

Abhidharma-dīpa-Vibhāṣhā-prabhā-vṛitti.

A critical edition and an Introduction on its Authorship
and its relation to the Abhidharma-kośa-Bhāṣhya of Vasubandhu.

[Part I INTRODUCTION]

Thesis submitted for the Ph.D. degree
of the

University of London

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1958

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ABSTRACT

The thesis consists of two parts: Introduction (Part I) and the Text (Part II).

Part II contains a critical edition of the Abhidharma-dīpa (with its commentary called the Vibhāṣhā-prabhā-vṛitti) based on the photographs brought by Pandit Rāhula Sāmkṛityāyana of a MS. discovered in Tibet in 1937.

This hitherto unknown work belongs to the Kāśmīra Vaibhāshika school and is written on the model and in refutation of the Abhidharma-kośa (and the Bhāṣhya) of Vasubandhu.

It has the distinction of being the only work written against Vasubandhu the Kośakāra that has survived in its original form, and thus has a unique value in furnishing us with the orthodox Vaibhāshika reactions to the Abhidharma-kośa and the Bhāṣhya.

Part I - INTRODUCTION

The first chapter contains a brief description of the MS., notes on the correspondence between the kārīkās of the Abhidharma-dīpa and the Abhidharma-kośa, and also a brief summary of the contents of the Abhidharma-dīpa and its Vṛitti.

The second chapter deals with the meaning and interpretation of the terms Sūtra and Abhidharma. An attempt has been made to trace the beginning of the Abhidharma to the Sūtras, particularly to those which deal with the thirty-seven bodhipākshika-dharmas. It also contains a comparison of several Mātrikā lists showing the identity of the subject-matter of the

Abhidharma of all Ābhidharmika schools.

The third chapter deals with the divergence between the Sautrāntika and the Ābhidharmika ^{ta}interpretations of the main items of the Abhidharma, as they are found in the Pali commentaries, particularly in the Vibhanga-Aṭṭhakathā, and in the Abhidharma-Kośa-Bhāṣya.

The fourth chapter deals with thirteen major controversies between the Sautrāntika Kośakāra and the Vaibhāṣika Dīpakāra (the author of the Abhidharma-dīpa). An attempt has been made to trace the origin of these controversies to the Pali Scriptures and to their Aṭṭhakathās.

The last chapter deals with the problem of the date and authorship of the Text.

Additional notes:

i) The system of transcription used is that of the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna, in which the Abhidharma-dīpa is to be published. The following diacritical marks may be noted.

ri =	ꣳ	cha =	च	chha =	छ
śa =	श	sha =	ष		

ii) Notes on the restorations and corrections to the Text are given on page 268 of the Introduction.

iii) Bound at the end of this volume is my article 'On the theory of two Vasubandhus' which forms a subsidiary paper to this thesis.

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ABBREVIATIONS

(For details see Bibliography)

<u>A.</u>	in combination with a title letter (e.g. <u>MA.</u>) = <u>Aṭṭhakathā</u> (on <u>M.</u>) (All references are to the Pali Text Society editions, unless otherwise stated).
<u>Aaa.</u>	<u>Abhisamay ālankār āloka.</u>
<u>Aam.</u>	<u>Abhidharmāmṛita.</u>
<u>Ad</u> or <u>Dīpa</u>	<u>Abhidharma-dīpa</u> (the <u>kārikā</u> text).
<u>Adv.</u> or <u>Vṛitti.</u>	<u>Vibhāṣhāprabhā-vṛitti</u> (the commentary on <u>Ad.</u>)
<u>Ak.</u> or <u>Kośa</u>	<u>Abhidharma-kośa</u> (<u>kārikā</u> text as given in the edition of P. Pradhan. See <u>Introduction</u> p.6, n.3.)
<u>Akb.</u> or <u>Bhāṣhya</u>	<u>Abhidharma-kośa-Bhāṣhya</u> (P. Pradhān's edition. Ibid.)
<u>Ambrh.</u>	<u>Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relation to Hīnayāna.</u>
<u>AmT.</u>	<u>Abhidharma-mūla-Tīkā.</u>
<u>Ang.</u> or <u>A.</u>	<u>Anguttara-nikāya.</u>
<u>Asm.</u>	<u>Abhidharmasamuchchaya.</u>
<u>A.sangaho</u>	<u>Abhidhammatthasangaho.</u>
<u>A.vibhāvinī</u>	<u>Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī.</u>
<u>BHSD</u>	<u>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary.</u>
<u>B. Pañjikā</u>	<u>Bodhicharyāvatāra-Pañjikā.</u>
<u>BSOAS.</u>	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

<u>Dhs.</u>	<u>Dhammasangani.</u>
<u>Dīgha</u>	<u>Dīgha-nikāya.</u>
<u>DPPN.</u>	<u>Dictionary of the Pali Proper names.</u>
<u>IHQ.</u>	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.
<u>JBORS.</u>	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna.
<u>Jps.</u>	<u>Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra.</u>
<u>JPTS.</u>	Journal of the Pali Text Society, London.
<u>Kv.</u>	<u>Kathāvatthu.</u>
<u>KvA.</u>	<u>Kathāvatthu Atthakathā</u> (SHBS. Vol. XXXVIII)
<u>LVPak.</u>	<u>L'Abhidharma-kośa de Vasubandhu</u> by L. de la Vallée Poussin.*
<u>M. or</u> <u>Majjhima</u>	<u>Majjhima-nikāya.</u>
<u>Milinda.</u>	<u>Milindapañho.</u>
<u>MCB.</u>	Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques (publiés par L'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, Bruxelles.)
<u>Netti.</u>	<u>Nettipakarapa.</u>
<u>PTS.</u>	Pali Text Society, London.
<u>PTSD.</u>	<u>Pali English Dictionary</u> of the PTS.
<u>S. or</u> <u>Samyutta</u>	<u>Samyutta-nikāya.</u>
<u>Sakv.</u>	<u>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharma-Kośa-Vyākhyā.</u>
<u>SHBS.</u>	Simon Hevavitarane Bequest Series, Colombo.
<u>Śikshā.</u>	<u>Śikshāsamuchchaya.</u>
<u>Tvb.</u>	<u>Trisīkā-vijñaptimātratā-Bhāshya.</u>
<u>Vinaya.</u>	<u>Vinayapitakam.</u>

* References are to chapters and kārikās, unless otherwise stated.

<u>Vbh.</u>	<u>Vibhanga.</u>
<u>Vm.</u>	<u>Visuddhimagga.</u>
<u>VmT.</u>	<u>Visuddhimagga-Tikā.</u>

I. SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS
OF THE ABHIDHARMA-DĪPA.

The palm-leaf manuscript of the Abhidharma-dīpa was discovered in Tibet by Pandit Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana in the year 1937. He brought the photographs of this manuscript, which are preserved in the K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna. As the original MS. is not available to us, our only guide about it are the notes made by the discoverer. In his article 'Second search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf MSS. in Tibet',¹ he notes the following details: "Discovered in Shalu monastery, Abhidharma-pradīpa, Śāradā script, size 22" x 2", leaves 63, 9 lines in each side of leaf, incomplete. Begins - 'svasti, namaḥ sarvajñāya / yo duḥkhaḥetuvyūpa-sāntimārgam /'. From leaves 1 to 150, following 84 are missing: 2-30, 40, 46, 48, 50-52, 54-81, 83-90, 119-125, 127-129, 131-133, 138, 140, 145, 147, 149. Every chapter has four pādas. The third pāda of the eighth (perhaps the last) ends at 150b. The whole book contained not more than 160 leaves"

The numbers of the missing leaves as well as the title of the book given by the discoverer need correction. After arranging the leaves in proper order, we find the following 88 folios missing: 2-30, 40, 46, 48, 52-79, 81-90, 118-125, 127, 129, 131-3, 138, 140, 145 and 147. The last folio is numbered 150. Thus out of 150, only 62 folios have come down to us.

1. JBORS, XXIII, 1, 1937, p.35.

The name of the MS. given on the label of the photographs is Abhidharma-pradīpa. However, the MS. contains two works, viz., the metrical Abhidharma-dīpa and a prose commentary on it known as the Vibhāṣhāprabhā-vṛitti. The original work is called Abhidharma-dīpa.¹ The author of this is referred to as Dīpakāra.² At the end of each chapter (Adhyāya) and sub-chapter (pāda) the work is called Abhidharma-dīpa.³ But in two places (p.347 and p.429) it is called Abhidharma-pradīpa, which may be an unauthorized improvement by the scribe. We shall, therefore, call the work Abhidharma-dīpa and not pradīpa.

The kārikā text, namely the Abhidharma-dīpa closely follows, both in the contents and in presentation, its counterpart, the Abhidharma-kośa⁴ of Vasubandhu. The latter divides his work into eight Kośa-sthānas and adds a ninth Kośa-sthāna, viz., the Puḍgala-nirdeśa, more or less as an appendix. The Abhidharma-dīpa⁵, too, is divided in eight chapters called Adhyāyas, but unlike the Kośa, it subdivides each Adhyāya into four pādas. As the MS. discovered is incomplete, we are not certain whether the Dīpa too had a ninth Adhyāya corresponding to the IX Kośa-sthāna. Most probably the Dīpa had not, for it is not referred to anywhere, even in the relevant parts of the work.⁶

-
1. See Ad. kārikā 1.
 2. See Adv. p.169.
 3. See Adv. p.14 etc.
 4. Henceforth called Kośa or Ak.
 5. Henceforth called Dīpa or Ad.
 6. See Adv. p.158, n.1.

The eight Adhyāyas deal with the following topics in the same order as in the Kośa:-

- | | |
|------|------------------------|
| I | Skandha-āyatana-dhātu. |
| II | Indriya. |
| III | Loka-dhātu. |
| IV | Karma. |
| V | Anuśaya. |
| VI | Mārga. |
| VII | Jñāna. |
| VIII | Samādhi. |

The Adhyāyas in the Dīpa are not named in the manuscript, but merely numbered. The seventh Adhyāya, however, is named at the end of its fourth pāda as Jñānavibhāga.

The number of the kārīkās found in the Dīpa extant is 597. Of these 11 kārīkās¹ have lost either the first two (a and b) or last two (c and d) quarters as they come either at the end or the beginning of the lost folios. Two kārīkās² have a line missing, probably due to the inadvertence of the scribe.

The distribution of the kārīkās in each Adhyāya cannot be ascertained with certainty as most of them have lost certain portions. The fourth pāda of the II Adhyāya (dealing with hetu, pratyaya and phala),

1. 87, 129, 130, 158, 383, 396, 425, 437, 481, 488, 547.
2. 93 and 192.

and the first three pādas of the III Adhyāya (dealing with pratītya-samutpāda) are entirely lost. Major portions of the first pāda of the I Adhyāya (29 folios), first pāda of the IV Adhyāya, fourth pāda of the V Adhyāya (7 folios) and the third pāda of the VI Adhyāya (3 folios) and several small portions of the last two Adhyāyas are also lost. As it is, we find the following number of kārīkās in each Adhyāya:-

I	71
II	78
III	4
IV	105
V	125
VI	92
VII	58
VIII	<u>64</u>
Total	597

Since our extant work is just a little more than one-third of the original, it will be reasonable to presume that the entire kārīkā text consisted of at least 1200 verses, covering almost the same topics that are dealt with in the Kośa, which consists of only 600 kārīkās¹ (excluding the thirteen kārīkās of the IX Kośa-sthāna).

A large number of kārīkās of the Dīpa correspond, almost one for one and sometimes word for word, to the kārīkās of the Kośa as will be evident from the comparisons given in the footnotes to the text. The table given at the end of this introduction² will show that a majority of of the kārīkās of the Dīpa find their parallels in the Kośa.

1. 'Abhidharma-kośa-kārīkās of Vasubandhu', text edited by G.V. Gokhale, JRAS, Bombay, Vol.22, 1946.

2. See Appendix I.

This correspondence between the kārikās of Dīpa and Kośa is very striking. Out of the 597 kārikās of the Dīpa, not less than 300 have their parallels in the Kośa. Except in a few cases (which are noted in the footnotes to the Text), they are presented in a consecutive order. It is possible to determine the subject matter of the lost folios of the Dīpa by referring to the corresponding Kośa. Even in phraseology, they appear almost as imitations of the Kośa. This may be partly due to the common subject matter. But on the whole, one is led to the impression that the Dīpakāra had the Kośa-kārikās as models for his composition.

The kārikās of the Kośa are brief and compressing many points in single verses. Hence we see the Kośa-Bhāṣhya breaking the kārikās in small pieces for commentary. The kārikās of the Dīpa are usually divided only in two parts.

The number of kārikās in the Dīpa is larger than in the Kośa. This is firstly due to the new topics introduced by the Dīpakāra and secondly due to a detailed exposition of those topics which are briefly discussed in the Kośa. About fifty kārikās are devoted to topics which do not occur in the Kośa.¹ About eighty kārikās² are devoted to the topics which are treated only in the six kārikās in the Kośa. It should, however, be noted that the majority of the kārikās of the second kind

1. See the following kārikās:- 58-70, 81-85, 93-98, 145-148, 214-222, 232-234, 451-456, 555-563.

2. E.g., kārikās 101-108 = Ak. II.21.
300-324 = Ak. V.26, 27.
332-355 = Ak. V.31.
397-420 = Ak. VI.18-19.

contains, in most cases, only such details as are given in the Kośa-Bhāshya.

The commentary on the Dīpa, the Vibhāshā-prabhā-Vṛitti¹, is also Bhāshya.

The commentary on the Dīpa, the Vibhāshā-prabhā-Vṛitti¹, is also written more or less on the pattern of the Abhidharma-kośa-Bhāshya² of Vasubandhu³ he

Dīpa and its Vṛitti. Nevertheless, it is only in the Vṛitti that we meet severe criticism directed against the Kośakāra. It will be proved in a subsequent chapter that this commentary is written solely for presenting the orthodox Vaibhāshika viewpoint, encountering the criticisms levelled against it by the Kośakāra in his Bhāshya. We may here note that although criticising it, the Vṛitti, in most parts, is an imitation of the Bhāshya and differs only in those places where it either deals with new topics or deals in detail with those which are given in brief in the Bhāshya. We have indicated in the footnotes to the Text, the passages common to the Bhāshya. There are about fifty such large passages (the

1. Henceforth called Vṛitti or Adv.

2. Henceforth called Bhāshya or Akb.

3. This work has hitherto been known to us through the L'Abhidharma Kośa de Vasubandhu of Louis de la Vallée Poussin, who translated it from the Chinese and Tibetan translations. Fortunately, the original Sanskrit MS. of this work was also discovered by Pandit Rāhul in Tibet in 1937. This has now been edited by Professor Prahlād Pradhān and awaits publication in the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna. I am deeply grateful to Professor Pradhān for giving me access to his press-copy of this MS. I am also indebted to Professor A.S. Altekar, the General Editor of the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, for his kind permission to quote and print passages from the above work in my edition of the Dīpa.

smaller ones are not noted) which are more or less identical with the Bhāshya. Of these about twelve passages are quotations from other works (mostly Sūtras, the Prajñapti and the Jñānaprasthāna) common to both.¹ Four passages deal with the chatushkoṭikas², which also appear to be borrowed by both from some common Abhidharma source. Two passages are mentioned as quotations from the Bhāshya itself as providing the 'pūrva-paksha'.³ The remaining 32 passages are directly borrowed from the Bhāshya without any acknowledgement. Of these a large number are identical and a few substantially agree with the Bhāshya. The entire Vṛitti on the kārīkās 17a, 185, 204cd, 209, 261 and 350 of Dīpa may specially be noted as it is identical with its corresponding Bhāshya.

Keeping in view this primary relation of the Dīpa and its Vṛitti with the Kośa and its Bhāshya respectively, we may proceed to give in brief the contents of the work. In doing this we will be taking notice only of the more important topics and particularly of those which are either controversial or are not treated in the Bhāshya.


-
1. See Adv. pp. 452-454.
 2. See Adv. pp. 16, 27, 90, 102.
 3. See Adv. pp. 98, 168.

I Adhyāya

[Kārikā 1]

The MS. opens with a salutation to the omniscient. The first kārikā declares that the author will compose a śāstra known as the Abhidharma-dīpa. The Vṛitti on this contains a brief survey of the Four Noble Truths, which constitute the central teachings of the Buddha. An etymological discussion of the term Buddha is given to show that he knows all (sarvam, i.e., the twelve āyatana).

Here the Text is very seriously interrupted as not less than 29 folios, containing a major portion of the first and the second pāda are lost. These lost folios might have contained a very useful discussion on the meaning of the Abhidharma and a detailed scheme of the Dharmas set out in their traditional divisions of asaṃskṛita and saṃskṛita and the latter in the five skandhas, further divided into the seventy-two categories of the Vaibhāṣika.¹ This is evident from a subsequent statement:
vyākhyātāḥ aṣṭau padārthāḥ, saṃskṛitāḥ pañcha, trayaś chāsaṃskṛitāḥ.



[Kārikā 2-3]

The only point to note here is that the Vṛitti contains a criticism, in this connection, of the Vaiśeṣika padārthas and the ^mSāṃkhya prakṛiti, topics which are not referred to in the Bhāṣhya.

[Kārikā 4-16]

The Vṛitti now deals with the āyatana and dhātu-vyavasthā. The meanings of these two terms are given in almost the same words as in the Bhāṣhya. More detailed information is given about the manodhātu and its relation to other vijñānadhātus. Two ābhidharmika terms, viz., saṃgraha (collection) and samprayoga (association) are explained in order to extend the scope of such terms as skandha, āyatana and dhātu to cover many categories which occur in the Sūtras but are not tabulated in the Abhidharma. The traditional list of the 80,000 dharma-skandhas (aggregates of the preachings of the Doctrine) is referred to with various interpretations of this word. The Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra agree that this number corresponds to the 80,000 kinds of people, differing on account of their charita (nature) for whom the Buddha has preached the law suitable to each one of them.

[Kārikā 17]

In the third pāda, the Vṛitti deals with the eighteen dhātus in the well known Ābhidharmika manner, i.e. grouping them in pairs and triads, as sanidarśana (visible) and anidarśana (invisible), sapratigha

(impinging), etc. The meaning of the term pratigha is given in a passage which is borrowed from the Bhāshya, including a quotation from Kumārā^alāta.

[Kārikā 18]

While dealing with the distribution of the eighteen dhātus in the three spheres of existence, (kāma-rūpa-arūpa), the Vṛitti, unlike the Bhāshya, merely mentions that the beings of the rūpa-loka do not possess four dhātus, viz., gandha, rasa, ghrāpa-vijñāna and jihvā-vijñāna. This Vaibhāshika theory shared also by the Theravādins is very pointedly criticised by the Kośakāra in the Bhāshya.

[Kārikā 19]

While defining the term sāsrava, the Vṛitti refers to the Kośakāra and criticises his definition of this term. According to the Kośakāra, the dharmas included in the first and second Truths are sāsrava, because āsravas (influxes) coincide with and reside (anuśerate) in them. The Vṛitti shows that this is a wrong derivation.

[Kārikā 20]

The next notable topic in this pāda is of vitarka and vichāra. The Vaibhāshikas maintain that there is some kind of sensation (vitarka) and discursive thought (vichāra) in every moment of consciousness. The vikalpa is of three kinds: svabhāva-vikalpa (pure sensation), abhinirūpapa-vikalpa (investigatory sensation), and anusmarapa-vikalpa (recollecting sensation). The Kośakāra mentions these three, but as Yaśomitra points

out, does not approve¹ of these distinctions. He further identifies the svabhāva-vikalpa with vitarka. According to the Vaibhāshikas, this svabhāva-vikalpa alone is found in the five kinds of sense consciousness. These, therefore, are treated as avikalpaka or not having any active sensation.

[Kārikās 21-34]

The Kośakāra, in dealing with this topic, leaves out many details which are only to be found in the Vṛitti. The Vṛitti here has 14 kārikās (21-34) dealing with the various kinds of vikalpas obtained in various states of mind, and the possibility of memory (smṛiti) in the absence of a permanent entity or soul.

[Kārikā 44]

The fourth pāda opens with a long criticism of the Kośakāra's views on the theory of cognition. The controversy relates to the process of cognition, i.e. whether it is the consciousness or the organ of sense that comprehends the object. The Vṛitti takes up the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika viewpoint, following an āgama passage, that it is primarily the sense organ that comprehends and not the consciousness. The Vṛitti closes this controversy with a severe condemnation of the Kośakāra for his ignorance of the Abhidharma and for his leanings towards the Mahāyāna (Vijñāna-vāda).

1. [tri-vidhaḥ kila vikalpa] iti. kila-śabdaḥ paramata-dyotanārthaḥ. svābhiprāyas tu chetanā-prajñā-viśeṣa eva vitarka iti na svabhāva-vikalpo'nyo dharmo'stīti.

[Kārikās 57-70]

At the end of this pāda we find a very bold line indicting the Kośakāra for his omission of an important topic. It reads: "Now this topic, constituting the very essence of the Abhidharma, forgotten by the Kośakāra, should be explained." The Vṛitti in 14 kārikās (58-71) gives various details about the cessation of dhātus through various stages of the anāsrava mārga.

II Adhyāya

[Kārikās 72-77]

The second Adhyāya deals with the division of the dharmas into 22 indriyas. By indriya is meant aiśvarya (supremacy). The twenty-two indriyas have supremacy over their respective functions. The Vṛitti quotes a passage containing the view of the paurāṇa-āchāryas (which also occurs in the Bhāṣhya but not so acknowledged), attributing several functions to the five organs - the first five indriyas. The Kośakāra, however, holds that the sense organs have supremacy only over the knowledge of their respective objects, e.g., the organ of eye has supremacy over the action of seeing the matter. This, says the Vṛitti, is not a novel theory. Indeed, it is a Vaibhāṣhika view, and by saying so, the Kośakāra has indirectly accepted the Vaibhāṣhika contention that the eye comprehends and not the eye-consciousness.

The Vṛitti next refers to a very important theory of the Dārṣṭāntika (i.e. the Sautrāntika), according to whom, no direct

perception is possible. It is his contention that perception is not possible, since the object, the sense organ and the cognition are all momentary. This leads to the famous theory of Bāhyānumeyavāda closely resembling Locke's doctrine of Representative Perception, attributed to the Sautrāntika in later works like Sarvadarsānasamgraha. The Vṛitti, however, does not enter into any criticism of this Sautrāntika position.

[Kārikās 80-87]

If the meaning of indriya is supremacy, why only twenty-two indriyas? There are various dharmas, e.g., saṃjñā, chetanā, etc., which also have supremacy over different mental states. This question is discussed in five kārikās (81-85). It may be noted that the Bhāṣhya too deals with this topic, but instead chooses other examples, e.g., vāk, pāpi, pāda, etc.

[Kārikās 89-90]

The only other notable point in this pāda is a controversy about five indriyas, viz., śraddhā, smṛiti, etc. The controversy is whether these five are sāsrava (defiled) or anāsrava (undefiled) or both. Here the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra hold identical views that they are sāsrāvānāsrava. In this connection, the Vṛitti borrows a whole passage from the Bhāṣhya without any acknowledgement.

[Kārikās 92-111]

The second pāda of this Adhyāya is very short. It is devoted to various minor details about the indriyas. It also contains a short but

important reference to the atomic theory of the Vaibhāṣhika and a criticism of the Kośakāra's definition of paramāṇu.

[Kārikās 112-115]

The third pāda contains a long discussion on the 46 chaitta dharmas and the 14 chitta-viprayukta-samskāras. The former are divided into the following six categories:

10	chitta-mahābhauma
10	kuśala-mahābhauma
6	kleśa-mahābhauma
2	akuśala-mahābhauma
10	parittakleśa-mahābhauma
and 8	aniyata
46	

The Vritti gives definitions of these dharmas.

[Kārikās 116-120]

The Vritti here contains a criticism of Bhadanta Buddhadeva's view that the chitta and chaitasikas are not different dharmas. Buddhadeva also holds that the bhūta-rūpa and the bhautika-rūpa (primary and derived matter) are not different. The Vritti makes a reference to its arguments contained in a previous chapter - bhūta-bhautikānyatva-chintā. This, however, belongs to some lost portions of the I Adhyāya. The Kośakāra deals with this in the I Kośasthāna while discussing the bhūta and bhautika dhātus. The Kośakāra, the Dīpakāra and the Theravādins hold

identical views on this point.

[Kārikā 123]

Of the aniyata (miscellaneous) chaitasikas, the Vritti deals in detail only with the vitarka and vichāra. This is one of the major controversial points found in the Abhidharma literature. The vitarka and vichāra are characterised as coarser (audārika) and refined (sūkshma) sensations simultaneously operating in all kinds of the kāmāvacara consciousness. Since these two partake of two opposite natures (audārika and sūkshma), the Kośakāra maintains that these two cannot cooperate in one and the same moment of consciousness. The Vritti strongly criticises this unorthodox contention of the Kośakāra.. It may be noted that the views expressed in the Vritti are identical with the views of Saṅghabhadra, a celebrated Vaibhāshika contemporary of Vasubandhu.

[Kārikās 126-149]

The rest of the II Adhyāya is devoted to the discussion or rather the defence of the viprayukta-saṃskāras, accepted by the Vaibhāshikas but strongly criticised by the Kośakāra and rejected by the Sautrāntikas. There are thirteen such saṃskāras which cannot be included among material or mental groups. The Kośakāra argues that these saṃskāras have no independent nature or function, nor are they preached by the Buddha. The Vritti provides an answer to this criticism. It is its claim that only such great Buddhists as (ārya) Maitreya or (sthavira) Vasumitra or (āchārya) Āsvaghosha can comprehend the teachings of the Buddha and not

those infants who are ignorant of the Abhidharma.

Much of this valuable discussion on the first two saṃskāras, viz., prāpti and aprāpti is lost.

The third saṃskāra known as sabhāgatā, a force producing generality, is defended against the criticism of the Kośakāra, who holds it to be identical with the realistic generality (sāmānya) of the Vaiśeṣika.

The next two saṃskāras, viz., āsamjñika and the nirodha-samāpatti (forces stopping the functions of consciousness in the realms of unconscious trance) are dealt with in the traditional way. Here too, the Vṛitti launches a strong criticism of the Kośakāra for his 'unbuddhistic' (abauddhiya) theory that these states of trances are not unconscious (achittika) but are conscious (sachittika). This valuable criticism is unfortunately interrupted as one folio containing it is lost.

The next saṃskāra is jīvita, the force of life-duration. The Vaibhāṣika holds that it is this saṃskāra which (as determined by the previous karmas), at the time of conception, is instrumental in determining the life-duration (sthitihetuh). The Kośakāra holds that if the karma determines the duration, the function of the jīvita is superfluous and hence no reality. The Vṛitti puts forward arguments to prove that the jīvita is a dravya, a real element.

The Vṛitti here introduces a very interesting controversy regarding the nature of any possible prolongation of life by yogic powers. According to the Vaibhāṣika theory, such a thing is contrary to the laws

of karma. The life span (jīvita) is a result of karma (vipākaja), which does not admit any prolongation by samādhi.

This controversy arises from the well known legend of the Buddha's declaration that he could, on account of his mastery over the four paths to riddhi live in the same birth for a kalpa or a kalpāvasēsha.

The Kośakāra fully deals with this controversy while dealing with a topic: kati indriyāṇi vipākaḥ. There the Kośakāra maintains, contrary to the accepted Vaibhāshika theory, that in the case of such prolongation of life by the Buddha (or any other arhat), the yogic powers supersede the karma and produce a new life. It is, therefore, a life which is samādhija (born of samādhi) and not vipākaja (a result of karma).

This view of the Kośakāra is censured by the Vṛitti as uninformed, contrary to the words of the Buddha and unworthy of any criticism. The accusation is even made that the Kośakāra had accepted the Vaitulika-śāstra and had so entered the portals of Mahāyāna.

The Vṛitti next deals with the four saṃskāras known as the saṃskṛita-lakṣaṇas or the phenomenalising characteristics of all phenomena. They are: jāti (origin), sthiti (subsistence), jarā (decay) and nāśa (extinction). The Vaibhāshikas, on the basis of a sūtra, conceive that every phenomenal element in its each momentary existence is simultaneously affected by all these four saṃskāras.

The Sautrāntikas hold that as these four saṃskāras have natures opposed to each other, they cannot simultaneously function on a momentary thing. They point out that these four lakṣaṇas have no reality as they

were spoken of by the Buddha only with reference to the series of moments (pravāha) and not to the kshana (moment).

The Kośakāra openly favours this Sautrāntika view in the Bhāṣhya. The Vṛitti criticises this 'nāstikapakṣa' adopted by the Kośakāra. The last three saṃskāras, viz., nāma-kāya, pada-kāya and vyākṛjāna-kāya (saṃskāras which impart significance to words, sentences and articulate sounds respectively) are discussed in detail in the Vṛitti. The Sautrāntikas maintain that since these saṃskāras are not different from vāk-śabda, i.e., the sound of speech produced from the atoms of sound, it is not necessary to invent such new saṃskāras outside the group of Matter.

5 The Kośakāra favours this view and ridicules the Vāibhāṣhika doctrine of the chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra. The Vṛitti contains an answer to his arguments. It also criticises the Mīmāṃsaka, Vaiyākaraṇa and Vaiśeṣhika theories of śabda. The Bhāṣhya does not refer to the views of these three schools.

The third pāda comes to an end with the discussion on the viprayukta-saṃskāras. The fourth pāda, containing a discussion on hetu, pratyāya and phala is entirely lost.

III Adhyāya

[Kārikā 150-153]

The first three pādas of this Adhyāya, dealing with cosmology are entirely lost. Only one topic of the dissolution (saṃvartanī) of the

universe is available to us. A number of controversies regarding the antarābhava (intermediate existence between two lives) and the pratītya-samutpāda are thus lost to us, as not less than thirty folios of this Adhyāya are lost.

IV Adhyāya

[Kārikās 154-157]

The IV Adhyāya deals with the doctrine of karma. The Vṛitti opens the first pāda with a criticism of the īśvara-kāraṇa-vāda in more detail than the Bhāṣhya. The karma is divided into its traditional three types: physical, vocal and mental. The first two are further divided as vijñapti ('manifest act') and avijñapti ('unmanifest act'). These two Vaibhāṣhika conceptions, rejected by the Sautrāntika school, are very pointedly criticised by the Kośakāra in the Bhāṣhya. Unfortunately, the Vṛitti here is interrupted as several of its folios are lost.

[Kārikās 159-169]

The beginning portion of the second pāda is also lost. The Vṛitti here deals with further details of karma. The karma is of three kinds: saṁvara karma (act of abstention from evils), asaṁvara karma (act of indulgence in evils) and naiva-saṁvara-nāsaṁvara-karma (absence from the first two kinds of karma). Of these the first is again divided into three: prātimoksha-saṁvara, dhyāna-saṁvara and anāsrava saṁvara.

Of these, the prātimoksha-saṁvara is dealt with in detail. The

Vritti contains an answer to a criticism from the Kośakāra regarding the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika definitions of the upāsaka and bhikshu.

[Kārikās 170-187]

The remaining portion of this pāda is devoted to the treatment of various kinds of karma divided in several groups of triads. Here too, the Vritti closely follows the Bhāshya and borrows several portions from the latter.

[Kārikā 188]

The only other notable point in this pāda is a reference to a Dārśhāntika view. The Dārśhāntika maintains, on the basis of a sūtra passage, that the kleśas known as abhidhyā (covetousness), vyāpāda (illwill) and mithyādrishti are of the nature of karma. The Vritti considers this a wrong view since it results in the identity of karma and kleśa. The Dārśhāntika is here called 'Sthitibhāgiya', a term not used either by the Kośakāra or by Yaśomitra. The Vritti criticises the Kośakāra for adopting this heretic view, which is contrary to the Abhidharma.

[Kārikās 190-198]

The third pāda is devoted to a discussion on the ten karmapathas (the ways of acting). The Vritti gives their definitions, stages of completion and various other details. In this connection it refers to the Pārasikas who consider it religious to kill their parents and also indulge in illegitimate relationship with their mothers. The Brāhmanas are

accused of justifying their plunders and the Vedas are condemned as irrelevant talks. The Jainas (nagnāṭa) are criticised for their wrong conception of himśā. It may be noted that this whole criticism is much in the same words as in the Bhāṣhya. The Vṛitti, however, contains a longer examination of the yājñika conception of the sacrificial himśā.

[Kārikā 199]

The next notable point is a controversy about the destruction of the kuśala-mūla (the basis or roots of goodness). The Kośakāra gives several details about the manner in which the kuśala-mūlas are completely annihilated by the power of wrong views (mithyā-dṛishṭi). It is a Vaibhāshika doctrine that every person is endowed with some kind of kuśala-mūla but this can be completely annihilated without any residue by the evil powers of mithyā-dṛishṭi. The Kośakāra, however, maintains that the elements of kuśala are never entirely lost, but persist in the form of subtle seeds even in the akuśala state of mind. The Vṛitti quotes this view of the Kośakāra and puts forward the arguments of Dipakāra supported by the āgama.

[Kārikās 200-222]

The remaining portion of this pāda is devoted to other details of the karma-pathas, more or less on the same pattern as the Bhāṣhya. At the end of this pāda we find a new topic, viz., the karma-svakatā, not mentioned in the Bhāṣhya. The latter, however, contains discussions on tripi āvaranāni (three obstructions) and five ānantarya-karmas (conducts

that find retribution without delay). These topics are not found in the Vritti.

[Kārikās 223-230]

The fourth pāda is solely devoted to a full discussion of the bodhisattva doctrine. The Pāli Abhidharma works do not even mention this topic. Even the Visuddhimagga makes just a stray reference to the bodhisatta-sīla. The Bhāṣhya deals with this, but only incidentally and devotes only four kārikās (Ak. IV. 108-111). The Vritti, therefore, is our only Abhidharmika source for the Hīnayānist interpretation of this important topic.

The Vritti contains a long description of the determination of the bodhisattva to help the world by cultivating the bodhi-chitta and the pāramitās. This is given in a very ornate style, unusual in Abhidharma works, reminding us of similar passages in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka or the Śikṣhā-samucchaya. Conditions attending the first moment of the bodhi-chitta and the acquisition of other excellences are given in detail. The Vritti enumerates the thirtytwo mahā-puruṣa-lakṣaṇas (marks of a great man) and the eighty anuvyākṣaṇas (the secondary marks) in conformity with their traditional lists. The Bhāṣhya omits this enumeration, but instead enumerates the names of the sixty sthānāntaras, constituting a kalpa, which are not given in the Vritti.

[Kārikā 231]

Only four pāramitās (viz., dāna, śīla, vīrya and prajñā), as

against the traditional six or ten, are mentioned in the Vritti. The Vritti informs us that the Vaibhāshikas do not consider the kshānti and dhyāna as separate pāramitās but include them in the śīla and prajñā respectively. The vinayadhara-Vaibhāshikas, it says, read only four pāramitās in the Vinaya. Neither of these views are mentioned in the Bhāshya.

[Kārikās 232-235]

Here the Vritti introduces a very important controversy, unnoticed by the Kośakāra. It is claimed by some (Mahāyānists) that the bodhisattva-mārga is not preached in the three Piṭakas. The Dīpakāra takes up this challenge and argues that all the essential points (even including the thirty-seven bodhipākshika dharmas) of the bodhisattva path are preached in the Sūtras, and the pāramitās are mentioned in the Vinaya. It is, therefore, a great heresy to suggest that this doctrine is alien to the Piṭakas. Since there are several Sūtras and Piṭakas, the Vritti makes it clear that only those words of the Buddha are authentic which are included in the Four Āgamas by the elder councillors like Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda.

[Kārikās 239-241]

This leads us to a still more controversial topic of the phalabheda. If the bodhi-mārga is not different from the Piṭaka-preachings, how do we account for the difference in the accomplishments of a śrāvaka, a pratyekabuddha and a Buddha? The Vritti very consistently

maintains that the entire preaching of the Lord, which is to be traced to the three Piṭakas, points to the two kinds of Deliverance, viz., chetovimukti and prajñā-vimukti. Both these are equally attained by the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha and the Buddha. The difference, therefore, is not in their Deliverance but only in their phenomenal excellences of equipments, faculties and aspirations.

V Adhyāya

[Kārikās 259-261]

The fifth Adhyāya is devoted to the exposition of the anuśayas and other minor kleśas. The Sūtras speak of the six basic anuśayas, viz., rāga (bias of passion), pratigha (illwill), moḥa (infatuation), māna (pride), vichikitsā (doubt) and drishti (wrong views). In Abhidharma these are further divided into ninety-eight. As Yaśomitra points out, the different schools attach different meanings to this term. The Vaibhāshikas maintain that the anuśaya means pariyavasthāna, the Vātsīputriyas hold it to be prāpti, and the Sautrāntikas consider it a bija. The Kośakāra examines the first two views and openly favours the Sautrāntika theory of bija. The Vṛitti borrows that part of the Bhāṣhya which criticises the Vātsīputriya, but strongly criticises the Kośakāra for his Sautrāntika bias. The Vṛitti is brief here, as it says, it has discussed this topic in the Karma-chintā (the IV Adhyāya) and also in a work known as Tattva-saptati. This work is unknown to us. It may quite well be an

independent work of the Dīpakāra, written on the model of the Paramārtha-saptati of Vasubandhu.

[Kārikā 271]

A controversy about a *drishṭi* known as the *śīlavrata—parāmarsha* (grasping after works and rites) should be noted here. There are various views about the way this *drishṭi* is destroyed. The Kośakāra strongly criticises the Vaibhāshika theory that this *drishṭi* is removed by insight into the Second Truth (*samudaya-darśana*). The Vṛitti upholds the orthodox Vaibhāshika viewpoint shared by Āchārya Saṃghabhadra.

[Kārikās 272-288]

The rest of the first pāda deals with several details about the ninety-eight divisions of the *anūśaya*.

[Kārikās 289-324]

The second pāda of this Adhyāya constitutes by far the most important part of the whole work. The fundamental principle of the Sarvāstivāda school, namely, the reality of the past and future elements, is discussed here in opposition to the Sautrāntika arguments forwarded by the Kośakāra in the fifth Kośasthāna of his Bhāshya. We are familiar with this controversy through the pioneer works of Stecherbatsky and Poussin. The Dīpakāra takes up each argument of the Kośakāra, reinterprets the relevant sūtras put forward by the Sautrāntikas and establishes, with considerable success, the Vaibhāshika doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda.

Both the Bhāshya and the Vṛitti quote in this connection the four theories advocated by Dharmatrāta, Ghoshaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. But there are a few important points found only in the Vṛitti. The latter refers to the schools of Dārśhāntika, Vaitulika and Paudgalika and equates them respectively with the Lokāyatika, Vaināśika and Nagnāṭa (Jaina) schools. The Vṛitti quotes Kumāralāta's view supporting the Vaibhāshika view-point. It also examines the doctrine of Śūnyavāda, the paripāmavāda of Sāṅkhya, the avayavivāda of Vaiśeṣhika and contains a valuable reference to the trisvabhāva-vāda of the Kośakāra who is described as a Mahāyānist fallen from the Sarvāstivāda.

[Kārikās 325-359]

The rest of this pāda deals with different anuśayas obtaining in different states of mind. The Kośakāra is very brief and explains this point by way of an illustration of the sukhendriya. The Dīpa devotes twenty-five kārikās to this topic.

[Kārikās 360-370]

The third pāda is devoted to the exposition of other kleśas grouped as āsrava, ogha, yoga, upādāna, saṃyojana, bandhana and grantha. The Vṛitti here differs very little from the corresponding Bhāshya.

[Kārikās 371-383]

The upakleśas or minor kleśas collected in the Kshudraka-vastu (corresponding to the Pali Khuddaka-vatthu-vibhanga) are dealt with in detail in the Vṛitti. The Bhāshya is very brief and mentions only three upakleśas.

The last portions of this pāda and the entire fourth pāda, containing details on the kleśa-prahāṇa and kleśa-parijñā are lost.

VI Adhyāya

This Adhyāya deals with the ārya-mārga or the stages leading to arhatship. A large portion of this Adhyāya, consisting of about seven folios, is lost.

[Kārikās 384-390]

The first pāda contains discussion on the darśana and bhāvanā-mārga. In this connection the practices of the four smṛityupasthānas (or application of mindfulness on the nature of the body, feelings, mind and dharma) are explained in detail as they alone bring the annihilation of the impurities (kleśa-kṣaya). Of these the last, viz., the dharma-smṛityupasthāna is equivalent to vipaśyanā, the analytical insight into the law of pratītya-samutpāda, the central teaching of the Buddha. It is called here 'dharma-mudrā' and is identical with the term 'śūnya'. The Vṛitti, however, deems it necessary to delimit the meaning of this term against the absolutist interpretations and explains that the saṃskāras are not devoid of svabhāva (own nature) but are only anātma, i.e., devoid of a substance. The Bhāṣya does not contain this comment.

[Kārikās 393-438]

The practice of the smṛityupasthānas is conducive to the attainment of the first four stages in the darśana-mārga. They are known

as ūshma, mūrdha, kshānti and laukikāgradharma. The first is the 'fire' of intuition producing the pacification (śama) of mind. The second is called mūrdha (superior) as it enfeebles the power of mithyādrishti and thereby consolidates the kuśalamūlas. The third is called kshānti where the aspirant achieves unassailable faith in the 'triple gems'. The fourth stage is 'supreme phenomenal existence', so called because it is a turning-point in the career of the aspirant. This stage is comparable to the gotrabhū-chitta of the Pali Abhidharma. This stage is followed by fifteen moments of insight into the Four Truths and culminates in the darśana-mārga known as srota-āpatti or the entering upon the Noble Path. Various details concerning these stages and controversies relating them are given in the Vritti. The remaining three stages, viz., that of the sakridāgāmin, anāgamin, and the arhat, belonging to the bhāvanāmārga are also dealt with in the third pāda, a major portion of which is lost.

[Kārikās 439-475]

The fourth pāda contains an exposition of several kinds of mārgas and pratipats (modes of progress) spoken in the Sūtras. A large portion is devoted to the thirty-seven bodhipakshya-dharmas covering all the essential factors leading to the bodhi. Bodhi, according to the Vaibhāshikas, constitutes the two illuminations, viz., the kshaya-jñāna and anutpāda-jñāna, terms which we repeatedly meet in the following Pali passage: 'khīṇā me jāti ... nāparam itthattāya'. This bodhi, says the Vritti, is of three kinds, viz., buddhabodhi, pratyeka-buddhabodhi and

śrāvaka-bodhi, giving rise to the concepts of Three Yānas, differing not in kind but only in the degrees of practice of the thirty-seven bodhipakshya-dharmas. These dharmas are then explained in detail in the traditional manner. The only notable point is that the Vṛitti, as in the case of the indriyas, devotes seven kārīkās to explaining the reason for not including several dharmas under the bodhipakshya. This topic is not found in the Bhāṣhya.

VII Adhyāya

[Kārīkās 476-492]

The Lord has said that this spiritual discipline (mārga) consists of three skandhas (aggregates). 'The śīla-skandha', says the Vṛitti, 'is explained in the Karmādhyāya (i.e. the IV Chapter), the samādhi-skandha will be explained in the VIII Adhyāya, the prajñā-skandha should now be explained'.

The treatment of the prajñā is more or less on the lines of the Pali Nānavibhanga. The Pali works are more elaborate and enumerate a large number of jñānas but the Sanskrit Abhidharma works (including the Bhāṣhya and the Vṛitti) deal only with ten kinds, viz., dharma, anvaya, saṃvṛiti, para-chitta, duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga, kshaya and anutpādayjñāna. A large portion of the Vṛitti dealing with these and controversies relating to them is lost.

[Kārīkās 493-495]

The third pāda of this Adhyāya is devoted to the exposition of

the eighteen extra-ordinary qualities (asādhāraṇāḥ dharmāḥ) of the Buddha. They are ten powers (bala), four confidences (vaiśāradya), three applications of mindfulness (smṛityupasthānas), and great compassion (mahā karuṇā). These qualities appear only in the Buddha on his attainment of the bodhi, i.e., the kshaya-jñāna.

[Kārikās 496-497]

The treatment of this topic is not much different from the Bhāṣya. We may, however, note that a Mahāyānist term sarvākārajñatā is mentioned in the Vṛitti in its description of the sarvatra-gāminī pratipat-jñānabala. Its definition of the term dhātu (in the nānādhātubala) is identical with Saṃghabhadra's definition quoted by Yaśomitra.

[Kārikās 517-533]

The fourth pāda deals with jñānas which are not exclusive to the Buddha. They are six abhijñas, three vidyās, three prātihāryas and such other intellectual powers obtained by yogic practices. The only notable point here is the view of the Dīpakāra about the three vidyās which is identical with Saṃghabhadra's view, quoted and accepted by Yaśomitra.

VIII Adhyāya

[Kārikās 534-546]

This last Adhyāya deals with śamatha or samādhi. Details about

the three kinds of dhyānas (sāsrava, śuddha, anāsrava) and the five āngas (vitarka, vichāra, prīti, sukha, upekshā) are given in the first pāda. Various controversies on the nature and number of the five āngas, contained in the Bhāshya, are lost in the Vṛitti.

[Kārikās 547-554]

The second pāda contains controversies on ānejya (unshakable) and four arūpādhyānas. The Vṛitti here is rather brief compared to the Bhāshya. The last portions of the second pāda, containing controversies on the dhyānāntaras is lost.

[Kārikās 554-563]

The third pāda contains brief criticisms of the Brahmanical conceptions of dhyātā, dhyāna and dhyeya, and also of the controversy over karmamārga and jñānamārga. It also contains a criticism of the Vedic mantras. The Vṛitti in this connection mentions the mantras of Pārasika, Śābara and Kāpālika and criticises the casteism of the Brāhmanas. These points are not found in the Bhāshya.

[Kārikās 588-597]

Now we come to the last folio of our incomplete manuscript. This folio contains a brief discussion on the four apramāṇas (boundless states, also known as brahma-vihāras) eight vimokshas (deliverances) and eight abhibhāvāyatanas (stages of mastery) in the same order as in the Bhāshya. The Bhāshya after this deals (in three kārikās = Akb. VIII. 36-38) with the ten kṛitsna-āyatanas. This is followed by five concluding

verses in which the Kośakāra says that he has composed this Abhidharma-śāstra conforming to the Kāshmīra-Vaibhāshika school¹ in order to save the Lord's dispensation from growing dissensions and ignorant heretics.

Most probably the Dīpa too came to a close after a few additional verses. It is most unfortunate that we should have lost the last folio which might have given us the name of the author and also a statement of the circumstances that led to the composition of this important work.

1. Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika-nīti-siddhaḥ prāyo mayā'yaṁ kathito'bhidharmah/
Ak. VIII. 40ab.

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SŪTRA AND ABHIDHARMA.

This brief sketch of the Dīpa and its Vritti reflects predominantly the Vaibhāshika attempt to correct the Kośakāra of his Sautrāntika bias. It is, in a way, a record of the dispute between the Sautrāntika and the Abhidharmika on the interpretation of the 'Sūtras' of the Buddha. Before dealing with the specific differences between the two schools, we may here trace the meaning and interrelation of the terms Sūtra and Abhidharma as seen by these schools.

The earliest canonical reference to the term sūtra¹ is found in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. It is said there that the Buddha on the eve of his parinirvāṇa laid down the following four 'Great Authorities': "In the first place Brethren, a bhikkhu may say thus: From the mouth of the exalted one himself have I heard, from his own mouth have I received it. This is the Dhamma (Doctrine), this is the Vinaya (Law), this is the teaching of the Master. The word spoken, ... should neither be received with praise, nor treated with scorn ... but every word and syllable should be fully understood and then put beside the Suttas and compared with the Vinaya. If when so compared they do not harmonize with the Suttas and do not fit in with the rules of the order, then you may come to the conclusion: 'verily, this is not the word of the exalted one, and has been

1. The term sutta occurs several times in the Nikāyas. In the Majjhima (I.133, III.115) and in the Aṅg (II.7, II.103, II.178, III.86, III.177, III.361) it is mentioned as one of the aṅgas of the traditional 'navāṅga-satthusāsaṇa'. The term suttanta occurs in the Saṃyutta (II.267) and Aṅg (I.60, I.72, II.247, III.107, III.178), but not in the sense of a particular collection of the words of Buddha.

wrongly grasped by that brother.' Therefore, Brethren, you should reject it. But if they harmonize with the Suttas and fit in with the Vinaya, then you may come to the conclusion: Verily this is the word of the exalted one and has been well grasped by that brother."¹... etc.

This passage, occurring^r in one of the most important and widely respected sūtras, is very interesting for the history of the authenticity of several Buddhist scriptures handed down to us. It anticipates, even during the lifetime of the Buddha the existence of several different versions² and at least one authorized version of the Sutta and Vinaya collections. It is possible that this particular authorized version was accepted as the only authentic one in the First Council of Rājagriha, held immediately after the passing away of the Buddha. The omission of the term Abhidharma in this passage, in spite of its occurrence^r in several other suttas, points to a later period for the composition of the Abhidharma texts, traditionally claimed as the word of the Buddha. The passage itself is silent on the meaning of the terms sutta and vinaya, but from the context we can assume that they are used here to indicate the collections of the dhamma and vinaya³ preachings of the Buddha.

The exact meaning of these two terms, viz., sutta and vinaya, was still a controversial point even during the time of Buddhaghosa.

1. See Adv. p.100, n.1.

2. Not of the written words but of the words heard by his direct disciples as, for instance, shown in the Chullavagga: āyasmantaṃ Purāṇaṃ therā bhikkhū etadavochuṃ. 'therehi, āvuso Purāṇa, dhammo cha saṅgīto... upehi taṃ saṅgītiṃ ti.' 'Susaṅgītavuso therehi dhammo cha vinayo cha, api cha yatheva mayā Bhagavato sammukhā sutāṃ sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ tathēvaṇaṃ dhāressāmi ti.' Vinaya, Vol.II, p.290.

3. For a difference between these two terms, see Oldenberg's Introduction to Vinaya Piṭakam, I. pp.X-XIV.

In his commentary on this passage, Buddhaghosa records several views on what constituted the sutta and vinaya:

1. Here the 'sutta' means Vinaya, as is said: 'where was this prohibited? At Sāvattthi in the Sutta-vibhanga.' 'Vinaya' means Khandhakas, as is said: 'In Kosambi, on the transgression of the Vinaya'. But this explanation does not cover the entire Vinaya-piṭaka.¹

2. Or 'sutta' means Ubhato-vibhanga, whereas 'vinaya' means Khandhakas and Parivāra. In this view the entire Vinayapiṭaka is included (but not others).²

3. Or 'sutta' means Sutta-piṭaka and 'vinaya' means the Vinaya-piṭaka. But here only two piṭakas are covered (not the third, i.e. the Abhidhamma).³

4. Or 'sutta' means the Sutta-piṭaka and the Abhidhammapiṭaka, and 'vinaya' means the Vinaya-piṭaka.

Even this explanation is not satisfactory as there are many works which are not included in 'sutta', e.g. Jātaka, Niddesa, etc. (all books of the Khuddaka-nikāya).⁴

1. ettha cha 'suttan' ti Vinayo, yathāha: 'kattha patikkhittam? Sāvattthiyam Sutta-vibhange ti. 'Vinayo' ti Khandhako, yathāha: 'Kosambiyā vinayātisāre' ti. evam Vinayapiṭakam pi na pariyādiyati. Dīgha A. II.p.565.

