43 *Ibid.*
44 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1946, pp. 33 - 34.

V. Schools.

Basically, the aim of the B.M.A. during the first, four years of the Administration was to "revive" education, which had ceased entirely at the time of the Expeditionary Force's arrival in Tripolitania. By "revival" was meant the reopening of all those schools still functioning in the final year of the former Italian Administration in 1941 or at the outbreak of war with the Allies in 1940. In this work the ethnic and cultural balance inherited from Ottoman times was to be maintained in the schools. Thus, Arab, Jewish, Italian and various expatriate elements, such as Cypriot, Greek, Maltese and European, were to have their schools restored in the exact pre-war pattern. Moreover, while the pupil numbers, teachers and schools were to be the same as in 1940, these levels were not to be exceeded, and indeed if necessary cut back, as in fact occurred though for financial reasons, in 1946. The B.M.A. therefore, while anxious to honour its commitment to International Law, had no "civilising Mission" in mind, such as the Italians claimed to have, when they invaded the territory in 1911. The Administration would do what it had to do in the field of education as elsewhere; but no more in view of its very temporary nature and pecualir character as a military , not a colonial, administration. We should not therefore be particularly surprised to note that the B.M.A., neither in 1943 or subsequently entertained the idea of launching into a school building programme. Tripolitania, where few buildings had been destroyed and which had become in Italian times virtually a European capital had its stock of educational building more or less intact. Cyrenaica, on the other hand, had been utterly devastated by the war and required to be entirely rebuilt before it could begin to function as in former times. Also, as has been noted, many new departures took place in education which were not extended, for reasons that will never be entirely clear, to the sister province. Colonial times, therefore, tended to live on in Tripolitania, though the prosperity of those times had evaporated, as recession gripped the province after the war, and austerity measures began to bite. In such an atmosphere, few changes were envisaged in education, which had dificulty even remaining within the narrow constraints determined by Care and Maintenance.

VI. Buildings.

Given such aims and the essential character of the régime, it was necessary at the start, if colonial levels of school population were to be reached, for all the former schools to be brought back into service as educational institutions, through making the needed repairs to their fabric in 1943. This was important, as many schools in the first six months of 1943 had suffered from vandalism, looting, military requisitioning and bomb damage. Steele-Greig's first task, on becoming D. of E. in June 1943, was to carry out a "comprehensive survey of

the schools and equipment in the territory." (45) The six-month delay in appointing an education officer for Tripolitania had led to more damage taking place in schools in rural areas. This was due to military requisitions and the simple fact that "not all soldiers appreciated the future use of school furniture and equipment." (46) The general situation was summed up by Steele-Greig as "following the evacuation of Italian troops, a certain section of the Arab and Jewish population took advantage of the abandonment of school buildings to loot and destroy. In the former case, the five large schools were stripped of everything moveable and immoveable, even the electric and latrine fittings, doors and windows, while marble steps and floor tiles were torn up, leaving the buildings as mere empty shells." Steele-Greig concluded, "Whether this action was done for gain or spite will never be known."(47)

Such was the situation at the start of Steele-Greig's appointment as D. of E. Tripolitania. Yet it was most important that these buildings and others like them be brought back into use, since they represented the total stock of educational buildings in the territory, without which even colonial levels of schooling could not be arrived at. Steele-Greig's survey of the former Italian schools revealed they numbered 214, most of which had been closed since June 1940. Of these 120 had been open in 1941, but only 60 in 1942 and then for a mere two months, so making educational activity virtually non-existant when the B.M.A. took over in January 1943. (48) In Tripoli city, the 22 existing schools were either occupied by the military or R.A.F. units (49); or had been so badly damaged by air raids and looting as to be unuseable without urgent repairs. (50) The same was true in the provinces but here schools were intact but badly looted. The school situation at the end of 1943 was given as follows: "There are now 106 schools open, 54 Italian and 52 Arab distributed as follows:

Tripoli City	14 -	8	Italian &	6	Arab	
Tripoli Province	27 -	17	"	10	"	
Central Province	16 -	2	"	14	"	
Northern Province	15 -	9	"	6	"	
Eastern Province	12 -	12	"	5	"	
Western Province	22 -	11	"	11	"	(51)

This tally of schools in 1943 for Tripolitania coincided more or less with the position at the end of 1939 when there were probably 64 government primary schools for Arabs with a total roll

45 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943, p. 64.
46 Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, P. 31.
47 *Ibid.*
48 *Op. Cit.*, P. 31.
49 The Arts and Crafts School still continued to function even though partly occupied by a Royal Air Force Balloon Unit. See, Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 31.
50 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1943, p. 64.
51 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

of 6136 pupils. (52) Until 1945, it was the objective of the B.M.A. to restore to what it had been like prior to its arrival in 1942. This meant the same number of schools and pupils or around 64 elementary schools in full operation attended by 7988 pupils. (53)

VII. Difficulties in Meeting the Swelling Demand.

By the end of the first educational year for the B.M.A. in the summer of 1943, 50 schools had been opened and 4848 Arab children had been enrolled in them. (54) These, however, were insufficient to meet the demands of the population and in October when the new educational year began, a further 29 schools were opened for Arabs, expanding the rolls to 7988 - a 3140 increase over the previous year. (55) At this point, the D. of E. drew to the attention of his superiors, the fact that it was impossible for the education department to satisfay the swelling demand of the Arab population for school places and a further 30 or 40 schools at least were required. (56) The reason given was that the buildings available were "in such a bad state that the cost of repairs cannot be met from available funds. Moreover, the supply of benches, desks and other furniture is exhausted." (57) To alleviate some of the problems stemming from post-war austerity measures, where rationing was of course in force in Britain itself, and shortages of all kinds dogged people and administrators alike, Steele-Greig was obliged to introduce "double sessions" into a number of schools. (58)

The demand for school places from the Arab population, however, continued unabated despite the overcrowding and recourse to evening sessions in the schools. This is very apparent in the 1945 - 46 school year where the same pattern repeats itself and the demand for more places shows no sign of being met by the Administration - a modern phenomenon in Libya and other developing countries with educational need outstripping supply, right down to the present day. By 1945 - 6, however, it is clear that for the time being at least the B.M.A. had reached its ceiling as far as educational expansion was concerned. This is very apparent if one compares the picture at the end of 1945, when the number of schools had increased to 79, whereas the 1946 school-year witnessed virtually no advance on this figure peaking at 80

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52 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., 1948, p. 56. Although it is impossible to verify these sources, acquired by Steele-Greig from his Italian collaborators, they do offer some comparison with the figures given in the first Annual Report for Tripolitania see, footnote 51. Other Itaslian sources do give a lighter figure for the schools and the pupils attending them until the end of the colonial era itself. These read as 77 schools for Arabs, including 13 girls schools, with a total of 6,850 pupils, including 963 girls, in attendance. See, L.A. Appleton, Op. Cit., p. 56.

53 Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, P. 56.

54 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1944, p. 77.

55 *Ibid.*

56 *Ibid.*

57 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

58 *Ibid.*

schools, though the number of pupils continued to advance to 9104. "Up to this point, the expansion in the number of pupils has been steady," the Annual Report of that year announced, "rather than spectacular." (59) Italian and Jewish attendance figures, on the other hand, "were approaching saturation point," added the D. of E., "many more Arab pupils could have been enrolled but financial restrictions, shortage of equipment and above all the dearth of qualified Arab teachers, forced the Department to discourage an influx of pupils for whom there would be no proper provision." (60) This, however, was not the case with girls' education, and it was anticipated that 1945 would be a "turning point for girls' education in the territory." (61)

VIII. Reasons for the Slow Down in Expansion.

The reason for having to apply the brake on further educational expansion at this point lay in financial limitations imposed by the War Office which had "narrowly circumscribed the educational programme." (62) Until this point the only real limitation upon expansion had been the yearly intake itslef. This, however, had been cut to Lst 11000 as the most the budget would allow. (63) Instead, therefore, of taking on more teachers, the D. of E. had been obliged to lay them off. The statistical evidence for 1946-7 again shows how financial limitations were having a noticeable effect in suppr5essing the demand for education amongst the Arab population, the number of schools only increasing by 6 to 86 for the year and the number of pupils by 592 from the previous 9104. Again the bright spot in this otherwise gloomy situation was girls' education, at least in Tripoli, where the main girls' school, "had made unpredictable strides" from a small insitution with under 60 pupils in 1943 to 500 girls in 1946-7 distributed between two schools. (64)

1947 was the year when the War Office Working Party visited the territory and although this had no immediate impact upon Arab education there it was a harbinger of change of sorts. Initially, however, it gave approval to Steele-Greig's proposals for reducing the number of pupils in the elementary schools frrom 50 - 40in a class, so ensuring the maintenance of acceptable standards through an improved pupil-teacher ratio. (65) Otherwise, little of educational significance occured during 1947, the number of schools increasing by six, and the school population to 10,224 which, though well above colonial levels, was still below Italian totals, the latter having increased to 11,643 and Jewish to 5,000. (66) At this point,

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59 *Ibid.*
60 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p. 34.
61 *Ibid.*
62 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
63 *Ibid.*
64 *Ibid.*
65 Annual Report, 1947, p. 44.
66 *Ibid.*

the picture is of a relatively small number of Arab children being able to receive an elementary education in the B.M.A. schools, whereas the Italian or Jewish child expected it of right. Even so, those children attending the B.M.A.'s schools could almost be regarded as part of a new and almost privilege élite, as the B.M.A. never viewed it as part of its mandate to provide anything approaching universal education, an impossibility in any case at this time. Instead, the Administration aimed only to re-eatblish educational levels as they had existed in colonial times of until 1939. This had already been exceeded by 1947 and many wondered where the Administration was now heading.

On the other hand, the B.M.A. had originally been expected to last for only three years and, having already exceeded this estimation was thereafter expected to make decisions and initiate policies, in the manner of a colonial government, which it was not in its nature to be. The prospects for the Arab child, as a result of it, destined under the former Italian dispensation, as only to become "hewers of wood and drawers of water to their colonial masters," was infinitely brighter under the B.M.A. Perhaps it is no accident of history that the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammer Qadaffi, and many fof his colleagues, were educated under the B.M.A. in one of its schools. (67) These children can therefore with some justification be described as an élite who would shortly become the objects of policies that would eventually enable them to become the masters and administrators of the new Libya.

IX. The Move away from Care and Maintenance.

This tendency becomes apparent for the first time in 1949 when more Arab children were receiving government-sponsored education than at any time before in the territory. Indeed, the numbers in the schools exceeded those of the existing Italian and Jewish schools combined, though the latter began to decline after 1948. Even so, the figure is impressive in the circumstances, with 19,536 enrolled in the Arab schools, an excess to 7,766 over the combined total in the other schools of the provnce. (68) Also for the first time, the Annual Report separates the statistics for the native population from those of Italian or Jews. The new Arab Secondary School also appears in the 1949 Report, indicating the emergence of a two-tier system of education, whereas before there had only been elementary education for them if they were lucky. (69) The 1948 figures for the Italian and Jewish schools are perhaps misleading though not without some political significance. The increase in numbers especially of the Italian school population for 1948 reflects Italian attempts to regain control of Tripolitania; while the Jewish school numbers were to decline rapidly following Jewish emigration to

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67 Steele-Greig to Appleton, El-Alamein, Barbados, 17th Jan. 1986. The former D. of E. Tripolitania, writes, "I suppose I met Ghadafi as he was a pupil in one of my schools in Sirte some years ago."

68 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 75 - 76.

69 *Ibid.*

Palestine in 1948. 1949 should, however, be seen as the year when Arab education finally brike loose from the constraints of the past with "an appreciable all-round increase in school attendance during the latter part, due to two factors: first the approval of the financial estimates covering the school year, October 1948 - June 1949, and secondly an increased enthusiasm on the part of the Arab population to have their children educated." (70)

X. Initial Functioning of the "New System".

Judged in terms of the average Arab child, who had entered the B.M.A.'s Arab schools in 1943, he would be the end of the school year in 1948 have completed five years of schooling, or the "original primary course", as devised by Steele-Greig on re-opening the former Italo-Arab schools in 1943. (71) This would have enabled the Libyan primary school graduate to proceed to the newly opened Arab secondary school. If, however, he was unable through financial reasons to go on to secondary education, he was now able to improve his primary education to the level obtaining in Egypt by a further two years of elementary schooling. "This move was popular," writes Steele-Greig, with 106 boys in 1948 attending the sixth year of the primary class. (72) Steele-Greig's enthusiasm for the importation of the Egyptian system in 1948 seems ironical in view of his earlier opposition to its employment in the territory in 1943. One must conclude that political factors connected with the possibility of Tripolitania's return to Italian sovereignty were the determining influences to which in 1948-9 no longer existed in view of the United Nations decision to grant independence to Libya.

Despite being able to increase the number of school places from 17,638 in June, 1949 to 19,557 in December 1949, the increase in the number of schools and pupils was judged "small in comparison with the number of requests received from the rural population." (73) At this juncture, it is observable that the B.M.A. has become apparently committed to some form of universal education. Unfortunately, the shortage of trained teachers at either elementary or secondary level made it impossible for the Administration to go much further at this stage. (74) The predicament is a common one in developing countries and Libya would have to wait until the 1950s, when the availability of wealth from oil, made it possible to recruit extensively from abroad, especially in Egypt.

The B.M.A. did not have this facility, being constantly plagued by financial inadequacy, such as prevented the opening of new schools in rural situations, the cause of considerable disappointment amongst the rural population who did not like their sons to have to pursue their secondary education in Tripoli. It is to Steele-Greig's credit that in this situation, when he was

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70 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48.
71 *Ibid.*
72 *Ibid.*
73 B.M.A. Annual Report Tripolitania, 1949, p. 30.
74 *Ibid.*

in fact due to be replaced by the ailing and psychologically dispondent Cuthbert Scott, who had not yet arrived by the end of 1949, he set about reorganising the rural schools. Steele-Greig's reorganisation enabled boys who had started class 1 in 1943 and passed out of primary school, to recontinue their education. The alternative would have been to set up small secondry schools in rural areas but these could not have been managed properly at the time in view of the lack of resources.

Instead the "new System" which was a makeshift attempt at preparing the way for a full-blown introduction of the Egyptian system into Tripolitania as soon as was judged feasible, sought to bridge the gap by enabling a child, starting school at the age of six, to attend a preparatory class, (Tamida), so that aged seven he or she could then proceed to the primary (Awali) school. From class I - IV, he could proceed to the intermediate (mutawassati), classes V - VI. Thus, as Steele-Greig observed, "he can attend school from the age of 6 - 12 whilst obtaining an elementary education." (75) Moreover, he continues, "should the parents so desire, he can attend school for a further two years, when he will be taught amongst other subjects, simple gardening, botany, hygiene and, where possible, English." (76) English thus appears in this context and at this time as a replacement of Italian, which until that time had been the second language in the territory, since as far back as the initial Italian occupation in 1911.

Secondary education was also by this time finally available but only in Tripoli and Zawiea. Unfortunately, despite many notable improvements in both the scale and range of educational amenities available, Secondary education was also by this time finally available but only in Tripoli and Zawiea. Unfortunately despite many notable improvements in both scale and range of educational amenties available to the Arab child, the quality remained poor. This was especially so in rural areas where trained teachers were reluctant to tread, a feature just as pronounced in Italian times, and today too. Consequently, standards were uneven and inadequate despite the enthusiasm of the population for schools. Again, as in Italian times, an initial, large registration was inevitably followed by poor attendance and numbers fell away. (77) This was connected with the very pattern and demands of rural life where emigrant labour had not yet been introduced. Hence, the male child was still not free to pursue his education and future career, leaving the heavier work to the emigrant worker and the lighter work to the girls and the women of the household.

1950 was of course the B.M.A.'s final year during which it was officially committed to preparing the country for indpendence. By this time, it had become quite clear that the decade

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75 IIbid. Steele-Greig seems at this point to have been receiving advice from an educational expert who arrived for this purpose with the War Office Working Party of 1949.

76 *Ibid.*

77 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

from 1939 - 1950 was to be a watershed in Libya's development, however unprepared the country might be for independence itself. During this period, the Italian era was eclipsed never to return by new voices with new demands which had remained dormant or repressed under the Italian occupation itself. Yet during this decade Italy was ever-present as before especially in education with the Italian schools still being fully financed by the Italian government for pupils of Italian nationality. Moreover, the Jews who had by 1949 mostly fled the country had managed their own schools, though under nominal B.M.A. supervision, issuing in a new age that ended the long centuries of uneasy toleration between Arab and Jew that had characterised life in the territory until that point.

Educationally, these momentous events, produced a change more radical than at any time in the past. There were 800 fewer Italian children in the Italian schools by 1949 than before and the number of Italian schools had declined in the province. Libyan school numbers, however, had risen by more than 4000 and Jewish declined by 3790, signifying the end of the Jewish tradition in education in Tripolitania. To assist the creation of a Arab national system of education, an additional grant of Lst 50,000 was secured from the British government for training teachers and improving secondary education. ((78) Future developments it seemed would depend upon securing an adequate supply of native Libyan teachers though at this point the competition for educated manpower was already developing from the new civil service.

78 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1950, p. 33.

Chapter Five Elementary Education.

I. Examinations.

Unlike Cyrenaica, where the Egyptian system was in operation, no formal system of examinations existed in Tripolitania under the B.M.A., other than that devised by the Director of Education himself, for the yearly promotion of pupils from class to class, the method inheritied from Italian times. As no copies of these examinations were preserved, it is impossible to say what they were like. Most probably such examinations or tests were prepared by individual teachers in the various subjects which they taught, or generally, after which they were discarded. Each school would then collate the marks and these would be forwarded to Tripoli for statistical and general use by the Department of Education.

Examinations were to become under the B.M.A. an increasingly important measuring rod of social progress and adaptability in the urban centres where tribal links were either non-existant or very weak, at least, in Tripolitania. Hence, they became more relevant to the running of the schools. This of course had always been the case in the Italian schools which, as in colonial times, were carefully regulated by the Ministry of Public Instruction in Rome. (1) The lack of effective examinations for Libyans under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania was regretable and would have to wait for remedy until Independence itself, when the Egyptian system was adopted in the territory.

An attempt to mitigate the effects of this shortage was in 1945 presented in the from of an Arab Teachers' Examination to enable Libyans employed as teachers by the Department of Education to qualify as certified teachers and obtain a risae in salary. (2) The failure in 1945 of the Administration to set up an Arab boarding-school outisde Tripoli led the authorities to permit pupils who had passed the fifth form examination to be allowed to continue their schooling at the Teachers' Training School in Tripoli without having to undertake any further examinations. (3) In this respect, we at last see Libya perhaps turning into a developing country in which social and economic priorities become increasingly determined for both individual and nation by the quality and quantity of school life.

Basically, the aim of examinations at this stage of Libya's development was the assessment of general educational competence, especially literacy, rather than any form of technical proficiency for which few if any Libyans were receiving education or training. This was the pattern too for the selection of teachers either for direct employment in the schools or for entry into one or other of the B.M.A.'s training programmes. This was the pattern even as late as

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1 This was even so until the "evacuation" of all Italians from Libya in 1970> To this day, all records relating to education of former Italian residents in Libya between 1950 and 1969 are fully preserved by the Italian authorities in Rome.

2 B.M.A. Tripolitania 1945, p. 34.

3 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, P. 36.

1946 when a public examination was held for the appointment of Arab teachers. On this occasion, out of 142 candidates who sat the examination, only 12 were successful "possibly due to the high standard demanded of them", opined Steele-Greig, despite "the papers being easier than an English Common-Entrance Examination" (the entrance examination to the English public schools), he went on to conclude scornfully. (4) Thus, even at this stage, basic literacy was a rare commodity, even for entrants to the teaching profession, and in a country that had undergone Italian rule since 1911 and with Turkish rule going back much longer. No wonder indeed that the Libyans seemed so united in their determination to avoid any repetition of colonialism. Yet by 1947, Steele-Greig was able to note that "the general tone of the Arab teacher is improving, due to the increasing experience of classes, lectures and examinations which have been held". (5)

Yet it should be noted that up to this time, no no special provision had existed for the training of Arab teachers and whatever training they did undergo was extremely similar to that used in Italian times. Hence the emphasis upon control rather than skills. Only a "small proportion obtained a pass" in 1947 and the results of existing courses were declared to be "disappointing". (6) So at this stage, with the worst literacy rate in the Arab world, and desperately short of elementary teachers, the Department of Education in Tripoli's main concern was to "weed out a number who were teaching merely as a livelihood" - an extraordinary and unreal preoccupation one might surmise - and increase the number who were really interested in teaching". (7) Matters at this point were made worse with a declared shortage of funds for further educational development so that even evening classes for adult illiterates, commenced in December 1946, had to be scrapped, since provision for the payment of the necessary teachers was no longer available from the 1947 treasury estimates. (8) Again, it must be at this point emphasised, education for development was not a direct policy and the country had been exposed to several years of severe drought, causing serious food shortages which could only be alleviated from British government funds and resources. "Care and Maintenance" still applied and indeed was mandatory by International Law in Libya and as such had been more than fairly and adequately applied in the territory. That international pressures, along with events in Libya itself, were pressurising the B.M.A., albeit reluctantly, along the road to developing the territory in the direction of eventual independence is another story, but one which increasing cognisance must now be taken of. Certainly, from a technical point of view, a political and educational solution for Tripolitania should by this time have been arrived at, instead of the latter especially being relegated by International Law to a secondary issue. Unfortunately, when this moment arrived the B.M.A. had no time to prepare

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4 *Ibid.*
5 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
6 *Ibid.*
7 *Ibid.*
8 *Ibid.*

the country adequately for independence, which policy had not been originally a part of its mandate., in 1942. This fault must be laid at the feet of the Great Powers whose task it had been to asceratin the future of the country; but in the final analysis Libya fell victim to the war itself and the prolonged negotiations, based upon the stalemate of the Great Powers, which followed its outcome.

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The world, however, was changing and with it Tripolitania, so even while the B.M.A. continued to exercise its mandate there, the visit in 1947 of the War Office Working Party, signalled the need of the Administration to begin to adopt an alternative to Care and Maintenance. (9) Yet, even at this comparatively late hour, the B.M.A. could not abandon completely, if at all, Care and Maintenance. This meant that at the educational level, it became necessary to distinguish between development programmes and the ordinary running of the educational service as such. Steele-Greig cannot be blamed for insisting that the new development programmes were : Blackley's pigeon" and therefore a separate issue from running the schools. (10) His attitude, however, to Libyanisation and the general move from Care and Maintenance to Development was conditioned to a large extent by beliefs such as those expressed in his two short histories of education in Tripolitania. (11) Steele-Greig's major key was always that the future of the territory lay with the reimposition of Italian sovereignty. He had little real faith, if indeed any, in the idea of a Libya run for and by Libyans. This was completely contrary to the yearning of the indigenous population though not necessarily of the Administration which was technically neutral. Yet despite sentiments of an unsympathetic nature as far as Arab political aspirations were concerned, Steele-Greig probably did more to aid their development at this time than any other member of the Administration. In this respect, Steele-Greig was a paradoxical figure, on the one hand the architect of the post-colonial education system for Arabs, on the other hand unsympathetic to their political aims and culture. Also, divorced from the semi-collonial milieu of which Blackley was the centre, instead he was left to cutivate Italian society. This apparent divorce between Blackley and Steele-Greig meant that, even if his hour had passed as an educational influence in the territory, he would cling on for the pension and gratuities which would provide his only source of income on leaving the service. Furthermoerre, as time was to show, in both the role of advisor without portfolio and educational administrator, Steele-Greig was without parallel equipped to deal with day to day matters and virtually indispensible at this point.

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9 *Ibid.*
10 Appleton to Steele-Greig.
11 *Op. Cit.*

Given that Arab secondary education would take "several years" before "turning out students who have completed their full secondary education" it followed that the examination system, relevant to education, would be the sole vehicle of educational development for the country as a whole. Unforunately, unlike Cyrenaica, where care and Maintenance does not appear to have prevented the adoption of an effective educational policy for the territory as a whole, Tripolitania was to continue more or less in the same position as it had been in before the visit of the War Office Working Party, almost as if the visit had never occured. The only formal qualification still to be gained was a "qualifying certificate" for those teachers who did not hold a recognised diploma. (12)

As the educational system itself gradually became more firmly established at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, so an examination was devised to meet the requirements of the different levels of attainment. Unfortunately, as this was devised in and administered from Tripoli for Tripolitanians, it is impossible to make valid comparisons with the Eastern Province. Libya, by 1949, had finally become recognised as a developing country in its own right and not as an appendage of either Great Britain or Italy. Not surprisingly, the most promising students began to be sent overseas for training, so exercising a new option, that of obtaining a qualification not otherwise obtainable at home. In fact, as early as 1945, 16 teachers from Tripolitania attended a course at Dar-El-Ulum Training College in Cairo. The party was under the charge of the Superintendant of Education for Cyrenaica, and was run by well-known Egyptian educationalists. The results of the course were declared "a success both educationally and culturally" and as such mark a minor watershead as such - an event that had never occurred before. (13) As it was, however, such examples of joint participation between the two sister provinces of Treipolitania and Cyrenaica were, and still are, extremely rare. There is in fact no recorded instance of any Cyrenaican teachers visitng Tripolitania for the pupose of furthering their educational expertise up to this point.

By December 1944 "following four years of work the foundations of a sound educational system have been laid" announced the Director of Education for Cyrenaica. (14) This work included the successful adoption of the Egyption curriculum for the territory and the establishment of an examination system which corresponded to that curriculum. Steele-Greig could make no such claim for the Arab sector of education in Tripolitania, in which case the fault was either his or that of the higher authorities, who at the level of provincial admionistration had their hands tied politically and financially. Whatever the explanation the

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12 The Annual report states "only 13 per cent of Moslem teachers have recognised diplomas and 16 per cent hold the education Qualifying Certificate. The remainder have no qualification other than having passed out of the fifth year primary class and are not really fitted to teach, although in order to meet the demand for new schools, these have of necessity had to be employed . . . . .A training course was held in the summer and over 300 candidates entered for the final examination in September./ Only 16 per cent were able to obtain a pass. B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p. 32.

13 *B.M.A. Cyrenaica*, 1945, p. 6.

14 *Ibid.*

practical results for the territory were appalling and boiled down to the adoption of an esoteric home-made type curriculum or "syllabus" constructed almost entirely on the advice of Fulvio Contini, the former Italian superintendant of education, so clearly motivated by the desire and determination to restrain Arab educational ambitions within the constraints imposed by the colonial times. Such policies, as practised by both colonial and British Administrations, the Italians hoped, would lead eventually to the restoration of Italian sovereignty in the province. It has already been noted that such policies were mercifully absent from the B.M.A.'s aims in Cyrenaica where by 1946 "senior boys" in senior classes "took examinations"(15)

II. Teacher Training and Supply.

As the Italians had never trained Libyans as teachers, even for the Italo-Arab schools, the B.M.A. was not legaly required to undertake such training in Tripolitania at least. The abolition of the Italo-Arab schools, however, combined with the flight to Italy of the Italian teaching force radically changed the situation. The Arabs too had changed and were no longer so quiescent as before. They had developed a new sense of political and social awareness which required a new type of teacher for the Muslim schools.

To develop such a force was not per se an easy task, especially in view of the fact that the Arab teachers had now to conduct not only Arabic Language lessons and the Koran, which had been their principal task in the former Italo-Arab schools, but also the other subjects of the curriculum formerly exclusively taught by Italians in the government schools.(15) Therefore, Steele-Greig was not only concerned to ensure that the new teachers were equipped for their task with suitable teaching methods but also with the necessary educational background, sufficient for such an enlarged role. (16) In Cyrenaica, Major W.O. Foreman, the Director of Education under the B.M.A. there, along with his Arab Superintendant, Mr Ali Assa El-Jerbi, accomplished this difficult task because of their clear understanding and appreciation of the issues involved. Steele-Greig, on the other hand, cannot at any point, at least in the early stages when all the mistakes were made, be said to have been in possession of such insights or if he was kept them to himself or was secretly briefed by higher authorities to proceed differently. Instead, the latter preferred to to rely upon the uncertain advice of enthusiasts of the previous régime, such as the Italian school teacher and inspector of schools, Fulvio Contini, the longest serving Italian teacher in Libya, whose notions of native educational development in the former colony were extremely restrictive, preventing in a differnet climate of opinion the adoption of new ideas and methods, such as the B.M.A. had espoused in Cyrenaica.

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15 *B.M.A. Tripolitania 1943*, p. 65.
15 *Ibid.*
16 *Ibid.*

The almost total absence of disinterested objectivity, idealism and even professional competence, hung like a black cloud over the whole issue of teacher preparation under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania at this delicate point in the history of the territory. Until the arrival of the British in Libya education, and in particular the training of teachers had been viewd as a political rather than as a purely educational matter. This required, according to the essential Italian premise, the distancing and separation of Tripolitania from any form of Egyptian influence. Egyptian teachers were in particular regarded as anathema, as was the sending of Libyans to be educated in Egypt, except under the strictest supervision. Similarly, the importation of Egyptian ideas at the educational or political level was carefully censored and restricted. (17) This was the basis upon which Steele-Greig in 1943 set about interpreting his role in Tripolitania and constructing an educational system that would make sense of the post-colonial era.

III. Teacher Training.

As the recruitment of Egyptian teachers to work in the B.M.A.'s schools or even operate as teacher trainers appears to have been virtually taboo, experienced teacher manpower had to be attained from other sources. The most obvious place to obtain teachers was either Palestine, then like Libya under a British Mandate, or that other British Protectorate, the Sudan, where Travers Blackley, as a former "Sudan Hand" had links. In this instance, however, two Palestinian inspectors were given a temporary contract to work in Tripoli for six weeks during the summer of 1943 and "lectured for six hours a day to as many teachers as could attend." (18)

The main aim of this and other summer-courses was both educational and pedagogical. Intending teachers, as well as those who were already engaged in the schools, as well as the interested public, were instructed in basic subjects of the curriculum, such as Geography, History, Arithmetic, Physical Hygiene, English Language and Teaching Methods. Such novices were then declared "capable of teaching, although their standard is low" and "the majority leave a lot to be desired." (19) Similarly, the women teachers in the girls' schools were somewhat unflatteringly described as a "poor lot" though Steele-Greig expressed the hope that "a capable inspectress" would improve matters." (20)

The method whereby a "summer course" would be held to "raise standards" appears again to have been employed in 1944 though on this occasion for the preparation and training for candidates for the girls' schools. (21) During 1945, evening classes were also planned and

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17 *Italian Educational Policy Towards Moslems in Libya 1911 - 1922. Op. Cit.*, pp. 130 -158.
18 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943, p. 65.
19 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943, p. 66.
20 *Ibid.*
221 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.

subsequently held for the training of teachers with the particular aim of laying "greater emphasis upon pedagaogy, athletics and general knowledge." (22)

It was during 1944 that 16 teachers were sent to Egypt for a short course in "school management and educational psychology." (23) Yet, as in previous years, the main aim was the training of teachers via the annual summer course. In the summer of 1945, the course was followed in September by an examination for those Arab teachers then employed in the schools, though it was also declared to be open to the general public or more specifically those aspiring to teacher status with the requisite modicum of formal education. (24)

Overall, as a result of these efforts, the standard was described as being "quite high" for the circumstances as only 36 out of the original 120 candidates were successful. Only the successful ones were then allowed to receive certificates and in exceptional cases book-prizes. (25)

The method whereby the "summer course" or "evening course" became the principal means for the preparation and training of teachers, whether male or female, continued on year after year as the B.M.A. itself continued to operate long after its real sell-by date had long expired. In this way, "keen applicants" also continued to come up against an apparently insupperable obstacle course leading inevitably to failure for most of them. Perhaps this was unavoidable because the basic standard was so low; nonetheless, the Chief Administrator should have enquired why the failure rate was so high.

Thus out of 142 candidates for the September Teachers' Examination, only 42 were declared successful, despite the desparate need for more teachers in the schools. (26) Producing teachers of the required standard for a burgeoning school population was to become an uphill struggle and was clearly beyond the capacity of the B.M.A. at this time. Official sources admit this the following year when it was admitted for the first time that although the "general tone of the Arab teachers was improving", the examination results were "disappointing and only a small percentage had obtained a pass." (27) By this time, however, the authorities had got the message (28) but dropping the pilot by demoting Steele-Greig to Grade II could hardly be expected to help matters very much at this stage as in fact transpired. (29) Therefore the first officially designated teacher training class was opened in November 1948. (30) As the Annual Report for the year stated, it had been "urgently needed, even since 1943," and was to consist of "36 selected candidates." It was anticipated that "in two or three

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22 *Ibid.*
23 *Ibid.*
24 *Ibid.*
25 *Ibid.*
26 *Ibid.*
27 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
28 Steele-Greig/Appleton, Barbados, 6 Aug. 1982.
29 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48.
30 *Ibid.*

years these will be able to take over in the primary sector and greatly improve the standard of these schools in the territory." (31)

"Lack of finance" is given as the main reason why this "important side of education" has been slow to emerge. (32) Yet, This was only half the story, since it was not until 1948 that the neglect of the early years was rectified by the adoption of measures that had proved successful from the commencement of the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica. From 1948, however, the recruitment of Egyptian teachers was allowed to proceed upon a very limited basis, an issue that nor surprisingly was quick to attract the attention of the Egyptian Government, which was concerned to establsih its influence in this important field. (33)

No teacher training centre had by 1948 as yet been established, though in this year it was announced that the territory would go on to the Egyptian system. (34) This decision was of political rather than immediately practical nature. (35) Hence, the teacher-training classes were to continue on as before until as late as 1951, after which candidates had to be secondary-school graduates first. (36)

The transition from one system to another is never easy; but the B.M.A.'s failure to adapt the Egyptian system in 1943 occasioned much confusion and delay even when that system was finally adopted in 1948, though it did not becaome a practical reality until much later. In 1950, the fear of Egyptian interference in the running of the new state led Palestinians, who would most probably have been educated under that other British Military Administration in Palestine itself, neing offered contracts to staff the two Teacher Training Colleges set up in that year. (37) (These opened their doors in November for men and in January of 1951 for women.) (38) By this time, independence had finally dawned though the schools were as woefully short of trained teachers as ever, a situation that would certainly have been less dire, if the right policies had been adopted at the outset. The frequently made excuse of "lack of funds" as has been shown was not altogether accurate. (39)

The same cause, "lack of funds", also appears to have applied in Cyrenaica but there it does not seem to have had the same drastic effect upon educational progress as in Tripolitania. Thus, in 1945, 35 out of 45 applicants passed the Teachers' Examination, whereas only 36 out of 45 applicants passed in the more populous Tripolitania an examination bearing the same name but entirely different in content. (40) This is apparent when we consider that by 1946,

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31 *Ibid.*
32 *Ibid.*
33 *Ibid.*
34 *Ibid.*
35 *Ibid.*
36 *Ibid.*
37 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 34.
38 *Ibid.*
39 *Ibid.*
40 *Op. Cit.*, p. 35.

two centres for training teachers, one in Bengasi and another in Derna were set up with another in the pipeline for El-Abiar. Moreover, in 1947 an Advanced Teacher Training summer course was organised by Egyptian teachers in Benghazi. (41) 1948 saw a Teachers' Centre for men opened in the El-Amir School in Benghasi City, which was later transferred to the spacious El-Amira School, where it was to concentrate upon the training of Elementary Teachers only. A centre for training women treachers followed in the next year, 1949, again at Bengasi in the El-Beski School. (42) In addition to what could be trained locally, Cyrenaica differed from Tripolitania in the import of Egyptian teachers, considered anathema in the latter province. Precise figures are not always available but 50 teachers a year were being imported from Egypt into Cyrenaica, so that by 1948 the B.M.A. had successfully completed its task there, with the result that when independence was finally declared in 1949, education in the province was entirely in Libyan hands.

IV. Teacher Supply.

Teacher supply, it could be said, did not comprise any problem under the Italian régime, since the colonial authorities after 1911, limited the educational role of Arabs in the schools to that of teaching the Arabic Language and the Koran. With hindsight this could be regarded as an extraordinary political blunder on their part since it presented to those most opposed to their cause an apparently open field for ideological and political conquest. Before 1922 a wider role had been envisaged for the Arab teacher but Rome repeatedly explained failure to develop the Arab sector upon lack of suitably trained native teachers. After the demise of the Italian colonial régime in 1943, the supply of teachers again became a problem, since once again there were no Arabs qualified to teach apart from the Koran and Arabic itself. At this point, Steele-Greig deserves qualified praise for creating a system of education in Tripolitania that was not shunned by the local population as the Italo-Arab schools had been in part shunned. This is not, however, to attribute the popularity of education in the province at this time to Steele-Greig himself since it was not created as such by the Administration itself. So much so that the demand for education created by the fall of the Italian régime - and it had never existed as such under that régime - created demands it was impossible for the B.M.A. apparently to satisfy or at least Steele-Greig himself thought so. Like the colonial régime before it, the B.M.A. ultimately failed because it was unable or unwilling to create a sufficient supply of teachers to cope with the problem even when not looked on as an absolute. The inability to produce enough elementary school teachers to satisfy quite limited goals was in some respects unavoidable given the expectations that emerged amongst the Arab population after 1942. Libya in this respect had suddenly developed an appetite for education, long no doubt

41 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1947, p. 10.
42 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p. 8.

dormant, that placed Libya in a similar situation to other countries of the Arab World and Africa, where indpendence had either been achieved or was on the not too distant horizon. It was therefore a matter of degree since there was no way a transient body such as the B.M.A. in LIbya could satisfy the demand for education then being manifested there. Our question is whether it could have done more with the limited resources at its disposal than it did? Whether it adopted the right measures and policies to suit the circumstances before it? The argument here in the critical sense is that whereas in Cyrenaica the B.M.A. passed with honours the same is not true in Tripolitania where the case for the B.M.A., despite many other achievements, such as a peaceful and orderly transition to independence, is much less plausible in education, where mistakes occurred and the end-product was not as good as it might have been if different policies and measures had ben applied.