2. Ubhato-vibhango pana 'suttam', Khandhaka-Parivāra 'vinayo' ti: evam Vinaya-piṭakam pariyādiyati. Ibid.

3. atha vā Sutta-piṭakam 'suttam', Vinaya-piṭakam 'vinayo' ti: evam dve yeva piṭakāni pariyādiyanti. Ibid.

4. Suttantābhidhamma-piṭakāni vā 'suttam', Vinaya-piṭakam 'vinayo' ti: evam pi tīni piṭakāni na tāva pariyādiyanti. asutta-nāmakam pi Buddha-vachanam nāma atthi, seyyathidam: Jātakam Paṭisambhidā Niddeso suttanipāto Dhammapadam Udānam Itivuttakam Vimānavatthu Petavatthu Theragāthā Therīgāthā Apadānam ti. Ibid.

5. Sudinnathera, however, says: "There is not a word of the Buddha which is not sutta. 'Sutta' means three Piṭakas. 'vinaya' is (only mentioned separately as) a means (of subduing passions)." And to illustrate this he puts forth the following sutta:¹ "Those things of which you know thus: these things lead to passion, not to release therefrom, these to bondage ... these to luxury not to frugality, of these things hold definitely: This is not dhamma; this is not vinaya, this is not the word of the Teacher."

"But as to those things, O Gotami, which you know lead to dispassion, to release from bondage, to the dispersion of rebirth, to wanting little, to contentment, to solitude, to exertion and to frugality (and in no case to their opposites), be assured that they are dhamma, the vinaya and the word of the Teacher."²

"Therefore", concludes Buddhaghosa, "'sutta' means the three Piṭakas; 'vinaya' means all that is conducive to the subduing of passion ... But those words which do not occur in the tradition of the suttas but appear only in the apocryphal Vessantara, Ummagga, and Vinaya and the Vedalla-piṭakas, or in one of these ... they are to be considered as not

1. Sudinnatthero pana: asutta-nāmakam Buddha-vachanam nāma n'atthi' ti, tam sabbam paṭikkhipitvā: tīni piṭakāni 'suttam', 'vinayo' pana kāraṇam ti āha. tato tam kāraṇam dassento idaṃ suttam āhāri. Ibid.

2. Ye kho te Gotamī dhamme jāneyyāsi, ime dhammā sarāgāya saṃvattanti no virāgāya, saṃyogāya saṃvattanti no visaṃyogāya ... Ekamsena Gotamī jāneyyāsi: 'n'eso dhammo, n'eso vinayo, n'etaṃ satthu-sāsanan' ti.

Ye cha kho te Gotamī dhamme jāneyyāsi, ime dhammā virāgāya saṃvattanti no sarāgāya ... apaṭchayāya saṃvattanti, no āchayāya. Ekamsena Gotamī jāneyyāsi: 'eso dhammo eso vinayo, etaṃ satthu-sāsanan' ti. Ang. IV.p.280.

the words of the Teacher ... "¹

One can see in these explanations an attempt to extend the meaning of these terms and particularly that of sutta. First it is held to mean only a single Vinaya text, viz. the Suttavibhanga, then a larger Vinaya text, the Ubhato-vibhanga. Next it is made to include not the Vinaya texts, but the entire Sutta-piṭaka. Then it is made to include both the Sutta and Abhidhamma Piṭakas, and finally not only all the three piṭakas, but also anything that may be conducive to a holy life.

The purpose of this extension evidently appears to include the Abhidharma (and also the Khuddakanikāya) which is not specifically mentioned in the passage dealing with the mahāpadesas. The commentators are determined to include it and end in giving a very wide and general meaning to the term sutta, thereby making it comprehensive enough to include all good words.

The Sarvāstivādin version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra also contains the mahāpadesas. They are identical with the Pali passage, except for one more significant phrase - "dharmatām cha vilomayanti".²

1. tasmā 'sutte' ti tepiṭake Buddhavachane otāretabbāni, 'vinaye' ti etasmim rāg' ādi-vinaya-kāraṇe saṃsandetabbāni ti ayamettha attho.

'na ch' eva sutte otaranti' ti sutta-paṭipāṭiyā katthachi anāgantvā chhaḷḷim utthāpetva gūḷha-Vessantara gūḷha-Ummagga-gūḷha-Vinaya-Vedalla-piṭakānaṃ aññatarato āgatāni ... Evaṃ āgatāni hi rāg' ādi-vinaye cha na paññāyamānāni chhaḍḍetabbāni honti ... Dīgha A. II. pp.565-6.

2. tasmāt tarhi ta Ānanda sūtrāntapratīśarapair bhavitavyaṃ na pudgala-pratīśarapair katham ... yadi sūtre 'vatāryamānā vinaye sandarśayamānā sūtre nāvataranti vinaye na sandarśayante dharmatām cha vilomayanti ... nāyaṃ dharmo nāyaṃ vinayo nedam śāstuh śāsanamiti viditvā chhorayitavyaṃ. Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, pp.238-240. Vide Adv. pp.99 and 197.

The term dhammatā is quite well known to the Pali scriptures.¹ It is, therefore, difficult to account for the omission of this term in the Pali version. In the absence of any commentary on the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, we have no precise information on how the Sarvāstivādins understood these terms. Fortunately, our Vṛitti gives some explanation of the term sūtra. It says:² only that sūtra is to be accepted which was spoken by the Buddha, collected in the four āgamas by the elder councillors Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda, and which is contained in the Uddānagāthās³ (summary verses). This explanation helps us to identify the term sūtra with the four āgamas, viz. the Dīrghāgama, the Madhyamāgama, the Saṃyuktāgama and the Ekottarāgama, corresponding to the first four Nikāyas of the Pali canon. The Abhidharma piṭaka and the Kṣudrakanikāya (Pali Khuddakanikāya) are not included here in the term sutta, pointing again to their late acceptance as canonical works. Incidentally, it may be noted that in the nikāya classification, Abhidhamma Piṭaka is included by Theravādins in the Khuddaka-nikāya.⁴ The Sarvāstivādin meaning of the

1. We find such expressions as dhammatā esā bhikkhave yaṃ sīlavato ... avippaṭṭisāro uppajjati (Ang. V.p.2), Bhagavā paṭipanno ... kalyāṇa-dhammatāya ... kusalādharmatāya (Ang. V.p.66), esa Buddhena dhammatā (Saṃyutta, I.p.140), saṃkhārānaṃ khayadhammataṃ vayadhammataṃ ... viparipāmadhammataṃ nissāya bhāsitaṃ ... (Saṃyutta, IV.p.216) etc.

2. yat khalu sūtraṃ bhagavatā Buddhena bhāṣitaṃ tach chaturshv āgameshu sthavira-Mahākāśyapa-sthavir-Ānanda-dibhiḥ saṅgītikarībhiḥ Uddānagāthābhir nibaddhaṃ tadeva grāhyam. Adv. p.197.

3. On the uddāna-gāthās, see Adv. p.197, n.6. cf. Pali uddāna-saṅgaha compiled by saṅgītikāras. See Dhs A. I.68.

4. katamo Khuddaka-nikāyo? sakalaṃ Vinaya-piṭakaṃ, Abhidhamma-piṭakaṃ, Khuddakapāṭha - Dhammapadādayo cha pubbe dassitā pañchadasappabhedā; thapetvā chattāro Nikāye avasesaṃ Buddhavachanaṃ ti. Dhs A. I.65.

term sutta appears more accurate and nearer to the original meaning of that term, compared to the several meanings given by Buddhaghosa.

The term 'dharma¹tā' found in the Sanskrit version of the mahāpadesas is also at a later period accepted by the Theravāda school. The Nettipakarapa, a non-canonical¹ Pali work ascribed by tradition to Mahākachchāna (a direct disciple of the Buddha), contains the term dhammatā along with sutta and vinaya. The meaning of these terms given in this work differs from the traditional Aṭṭhakathās. Its version of the Mahāpadesas reads:² "... those words and syllables should be put beside the suttas, compared with the vinaya and put alongside the dhammatā.

With which sutta are they to be put beside? With the Four Noble Truths.

With which vinaya are they to be compared? With the pacification of passion, illwill and infatuation.

In which dhammatā are they to be tested? In the doctrine of paṭichcha-samuppāda.³

This explanation is remarkable in that these three terms are not identified with any Piṭakas, but only with the general preaching of the Buddha.

1. In the Burmese tradition this book is included in the Khuddaka-nikāya. See Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, p. 77, n. 3.

2. katamasmiṃ sutte otāretabbāni? chatūsu ariya-sacchesu. katamasmiṃ vinaye sandassetabbāni? rāgavinaye dosavinaye mohavinaye. katamiyaṃ dhammatāyaṃ upanikkhipitabbāni? paṭichchasamuppāde. Netti, p. 22.

3. Sarvāstivādiṃs also interpret dhammatā as pratītya-samutpāda:— [na cha sūtraṃ bādhate] na cha sūtrāntaraṃ virodhayati. [na dharmatāṃ bādhata] iti pratītya-samutpādādharmatāṃ. Sakv. p. 705.

Dhammapāla (5th century A.D.) in his commentary on the Nettipakarapa, however, reasserts the aṭṭhakathā meaning of the term sutta. He says: "Since there is not a single word of the Buddha devoid of (the preaching of) Truth, it is said here that sutta means the Four Noble Truths. The Aṭṭhakathās, however, say that sutta means three Piṭakas. There is no contradiction in these two meanings."¹

Despite the differences on the meaning of the term sutta, the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins considered this mahāpadeśa as a characteristic mark (lakshapa) of the words of Buddha. Our Vṛitti twice quotes this mahāpadeśa to refute views conforming to the Vaitulika-sāstra.²

But the Mahāyānists, against whom this mahāpadeśa was quoted by the Hinayāna schools, never accepted it as an Authority or a standard for judging the authenticity of a particular version of the Buddha-vachana. They had a distinct disadvantage. Though they claimed that their scriptures originated from the Buddha, they could not by the very nature of their teachings, name any śrāvakas like Mahākāśyapa or Ananda as their compilers. Bu-ston in his account of the rehearsal of the Mahāyānistic scripture says:³ "Manjuśrī rehearsed the Abhidharma, Maitreya - the Vinaya, and Vajrapāṇi - the Sūtras. It is said moreover in the Tarkajvālā -

1. tattha yasmā bhagavato vachanaṃ ekagāthāmatṭaṃ pi saccha-vimuttaṃ nāma natthi, tasmā 'sutte' ti padassa atthaṃ dassetaṃ chatūsu ariyasachchesū ti vuttaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana 'tīpi piṭakāni suttāṃ' ti vuttaṃ. taṃ iminaṃ Netti-vachanena aññadatthu saṃsandati cheva sameti cha. Netti A. p.219.

2. Vide Adv. pp.98 and 197.

3. Bu-ston's History of Buddhism, by Vol.II, p.101. H. W. Obermiller.

The Mahāyānistic scripture is the work of the Buddha. The chief compilers of it were Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī, The Lord of the secret charms (= Vajrapāṇi), Maitreya and others. The śrāvakas were not the chief compilers of our (Mahāyānist) canon, since the latter is not accessible to them."

This Mahāyānistic tradition appears to be very old. Bu-ston supports it by a passage from Haribhadra's Abhisamayālaṅkāra—Āloka. Haribhadra in this work gives a view of the purvāchāryas to the effect that Vajrapāṇi is the compiler of the teachings of not only the Śākya-muni, but also of all the Thousand Buddhas (that are to arise in the bhadra-kalpa.)¹ Haribhadra further repudiates the Hinayānist claim of authenticity by pointing out the invalidity of their mahāpadeśas. While commenting on a word 'moha-purushāḥ', he says: "'infatuated', on account of not comprehending the nature of the Mother (the Prajñā-pāramitā), due to their belief that only that is a word of the Buddha which compares with the sūtra, fits in the vinaya and conforms to the dharmatā. It may be argued that such persons are really not ignorant, since they reject the Mahāyāna on account of its non-occurrence in the limited number of the sūtras of their School, because it does not fit in their Vinaya and because it goes against their so-called dharmatā of the pudgala-nairātmya (the unreality of the individual Ego). But this is not proper, for in that case the Mukṭaka-sūtras,² which are not read in the Sūtrānta-piṭakas,

1. Ibid. aa. p.

2. The Kośakāra quotes this sūtra to enumerate the sixty sthānāntaras of an asaṃkhyeya. Vide Adv. p.199, n.1 and LVPak. III, pp.187-194.

may well be treated as not the words of the Buddha. Similarly, there is no concordance between different versions of the Sūtra and Vinaya Piṭakas. The dharmatā established in one school is not identical with that of the other schools. With the eighteen different schools and their separate versions of the three Piṭakas, it is improper to hold the Mahāpadeśa as a standard for judging the authenticity of the words of the Buddha."¹

The same view is held by Śāntideva, the author of the Bodhi-charyāvatāra. Prajñākaramati, in his Pañjikā on this work goes a step further. He rejects the Buddha-vachana-lakṣhaṇa propounded by the Hīnayāna schools and puts forward his valid definition:² "This then is the universal characteristic of the Buddha-vachana as preached in the Adhyāśaya-samchodana-sūtra: "Moreover, O Maitreya, by four causes the word of the Buddhas may be recognised. What four? (1) O Maitreya, it refers to truth, not to untruth; (2) to the doctrine, not to the non-doctrine; (3) it lessens sin, not increases it; (4) it shows the advantages of Nirvāṇa, does not indicate those of continued rebirth, ... When someone, O Maitreya, utters or shall utter a word endowed with these four qualities, the believing young men and women will produce the idea of Buddha, of Master; they will hear this Law as he preaches. Why? Anything, Maitreya, that is well said is a word of Buddha."³

This passage reminds us of the Buddha's preaching to Gotamī

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1. Aaa. pp.260-1. Vide Adv. p.197, n.7.
 2. B. Pañjikā, IX.43-44. Vide Adv. p.198, notes.
 3. yat kiñchin Maitreya subhāṣitaṃ sarvaṃ tad Buddha-bhāṣitaṃ. Ibid. See Lamotte's Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, I. pp.81-2 notes.

quoted above. The Hīnayānistic attitude towards the Buddha-vachana is well summed up in Emperor Aśoka's famous line: "whatever is spoken by the Buddha is well spoken."¹ In Mahāyāna it is reversed. All good words become the words of Buddha.

Among the schools of Hīnayāna, the disagreement is mostly on the interpretation and not on the validity of a particular sūtra. The Kathāvatthu, for instance, which records as many as 217 points of controversy, is solely devoted to a Theravādin interpretation of 187 suttas,² which were also accepted by its rivals. Even the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra, representing the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāshika schools respectively, differ, on almost all major occasions, only on the interpretations of the 'sūtras' and not on the authenticity of any particular sūtra. This may be illustrated by their debate on the doctrine of sarvāsti-vāda itself. Not less than ten sūtra passages³ are put forward by both contending parties, each interpreting them in his own way. The contention for the authenticity of a particular sūtra is generally to be found only in the Mahāyāna works as we have seen from the works of Haribhadra and Śāntideva.

In spite of these different versions and standards, interpretations and doctrines, all the Buddhist schools, both Hīnayāna and

1. ~~2~~ kechi bhaṁte bhagavatā Budhena bhāsite save se subhāsite vā. Edicts of Aśoka, p.82 (Adyar edition 1951).

2. The tradition, however, claims that the original Kathāvatthu, as accepted in the III Council, was elaborated by Moggaliputta to the extent of the Dīgha-nikāya, bringing together five hundred orthodox and five hundred heterodox suttas:— Kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṁ nāma. taṁ sakavāde pañcha sutta-satāni paravāde pañchā ti suttasahassaṁ samodhānetvā vibhattaṁ. taṁ vāchanā-maggato idāni potthake likhitaṁ agahetvā saṅgīti-āropita-nayena Dīgha-nikāyappamaṇaṁ. Dhs A. I. 15.

3. Vide Adv. pp.264-280.

Mahāyāna, held some common, indisputable teaching of the Buddha. It was this common heritage that held these schools together through centuries of discord and dissensions. The origin of Abhidharma is to be found in the beginnings of the attempts of the earliest Buddhists to find such a common teaching.

The tendency of the saṅgha to split into various groups is manifest even during the lifetime of the Buddha. In the earlier stages the differences over the laws of Vinaya divided the fraternity. The Vinaya texts are full of stories, invented as well as real, of monks and groups who gave occasion for the institution of several major and minor rules of the Pātimokkha. But the differences over the Vinaya were not considered as harmful as disagreement on the doctrines of the Buddha. During the latter part of the Buddha's life, together with the rise of Devadatta as a rival, we see a kind of fear among the elders that the unity of the Saṅgha may not survive the death of the Master.

Several suttas of the Pali canon bear witness to such a fear and to a consequent attempt to preserve the doctrinal unity by putting his more important doctrines in one collection.

In this connection, the Pāsādikā sutta¹, the Sāmagāma sutta² and the Saṅgīti suttanta³ may be noted as of particular interest. The death of the Jain leader Nāthaputta Nigaṇṭha and a subsequent division in his saṅgha form the occasion for these three suttas.

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1. Dīgha, sutta 29, Vol.III, p.117.
 2. Majjhima, sutta 104, Vol.II, 243.
 3. Dīgha, sutta 33, Vol.III, p.272.

It is said in the introduction (nidāna) to the Pāsādika sutta:
"while the Lord was staying among the Sākyaṃs, Nāthaputta the Nigaṇṭha
had died recently at Pāvā. At his death the Nigaṇṭhas became disunited
and divided into two parties, in mutual strife and conflict, quarrelling...
with each other ... - thou dost not understand this doctrine (dhamma) and
discipline (vinaya) but I do understand it. Thou art in the wrong; I
am in the right! ... Thou sayest last what should be said first, and
first what ought to come last! ... Truly the Nigaṇṭhas ... were out
methinks to kill. Even the lay disciples ... showed themselves shocked ...
so badly was their doctrine and discipline set forth and imparted ... and
now wrecked as it was ... without a protector."¹

Now Chunda the novice who had seen this, visited Ānanda at
Sāmagāma and reported it to him. And Ānanda said "Friend, this is a
worthy subject to bring before the exalted one". They went to the Lord
and reported the episode. The Buddha was not surprised to learn the
happening. He gives a long discourse on the nature of a perfect Teacher,
on the conditions of a perfect religion and claims that his is the perfect
saṃgha and the exalted Law. He then sums up his teachings and exhorts
the saṃgha in the following words: "Wherefore, Chunda, do ye, to whom I
have made known the truths that I have perceived, come together in company

1. tena kho pana samayena Nigaṇṭho Nāthaputto Pāvāyaṃ adhunā kālakato
hoti. tassa kālakiriyāya bhinnā Nigaṇṭhā dvedhikajātā ... aññamaññaṃ
mukha-sattihi vitūḍantā viharanti - 'na tvaṃ imaṃ dhamma-vinayaṃ ājānāsi, ..
"vadho yeva kho maññe Nigaṇṭhesu Nāthaputtiyesu vattati" Ye pi ...
sāvaka gihī odāta-vasanā, te pi ... nibbīṇarūpā ... yathā taṃ durakkhāte
dhamma-vinaye ... bhinna-thūpe appaṭṭisarane. Dīgha, III. pp.117-8.

and rehearse all of you together those doctrines and quarrel not over them, but compare meaning with meaning, and phrase with phrase, in order that this pure religion may last long and be perpetuated, in order that it may continue to be for the good and happiness ... and the weal of devas and men!"¹

"Which then, Chunda, are the truths which, when I had perceived I made known to you ... ?

They are these - the Four Onsets of Mindfulness, the Four Supreme Efforts, the Four Paths to Efficacy, the Five Powers, the Five Forces, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment, the Ariyan Eightfold Path. These o Chunda, are the truths ..."²

This sum-total of his preachings is followed by a discourse on the principles and applications, on the same lines as the mahāpadesas, though this time without referring to the terms sutta and vinaya. The sutta ends with a discourse on the infallible nature of an arhat and on the ways to meet criticisms of heretics against his doctrine and discipline. The whole trend of this sutta is to collect the supreme teachings reassuring the saṅgha of their unity and infallibility in contrast to other schools of heretics.

1. tasmāt iha Chunda ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā, tattha sabbe'eva saṅgama saṅgama atthena attham vyañjanena vyañjanam saṅgāyitabbam na vivaditabbam, yathayidam brahmachariyam addhaniyam assa chiratthitikaṃ, tad assa bahujaṇahitāya ... sukhāya deva-manussānam. Dīgha, III. p.127.

2. katame cha te Chunda mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā ... seyyathidam chattāro satipaṭṭhānā, chattāro sammappadhānā, chattāro iddhipādā, pañch' indriyāṇi, pañcha balāni, satta bojjhaṅgā, ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo. Ime kho te Chunda dhammā ... Ibid.

For a full exposition of these thirty-seven items, see The Dialogues of Buddha, II. pp.128-130, notes. Vide Adv. pp.356-362.

The Sāmagāma-sutta also begins with the same episode of the Nigāṇṭha Nāthaputta's death. Here Ananda relates this to the Buddha adding his hope that when the Lord dies, no 'similar' quarrels will arise in the saṅgha, to the grief and sorrow of gods and men.¹

The reply of the Buddha on this occasion is worth noting here. He repeats the dhammas preached in the last sutta and asks: "What think you Ananda? Do you observe even a couple of Bhikkhus at variance about the truths which, when I had perceived, I made known to you ... to wit, the Four Onsets of Mindfulness ... the Ariyan Eightfold Path?"²

"No Sir. But those who are about the Lord might, at his death, stir up quarrels in the saṅgha respecting the rigours of the regimen or of the code. Such quarrels would make for the grief and sorrow of the gods and men."³

"Of little concern, Ananda, are quarrels respecting rigours of regimen or of the code, it is possible quarrels in the confraternity about the Path or the course of training which really matter."⁴ Here we can

1. tassa mayham bhante evaṃ hoti: mā heva Bhagavato achchayena saṅghe vivādo uppajji, so vivādo bahujaṇāhitaya ... dukkhāya devamanussānaṃ ti. Majjhima, II, p.245.

2. tam kiṃ maññasi Ananda? ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā, seyyathidam-chattāro satipaṭṭhāna ... ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo - passasi no tvaṃ, Ananda imesu dhammesu dve pi bhikkhū nānāvāde ti ...? Majjhima, II, p.245. 'abhiññā desitā' ti Mahābodhimūle nisinnena pachchakkhaṃ katvā paveditā. Majjhima A. IV, p.37.

3. ye cha kho, bhante, puggalā Bhagavantam patissayamānarūpā viharanti, te Bhagavato achchayena saṅghe vivādam janeyyūṃ ajjhājive vā adhipātimokkhe vā so'ssa vivādo ... dukkhāya ... Ibid.

4. appamattako so, Ananda, vivādo yadidaṃ ajjhājive vā adhipātimokkhe vā. magge vā pi, Ananda, paṭipadāya vā saṅghe vivādo uppajjamāno uppajjeyya, so'ssa vivādo ... dukkhāya ... Ibid.

discern the rise of Abhidharma, the supreme Doctrine of the Buddha. The statement that there are no two opinions on the thirty-seven items, raises the latter to a higher degree and can be called the central and universally accepted preaching of the Buddha. The differences rising out of the Vinaya are not ruled out, but they are not exaggerated. No particular sutta is mentioned as the supreme, but only the sum total of all the teachings put into an aggregate later known as the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā. It is the burden of a large number of suttas in the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas. It constitutes one of his last preachings to the congregation, following the declaration of his intention of entering into parinirvāṇa.¹ The Milindapañha almost makes a generalisation by saying that all tathāgatas, when they preach, preach these thirty-seven (bodhipakkhiya) dhammas.² It is said in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka that the career of a bodhisattva is completed by practising these dhammas.³ Almost all major works on Buddhism, both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, contain this list. This, therefore, was the supreme dharma, acceptable to all. It marks the beginning of the Abhidharma.

This can be corroborated by many suttas, particularly by the Kinti sutta, where these thirty-seven dhammas are identified with the term abhidhamma. The following discourse may be noted: "What think ye of me Brethren? Is it to get robes or alms, is it to get lodging or to secure

1. tasmā'ti'ha bhikkhave ye vo dhammā mayā abhiññāya desitā, te vo sādhuḥkaṃ uggahetvā āsevitabbā bhavetabbā bahulikātabbā ... sayyathidam chattaro satipaṭṭhānā ... atthaṅgiko maggo ... Dīgha, II, p.127.

2. Vide Adv. p.196, n.8.

3. Ibid.

some future or other hereafter that the recluse Gotama preaches his doctrine?

No Sir ...

Well then, Almsmen, you must school yourselves in the higher lore which I taught you to wit, the four Onsets of Mindfulness ... the Ariyan eightfold Path.

In this higher lore you must school yourselves in unity and harmony without strife. So schooling yourselves, you may find two Bhikkhus maintaining divergent views on the Abhidhamma."¹

The commentary on this passage says: "In the abhidhamma means in the supreme dhammas, in these thirty-seven bodhipakkhiya dhammas² (qualities or items constituting or contributing to bodhi)."

The term 'bodhipakkhiyā dhammā' appears only in a few places in the older Nikāyas. In the Ang. N. it is mentioned without indication of the scope of the term.³ In the Samyutta N. it is applied to the five indriyas (saddhā ... paññā).⁴

The term occurs in the Aggañña-sutta, where it consists of seven dhammas only.⁵ It occurs twice in the Vibhanga, and there too it consists

1. kinti vo bhikkhave, mayi hoti? chīvarahetu vā samapo Gotamo dhammāṃ deseti ... tasmātiha, bhikkhave, ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā, seyyathidaṃ: chattāro satipaṭṭhānā, ... ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, - tattha sabbeheva samaggehi sammadamānehi avivadamānehi sikkhitabbhaṃ; tesāṃ cha vo, bhikkhave, samaggānaṃ ... sikkhatam, siyāmsu dve bhikkhū abhidhamme nānāvādā. Majjhima, II. pp.238-9.

2. 'abhidhamme' ti 'abhi'-visiṭṭhe dhamme, imesu sattatimsa-bodhipakkhiya-dhammesū ti attho. Majjhima A. IV, p.29.

3. Ang. III, 70, 300.

4. Samyutta, V. 227; 237-9.

5. Dīgha, III. p.97.

of the seven bojjhaṅgas.¹ In the same book, the thirty-seven items are called saddhammā.² In the Jātakatṭhakathā these thirty-seven are called both saddhammā and bodhipakkhiyā dhammā.³ The Visuddhimagga enumerates the thirty-seven dhammas as bodhipakkhiyā and discusses them in detail.⁴ The Nettipakarapa once speaks of thirty-seven⁵ and in other place adds seven saṃmās⁶ to the thirty-seven, bringing the number of the bodhipakkhiyās to forty-three.⁷

The same thirty-seven items, called bodhipakṣhyāḥ or bodhipākshikāḥ⁸ dharmāḥ, are also found in most of the Buddhist Sanskrit scriptures. It is possible that the seven bojjhaṅgas formed the nucleus of this collection, to which were added other dharmas. The overlapping character of several items - e.g., the five balas again grouped under the five indriyas - was recognized by the commentators. Consequently we find both in the Kośa and in Dīpa, as well as in the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaho of Anuruddha, an attempt to delimit the term to contain only ten, eleven or fourteen dharmas.⁹

This tendency to collect the most repeated and advanced teachings of the Buddha and group them in several clusters is common to many suttas of all five Nikāyas.

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1. Vbh. pp. 244 and 249.
 2. Ibid. p. 372.
 3. saddhammāṃ ti ... sattatimsa-bodhipakkhiya-saṃkhātāṃ saddhammāṃ. Jātaka, V. p. 483.
 4. Vsm. XXII, 34-38.
 5. Netti, p. 31.
 6. Ibid. p. 112. For saṃmās, vide Adv. p. 371.
 7. For a note on the extension of this term, see Mrs. Rhys Davids' Preface to the Vibhanga, p. XIV. Vide Adv. pp. 356-7.
 8. For a complete list, see BHSD, p. 402b.
 9. Vide Adv. p. 358, notes.

1. The Mahāsatipatṭhāna-sutta¹ is a long discourse on the four satipatṭhānas and four ariya-sacchās.
2. The Mahānidāna-sutta² is devoted to a long discussion on the twelve āngas of the paṭichcha-samuppāda.
3. The Chhachhakka-sutta³ is purely catechetical in that it deals with six groups of sixes (chhakkas).
4. The Bahudhātuka-sutta⁴ is composed solely to collect all 'dhātus' scattered in various suttas. Instead of the usual eighteen, we here find an enumeration of forty-one dhātus. The same sutta also contains a list of twelve āyatanas and the twelve āngas of the paṭichchasamuppāda. This sutta does not contain anything spectacular in the way of doctrine. But the collection of all dhātus in one sutta must have been in some sense a novel thing, to entitle it to be variously called 'the Mirror of the Doctrine', 'the Drum of Deathlessness', or 'Victory in the Fight'.⁵

The Mahāasukuludāyī-sutta⁶ contains a larger number of items. In addition to the traditional thirty-seven items, there are mentioned eight vimokkhas, eight abhibhāyatanas, ten kasināyatanas, four jhānas and six abhikkhās. These topics are found fully discussed in all Abhidharma works.⁷

A whole series of suttas with the appellation 'vibhanga'⁸ are

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1. Dīgha, XXII (Vol.II, p.290).
 2. Dīgha, XV (Vol.II, p.55).
 3. Majjhima, sutta 148 (Vol.III, p.280).
 4. Majjhima, sutta 115 (Vol.III, p.61).
 5. tasmātiha tvaṃ, Ananda, imaṃ dhammapariyāyaṃ Bahudhātuko ti pi dhārehi, Chatuparivatto ti pi naṃ dhārehi, Dhammādaso ti pi naṃ dhārehi, Anuttaro Saṃgānavijayo ti pi naṃ dhārehīti. Majjhima, sutta 115 (Vol.III, p.67).
 6. Majjhima, sutta 77 (Vol.II, p.1).
 7. Vide Adv. pp.395 fol. and 429 fol.
 8. Majjhima, suttas 135-142 (Vol.III, pp.202-257).

found in the Vibhangavagga of the Majjhima-nikāya. They are (1) Chūlakamma-vibhanga, (2) Mahākamma-vibhanga, (3) Saḷāyatana-vibhanga, (4) Uddesa-vibhanga, (5) Araṇa-vibhanga, (6) Dhātu-vibhanga, (7) Sacchchayibhanga, and (8) Dakkhinā-vibhanga.

The term vibhanga is significant. It means distribution, division or classification. It also means expansion (of a meaning), i.e. a commentary. Vibhanga is also a name of the second Abhidharma Book, which is more or less a continuation and expansion of the dhammas collected in the Dhamma-saṅgāṇi. These two Abhidhammika functions, namely the collection and expansion, characterise these vibhanga-suttas and mark the second stage in the development of the Abhidharma.

The Chūla and Mahā-kamma-vibhanga-suttas contain small lists of karmas. Their Sanskrit version, the Mahākarma-vibhaṅga gives a list (uddesa) of seventy-three items (twenty-two ones and fifty-one fours - chatuṣṣkoṭikas), followed by brief explanations of each item.¹ The Karma-vibhaṅgopadeśa, a work related to the Mahākarma-vibhaṅga, contains a significant statement that some other schools read the Karma-vibhaṅga in their Abhidharma-saṃyuktas.²

The Dakkhinā-vibhanga-sutta contains a list of fourteen grades of donations and four degrees of purity in donations.³

1. Mahākarma-vibhanga (Ed. Levi), pp.30-31.

2. gotrāntariyāṇām Abhidharma-saṃyukteshu. Ibid. p.167. See S. Levi's Introduction, p.12.

3. See Adv. p.212, notes.

The Salāyatana-vibhanga-sutta, like the Sanskrit Mahākarma-vibhanga, begins with a short summary of its contents (uddesa): "Six internal senses, six sets of external sense-objects, six groups of consciousness, six groups of contacts, etc. - such is the summary of the classification of sense relations."¹ This summary is then expanded almost on the pattern of the Vibhanga.

The Uddesa-vibhanga-sutta (A Summary Expanded) differs slightly from the above one. In this sutta the Buddha makes a statement on the non-arising of dukkha and withdraws to his vihāra. The monks approach Mahākaccāna and request him to expound the cryptic saying of the Master. At the end the Buddha commends Mahākaccāna for his 'vibhanga' and says that if the monks had asked him, he too would have explained it as the Thera did.²

The Arāpa-vibhanga-sutta also contains its uddesa and deals with the eightfold Aryan Path and several other items. The Dhātu-vibhanga-sutta is a long discourse on various sets of the six dhātus, followed by a detailed exposition of each term, almost in the manner of a commentary. The Saccha-vibhanga-sutta begins with a brief reference by the Buddha to his dhamma-chakka-ppavattana and a synopsis of the Four Noble Truths. He then praises Sāriputta as the one who is able to announce, teach, unfold

1. cha ajjhattikāni āyatanāni veditabbāni, cha bāhirāni āyatanāni veditabbāni ... etc. ayam uddeso Salāyatana-vibhangassa. Majjhima, sutta 137, (III. p.216.)

2. tesam no, bhante, āyasmata Mahākaccānena imehi ākārehi imehi padehi imehi byañjanehi attho vibhatto ti.

pandito, bhikkhave, Mahā-Kaccāno; ... mafiche'pi tumhe, ... etam attham paṭi-puccheyyātha, aham pi tam evam evam byākareyyam, yathā tam Mahākaccānena byākatam. eso cīetassa attho evaṃ cha nam dhārethāti. Majjhima, sutta 138 (III. p.229).

and manifest the Four Truths in all their details.¹ When he withdraws from the assembly, Sāriputta proceeds with his exposition. The whole sutta is repeated in the Suttanta-bhājanīya section of the Saccha-vibhanga. The only word that does not occur in the latter is 'āvuso'. The omission of such words renders the Abhidharma works more impersonal and unconventional, giving them an appearance of formulas rather than Dialogues.

Several suttas of the Saṃyutta-nikāya can also be called pure abhidhamma. The Nidāna-saṃyutta² has several suttas dealing only with the paṭichhasamuppāda. The Dhātu-saṃyutta³ deals with all kinds of dhātus and give their traditional definitions. The Khandha-saṃyutta⁴ contains details of all khandhas. The Saḍāyatana-saṃyutta⁵ and particularly the Saṭṭhi-peyyala deal with āyatanas, with the triple doctrine (anichcha, dukkha, anattā) applied to them. The Sāriputta⁶ and the Moggallāna-saṃyuttas⁷ are long discourses on the rūpa and arūpa-dhyānas, given in the stereotyped formulas repeated all over the Nikāyas. The Asaṃkhata-saṃyutta⁸ deals with nirvāṇa. The last Book of the Saṃyutta-nikāya, viz. the Mahāvagga, deals with magga, i.e. the thirty-seven (bodhipakkhiya) dhammas. There are seven separate saṃyuttas dealing with the seven main items of these bodhipakkhiyas.⁹

1. Sāriputto, bhikkhave, pahoti chattāri ariyasachchāni vitthārena āchikkhitum desetum paññāpetum paṭṭhapetum vivaritum vibhajitum uttānikātum ti. Majjhima, sutta 141, (III. p.248).

2. S.II. pp.1-132.

3. S.II. pp.140-177.

4. S.III. pp.1-180.

5. S.IV. pp.1-172.

6. S.III. pp.235-240.

7. S.IV. pp.262-280.

8. S.IV. pp.359-373.

9. See Magga-saṃyutta (XLV), Bojjhanga-saṃyutta (XLVI), Satipaṭṭhāna-saṃyutta (XLVII), Indriya-saṃyutta (XLVIII), Sammappadhāna-saṃyutta (XLIX), Bala-saṃyutta (L), and Iddhipāda-saṃyutta (LI). (S.V. pp.1-290).

The Ang-nikāya, due to its method of numerical order comes much closer to the books of Abhidhamma. The dhammas scattered all over the other Nikāyas find repetition here in an artificial group of numbers. Two books of the Khuddaka-nikāya, viz. the Uddesa and the Paṭisambhidā-magga are pure Abhidhamma works, though grouped in the Sutta-Piṭaka. Of these, the Paṭisambhidā-magga is attributed by tradition not to the Buddha but to Sāriputta. It is said in its commentary that this work was preached by Sāriputta to Ananda, who recited it before the I Council.¹

This review shows us the tendency of certain suttas of all the Nikāyas towards collecting and classifying, and at times elaborating the advanced teachings of the Buddha. Several of these Suttas are not the direct words of the Buddha, but elaborations by his chief disciples like Sāriputta and Moggallāna on an uddesa or synopsis laid down by the Buddha.² These categories or dhammas can be summed up in such oft-repeated technical terms as khandha, dhātu, āyatana, indriya, sachcha, paṭichcha-samuppāda, kamma, kilesa, magga, the items of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas, jhāna, the eight vimokkhas, eight abhibhāyatanas, ten kasinas, saṃhās, etc. The collective name for all these dhammas is 'abhidhamma', as they are 'abhi=visiṭṭhā dhammā'. The contents of all the major works on Abhidhamma, including the Kośa and Dīpa, do not, in essence, differ from these few topics, scattered here and there throughout the Sutta-piṭaka.

1. tad etaṃ Paṭisambhidāmaggaṃ ... satthukappena ... Dhamma-
-Sēnāpatinā āyasmata Sāriputta-ttherena bhāsitaṃ sutvā āyasmata Anandena
paṭhama-saṅgītikāle yathāsutaṃ eva saṅgītiṃ āropitaṃ. Paṭisambhidāmagga A,
p.9.

2. For instance, the Sachcha-vibhanga-sutta and the Uddesa-vibhanga-sutta.

Now we turn to the Saṅgīti suttanta, which marks a definite start of the Abhidhamma literature proper, in the Sutta-piṭaka. This sutta also opens with an account of the Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta's death. This time Chunda or Ānanda do not report it to the Buddha, but Sāriputta himself relates it to the saṅgha, in the presence of the Master: "The Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta, friends, has just died at Pāvā. Since his death the Nigaṇṭhas have become divided and have fallen into opposite parties and into strife ... But to us, friends, the Norm has been well set forth and imparted by the Exalted One. It is effectual for guidance, conducive to self-mastery and is imparted by one perfectly enlightened. Herein there should be a chanting by all in concord, not a wrangling, that this holy life may persist and be long maintained. That may be for the welfare and happiness ... of devas and of men."¹

This historical introduction is followed by a long list of 227 kinds of dhammas presented in the numerical order of ones, pairs, triads, etc. up to tens, covering 903 dhammas in all. At the end of each numerical section is repeated, the exhort^{ta}ion to 'chant in concord' and not to wrangle.

The last sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, viz. the Dasuttara-sutta also follows the same pattern. But it has no story to tell. It opens with a declaration by Sāriputta that he will propound the groups one to

1. Nigaṇṭho āvuso Nātha-putto ... kālakato. tassa kālakiriyāya bhinnā Nigaṇṭhā ... ayaṃ kho paṇ'āvuso ahamkāraṃ Bhagavatā dhammo svākkhāto ... atthi kho āvuso tena Bhagavatā eko dhammo sammad-akkhāto. tattha sabbeheva saṅgāyitabbam na vivaditabbam ... Dīgha, XXXIII.7 (III. pp.210-211).

ten. The division of the dhammas here is made not only on their numerical order but also in consideration of their nature. All dhammas are included in one or other of the following groups: dhammas that help much (bahukāra), are to be developed (bhāvetabba), are to be understood (pariññeyya), that bring disaster (hānabhāgiya), that lead to distinction (visesabhāgiya), that are hard to penetrate (duppaṭivijjha), that are to be brought to pass (uppādetabba), are to be thoroughly learnt (abhiññeyya), and finally, that are to be realized (sacchhikātabba). Each numerical section is divided into these ten heads.

These two suttas can very fairly be compared with the Mātikās of the Abhidhamma, given in the beginning of the Dhamma-saṅgani. In fact, the Suttanta-mātikā given there is almost identical with the dukas (pairs) occurring in the Saṅgiti-suttanta. The former gives forty-two pairs of which thirty-two are the same as in the latter. Several items of the tika-mātikā also are common with the tika-dhammas of both the Saṅgiti and the Dasuttara suttantas.

The ābhidharmika character of these two suttas was long ago noted by T.W. Rhys Davids in his translation of the Dīgha-nikāya: "All that we know is that each of them forms a sort of thematic index to the doctrines scattered through the Four Nikāyās ... In the two features they have in common, of catechism as a monologue by the catechumen; and of the absence of narrative, this further interest attaches to these last suttantas, that they become practically Abhidhamma rather than Sutta Piṭaka."¹

1. Dialogues of the Buddha, III. p.199.

This observation is further confirmed by the fact that the Saṅgīti-suttanta happens to be one of the seven Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivāda school. This work is there known as Saṅgīti-paryāya, now preserved only in its Chinese and Tibetan translations. The researches of J. Takakusu¹ have revealed that the Chinese translation of this work attributes this sūtra to Śāriputra² and contains the same episode of Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta's death, which hastened Śāriputra (or the compilers of this sūtra) to draw up a summary of the Doctrines, which subsequently came to be called the Abhidharma.

So far we have seen the Abhidhamma in its one aspect, viz. the viśiṣṭhā dhammā. The abhidhamma in the Sutta-piṭaka mainly consists of the collection of dhammas in different groups as khandha, āyatana, dhātu, indriya, sachcha, paṭichcha-samuppāda, jhāna, magga, etc. Another aspect consists in the minute analysis of these dhammas into various units. The method of the Buddha's preaching is characteristically analytical. His first sermon, the Dhamma-chakka-ppavattana, is followed by a preaching solely devoted to an analysis of Personality into the five aggregates (khandhas) and the latter again in their various triple aspects as past, future, and present; and dual aspects as personal and external, gross and subtle, low and exalted, far and near.³ The bodhi of the Buddha also

1. 'On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins', JPTS, 1905, pp.100-103.

2. In the Tibetan tradition it is attributed to Mahākapphina. Ibid.

3. yaṁ kiñchi rūpaṁ atitānāgata-pachchuppannaṁ ajjhattaṁ vā bahiddhā vā olārikaṁ vā sukhumaṁ vā hīnaṁ vā paṇītaṁ vā yaṁ dūre vā santāke vā, sabbam rūpaṁ ... Vin. I. p.14.

consists of his knowledge of the doctrine of paṭichcha-samuppāda, which again is an analysis of the series of causes of the cycle of birth and death. From this analytical and critical consciousness arise his unique doctrines of anityavāda (momentariness), anātmavāda (impersonality) and śūnyavāda (unsubstantiality), which distinguish Buddhism from other Indian schools of thought. The preaching of these unique doctrines is called his sāmukkāmsikā dhamma-desanā (exalted sermon) as opposed to his anupubbikā dhamma-desanā¹ (graduated sermon) of charity and morals. It is the knowledge of these higher dhammas (Doctrines) described as profound, subtle, difficult to comprehend, transcending mere speculation, capable of being known only by the wise, which he claims as the result of his attaining the supreme enlightenment (samyak sambodhi).

This analysis of the dhammas is another aspect of Abhidhamma.

It is said in the Vinaya-piṭaka that a monk who is incapable of instructing abhidhamma and abhivinaya must not take part in ordaining a disciple.² Commenting on these two terms, Buddhaghosa says: "Abhidhamma means dividing (the dhammas) as mind and matter. Abhivinaya means the entire Vinaya-piṭaka."³

This piece of commentary is valuable for defining in brief the function and method of Abhidhamma. The contents of this term are shown

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1. ... Bhagavā ānupubbikatham kathesi - seyyathidam, dānakatham, silakatham, saggakatham ... yadā aññāsi - ... pasanna-chittam, atha yā Buddhānam sāmukkāmsikā dhamma-desanā tam pakāsesi - dukkham samudayaṃ nirodham maggaṃ ... Vinaya, I, p.15.
 2. bhikkhūnaṃ na upasampādetabbam ... na paṭibalo hoti abhidhamme vinetum abhivinaye vinetum. Vinaya, I, p.64.
 3. 'abhidhamme' ti nāma-rūpa-parichchede vinetum na paṭibalo hoti. 'abhivinaye' ti sakale Vinaya-piṭake vinetum na Sakkoti. Vinaya A. V, p.990.

by taking it to mean the 'visiṭṭhā dhammā'. Its analytical method and its specialised field of operation are shown by its description as 'nāma-rūpa-parichchheda'. It is parichchheda, i.e. division, classification or analysis which characterises the method of abhidhamma. It is not sīla or samādhi as in the general dhamma preachings, nor āpatti and anāpatti as in the Vinaya preachings, but nāma and rūpa that constitute the basic sphere of abhidhamma.

The Sarvāstivādīns also attribute the same function to abhidharma. Vasubandhu defines it as amalā prajñā - the pure wisdom - and interprets it as dharma-pravichaya, analysis of dharmas as sāsrava and anāsrava, etc. This is the real Abhidharma: the term is only secondarily applied to the Abhidharma-śāstās, as the latter are helpful in attaining the prajñā.¹

The bodhi of the Buddha consists of this dharma-pravichaya or the nāma-rūpa-parichchheda, which is fully elaborated in the Abhidharma.² It is to impart this that he preaches Abhidharma to his disciples.³ It is not only a means to attain nirvāṇa, but also an end, indeed arhatship itself.

Commenting on the term 'abhidhamma' in the Saṅgīti-suttanta,⁴

1. Prajñā'malā sānucharā'bhidharmah. Ak. I, 2ab. - tatra prajñā dharma-pravichayaḥ, amaleti anāsravā. ... esha tāvat pāramārthiko'bhidharmah ... sāṅketikas tu ... yach cha śāstram asyaḥ prāpty artham anāsravāyāḥ prajñāyāḥ tad apy abhidharmah. Akb. I. 2ab.

2. ayaṁ abhidhammo nāma keṇa pabhāvito? kattha adhigato? ... bodhi-abhinihāra-saddhāya pabhāvito ... kattha adhigato ti Bodhi-mūle. Dhs A. I. 78-79.

3. tasya pravichayasyārthe śāstrā kila Buddhena abhidharma uktaḥ. na hi vinā abhidharmopadeśena śiṣyaḥ śakto dharmān pravichetum iti ... Akb. I. 3.

4. bhikkhu dhammakāmo hoti, ... abhidhamme abhivinaye ulārapāmuḍḍo ... ayaṁ pi dhammo nātha-karapo. Dīgha, III. p. 267.

Buddhaghosa says: 'abhidhamma' means the Seven Books of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka ... or 'abhidhamma' means the Supermundane Path and Fruits.¹

The analysis of nāma and rūpa and particularly of nāma, i.e. the mind and mental dhammas, dominate the entire preachings of the Buddha. The doctrines of karma, rebirth and salvation are all explained on the basis of the analysis of the mind in its good, bad and indeterminate states. His oft-quoted saying "Beings suffer on account of the impure mind; they are freed by the purification of the mind,"² can be pointed to as a good example of this analysis. A study of the mind and its functions with reference to its different objects in various states of existence, a minute observation of the various kinds of feelings, volitions and other concomitants that associate with those states and an analysis of the complex network of causes that lead to such combinations are to be found in various suttas, in several repeatedly occurring passages that deal with jhānas, paṭipadās, abhiññās and the bodhipakkhiya-dhammas. The analysis of the matter is also given in the suttas to the extent that is necessary to understand the role it plays as an object of the mind and also to comprehend its mysterious co-operation with the mind in giving effect to a corporeal life. A large number of suttas emphasize the need of this analytical consciousness. We may particularly note here the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta of the Dīgha nikāya. The practice of the contemplation of the nature of body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), mind (chitta) and dhammas is spoken by the Buddha as the one and

1. 'abhidhamme abhivinaye' ti ... 'abhidhammo' ti satta-pakarapāni ... athavā ... maggaphalāni abhidhammo. Dīgha A. III. p.1047.

2. Vide Adv. pp.46, 78 and 363.

only way leading to the purification of beings and the realization of nibbāna.¹

We have noted above the attempts by the Elders towards collecting the visiṭṭhā dhammā in several groups. At a later time, we find works like the Khuddaka-pāṭha, containing lists enumerating the three sarapas, sikkhāpadas, kammaṭṭhānas and such other items useful for novices. It is possible that several units into which these dhammas were further analysed by the Buddha, were also tabulated (quite possibly with the approval of the Master) by elders like Sāriputta, Moggallāna or Mahākachchāyana, famous for their ability to expound the words of the Buddha, for the benefit of monks engaged in higher studies of the dhammas. Such tabulations called Mātikās, were certainly known to the early Buddhists. It is said in the Gulissāni sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya that a bhikkhu living in forests should apply himself to abhidhamma and abhivinaya.² The commentary on this passage says: "He should apply himself to the study of the Abhidhamma-
-piṭaka and the Vinaya-piṭaka, together with their Commentaries. As regards the Abhidhamma, he should at least know the Duka and Tika Mātikās together with the Dhamma-hadaya-vibhanga (last chapter of the Vibhanga). As regards the Vinaya-piṭaka, he must at least learn the two Pātimokkhas."³

1. Vide Adv. p.317, n.2.

2. araññakenāvuso bhikkhunā abhidhamme abhivinaye yogo karaṇīyo.
Majjhima I. p.472.

3. Abhidhamma-piṭake cheva Vinaya-piṭake cha Pālivasena Aṭṭhakathāvasena
cha yogo karaṇīyo. sabbantimena hi parichchhedena Abhidhamme duka-tika-
Mātikāhi saddhim Dhamma-hadaya-Vibhangam vinā na vaṭṭati. Vinaye ... dve
Pātimokkhāni vinā na vaṭṭati. Majjhima A. III, p.185.

Leaving aside this commentorial identification of the term abhidhamma with the Abhidhamma-piṭaka as merely traditional, we may note its emphasis on the two Mātikās.

The Mātikās are tabulations of the topics of Abhidhamma given in the Dhammasaṅgani¹, the first book of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. There are two Mātikās given at the beginning of this book, viz. the Tika-mātikā, and the Duka-mātikā.

The first, viz., the Tika-mātikā consists of twenty-two triads headed by the triplet of dhammas that are good (kusalā), bad (akusalā) and indeterminate (abyākata). The arrangement of these triplets is on the principle of grouping the dhammas in three mutually exclusive sets which, when put together, in some cases comprehend all nāma dhammas and in others comprehend both the nāma and rūpa dhammas. Six of these twenty-two triplets (Nos. 2, 7, 13, 16, 19 and 21) cover only the nāma. These deal with different states of chitta and chetasikas in their relation to the three kinds of feelings (No. 2), five aṅgas of the jhāna (No. 3), and lastly with reference to their several kinds of objects (Nos. 12, 16, 19 and 21). The remaining sixteen triplets cover the entire range of phenomena, i.e. the nāma and rūpa. An inspection of these sixteen triplets reveals that they cover not only the phenomena, but also the nibbāna, called asaṁkhata dhātu (the Uncompounded element), which is included in the nāma.² It is excluded

1. Edited by P.V. Bapat, Poona, 1940.

2. vedanākkhandho ... viññāṇakkhandho, asaṁkhata cha dhātu, idaṁ vuccati nāmaṁ. Dhs. 1309.

from three triplets viz., (i) the dhammas arisen-not arisen-bound to arise; (ii) states that are past-present-future; and (iii) dhammas that are personal-external-both¹, as it transcends the conceptions of time, origin and relation. It is included in the third member of the remaining thirteen triplets and shares nine items² common to the rūpa khandha.