In 1943, the first educational year under the B.M.A., "education was practically non-existant." (43) In this first year, 151 Arab teachers were appointed including 15 women. (44) though by the end of the year this figure had dropped to 146. (45) Another 146 Arab teachers were however still needed to staff the schools. (46) This figure was achieved in 1944 when the number of Arab teachers in the schools rose from 146 to 271 (47) being as such described in the Annual Report as "a very mediocre stock". (48) Two years were then to follow during which the number of Arab teachers in the schools remained virtually static while pressure on the schools to increase their rolls increased dramatically. Thus 1945 saw the number of Arab teachers employed in the B.M.A. schools actually fall to 265 (49) on account of "financial limitations imposed by the War Office which narrowly circumscribed the educational programme." (50) Consequently, the proposed expenditure on the expansion of the teaching staff was "drastically cut to Lst. 11.000". The financial situation in fact was so bad that Steele-Greig could hardly afford to pay the provisional teachers taken on for the adult illiteracy classes designed for the summer vacation. (51) Moreover, he was obliged to reduce the existing staff (52); and no contracts to foreign Arabs were issued in that year.

1946 was the year when the Chief Administrator, Brigadier Travers Blackley, intervened in the running of the Education Department to Steele-Greig's chagrin, appointing a Sudanese Arab as a superintendant. (53) The teacher supply problem was however slightly alleviated

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43 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943, p. 64.
44 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
45 *Ibid.*
46 *Ibid.*
47 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 77.
48 *Ibid.*
49 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p. 34.
50 *Ibid.*
51 *Ibid.*
52 *Ibid.*
53 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p. 34.

with the number of teachers employed in the school rising from 265 - 310. (54) 1947 saw numbers increase by 70 to a total of 334 (55) ; but this was still nowhere near the numbers required if the pupil ratio was to be reduced below 50, (56) a figure not achieved in many developing countries even today. Meanwhile the inability of the B.M.A. to provide funds for the patment of teachers scheduled to work on the Adult Illiteracy Programme meant pupils themselves had to pay and not surprisingly, in the words of Steele-Greig, the courses "fizzled out".

By the commencement of the 1948 school year, the B.M.A. had been running the schools for 5 years and in this year finally opted for the Egyptian system. This was a decision not without financial implications as new funds needed to be drawn upon for the financing of such a development. The previous two years had not been without defficulty for the Administration on account of the great drought that had ravaged the territory, a factor which must be taken account of in explaining how the lack of new monies for education occurred. Instead, money was channelled into relieving the famine caused by the lack of adequate rain in what were always harsh climatic conditions.

Progress in education, however, was again resumed in 1948 with the number of teachers rising from 335 to 519. (57) In 1949, education in Tripolitania seemed at last to be turning a corner as the number of teachers rose to 609 from 519. (58) Unfortunately, many of these new entrants to teaching in the province were untrained but, employed of necessity to meet the demand placed upon the schools, which popular demand, now expressed as political pressure, began to insist be opened wherever there was a need. (59) Where an educated cadre of teachers wasrequired, as in the secondary schools, non-Libyans were employed. (60) The final year of the B.M.A. saw the number of teachers rise to 698, an increase of 547 teachers from the first year of the British Military Administration in 1943. (61)

Unfortunately, despite this considerable improvement in the overall question of teacher supply, the shortage of teachers was still a key problem and a "major obstacle to progress." (62) This is apparent from the Annual Reports which show that even in 1948(63) there were not enough qualified teachers of Libyan nationality for the classes then in existence". Moreover, as independence drew closer, a new phenomenon not unusual to developing countries began to manifest itself, as more and more Libyans trained as teachers were drawn

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54 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
55 *Ibid.*
56 *Ibid.*
57 See, *infra.*, p. 326.
58 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1949, p. 75.
59 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
60 *Ibid.*
61 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 87.
62 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
63 *Ibid.*

away from teaching to more lucrative and promising employment. (64) By this time, however, the penny had finally dropped and the Administration began to inaugurate policies which relied increasingly upon the employment of foreign teachers, yet another phenomenon not uncommon to richer developing countries. This Libya certainly was not at this stage of her economic history and the recruitment of such teachers was not always successful as the cost of living in the country was high and the shortage of housing discouraged many from applying. (65) In such a climate independence was finally declared and the B.M.A. replaced by an indigenous régime.

V. Administration.

The administration of the Arab schools in effect involved two periods, 1943 - 1946, during which time it seemed more likely that Libya - or at the very least Tripolitania - might revert to Italian sovereignty; and 1946 - 1951 when independence became increasingly the assumed fact, governing political and administrative practice in the territory as a whole. The administrative policies, measures and personnel of the Department of Education in particular, during both periods, to a large extent reflect the assumptions more or less prevalent. Between 1943 - 1946 the position was virtually the same as between 1922 - 1940 with the Education Department being responsible for administering Arab, Italian and Jewish schools in the territory. The personnel were exclusively Italian nationals apart from Steele-Greig himself who was of course British. As Director of Educational Services Tripolitania, Steele-Greig was assisted by Captain E.T. Hall, (66) who was also British, though with no previous experience of education. In 1944, the Arab Inspector appointed by the previous colonial régime was reappointed to his former post on the recommendation of Cav. Fulvio Contini, the former Director of Education for Cyrenaica and the longest serving Italian teacher in Libya. Not surprisingly, Steele-Greig pronounced him to have "proved satisfactory" in the report of that year. (67) Two other promotions to the rank of inspector followed of teachers serving in the B.M.A.'s schools, one as Inspector of Schools in the Western and Central Provinces, and another as Inspector of Schools in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The nationality of the men is not stated, unlike in the Eastern Province, educational personnel go unlisted, though they would most probably have been of long-serving teachers, in which case they would have been Libyan Arabs formerly employed in the Italo-Arab Schools. (68)

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64 *Ibid.*

65 *Ibid.*

66 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 46. There was virtually no change in administrative personnel until Captain Hall was replaced at Tripoli by Cpt. N.F. Pengelly in 1948 and A.J. Steele-Greig by Cuthbert Scott, though Steele-Greig remained on as Deputy until 1951. See *Annuario Delle Scuole Italiane*, Tripoli, Anno 1948, p. 13.

67 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.

68 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 51.

As far however as the general working of the education office was concerned, the most important individual, apart from Major A.J. Steele-Greig himself, was undoubtedly the former Director of Education in Cyrenaica and already referred to as Cav. Fulvio Contini, bearer of a special gold medal bestowed by the Duce for distinguished service in the colonies. As Inspector of Education for Italian schools in Tripolitania, the former now having ceased to exist with the complete evacuation of all Italian nationals from Cyrenaica, Fulvio Contini was Steele-Greig's friend, confidant and right hand man. Even in the official report, Contini was described as "a very competent man" whose "advice and cooperation have been most valuable in the establishment and running of the Italian schools. (69)

Fulvio Contini, however, was not only important in the running of the Italian schools; but was the key figure in determining the policy and management of the Arab schools at the vital early formative stage. With Steele-Greig he remained on at the Education Office until the period of transition to Libyan rule when he was somewhat summarily replaced by the Italian Government with another of their nominees. (70)

In this first year of the B.M.A. a number of "experiments" were tried out at the administrative level. An English woman was appointed to inspect the girls' school and four sub-inspectors were appointed for the Arab boys' schools. Steele-Greig, however, was clearly not going very far in the field of administrative experiments. Not only was Contini his one and only advisor on Arab affairs, which could only mean the continuance of pre-B.M.A. policies in an area that required quite radical alternatives, but no Arabs were given posts of administrative responsibility as such on the grounds that they had not exercised such responsibility in Italian times. (71) This method of proceeding was completely different from that of Steele-Greig's opposite number in Cyrenaica, Major W.O. Foreman, who had gone all out for Arabisation at the start of the new régime there. This was a policy not available in its entirety in Tripolitania on account of the still considerable Italian and Jewish minorities still there, though a version of it could have been adopted for the Arab majority to their incalculable benefit. (72) Whether this omission can be put down to sheer caution on the part of the Authorities or because they considered such measures as in contravention of their mandate is debatable. Certainly, it did not seem as such to the Arabs who were quick to detect anything smacking of bias or as favouring the Italian minority and national interest. Not surprisingly, relations between the Administrative section of the Education Department and the Arab teachers whether Libyan or foreign soon began to deteriorate. Steele-Greig was repeatedly to bemoan the fact that it was the Arab teachers who were increasingly turning the schools into a forum of political debate and even having recourse to strike action as well. Unfortunately, the D. of E.

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69 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.
70 See, Steele-Greig to Appleton, Conversation, Barbados, 1981-2.
71 *Op. Cit.*, p. 35.
72 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, pp. 8 and 54.

did not recognise in this manifestation of apparent political dissatisfaction any criticism of his policies with the result that he became more cautious than ever, refusing either to promote Arabs or see anything good in their cause. Blackley seeing the danger inherent in such a situation and anxious to reduce the danger of open confrontation used every expedient to render the Education Department more responsive to Arab desires and aspirations.

The first evidence of this commences as early as 1945 when a policy of decentralisation was introduced, whereby Arab inspectors were given greater authority in their domain. (73) Decentralisation also implied local residence for the new inspectors - contact being maintained with Tripoli through monthly meetings and occasional "tea parties" which Steele-Greig notes had "good results". (74) Such measures, however, were not sufficient to prevent the first teachers' strike in the history of the territory. This was "in sympathy with the provisional teachers whose holiday pay could not at once be approved", an incident with which Steele-Greig "dealt firmly" managing to leave "no ill feeling." (75)

Such apparently sanguine comments leave perhaps a doubt in the mind, as this was to be the first of a series of such "strikes" involving the Administration with Arab teachers. Also, the relationship, never good, between Steele-Greig and Blackley was taking a turn for the worse. This tended increasinly to be expressed as the D. of E. and Signor Contini with the pro-Italian lobby favouring the cautious policies pursued until then, against the "old buddy net" pressing for the employment of more Sudanese and even the odd Egyptian teacher. (76)

Blackley, however, though concerned to clip the D. of E.'s wings must have realised that he could not at this stage do without him completely and was therefore anxious not to rock the boat too much by pressing for changes of which Steele-Greig disapproved. Improving the image of the B.M.A. with the Arab population by adopting a more populist line in education would more likely have been Blackley's position at this point. This is apparent from developments during 1946 when various staff changes were engineered in the Department of Education described as having "proved beneficial to education generally". (77)

Most important of these changes involved the appointment of a Sudanese Superintendant of Education for the Arab Schools, who was also to act as director of the new Arab Secondary School.(78) Such changes as these were fiercely resisted by Steele-Greig backed by Contini who saw them as underminig their authority with the Arab teachers and introducing a different element into the situation which was completely contrary to policies which had been pursued until then. It was a case of Blackley acting against their advice and without their endorsement; but clearly it meant that the writing was on the wall for Steele-Greig if he persisted in opposing

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73 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p. 14.
74 *Ibid.*
75 *Ibid.*
76 Steele-Greig to Appleton, Op. Cit., Conversations, 1981-2.
77 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1946, p. 33.
78 *Ibid.*

such measures. On the other hand, one should perhaps distinguish between Arabisation of the educational services which Steele-Greig did not oppose in principle and fear of being taken over by elements from the former Sudanese Colonias! Service - "the old buddies" as he called them.

Again, we are looking at the old problem of the recruitment of foreign teachers and in this respect until 1946 the B.M.A. had clearly endorsed the Steele-Greig-Contini approach to the subject which must have reflected political policy at a high level. This clearly wanted to see Italian sovereignty reimposed upon Tripolitania and therefore favoured the strict application of International Law as regards Education. There was however another emergent attitude to the issue which favoured a more open and flexible approach to the problem. The latter would gain in strength at the expense of the former from 1946 onwards but both faced the same problem from where to recruit Arab teachers?

It is interesting to note at this point that the jolt to the running of the Education Department administered in 1946 by Blackley's appointment of the Sudanese Superintendant may reflect desire for a more flexible approach to the subject of teacher employment than events on the world political scene where the issue of Libyan independence was then dead-locked. (79) Educational issues were important in Libya itself and were not necessarily sounding boards for events on the wider stage of international politics. At this level, therefore, the B.M.A. continued to show interest in educational developments within the territory during 1947, when not only was an Inspector of Koranic Schools appointed, but in June of the same year an Arab committee was specially delegated, as "Advisory Board to the Controller of Education". (80) This committee consisted of a number of prominent citizens and leaders of the political parties. (81) As such it was perhaps unique in the history of the territory as no such body had existed in either Turkish or Italian times.

The Arab Committee, however, should be seen for what it was primarily intended to achieve, which was the improvement of relations between the Administration and the emerging political and social foci within the territory. This was all the more important at this moment when the polotical situation inside Libya was particularly tense, as the opportunity of obtaining a political settlement in favour of Libyan national aspirations seemed to be fading. This was a situation the Administration was powerless to affect in any decisive way but was faced with having to hold the ring until it was finally sorted out by the Powers concerned. The much publicised meetings of the Arab Consultative Committee was one of the few ways of keeping the parties talking on a subject close to their hearts, namely the educational development of the country. As such, the meetings were called at the behest of either the Department of Education

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79 See, *supra*, pp. 22 - 48.
80 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
81 *Ibid.*

in Tripoli or the Board of Arab Education. (82) In this way a much needed forum of discussion enabled frustrations to be vented and ideas of possible practical import to be discussed. "All branches of Arab Education", wrote Steele-Greig, "were openly discussed". (83) Lacking, however, any executive power meant that few of the Board's recommendations were ever followed up or even recorded. Yet there can be no doubt that the meetings were the first of their kind in the territory, attracting serious attention , with discussions that were often "very heated". (84) In this way, they served the purpose intended for them, by enabling the participants to feel that they were playing a part in developing the educational service, towards providing equal opportunities for Arabs, something consistently denied them in the past, but still some way ahead in practical terms. It also served to save the Administration's face at a time when it had no magic solutions or panaceas on offer. (85)

Other measures aimed at increasing the degree of Arab participation in the educational administration of the territory were also introduced at the time. Frequent meetings of inspectors and headmasters were held partly in an attempt to improve the general climate of opinion in favour of the Administration. (86) This policy continued into 1948, it only becoming clear in the summer, which way the political future of the territory would develop. The departure of the Sudanese Superintendant on leave and the refusal of the Egyptian Authorities to allow him to re-enter Tripolitania, (87) enabled Steele-Greig to replace him with his own nominee. This was a Pastinaian Inspector of many years' experience, described by Steele-Greig, in his usual way for those of whom he approved as a "capable man", whose task would be to supervise Arab education as well as being headmaster of the Arab Secondary School in Tripolitania. (88)

The appointment of the Palestinian Inspector was Steele-Greig's final coup, Blackley communicating to him while on leave, his dcision to "sack" him, later commuted to a demotion to Education Officer, Grade II, having replaced him with a new man. (89) It is interesting to speculate on the possible implications for general changes of the Administration's orientation and policy inherent in Steele-Greig's removal from the sensitive position of Director of Education, coinciding as it did with the dashing of hopes for the restoration of italian sovereignty in Tripolitania. (90) Unfortunately for the Administration, Blackley's "new man" in the shape of the Arabphile former "Sudan hand", G.C. Scott, did not arrive when wanted and expected, postponing his departure from England for more than a year. Steele-Greig,

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82 *Ibid.*
83 *Ibid.*
84 *Ibid.*
85 *Ibid.*
86 *Ibid.*
87 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48.
88 *Ibid.*
89 Steele-Greig to Appleton: Conversations.
90 See, *supra*, re failure of Bevin-Sforza initiative, pp. 26-48.

therefore, continued to run the Education Department as before though presumably with even less disposition for change than before. Maybe because of this, few if any changes could now be expected to take place, despite the surrounding atmosphere, politically and socially having changed considerably towards the Arab side. As before, the Arab Advisory Committee continued to meet in 1948 on a monthly basis, offering advice still either accepted or rejected by Steele-Greig who basically had as little or less sympathy with their essential aims and objectives than before his demotion. (91)

The final two years of the B.M.A. saw few changes of a fundamental kind to the system established in the first year of british occupation which still reflected many problems of a long-term nature going back to Italian times and before and not therefore susceptible to instant solutions. So, although the period saw the appointment of two new directors in the educational field and finally a Libyan Minister of Education, few initiatives were attempted. The belated arrival of G.C. Scott, as Director, Grade I, ostensibly to replace Steele-Greig and after a mere year of his tenureship of Steele-Greig's former position, C.E. Leigh - "Sheikh Leigh" from the Sudan - had virtually no practical effect on the educational situation. Their aim was primarily to improve Anglo-Arab relations, as they were both fluent speakers of Arabic. Otherwise, the old problems continued as before, the sheer vastness of the country defying the puny efforts and miniscule resources of the Administration, now on its last legs, to extend modern educational facilities into remote areas.

Consolidation of what had already been achieved was clearly required to prevent earlier initiatives from dissolving into nothingness, due to lack of resources. Thus, the three recently-appointed provincial inspectors found themselves "unable to carry out their dutires through lack of transport" to out-of-the-way schools. (92) To try to bring these areas into line, new sub-inspectors were appointed at the commencement of the school year in October 1949 for each administrative district. (93) Each sub-inspector was responsible to the provincial inspector while also being expected to work closely with the District Commissioners. (94) The inevitable consequences of these "experiments" was that they tended to fall foul of "political extremists". This was the term used by the Department of Education to describe those Libyans who wished for a discussion of political matters which the Administration regarded as the sole preserve of the British Government in London. (95) Despite such fears on the part of the Administration, 3 teachers were selected in 1949 to take a two-year course in the College of Education in Cairo and 6 other students were sent abroad on special courses. Relations between the Department of Education and Arab teachers still continued to be tense

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91 *Op. Cit.*, p. 48.
92 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 31 - 32.
93 *Ibid.*
94 *Ibid.*
95 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 33.

and another strike by teachers took place in May. (96) The latter can best be understood within the context of the times and were undoubtedly part politically inspired, as a means of pressurising the Administration., and also aprt economically motivated due to poor pay and conditions. At least the Administration continued its positive upgrading of Libyans to more senior status in the education service. October 1950 saw the upgrading of about 80 Libyans to the rank of inspector, headmaster or secondary school teacher as part of a final drive before independence, to "improve the terms of service for teachers in Tripolitania". (97)

VI. Kuttabs.

As in Italian times, information on the Koranic Schools was extremely scant under the B.M.A., not because there was anything secretive about the nature or running of these schools, but mainly on account of their essential nature, as the means whereby the Mosques taught the holy book to the children of the prophet. This was an area which the British, like the Italians before them, wisely left ot the religious authorities, not seeking to interfere. As a consequence of such a policy, statistics wre not collected on these schools, since there was no need to refer to them in the Annual Reports, though this policy was changed in 1948 - 1959 when for reasons that are not clear the following figures were provided for the Koranic schools:

Year	!	Pupils	!	Teachers
	!		!	
1943/4	!	14897	!	358
1944/5	!	15101	!	385
1945/6	!	14986	!	358
1946/7	!	15468	!	358
1947/8	!	15532	!	358
1948/9	!	14861	!	358
1949.50	!	14398		500 *
1950/51.	!	13983	!	503 **

* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p. 76.
** B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 87.(98)

96 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
97 *Ibid.*
98 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, Appendix "H"

Generally speaking, however, the Koranic schools were regarded by the Administration as "private schools"and as such were classed with other schools of a similar nature, namely the Jewish and Greek schools. These were traditional religious schools and quite different from the Italian religious schools under the control of the Vatican which had been a feature of educational life in Tripoli, especially since Ottoman times, and would still be well represented in Tripoli on until the Revolution when they ceased to exist. As such, the latter taught the Catholic Catechism alongside the ordinary syllabus during elementary education. Under the B.M.A. all Italian schools were reagreded as government schools regardless of whether they were Catholic or not.

The B.M.A.'s policy towards the Koranic schools hardly differed from that of Fascist times, that is after 1922, whereby these schools were left to their own devices apart from being subjected to the occasional government inspection. (99) Such a policy was also followed in Arab countries generally, though the Koran was and still is often taught in the elementary schools as part of the general curriculum, the policy followed by the Italians in Libya before 1941 in the Italo-Arab schools. (100)

VII. Conclusion: Elementary Education in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica The Case for Comparison.

Any attempt to compare educational developments in tripolitania under the B.M.A. with similar developments under the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica requires somce form of initial qualification, since while there were undoubted similarities, and therefore possible policy options, there were also many dissimilarities between the two coastal provinces. Geographically and historically, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been bound together, however loosely, by ties of blood, language and religion, despite strong particularism which would continue into modern times. Under the Libyans, especially after 1922, the attempt had been made to treat Libya as a single political entity. This was so at the educational level as at other levels with similar policies being pursued in both provinces. (101) At the onset of the B.M.A., however, virtually all vestiges of Italian colonisation had been wiped out in Cyrenaica so that there remained "the ghost of the country that had cost Italy so much money, blood and moral reputation to convert into a progressive Italian colony". Not only was the former colony materially devastated by the disabling effects of the war, but "all Italian officials and all but an unwilling band of Italian nationals had been withdrawn when the battle of El-Alamein was lost." (102) Moreover, at the political level, Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden's celebrated

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99 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 47.

100 See, Appleton, Op. Cit., Chpt. 3. Direct Rule and the Libyan Schools 1911 - 1919. Italian Policy and the Koranic Schools, pp. 69 - 74.

101 *Ibid.*, Chpt. 10, P. 309.

102 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 3.

pronouncement to the British House of Commons in January 1942 that "His Majesty's Government are determined that the Senussi of Cyrenaica will not again be subjected to Italian domination" had a marked effect upon the relative attitudes of the B.M.A., the people of Cyrenaica and their leaders, and the world in general. (103) Tripolitania on the other hand, as has already been shown (104) was blessed and cursed in this respect, having a territory virtually untouched by war, but from the Arab point of view, still almost as Italian as it had been under the former colonial régime. Moreover, Eden would not make a similar statement on the future of Tripolitania, as he had made on Cyrenaica, to the intense chagrin of its inhabitants, so leaving their future considerably in doubt.

Moreover, at the educational level, the situation in the provinces reflected this disparity of political feeling over the question of the possible reimposition of Italian rule. Whereas Cyrenaica was prepared positively for independence from the start of British rule, Tripolitania became a vacuum of frustrated expectations and desires. Whereas in Cyrenaica, the Egyptian system was adopted in 1948, in Tripolitania no system was taken up, with the effect that no clearly indentifiable standard was obtainable at any educational level. This is to be compared with Cyrenaica where the school year started on 1st October 1944 with the adoption of the school system and curriculum of the Egyptian Government Primary Schools. (105) This was a properly geared six-year course after which pupils might take an examination equivalent to the Egyptian Primary Certificate. Passing this examination entitled them to entry into the Egyptian Government Secondary Schools, Schools of Agriculture and Trade Schools. It can at once be seen that although it would take some time before Libyan equivalents could be developed, there was a tremendous advantage to be gained in modelling educational progress upon that achieved in a developed neighbouring Arab state.

Outside Bengasi, Derna and Tobruk remained 20 other schools which were really village schools, offering a four year elementary course designed to cater for "rural needs". (106) So successful was the adoption of the Egyptian system in Cyrenaica that it continued on well after the unification of the country in 1950 though indeed as early as 1940 a "sound educational service" could be said to have been founded. (107) Furthermore, the problem Steele-Greig encountered in obtaining suitable text-books for the Tripolitian Arabs did not arise in Cyrenaica as these were easily obtainable in Eygpt. Only after 1948 did the B.M.A. start to experience problems in obtaining books from Egypt, "the best and most convenient source of supply of suitable books in Arabic" and this was due to "long delays in getting export permits from the Egyptian Government".(108) It may seem gratuitous at this point to argue that if Steele-Greig

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103 *Ibid.*
104 See, *supra*, Chpt. Two, p. 27.
105 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 3.
106 *Ibid.*
107 *Ibid.*
108 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p. 8.

or the B.M.A. had availed itself of books.from Egypt at the start in 1943 the possibility that the supply at some later date might have been cut off by the action of a hostile foreign government need not have presented a practical problem since the B.M.A. in Tripolitania had at its disposal excellent printing facilities in the form of the Pliny-Maggi Press at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli. (109)

When comparing the number of schools relative to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, reference must be made to population totals for the two sister provinces. In this respect, whereas Tripolitania had a population of 690,377 Moslems in 1944, to rise in 1950 to 711,960 Moslems (110) ; the population of Cyrenaica in 1944 was 254,004 which by 1950 had dropped to 72,496 due to administrative reorganiation. (111) Relative areas for the two provinces saw 106,471 square miles for Tripolitania in 1944 which was unchanged in 1950 at 106,471 square miles. (112) with 254,004 square miles for Cyrenaica in 1944 which had altered to 72,496 square miles in 1947. (113) These statistics are reflected in the educational distribution of schools, teachers and pupils for the two provinces. Hence the numerically superior Tripolitania in 1944 had 79 schools, 271 teachers and 7,988 pupils,which figures by 1949 had risen to 127 schools, 632 teachers and 19,557 pupils. (114) Meanwhile in Cyrenaica in 1944, there were 28 schools, 59 teachers and 3,257 pupils to rise to 127 schools, 632 teachers and 19,557 pupils by 1949. (115) These figures, as can be seen, reveal only marginal difference between the two territories, given that in both the aim was a pupil-teacher ratio of 50 pupils in the elementary sector. This relatively high figure for a developing country was subject to rapid population growth, shortages of every kind, most of all in the field of teaching personnel.

The adoption of the Egyptian System, complete with syllabuses, textbooks and examinations, by the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica meant unavoidably, reliance upon Egyptian expertise and teachers to manage, direct and run it..This does not appear to have been accompanied as in Tripolitania by manifest fears that such a step would reap a harvest of political interference from the same source. In Tripolitania, on the other hand, the situation offered little from Italian times and the same prejudices existed against the employement of Egyptians. The political fears over Egypt continued in Tripolitania yet, despite the absence of Egyptians in the territory, the disturbances ovber the future of the country inevitably left their mark on the schools. This was not so in Cyrenaica, where only the positive effect of employing Egyptians was apparent.

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109 See, B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p. 8
110 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 53 and *ditto*, 1950, p. 80.
111 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 31 and *ditto*, 1947, p. 41.
112 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944 & 1950, pp. 53 & 86 respectively.
113 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944 & 1947, pp. 31 & 41 respectively.
114 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, and 1949, pp. 77 & 30 respectively.
115 Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1944, p.8.

Gradually, links were extended with Egypt in Cyrenaica and graduates initially from the primary schools were sent for training at the Dar El-Ulum Training School in Cairo. This resulted in the First group of Cyrenaican headteachers being ready for employment in the schools as early as 1944, more than 5 years ahead of any similar development in Tripolitania. (116) To speed up the pace further, two Egyptian certified teachers were employed in November 1945 to train Cyrenaicans as elementary school teachers in the territory itself. (117) The dependence upon Egypt was extended in 1954 when both Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian teachers attended courses given by Egyptian educational experts at Cairo. (118) Moreover, three mistresses were employed from Egypt for the Libyan girls' schools at Bengasi, Berka and Barce. (119)

During 1946, the shortage of qualified Libyans for the schools was having a deleterious effect upon the expansion of the elementary schools in Cyrenaica , as in Tripolitania, with the result that plans were laid to employ more Egyptians in the schools. (120) These were put into action in 1947 with the employment of 17 more Egyptians in the schools of Cyrenaica. In 1948, despite problems with the Egyptian government over the supply of school books and equipment, 42 male and 10 female teachers were imported from Egypt which, states the Annual Report, "did much to ease the situation and will continue to be an indispensable measure until such time as the territory is in a position to train a sufficient number of its own teachers. (121)

So, already ahead of Tripolitania in many aspects of the development of a modern educational service by 1948, Cyrenaica was to move yet further ahead with the setting up in this year of a training centre for male teachers at Bengasi. (122) This was an event not equalled in Tripolitania until the dawn of independence. (123) and even then was without the backing of the Egyptian educational infrastructure; and years of solid development, such as had already occurred in the neighbouring coastal province. From the start, the Bengasi Training Centre was a success with "one class of 15 pupils" and a programme designed to provide "a 2-year course of training". Arrangements were also complete for the opening of a female tachers' training centre at the El-Berka school in Bengasi City from january to train elementary teachers for the girls' schools. Before opening in 1949, it had already enrolled by January of that year 5 trainees and a second class for 15 girls who were already teachers and needed more advanced instruction was also on the agenda for later in the same year. (124)

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116 Annual Report Tripolitania, 45, p.
117 *Ibid.*
118 Op. Cit., P.
119 *Ibid.*
120 B.M.A. Cyrrenaica, 1947, p. 11.
121 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p. 8.
122 *Ibid.*
123 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 35.
124 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, p. 30.

Thus by 1949 the training of teachers was already well established in Cyrenaica with the establishment there of two centres, one for each sex, whereas in Tripolitania, the first faltering steps had hardly been taken in this direction.

As in Tripolitania so in Cyrenaica, the Koranic school or Kuttab was the chief if not the only form of indigenous education. As such, it was usually attended by Arab boys, though statistics on these schools in both territories are inconsistent if not elusive. Primarily the concern of these schools was to teach the Koran through repetition rather than by any other method. This was probably the best way in the circumstances and given that subsequent levels of Islamic education almost entirely depended on familiarity with the text of the holy book itself. In this respect the aim of the Koranic schools was to get the pupils to recite the text of the Koran by heart and the most successful pupil in any age range was he who was best able to do this.

For pupils desirous of proceeding to the next stage of an Islamic education or of pursuimg a religious or legal career in the Islamic world, the work of the Koranic schools was , in the above sense, an indispensable prerequisite, which was the main reason why the colonial authorities could not close them down, or supersede them with another more modern form of education. Islam itself was in many senses grounded upon the work of the Koranic schools, and an attack upon such institutions would, in the eyes of Muslims, be conceived as an attack upon Islam, involving confrontational politics which the colonial authorities were most anxious to avoid at all costs.

It was success at the Koranic school that enabled a pupil to proceed to the next stage of an Islamic education which took place at the Medressah of which there were several attached to important mosques or Zawias in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Success at the Medressah allowed students to proceed to the Islamic University of which there were several in Libya. However, the most prestigious of these institutions were located in the surrounding Arab countries. Al-Azhar University in Cairo was a particular favourite with Libyan students, though they also went to established places of Islamic learning in Tunisia, Algeria and Syria.

The Koranic schools therefore were normally the first or attendant phase of education in Libya as elsewhere in the Islamic world, after which pupils continued a more or less exclusively Islamic education or went on the study secular subjects in the government schools. In its attitude to the Koranic schools, the B.M.A.'s of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica differed little from the policies followed in Italian times. As in Italian times, the Kuttabs were occasionally inspected by government nominees but little or no attempt was made to control their inner workings, which were left to the religious authorities. Both the Italian and British regimes basically preferred to treat the Kuttabs as private institutions. In this way they followed established precedents that equally applied to the other denominations - Catholic, Jewish or Greek.

By 1946, the Administration in Cyrenaica observed that there were 26 Koranic schools "scattered around the territory, mainly in the remoter areas, which give some 400 boys a religious course of instruction". (125) This is an important point, as it indicates that most Libyan boys, and most Libyan girls, received no education at all, outside the home, and, if the parents were illiterate, none in the home, which explains to some degree the high illiteracy rate in the country as a whole, where reading and writing in Arabic were minority skills.

A different approach, however slight, can perhaps be detected towards the Koranic schools in Cyrenaica on the part of the B.M.A. where a more Arab-phile policy was in any case being carried out. There the Administration aimed at "giving every encouragement to these schools" even if they were "entirely maintained by the tribes themselves". (126) Even so the numbers of these schools and those of pupils attending them appears to have remained fairly constant. (127) However, it had always been recognised that the educational problems of Libya would never be solved until illiteracy in the country as a whole became less widespread. Given that the government schools, even when functioning with maximum efficiency, could do no more than scratch the surface of the problem, any real attempt to progress out of the illiteracy impasse, depended to a large extent upon reforming the Kuttabs and making them an integral part of a reshaped national system. 1949 witnessed an important move in this direction due to the approval of a new policy by the Emir, Sayed Mohammed El-Senusi himself, whereby 26 Kuttabs situated in the Zawias or Senusi Lodges, maintained by the tribes, were to be transformed into "instructional centres", under the control of a specially appointed Inspector of Zawias, who was also to act as liaison officer with the education office situated in Bengasi. (128) Maybe one is anticipating too much by recognising in this move, the beginning in Libya of some form of Islamic state, since such a move would have been unlikely under a colonial regime. This perhaps explains why there was no emulation in Tripoli, though it should be recalled that the Sayed Idris had as early as 1922 called upon the Italian authorities to involve the Kuttabs in the government system of education, especially in the rural areas, where there was little or no hope of establishing government schools. (129)

There can be no doubt, it must be categorically stated, Cyrenaica got the better deal under the B.M.A. both educationally and politically. For whatever reason, and this in the final analysis must have been political, education in Cyrenaica developed in accordance with criteria that were absent in the sister province of Tripolitania. This is particularly apparent in the administrative aspect, since on the Arab side at least, the presence of the Emir Idirs Al Senusi in the eastern province, as in Italian times too, ensured that Muslim interests were well cared

125 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1946, pp. 6 & 7.

126 *Ibid.*

127 The number of such schools tended to remain the same while the number of pupils rose slightly from 400 in 1946 to 500 in the next year. See, B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1947 and 1948, pp. 11 & 9.

128 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, p. 15.

129 Op. Cit., Chpt. Six. The establishing of a Protectorate in Cyrenaica and the Final Formulation of Liberal Educational Policy, R.O. 1922 and D.M. 14 Sept. 1922, 1919 - 1922, pp. 158 - 191.

for. For the British, the Emir represented the status quo in the province with whom they would have to deal in the future. Whatever happened to the future of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica would remain a client state, dependent on Britain both politically and financially. As such in a volatile but important part of the world, it would safeguard British interests, should Egypt fall prey to the nationalists and revolutionaries.

The important thing for Britain was to get Cyrenaica set up as a small but effective state with a modern educational system under a conservative but wholly Islamic head of state in the form of Sayed Idris Al Senusi who had been such a prominent figure in its history so far. Hence there was no hesitation in appointing a Libyan, Ali Assas Al-Jerbi, as Superintendent of Education in Bengasi to assist the British Director of Education, Major W.O. Foreman, and eventually take over from him. Such an appointment in 1944 was way ahead of similar moves in Tripolitania where such a step would have been virtually unthinkable at the time. (130)

Such a devolution of authority was fully in accord with British Government policy for the region and could not have occurred had International Law been strictly adhered to, as was frequently proclaimed as part of a stance of non-interference by B.M.A. officials. Instead, at least for Cyrenaica, devolution of authority took place at all levels of the administrative machine. (131) Thus, the Al-Jerbi appointment was quickly followed by two other nominations at a senior level in the form of two Arab inspectors for both provinces who accompanied a party of Libyan teachers from both provinces to the Dar-Ulum College in Cairo. (132)

By 1944, the Department of Education in Bengasi was virtually being run by Libyans, though Major W.O. Foreman remained on in a semi-supervisory role which had more to do with advising rather than controlling. (133) However, it was not just the presence of Libyans at a relatively high administrative level that was responsible for the difference in the quality of education in the two territories. British Administration at the top-most level was in the hands of personnel of a very high calibre. Hence Brigadier A. Kirkbride's replacement by E.V. Candole in 1947 as Chief Administrator could not have been more inspired to ensure the continuance of sound educational policies for the territories, so lamentably absent in Tripolitania. (134)

On 15th November, 1949, a Minister of Education was not surprisingly appointed, so more or less completing the process begun by the B.M.A. in 1943. (135) Such developments were in marked contrast to those in Tripolitania where the B.M.A. had largely marked time

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130 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
131 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
132 *Ibid.*
133 *Op. Cit.*, p.1.
134 *Ibid.*
135 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 30-32.

until 1948, after which developments were too late to have any immediate impact upon the new Libya then emerging.