The second mātikā namely the Duka-mātikā is divided into two - Abhidhamma-mātikā and Suttanta-mātikā. The former consists of one hundred pairs collected in thirteen groups. Ten of these groups are called 'clusters' (gochchhakas). They deal with ten kinds of corruptions³ and dhammas that enter into various relationships with them. The remaining three groups, called Chūlantara-duka (Short Intermediate set of seven pairs), Mahantara-duka (Great Intermediate set of fourteen pairs) and Piṭṭhiḍuka (Supplementary set of eighteen pairs) treat of miscellaneous pairs of dhammas. A large number of pairs of the Mahantara-duka deal with the mutual relation of chitta and chetasikas. The first nine of the eighteen pairs of the Piṭṭhiḍuka are borrowed from the Tika-mātikā. This last duka closes with the pair of dhammas which are sarapa and arapa. Although the gochchhakas occupy a large portion of these dukas, the remaining three groups appear to be older. The latter contain several items common to the mātrikās of the Sanskrit Abhidharma. The gochchhakas are found only in the Pali Abhidhamma.

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1. uppamā-anuppannā-uppādinō (No. 17), atitā-anāgatā-pachchuppannā (No. 18), ajjhattā-bahiddhā-ajjhattabahiddhā (No. 20).
 2. 1 (c), 3 (c), 6 (c), 8 (c), 9 (c), 10 (c), 11 (c), 15 (c) and 22 (c).
 3. hetu, āsava, saññyojana, gantha, ogha, yoga, nīvaraṇa, parāmāsa, upādāna and kilesa.

The second division of the Duka-mātikā is called Suttanta-mātikā. It contains a list of forty-two pairs, mostly of miscellaneous nature and dealing more with dhammas related to sīla, samādhi and diṭṭhi than with nāma and rūpa as in the Abhidhamma Mātikā. We have already noted that thirty-two of its forty-two pairs are identical with the duka-dhammas given in the Saṅgīti-suttanta of the Dīgha-nikāya. It may well be that it is called Suttanta-mātikā because it was directly borrowed from the Saṅgīti-suttanta. It is not commented upon in the Atthuddhāra-kaṇḍa of the Dhammasaṅgani and receives but scant attention from the author of Aṭṭhasālinī. It appears that this whole list was at some later time added to the Mātikā list. This is confirmed by tradition. The Aṭṭhasālinī says that only the twenty-two tikas and hundred dukas were the directly spoken words of the Buddha. As regards the Suttanta-mātikā it says: "They originated with Sāriputta, having been laid down and taught by him. But he did not lay them down through his own exalted knowledge. They have been gathered from the Eka-nipāta, Duka-nipāta, the Saṅgīti and Dassuttara suttantas, in order to help students of Abhidhamma in their study of the Suttantas."¹

No corresponding mātrikās of the Yogāchāra and the Sarvāstivāda schools have come down to us. But it is possible to reconstruct such a list on the basis of the items dealt with in their Abhidharma works.

1. athāpare dvā-chattālīsa Suttantika-dukā kutopabhavā ... Sāriputta-ttherappabhavā, tena thapitā, tena desitā tiṃse thapento ... na sāmu-kkamsikena attano māpēna thapesi. Ekuttariyaṃ pana Eka-nipāta Duka-nipāta-Saṅgīti-Dassuttara-suttantehi samodhānetvā ābhidhammika-ttherānaṃ suttantaṃ patvā ākilamanatthaṃ thapitā. Dhs A. I. 18.

The Abhidharma-samuchchaya of Asanga (representing the Yogācāra school), the Kośa-Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu and the present work Dīpa (with its Vṛitti), contain an almost identical set of pairs and triads corresponding to the Mātikās of the Theravāda school.

The Abhidharma-samuchchaya of Asanga deals with a large number of dharmas in its first chapter devoted to a study of skandha-āyatana-dhātu (tri-dharma-parichchheda). Its method, like other Abhidharma works, is catechetical. After putting a question like "katham dravyamāt, kati dravyamanti, kim artham dravya-parīkṣhā?", it gives an answer to these questions in the manner of the Nikkhepa-kāṇḍa of the Dhammasaṅgani. The dhammas in the Abhidharma-samuchchaya are presented in the following order:-

1	(a) dravyamat	(b) prajñaptimat	
2	(a) samvṛitisat	(b) paramārthasat	
3	(a) jñeyam	(b) vijñeyam	
4	(a) rūpi	(b) arūpi	[33] ¹
5	(a) sanidarśanam	(b) anidarśanam	[31]
6	(a) sapratigham	(b) apratigham	[32]
7	(a) sāsravam	(b) anāsraavam	[37]
8	(a) sarapam	(b) arapam	[122]
9	(a) sāmisham	(b) nirāmisham	
10	(a) gredhāsritam	(b) naishkramyāsritam	
11	(a) saṃskṛitam	(b) asaṃskṛitam	[30]

1. These numbers in the square brackets refer to the number of corresponding items of the Pali mātikā given in the Dhammasaṅgani (Poona edition).

12	(a) laukikam	(b) lokottaram	[34]
13	(a) utpannam	(b) anutpannam	[17]
14	(a) grāhakam	(b) grāhyam	[77]
15	(a) bahirmukham	(b) antarmukham	
16	(a) klišṭam	(b) aklišṭam	[99]

These sixteen pairs are followed by the following five triads:-

17	(a) atītam	(b) anāgatam	(c) pratyutpannam	[18]
18	(a) kuśalam	(b) akuśalam	(c) avyākṛitam	[1]
19	(a) kāma-pratisamyuktam	(b) rūpa ^o	(c) ārūpya ^o	[115-7]
20	(a) śaiksham	(b) aśaiksham	(c) naiva-śaiksha- nāśaiksham	[11]
21	(a) darśana-prahē ^y tvam	(b) bhāvanā ^o	(c) aprahātavyam ^o	[9]

These triads are interrupted by a long discussion on pratitya-sam-utpāda and pratyayas. Lastly the following pairs are enumerated:-

22	(a) sabhāgam	(b) tatsabhāgam	
23	(a) savipākam	(b) avipākam	[3]
24	(a) suttaram	(b) anuttaram	[121]

We can see from this list that the Abhidharma-samuchchaya deals with nineteen pairs and five triads. Of these, twelve pairs and all triads have their parallels in the Pali Mātikās.

Same method is followed in the Kośa (and Bhāṣya). In its first Kośa-sthāna (dealing with skandha-āyatana-dhātu), dharmas are presented in the following order:-

1	(a) sāsrava	(b) anāsrava	[37]
2	(a) saṁskṛita	(b) asaṁskṛita	[30]
3	(a) sanidarśana	(b) anidarśana	[31]
4	(a) sapratigha	(b) apratigha	[32]
5	(a) kuśala	(b) akuśala (c) avyākṛita	[1]
6	(a) kāmādhātupratīsamukta	(b) rūpa° (c) ārūpya°	[115-7]
7	(a) savitarka-vichāra	(b) vichāra-mātra (c) avitarka-avichāra	[6]
8	(a) sālambana	(b) anālambana	[77]
9	(a) upātta	(b) anupātta	
10	(a) bhūta	(b) bhautika (c) nobhaya	
11	(a) saṁchita	(b) asaṁchita	
12	(a) vipākaja	(b) aupachayika	
13	(a) adhyātma	(b) bāhya	[88]
14	(a) sabhāga	(b) tatsabhāga	
15	(a) darśana-heya	(b) bhāvanā-heya (c) aheya	[8]
16	(a) dṛishṭi	(b) na dṛishṭi	
17	(a) dāhaka	(b) dāhya	
18	(a) tulya	(b) tolayitṛi	

In the III Kośasthāna, the indriyas are divided only in four triads (the same as Nos. 5, 6, 15, and one more, i.e. No. 19)

19	(a) sāsrava	(b) anāsrava	(c) ubhaya	[37]
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and two pairs:-

- | | | |
|----|--------------|---------------|
| 20 | (a) vipāka | (b) na-vipāka |
| 21 | (a) savipāka | (b) avipāka |

Thus in the Kośa we find six triads and fifteen pairs. Of these four triads and eight pairs have their parallels in the Pali Mātikās.

Almost the same pairs and triads are given, in the same order, in the Dīpa and its Vṛitti. For both the Bhāṣhya and the Vṛitti, the main purpose is to deal with the dharmas in accordance with these mātrikās. All discussions on the doctrine valuable as they are from our point of view are treated as incidental. Thus, for instance, the third pāda of the I Adhyāya of Dīpa begins: "Now this should be said. Of these eighteen dhātus, how many are sanidarśana, how many anidarśana? How many sapratigha, how many apratigha? How many vyākṛita, how many avyākṛita?"

After dealing with these and a few more pairs, the Vṛitti discusses a topic unrelated to them. It is that of smṛiti (memory). At the end of this discussion, the Vṛitti says "gatam etad aupodghātikam prakaranam; prakṛitam evābhidhiyatām". Then follows a discussion on several other pairs like sālabhāna and anālabhāna, upātta and anupātta, etc.¹

This account of the four major works on Abhidharma shows that the Yogācāra and the Sarvāstivāda schools too had Mātrikās, similar to the Pali Mātikās. The numbers of items of both pairs and triads varied in each school. It is probable that originally the mātikā list consisted of

1. Adv. p. 24.

a few items, only of those which are included in all these four Abhidharma works. The following table shows the number of items treated in the following three schools:

	Theravāda (<u>Dhammasaṅgani</u>)	Yogācāra (<u>Abhidharma-</u> <u>-samuchchaya</u>)	Vaibhāshika (<u>Kośa</u>)
Triads	22	5	6
Pairs	100 Excluding the Suttanta- -mātikā	22	15

Considering the overlapping character of the several pairs and triads in the Pali Mātikās, it appears to us that the Vaibhāshika list is more original and has suffered less additions. The Yogācāra list is also nearer to the Vaibhāshika list than to the Pali Mātikās. Though as many as twenty-three triads and a hundred pairs are given in the Pali Mātikās, it should be noted that only the first triad, namely the kusala tika, has been fully expanded in the Dhammasaṅgani. The entire Chittuppāda-kāṇḍa and even the Rūpa-kāṇḍa (which is covered by the term abyākata dhammā) deal with the mind and matter, only with reference to the first tika. The Rūpa-kāṇḍa has its own Mātikā, which consists not only of pairs and triads,

but also of fours, fives, etc., up to tens, like the collection of dhammas in the Saṅgīti-suttanta. The remaining twenty-two tikas and the entire duka-mātikā are briefly explained in the nikkhepa-kapḍa, which is a sort of commentary on the Matikās.

Whatever the original contents of the mātikās may have been, there is no doubt that it formed the nucleus of the Abhidhamma literature,¹ both Pali and Sanskrit. The Dhammasaṅgani and Vibhaṅga, particularly, deal with the dhammas on the lines indicated by the Mātikās. The Sanskrit Abhidharma works have not come down to us in their original form. But from the above analysis of the later Abhidharma works like Asm., Aam., Kośa and Dīpa, it is certain that the original works too had mātrikās as their basis. In the old canonical Pali literature the term mātikā takes place of Abhidharma. It occurs once in the Vinaya-piṭaka and once in the Ang. nikāya. An expert in the mātikās is called mātikādhara. The latter term always occurs with the other two, viz., dhammadhara and vinayadhara,² pointing to the existence of mātikās as a separate collection of the words of Buddha. The term is known to the Vinaya of the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins³ and to the Divyāvadāna,⁴ where also it is placed side by side with sūtra and vinaya.

The Mātikās are to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka what Pātimokkha rules are

1. tesu dvāvisati tikā satam dukā ti ayam āhechcha bhāsita ... sattannam pakarapānam mātikā nāma. Dhs A. I.18.

2. bhikkhū dhammadharā vinayadharā mātikādhara ... Ang. I.117. - 'dhammadharā' ti Suttanta-piṭaka-dharā, 'vinaya-dharā' ti Vinaya-piṭaka-dharā, 'mātikā-dharā' ti dve mātikā-dharā. Ang. A. II p.189.

3. See BHSD p.428.

4. sūtrasya vinayasya mātrikāyāḥ. p.18.

to the vinaya. They are foundations for the super-structures of the Abhidhamma texts (excluding the later Puggala-paññatti and Kathāvatthu) and the Suttavibhanga. The laying down of both is considered by the tradition as an exclusive privilege of the Buddha and not of his disciples. Hence follows the claim that even the works built on them are words of the Buddha. The commentators are well aware of the fact that several suttas preached by Ananda, Moggallāna, Mahākachchā^{ya}na and Sāriputta are included in the canon as the word of the Buddha.¹ Atthasālinī quotes the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya to show that although that was preached by Mahākachchā^{ya}na, he had done so on the basis of the synopsis given by the Master and hence it is a Buddha-vachana. We have noted above several suttas which are only expansions by the theras of the uddesas and certain cryptic sayings of the Buddha. The commentators do not pretend that the Kathāvatthu was preached by the Buddha. They attribute it to Tissa-Moggaliputta. But they do claim that the mātikā of that work was laid down by the Master.²

The tradition is that the Buddha preached the Abhidhamma first to his mother during his sojourn for three months in the Tāvātimsa heaven. Atthasālinī, however, wisely adds that he used to leave a "nimmita-Buddha" in heaven and return daily to the human world to fetch his alms. Sāriputta used to approach him then, learn the Abhidhamma from him and preach it to other monks.³ This story further confirms the part played by Sāriputta in

1. evaṃ satthārā anumodita-kālato patthāya pana sakalam suttantaṃ Buddha-bhāsitaṃ nāma jātaṃ. Ananda-ttherādihi vitthārta-suttantesu pi ese va nayo. Dhs A. I. 8.

2. Moggaliputta-Tissa-tthero pi idam pakaraṇam desento na attano nāpena desesi, satthārā pana dinna-nayena thapita-mātikāya desesi. Dhs A. I. 7.

3. Dhs A. I. 39-40.

expounding the Abhidhamma. It is stated in the same commentary that "the textual order of the Abhidhamma originated with Sāriputta. The numerical series in the Paṭṭhāna were also determined by him."¹

If the monks received the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka from Sāriputta (and not from the Buddha) a question is rightly asked "Well, in that case Sāriputta is the first Abhidhammika?". The answer of Aṭṭhasālini is "No. The Buddha is the first Abhidhammika. It was he who penetrated it under the Bo-tree".²

These accounts show, in spite of this determination to make the Buddha the sole author of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, that the commentators agree to a great extent that the books of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka were propounded by the Elders, albeit on the basis of the Master's preachings, and not entirely by the Buddha himself.

A somewhat similar view is shared by the Sarvāstivādins, who also possess a separate Abhidhamma Piṭaka, consisting of seven 'śāstras'. They too claim that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is preached by the Buddha. Commenting on this claim, Yaśomitra (a Sautrāntika) says, "This is a view of the Ābhidharmikas (not of us who are Sautrāntikas). Indeed, we are told that the Abhidhamma śāstras actually have individual authors, namely:- Ārya Kātyāyanīputra of the Jñānaprasthāna, Sthavira Vasumitra of the Prakaranapāda

1. Abhidhamme vāchanāmaggo nāma Sāriputta-thera-ppabhavo. Mahāpakarane gaṇanavāro pi thereneva ṭhapito. Ibid. I. 43.

2. evaṃ sante therō cha paṭhamataraṃ ābhidhammiko hoti ti? na hoti. sammā-sambuddho cha paṭhamataraṃ ābhidhammiko hoti. so hi taṃ Mahābodhi-pallāṅke nisīditvā paṭivijjhi. Dhs A. I. 44.

Sthavira Devasārman of the Vijñānakāya, ārya Śāriputra of the Dharma-skandha, ārya Maudgalyāyana of the Prajñapti-sāstra, and Mahākaushthila of the Saṅgītiparyāya."¹

Commenting further on the differences between the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāshikas on the authenticity of the Abhidharma canon, Yaśomitra says: "What is meant by the term Sautrāntika?" "Those who hold the sūtras as authentic and not the śāstras, are called Sautrāntika." "If they do not accept the śāstras as authentic, how do they explain the division of the canon in the three Piṭakas? Is it not a fact that the sūtras know the term 'Abhidharma Piṭaka', as for instance in an expression 'a tripiṭaka monk'?" That does not matter. For a certain kind of Sūtras themselves, dealing with the determination of meanings and characteristics of dharmas are called Abhidharma."²

"In order to dispel a possible confusion arising from this view, the Vaibhāshikas maintain that the Abhidharma-Piṭaka, which deals with the nature of the characteristics of elements and belongs to the Upadeśa class, was preached by the Buddha to his disciples, and remains scattered here and there. Just as Dharmatrāta compiled several udānas of the Master (like "Impermanent^{ne} are indeed the compounded elements") in a work like the Udānavarga, similarly, the Elders Kātyāyanīputra and others collected the

1. katham nāma dharma-pravichayaḥ syād ity [abhidharma upadisṭaḥ śāstrā Buddhena / ata eva ... uditaḥ kila ...] kila-śabdaḥ parābhiprāyaṁ dyotayati. abhidharmikāṇāṁ etan matam. 'na tv asmākaṁ Sautrāntikāṇāṁ iti bhāvaḥ. śrūyante hy Abhidharma-śāstrāṇāṁ kartāraḥ. tad yathā Jñānaprasthānasya ārya-Kātyāyanīputraḥ kartā ... Saṅgītiparyāyasya Mahākaushṭhilaḥ ... Sakv. p. 11.

2. kaḥ Sautrāntikārthaḥ? ye sūtra-prāmāṇikā na śāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ te Sautrāntikāḥ. yadi na śāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ katham teshāṁ piṭaka-traya-vyavasthā? sūtrapiṭako vinaya-piṭako 'bhidharmapiṭaka iti? sūtre'pi hy abhidharma-piṭakaḥ paṭhyate. tri-piṭako bhikṣur iti? naisha doṣaḥ. sūtra-viśeṣhā eva hy artha-viniśchayaḍayo 'bhidharma-samjñāḥ yeshu dharma-lakṣhaṇāṁ varṇyate ... Ibid.

Abhidharma together in these śāstras."¹

These comments of Yaśomitra are helpful in understanding the main differences between the Abhidharmikas and the Sautrāntikas on the authenticity of the Abhidharma. The Sautrāntikas, too, recognise a class of literature grouped under the term Abhidharma-piṭaka, but maintain that it is scattered in the Sūtra-piṭaka itself. The Abhidharma of the Abhidharmikas, however, consists of a separate collection, claimed as a word of the Buddha. This Abhidharma is, for the Sautrāntikas, a work of śāstras or āchāryas, and hence not cononical.²

A similar view is attributed to a heterodox Buddhist in the following account of the Atthasālini: Thus as rehearsed at the (First) Council, the Abhidhamma is a Piṭaka by Piṭaka classification, Khuddakanikāya by Nikāya classification, Veyyākaraṇa by Part classification ... One of those Bhikkhus who studies the Abhidhamma, once sat in the midst of bhikkhus ... and quoting a sutta from the Abhidhamma taught the dhamma thus: 'The aggregate of matter is unmoral; of the four (mental) aggregates some are moral, some immoral, and some unmoral.'³ A bhikkhu, seated there, asked 'Preacher, you quote a long text (sutta) ..., what sutta is it?'

1. etadāśaṅka-nivṛittyartham āhuh [sa tu prakīrṇa ukto Bhagavatā] iti vistarah. [yathā sthavira-Dharmatrātena, udānā] 'anityā bata saṃskārā' ity evamādikā [vineya-vaśāt] tatra tatra sūtra ukta [vargī-kṛitā] ... evam abhidharmo'pi dharma-lakṣhaṇopadeśa—svarūpo vineya-vaśāt tatra tatra Bhagavatoktaḥ [sthavira-Kātyāyanīputra-prabhṛitibhir] Jñānaprasthānādishu pīṇīkṛitya sthāpitā ity āhur Vaibhāshikāḥ. Sakv. p. 12.

2. Bhandanta-Kātyāyanīputrādīnāṃ pīṇīkaraṇena paśchād upadeśasya siddhatvāt. prathamata upadeśe hi vivādaḥ. Sakv. p. 10.

3. evaṃ saṅgīte panettha ayaṃ abhidhammo piṭakato Abhidhamma-piṭakam nikāyato Khuddakanikāyo, aṅgato Veyyākaraṇam ... pubbe eko bhikkhu Abhidhammato suttam āharitvā dhammam kathento "rūpakkhando abyākato, chattāro khandhā siyā kusalā siyā akusala siyā abyākata ..." Dhs. A I. 69.

'Abhidhamma sutta, brother.' 'Why do you quote the Abhidhamma sutta? Does it not behove you to quote other suttas spoken by the Buddha?' 'Brother, by whom was the Abhidhamma taught?' 'Not by the Buddha.'¹

The Atthasālinī, in the manner of the Vaibhāshika,² confronts this heterodox Buddhist with the occurrence of the term abhidhamma in the following passages of the Vinaya and Sutta-piṭakas:

i) 'No offence if, not desiring to disparage, he speaks, saying 'Look here, do you master Suttantas or Gāthās or Abhidhamma and afterwards you will master Vinaya'.³

ii) 'If having asked for leave in regard to Suttanta, she asks about Vinaya or about Abhidhamma, there is an offence of expiation.'⁴

iii) 'Here, o brother Sāriputta, two bhikkhus converse on the discourse on Abhidhamma, they ask questions to each other ...'⁵

As regards the term abhidhamma in the first Vinaya passage, Oldenberg long ago noted that it could not mean the Abhidhamma Piṭaka,⁶ but only such works as the Paṭisambhidā-magga, which are similar in character to the Abhidhamma. With reference to the second passage, where the term

1. 'kiṃ suttaṃ nāmetaṃ ti' āha. 'abhidhamma-suttaṃ nāma āvuso ti.' 'abhidhamma-suttaṃ kasmā āharasi? kiṃ aññaṃ Buddha-bhāsitaṃ suttaṃ āharituṃ na vaṭṭati'ti?' 'abhidhammo kena bhāsito ti?' 'na eso Buddha-bhāsito 'ti.' Dhs A. I. 70.

2. vide supra, p. 74.

3. tattha anāpatti, na vivannetu-kāmo iñha tāva suttantaṃ vā gāthāyo vā pariyāpunassu, pucchhā pi vināyaṃ pariyāpunissasi ... Vinaya IV. p. 144.

4. suttante okāsaṃ kārapetvā abhidhammaṃ vā vinayaṃ vā pucchhati, abhidhamme okāsaṃ kārapetva suttantaṃ vā vinayaṃ ... Vinaya IV. p. 344.

5. idhāvuso Sāriputta, dve bhikkhū abhidhammakathaṃ kathenti, te aññamaññaṃ pañhāni pucchhanti ... Majjhima I. p. 218.

6. Vinaya, Intro., p. XII, n. 2.

abhidhamma could mean the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, Oldenberg,¹ followed to some extent by Horner,² considers it an interpolation.

The term 'abhidhamma-kathā' occurring in the Majjhimanikāya, is not commented upon in the Aṭṭhakathā. The same term occurs twice in the Ang. nikāya,³ where it is taken by the commentary to mean 'uttama-dhamma-kathā'.⁴ This argument of the Aṭṭhasālinī, therefore, is not conclusive to prove the authenticity of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

On the contrary, the Sautrāntika view, which recognises the abhidharma independent of the Abhidharma Piṭaka, is supported by a large number of sūtras in the Sūtra Piṭaka and by the absence of any mention of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka in the mahāpadeśa preaching and in the traditional account of the First Council given in the Chullavagga and other Northern Buddhist chronicles.⁵

The Pali commentators were certainly aware of the late composition of the Abhidharma-piṭaka. This is apparent from their attempt to call it 'abhidhamma-sutta', and their determination to invent alternative introductions (nidānas) for these 'suttas'.⁶ In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, however, the Abhidharma-piṭaka is known as śāstra (treatise) clearly showing

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1. Vinaya, Intro., p.XII, n.2.
 2. Book of the Discipline, part III, Intro., XIV.
 3. Ang. III. pp.106, 392. See also the Milinda, pp.48, 59.
 4. Ang A. III. p.271.
 5. See Rockhill's The Life of the Buddha (p.160), where Mahākāśyapa is said to have recited the Mātrikā, and not the Abhidharma-piṭaka.
 6. See Dhs A. I. 73-77.

its distinction from the 'sūtra'. The Sautrāntikas recognised only the Sūtras as canonical and whenever there was conflict between the sūtra and the śāstra, adhered to the Master's advice in the Mahāpadeśa preaching.¹ 'Monks, you ought to take refuge in the Sūtrāntas and not in individuals.' Curiously enough, this line is not found in the Pali version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra.

The Sautrāntikas, on account of their adherence to the Sūtrānta in preference to the Abhidharma, claimed not Śāriputra or Mahākāśyapa, but Ananda as their main preceptor.² In the Vinaya-piṭaka we find a group of monks called Suttantikas (versed in Suttas), always appearing side by side with vinayadharas and dhammakathikas.³ It is possible that they remained devoted to Ananda, zealously learnt the suttas in their original version, and claimed to preserve the original meanings of them against the 'unauthentic' interpretations by other elders and heretics.

But the Sautrāntikas (Pali Suttantika) as a separate school appear very late in the history of Buddhist church. Both the Pali and Sanskrit accounts place the Sautrāntika school at the end of the traditional eighteen Nikāyas. Buddhaghosa calls it Suttavāda, a branch of the

1. of. kva chaisha niyamah siddhah? śāstre. sūtra-pramāṇakā vyaṁ na śāstra-pramāṇakāh uktam hi Bhagavatā "Sūtrānta-pratiśarapair bhavitavyam" iti. Akb. III. 31cd.

2. See 'Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools' by Masuda, J, Asia Major II. p.17. (1925).

3. See Vinaya I. 169; II. 75, 161; III. 159; IV. 67.

Sankantivāda.¹ The latter branched off from the Kassapikas, a sub-section of the Sarvāstivāda school.

The Sanskrit account given by Vasumitra² agrees with the Pali account. Here also the Sautrāntika is a branch of the Sarvastivāda school and is the last of the eighteen Nikāyas. Vasumitra, however, identifies the Sautrāntika with the Saṃkrāntivāda. Bhavya's account³ makes no mention of the Sautrāntika school, but takes the Saṃkrāntivāda as a branch of the Sarvāstivāda school.

As in the case of several other schools, no work belonging to the Sautrāntikas has come down to us. Therefore, our knowledge of their doctrines is derived solely from other sources. The Kathāvatthu makes no reference to their doctrines. Vasumitra attributes five original doctrines to this school, all dealing with saṃkrānti or santāna,⁴ which correspond to the doctrine of bīja (seed) attributed to them in the Bhāṣya, Vṛitti and the Sphuṭārthā of Yaśomitra.

The Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha of Mādhava attributes to them the doctrine of bāhyānumeya-vāda, which revolutionised the theory of perception and foreshadowed the beginnings of Buddhist Logic.

Though the Sautrāntikas existed since the time of the Buddha and survived as an influential school till the later phases of Buddhism, their

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1. Sabbathivāda-kulato bhijjitvā Kassapikā nāma jātā. Kassapikesu bhinnesu apare Sankantikā nāma jātā. Sankantikesu bhinnesu Suttavāda nāma jātā. Kv A.(Introduction) p.81.
 2. Masuda, J. op. cit. p.66.
 3. The Life of the Buddha by Rockhill, p.193.
 4. See Masuda, J. op. cit. pp.66-9.

major activities are to be seen only after the full ascendancy of the Vaibhāshika school. Backing their arguments with the Sūtra preachings, they arose chiefly in revolt against the Realism (dravyavāda) of the Abhidharmikas and paved the way for the emergence of the Idealistic Mahāyāna schools and particularly that of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

What are the particular Abhidharmika points that the Sautrāntikas thought contrary to the sūtra-preachings of the Buddha? An answer to this question can be found in a close comparison of the Sūtras with the Abhidharma, works of both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools. Of these, only the Pali Abhidhamma works, together with their commentaries, have come down to us. The entire Abhidharma Piṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins, together with the Mahāvibhāṣā, is lost in its original form and is preserved only in the Chinese and Tibetan translations. The few works of this school available to us, therefore, are the later works of Ghoshaka, Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra, and our Dīpa with its Vṛitti.

III. SAUTRĀNTIKA AND ĀBHIDHARMIKA.

Both in the Pali and Sanskrit traditions the Abhidharma is grouped under a sub-section called Vyākaraṇa, meaning exposition. But with the growth of the doctrine of bodhisattva, this term came to be used for prophecies or revelations. The Asm. defines the term as a class of literature which contains the prophecies concerning the deaths or births of śrāvakas, or that which explains the import of the Sūtras.¹ In the course of time, the second function of the term Vyākaraṇa was transferred to a new aṅga called Upadeśa. Asm. defines it as that which demonstrates the essence of all elements of existence in its true form. It further adds that the upadeśa class as a whole forms the Abhidharma code of both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.² Asanga further defines the Abhidharma as that by which the meanings of the Sūtras is best understood.³ These explanations emphasize the relation of the Abhidharma to the Sūtras. The latter is to be understood through the former, which alone gives the absolute meanings of the dharmas. The Atthasālinī opens with a statement that the Abhidharma exceeds and is distinguished from the dhamma⁴ (i.e. the Suttas). It says that in the Suttanta, the five aggregates (and similarly the twelve

1. Vyākaraṇam katamat? tat tat sthāneshu samatīkrāntānām ārya-śrāvakāṇām prāpty-utpatti-prabheda-vyākaraṇam. api cha sūtreṣu nirūpitārthasya sphuṭīkaraṇam. p.78.

2. Upadeśaḥ katamaḥ? sarva-gambhīragūḍha-dharma-lakṣhaṇānām aviparītaṁ vyākhyānam ... upadeśa ekaḥ śrāvaka-bodhisattva-piṭakayoḥ Abhidharma-piṭake saṁgr̥hīto bhavati. p.79.

3. abhigamyate sūtrārtha etenety abhidharmaḥ. M. Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI.3.

4. kenatthēna abhidhammo? dhammāṭṭireka-dhamma-visesaṭṭhena. I.2.

āyatanas, eighteen dhātus, four Truths, twentytwo indriyas, etc.) are classified partially and not fully. In the Abhidhamma they are classified fully by the methods of the Sutta-classification, Abhidhamma classification and catechism.¹ It further states that the Suttas speak of conventional truths with reference to circumstances and with a view to refuting the heretical views, whereas the Abhidhamma deals with reference to states, and aims at the analysis of mind and matter.²

A somewhat similar distinction is drawn by the Dīpa. Whenever a discrepancy is found between the Sūtra and the Abhidharma, the Dīpa holds that the statement of the Sūtra is, in some cases ābhiprāyika (explanatory) and in some cases aupachārika (conventional), whereas the Abhidharma statement is lākṣhanika³ or definitive, and hence valid.⁴

This distinction between the Sūtra and Abhidharma is clearly presented in the Vibhanga-ppakarana⁵ and vividly explained in its commentary by Buddhaghosa. The Vibhanga is the second book of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. It is devoted to an exhaustive investigation of the dhammas grouped in the style of Abhidharma. It consists of a series of eighteen independent treatises or Vibhangas called Khandha°, Āyatana°, Dhātu°, Saccha°, Indriya°, Pachchayākāra°, Satipaṭṭhāna°, Sammappadhāna°, Iddhipāda°, Bojjhanga°,

1. suttantaṃ hi patvā pañchakkhandhā ekadeseneva vibhattā, na nippadesena; abhidhammaṃ patvā pana suttantabhājanīya-abhidhamma bhājanīya-pañhā-puchchhakanayānaṃ vasena nippadesato vibhattā. I. 3.

2. Suttantapitakam hi ... vohārabāhullato desitattā vohāradesanā; Abhidhammapitakam ... paramatthadesanā ti vuchhati ... Ibid. I. 52.

3. The term lākṣhanika should be derived from lakṣhaṇa (definition), and not from lakṣhaṇā (figurative sense of a word).

4. See Adv. pp.104, 146, 221, 410.

5. For a brief summary of this work see Nyanatiloka's Guide through the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, pp.17-28.

Magga°, Jhāna°, Appamañña°, Sikkhāpada°, Paṭisambhida°, Nāpa°, Khuddaka-
-vatthu°, and Dhamma-hadaya°. Of these, thirteen Vibhanga consist of three
parts: the Suttanta-bhājanīya, the Abhidhamma-bhājanīya, and Paṭi-
-pucchhaka, i.e., a summary of the topic by way of questions and answers
with reference to the one hundred and twenty-two headings of the Mātikā-
list. The Indriya and the Sikkhāpada Vibhanga have no sutta explanation.
The last three Vibhanga appear to form a separate unit. Of these the Nāpa
and the Khuddaka-vatthu Vibhanga have their own mātikās and are presented
in a numerical order. The last Vibhanga is a kind of summary of all the
topics and has suffered a great deal of addition of non-ābhidharmika
speculations.

The division of the Vibhanga into Suttanta-bhājanīya¹ and
Abhidhamma-bhājanīya² is significant. In the former, the dhammas are
presented as they occur in the Suttas. Sometimes a brief commentary is
also given here on the Sutta formulas. Thus, for instance, in the Sb.
of the Khandha-vibhanga³, the five skandhas are presented in ^{the} manner of the
Anattapariyāya-sutta⁴ where these are called past, present or future,
personal or external, gross or subtle, low or lofty, far or near. These
terms are not explained in the Suttas. A question, for instance, may
arise regarding the nature of a gross or subtle nāma-khandha, or about the
precise meaning of the term atīta. These explanations are given in the

1. Henceforth referred to as Sb.

2. Henceforth referred to as Ab.

3. For a comparative study of the skandha, āyatana and dhātu classifica-
tions in the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra schools, see Manual of
Buddhist Philosophy, by McGovern, pp. 81-162.

4. v. supra, p. 58, n. 3.

Sb. and expanded in the Commentary. It is said here that an akusala-vedanā¹ is gross compared to a kusala-vedanā. The latter is subtle compared to the former. Buddhaghosa gives several conflicting views on these explanations. According to Tipiṭaka-Chūlanāgatthera this division should not be applied to akusala-vedanā as all akusala-vedanās are only gross. Similarly all lokuttara-vedanās are only subtle and hence there also this division is not to be applied.² Tipiṭaka-Chūlabhayatthera quotes a sutta and proves that this division can be applied to all kinds of feelings.³ Buddhaghosa sums up by saying that an akusala-vedanā yielding more vipāka is gross compared to a similar vedanā yielding less vipāka. The rule is reversed in the case of kusala. Here a kusala-vedanā yielding less vipāka is gross compared to a similar vedanā yielding more vipāka.⁴ Several controversies on this topic are preserved in the Bhāṣya. The gross and subtle rūpa are explained in both schools as sapratigha and apratigha.⁵ But in the case of nāma-skandhas, where the concepts of gross or subtle are out of place, the explanations are different. The Vibhāṣikas explain that in the case of nāma-skandhas those which have the five organs as their base are gross; the mind-consciousness and its concomitants are subtle, or alternatively, the kāmāvacara nāma-skandhas are gross compared to the

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1. akusalaṃ viññāṇaṃ oḷārikaṃ; kusalāvyākataṃ viññāṇaṃ sukhumaṃ ... Vbh. p. 10.
 2. Tipiṭaka-Chūlanāgatthero paṇāha: "akusale oḷārika-sukhumatā nāma na uddharitabbā. taṃ hi ekanta-oḷārikameva. lokuttarepi ... taṃ hi ekantaṃ sukhumaṃ ti ..." Vbh A. p. 15.
 3. Tipiṭaka-Chūlabhayatthero paṇāha: "... sammāsambuddhena pana lokuttarepi oḷārika-sukhumatā uddharitā" ti ... vatvā suttam āhari ... Ibid.
 4. sankhepato akusalaṃ patvā yam vipākaṃ bahuṃ deti sā oḷārikā, yā appamā sā sukhumā, kusalaṃ patvā pana appavipākā oḷārikā, bahuvipākā sukhumā. Ibid.
 4. See Vm. XIV. 73.

rūpāva^hçara skandhas, etc.¹ The latter explanation agrees with the Pali Abhidhamma.

As regards the term atīta and its precise meaning, the Atthakathā says that this term may refer to ^{the}past in general (addhāna) or to a particular unit consisting of a series of moments (santati) or to a certain period (samaya) or only to a single moment (khapa). The first three meanings are obtained in a conventional preaching, i.e., in the Suttas. In the Abhidhamma, however, only the last explanation is valid as it is a 'paramattha-desanā'.²

The abhidhamma treatment of the same topic, therefore, differs from the simpler and shorter sutta exposition. Here the five khandhas are in the manner of the Dhammasaṅgani, subjected to a minute analysis of their relations and functions in a momentary existence. They are presented here in several long categories grouped in their ascending numerical order combined with each heading of the 122 Mātikā list.

In the Āyatana-vibhaṅga, the Sb. is very short. The twelve āyatanas are enumerated and described in a single line as impermanent, miserable, non-ego and subject to change.³ No further details or even definitions of the āyatanas are given, as it is not customary for the

1. [ayaṃ tu viśeṣo] vedanādinam. [audārikam pañcendriyāśrayam] vedanādi-chatuskham. amūrtatvat svagatam audārikatvam nāsti. [sūkṣmam mānasam] āśrayasyā'py amūrtatvāt. [bhūmito ve] ti audārikam sūkṣmam cha vedanā^oadikam audārikī kāmāvacarī vedanā. sūkṣmā prathama-dhyāna-bhūmikā ... Sakv. p.44.

2. idaṃ pana atītānāgata-pachchuppannam nāma ... suttantapariyāye bhavena parichchhinnaṃ ... abhidhammaniddese pana khapena parichchhimmaṃ ... aparo nayo, idaṃ hi rūpaṃ addhāna-santati-samaya-khapa-vasena chatudhā atītaṃ nāma hoti ... addhānavasena tāva ekassa ekasmiṃ bhava paṭisandhito pubbe atītaṃ; ... ettha cha khapādikathā va nippariyāyā; sesā sappariyāyā, tāsu nippariyāya-kathā idha adhippetā. Vbh. A. pp. 7-8.

3. chakkhum anichchaṃ dukkhaṃ anattā vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, rūpā anichchaṃ ... etc. Vbh. p.70.

Sūtras to furnish them. The Ab. is more exhaustive. Here the twelve āyatanas are defined and presented in full detail. The term dhammāyatana, for instance, is nowhere fully explained in the Suttas. It is a name given to dhammas which are exclusively the objects of mind. They are five: vedanā, chetanā, saññā, saṁkhārā, anidassana-appaṭigha rūpa and asaṁkhata dhātu (= nirvāṇa). Of these the last two items are variously explained in different schools. The Theravādins and the Sautrāntikas do not recognise a kind of matter called avijjāpti, but the Vaibhāshikas maintain its existence by referring to the term 'anidarsana-apratigha-rūpa'. The skandha division does not include the nirvāṇa but in the āyatana classification even that non-phenomenal element is included. The Theravādins and the Vaibhāshikas hold it a positive element, whereas the Sautrāntikas, on the authority of several sūtras, maintain that it is only a name for the 'cessation' of passions. Both the Vibhanga-aṭṭhakathā¹ and Bhāṣya² contain long controversies on this topic. It is quite possible that this was a later development introduced by the Abhidharmika schools.

The Sb. of the Dhātu-vibhanga points to an important phase in the development of the dhātu classification. Three different sets of six dhātus are enumerated here. The first six consist of the elements of solid, liquid, heat, motion, space and consciousness. These are explained here as in the Rāhulovādaṣutta. The second six consist of five kinds of

1. vitanḍavādī panāha. paṭiyekkaṁ nibbānaṁ nāma natthi kilesakkhayaṁ va nibbānaṁ ti ... Vbh A. pp.551-4.

2. See LVPAK. II. 55d.

feelings with ignorance as the sixth element. The third six consists of three kinds of wrong thoughts and their three opposites.

It may be noted here that the oft-repeated formula of the eighteen dhātus is not given under the suttanta explanation, despite the fact that it occurs in the Bahudhātukasutta. Instead, it is found enumerated in the Ab. Such a discrimination in the treatment of these two sets points to a possibility of a later origin of the Bahudhātukasutta. We have already noted the ābhidharmika character of this sutta.¹ The first set of six dhātus is most certainly the older one. It is repeated several times (even in the Bahudhātukasutta) in the suttas. In the Kośa and the Dīpa² they are called maula or basic elements as they constitute a personality. Buddhaghosa is not unaware of the precedence given to these six dhātus over the traditional eighteen. He says that they are virtually included in these six.³ This, however, appears to be an attempt by the Ābhidharmikas to make their dhātu enumeration conform to the older sūtra formulas.

In the Ab. the eighteen psycho-physical elements are explained in full detail. The six organs, their corresponding six objects, and the resultant six kinds of consciousness constitute the ābhidharmika dhātu classification. This is, no doubt, highly useful and scientific. It explains the Buddhist doctrine of perception and serves as a basis for the formation of the doctrine of chitta-vīthi, a unique theory of the Theravāda aṭṭhakathās. As pointed out by Ven. Nyānatiloka, a beginning of this

1. v. supra, p. 51.

2. Sattva-prajñāpti-upādānaṃ-maulaṃ shaḍ dhātavo matāp/ Ad. kā. 13.

3. iti imāsu chasu dhātusu pariggahitesu aṭṭhārasaḍ dhātuyo pariggahitā va honti. katham? ... Vbh A p. 72.

doctrine is suggested in this Dhātu-vibhanga.¹

The Aṭṭhakathā gives several details on the meaning, scope, number and sequence of the dhātus. Different sets of dhātus are spoken of in the suttas. Buddhaghosa collects them all together and tries to show that all these (they number 35) are included in the traditional eighteen. There seems to be no unanimity on the meaning and nature of a few of these dhātus. For instance, the saññā-vedayita-nirodha-dhātu is once described as a non-entity (since it is only a name given to the suppression of saññā and vedanā), and again as a kind of kāma or dhammadhātu.² It may be noted that the former explanation agrees with the Saṃtrāntikas who also call it a mere notion, a prajñapti-dharma. The Yogācāras and the Vaibhāshikas, however, enumerate this dhātu as a positive element in their list of the chitta-viprayuktāsaṃskāras.³

In the Sb. of the Saccha-vibhanga, the Four Noble Truths are given in the same words as in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta. In the Ab. the same topic is presented with a few significant changes. Here the term ariya (noble) is dropped in order to extend the scope of the second Truth, viz., the samudaya.⁴ In the Suttas the samudaya is described as taṇhā. In the Abhidhamma all kilesas form the samudaya. In the Asm. also the

1. A few links of this chittavīthi may be noticed in the following definition of the manoviññāna-dhātu:- "chakkhu-viññāna-dhātuyaṃ uppajjitvā niruddha-samanantarā uppajjati manodhātu, manodhātuyaṃ pi uppajjitvā niruddha-samanantarā uppajjati chittam ... tajjā manoviññāpadhātu ..." Vbh. pp. 89-90.

2. saññā-vedayita-nirodha-dhātu pana sabhāvato natthi. dhātudvaya-nirodha-mattameva hi sā, kāmādhātu-dhammadhātu-mattam vā hoti. Vbh A. p. 78.

3. v. Adv. pp. 91-6.

4. tattha ariya-sacchānti avatvā nippadesato ... samudayaṃ dassetuṃ chātāri sacchānti vuttam. Vbh A. p. 122.

samudaya is described as kleśa and karma. It is said there that the Sūtra-description only emphasizes the universality and predominant importance of the trishṇā¹. Consequently, the third Truth is described not as taphā-nirodha (as in the Suttas) but as asesā-kilesa-nirodha. The Asm. too describes it as sāsravāṇām dharmāṇām nirodhaḥ. In the Suttas the magga-sachcha is described as the Noble Eightfold Path. In the Ab. this Path is described exclusively in association with the lokuttara (super-mundane) states of mind and hence only five aṅgas are spoken of. In the Suttas the dukkha-sachcha is always presented first. In the Abhidhamma, however, the samudaya-sachcha is named in the first place.

The theory of Two Truths, viz., the saṃvṛiti and paramārtha which dominates the Idealistic schools of Buddhism, is not referred to in the Pali Abhidhamma Piṭaka. But the Asm. explains it with reference to the Sūtra-description of the dukkha-satya. In the Sūtras it is described as birth, decay, death, etc., and also as the five upādāna-skandhas. The Asm. says of this that the latter description is according to the paramārtha-satya, the former description is a matter of saṃvṛitisatya².

It is interesting to note that there is no Sb. in the Indriya-vibhanga. This treatise opens with an Ab. Buddhaghosa explains that the twenty-two indriyas do not occur in their traditional order in any Sutta³. Certain items of these occur here and there, but their arrangement in the

1. samudaya-satyaṃ katamat? kleśaḥ kleśādhipateyaṃ cha karma. prādhānya-nirdeśastu Bhagavatā trishṇā ... nirdiṣṭā. p.43.

2. jātir dukkhaṃ yāvat yadapīchchhan na labhate tadapi dukkhaṃ iti saṃvṛiti-satyena dukkhaṃ yaduktam saṃkshiptena pañchopādāna-skandhā dukkhaṃ iti paramārthena dukkhaṃ. p.38.

3. idha suttanta-bhājanīyaṃ nāma na gahitaṃ kasmā? suttante imāya paṭipāṭiyā ... anāgatattā. suttantasmiṃ hi katthachi dve ... tīpi ... pañcha, evaṃ pana nirantaram dvāvīsti āgatāni nāma natthi. Vbh A. p.125.

1a given order is found only in the Abhidhamma. Yaśomitra, however, quotes a Sūtra passage enumerating the twentytwo indriyas in the same order as in the Abhidharma.¹ In view of the above evidence of Buddhagosa it will not be unfair to treat this particular Vaibhāshika sūtra as of late origin, composed by the Abhidharmikas to give credence to their enumerations.

It may also be noted that the last three ultramundane faculties are only suggested and not expressly mentioned in the suttas. Nor is there uniformity regarding the order of these twentytwo indriyas. Yaśomitra states that certain ābhidhārmikas place manas-indriya after the jīvitendriya.² The Asm. does not enumerate any of these indriyas but gives a separate list drawn from the skandha-āyatana-dhātu classifications. It appears that the indriya classification was not considered of any great importance in the Sūtras. It was formulated in the period of Abhidharma and received full attention only in the commentaries, both Pali and Sanskrit.

The next Vibhanga called Pachchayākāra (a treatise on the modes of 'conditionality') deals with the doctrine of paṭichchāsamuppāda (dependent origination). The Sb. is simple. Here the twelve āṅgas of the paṭichchāsamuppāda (avijjā to upāyāsa) are enumerated and explained in the manner of the Nidāna-saṃyutta. The Ab. is, however, repetitive, tedious and complex.³ Here the twelve āṅgas in their natural (anuloma) and

1. [dvāviṃśatindriyāṇy uktāni sūtra] iti. atha kho Jāṭisūropo brāhmaṇo yena Bhagavāms tena ... kati bho Gautama indriyāṇi ... dvāviṃśatir imāni bhāhmaṇa indriyāṇi ... Sakv. p.90.

2. [Abhidhārmikās tu shaḍ-āyatanavyavasthām anādritya] ... [jīvet-endriyānantaram manas-indriyaṃ paṭhanti] Sakv. p.91.

3. As Ven. Nyanatiloka says: "... all the different phenomena are so tediously explained, that, if unabridged and not leaving out any repetition, the explanations alone would already fill nearly 2,000 pp." loc. cit. p.25.

reverse (paṭiloma) order are combined with the formula of the modes of 'conditionality' (pachchāyas), and presented, each time with slight but important changes, in relation to their operation through various (kusala, akusala, abyākata, etc.) momentary states of consciousness. It is said in the Aṭṭhakathā that the paṭichcha-samuppāda is preached in the Suttas with reference to a lifetime, whereas in the Abhidhamma it is preached with reference to a single moment.¹ Consequently we find certain significant changes in the abhidharma formula of the paṭichchāsamuppāda. In the suttas it is 'avijjā pachchayā saṅkhārā' - plural. In the Abhidhamma-bhājanīya it is saṅkhāro - singular.² Similarly in the Suttas the fifth link is called saḷāyatana (six āyatana), whereas in the Abhidhamma it is called chhaṭṭhāyatana (sixth āyatana, i.e., the mind).³ This is because in one single moment there is no possibility of more than one saṅkhāra or one āyatana. In the Suttas the third link is called nāma-rūpa (mind and matter), whereas in the Abhidhamma it is only nāma.⁴ It is explained that the abhidharmika formula is universal, applicable to all existences. In the arūpa-loka there is no matter and hence the term nāma-rūpa would not apply to it. Similarly, the last five words (soka, parideva, dukkha, domanassa, upāyāsa) of the sutta formula are dropped out in the abhidhamma as these are not in operation simultaneously in a single moment.⁵

1. ... suttanta-bhājanīye ... pachchayākāraṃ nānā-chittavasena dassetvā ... abhidhamma-bhājanīyavasena eka-chitta-khaṇikāṃ ... Vbh A. p.199.

2. suttanta-bhājanīyeva viya saṅkhārā ti avatvā saṅkhāro ti vuttam. tam kasmā ti? eka-chitta-khaṇikattā. Ibid. p.201.

3. chhaṭṭhāyatanaṃ ti ekam mānāyatanaṃ eva āha. Ibid.

4. sabbhaṭṭhāna-sādhārapato cha ... nāmaṃ tveva vuttam. Ibid.

5. sokādayo pana yasmā sabbe eka-chittakkhane na sambhavanti ... Ibid.

The Bhāṣhya also contains similar observations on the pañichcha-samuppāda. It is said there that this formula can be viewed in four ways. It is applicable to a moment (kṣaṇika) or many moments i.e. three existences (prākaraṣhika). Its links can be viewed only as a relation of the moments of cause and effect (sāmbandhika) or as different states of the five skandhas (āvasthika).¹

The Vaibhāṣhikas maintain that the Sūtra formula is āvasthika. It is only another name given to twelve different states of the five skandhas. In their abhidharma work called Prakarapa, however, it is said that all phenomenal dharmas are pratītya-samutpāda. The Vaibhāṣhika points out that the Sūtra preaching is only explanatory, whereas the Abhidharma preaching is definitive.² According to the Sūtra, the pratītya-samutpāda is āvasthika, prākaraṣhika and sattvākhyā (deals with a personality), whereas according to the Abhidharma it is kṣaṇika, sāmbandhika and sattvāsattvākhyā (deals with both beings and non-beings). This explanation agrees with the Theravādin explanation given by Buddhaghosa.

In the Aṭṭhakathā, the meaning of the term avijjā and its place in the whole link is discussed in detail. According to the Sūtras, avijjā is ignorance of the Four Noble Truths, whereas according to the Abhidhamma, it is ignorance of not only the Four Truths but of the past, of the future,

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1. [kṣaṇikāḥ] kṣaṇe bhavaḥ ... [prākaraṣhikāḥ] prabandha-yukta ity arthaḥ [sāmbandhikāḥ] hetu-phala-sambandha-yukta ity arthaḥ. [āvasthikāḥ] dvādaśā pañcha-skandhikā avasthā ity arthaḥ. Sakv. p.286.
 2. [ābhiprāyika] iti. vineyābhiprāyavaśāt tathā [deśita] ity arthaḥ [lākṣaṇiko' bhidharme] ... Prakarapeshu hi sarvasaṃskṛita-grahanāt sattvā-sattvākhyāḥ ... Sakv. p.286.

of both, and of the law of causality.¹ In short it is ignorance and as such only the absence of knowledge, and hence is described as moha.² This view agrees with the Sautrāntikas who also hold it to be only an absence (abhāva)³ of vidyā or prajñā. The Vaibhāshikas, however, maintain that avidyā is not just an abhāva but a positive element, and cannot be included in any other dharmas.⁴ The Bhāshya discusses this point in detail and examines the views of Bhadanta Śrīlāta⁵ and Dharmatrāta.⁶

Avidyā heads the formula of the chain of the pratītya-samutpāda. A question arises whether the avidyā itself has a cause or is of fortuitous origin? The Aṭṭhakathā raises this point and quotes Sūtra passages to show that even avidyā is subject to the same law. It is produced by āsavas.⁷ This point is discussed at great length in the Bhāshya. Vasubandhu examines two Sūtras where avidyā is said to be the effect as well as the cause of ayoniśo-manaskāra, criticises the views of the older Vasubandhu and Bhadanta-Śrīlāta, and gives his own view.⁸

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1. avijjā ti suttantapariyāyena dukkhādisu chatusu ṭhānesu aññāṇaṃ, abhidhamma-pariyāyena pubbantaḍḍhi saddhim aṭṭhasu ... Vm. XVII. 58.
 2. aññāṇaṃ ... moho akusalamūlaṃ ayaṃ vuchchati avijjā. Vbh. p.144.
 3. See IVPAK. III. 28cd.
 4. vidyā-vipakṣho dharmo'nyo 'vidyā 'mitrāṇṇitādivat/ Ak. III. 28ab.
 5. [yo'pi manyate sarva-kleśā avidye] ti. bhadanta-Śrīlātaḥ ... Sakv.p.302
 6. Ibid.
 7. kasmā pan'ettha avijjā ādito vuttā? kim pakativādināṃ pakati viya avijjā pi akāraṇaṃ mūlakāraṇaṃ lokassā ti? na akāraṇaṃ, "āsava-samudayā avijjā-samudayo" ti avijjāya kāraṇaṃ vuttaṃ ... Vbh A. pp.132-3.
 8. [ayoniśo-manaskāra-hetukā' vidyoktā sūtrāntara] iti. Sahe-tuspratyaśāsanidānasūtre ... [avidyā hetukāś chāyoniśo-manaskāra] iti sūtrāntara ukta ityadhikṛitam. ... na chānavasthā prasaṅgo' vidyā-hetukatvād ayoniśo-manaskārasya. ity [apara] iti. sthavīro Vasubandhur āchārya-Manorathopādhyāya evaṃ āha ... anyāḥ punar āhe] ti bhadanta Śrīlātaḥ ... [achodyam eva tv etad] iti ... Ācharyaḥ sva-matam āha ... Sakv. pp.288-91.

The second link, viz. the saṅkhāra [karma formation] is variously described in the Suttas. In some places like the Parivāṃsanāsutta,¹ it is described as meritorious, unmeritorious and imperturbable volitions.² In the Vibhaṅgasutta³ or the Sammādiṭṭhisutta⁴ it is explained as volitions manifested in bodily, verbal and mental actions.⁵ But these two meanings are put together only in the Abhidhamma explanation of the term. Commenting on this Buddhaghosa says: "Well, this Abhidhamma is not of recent composition, nor is it spoken by heretic sages or disciples or gods. It is a word of the Omniscient. The two interpretations are put together to show the identity of the treatment of this topic in the Sutta and Abhidhamma."⁶ This explanation reflects the anxiety of the Abhidharmikas to make their treatment conform to the Sūtra teachings. It also reveals that the Abhidharma not only collects the dhammas scattered in the Sūtras, but also compiles several Sūtras on a given topic. This can be illustrated by one more example. In the Ab. in one place the formula of the paṭichchasaṃsuppāda is presented with only eleven aṅgas by the exclusion of the term saṃāyatana. The Aṭṭhakathā explains that this is done to accommodate the enumerations given in the Mahānidānasutta.⁷

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1. Samyutta, II. pp. 80. ff.
 2. Puñña-apuñña-āneñjābhisankhāra.
 3. Samyutta, II. pp. 2. ff.
 4. Majjhima. I. pp. 46-55.
 5. kāya-vācī-chittasankhāro.
 6. kasmā panetesam suttānam vasena te gahitā ti? ayaṃ abhidhammo nāma na adhunā kato. nā pi bāhirika isihi vā sāvakehi vā devatāhi vā bhāsito. sabbaññujina-bhāsito paṇāyam, abhidhamme pi hi suttepi eka-sadisā va tanti niddiṭṭhā ti imassatthassa dīpanattham. Vbh A. p. 142.
 7. dutiyavāre nāma-pachchayā phasso ti vatvā saṃāyatana-tṭhāne na kiñchi vuttam - tam kimatthanti? pachchayavisesa-dassanattam cheva Mahā-nidānadesanā-saṅgahattham cha ... ekādasāṅgiko paṭichchasaṃsuppādo vutto. Vbh A. p. 203.

The third link *viññāna* is explained in the Sb. as six *viññānas* (chakkhu to mano) as in the Vibhangasutta.¹ In the Mahānidānasutta, however, the *viññāna* is spoken of as descending into the womb of the mother,² suggesting that the term referred only to the rebirth consciousness (*paṭisandhi chitta*), which can only be the last, viz., the *manoviññāna*. In the Abhidhamma, the more comprehensive meaning is accepted so as to embrace all states of consciousness. The Aṭṭhakathā division of the *chittavīthi* (process of consciousness) into *pavatti* and *paṭisandhi* is based on the recognition of these two Sutta explanations of the term *viññāna*. The *paṭisandhi* process explains the moment of rebirth. The *pavatti* process is ~~usually~~ employed to explain the functions of the consciousness in all other moments.

It is possible that the Sūtra meaning of the term *viññāna* (in this formula) was confined only to the moment of rebirth, as the formula was primarily intended to explain the phenomena of rebirth in the absence of an abiding ātman. The other meaning, viz., the six *viññānas*, although occurring in the Vibhangasutta of the *Saṃyuttanikāya*, is most probably a later addition introduced by the Abhidharmikas. This becomes evident from the attempt of the Vaibhāshikas to apply this term not only to the moment of rebirth consciousness, but also to a long preceding period called *antarābhava* (intermediate existence), where alone the six *viññānas* could be understood to function.³

1. *Saṃyutta*, II. p.1.

2. vide *Adv.* p.46, n.3.

3. yadi saṃskāra-pratyayam antarābhava-pratisandhi-chittam upādāya yāvad upapattikṣaṇaḥ sarvā'sau vijñāna-saṃtatīḥ śhāpām vijñāna-kāyānām saṃskāra-pratyayam vijñānam abhipretam [tad upapannam bhavati]. ... anyathā hi ... pratisandhi-chittam evābhipretam syāt. atra śhaḍ vijñānakāyā iti noktam syāt. evaṃ tu vaktavyam syāt. vijñānam katamat? manovijñānam iti ... *Sakv.* p.299.

The fourth link is nāma-rūpa. Of these two, the nāma is explained in the Suttas (e.g. the Vibhangasutta) as vedanā, saññā, chetanā, phassa and manasikāra. In the Abhidhamma, however, the last three terms are replaced by one comprehensive term, viz., the saṅkhāra-khandha. Usually nāma means the four non-material aggregates. The Bhāṣya explains it as 'nāmatv arūpīṇaṃ skandhāṃ'. But in the Pali Abhidhamma, the term nāma (in the formula) excludes the viññāṇa-khandha as the latter is represented by the third link. The causal relation between mind and matter is discussed in detail in the Aṭṭhakathā and also in the Visuddhimagga. The Bhāṣya refers to this topic while dealing with the problem of the existence of rūpa in the arūpa-loka. The Vaibhāṣikas, in common with the Theravādins hold that there is no rūpa in the arūpa-loka. If an arūpa-being after his death is reborn in a kāma-loka, his material body is produced solely by the mind. This theory contains the germs of the Vijñānavāda, where matter is described as a manifestation of mind.

As noted above, the fifth link, viz., the cchaḷāyatana is, in the Abhidhamma, replaced by the term cchaṭṭhāyatana (the sixth, i.e., the mind).

The next link called phassa is described in the Sb. as six kinds of contacts (chakkhu to mano-samphassa) as given in the Vibhanga-sutta.¹ In the Ab. it is described in the manner of the Dhammasaṅgani: "contact which is touching, the being brought into contact ..." ² The term, however, is defined in the Madhupindikasutta as the coming together of three (i.e.,

1. Saṃyutta, II. p.2.

2. yo ... phasso phusaṇā saṃphusaṇā saṃphusitattaṃ ... Dhs. I. 2.

the organ, the object and the consciousness.¹ Here the phassa is a name given to the mere contact of the trio and not to a separate chetasika dhamma. The Sautrāntikas also quote a similar sūtra² and hold sparśa to be mere contact. According to them the sparśa is contact, i.e. coming together of the trio in a causal relationship. In the Abhidharma, however, the sparśa is considered a separate dharma resulting from this contact.³ The Vaibhāshikas hold this view on the authority of the Shaṭṣhaṭkasūtra, where the sparśa is enumerated in addition to the indriya, artha and vijñāna.⁴ This sūtra corresponds to the Pali Chha-chhakkasutta, the ābhidharmika nature of which is already noted.⁵ Buddhaghosa too describes phassa as (sensorial or mental) impression resulting from the contact of the trio.⁶ The Yogācāra tradition also holds the sparśa as a distinct dharma. The Asm. defines it as that which determines the changes in the organs on account of the contact of the trio.⁷ Thus we see that in all Abhidharma schools the sparśa is treated as a distinct dharma, although the Sūtras speak of it as mere 'contact'. Vasubandhu says that certain schools read the sūtra differently as 'sangateḥ' instead of 'sangatiḥ', which too appears to be an ābhidharmika modification of the sūtra passage.⁸

1. chakkhuṃ-ch'āvuso paṭichcha rūpe cha uppajjati chakkhuvijñānam, tippam sangati phasso ... Majjhima, I. p.111.

2. kechiddhi sakrin nipātam eva sparśa vyāchakshate sūtram chātra jñāpakam ānayanti "iti ya eshām trayāṇām dharmāṇām sangatiḥ sannipātaḥ samavāyaḥ sa sparśa iti" Akb. III. 30 b.

3. cf. sparśaḥ shat sannipātajāḥ/ Ak. II. 30 b.

4. kechit punaḥ chitta-samprayuktaṁ dharmāntaram eva sparśam vyāchakshate, sūtram chātra jñāpakam ānayanti "Shaṭ-shaṭko dharma-paryāyaḥ.." Akb. III 30 b.

5. vide supra, p. 51.

6. tika-sannipātassa attano kāraṇassa vasena paveditattā sannipāta-pachchupaṭṭhāno... Vm. XIV 134.

7. sparśaḥ katamaḥ? trika-sannipāte indriyavikāraparichchedaḥ. p.6.

8. ye punaḥ sannipātād anyam sparśam āhuḥ ta etat sūtram kathāṁ pariharanti "iti ya eshām trayāṇām sangatiḥ sannipātaḥ ... sa sparśa" iti na vāi vām paṭhanti kim tarhi? sangateḥ sannipātāt samavāyad iti paṭhanti kāraṇe vā kāryopachāro'yam iti bruvanti. Akb. III 30 ab. See LVPAK. III-30 ab.

The next link is called vedanā (feeling). In the Sb., the vedanā is explained with reference to the six organs through which it is generated (e.g. chakkhusamphassajā vedanā, etc.). In the Ab. it is explained with reference to its qualities as pleasant, unpleasant, etc., as they are obtained in the eighty-nine kinds of the consciousness.

In both the Pali and Sanskrit Abhidharma, the sparśa and vedanā are treated as mahābhaumika dharmas. They occur simultaneously in all states of consciousness. In the pratītya-samutpāda formula, however, the vedanā is placed after sparśa, as the latter is the cause of the former. As the cause must precede the effect, the Sautrāntikas hold that on account of their causal relation they cannot operate simultaneously.¹ The Vaibhāshikas, however, hold that the sparśa and vedanā are co-nascent.² They quote a sūtra³ in which these two dharmas are spoken of as being saha-jāta. The Sautrāntikas take the term saha-jāta to mean samanantara.⁴ Although the Pali Abhidhamma holds them 'saha-jāta', the Suttas⁵ seem to support the Sautrāntika view.

The remaining links of the formula of the paṭichchāsamuppāda (taṇhā, upādāna, etc.), with the exception of bhava, are treated almost identically in the Sb. and Ab. In the Suttas, the bhava (process of

1. sparśād uttarakālaṃ vedanety apare ... Akb. III 31 cd. See LVPAK. III.31 cd.

2. atha kiṃ sparśād uttarakālaṃ vedanā bhavaty āhosvit samāna-kālam? samānakālam iti Vaibhāshikāḥ anyonyam saha-bhū-hetutvāt. Ibid.

3. sūtram parihāryam "chakshuḥpratītya ... trayāṇāṃ sannipātaḥ sparśaḥ saha-jātā vedanā saṃjñā chetanā ... Ibid.

4. samanantare pi ch'āyam saha śabdo drishtaḥ. Ibid.

5. cf. tippaṃ sangati phasso, phassapachchayā vedanā ... Majjhima I, p.111

Becoming) is explained with reference to the three spheres of rebirth, viz. kāma, rūpa and arūpa bhavas.¹ In the Abhidhamma, however, the bhava is divided into kamma-bhava (karma-process) and the resultant uppatṭibhava (Rebirth Process). The former is identical with the second link, viz. saṅkhāra. The uppatṭi-bhava is explained with reference to the nine kinds of spheres in which a being may be born.

This division of the bhava into kamma and uppatṭi is found solely in the Abhidhamma. This was probably introduced to explain the rebirth in a future life. The second link saṅkhāra belongs to a past birth and produces rebirth here. The kammabhava is the accumulation of the rebirth-producing karma which determines the sphere of rebirth (uppatṭi-bhava) and conditions the jāti, i.e., new birth.

The Paṭichcha-samuppāda-vibhanga is followed by a series of five Vibhangas dealing with the items of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas. They are Satipaṭṭhāna-vibhanga, Sammappadhāna°, Iddhipāda°, Bojjhanga° and Magga-vibhanga. Only two groups (indriya and bala) consisting of ten dhammas (viz. saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā counted as indriya as well as bala) are not separately treated here as they are already dealt with in the Indriya-vibhanga.

The Sb. of these five vibhangas closely follow the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta and read like commentaries on the latter. The satipaṭṭhāna-formula, for instance, is directly borrowed without any change. The formula begins as: idha bhikkhū vajjhataṃ kāye ... etc. The mention of the term bhikkhu

1. See Vibhanga-sutta, S. II p.2.

in a preaching given to the gods has not escaped the notice of the commentator. Buddhaghosa says: Although the Lord spoke this in the world of gods and no monk was present there, the term bhikkhu is used to show that only monks practise the four satipaṭṭhānas. A question is naturally asked whether bhikkhus alone could practise them? Buddhaghosa concedes that even gods can practise them. He broadens the meaning of the term bhikkhu and says that whosoever practises them is a bhikkhu, no matter whether a woman or a god.¹ This explanation once more demonstrates the determination of the commentators to prove the authenticity of the Abhidharma and the legends connected with its origin.

The Ab. of these five vibhāṅgas do not much differ from the suttanta-explanations. The same topics are presented here with reference to the supra-mundane (lokuttara) consciousness and in connection with various kinds of samādhis and paṭipadās. Consequently, there are a few changes, for instance, the enumeration of only five āṅgas of the magga instead of the traditional eight. In the Maggavibhāṅga, the magga is treated in the same manner as in the Saccha-vibhāṅga. Here also the term ariya is dropped. Such changes appearing in the Abhidhamma must have been repugnant to the followers of Sūtras. Such changes might well have given rise to new doctrines unacceptable even to the Abhidharmikas. Even the commentator Buddhaghosa appears very uneasy about such changes. In his

1. [idha bhikkhū] ti, ettha kiñchā'pi bhagavatā devaloke nisīditvā ayaṃ Satipaṭṭhāna-vibhāṅgo kathito. eka-bhikkhūpi tattha bhagavato saṃtike nisinno nāma natthīti, evaṃ sante pi yasmā ime ... bhikkhū bhāventi ... paṭipattiyā vā bhikkhubhāvadassanato evamaṃha. yo hi imaṃ paṭipattiṃ paṭipajjati so bhikkhu nāma hotīti, paṭipannaṃko hi devo vā hotu ...
Vbh A. p.216.

commentary on the Sachcha-vibhanga he explains the ābhidharmika formula¹ of the pañchaṅgika magga by quoting a Sūtra passage. But in his commentary on the same formula in the Magga-Vibhanga he attributes the pañchaṅgika-magga-vāda to a vitanda-vādin and controverts his view by² quoting a different Sutta.

The Sb. of the Jhāna vibhanga contains a word for word commentary on a short but comprehensive mātikā comprising the gradual stages of attaining the trances leading up to the last arūpa jhāna.

In the Ab. the formula of the four rūpa and four arūpa jhānas are enumerated in the same words as in the Suttas, but with an emphasis on their aṅgas, viz. vitakka, vichāra, pīti, sukha and upekkhā. This formula is further repeated with reference to the objects of trance, e.g. the pathavi kasina, and also with reference to the four kinds of the lokuttara consciousness. In the Suttas only four rūpa jhānas are enumerated. In the Abhidhamma, however, five jhānas are described by adding one more trance, where vichāra alone persists independent of the vitakka. The relation of these two opposite dhammas (viz. the vitarka and vichāra) and the possibility of their co-operation in a single moment is discussed at great length in the Atthakathās, the Visuddhi magga, Milindapañha, Bhāshya and the Vritti.

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1. yasmā pana na kevalam atthangiko maggo vo paṭipadā "pubbe va kho panassa kāyakammaṃ vachikammaṃ ājīvo parisuddho hoti" ti vachanato.... pañchaṅgiko pi maggo desito... tam nayaṃ dassetuṃ pañchaṅgikavāro pi niddiṭṭho Vbh A.p. 123.
 2. pañchaṅgika-vāre pi atthangiko ti avutte pi atthangiko evā ti veditabbo. lokuttaramaggo hi pañchaṅgiko nāma natthi ayamettha āchariyānaṃ samānatthakathā; vitandavādī panāha: "lokuttara-maggo atthangiko nāma natthi pañchaṅgiko yeva hoti" ti.. tassa.. uparipappāsato suttam āharitabban.... idaṃ te suttam akāmakassa lokuttara-maggo atthangiko ti dīpeti..... Ibid p. 319. See DhsA III. 478-482.

The next Vibhanga deals with the four appamaññās (skt. apramāṇa unbounded states) or brahma-vihāras as they are called in the Suttas. The term appamaññā appears to be an ābhidharmika term replacing the more conventional brahma-vihāra. In the Saṅgītisutta the latter term is dropped in favour of the former. In the Vibhanga it is not even mentioned. The Atthasālinī notes it and says that in the Vibhanga the ārammaṇas (objects)² of these meditations are emphasized and hence they are called appamaññā.

The Sb. of this vibhanga reads like a commentary on the Sutta formula of the four brahma-vihāras found in the Tevijja and other suttas. In the Ab. they are demonstrated only by the four rūpa-jhānas, suggesting thereby that they are not obtained in the arūpa or lokuttara trances.

The Sikkhāpada-vibhanga has no Sb., although, as a matter of fact, the sikkhāpadas (observances) can more suitably be included in the Suttas than in the Abhidhamma. Only five observances common to both the laity and a monk are treated here. They are not explained here as in the Suttas but as in the Dhammasaṅgani. It is demonstrated here that the observances manifest themselves only in the eight kāmāvacara kusala states. In the Suttas the 'viramaṇa' is explained as abstaining from a particular act such as violence or theft, whereas in the Abhidhamma it consists in abstaining from 'states of volition' (chetanā). Thus indirectly, this treatise deals with the nature of karma and corresponds to the Karmādhyaṃya of the Vṛitti.

1. See Adv. pp. 427-9.

2. tattha siyā kasmā panetā mettā-karunā muditā upekkhā brahma-vihārā ti vuchchanti ? Vibhange kasmā appamaññā ti vuttā ti ? Dhs.A. III. 411.

The next vibhanga deals with four kinds of paṭisambhidās (faculties of analysis) viz. attha, dhammā, nirutti and paṭibhāna. The derivation of the term paṭisambhidā is doubtful, since in the Skt. tradition it is called pratisamvit. There also the same four kinds are enumerated, but the order of the first two is reversed.

Although the Sb. of this vibhanga gives several meanings of the four paṭisambhidās, it should be noted that neither the term nor the four kinds occur in the early Nikāyas. They are found only in the Ang. nikāya, and there too they are not explained. The so-called Sb, therefore, is derived from the Paṭisambhidā-magga, an abhidhamma work (attributed to Sāriputta) included in the Sutta-piṭaka. The Ab. is also drawn from the same source, and hence differs very little from the Sb.

The traditional meaning of these four terms, and particularly that of the first two, viz. the attha and dhamma are given in detail by Mrs. Rhys Davids in her translation of the Kathāvatthu,¹ where she also gives views of Dr. Ledi Sadaw on this subject. But the differences between the sūtra and abhidharma meanings of these terms is not clear from this exposition. With the help of the Vaibhāshika interpretations, it is now possible to arrive at a plausible sūtra meaning.

The four paṭisambhidās in all probability stand for four branches of textual analysis. Dhamma meant the navāṅga preachings i.e. the terms, and attha their verbal meanings. Nirutti meant derivations of the terms or definitions, and paṭibhāna meant a specialised skill in all these in

1. Points of controversy, Appendix, pp. 377-382.

in addition to a mastery in the art of composition, preaching and disputation.

In the Sb. however, several meanings are given to the first two viz. the attha and dhamma. Attha means dukkha, dukkha-nirodha, phala and finally the meanings of any speech, particularly that of the navāṅga preaching.¹ Dhamma means dukkha-samudaya, dukkha-nirodha-gāminī-paṭipadā,² hetu and the contents of the navāṅga preaching. In short the attha and dhamma stand for the four Truths and also for the meanings and contents of the Scriptures. This latter meaning is completely dropped in the Ab. of this topic. Here the first three meanings alone are repeated and demonstrated by applying these terms to the mental concomitants of a given state of consciousness. Thus, for instance, the chetasika dhammas of a kusala chitta are called dhammā (samudaya = phenomena capable of yielding vipāka). An analytical knowledge of these dhammas is called dhamma-paṭisambhidā. The vipāka (or resultant) dhammas of these mental concomitants are called attha and their knowledge is called attha-paṭisambhidā.³ Thus the dhamma and attha are here taken solely in the sense of hetu and phala. In consistancy with this interpretation, only three paṭisambhidās are enumerated in illustrating the vipāka and kiriya chittas.

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1. dukkhe nāṇam dukkha-nirodhe hetu-phalamhi.....tassa tasseva bhāsitassa attham jānāti: ayaṁ imassa bhāsitassa attho...ti: ayaṁ vuchchatī attha-paṭisambhidā. Vbh. pp. 293-4.
 2. dukkhasamudaye nāṇamdukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya....hetumhi..... idha bhikkhu dhammam jānāti suttam geyyam....vedallam: ayaṁ vuchchatī dhammapaṭisambhidā. Vbh. pp.293-4.
 3. tasmīṁ samaye phasso hoti...avikkhepo hoti; ime dhammā kusalā imesu dhammesu nāṇam dhammapaṭisambhidā. tesam vipāke nāṇam atthapaṭisambhidā... Vbh. p. 295.

These two kinds of chittas are not causes (= samudaya dhammā) of a new vipāka. Hence the dhamma-paṭisambhidā is not possible in their case. Consequently, only three paṭisambhidās could be enumerated here. It may also be noted that in the Ab. the order of the attha and dhamma is reversed, so as to make them stand for hetu and phala, and by extension, to represent the samudaya and dukkha-sachcha. This coincides with the treatment of the four truths in the Ab. of the Sachcha-vibhanga, where also the samudaya-sachcha is placed first, instead of the traditional dukkha-sachcha.

While employing the formula of paṭisambhidās to represent the doctrine of Truths, the Ab. completely leaves out the more conventional, and perhaps the original, meaning of the dhamma and attha, viz. the navāṅga scriptures and their meanings.

In the Ang.nikāya, in one place, Sāriputta claims that he has mastered the four paṭisambhidās even when he was ordained only a fortnight, and that he explains it in various ways.¹ Although the terms attha and dhamma are not explained here, they appear more likely to refer to the expounding of scriptures than to the doctrine of four Truths.

This conjecture is strengthened by his demonstration of the paṭisambhidās in the Paṭisambhidāmagga.² In a chapter dealing exclusively with this topic, the Dhammachakkappavattanasutta is fully quoted, followed by an application of the four kinds of paṭisambhidās. A sentence like the

1. addhamāsūpasampanna me āvuso attha dhamma ... nirutti....
paṭibhānapaṭisambhidā suchchhikatā. tam aham aneka-pariyāyena
āchikkhāmi.... Ang. II. p.160.

2. Vol.II.pp.147-158 (Paṭisambhidā-kathā).

following is selected: " idam dukkham ariya-sachchanti pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu chakkhū udapādi, nānam....., paññā...., vijjā.... āloko udapādi". This is followed by explanations of the terms chakku, nāna, etc. e.g. chakkhū udapāditi dassanaṭṭhena. It is then explained that the chakku, nāna, paññā, vijjā and āloka are dhammas; they are the objects of the dhamma-paṭisambhidā. The dassanaṭṭha, nānaṭṭha, pajānaṭṭha, paṭivedhaṭṭha, obhāsaṭṭha - these are atthas and are objects of the attha-paṭisambhidā. The five dhammas and the five atthas become the objects of nirutti; knowledge of these ten derivations is nirutti-paṭisambhidā. Knowledge of the five dhammas, five atthas, and ten niruttis make twenty paṭibhāna-paṭisambhidās.

The same formula is applied to parinīyā and parinīyāta formulas of the dukkha-sachcha. This gives fifteen dhammas (terms), fifteen atthas, thirty niruttis and sixty paṭibhānas. A similar number is obtained in the case of remaining three Truths. Thus, according to this calculations, the discourse on the four Truths in their ti-parivaṭṭa-dvādas-ākāra¹ formula has 60 dhammas, 60 atthas, 120 niruttis and 240 paṭibhānas. Similar calculations are given for the formulas of satipaṭṭhāna, sammappadhāna, etc. bringing the total of dhammas (terms) treated in the² Paṭisambhidā-kathā to a number of 850. It is clear from this illustration that according to the Paṭisambhidā-magga, the dhamma in the paṭisambhidā formula stands for 'terms' and attha for 'meanings'.

1. chatūsu ariya-sachchesu satṭhi dhammā, satṭhi atthā, visati niruttiyo, chattarīsā cha dve cha nānasatāni. Ibid. p. 152.

2. Ibid. p. 158.

Such ^a collection of dharmas (or terms) might well have received the designation ' dharma-skandha' ^{or} aggregates of dharmas. The Pali tradition speaks of 84,000 dhammakkhandhas learnt by Ānanda. It is said that of these he learnt 2,000 from Sāriputta, and the rest from the Buddha himself. The Atthasālinī explains that a sutta containing one theme constitutes a dhamma-khandha. In verses each query asked forms a skandha, and each answer forms another. In the Abhidhamma each duka or tika classification, as well as each classification of states of consciousness, forms a dhamma-khandha. In the Vinaya the subjects, tables of contents, classification of terms etc. are considered as separate dhamma-khandhas.

The Vaibhāshikas speak of 80,000 dharma-skandhas. But there is no unanimity on what constitutes a dharma-skandha. Some āchāryās hold that the term refers to an Abhidharma text called by that name. But this is said to contain only 6,000. Some hold that the term refers to discourses on such topics as skandha, āyatana, dhātu, pratītya-samutpāda etc. The Dīpakāra holds that there are 80,000 kinds of people for whom ¹ the Buddha preaches dharma suitable to each one of them.

All these explanations tend to give an impression that the original meaning of this term might have been something like a unit of a text commented upon, which comes very near to the 'dhamma' in the formula of the Paṭisambhidā.

This is supported by the evidence of the Vaibhāshika and

1. Adv. p. 11, notes.

Yogāchāra interpretations of these terms. In both schools the dharma precedes the artha pratisamvit. Yaśomitra is aware of the several meanings of the term dharma but specifically states that in the present context it means the Scriptures.¹ The Vritti explains it as the contents of the dvādaśāṅga-pravachana corresponding to the navaṅga-satthu-sāsana.² The Asm. too explains the term as sarva-dharma-paryāya.³ The artha in all these schools means the meaning or purport of the Scriptures.

The Vaibhāshika and the Yogāchāra schools thus take the dharma and artha exclusively in the sense of the knowledge of Scriptures and their meanings. This, therefore, appears to be the original or the sūtra meaning of these terms. The other meanings such as hetu and phala are found only in the Pali Abhidhamma.

The nirutti paṭisambhidā is explained as knowledge of the etymological meanings of the terms (dhammā) and their interpretations (attha).⁴ It is also a knowledge of languages, particularly that of the Māgadhi,⁵ claimed to be the origin of all languages. A person endowed with this knowledge may also be an expert in grammar, but the Pali commentators do not hold it essential.⁶ The Vritti, however, states that the nirukti-pratisamvit⁷ is an unfailing knowledge of rūpa, dravya, liṅga, saṁkhyā, sādhana, kriyā, kāla and puruṣa of the terms occurring in the scriptures.

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1. [dharma-pratisamvit] iti. iha deśanā dharmah, anekārtho hi dharma-sabdah..Sakv. p. 652.
 2. Adv. p. 393.
 3. Asm. p. 96.
 4. Vbh. p. 294.
 5. Paṭisambhidā A.I. p. 5.
 6. Ibid.
 7. Adv. p. 393.

The paṭibhāna paṭisambhidā is also associated with speech. In the suttas it is used to denote fluency in expression or 'rhetorical gifts'.¹ In the Abhidhamma, however, it means knowledge of the knowledge² of dharma, artha and nirukti. The Vritti also explains it as an unfailing knowledge of the first three pratisamvits and also an excellence in controlling the meditations. But since hetuvidyā or logic is considered a prerequisite of this pratisamvit, it is possible that pratibhāna referred to a gift of speech, particularly in debates over the Doctrine.

Various details regarding the attainment of these four paṭisambhidās or the branches of textual analysis are given in the Atthakathās, in the Visuddhi-magga and in the Bhāṣya. Attainment of arhatship, study of scriptures, hearing of the Doctrine, discussion, are enumerated as necessary for attaining them. Yaśomitra says that knowledge of ganita (arithmetic), Buddha-vachana (scriptures), śabda-vidyā (grammar) and hetu-vidyā (logic)³ are respectively the prerequisites for attaining the four pratisamvits. The Vaibhāṣhikas, however, hold the scriptures as the most important of all these.

From this it is clear that the paṭisambhidās have little connection with the super-mundane path. They are not attained by any traditional dhāyanas⁴ but by the study of scriptures and sciences useful in textual exegesis. It is a method adopted by the Abhidharma piṭaka and the Atthakathās to explain the Suttas. The texts like Dhammasaṅgani

1. Ang. I. 187. See Points of Controversy, Appendix, p. 379, n.1.

2. Adv. p. 393.

3. Vide Adv. p. 393, n. 5.

4. paṭisambhidā-ppattiyā cha pāṭiyekko kammaṭṭhāna-bhāvanānuyogo nāma natthi. Vm. XIV. 31.

Vibhanga, their Aṭṭhakathās, Milinda-paṭṭha, Visuddhimagga, the Asm. Bhāṣya and Vṛitti reveal an intensive and sustained application of their authors towards collecting the dharmas (terms) and explaining them by giving their derivations. In doing this they have taken recourse to all kinds of etymologies, which often appear far fetched and at times even¹ incorrect. Usually each term is explained with regard to its characteristics or lakṣhaṇa. But in some cases, and particularly in dealing with a series of dhammas constituting a topic, they are explained with reference to their classification, derivations, characteristics, functions, modes of manifestation, proximate cause, meaning or a selected meaning (among several possible meanings), propriety of number, sequence, application to mundane or super-mundane consciousness, contents, analogies, set of four alternative propositions, śūnyatā, and finally with reference² to their mode of grouping as similar and dissimilar.

This method of textual analysis helped the commentators to attempt a concordance of diverse Sūtras spoken in different contexts and thus to present a consistent and coherent interpretation of the scriptures. This is called abhisamādhī. The Asm. repeatedly quotes conflicting Sūtras³ and tries to reconcile their meanings. This proficiency in discovering the hidden meanings and giving a correct interpretation of the Sūtras is held⁴ to result from a proper knowledge of the abhidharma.

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1. A word like arahā, for instance, is derived from āraḥ, hata-ari, ārā, raho and finally from the root araha (Skt. √arh). (See Vm. VII.4.). A word like machchhariya (mātsarya), for instance, is derived from achchhariya (āścharya) and explained as mā idam achchhriyam aññesaṃ hotū ti. See Adv. p. 309, n.6.
 2. See Vm. XVI, 14.
 3. See Asm. pp. 56,57,84,106, 107.
 4. katham dharmeshu dharmakūśalo hoti ? bahu-śrutatām upā dāya. katham artha-kūśalo hoti ? abhidharme abhivinaye lakṣaṇajñatām upādāya. Asm. p.83.

In doing this, the commentators are guided by the consideration of the Doctrine. We have seen how the Abhidharma is claimed to be an absolute preaching in opposition to the conventional preaching of the Sūtras. The same test is applied in judging the value of two or more conflicting Sūtras. Already in the Ang.nikāya, we find a distinction¹ drawn between neyattha (neyārtha) and nītattha (nītārtha) suttas. A person claiming a neyattha sutta as nītattha is said to be falsely² accusing the tathāgata. The commentary on these two words says that the suttas like "eka puggalo....dve puggalā" etc., are neyattha, i.e. of secondary import, since they need to be explained further, in the light of the anattavāda, that in reality there is no personality. But suttas like 'anichcha-dukka-anattā' are nītattha, i.e. of ultimate import,³ because the meaning of these is clear, well established and absolute. The entire Kathāvatthu may be taken as a demonstration of the application of this test to the sūtras put forward by the opponents. The first Puggala-kathā, for instance, is devoted to showing the 'nītārtha' of the sūtra term puggala to the Sammitiya. In discussing the topic of perception, the Mahāsāṅghikas on the basis of a sutta "chakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā" claim that the eye sees the object. The Theravādin maintains that here the text is not to be taken literally. The usages of language should not be treated as doctrine. The Sautrāntika too maintains

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1. For a complete and illuminating discussion of these terms in Pali and BHS., see LVPAK. IX. pp. 246-8. For their application in the Mādhyaṃika, see The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 254-5.
 2. Dve'me bhikkhave tathāgataṃ abbhācikkhanti; yo cha neyyatthaṃ suttantaṃ nītatthaṃ suttantaṃ ti dipeti... Ang. I. p. 60.
 3. Ang. A. II. p. 118.

the same argument against the Vaibhāṣika by reminding him that one¹ should not run after wordly beliefs and usages of language.

The foregoing study of the Vibhanga-pakarana amply justifies the claim that the sūtras are to be understood through the Abhidharma. It also reveals the Ābhidharmika approach to Sūtras and the Abhidharma. The Sūtras are conventional, partial, explanatory, and at times of secondary import. The Abhidharma is absolute, comprehensive, definitive and of primary import. The subject matter of both is the same, viz. the dharmas called variously as skandha, āyatana, dhātu, etc. but the Sūtras deal with these as components of a personality, i.e. with reference to a life-time, whereas the Abhidharma deals with them as unique dharmas of momentary existence. The pivotal doctrine of Buddhism, viz. anātmavāda, although it pervades the whole range of Sūtras, is deepened, emphasized and fully demonstrated only in the Abhidharma. But this could hardly have led even the early Sautrāntikas to oppose the Abhidharma, for they too were, unlike the Sammitīyas, equally committed to this doctrine. Their main contention must have been against the manner in which their opponents sought to establish it. The Ābhidharmikas not only claimed authenticity for their own Abhidharma works but also superiority over the Sūtras - the words of² the Buddha, and consequently over the Sautrāntikas. They claimed for their works the exclusive title of 'paramārtha deśanā', relegating the Sūtras to

1. Vide Adv. p. 33, notes.

2. ābhidhammika bhikkhū yeva hi kira dhamma-kathikā nāma, avasesā dhammaṃ kathentāpi na dhamma-kathikā.... tasmā ābhidhammiko bhikkhu... kira ekanta-dhamma-kathiko nāmā ti. Dhs A. I. 72.

the realm of vyavahāra. They accepted the Sūtra formulas of the dharmas but presented them with significant changes, as for instance the pañcāṅgika magga, the ekādaśāṅgika-paṭichchāsamuppāda or the pañchaka-jhāna. In the interpretation of formulas they made additions of dharmas which were most probably not warranted by the Sūtras. For instance, the inclusion of the asaṁkhatā dhātu in the nāma-khandha and in the dhammāyatana. They extended the scope of terms as for instance of the viññāna or sparśa in the paṭichchāsamuppāda formula, or of the dhamma and attha in the formula of paṭisambhidās. They invented new dharmas as, for instance, the hadaya-vatthu or such kinds of the rūpa-skandha as lahutā, mudutā etc., or the three super-mundane indriyas, not treated in the Sūttas. The Sūttas speak of only six kinds of viññānas. The 89 classes of viññānas (as illustrated in the Dhammasaṅgani are found only in the Abhidhamma. The Sūttas describe the saṅkhāra-khandha as six kinds of chetanā, but the Abhidhamma enumerates fifty dhammas under the term saṅkhāra. The classification of these saṅkhāras into sabba-chitta-sādhāraṇa and such other groups is also found only in the Abhidhamma, and especially in the Commentaries. The theory of chitta-vīthi suggested in the Vibhaṅga was also fully developed only in the Aṭṭhakathās. These new formulas, novel interpretations and later additions introduced by the Abhidharmikas might have been unwelcome to the early Sautrāntikas, the contemporaries of the Pali Abhidhamma.

This is proved by their sustained opposition to the inflated list of categories formulated by the Vaibhāṣhika school. The Theravādins had included only the chaitasika dharmas in the saṁskāra skandha, but the

Vaibhāshikas added thirteen new dharmas called chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra. Indeed, a majority of the controversies raised in the Bhāshya and the Vṛitti deal with these saṃskāras which the Sautrāntikas treated as mere notions (prajñaptimātra.) They reduced the 46 saṃskāras of the ¹ Vaibhāshika to a number of twenty, consisting of ten kuśala and ten akuśala chetanās, more agreeing with the Sūtra meaning of the saṃskāra-skandha. Even the Abhidharmika division of the saṃskāras as mahā-bhūmika etc. was not recognised by them. They discarded this grouping when it went against the sūtras as is shown by their insistence on treating the sparśa and vedanā (two mahābhaumika dharmas) as cause and effect, and hence not operating simultaneously in one moment.

In the Theravāda² Abhidharma nirvāṇa alone is called asaṃskṛita-dharma. The Vaibhāshikās enumerated one more, viz. ākāśa. They also maintained the reality of past and future dharmas. The ² Sautrāntika, on the basis of a sūtra, rejected all these as prajñaptimātra and relegated them to the position of the pudgala. By his bold advocacy of the theory of prajñapti and its extension to a majority of reals (dravya) including the asaṃskṛita dharmas of the Abhidharmika, the Sautrāntika not only asserted his critical spirit but also established the superiority of the Sūtras over the Abhidharma. From this theory flowed his doctrine of vikalpa (conceptual construction), his theory of perception and lastly the revolutionary theory of

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1. For the dharmas enumerated by the Sautrāntikas, see Appendix D of the Alambana-parīkṣhā.
 2. " pañicemāni bhikṣavah saṃjñā-mātram pratijñā-mātram vyavahāra-mātram saṃvṛiti-mātram yad utārito 'dhvānāgato' dhvākāśam nirvāṇam pudgalaś cheti ", quoted in the Mādhyamika-kārikā-Vṛitti by Chandrakīrti, p. 393. For details see The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. p. 82.

bāhyānumeyavāda, which was but one step towards the more critical subjective idealism of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

IV. SOME MAJOR CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN THE KOŚAKĀRA AND THE DĪPAKĀRA.

This struggle, stretching through several centuries of the history of Buddhism, between the Sautrāntika and the Abhidharmika reaches its culmination in the Kośa-Bhāṣya and the Dīpa-Vṛitti. The Dhammasaṅgani, Vibhaṅga and their Aṭṭhakathās reveal only the beginnings of these differences. It is not possible to say to what extent the seven Abhidharma Śāstras of the Sarvāstivāda school opposed the Sautrāntika doctrines. Their compilation perhaps led to the emergence of the Sautrāntika as a distinct school. But it is certain that the Mahā-Vibhāṣā¹ the encyclopaedic commentary on the Jñāna-prasthāna which gave rise to the Vaibhāṣika school, contained opinions of several contemporary Sautrāntika āchāryas, notably of Kumāralāta, Śrīlāta, Dharmatrāta and "Bhadanta".

The name Sautrāntika, however, occurs only once in the Mahāvibhāṣā.² Instead, we find scores of references to Dārśhāntikas,³ whom Yaśomitra describes as a section of the Sautrāntika school. Kumāralāta is generally held to be the founder of this school. It is suggested that his followers were called dārśhāntika after his Dṛiṣṭānta-pankti.⁴ J. Przyluski connects the word dṛiṣṭānta to dṛiṣṭi (Pali diṭṭhi) in opposition to sūtra (śruti) and maintains that the word Dārśhāntika was applied to the Sautrāntikas by the Vaibhāṣikas, as did

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1. See J. Takakusu's article " On the Abhidharma literature of the Sarvāstivādins", JPTS. 1905.
 2. See LVPAK, Introduction, p. LII.
 3. Dārśhāntikāḥ Sautrāntika-viśeṣa ity arthaḥ-Sakv. p. 400.
 4. See LVPAK. Introduction, p. LII.

the Mahāyānist¹s use the deprecatory term Hīnayāna to their opponents. In the Vṛitti too they are called 'sthiti-bhāgiya' and further abused as a kind of Sākyas having a dog's tail.² The term sthiti-bhāgiya perhaps alludes to the Sautrāntika theory of saṃkrānti, santāna or bīja, severely criticised in the Vṛitti and also in the works of the Vaibhāshika āchārya Saṃghabhadra.

Although these two words, viz. the Dārśhāntika and Sautrāntika are used separately in the Bhāshya, in the Vṛitti they are almost used as synonyms. Several Sautrāntika views appearing in the Bhāshya are attributed to the Dārśhāntika in the Vṛitti.³ It is, therefore, to be presumed that at the time of the Vṛitti these two names were treated as almost identical, referring to one and the same school.

Although the Sautrāntikas or the Dārśhāntikas like Kumāralāta and Śrīlāta played a major role in the period of the Mahā-vibhāshā, their activities appear to be directed only towards evolving their doctrines side by side with the Vaibhāshikas, or towards submitting alternative interpretations of the sūtras quoted by the Abhidharmikas, as is evident from the Spṛṣṭārthā of Yaśomitra. They are not yet hostile to the Vaibhāshika; the Vṛitti quotes Kumāralāta as an authority⁴ and seeks to support even the doctrine of three times (adhva-traya) by his⁵ drishtānta of the motes in the sunlight.

1. Vide Adv. p. 47, note 4.

2. sthiti-bhāgiyā nāma Sākyāṃ śva-lāṅgūlā^{ka-}dvitīya-nāmanah...Adv. p. 148.

3. The Mahāvibhāshā also attributes several Sautrāntika views to the Dārśhāntika. See LVPak. Introduction, pp. L II-LV.

4. Adv. p. 16.

5. Adv. p. 277.

The Sautrāntikas found their chief exponents in the persons of Vasubandhu the author of the celebrated Abhidharma-Kośa-Bhāṣya, and his competent commentator Yaśomitra, the author of the Sphutārthā-
-Abhidharma-Kośa-Vyākhyā. Vasubandhu stands in a supreme position among the later Buddhist teachers. A sautrāntika by conviction he wrote a compendium on the Abhidharma and finally emerged as a great exponent of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

Although he claimed that the Kośa was composed in conformity¹ with the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika school, his Bhāṣya reveals that his real affiliation was with the Sautrāntika. He often uses the adverb 'kila'² to show his disagreement with the Vaibhāshika view. On almost all controversial points between the two, he openly favours the Sautrāntika view-³ point. In his characteristically powerful style, Vasubandhu critically examined the dravya-vāda of the Vaibhāshikas, accused them of being⁴ literalists,⁵ ridiculed their dogmatism, and compared them with such⁶ heretical schools as the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeshika. Yaśomitra rightly⁷ observes that Vasubandhu belongs to the Sautrāntika school.

These Sautrāntika leanings of Vasubandhu, professedly in a work

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1. Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika-nīti-siddhah prāyo mayā'yam kathito 'bhidharmah/ Ak. VIII. 40 ab.
 2. [tad dhetor udita kilaisha śāstrā] kileti kila-śabdah parābhiprāyaṁ dyotayati. Sakv. p. 11. kila-śabdah Vaibhāshika-mata-dyōtanārthah Ibid. p. 27. kila-śabdena Vaibhāshika-mataṁ dyotaytvā āchāryaḥ svamatam āhā. Ibid. p. 399. See LVPak, Introduction, p. XII, n. 1.
 3. e.g. evaṁ tu sādhu yathā Sautrāntikānām... Akb. V. 2a.
 4. e.g. vyavahārārtham upachārāḥ kriyante... Akb. I. 42. tad etam ākāśam pātyata iti Sautrāntikāḥ... Akb. II. 46 ab.
 5. [...śraddhāniya esho'rtho nānumāniyah...] iti Vaibhāshikān evaṁ chodayanti. Sakv. p. 125. dravyameva tu Vaibhāshikāḥ... varpayanti. kim kāraṇam? esha naḥ siddhānta iti. Akb. II. 36. bcd... na hi sarvadharmā tarka-gamyā bhavanti... Akb. II. 47 ab.
 6. Vaiśeshikāś chaivaṁ dyotitā bhavanti... Akb. II. 41 a. Vārshyaganyavādaś chaivaṁ dyotito bhavati... Akb. V. 27 c.
 7. Sautrāntika-pākshikastv ayam āchāryaḥ. Sakv. p. 26.

dealing with Abhidharma, brought hostile reactions from his contemporary¹ orthodox Vaibhāshikas. Paramārtha, in his 'Life of Vasubandhu' relates that Saṃghabhadra, an eminent orthodox Vaibhāshika composed two works in refutation of the Bhāṣya.² In the first work entitled 'Conformity of the Truth' ('Nyāyānusāra'), he refuted the Bhāṣya in favour of the Vibhāṣā.³ Yaśomitra in his Sphuṭārthā quotes several long passages from this work and at times refutes them in favour of the Bhāṣya. This work is not referred to in the Vṛitti.⁴ But as will be seen from the comparisons given in the foot notes to our Text, the Vṛitti is in agreement with the views of Saṃghabhadra, particularly on such topics as vitarka-vichāra, prāpti, kāritra etc., which will be discussed in following pages.

The other work called "Samayapradīpikā" is an abridged version of

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1. J. Takakusu, T'oung Pao, Serie II, Vol. V, 269-96.
 2. See JPTS, 1905, pp. 134-39. Poussin gives following information:
"Saṃghabhadra a écrit deux ouvrages.
Le premier, dont le titre est transcrit en chinois Abhidharmanyāyā-nusārasāstra - peut-être mieux Nyāyānusāro nāma Abhidharmaśāstram - est un commentaire qui reproduit sans modifications les kārīkās de l'Abhidharmakośa. Mais ce commentaire critique les kārīkās qui exposent la doctrine Vaibhāṣika en la notant par le mot kila qui signifie "au dire de l'école"; il réfute le Bhāṣya, auto-commentaire de Vasubandhu, quand celui-ci expose des vues opposées à celles des Vaibhāṣikas, le corrige quand il attribue aux Vaibhāṣikas des vues qui ne sont pas les leurs". LVPak, Introduction, p. XXII.
 3. See Sakv. Index (Proper Nouns), where 35 entries are made under Saṃghabhadra.
 4. See Adv. pp. 38, 65, 83, 87, 89, 162, 163, 170, 229, 233, 385, 398, 399.

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the "Nyāyānusāra".

Although written in refutation of the Bhāshya, these two works of Saṃghabhadra^a are, in a sense, commentaries on the Kośa. The kārikās of the Kośa were taken as a basis, except for a minor changes in a few places, for explaining the orthodox Vaibhāshika view-point. As Takakusu points out " Vasubandhu's Kośa-kārikā itself, being a summary of the Vaibhāshika doctrines, was not objectionable to any followers of that system; the only objection being directed to the prose exposition (Bhāshya) of the Kośa, in which some doctrines of the Sautrāntikas are found incorporated. This being the case Saṃghabhadra cites freely the kārikā of his opponent, and explains them according to the orthodox views of his school".²

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1. "Le titre du second traité n'est pas complètement transcrit: Abhidharmasamaya-hsien-śāstra ou Abhidharmasamaya-koang-śāstra. J. Takakusu propose Abhidharmasamayapradīpikāśāstra, ce qui n'est pas mauvais; cependant pradīpa, lampe, est toujours teng, et on a pour hsien les équivalents prakāśa et dyotana.

C'est un extrait du Nyāyānusāra, dont toute polémique est exclue et qui est donc un simple exposé du système (samaya) de l'Abhidharma. Il diffère du Nyāyānusāra par la présence d'une assez longue introduction, sept stances et prose, et encore par la manière dont il traite les kārikās de Vasubandhu: ces kārikās sont ou supprimées (ii, 2-3) ou corrigées (i, 11, 14) lorsqu'elles expriment des doctrines fausses ou lorsqu'elles mettent en suspicion des doctrines vraies par l'addition du mot kila". LVPak. Introduction, p. XXII.

2. JPTS, 1905, p. 135.

These two works of Saṃghabhadra afford a striking parallel to our Dīpa (and its Vṛitti). All the three works belong to the Kāshmirā-Vaibhāshika school. They are hostile to the Kośakāra, and are primarily written to refute the Sautrāntika views upheld in the Bhāshya. In their contents and their presentation they take the Kośa as their model and retain those parts of the Bhāshya which are not objectionable to them. They hold identical views on almost all controversial points. Their main difference, however, lies in the fact that the works of Saṃghabhadra are based on the kārikās of the Kośa, whereas the Dīpa has its own kārikās, notwithstanding their correspondence to the Kośa.

Neither the "Nyāyānusāra" (except for the extracts quoted in the Sakv.), nor the "Samaya-pradīpikā" have come down to us in their original form. They are available only in Chinese Translations. Nor are we aware of any other work written against the Kośakāra. The Dīpa, therefore, notwithstanding its fragmentary character, has a unique value in furnishing us with the orthodox Vaibhāshika reactions to the Bhāshya.

The extant Vṛitti contains the following sixteen hostile references to the Kośakāra:-

- (1) Kośakāras tvāha - anuśayānuśayanāt sāsravāḥ. tad etad abrahma. (p. 18).
- (2) tatra yad uktaṃ Kośakāreṇa ' kim idam ākāśam khādyate, sāmagryāṃ hi satyāṃ drishtaṃ ity upachārah pravartate. tatra kaḥ paśyatī' ti. tad atra tena bhadantena sāmagryaṅga-kriyā [paharanam ?] kṛiyate. Abhidharma-sammohāṅka-sthānenātmāpy ankito bhavaty ayoga-śūnytā-prapātābhimukhyatvaṃ pradarśitam iti. (p. 33).