Chapter Six Secondary Education

> "The Italians intended that the Arabs in Libya should be hewers of wood and drawers of water.....The Arabs knew this and knew that the Italians were achieving their intention. They realised that they are one of the most backward Arab Communities in the Middle East." (*)

Secondary Education for Arabs was not developed under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania until 1946; or in Cyrenaica until late 1947. The reason for this discrepancy lies in planning for Cyrenaica between 1943-1949, whereby the Egyptian System was adopted and entry to secondary education only followed six years in the elementary schools. In Tripolitania, on the other hand, there was no lower or higher elementary education, only elementary education, which in the case of a few selected schools provided a fifth year course, followed by secondary education. (1) The reason, however, for the late development of secondary education in Libya for Arabs can only be explained in terms of the ambivalent attitude of the Italian authorities to any form of secondary education for them.(2) .

If secondary education for the Arab population had existed in Libya, when the B.M.A. was first inaugurated, then International Law would have clearly required the British Authorities to continue the same service as had existed in Italian times. The British did not need to have this explained to them, and had gone ahead in the first year of the B.M.A. in Tripolitania, with the reopening of the former Italian Secondary Schools in Tripoli itself. (3) The fact they were unable to open such schools for Arabs again underlines the virtual non-existence of such institutions there. The only exception to the rule was the former school of Islamic studies in Tripoli opened in 1936, as an integral part of Mussolini's Islamic Policy for the Italian Empire in Africa, which was never reopened by the British apparently owing to "bomb damage".(4)

Unfortunately, Italian propagandists for reasons connected with the attempt to obtain the return of Tripolitania to Italian sovereignty did not abandon entirely their attempts to deceive the general public over Italy's efforts to provide education, and particularly secondary education, for Arabs under the Fascist Regime and before. Not only did they continue to

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* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943, p. 16.

1 See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946 and B.M.A. Cyrenaica ,1947, pp. 34 and 10 respect.

2 See, *R.D. Giugno 1928, n. 1698, Norme reflettenti l'Istruzione primario e per i musulmani della Tripolitania e delle Cyrenaica*, B.U.T.

3 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.

4 There is no reference to this notable institution in any of the B.M.A. reports for Tripolitania though Steele-Greig h stated that the building fell into disuse under the B.M.A. and suffered from "bomb damage". *Op. Cit.* Steele-Greig/Appleton: Conversations.

maintain that Arabs had been well treated at the elementary level of education; (5) but also had been provided with adequate secondary education as well. (6) It would therefore be helpful at this point to get the facts clear regarding secondary education for Libyans before the B.M.A. took over in Tripolitania. Without this understanding it is not possible to understand B.M.A. policy towards secondary education within its proper context or the implications for Libyans in the territory.

II. Reasons for Italian Failure to Develop Secondary Education.

> "Of particular interest amongst the Arab schools are the girls' schools of education and domestic work along with the 'IDADIA' of which there are only two - one at Bengasi and the other at Derna." (*)

Initially, at least, Italy's "civilising mission" to Libya had been intended by Italian legislators (7) and indeed for a wide range of writers on colonial matters (8) to provide for all forms and degrees of education, including secondary education. Unfortunately, these historic good intentions did not survive the passage of history itself, founded as they were upon a basic set of misconceptions about Muslims and the Arab world. This may seem extraordinary in retrospect considering Italy's history, culture and extensive trading contacts with Arab countries. Unfortunately it is true and Italy would pay dearly for the price of ignorance in such matters in Libya, where the civilising mission was unwelcome.

In Libya it soon became apparent that Italy lacked both prior experience of Arab countries and knowledge too of the people and civilisation that Italian intellectuals and politicians had so ardently desired to change. There was also a dearth of officials trained and desirous of running a colonial empire in an hostile environment.(9) Instead, the early aim, it can hardly be called a policy, was simply to extend to the Arab population, the system operating in Italy itself. This policy had already proved to be successful in the numerous Italian speaking schools set up and sponsored by the Italian Government throughout the Middle east or wherever Italian communities existed. (10)

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5 See, Appleton, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 344 - 348.

6 See, Fulvio Contini, *Storia delle istituzione scolastiche delle Libia; Libia, Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi Libici, Luglio - Settembre*, 1952, pp. 52 - 54.

* Dr. Angelo Piccioli, *Relatione Finale, Anno Scolastico, 1922 - 3, A.S.E. Il Governatore della Cyrenaica*, Bengasi, 19 Agosto, 1923, p. 39.

7 Camera dei deputati, *Atti Parliamentari, Legislatura XXIII, Sessione 1909; Desegno di Legge, Riodinamento delle scuole Italiane all estero, Seduta del 18 Novembre* Roma, 1909

8 See, Claudio Segre, *Fourth Shore*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1974, pp. 26, 30, 42, 14 and 148.

9 Cachia, A.J., *Libya Under Ottoman Rule*, Tripoli, 1946, p. 82.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 92.

These policies referred to initially as "westernisation", "assimilation" or simply "Italianisation", when applied to the native population of Tripoli and the coastal areas rebounded, demoralising and confusing their originators. At the practical level, the initial attempt at elementary education, bent on Italianisation, outraged Muslims in Tripoli, so alienating those they were intended to win over to the Italian side. (11) Italianisation was therefore from its start a disaster and quickly recognised as such. Also, never a very practical proposition, the policy failed due to the shortage of suitable trained and motivated teachers.

Having in the first few years of colonial experience burnt their fingers, Italian educational policy, thenceforward, retreated to whatever position of vantage was considered to be politically expedient. The authorities now recognised how difficult it was to come up with an educational policy for Muslims in their new colony of Libya. Attention therefore shifted to what other colonial powers had successfully attempted to achieve wherever the situation seemed similar to Libya. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Educational Section, sought to borrow ideas from the educational policies and practices of the French in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, or the British towards the Muslim population of the Sudan or Egypt. The Ministry also turned for support and advice from its own Arabists, in particular the notable Professor Nallino of the University of Rome. Both the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Education in Rome were taken aback by Nallino's recommendations, which sought to remove education from the realms of the political ideas that were virtually anathema to colonial-minded officials. (12) Education for Arabs not surprisingly failed to get off the ground in the colony dependent as it had become upon so many conflicting opinions amongst the originators of the policy. Worse, however, was the burgeoning political, economic and social crisis within Italy itself matched as it was by political and military weakness within the colony. The first ten years of Italian rule therefore can only be seen as one consisting of intellectual debate and political and educational stalemate. Many policies were discussed and even written about but no real progress was made in practical terms. Even the famous Fundamental Laws were never put into practice sufficiently, especially in Tripolitania where they were not even implemented. (13)

Yet, despite this tangle of aims and motives, some high some low, but for the most part, confused and uncertain, there were strident tones that would eventually become the dominant chord. Beliefs themselves were coalescing against the colonists and their representatives in Rome to the effect that a workable strategy could only be found of relevance to Libya if colonialist criteria of service to Italy were adopted there. In this respect the ideas of the founder of the colonial Ministry, no less than Pietro Bertolini himself, are of fundamental importance and a continual source of reference to the founders of scholastic policy there. As

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11 *Op. Cit.*, Appleton, P. 41.

12 See, Appleton, *Op. Cit.*, *III. Nallino's development of an Orientalist Policy*, pp. 114 - 123.

13 *Op. Cit.*, Chpt. Seven, *Arab Reaction to the Statutes of Libya* in Tripolitania, pp. 192-229.

such, they received constant expression in the reports of Dr. Rodolpho Miccachi, whose lieutenant in Libya, Dr Angelo Piccioli, and after him Mario Tortenese were to put Bertolini's colonial nostrum into educational practice.

It is Bertolini, Miccachi and Piccioli who are the three primary authors of Italian colonialist theory as an educational ideology for Libyan Arabs and indeed wherever else the Italian flag flew and Italian Africa. It is not too much to say that whatever Italy did or failed to do in Libya in the educational sense was in direct measure to their response to the colonial imperative of the times. Starting with the so-called Bertolini Legislation of 1914-1915, never as such subsequently repealed, it represents what could be seen as the limited approach to native education in a colonial situation. Such a policy sought to capitalise on the scarce resources of money and manpower with a view to providing no more than a basic structure which was all a poor country like Italy could afford.

In this way the Italo-Arab school became the matrix of Italian colonial educational policy for Libya later added to with the School of Higher Islamic Studies in Tripoli but clearly indicated by Bertolini as early as 1913. No mention was made of any other form of educational institution other than the Koranic schools or Kuttabs; and these were to continue functioning as in Ottoman times without any government subsidy, though subject to government inspection.(14) Bertolini's decree made no mention of any form of secondary education for Arabs though apologists of Italian rule in Libya seized upon the notion of a School of Higher Islamic Studies or Medersa as providing a special form of education for Arabs suited to their religion and culture. Yet to refer to the Medersa in Tripoli as a form of secondary education for Arabs is to misunderstand entirely the philosophy of colonial thinking on the subject of Arab education. In this respect, history shows Bertolini and his successors as highly suspicious of secondary education for Arabs, since such a form of education was undesirable economically and also politically dangerous to Italy as a colonial power. (16) Instead, only specially crafted colonial institutions, such as the College of Higher Islamic Studies, should be permitted to exist in the colony. These institutions, by fostering cultural separatism would enable the Arabs to develop in accordance with their own language religion and culture so removing any threat to Italian colonial interests by preventing Arabs from becoming equal to Italians in educational opportunity.

It was, however, left to Rodolfo Miccachi, following his extensive tour of all the schools of the colony late in 1918 and early in 1919 to formulate the definitive policy for Libya based upon the premises of Bertolini and the colonialist thinkers. In this respect he clearly supersedes Alfonso Nallino, the noted Arabist, whose ideas unfortunately enter into prominence in Libya in association with a succession of weak centre coalitions such as

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14 See, R.D., 15 Gennaio 1914, n. 56, "con quale vienne approvato il regolamento scolastico della Tripolitania e delle Cyrenaica. B.U.C., 268.

16 Angelo Piccioli, *Op. Cit.*, P. 39.

characterised Italian post-war politics. They sought to appease the Libyans, particularly in Cyrenaica, by fulfilling their aspirations through a pro-Arab social policy. In this way, they hoped to remove the threat of a further colonial war and gain Arab support by "moral means" for the continuance of Italian sovereignty in Libya.

In some ways, Miccachi attempted to take account of both streams of thinking by rejecting, like Nallino the westernising approach which offended the Arabs and the easternising tendency (a blend of Arabisation and Islamisation) that was equally unpopular with the Italian nationalists. The important point for Miccachi was not to endanger in any way the retention of Italian sovereignty in Libya. This seemed to be endangered by the Liberals represented in Libya by Nallino, especially in the aftermath of the First World War, whereas Miccachi knew circumstances would change once Italy emerged from the post-war deparession syndrome of 1919. He therefore sought to frame an educational policy for the future that would allow for the restatement of a colonialist identity for Italy in the post-war era by restating the original Bertolini Policy of 1913. (17)

For Miccachi the future development of Italian Educational Policy in Libya should take the following form:

1) An elementary instruction to the mass of the indigenous population consisting of reading, writing in Arabic and, where possible, Italian, elementary arithmetic, hygiene, agriculture and manual work, all to be imparted without any form of restriction in conformity with their own particular aspirations;

2) An instruction, also elementary but a little wider, for those who would benefit from secondary education and who intend to enter a trade or become even minor officials or clerks in the 'zaptie';

3) A secondary education for the sons of notables, such as will place them in a position that they will be able to exercise their functions in public life amongst the native population;

4) A higher education for the training of Imam, Cadi, etc.,etc. (18)

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17 Dr. Ridolfo Miccachi, *Rilazione Finale, Anno Scolastico 1919 A.S.E. II Governatore della Tripolitania, Tripoli, Luglio, 1919.* pp. 141 - 152.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 146.

Unfortunately, he recognised the existing policy and practice did not as yet meet these requirements on account of the then fashion for the said principles of Professor Nallino of Rome University. (19)

It should be noted that the finishing touches to Micacchi's blueprints for Libyan education, especially in respect of secondary education, were to be left to his successor, Dr. Angelo Piccioli, who was to add the commas and dot the i's. By the time that Piccioli took over as superintendant of education, the March On Rome had taken place and any serious notion of secondary education for Arabs had gone into complete reversal as Year One was proclaimed and the decades of Fascism commenced. Now the very mention of the "scuole medie" or "Idadia" was frowned upon as being the poisonous fruit of the hated Statutes of Libya. Such a climate quickly reneged upon the surviving Arab secondary schools at Bengasi and Derna which were now declared by Rome to be "no longer necessary." (20) This had been foreseen by Piccioli in his report of 1922, when sensing the direction in which the wind was now blowing, jhe was quick to recognise them as "politically dangerous". They were, he had decided, despite their limited curriculum, responsible for fostering notions of intellectual and cultural superiority amongst the Arabs. (21)

No attempt was made either to revive the "idadia" or introduce some other form of secondary education for Arabs, such as the French successfully attempted in North Africa and the British in Egypt and the Sudan. Instead, during the remaining 15 years of Italian colonisation in Libya, education policy drifted between the often stated intention of setting up the long-promised School of Islamic Studies or Medersa; and the idea of adding a few higher (post-elementary) courses to the existing italo-Arab schools. These were chiefly designed, as Miccachi had intended, for the sons of notables or those wishing to became small tradesmen or clerks in the Italian administration or "Zaprie". (22)

III. Initial British Response to the Problems of Secondary Education.

> " little provision was made for Arab Secondary Education and before 1946 it was impossible to consider the opening of a Secondary School. In the first place there was no staff available and secondly the Primary School pupils were not to the required standard". (*)

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19 See, R.D. 1 Giugno 1919, n. 931, "che approva le norme fondamentali per l'assetto della Tripolitania, B.U.C., 289; & R.D. 31 Ottobre, 1919, n. 2401. Norme fondamentali per l'assetto della Cirenaica, B.U.C., 601.

20 *Op. Cit.*, R.D., 21 giugno 1923, n. 1698.

21 Dr. Angelo Piccioli, *Op. Cit.*, p. 39.

22 *Ibid.*

* Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 38.

It can only be postured rather than argued that as "little provision was made for Arab Secondary Education before 1946", therefore the B.M.A. was ipso facto absolved of making it. Moreover, even if secondary education had for whatsoever reason not been provided before 1946, this was no reason why it should not have been made available after that date. This would require the pupils to be of the "required standard" and the teachers to be made "available" for secondary education. In other words, given that neither the Moslem Turks or the Catholic Italians had seen fit to provide scondary education for Moslem Arabs in Libya they were extremely fortunate and should per se be extremely grateful that the mainly Protestant British were ready to provide it in 1946. However idiosyncratic this position may seem in retrospect it was in fact the "gut reaction" to the situation of the British on the spot from common soldiery to Oxbridge educated officials. These largely "civilians in arms" knew as a matter of fact that the Libyans had received a raw deal from their Italian over-lords and it had fallen on them in the role of liberators to put them back on the road to "democracy and progress" again.

The Libyans appreciated this attitude and were well enough aware that neither Moslem Turk nor infidel Italian had done much if anything to benefit them - to whom Allah in his Mercy had given the country of Libya - despite the ample legacy of material progress that the Italians had bequeathed to the victors amonst whom they undoubtedly, even at this early stage, included themselves. In the meantime, the Libyans believed, however emotionally or indeed with the full force of Islamic determinism, that the British had been sent by Allah, not only to deliver them from the hated yoke of the Italian appressors, but also to bring - in the sense of development - them into the light of the twentieth century. This was an aspiration that the B.M.A. could neither fully live up to or completely fulfil. It was not however easy to escape from once implanted ideas and made no sense in terms of International Law, which the Arabs failed completely to understand. Educationally, however, the inevitable result of what had become a matter of political fact and daily expectation was a commitment on the part of the B.M.A. to set up secondary schools.

Thus, whether the politicians likd it or not, the B.M.A. was left with the need to provide some sort of secondary education for Arabs and quickly. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the matter of secondary education did not seem to pose any particular problem for the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica and a fine system of secondary schools was soon brought into existence. However, this was not to be so in Tripolitania, for reasons that have never been made adequately clear. Instead, policies associated with the defunct Italian colonial régime were allowed to persist long after all trace of their existence had been said to have been removed. (23)

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23 See, *supra.*, p. 52.

The question most central to this issue was the question of the employment of Egyptian teachers. How was it that they were the unquestioned hub of the system in Cyrenaica, yet as in Italian times virtual anathema in Tripolitania, where they were as much, if not more needed? The deteriorating political relationship with Egypt did not appear to have much effect upon the employment of teachers in Cyrenaica, but as in Italian times, still counted for much in Tripolitania. Hence, guided by the indefatigable Fulvio Contini, Steele-Greig all but refused to accept Egyptian teachers at the elementary level, so making it much more difficult to set up a system of Arab secondary schools in the territory.

Steele-Greig's task of creating a modern educational system, which role he would have viewed with reluctance, would have been easier if some degree of chronological continuity had existed from the Fascist era in the territory. However, as has been shown, the Italian Fascists had no intention of providing any form of general education at the secondary level at least in a modern context for Arabs. Even the so-called higher-elementary schools which, according to Italian propaganda, were supposed to pressage the eventual arrival of secondary education for Libyans, failed to survive the demise of Fascism itself in the territory.

It was nonetheless the idea of higher elementary schools that first appealed to Steele-Greig, no doubt at the suggestion of Contini who would have been fully familiar with the original such schools, as a possible solution to the problem of providing secondary education for Arabs in the territory. Otherwise, it was generally realised that the B.M.A. could not get away with merely imitating the Italians in this area; but would have to start at some point, almost from scratch if a suitable secondary programme was to be devised for Arabs. Such ideas went against the grain of International Law but had to be initiated if Britain was to preserve her reputation as a progressive Colonial Power.

In facing the problem of devising a suitable programme of secondary education for Arabs in the territory, while at the same time assuming a political interest in the territory which would continue long after the demise of the B.M.A., Britain was in effect adopting the guise of a colonial power. This was fatal as far as the development of secondary education was concerned - however expedient from a political point of view - since it paradoxically placed the B.M.A. in almost the same position as its Italian Fascist predecessors - the governements of Volpi, De Bono and Marshalls Badaglio, Balbo and Graziani.

The B.M.A. therefore, was incapable in its own terms of solving the problem of secondary education in Tripolitania and its attempt to come up with a solution under Steele-Greig was a complete failure. It was only when the political future of the territory had been determined that a solution could be attempted; but, even then, the problem did not go away, and probably contributed more to effect political change in the country in 1969 than any other single factor. But it was the nature of this change that both the Italian and British Occupations - and their successor régime too - was most anxious to avoid; and we see reflected in the cautious educational planning of the first half of the twentieth century in Libya.

Flushed with victory in the circumstances of 1943, however, it was never imagined that the B.M.A. would last long enough to have to grapple with these issues. Secondary education, therefore, was viewed at least initially as a political palliative rather than a lasting solution. Italy would again have the chance when returned to Tripolitania to make up for the faults and omissions of the past. Instead, however, contrary to all the machinations on the part of Britain and America and the predictions of the "conoscenti" in Tripoli, the Egyptian curriculum was belatedly adopted in 1948 - a policy already accepted in Cyrenaica as early as 1943.

IV. A Curriculum for the B.M.A.'s Secondary Schools.

"The curriculum followed is that of the Egyptian secondary education, except for the following modifications in history and geography teaching, Libya instead of Egypt is the central subject; the first foreign language taught is English; up to October 1950, French was the second language, but since then Italian has gradually taken precedence over French." (*)

Given that some form of secondary education was required to be provided for Libyans in the changed circumstances and expectant atmosphere created by the fall of the Axis in Africa, it remained for the B.M.A. to determine what shape this secondary education should take or what curriculum be adopted, given that there was nothing of relevance from Italian times that could still be adhered to in 1943.

It would also be necessary to establish what the aim of the secondary schools should be now that Fascism had been officially at least abolished, even though not all of what had been attempted was necessarily considered wrong in the circumstances of the time, since much had in fact been culturally taken by Italy from the education programmes of neighbouring colonial powers, particularly Britain and France.

In the latter respect, the task of the B.M.A. was rather to reorientate the programmes of the Arab schools to what was considered best in the circumstances while at the same time ensuring that as much as possible of what Italy had attempted was still taught - even if the most blatant aspects of Fascism were removed from the Curriculum and activites of the schools. This process was as important for secondary education, as it had been in the elementary sector and perhaps even more so, given the political connotation that secondary education always assumes in Arab countries, leading as it often does either directly to the universities or military academies and sometimes even to supreme political power itself.

Unfortunately, as in colonial times, no satisfactory answer emerged to what should be either the aim or curriculum of the secondary schools if and when they were establsihed in

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* Professor R. Le Tourneau, *I. Libyan Education and its Development in Educational Missions - V. Report of the Mission to Libya*, UNESCO, Paris, 1952, p. 23.

post-Italian Tripolitania under the B.M.A. As before the commencement of the Occupation itself, it proved just as hard for the Administration to resolve all the political and cultural contradictions inherent in providing a curriculum for the secondary schools. The fact that the Italians had not left any secondary schools for the B.M.A. to service seemed to shelve the problem for the B.M.A. at least initially.

Yet the problem would not go away, and given that a colonial model became increasingly irrelevant and that there was momentarily at least a seeming vacuum on the subject, the Administration had a chance to come up with its own ideas. In this respect it had an advantage over its neighbours, the Francophone colonies of North Africa, where the past would continue to shape the future for a considerable time into the post-colonial world. In Libya, on the other hand, the question should have been resolved in terms of the linguistic traditions of the country, aided by contemporary relevance to the modern world.

The B.M.A., however, lacked the knowledge and experience to tackle such a question head-on without running into political and cultural problems on all sides. There was therefore no first-hand answer to these questions yet the aspirations of the people were clear.

Instead, in the circumstances of 1943 other priorities took precedence over the provision of secondary education for Arabs and it was not until 1946 that secondary education became a serious administrative option. Even at this point it was far from clear what the aim should be as Tripolitania was still under International Law and the independence of the country had not yet been determined. Certainly, various areas couuld be ruled out: reversal to the colonial situation was out of the question, linguistic considerations, which had dominated so much thinking on Arab education were no longer relevant, given the predominance of Arabic; also religion it could be assumed would no longer be so important in the future given that Islam was virtually the state religion.

The Italian propagandists, such as Fulvio Contini, made much of the pre-Fascist legacy associated with the Statutes of Libya, so derided by empire builders, and it was both unavoidable and desirable that the new secondary schools be founded on the past aspirations of the Arabs in Libya. These had been well summed up by Professor Nallino who had in 1919 formulated the following options which had been approved by Idris Senusi himself. Such a policy was very similar to that espoused by the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica and known as the Egyptian system. In both systems, the Kuttab is viewed as the key element in solving the educational problems of the region for the:

> "improved "kuttab", which would constitute the Libyan elementary school, would teach exclusively in the Arabic Language (or Berber/Arabic Language), with an educational programme similar in all respects to that of the government Kuttabs in Egypt. This would be on the following lines: a) religion and morality...b) reading, writing and dictation; c) arithmetic (limited to the four basic operations); d) the

committing to memory of a section of the Koran. Text books must be urgently drawn up to deal with the subjects relevant to Libya and an adequate syllabus must be constructed.The school will operate on the basis of a four-year system to which a fifth year will eventually be added in areas where a secondary school exists. The pupils who attend the school will be between the ages of six to none or between seven and ten....." (24)

The continued relevance of even the Kuttab to the basic functioning of the secondary system was fully recognised at this early stage by Nallino who added:

II, Lower Secondary Schools.

"These schools would offer a course lasting for three years and be open to the pupils who had completed the three years at the Kuttabs. They are intended to provide an education for the lower middle classes through training postal and telegraph operatives, police, small-time officials, etc., etc. Instruction will be provided in the Arabic Language in the following areas: religion and morality, grammar, writing, arithmetic, elementary geometry, general studies (comprising laws and duties of general applicability to Libya), knowledge of local agricultural conditions,, geography and Italian history, combined with the history of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Where Italian is taught, it should be confined to reading and ordinary spoken Italian." (25)

III. Higher Secondary Schools.

"Candidates will be admitted to this school who have obtained the leaving certificate of the secondary (lower) schools, or have otherwise satisfied the entrance requirements. The course will have the duration of four years, and the final year will be divided into two sections: one will provide a general course for the education of merchants and Libyan officials, along with accountants, land surveyors, etc. The other for the preparation of teachers to work in the Kuttabs and lower secondary schools. The teaching will be in Arabic but a course in Italian is obligatory. Moreover, the programme of individual disciplines will be devised to respond to the particular needs of the Libyan population." (26)

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24 C.A. Nallino, Post-War Commission's Report, Roma, Jan. 1919 in Istruzione Nelle Colonie, p. 135.
25 *Ibid.*
26 *Ibid.*

Unfortunately, Nallino's "motu proprio" on the subject of Arab education were only quoted by Contini, to present Italian educational policy in Libya from its most favourable aspect, with a view to winning over support or disarming antagonism towards efforts then being made to win over support for Italian attempts at obtaining the return of Libya, or at least of Tripolitania to Italian sovereignty. There is no evidence that Contini ever presented such ideas to Steele-Greig as the basis of policy, and it is extremely unlikely that Steele-Greig had ever even heard of Nallino, though he had certainly heard of the Egyptian system. This is unfortunate for Nallino's policy was by no means irrelevant to the circumstances of Tripolitania under the B.M.A. It could after all have presented some form of alternative to the Egyptian system, if non-Egyptian Arab teachers could have been recruited to put it into practice; and it would have been a good preparation for the future; yet without compromising the present, because of its close similarity with the Egyptian system being put into practice in Cyrenaica.

As some sort of authority on educational developments in Libya under the Mussolini Régime, he was well aware at least that the celebrated, so-called "reform" of Muslim education, carried out by the fascist colonial authorities in 1927 and 1928, could have been used as a starting point for the future under him. This measure had abolished the two then existing secondary schools and sought to remodel the Italo-Arab schools in certain areas of population by creating in addition to the normal 3-year course, a further 2-years in particular schools, termed higher-elementary schools for Arabs. (27) These higher-elementary schools were only conducted in places importance such as Tripoli and Bengasi and as such represented were the closest the Fascist authorities got to providing lower secondary schools in the territory for Arabs. Unfortunately, Steele-Greig neglected to reverse the crime whereby the two "Idadia" had been abolished; but finally in 1949 got round to to adding a further two years on to certain elementary schools in remote areas where secondary education was not yet feasible. (28)

Again, in devising a suitable curriculum for the projected secondary schools in 1945, when secondary education first became a serious issue in Tripolitania, the B.M.A. was in a quandary as it was still impossible, on account of the political uncertainty facing the territory, to determine what should be the aim of these schools. The general lack of teachers, the paucity of books and other materials indeed invested the whole debate upon the future aims of the schools with an ethereal quality which bore no relationship with the pressing educational needs of the people. The lack of clear aims was determined by the general ignorance on which direction education would take in the territory,. Cyrenaica on the other hand had adopted a definite system and knew in which direction it was going, whereas in Tripolitania the mention of the Egyptian system was still anathema at the Department of Education in Tripoli. Lack of

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27 Steele-Greig, *Op. Cit.*, 1948, p. 23: Contini, *Op. Cit.*, p. 47.
28 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 30-32.

finance, suitable buildings, laboratories, workshops and skilled personnel were again inhibiting factors preventing the emergence of a coherent system and philosophy.

In such circumstances, the most the new schools could do was to continue with the 5-year elementary syllabus so far put into practice, adding to it a 3-year period of further schooling, conveniently termed "secondary education" for carefully selected pupils. (29) Therefore, a general syllabus was envisaged, academic in nature, with the same type of bias towards traditional subjects that would have been found at this time in the typical Arab secondary school in Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon and even French North Africa. In comparison with the Franco-phone schools, however, the new Arab schools, like their equivalents elsewhere in the Arab world, did not contain any European element and were weak in scientific and practical disciplines. The absence of European administrators had a hidden implication that should not go unremarked, since it meant that educational practice was not referred to the standard or model operating in the metropolitan country. A European contry would never have tolerated science lessons which were without the opportunity to conduct experiments in a modern-style laboratory but this became the pattern in most Arab countries. It was these factors that we find reflected in the following syllabus, originally introduced in 1946 with the opening of the first secondary school for Arabs in Tripoli, and continuing in practice more or less unchanged until the Egyptian Curriculum was finally adopted in 1948. (30)

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29 "Only boys who had successfully passed their fifth year primary examination were eligible for the entrance examination but of the 68 who sat only eight failed". See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p. 34.

30 See, Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., 1948, p. 61.

SUBJECT	SECONDARY SCHOOLS: TRIPOLI		
YEAR	I	II	III
Arabic	10	9	11
Religion	2	2	1
Mathematics	5	4	4
History	2	2	2
Geography	2	2	2
Science	4	4	2
Drawing	2	2	1
Hygiene	0	0	0
Handwriting	0	0	0
English	5	5	5
Italian(op)	0	4	4
Physical Training	2	2	2
Total hours per weeek	34	36	36

(31)

The final phase of development, affecting the Tripoli schools, is the most important in historical terms because it marks a clear transition from the colonial era as such and also its immediate aftermath (1943 - 1946) when the B.M.A. hesitated to open a secondary school in the province. In this final phase an attempt was made to find a solution to what had been in effect a recurring crisis since Turkish times, namely the absence of modern secondary education for Muslim Arabs in the territory, without which Libya could not hope to develop. (32) As expected, even this transition from the educational deprivation of the colonial era to the relative uplands following independence was not smooth. Tripolitania was still in most respects still in an epoch that had more to do with the colonial era itself than with the post-colonial modern world. In Tripolitania, life seemed to stand still, nothing really changed under the years of the B.M.A., as far as the ordinary inhabitants of the territory were concerned. This was in stark contrast with Cyrenaica where the Egyptian curriculum had been embarked upon which would enable pupils at the end of the 1948-9 school year to take examinations equivalent to Egyptian Government Primary Certificate. (33) As has already been pointed out

31 See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p. 34 and B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48
32 *Supra, Op. Cit.*, P. 38.
33 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 18.

this would enable them to gain admittance to the secondary schools of Agriculture, Arts and Crafts and Trade Schools either in Libya or Egypt.

In Tripolitania on the other hand, a five-year system of education as had existed in Italian times but by no means identical to it, permitted those pupils fortunate enough to be able to avail themselves of it to have longer schooling than would otherwise have been possible but little more. The examinations that they took were of little significance outside Libya and led to no where inside the country, as developed secondary education did not as yet exist in the territory except in extremely rudimentary form as with the Tripoli Secondary School set up in the school year 1946-7. (34) (35) This school not only lacked trained teachers, but also a recognisable curriculum of relevance to any pattern of educational development in the sister territory of Cyrenaica, or anywhere else in the Arab world. The pupils knew this, which would no doubt in large measure account for the high student waste rate.

If the B.M.A. could have got away without having to set up a secondary school with all its associated problems, such as the need for a better qualified teacher, relevant text-books and of course the added expense, it would have deferred the event until independence. Why the year 1946 was chosen is not altogether clear, as the five-year curriculum then being followed would have logically led to the appointment of 1947-8 as the most suitable time. Various explanations are possible for 1946 being the date for the opening of the new school. Educationally, the fact that certain pupils were advanced beyond the average and required some form of secondary education especially in Tripoli. This option, however, was not open to them in Tripolitania, whereas in Cyrenaica they could have been sent to schools in Egypt. It was not open to them in Tripolitania because they lacked the relevant entrance requirements on account of the curriculum then being followed in the elementary schools of the territory. Hence, special schools had to be set up to cater for their needs. (35/B)

Another reason would take a political form, as 1945 saw the "pogrom" of November of that year which resulted in the deaths of 130 Jews. This certainly amounted to a turning point not only in Arab-Jewish relationship in the territory that could not be ignored by the Administration but also reflected a major change in the region without any historical parallel or precedent. It forced the régime to put its house in order by considering reforms that would alleviate Arab feeling in the territory, such as the introduction of a secondary school a year ahead of schedule. (36) As a crisis measure, they were "secondary" in name only, being seen as essentially as higher elementary schools. As such they were set up in 1946 in Tripoli and Zawia where their programme offered little that was not obtainable in the higher elementary schools. (37) Neither can they be compared with the secondary education offered by the

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34 See, Steele-Greig, *Op.cit.*, p.61

35 B.M.A. Cyreanica, 1947, p.6 and B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p.1

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36 Sandison, *Unfinished Memoires*, *Op.cit.*, p.81

37 *Infra*, p.239

Statutes of Libya or even the Idadia subsequently abolished by the Fascist Educational Codes. Again the coming of Secondary education would have to wait for political change in Tripoli.

The adoption of the Egyptian curriculum in 1948-9 was quite definitely in response to Libya. This of course had been on the cards since 1943 in Cyrenaica and had it not been granted would have led to the setting up of British backed kingdom or Emirate in the Eastern province and the Italian protectorate in the Western province of Tripolitania. Eventual union of the two provinces would have followed after a number of years to allow time to develop to a sufficient level of political maturity. It is within this context that the establishment of secondary education in Tripolitania should be viewed if the nature of the challenge and shock is to be properly gauged. At the initial practical level the two fledgling secondary schools now had to be transformed and developed in accordance with the requirements of the new curriculum, as had the elementary schools too.

This was the final blow to the department of Education in Tripoli, already reeling and in chaos from Steele-Greig's sacking and still further demoralised by ailing Cuthbert Scott's postponement of his departure from England for a further year, so leaving the aggrieved Steele-Greig still in charge. The new schools were as follows:

a) Secondary schools;
b) agricultural schools
c) arts and crafts schools
d) trade schools

As the curriculum of the final three of these schools is the subject of Chapter Six ([38]), concluding remarks will attempt to deal with some of the problems associated with the adoption of the new curriculum from the point of view of general education in the B.M.A. in its last years.

Again we see in the adoption of this measure, the effect of political pressure indicating that 4 secondary schools must be set up in the territory, namely Tripoli, Zawia, Zuara and Nalut, though as the latter only had two classes they were abolished in 1951. This left only Tripoli and Zawia as in 1946 as a result of which selection procedures had to be intensified to reduce the number of applicants to an acceptable level. Hence by 1952 not only did applicants for secondary school places in Tripolitania have to be in possession of the primary school leaving-certificate; but they also had to pass a qualifying examination set by the schools themselves. Shortages of laboratory equipment, books and even a sports ground continued as before. ([39])

Improvement, however, was on the way and the 1952-3 school year saw the two schools included in the educational budget for that year. Even so the really expensive type of equipment required by a secondary school needed funding from an additional source. The

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[38] *Op.cit.*, 1944, p.8
[39] Professor R. Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.23

Four-Point Plan therefore agreed to fund the installation of laboratories.([40]) The United Nations Technical Assistance Programme funded a library for the Zawia School with the Four Point Programme and UNESCO providing additional funding. ([41]) A playing field was paid for by the Tripoli Administration and the Development Agency provided for the Zawia School a lecture and cinema room and a theatre.([42])

V Organisation of the Schools

> "....both schools give the impression of abounding with life and activity. There seems every reason to believe that they will continue to develop successfully....."

As secondary education had never existed for Arabs in Tripolitania before the advent of the B.M.A., special pains were taken after 1945, as it became increasingly urgent to commence secondary education for Arabs in the territory, to ensure their organisation was placed on the proper footing. The delicate task of securing the services of the right teachers was placed in the hands of G.H.Q. Cairo by Brigadier Travers Blackley. In this respect he relied upon the support of his long-time chum colleague, Brigadier Cumming, who held the Cairo command. Blackley's wish was not to recruit Egyptians but reliable Sudanese, especially for the appointment of Headmaster to the Tripoli school who could also be relied upon to act as superintendent to all secondary schools in the territory. There was much talk and propaganda at this time in favour of the Sudan amongst the British who viewed the development of the territory as a British success story. The British were particularly confidant of their educational achievements in developing a largely backward indigenous population, providing sophisticated establishments like Gordon College.

Strangely enough Egyptians had never been popular with the ordinary people of Tripoiltania for reasons that go back into history before even Italian times. Hence the employment of Sudanese was a tempting alternative to the politically risky and unpopular Egyptians. In attempting to get not only this one Sudanese for the Secondary School but, if he was a success, others of similar calibre to work in Tripolitanian schools, Blackley over-committed himself in a way typical of the man. While Steele-Greig stood on the sidelines and gleefully watched the initiative fail. He was personally annoyed that he had never been consulted in the operation, confident the initiative would be a failure in which he was right, and probably correct in believing that a Palestininan would have been a better choice in the circumstances. ([43])

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[40] B. Higgins, The Economic and Social Development of Libya, United Nations Report, 12 Oct., 1953, New York, p.122

[41] *Ibid*

[42] *Ibid*

[43] Steele-Greig to Appleton. Also Sanderson, Italian Rule in Tripolitania, Chpt. IV pp.56-65

Blackley was worried that the trouble which had been building up in the schools amongst both pupils and teachers would lead to a confrontation with the Administration which he was anxious to avoid. The existing superintendent, an Arab of long-standing in the area and a nominee of Steele-Greig was not sufficiently in control of the situation and should be replaced as soon as a suitable successor could be found.([44]) The new man had now been located by Cumming in the form of a Sudanese by the name of Abdul Hakim El-Gamil and was accordingly appointed to the vacant post at the Tripoli Secondary School. As planned the following year, he replaced the existing superintendent who had fallen from favour with the Authorities, being dismissed from his post, and was made superintendent of all Arab schools. ([45]) It was clearly a case of out with the old and in with the new, as the disgraced supervisor had been an inspector under the Italian regime and had been especially appointed to the post by Steele-Greig on Contini's recommendation as early as 1943. He was now, however, regarded as having "old-fashioned ideas liable to be influenced too much by the politically-minded notables". As a final damming indictment, he was also regarded as acting as a "deterrent to educational progress" which says something for the mind of the B.M.A. at this turning point in Tripolitania's history.

Abdel Hakim, on the other hand, was Blackley's man of the moment, being billed by the Annual Report as "fresh from the Sudan Education Department" and accordingly given every accolade, at least during his first six months in the territory. ([46]) Even Steele-Greig rose to the occasion, writing in 1947, "His go-ahead enthusiasm, resulting in a really harmonious atmosphere and a general improvement in the work of the staff." ([47]) "He is besides," wrote Steele-Greig, anxious at this time to make conciliatory and reassuring noises in the direction of Blackley, "popular in and out of the school, and it is a pity the government cannot release three more such men to assist in the building of the Arab schools." ([48])

Unfortunately, it was perhaps because the government couldn't release any more Abdul Hakim's that the much trumpeted Sudanese initiative ground to a halt, since the Sudan, unlike the ever educationally-fecund Egypt, lacked enough surplus manpower to resolve the educational problems of Tripolitania on sufficient scale to the size of the problem. Also Abdul Hakim was seen by the Libyans as too much a B.M.A. man, at a time when the popularity of the B.M.A. was fast on the wane, if it hadn't by this time almost waned entirely in their eyes. Trouble therefore was sooner or later bound to blow up between Abdul Hakim and the Libyan teachers at his secondary school and this led to strikes during the politically sensitive visit of the Four-Power Commission who in 1948 were in Libya on a fact finding expedition.

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[44] Steele-Greig, Op.cit., p.38
[45] *Ibid*
[46] *Ibid*
[47] *Ibid*, p.41
[48] *Ibid*. Also, see, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.47

Steele-Greig from his Olympian height as D. of E. blamed the strike upon "petty professional jealousy among the staff, a lack of experience and above all outside political influences both on the boys and the masters". ([50]) It was however, the end of the Sudanese initiative in Tripolitania, as a scape goat had to be found for the public humiliation the Administration had suffered in the presence of the Four-Power Commission and inevitably Abdul Hakim was asked to resign, though the ring leaders were subsequently punished too. Steele-Greig secretly rejoiced in what he saw as the humiliation of Blackley since to him, whatever his public pronouncements on the controversial Abdul-Hakim, privately he viewed him as a "disaster" a view later confirmed by the Official Report of 1948 which now accused the unfortunate man of not possessing the "required personality" as a result of which he was "unable to maintain discipline with both masters an pupils". ([50/b])

Now at last the penny had dropped and it was realised that whatever the attendant political risks, the only hope lay in the recruitment of sufficient Egyptian teachers to staff the secondary schools. This had been realised as early as July 1947 when the Administration had accepted the inevitable and sent Abdul Hakim to Cairo to recruit at least 10 Egyptians to work in the secondary schools. This mission was likewise a failure as for a variety of reasons, none would come. In all probability, 1947 was not viewed as a good time to start a career on the Tripoli secondary schools, on account of events in Tripoli, which were front page news in Cairo. Abdul Hakim, meanwhile, having survived the threat of resignation in Tripoli in view of the general difficulty of finding for him a replacement at this time, took his vacation during August in his native Sudan. Unfortunately, he was prevented from returning to Tripolitania by the refusal of the Egyptian Authorities to grant him a visa in his passport. ([52])

At this point, in a desperate stop-gap operation, the future of the secondary schools in Tripolitania was placed in the hands of an experienced Palestinian. His reign, however, was brief since the importance of healing the breach with Cairo could brook no odds, and the Palestinian was replaced at the end of 1948 by an Egyptian who was appointed to spearhead the adoption of the Egyptian system in the territory. This measure finally bore fruit and the school year 1948-9 finally witnessed Libyan students attending secondary schools in Tripolitania offering a recognised curriculum on a similar par to their equals in Cyrenaica. If successful at their studies they could now go on to study at Al-Azhar University in Cairo ([54]). This change was accomplished by the end of 1948 before the establishment of a United Nations Mandate in the territory.

The adoption of the Egyptian System for the schools of Tripolitania was therefore a British move completed when the B.M.A. had only two more years still to run. If there was any fear

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[50] Steele Greig, *Op.cit.*, p.41: and B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.47
[50/b] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.47
[52] B.M.A., Tripolitania, 1947, p.44: and Steele-Greig, Op.cit., p.48
[54] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.48 and 1949, p.31

of Egyptian influence surfacing at this point, it was not acknowledged at least officially, though the rapid Libyanisation which now took place at every level could be seen as an attempt to ensure that the future of the country would be firmly in Libyan hands. The senior appointments, including headmasterships at the new secondary schools, were entrusted to Libyans holding University degrees from Cairo. ([55]) They were to preside over a mixed staff of Libyan and foreign Arabs in an arrangement familiar to all who have experience of these schools down to the present day. ([56])

A) Teachers

The real start of secondary education in Tripolitania was determined towards the end of 1948 therefore by the B.M.A.'s decision to adopt as Cyrenaica had the Egyptian curriculum. This began the long process whereby the schools were orientated towards Egypt and eventually virtually controlled by teachers with Egyptian nationality. This step had many implications for Libya and in particular Tripolitania which it is beyond the terms of this thesis to examine. However, at a time of rapid political, economic and social change it exposed Libya in a way that had never occurred in the past to a whole range of new influences amongst which the dominant position of Egypt in the affairs of the area cannot be ignored.

Such a situation had undoubtedly been foreseen before 1948; but in the end it had been brought about by the very Administration that had done so much to limit and delay the acceptance of Egyptian influence in the territory. It was the fear of Egyptian influence on the highly volatile environment of the territory before 1948 that had made it so difficult for the Administration to develop secondary education there. Secondary education on any scale does not appear to have been feasible in the area without Egyptian teaching-manpower. Within this context the employment of Abdul Hakim and the adoption of the Sudanese strategy can be seen as temporary stop-gap measures. Other than Egypt, Palestine and Syria there were no other countries in North Africa and the Middle East, other than the Franco-phone colonies from where it would have been impossible to recruit teachers suitable for Libya. Yet all of these countries were at the time either undergoing political turmoil themselves or about to do so; a factor which the B.M.A. was anxious not to import into the already uncertain and disturbed territory of Tripolitania on the eve of independence.

The recruitment of secondary school teachers was not helped by the low educational and cultural terms even in Arab and Muslim terms of the country at this time in its development, largely because of previous colonial policies, there were few Tripolitanian Arabs, other than the Karamanli and Muntazars who received any form of respectable secondary education, and that had been in Italy itself. Even secondary-school teaching would not have offered sufficient

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[55] *Op.cit.*, 1949, p.31

[56] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.23. Also see Educational Planning Mission to Libya, UNESCO, Paris, June 1964, p.27

status and renumeration for the sons of notables or generally those of middle class background to find it possible as a career. At a time when even primary education was at a premium secondary school graduates could find far more promising and rewarding careers to follow than school teaching. This was the problem for Steele-Greig and would be for his successors down to the present day. In therefore examining the staffing problems of the new secondary schools one is observing the run-in to a new era in connection with which the dominant element was and would continue to be that of the foreign and mainly Arab teachers who were being recruited to run the schools. The top man, however, would be a Libyan even if he or she was the only adult in the institution of Libyan nationality.

As already pointed out, the new secondary school was destined for 1947 but opened its doors in 1946 on a purely makeshift basis to meet the needs of the time, which included enabling the B.M.A. to save face with the Arab population. The teachers employed had not been specially recruited for the job outside the country and were largely untrained for their new role, though the best available in the territory at the time. "A better type of schoolmaster" Steele-Greig lamented was "clearly required" but how and from where was such an individual to be obtained. ([57]) Despite this, the initial year of the school was described as "very successful under the able direction of the new superintendent." ([58]) His failure, however, to handle the striking pupils and teachers at the time of Four Power Commission's visit got him marked down as not possessing the "required personality". ([59]) Only following his failure to return in the summer of 1948 did the school lose its turbulence and settle down to "serious work" again. Yet Abdul Hakim was regarded by the Administration as having been the "founder" of secondary education in the territory. ([60])

In the final analysis, however, even Steel-Greig conceded that the real cause of unrest in the school had been the absence of a suitably educated and trained staff of teachers there. The impression is somehow gained that the pupils felt their time was being wasted at the school. This was not remedied until 1949 with the appointment of an Egyptian headmaster. He was however only at the school for a few months before a Libyan was appointed in his place along with 4 qualified teachers.

Despite the problems experienced by the school in 1948 it was still the best school of its type in Tripolitania and pupils were arriving at it from all parts of the territory in the hope of receiving a "better education" ([61]) The Administration recognised by this time that "the employment of unqualified teachers is both a waste of time and money, as the teachers being untrained are unable to impart sufficient knowledge to the pupils with the result that

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[57] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p.33
[58] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p.44. Also see *supra* note 48
[59] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.48
[60] Steele-Greig, *Op.cit.*, p.38
[61] B.M.A., 1949, p.31

examination failures are numerous". ([62]) One consequence of this was the attempt at cutting down on the annual intake "until such a time as more accommodation and staff are available " ([63]) The Authorities were however sufficiently satisfied with the progress made so far as to be able to conclude that the school had had "a successful year although difficulty has been experienced in obtaining enough suitably qualified imported masters". ([64]) By 1951 the Tripoli Secondary School had moved a long way from the early hesitant beginnings. In that year it had on its role 33 teachers, part Libyan and part foreign of whom 9 were Palestinian and 2 Egyptian, 2 British and 1 Maltese. There were also 14 teachers at Zawia of whom 6 were Libyan and 8 foreign (Egyptian and Palestinian). ([65]) Despite these good results, a serious shortage of teachers nonetheless continued to plague all branches of the service after independence in consequence of which it continued to be necessary to employ many more expatriate teachers, especially at secondary level. ([66])

Pupils

As the first secondary school was set up in the capital, Tripoli itself, it may at this point be pertinent to ask, whether the school had the aim of providing an education for the emerging Arab middle-class? As social statistics and sociological information is generally lacking, it is not possible to make definitive statements about the condition of the Libyan middle-class at this time, though it would be surprising if groups generally falling under the heading "middle-class" did not exist, at least to some extent. In the parlance of the B.M.A. the sociological groupings most often referred to in this connection were the sons of notables, shopkeepers and minor officials.

Such groupings were not really eligible to use the excellent Italian Secondary Schools in Tripoli despite Italian propagandist claims to the contrary. It was contrary to Italian policy even in Italian times to allow Libyans into their Secondary Schools and even after 1943 the exacting entrance requirements, combined with the general distrust of even rich Libyans from attending these schools, would have mitigated against the idea. ([67]) We can therefore only hazard a guess as to the origins and social class of the 60 or so initial entrants as coming from the better off sections of Libyan society in the metropolis itself, and not at first from the surrounding countryside.

As places were strictly rationed admittance was by special examination of which only 8 failed and this followed attendance at the primary schools. ([69]) By October 1947, the numbers

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[62] B.M.A. 1948, p.48
[63] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p.30
[64] *Ibid*
[65] *Ibid*, p.31
[66] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.23
[67] Appleton, *Op.cit.*
[69] *Ibid*

attending the school had risen to 170. ([70]) During its second year of existence, the number of promotions from the 1st to the 2nd year courses was declared to be "satisfactory" and entries continued to increase from the primary schools.

The adoption of the Egyptian System in 1948 was a severe challenge to the secondary schools with the effect that standards had to be seen to rise in accordance with its requirements. This is perhaps apparent in the results for 1948 being declared "not up to expectations". This appears to have had a knock-on effect reducing demand for places. The reduction in demand meant the Administration only had to open "a single secondary class" in Nalut, Zuara and Zavia for a total of 55 boys who were to follow a programme in English and Italian if requested. ([71]) In fact the demands and pressures caused by the initial adoption of the Egyptian System had the effect of forcing the abandonment by the Administration of all provincial classes in that year except at Zawia and Nalut. ([72])

The closure of classes created an unfavourable impression of the Administration's efforts in the minds of rural populations who felt they were being neglected. Yet to open secondary schools in rural areas was unrealistic in terms of the circumstances of he times. ([73]) Le Tourneau gives a clear picture of the condition of the surviving secondary schools at Tripoli and Zawia in the final year of the B.M.A.: "In all there were 539 pupils, 170 of whom are boarders. They must all hold the primary school leaving certificate and from this year onwards must pass a qualifying examination before entering the secondary school. They are grouped in the following way:

Year	Tripoli	Zawia
1st	154 (4 Sections)	100 (3 Sections)
2nd	97 (3 Sections)	43 (2 Sections)
3rd	50 (2 Sections)	8
4th	42 (1 Section)	
5th	45 (*)	
Total	388 (**)	150 (***)

* Divided into 3 Sections: Arts; 11 Mathematics; 14 Experimantal Sciences, 20.

** 70 of them boarders

*** 100 of them boarders

(74)

Schools

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[70] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p.44, p.168
[71] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.52
[72] *Ibid*, p.170
[73] *Ibid*
[74] *Op.cit.*, Le Tourneau, p.23

The virtual non-existence of secondary education for Arabs in Italian times, apart from the imposing Scuola di Cultura Islamica or Scola Superiore Islamica, situated in the centre of Tripoli, and only brought into existence towards the end of the Fascist era, ([75]); and virtual non-existence of special funds under the B.M.A. for the construction of new secondary schools, meant that maximum use had to be made of existing buildings. These were requisitioned and brought up to scratch for use as schools. Tripoli was lucky in the respect, and unlike Cyrenaica where war damage had been severe, it had escaped bomb-damage more or less completely. This left a good legacy of excellent buildings from the Italian era that could and often were transformed into schools.

Initially also the new secondary schools were to be set up in Tripoli city and other centres of Italian colonisation like Zawia, Nalut and Zuara, those at Nalut and Zuara, however, were little more than sections, consisting of one or more rooms each, whereas those in Tripoli or Zawia were much larger and intended for the region as a whole. To facilitate the development of the latter, special boarding accommodation was provided, so that boys from the provinces could attend on a more-or-less equal basis with those from Tripoli in Nalut and Zuara, so as to concentrate manpower and resources in Tripoli and Zawia, where there were "excellent buildings, until recently occupied by the army". These were then converted by the Administration into greatly enlarged schools. ([76])

In both these schools a combined total of 7 new classes was accepted for the 1950 -51 school-year, as against 3 new classes in 1949-50. Moreover, free tuition was arranged for poor but deserving pupils and free boarding "for those whose homes were not near by". Boarding accommodation was not provided in Tripoli until a year later - January, 1951. Yet not surprisingly, given the shortage of qualified and experienced teachers, the standard of teaching was viewed by the Department of Education as only "moderately efficient". The "absence of laboratories proved a serious handicap in teaching on the scientific side" - something which had still not altered in the 1950-51 academic year. Monies for the new laboratories and other much needed accessories for the school would be provided shortly by the Point-Four Aid Programme as organised by the United States of America. ([77])

By 1952-53 the donations of international and foreign bodies was beginning to have some effect in the bringing about of developments and improvements in the schools. Hence we see the "installation of laboratories at the two schools, a library for the Zawia school along with the purchase of additional books". ([78]) The organisations providing finance for the Libyan secondary schools at this stage in their history were the Development Agency itself (United Nations), the Point Four Programme and UNESCO, and as such have already been referred

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[75] Contini, *Op.cit.*, p.97
[76] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.22
[77] United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, p.122
[78] *Ibid*

to. ([79]) Also, as already mentioned, at Zawia a lecture and cinema room, along with a theatre were planned for the following school year. ([80]) Le Tourneau also confirms that by 1952, these schools were developing satisfactorily, with all the facilities including sports fields then in full operation.

Moreover, at Tripoli the pupils produced a weekly paper with an "admirable layout" which was posted up at the school entrance, electing committees for their club, newspaper and dramatic activities. ([81]) At this stage planners of secondary education, while recognising the existence of considerable local demand for secondary schools in places such as Jeffren, Misurata and Homs, believed there was not the need as yet for a third school in the immediate future or at least until primary education had become "firmly established in the Eastern province". ([82]) Supplementary agricultural colleges were another question and as such are delt with in Chapter Seven. ([83])

VI Conclusion: Comparison of Developments in the two Territories.

As secondary education had not yet been established in either Tripolitania or Cyrenaica by the Italians, apart from the brief attempt to implement the Fundamental Laws at Bengasi and Derna; the B.M.A. was at least in theory absolved from the obligation to set up secondary schools in terms of International Law. Unfortunately neither International Law, the British Government, the individual B.M.A.'s themselves or the indigenous populations of both territories had imagined a situation would result from the Italian defeat, in which the fate of the territories would for so long be held in the balance. Arab discontent must and did of moral and political necessity arise from such a situation and could only be mollified if a development policy was put into operation and seen to work. Secondary education must inevitably be part of any such package and the bona fides of either regime depended upon providing it at some point. In this respect, as far as the B.M.A. was concerned in either territory, the dilemma was the same, though it was not clear initially, that it would require a joint solution, as occurred when independence was finally declared in 1949 - an outcome not envisaged in 1943

The initial response to the advent of British Military Occupation appears to have depended upon the same factors, though having adopted the Egyptian Curriculum in the first place, meant that Cyrenaica would at all relevant stages of the development process, be better placed to seize opportunities than Tripolitania. One should not be misled into thinking the opposite, simply because secondary schools were set up first at Tripoli, Zawia and Zuara, since the acceptance of the idea of secondary education did not necessarily mean it would be

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[79] See Appleton, *Op.cit.*, Chpt. Nine pp.268-308
[80] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p.8
[81] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5
[82] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1946, p.6
[83] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1947, p.10

successfully implemented. The acceptance in Cyrenaica of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1943 implied that a proper system of secondary education would be brought about there at the appropriate time. Merely to take the primary certificate meant that a boy in Cyrenaica was eligible to attend secondary school in Egypt - an option not open to his colleague in Tripolitania. This is apparent as early as 1945, when plans were drawn up to send "some thirty boys from Cyrenaica to Egypt for technical training.

Moreover details abound of a similar nature to illustrate as they do that advances were being made in Cyrenaica of a real and tangible nature, especially with regard to secondary education, when in Tripolitania they did not exist in sufficient substance to be termed "real". This is apparent in 1946 when as Steele-Greig was opening his first secondary school in Tripoli, 15 Cyrenaican boys were already in attendance at the Helouen Secondary School in Cairo, with another 5 at the celebrated Victoria College, Alexandria and still more in other secondary schools in Egypt. Plans had of course been laid at this stage for the opening of secondary schools in Cyrenaica itself.

Thus initially at least, although Tripolitania had opened a secondary school of kinds in 1946, where 60 boys were enrolled for the school year 1946-1947, Cyrenaica, while having as yet no secondary school of its own in operation, had at least 20 boys enrolled at Egyptian secondary schools. Officially, there was as yet no need to open secondary schools in Cyrenaica, as the Egyptian Curriculum did not require the provision of such places until the 1949-50 school year. By this time children in the Cyrenaican elementary schools would have completed the requisite six years of schooling and in accordance with the Egyptian curriculum be ready to start their secondary courses in a state of complete readiness. For those who had completed their elementary education before the average, the Department of Education in Bengasi made arrangements to have them educated in appropriate secondary schools in Egypt, a facility not open to Steele-Greig in Tripolitania. Thus in the school year 1947-48, despite the failure to open the projected secondary school at Bengasi, due largely to the failure of the Egyptian Government to authorise export permits for school supply to Cyrenaica, there were 21 students in Egyptian secondary schools and another 13 in various Egyptian "higher educational institutions".

In November 1948, at the same time as Tripoli was converting to the Egyptian Curriculum, Cyrenaica was opening its first Secondary School in Benghasi. Sixty four boys were enrolled for that year with another 14 under instruction at the Helwan school in Egypt, 18 others elsewhere in higher educational institutes, with 3 on courses in the United Kingdom and 1 in France. ([84]) Compared with this 100 students then receiving secondary education in the less numerically populated Cyrenaica, 226 were receiving secondary education in the numerically superior Tripolitania's 4 secondary schools (soon to be reduced to 2). ([85]) No evidence exists

[84] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5

[85] See, Appendix, H.: Education, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948

to show that Tripolitanians were being educated outside the territory although a few from wealthy families may have been undergoing education privately. By December 1949, 141 boys attended the Bengasi Secondary School with 52 receiving education abroad. ([86])

The B.M.A.'s final year, 1950, produced for both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica an additional 70 entrants for the Bengasi Secondary School, where the "foundation class" had by this time reached their fourth year. The result was a total of 211 pupils at this school, the only institution of its kind, which boasted a further 57 alumni studying abroad. ([87]) Tripolitania, on the other hand, had 4 so-called secondary schools containing 482 pupils, but no additional pupils studying abroad. ([88])

Although the figures for the two provinces appear to break-down fairly evenly it should be remembered that the population of Tripolitania was twice the size of the neighbouring coastal province. Also statistics take no account of the difference in quality and quantity between the two territories and this was considerable. For example, Cyrenaica on the eve of independence was better placed to benefit from this event than Tripolitania at least educationally, and possibly in other respects as well. Not only did it possess more and better qualified and educated secondary school graduates - and even some university graduates too - but also a school system that was effective and as up to date as any in the Middle East at this time.

Such a juxtaposition must seem confusing in retrospect, but it was not part of any deliberate design by the occupying power which had virtually granted self-determination to Cyrenaica from 1943 onwards and this almost certainly have been confirmed by the United Nations in the resultant settlement. On the contrary the result was one of chance since the final unification of the country could not have been envisaged in 1943.

Le Tourneau merely notes this difference without remarking on its general significance during first year of the new dispensation following the granting of independence by the United Nations when both territories had a fifth secondary course in operation. ([89]) By this time, 1951-52, Cyrenaica already had 7 secondary school graduates attending courses at the King Fuad University in Cairo and another 9 at the Islamic University of Al-Azhar. ([90]) During this year, however, 78 students from Tripolitania were finally sent overseas to study with a few more taking courses overseas at their own expense.([91]) By this time the government was already making a "considerable effort" to advance the education of the country, and indeed without it independence would have little reality in the economic, social or political sense. The

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[86] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, Educational Statistics, p.52

[87] Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1950, p.7

[88] See, Education: Appendix C, Annual report Tripolitania 1949, p.87; and Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1949, p.52

[89] This had only recently been accepted by the Egyptian Government as a leading qualification, designed for entry into the Universities.

[90] *Ibid*, p.28

[91] United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *Op.cit.*, p.122

question for posterity is - could not more have been done earlier? And what price would Libya have to pay for the failure to determine the future of the country before 1949?

Chapter Seven Female Education

"The girls' Italo-Arab School had a vocational direction and is continuously increasing. It has a great future ahead of it and fully accords with the desires of that section of the native population which wishes to be associated with us."*

Apart from in certain important centres, such as Tripoli and Bengasi, where female education had been started by either Italians or Turks, female education outside the home hardly existed in Libya before the Italian Occupation of 1911.([1]) The Italians, however, regarded the education of girls as an appropriate and efficacious means of exercising what they termed their "civilising mission" - sometimes referred to by the somewhat "infelicitous phrase" of "pacifico penetrazione". The objective of "pacifico penetrazione" was to secure the collaboration of the Muslim population through education and good works, such as schools and hospitals.

Basically, the plan aimed to provide Muslim girls with an education similar in most respects to that provided for boys in the Italo-Arab schools of the territory. In terms of curriculum, this would include the teaching of "our language, history and geography", along with the usual subjects associated with an elementary school curriculum. These included arithmetic, with suitable emphasis upon the "rule and duties of proper hygiene." ([2]) As the Italo-Arab Schools became gradually established in Libya, the syllabus was more or less evenly divided between the Italian language and subjects taught in Arabic such as the Koran.

This pattern was extended with little alteration to the girls schools set up in Libya after 1911. Yet the colonial authorities were fully aware throughout the whole period under their control that female education was a most delicate matter in a Muslim country such as Libya, where traditional values could easily backfire unless handled with great discretion. The peculiarity of the situation was well summed up by Contini who had a continuous working association with educational developments in Libya of more than forty years.

Writing in 1953 of the situation obtaining in Libya, he says "the situation of women in Muslim countries proceeds against difficulties that have deep roots in the customs and traditions of the local population. Except in the larger centres, where there is a local element that is less misogenisitic, due to long contact with Europeans, the establishment of a girls' school raises opposition, especially from true upholders of tradition for whom the education of women strikes a note completely contrary to Islamic traditions. Only a form of education that is vocational and practical, and of direct benefit to the family can be imparted without raising

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* Miccachi, Op.cit., 1919, p.75

1 " Exact estimates of the numbers of girls receiving a formal education before 1911 are impossible to deduce in respect of girls, due to the absence of separate statistics, the tendency being to compound the Arab with the Turkish statistics." Op.cit., footnote 39, p.342

2 Abstracted from Caruso Ingilleri, Report of April 1912, p.4, See Appleton, *Op.cit.*, p.35

difficulties. For these reasons, it was necessary, especially at the beginning to ensure female education was of a primarily practical nature, which meant being concerned with domestic economy and hygiene. Hence the schools in Tripoli and Bengasi taught the weaving of baracanes and traditional carpets." ([3])

Writing in 1948 Steele-Greig echoes the same sentiments, "The education of girls" he says, "is still only possible on a limited phase." He agrees with Contini that the aims of the girls' schools should be of a "practical nature" and designed to "stimulate powers of self-expression and self-reliance." By 1948 the climate of opinion in Libya, or at least in Tripoli itself, was favourable to the notion of female education, so much so that "the difficulties and prejudices of the earlier phases of girls' education are slowly disappearing" wrote Steele-Greig. ([4])

The problem after 1945 was how to develop the wave of positive sentiment for female education so as to bring the girls' schools into alignment with the standard pattern of education in the territory. Steele-Greig at this point was fully aware that this should be his goal, writing "it is far from easy to graft the modern system of education onto the social structures of Tripolitania." Unfortunately, like so many exclusively western orientated administrators when coming face to face with the cultural and religious differences of the Muslim and Arab World, he at this point retreated into viewpoints which were far from helpful if he was to make progress with the tasks facing him. "Modern education", he writes, "is based upon modern psychology, and this is not acceptable to, or even understood by a people who regard the other 'sex; as something improper. Within limitations, however, what can be done is being done" ([5])

Unfortunately, the apologies of Italian times re-echoed under a British Administration were insufficient to meet the demands of the times. In Italian times, female education like the education for boys provided in the Italo Arab schools was too associated in the Arab mind with "colaborazione", "penetrazione pacifico", civilising missions and all the other slogans with which the Italians adorned their social policies towards the Arab population. It would have been better if Steele-Greig had separated British policy in Tripolitania at this point from ideas which still had too many unpleasant associations for many Libyans.

Fortunately, the drive towards education and development, following the arrival of the British Army in Tripolitania, when the feeling that a new era for the territory was about to dawn had become such a universal sentiment, that even Steele-Greig couldn't completely drown it with cold water. Female education therefore continued to spread and by the end of the British Administration had become as established in the territory as boys education, though girls were still not as numerous.

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[3] F.Contini, *Op.cit.*, p.41
[4] Steele-Greig, *Op.cit.*, p.37
[5] Stele-Greig, *Op.cit*, p.37

II British Policy towards Female Education

> "Education is the care of both economic and social development in Libya. The Libyan Constitution makes elementary education compulsory for all children of both sexes. This obligation will be the objective of all educational development in Libya." (*)

In the circumstances facing the B.M.A. at its inception in 1943, the setting up of schools for the female section of the population was less of a priority than that of developing male education. Italians had only opened girls' schools, as a part of "pacifico penetrazione" whereby they hoped their regime would be provided with a means of entering into the domestic and social ambit of the indigenous population. This had adversely affected the development of education for girls in the territory, especially outside the main towns, as needed it had for boys too. The chief problem affecting the B.M.A. was to separate educational policy generally from the political attitudes associated with the former colonial regime, but at his point it must be remembered that the B.M.A. was only a temporary regime, and apart from the grosser aspects of Fascism it was quite happy to co-exist ideologically with some form of Italian colonisation which it believed would take over again at a later date in any case.

At a more practical level, although the attitudes of Islamic scholars upon the subject of female education have varied down the ages; but more important than the consensus of educated opinion among Muslims at the time was the effect of prevalent social attitudes. Here we are dealing with the popular mind as such, in the Libya of 1942, where the sending of women out of the household was still regarded as generally undesirable, unless for the purpose of visiting of relatives. As far as the planners were concerned, the yardstick of past attitudes was more important in determining future trends than hypothetical changes to those attitudes in the sentiment of the public. Moreover, priority had to be given to the education of boys because the economic and social development of the country would as far as the immediate future was concerned would be largely dependent upon them.

To plan for the education of girls and women required looking ahead, beyond the unemployment and stagnation that characterised the Libyan economy, following the ending of Italian subsidies, which had been largely responsible for the general prosperity which had attended the years of Fascism ([6]). For the moment at least, whatever the manifold usefulness of women in the home, there was no place for them in the marketplace, where men were in a traditional society still the bread winners.

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* United Nations Technical Assistance Program, *Op.cit.*, p.114

[6] United Nations Technical Assistance Program, *Op.cit.*, p.114

The message was however being imparted under the B.M.A. that methods of production and general living standards could only be improved through education. "Pacifico Penetrazione" had also sought to get a similar message home but it was unfortunately inseparable from political messages imparted by the colonial system as such which the Arab population rejected. Women as much as men accepted the need for change and development and wanted increasingly to be part of this experiment. For both men and women, future economic prosperity would increasingly be seen to depend upon being able "to make use of these opportunities" and for this " a good elementary education is necessary , to serve as a firm basis for learning these new skills." ([7])

Unfortunately, under the uncertain years of the B.M.A., when stagnation became general and investment virtually non-existent, the economic role of women remained what it had been before, and was still largely outside the home. Only as prosperity started to return in the late fifties did opportunities for the employment of women begin to appear in the market place. Before these developments, educational changes had to be in keeping with the basic mood of the country, which as Steele-Greig remarked, might change but only "slowly" given that Libya was still by all the available indices regarded as being one of the most backward societies in the Middle East, lacking as it did, following 30 years of Italian colonial rule, the educational facilities developed in Egypt and North Africa.

This, unfortunately, was one of the dilemmas of the B.M.A. that whereas its existence raised expectations amongst the Arab population, the capacity of the regime to satisfy these expectations was extremely limited Female education was a case in point that while being far from intrinsically opposed to the idea, the B.M.A. lacked the means to carry it very far. Even when the B.M.A. was almost over, further expansion of female education, as of boys, would have to await more prosperous times. It was important at this point not to burden the country with an educational system it could not afford to run in the future. What facilities had been developed in addition to the basics of elementary and some secondary education depended upon foreign aid - support without which they would not have been possible.

If the economic argument for any expansion of female education was unpromising under B.M.A., other grounds for action were considered relevant, "civilising mission" divested of its political associations, might come into its own in this sphere, though on a limited scale. Always happy to be following Italian precedents, it was a such embraced Steele-Greig who saw his role in this respect, less as a means of securing Arab approval for the B.M.A., but more in the guise dispensing "sweetness and light." ([8])

The B.M.A.'s policy therefore regarding female education was primarily to pursue low-keyed altruism and in this respect bears some affinity with the Italian notion of "civilising mission". As such therefore it was utilitarian rather than economic or political, falling into the

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[7] *Ibid*

[8] Steele-Greig, *History of Education in Tripolitania*, Tripoli, 1948 p.37

Chapter Eight: Educational Training and development (Part One)

"Vocational schools are just as indispensable in the colony as private and secondary schools, whether for metropolitans or for natives." (*)

Italian Policies

Given that the B.M.A. entered less into an inheritance and more into a political and administrative vacuum when it undertook the burden of managing the affairs of the former Italian colony of Libya in 1942, until the major powers could find a way of disposing of the Italian colonies, it is necessary to look at events before this date if light is to be cast upon subsequent developments under the B.M.A. Firstly, it is necessary to recognise that little remained from the previous regime apart from buildings, all personnel having left and documents on the administration of the colony having been removed to Italy or destroyed. The return of Italian teachers to run the Italian schools was the only exception to a situation in which everything was otherwise run by British personnel . This was a confusing situation for the administration to be in, especially with regard to matters connected with education. With the help of Fulvio Contini, the former Italian Director of Education for Cyrenaica, Steele-Geig was enabled to reopen not only the schools for the children of Italian residents but also most importantly for Libyans too. When it came, however, to vocational education and eventual development in the form of Libyanisation neither Fulvio Contini or Steele-Greig had anything to offer and matters fell into the hands of the Chief Administrator, Brigadier Blackley himself. In his handling of these matters, Blackley, however, found himself dealing with problems in terms of a bureaucratic system that had been largely set up by the former Italian colonial regime, even if controlled if not exclusively staffed by British personnel, though there were still many Italians still working in the Administration, especially as medical personnel. Also despite Steele-Grreig's reservations on the subject, the Department of Education became involved, at least indirectly, in a range of activities, such as Libyanisation, which technically at least were beyond its immediate area of concern, namely the running of the school system. Furthermore, although many B.M.A. personnel would have preferred to see a clear cut between the former Italian colonial regime and themselves, they became increasingly preoccupied with the affairs of the former colony upon a range of related issues.

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* Angelo Picciolli *l' instruzione publica in Libia, Parte Prima : La Libia Venti Anni Di Occupazione Italiana*, Tomaso Silleni, Seconda Edizione, Roma, MCMXXXIII, p,119

Italian policy upon subjects like vocational education and various aspects of Libyan development in the economic sphere after 1922 did exist at least on paper; but was heavily clothed in the political and cultural mentality of colonialism. This in Libya was summed up by the term "pacific penetration" by which was meant the attempt by the colonial authorities to influence the lives and behaviour of the indigenous population with a view to bringing them into a relationship of collaboration with the regime. ([1])

This policy was formulated by the first Minister of Colonies, Pietro Bertolini and applied to Libya as early as 1913 in his initial educational ordinance. In this document, it was accepted that the curriculum of the Muslim schools in Libya be directed towards vocational and agricultural education, expressed as "spoken Italian, hygiene, morality and love of the soil". ([2]) Vocational education was accordingly viewed as the teaching of particular skills to an "élite workforce". A more general type of vocational education was also to be provided in the elementary schools which in rural areas were to give practical guidance on agricultural matters. ([3]) It is therefore all the more curious that the Bertolini ordinance of 15 January, 1915 omitted all reference to the provision of vocational education, as part of the elementary system of education for Arabs. Vocational education was instead confined to special institutions, such as the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli and a specially projected School of Agriculture. ([4]) The problem was the Italian Government was always looking for the convenient cost-effective way of introducing a system of education in the colonies so overlooked the fact that the existing School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, originally set up by the Turks in 1896, was an eleemosynary or Islamic institution. As such it was technically beyond the control of the Italian Government being controlled by the statutes of Auqaf-El-Sur ([5]). Again nothing could be done immediately to implement the Bertolini Ordinance at the existing school of Agriculture, as the Italians had initially hoped. This had also been set up by the Turks prior to their departure from Tripoli, following the Treaty of Ouchy which had concluded the Italo-Turkish War, but had never been opened for teaching purposes. ([6])

Neither the Colosimo proposals of 1918 ([7]) or the educational provisions of the Fundamental Law of June 1919 ([8]), produced any new Italian initiatives regarding professional education. Whatever was available in Libya, continued as before the Italian occupation, to be taught in either the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli; or at the Girls' Italo-Arab School in the Shara Misran. Meanwhile, attempts to implement the educational

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1 *Ibid*, p.111
2 Mamias Report of July, 1913, p.7
3 *Ibid*
4 See, Arti 1,2,18, R.Decreto, 1946, n.56, Gazzetta Ufficiale del 13 Febrio, 1914, no. 36
5 See MAI-AS, Assetto Dei Servizi Civili 1911-1919, p.113, Fasc, 1-2, Systemazione dei beni auqaf 1911-1916, C.A. Nallino, 27 Luglio, 1916,
6 See Caruso Ingillieri, *Op.cit.*,p.2
7 See,Colosimo report, *Op.cit.*, Professional Education, p.373
8 See, Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania, Arts. 10, 11 & 12, B.U.C., 289

provisions of the Statutes of Cyrenaica had produced, albeit temporarily, the Bengasi School of Arts and Crafts which unlike its namesake in Tripoli was to be both set up and controlled exclusively by the colonial authorities as an Italian government institution. ([9]) Attempts after 1922 in Tripoli to develop some form of vocational education for Libyans would largely as before depend upon what use the Italian authorities could make of the School of Arts and Crafts for this purpose. Also, in the case of agricultural education, the School of Agriculture set up by the Turks in Sidi Mesri, but not yet used for educational purposes.