- (3) Kośakṛid āchashte - na hy atra kiñchit phalam utprekshyata iti. tam pratidam phalam ādarśyate. (p. 37).
- (4) idam idānim abhidharma-sarvasvam Kośakāraka-smṛiti-gocharātītam vaktavyam. (p. 40).
- (5) Kośakārādayaḥ punar ānuh - 'svārthopalabdhāḥ eva chakshurādīnām pañchānām āhipatyam'. tad etaḍ Vaibhāshikīyam eva kiñchid gṛhītam. nātra kiñchid Kośakārakasya svaka-darśanam. (p. 47).
- (6) Kośakāras tvāha - 'sarvaśūkshmo rūpa-saṅghātaḥ paramāṇur' iti. tena saṅghāta-vyatiriktaṁ rūpam anyad vaktavyam. (p. 65).
- (7) tad idam ati-sāhasam vartate yad viruddhayaḥ api dvayaḥ dharmayoḥ ekatra chitte samavadhānam pratijñāyate.... iti Kośakārah.... tad idam andha-vilāsini-kaṭāksha-guṇotkīrtana-kalpaṁ chodyam ārabhyate. (pp. 81-3).
- (8) siddhā sabhāgatā. Kośakārah punas tām Vaiśeṣhika-parikalpita-jāti-padārthena samīkurvan vyaktaṁ pāyasa - vāyasayaḥ varṇa-sādharmyam paśyatīti. (p. 90).
- (9) atra punaḥ Kośakārah pratijānīte - ' sachittikeyam samāpattiḥ' iti... tad etaḍ abauddhiyam. (pp. 93-5).
- (10). 'samādhi-balena karmajam jīvitāvedham nirvartyāyuh saṁskārādhish-thānjam, āyur na vipākah' iti Kośakārah. tatra kim uttaram iti ? na tatrāvaśyam uttaram vaktavyam....tasmād Vaitulika-śāstra-praveśa-dvāram ārabdham tena bhadantenety adhyupekshyam etaḥ (pp. 98-101).
- (11) tasmāt pūrvokta-lakṣhaṇa eva bhikṣur na yathāha Kośakārah. (p.133).
- (12) abhidhyādaya eva karma-svabhāvanīti sthiti-bhāgiyāḥ... Kośakārah 'ko 'tra doṣah ? '.... Sāṁkhyīya - darśanam abhyupagataṁ syāt. (p. 149).

- (13) 'sūkshmaṁ kuśala-dharma-bījaṁ tasminn akuśale chetasy avasthitam yataḥ punaḥ kuśalam chittam utpadyate' iti Kośakārah. yuktyāgama-virodhāt tan na iti Dīpakārah. (pp. 168-9).
- (14) 'evaṁ tu sādhu yathā Dārśhāntikānām' iti Kośakārah.... tad etad Sautrāntikair antargataṁ Buddha-vachana-nīti-śravaṇa-kausīdyaṁ āvirbhāvyate. (p. 222).
- (15) tad atra Kośakārah praśnayati - ' ko vighnaḥ' ... tatra vyaṁ prativadmah - 'durbodhā khalu dharmatā'. (p. 279).
- (16) atra Sarvāstivāda-vibhrashtir Vaituliko nirāha vyaṁ api trīn svabhāvaṁ parikalpayishyāmaḥ.... ity etad aparaṁ adhva-sammohāṇ-kanā-sthānaṁ Kośakārahasyeti. (p. 282).

Of these Nos. 3 and 4 refer to omissions of certain topics by the Kośakāra in his Bhāshya. Nos. 2 and 5 deal with certain aspects of the Sautrāntika theory of perception. No. 6 deals with the Kośakāra's definition of paramāṇu. No. 7 refers to a controversy about the co-operation of vitarka and vichāra in a single moment of consciousness. Nos. 8, 9 and 10 deal with certain items of the much debated Vaibhāshika categories called chittaviprayukata-saṁskāra. Nos. 11 and 12 deal with certain aspects of karma. Nos. 13 and 14 have a bearing on the Sautrāntika theory of bīja. The last two references, Nos. 15 and 16 deal with the fundamental Vaibhāshika doctrine of the reality of three Times, i.e. the 'Sarvā-(dā)sti-vāda'. In the following pages we propose to deal in brief with these controversies in the light of the Bhāshya and the Vritti.

1. THEORY OF COGNITION.

While dealing with a topic 'kati drisṭih, kati na drisṭih?', the Dīpa says that there are eight kinds of drisṭis, viz. the five wrong views and three right views. In addition to these the organ of eye is also called drisṭi on account of its function of seeing its object. A question then is raised whether vijñāna should also ~~not~~ be included under this term. The Vṛitti points out that the function of apprehension (darśana) cannot be primarily attributed to vijñāna. Four things can be said to perform the function of seeing. The eye or the eye-consciousness, or the prajñā (one of the eight drisṭis accompanying all states of consciousness), or finally the totality of all these and such other causes as the light, etc.

Of these, the eye alone, independent of the vijñāna, cannot be said to apprehend, for at the same time other organs also will similarly be doing their actions (hearing, smelling, etc.) and this will result in a simultaneous activity of all sense organs in a single moment. The eye-consciousness alone cannot be said to 'apprehend', for being independent of the eye, it may 'see' even things screened from view. Furthermore, if the vijñāna 'sees' (paśyati) the object, who else does the function of knowing (vijñāti) it? The prajñā too cannot see, as it is a mental concomitant common to all states of consciousness. The last, viz. the totality of causes is only a notion, since it is not different from the factors of perception examined above.

1. Adv. p. 29, n. 4.

2. Ibid.

3. These are the views held by different schools. See LVPak, Vol. I, p. 82. Vide Adv. p. 32, n. 1.

4. Adv. p. 31.

After showing the invalidity of these four views, the Dīpakāra sets forth the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika theory : " The eye apprehends and the consciousness knows (its object). There is a great difference between these two on account of their different functions, viz., the apprehension¹ and comprehension.

² The substance called eye is of the nature of that which sees (a 'seer'). In it is produced an action of seeing when its power is awakened on account of the emergence of the totality of its causes and conditions.³ The eye does not apprehend independent of the vijñāna, nor does the eye-consciousness know the object unsupported by the active eye. The eye, as well as the eye-consciousness, with the help of such accessories as the light, etc. co-operates⁴ simultaneously towards bringing the perception of a given object. All these things happen in a single moment. The object, the eye, the eye-consciousness and the light, all manifest their power, i.e. become active and flash forth simultaneously.⁵ The object appears, the eye sees and the eye-consciousness knows it. This is called the direct knowledge of an object.

Therefore, although there are several conditions, still, since the condition of eye is prominent, it is said that the eye sees. The prominence of the eye is evident, since the clearer the eye-sight, the

1. Ad. kārikā 44.

2. chakshur drravyam hi drashtri-svabhāvam. Adv. p. 32.

3. tasya hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī-parigraha-prabodhita-śakteḥ rūpa-darśana-kriyā-mātram utpadyate. Ibid.

4. yugapad ekasmin vishaye vritti-lābho bhavati. Ibid.

5. ta ete vijñāna-chakshū-rūpādayaḥ sva-hetu-sāmagrī-prabodhita-śaktayaḥ... yugapat.... vrittiṁ pratipadyanta iti..... Ibid.

clearer the perception. It is, therefore, well said " (In fact) the eye sees, but we use such (metaphorical) expressions: ' the consciousness¹ sees".

This, in short, is the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika theory of perception. A few significant points of this theory may be noted here: (1) The chakshu is called a substance (dravya). It is compared to a seer (drashtṛi). It is said to possess a certain power (śakti) - its own nature. (2). This power is made manifest by certain causes which makes the substance active. (3) The perception is said to take place in a single moment, as the object, the organ and the (eye-) consciousness are made to operate simultaneously, without explaining the causal relation that must exist between the object and the consciousness.

The Kośakāra in his Bhāshya examines this Vaibhāshika theory. He points out that, in this particular context, there is no real difference between 'seeing' and 'knowing', although we have such usages as the eye 'sees' or the mind 'knows'. The Vaibhāshika seeks to support his point² by referring to a sūtra: ' chakshushā rūpāni drishtvā'. The Kośakāra maintains that this should not be taken literally. We do use such expressions as ' the cots cry', when in fact we mean the children (in the cots) cry. Similarly, the organ of eye is a seat or a door (dvāra) through which the consciousness 'sees' an object, although we say the eye 'sees'.

1. Ibid. p. 33.

2. This controversy is recorded in the Kathāvatthu, where the Mahāsaṅghika too quotes this sūtra. The Theravādin's interpretation is identical with that of the Kośakāra. Buddhaghosa in his Vm. clearly states that it is chakkhuvimāṇa which 'sees' the rūpa and not the chakkhu. See Adv. p. 33, n. 1.

But even the expression 'consciousness knows' is not to be taken literally, since there is no consciousness apart from knowing. The knowledge does not grasp, the eye does not see, the object does not offer itself to both. All dharmas being momentary are incapable of any activity; what we call action is nothing more than their coming into existence in a sequence determined by the law of pratītya-samutpāda. There is neither¹ an actor, nor an action apart from the mere flash of dharmas.

After showing the real meaning of the sūtra, the Kośakāra turns his polemic against the 'dravyavāda' of the Vaibhāshika. The use of such words as dravya, kartri, śakti and kriyā by the latter echoed the views of the heretical Pudgalavādin, who also maintained the reality of an 'actor' doing an action. The Vaibhāshika, however, uses these terms to show the reality of his 'dravya' in the three times. The Kośakāra points out that this 'kartri-kriyā-bheda' is repugnant to the spirit of Buddhism and puts the following words in the mouth of the Sautrāntika: "What is this chewing of the empty space! A visual consciousness arises conditioned by the organ of vision and the object. Here who sees and who is seen? There is nothing else but the elementary factors appearing as cause and effect. In usage, however, such expressions are employed 'the eye sees' or 'consciousness knows'. One should not attach any importance to such expressions. Indeed the Buddha has declared 'do not stick to the expressions used by common people, do not run after the

1. cf. kṣhṇikāḥ sarva-saṃskārā asthirāṇāṃ kutah kriyā/ bhūtir yai 'śhāṃ kriyā' sai • va kārakāṃ sai • va chochyāte/ Quoted in the Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā, p. 11. See Buddhist Doctrine of Flux, pp. 71 ff.

worldly terms". The Kāśmīra Vaibhāshikas, however, hold " the eye sees, the ear hears, the nose smells, the tongue tastes, the body feels and the intellect knows".¹

The Dīpakāra notes these provoking words of the Kośakāra (identified with the Sautrāntika) which repudiated the Sarvāstivādin's theory of kāritra (vyāpāra = activity of a dravya) and condemned the Vaibhāshika as a literalist. He brings an accusation against the Kośakāra of not only showing his ignorance of the Abhidharma but also of heading for the precipice of ayoga-śūnyatā.² The term ayoga-śūnyata, as will be discussed below, refers to a Mahāyāna doctrine attributed by the Vritti to a Vaināśika school which repudiated the reality of not only the past and future but also of the present.³

This Vaibhāshika theory, i.e. ' the eye sees' etc. is again alluded to in the Vritti in^a discussion on the ādhipatya of the indriyas. The Dīpakāra holds that the five sense organs have supremacy over the action of illuminating their own objects, as for instance, the eye 'perceives' a path as even or uneven.⁴ The Vritti also quotes a view of the Elder āchāryas who consider that the five organs have domination over the following four actions: 1) In making the body beautiful, 2) in withdrawing

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1. Vide Adv. p. 33, n. 2. For a brief summary of this controversy, see The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 61-2.
 2. Abhidharma-sammonāṅkasthānenātmapy ankito bhavaty ayoga-śūnyatā-prapātābhīṃ uchyatvaṃ pradarsitam iti. Adv. p. 33.
 3. Vaitulikaśūnyatā-śūnyatā-vādinah sarvaṃ nāsti. Adv. p. 257.
 4. vayanṃ tāvat paśyāmaḥ... "Svārtha-vyaktishu pañchānām" chakshurādīnām pañchānām svārtha-prakāśana-kriyāyām ādhipatyam sama-vishama-mārgālochanād ity arthah. Adv. p. 45.
 5. Adv. p. 46.

the body from undesirable objects, 3) in the production of their corresponding vijñānas, 4) and in being a special cause of such actions as darśana, śravaṇa, etc.

The Kośakāra also quotes this view of the Elder āchāryas and criticises it from the Sautrāntika view-point.¹ The latter maintains that the withdrawing of the body is a function of the vijñāna and not of the organs. As regards the actions like darśana or śravaṇa, they are identical with vijñāna. It is, therefore, wrong to attribute these functions to the sense organs. The ādhipatya of the sense organs (says the Sautrāntika)² consists only in perceiving (upalabdhi) their respective objects.

It may be noted that this view of the Sautrāntika (i.e. the Kośakāra) is not different from the view of the Vaibhāshika Dīpakāra. The former describes it as svārthopalabdhi, the latter calls it svārth^{a-}vyakti. This identity gives a further occasion for a criticism of the Kośakāra. The Dīpa accuses him of claiming to be a 'paṇḍita'. The Vṛitti comments that this view of the Kośakāra is borrowed from the Vaibhāshika.³ Nothing new is said; the Vaibhāshikas themselves have held this view.

The causal relation between the object and the consciousness forms one of the most intricate problems that confront the Buddhist theory of perception. The Buddhist is committed to a doctrine of radical momentariness of all things, both mind and matter. According to him all

1. See LVPak, II, p. 103. Vide Adv. p. 47.

2. chakshurādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ svasya svasyārthasyopalabdhāvādhipatyam. Adv. p. 47, n. 3.

3. tad etad Vaibhāshikīyam eva kiñchid grihitam. nātra kiñchid Kośakārakasya svaka-darśanam. Vaibhāshāireva svārthopalabdhir ukteti. Adv. p. 47.

dharma are particular, unique and momentary. A perception involves the participation of at least three things, viz. an object, an organ of sense and a consciousness. It is said in the sūtras that a visual perception arises, conditioned by an organ of vision and its object - a rūpa. Since all these are momentary, it is difficult to establish a relation between them. Causality demands a temporal sequence. A cause must precede the effect.

The object according to the Buddhist is a cause (ālambana-pratyaya) of its knowledge. Being a cause it must be antecedent to its cognition. The two cannot arise simultaneously and yet stand as cause and effect. But being momentary the object ceases before its cognition can be produced. A perception of a momentary object is therefore an impossibility.¹

This is well summed up in the following objection raised by the Dārshtāntika: " The organs and the objects of the five sense-consciousness, being causes of the latter, belong to a past moment. When the object (rūpa) and the eye exist, the visual-consciousness is non-existing. When the visual consciousness exists, the eye and the object (rūpa) are not existing. In the absence of their duration in the moment of the (visual) consciousness there is no possibility of the cognition of the object". "Therefore", concludes the Dārshtāntika, " all (sense) perceptions are indirect".²

1. See The Buddhist Doctrine of Universal Flux, pp. 76 ff.

2. Dārshtāntikasya hi sarvam apratyaksham. pañchānām vijñāna-kāyānām atīta-vishayatvāt yadā khalu chakshūrūpe vidyete tadā vijñānam asat. yadā vijñānam sat, chakshū-rūpe tadāsatī, vijñāna-kṣhāna-sthity-abhāve svārthopalabdhya anupapattes cha. Adv. pp. 47-8.

The object must precede and endure if it is to be available to its cognition. But this goes against the doctrine of momentariness. The Theravādin gets rid of this difficulty by partially abandoning the theory of momentariness. According to him a 'mind moment' (chittakkhana) consists of three ultimate moments, viz. the moments of origin, duration¹ and death. The whole process of cognition (chitta-vīthi) takes seventeen such chittakkhanas. The number seventeen would appear arbitrary, but according to the Theravādin it corresponds to the life of a material object. One object-moment (rūpakkhana)² is equivalent to seventeen mind-moments. The matter is born in the first moment, endures for fifteen moments and perishes in the seventeenth moment. It cannot become an object in its first (i.e. origin) moment, but can become one from its second moment onwards.³ This theory apparently makes the object precede as well as endure a whole process of its cognition. This is indeed a very ingenious explanation. Both the object and the cognition are called khaṇika (momentary), but the speed of the perishing of the object is slowed down 17 times. Here we have a theory of two kinds of moments, put forth for the sake of convenience, regardless of the fundamental Buddhist hypothesis of universal impermanence.

This theory of the Theravādins is shared by the Sammitiya. The

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1. uppāda-ttḥiti-bhaṅga-vasena khaṇa-ttayaṃ eka-chittakkhaṇaṃ nāma. A. Sangaho, IV, 8.
 2. tāni pana sattarasa chittakkhaṇāni rūpa-dhammānaṃ āyu. Ibid.
 3. eka-chittakkhaṇātītāni vā bahu-chittakkhaṇātītāni vā thitippattāneva pañchārammaṇāni pañcha-dvāre āpāthamāgachchhanti. Ibid.

latter also maintains that the mind and mental concomitants are momentary¹ but that matter endures for a longer time.

The Kathāvatthu records a controversy on this assumption of two kinds of impermanence. The Pubba-seliyas and the Aparaseliyas hold that since all conditioned things are impermanent they must endure but one chitta moment. Having accepted the law of universal impermanence it is illogical to hold that one thing ceases quickly and another after an interval.² The Theravādin points out that if it were not so, the organ of eye and the (resultant) visual consciousness would be saha-jāta³ (born together). This will be contrary to the Scriptures where it is said : "If the organ of sight within be intact, the object without come into focus, and there be a coordinated application of mind resulting therefrom, then a corresponding state of cognition is manifested".⁴

In his attempt to make the cause precede the result, the Theravādin abandons the theory of universal momentariness. The Vaibhāshika takes an opposite course. He adheres to the doctrine of universal momentariness but admits the co-existence (saha-bhāva) of the object and its cognition by discarding a temporal sequence between the two. He maintains that there is a peculiar relation called sahabhū-hetu between the object, organ and the cognition. All these rise simultaneously and yet operate as cause and effect like the lamp and its light or the sprout and its shadow. The objection that a causal relation demands temporal

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1. Ārya-Sammatīyaḥ...kāḷāntarāvasthāyī hi tasya rūpaṃ chitta-chaittānāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ. Sakv. p. 179.
 2. Vide Adv. p. 107, n. 2.
 3. chakkhāyatanaṃ chakkhuvinnāna saha-jātaṃ ti ? Kv. XXII, 8.
 4. Ibid.

sequence does not frighten the Vaibhāṣhika. According to him a causal relation consists in the invariable concomitance of two things. Since there is this relation between the object (and organ) and its cognition,¹ these are related as cause and effect.

But if the object, organ and the consciousness operate simultaneously, it is difficult to see why the knowledge is determined by the object and not by the eye. It may determine its character even without the object. The Vaibhāṣhika here takes recourse to a theory of 'co-ordination', called sārūpya. According to this theory "there is between two of them - consciousness and object - a special relation called sārūpya, a relation which makes it possible that the complex phenomenon - the resulting cognition - is a cognition of colour and not of the visual sense".²

The Sautrāntika accepts the relation of sārūpya ('co-ordination') between the subject and object, but criticises the sabhāgaḥetu or the simultaneity of the cause and effect. He examines the examples of lamp and light and points out that the lamp is not the cause of light. Both³ are results of a separate cause belonging to a past moment. The problem of perception thus remains unsolved on account of the uncompromising nature of the doctrine of momentariness and the theory of causation.

The Sautrāntika theory of perception is not explained in the

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1. See LVPak, Vol. I, pp. 248-54 and Sakv. pp. 191-97. Vide Adv. p.114, n.4.
 2. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 56. See Stcherbatsky's notes there on further developments of the theory of sārūpya in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Also see his Buddhist Logic, Vol. II. pp. 40 ff and S. Mookerjee's The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, pp. 337-45.
 3. See Sakv. p. 197.

Dīpa or in the Kośa. But we can gather it from later works like the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti, its Tīkā by Dharmottara, the Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, the Pañjikā on it by Kamalaśīla, and finally from the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha of Mādhava.

The Sautrāntika is called a sākāra-jñāna-vādin. According to him the subject is, like a mirror, capable of receiving an impress of the likeness of its object. What is directly known in the cognition (which is 'self-revealing' sva-samvedaka) is this representation of the object and not the object itself. The object is only inferred to be existing as it corresponds to the impression perceived. This theory is known as bahyārthānumeyavāda, the theory of the inferrability of the external object.

This is well explained in the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha. In his reply to an objection of the pūrva-pakṣa (Vijñānavādin) that a past object cannot be grasped by knowledge, the Sautrāntika says that the object which has come into contact with an organ has a power of leaving its image on the following resultant knowledge, whereby the object is inferred. This peculiar efficiency of the sense-object determines the causal relation between the object and its cognition. The external object is only inferred as for instance, good feeding is inferred from a well-nourished appearance or affection is inferred from flurried movements.¹

1. nanu jñānād bhinnakālasāyārthasya grāhyatvam anupapannam iti chettad anupapannam. indriya-sannikṛisṭasya viśayasyotpāde jñāne svākāra-samarpakatayā samarpitena cākāreṇa tasyārthasyānumeyatopapattēḥ ... "bhinnakālaṁ katham grāhyam iti chēt grāhṭām viduḥ/hetutvam eva cha vyakter jñānakārapaṇakṣhamam//"... yathā puṣṭyā bhojanam anumīyate ... tathā jñānakāreṇa jñānam anumeyam. Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 36.

The Sautrāntika by his theory of sākāra-jñāna-vāda (Representative Perception'¹) paved the way for the emergence of the idealist Vijñānavāda. The external object was pushed into the background by maintaining that what was directly perceived was the content of knowledge and not the object. The object being always inferred, the content alone became real to the knowledge. The Vijñānavādin goes a step further and maintains that the objects are mere ideal projections, ideas alone are real.

The Dīpakāra does not enter into a full criticism of this Sautrāntika theory of perception. He only points out that in the absence of a direct perception (pratyaksha) of the external objects, even the other two means of proper knowledge - the anumāna (inference) and the scriptures (āgama)², are not possible, as the latter are dependent on the direct perception.

2. THEORY OF PARAMĀNU.

The next controversy between the Dīpakāra and the Kośakāra is related to a definition of paramānu. According to the Vaibhāshika there are two kinds of paramānus, viz. dravya-paramānu and saṃghāta-paramānu. The former is called sarva-sūkshma or the most subtle part of matter which cannot be split further. It is of fourteen kinds: the four mahābhūtas (elements of earth, water, fire and air) and one element of each of the five sense organs and their corresponding five objects. An agglomeration of

1. See The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 82.

2. tasya sākshād vishayānubhavanābhāvād anumānāgamābhāva-prasaṅgah.

these dravya-paramāṇus receives the name saṃghāta-paramāṇu.

The constituents of this saṃghāta-paramāṇu vary according to the planes of existence. In the kāma-loka, it consists of at least eight dravya-paramāṇus, viz. the four mahābhūtas and the four derived matters (viz. rūpa, gandha, rasa and sprasṭavya). When sound is to be produced, the number is nine, due to the addition of the sound element. When this saṃghāta is organic, then the element of kāya-indriya is added to these nine. When this saṃghāta has other indriyas like the eye, ear, nose, tongue, then one each of these elements is added to the above nine.

It is a Vaibhāshika theory that the elements of gandha and rasa are not found in the rūpa-loka. The smallest saṃghāta-paramāṇu of the rūpa-loka, therefore, consists of only six dravya-paramāṇus (the four mahābhūtas and the elements of rūpa and sprasṭavya). This number is increased by the addition of the elements of sound (śabda) and the five indriyas, as in the case of the kāma-loka.

Thus according to the Vaibhāshika a dravya-paramāṇu is called 'sarva-sūkshma'. A saṃghāta-paramāṇu is an aggregate of several such (sarva-sūkshma) dravyas. The Kośakāra, however, defines a paramāṇu as the minutest (sarva₁sūkshma) aggregate of matter. The implicit contradiction between this definition and the usual one has not escaped the notice of his commentator. Yaśomitra explains that the 'paramāṇu' in this definition refers to a saṃghāta-paramāṇu and not to the dravya-paramāṇu, as the latter

1. sarva-sūkshmo hi rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramāṇur ity uchyate. yato nānyataro vijñāyeta. Akb. II. 22ab.

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is devoid of any parts and, therefore, cannot be called an aggregate.

The Kośakāra is silent on the subject of the dravya-paramāṇu. The Dīpakāra takes note of this omission on the part of the Kośakāra, which implicitly suggests that there are in reality only saṃghāta-paramāṇus and no dravya-paramāṇus that produce a saṃghāta.

The Kośakāra critically examines the reality of the dravya-paramāṇu² in his discussion on the nature of the rūpa-skandha. The rūpa is characterised by rūpaṇa, i.e. resistance or obstruction. A question is raised about the possibility of a dravya-paramāṇu resisting (or coming into contact with) other similar paramāṇus.³ It can touch other paramāṇus either wholly or by parts. If wholly, then both paramāṇus will occupy but one space and, therefore, the whole aggregate will still remain a single dravya-paramāṇu. If by parts, then this will involve the divisibility (sāvayavatva) of the dravya-paramāṇu which is held to be part-less. Thus in neither way is rūpaṇa possible without involving a contradictory conclusion.

The Vaibhāshika gets rid of this difficulty by postulating a theory that a dravya-paramāṇu (sarva-sūkshma) does not exist by itself, but always remains in an aggregated form (saṃghāta) from which it cannot be disassociated (avinirbhāga). Although it is not individually capable of

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1. [sarva-sūkshmo rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramāṇur] iti. saṃghāta-paramāṇur na dravya-paramāṇuḥ. yatra hi pūrvāpara-bhāgo nāsti tat sarva-rūpā'pachitaṁ dravyaṁ dravya-paramāṇur itīshyate. Sakv. p. 123.
 2. Vide LVPak, I. 13.
 3. dravya-paramāṇu-rūpaṁ na rūpaṁ prāpnoti. kasmāt ? arūpaṇāt. niravayavatve sati arūpaṇāt...Sakv. p. 34.

rūpana (resistance), it is capable of it in an aggregated (saṃghāta) form.¹
Hence all rūpa is characterised by rūpana.

The fallacy in this assumption is pointed out by the Kośakāra. He says that a saṃghāta (aggregate) is not different from its constituents (dravya-paramāṇus). Hence it cannot have the quality of rūpana which is lacking in these constituents. Thus either one abandons the rūpana-lakshana of matter or accepts the sāvayavavattva of the dravya-paramāṇu. The Kośakāra accepts the latter position and strives to disprove the theory of paramāṇus.²

It may be noted that these arguments of the Kośakāra are identical with the arguments put forward by the Vijñānavādin Vasubandhu in his Vimśikā-bhāṣya. There also the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika is confronted with a similar question on the relation between the paramāṇus

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1. [na vai paramāṇu-rūpam ekaṃ prithag-bhūtam asti] ti. [ekaṃ] ti grahaṇam dravya-paramāṇu-sandarśanārtham. [prithag-bhūtam] asaṃghātam ity arthah. tad idrig nāsti. saṃghātastham nityam bhavati.... saṃghātashtam tad rūpyata eveti... tad dravya-paramāṇu-rūpam saṃghātastham rūpyate.... pratihanyate.... Ibid.
 2. ayam chāparo doṣah. [na cha paramāṇubhyo'nye saṃghātāḥ] yathā Vaibhāṣikāḥ kalpayanti. [ta eva te] saṃghātāḥ [paramāṇavaḥ sprishyante. yathā rūpyanta iti]. saṃghātā eva naika ity arthah. [yādi cha paramāṇor] iti vistarah. paramāṇu-aparinishpattiṃ vaktu-kāmaḥ Achārya vichārayati.... ..na niravayavaḥ paramāṇuḥ. dig-bhāga-bhedavattvāt. māsa-rāśi² eva iti. tad etad dig-bhāga-bheda² vattvaṃ nechchhanti Vaibhāṣikāḥ. dig-bhāga-bhedo hi saṃghāta-rūpāṇām eva kalpyate. Sakv. p. 85.

and their aggregates (saṃghāta).¹

The Vaibhāshika fails to solve this riddle and maintains, in his usual dogmatic manner, that it is in the nature of the things (dharmatā), that the dravya-paramāṇus are devoid of parts, yet always exist in an aggregate form, and thus are capable of rūpaṇa.

In conformity with this Vaibhāshika theory, the Dīpakāra points out the omission by the Kośakāra. He says ' The Kośakāra (who has defined only a saṃghāta-paramāṇu) ought to have pointed out the other rūpa (i.e. dravya-paramāṇu) which is not an aggregate (saṃghāta). For, if there is no such (non-aggregate) rūpa, then there is not any aggregate (saṃghāta) (possible). Therefore, it is proved that the sarva-sūkshma is (a dravya), which is a paramāṇu of matter'.²

His own definition of the (dravya) paramāṇu is as follows:

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1. yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṁ dravyam na sidhyati. katham na sidhyati ? yasmāt
shatkena yugapad yogat paramāṇoh shad aṁśatā /
shannām samāna-deśitvāt pīṇḍāḥ syād anu-mātrakah //
...naiva hi paramāṇavah saṃyujyante, nirāvayavatvāt. mā bhūd esha
dosha-prasaṅgah saṃhatās tu parasparam saṃyujyante iti Kāśmīra-
-Vaibhāshikāḥ. ta idaṁ prasṭavyāḥ. yāḥ paramāṇūnām saṃghāto na sa
tebhyo'rthāntaram iti.
Paramāṇor asaṃyoge tat saṃghāto'sti kasya sah /
na chānavayavatvena tat saṃyogo no sidhyati //
Vimśikā-bhāshya, kā. 12-13.
 2. Kośakāras tv āha - 'sarva-sūkshmo rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramāṇuḥ' iti. tena saṃghāta-vyatiriktaṁ rūpam anyad vaktavyam. yadi nāsti saṃghāto'pi nāsti. atāḥ siddham sarva-sūkshmaṁ rūpa-paramāṇuḥ' iti. Adv. p. 65. Perhaps there is a need to add 'dravyam' after sarva-sūkshmaṁ in the above passage.

" A (dravya)paramāṇu is a final division of that aggregate (i.e. saṃghāta) which is a substratum of the resisting Matter. It is known as the 'most subtle'. (In the kāma-loka) it abides in a state of invariable association with four mahābhūtas and three upādāya (derived) rūpas, or with three mahābhūtas and four upādāya rūpas (as the case may be)".¹

This definition of the (dravya) paramāṇu agrees with the one given by the orthodox Vaibhāshika Saṃghabhadra (as quoted by Poussin) : " Among the rūpas susceptible of resistance, the most subtle part which cannot be split further is called paramāṇu; that is to say, the paramāṇu cannot be divided into several by another rūpa, by thought. That is what is said to be the smallest rūpa as it has no parts, it is given the name of 'smallest'. In the same way as a kṣapa is called the smallest time and cannot be divided into half kṣapas".²

The Kośakāra, in this context, examines the so-called dravya-paramāṇus of the Vaibhāshika. A saṃghāta-paramāṇu consists of at least eight dravyas. Of these four are the mahābhūtas and four derived elements, viz. rūpa, gandha, rasa and sprashtavya. But even the four derived elements are, according to the Vaibhāshika, each made up of four mahābhūtas. Thus a saṃghāta-paramāṇu (of eight) really consists of twenty dravyas. The Kośakāra here points out that the original number of eight is, therefore, wrong. The Vaibhāshika says that of these the four

1. sarva-sūkṣmah khalu rūpa-saṃskāropādāna-saṃchaya-bheda-paryantaḥ paramāṇur iti prajñāpyate. sa tu sapta-dravyāvinirbhāgī chaturbhir bhūtais tribhiḥ chopādāya-rūpais tribhis tribhir vā bhūtais chaturbhiḥ chopādāya-rūpair avinirbhāgavarty asāv aṣṭama iti. Adv. p. 65.

2. Vide Adv. p. 65, n. 4.

mahābhūtas are real dravya (dravyameva dravyam) as they are substratum of the four derived elements, which are to be called āyatana-dravya.

The four mahābhūtas have a distinct nature (jāti) of their own, such as solidity, etc. They remain the same whether they support one or the other kind of the derived matter. They are, therefore, dravyas in a real sense. The derived matter is called āyatana-dravya, as it is the basis of recognisable things as pot, cloth, etc. The Kośakāra dismisses the whole theory by saying " Why use the word dravya in two different ways ? Words give way to whim but we must examine the meaning".¹

The Dīpakāra takes note of this hostile criticism of the Kośakāra. He repeats the same reply of the Vaibhāshika and says that the Kośakāra misses the whole point on account of his ignorance of the intention² behind calling one dravya-paramāṇu dravya and another āyatana.

3. VITARKA AND VICHĀRA.

The next controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra is about the simultaneous co-operation of two opposite dharmas in a single moment of consciousness.

We have seen above a predominant tendency of the Abhidharma Piṭaka towards a minute analysis of the mind and mental concomitants, (chaitta). The latter consists of three skandhas, viz. vedanā, saṃjñā, and saṃskāra. Of these the last is more complex as it covers a vast field of several constituents of consciousness recognised as ultimate real

1. Vide Adv. p. 66, n. 2.

2. Vide Adv. p. 66.

elements by all Abhidharmika schools. A major part of the Dhammasangani is devoted to an enumeration of saṃskāras that associate with each of the 89 kinds of consciousness. The first kāmāvacara-kusala-chitta, for instance, is said to be accompanied by not less than 54 regular and nine supplementary (yevāpanaka) saṃskāras. A large number of factors in such lists are synonyms. A factor called paññā, for instance, is variously enumerated as paññindriya, paññā-bala, sammāditthi, amoha, sampajañña and vipassanā. The commentators are not unaware of the overlapping character of these factors. The Atthasālinī puts into the mouth of a critic the comment : ' It is a disconnected exposition, disorderly like booty carried away by thieves... it is done without an understanding of the matter'.¹ Although the Atthasālinī tries to justify this inflated list, the² neo-Theravādins like Buddhaghosa and Anuruddha brought the number of real saṃskāras to fifty by removing the repetitions and attributing several functions to a large number of factors. The groupings of these saṃskāras as universal (sabba-chitta-sādhāraṇa) and particular, etc., are also found only in the later works like the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaho. This³ division of saṃskāras in such groups not only necessitated detailed definitions of them but also an explanation of their relation to each other.

The Atthasālinī and the Visuddhimagga offer good definitions of

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1. "ettha apubbaṃ nāma natthi.... ananusandhikā kathā upptipātiyā charehi ābhata-bhaṇḍa-sadisā... ajānitvā kathitā'ti.... DhsA. III. 263.
 2. For a critical study of the classification of these factors, see Abhidhamma Studies by Bhikkhu Nyāpaponika.
 3. For a comparative study of these divisions in the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra schools, see McGovern's Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, Vol. I. pp. 137-162.

these dharmas but are rather laconic in dealing with their mutual relation. The latter task is more seriously taken up during the time of the Mahā-vibhāṣhā, and is carried further by the Kośakāra in his Bhāṣhya.

While dealing with a definition of upekshā (a factor belonging to vedanā skandha), the Kośakāra compares it with manaskāra (a factor of the saṃskāra-skandha) and raises an objection to the Vaibhāṣhika theory of the simultaneous co-operation of these two dharmas in a single moment of consciousness.

Manaskāra is defined as an 'effort' (ābhoga) of mind in bending itself towards the object. Upekshā is defined as a lack of effort¹ (anābhoga) which is the equanimity of mind. Since these two dharmas partake of two opposite natures, they cannot operate simultaneously, as for instance, sukha and dukkha. The Vaibhāṣhika replies that it is difficult to know the subtle differences of these dharmas. But the critical Kośakāra points to his subsequent examination of a similar problem regarding two (apparently) incompatible saṃskāras, viz. vitarka and vichāra, and says that the same² conclusion should be applied in the case of upekshā and manaskāra.

In the Pali suttas the term vitakka is often used to denote a certain pre-occupation of mind, a particular kind of thought, as for instance, kāma-vitakka, vyāpāda-vitakka, vihiṃsā-vitakka (sensual, malign and cruel thought) and their opposites: nekkhama, avyāpāda, and avihiṃsā vitakka. In this particular sense the vitakka is a synonym of micchhā-saṅkappa

1. See Adv. p. 70, n. 4.

2. Ibid. p. 72, n. 2.

('wrong thoughts or intentions) and sammā-saṅkappa (right thoughts or intentions). In the formulas of jhāna, the vitakka is often combined with vichāra, where they mean respectively the initial and the sustained¹ application of mind on the object. They are also said to provoke speech suggesting thereby that every speech is preceded by a certain examination² and judgment. In Atthasālinī these two terms are explained at great length. The vitakka is described as ūhana ('prescinding' of mind). It lifts the consciousness onto the object. By it the mind strikes at (āhanana) and around the object. Vichāra is the discursive work of the mind upon or traversing (anusañcharapa) of the object. Threshing out (or contemplation-anumajjana) of the object is its characteristic. In the Milindapañha, vitakka is called appanā ('application'). It is again called ākoṭana ('knocking') and compared with the initial stroke on a drum. The vichāra³ is compared to the after reverberation and continuous emission of sound. The commentators explain these two factors by the help of various similes. The vitakka is compared to the striking of a bell, the vichāra is compared to the consequent reverberation. The vitakka is again compared to the flapping of the wings of a bird about to fly up in the air and the vichāra is compared to the gliding movement of the wings of that bird in the sky. Or again the vitakka is like the thorn fixed in the middle in making a circle and vichāra is like the revolving thorn outside.⁴

From these explanations it is evident that the vitarka is an

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1. Vide Adv. p. 83, n. 1.
 2. See DhsA. III. 198-201.
 3. Milinda, p. 65.
 4. Dhs A. III. 200-1; Vm. IV. 88-92.

initial application of mind on the object and the vichāra is a subsequent sustained application. The former is said to possess 'vibration (vipphāravā) or a mental thrill and therefore called olārika (gross). The latter is of a calmer nature and hence called sūkshma.

Thus these two dharmas partake of two opposite characteristics, viz. audārika and sūkshma. Yet they are held, both in the Theravāda and the Vaibhāshika schools, to operate simultaneously in all kinds of kāmāvacara consciousness and also in the first rūpa-dhyāna.

The Vritti describes the vitarka as having the characteristic of grossness (audārya) of mind. It is a synonym for saṃkalpa. It contains a 'rudimentary synthesis' (vikalpa) of the differentiators of objects (vishaya-nimitta) that produce it. Its activity is stimulated by the wind of ideas. It is a cause of the manifestation of the five gross sense-cognitions. The vichāra is of the characteristic of subtlety (saukshmya) of mind. It is conducive to the manifestation of the mind-consciousness. Both these dharmas invariably operate in all kinds of

1. Adv. p. 81.

2. Cf. Pali saṅkappa = vitakka.

3. Vishaya-nimitta-prakāra-vikalpī. The term vikalpa in this passage refers to svabhāva-vikalpa. The Vaibhāshikas assume three kinds of vikalpas, viz. svabhāva, abhinirūpaṇa and anusmarāṇa. All these are present in the mano-vijñāna, but only the former is found in the five sense-cognitions. The Vaibhāshika holds that this svabhāva-vikalpa, i.e. a rudimentary synthesis, is inherent in all kinds of consciousness. The Kośakāra does not recognise the svabhāva-vikalpa, as according to him it is not different from vitarka: na svabhāva-vikalpo' nyo dharmo'stīti [svabhava-vikalpo vitarkah] Sakv.p.64. See Adv.p.19. notes, and The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 105. For a difference between the Vaibhāshika vikalpa and the term vikalpa used in Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu, see Stcherbatsky's Buddhist Logic, Vol.II.p.20, notes.

4. saṃjñā-pavanoddhata-vṛittih.

the kāmāvacara-consciousness.

Thus here too the vitarka and vichāra are described as sthūla and sūkshma respectively. The Kośakāra raises an objection to the Vaibhāshika theory of their simultaneous operation.

After quoting and criticising several views on this controversy from the Mahā-Vibhāshā, the Kośakāra explains the Sautrāntika view. According to the latter, the vitarka and vichāra are two different names given to gross and subtle states of saṃskāras that produce corresponding gross or subtle speech (vāksamutthāpaka), and therefore, cannot operate together. The Kośakāra, in consistency with this view, says that they do not operate simultaneously, but only alternatively, each to the exclusion of the other. As regards the scriptures which clearly speak of the first rūpa-dhyāna having both these factors, he maintains that here the two factors are to be taken to belong to the same plane (bhūmitaḥ) and not to the same moment (na kṣanataḥ). The first dhyāna appears now with vitarka and now with vichāra, but cannot have both aṅgas together.

The Dīpakāra reproduces this controversy from the Bhāṣhya, severely criticizes the Kośakāra for his heterodox theory, and puts forth the Vaibhāshika view-point. The Vaibhāshikas, he says, assert only the co-existence of the vitarka and vichāra in one moment of consciousness, and not their simultaneous activity. These dharmas are comparable to

1. Vide Adv. p. 82.

2. Ibid. p. 81, notes.

3. tayoḥ hi yathokta-lakṣhanayor ekasminś chetasi sadbhāva-mātram pratijñāyate, na yugapad vṛitty-udrekātā-lābhah. yathā vidyāvidyayor saṃśaya-nirṇayayoś cheti.... Adv. p. 83.

vidyā and avidyā or doubt and decision, which also co-exist but do not manifest together.

It may be noted that this view of the Dīpakāra is identical with the view of Saṃghabhadra, quoted and criticized by Yaśomitra. Saṃghabhadra too maintains that the vitarka and vichāra are associated with each thought, but do not reveal themselves by their action (udbhūta-vṛitti) at the same time. His examples are, however, different from that of the Dīpakāra. He compares these two dharmas with rāga and moha, which are¹ always co-existent but only one of them is active at one time.

Yaśomitra, who favours the view of the Kośakāra, finds² Saṃghabhadra's explanation unconvincing. He says that he too accepts the principle that a certain factor of an aggregate alone manifests itself in a given condition, and not the other. But this does not apply in the case of the vitarka and vichāra as their characteristics are not fully differentiated. The Vaibhāshika contention that they possess independent characteristics, viz. grossness and subtleness, is invalid, since these two do not establish any specific difference (jāti-bheda) but only a difference of degrees of a single factor. In short, the vitarka and vichāra are not two different dharmas but only different states of a single dharma.

From this controversy it appears that originally the Vaibhāshikas, like the Theravādins, held these two factors to be simultaneously active, but modified their view under the influence of the criticism of the

1. Vide Adv. p. 83, n. 3.

2. Ibid.

Kośakāra. The explanation given by Saṃghabhadra that they co-exist, but do not become active together is consistent with the doctrine of sarvāstivāda, according to which, all dharmas, irrespective of their mutual opposition, always remain in existence (sarvadā asti) but become active only under certain circumstances. Saṃghabhadra chooses two complementary factors like rāga and moha as his example. But from the Sarvāstivādin's point of view even vidyā and avidyā, or saṃśaya, and nirṇaya can 'co-exist'. These examples given by the Dīpakāra, therefore, show his conviction in the specific difference (jāti-bheda) between the vitarka and vichāra and his attempt to accommodate them in a single moment of consciousness, in the framework of the sarvāstivāda.

Further speculations on the nature of these two dharmas are recorded in the Asm. of Asanga, in the Pañcha-skandhaka¹ of Vasubandhu, and in Sthiramati's Bhāṣya on the Trīṃśikā² of Vasubandhu. These are almost identical with the views of the old Masters (pūrvāchārya) quoted by Yaśomitra: What is vitarka ? A mental murmur of enquiry (paryeshako manojalpaḥ), which rests on the support of volition (chetanā) or speculative knowledge (prajñā), according as it does not or does include deduction (abhyūha). It is the gross state of mind. What is vichāra ? A mental murmur of judgment (pratyavekshaka) which rests on the volition, etc. (as above). That is the subtleness of mind. Here the vitarka refers to the state of enquiry of mind and vichāra to the state of judgment. Sthiramati explains the terms sthūlatā and sūkshmatā:

1. See Sakv. p. 64.
2. Vide Adv. pp. 81-82.

Vitarka is sthūla as it seeks only the object (vastu-mātra-paryeshanā-kāratvāt). Vichāra is sūkshma as it knows that object as 'this is that'¹ (evam tad iti pūrvādhigata-nirūpanāt).

From this explanation we can conclude that the Yogāchāra and the Vijñānavādins accepted a specific difference between these two dharmas by attributing to them respectively the functions of enquiry and judgment which can appear only successively and not simultaneously.

4. CHITTA-VIPRAYUKTA-SAMSKARA.

After dealing with the vitarka and vichāra, the Kośakāra turns his polemic against a whole body of dharmas, grouped by the Vaibhāshikas under the name of chitta-viprayukta-samskāra.

In early Buddhism, samskāra is described by a solitary term, chetanā or volition. The samskāra skandha consists of six volitions corresponding to the six sense objects. But as the Abhidharmikas analysed the mental factors and differentiated their characteristics, they formulated long lists of dharmas which had to be accommodated in the traditional formula of the five skandhas. Instead of postulating new skandhas, they included these new dharmas in the samskāra skandha.

This addition of new dharmas in the group of chaitta is justified by showing a functional co-ordination (samprayoga) between them and the chitta. The A. saṅgaho speaks of three kinds of uniformities that exist between a chitta and 52 kinds of chetasikas (one vedanā, one saṁjñā,

1. Vide Adv. p. 81, notes.

and fifty saṃskāras¹). They arise and disappear in one time, have the same object and depend on the same base. The Vaibhāṣhikas also speak of five kinds of samatā (uniformity)². There is between the chitta and chaṭṭa uniformity as regards time, basis, objects, essential qualities and function.

Both the Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣhikas arrived at almost identical lists of these saṃskāras. The former enumerated 59, and the latter had 44 saṃskāras. In the formulation of these saṃskāras, the early Buddhists appear to have been influenced by the Yoga school, which also analysed various states of mind with reference to several chitta-bhūmis, samādhis, riddhis and dhyānas with their attendant yogāṅgas or the means of yoga³. In course of time, the Abhidharmikas, and particularly the Vaibhāṣhikas seem to have been much influenced by their contemporary realists like the Sāṃkhya, Vaisheshika, and Mīmāṃsaka schools.

Over a long period and particularly during the time of the Mahāvibhāṣhā, the Abhidharmikas were engaged in studying and criticising the doctrines of these rival schools. Aśvaghosha's poems reveal a profound study of the Sāṃkhya system. Vasumitra, a leading Vibhāṣhā-śāstrin is extolled by the Vṛitti as the one who refuted the theory of 25 tattvas (of the Sāṃkhya) and demolished the (Vaiśeshika) doctrine of the

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1. ekuppāda-nirodhā cha ekā lambana-vatthukā /
chetoyuttā dvipaññāsa dhammā chetasikā matā // A. sangaho, II. 1.
 2. Vide Adv. p. 85, n. 1.
 3. See Poussin's article ' Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali', MCB, V, 223 ff.

atomic structure of the cosmos. We learn from Paramārtha¹ "Life of Vasubandhu"² that a Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin defeated Buddhamitra, the teacher of Vasubandhu, in a debate, whereupon the latter composed the Paramārthasaptatikā in refutation of the Sāṃkhya. The Bhāṣhya³ as well⁴ as the Vṛitti contains several criticisms of the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika theories.

A result of these criticisms and counter-criticisms was the acceptance of not only new theories but also of new dharmas and novel terms in the Vaibhāṣika school. The doctrine of the sarvāstivāda bears a close resemblance to the satkāryavāda. The four traditional⁵ explanations of the sarvāstivāda can be treated as interpretations of the paripāṃavāda of the Sāṃkhya. The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika too played a great part in formulating the Vaibhāṣika theory of the dravya and saṃghāta paramāṇus. The seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika greatly influenced the Vaibhāṣika analysis of the nāma-rūpa and even their theory of dharma. On account of their fundamental thesis of anātmavāda (non-substantialism), the Buddhists did not recognise the Vaiśeṣika distinction of padārthas as dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (action), etc., but reduced all things to the status of dharmas, i.e. unique, momentary ultimate elements. It is, therefore, not surprising to

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1. sthavira-Vasumitraḥ pañcaviṃśati-tattva-nirāśi paramāṇu-saṃchaya-vādonmāthi cha... Adv. p. 260.
 2. T'oung Pao, Serie II, Vol. V, 269-96.
 3. Vide Adv. pp. 4, 31, 106, 149, 267, 268, 273, 416.
 4. Vide Adv. pp. 4, 9, 10, 113, 274, 416.
 5. Vide Adv. pp. 259-60.

find that the term dravya is conspicuous by its absence in the Pali suttas and even in the Abhidhamma. In the Vaibhāshika school, however, it almost replaces the Buddhist term dharma. Here all real dharmas are called dravya. Of the nine dravyas of the Vaiśeṣika, only five, viz. substances of earth, water, fire, air and mind have their corresponding dharmas in the Theravāda Buddhism. The ākāśa was recognised by them only as a kind of matter (ākāśa-dhātu = parichcheda-rūpa), and not as a mahābhūta. In the Vaibhāshika school the four mahābhūtas came to be regarded as dravya-paramāṇus, as indivisible as the atoms of the Vaiśeṣika. The ākāśadhātu of the Theravāda was raised here to the status of an asaṃskṛita dharma, and made a nitya-dravya as in the Vaiśeṣika school. Of the remaining three dravyas of the Vaiśeṣika, viz. kāla, dik and ātman, the first two were recognised by the Yogācāras as prajñapti dharmas. Thus with the sole exception of the ātman, all the Vaiśeṣika dravyas came to be recognised in the later Abhidharmika schools.

As in the case of the term dravya (substance), the term gūḥa¹ (quality) also is not found (in its technical sense) in the Theravāda canon. But one can detect an influence of the Vaiśeṣika theory of gūḥa and dravya in their enumeration of the derived matter (upādāya rūpa).

The Visuddhimagga enumerates the following 24 kinds of derived matter: chakkhu, sota, ghāṇa, jivhā, kāya; rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa;

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1. The word gūḥa occurs in the Pali scriptures only in the sense of a string, a cord or a strand (as in the case of pañcha kāmagūḥa). It is sometimes used to mean a virtue but never in its technical sense of a quality as in the Vaiśeṣika or the Jaina schools.

itthindriya, purisindriya, jīvitindriya; hadaya-vatthu; kāyaviññatti, vachivīññatti; ākāśadhātu; rūpassa lahutā, rūpassa mudutā, rūpassa kammaññatā; rūpassa upachayo, rūpassa santati, rūpassa jaratā, rūpassa anichchata¹, and kabalikāro mahāro.