Unfortunately for Italian plans, the educational and disciplinary situation at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli between 1911 and 1922 had fallen into a condition of more or less complete stagnation and decay. Upon the reform of this institution, however, seemed to depend the future of vocational education for Arabs in Libya at this time. The Ministry of Colonies therefore in 1926 ordered a special report to be drawn up on the school by the then Superintendent of Education, Dr. Angelo Piccioli, a official of high critical acumen. ([10]) Piccioli's extensive report, which was never fully implemented, was intended to provide a plan, whereby the school could be regenerated and made to serve a wider purpose than had been intended by its original founders. Intended to serve as an orphanage and institution whereby orphans could receive some form of training in a craft or skill that would enable them to survive upon leaving the shelter of its walls for the wider world. The general plan for vocational education in Libya of which the School of Arts and Crafts was to be so central a feature had been laid down by Piccioli's superior Rome, the celebrated Dr. Rodolfo Micacchi. This plan for Arab vocational education was not intended by Micacci to be particularly extensive, the level of economic activity in Libya to which any scheme of educational training should be related, not being considered sufficiently substantial to justify an elaborate programme of training for Libyan tradesmen and artisans. ([11])

Micacchi's approach was in line with the government's extreme frugality whenever it came to any question of providing actual educational facilities for the indigenous population. Almost Malthusian in his approach to vocational education for Arabs, Micacchi derived his more direct inspiration from the ideas and work of the American, Senator Combes in Algeria. This view, whereby supply was always seen to follow demand served post-liberal and Fascist Italy until the era of demographic colonisation. Then the almost opposite notion of syndicalism, an inverted form of state socialism, came into fashionability with the creators and propagandists of imperialism. ([12])

Educationally, the Combes' view as transcribed by Michacchi implied that it was both useless and educationally dangerous to provide the native population with knowledge and

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[9] See Appleton, Op.cit., re Chpt. Nine: Professional Education, p.287
[10] Angellio Piccioli, *Op.cit.*
[11] See, Micacchi Report, *Op.cit.*, Insegnamento Agrario e Professionale, p.166-173
[12] *Ibid*

skills for which there was not a commercial market. There had to be first a need for carpenters and builders before money and expertise were lavished by the state upon creating a supply of them. ([13]) Almost designed to give capitalism a bad name, these distortions of laissez faire economic principles were used by Micacchi to try and justify the Italian approach to vocational education for Libyans even before Mussolini sought to impose such a system after 1922. In practical terms Micacchi had concluded, and Piccioli after him, that in the circumstances of post-war Libya, there was hardly enough work in the principal towns and urban centres to occupy Italian operatives. Would Libyans therefore who had received an expensive vocational education be able to use the skills they had acquired not in towns but in their own villages or tribal locations? But here too there was neither need nor demand for such operatives, so why waste government money in developing such an additional workforce in the first place? ([14])

Yet sooner or later, even the most hard-headed and bigoted of colonial officials, would have to recognise that "civilising mission" and "pacific penetration" implied schemes of vocational and agricultural education for Libyans that would compliment in some degree, the advanced plans for the mass settlement in Libya of Italian peasant farmers. the thinking on these subjects had been provided by Micacchi before the era of mass colonisation but was still considered relevant by his successors. Professional education, Micacchi argued, should be of two kinds: the first of a purely preparatory nature, to be conducted in all the rural schools, where it should consist of manual work with a practical aim. Love of the soil and manual dexterity, such as would be required for the repair and manufacture of domestic appliances, should also be encouraged at this stage. If these aims, Micacchi believed, became the basis of government policy in the field of professional and vocational education towards Libyans, Italy could avoid creating a class of discontented operatives unable to put to profitable use the skills they had so arduously acquired. This had been the fate of other colonial powers such as France in North Africa where enlightened educational policies had created not only discontented intellectuals - products of the Franco-Arab secondary schools; but also a new proletariat of skilled and semi-skilled workmen who unable to find productive employment turned to political agitation against the colonial authorities.

Italy, Micacchi argued, could avoid this fate by adopting in Libya a via media between the two extremes by producing mainly the manually dextrous who in normal circumstances would have no difficulty in finding suitable employment in the familiar environment of village or tribe, where traditional ways of work were both understood and applied by the population ([15]) The danger of this approach was of creating a semi-skilled underclass of Libyan operatives who would be at the mercy of economic and political forces in the colony. Such ideas were not acceptable in the era of weak liberal governments but must have done much to prepare the way

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[13] *Ibid*
[14] *Ibid*
[15] *Ibid*

for the cultural separatism referred t oin fascist propaganda as the new "Islamic Policy" and culminating in the mid-thirties in the College of Higher Islamic Studies along with for artisans a form of craft-education, based upon the School of Arts and Crafts and the souk, whereby selected Libyan apprentices would be attached to a master craftsman and thereby acquire a traditional craft. These it was predicted would begin a renaissance of traditional crafts in Libya carrying on to future generations the glories of the Arab and Islamic heritage.

In the straightened circumstances of 1919, Miacacchi thought in more prosaic terms and was sufficiently old-fashioned to still recognise that a more rigorous form of professional and vocational education would have to be provided for Arabs at the secondary level, even if this involved setting up additional schools of arts and crafts for the purpose. Yet for the moment, he concluded, this training should be limited to those pupils for whom work opportunities existed in the current economic environment of the colony. Only by looking further ahead did he foresee the need to develop a class of master craftsmen and technicians to supervise the technical and artistic requirements of native industries. ([16])

Piccioli's transference in December 1924 to Tripoli as Italian Superintendent of Education brought about a period during which the ideas and plans of Rudolfo Micacchi, now in charge of the foreign and colonial schools, in the Ministry of Colonies were put into effect. Starting with a reorganisation and extension of the Italo-Arabs schools, he almost immediately commenced an in-depth enquiry into the history, organisation and management of the School of Arts and Crafts itself in Tripoli. ([17]) This at least had the effect of bringing about a reform of the school in 1925 on the lines of Micacchi's analysis in his report of 1919 upon the possible development of the colony. It also commenced a new period in the history of the school during which it was to undergo a series of reforms, designed to ensure not only its greater efficiency but also a more extensive use of facilities by both Arabs and Italians. ([18]) Still continuing its traditional function as orphanage, day boys were now admitted from Tripoli, and the syllabus was redesigned to provide both an elementary and craft education. ([19])

More controversial was Piccioli's plan to make a more intensive use of the school's craft workshops and machinery even to the extent of making them available at a price to local industry - a practice that had been going on illegally for some time already. ([20]) This certainly helped with the financing of the School of Arts and Crafts but it is doubtful if all the money so acquired was used for the purpose of Muslim education as the Statutes of the school would have required. More likely it helped also to finance the new Italian Complimentary and Technical School, to which Arabs were not allowed to enrol, at the rear of the School of Arts

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16 *Ibid*
17 See, Piccioli Report, *Op.cit.*
18 Contini, *Op.cit.*, p.42: Piccioi, *Op.cit.*, p.119
19 *Ibid*
20 Contini, *Op.cit.*, p.43

and Crafts and which also made extensive use of the former' workshops. ([21]) This phased reorganisation of the school of Arts and Crafts was undoubtedly a gross extension of the authority of the Department of Education into the affairs of what was essentially an Islamic institution with its own statutes. Designed to make use of the institution in the Italian interest, it did virtually nothing to extend and improve the facilities on offer to Libyans.

By a similar measure, Royal Decree, January 1926, the fascist authorities, established almost exclusively in the Italian interest the former School of Agriculture set up for the Libyans by the Turks. ([22]) The new school was modelled upon the Italian schools of agriculture (with necessary modifications to fit in with the climatic and soil requirements of Libya) and provided both theoretical and practical instruction on a four year basis. Like, however, the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, the education and training of Libyans rapidly became a secondary issue. As with the School of Arts and Crafts the School of Agriculture was fully exploited by Fascist propaganda to show that Libyans were getting a good deal when in fact the object of both institutions was to train Italians on the one hand to be intelligent efficient artisans and on the other to be intelligent and good farmers. Libyan education was to be confined to the practical side of the curriculum "as political circumstances were judged to be right." ([23])

Gradually, however, Micacchi's original idea of providing agricultural training for Libyans in rural schools replaced any notion of sending some of them at least to the newly established School of Agriculture. Certain Italo-Arab Schools therefore came to have attached to them agricultural sections in rural areas. ([24])

The final phase of Italy's development policy for Libyans was introduced in the thirties by Italo Balbo, Governor of Tripolitania from 1.1.1934 until 28.6.1940, when he was accidentally shot down in his plane by Italian gunners while surveying the Italo-Libyan frontier. By this time, with war on the horizon, Mussolini decided upon introducing the new Islamic Policy in what was basically designed as a propaganda move to counteract Western attempts to influence Muslim opinion against Rome within Libya itself. The possibility of introducing radical new measures to raise the educational level of Libyans to that of Italian settlers and residents had by now receded beyond recall. In such circumstances, the fascist authorities decided upon the best political solution they could devise in the form of "syndicalism" ([25]) Intended to counteract the effects of the political fallout upon the Arab population of the massive new waves of "demographic colonisation", whereby the best land in the colony was handed over on a plate to the landless of Southern Italy, Arabs were offered in

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[21] Ibid., pp.41-44. Angelo Piccioli, *Op.cit*, L' istruzione publica in Libia p.120. Appleton, *Op.cit.*, p.315

[22] See, D.G. 16 Gennsio 1926, No. 41 che istituisce presso L' istituto sperimentale agrario di Sidi Mesri, una scuola practica d' agricoltura, B.U.T., 5, 135

[23] Appleton, *Op.cit.*, p.316

[24] *Ibid*

[25] See, Gulielmo Quadrotta, Syilluppo e Realizzazioni Dell Artigianato in Libia, Roma, 1938 - Anno XVI, p. 2-3 This official pamphlet offers a unique breakdown of "syndicalism" as it was practised in Libya by the Fascist authorities, immediatley prior to the out break of hostilities with the Western Allies in 1939.

place of their lost land "equal and parallel development" with their Italian neighbours ([26]) Few Libyans seriously believed by this time that Italian rule was designed to "benefit both Italians and Libyans" as some apologists of Italian colonisation there still like to affirm. ([27]) "Equal and parallel development" nonetheless continued and the "Associazione Fascista degli Artigiani della Libya" was specially created to regulate and control the professional and social development of the Libyan artisan. ([28]) It is impossible to gauge now what effects if any this measure is likely to have had upon the actual development of the Libyan artisan. Certainly, a centre was established in Tripoli for the cultivation of traditional arts and crafts and various workshops were set up around a central courtyard for such a purpose. ([29]) However, it could hardly be regarded as a new policy in any definable sense of the word as it merely drew upon existing levels of expertise, such as could be already found in the School of Arts and Crafts or indeed the souk itself where many alumni of this institution made a living. It is even so, a fitting comment on what was for Libyans a very barren era educationally, as in so many other ways, and as such had no historical follow on to the succeeding dispensation.

Initial Policies Under the B.M.A. (1943-1946)

The British recognised from the start of their administration that despite Arab yearning for an end to the war, a return of the P.O.W.'s and an awareness of some of the material benefits of Italian rule (roads, hospitals, electricity and abundant fresh water supplies), the Italians had never been very popular with the inhabitants of Tripolitania. To the Arab population, the so-called benefits of Italian rule had been "more than counter-balanced by its evils - expropriation of land for demographic colonisation, a horde of corrupt and inefficient officials, and perhaps most important of all, the lack of any advancement in the professions in business, in administration if their courts or of learning." ([30])

As the British were quick to note in the early days of 1943, "At the time of our occupation, there were in Tripolitania, no Arab doctors, lawyers or engineers or magistrates, in trade the Italian and Jew predominated and in the administration the Arabs held only minor posts. Arab children would leave school with neither a good education in their own language or in Italian. The Italians intended that the Arabs in Libya should be hewers of wood and drawers of water and provide a market for the output of Italian industry. The Arabs knew this and knew that the Italians were achieving their intention. They realised that they were one of the most backward

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[26] Claudio Segre, Op.cit, pp. 87-8
[27] *Ibid*
[28] Guglielmo Quadrotti, *Op.cit.*, p.6
[29] *Ibid* see, plates i-x
[30] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943, p.16

Arab communities in the Middle East" [31] This then was the true measure of Italy's "civilising mission" and a policy of "pacific penetration" over a period of virtually 32 years of uninterrupted Italian rule at the beginning of the British Administration. For this reason the B.M.A. was welcomed "for the hope of things to come" since even to a superficial observer, "the material prosperity of Egypt and the independence of Iraq were credits which Great Britain could claim. Britain stood for democracy with a capital D, and at a later stage perhaps for independence". ([32])

Unfortunately, while all this was true and much more besides, Britain could not even pretend, like the Italian colonists in Libya before them, to have even the most superficial of "civilising" missions, only a policy of "care and maintenance" and a dry, if not at times cynical espousal of International Law as determined by the Hague Convention. Barely a month following the start of the British occupation, the Arab population quickly recognised that for whatever reasons, their new conquerors were certainly not bearing gifts. At least under a third rate power like Italy, there had been some material benefits, but under British rule there were few if any. Thus in the summer of 1943, a reaction had set in amongst the Arab population as the cost of living increased, the price of goods on the black market soared, the currency had become devalued, taxation had increased, wages increased, trade remained at a standstill, shops empty and lands still expropriated by the Italians not returned to their previous owners. ([33])

In such circumstances, any hope of development at the level of vocational education seemed slight if not ridiculous. Whatever efforts the Italians had made in this area, such as the much trumpeted policy of "equal and parallel development" with its accompanying program of so-called technical, artistic and commercial assistance to Libyan craftsmen and artisans had disappeared for ever into the dustbin of history. All that was left for the British to get to work upon was the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, in which vocational education had at least in part survived the Italian regime. Later, as new political initiatives gradually manifested themselves, more ambitious programmes, such as those associated with Libyanisation might be attempted; but unlike Cyreanica, where a future government of the Territory was already in virtual formation under the Emir Idris El-Senusi, Tripolitania was leaderless and powerless to take steps at this early stage that might have filled the vacuum left by the departed Italian regime.

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[31] *Ibid*
[32] *Ibid*
[33] *Ibid*

III The School of Arts and Crafts

"The Arab Trade School - Madressa Fanun Ua Sanaa - is a noteworthy institution." (*)

The School of Arts and Crafts had remained open, along with the Bishop of Tripoli's school, throughout the emergency caused by the war, even following the advance of the 8th Army after the Battle of Alamein. (34) This was extremely fortunate for the school and probably did more than anything else to save it from the bouts of looting that occurred in the early months of 1943, following the Italian and German military evacuation, when many schools were literally stripped of everything moveable and immovable, leaving them often no more than "empty shells". (35)

As Steele-Greig commented, "whether this action was done purely for gain or spite will never be known". (36) More looting and damage occurred when many schools including this time the School of Arts and Crafts, were occupied by the Army, since, " not all soldiers appreciated the value and future use of the school and its equipment". (37) This, however, was no new experience for the School of Arts and Crafts, then occupied by a Royal Airforce Barrage Balloon Unit, with the orphan boys still continuing to reside there as indeed, had their somewhat distant predecessors, when the school had also been used as a barracks at the start of the Italian occupation itself in 1911. (38)

A) Administration

Under the B.M.A., and the evidence is far from substantial, it would appear that the School of Arts and Crafts in the main reverted to the way its affairs had been managed in Turkish times, even if parts of the building were used in ways not envisaged by its original founders, as for example when use was made of the premises as a Girls' Teacher Training College. In other words its unbroken tradition as a place of refuge for orphan boys, who were trained on its premises in arts and crafts or some other profession, from which they would be able to make a living on leaving the shelter of its walls.

During this phase of its history, the connection with the existing Italian Technical school appears not to have continued, though of course the Italian schools as such continued to cater for the needs of the still considerable Italian community. The use of the school workshops by

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* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p.35
34 Steele-Greig, *Op.cit.*, p.28
35 *Ibid*, p.31
36 *Ibid*
37 *Ibid*
38 *Ibid*, Official sources indicate that there were 77 orphan boys in the school at this time

local business interests also appears to have fallen into abeyance, and for the first time ever, a Libyan rather than a Turk or Italian became its "able Arab director". ([39]) As in Italian times, the overriding control of the school rested with the Director of Education, now Major A.J. Steele-Greig and a committee of Arab notables who were in effect the trustees. ([40]). With the exception of the appointment of an Arab director, this had been the administrative system in Italian times, during which the school had undergone some quite radical changes. The original Auqaf, whereby the institution had been funded, was sequestrated by the Colonial regime, funding instead coming directly from the colonial budget. The collapse of the colonial regime, also meant that the school at the start of the British Occupation was without any official funding, as the original funding from Auqaf-El-Sur could not be restored. ([45])

In these circumstances, the B.M.A. was obliged to step in and provide the school with sufficient funding to keep it going, but little more, and certainly nothing in the way of financing that would be required to turn the institution into a centre for vocational training in the territory, as Ralph Micacchi had initially dreamed of doing. ([46]) Instead the subsidy consisted for the most part of wages for the staff ([47]). Because of the crisis in funding and the financial limitations affecting the Administration's begetting arrangements, the old-time method of maintaining the school was reverted to and, as in Italian times additional income was again derived from the production and sale of touristic items, in this case to the British troops.

The ability of the school to fund itself had been tested in the first year of the B.M.A,. even before the Administration agreed to subsidize the payment of teaching staff, and output from sales, "particularly of pottery" to the British troops had put the finances of the institution well into the black. Unfortunately, a shortage of basic raw materials threatened the future of this entrepreneurial exchange, and notes the Annual Report, "the lack of glazing powder has now caused output to virtually cease".

Fortunately, the financial well-being for the school was not entirely dependent upon its output of pottery, and the report again notes that a "master cobbler had been engaged and the boys are learning bootmaking and repairing". Whatever the educational merits of "bootmaking", and it should not be forgotten that the school exists to train boys in a skill or craft, the activity proved "very profitable to the school" at this difficult stage in its existence. ([48]).

The continuance of such methods of financial survival, also enabled the School of Arts and Crafts to be "financially successful" during 1945, but concern that the school was again becoming a souvenir factory, which it had been its fate under Balbo's regime were now being

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[39] B.M.A.., Tripolitania, 1944,p. 35
[40] Ibid
[45] Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p. 35.
[46] R. Micacchi, op. cit., pp.166-173
[47] Annual Report Tripolitainia, 1945, p. 35
[48] Ibid

voiced. As a result of such criticism, the orientation of the school towards the commercial exploitation of its products, however lucrative, was brought to a definite halt, and all income from such sources of commercial activity was accordingly terminated. ([49])

The decision of the Administration in Tripoli to re-establish the School of Arts and Crafts upon its original footing, in accordance with the intentions for its Ottoman foundees was not an unpopular move in Tripoli, as at least it meant that the institution would finally come under Arab control, with its own administrative body chosen exclusively from local personages and without any strings attached. This in effect meant that the school became an orphanage continuing its original function of training the alumni in an art or craft. Unfortunately, the demise of the Aqaf-El-Sur meant that funds for the running of the orphanage and school would have to come from the B.M.A., which was an important precedent for the future since it meant that all funding would now come from the government, whatever that government might be, and the return of the Italian authorities was still very much a likelihood at this time.

On the other hand, the institution was again a purely religious and educational institution and apart from periodic inspection by the Department of Education was free to run its own affairs under its Arab Committee of Libyan Notables. Also for the B.M.A., this meant that it was carrying out limited responsibilities towards the institution as determined by international law. According to this definition of its role, no mandate existed to transform the School for Arts and Crafts into any thing other than what it had been in the past, namely an orphanage and vocational training centre for the exclusive benefit of its alumni.

B) Curriculum

The B.M.A.'s decision not to attempt any transformation of the School of Arts and Craft, as would later be recommended in 1951 by the UNESCO Committee of visiting experts, into vocational centre for Tripoli, and even the territory as a whole, meant that curriculum at this point would revert to what it had been under the Turks. This of course now meant that the curriculum would express the previous social, religious and economic goals of the institution but little more. ([50])

It does appear, however, that the possibility of engineering changes in the nature and goals of the institution to make it reflect contemporary realities and permit future evolution upon lines of a vocational centre for general use was mooted at this time. Such ideas, however, did not find acceptance amongst the Committee of Libyan Notables running the School. Instead, fearing perhaps a recurrence of the troubles which had in the past sadly affected the running of the School they favoured a more conservative regimen, in line with the original dispensation

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[49] Ibid

[50] R. Micacchi, *L'Enseignment Aux Indigenes Dans Les Colonies Italiennes Dependent Directement de la Couronne*, Institut Colonial International, Session de la Haye de 1927, Rapport Preliminaire Bruxeles, 1926, p.545

originally safeguarded before its abolition ([51]) by the Auqaf-El-Sur. This was designed to ensure the maintenance of a purely eleemosynary institution run on Islamic Lines, all other ideas being rejected by the Committee of Notables, ([52])

The clearest expression of the nature of this curriculum in print is provided by Piccioli in the course of his report of 1926 on the history, organisation and administration of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli. ([53]) "In Ottoman times", wrote Piccioli, "the School had offered a six-year course consisting of six classes, five of which were preparatory (elementary geography, history, arithmetic, geometry, reading and writing in Arabic and Turkish, the Koran and religious doctrine) with the remaining classes being professional. In the professional course, Piccioli added "following the daily two hours of general education - and lasting until one hour before sunset, the following skills were taught: shoemaking, carpentry, fitting and mechanics, tailoring, brass and copper work, saddling, building, typography, gold and silver work, along with special crafts reserved for girls (weaving, carpet-making and seamstressry) which were conducted in a special girls' section of the school." ([54])

Following the revival of the school after a long period of decay and neglect, in the late twenties by the Italian governor De Bono, the original pattern of the curriculum, with the exception of the teaching of Turkish, was re-continued. This is confirmed by Contini, who while adding that the school was substantially reformed in 1925, following the proposals put forward by Piccioli in his report of that year (though for some strange reason dated as 1926), ([55]) Despite the changes which overcame the functioning of the School, as it was opened up to the Italian interest, especially under Governor Italo Balbo, the curriculum would have continued to be followed in the remaining years of the Italian Administration and on under the B.M.A. for the Moslem pupils.

As no vocational schools as such were to be set up, though vocational training would be an integral part of preparation for independence in the late forties, it is important to recognise the nature of what was essentially a standard curriculum for the School of Arts and Crafts, especially as this institution was the only serious vocational training establishment in the whole of the territory. In this respect Fulvio Contini provides us with the following outline of options:

a) an embroidery section

b) a weaving section

c) a carpentry section

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[51] Appleton, *Op.cit.* chpt, three, Direct Rule and the Libyan Schools 1911-1919, IV Policy Towards Professional Education, p.85

[52] Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p.35

[53] Angelo Piccioli, *Op.cit*, p.16

[54] *Ibid*

[55] *Ibid*

d) a bookbinding section
e) a silversmiths section
f) a painters section
g)a bricklayers section

Contini informs us, as is clear from any study of the internal running of the school during the later Italian period, that there was an enormous machine-workshop in the school, with specialised sections equipped and operating as forges, lathe-shops, welding and soldering shops, foundries, automobile repair shops and finally an enormous workshop for the manufacture of wooden objects. In addition there had been established a section for the production of ceramics and another for the hotel industry. ([56]) What Contini neglects to add to his lengthy description of the workshops was the additional information that under the preceding Fascist Administration those facilities had been the virtual exclusive preserve of pupils from the nearby Italian Secondary Schools and such businessmen as had obtained from the colonial authorities direct access and use of them. This was something Italians under the B.M.A., especially in the early phase when it was hoped that Tripolitania would revert to the Italian flag, were anxious to play down of forget entirely: but to claim that Libyans had equal access to them or that they were there for the exclusive use of orphan pupils at the School of Arts and Crafts itself was just propaganda repeating itself ad nauseam.

Balbo had recognised the need to compensate for depriving the native population of any form of modern education and training s workmen and artisans, such as was being provided for Italian subjects in the excellent Italian secondary schools in Tripoli and the workshops of the School of Arts and Crafts, by developing the traditional arts and crafts option for Libyans. This of course was the function of the Fascist syndicate for Libyan artisans intended on paper at least to offer the same equity as was being offered by the state in the "Fascist Syndicate for Italian Artisans". ([57]).

IV Attempts to Develop the School of Arts and Crafts Beyond its Traditional Role.

Not surprisingly under a Libyan Administration, reaction to a curriculum dominated by arts and crafts and the virtual transformation of the school into a "commercial concern, catering for a souvenir hunting public, rather than an educational institution meant for the training of young artisans" was not slow to surface. A scheme was accordingly submitted to the Administration, whereby the school was accordingly submitted to the orphanage and training institution, still in the field of arts and crafts but within terms of the accepted educational conventions, This was

[56] See, Contini, *Op.cit.*, p.42
[57] *Ibid*

accepted by the B.M.A. which appears to have had no alternative ideas to offer on the subject and the school was allowed to revert to what it had been in Turkish times. ([58])

Yet it could be argued that in returning to the status quo ante bellum a valuable opportunity had been lost in developing the school in the interests of the territory as a centre for vocational education. Such a reform would only have been inconsistent with the B.M.A's role if it had acted against the interests of the Moslem community or without its consent. The problem with so-called reforms under the Italians was that they had been neither in the interests or with the consent of the Moslem community. The result, however, of these reforms was to develop the School of Arts and Crafts and its surrounding institutions, such as the Italian Secondary Schools, the Complimentary School and most importantly the Scuola D'Aviamento y Professionale into a centre of unrivalled technical an educational expertise. True the workshops may have been plundered by the invading soldiery, but they were British soldiers not Italian of German soldiers, as has been noted on page 187. Also, the Italian secondary schools in the immediate vicinity of the School of Arts and Crafts were falling into disuse due to the poverty affecting the Italian community following the collapse of the former colonial regime. In the circumstances International Law might well be seen as requiring the B.M.A. to do something about this situation if only to ensure that the status quo anti bellum was maintained.

As has, however, frequently been stated, the B.M.A.'s position was one of extreme ambivalence in a highly charged volatile situation in which Arabs, Jews and Italians were ready to blame the Administration for any infringement of their interests. Permission to sequestrate the Italian schools in the interests of the Moslem majority would never have been obtained from London; and it is most unlikely it would ever have been sought. At this point, any comparison with the conduct of affairs in Cyrenaica is irrelevant and erroneous as political, social and cultural conditions in the two territories were entirely different, however similar on other respects. Furthermore, any attempt to confiscate Italian property or interfere with the educational rights of Italians, however high-minded and well-intentioned, would have infuriated the new democratic government of Italy and outraged the Italian community in Tripoli.

When it came, however, to the management of the affairs of the School of Arts and Crafts, the B.M.A. was on firmer ground and a case for developing the school as a vocational centre for Libyan artisans would certainly have gained support of the Muslim majority for the B.M.A. International Law nonetheless did not require the B.M.A. to do more with the institution than it had to and this depended upon what type of institution it was seen to be. It would be helpful therefor to see whether the B.M.A. should have reformed the institution by

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[58] *Ibid*

looking more carefully at it in Turkish and Italian times and particularly at how the non-boarding element had been viewed then.

Pupils and Teachers

Any perusal of the documentation relating to the history of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli quickly conveys the idea that this was a religious foundation set up for the maintenance and training of either orphans or the children of very poor families.([59]) If therefore the legacy of Italian times, in the shape of up-to-date workshops, machines and tools was to be made use of them, it was clear that it must be in terms of the constitution of the school. Whether the B.M.A. had any obligation in terms of the International Law to proceed with such a reform is another matter, though by no means irrelevant to the B.M.A's position in Libya at this time. Certainly, even if the B.M.A did not attempt to improve vocational education in Tripoli by means of the School of Arts and crafts, the same dilemma could beset its successors, whether Italian or Libyan and this was still far from clear in the circumstances of 1945. The immediate practicality of a reform of the school by the B.M.A. is also largely irrelevant given that the question appertained to the development of the workforce of the territory in the near and if not immediate future. Steele-Greig's attitude to this issue was to view it as unnecessary in the immediate future. He believed that any attempt for vocational education would not meet with any favourable responses from the Arab population who were not interested in being trained for manual work only for work with a future managerial connotation. He had accordingly advised Blackley that any scheme of vocational training was "a waste of time with the Libyans" who did not want to become artisans. The brigadier ignored his advice on one occasion when he sent a group of young Libyans for training to the former Agricultural institute. On this occasion, Steele-Grieg's advice was correct, and on being taken out to start work on plantations surrounding the college, the students were shocked and dismayed to find they were expected to roll up their sleeves and start digging the soil. As a result, the project collapsed and the brigadier ended up with egg on his face. ([60])

Yet in the long run such attitudes had to be overcome in the interests for the country, though it is arguable whether the B.M.A was the best Administration to attempt this, rather than a national government of the future. Nonetheless, an attempt could and should at this time have been made by the B.M.A to at least improve vocational education in the schools. If not the School of Arts and Crafts should have been a candidate for reform. There the number of boys in the capital, Tripoli, could satisfy category number one, of being either "orphans" or "utterly destitute" was perhaps numerically insufficient. There were, however, very many more, on the other hand, definable as "being of very poor family" or at least of "poor" family

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[59] *Ibid*

[60] G.Quadrotta, "L'Ordinamento Autorizzato Per Nazionali" *Op.cit* p.6

must have included virtually the whole Arab population of the city if not the territory as a whole.

Indeed, it could be argued, that with the latter factor in mind, the Turks had originally in part at least, set about founding such institutions as the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli throughout their extensive domains in the previous century. ([61]) Moreover, not all these schools were orphanages, many being set up for the training of apprentices most of whom would have been boys from poor families. The Tripoli School of Arts and Crafts, however, seems to have begun its existence as an orphanage, which perhaps explains why it was set up, though later moved to its present location, at a distance of five kilometres beyond the city walls. Also, the Tripoli institution was not a government institution, rather being organised as an autonomous institution, with its own statutes and financing, though this was not always sufficient for its needs. ([62]) Once the era of colonisation began, the city of Tripoli rapidly began to spread beyond its walls eastward and with this increase in the commerce and activity of the city started the pressure, from a variety of different sources for changes to the nature and running of the School of Arts and Crafts, so that it could be used for wider purposes than those intended by its founders, the Wakf.([63])

In the tumult and uncertainty, however, surrounding the start of the Italian era in 1911, it was the school's facility as an orphanage that was most in demand, due to the increase in homelessness an destitution amongst the Arab population that created many homeless and often parentless children. Two years following the start of the colonial era, 1913 saw the school with a population of 120 orphans of both sexes, under the age for seven. A time of crisis that particularly affected the running of the school causing it to suspend all educational functions sue to the increase in the numbers of destitutes to which it had to attend. ([64])

By this time it became clear to the Italian authorities in Tripoli that the school was barely able to support from it own patrimony of 100 orphans, whereas in fact the numbers in need of care and attention far exceeded this figure, so requiring additional provision from the colonial authorities, if they were to be maintained there. ([65]) After 1913, the arrival of more settled social, economic and political conditions, at least along the coastal areas of Tripolitania, as a result of the Italians consolidating their control of the region, had the effect of reducing the refugee problem considerably.

Plans were therefore revived for an increase in the educational activity of the school and in particular for its opening up to Moslem children other than orphans. This development had undoubtedly established itself as a trend immediately prior to the Italian Occupation, as is apparent from the statistical evidence available form this period. By then, there were 120 Arab

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[61] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p.35
[62] Piccioli Report, *Op.cit.*
[63] Steele-Geig to Apleton, Barbados, 1981
[64] A.J. Cachia, *Op.cit.*, p.48
[65] Appleton, *Op.cit.*, Note 4

boys at the school of whom about 90 were orphans in receipt of general education and another thirty artisans. ([66]) Between 1918-1919 during which the training functions of the school virtually ceased, the number of enrolments increased to 175. ([67]) This rise was due entirely to the establishment at the school in 1913 of an Italo-Arab annexe. ([68]) By 1922, the School of Arts and Crafts had also become the principal Italo-Arab centre in Tripoli, with a total on the site of 243 pupils.([69])

The removal in 1913 of the Italo-Arab school from the old city, where since 1911 it had functioned somewhat unsatisfactorily as an annex to the original Italian elementary school, lasted until 1925. As such it functioned in tandem with the School of Arts and Crafts which continued as an orphanage. Unfortunately, due to a succession of ineffective and corrupt directors, it virtually ceased to operate during this period as a training centre for either arts and crafts or artisans. ([70]) The gradual establishment of the colonial regime in the region began after 1922 to have an impact upon the organisation and running of the school which from 1925 onwards changed considerably both as an orphanage and training centre, the Italo-Arab School being moved to another site. It was during these final 17 years of the Italian regime that it became a skill centre for the near-by Italian Complimentary School and Scuola D'Aviamento e Professionale, as well as being a factory for producing printed items and commercial wares.([71])

At the advent of the British period, therefore, the school had served a wide variety of purposes, not all of which had been educational, to a wide range of purposes and commercial interests. The pupils had been orphans and non-orphans from poor families, ordinary scholars from Tripoli, though the Italo-Arab Annex had been technically separate from the functioning of the School of Arts and Crafts as such, while using the same premises, and finally Italian pupils and trainee artisans from the Italian Secondary Schools.

As there are no separate sets of statistics, covering the running of the school and admissions to it over the years, one can only surmise that the figure of 182 boys provided by Contini for the year 1939-40 is correct. ([72]) for some reason, Steele-Greig also neglects to mention of it in his two short historical accounts of education in Tripolitania. ([72]) One is therefore left to conjecture that under the B.M.A., the school remained an orphanage with possibly 100 residents which available evidence suggests was the maximum it could accommodate. Certainly Steele-Greig himself affirms in 1948, by which time it had reverted to its original function as an orphanage that "the average number of boys being educated there

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[66] *Ibid*, p.92
[67] *Ibid*, p.87
[68] *Ibid*, p.88
[69] See Piccioli Report, *Op.cit.*, p.68
[70] *Ibid*
[71] *Ibid*, p.77
[72] *Ibid*
[72] *Ibid*

was 90". ([73]) There is no doubt that the situation would have remained the same when independence was declared though changes could have occurred subsequently. The dream of Rodolfo Micacchi, the former director of the Italian colonial schools, that the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli should become a vocational centre for the region, while being realised under the Fascist regime for the Italians, was never realised for the Arabs. It is perhaps one of the ironies of history that when the opportunity finally seemed to appear for the School of Arts and Crafts to become a vocational centre for the whole region, under a regime controlled by a nation that had liberated the country from the Italian oppressors, it merely reverted to the type of institution it had originally been under the defunct Ottomans.

No doubt had the political position in Tripolitania in 1942, when the B.M.A. commenced, been the same as it was in Cyrenaica, the School of Arts and Crafts would have had a different fate. Unfortunately, the political vacuum in Tripolitania under the B.M.A. and the general shortage of personnel and resources, combined with the fact that the B.M.A. was not intended by the Hague Convention to do anything more than preserve the situation in all its aspects as it had been when the Italian colonial government was in control, ensured that the institution merely reverted to the original pattern.

At least, however, the School of Arts and Crafts under the B.M.A. was not subject to the exploitation and neglect that had marred most of its existence until this time. By becoming again an orphanage and training school in traditional arts and crafts, the position was clear for the new independent government of Libya to determine what its future would be. By this time, the development situation in the country had considerably widened so ensuring that the School of Arts and Crafts need not be subject to further changes, as new schools and training centres began to emerge.

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[73] Contini, *Op.cit.*, p.42 and 68

Chapter Nine Educational Training and Development (Part Two)

"Few countries in the world are less advanced economically, have a higher proportion of illiteracy, or have been longer under foreign domination than Libya." (*)

As will have been observed so far, while the B.M.A. had a firm commitment to restore the educational system in Tripolitania as it had been in Italian times, this commitment did not necessarily extend to any further form of provision. Unfortunately the B.M.A.'s mandate was to continue long after the period originally envisaged for it, due to the difficulties experienced by the powers in determining the future of the Italian colonies.

The B.M.A. therefore was obliged increasingly after 1945 to rethink its position with regard to vocational education in general though this did not have any immediate effect upon the educational situation in the territory. In the latter respect the financial limitations imposed by Care and Maintenance ensured that only very limited measures were taken in this field at least as far as the educational system itself was concerned.

No firm policy was therefore originated with the result that in the case of one avenue where something positive might have been achieved, a reform of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, opportunities that might otherwise have been seized upon were allowed to pass by.

This refusal to become involved in vocational education by means of an existing institution which was crying out for reform was unfortunately typical of the B.M.A. which often seemed to see itself in the role of a caretaker administration in the territory. Such a policy was in marked contrast to Cyrenaica, where the political environment was so different from Tripolitania, enabling vocational education to move ahead rapidly.

If the B.M.A. did not then consider the development of vocational education in the territory as an integral part of its mandate under International Law, it would have to consider other ways of training Libyan personnel to fill vacancies created by natural wastage in the system of administration itself. Priority was therefore increasingly given after 1945 to education and training of personnel for the future manning of the infrastructure required for running the country. This was necessary both while the B.M.A. had itself finally passed away.

Before 1946 such training programmes were given less emphasis as it was still far from clear whether independence as such would ever take place. Until the Administration knew for certain that the Emir would be eventually installed as head of the government of united Libya its position with regard to the training of personnel was extremely ambivalent. Indeed in terms of International Law it had no mandate to commence what amounted to the devolution of authority in the territory. Until the legal position was crystal clear any major job-training scheme leading to a Libyanised work force in the administration itself was in many respects

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* B. Higgins, *Op.cit.*, p.7

contrary to both the spirit and the letter of International Law. Therefore, until the issue of Italian sovereignty in the territory was finally settled by the United Nations, Libyanisation would have to be a low-key issue involving the training of only essential personnel who could not be obtained from any other source.

Fear of contravening International Law was undoubtedly a factor in the delay of major Libyanisation programmes until they were too late have the effect intended. Had Libyanisation been introduced five years before it was a more effective administration would have resulted in 1951.

Libyanisation: Phase One

" The administration began to aim not only at removing the Fascist work but at laying sound foundations upon which any successor government might build in the future. " (*)

Sanderson's observations refer to moves towards some form of Libyanisation by the B.M.A. following the failure of the Bevin-Sforza initiative in the year 1948. This ended all speculation that Tripolitania might return to Italian jurisdiction and was met with great rejoicing throughout Libya. As such it marks the end of the marking-time era of British Military Rule and the start of a more dynamic period leading directly to independence. It must however, be noted that even at this phase it was still not finally clear that Libya would become an independent sovereign state or what form the final settlement might take. In fact both external and internal observers were far from united as to whether Tripolitania was in fact ready for independence yet and pointed to the weakness of the country in economic and educational terms.

"Care and Maintenance" was nonetheless over as such, since although Britain would have only limited funds to spend upon Libya, in the restricted post-war climate of rigid austerity measures and rationing, planning for the future of the country could now be clearer and more positive. Tentative moves away from a strictly applied "Care and Maintenance" policy had in fact been underway since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Italy. This, although due to be approved by the peace conference on 25 September, 1946 was not in fact finally ratified by Italy Russia and France until 15 September, 1949 but had a more or less immediate effect upon relations between the B.M.A. and the Libyans themselves. ([1]) In this sense, the final outcome had been recognised by the concerned parties, though it was not until the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty in September, 1947 that the B.M.A. officially received the green light to proceed with internal reforms. By the Treaty, "greater power" was given to the B.M.A.,

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* Sandison, *Op.cit*, p.92

[1] *Ibid.*, p9

"since Italy renounced her right and title over all her former colonies". Hence, political changes with a view to "training the country for self-government" were not undertaken. ([2])

These political preparations included, the setting up of Libyan People's Courts, in all districts, with local provincial headquarters, along with further measures, marking "real progress towards democratic government". These included the adoption of plans to "establish elected local government councils". ([3]) It should be added that the B.M.A. had in fact already begun a measure of Libyanisation, before these momentous changes had been announced which "was at first restricted to lower grade employees". ([4]) This could be called the first phase of Libyanisation.

The first so-called phase of Libyanisation was less a response to any legal ideological mandate than a pragmatic answer to the demands of the times. It contained three discernible areas: to provide employment and practical training to Libyans who might not have received elementary education, as in the case of the early police recruits; and to fill with Libyan personnel, vacancies created by the demobilisation of British servicemen. This process was at first "restricted to lower grade employees - clerks, police constables and customs guards". ([5])

Gradually, these initial categories of personnel were extended with the same aims in view to cover almost all the areas included in the existing administration, other than that is the political, military and diplomatic. These included the departments of Education, Legal Affairs, Finance, Customs and Excise, Custodianship of Enemy Property, Labour, Postal Services, Press and Propaganda, Police, Medical and Veterinary, Antiquities and Agriculture. It is safe to say that in almost all these Departments, Libyans were from the very commencement of the B.M.A., both employed and depending upon the skills required - provided with on the job training which in some cases, such as police, could be described, quite accurately, as "vocational training" or education. Steele-Greig, for example, asserts that in the case of the Transport Department, the "Road Transport Officer was able to train a number of boys in motor-mechanics which proved a huge success".([6]) Educationally, several of these areas would require both a level of educational attainment and vocational training, though the Annual Report only refers to Police and Medical services in this respect. Obviously, at this stage insufficient analysis had taken place as far as the determination of present and future education and training requirements were concerned, though this would have to change later as standards of admission were raised.

After more than thirty years of Italian rule, including 22 of the Fascist regime itself, the removal of which had required a World War of unprecedented ferocity, the re-establishment of the Tripolitanian Police was undoubtedly a priority. Not surprisingly, the very first plans for

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[2] *Ibid*
[3] *Ibid*
[4] *Ibid*, p.92
[5] *Ibid*
[6] Steele-Greig to Appleton, May 1983

the occupation of Tripolitania, included "the provision of classes of instruction in police duties for the newly joined officers". This was soon followed in March by the setting up of a training school in the ex-Italian barracks at Tarhuna with a composite staff of British and Libyan personnel. Initial courses of instruction were scheduled to last two months; but subsequently increased to three months. ([7])

Later additional courses for mounted personnel, inspectors, and those requiring refresher courses, were added to the school's curriculum. Of the 2295 recruits who passed out of the school at the end of 1943 598 had failed to graduate "for a variety of reasons". ([8]) Pay and conditions, along with other factor made for a high wastage rate of trained officers, and the force had become so depleted by December, 1944 when the actual strength was only 1328, whereas the "war establishment" required 1816. ([9]) further extensive training programmes were therefore constantly required under the B.M.A. to maintain the Tripolitanian Police on the required footing.

Extensive recruitment of Libyans into the police service had many educational implications since "literacy" was a sine qua non of entry into the police, except where an applicant had special qualifications, such as a knowledge of animal management, mechanical transport, etc., etc." (10) Despite such entrance requirements, by 1947 the force still contained "illiterates", though these had greatly diminished, which was perhaps a reflection of the increased educational standards in the territory. ([10]) Thus of the 794 applicants, 425 were accepted in accordance with the new educational standards. ([11]) This was reckoned, a "100% in excess of those for 1946". ([12])

The standard of intelligence was also improving slowly though the illiterate policeman was still an indispensable element in the force and often highly esteemed by his superiors. ([13]) many of these policemen, it was estimated, possessed great "powers of memory" and were the force's "most valuable policemen. "It is not clear whether the police Training School held classes for illiterates though it would be surprising if it hadn't. This is more or less confirmed from reports that in 1948 those recruits whose literacy was "not of high standard received tuition in the Arabic Language at the Police Training School, and for this purpose, Arab teachers have been specially engaged." ([14])

By 1948, however, literacy was being "insisted upon", as a condition of enlistment, and the percentage of literate members of the force was "higher than at any stage since the

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7 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1943, p.33
8 *Ibid*
9 Annual report to Tripolitania, 1944, p.26
10 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1947, p.31
11 *Ibid*
12 *Ibid*
13 *Ibid*
14 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1948, p.57

occupation". ([15]) By 1949, the inspectorate was opened to Libyan applicants, and two English speaking Libyan inspectors were sent to England on a special training course. ([16]) The Police Training School continued to provide "a good basic training for recruits, together with promotion courses for those selected as possible for N.C.O. rank and the Libyan Inspectorate". ([17])

The final year of the B.M.A. and the imminence of independence "attracted recruits of a better type" into the force and led to the imposition by it of ever higher standards of education and discipline. ([18]) The pressure for even higher standards culminated in 1950 in the establishment of a Cadet Officer's Training Centre, which was placed in the charge of a Grade II British Officer, following retirement, earlier in the year, as Commander of Metropolitan Training School at Hendon. ([19]).

Arab instructors were obtained from the former Palestine Police Force and the first course of 36 weeks was started immediately with 24 cadet officers drawn from the Libyan Inspectorate, ([20]) As no preparations had been made under the B.M.A. for the setting up of the Libyan Armed Forces, it is only with reference to the Police Force, that it is possible to get some idea of the educational requirements of the Libyan Armed Forces, when they were eventually set up, which was following Independence itself.

The Libyanisation of the Tripolitanian police Force was obviously a case of political reality assuming an absolute role over the political and diplomatic niceties of the moment. Clearly, the absence of the former Italian Police, and the Fascist antecedents of that force, required the creation of a viable alternative, as quickly as possible, if control over the territory was to be maintained by a so-called "military administration" in mufti. Yet the creation, organisation and training of the Tripolitanian Police Force was Libyanisation at its most important level, not only springing out of the needs of the moment, but without any international sanction or approval whatsoever. The same pattern was also to occur with another very important area upon which the Italians had prided themselves, especially in the quality and extent of the medical service which they had provided for the Moslem population, This had been regarded as almost as if not more important than education, since it was integral to "pacific penetration",

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15 *Ibid*
16 Anual Report to Tripolitania, 1949, p.48
17 *Ibid*
18 annual Report to Triplotania, 1950, p.54
19 *Ibid*
20 *Ibid*

and like education enabled the government to obtain the sympathy and goodwill of the native population, especially women and children.

It seems to have been important for the Italian propaganda machine to be able to show Italians actually attending to Arabs in a medical role, and there does not appear to have been any shortage of Italian medical operatives at this time. Therefore, apart from last minute provisions at the School of Higher Islamic Studies ([21]), virtually no effort was made to prepare Libyans for the future as a people, training them as nurses and doctors. Instead, as with everything else, they were to be kept in subservience to Italian personnel whether trained or untrained.

The numerous clinics, hospitals and medical annexes, established throughout the country by the Italian regime were therefore at the start of the B.M.A. staffed exclusively by Italian nurses and doctors without a Libyan in sight, except perhaps as a patient. ([22]) Unfortunately, the acute shortage of the former, who had mostly fled to Italy before the arrival of the B.M.A., produced a virtual complete breakdown of the Italian Medical Service, causing in 1943 a severe threat to the health of the territory and the army in particular. ([23])

Once this crisis had been dealt with by the then Director of Medical Services, Lt. Colonel Beamish, R.A.M.C., it might have been expected that the B.M.A. would begin training Libyans for the Medical services. This would have to have been purely at the level of nurses, as it had not the facilities or opportunity to educate and train doctors, which would in normal circumstances take many years to achieve for a country like Libya.

Initially, however, the burdens and challenges were too many for the B.M.A.'s hard-pressed medical teams to be able to devise programmes for the education and training of Libyans as nurses and medical assistants.

The steam, however was taken out of this issue by the return to the territory of many Italians who had worked in the hospitals before the arrival of the 8th Army in Tripoli. Nonetheless, the Medical Services were under considerable pressure which was aggravated in this first year by the reopening of the schools. This required that the B.M.A. provide on the spot medical service to meet the requirements of moment. Italy had ensured that Libya had one of the best medical services in the Middle East and the B.M.A., had to work hard to ensure the same standards were maintained after 1942. This included dental treatment. ([24])

Within a few weeks of the schools having been opened, all the children had been examined, and cases of trachoma isolated and the sufferers put into separate classes. Medical standards had been one of the achievements of the Italian colonial regime, and the establishment of peaceful and secure conditions ensured the maintenance of such standards

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21 See Appleton, *Op.cit.*, M.Phil, p.34
22 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1943, p.42
23 *Ibid*, p.42
24 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1943, p.44

under the Occupation. This was particularly the case in the schools, where inspections of all educational institutions became routine, and a close check was kept upon the general health of the school population upon a regular basis by qualified medical personnel. ([25]) Yet still no Libyans worked in the Medical Services. The first sign of Libyans at work in the Medical Service, was the placing in charge of many small medical dispensaries, of Arab medical orderlies in provincial locations. Also short courses, of two months duration were provided to train veterinary assistants, who following an examination, were offered employment in their departments. ([26])

By 1945 it was clear that the B.M.A. would have to remain in charge of the country for longer than was originally anticipated, and attempts began to train Arab nursing personnel. ([27]) initially, however, shortage of staff rather than the needs of the future or policy, was the motivating factor in this particular development. ([28]) Nonetheless, Arabisation now became the key word and by December, 1946 outlying dispensary, such as those at Nalut, Ulid and Jeffen were staffed exclusively by Arabs.([29])

In those circumstances, however, it was impossible to Libyanise higher grade positions following the increasing demobilisation of British personnel after 1945, and it therefore became increasingly necessary to rely upon Italian doctor, nurses and even religious to keep the hospitals running effectively. Even so, the shortage of personnel became acute, despite the arrangement of crash courses for the training of male and female nurses, from which the results were not reckoned good enough to maintain the quality of the service. ([30]) This included the training of additional medical personnel, such as local sanitary inspectors, when basic educational standards permitted.

The shortage of higher grade staff, however, persisted with the result that in 1947 the possibility of enlisting Arab doctors was reviewed without much progress. The problem was one of insufficiently high salaries, lack of job security and difficulty in securing suitable accommodation. Moreover, until the future of the country had been determined, new entrants to the service, especially foreign doctors, could not be sure that they were really welcome in a service primarily staffed by Italians. ([31])

The training of lower grade staff, however, proceeded apace, with the organising of more courses for Libyan nursing staff at the Tripoli and Misurata hospitals followed by the issuing of 8 diplomas. At this point the Department of Education was brought into the picture and 8 Arab boys commenced a higher standard than of nurse, so that they would be able to

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25 *Ibid*, p.64
26 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1944, p.30
27 Annual Report to Tripolitnia, 1945 , p.29
28 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1946, p.29
29 *Ibid*
30 *Ibid*, pp.29-30
31 *Ibid*

commence work in the provinces, where non-Libyans often refused to go, but where there was a desperate need for qualified medical personnel, ([32])

The need, obviously at this stage was to create more diversity in the service, by selecting from graduates of the basic nursing courses, those who could should go on to more specialised training. Hence in 1948, whereas 31 new staff qualified as nurses "4 of the best trainees from the previous year commenced their second year of training" specialising in hygiene. Moreover, if candidates showed themselves to be suitable for such courses, a similar scheme would be organised for the next year. ([33])

During 1949, training courses for nurses of "all nationalities" continued and in addition, the general medical courses for "selected students" proved satisfactory. Clearly by this time the long-term factor had entered into the calculations of the authorities, since 3 students completed their third year of training, and it was hoped to find students to commence first and second year courses. ([34])

In its final year, the B.M.A., though some success had been obtained in the training of nurses, it was nowhere near adequate enough for the staffing of the hospitals with Libyan personnel, something which still has not been accomplished down to the present. The training of doctors had not yet been touched upon and could only come following a development of the educational service as a whole. Consequently, Italian and foreign personnel continued to dominated in the Medical Service. ([35])

By 1950 it was necessary to recruit foreign Arab women to work in the hospitals, as most Jewish nurses had departed following the rapid disturbances of 1945. Also as Libyan independence became a political reality many Italian nurses decided not to stay on in the country. ([36]) Unfortunately, efforts to train Libyan replacements had largely failed. ([37])

The same problems prevented the training of local girls as mid-wives. ([38]) Obviously, there were still some local difficulties to be circumvented before the medical services could be sufficiently evolved t meet the demands placed upon it. This would again depend upon improving the quality of basic education upon which everything else really depended. Only when the latter had been achieved would the problem of female illiteracy be sufficiently reduced to perhaps successfully persuade the families of Libyan girls to let their daughters seek careers and employment in the hospital of the metropolis and provinces.

II. Libyanisation: Phase Two

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32 *Ibid*, p.37
33 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1948, p.53
34 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1949, p.23
35 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1950, p.26
36 *Ibid*
37 *Ibid* See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.48
38 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p.10

"The year 1947 will be remembered as a year of drought and hardship greater than any since the troubled times of twenties."(*)

Until 1947, the Libyanisation scheme had made steady if unspectacular progress, despite many difficulties and a number of setbacks, such as shortage of finance and time as well as the lack of adequate facilities in which to train the new Libyan personnel for the opportunities arising daily. The failure to develop the School of Arts and crafts into a true vocational centre, offering modern courses relevant to the needs of a post-colonial and developing society, along with the postponing of the opening of the new secondary school "with a strong agricultural bias" outside Tripoli were further factors in a difficult situation. ([39]) Even legally, it is not clear what the situation of the B.M.A. really was regarding the Libyanisation project as far as International Law was concerned. Steele-Greig simply regarded it as technically at least outside the sphere of activities of the Department of Education, sanction for it having been obtained by Blackley from his superiors in Cairo.

Elsewhere, however, support for Libyanisation came from boys who had completed their primary course in Tripolitania of 4 years originally commenced in 1943. "Successful graduates of these schools were by 1947 ready to be admitted to secondary classes in the larger centres." ([40]) Meanwhile attendance at Koranic Schools had by then exceeded 16,000 and a qualified Libyan Inspector had been appointed to take charge of them. ([41]).

At the level of adult education, and so-called continuation classes for the "partially educated", attendance was 2,600 students. ([42]) Moreover, there were 100 boys receiving technical training "to fit them for employment in a government department". Also 30 teachers had enrolled in the newly opened" Teacher Training School", though in effect this more likely referred to the special course for training elementary school teachers, which Steele-Greig had devised than a fully organised Training School as such, which for teachers was not finally opened until 1950. This is confirmed for 1948, when only in November "was the first teachers class opened. This had been urgently needed since 1943, but lack of finance had impeded the advancement of this important side of education. The class consisted of 36 selected candidates". ([43]) The B.M.A., attested proudly that, in all, "some 31,000 Libyans" were receiving some form of education, as against the "highest total under the former Italian regime of 15,921". ([44]) These successes were the culmination of 4 years of B.M.A. existence in

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* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p.9
[39] *Ibid*
[40] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.9
[41] *Ibid*, p.45
[42] Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1948, p.49
[43] *Ibid*, p.49
[44] *Ibid*

Tripolitania, which according to the B.M.A.'s mandate, should at this point have seen the territory handed back to Italy, following the ratification of the peace treaty with Italy in September.

It was however difficult to terminate the B.M.A. at this point without formally issuing to it a new mandate, that required both the development and intensification of the Libyanisation programmes, even though it was still not finally clear whether Italy's last-ditch attempt to retain Tripolitania, through the Bevin-Sforza initiative would succeed or fail, until it was rejected by the United Nations a year later, in 1948. Such uncertainty, vacillation, and of clear directives which could only be issued to the B.M.A. by the cabinet office in London, via the central Bureau in Cairo, but never were, was part and integral to the whole precedent in which it was placed in trying to provide effective government to Tripolitania at this most uncertain and difficult time in its history. Had the position of Tripolitania been the same as its sister province, Cyrenaica, where the Emir was all but installed as a ruler so much more beneficial to the territory as a whole.

Unfortunately, nothing was ever clear-cut in the affairs of the troubled province, and even at this belated stage the position was only similar to gazing into a crystal ball though the contours of the situation were becoming clearer. It was, however, increasingly apparent to the Administration that it must at all costs retain overall control of the political affairs of the territory until the final decisions for the future were made and power was handed over to the new government. It was therefore essential to increase Libyanisation and Libyan participation in the e running of the province without sacrificing final control yet. This was most important with regard to education, where affairs were still largely under the direction of the somewhat autocratic Major A.J. Steele-Greig with whom relations were difficult.

An Arab advisory committee was therefore set up for education by Blackley to "assist the department in maturing its plans" but primarily with a view to as ostensibly as possible increasing the political participation of the Arabs in the running of the territory. Membership of the Committee was therefore restricted to "leading members of the main Arab political parties" whose role was to be purely advisory. ([45]) Executive power, as before, was to remain in the hands of Director of Education, a pattern that was repeated with all the participation and Arabisation schemes that were developed during the B.M.A.'s final years.

Another similar scheme embarked upon by the Administration in the same year was that of Ahilya or Peoples Courts, which while offering little in substance, were again designed by the Administration to win time and convince the Arab population that the tide was flowing in their direction, when in fact it could still have been turned back. After all, Italy had merely "renounced" her colonies, which did not amount to abandoning all hope of ever having them

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[45] *Ibid*

returned. In fact, a "large majority" of Italians in Tripolitania and Italy itself, still favoured either the "outright return of Italian sovereignty" or "at last Italian trusteeship". ([46])

Such measures were in fact also window dressing in anticipation later in the year of the War Office Working Party which was known to favour increased Libyanistion measures. The War Office Working Party was also seeking increasing signs of development, particularly at the educational level, which was essential if the case for the independence of the country favoured by Britain was to be successfully presented at the United Nations. In return, the B.M.A. wanted the support of the War Office Working Party for projects, such as the importing of secondary school teachers and the implementation of a scheme for training Libyan apprentices in the various sections of the Administration.

The latter, worked out and implemented, "in conjunction with the heads of departments" was also operated in conjunction with the new Arab Advisory Committee, which had selected the boys for training from the many applications. The heads of the various government departments then interviewed all the candidates forwarded to them by the Committee before the start of their training programmes. Steele-Greig observed that a number of trainees "resigned" from their course but were quickly replaced by other eager applicants. ([47])

The boys accepted as trainees were often from rural districts with ages ranging from 13-20, who "besides learning a trade", received lessons in English, Mathematics and Commercial Subjects," so as to fit them to fill vacancies, which might occur from time to time in the various departments of the Administration". The trainees were also assisted financially, being "in receipt of an honorarium of Lst. 3 a month". ([48])

By 1948, the number of trainees appears to have fallen to 52 and these completed their course in October. The programme of training as such fell "under the War office Working Party's scheme for the training of Libyans to fill posts in the various departments of the Administration now being filled by Europeans". ([49]) This policy did not contain anything new, as Libyans had been under training with such a purpose in mind since 1943. If there is any change in the nature of this training it lies in its political orientation or dimension, as the Libyans under training are now to replace "Europeans", albeit British or Italians, the former being demobilised, the latter having lost their empire. Moreover, not only will they replace Europeans, in the job-allocation sense, they will replace them in the executive sense for the most part too. This was already apparent by 1948, when some "thirty seven" Libyan trainees had already been absorbed into the various departments and sections of the Administration as "permanent employees". Of those remaining, fifteen were described as having "commenced a

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[46] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.49
[47] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p.32
[48] *Ibid*
[49] *Ibid*

second year of training in technical work" ; for which one years training was not regarded as sufficient preparation. ([50])

The difference at this point between a normal course of technical or vocational education or training and the type of courses being offered by the B.M.A., lay on the one hand, in the job-related training factor, which was new, and had all kinds of other connotations, such as the political factors already referred to. These concerns are apparent in the preparations made for the second of such courses, whereby some fifty trainees (the number being limited by the jobs-related principle" to the number of junior employees which can be absorbed into the various departments at the end of the course of training") had been drawn up for interview, presumably again following selection by the Arab Advisory Committee.

The various curricula or syllabuses followed by the trainees is unfortunately not available for comment, though presumably it was based upon the previous pattern. What is known is that technical training in the job skills required by the departments took place in the mornings, with general education following in the afternoon. Where the training and education took place is similarly not known in the absence of any training centre as such for this purpose. ([51])

The schemes of training in operation had to be diversified to cater for the needs of the various departments, this meant not only training for apprentices, but also training for clerical and other administrative types of personnel as well. Here again, it should be recalled that the B.M.A. had involved Libyans in the various administrative and clerical tasks of administering the former Italian colony, though on an extremely low level from 1943. Then, and subsequently, most of these tasks had been in the hands of Italians, but in 1948, a "specialised Commercial Training Class" had been set up with the object of training selected Libyan applicants, "for training and other duties in the district administrative offices of the territory". ([52])

The class was composed of 18 trainees, the curriculum comprising "a thorough grounding in English, typing accountancy and general office routine". It was intended that these applicants should replace "expensive imported personnel". Plans were also laid for the training of a further 50 students for the next course, but as with much of the Libyanisation policy, the success of the plans was jeopardised by the "lack of general" education on the part of the entrants themselves. Obviously, "only when the Arab secondary schools have been working for several years..... and turning out students who have completed their full secondary education" would this problem be overcome. It would be "from these that future Commercial Training Classes would be formed". ([53])

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[50] *Ibid*
[51] Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1950, pp.34-38
[52] *Ibid*
[53] *Ibid*, p.260

In the meantime, the graduates of the new Libyanisation projects returned to their various district and provincial centres for on the job training. This included a "three month probationary period in practical office work", after the successful completion of which, "all the trainees became junior clerks". Even so, the number finally "passing out" was only fifteen, compared with the eighteen original entrants. The ones who succeeded in the course were declared to be "doing good work" and to have fully justified their training". ([53])

These trainee clerks had started the ball rolling towards the formation of a skilled cadre of Libyan administrative personnel who would be around in future to fill posts previously filled by Italians. In May of the same year, a further class was started in what was clearly designed to be an ongoing process, whereby a new Arab bureaucracy would be formed. Even so "the general standard of the candidates "was declared "to leave much to be desired". Hope, however, was expressed that "when a better educational standard has been reached by the aspirants for the trainee scheme that these difficulties of selection will be largely averted". The class was therefore deliberately kept small to ensure a higher standard with only 21 clerical entrants. ([54])

On the technical side, a "further course was commenced in February for technical trainees who spent the mornings in the department to which they were attached and the afternoons at school". Again the emphasis was on quality rather than quantity, as from a large number of applicants, only s limited number were selected for interview, with only "62 being chosen for work in the various departments". This totalled 51 in training with a further nine being held back from the previous year for further training. all of which, by December 1949 had been taken as employees. ([55])

This phase of Libyanisation projects was brought to a conclusion in 1950 when the several trainee courses, which had been set up "with the object of fitting young Libyans for various manual trades and non technical posts, such as clerks and accountants", were completed. These trainees were in February of the same year appointed to posts in the Administration, and a further 23 were appointed to different posts at various intervals throughout the year. Not all, however, completed their training satisfactorily, 5 not receiving any appointment at all. ([56])

The second clerical course finished in April, and "all its 21 students were appointed, after the usual probationary period, to posts in the Administration". ([57]) This system of educating and training applicants for posts in the Administration who had previously been selected by the Arab Advisory Committee followed by a further vetting by the various heads of department with the offer of a job in the Administration, following satisfactory completion of the course, now came to an end with the setting up in 1950 of the Tripoli Technical College.

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[53] *Ibid*
[54] *Ibid*
[55] *Ibid*
[56] *Ibid*
[57] *Ibid*

Greeted as a "major step forward" in the history of the territory, the initial organising and funding for the institution came from the B.M.A., with UNESCO agreeing to pay the salaries of the teachers. This was on the understanding that the Administration, and subsequently the Government itself, "defrayed all other costs and made its departmental workshops available for institutional purposes". ([58]) from this point forward it is clear that one era has been left and another dawned.

Before the end of the year, the Tripoli Technical Commercial School, as it was now known, had a "well qualified Egyptian Principal", along with "such staff as was available locally". Nonetheless it was not until January, 1951 that a start was made with the "preliminary general education of more than 200 students". ([59]) The problem, however, as always was who were the teachers going to be and from where would they be obtained. It was easy to acquire or even put up educational buildings but a much more difficult task to find the right pupils and students to fill them and qualified and experienced staff ready to work there.

The adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum, besides being a good logical choice, also meant that there would be less of a problem in obtaining the right teachers to work it. Therefore, negotiations were started with the Egyptian Ministry of Education to secure the secondment of a number of technical instructors, whose arrival was expected in February 1951. This was not the only problem in getting the school on a work-a-day footing because it did not as yet possess any workshops of laboratories of its own. Only by using the Administration's workshops could the school in fact be opened at all, and this dependence would have to continue until such a time as the college was equipped with its own plant and tools, either from U.N.E.S.C.O. or from the United States Government, under the Point Four Programme. ([60])

Education although important, as independence approached, was not the most important activity of the Administration. Much Libyanisation up to this point, as has been shown, was really vocational education in another guise. It may therefore be irrelevant to suggest that if the B.M.A. had set up vocational schools along with ordinary schools, in 1943, a proper system of vocational education would have been in position by the time it came to handing over control to a Libyan Government, or at least by the time Phase Two of the Libyanisation Programme commenced. As it was the B.M.A. at least bequeathed to the new Libyan Government a corps of skilled manpower which had been specially trained to replace British and Italian personnel.

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[58] *Ibid*
[59] *Ibid*
[60] *Ibid*

Chapter Ten: Educational Training and Development - Vocational and Agricultural

"For some time (the School of arts and Crafts) had tended to become a commercial concern, catering for a souvenir hunting public, rather than an educational institution meant for training young artisans." (*)

Under the British Administration, the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli eventually reverted to its original status and function before the reforms of the colonial era, more or less as it had been under the Turks. No attempt was made to develop it on modern lines or to set up a vocational training centre elsewhere, as had been done by the British Administration in Bengasi, for the teaching of modern vocational skills. The Italians had at least promised to import trained teachers of professional skills for the School of Arts and Crafts, though had largely neglected to do so, but under the B.M.A. the institution was largely neglected. Even the debate over the future of vocational education for Arabs in the territory which had been conducted in official circles during the early years of Fascism subsided under the B.M.A. with hardly a mention of the institution appearing in the official reports of the Administration.

Instead the B.M.A. decided to let the school go its own way under its own Administrative body which was constituted on purely traditional lines with the Department of Education exercising only nominal control over its functioning. Indeed with Steele-Greig at the helm, the authorities were initially at least mainly content it could pay its own way, through the sale of souvenirs to Allied servicemen. What educational activity there was at the School both before its reversal to its traditional role was confined to the school itself, at which teaching would have been related to that of a normal general education, such as was already provided in the existing school of the B.M.A. in the territory. In addition, of course, skills had to be imparted and the teaching of craft, such as "pottery, leatherwork, carpentry, shoes and aluminium" (for the making of pots and pans) etc. etc. ([1])

These skills would have to have been imparted by local craftsmen or by former boys, working at the school, rather than foreign teachers who would not have been employed for such low grade work. Any attempt to return the school to what it had been under the Italians, a Vocational Centre, but this time for Moslem Arabs, either did not occur to the B.M.A. or was rejected by Steele-Greig and Blackley. Nor is there any evidence that the school gave up its traditional role in favour of becoming a Vocational Training Centre for Libyan artisans during the immediate post-independence period. Vocational training, when it came to Tripolitania, would require the establishment of a different set of schools especially designed for such a

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* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p.35

[1] Steele-greig, *Op. Cit*, P.42

purpose, and with a new body of teachers, who had been trained in the requirements of technical and vocational education.

The reason why the vocational training was never developed on any scale in Tripolitania under the B.M.A. was basically because it was not regarded as either compatible with the B.M.A.'s mandate, since it had never been offered to them by the Italians, and also because all such essential training was covered by the Libyanisation projects, already referred to. Vocational education for Libyans had not been regarded as essential for Libyans ([2]) under the defunct colonial regime, because the colonists argued it would only bring them into competition with "metropolitani"; but would also defeat one of the main objectives for building a colonial empire namely to provide lands, homes and employment for Italy's excess population on the "Fourth Shore". By training Libyans in arts and crafts associated with their history and culture, Italy was helping them benefit from the peace and prosperity provided by the colonial authorities in their own country. Propaganda apart however, considerable prosperity had been created in and around the environs of Tripoli and in the country generally by the "vast military expenditure" which characterised the years of Fascism and this enriched both Arab and Italian. ([3])

Under British Rule, such expenditure had come to an end and "Italian subsidies, building programmes and tourist traffic were all swept away leaving the country to exist on its own resources" with the result that unemployment increased and the territory became increasingly "poverty stricken". ([4]) Under such circumstances, and given that "80% of the Libyan population is engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry" ([5]), there seemed little justification for the B.M.A. to go about trying to set up vocational schools, even with adequate resources which it didn't possess. This, however, is not to deny that educational programmes were needed, including training in light industry, handicrafts and agriculture. ([6])

I Vocational Education

Before the development of educational programmes, designed to benefit light industry, handicrafts and agriculture, there was the fundamental problem of illiteracy to deal with especially in the countryside and non-urban areas where educational facilities were either slight or non-existent. This had been unanimously agreed by a Commission of Experts who had visited the country in 1951 and had determined that "there must be a solid foundation of general education". New educational programmes were required to deal with endemic problem of "illiteracy" which the B.M.A. had already attempted to affect in the East and West of the

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[2] See, Supra, Italian Policies, pp. 206-217
[3] Sandison, *Op.Cit.*, p.94
[4] *Ibid*
[5] Higgins, *Op.Cit*, p.10
[6] *Ibid.*, p13

Country, including "improved facilities for elementary education and a general development of Libyan minds and bodies, must be among the top priority projects in any plan for the economic and social development of the country". (7)

By the end of British Occupation in 1950, while still burdened with this tremendous illiteracy problem that would take decades to solve, if indeed it could or would be solved at all, since all prognostications depended upon the change of social and cultural attitudes, and the allocation of precious resources in money buildings and manpower which as always were required for other as pressing projects, Tripolitania was in certainly in a better educational condition than at the start of that occupation in 1943. It is also clear that for the country as a whole to benefit from more specialised education, such as vocational schools, these should be designed to initially fit in with more general patterns of education at the elementary level. By the end of the British Occupation more specialised vocational and technical education had already been established in Tripoli but this was at a more specialised level than was required in the country as a whole. (8)

Unable to formulate a policy of vocational education for the country as a whole the B.M.A. had instead attempted to develop points of excellence to provide a few skilled artisans and technicians to deal with particular demands only. This was probably all the B.M.A. could hope to achieve in the circumstances of its mandate, and indeed the sorry state of the Libyan economy by the end of that mandate, required very few numbers of technical and skilled personnel to run it. These were primarily needed to replace the non-Libyan personnel, then in the "key posts" in order to achieve the "real economic independence" that the nationalists required. (9)

For this purpose, the new Ministry of Education, in co-operation with UNESCO and with the assistance of the Ministry of Public Works Department, set up in Tripoli a centre for the administrative and technical training of future employees and workers in the government service. (10)

This organisation not only filled an empty space left by the B.M.A., which as has been noted had done little or nothing until the end of its administration to facilitate vocational education and technical training, but also emphasised the importance now being placed in post-B.M.A. Libya on this aspect of development. The B.M.A.'s contribution had been to set up the Technical Commercial School and also go ahead with its Libyanisation Programmes which had been a select form of vocational education. (11)

The setting up of the Technical Commercial School was a must because without it "vocational training" could not have been effectively established, beyond the sphere of

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7 *Ibid.*, p.13
8 Le Tourneau, p.60
9 *Ibid*, p.66 also, see *supra*, pp.253-266
10 See, *supra*, Libyanisation, pp.253-266
11 Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.69

agricultural activity. This was observed by Le Tourneau in 1951 since the former "to a very large extent" depends "on the link between primary education and technical training". ([12]) "So long", he adds "as the young people leaving the primary schools have not reached a sufficient level of general education, or been instructed in technical training" ([13]) The most the B.M.A. could do in these circumstances was to have adopted the temporary solution, known as Libyanisation, which as has been shown was fine, as far as the specific requirements of the Administration was concerned, in so far as it produced a body of trained native personnel to take over from the other employees; but did not solve the problem referred to by Le Tourneau, which rightly became a number one priority for the government in 1951.

II Agriculture

"Agricultural improvement in Libya is a long-term project, and its success requires new attitudes and skills among the future farmers of the nation." (*)

As Claudio Segre writes, "The Italian dream of creating a fourth shore in Libya reached its peak in 1940. The war, " he adds, "prevented any further settlement and seriously disrupted the programme of agricultural development." ([14]) Even so, Tripolitania, "remained the home of an Italian community of nearly fifty thousand during the early post-war years." ([15])

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Italian government was concerned to either re-establish it sovereignty over Tripolitania (Cyrenaica had been vacated entirely by Italian colonists); or at least maintain some form of indirect control. The failure of Italy to regain control over her former province of Tripolitania was largely due to the back-lash of Arab sentiment against a country that had ruled them for over thirty years. The situation is well summed up in Segre's remarks that "For nearly thirty years the colonists had defended their creation as best they could. But were no longer masters of Libya, and without Italian political control, the colonisation rested on treacherous foundations." ([16])

Yet despite this apparent fact, the Italian agricultural settlements, or at least the farms which they comprised had nearly another 30 years still to run before their Italian resident-owners were expropriated and expelled from Libya in summer of 1970. ([17]) By this time, however, the number of actual Italian tenants of farms in Tripolitania would have been greatly diminished as properties were one by one sold off or part exchanged to Libyan owners.