According to the Theravādins, all these 24 upādāya rūpas are 'dhammas' and hence ought to be recognised as ultimate elements. But a large number of these can be treated rather as aspects, modes or qualities than as separate entities. This is borne out by the commentarial description of some of these dhammas and a distinction drawn between the nipphanna and anipphanna rūpa². Thus, for instance, the ākāśa-dhātu (element of space = vacuum) is called parichcheda-rūpa ('material quality of limitation'). The two viññattis (intimation by body and speech) together with the lahutā, mudutā and kammaññatā (lightness, pliancy and adaptability of matter) are called vikāra-rūpas, i.e. material qualities signifying special conditions. The upachaya, santati, jarā and anichchata (i.e. the integration, continuance, decay and impermanence of matter) are called lakkhana rūpa i.e. the characteristics of matter. These ten kinds of rūpa are called anipphanna in order to distinguish them from the remaining 14 rūpas (and the four mahābhūtas) which are called nipphanna-rūpa. Thus in the Aṭṭhakathās Buddhaghosa

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1. Of these only 23 are enumerated in the Dhammasaṅgani. The hadaya-vatthu is a later addition by the commentators. See DhsA. IV. 112.
 2. Also termed as parinipphanna and aparinipphanna in the DhsA. IV. 119.

explains the nipphanna rūpas as those which 'transcend limits, change and characteristics and which are to be seized in their intrinsic nature' (sabhāva)¹. The anipphannas are contrary thereto. The Visuddhimagga-Tīkā explains further that the nipphanna-rūpas have their own nature (svabhāva), whereas the anipphannas are devoid of them and are known only by relating them to the svabhāva-rūpas². The anipphanna rūpas are nowhere in the suttas enumerated as rūpa-dhammas. Their inclusion in the Abhidhamma suggests an influence of the Vaiśeṣika school. It is certain that the commentators knew the theory of guṇa. Buddhaghosa criticises a (Vaiśeṣika) theory according to which the rūpa and gandha³ are qualities of teja and prithivī, respectively. The words nipphanna-rūpa and anipphanna-rūpa do not occur in the canon. They are found only in the Aṭṭhakathās. It is, therefore, possible that the commentators introduced this division in order to separate the 'real'

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1. aṭṭhārasavidham rūpaṃ parichcheda-vikāra-lakkhaṇabhāvaṃ atikkamitvā sabhāveneva pariggahetabbato nipphannaṃ, sesaṃ tabbiparītātāya anipphannaṃ. Vm. XIV. 73.
These two terms are usually translated as 'predetermined and unpredetermined' (by kamma, chitta, utu or āhāra). See Compendium of Philosophy, p. 157, n. 6; Points of Controversy, p. 261, n6.
 2. sabhāvenevā ti rūpassa parichchedo, rūpassa vikāro, rūpassa upachayo ti ādinā aggahetvā attano sabhāveneva kakkhatattādinā āpāna paribhiṇṇa gahetabbato [nipphannaṃ] sesaṃ sabhāvena apariggahetabbato [anipphannaṃ] Vm T. pp. 457-8.
 3. kechi panettha, tejādīnaṃ guṇehi rūpādīhi anugahyabhāvato ti kāraṇaṃ vadanti..... Vm. XIV. 43.

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upādāya rūpas from 'qualities', which in the later Sautrāntika terms could be designated as mere prajñapti (nominal) dharmas.

A few of the so-called nipphanna rūpas can also be placed in the category of the anipphanna. The jīvitindriya, for instance, does not consist of a separate rūpa, but only a name given to the life of matter. The itthindriya and purisindriya, two 'material qualities of sex' can be treated as different aspects of the kāya.² The last nipphanna-rūpa, called kabalikāro āhāro (edible food) is also not a separate entity but only a name given to the material quality of nutrition.

Thus out of the 24 kinds of upādāya rūpas, only nine, viz. the five sense organs and four sense objects (The phoṭṭhabba - touch object - being included in the mahābhūtas) can be considered as dharmas having intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and, therefore real.³ As a matter of fact, these ten are identical with the ten of the eleven dharmas enumerated in both the Vaibhāshika and the Yogācāra lists of the rūpa-dharma.⁴

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1. This is further confirmed by the commentarial description of the nipphanna and anipphanna rūpas. The nipphanna-rūpas alone are called rūpa-rūpa, i.e. matter having the characteristic of ruppana :-
nipphannarūpaṃ panettha rūpa-rūpaṃ nāma..Vm. XIV. 77. yadettha....
nipphannaṃ ti vuttaṃ rūpaṃ, tadeva rūpa-lakkhana-yogato rūpaṃ-ruppanaṃ rūpaṃ, taṃ etassa atthi ti...yadi evaṃ ākāsadhātu-ādīnaṃ kathaṃ rūpabhāvo ti ? nipphanna-rūpassa parichchheda-vikāra-lakkhanabhāvato taggatikamevāti. Vm T. p. 460.
 2. The Vaibhāshikas include these two indriyas in the kāyendriya :-
kāyendriya-pradeśa eva hi kaśchit strī-purushendriyākhyam labhate...
Adv. p. 44.
 3. The Sautrāntikas go still further and enumerate only the four mahābhūtas and the four objects (rūpa, gandha, rasa and sprashtavya) as real rūpa-dharmas. See Ālambana-parīkṣā, Appendix D. p. 116.
 4. The Vaibhāshikas enumerate one more rūpa, viz. avijñāpati (unmanifested matter) which the Yogācāhārins include in their 11th category of rūpa, called dharma-dhātu-paryāpanna (matter included under dharmadhātu). For details, see Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 118 ff.

Although the Vaibhāshikas did not enumerate the 'qualities' of rūpa in the rūpa-dharma, they certainly knew some of them. They recognised, for instance, the four lakṣhaṇas, which were proclaimed in the sūtras as being universal characteristics of not only the rūpa but of all phenomenal elements. These were not enumerated as separate dharmas in the traditional formula of the five skandhas. If a large number of new chaitasikas could be added under the saṃskāra skandha, there was no reason why these four lakṣhaṇas could also not be accommodated under that heading, particularly when these were specifically called 'saṃskṛita-lakṣhaṇas' by the sūtra. But these lakṣhaṇas were not exclusively chaitasika, and could not, therefore, be treated as purely mental factors, in as much as they covered even the rūpa-skandha. The origin of a novel¹ category called the (rūpa-)chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra is perhaps to be traced to an attempt to include the lakṣhaṇas and such other aspects or qualities in the traditional formula of the pañca-skandha.

The term chitta-vippayutta (disconnected with thought) is known to the Dhammasaṅgani.² But there it refers only to the rūpa-skandha and nibbāna. It is not recognised as a separate category as in the³ Vaibhāshika school. The Kathāvatthu contains a controversy where the opponent holds that the pariyutthānas ('outbursts' of anuśayas) are chitta-vippayutta dhammas. Buddhaghosa attributes this view to the

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1. Yaśomitra explains this term fully. These dharmas are disassociated from the chitta but are more akin to it than to the rūpa-skandha. Hence they are included in the nāma-skandha. The term viprayukta is used for excluding the chaittas which are samprayukta. The term saṃskāra is used to exclude the asaṃskṛita dharmas. Thus the viprayukta saṃskāras are distinct from the rūpa, chitta, chaitta and asaṃskṛita dharmas. Vide Adv. p. 85, notes.
 2. sabbam cha rūpam, asaṃskṛitā cha dhātu, ime dhammā chitta-vippayuttā. Dhs. 1192.
 3. pariyutthānam chitta-vippayuttam ti kathā. Kv. XIV. 6. Vide Adv. p. 223, n. 7.

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Andhakas. In his commentary on another controversy on the anusayas, he says that the Andhakas, Uttarāpathakas, Mahāsāṅghikas and Sammitiyas hold that the anusayas are chitta-vippayutta. According to Yaśomitra, the Vātsīputriyas also maintained the same view. The jīvitindriya was also, according to Buddhaghosa, considered as a chitta-vippayutta dhamma by Pubba-seliyas and Sammitiyas. The Yogācāra school of Asanga not only accepted this new category but added several dharmas of its own under that heading. Thus the category of the chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra was not necessarily a Vaibhāṣika invention; it was known as early as the time of the Kathāvatthu and was accepted by several major and minor schools.

There is no unanimity among different schools regarding the number of saṃskāras that were enumerated under this category. The lists of only two schools, viz. the Vaibhāṣika and the Yogācāra, have come down to us. Of the former, two lists are known. The older one is given in the Asm. of Ghoshaka, and the later ones are given in the Bhāṣya and the Vritti. The Yogācāra list is found in the Asm. of Asanga.

Ghoshaka enumerates the following 17 saṃskāras:- (1) prāptiḥ (2) asaṃjñi-samāpattiḥ (3) nirodha-samāpattiḥ (4) asaṃjñi-āyatanam (5) jīvitendriyam (6) nikāya-sabhāgatā (7) sthāna-prāptiḥ (8) vastu-prāptiḥ (9) āyatana-prāptiḥ (10) jātiḥ (11) jarā (12) sthitiḥ (13) anityatā

1. Ibid.

2. See KvA. IX. 4, XI.1; XIV. 6. Vide Adv. pp. 223, n. 7.

3. Vātsīputriyanayena prāptir anusayah. Sakv. p. 442. Vide Adv. p. 220.

4. Vide Adv. p. 97, n.4.

(14) nāma-kāyah (15) padakāyah (16) vyafijana-kāyah (17) prithgjan¹t¹vam.

Asanga in his Asm. drops Nos. 7, 8 and 9 of the above list and adds the following nine, bringing his total to 23 :- (1) pravṛtit¹ih (2) pratiniyamah (3) yogah (4) javah (5) anukramah (6) kālah (7) deśah (8) saṁkhyā and (9) sāmagri.

The Kośa and the Dīpa closely follow the list of Ghoshaka. They enumerate only 13, dropping Nos. 2, 7, 8, 9 and 17 from his list, and adding one more item called aprāpti. The last 9 saṁskāras of the Yogāchāra list are omitted by them. Of these three, Ghoshaka's list is undoubtedly the oldest as he represents the period of the Mahā-vibhāṣā. The Yogāchārins seem to have modified his list by including Nos. 7, 8 and 9 in No. 1 = (prāpti). The Neo-Vaibhāshikas like the Kośakāra modified it still further by including No. 2 in No. 4. They replaced the prithagjanatva (No. 17) by their new dharma, viz. aprāpti, since the former is only an alābha (non obtainment) of āryamārga.

At least five items of these lists, viz. the four lakṣhaṇas and the jīvitendriya, have corresponding dharmas in the upādāya-rūpa of the Theravāda. But the Theravādins enumerated the lakṣhaṇas as 'qualities' devoid of saṁskṛita-lakṣhaṇas like the Vaiśeṣika guṇas which are aguṇavat. The Vaibhāshikas enumerated them as 'dravya', i.e. having intrinsic nature, abiding in the three times and causing the origination, subsistence, decay and extinction of all phenomenal existence. A logical conclusion of such a step was to postulate upa-lakṣhaṇas

1. Asm. p. 10.

2. upādādayo saṁkhata-lakkhaṇā nāma.. lakkhaṇam na saṁkhataṁ saṁkhataṁ na lakkhaṇam.... Vide Adv. p. 104, n. 2.

(secondary characteristics) like jāti-jāti, sthiti-sthiti etc. to these ¹lakshanas which was ridiculed by the Sautrāntikas as absurd and involving the fallacy of an infinite regress.

The same rule is applied in the case of the first two saṃskāras, viz. the prāpti and aprāpti. The former is a saṃskāra ('force') which controls the collection or obtainment of certain dharmas in a given santāna (stream of life), as for instance, in the case of an arhat there is a prāpti of aśaikṣa dharmas. The aprāpti is a 'force' which prevents this prāpti, as for instance, in the case of a prithagjana, there is a non-collection of the ārya-dharmas. As in the case of the lakshanas the Vaibhāṣika here postulates such additional dharmas as prāpti-prāpti and aprāpti-aprāpti for explaining the obtainment of the prāpti and the prevention of aprāpti, respectively, again exposing his theory to the fallacy of regress.

One can detect an influence of the Vaiśeṣika in this 'dravya-vāda' of the Vaibhāṣika. This influence is unmistakably seen in a few other saṃskāras of this list. The Vaiśeṣika category of sāmānya (generality), for instance, is unknown to the Pali canon. The Buddhists being pluralists, non-substantialists and vibhajya-vādins always tended to oppose the reality of sāmānya, as the latter was a stepping stone towards a unity, a substance or even to the theory of brahman of the Advaita school. Their formulas of the skandha, āyatana,

1. jāti-jāty ādayas teshāms te'shṭa-dharmaika-vṛittayah /
Ak. II. 46 ab.

dhātu, etc. were primarily aimed at removing false notions of unity¹ (ekatva-grāha). In the later works on Buddhist logic the sāmānya is unanimously described as a mere conceptual construction (vikalpa)² imposed on the discrete, unique and momentary dharmas, and hence unreal. But this sāmānya creeps up, in the Vaibhāshika category of the viprayukta, under the guise of sabhāgatā. Like the parā-sattā and the aparā-sattā of the Vaiśeṣhika, the Vaibhāshika, sabhāgatā is also divided into sattva-sabhāgatā (which is common to all beings - abhinna) and dharma-sabhāgatā (which is found in smaller groups like men, women, layman, monk, etc.)³

The Sautrāntika Kośakāra rightly observes that in recognising the sabhāgatā as a 'dravya', distinct from the skandha, āyatana or dhātu (which constitute a sattva or a dharma), the Vaibhāshika has only supported the Vaiśeṣhika category of sāmānya. The Vaibhāshika seeks to support his sabhāgatā by a sūtra passage where the word nikāya-sabhāga is mentioned, and asks for an explanation of the notion of generality. The Sautrāntika points out that the sūtra does not warrant any recognition of the sabhāgatā as a distinct dravya. The generality is only a notion⁴ (prajñapti) and not a real dharma. "And if all notions were to be treated as real", continues the Kośakāra, "why not assume distinct dharmas for the notions of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction,

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1. buddhyaikta-grāhaṃ nivartayanti, pinḍaikātma-grāhaṃ nivartayanti....
Adv. p. 6.
 2. See Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Chapter VI.
 3. Vide Adv. p. 89.
 4. Vide Adv. p. 90, n. 6.

remoteness, nearness, etc., which are treated as realities by the heretic schools ?" ¹ Indeed, the last nine viprayukta saṃskāras of the Yogāchāra list seem to represent these notions treated as reals in the Vaiśeṣhika school. Of these nine, the following six, viz. the pravṛitti, java, kāla, deśa, saṃkhyā and sāmagrī correspond respectively to the pravṛitti (a kind of prayatna), vega (a kind of saṃskāra), kāla (a dravya), dik (a dravya), saṃkhyā (a guṇa) and saṃyoga (a guṇa). The anukrama can be taken to correspond to the paratva and aparatva, two guṇas of the Vaiśeṣhika. The only two, viz. the pratiniyama (manifoldness) and yoga (conformity of ² hetu and phala) have no corresponding reals in the Vaiśeṣhika list.

The acceptance of these Vaiśeṣhika reals exclusively by the Yogāchāras did not, however, make them realists like the Vaibhāṣhika. Unlike the latter, they treated all viprayukta-saṃskāras as mere notions (prajñapti). And in the case of the last nine saṃskāras, which directly correspond to the Vaiśeṣhika padārthas, they interpreted them ³ merely as different names of the hetu-phala.

The Sautrāntikas also recognise these notions, but severely oppose the Vaibhāṣhikas for accepting them as dravya-dharmas or reals. They point out that the so-called viprayukta-saṃskāras have neither own nature (sva-bhāva), nor exclusive functions, nor are they preached in

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1. saṃkhyā-parimāṇa-prithaktva-saṃyoga-vibhāga-paratvāparatva-sattādayo'pi tīrthakara-parikalpitā abhyupagantavyā eka-dvi-mahad-anu-prithak-saṃyukta-viyukta-parāpara-sad-ādi-buddhi-siddhy artham. Akb. II. 46 ab. See LVPak. II. 46 ab, and Sakv. p. 180.
 2. hetuphala-nānātve pratiniyama iti prajñaptiḥ. hetuphalānurūpye yoga iti prajñaptiḥ. Asm. p. 11.
 3. e.g. kālaḥ katamah ? hetuphala-prabandha-pravṛittau kāla iti prajñaptiḥ. deśaḥ katamah ? ... daśasu dikshu hetuphala eva deśa iti prajñaptiḥ. Asm. p. 11.

the sūtras. The II kośasthāna of the Bhāshya¹ contains long and lively controversies between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāshika on the validity of each and every item of the viprayukta-saṃskāra. The Kośakāra examines the scriptures quoted by the Vaibhāshika, analyses their arguments, ridicules their dogmatic realism and finally accuses them of supporting the heretic schools.

A counter attack to this polemic of the Kośakāra has survived in our Vritti. The Dīpakāra indirectly refers to the Kośakāra as an infant,² ignorant of the Abhidharma and boldly declares that he will prove the³ sva-bhāvas of these saṃskāras, and will also quote sūtras in his favour. Unfortunately, a large number of folios containing these lively controversies are lost. Discussions on prāpti and aprāpti are entirely lost. The controversies on the nirodha-samāpatti are severely interrupted, since only a prima facie argument has survived which contains a view of the Kośakāra condemned as 'unbuddhistic' by the Vritti.⁴ The treatment of sabhāgatā and āsamjñika is almost identical with the Vaibhāshika explanations of these saṃskāras in the Bhāshya. The Vritti here borrows several passages from the latter. The Dīpakāra does not advance any new arguments but contents himself with a remark that the Kośakāra in comparing the sabhāgatā with the Vaiśeṣhika sāmānya has only made a futile attempt to see a similarity of the kind which we find obtaining between pāyasa⁵ (milk-porridge) and vāyasa (a crow).

1. LVPak. II. 35-48.

2. stanandhaya-buddhīnām abhidharma-paroksha-mati-vrittīnām... Adv. p. 86.

3. yad api Buddha-vachane na paṭhyanta iti. tatrāpi sārvaśāstrīyaṃ vachanam vyāharishyate. Ibid.

4. Vide Adv. p. 95.

5. Adv. p. 90.

The only important discussions available to us, therefore, are on the jīvitendriya, the four lakshanas and the last three saṃskāras called nāma-kāya, pada-kāya and vyāñjana-kāya. Even in the case of these topics, the Vaibhāṣika arguments of the Dīpakāra are not different from those given in the Bhāṣhya, which are well known through Poussin's L'Abhidharma-kośa and Stcherbatsky's The Central Conception of Buddhism. We, therefore, shall concentrate here only on certain aspects of these controversies which are found only in our Vritti.

5. JĪVITENDRIYA.

Although the term jīvita is known to the Pali suttas, the technical term jīvitindriya is mostly found in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. In the suttas the term āyu is more commonly used in the sense of a principle signifying life-duration. The Mahāvedalla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya contains a conversation between Mahākotṭhita and Sāriputta on the mutual relation of the mind and mental concomitants.. In this connection a question is asked on the basis of stability of the five indriyas. Sāriputta replies that their stability is on account of āyu. The latter, he says, depends on usmā (ūshmā- fire generated by karma). Since usmā is also a part of the body, the āyu and usmā are interdependent like the flame and the light of a lamp. The light is seen by the help of flame, the flame is seen on account of the light. As yet there is no indication

1. imāni kho āvuso pañc'indriyāni āyūṃ paṭichcha tiṭṭhantīti.... āyu usmaṃ paṭichcha tiṭṭhatīti... usmā āyūṃ paṭichcha tiṭṭhatīti. seyyathāpi..... achchim paṭichcha ābhā paññāyati, ābhaṃ paṭichcha achchi paññāyati.... Majjhima, I. p. 295.

here to show the place of āyu in the traditional formula of the five khandhas. Perhaps to elucidate this point a further question is raised whether the āyusāṅkhārās (constituents of life) are identical with feelings (i.e. vedanā). Sāriputta says that they are not identical, for, if they were, a person undergoing the trance called saṁnā-vedayita-nirodha¹ will not rise again from that trance. It may be recalled here that according to the Theravādins, the four nāma-skandhas always rise and disappear in one time. The nirodha (cessation) of vedanā and saṁnā would, therefore, automatically mean nirodha of all the four.

Consequently, if āyu is identical with any of them, it will also cease to be, resulting in the death of the yogin. Sāriputta further explains that when a person dies, three things abandon him, viz. the āyu, the usmā and the mind (viññāṇa). In the case of a person who has undergone the above samādhi² the āyu and usmā still exist. It appears from this passage that the sutta recognises āyu as a factor which stabilises the five indriyas, but does not include it in any of the nāma-khandhas. Its inclusion in the latter group would also go against the recognition of an existence called asaṁnā-bhava which consists of only the rūpa-khandha. Nor could it be included in the rūpa-khandha, for in the arūpa-loka, in the absence of any rūpa, its operation will be impossible. Various speculations regarding

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1. te cha āvuso āyusāṅkhārā abhaviṁsu te vedaniyā dhammā, na-y-idam saṁnā-vedayita-nirodham samāpannassa bhikkhuno vuṭṭhanam paññāyetha. Ibid.
 2. yadā kho āvuso imam kāyam tayo dhammā jahanti : āyu usmā cha viññāṇam, athāyam kāyo ujjhito avakkhitto seti yathā kaṭṭham achetanam ti..... yvāyam...mato...yo chāyam ...saṁnā-vedayita-nirodham samāpanno, imesam kim nānakaranam ti ? yvāyam mato... tassa... āyu parikkhīno, usmā vūpasantā... yvāyam... samāpanno tassa... āyu aparikkhīno, usmā avūpasantā... Ibid. p. 296. vide Adv. p. 98, n. 1.

its inclusion in the formula of the five skandhas can be traced to the above sutta and to the problems that arise on account of recognising these two existences, one wholly material and another wholly mental.

The Theravādins solved this problem by postulating two jīvitendriyas (i.e. āyu), one physical (rūpa) and another mental (arūpa). Their Abhidhamma includes the former in the upādāya-rūpas, and the latter in the saṁkhāra-khandha.¹ The beings of the asaṁjña-bhava and the arūpa-bhava live their life-span on account of these two dharmas, respectively. The beings of other existences possess both kinds of the jīvitendriya.

The Theravādin enumeration of āyu in the rūpa-khandha looks rather far-fetched. The sutta quoted above specifically raises the whole problem with reference to five indriyas, i.e. the five senses, and not matter in general. Death there spoken of refers not to a corpse but to a personality, i.e. a being led by his karma in different destinies (gati) or existences (nikāya-sabhāga) such as naraka (hell), tiryakcha (animal), preta (spirit), manushya (human) and deva (god). The āyuh thus was directly related to karma or chetanā and not the rūpa-skandha. This seems to be the main reason for a criticism of the rūpa-jīvitendriya by Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas recorded in the Kathāvatthu.² They held that the jīvitendriya was essentially an arūpa-dharma. But these schools, as well as the Vaibhāshikas were equally committed to the theories of the asaṁjña and arūpa-bhavas, and hence could not include the jīvitendriya in

1. katamaṁ taṁ rūpaṁ jīvitindriyaṁ ? yo tesāṁ rūpīnaṁ dhammānaṁ āyu ṭhiti... jīvitaṁ... Dhs. 635.

... yo tesāṁ arūpīnaṁ dhammānaṁ āyu, ṭhiti... jīvitaṁ. Ibid. 19.

2. Kv. VIII. 10. Vide Adv. p. 97, n. 4.

the nāma-skandha. They, therefore, included it in their viprayukta category, distinct from both the chitta and rūpa.

This conjecture is supported by the Vaibhāshika description of this dharma. The Vritti¹ defines it as a (cause of) subsistence (sthitī) of the vital fire (ūshmā) and mind (vijñāna). It is a basis for notions of different existences like human, animal, divine etc. on account of its nature of being a result of the past karma. The Abhidharma describes it as a force of life-duration in all the three existences (viz. the kāma, rūpa and arūpa worlds). The Vritti, in conformity with this Abhidharma says that there is no faculty other than the jīvita, which is born of karma, covers all the three worlds, exists uninterrupted from the moment of birth, and thus becomes a basis for the notions of a particular destiny. The Vritti further quotes a scripture: ' when the āyuh, the ūshmā and vijñāna abandon this body, then (a person) lies discarded like a piece of wood devoid of consciousness'.²

But if the āyuh were to be always associated with the ūshmā (matter) and vijñāna (mind), then it would not operate respectively in the arūpa-bhava and in the asaṃjñā-bhava. Therefore, the Vritti says that the āyuh in the kāmādhātu is always accompanied by the sense of touch, the ūshmā and vijñāna. It is not essential to have all the five senses for its operation. In the rūpa-dhātu which includes the asaṃjñā-bhava, the āyuh is always accompanied by the five senses, but not necessarily by mind.

1. Vide Adv. p. 97.

2. Adv. p. 98.

In the arūpa-dhātu it is accompanied only by vijñāna, with the exception of the nirodha-samāpatti (where even vijñāna is brought to a cessation).

The Sautrāntika objection to this theory (as contained in the ¹ Bhāshya) is that if a separate dharma like āyuh is necessary to sustain the ūshmā and vijñāna, then the āyuh itself will need to be sustained by another āyuh. The Vaibhāshika, in conformity with the above sutta says that the āyuh, ūshmā and vijñāna are interdependent. This gives rise to another problem as to which of these precedes the other two. The Vaibhāshika, therefore, says that karma produces and sustains the āyuh. The Sautrāntika rightly argues that the karma alone should be efficient to sustain both the ūshmā and vijñāna. There is no need to postulate a ² life-sustainer like āyuh. Moreover, the āyuh is a mere notion. Just as the destiny of an arrow and the time it will take to reach its destination are determined at the moment of its shooting, similarly the karmas of an individual, at the moment of a rebirth, fix the destiny (nikāya-sabhāga) and the duration of the santāna of the five skandhas. Therefore, concludes the Sautrāntika, the āyuh postulated by the Vaibhāshikas is merely ³ a notion and not a dharma separate from the santati.

The Dīpakāra does not take note of these arguments but asserts his position by saying that the jīvitendriya, being a basis of the notion ⁴ of a destiny, is a dravya, a real dharma. Otherwise, he says what could

1. LVPak. II. 45 ab.

2. na hi nāstīti brūmo na tu dravyāntaram. Vide Adv.p. 98, n. 3.

3. Ibid.

4. jīvitendriyam gati-prajñāpty-upādānam astīti dravyam. Adv. p. 98.

prevent the death of a person who undergoes the nirodha-samāpatti or the asaṃjñi-samāpatti ? Both are devoid of consciousness and hence require some real dharma which will be instrumental in the life-duration of these two states. That dharma is the jīvitendriya. These Vaibhāṣhika arguments are, however, unconvincing to the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, for whom both samāpattis are conscious (sachittika), and which, therefore, do not require¹ a separate dharma for sustaining the life-stream during that state.

Whether the āyuh was accepted as a dravya or as a mere prajñapti-dharma, both the Vaibhāṣhikas and the Sautrāntikas (together with the Theravādins) agreed that it was a vipāka, i.e. a result of some past karma. Being a vipāka, and being co-nascent with birth and coterminous with death, it functioned automatically, independent of any new karma. If a life-span (āyuh) was fixed it could neither be prolonged at will, nor could it be replaced by a new life-span to sustain the same santati. This unanimously accepted theory of āyuh, however, went against an equally well founded belief in the Buddha's power of prolonging his life-span for an indefinite period.

Various controversies relating this belief and its bearing on the theory of karma are preserved in the Pali commentaries, the Bhāṣhya and our Vritti. The Kośakāra deals in detail with this problem and² advances certain unorthodox solutions to this riddle. The Dīpakāra examines his arguments, declares them to be invalid and accuses the Kośakāra of entering the portals of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

1. Adv. p. 93. See LVPak. II. 44.

2. See LVPak. II. 10 a. Vide Adv. pp. 98-100. notes.

6. BUDDHA'S PROLONGATION OF LIFE.

An account of the last days of the Buddha is preserved to us in the Pali and Sanskrit versions of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra.¹ In both accounts it is said that the Buddha was eighty years old when he attained parinirvāṇa. It is also said that three months prior to his death, he was overcome by a severe illness which he bore with great composure. Immediately after his recovery, during his sojourn in Vaiśālī, in the Chāpāla shrine, he declared to his intimate attendant, "whosoever, Ananda, has developed, practised....² and ascended to the very heights of the four paths to riddhi,..... he, should he desire it, could remain in the same birth for an aeon (kalpa)³ or more than a kalpa (kappāvasesaṃ). Now the Tathāgata has thoroughly practised them and he could, therefore, should he desire it, live on yet⁴ for an aeon or for more than an aeon".

This was indeed a hint to Ananda that he should beg the Lord to remain during the aeon. But we are told that as the heart of Ananda was possessed by the Evil Māra, he did not beg the Lord to exercise this power. The Buddha then repeated his declaration twice in vain and asked Ananda to leave him alone. In the meantime, the Māra appeared and reminded the Lord that it was time for the latter to attain parinirvāṇa. The Buddha promised that after a period of three months he would pass away. After the

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1. For other traditions on this point, see Obermiller's History of Buddhism by Buxton, II, p. 70.
 2. Will (chanda), effort (vīrya), thought (chitta) and investigation (vīmaṃsā), each united to earnest thought. Vide Adv. p. 359.
 3. The Pali English Dictionary (PIS ed.) takes the word kappāvasesaṃ to mean '(for) the rest of the kappa'. But as Professor Edgerton has shown, this word probably means 'more than a kalpa'. See BHSD. p. 173.
 4. ākaṅkhamāno Ananda, tathāgato kappam vā tiṭṭheyya, kappāvasesaṃ vā. Dīgha, XVI, 3, 3. cf. ākaṅkshamānaḥ sa kalpam vā tiṣṭhet kalpāvaśeṣam vā. E. Waldschmidt : Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 204.

departure of the rejoicing Māra, it is said, the Buddha deliberately and¹ consciously rejected the rest of his natural term of life.

This account is given in identical terms in both the Pali and Sanskrit versions of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. The Sanskrit version has a few more points of interest. It is said there that before rejecting the āyuh-saṃskāra (the force of life-duration), the Lord thought that there were² only two persons, viz., Supriya the King of Gandharvas and Subhadra the³ parivrājaka, who would be taught by the Buddha himself at their attaining maturity of insight within a period of three months. Thinking thus, the Lord attained that kind of samādhi, by which he "created" the forces of jīvita (new prolonged life) and rejected the forces of āyu (the existing⁴ life-span).

The Sarvāstivādins, on the basis of this, hold that the life of three months was indeed an extension of life. He prolonged his life for only this short period: there was no purpose in prolonging it further, as the two new converts mentioned above would have become his⁵ disciples by that time. Further the Buddha did this to show his control over the forces of⁵ life and death.

This episode in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra became a centre of several controversies among the Buddhists. The Theravādins and the

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1. atha kho bhagavā Chāpāle chetiye sato sampajāno āyu-saṃkhāraṃ vossajji. Dīgha, XVI, 3, 9.
 2. There is no mention of Supriya in the Pali version.
 3. Both versions contain an identical account of the conversion of this parivrājaka.
 4. yannv ahaṃ tadrūpān riddhyabhisāṃskārān abhisāṃskuryāṃ yathā samāhite chitte jīvita-saṃskārān adhiṣṭhāya āyuh-saṃskārān utsṛijeyam. Das Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, p.210 . Also see Divyāvadāna, p. 203.
 5. maraṇa-vaśitvā-jñāpanārtham... traīmāsyameva nordhvam...vineyakāryābhāvat Sakv. p. 105.

Sarvāstivādins agreed on the various miraculous powers of the Buddha. The prolongation of the life-span was indeed a splendid miracle which they would have gladly conceded to him. But when the Atthakathā-kāras and the Vibhāṣhā-śāstrins set about explaining this sūtra-passage, they were confronted with the theory that the āyuh is a vipāka. The main question was how to account for the new life and how to reconcile it with the accepted theories of the laws of karma? If the phenomenon of life-prolongation is accepted, we have to account for a new 'force' of life (āyuh-saṃskāra). This, as suggested by the Buddha's declaration, is possible by assuming that the riddhi or the yogic potency produces such new āyu. Thus we find two kinds of life, the original one generated by karma and the other by yogic powers.

The Theravādins, despite the above mentioned declaration of the Buddha in their sūtra, did not accept the theory of generating a new life by yogic practices. Consequently, they were not able to reconcile the text with their accepted theories of karma. They retained the passage, but gave it an interpretation to suit these theories. According to them the 'kappa' in this passage never meant a mahākappa, i.e., an aeon, but an āyukappa, i.e., the duration of a man's life. Now the āyukappa is what people consider as the normal life-span of a human being. It is, as the Buddha himself said, (in a different context), "a hundred years, less or more".¹ Since the Buddha had reached the normal limit, he did live for a

1. ettha ca kappaṃ ti āyukappaṃ, tasmim tasmim kāle yaṃ manussānaṃ āyuppanānaṃ hoti taṃ paripuṇṇaṃ karonto tiṭṭheyya, kappāvasesaṃ ti: "appaṃ vā bhiyyo" ti vuttavassasatato atirekaṃ vā/ Dīgha A. Vol. II, p. 554.

kalpa. This indeed was a very poor explanation. The Theravādins were aware of the doctrinal difficulties involved in this belief. Indeed, in the Kathāvatthu, where for the first time we meet with this controversy, the Theravādin argues against the Mahāsāṅghika's claim that the Buddha could have lived for a mahākalpa. The main argument is whether the new life-span (āyuh), the new destiny (gati), the acquirement of a new individuality is a thing of magic potency.¹ This the Mahāsāṅghika cannot affirm, for he is committed to the theory that the āyuh is a karma-vipāka and not a result of magic potency.

Buddhaghosa, in his commentary on this controversy, maintains that the kappa here meant only āyukappa. He further explains that a person like Buddha, or any one having mastery over the riddhipādas, can avert any obstructions to life, whereas others are not capable of this. When, therefore, the Buddha claimed that he could live for a kappa, what he really meant was that he had powers to avert any premature death.²

We may note here that as yet there is no suggestion in the Pali works that the Buddha extended his life even for a short period of three months. It was a modified belief of the Sarvāstivādins. The Milindapañha accepts this Sarvāstivādin theory and maintains that the Buddha did extend his life for a period of three months and could have lived for a kalpa, if only he had any desire for the worldly life. While maintaining this,

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1. iddhibalena samannāgato kappam titttheyyā'ti ? āmantā. iddhimayiko so āyu, ... sā gati... so attabhāvaṇṇatīlabbho ti ? na hevaṃ vattabbe....
Kv. XI. 5.
 2. ko pañettha iddhimato vireso, nanu aniddhimā'pi āyukappam titttheyyā'ti ? ayam vireso, iddhimā hi... akālamaraṇam nivāretum sakkoti, aniddhimato etaṃ balam natthi. Kv. XI, 5. Vide Adv. p. 101, n. 1.

the author of the Milindapañha most inconsistently explains that the kappa¹ here means only āyukappa and not the mahākappa.

These explanations did not satisfy any one, least of all the Theravādins. In the commentary on the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, Buddhaghosa gives the view of one elder, Mahāsīvathera. This Thera maintained that the Buddha did mean to live for an aeon by the powers of his magic gift. But he did not live because the physical body is subject to the laws of old age and the Buddhas pass away without showing any severe effects of it. Moreover, all his chief disciples would have attained nirvāṇa by that time and the Buddha living to the end of the kalpa would have been left with a poor following of novices. Buddhaghosa dismisses this view without any comment and expressly states that according to the Atthakathās, the kappa² here means only the āyukappa and not the mahākappa.

These explanations of the Atthakathās do not seem to take notice of another Vinaya passage of the Theravādins. In the Chullavagga, in the section dealing with the first council held under the president³ship of Mahākassappa, Ananda is censured for his failure to request the Buddha to live for a kappa or kappāvasesa. Surely if kappa meant only an āyukappa, and if the power of the Buddha was only limited to avert any premature death, there was no point in censuring Ananda for his absentmindedness.

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1. 'kappāvasesaṃ vā' ti temāsaparichchhedo cha bhanito/ so cha pana kappo āyukappo vuchchati.... vijjati ca taṃ mahārāja iddhibalaṃ bhagavato... anattiko mahārāja bhagavā sabbabhavehi... Milindapañha, pp. 141-2.
 2. Mahāsīvatthero panāha: Buddhānaṃ atthāne gajjitāṃ nāma natthi... idaṃ bhaddakappameva tiṭṭheyya... evaṃ vutte'pi so pana: ruchchati, āyukappo ti idameva Atthakathāyaṃ niyāmitaṃ. Dīgha A.Vol.II, p. 554. vide Adv. p. 101, n. 1.
 3. The commentary on this section of the Chullavagga makes no reference to this point.

The Pali commentaries are silent on the manner in which the prolongation and the rejection of the āyuh is accomplished. This topic is fully discussed in the works of the Sarvāstivāda School. The Bhāṣya¹ gives several Vaibhāṣika views on this topic. According to the Vibhāṣā-śāstra, karma is of two kinds. One is known as āyur-vipāka-karma, i.e., the karma which at the moment of conception determines the life-span. The other kind is bhoga-vipāka-karma. This is a sum total of all past karmas, accumulated in the series of consciousness, which continuously yields its fruits (other than āyuh) during the phenomenal existence. A human arhat, having full mastery over the riddhipādas, can, by his strong resolution, transform the bhoga-vipāka karma into an āyur-vipāka-karma. This transformed karma then produces the new āyuh. If he wishes to reject his already established life-span (āyuh-saṃskāra), he transforms his āyur-vipāka-karma into the bhoga-vipāka.

This explanation is not satisfactory because at the time when the āyuh is rejected, the āyur-vipāka-karma is no longer potentially existent, for it has already yielded its fruit. Therefore, some āchāryas hold a different view. According to them, the karmas of the past birth, as yet unripe, are ripened and made to yield their fruit by the power of meditation. But the difficulty here is that in the case of an arhat, there is no possibility of any new potential āyur-vipāka-karma, since at the attainment of the arhatship, he has brought an end to all new births. In all these explanations we can see a sustained but unsuccessful attempt to

1. See LVPak, II. 10. Vide Adv. pp. 98-101, notes.

relate the new (i.e., the prolonged) āyuh to some form of karma.

Ghoshaka goes a step further. He holds that an altogether new body consisting of the material elements (mahābhūtāni) of the rūpāvachara world is produced by the yogic powers. This body is capable of living for a kalpa. One can see here a veiled reference to the nirmāṇa-kāya or the Assumed body of the Buddha. But it is not explained here how such a body can continue to exist when the original body would cease at the end of the āyuh.

The Kośakāra, after giving these views, gives his own. He says that such an arhat has such yogic potency that he can cut short or put aside the life-span cast by the past karma and produce a new life-span by the sole power of his meditation. Consequently, this new force of life-span¹ would be a result of samādhi and not of karma.

This view takes us back to the controversy raised in the Kathāvatthu. The view of the Kośakāra is identical with the Mahāsaṅghika view condemned by the Theravādins as contrary to the laws of karma.

The Dīpakāra does not go into the details of this whole controversy, but only notes this unorthodox view of the Kośakāra. The latter's view he says,² " does not conform to the Sūtras, nor is it to be seen in the Vinaya. Moreover, it goes against the law. Therefore, like the words of an ignorant person, this view deserves no consideration".

1. evaṃ tu bhavitavyaṃ.... pūrva-karmajaṃ cha sthitikālāvedhaṃ indriya-mahābhūtānāṃ vyāvartayanty apūrvaṃ cha samādhijam āvedham ākshipanti...

See Adv. p. 98, n. 4.

2. vide Adv. pp. 99-101.

"And how does it not correspond to the Sūtra or the Vinaya ?

It is said in the Sūtra: 'It is impossible that one might by strenuous effort or violence ripen what is unripe, or change the course of that which is already ripened'. It is said in the Vinaya also 'The three kinds of ¹ karmas, the result of which must be experienced (niyata-vedanīya), cannot be set aside even by gods'. In the Abhidharma too, boundless life-spans are not accepted. Thus on account of its departure from scriptures, the Kośakāra's view does not merit any consideration".

"Moreover, if the Lord, by the powers of meditation could at will produce a new personality endowed with consciousness and living organs, or by his yogic powers could cast a new life-span which was not fixed by his past karmas, then indeed, the Buddha is made here a Nārāyaṇa, on account of creating a new being. Moreover, he may never attain the parinirvāṇa, such is his compassion. He might as well remain alive to resolve all doubtful points that divide his dispensation. Therefore, this view deserves no consideration, as the Kośakāra here has begun entering the portals of the Vaitulika-śāstra ! "

This criticism is very significant. It reaffirms the doctrines of karma and āyuh, and rejects the Buddha's power over these universal laws. It anticipates the development of the avatāra-vāda in the Mahāyāna Buddhism and reasserts the Hīnayāna theory of the human Buddha. By referring to the Vaitulika-śāstra it also points to the Mahāyānistic origins of the belief in the Buddha's power of prolonging his life-span.

1. vide Adv. p. 141.

By the term Vaitulika, the Dīpakāra may be referring to a school known by that name or the Mahāyāna in general. In a subsequent place, he identifies the Vaitulika with the Vaināśika.¹ The Vaitulikas are known to have professed a 'Docetic' heresy that the Buddha did not live in the world of mankind but visited this world only in a shape specially created.² This view of the super-human Buddha was also shared by the Lokottaravādins, a branch of the Mahāsāṃghikas. We have already seen that the Kathāvatthu attributes the belief in the Buddha's power of prolonging the life-span to the Mahāsāṃghika. The Mahāvastu, a Vinaya text of the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṃghika, specifically states that the Buddhas are not subject to the effects of old age. Nor are they subject to the laws of karma.³ The following verse seems to refer to the belief in the Buddha's power of life prolongation and yet his passing away as a human being:

prabhūścha karma vārayitum karmam deśayanti cha jinā/
aiśvaryaṃ vinigūhanti eśhā lokānuvartanā//⁴

The Pali commentators and the Vibhāṣhā-śāstrins had precisely to account for the laws of karma which even the Buddhas could not escape. Hence their feeble argument that the Buddha wished to pass away while his body was still unaffected by old age. The Lokottaravādins placed the Buddha above the laws of karma and thus paved the way for the Mahāyānistic doctrine of a Transcendent Buddha.

1. vide Adv. p. 258.

2. Kv. XVIII. 1.

3. Mahāvastu, I, p. 169.

4. 'Although they could suppress the working of karma, the conquerors let it become manifest and conceal their sovereign power. This is mere conformity with the world.' (Trans. by J.J. Jones, The Mahāvastu, Vol.I, p.133).

Once the supremacy of the Buddha over the laws of karma was accepted, there remained no great difficulty in assuming a limitless life for the Buddha. The Sukhāvatī-vyūha opens with a similar and this time a far bolder declaration of the Buddha.¹ "Should he desire, O Ananda, the Buddha can live on a single morsel for one kalpa, or even a hundred, a thousand ... or even millions of kalpas, or even beyond that and still his faculties will not diminish, nor will his complexion show any decay." The Sukhāvatīvyūha was indeed devoted solely to the glorification of the Buddha of immeasurable life.

If the phenomena of life-prolongation was a Vaitulika theory, and, therefore, unacceptable to the Dīpakāra, how do we account for its occurrence in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra? Unfortunately, the Dīpakāra is silent on this point. He neither refers to the sūtra, nor gives any alternative interpretations as are found in the Pali Aṭṭhakathās. Most probably he dealt with this topic on an earlier occasion, while dealing with a topic "kati indriyāṇi vipākaḥ" (where the Kośakāra also treats this controversy) which, however, is lost to us.² Considering his usual affiliations to the orthodox Vaibhāshika views we may hazard a conjecture that the Dīpakāra favoured one or other of the views of the Vibhāshā-śāstrins collected in the Mahā-vibhāshā and quoted in the Bhāshya.

1. Akāṁkshann ānanda, Tathāgata eka-piṇḍa-pātena kalpaṁ vā tiṣṭhet, kalpaśataṁ vā ... tato vottari tiṣṭhet, na cha Tathāgatasyendriyāṇy upaśyeyur na mukhavarṇasyānyathātvaṁ bhaven nāpi chhavivarṇa upahanyeta. Sukhāvatīvyūha, (Anecdota oxoniensia, Aryan Series, vol.I, part 2) 1883, p.4.

2. vide Adv. p.52, n.4.

7. SAMSKRITA-LAKSHANAS.

The next four viprayukta-saṃskāras viz. jāti (origination), sthiti (subsistence), jarā (decay) and anityatā (extinction), are called saṃskṛita-lakṣhaṇas or phenomenalisng characteristics of all phenomena. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, these four simultaneously exercise their power on all phenomena causing the origination, etc. of the latter. They further maintain that these four lakṣhaṇas are as real as the dharmas which they characterise. Consequently, they are also characterised by secondary characteristics (upa-lakṣhaṇas) like jāti-jāti, etc. They seek to prove the reality of these four lakṣhaṇas by the support of a sūtra which says " of the saṃskṛita there is known the origin (utpāda),¹ cessation (vyaya) and change of state (sthityanyathātva).

The Sautrāntika Kośakāra examines these lakṣhaṇas at great length. His main arguments against their acceptance as real dharmas, distinct from the phenomena, are : 1) They cannot simultaneously work upon a momentary (kṣaṇika) dharma; 2) The theory of upa-lakṣhaṇas results in the fallacy of regress; 3) The term saṃskṛita in the sūtra quoted by the Vaibhāṣikas does not refer to a momentary dharma but to a series of them (pravāha). The series or stream itself is called subsistence (sthiti), its origin is called jāti, its cessation is vyaya, and the difference in its preceding² and succeeding moments is called sthityanyathātva. Therefore, concludes

1. Vide Adv. p. 104, notes.

2. jātir ādih pravāhasya vyayach chhedah sthitis tu saḥ/
sthitynyathātvaṃ tasyaiva pūrvāpara-viśiṣṭatā // Vide Adv. p. 105, n. 2.

the Sautrāntika, the words like jāti etc, have no corresponding realities: they are only names, like the word pravāha (series). The saṃskṛita is defined by the Lord in a different sūtra: " Phenomenon is that which becomes having not been before, having once become it does not become again, and it is the series of which it forms a part which is called subsistence and which changes its state".¹

The Dīpakāra does not attempt a reply to these criticisms of the Kośakāra. He briefly deals with this topic concentrating only on two points, viz. the reality of jarā (decay) and vināśa (extinction).

The sūtra quoted by the Vaibhāshikas speaks of only three lakshanas, viz. utpāda, vyaya and sthityanyathātva. In their Abhidharma, however, four are enumerated : jāti, sthiti, jarā and anityatā. Of these the first and last are identical with utpāda and vyaya. The sūtra term sthityanyathātva is differently explained in different schools. The Theravādins interpret it as jarā.² They do not recognise the sthiti as a separate lakshana. Although it is represented in their upādāyarūpas as (rūpassa)santati, the Dhammasaṅgani as well as the Visuddhimagga treat the latter term as a synonym of jāti (i.e. upachaya).³

The Vaibhāshikas recognise both sthiti and jarā. They, therefore, interpret the term sthityanyathātva differently. The Bhāshya gives two views.⁴ Some āchāryas hold that the term sthityanyathātva means jarā

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1. "saṃskṛitaṃ nāma yaḍ abhūtvā bhavati, bhūtvā cha punar na bhavati, yaḍ chāśya sthiti-saṃjñakāḥ prabandhaḥ so 'nyathā chānyathā cha bhavati", iti kim atra dravyāntarair jātyādibhiḥ..... Ibid.
 2. uppādo ti jāti, vayo ti bhedo, sthitasā aṇiathattam nāma jarā. AngA.II p
 3. āchaya-lakkhaṇo rūpassa upachayo, ... pavatti-lakkhaṇā rūpassa santati,... ubhyampetaṃ jāti-rūpassevādhivachanaṃ.... Vm. XIV. 66. See Dhs. 643.
 4. vide Adv. p. 104, n. 3.

only and not sthiti. The sūtra is only explanatory, and hence speaks only of jāti, jarā and nāśa, whereas the Abhidharma is definitive and hence speaks of four. The sūtra does not refer to sthiti, because the Lord wanted to cause distress about the phenomena in the minds of his disciples. Moreover, sthiti (albeit not as a saṃskāra) is found even in the ~~asaṃsk~~saṃskṛita dharmas which are held to be eternal. In order to dispel any confusion between the saṃskṛita and asaṃskṛita, the sūtra speaks of only three. Other āchāryas, however, maintain that the term sthityanyathātva includes both sthiti and jarā. These two dharmas are like the goddesses of good luck and bad luck. The Lord combined jarā with sthiti in order to cause detachment from the phenomenal world.¹

This second view alone is given by the Dīpakāra. He maintains that if a dharma were to be devoid of sthiti (subsistence), then it would be incapable of yielding any fruit, i.e. performing any action. Consequently, it would not be a real dharma. But mere sthiti without jarā will also not be desirable. For in that case the dharma will go on performing more than one action and will never cease to be. Therefore, it is to be inferred that there is a force like jarā (decay) which reduces its strength (śakti-hāni) and hands it over to the last force, viz. anityatā, which brings an extinction of the dharma.

The Sautrāntika takes strong exception to this Vaibhāshika theory of śakti-hāni. He points out that the change of a subsisting dharma into a decaying dharma corresponds to the parināma-vāda of the Sāṃkhya, where²

1. vide Adv. p. 105, n. 1.

2. bhavatā Sāṃkhyiṇaḥ parināmo 'bhyupagato bhavati, Adv. p. 106.

also a substance (dharmin or dravya) changes its aspects or qualities (dharma) without losing its identity.

The reply of the Dīpakāra to this criticism is brief. He says that according to the Sāṃkhya, when that which is characterised (dharmin, i.e. a substance), while remaining permanent, gives up one characteristic (or aspect = dharma) and assumes another, both these characteristics being identical (svātmabhūta) with the characterised this is parināma. According to the Vaibhāshika, however, a characterised (dharmin, i.e. a dravya) is different from the characteristic (dharma), (in this case) ¹ jarā.

Although brief, this statement of the Dīpakāra is significant. His definition of the Sāṃkhya parināma corresponds to the one given by Vyāsa ² in his Yoga-sūtra-Bhāshya. Commenting on a sūtra dealing with three kinds of mutations (parināma) viz. dharma (of external aspects) lakshana (of time -variation), and avasthā (of intensity), Vyāsa defines a parināma in the following words : ' What is a mutation ? It is the rise of another external-aspect (dharma) in an abiding substance after an earlier ³ external-aspect has come to end'.

It may be noted that these two definitions of the Sāṃkhya parināma are almost identical, with the significant exception of the term svātmabhūta found only in the Vritti. The Dīpakāra uses this term to show that in the

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1. anya eva hi no jarākhyo dharmo anyas cha dharmi. Sāṃkhyasya tv avasthitasya dharminah svātmabhūtasya dharmāntarasyotsargah svātmabhūtasya chotpādah parināma iti. Adv. p. 106.
 2. etena bhūtendriyeshu dharma-lakshana-vyavasthā-parināmā vyākhyātāḥ. Yoga-sūtra, III. 13.
 3. atha ko'yaṁ parināmo 'vasthitasya dravyasya pūrva-dharma-nivṛittau dharmāntarotpattiḥ parināma iti. Yoga-bhāshya, III, 13.

Sāṃkhya theory the dharmas and the dharmin are identical. This idea is also clearly enunciated by Vyāsa. After declaring that the three-fold mutation is in reality one mutation, Vyāsa says " the external aspect¹ (dharma, etc.) is nothing more than the substance itself ".