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[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] Le Tourneau, Op.cit., see III. Training in Agriculture, p.78
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid*
[17] *Ibid*

In the early days of the B.M.A., however, while most of the country was farmed if not owned by Libyans, "The demographic villages and private concessions employed between a third and a quarter of Italians remaining in Libya" or around 16,000 farm workers, ([18]) It is clear therefore, that even at this stage the Libyans comprised by far the majority of those employed in agriculture in the territory which from the point of view of employment was indeed Libya's predominant industry. ([19])

As late as 1964, agriculture provided a livelihood for over 70% of the population, but at the time of the British Occupation, the figure was more than 80% and about a quarter of the gross national product. ([20]) These proportions therefore for the period under review (19442-1952) would have remained fairly constant after which they began to decline. From then on, in the middle sixties, the industry with the most rapid growth was petroleum. ([21])

The importance therefore of following educational projects with an agricultural dimension as early as possible for Libyans should not have needed to be emphasised. It was nonetheless not until 1951 that the first social and economic development plans for Libya were drawn up. ([22]). It need not also be emphasised that the responsibility for such plans, while falling to government were not part of the B.M.A.'s mandate, which deriving from International Law had neither the authority, manpower or finance to institute new policies, however vital for the well being of the country, merely preserve things as they had been under the pervious regime, until a legitimately constituted government authority came along to replace it.

In fact this was part of the tragedy, given that the essential conditions of the territory had not developed between the start of the Occupation in 1942 and its phasing out, nearly a decade later. Unfortunately during this time the fabric of the country - building, roads, services, economy - had all deteriorated. This of course was not the fault of the Occupation which was neither intended or equipped to develop the territory or allow the territory to develop itself. As a caretaker administration it was obliged for the most part to stand aside until a legitimate solution for the future of the territory could be found; or indirectly implemented strategies determined by the government in London in line with British interests in the area.

The only people to really suffer from this situation were the people themselves who unlike their neighbours in Cyrenaica were unable to get on with the development of their country in accordance with their own intentions and desires. This stalemate is reflected in the failure under the B.M.A. to do more than marginally affected the following educational areas:

"a) the adoption of primary schools to include agricultural education:

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[18] *Ibid*
[19] Educational Planning Mission to Libya, UNESCO, Paris, 1953, p.10
[20] *Ibid*
[21] *Ibid*, pp.10-11
[22] *Ibid*

b) the organisation of two agricultural training centres for training rural teachers and practical agriculturists;

c) the establishing of twenty-five scholarships for higher studies abroad which cannot be pursued in Libya." ([23])

Although all three of these points have absolute relevance as far as the development of the country is concerned in a most vital area, the "adoption of primary schools to include agricultural education" is perhaps the most important in order of priority, especially for a country like Libya, where agriculture is the dominant industry for most of population. This of course had been recognised by the Italians too, but as with many of their ideas, so good in theory, but never put into practice for the Arabs except perhaps in a very minimalist sense, if at all.

In 1953, however, it was a case of actions speaking louder than words as so much tie remained to be made up - and time was a shortage commodity for Libya. Experts in agricultural matters determined that special material would have to be devised for class-room and practical instruction ([24]), something which the B.M.A. had not possessed the expertise deal with, though it had successfully coped with a succession of the severest famines in the country's history between 1946 and 1948. Certainly Steele-Greig had not had at his disposal, the "four experts" required to draw up a relevant programme of agricultural education for the country in 1943, and nothing remained of relevance to schools in these areas from Italian times either.

Unfortunately, the refusal of the Administration to adopt the Egyptian curriculum in 1943 or during the early years of the Occupation may at this point have compounded the B.M.A.'s worst error or omission with the failure to develop elementary schools in the countryside with an agricultural bias. The final adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum while rectifying errors of judgement and omissions from an earlier phase, also in 1948 enabled educational materials produced in Egypt to be used in schools in Libya. Now, however, it was a case of more hurry less speed as these materials, while dealing with agriculture of relevance to Egyptian conditions, did not contain material that suited agricultural conditions in Libya. ([25]) as has been noted the problem still hadn't been rectified when Tripolitania became independent with the result that even as late as the mid-fifties suitable agricultural material had not been devised for use in the primary schools.

It would be extraordinary, however, if in the long period of Italian rule and the intervening British interregnum some ideas had not been discussed and even put into practice to the benefit

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[23] United Nations Assistance Program, *Op.cit.*, p.130
[24] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.79
[25] *Ibid* p.78

of the Libyan population in agriculture. At its simplest level, rural education as conceived in terms of placing at the disposal of students agricultural plots together with simple tools, such as hoes, spades, etc., etc. had several times been proposed. ([26]) Micacchi in 1919 in his Report to the Ministry of Colonies had proposed the idea, which at least had the merit of being cheap and easy to implement, along with many other much more expensive schemes, related to Arab education. In this case it was put into practice at the School of Arts and Crafts in 1932. ([27])

In 1932 the orphans from the School of Arts and Crafts, attended an agricultural course at the primary level in buildings and estates of the former for of Sidi-Bilal and later transferred to the Sidi-Mesri district, "where land and buildings were provided for 40 boarding students". ([28]) This agricultural annex appears, almost miraculously, to have survived until 1943, when it was closed down - presumably by the British - under what circumstances is not known, except that it was not re-opened again.

Steele Greig did make an attempt, with Blackley's approval, towards the end of 1946 to provide agricultural training for about 20 young Libyans between the ages of 13 and 18. Unfortunately, the effort ended in fiasco when the previously enthusiastic trainees, on being given overalls and told to get ready for sowing suddenly became extremely reluctant, downing tools and saying that they were "students and not common workers". ([29]) This incident which perhaps well illustrates the assertive attitude of ordinary Libyans at the time, following 30 years of economic, educational and political repression, is perhaps explained by their new attitude and expectationism in this era of transition, when those who took education seriously expected middle-class type occupations as a result of it. More, one might add, than similar students today might reasonably expect from completing their courses!

Light is shed on the closure of the School of Arts and Crafts Agricultural Annex in 1943, by the opening in the same year of the same premises at Sidi-Mesri to a number of psychiatric military patients, who were undergoing a course of rehabilitation involving the practice of simple animal husbandry, crop husbandry, poultry keeping, fruit and vegetable production under British N.C.O.'s and Educational Leaders. ([30])

Unfortunately, there is no detailed evidence of the rural schools, opened increasingly in country and agricultural areas after 1943 by the B.M.A., though it is clear that they were not part of a concerted attempt, such as occurred following the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1948 and would have therefore without any rigorous theoretical or practical elements as far as agriculture was concerned, though some might have plots set up at local instigation. The main aim at this level should have been the teaching of new skills and

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[26] *Ibid*
[27] *Ibid* p.80
[28] *Ibid*
[29] Steele-Greig to Appleton, 1st May 1983
[30] B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943.

awareness to pupils at the elementary stage, so that when they themselves became responsible for the management of their own farms, they might break free from the "archaic agricultural environment which has made their parents content with current methods of agriculture." ([31]) There is no evidence that these goals were set out or at any point achieved.
The second aim of the plan, the "organisation of two agricultural training centres for training rural teachers and practical agricuturalists", along with "the establishing of twenty five scholarships for higher studies abroad, which cannot be pursued in Libya" could only come at the end of a period of development rather than at its commencement. It was not possible to bring about either of these aims under the B.M.A. although some progress was made in this direction in Cyrenaica. ([32])

Instead, the Agricultural Institute at Sidi-Mersri, originally established by the last Turkish Governor of Tripolitania, Ibrahim Pasha in 1910, and extended and developed by the Italians after 1922, remained an Agricultural Experimental Centre, organised and managed by British and Italian personnel, but without any form of teaching commitment. ([33])

By the end therefore of the B.M.A.'s decade in Tripolitania, agricultural education needed to be developed boys as an integral part of the primary system of schools and also along with technical and commercial education. A Training Centre, Le Tourneau advised in 1951, should be set up at the Experimental Centre of Sidi-Mesri, an idea which shortly materialised. The training however, of rural teachers, he regarded as a "long term" business, despite the urgent need for such teachers in the system. In the meantime "short term" measures should be adopted including the training of teachers on special courses at the Sidi-Mesri Institute. ([34])

III Comparison with Cyrenaica

Despite possessing the historic School of Arts and Crafts with its legacy from Italian times of well equipped machine workshops, Tripolitania under the B.M.A. lacked any definite commitment - other than through "Libyanisation" - to vocational education as such. On the one hand, International Law did not require the B.M.A. to pursue policies, such vocational education which had not been adopted by the Italians; on the other hand, the eleemosynary character of the school, meant in practice that its facilities could only be used by accredited orphans or by children from "very poor families". The latter presented a loop-hole which the B.M.A. could have exploited had it so wished in order to develop the school as a Vocational

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[31] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.78
[32] See Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*,
[33] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.80
[34] *Ibid* p.8

Training Centre, ostensibly for the poor of Tripoli and its environs, but as the Italians had not done so, the B.M.A. had no obligation in International Law to do so either.

Instead the B.M.A. quite correctly allowed the school, which had been placed under the control of its own director and governing board, to revert to the policies adopted in Italian and even Turkish times. The Italians had of course made extensive use of the workshops, which they refitted, for their own nationals. This had been stopped by the B.M.A. and the school continued as an orphanage also training boys as potters, carpet weavers, silversmiths or producers of items for the tourist industry until this was stopped. The curriculum, however, differed little from that followed in Turkish times and no up-dating of it occurred under the B.M.A.

The criticism against this reversion to past policies - however legitimate in terms of Islamic and International Law - took the view that at a time of transition and great uncertainty in the history of the territory, vital opportunities were being lost, as far as the education and training of the future workforce of the country was concerned. In the only place where this kind of training had and could be given, instead of producing local mechanics, bricklayers, carpenters, plumbers and automobile technicians, the school was producing specialists in traditional arts and craft but little more on a serious scale.

Cyrenaica, on the other hand, while lacking a School of Arts and Crafts on the model of Tripoli, had embraced vocational education and training programmes by adopting in 1943, the Egyptian Curriculum. as has been noted, this did not occur in Tripolitania until 1948 and even then the course books were unsuitable for the territory. Thus from 1943 onwards, the schools of Cyrenaica had a school system fully related to vocational education and training. One of the many advantages of this arrangement was that candidates from Bengazi, Derna, Barce, Agedabia and Apollonia, following the completion of a six-year elementary education, could then pass on to commence either study at the government secondary schools, schools of agriculture, arts and crafts or trade schools. Needless to say this range of choice was not available in Tripolitania until the mid-fifties, despite the Egyptian Curriculum having been endorsed in 1948. Even in Cyrenaica, the secondary tier was not fully established in 1946, but plans had been laid to send 30 boys to Egypt for technical training in that year. ([35])

The absence of trade schools in Cyrenaica does not appear to have unduly hampered the training of apprentices there, who if not sent on courses of technical education in Egypt, underwent training at the Public Works Department or Transport Department until such schools could be established in the territory. ([36]) This method for training apprentices, in the absence of trade schools, was never adopted in Tripolitania, apart from the Libyanisation Programme, which involved allocating selected candidates to the various departments of the Administration for subsequent education and training with future employment in mind. No

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[35] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5
[36] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1946, p.7

doubt, the fact that elementary education, except in an extremely superficial sense, meant that there was no subsequent demand for such training, until 1952 when candidates would have been available for the new Technical Commercial School and Agricultural Centre, following the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1948.

The sending of trainees to Egypt was only intended in Bengasi as a temporary measure, as a Trade School was to have been opened at Bengasi in 1947, but was delayed until 2nd April 1949 when it was finally opened with a staff of 1 headmaster from Palestine, 6 teachers and a role-call of 53 boys. ([37]) This school was the exact counterpart of its equivalent in Egypt; but would have no counterpart in Tripolitania until the mid-fifties. As such, it pursued the curriculum of primary education, which allowed sufficient time for additional studies, such as mechanics, carpentry, weaving or leather work, with the option of introducing the students to further trade skills at a later date, since the school was expected to be popular in the region due to the scarcity of tradesmen or similar training. ([38])

Known subsequently in Bengasi as the Technical School, it cost £3000 to fit out, and was situated at Sidi husein. As such, it was fairly well equipped with 12 fitted workbenches and various kinds of equipment.([39]). Obviously the chief problem with technical education was the cost of the equipment which in Tripoli had meant that the practical classes had to be carried out for some time still to come in the workshops of the Administration. ([40])

Agricultural education and training should have been much less of a problem to introduce into the school system both in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania since it required a possibly lower level of expertise and little if any expensive equipment. This point was made in the latter part of 1951 by Professor Benjamin Higgins, who visited Libya at this time in company wit h18 other specialists. According to Higgins, "Agricultural training is partly a matter of including bias into regular instruction in primary schools, partly a matter of including a certain amount of practical instruction in agriculture by means of school gardens, and partly a matter of establishing agricultural training centres." ([41])

Coming at the end of the B.M.A.'s decade, Higgin's policy statement upon agricultural education was clearly too late to be implemented; or have any effect upon the policy of the outgoing Administration; but not for the new government of Libya whose task it now was to implement the Egyptian Curriculum (now the "National Curriculum"). The B.M.A.'s policy in 1943 was more influenced by what Italians had done than what they hadn't done, but needed to have done, if Libya was to develop into a modern society. While not wishing to turn the clock back too much, the B.M.A. had also no deep seated desire to turn it too far forward

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[37] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, p.16

[38] *Ibid*

[39] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, p.16

[40] Le Tourneau, Op.cit., See II Technical Training for Industry, p.66

[41] Professor B. Higgins, Education and the Economic and Social Development of Libya, Report of the Mission to Libya, *Op.cit.*, p.15

either. To have done the latter would have required more money and manpower than was available for running Tripolitania on a budget of Care and Maintenance which was all International Law required of it. As has already been noted in the previous section on agriculture, the Italians opened an Annex at Sidi-Bilal in 1932, later transferred to Sidi-Mesri, where land and building was acquired for 40 students. Having discontinued this undertaking in 1943, maybe Blackley felt obliged under International Law to restart it, this time under the Chief Agricultural Officer of the Administration, with 20 students in 1944, and the help of a specialist from the Sudan. The failure of the operation, recounted elsewhere ([42]) need not referred to again, save to add it was not restarted, at least under the B.M.A. ([43])

In Cyrenaica, the "agricultural bias" referred to by Professor Higgins in his policy document of 1952, had already been appraised by the B.M.A. at the start of its Administration in 1943. Practical instruction by means of school gardens had already been implemented and eventually the establishment of a training centre was also achieved. At the elementary levels in village schools, a four-year course, designed to meet rural needs was the universal standard. Moreover, "where possible gardening is a school activity and at Gerdis, Gubba, Cyrene and Apollonia, large plots have been secured for the use of the boys. In March, a professional gardener was appointed as instructor; he travels about the territory spending about a month a time at each school he visits." ([44]) The importance of acquiring plots was emphasised by Le Tourneau - " In order to carry out the practical side of school education, a garden plot at the disposal of the students must be provided together with simple agricultural tools such as hoes, spades, etc. Where programmes of this nature," he added, " have been introduced in other parts of the world, they have usually received the endorsement of the rural population." ([45])

Regarding the third criteria, the establishing of an agricultural centre for the training of future farmers, this was promised by the Administration for early 1949. ([46]) It was not, however, until October 1950 that the Magdalen School of Agriculture was set up in Cyrenaica. The school planned to offer a three year course composed of theoretical and practical instruction in agricultural subjects for students who had completed primary education. ([47])

During 1951, its initial year, this school "provided first year courses consisting of two sections, one of 17 regular pupils and another of 19 government workers, for a special intensive course on agriculture. For 1952 a regular attendance of 15 pupils for second year courses and thirty recruits in the first year was expected." ([48])

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[42] See supra, p. 242
[43] Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, 1st May, 1983
[44] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5
[45] Le Tourneau, Op.cit., p.79
[46] B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p.8
[47] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, Agricultural Education, p.80
[48] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.80

The "scarcity of people trained in agriculture", concluded Le Tourneau, "is undoubtedly one of the most formidable obstacles confronting any effort aimed at the development of the country's agricultural resources." ([49]) As far as the future was concerned, with the opening of new Agricultural Training Centres at Sidi Mesri in Tripolitania and the Magdalen School in Cyrenaica, provided personnel were forthcoming, the prospect looked brighter for Libyan agriculture than at any point previously. ([50])

[49] *Ibid.*, p.80
[50] *Ibid*, p.82

Chapter Eleven: Conclusion

".....the first step worthy of great care is to unify the curriculum of education in the United Kingdom of Libya on the Basis of the Egyptian Programmes and make its purpose clear and definite, that purpose being to create a good, fruitful generation, straightforward in its morality, organised in its thinking, believing in God and loyal to the fatherland...." (*)

Major A.J. Steele-Greig in the circumstances of 1943, as far as education was concerned in Tripolitania, appears as either the man with all the options available to him; or instead the creature of circumstances and political forces with few real options at all. However, as has been repeatedly emphasised throughout, he in fact did have options available to him of a limited nature which had to be interpreted in terms of International Law and not exceed the Care and Maintenance budget allocated to education.
According to this brief, he was called upon to devise educational policies - or at least strategies - that made sense of and by and large maintained in being the legacy for Arabs, Italians and Jews of his colonial predecessors. To satisfy the changed circumstances emerging following the Axis defeat in Libya, the various accretions of Fascism were purged from the educational system, adding whatever else might be required to satisfy the requirements of the British mandate. Under no circumstances, was anything of a revolutionary or extreme reactionary nature to be allowed though there was pressure for both from both Arab and Italian sources. Therefore, within these limited constraints, sufficient scope existed for Steele-Greig to put his own stamp upon the development process in a way that would certainly affect the evolution of human resources long after the B.M.A. was over.

It has never been clear, whether Steele-Greig ever sat down and thought out the possibilities inherent in his situation on a systematic basis, or simply went ahead on a day-to-day basis, mustering whatever advice and support he could obtain, in the hope that it would all work out for the best in the end. Of course, it was far from clear what that end would be, especially in the circumstances of 1943 when he was first offered his position as Director of Education for Tripolitania by the then Chief Administrator, Brigadier Maurice Lush. Closely associated with these considerations is the question of whether he can in retrospect be seen as a reformer of education in Libya; or as the founder of post-colonial education for Arabs in the country?

As the latter question cannot be answered without a survey of Steele-Greig's achievement in Libya, it is better to attempt to deal with the first question first - was he in any sense an

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* Higgins, Op.cit., "Speech from the Throne" report on Libya, p.14

educational reformer? To qualify for such status, Steele-Greig would have had to radically resolve the dilemma facing him in some way so as to utilise all the existing resources for the benefit of all the children of the territory whether Arab, Italian or Jew. As it was all the resources were in the hands of the Italian minority and had been for thirty years. If those resources were to be fully utilised, it would require that a new system of education was created for the territory in which all children were given an equal chance to succeed. This would indeed have been a radical step and if embarked upon with energy, enthusiasm and resources might well have created a new Libya.

Unfortunately, as has been repeatedly shown, the B.M.A. was not a reforming organisation as such, and even if it had possessed the necessary ideas and resources, the practical problems inherent in such a project would have been immense. Also, from what we know of Steele-Greig as a man such a course of action would have had no appeal to him, even while persisting that he had all the options open to him and could have decided in 1943 to go in whatever direction he chose. ([1/a])

In fact when it came to the subject of choice he was like all other administrators belonging to the B.M.A. guided by International Law and Care and Maintenance for most of his time as Director of Education. This in practical terms meant working within terms of the existing educational settlement in Tripolitania. Arab, Italian and Jewish schools were to be maintained exactly as they could be handed over to whatever government or regime legally arrived in the territory following the termination of the British Administration. Whatever options Steele-Greig had to exercise would have had to have been within terms of this existing settlement.

Unfortunately, as has been shown throughout this thesis, whereas the Italian and Jewish educational settlements were static or declining, the educational situation for Arabs was in constant crisis and had been for the last thirty or more years extending not only throughout the Italian period but into Ottoman times as well, with the Ottomans doing as little to resolve it as their Italian successors. Neither International Law of Care and Maintenance were sufficiently elastic to contain effectively the cultural, religious and racial contours of the problem as both Steele-Greig and the B.M.A. were to experience during the whole of this interregnum. Therefore both Steele-Greig and his superiors had indeed no option but to devise new policies and solutions to a continuing or recurring crisis or problem, a situation not foreseen by the original devisors of Military Administrations following the end of the 1914-1918 World War upon which precedents the Military Administrations in ex-Italian Africa were based.

It is in reaction to this problem that both Steel-Greig and indeed the British Government of the day must be judged, as far as the setting up of adequate provision for Arabs in the territory was concerned, and given the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum for Arabs in 1943 was not deemed admissible, whatever alternative produced by the Administration. In this respect it

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[1/a] Steele-Greig to Appleton, interview Barbados, West Indies, Dec/Jan 1981-1982. See *infra*, p.314

seems clear in retrospect that Steele-Greig was chosen for the job of Director of Education because an Italian-type solution to the problem was considered to be the most appropriate, as in all likelihood Tripolitania would at some future point be returned to the Italian flag.

In these circumstances Steele-Greig's approach to the question of Arab Education does not seem as bizarre and irrational as might at first be concluded and he should not be blamed for policies resulting from political decisions beyond his control. Also, when pro-Italian policy changed after 1946, once it had become clear that Tripolitania was less likely to be returned to Italian sovereignty, the failure to replace Steele-Greig with a suitable substitute to carry out the pro-Senusi policies in Education only served to aggravate the already profound dilemma. Once this is clear it is easier to assess both Steele-Greig the administrator and the policies which were in effect put forward by the B.M.A. to resolve what was a very old problem in the territory, which in the change of regimes entered into its terminal phase.

In devising policies that would suit the Italian minority and a future democratic government in Italy Steele-Greig was obliged to become an expert in ideas, policies and methods already put forward by former colonial administrators in Libya. In understanding and interpreting his role in post-Fascist Libya he was advised and helped by the superintendent of Italian Schools Cav. Fulvio Contini, who was undoubtedly immensely knowledgeable and experienced in the management of education in the country. Unfortunately, the Italian experience in Libya with regard to Arabs had been a disaster and the Educational ideas and methods of the past offered little or no solution to the present and the future. It must have been a very difficult and confusing time for the new Director of Education and it is likely that he really only began to find his feet by 1945.

By this time Steele-Greig had come to realise that the old Italian ideas for Arabs would not work but he could not dispense with them entirely. Rational solutions, such as modelling the Tripolitanian schools upon those of the French colonies in North Africa had been deemed unworkable in Libya even before the Fascist era began. In the circumstances of the B.M.A. they were similarly unworkable, and Steele-Greig was largely left with the Italo-Arab school, which the Italians had devised as an alternative to the Franco-Arab schools of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. The object of these schools had been to secure the collaboration of the indigenous population for the colonial regime. Unable to draw upon resources of Arab teachers and school materials in Arabic, Steele-Geig was unable to really phase them out until after 1946. Instead, he made the claim that the "new Arab schools" had been put onto the "British Curriculum" which was a nonsense and only emphasises the impossibility of the situation into which the authorities had placed him.

Unable to adopt the Egyptian Curriculum, which would have solved the problem of school textbooks, examinations and teacher supply. Steele-Greig was similarly unable to adopt the British Curriculum except in name, though for reasons of propaganda, he claimed in both his Histories of Education in Tripolitania to have so done. For the latter claim to have made any

sense would, however, have involved even more of an upheaval in the country than the idea of setting up a single system of education for all races, religions, languages and cultures.

Instead a "modus vivendi" was operated in practice as a way out of the impasse until the final adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1948. Trial and error was presented as the way forward in the early days as the former Italo-Arab schools struggled to adapt to a post-colonial era. This involved, at least initially, having to make do with school materials and textbooks drawn up for the former colonial schools. Employment of teachers who were either untrained and poorly educated unless they had worked alongside Italian teachers in the former Italo-Arab schools. Use of syllabuses and examinations which bore no relation to those currently in use elsewhere in the Arab world. It was no wonder that by 1948 administrators despaired of a situation in which most of the mistakes had been committed in an earlier period and the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum was like starting afresh. Yet by this time there were more schools open for Arabs in the territory than ever before and in this sense the earlier years had at least established a base upon which future generations could build. It is unfortunate that political factors in the earlier phase prevented Tripolitania from receiving a similar deal to Cyrenaica. Also that reform when it came was too late to produce the improvements required in time for independence, the B.M.A. having by this time run out time and steam.

I. Elementary Education

"..... the educational and cultural level of Libya is extremely low. It is out of the question, therefore, to train up at the outset an élite able to cater for all the country's needs. Provision will have to be made at several stages, before an educational system suited to the country's needs and potentialities can come fully into operation." (*)

Le Tourneau's observations in 1951 were based upon what he could see of the educational system then in existence after nearly a decade of military rule. He therefore knew nothing of its emergence in 1942 or subsequent mutations. his approval of what he saw must be understood in this light and was summed up by him as follows: "it would appear unnecessary to make any radical changes in the basic structure of the educational system during the next few years; but its framework i.e. the teaching staff, should be strengthened and improved both in quality and quantity." ([1]) These remarks therefore referred directly to the reforms, which Steele-Greig had done his utmost to prevent and resulting in the final adopting of the Egyptian System, not to what had existed before this event of which he knew virtually nothing. ([2])
The B.M.A., however, had not neglected its responsibilities towards education, but merely pursued policies not intended to lead directly to national independence and here lies the

[1] *Ibid*
[2] *Ibid*, p.19

difference between developments in Cyrenaica and those in Tripolitania. Hence Le Tourneu's observations that there are elementary and primary schools in three provinces, secondary and technical girls' schools and teachers training centres underlies the former point. ([3]) Moreover, the Libyans while enthusiastic for official education under the B.M.A. had shunned such efforts under the Italians. This enthusiasm for schooling, notes Le Tourneau, affected both children and parents, some children walking 12 kilometres to school with several villages asking for additional schools and classes. In Cyrenaica, on the other hand, boarding schools were in great demand. ([4]) though as has been noted not all parents approved of such institutions for their daughters at least. Thus by 1951 there were 244 schools, providing modern education to 32,928 pupils, against 50 schools catering for 6,637 Arabs for 1939-40, the last scholastic year of Italian rule. ([5]) These statistics speak volumes for what was achieved in education under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania, despite criticism of the limitations imposed by the political status quo, reflected in the nature of the curriculum adopted before 1948.

Traditional schools, such as Kuttabs, existed throughout Libya but were treated separately by the authorities from the government schools and therefore cannot be considered here due to the absence of official statistics. Yet it is known that the four higher Kuttabs or medressa were attended by up to 800 pupils. ([6]) Neither do the figures appear to exist for the number of teachers - Arab or Italian - employed in the Italo-Arab schools prior to the British Occupation. Hence reliable comparisons cannot be made with more than 1,192 Libyans in official teacher-employment in the elementary schools at the end of British Rule. ([7])

On a wider comparison with Italian times, however, it is apparent that under the B.M.A. there was a five-fold increase in the number of teachers employed in the Arab schools. This was as important as the similar increase in the number of pupils being educated at the schools. Yet by far the most dramatic step was of course the eventual adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum. It is however, unlikely if this measure produced any immediate impact upon either the quality or quantity of education in Tripolitania. It must nonetheless have greatly facilitated the planning of education in the territory since it was now clear not only what the aim of the curriculum and schools should be but also the materials and types of examination required to produce a national standard of education that bore some correlation with what took place elsewhere in the Arab World and especially in Libya's powerful neighbour, Egypt. Certainly for the immediate future, Tripolitania was bound to drag behind Cyrenaica, where education had undoubtedly come on in leaps and bounds since Italian times under the B.M.A., due no

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[3] *Ibid*, p.31
[4] *Ibid*, p.27
[5] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.19 and Contini, *Op.cit.*, p.96
[6] The "four higher schools" were Ahmed Pashaan Mezran in Tripoli: Sidi-al-Glam at Ziltern and Sidi Zarrugh, nr Misurata. Le Tourneau, *Op.cit*, p.19
[7] *Ibid*, p.19

doubt in part to the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum, but also to superior efficiency and different political climate in the territory since 1943.

During 1950-51, the final year of the B.M.A., the syllabus operating in the schools had two stages: "the first four years of elementary education when children learn to read, write count and express themselves with increasing clarity; and then the next two years - the fifth and sixth years, when the educational field is expanded to include history, geography, science and even a foreign language." ([8]) Education under the B.M.A. had never been compulsory but under the Libyan Constitution, the first four years became compulsory and given the continuing shortage of teachers, it is likely that for a considerable time into the future, the first four years would have to suffice for the majority of Libyan children.

One way of partly resolving the latter problem which was put forward in 1950 was to provide facilities whereby these four years might be supplemented by "adult courses where the children can keep their knowledge alive - and even add to it. "This partial solution, however, was not intended to be other than temporary, the additional fifth and sixth year of education being seen as the real alternative where possible. ([9])

This situation was also noted Le Tourneau who states that the two main types of primary education were provided; schools with six classes, "some of which can be divided into several sections if there is a sufficient number of pupils" and, "incomplete schools containing a maximum of five classes." ([10]) Unlike the situation in Cyrenaica, this Egyptian Syllabus had only been in operation for two years in Tripolitania when independence was declared and still had a long way to go before it was effectively established in the territory.

At the time of Independence, not even the city of Tripoli possessed even a single elementary school with the full six classes required by the Egyptian Curriculum, with the result that all the sixth-year pupils of the town were "grouped together in order to make the best and most economical use of available teachers." Furthermore, although the B.M.A. had greatly increased the number of schools in operation since Italian times, very few new schools had been built, most being perforce set up in former Italian buildings, most notably former barracks, which must have been very cold and draughty in winter. ([11])

Unlike Cyrenaica, the adoption of the Egyptian Syllabus, initially by the B.M.A. in October, 1948 and then by the government of Libya on the declaration of independence in 1950, ([12]) meant by no means the adoption of the entire Curriculum, but only those sections of it appertaining to the operation of Primary Schools, and even the latter was severely restricted as far as Tripolitania was concerned. ([13])

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[8] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.47
[9] *Ibid*
[10] *Ibid*, p.20
[11] *Ibid*
[12] Le Tourneau, Op.cit., p.20
[13] See Appendicies

The reasons for the partial adoption of the Egyptian Syllabus is not far to seek, and relates closely to the anti-Egyptian policy pursued by the B.M.A. in Tripolitania before independence. Le Tourneau lists the following modifications to the Egyptian Primary Curriculum as it was applied in Tripolitania after independence:

"1) In order not to have to employ foreign teachers, no foreign language is taught in the primary schools.

2) History and Geography teaching is focused on Libya, not on Egypt." ([14])

The textbooks to be used for this very abridged form of the Egyptian Curriculum, now referred to only as the "Syllabus" were Egyptian in origin, the B.M.A. having failed to develop satisfactory course books, despite considerable efforts to do so before 1948.

However, given the anxiety of the authorities to prevent Libyans focusing their attentions upon Egypt, no textbooks in history and geography were acquired as these were all too impregnated with revolutionary nationalism to be acceptable. Instead, teachers were told what to teach until suitable textbooks could be produced in Libya. ([15]) Otherwise, the so called "syllabus" was developed on the lines of the Egyptian Curriculum as it was practised in Egypt itself. This was particularly valuable in Libya when it came to teaching practical concerns like gardening or handicrafts - "according to childrens ages and circumstances" ([16]) Infusions of Egyptian politics and culture therefore were closely controlled by the authorities after Independence as before.

Fear of Egypt in this way continued to beset the new government of Libya as it had its predecessors, a trend that again continued to have a deleterious effect upon the conduct of educational developments within the country as a whole, since because of it few if any Egyptian teachers could be employed in the schools. In this financial factors undoubtedly played a part as much as educational policy was still dictated in terms of financial stringency and there was little alternative but to recruit Egyptian teachers for Vocational and Secondary Education.

Moreover, it rapidly became clear that the development of a country like Libya was not possible without considerable dependence upon the Arab neighbour, Egypt regardless of political developments in that country. Hence by 1964 there were 825 Egyptian teachers in the schools and many young Libyans undergoing training in Egypt itself. The trend was foreseen with the signing of special educational concordat with Egypt 1954 "under which Egypt would

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[14] Le Tourneau, Op.cit., p.21
[15] *Ibid*
[16] *Ibid*

co-operate in developing Libyan education by sending teachers and books" as well as supervising and correcting some high school examinations. ([17])

It is difficult to say what the political effects of this ever closer association with Egypt were to have upon the fledgling state at its most impressionable early phase but they must have been considerable. Thus at the same time that the new state was acquiring an "urban class of bureaucrats, civil servants and businessmen," the education of such élites were almost exclusively in the hands of Egyptian teachers who dominated the new educational system especially at the secondary level. Thus young and impressionable Libyans were "going in increasing numbers to the new secondary schools and collages, where they under the Nasserite guidance of their many Egyptian teachers." ([18])

This was certainly a situation which both the Italian regime from its initial inception in 1911 and the B.M.A. throughout its decade-long interregnum had foreseen occurring, though not perhaps in quite the same form as it was to transpire, and had done everything within their power to prevent ever materialising in the country but to no avail.

Such is the logic of history, unwittingly, if unavoidably sanctioned by the B.M.A. in 1943, when it had sought to change the curriculum, however ineffectively from what it had been in Italian times, into an exclusively Arabic language syllabus, concocted by an inexperienced former prep-school master now Director of Education for Tripolitania. This change to a curriculum at a time when especially from 1946 onwards it had become increasingly clear, that the B.M.A. would have to "soldier on" for considerably longer than had been originally anticipated in 1942, exacerbated many problems with which the B.M.A. had not been designed to deal.

The supply of suitably qualified Arab teachers was hopelessly inadequate for the task of teaching the Egyptian Curriculum - another problem with deep historical roots in the territory and with which Steele-Greig had ineffectually wrestled before having to succumb to the inevitable. Thus despite organising a training section for teachers at the Libyan secondary school, which in October 1950 was transferred Sidi-Mesri (subsequently the original site of the Faculty of the University of Tripoli), the supply of teachers was completely inadequate for the needs of the country.

As a temporary solution to this problem, the new government had no alternative but to employ young Libyans, barely out of elementary school to work as teachers. This was the situation until 1958 when "black gold" was finally discovered in the country, the panacea that would change everything. ([19]) Ironically this only served to reduce the supply of native Libyan teachers still further as the new graduates of the elementary schools rushed to enter the

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[17] J. Wright, *Libya, A Modern History*, London, 1974, p.94
[18] S.A. Hajjajy, *The New Libya*, Tripoli, 1967, p.84
[19] Wright, *Op.cit.*, p.101

nascent petroleum industry: and increase the educational dependence upon Egypt as more and more Egyptian teachers were needed to fill their places in the schools.

In the meantime, the international advisors and educational experts, offered solutions, which while apparently plausible on paper stood little chance of ever being implemented in practice, as teachers were in short supply and sufficient cash was still unavailable. Le Tourneau in 1951 paints a somewhat depressing picture of the state of teaching and the shortage of teachers in the schools, but is unable to offer any remedy other than advice for the "long-term".

In the "short-term", he advises "consolidation" and "better use" of existing resources. "Any extravagance, anything unnecessary must be severely shunned," he urges, "these must be the watchwords of those responsible for education." The "goal", he adds, in respect of teachers for the elementary schools is to "train on the spot" as well as possible, using for this purpose teachers "nearly all recruited from abroad and paid either by the government of Cyrenaica or the Federal Government." ([20])

II Secondary Education

" There is considerable local demand for secondary schools in such places as Jefren and Homs. However, there is no need to establish a third secondary school in the immediate future - not until primary education has become more firmly established in the Eastern Province." ([*])

Having established two secondary schools in Tripolitania, one in Tripoli itself and the other at Zawia, which declared Higgins in 1951 were "flourishing", both he and Professor Le Tourneau are able to agree on the urgent need in the immediate future to avoid further unnecessary expansion or expenditure in the secondary sphere, seeking rather to improve what already existed than adding more to the stock. ([21])

Steele Greig would have taken some cheer perhaps from this advice without reflecting that it seemed more from retrenchment than reform as neither critics would have offered the olive branch of final approbation upon all the policies pursued to-date by the B.M.A. Even so whatever the circumstances and these were grim, the 1952-3 school budget permitted only very minor improvements in line with the advice so far rendered, and this included minor improvements to the two secondary schools in Tripoli and Zawia with no additions to the existing number of secondary schools. ([22])

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[20] *Ibid*, p.222

[*] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*

[21] *Ibid*, p.33

[22] *Ibid*, pp.34-35

As it was the existing two schools came under heavy criticism for being "too academic" for Libya's needs, though they had been devised with the Egyptian Curriculum in mind since Tripolitania was still only at the level of the "Egyptian Syllabus". ([23]) Confronted with the depressing reality of education as it really is in a developing country like Libya, where resources were virtually non-existent, and at a most critical juncture in its history, educational advisors seem to have no other option but to "think big". Hence, while criticising the two new schools for being "too academic", Higgins has no hesitation in going on to declare that "A vast educational programme..... covering both age groups now active and, more particularly, the rising generation" was now needed in the country. Not only that but given the federal structure of Libya, there will inevitably have to be three educational systems." ([24])

As it was, the new political system imposed upon the country was not only excessively expensive for a country living as close to the breadline as Libya, in the days before the discovery and commercial exploitation of oil on a sufficiently large enough scale to produce rising living standards in the country; but also a problem for development too, as the idea of federalism had of necessity to be incorporated into the educational system as well. Hence, if Triploitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan were to continue as before in the form of separate political entities, while part of the country proper, they would each need to have their own separate educational service.