Commenting on this, Vāchaspati Miśra says that the three-fold mutation is based on the distinction between the substance and the external-aspects (dharma) etc. But as referring to the lack of distinction between them it is said that in the strict sense the external-aspects² (dharma etc.) are nothing more than the substance (dharmin) itself. From this it is evident that the Sāṃkhya recognises the identity as well as difference between the dharma and dharmin. Vyāsa further examines an objection of an opponent who like the Dīpakāra, alleges absolute identity between the dharma and dharmin. Vāchaspati Miśra refers³ to this opponent as a Buddhist. The latter have always maintained that the satkāryavāda results in the identity of cause and effect and⁴ consequently in the denial of any action or change. The Dīpakāra here represents this Buddhist thought.

The parallel development of almost identical speculations regarding the nature of a substance and its change in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga

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1. paramārthatas tv eka eva parināmo dharmi-svarūpa-mātro hi dharmah...Ibid.
 2. so 'yam evaṃvidho bhūten-driya-parināmo dharmino dharma-lakṣhanāvasthanām bhedam āśritya veditavyah. abhedam āśrity āha. [paramārthatas tv iti] tu śabdo bheḍa-pakṣhād viśinashti pāramāthikatvamasya jñāpyte... Tattva-Vaiśārādī, III. 13. (*See Pātañjalasūtrāni, Bombay Sanskrit Series XLVI).
 3. nanu dharminām dharmānām abhinnatve dharmino 'dhvanām cha bheḍe dharmino 'nanyatvena dharmanāpiha dharmivad bhavitavyam ity ata āha...ekānta-vādinām Bauddham utthāpayati. Ibid.
 4. See The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 133-4, 168 ff.

and the Vaibhāshika schools have already been noted by many scholars,
notably Poussin¹ and Stherbatsky². The Sāṃkhya admits one everlasting reality (dravya) along with its momentary manifestations. The Vaibhāshika admits reality of several distinct elements (dravya) potentially existing in past as well as future, but manifesting only in their efficiency moments, i.e. the present. The four traditional Vaibhāshika explanations on the relation between a substance and its manifestations given by Dharmatrāta, Ghoshaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva³ have all been incorporated and harmonised by Vyāsa in his Yoga-Bhāshya. The reality of the past and future is also proved in almost identical words in both the schools. Both admit that the mutations are not occasional, but perpetual. But whereas the Sāṃkhya holds it as the very nature of the substance to undergo these mutations, the Vaibhāshikas hold that there are external forces like the saṃskṛita lakṣaṇas, which bring about a mutation in the substance.⁴ The statement of the Dīpakāra that the Vaibhāshika dharma (jarā) is distinct from the dharmin (i.e. a saṃskṛita dharma), and hence his position is different from the Sāṃkhya, confirms Stcherbatsky's observation that "when accused of drifting into Sāṃkhya, the Sarvāstivādins justified themselves by pointing to these momentary forces, which saved the Buddhist principle of detached entities."⁵

'Sarvāstivāda'

1./ MCB. V. (1936-37), p. 90, notes.

2. The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 27, 47 notes.

3. See III. 13 and 15.

4. guṇa-svābhāvyam tu pravṛttikāraṇam uktam guṇānam iti. Ibid. III. 13.

5. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 45.

The Dīpakāra's use of such terms as dharmin and dharma respectively for a (saṃskṛita) dharma and (saṃskṛita) lakṣhaṇa is also equally significant. It confirms our earlier hypothesis that the category of the viprayukta-saṃskāras was designed to accommodate 'qualities' or guṇas that qualified the substances (dravyas), i.e. non-viprayukta-dharmas. Had they been treated only as 'qualities' and, therefore, as mere names given to different aspects of a real dharma, the Sautrāntikas would have admitted them as prajñapti-dharma. The Vaibhāshikas, however, did not stop only at enumerating different 'qualities', but proceeded to make them reals and ended in treating them as dravyas or substances.

The contention of the Dīpakāra that without a reduction of its strength (śakti-hāni) caused by jarā, a dharma will not be affected by vināśa (destruction) leads to another Vaibhāshika theory that vināśa of a dharma is caused (sahetuka) and not inherent in it.

The Kośakāra deals with this topic in detail while explaining¹ the momentary nature of all phenomena. The Sautrāntika maintains that destruction is not caused. It is an inherent nature of a phenomena to perish the moment it flashes into existence. It does not depend on any external agency to bring about its destruction. For, if a dharma were not to perish immediately and spontaneously after its birth, it might never perish, even afterwards. The Vaibhāshika contention that it perishes on account of becoming different (anyathābhūta) by the loss of its power

1. LVPak, IV. 2 d; 3a. For full details and other references on this controversy see MCB, V. pp. 148-158. (1936-37).

(śakti-hāni) is wrong. For it is a contradiction to say that (a momentary thing) becomes different. A thing cannot be itself and yet appear different from itself. Therefore, destruction is uncaused. Moreover, vināśa is merely an absence (abhāva). An absence is not a reality, and being unreal it has no function to perform.

The Dīpakāra points out that this Sautrāntika position is not supported either by scriptures or by reason: Destruction of a thing is caused, because it depends on the origination of that thing. It conforms to the law that 'being this, this becomes'. If it were to operate without a cause, it will always exist, and consequently there will be no origination of any dharma.

Nor is destruction a mere non-existence. For, the Vaibhāshikas do not say that a substance is destroyed. It is only the efficiency (kāritra) of a substance that is destroyed by vināśa. 'What we call destruction', says the Dīpakāra, ' is the non-arising of a (new) activity (in a substance) when its efficiency is confronted by an opposite condition. ¹ Therefore, vināśa does not mean merely a non-existence (of a substance). Moreover, existence and non-existence are contingent upon each other. Denial of one means denial of another. If destruction is to be treated as uncaused, origination too will have to be treated similarly. The reasons for holding the origination as caused also obtain in the case of destruction. Hence vināśa is sahetuka. After advancing these arguments the Dīpakāra quotes the scriptures that support the

1. kāritra-mātra-nāśāch cha. viruddha-pratyaya-sānnidhye kriyā-mātram no[de]ti, naśyati. Adv. p. 108.

Vaibhāshika view: The Lord has said " one must strive hard to destroy bad states that have arisen ". " Here a person becomes a killer of life". "There are three periodical dissolutions by which the world is destroyed".¹ Finally it is said " depending on birth, there arise decay and death".

It may be noted that these arguments of the Dīpakāra are almost identical with the traditional orthodox Vaibhāshika views of āchārya² Saṃghabhadra. The central problem of this controversy rests, perhaps, on the meaning of a kṣaṇa and the simultaneous operation of these four incompatible lakṣaṇas on a kṣaṇika dharma. For the Sautrāntika, a kṣaṇa means a moment. For the Vaibhāshika, however, it means that time which all the four functions, viz. origination, subsistence, decay and destruction take for their accomplishment.³ Thus a kṣaṇa of the Vaibhāshika corresponds to a chittakkṣaṇa (mind-moment) of the Theravādins, which is really not a kṣaṇa but a unit of three moments. The Dīpakāra does not fully discuss this problem, but from his other arguments on the reality of the lakṣaṇas, we can infer that he also subscribed to the same Vaibhāshika concept of kṣaṇa.

8. NĀMA-PADA- VYĀJANA-KĀYAS.

The viprayukta-saṃskāras that have been discussed above show a considerable influence of the Sāṃkhya-yoga and the Vaiśeṣika schools on

1. Adv. p. 108.

2. MCB.V. p. 149.

3. kṣaṇa-trayāvasthānāt (kṣaṇikatvaṃ bādhyata] iti. [esha eva hi naḥ kṣaṇa] iti [kārya-parisaṃāpti-lakṣaṇo] na tūtpatty-anāṃtara-vināśa-lakṣaṇa ity arthaḥ. Sakv. p. 178. See The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 41, notes and MCB. V. pp. 135-58.

the Vaibhāṣhikas. The last three viprayuktas, viz. nāma-kāya, paṇa-kāya and vyañjana-kāya, saṃskāras that impart significance to words, sentences and letters respectively, show in their formulation a certain influence of the Mīmāṃsaka school and the Pāṭaṇjali school of Grammar.

The Pali scriptures make only incidental references to the problem of words and their meanings. The Kathāvatthu records no controversy on this theme. No Buddhist work prior to the Bhāṣhya takes any serious note of this problem. Indeed, the Bhāṣhya alone can be named as our earliest source for knowing the Buddhist theory of words. It ^{seems} ~~looks~~ probable that the Buddhists made their entry in this field under the influence of their contemporary Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas, who had developed their theories of eternal words and of sphoṭa.

For the Mīmāṃsakas, the problem of words and meanings was of primary importance, as all their metaphysical and ritual speculations were based on the doctrine of the validity of the Vedas. They, therefore, developed the doctrine of eternal words and their natural (autpattika) meanings. As in the case of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Vaibhāṣhika theories of words and their meanings can also be traced primarily to their speculations on the nature of the words of Buddha.

This can be seen from a controversy between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣhika on the inclusion of the words of the Buddha in the formula of the five skandhas. As a matter of fact, both these schools agreed that the words (which consisted of sounds - śabda) were made up of sound-atoms (śabda-paramāṇu) reposing on the eight dravya-paramāṇus.

It was, therefore, only logical to treat all sounds (vāk) (and therefore all words) as material, and hence include them in the rūpa-skandha. Contrary to this Sautrāntika position, the Vaibhāshikas maintained that the words of the Buddha are not of the nature of vāk (verbal sound) but are of the nature of nāma (non-material). The Vritti quotes a scripture on this controversy : " While the Lord lived, his words are of the nature of speech (vāk) as well as of the nature of nāma respectively in a secondary and primary sense. After his ~~parinirvāṇa~~^{parinirvāṇa}, however, his words are only of the nature of nāma and not of vāk. For, the Lord of the sages had a 'heavenly sound'nd ~~in~~^{to}comparable ~~with~~^{to} any mundane speech".¹

Commenting on this controversy Yaśomitra says that according to the Sautrāntikas, the Buddha-vachana is of the nature of vocal expression (vāg vijñapti) and hence is included in the rūpa-skandha. Those who maintain the category of the viprayukta-saṃskāras, include the Buddha-vachana in the saṃskāra-skandha. The Ābhidharmikas, however, accept both these² views.

In elaboration of his last statement that the Ābhidharmikas accept both views, Yaśomitra quotes two passages from the Jñāna-prasthāna: "What is a Buddha-vachana ? The speech, speaking, talk, voice, utterance, range of speech, sound of speech, action of speech, vocal expression of the³ Tathāgata is Buddha-vachana". According to this view the Buddha-vachana

1. Adv. p. 11.

2. Sakv. p. 52. Vide Adv. p. 11, n. 2.

3. katamad Buddha-vachanam ? Tathāgatasya yā vāg vachanam vyāhāro gīr niruktir vāk-patho vāg-ghosho vāk-karma vāg-vijñaptiḥ. Sakv. p. 52.

is merely a vāk-vijñapti, i.e. verbal expression, which is identical with the 'vāchā' of the Theravādins, also defined in similar terms.¹

This view, Yaśomitra says, is immediately followed by another view (supporting the Vaibhāshika theory of nāma-pada-vyafijana-kāyas):
" What is this dharma called Buddha-vachana ? The arrangement in regular order, the establishment in regular order, the uniting in regular order of the nāma-kāya, pada-kāya and the vyafijana-kāya (is called Buddha-vachana)."²

This latter view is accepted by the Vaibhāshikas. This passage suggests that the Buddha-vachanas are not verbal sounds but some other non-material dharmas put into order.

Yaśomitra does not name the Abhidharmikas who accepted both these views. Apart from the Bhāshya (representing the Neo-Vaibhāshikas) the Aam. of Ghoshaka and the Asm. of Asanga (Yagāchāra school) also enumerate the nāma-pada-vyafijana-kāyas in their viprayukta category. But their definitions are different from those of the Vaibhāshikas. Ghoshaka defines nāma-kāya as meaningful letters, the pada-kāya as naming a thing by aggregate of padas and the vyafijana-kāya as collection of letters.³
Asanga's definitions of the first two samskāras are altogether different. He says that when the own-natures of dharmas are designated or named there

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1. yā.... vāchā girā byappatho udīranam ghoso ghosakammam vāchā vachībhedo, ayam vuchchati vāchā.... Dhs. 637.
 2. punas tatraivānantaram uktam Buddha-vachanam nāma ka esha dharmah ? nāma-kāya-pada-kāya-vyafijana-kāyānam yā anupūrva-rachanā anupūrva-sthāpanā anupūrva-samāyoga iti. Sakv. p. 52.
 3. sārthakāksharāni nāma-kāyah. pada-samuchchayena vastv abhidhānam padakāyah. vipulasamuchchāyah (= varnā-samāmnāyah) vyafijana-kāyah. Aam. p. 130.
(It may be noted that this text is reconstructed from the Chinese translation).

is a notion called nāma-kāya. When the peculiarities (or details) of dharmas are designated there is a notion called pada-kāya. Vyāñjana-kāya is a notion for letters which are the support for the nāma-kāya and the ¹ pada-kāya. The same definitions are given in Haribhadra's ² Aaa and the ³ Vijñapti-mātrata-siddhi of Hiuan-Tsang, suggesting that neither the Yogāchārins, nor the Vijñānavādins interpreted these terms in the sense in which they are understood in the Vaibhāshika school. By Ābhidharmikas, therefore, Yaśomitra, seems to refer to certain Vaibhāshikas like our Dīpakāra who favoured the view that while the Buddha lived, his vachanas are of the nature of nāma as well as of vāk (albeit in a secondary sense) but after his death, they are only of nāma-svabhāva.

The Kośakāra deals with these saṃskāras rather briefly, concentrating more on their refutation and less on their explanation. We may here summarise the Vaibhāshika position and the Sautrāntika refutation of this topic as contained in the ⁴ Bhāshya.

The Vaibhāshika maintains that verbal sound alone is not capable of conveying any meaning. A verbal sound (vāk) operates on the nāman, and the latter conveys the meaning. Thus it is the nāman which gives significance to a word, which is purely material. This nāman is a viprayukta saṃskāra. In support of this theory, the Vaibhāshika quotes ⁵ a scripture which says that ' a stanza rests on nāman. '

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1. dharmanām svabhāvādhivachane nāma-kāyā iti prajñaptih. dharmanām viśeshādhivachane pada-kāyā iti prajñaptih. tadubhayāśrayeshv akshareshu vyāñjana-kāyā iti prajñaptih. Asm. p. 11.
 2. See Aaa. p.495.
 3. Poussin's Tr. Vol. I. pp. 68-70.
 4. LVPak. II. 47. See Sakv. pp. 181-85.
 5. 'nāma-sannīritā gāthā'.

The Sautrāntika maintains that the nāma-kāyas do not play any part in conveying a meaning. It is true that all sounds or sounds alone (ghosha-mātra) do not convey a meaning. But verbal sounds (vāk) which are agreed upon by convention to mean a particular thing (kṛita-saṅketa) do convey their meanings. Since such a saṅketa is essential even in the assumption of the nāma-kāya, the latter is redundantⁿ and hence useless.

Moreover, the Vaibhāṣika theory that a nāman is operated on by verbal sounds (vāk) does not stand any scrutiny. For, if nāman is an entity, a real dharma, it can be^{neither} produced nor revealed bit by bit by the verbal sounds, which come into existence only in series. Nor can it be said that it is produced or revealed only by the last sound, for in that case it should be sufficient to hear only the last sound in order to understand its artha.

If in order to avoid this dilemma the Vaibhāṣika thinks that, after the manner of a viprayukta like jāti, the nāman is also born with its¹ object (artha-sahaja), then it would mean that there are no actual nāma-kāy conveying past or future objects, or the asaṁskṛita dharmas which are not born.

Moreover to admit an entity in itself, called nāman (a word) or pada (a sentence) is a wholly superfluous hypothesis. We might as well argue that there exists distinct from ants a thing called 'line of ants'. One can understand the letters (vyañjana) being considered as reals but it is absurd to treat their arrangements in an order like word or sentence

1. Compare with the Pali 'opapātika nāmapaṇṇatti' and the 'apauruṣheya nāma-kāyas ' described by the Dīpakāra. Vide infra, pp.197 and 208.

as reals.

As regards the scripture quoted by the Vaibhāshikas, the Sautrāntika points out that the 'nāman' there means words on which men have agreed that they mean a certain thing. It does not refer to any additional saṃskāra as is postulated by the Vaibhāshikas.

It is interesting to note that the scripture quoted by the Vaibhāshika also occurs in the Pali Sagātha-vagga of the Saṃyutta-nikāya. ^{This} ~~It~~ deals with the composition of gāthās. To a question as to what is the origin and foundation of a verse, the Buddha says that letters are their ¹ origin and nāmas are their foundation. Commenting on this, Buddhaghosa says that letters (akkharas) produce a pada, padas produce a gāthā, and ² the gāthā conveys a meaning. As regards the term nāma, he says that it means names, such as ocean, earth, etc., which are designations of certain ³ concepts. From this it is clear that for the Theravādins the nāma is not a saṃskāra. But Buddhaghosa's explanation ⁴ of nāma agrees with the Vaibhāshika definition : " nāma-paryāyaḥ saṃjñā-karaṇaṃ yathā ghaṭa iti".

The Vaibhāshika takes the term pada as a synonym of a sentence ⁵ (pada-paryāyo vākyam). This rather unusual meaning of the term pada can also be traced to Pali. In the suttas this term is often used in the sense

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1. chhando nidānaṃ gāthānaṃ akkharā tāsāṃ viyañjanaṃ /
nāma-saṇṇissitā gāthā kavi gāthānamāsayo ti // S. I. 38.
 2. 'viyañjanaṃ' ti jananaṃ. akkharāṃ hi padaṃ janeti, padaṃ gāthaṃ janeti,
gāthā atthaṃ pakāsetīti. SĀ. I. p. 94-5.
 3. nāma-saṇṇissitā ti samuddādi-paṇṇatti-nissitā. gāthā ārabhanto hi
samuddaṃ vā pathaviṃ vā yaṃ kiñchi nāmaṃ nissayitvā va ārabhati. Ibid.
 4. Adv. p. 109.
 5. Adv. p. 109.

of a sentence or a refrain of a verse or a line of a verse.¹ In the scripture quoted above dealing with gāthā, the term pada is not used. But the commentary says that 'akṣharāṃ padaṃ janeti'. Since nāma refers to a word, it is probable that by padaṃ here is understood a sentence (pāda) or a line of a gāthā. This seems to be the original meaning of the term pada in the expression 'pada-kāya'. But a line of a verse may not necessarily be a complete sentence. Perhaps to make it conform to the Grammarian's definition of a sentence that the Bhāṣhya defines the term pada as 'that by which meaning is complete',² and quotes a line (anityā vata saṃskārāḥ) of a verse as an illustration. The Vṛitti also calls pada a synonym of vākya and quotes further an Ābhidharmika view: "A pada (sentence) is a collection of significant words (pada) which fulfil the intended meaning".³

The Vaibhāṣhikas are not unaware of the fact that the term pada according to the Grammarians meant a word. In the Ābhidharmika view quoted above, pada is used side by side in both these meanings. Yaśomitra also quotes the Grammarian's definition "sup-tiṇ-antaṃ padaṃ".⁴ The Theravādins also know this meaning as is evident from such expressions as padaso (word by word), padattho (meaning of a word), etc. The term vyañjana

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1. e.g. ekena padena sabbo attho vutto. S.II. p. 36. - ekena padenā ti 'phassa-pachchayā dukkhaṃ' ti iminā ekena padena. S.A.I p. 57. Also see S.IV. p. 379.
 2. vākyaṃ padaṃ yāvatārtha-parisaṃāptih. Akb. II. 47 ab.
 3. "yāvadbhīr arthavadbhīh padair vivakṣhitārtha-paripūrīr bhavati tāvatāṃ saṃūhaṃ padaṃ" ity ābhidharmikāḥ. Adv. p. 109.
 4. Sakv. p. 182.

is also interpreted by the Theravādins as letters (akkhara) apparently including both the vowels and the consonants. Commenting on a sutta where vanna and byañjana occur together, Buddhaghosa says that these two terms are identical, and that the latter term could also mean only certain¹ varṇas, (i.e. consonants).

Thus it is clear that there was a pre-Vaibhāṣhika tradition for the use of the terms nāma, pada and vyañjana in the sense of word, sentence and letter, respectively. Stcherbatsky's observation, therefore, that this is " a case exhibiting clearly the desire to have a terminology of² one's own" overlooks the tradition noticed above.

Nor is this tradition limited only to a common use of these terms. One can even detect a certain correspondence between this Vaibhāṣhika saṃskāra called nāma-kāya and a Theravādin dharma called nāma-paṇṇatti, recognised more or less as an independent category by later Theravādins like Anuruddha.

The term paṇṇatti occurs several times in the Suttas, always referring to designations or concepts recognised as unreal in themselves, nevertheless used in common worldly parlance. In the Photṭhapāda-sutta, for instance, the Buddha while speaking on various speculations on the nature of self, says that a word like atta-paṭilābha, or expressions like past, present, future or milk, curds, butter, ghee etc. which he used in

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1. tattha aparimāṇā vannaṃ aparimāṇā byañjanā. S. V. p. 430. - aparimāṇā vannaṃ ti appamāṇāni akkharāni, byañjanā ti tesam yeva vevachanam: vaṇṇanam vā ekadeso.... S.A. III. p. 298.
 2. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 24, n. 1.

his discussion, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. The Tathāgata although makes use of these,¹ is not led astray by them (i.e. knows them as unreal).

The Suttas do not contain further elaborations on the theme of paññatti. But the Abhidhamma-piṭaka and the Aṭṭhakathās offer several important speculations on the nature, scope, origin and cognition of the paññatti, and treat it almost as a separate category like the nāma and rūpa. The Puggala-paññatti, for instance, is, as the name itself suggests, solely devoted to a description of various concepts arising about a central concept (paññatti) called a personality (puggala).

The Suttanta-mātikā contains three pairs (dukas)² dealing with dhammas respectively called adhvachana, nirutti and paññatti, and the dhammas that are made known by them. Defining a dhamma which is paññatti, the Dhammasangani says : " that which is an appellation, that which is a designation, an expression, a current term, a name, a denomination, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinctive mark, a phrasing on this or that dhamma is a dhamma called paññatti. All dhammas are capable of being expressed.³ The other two terms, viz. adhvachana and nirutti are described in identical terms.

Commenting on these dukas, the Aṭṭhasalini dwells at length on

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1. imā kho Chitta, loka-samaññā loka-niruttiyo loka-vohārā loka-paññattiyo, yāhi tathāgato voharati aparāmasaṃ ti. Dīgha. IX. 45-53. Vide Adv. p. 278, n. 2.
 2. Dhs. Mātikā, Nos. 128-130.
 3. yā tesāṃ tesāṃ dhammānaṃ saṅkhā samaññā paññatti vohāro nāmaṃ nāmakammaṃ nāmadheyyaṃ nirutti byañjanaṃ abhilāpo, ime dhammā paññatti. sabbe' va dhammā paññatti-pathā. Dhs. 1308.

one term, viz. the nāma[-paññatti]. Nāma (name) is fourfold: that given on a special occasion, that given in virtue of a personal quality, that given by parents and that which has spontaneously arisen (opapātika-nāma). Of these the last is more significant, as it points to a belief that certain names are eternal. " In those cases where a former concept tallies with a later concept, a former current term with a later one, e.g. the moon in a previous cycle is [what we now call] moon, this name is called¹ opapātika-nāma". It is suggested here that there are things which are not named by others, but name themselves, or are born with their names. The four (arūpa) khandhas are called nāma, because they make their own name² as they arise. When they arise their name also arises. No one names vedanā, saying ' Be thou called vedanā'. A vedanā, whether it is past, present or future, it is always called vedanā. This theory of the opapātika-nāma reminds us of the Vaibhāshika theory that the nāma-kāyas are artha-sahaja (born with meanings) and also corresponds, as will be seen³ below, to what the Dīpakāra calls ' apaurusheya nāma-kāyas' conveying such dharmas as the skandha, āyatana and dhātu.

Finally on the scope of this nāma-paññatti, the Atthasālinī says that this is a unique dharma which covers all dharmas, all dharmas come⁴ under its scope. The nāma-paññatti is applicable to dhammas of all the

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1. yā pana purima-paññatti apara paññattiyam patati, purima-vohāro pachchima-vohāro patati, seyyathidaṃ purima-kappe chando chando yeva nāma, etarahi chando yeva...idaṃ opapātika-nāmaṃ. DhsA.V. 113.
 2. chattāro tāva khandhā nāma-karanatthena nāmaṃ. vedanādayo hi...attano nāmaṃ karontā va uppajjanti. tesu uppannesu tesam nāmaṃ uppannameva hoti...vedanāya uppannāya 'tvam vedanā nāma hohi' ti nāma-gaḥana-kichcham natthi. atīte pi vedanā vedanā yeva,...anāgate pi, pachchuppanne pi..DhsA.V.115.
 3. Vide infra, p. 208.
 4. eka-dhammo sabba-dhammesu nipatati, sabbe dhammā ekadhammasmim nipatanti. katham? ayam hi nāma-paññatti eko dhammo, so sabbesu-chatu-bhūmikesu dhammesu nipatati. satto pi saṃkhāro pi nāmato mutteko nāma natthi. Dhs A. V. 114.

three spheres. There is no being, nor thing that may not be called by a name.

The paññatti discussed above refers only to the nāma-paññatti or names. There is another kind of paññatti, called attha-paññatti, which can be roughly translated as 'ideas' or 'concepts' or 'reflexes' (nimitta).¹ The Theravādins recognise several kinds of ideas. There are ideas such as 'land', 'mountain' and the like referring to certain physical changes in nature; or ideas like 'man', 'woman', 'individual', referring to the fivefold set of aggregates; there are ideas of locality, time and the like, derived from the revolutions of the moon, etc. These ideas are not real dharmas. Nevertheless, they become objects of knowledge. As Anuruddha says, "they shadow forth the meanings [of things] and become objects of thought genesis [as our ideas]".² This idea is designated as attha-paññatti. It is called paññatti, because it is made known (paññāpiyattā paññatti) by the nāma-paññatti.² The names (nāmas) are called nāma-paññatti, because they make the ideas known (paññāpanato paññatti).³ Thus the term paññatti includes both names and ideas.

Although its unreality was not lost sight of, the Theravādins on account of their recognition of the paññatti as an object of mind, had to show its place in the traditional formula of the five skandhas. They had

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1. See Puggala-paññatti-Atthakathā, where in the beginning, Buddhaghosa explains six paññattis occurring in the scriptures, six paññattis occurring only in the Atthakathās, and another twelve kinds of paññattis recognised in the tradition (āchariya-naya). Also see Abhidhammattha-saṅgaho VIII. 31-36 and Compendium of Philosophy, S.Z. Aung's Introduction, pp. 4-6; 35.
 2. paramatthato aviḍḍamāṇā pi attha-chchāyākārena chittuppadānaṃ ārammanabhūtaṃ taṃ upādāya upanidhāya kāraṇaṃ katvā tathā tathā parikappiyamāna.... paññāpiyatīti paññatti. nāma. A. saṅgaho. VIII. 33. See Compendium of Philosophy, p. 199.
 3. paññāpanato paññatti pana nāma-nāmakammādi-nāmena paridīpitā. A. saṅgaho, VIII. 34.

to classify it either as nāma or rūpa, saṃskṛita or asaṃskṛita, traikālika (belonging to three times) or kāla-vimukta (transcending the time). A few speculations on this problem are found in the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaho and its commentaries.

Anuruddha classifies all dhammas into three categories, viz., rūpa, nāma and paṇḍatti. Of these the first includes matter, the second includes chitta, chetasikas and nibbāna. The last includes names and ideas (i.e. nāma and attha-paṇḍatti¹). He describes paṇḍatti as a saṃkhata dhamma since it is also produced by a cause viz. by a certain worldly convention that a particular name refers to particular object (loka-saṅketa)². Nevertheless, it is unreal, and hence cannot be predicated as past, present or future. Therefore it is called kāl^{a-}vimutta.

After dealing with the nature of paṇḍatti, Anuruddha explains the thought process involved in its cognition leading to an understanding of the thing meant (attha)³. Following, i.e. making its object a vocal sound (vachī-ghosa) there arises a thought process called śrotra-vijñāna (auditory consciousness). In a subsequent thought process the verbal sound heard gives rise in mind (manodvāra) to a corresponding nāma-paṇḍatti. This is grasped in a subsequent process by a mind-consciousness

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1. iti tekālikā dhammā kālamuttā cha sambhavā /
ajjhataṃ cha bahiddhā cha saṃkhatāsaṃkhataṃ tathā /
paṇḍatti-nāma-rūpānaṃ vasena tividdhā thitā / A. saṅgaho. VIII. 31.
 2. sāyaṃ paṇḍatti viññeyyā loka-saṅketa-nimmitā Ibid. VIII. 36.
 3. vachī-ghosānusārena sota-viññāna-vīthiyā /
pavattānantaruppanna-manodvārassa gocharā //
atthā yassānusārena viññāyanti tato param //
sāyaṃ paṇḍatti viññeyyā loka-saṅketa-nimmitā // A. saṅgaho. VIII. 36.

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(mano-viññāna-vithi) which is already conversant with the saṅketa between this nāma-paññatti and the particular object it is conventionally taken to convey. When this mind consciousness thinks on this saṅketa there follows the cognition of the object i.e. the thing meant (attha).

The nāma-paññatti of the Theravādins offers several points of comparison with the nāma-kāya of the Vaibhāshikas. Both these dharmas are different from verbal sounds (vāk-śabda or vachī-ghosa). Both are dependent on the verbal-sounds for their origin. Both follow a verbal sound perceived by a hearer. Both serve the purpose of conveying a meaning (artha) by the help of saṅketa. The nāma-paññatti is enumerated as a separate category distinct from the nāma and rūpa. The nāma-kāyas also belong to the viprayuktas, different from the nāma and rūpa. But whereas the Theravādins recognise the nāma-paññatti as unreal and, therefore, a prajñapti-dharma, the Vaibhāshikas treat the nāma-kāyas as a real dravya-dharma.

Although the Theravādins hold that vachīghosa gives rise to a nāma-paññatti, they do not offer any explanation on the difficulties involved in this operation. Nor do they show any acquaintance with the controversies that took place on this problem between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāshika or between the sphoṭavādins and their opponents. The Sautrāntikas were certainly acquainted with certain aspects of these controversies as can be seen from the Kośakāra's arguments against the

1. nāma-chintanākārappavattassa manodvārikaviññāna-santānassa idamīdissassa atthassa nāmaṃ ti pubbe yeva gahita saṅketopaniṣsayassa.....
A. Vibhāvinitika, VIII. 36.

revelation of the nāman by series of vocal sounds - arguments which are not different from those of the Mīmāṃsakas and others against the theory of the ¹ revelation of sphoṭa by dhvani. But neither the Kośakāra nor his commentator Yaśomitra makes any reference to the Mīmāṃsakas or the sphoṭavādins. Both are content only with a brief refutation of the Vaibhāṣhika. The Dīpakāra's treatment of this topic is more comprehensive. He refutes the Sautrāntika position, makes pointed reference to the theories of (verbal) sounds held by the Mīmāṃsaka and Viśeṣhika, and briefly examines the sphoṭa theory of the Grammarians.

After briefly stating the Sautrāntika argument that the nāma-kāyas etc. are not different from the verbal sounds (vāk-śabda) and, therefore, are unreal, the Dīpakāra sets forth the Vaibhāṣhika theory of these saṃskāras. ² A verbal sound (vāk-śabda), he says, is synonymous with speech (vāk), utterance (gīḥ), and is, therefore, included in the rūpaskandha. The nāma-kāya, etc. are viprayukta saṃskāras, and hence included in the saṃskāra-skandha. The nāmakāyas etc. are dependent for their origin on the verbal sound and manifest the meaning which is dependent on the utterance (or the individual word-shape) and thus are representative of the thing meant (artha) as in the case of (the content) of a ³ knowledge. Just as the five sense cognitions are dependent on their corresponding five objects, similarly the nāmakāyas, etc. are dependent for

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1. See Śābara-bhāṣya, I. 1.5 and Śloka-vārtika, sphoṭavāda.
 2. Adv. pp. 108-113.
 3. Jñānavad arthasya pratidinidhi-sthānīyāh. Adv. p. 109.

their origin on the verbal sound. It is said, therefore, " A verbal sound (vāk) operates on the nāman, the nāman expresses the object (artha)".

Here the Sautrāntika raises the following objection : you say that along with the speech-sound the letters (like ka, cha, ṭa, ta, pa, etc.) are produced, by the speech the nāmakāyas are brought into operation. This being the case, the speech, following as it does each letter in turn, is subject to divisibility. Therefore, there can be no such thing as a nāma-kāya as a meaning conveyor (abhidhāna). (Since for this purpose a unitary entity is required).

The Dīpakāra rejects this argument saying that when the aggregate of the sound parts are perceived, there is a possibility of its (nāma-kāyas having the capacity of being a meaning-bearer. Moreover, its existence is evident from its activity. Its activity is conveying its meaning. It conveys its own meaning, since the relation between nāman, and meaning is not created by any person (apaurusheyatvāt).

The Sautrāntika here brings forward the theory of sanketa. He says that the nāman, etc. are not different from the verbal speech. The verbal sound alone acting itself (kṛitāvadhiḥ) as the factor which gives rise to the cognition of the object, conveys the meaning to the listener when its constituent parts are grasped as a unit by memory. Why, therefore, postulate these separate nāman, etc.

The Dīpakāra points out that the verbal sounds, being atomic are

1. vān nāmni pravartate, nāmārtham dyotayati. Ibid.

2. Adv. p. 110.

not capable of revealing the artha. A (verbal) sound being a collection of atoms can bring to light only those objects with which it has come into contact, like a lamp. Things which are not born or which are destroyed or are inaccessible (to senses, like heaven etc.) are not reached by sound. Naturally, therefore, a sound cannot convey these objects.

Moreover, the sounds cannot convey a meaning either serially or simultaneously. The stems of balwaja grass, for instance, which are individually incapable of being used in the action of dragging a piece of wood, become capable when they are put together and remain in the form of a rope. But the words of a sentence which consist of atoms of sound, and which come into existence in series, are merely conceptual unities (samudāya-saṁkṣhepāḥ) of the constituent parts which are received by the mind. They are, therefore, incapable each part individually (of conveying the meaning), nor do they convey it if taken together, since they cannot stand in unity like the balwaja grass. Thus it is proved that the sounds do not convey the meaning either serially or simultaneously.

Moreover, as in the case of a lamp, there is no relationship of revealed - revealer between the sounds and meanings, (artha). Thus people who wish to see a pot take a lamp which has the capacity of revealing a pot and other things as well; and there are no speech sounds which have the predetermined activity of revealing (or acting) on any meaning taken atrandum by some particular relationship.

Nor is this particular relationship viz. of revealed - revealer appropriate in the case of the thing meant and a sound. For, the sounds do not convey that which is not agreed upon by convention to mean a particular thing.

Even if we accept the theory of saṅketa obtaining between a sound and artha, such a sound is still subject to the argument of seriality. If it is said that the memory of each sound conveys the meaning, then also it is subject to the same fault. And if it is maintained that the trace¹ (saṃskāra) left by the sounds in the mind conveys the meaning, then also we deny it as it is not proved.

The Dīpakāra further elaborates the atomic nature of sounds. He says that sound (ghosha) cannot be a unity as it consists of several paramāṇus. It is accepted that the diphthongs e and ai are produced in the throat and palate. But it is not correct to say that a sound consisting of only one atom operates in two different places. But this is possible² in the case of aggregates of atoms. Even then the atoms cannot convey a meaning individually, for their individual existence cannot be proved. Nor can they do so in a collection (saṃghāta). For a saṃghāta does not exist in reality apart from its constituent parts.

After showing thus that verbal sounds alone cannot convey a meaning, the Dīpakāra sums up his position. " The correct form of exposition", he says, " is that the letters which are past with reference to the last³ letter are grasped by a (single) mental effort (mano-buddhi) and then

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1. saṃskāra iti chet... Adv. p. 111. This appears to be an allusion to the Mīmāṃsaka theory : 'pūrvavarṇa-janita-saṃskāra-sahito 'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakah iti. Śābara-bhāṣya, I. 1. 5.
 2. Adv. p. 111 (on kā. 145 ab). The Vritti here should be corrected as following: " edaitau kaṇṭha-tālavyaū " iti pratijñāyate. na chaika-syān-(nu-)vachanasya....etc.
 3. atīta-varṇa-samudāyastv antya-varṇāpekṣho mano-buddhyopagrihita-svarūpaḥ sambandhiṇy arthe buddhim utpādayan pratyāyayatīti yukta-rūpe vyapadeśaḥ. Adv. p. 112. It is curious to note that there is no reference to the nāmākāya in this statement. Read without the context this line would appear to conform to the Sautrāntika view. Probably the term 'buddhi' should here be understood as a concept i.e. nimitta, another name for the nāman (Vide infra, p.206 n.1.) which directs the mind towards the artha.

cause to arise the mental concept (buddhi) as directed towards the relevant meaning and thus (only in this fashion) convey the meaning".

As regards a common belief that a (verbal-) sound conveys a meaning, the Dīpakāra says that this belief does not correspond to facts. "In fact the speech (vāk) operates on the nāman, i.e. it expresses or speaks the nāma, i.e. it gives voice to it. The nāma brings to light the artha. Thus the speech passing over each letter in order, speaking or giving voice to the nāma and at the same time giving rise to (the perception of) its own form, but existing only in the form of series, is said to reveal the artha only by a process of metaphorical transfer. The meaning is not expressed or brought to light by the sound¹".

This exposition of the nāma-kāya offers several points of comparison with the sphoṭa theory of early Grammarians. Sphoṭa is defined as " the abiding word, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which is the conveyor of the meaning"². The nāma-kāya is also distinct from letters (i.e. sound), is revealed by them, and is claimed as the conveyor of meanings. The Vaibhāṣika argument that sounds on account of their seriality cannot convey a meaning, is identical with the argument of the sphoṭavādins against the Naiyāyikas who, like the Sautrāntika, maintained³ that verbal sounds (with the help of saṅketa) convey the artha. But whereas the sphoṭa is called a śabda and described as one and eternal, the

1. Ad. kā. 144. and Adv. p. 111.

2. varṇātirikto varṇābhivyaṅgyo 'rtha-pratyāyako nityaḥ śabdah sphoṭa iti tad vido vadanti. Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 300.

3. Ibid.

nāma-kāyas are nowhere designated as śabda and are declared to be many and non-eternal.

The Dīpakāra does not appear to be unaware of this similarity. As if anticipating an attack from the Sautrāntikas on this account, he raises¹ a question whether the nāma-kāya etc. are nitya or anitya. Such a question is indeed unnecessary, for the nāma-kāya is a saṃskāra, and consequently antiya. The question raised, therefore, suggests that a similarity between the sphoṭa and nāma-kāya was present to the mind of the Dīpakāra. He is, therefore, unduly emphatic when he says that the nāmakāyas are anitya,² as they depend for their function on such causes as ghosha (sound) etc.

Nor does he recognize the theory of sphoṭa. He examines a statement of Patañjali that sphoṭa (the unchanging substratum) is the word, the sound is merely an attribute of the word. ("sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvaniḥ³ śabda-guṇaḥ"). The Dīpakāra does not admit any difference between a substratum and an attribute, and, therefore, says that these two being identical, even the sound (dhvani) will become eternal. For him dhvani, śabda and sphoṭa are all synonyms like hasta, kara and pāṇi etc. The sphoṭa being thus identical with verbal sound is subject to the same fault⁴ of seriality and therefore incapable of conveying the artha.

1. It is precisely on this ground that Śāntarakṣita refutes the Vaibhāṣika theory of nāma-kāya; "yo'pi Vaibhāṣikah śabda-viśayaṃ nāmākhyam nimittākhyam cārtha-chihṇarūpaṃ viprayuktam saṃskāram ichchhati, tad apy etenaiva dūṣitam drashtavyam. tathā hi - tan nāmādi yadi kṣhanikam tadā anvayāyogaḥ, akṣhanikatve kramajñānānupapattih...Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā, kā. 908. See Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. 115.

2. Adv. p. 111.

3. Mahābhāṣya, I. 1. 70. (Kielhorn's ed. Vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-20).

4. Adv. p. 112.

He further confirms his rejection of the theory of sphoṭa by openly favouring a view, which Patañjali calls naive, that śabda is dhvani. Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya gives two views on the nature of a word (śabda): (i) A word is that by means of which, when uttered (yeno chchāritena), there arises an understanding of the thing meant, (ii) or a word is a sound¹ capable of conveying a meaning (pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ).² The expression 'yeno chchāritena' is traditionally held to refer to sphoṭa. The Dīpakāra does not refer to this view, but quotes the second view showing his preference for it. But this second view equally goes against his theory of nāma-kāya. He, therefore, says that the nāma etc. are different from the dhvani (i.e. from the śabda), (because) they are 'sarvārthavishaya'. The significance of this statement seems to be that whereas a sound refers to a particular thing, the nāmakāya as a saṃskāra is capable of conveying all meanings. Taken as a dharma, this expression corresponds to what the Theravādins called 'sabbe dhammā paññatti-pathā' or with the statement of the Atthasālinī that "ayaṃ hi nāma-paññatti eka-dhammo sabbesu chatubhūmika-dhammesu nipatati".

The sphoṭa theory referred to by the Dīpakāra shows his acquaintance only with the Pātañjala school of Grammar. He does not refer to the later developments of this theory as contained in the Vākyapadīya

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1. Mahābhāṣya, p. 1. (Keilhorn's ed. Vol. I).
 2. On the validity of this tradition, see J. Brough's article 'Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians' in the Transactions of the Philological Society, 1951, pp. 27-46.
 3. tasmāt pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ. tataś chānye nāmādayaḥ sarvārtha-vishayaḥ iti sthāpanā. Adv. p. 113.

of Bhartrihari. While dealing with the nature of sounds, he says that the Vaiyākaraṇas (together with the Mīmāṃsakas) do not recognize the atomic nature of sounds, and proceeds to show that the sounds are atomic, because they possess resistance. The Vākyapadiya refers to a view that some¹ consider words (śabda) as consisting of atoms. It is possible that the Dīpakāra was not aware of this view, or did not consider it an authoritative view of the Grammarians.

As seen above, the sphoṭavādins understand the term 'śabda' in the sense of sphoṭa and not in the ordinary sense of a sound. This śabda,² therefore, is not perceived by ears but only by mind. The Dīpakāra makes play with the ambiguity of this term and ridicules the Grammarians for maintaining a view that śabda (sound) is perceived by mind.

The Dīpakāra further gives some more details about the nāma-kāyas etc. The nāma-kāyas are two fold: Those which have a determined meaning, and those which do not (in themselves) mean any particular thing (yādṛichchhika). The former is again divided into two kinds: apaurusheya (not created by any person) and laukika (mundane). The nāmakāyas which convey the dhātu, āyatana and skandhas are apaurusheya. They are primarily perceived only by the Buddha. It is therefore said " the nāma-pada-vyavijana-³ kāyas appear when the tathāgatas appear (in the world)".

1. Vide Adv. p. 112, n. 2.

2. yad apy uchyate Vaiyākaraṇaiḥ 'śabdo buddhi-nirgrāhyah...' Adv. p. 113. Cf. śrotropalabdhir buddhinirgrāhyah prayogenābhijvalita ākaśadeśaḥ śabdah..... Vārttikā 12 on Śivasūtra 1. (Keilhorn's ed. Vol. I, p. 18, line 19).

3. "tathāgatānām utpādān nāma-pada-vyavijana-kāyānām utpādo bhavati". Adv. p. 113.

The laukika (worldly) nāma-kāyas are two fold: those which convey a particular thing, and those which are (yādṛichchhika). Of these, the apaurusheya as well as the niyata-laukika nāmakāyas convey only those meanings for which there exists a saṅketa.

The use of the term apaurusheya for the nāmakāyas which convey the Buddhist categories of dharma is significant. It reminds us of the opapātika nāma of the Theravādins and shows a direct influence of the Mīmāṃsaka. For the latter, the Vedas are apaurusheya and eternal. For the Vaibhāshika, the Buddha-vachanas (i.e. nāma-kāyas) are apaurusheya, but not eternal.

It appears from the above discussion that the Vaibhāshika theory of the nāma-kāyas was a continuation and a development of an earlier tradition represented in the form of nāma-pañnatti in the Pali Abhidharma and Atthakathās. As in the case of many other prajñapti-dharmas, the nāma-kāyas, etc., also came to be recognised by the Vaibhāshikas as dravya-dharmas, and thus found a place in the viprayukta category. The lack of speculation on the nature of the Buddha-vachana in the Pali tradition and its presence in the Vaibhāshika school suggests that this was a later development brought about by a certain influence of other schools, particularly the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaranas, who, although for different reasons, had a primary interest in the problem of words and their meanings. The Vaibhāshikas seem to have benefitted from the arguments of the early sphoṭavādin Grammarians. But the Mīmāṃsakas seem to have exercised a far greater influence on them as is evident from the use of such expressions as apaurusheya for denoting the Buddha-vachana.

9. PRĀTIMOKSHA-SAMVARA-TYĀGA.

The controversies discussed above occur in the first two Adhyāyas of the Dīpa, as they are related to an examination of the Vaibhāshika dharmas in general and the viprayukta-saṃskāras in particular. The third Adhyāya of Dīpa is almost entirely lost. The fourth adhyāya, dealing with karma, contains a major controversy on the Sautrāntika theory of bīja, and also a brief refutation of the Kośakāra's views on the nature of a pārājika ('defeated') bhikshu, and on manas-karma (mental action).

After dealing with the ways by which a person can obtain disciplines (samvara) leading to his ordination as a bhikshu (upasampadā according to the laws of Vinaya), the Kośakāra explains the causes that bring a fall of such a bhikshu from the prātimoksha-samvara.

Four causes are accepted by almost all schools: A declaration by a bhikshu, made according to the laws of Vinaya, that he is discarding the discipline (śikshā-nikshepana); his death; his change of sex; and annihilation of his roots of good (kuśala-mūla).¹

In addition to these four, the Sautrāntikas maintain that a bhikshu loses his prātimoksha-samvara when he commits one of the four cardinal transgressions called pataniyas² (Pali pārājika), and thus ceases

1. śikshā-nikshepana-nikāya-sabhāga-tyāga-ubhaya-vyafījanotpāda -kuśalamūla-samuchchhedebyah.... Adv. p. 132. See Sakv. p. 385.

The Dharmaguptas maintain that the samvaras are lost when the good law disappears from this world. The Vaibhāshikas and the Sautrāntikas do not agree with this view. Vide Adv. p. 134, n. 1.

2. Vide Adv. p. 132, n. 3.

to be a bhikshu.

The Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshikas do not accept this view. According to them such a 'defeated' person (pārājika) is still a bhikshu, because he has¹ transgressed only against a part of his whole discipline (kṛitsna¹saṁvara). When he fully observes his precepts, he is called śīlavān. When he breaks any part of it he is called duh-śīla. In both states he remains a bhikshu. A duh-śīla is restored to his former state by duly confessing his transgression before the saṁgha, just as a person in debt obtains his freedom on repaying the debt. In support of his argument the Vaibhāshika quotes a scripture which says : "Should a duhśīla bhikshu teach a nun, he commits² a saṁghāvaśesha (Pali saṁghādisesa) offence". The Vaibhāshika points out that the term ' duh-śīla' in this passage means a person who has committed a pārājika. How could he be said to have committed a saṁghāvaśesha if he were not a bhikshu ?

The Sautrāntika does not agree with this Vaibhāshika interpretation of the term duh-śīla. He points out another scripture where a pārājika is compared to a palmyra palm cut off at the crown, and thus is incapable of growing again. It is also said in the same passage that " a pārājika becomes a non-mendicant, ceases to be a son of a Śākya, and perishes from his

1. Ibid. note 4.

2. duh-śīlaś ched bhikshuhr bhikshunīm anuśāsti saṁghāvaśesham āpadyate... See Adv. p. 132, n. 4.

This rule does not occur in the Pali Pātimokkha. Instead, a minor (pāchittiya = expiation) rule is laid down that a monk, who, without the consent of the saṁgha, exhorts nuns is guilty of a pāchittiya; yo pana bhikkhu asammato bhikkhuniyo evadeyya, pāchittiyam. (No. 21). (Vin. IV. p. 51).

monkhood". The Sautrāntika rightly asks "which kind of monkhood perishes when one becomes a pārājika?"¹

The Vaibhāṣhika does not repudiate these scriptures, but says that a pārājika monk ceases to be a 'paramārtha-bhikṣu'² (i.e. a bhikṣu in the highest sense).

The Kośakāra examines the meaning of the term bhikṣu. The Vinaya, he says, enumerates five kinds of bhikṣus: (i) a bhikṣu who is not initiated, (ii) an immoral bhikṣu, (iii) a bhikṣu because he begs, (iv) a bhikṣu because he has brought an end to his passions (i.e. an arhat), (v) a bhikṣu on whom is conferred the upasampadā through a Vinaya procedure called jñapti-chaturthaka-karma.³ The Vinaya specifically states that with regard to the application of the codes of Vinaya, a bhikṣu is the one who is duly initiated.⁴ When, therefore, the Vinaya says that a monk perishes from his monkhood it means he loses his initiation; it could not mean he ceases to be a 'paramārtha-bhikṣu' (i.e. an arhat). For surely, a person could not perish from a state which he has not yet attained. The Kośakāra, therefore, accuses the Vaibhāṣhika of wilfully distorting the meaning of the scriptures to suit his theory.⁵

1. Vide Adv. p.133, n.5, cf. seyyathā'pi nāma tālo matthakachchhinno abhabbo puna virūhiyā, evameva bhikkhu ... assamaṇo hoti aśkyaputtiyo ... Vinaya, I, p.96.

The Atthakathā also supports the Sautrāntika interpretation:- 'na labhati bhikkhūhi saddhiṃ saṃvāsaṃ' ti uposatha-pavāraṇā-pātimokkhuḍḍesa-saṃghakamma-bhedam bhikkhūhi saddhiṃ saṃvāsaṃ na labhati ... Vinaya A p.516.

2. paramārtha-bhikṣhutvaṃ sandhāyātaṃ uktam. Vide Adv. p.133, n.5.

3. See Sakv. p.386.

4. cf. ayaṃ (ñattichatutthena upasampanno) imasmiṃ atthe adhippeto bhikkhū ti. Vinaya, I, p.243.

5. idam ati-sāhasaṃ vartate ... yat bhagavatā nitārtham punar anyathā niyate ... Vide Adv. p.133, n.5.

The Bhāshya does not fully explain the Vaibhāshika meaning of the term 'paramārtha-bhikshutva', or their interpretation of the scripture which says that a pārājika becomes a non-mendicant, ceases to be a son of a Śākya, etc.

The Dīpakāra gives an indication of the Vaibhāshika standpoint on this controversy. Unfortunately a large part of the text which contained this controversy is lost. Only a definition of a paramārtha-bhikshu and a reference to the Kośakāra's view have survived in the extant Dīpa. The Dīpakāra defines a paramārtha-bhikshu as the one who is endowed with śīla (i.e. saṃvara) as well as with right view-point (dṛiṣṭi). One who is endowed with only one of these, is a bhikshu only by convention (or in a subordinate sense - saṃvṛityā bhikshuḥ), one who is devoid of both is not a bhikshu at all.¹

As regards the scripture which says that a pārājika becomes a non-mendicant, etc., the Dīpakāra says that the scripture here should not be taken literally. The Lord uses these expressions to censure those disciples who indulge in bad conduct, and to ensure the stability of the Order.² He has used similar expressions with regard to those monks who are envious, crooked, etc. It is said "If a monk be envious, jealous, wicked, crooked, holder of a wrong view, comparable to a tree the inside of

1. dṛiṣṭi-sampad-viśuddhā khalu śīla-sampat 'bhikshutvaṃ paramārthataḥ'. anyatara-vikalas tu saṃvṛityā bhikshur bhavati. dvy-aṅga-vikalas tu nāpi saṃvṛityā nāpi paramārthata iti. Adv. p.123.