Not only would this system be vastly expensive to maintain, especially in the educational sector, but it could easily perpetuate the situation bequeathed to the new state at independence, whereby Cyrenaica had all the cherries, Tripolitania the nuts but Fezzan only the straws. Thus Cyrenaica would have the full Egyptian Curriculum, Tripolitania only the "Egyptian Syllabus" and Fezzan possibly neither.

Le Tourneau, however, does not seem to have believed that the resulting imbalance in the development pattern of the country would necessarily be harmful, providing that "none of the three..... discriminated against each other." This could be avoided because " each should be able to train a proportion of the elite essential to the smooth functioning of each province and the state as a whole." ([25]) This training of various elites would be via the new secondary schools, previously criticised as "too academic" for Libya's needs for which three kinds were required. A) secondary schools proper; B) teachers' training centres; C) Technical schools. The development of the "secondary schools proper" were rightly envisaged as integral to the development of the country on the other. ([26]) This however, re-emphasised the essential philosophy, so to speak, of the advisors at this point in the development programme. This for the new government meant that there was no question of the over-multiplying of the new stock

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[23] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.28
[24] *Ibid*
[25] Le Tourneau, *Op.cit.*, p.114
[26] *Ibid*, p.37

of secondary schools", because the yield from primary education was still only slight (as regards both quantity and quality) and the economic outlook for Libya still uncertain." ([27])

Due to Libya's "uncertain" economic outlook and the limited financial resources for education, in common with many other developing countries on the African continent, limited access to secondary education was recommended. This was intended to ensure the "quality" aspect of secondary education. Only by adopting highly selective methods of entry would it be possible to produce the necessary elites for the proper running of the country. Otherwise, it would not be possible to maintain the "value of secondary studies." The form of selection adopted, it was advised, would need to become increasingly "rigorous" as the number of candidates for secondary education increased. ([28])

Thus the future pattern of educational progress in North Africa's new federal monarchy was determined by a combination of financial stringency, due to the state's inadequate resources; dependence upon Egyptian educational teachers and expertise, due to the failure in the past to produce an educated class with enough teachers to staff the schools; and a new version of Arab elitism with a view to maximising the potential of the existing limited quality resources at the secondary level, so as to produce a new governing class of Libyans for the future. In all these respects secondary education as advocated on the threshold of independence in Libya differed little in form or substance from that in operation in colonial dependencies elsewhere in Africa in a similar stage of transition to statehood. Libya, however, was very different as history would shortly reveal.

III. Vocational and Technical Education

"At present, technical training is limited by the general lack of education of the people. To make the training programmes effective, formal schooling must be extended and improved."

The opening of the new Technical Commercial School in Tripoli on 1 January 1951, although an important step for the future in the field of vocational education bears little in any relationship with what had or hadn't preceded it. Libya's adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum required such an institution, just as it required secondary schools, and eventually a university, but such developments were imposed by the independence settlement rather than being the fruit of a long and successful pattern of indigenous development. The latter had undoubtedly been the case in Cyrenaica following the demise of the Italian regime there but there had been no systematic parallel development in the sister province of Tripolitania under the B.M.A.

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[27] *Ibid*, p.33
[28] *Ibid*, p.49

Instead under the B.M.A., Tripolitania possessed the School of Arts and Crafts set up by the Turks to teach a livelihood to orphans and the children of very poor families and restored to that function by the Department of Education in Tripoli under the aegis of A.J. Steele-Greig but virtually nothing else. To compensate for this the B.M.A had begun various training schemes for Libyans in the Departments and workshops of the Administration which were quite effective in training new personnel to replace departing British servicemen or Italians, increasingly leaving the territory during the middle and latter years of the Administration. There were also various educational "nuclei" to facilitate the development of agricultural training and education in the schools in accordance with the requirements of the new curriculum. Otherwise, the B.M.A. for reasons already sufficiently explained like its Italian predecessor - if not because of its Italian predecessor - left no structural or institutional legacy in this area ([29]).

As independence approached and with it the demise of the B.M.A itself, the reason behind any attempt to develop vocational and technical training in the territory, apart form the requirements of the Egyptian Curriculum itself, lay in developing the future requirement in the form of skilled manpower. Yet in this respect, as it was then anticipated that "only a small number of technical and personal skilled personnel" would be required in the immediate future", there was no need, it appeared, to significantly develop this sector of education, especially when valuable resources were urgently needed elsewhere. ([30]). As far as the future running of the administration of the country was concerned, jobs were being created by the transfer of authority to the new Government of Libya and training schemes to facilitate this purpose had been in progress for some time already.

Instead of concentrating upon the training of personnel to replace the decaying B.M.A. or in the development of skilled manpower for an economy that had extremely limited requirements in this field, attention at the commencement of independence switched to agriculture. This was the main economy and agricultural production required a whole new approach to revitalise this most important sector. Educationally, recommendations were put to the government in 1951 that it was partly a matter of "introducing an agricultural bias into regular instruction in the primary schools, and partly a matter of establishing agricultural training centres, involving in Tripolitania, the improvement of facilities at Sidi-Mesri and in Cyrenaica at the Magdelena School near Bengasi." ([31]) The training of agricultural technicians at university level could only be achieved through "fellowships for study abroad" and 25 scholarships were suggested for this purpose. ([32])

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[29] *Ibid*
[30] *Ibid*
[31] Le Tourneau, p.84
[32] *Ibid*

Recommendations for the future with regard to technical and vocational training were complex and extended, despite the belief that short-term needs should relate to continued Libyanisation measures. In these fields the concern was less with higher education and training, for which as with the agricultural technicians, the grant of fellowships to study abroad was the only course open, and more concerned with the training of artisans, for which the establishment of a network of workshop schools at the primary level was intended. Such programmes, however, would "require instructors, equipment for practical instruction, and building space."([33])

These recommendations were summed up by Benjamin Higgins in his report for the Libyan Government for 1952 and as such compromise the agreed programme of such projects for the country, all aiming to provide the following "essentials of technical industrial training":

1) A network of school workshops within the framework of primary education will prepare students for further technical training;
2) Two technical industrial schools, one at Tripoli and one at Bengasi will train:
   a) skilled workers for the basic trades;
   b) junior technicians
3) The organisation of a Libyan technical instructors' training section attached to the industrial school at Tripoli;
4) The re-organisation of the Tripoli School of Arts and Crafts, if this school can be linked to the body responsible for defining and carrying out the handicrafts policy of the country."([34])

But at this point, with the mention of a further "reform" in connection with Tripoli's venerable School of Arts and Crafts, it is clear that a new and very different era has commenced. That associated with the former colonial regimes of Italy and the Military Administration of Britain is well and truly over.

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[33] *Ibid*, p.77
[34] *Ibid*

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appointment of Scott for Tripolitania, though the latter is not named. It is nonetheless clear from this letter that Blackley had Scott in mind for the D. of E. Tripoliania for some time.

SAD/668/14/47: Cox to Farrell, Colonial Office, 9.12.1949 - Relates to Blackley's sudden visit to London and the forthcoming appointment of a new D. of E. to Tripolitania with Cuthbert Scott emerging as the favoured candidate.

SAD/668/14/48: Farrell to Cox, Tibur, Castletownsend Co. Cork, Ireland (14.12.1949) - Farrell offers to help if required in briefing Scott upon his appointment t oTripoli but thinks the appointment a complete waste of time.

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SAD/670/10/1-111: Scott to Cox, Sudan Club, Khartoum (25.2.46) - Scott confesses to Cox that while he was the principal of Gordon Memorial College, he was "cracking up under the job'.

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-Ibid. 5 Nov 1979- emphasises the extent to which shortage of finance impeded developments under the B.M.A. (4 pp)

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- C. Tracey to Appleton, Milford-on-sea, Hants, 12 Aug. 1983 - yet another associate of Cuthbert Scott whom I was unfortunately unable to interview due to Tracey's sudden death. See C. Lea to Appleton, infra.

- Professor P.M. Holt to Appleton, Kirlington, Oxford, 20 Oct, 1984 - another associate of C. Scott while latter was aWarden of Gordon Memorial College.

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-Ibid 5 FEb. 1984 - relates to Christopher Tracey's death and the cancellation of the interview

- Capt. N.F. Pengelly, formerly Grade III Assistant to Steele-Greig at the Department of Education to Appleton, Hartely Hill, Surrey, 2 August 1982. - A most uncooperative response after first agreeing to meet me. Penegelly who was operative between 1946-50 in a most sensitive post disclaimed any responsibility fot the running of the Department, being only "the Number Two"

- J.B. Segal (Prof), Edgeware Middx, 14 July 1980 to Appleton - nothing out of significance (as Captain Segal he was predecessor to Penegally at the Dept of Education in Tripoli for the year 1945. Steele-Greig, however, was not impressed with his performance having, on one occasion to rescue him from getting linched from a mob in the city during the pogrom on 1945)

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-Sir Norman Anderson O.B.E., 23 oct at 3.30 pm in the Department of Advanced Legal Studies, London University, 17 Russell Square. Sir Norman Launched upon a 90 minute uninterrupted monologue of the B.M.A., from which 7 pages of handwritten notes were taken. This was an outstanding performance by a retired man with a heart condition.

-Mr E.V. De Candole C.B.E., Shootwood, Bistern Hants, 18th Dec 1981. On this and subsequent occasions the writer was Mr De Cadole's weekend guest and so able to avail himself of Mr De Candole's unrivalled scholarship and expertese upon Libya and Cyrenaica especially. 5 pages of notes.

-Brigadier T.R. Blackley C.B.E., Gurrane Co. Cork, Ireland 4-5 April,1982. A most fortunaye occasion when the writer was enabled to stay with the Blackney's as their weekend guest which presented a one and only opportunity to garner information upon a wide variety of topics connected with their stay in Tripoli. (7 pages of notes and References).

-Major A.J. Steele Greig, El Alemein, St. James's, Barbados, West Indies, Dec-Jan 1981 - over a week due to Steele-Greig's general indisposition, following his return from his annual visit to Caracas, where he owned a school. This resulted in Final secessions being conducted in his sick room. However, despite his fragile condition from which he later recovered Steele-Greig agreed to conduct our conversations in this way. This was regretably vital if the occasion was to be at all profitable as it turned out to be enabling us to covera wide range of tipics connected with his tenureship of the Directorship of Education in Tripoli between 1943-51.

-Mr C.A.E. Lea ('Sheikh Lea"), July 1983, Talbot Woods, Bournemouth - a most pleasant Weekend spent with Mr and Mrs Lea at their home in Bournemouth. Unfortunately, as most of "Sheikh's" experience has been in the Sudan. he had little to say of relevance to Libya. This visit was nonetheless important as "Sheikh" Lea was the last of "Blackley's buddies" and a personal friend of Cuthbert Scott, besides being the last D. of E. appointed by Blackney. He was able to cast light upon his sudden dismissal by the Mufti of Tripoli. (no record taken except for photograph)

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Appendicies

Appendix A: Relating to the growth of the Muslim schools and teachers under the B.M.A. (1943-1950)


GROWTH OF MOSLEM SCHOOLS IN TRIPOLITANIA, 1943-50
Number of Schools
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
50
79
80
86
89
109
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47
1947-48
1948-49
1949-50

(1)


Number of Pupils (1,000s)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
----Average number of pupils per school
98
103
114
119
132
162
GROWTH OF MOSLEM PUPIL POPULATION IN TRIPOLITANIA, 1943-50
(The proportion of the whole Moslem population is shown as a percentage)
4835
8152
9104
10224
11763
17638
23706
0·7%
1·15%
1·24%
1·40%
1·87%
2·43%
3·3%
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47
1947-48
1948-49
1949-50

(2)


Number of Teachers
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
---- Pupil/Teacher ratio
33
32
34
33
34
33
32
GROWTH OF TEACHER POPULATION IN MOSLEM SCHOOLS IN TRIPOLITANIA, 1943-50
146
256
267
310
350
539
732
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47
1947-48
1948-49
1949-50

(3)

Appendix B: Comparison of Italian and British Periods


THE ITALIAN PERIOD
BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
FIRST WORLD WAR
SECOND WORLD WAR
FASCIST PERIOD
THE BERTOLLINI PERIOD
STATUTES OF LIBYA
GROWTH OF MOSLEM PUPIL POPULATION IN TRIPOLITANIA, 1911-1950 — A COMPARISON OF THE ITALIAN AND BRITISH PERIODS. The proportion of pupils as compared to the total Moslem population is shown in brackets as a percentage.
Number of Pupils (1,000s)
Year
99
313
1031
725
287
422
506 (0·1%)
774
558
571
611
767
1804
4354
6360
7506
4835 (0·7%)
8152 (1·15%)
9104 (1·24%)
10224 (1·40%)
11763 (1·87%)
17638 (2·43%)
23706 (3·33%)
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1926
1931
1935
1939
1942
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

Appendix C: Schools under the B.M.A. (1950)

APPENDIX C

EDUCATION

(1)	*Schools* (2)	*Teachers* (3)	*Boys* (4)	*Girls* (5)
B. A. Moslem Schools				
Secondary Education	—	30	—	—
Tripoli City +	3	8	304	30
Western Province	1	—	118	—
TOTAL	4	38	482	30
Primary Education				
Tripoli City	14	174	4474	1084
Tripoli Province	18	83	2547	270
Central Province	33	144	4577	414
Eastern Province	43	138	3626	277
Western Province	26	155	5041	1232
TOTAL	134	694	20265	3273
Total B.A. Moslem Schools	138	732	20747	3359
B. A. Italian Schools				
Secondary Education	—	—	—	—
Tripoli City	6	119	705	705
Eastern Province	1	4	11	9
TOTAL	7	123	806	714
Primary Education				
Tripoli City	17	182	3043	2798
Tripoli Province	21	40	463	344
Central Province	4	12	180	131
Eastern Province	24	41	450	415
Western Province	14	30	297	372
TOTAL	80	305	4433	3330
Total B.A. Italian Schools	87	428	5239	3304
British School	1	8	112	95
TOTAL B.A. SCHOOLS	226	1168	26098	6858
Private Schools				
Jewish	2	20	632	487
Greek	1	1	20	18
Quttab	503	503	13983	—
TOTAL	506	524	14635	505

+ Including Men's and Women's Teachers' Training Colleges.

Appendix D: Schools under the Ottoman Occupation

STATISTICS: ITALIAN SCHOOLS DURING OTTOMAN OCCUPATION

YEAR	Total Pupils	Infant Schools	BOYS PRIMARY		GIRLS PRIMARY	SECONDARY TECHNICAL-COMMERCIAL		
			Day	Evening		Total	Italian	Others
1876	60	—	60	—	—	—	—	—
1883	90	—	90	—	—	—	—	—
1888	16	—	—	—	—	16	10	6
1889	551	—	162	180	162	17	8	9
1890	545	126	284	113	?	20	12	8
1891	146	124	?	?	?	22	12	10
1892	254	228	?	?	?	26	14	12
1893	152	117	?	?	?	35	15	20
1894	648	121	178	157	150	42	24	18
1895	577	165	152	?	210	50	25	25
1896	607	181	152	?	224	50	19	31
1897	625	177	160	?	236	52	23	29
1898	880	207	154	185	284	50	19	31
1899	532	207	?	?	287	38	16	22
1900	860	208	160	139	322	41	16	25
1901	979	269	198	166	302	44	17	27
1902	868	208	247	57	310	46	14	32
1903	995	258	326	88	280	43	16	27
1904	1100	235	364	148	301	52	20	32
1905	1091	268	338	148	289	48	14	34
1906	1203	258	394	198	306	47	15	32
1907	1118	213	385	125	340	55	19	36
1908	1329	239	453	241	340	56	23	32
1909	1469	252	463	335	348	71	25	46
1910	1327	275	433	208	348	63	23	40

Appendix E: Schools under the Italian Occupation

SCHOOL POPULATION 1911 - 1921

TYPE OF SCHOOL	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921
Primary, Italian . .	873	1908	1721	1947	2137	2231	2076	2066	2268	2319	2363
Primary, Arab . . .	99	313	1031	725	287	422	506	779	558	571	611
Trade-Technical-Commercial	119	107	115	124	159	183	186	179	197	215	243
Secondary	54	99	134	226	201	215	226	289	285	342	342
TOTAL PUPILS	645	2427	3001	3022	2734	3051	2994	3273	3308	3447	3559

Appendix F: Schools under the Italian Occupation (1921-1939)

TYPE			SCHOOLS					PUPILS					TEACHERS					Remarks
			1921-22	1925-26	1930-31	1934-35	1938-39	1921-22	1925-26	1930-31	1934-35	1938-39	1921-22	1925-26	1930-31	1934-35	1938-39	
Secondary. .		Italian	1	3	5	8	5	270	342	334	1435	1417	51	47	40	56	54	(1) Superior Islamic School
		Arab	—	—	—	—	1 (1)	6	7	5	20	134	—	—	—	—	7	
		Jew	—	—	—	—	—	66	93	27	64	66	—	—	—	—	—	
		TOTAL	1	3	5	8	6	342	442	336	1519	1617	51	47	40	56	61	
Trade-Technical		Italian	1	1	2	3	3	45	45	127	412	382	23	57	36	40	48	(1) These are mostly girl's schools
		Arab	—	—	1	5 (1)	5	150	371	440	522	636	5	10	10	10	14	
		Jew	—	—	—	—	—	48	31	148	32	47	—	—	—	—	—	
		TOTAL	1	1	3	8	8	243	447	724	966	1065	28	67	46	50	62	
Primary	Statal	Italian	4	10	24	42	72	1621	1622	2024	4665	4626	122	202	151	274	487	(1) Koranic Schools. (2) Rabbinical Schools and the alliance French Jewish schools.
		Arab	4	18	34	52	91	611	1426	3900	5818	6736	31	60	59	80	104	
		Jew	2	3	3	4	3	712	1241	2198	3747	5995	—	—	—	—	—	
	Para-Statal	Italian	4	6	7	5	7	237	715	921	740	671	26	27	—	—	23	
		Arab	—	—		—	—	—	22	83	22	18	—	—	—	—	—	
		Jew	—	—	—	—	—	—	69	75	49	37	—	—	—	—	—	
	Private	Italian	—	—	—	7	6	—	—	—	463	248	—	—	—	—	—	Not under the control of the Education Dept.
		Arab	52 (1)	69 (1)	260 (1)	503 (1)	348 (1)	1792	5370	5355	9864	7973	—	—	—	—	—	
		Jew	1	2	1	16 (2)	14 (2)	220	1211	186	1858	1303	—	—	—	—	—	
		Greek	—	1	1	1	1	—	56	58	89	16	1	2	2	2	2	
		TOTAL	67	111	332	628	514	5223	12239	15788	26259	25626	180	291	212	356	616	
TOTALS . .		Italian	10	20	38	65	93	2173	2724	3306	7645	7344	322	333	227	370	612	
		Arab	56	89	303	560	418	2350	7306	9942	16246	15407	36	70	69	90	125	
		Jew	8	7	6	18	16	1076	2932	2572	4744	5451	—	—	—	—	—	
		Greek	—	1	1	1	1	—	56	58	39	16	1	2	2	2	2	
		GRAND TOTAL	69	117	348	644	528	5808	13128	15878	28744	28308	359	405	298	462	797	

Appendix G: Schools under the British Occupation (1943-1948)

TYPE		SCHOOLS					PUPILS					TEACHERS				
		1943-44	1944-45	1945-46	1946-47	1947-48	1943-44	1944-45	1945-46	1946-47	1947-48	1943-44	1944-45	1945-46	1946-47	1947-48
SECONDARY	Italian	—	1	1	2	3	—	286	407	601	923	—	14	17	20	43
	Arab	—	—	—	1	4	—	—	—	81	226	—	—	—	9	15
	TOTAL	—	1	1	3	7	—	286	407	682	1149	—	14	17	29	58
PRIMARY	Italian	51	64	76	80	80	4035	3801	4416	5555	6559	191	253	265	270	315
	Arab	50	79	80	85	85	4848	7988	9104	10143	11762	146	271	265	301	362
	Jews	2	2	2	2	2	•1434	2226	3703	2138	3274	4	4	4	4	4
	British	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	313	246	252	—	—	7	7	8
	TOTAL	103	145	159	168	168	10317	14115	17536	18082	21847	341	528	541	582	689
PRIVATE	Italian	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Arab	358	358	358	358	358	14807	15101	14986	15468	15532	353	358	353	358	358
	Jews	—	1	1	2	3	—	1121	1206	2007	2061	—	40	62	80	74
	Greek	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	30	30	—	—	—	2	2
	TOTAL	358	359	359	361	362	14807	16222	16192	18105	17623	358	398	420	440	434
RACIAL TOTALS	Italian	51	65	77	82	83	4035	4177	4823	6156	7482	191	267	282	290	358
	Arab	408	437	438	444	447	19743	23089	24090	25692	27320	504	629	623	668	733
	Jews	2	3	3	4	5	1434	3347	4911	4743	5335	4	44	66	84	78
	Maltese	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	313	246	252	—	—	7	7	8
	Greek	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	30	30	—	—	—	2	2
GRAND TOTALS:-		461	505	519	522	537	25234	30013	34137	36869	40619	699	940	978	1051	1181

APPENDIX 5

Appendix H: Administration of the Arab Schools under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania

ADMINISTRATION ARAB SCHOOLS — TRIPOLITANIA



ADMINISTRATION ITALIAN (JEWISH) SCHOOLS — TRIPOLITANIA



Appendix J: Syllabus authorised in Arab Schools

SYLLABUS AS USED IN ARAB PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1948

SUBJECT	PRIMARY					SECONDARY		
	I	II	III	IV	V	I	II	III
Arabic	17	17	12	11	11	10	9	11
Religion	6	6	4	4	3	2	2	1
Mathematics	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	4
History	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geography	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Science	0	0	2	2	2	4	4	4
Drawing	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1
Hygiene	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
Handwriting	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
English	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	5
Italian (Optional)	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
Physical Training	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
TOTAL HOURS PER WEEK	32	32	32	32	32	34	36	36

Appendix K: Syllabus authorised for Italian Primary Schools

SYLLABUS AS USED IN ITALIAN PRIMARY SCHOOLS 1943 - 1948

SUBJECT	CLASSES								
	I & II	III	IV & V	VI Boys	VI Girls	VII Boys	VII Girls	VIII Boys	VIII Girls
Italian	9	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4
Mathematics	6	6	6	3	3	3	2	3	2
Physical Training	3	3	3	2	0	2	0	2	0
Religion	1½	1½	1½	1	1	1	1	1	1
Drawing	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geography	0	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
History	0	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Hygiene	1½	1½	1½	0	0	0	0	0	0
French	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3
English	0	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Arabic	0	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Singing & Music	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Science	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Domestic Economy	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	3
Needle Craft	0	0	0	0	4	0	5	0	5
Book-keeping	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Shorthand/Typewriting	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	3	0
Total hours per week	25	25	29	30	32	30	32	30	32

Classes VI, VII & VIII are post-primary for children age 11 to 13 who are not proceeding to Secondary schools.

Appendix L: Syllabus authorised for Italian Secondary Schools

TYPE OF SCHOOL	Italian	Latin	English	French	Arabic	Greek	History	Geography	Mathematics	Chemistry	Physics	Philosophy	Music	Art	Drawing	Religion	P. T.	Agrarian: Agronomy	Agrarian: Zoology	Commercial: Accountancy	Commercial: Merchandise	Commercial: Shorthand	Commercial: Typewriting	Commercial: Hotel Managemt.	Industry: Mechanics	Industry: Tailoring	Industry: Shoemaking	Customs Law	Commercial Law	Economics	Domestic Economy	Meteorology	Surveyor: Construction	Surveyor: Topography	Surveyor: Puericulture	Pedagogy	HOURS PER WEEK	REMARKS
(1) Avviamento Professionale	4	—	2	2	—	—	1	1	4	—	1	—	1	—	3	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	—	—	3	1	—	—	—	—	41	Each course minimum 35 hrs
(2) Tecnico - Commerciale	3	—	3	2	—	—	2	2	3	1	2	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	3	1	2	2	—	—	—	—	2	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	41	» 30 »
(3) Ginnasio Inferiore	6	5	2	3	3	—	2	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	
(4) Ginnasio Superiore	6	5	2	4	3	—	2	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	32	
(5) Liceo Classico	4	4	2	—	2	4	3	—	3	—	1	3	—	—	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	33	
(6) Media	5	5	2	3	3	—	2	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	
(7) Liceo Scientifico	4	3	2	3	2	—	2	—	3	—	2	3	1	—	2	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	32	
(8) Liceo Artistico	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	2	—	—	14	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	38	Art includes Anatomy / Modeling
(9) Istituto Tecnico	3	—	4	2	2	—	1	2	3	1	1	—	—	—	2	1	2	—	—	4	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	2	—	—	3	3	—	—	43	Minimum 32 hrs. per course
(10) Metodo	4	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	2	—	—	—	3	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	4	4	30	
(11) Istituto Magistrale	5	5	2	3	3	—	2	2	3	—	1	3	3	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	39	Minimum each class 22 hrs.

Appendix M: Timetable for the School Year 1950

II. WEEKLY TIME-TABLE FOR PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN TRIPOLITANIA

Subjects	*Number of lessons per week (each lesson lasts 45 minutes)*					
	1st year	*2nd year*	*3rd year*	*4th year*	*5th year*	*6th year*
Koran and religion . .	3	3	4	4	3	3
Arabic speech and writing .	12	12	10	9	9	9
Singing and music . .	—	—	1	1	1	1
Arithmetic	6	6	6	6	5	5
Practical geometry . .	—	—	—	—	1	1
History and civics . .	—	—	1	2	2	3
Geography	—	—	2	2	2	2
Elementary natural science.	3	3	2	2	2	2
Hygiene	—	—	—	—	1	1
Drawing	3	3	2	2	2	2
Practical work . . .	3	3	2	2	2	1
Physical education and games	6	6	6	6	6	6
Total	36	36	36	36	36	36

III. DAILY TIME-TABLE OF SCHOOLS IN TRIPOLITANIA

	First lesson	*Second lesson*	*Third lesson*	*Recreation and physical education*	*Fourth lesson*	*Fifth lesson*
Morning time-table (3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th year classes)	8.05 to 8.50	8.50 to 9.35	9.35 to 10.20	10.20 to 11.05	11.05 to 11.50	11.50 to 12.35
Afternoon time-table (summer) (1st and 2nd years) . .	1.00 to 1.45	1.45 to 2.30	2.30 to 3.15	3.15 to 4.00	4.00 to 4.45	4.45 to 5.30
Afternoon time-table (winter) (from 15 November to end of February) . . .	1.00 to 1.40	1.40 to 2.20	2.20 to 3.00	3.00 to 3.15	3.15 to 3.55	3.55 to 4.35

cation course at Sidi Mesri (Libyan Development Agency): Boarders, 2344; Staff, o be decided later.

ucation for Girls

uipment of the Tripoli teachers' training centre: Laboratories, sports equipment and library (at the expense of LATAS), £3,800.
ganization of a summer course in the above centre (at the expense of the Libyan Development Agency or of LATAS): Maintenance of boarders, £110; Teachers' salaries, not yet fixed.
nding, by Unesco, of a woman expert on girls' education and kindergartens.

neral Education

nding by Unesco of an expert to study the problem of the education of nomadic peoples.
nding by Unesco of an expert on agricultural training and manual work.
nding by Unesco of an expert to organize instruction in physical education.
ganization of medical inspection in schools and of assistance to under-nourished children: arrangements to be decided by WHO.
ganization by Unesco of the Tripoli production centre for textbooks and educational equipment.

ult Education

nding by Unesco of an expert to study the problem and propose solutions.
ganization, with Unesco's assistance, of school and popular libraries at Suk el-Gium, Garian, Zavia and Misurata.

ondary Education

ditional equipment for the secondary schools in Zavia, Tripoli and Benghazi (cost to be distributed between the Libyan Development Agency and LATAS), £9,200.
rmation of new classes in these schools: Staff (at the expense of the governments), £7,040.
crease in the number of boarders (at the expense of the governments), £1,850.
tablishment of a secondary class at Derna: Staff (at the government's expense), £1,944; Library (at the expense of LATAS), £500.

XI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED GOVERNMENT AND EXPENDITURE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FOR 1952-53

SUMMARY OF ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FROM UNESCO FOR THE YEAR 1952-53

nding of Experts

order of priority: 1 expert for the establishment of the teachers' training centre at Benghazi; 1 woman expert for girls' education and for kindergartens; 1 expert on adult education; 1 expert on physical education; 1 expert on agricultural training and manual work; 1 expert on the education of nomadic peoples.

Appendix N: Timetable for Teachers' Centre (1950)

IV. WEEKLY TIME-TABLE OF THE TRIPOLI TEACHERS' TRAINING CENTRE

Subject	*Number of lessons per week (each lesson lasting 45 minutes)*		
	First year	*Second year*	*Third year*
Arabic	6	6	6
Religion	2	2	2
English	5	5	5
Mathematics	5	5	5
Physics and chemistry	2	2	2
Practical work (physics and chemistry)	1[1]	1[1]	1[1]
Biology	2	2	2
Practical work in biology	1[1]	1[1]	1[1]
History	3	3	3
Geography	2	2	2
Civics	2	—	—
Agriculture	2	1	1
Practical work in agriculture	1[1]	1[1]	1[1]
Physical education	2	1	1
Drawing	1	1	1
Educational theory	2[2]	6	6
Educational practice	—	4[1]	4[1]
Total	39[3]	43[4]	43[4]

[1] Afternoon.
[2] Child psychology.
[3] Three in afternoon.
[4] Seven in afternoon.

Appendix O: Timetable for Women's Teachers' Training Centre (1950)

V. WEEKLY TIME-TABLE OF THE YOUNG WOMEN'S TEACHERS' TRAINING CENTRE

Subject	*Number of lessons per week (each lesson lasting 45 minutes)*	
	First year	*Second year*
rabic	8	8
nglish	8	7
eligion	2	2
athematics	6	5
istory	2	2
eography	2	1
ementary sciences	2	2
ygiene	1	1
fant welfare	—	1
mestic science	—	4
edlework	2	—
awing	2	1
ychology	—	1
ysical education and singing	1	1
Total	36	36

Appendix P: Budget for Tripolitanian Ministry of Education (1950)

VI. BUDGET OF THE TRIPOLITANIAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION FOR THE YEARS 1951-52 AND 1952-53 (English text supplied by the Director of Education)

Items	*Period*		
	1 Apr. 1951 to 31 Dec. 1951	*1 Jan. 1952 to 31 Mar. 1952*	*1 Apr. 1952 to 31 Mar. 1953*
	£	£	£
Personal Emoluments			
Ministerial staff[1]	1,200	400	1,600
U.K.-based staff	3,910	1,500	6,000
Imported staff	17,600	10,000	50,550
Locally engaged staff	171,800[2]	48,010	212,180
Total (Personal emoluments)	194,510	59,910	270,330
Other Charges			
Grant to religious (R.C.) schools[3]	2,250	750	3,000
Text books[4]	5,500	200	10,000
Purchase of school equipment[4]	9,500	400	12,600
Grant to Kuttab schools[5]	750	250	1,000
Detention and travelling allowances[6]	230	100	400
English instruction classes[7]	600	200	800
Grant to Jewish schools[8]	300	—	—
Technical training college[9]	7,500	3,375	12,125
Teacher training colleges[10]	3,450	2,550	9,125
Adult illiterate classes[11]	2,720	900	3,600
Library books[12]	250	65	250
Repairs to school buildings[13]	700	250	1,000
Secondary schools boarding[14]	5,460	4,225	13,600
Grants and bursaries[15]	3,270	1,000	7,000
Educational magazine[16]	300	100	200
Sundries[17]	180	60	300
Hire of Transport[18]	—	100	400
Total (Other charges)	42,960	14,525	75,400
Special Expenditure[19]			
Miscellaneous equipment[20]	11,000	700	6,800
Arabic reading books[21]	3,000	—	4,000
English school[22]	—	500	2,000
Total (Special expenditure)	14,000	1,200	12,800
Total (Ministry of Education)	251,470	75,635	358,530

[1] Allows for imported U.K.-based teachers of English.
[2] Includes the salaries of the teachers of Italian primary schools up to 30 Sept. 1951.
[3] Schools, mostly kindergarten, run by nuns and attended by all nationals.
[4] Text books, exercise books, and all expendable equipment, issued free to students. Enormous increase in cost of paper.
[5] Grant towards cost of running Moslem religious (Koranic) schools.
[6] Expenses incurred by inspectors, etc., on tour.
[7] Salaries of teachers at English evening classes.
[8] Similar to item 2 above, ceasing with Jewish exodus.
[9] Allowances paid to each student in lieu of boarding.
[10] Cost of boarding students at two teacher training colleges.

Appendix Q: Draft Budget for Cyrenaican Mininstry of Education (1952-1953)

VII. DRAFT BUDGET OF THE CYRENAICAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION FOR THE YEAR 1952-53

Budget Item	*Amount*
	£
Personal emoluments	152,157
Detention allowance	800
Boarding schools; food, laundry, cleaning, etc.	59,680
Books and materials	11,050
Technical education and courses abroad	10,758
Grants: Zawias and Koranic schools	7,865
Grants: community schools	3,075
Cleaning materials	550
Sundries	150
Furniture and equipment	19,091
Agricultural school: stock and equipment	500
School gardening scheme	—
Technical education, materials	1,300
Special courses, Cyrenaican personnel	1,800
Refund Arabic tuition fees	150
Courses for Cyrenaican teachers	3,950
Examination fees	300
Total (Education)	273,176

VIII. LIST OF SCHOOLS IN THE FEZZAN ALREADY OPEN OR ABOUT TO OPEN IN THE SCHOOL YEAR 1951-52

The attendances in the following localities were: Brach, 63 (including 20 boarders); Murzuk, 39; Dar el-Bey, 90 (including 27 boarders); Ouenzerik, 45; Agar, 15; Bend Beya, 13; Ghadames, 105; Derj, 35; Sinaouen, 39; Ghat, 83; El Barkat, 20; a total of 544. Schools to be opened: Edri, Berguen, Oum el Araneb, Tamezaoua.

[11] Originally teachers' salaries. Now concentrating on production of books.
[12] Central library and reference libraries in colleges.
[13] Only minor and urgent repairs. Major works done by PWD.
[14] Two resident secondary schools.
[15] Expenses of students attending course abroad.
[16] A local production.
[17] Cleaning materials, etc.
[18] Required when government resources are inadequate.
[19] Capital outlay.
[20] Includes school furniture and other non-expendable equipment.
[21] Provision of reading rooms in outlying areas.
[22] Proposed fee-paying English-speaking school for all nationals.

Appendix R: Fezzan's Educational Budget (1952-3)

IX. THE FEZZAN'S EDUCATIONAL BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1952
(Draft submitted for approval)

Item	*French francs*
Staff Salaries	
Item I	
1 director (65,000 × 12)	780,000
1 secretary (13,000 × 12)	156,000
Item II	
5 french teachers (35,000 × 12 × 5)	2,100,000
6 native teachers (35,000 × 12 × 6)	2,520,000
10 monitors[1] (7,000 × 12 × 10)	840,000
	6,396,000
Purchase and Maintenance of Equipment	50,000
School Supplies	250,000
School Canteens	900,000
	1,200,000

[1] The exact salary of the future monitors training in Algiers has not yet been fixed, but it will certainly be more than 10,000 francs a month.

A sum of 20,000,000 francs has also been estimated for school buildings and cultural missions.

X. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROJECTS FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR 1952-53

Training of Teachers

Establishment of a centre in Benghazi with school annex: Staff: 1 director (Unesco expert); 5 teachers paid by the government, £4,000; 4 teachers in the school annex, paid by the government, £1,000; domestic staff paid by the government, amount not fixed. Buildings: construction or conversion of the buildings required (to be financed by the Libyan Development Agency), amount not fixed. Equipment: Library (at Unesco's expense), £500; Laboratories, sports equipment (at the expense of LATAS), £3,300; Maintenance of boarders (at the government's expense), £1,450.

Supplementary equipment for the Sidi Mesri centre: Purchase of library books (at Unesco's expense), £200; Laboratories, sports equipment (at the expense of LATAS), £3,300.

Establishment of a school annex for the Sidi Mesri centre: Staff (at the expense of the government), £1,000; Buildings: construction and furnishing of 4 classrooms (at the expense of the Libyan Development Agency), amount not fixed.

Establishment of a senior section in the Sidi Mesri centre: Staff (at the government's expense), £3,400; Maintenance of boarders (at the government's expense), £1,100; Buildings: alterations to be decided later (at the expense of the Libyan Development Agency), amount not fixed; Equipment: additions to equipment to be decided later (at the expense of LATAS).