2. śāsana-sthity-arthaṃ durvṛitta-vineyā-vasādanārthaṃ. p.133. cf. saṅgha-sutṭhutaḥ ... dummaṅkūnaṃ puggalānaṃ niggaḥaya ... Vinaya, III.i, p.21.

which is rotten, such an evil bhikshu should be expelled".¹ It is well recognised that one is not expelled from the order for only entertaining such mental evils. The same rule also applies in the case of the above scripture which says that a pārājika ceases to be a monk. It should not be taken literally.

Whether judged by the laws of Vinaya or by practice (as prevalent in the Theravāda tradition), the Vaibhāshika contention that a pārājika bhikshu retains his monkhood is both illegal and unusual. The Vinaya passages quoted by the Sautrāntika are also found in identical words in the Theravāda canon. The Aṭṭhakathā interpretations of these scriptures, of the term bhikshu,² and of the simile of the palmyra palm also agree with the Sautrāntika standpoint. Even today, in the Singhalese saṅgha, a 'defeated' monk is treated as an outsider, after being duly expelled by the saṅgha through a Vinaya act called ukkhepaniya-kamma. The saṅgha has no authority, however, to disrobe such a monk; he may continue to live in the vihāras, but is not entitled to any rights or privileges, which only an initiated monk can enjoy. He is treated, more or less, as a theyya-saṁvāsaka (one who lives clandestinely with the bhikshus), and is never readmitted to the saṅgha. For all outward appearances, he may still remain a bhikshu, but in reality he has lost his bhikshuhood.

It is doubtful if the Vaibhāshika is claiming only such a nominal monkhood for a monk guilty of a pārājika offence. It appears from the

1. Vide Adv. p.133.

2. See Vinaya A, I, pp.239-243.

explanation of the Dīpakāra that a pārājika was not really treated as a non-ascetic, but only as an immoral monk, comparable to a person guilty of a saṃghāvaśeṣha offence. Thus according to the Vaibhāshikas, a pārājika monk, after duly confessing his guilt, can retain his bhikshuhood (i.e. upasampadā) in a legal Vinaya sense. Consequently, he does not forfeit the prātimoksha-saṃvara which he receives at the time of his upasampadā. This indeed is a grave departure from the traditional Vinaya laws accepted by both the Theravādin and the Sautrāntika schools.

The real controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra, therefore, seems to be on the effectiveness of a pārājika offence in bringing to an end the prātimoksha-saṃvara, quite independently of a voluntary disavowal of the latter by the offender (i.e. a monk guilty of a pārājika offence).

The prātimoksha-saṃvara, on undertaking of which a person becomes a bhikshu, is a kind of volition (chetanā) and, therefore, is called karma. This volition is made known by a vocal expression called samādhāna-vijñapti (expression of an assumption of moral duties). This expression lasts only a moment. But according to the Vaibhāshika, it produces a kind of a subtle matter called avijñapti¹ which remains in the santati of a bhikshu until it is destroyed by his death, or by the rise of an opposite vijñapti, called samādhāna-viruddha-vijñapti.

The latter is a result of a new volition by which a monk wants to discard his previously assumed prātimoksha-saṃvara. When this volition is

1. See Sakv. pp. 295, 30, 352. LVPK I. 11, IV. 3-5; E. Lamotte 'Le Traité de l'Acte de Vasubandhu Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa', MCB, IV, 1936, pp. 156 ff; pp. 222 ff.

duly expressed by a speech, in the presence of a competent authority, the bhikshu is said to have given up his discipline (śīkshā-nikshepapa) and consequently to have become a non-ascetic.¹ A bhikshu might commit a pārājika offence, and the saṃgha may expel him from the order. But as long as the offender does not voluntarily discard or renounce the prātimoksha-saṃvara, he would still be in a possession of it, and thus would retain his bhikshuhood.

The Vaibhāshika contention that even a pārājika bhikshu retains his prātimoksha-saṃvara is perhaps to be understood in some such manner. It may also be recalled that he recognises the 'śīkshā-nikshepapa' as a cause for the loss of the bhikshuhood. Our conjecture is strengthened by an argument of the Vaibhāshika given in the Bhāshya. He asks that if a pārājika is not a monk, why is he not readmitted to the saṃgha? The Vaibhāshika implies by this question that a readmission of a pārājika is unnecessary, because he has not lost his prātimoksha-saṃvara. The Kośakāra refutes this implication by saying that a pārājika ceases to be a bhikshu. He is not re-admitted because he is unfit for keeping the discipline, and not because of the causistry that he has not actually lost his bhikshuhood.²

The Theravādins also do not re-admit a pārājika to the order of monks. The Sutta-vibhanga gives two rules on this point. It is said

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1. [samādāna-viruddha-vijñāpty-utpādāt] iti. yāvajjivam prāpātipātādibhayaṃ prativiramamīti yat samādānam. tena viruddhāya vijñāpter utpādāt ... prātimoksha-saṃvara-tyāgaḥ. Sakv. p. 385.
 2. [kim na punah pravrajyate] anikshipta-śīksha ity adhyāhāryam. [tivrānapatrāpya-vipāditatvāt ... saṃvarasyābhavyatvam] tasmān na punah pravrajyata ity adhikāraḥ [na tu khalu bhikshu-bhāvāpekshayā] ... Sakv. p. 387.

there that a large number of Vajjiputtakas monks not having (previously) renounced their discipline (sikkham appachchakkhāya - cf. sikkhā-nikshepapa) indulged in sexual intercourse (i.e. were guilty of a pārājika offence). In course of time they approached Ananda with a request that they might be once more given the pabbajjā ordination and the upasampadā ordination, since they did not abuse the Buddha, dhamma or the saṅgha, but wished to live a holy life. The Buddha did not agree to this: "It is impossible that the Tathāgata should abolish the teaching on defeat (pārājika) ... because of the deeds of the Vajjiputtakas." He then laid down the following rules: "Monks, whatever monk should come, without having disavowed the training, ... and indulge in sexual intercourse, he should not receive the upasampadā ordination. But monks, if one comes, disavowing the training, yet indulging in sexual intercourse, he should receive the upasampadā ordination."¹

The discrimination made between these two kinds of persons is significant. The former is not only guilty of a sinful act but also is a grave offender against the laws of Vinaya. Hence he is considered unfit to live a holy life. The latter is a sinner, but not an offender, since he had voluntarily renounced his precepts, and hence is not a pārājika in the Vinaya law. He is re-admitted and may even obtain the upasampadā ordination. It is understood here that a pārājika has not need to renounce formally his submission to the Vinaya laws, as he will automatically and entirely perish from his prātimoksha-saṃvara at the time of his committing a pārājika offence.

1. yo pana bhikkhave bhikkhu sikkham appachchakkhāya dubblyam anāvikatvā methunam dhammam paṭisevati, so āgato na upasampādetabbo. yo cha kho sikkham appachchakkhāya ... so āgato upasampādetabbo. Vinaya, III, i, p.23.
See Vinaya A, I. p.230.

The Vaibhāshikas do not seem to agree with this view. They seem to consider the voluntary renunciation on the part of a pārājika as a necessary step leading to his loss of bhikshuhood.¹ Until he does that he may still possess a desire to live a holy life and may even be endowed with a right view (sad-dṛiṣṭi) which may entitle him to a nominal bhikshuhood, (saṃvṛiti-bhikshu-bhāva) as we can deduce from the explanation given by the Dīpakāra.

10. MANAS-KARMA

The next controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra is on the interpretation of a sūtra dealing with manas-karma (mental actions).

Three kinds of purely mental (evil) actions are spoken of in the sūtras. The Sañchetaniya-sūtra, for instance, says: "How are the three kinds of volitional acts committed through mind? Here ① monks, one becomes covetous (abhidhyālu), full of ill-will (vyāpanna-chitta) and holder of a wrong view (mithyā-dṛiṣṭi)."² According to this sūtra, the abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithya-dṛiṣṭi are purely mental acts. Since the Lord has said that karma is volition,³ the Dārshtāntikas maintain that these three being mental actions are identical with volitions (chetanā).

The Vaibhāshikas do not agree with this Dārshtāntika view. According

1. A change of sex or a complete annihilation of the roots of good (Kuśala-mūla-samucchheda - on account of holding a very grave mithyā-dṛiṣṭi) may be considered as exceptions to this rule. These are supposed to cut at the roots of the prātimoksha-saṃvara. The Sautrāntikas and the Theravādins place the pārājika offence on the same level as these two, but the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshikas seem to treat it as less severe than the Kuśala-mūla-samucchheda.

See 'Change of sex in Buddhist Literature' by P.V. Bapat in the Dr. S.K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume, Delhi, 1957, pp. 209-15.

2. Adv. p.148, n.5.

3. chetanā karma chetayitvā cha. Adv. p.118, n.3. See Karma-siddhiprakaraṇa (translated by Lamotte), MCB. IV, pp.256 ff. (1936).

to them the abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithyā-dṛiṣṭi are passions (kleśas) that produce an evil volition (karma), and not actions by themselves. They are not manas-karma (mental actions) but only mano-duścharita.¹ In the sūtra these three are identified with chetanā because the latter arises through them.

The Kośakāra, as usual, favours the Dārśhāntika viewpoint.² The Dīpakāra asserts the Vaibhāshika position without advancing any new arguments in his favour, and criticises the Kośakāra for favouring the Dārśhāntika interpretation of the Sañchetaniya-sūtra.³

The reason for the Vaibhāshika treatment of abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithyā-dṛiṣṭi as passions distinct from volitions is perhaps to be found in the Abhidharmika theory that two volitions (chetanās) cannot operate in one moment. According to the Abhidharma all evil volitions (like killing, theft, etc.) are prompted and sustained by one of the three, abhidhyā, vyāpāda or mithyā-dṛiṣṭi. In the case of an evil act like prāpātīpāta, for instance, one of these three produces a vadhaka-chetanā (a volition to kill) which is essentially accompanied, till the accomplishment of the act of killing, by vyāpāda (ill will). If vyāpāda is also treated as a chetanā then there will be two volitions (vyāpāda and vadhaka-chetanā) operating in one moment. The Vaibhāshika, therefore, maintains that these three are to be treated as kleśas (passions) and not as volitions (karma).

1. akarma-svabhāvāny apy tv abhidhyādīni mano-duścharita-svabhāvāni.

Adv. p. 148.

2. Adv. p. 149.

3. Ibid.

The Pali commentators also seem to recognise a similar theory. The Atthasālinī states that of the ten evil karmas (viz. prāpātipāta etc.) the first seven are chetanā-dhamma (i.e. identical with volition), whereas the last three, viz. abhiijjhā, byāpāda and michchhādītṭhi are chetanā-sampayuttā dhammā (i.e. factors associated with the first seven volitions).¹

In the Bhāshya the Kośakāra attributes the view of the volitional nature of these three dharmas to the Dārśhāntika. The Dīpakāra, however, attributes it to a kind of Śākyans (i.e. Buddhists) called 'sthitibhāgiya' whom he abuses as 'śva-lāṅgūlika' (having a dog's tail).² The significance of this abuse is not clear. It is common to compare an incurable person to a dog's tail. For instance, in the Pañcha-tantra it is said that it is as difficult to reform a rascal as it is to take the kink from a dog's tail.³ By calling them śva-lāṅgūlika the Dīpakāra also seems to be abusing the Dārśhāntikas (i.e. the Sautrāntikas) for their persistence in maintaining views repugnant to the Abhidharma. In a subsequent place the Dīpakāra again rebukes them for their habit of repeatedly bringing forth (apparently inconsistent) sūtras against the Vaibhāshika.⁴

1. satta chetanā dhammā honti, abhiijjhādayo tayo chetanā-sampayuttā.
Dhs. A. III, 158. vide Adv. p. 149, notes.

2. sthitibhāgiyā nāma śākyāḥ sva(śva)lāṅgūlika-dvitiya-nāmāḥ. te
khalv abhidhyādini manas-karma-svabhāvaṇichchhanti. Adv. p. 148.

3. durjanah prakṛitiṁ yāti sevyamāno'pi yatnataḥ/
svedanābhyañjanopāyair śva-puchchham iva nāmitam//
Pañchatantra, I, 78 (Edgerton's edition).

4. uktottaro hy esha vādaḥ. kiṁ tila-pīḍakavat punar āvartase? Adv.
p. 266. tasmād durvihita-vetāḍḍhotthānavat Sautrāntikair svapakshopaghātāya
sūtram etad āśriyate. Adv. p. 268.

The term sthitibhāgiya is not used, either by the Kośakāra or by Yaśomitra to indicate the Dārshṭāntika. This term usually occurs with other three terms, viz., hānabhāgiya, viśeshabhāgiya and nirvedhabhāgiya,¹ where it means 'that which is conducive to enduring or lasting', of a particular state of mind. This meaning does not seem to be intended here. The word sthiti in this term most probably means pravāha or santati. We have seen above that the Sautrāntikas do not recognise sthiti (subsistence) as a separate saṃskṛita-lakṣhaṇa, because they consider that it is a name given to the series of momentary dharmas (santati). By sthitibhāgiya, therefore, the Dīpakāra means one who belongs to or is heading for the (theory of) santati, a term which a Vaibhāshika could use as an abuse to the Sautrāntika. But the use of the term sthitibhāgiya need not be taken as purely abusive. We learn from other sources that the Sautrāntika school was also known by two other names, viz., ~~Santānavāda~~ and Saṅkrāntivāda. Vasumitra in his Samaya-bhedoparachana-chakra² attributes the following three doctrines to this school:- "(i) The skandhas transmigrate from one world to the other: hence the name Saṅkrāntivāda. (ii) There are the mūlāntika-skandhas and also ekarasa-skandhas. (iii) An average man (prithagjana) also possesses the potentiality of becoming a Buddha (lit. in the state of average man there are also divine things, āryadharmas)."

Elucidating these doctrines and particularly the term skandha,

1. Vide Adv. pp.384, 418-9.

2. J. Masuda, Asia Major, 2, 1925. See Lamotte's introduction to his translation of the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, MCB. IV. pp.170 ff.

J. Masuda says that a commentary on Vasumitra's work, called 'Shu-chi interprets the term skandha as bijas. The eka-rasa-skandhas are interpreted as bijas of one taste, which continue to exist from the time immemorial without changing their nature. The ārya-dharmas stated in the last doctrine are interpreted as anāsrava-bijas.¹

Very little is known about these Sautrāntika doctrines or about their theory of saṅkrānti. The term sthitibhāgiya used for the Dārśhāntika (i.e., the Sautrāntika) in the Vṛitti may refer not only to an ordinary santati but to the santati of the bijas or seeds of good and evil which form the next point of issue between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra.

11. ANUSĀYA

We have seen above an Abhidharmika distinction between a volition (karma) and a passion (kleśa). The kleśas are like roots which produce as well as sustain an evil volition. Abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithyā-dṛisṭi are not called roots but are recognised as intensive states of three roots of evil (akuśala-mūla) viz. lobha, dvesha and moha respectively. All evil volitions are essentially rooted and spring from one or the other of these three basic passions (mūla-kleśa).

Corresponding to these three roots of evil, the Buddhists recognise three roots of good (volitions) viz., alobha, advesha and amoha. All good

1. J. Masuda, Asia Major, 2, 1925, pp.67-9, notes. Also see Lamotte, MCB IV (1936) pp.163 ff.

volitions spring from these three kuśala-mūlas, the intensive states of which are called anabhidhyā, avyāpāda and samyak-dṛiṣṭi respectively. Thus the kuśala-mūlas and the akuśala-mūlas are incompatible in nature and exclude each other in their operation in a single moment.

Whereas their intensified states can be overcome by the attainment of the first three lokottara paths, the basic passions (akuśala-mūlas) are not completely annihilated until one attains arhatship. A srota-āpanna, for instance, overcomes mithyā-dṛiṣṭi, but still possesses its root, viz., moha. A sakṛidāgāmin overcomes grosser forms of vyāpāda but still possess its root, viz., dvesha. An anāgāmin completely overcomes vyāpāda but he is not free from the akuśala-mūlas. Only an arhat brings an end to these roots of all evil volitions.

If the akuśala-mūlas are not annihilated till the attainment of arhatship and if they are incompatible with the kuśala-mūlas, how are we to explain the operation of kuśala-mūlas or of kuśala volitions in a mundane (laukika) existence? Being incompatible they cannot operate simultaneously. Nor can they operate successively, for succession demands a certain element of homogeneity between the preceding and succeeding moments. If a kuśala chitta were to follow an akuśala chitta, then it will depend for its nature on a heterogeneous cause. It will amount to an admission of an unacceptable position that good springs out of evil or vice versa.

The Theravādins avoid this dilemma by postulating a theory that the akuśala and kuśala chittas never follow each other without an intervening

avyākṛita (indeterminate, i.e., vipāka) chitta. An akuśala chitta-vīthi can be succeeded by a kuśala chitta-vīthi only after an intervention of a bhavaṅga-chitta, which is necessarily a vipāka-chitta.

The Vaibhāṣhikas seek to avoid this difficulty by postulating a chitta-viprayukta saṃskāra called prāpti, a force which controls the collection of a particular kind of elements, and another saṃskāra called aprāpti which prevents such a collection. Thus, for instance, when an akuśala chitta is followed by a kuśala chitta the latter is brought into operation by prāpti of the kuśala dharmas which is at the same time assisted by the aprāpti which prevents the rise of akuśala-dharmas.

The Sautrāntikas reject both these theories. They do not accept the theory of the Theravādins, presumably on the grounds that an avyākṛita chitta is not more helpful than the akuśala-chitta, in as much as both are equally ineffecient to produce a kuśala-chitta. They reject the Vaibhāṣhika dharmas called prāpti and aprāpti on the grounds that these in turn need to be produced by another prāpti and aprāpti, a position which leads only to an infinite regress.

The Sautrāntikas explain the operation of kuśala and akuśala dharmas by postulating a theory of seeds. There are three kinds of seeds: seeds of evil and seeds of good, and those which are indeterminate. The seeds of evil ((akuśala-bīja) are called anuśaya; the seeds of good are called kuśala-dharma-bīja. Before we proceed to an examination of the latter we shall note here views of several Buddhist schools on the nature of the anuśayas, a topic which holds a clue ^{to} ~~for~~ the theory of seeds.

The Pali scriptures as well as commentaries contain several references to and controversies on the *anuśayas*. The term *anuśaya* is derived from *śī* (*śaya*) to lie, and means 'to live along with' or 'to cling to'. It is always used in the sense of a bias, a proclivity, a persistence of a dormant or latent disposition of mind leading to all kinds of evil volitions. Buddhaghosa says that a passion is called *anusaya* because of its pertinacity. It ever and again tends to become the condition to the arising of ever new passions.¹ The *Kośakāra* calls it the root of existence.² The *Vṛitti* describes it as that which follows through the series of mind.³ Seven such evil pre-dispositions are enumerated in the scriptures. They are *kāma-rāga*, *pratigha*, *drishti*, *vichikitsā*, *māna*, *bhava-rāga* and *avidyā*. The three *akuśala-mūlas* as well as their accessory *kleśas* are included in these seven *anuśayas*.

The outbursts of these dormant passions are called *pariyuṭṭhāna* (skt. *paryavasthāna*). There are seven *pariyuṭṭhānas* corresponding to the seven *anusayas*, bearing the same names.⁴ In the *Vaibhāṣhika* tradition different *kleśas* are enumerated under the *paryavasthāna*. The *Vṛitti* enumerates ten, viz., *mraksha*, *īrshyā*, *ahri*, *anapatrāpya*, *styāna*, *middha*, *auddhatya*, *krodha*, *mātsarya* and *kaukritya*.⁵ But this seems to be an *Abhidharmika* tradition. The *Sautrāntikas* do not treat these ten as *paryavasthāna*. They agree with the *Theravādin* tradition (based on *sūtra*) in treating the *paryavasthāna* as outbursts of the latent *anuśayas*.⁶

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1. *Vm.* XXII, 60.
 2. *mūlam bhavasyānuśayāḥ. Ak.* V. 1.
 3. *santānānugatā ity anuśayāḥ. Adv.* p. 220.
 4. *Vide Adv.* p. 308, n.1.
 5. *Ibid.* *kārikā* 373.
 6. *Vide infra*, p. 230.

The relation between an anusaya and a pariyuṭṭhāna is made clear in the Mahā-Mālunkya-sutta.¹ This sutta deals with saṃyojanas (bonds or fetters) like kāma-chchanda, vyāpāda, vichikitsā, etc., which chain all beings to the lower life. It is said there that heretic ascetics used to ridicule this theory of saṃyojanas by saying "An infant is not conscious of lusts of the flesh (kāma), much less can passion (kāma-chchanda) arise within it, its sensual propensities (kāma-rāgo), being latent only (anuseti)".²

The implication of this criticism is not clear. According to the Aṭṭhakathā these ascetics believed that a person is associated with passions (kilesa) only when they operate or beset him but at other times he is disassociated from passions.³ Apparently the heretics believed that an infant is free from kleśas (passions).

The Buddhists do not accept this position. According to them even an infant is in possession of kleśas, because the latter are present in him in their dormant state (anusaya) and become active when there arise suitable conditions for their operation (pariyuṭṭhāna). This implies that when the passions are not operating they always remain in a dormant state. If they are always present in mind then the latter is always akuśala, for a kuśala can neither co-exist nor operate simultaneously with an akuśala. Consequently, there will be no kuśala chitta as long as the latent passions

1. Majjhima, I. p.433.

2. daharassa hi ... kumārassa mandassa ... kāmā ti pi na hoti, kuto pan' assa uppjissati kāmesu kāma-chchando; anuseti tv-ev'assa kāmarāgānusayo. Ibid.

3. ayaṃ hi tassa laddhi samudāchāra³kkhane yeva kilesehi saṃyutto nāma hoti. itarasmim khane asaṃyutto ti ... Majjhima A, III. p.144.

are not removed, and they will not be removed without a kuśala chitta.

Different solutions are put forward by different schools to this problem¹

The Theravādins (despite their objection to the heretical view noted above) and the Vaibhāshikas denied the existence of anuśayas apart from the paryavasthānas. According to them a mind is akuśala only when passions are in operation. There is no such thing as purely latent passions. The Vātsīputriyas maintained a difference between the anuśayas and paryavasthānas. But they said that the anuśayas are chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāras, and hence could co-exist with kuśala-dharmas. But paryavasthānas are chitta-samprayukta-saṃskāras and therefore cannot operate with kuśala dharmas. They include the anuśayas in prāpti, a viprayukta-saṃskāra of the Vaibhāshika list.

The Sautrāntikas maintained that the anuśayas as well as the kuśala elements (bījas) co-exist side by side in the form of subtle seeds, but only one of them operates at one time. When the anuśayas operate (i.e., become paryavasthānas), the mind is akuśala. When the seeds of kuśala operate the mind is kuśala.

All these views are well represented in a controversy on the meaning of a sūtra passage preserved in the Bhāshya, the Vṛitti and also in the Aṭṭhakathās. A question is raised whether a term like rāgānuśaya should be taken as a karma-dhāraya or as a genitive tatpuruṣa-compound. The former (i.e. rāga eva anuśayaḥ) goes against a sūtra passage which says:

1. Vaibhāshika-nayena paryavasthānam evānuśayaḥ. Vātsīputriya-nayena prāptir anuśayaḥ. Sautrāntika-nayena bījam. Sakv. p.442.

"Here a person has a mind beset and obsessed (paryavasthita) by no sensuality (kāma-rāga); he knows the real escape therefrom; this obsession of sensuality (kāma-rāga-paryavasthāna) if vigourously combated is destroyed together with its propensities thereto (sānuśayaṃ prahīyate)."¹

By using the term sānuśayaṃ the Sūtra makes it clear that paryavasthāna and anuśaya are not identical. The Vātsīputriya here suggests that the term sānuśayaṃ means 'together with anuśaya, i.e., a viprayukta-saṃskāra called prāpti.. But this contention goes against Abhidharma where it is said that the rāgānuśaya is associated with three kinds of feelings. Prāpti being a viprayukta cannot associate with a chaitasika. Therefore, anuśaya cannot be a viprayukta.²

Faced with this dilemma the Vaibhāṣika, regardless of the sūtra, states that the term rāgānuśaya should be taken as a karma-dhāraya compound. He resolves the sūtra opposition by interpreting the term sānuśaya as sānubandha,³ i.e., together with its power of producing a new kleśa. He also gives an alternative suggestion that the sūtra identifies anuśaya with prāpti only figuratively; the Abhidharma is definitive when it says that rāga (paryavasthāna) is (identical with) anuśaya.⁴

The Theravādins also identify pariyutthāna with anusaya. Commenting on the sūtra words 'sānusayo pahīyati', Buddhaghosa observes that some people on the basis of this expression maintain that the saṃyojanas

1. Vide Adv. p.221.

2. Ibid. n.4.

3. sānuśayaṃ sānubandham ity arthah. Adv. p.221, n.6.

4. lākṣhaṇikas tv abhidharme kleśa evānuśayah. Adv. p.222.

(here identified with pariyutthānas) are different from anusaya. They should be refuted, he says, by the simile of a person sleeping with his head covered. The person is not different from (his) head.¹ Buddhaghosa takes note of an objection that if saṃyojanas and anusayas are identical then the Buddha's criticism of the heretic ascetics (for holding the view that an infant has no passions) is meaningless.² Buddhaghosa does not give any convincing answer to this criticism but asserts his position by repeating that the same passion is called saṃyojana because it binds, and is also called anusaya because it is not renounced (appahīna).³

The Kathāvatthu records several controversies on the annusayas. The Andhakas held that the anusayas are different from pariyutthāna.⁴ The Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sammitiyas maintained that the anusayas are indeterminate (abyākata), without good or bad roots (ahetukā) and therefore chitta-vippayutta.⁵ The arguments of these schools is the same as noted above that if the anusayas are akusāla and chitta-samprayukta there will never be an occasion for the rise of kuśala consciousness.⁶

Buddhaghosa's reply to these schools is the same that the anusayas are identical with pariyutthānas. He once more returns to this topic in his commentary on the Yamaka. There also he repeats the same arguments

1. Vide Adv. p.221, n.3.

2. athā pi siyā yadi tadeva saṃyojanam so anusayo evam sante Bhagavatā ... tarunāpamā upārambho du-āropito hoti ti. na du-āropito. kasmā? evam laddhikattā ti vitthāritam. Majjhima A., III, p.145.

3. so yeva kilesa bandhanatthēna saṃyojanam appahīnatthēna anusayo ti... Ibid.

4. añño anusayo ti kathā. Kv. XIV, 5. vide Adv. p.308, n.1.

5. tisso pi anusaya-kathā. Kv. XI. 1. vide Adv. p.223, n.7.

6. puthujjano kusalābyākate chitte pavattamāne 'sānusayo' ti vattabbo ti? āmantā. kusalākusalā dhammā sammukhībhāvaṃ āgacchhantīti? Kv. XI.1.

and adds that these passions are called anusaya not because they are different from pariyutthāna but because they are strong passions (thāmagata-kilesa) and because they arise on obtaining suitable conditions for their operation (anuseññitī anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantīti ...).¹

It is clear from these discussions that the Theravādin as well as the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the term sānuśaya, and the subsequent identification of the anuśayas with paryavasthāna are contrary to the sūtra quoted above. They show a determined effort to uphold the Abhidharma in preference to the Sūtra. The Sautrāntika takes strong exception to the Abhidharmika theories and puts forth his theory of bīja. He says that the word rāgānuśaya should be taken as a genitive tatpurusha, i.e., anuśaya of rāga. Asked further if this anuśaya is a samprayukta or a viprayukta, the Sautrāntika says that it is neither, because it is not a separate dravya (reality).² When a kleśa (like rāga) is dormant, it is called anuśaya. When it is awakened, it is called paryavasthāna.³ When it is dormant it does not appear but persists in the form of a seed.⁴ This form of seed is nothing else but an inherent power of mind to produce a (new) passion which is itself born of a past passion. It is comparable to an inherent power of yielding rice found in a sprout which is also born of rice.

1. Vide Adv. p.223, n.7.

2. na chānuśayaḥ samprayukto na viprayuktaḥ, tasya adravyāntaratvāt. Adv. p.222.

3. supto hi kleśa 'anuśaya ity uchyate. prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam. Adv. p.222. This statement supports the Theravādin tradition where the same kleśas are enumerated under anusaya and pariyutthāna.

4. kā cha tasya prasūptih? asammukhibhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ. ko 'yam bījabhāvo nāma? ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādana-śaktiḥ. Adv. p.222.

The Kośakāra openly favours this Sautrāntika theory of bīja (attributed in the Vṛitti to the Dārśhāntika) in his Bhāṣhya. The Dīpakāra borrows this whole controversy from the latter and remarks that he will expose this indolence of the Sautrāntika Kośakāra in properly grasping the words of the Buddha. He refers to his other work called Tattva-saptati¹ where he says he has fully dealt with this topic, and adds that the bīja imagined by the Sautrāntika, which is described as a mere power (śakti) or application (bhāvanā) or impression (vāsanā) of mind cannot stand any scrutiny. For this bīja could either be identical with or different from the mind. If the former, there is no point in speaking about it. If the latter, then it must be a samprayukta (associated) or viprayukta element, a position unacceptable to the Sautrāntika. If it is maintained that the bīja is neither identical with, nor different from the mind, and thus conforms to a middle course, then also it is denied, for such a middle course is impossible in the case of a bīja which is an unreality like a stick made of sky-flowers.²

These brief arguments of the Dīpakāra are identical with Saṃghabhadra's criticism against the theory of bīja. We have noted above a Vaibhāṣhika theory that a viprayukta saṃskāra called prāpti brings into operation a particular set of dharmas (to the exclusion of others) in a given moment, and thus determines the nature of a santati either as impure (akuśala) or pure (kuśala). While dealing with this topic, the Kośakāra refutes the Vaibhāṣhika on the grounds that the seeds (bījas) of kuśala or

1. Vide Adv. p.225, n.2.

2. Adv. p.225.

akuśala accumulated in a santati determine a character of the latter. He defines the bīja as nāmārūpa, i.e. the complex of the five skandhas¹ capable of producing a fruit either immediately or mediately by means of a paripāma-viśeṣa of the santati.²

This theory of bīja advocated by the Kośakāra is subjected to a severe criticism in the 'Nyāyānusāra' of Saṃghabhadra. Yaśomitra quotes a fairly long passage from the latter and defends the Sautrāntika position.³ Saṃghabhadra's main criticism of the theory of bīja (i.e. śakti-viśeṣa) is that it could be either different from or identical with the mind. If it is a separate entity, then it is prāpti, for the dispute then is only on naming it. If, however, it is identical with mind, then it will result in the fault of mixture or confusion (sāṅkhyā-dosha) of good and bad seeds. For surely the Sautrāntika will admit that a mind possesses seeds of both the good (kuśala) as well as bad (akuśala), of sāsrava as well as anāsrava elements. If they all are accumulated in one chitta what is there to determine the nature of a particular chitta as kuśala or akuśala or avyākṛita? Yaśomitra's reply to this criticism is that the sāṅkhyā-dosha would arise only if the bījas were to be identical with the mind. But we maintain, he says, that a bīja is neither identical with, nor different from the mind, because a bīja is not a separate entity (dravya) but only a prajñapti (nominal) dharma.

Yaśomitra further states that even if a bīja is considered

1. LVPAK. II. 36 cd.

2. [kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāmeti] ... [yan nāma-rūpaṃ phalotpattau samartham ... sākṣhād ... pāramparyeṇa vā] Sakv. pp.147-8.

3. Sakv. pp.148 ff. vide Adv. p.170, n.2.

identical with chitta it will not involve any fallacy. When, for instance, a kuśala chitta is produced, it deposits its seeds in its immediately succeeding chitta. If the seeds deposited are strong (kārapa-viśeṣha) then the succeeding chitta also becomes kuśala. But if the succeeding chitta has stronger akuśala seeds it remains akuśala. The kuśala seeds deposited in an akuśala chitta do not themselves become akuśala, for every preceding chitta ~~does~~ leaves a certain impression (bhāvanā) or a perfume (vāsanā) of its nature on the succeeding chitta. This impression which is capable of producing similar chittas immediately or in ^{the} future is called bīja, śakti or vāsanā. These are all synonyms.

Even the Vaibhāṣhikas, he says, will have to resort to some such theory to explain the phenomena of succession of two heterogeneous chittas. They also believe that an akuśala can be succeeded by a kuśala. Do the Vaibhāṣhikas here agree that the kuśala is produced by an akuśala? If they do not agree then they deny samanantara-pratyaya. If they agree then they must explain what kind of power (śakti) it is that produced a kuśala chitta? If this power is akuśala it cannot produce kuśala. If it is kuśala then it cannot remain in an akuśala chitta. It is, therefore, wrong of the Vaibhāṣhikas to accuse us of maintaining that an akuśala seed would become the cause of kuśala chitta. We never maintained that a kuśala seed deposited in an akuśala chitta transforms the latter. What we maintain is that this kuśala seed remains there and produces either immediately or in

1. bhavatām api Vaibhāṣhikāpām idaṁ chintyate ... Ibid.

succession a corresponding kuśala chitta. This power of producing a new chitta is what we call a bīja. It is not an independent entity but only a nominal thing (prajñapti mātra).

It appears from Yaśomitra's explanation that the theory of bīja was employed by the Sautrāntika primarily to replace the Vaibhāṣika dharma called prāpti in explaining the phenomena of immediate succession (samanantarotpāda) between two chittas of heterogeneous nature, and secondarily to reconcile the abiding nature of santati with the momentary flashes of dharma. Their theory that the bījas are neither identical with nor different from the mind bears a close resemblance to the Vātsīputriya theory of pudgala which is also described as neither different from, nor identical with the five skandhas.¹ But whereas the Vātsīputriya claims reality for his pudgala, the Sautrāntika insists on the nominality (prajñaptimātra) of the bījas and thus escapes the condemnation which he inflicts on the former for maintaining a heresy. On the other hand his theory that the mind is a depository of good and bad seeds capable of yielding new seeds in the series of mind foreshadows the theory of ālaya-vijñāna (also called mūla or bīja-vijñāna) of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism.²

1. See Stcherbatsky's The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p.30, n.1.

2. See J. Masudā, Asia Major, 2 (1925), p.68, n.1; Studies in the Lankāvatārasūtra, pp.176 ff. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. I, pp.100-123; Poussin's article 'Notes sur l'Ālayavijñāna', MCB III (1935) p.151; 'Le Bouddhisme et le yoga de Paṭaṅjala', MCB V (1937) pp. 231 ff. Lamotte's 'L'Ālayavijñāna-saṃgraha (chap. II)' MCB III (1935) pp. 208 ff.

12. KUŚALA-DHARMA-BĪJA

Although the Theravādins do not recognise this Sautrāntika theory of bīja, there is substantial evidence pointing to its origin in the suttas. The Āṅg. nikāya contains a long sutta dealing with the operation of kuśala and akuśala-mūlas in six kinds of persons.¹ In the case of the first three of these persons a comparison is made with good or bad seed (bīja) sown in a fertile or stony field. In the case of the first person, for instance, it is said:- "There is a person endowed with kuśala as well as akuśala dharmas. In course of time his kuśala dharmas disappear, and akuśala dharmas appear. But since his kuśala-mūlas are not completely annihilated, new kuśala dharmas appear from that (unannihilated) kuśala-mūla. Thus this person becomes in future one who does not fall (from the holy life). His kuśala is comparable to whole seeds (akhaṇḍa bīja) sown in a cultivated fertile field, capable of yielding abundant fruits."²

We may note here a few significant points of this sutta:

- (1) There are kuśala and akuśala dharmas in a pudgala, i.e., a santati of the five skandhas. (2) When the kuśala dharmas appear the akuśala dharmas disappear (and vice versa) i.e., they do not operate together. (3) The disappearance of an element is not its annihilation. It remains in the santati in the form of mūla (root) from which in a future time there arise

1. Āṅg. III. pp. 404-9. vide Adv. p.168, n.1.

2. "imassa kho puggalassa vijjamānā kuśalā pi dhammā akusalā pi dhammā ... imassa kho puggalassa kuśalā dhammā antarahitā, akusalā dhammā sammukhibhūtā, atthi cha khvāssa kusalamūlāṃ asamuchchhiramā, tamhā tassa kuśalā kusalamā pātubhavissati. evamayam puggalo āyatimā parihānadhammo bhavissati." Ibid.

corresponding new kuśala or akuśala chittas. (4) It is this mūla which determines the nature of a santati as parihāṇa-dharma or aparihāṇa-dharma. (5) This mūla is compared to a good or bad seed according to its having the nature of kuśala or akuśala.

All these points are favourable to the Sautrāntika theory of bīja. They support his contention that the kuśala and akuśala co-exist in the form of seeds which give rise in a subsequent time to their corresponding kuśala or akuśala thoughts, and thus determine the nature of a particular santati as subject to decay or subject to growth.

The Vaibhāshikas also read this sūtra in their scriptures. But they maintain that it refers not to the theory of bīja but to their theory of prāpti. When, therefore, the sūtra says that a person is samanvāgata (endowed) with kuśala and akuśala dharmas¹, it means that he has the prāpti of these dharmas. According to them samanvāgama and prāpti are synonyms.² A person cannot be endowed with kuśala and akuśala in one moment, because these two are samprayukta dharmas. But their prāpti being viprayukta can co-exist and thus cause the rise of kuśala and akuśala dharmas in favourable circumstances.

In support of this contention the Vaibhāshika quotes the following passage from the same sūtra: "A person is endowed with kuśala as well as akuśala dharmas. His kuśala dharmas disappear and akuśala dharmas appear. But there is in him the root (mūla) of kuśala not destroyed. Even this

1. "samanvāgato 'yaṁ puruṣaḥ kuśalair api dharmair akuśalair api dharmair" Quoted in Adv. p.166.

2. prāptir nāma samanvāgamo lābha iti paryāyaḥ. Adv. p.87.

kuśala-mūla is in course of time completely annihilated, whereupon he comes to be designated as a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla."¹

Here arises a problem regarding the rise of a new kuśala-chitta in the santati of such a person. Vaibhāṣhika solves it by postulating the theory of prāpti which ushers in a new kuśala chitta independently of the seeds of kuśala. But according to the Sautrāntika a kuśala chitta can arise only out of its seeds. In the absence of the latter, therefore, a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla will have no possibility of having a kuśala chitta. Consequently he will be doomed to have only akuśala chittas till eternity.

Indeed the Theravādins, on account of their rule that a kuśala cannot succeed an akuśala, and because of their nonrecognition of the theory of prāpti, arrived precisely at such a fateful conclusion. They maintained that a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla was incapable of producing a kuśala chitta, and sought to support this theory by the following scripture: "Take the case, bhikkhus, of a person who is possessed with entirely black akuśala states (ekanta-kālakehi akusala-dhammehi), he it is who once immersed, is immersed for ever."² Commenting on this, Buddhaghosa says: "The term ekanta-kāḷaka means those grave wrong-views (micchā-diṭṭhi) which deny the

1. samanvāgato 'yaṃ puṅgalāḥ kuśalair api dharmair akuśalair api dharmair ... te 'sya puṅgalasya kuśalā dharmā antardhāsyanti ... asti chāsya kuśala-mūlam ... anupachchhinnam ... tad apy apareṇa samayena sarvena sarvaṃ samuchchhetsyate yasya samuchchhedāt samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla iti saṃkhyāṃ gamishyati ... Adv. p.166.

This passage corresponds in the Pali version to that part which speaks of the fourth person. vide Adv. p.169 notes.

2. idha bhikkhave ekachcho puṅgalo samannāgato hoti ekanta-kālakehi akusalehi dhammehi, so sakiṃ nimuggo nimuggo va hoti. P. Paññatti, VII. 1.

result of Karma - natthikavāda, ahetukavāda and akiriyavāda. A person like Makkhali Gosāla who is possessed with these grave wrong views becomes the food of the fire of lower and lower hells. For such a person there is no emergence from worldly existence."¹

But neither of these alternatives (viz. of prāpti and of eternal doom) are acceptable to the Sautrāntika. The Kośakāra here puts forth a bold and original solution to this problem. He says that we should distinguish between two kinds of kuśala dharmas. There are some kuśala dharmas which are innate, which do not presuppose any effort (ayatnabhāvi) but are always present in any given condition (upapatti-lābhika). Then there are other kinds of kuśala dharmas which are obtained only by effort or practice of meditations (prāyogika).² The former, i.e., the innate kuśala dharmas are never completely annihilated. When a person on account of holding a grave mithyādrishti becomes samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla, he destroys only his prāyogika kuśala-mūlas. His innate kuśala-dharmas remain in the form of bijas intact in his santati³ from which arise new kuśala dharmas in a favourable condition.

The statement of the Kośakāra that even a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla possesses a subtle element of kuśala is not free from contradiction. The Bhāṣya does not contain any criticism of this incompatible position.

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1. ... evaṃ puggalo ... nimuggo va hoti. etassa hi puna bhavato vuṭṭhānaṃ nāma natthīti vadanti. Makkhaligosaḷādayo viya heṭṭhā heṭṭhā narakaggaṇaṃ yeva āhārā honti. P. Paññatti A. VII. 1. vide Adv. p.169, notes.
 2. vide Adv. p.168, n.1. See LVPak. II 36cd.
 3. [na tu khalu kuśalānāṃ dharmāpāṃ bijabhāvasyātyantāṃ santatau samudghāto] yathā kleśāpāṃ ārya-mārgenātyantāṃ santatau samudghāta ity abhiprāyaḥ. Sakv. p.147. vide Adv. p.168, n.1.

Even Yaśomitra who defends the theory of bīja against a criticism from Saṃghabhadra is silent on this contradictory statement of the Kośakāra. Fortunately, a brief criticism of this major controversy has survived in our Vṛitti. The Dīpakāra gives the meaning of the term samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla as understood in the Vaibhāshika tradition, and criticises the theory of bīja as propounded by the Kośakāra.

According to the Vaibhāshikas, the mithyādrishti and the kuśala-mūlas ^{both} ~~each~~ consists of three basic grades, viz., mṛidu (subtle or slight), madhya (of medium nature) and adhimātra (extreme). Each of these three grades ^{is} ~~are~~ further divided into these three, e.g., mṛidu-mṛidu adhimātra-adhimātra.

The kuśala-mūlas pertaining to the arūpāvachara and the rūpāvachara are destroyed by the mṛidu and madhya mithyādrishti¹. The adhimātra mithyādrishti destroys the prāyogika-kuśala-mūlas pertaining to the kāma-world, leaving in such a person only the innate or the upapattilābhika roots of good. But when a person (like Maskarī Gośālīputra for instance) comes to hold such extremely grave (adhimātra-adhimātra) wrong views as nāstikavāda, ahetukavāda or akriyāvāda, then he destroys even these innate and the most subtle (upapatti-lābhika) kuśala-mūlas pertaining to the kāmaloḥka, whereupon he is called a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla.

After stating this Vaibhāshika theory of the loss of kuśala dharmas the Dīpakāra turns to the kośakāra's definition of a samuchchhinna-

1. The Kośakāra gives several views on the manner in which the kuśala-mūlas are destroyed. vide Adv. p.167, n.1. See LVPak. IV. 79 ab.

kuśala-mūla. This he condemns as contrary to the scriptures where it is specifically stated that the kuśala-mūlas are completely annihilated (sarveṇa sarvaṃ samuchchhetsyate. cf. sabbeṇa sabbaṃ samugghātaṃ gacchhati). He then criticises the theory of bīja with the argument that the kuśala and akuśala being incompatible like light and darkness cannot coexist at one time. Even if they coexist in the case of a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla, the kuśala elements are entirely lost. How can a new kuśala arise in this person? If it arises from the akuśala then one may as well argue that rice is obtained from barley seeds or that mithyā¹drishti is produced by right thinking. Thus the Kośakāra's theory of bīja and the consequent wrong definition of a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla do not stand the test of either the scriptures or of reasoning.

The Kośakāra's definition of the term samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla is identical with the Yogācāra definition of this term. In the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra only the imminent liberation of a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla is denied.² This suggests that he may attain parinirvāṇa in ^{the} distant future. This would mean that according to the Yogācāras such a person is not completely devoid of a kuśala-mūla. The contention of the Kośakāra that the innate kuśalamūlas are never entirely destroyed marks a still further departure from the orthodox Hīnayāna. It implies that unlike the akuśala-bījas which are completely annihilated, the elements of kuśala persist throughout the series of existence. This is a characteristically Mahāyānis

1. Adv. pp.169-71.

2. tatkalāparinirvāṇa-dharmā ... duṣcharitaikāntikaḥ samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūlaḥ ... Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, Vol.I, p.12. See Studies in the Lankavatārasūtra, p.220.

view in as much as it holds an assurance of liberation even for a person like Maskarī Gośālīputra who comes to hold the gravest of wrong views.

The Kośakāra does not give further details of this incorruptible element of kuśala. Unlike the elements of akuśala which are only sāsrava, the kuśala elements are of two kinds, viz., sāsrava and anāsrava. The former pertains to the (kuśala) kāma, rūpa and arūpa bhavas. The anāsrava kuśalas are those which produce the lokottara (super-mundane) states like arhatship or Buddhahood. Is it possible that the incorruptible kuśala-bīja spoken of by the Kośakāra represents the anāsrava-kuśala-bīja leading to nirvāṇa? We have noted above the Sautrāntika doctrines of 'eka-rasa-skandha', 'ārya-dharma' and the 'paramārtha-pudgala'. All these are described as existing from time immemorial without changing their nature, transmigrating from one birth to another. In the Shu-chi they are interpreted as 'extremely subtle and incomprehensible bīja'.¹ The kuśala-dharma-bīja propounded by the Kośakāra, which is also described as subtle (sūkshma) and incorruptible (na samudghāto), offers a striking resemblance to the ekarasa-skandha, the ārya-dharma and the paramārtha-pudgala. None of these could mean a sāsrava-kuśala-bīja, for the latter is as much subject to destruction as are the akuśala-bījas. The sūkshma-kuśala-dharma-bīja of the Sautrāntika, therefore, should be understood as an anāsrava-kuśala-bīja, variously called as nirvedha-bhāgiya, or moksha-bhāgiya kuśala leading to parinirvāṇa.

This conjecture is strengthened by the occurrence of such terms as

1. Vide supra, pp. 221-2.

moksha-bīja in the Sanskrit Buddhist scriptures. Of the ten extraordinary powers (asādhāraṇa-dharma) of the Buddha¹ one is his power of fathoming the innate capacities of all beings for liberation. Illustrating this power, Yaśomitra quotes the case of a person desirous of obtaining the pravrajyā ordination. It is said that this person approached Śāriputra, but the latter could not see any roots of kuśala-mūla leading to liberation in him (mokshabhāgiya-kuśala-mūla), and, therefore refused to admit him to the order. The Buddha, however, noticed it and said:-

moksha-bījam ahaṁ hy asya susūkṣmāṃ upalakshaye/
dhātu-pāshāṇa-vivare nilīnaṃ iva kāñchanaṃ/²

(I see his extremely subtle seed of salvation like a seam of gold hidden in metal-bearing rock.)

The use of the term moksha-bīja and of the simile of hidden gold are of great significance. The simile of gold aptly describes an incorruptible element. The moksha-bīja thus described as extremely subtle (susūkṣmā) and incorruptible seems to be identical with the sūkṣma-kuśala-dharma-bīja propounded by the Kośakāra. Even the word dhātu used in the above verse is significant. This word also occurs in the term nānā-dhātu-jñāna-bala (Pali aneka-dhātu-nānā-dhātu-lokaṃ pajānāti) where it is understood as vāsanā, āśaya or a gotra.³ The sarvākārajñatā of the Buddha

1. Vide Adv. pp. 382 ff.

2. Sakv. p. 644. vide Adv. p. 388, n. 2. See LVPak. II. 30 cd; Sūtrālamkāra d'Āśvaghoṣa (Huber's translation), p. 283. This story occurs in the Mahāvagga, (Vinaya, I, p. 55) and the Dhammapada A. VI. 1 (Rādhaththera-vatthu). In the Pali versions, however, Śāriputta ordains this person after recalling his charity of offering a spoonful of alms.

3. Vide Adv. p. 385. See Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra, I, 18.

consists in knowing the gotra of all beings. The doctrine of gotra forms the starting point of Mahāyāna. It determines the family of a person as belonging to the community of a śrāvaka, pratyeka-buddha or a Buddha. Yaśomitra describes this gotra as bīja¹, which could only be the moksha-bīja concealed in the midst of other dhātus or bījas such as of akuśala and of śāsrava kuśala.

The theory of an innate, indestructible and pure (anāsrava) element existing in the midst of destructible, phenomenal and impure elements shows an affinity with the Mahāyāna doctrine of prakṛiti-prabhāsvara-chitta, according to which mind is essentially and originally pure but becomes impure by only adventitious afflictions. This prakṛiti-prabhāsvarachitta² is further described as identical with the dharmatā, tathātā² and, therefore, with dharma-kāya of the Buddha.²

The theory of a prabhāsvara-chitta is not unknown to the Pali scriptures. It is said in the Ang. nikāya: "pabhassaramidaṃ bhikkhave chittaṃ, taṃ cha kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ" and "... āgantukehi upakkilesehi vipṇamuttaṃ"³. But the Theravādins interpret it as a bhavaṅga-chitta⁴, i.e., a paṭisaṃdhi chitta causing a rebirth. Now a paṭisaṃdhi-chitta can either be a kusala-vipāka or an akusala-vipāka-chitta,

1. Sautrāntikāḥ punar varpayanti - bījaṃ sāmānyam chetaso gotram iti. Sakv. pp.583-4. See The Bodhisattva Doctrine, pp.51 ff; AMBRH, pp.84-7. See BHSD p.216.

2. mataṃ cha chittaṃ prakṛiti-prabhāsvaram sadā tad āgantuka-dosha-dūṣitam na dharmatā-chittam rite 'nya-chetasāḥ prabhāsvaratvaṃ prakṛitau Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra, XIII. 19. vidhiyate//

3. Ang. I. p.10.

4. Ang A. I. p.60.

accompanied by the kusala-(vipāka)-mūlas like alobha, adosa or amoha or akusala-vipāka-mūlas like lobha-dosa-moha. But according to the Theravādin Abhidhamma only the kusala-vipāka chittas are sahetuka, i.e., have the mūlas. The akusala-vipāka-chitta is considered to be ahetuka, i.e., devoid of any mūlas.¹ No reason for such a discrimination is given either in the Aṭṭhakathās or in the later Tīkā. Dharmānand Kosambi, who noted this, explains that the akusala-vipāka-chitta is considered ahetuka because the akusala-mūlas do not strengthen each other.² The real reason for such a discrimination is, perhaps, to be found in the Theravādin interpretation of the pabhassara-chitta, as a bhavaṅga-chitta. They must have thought that a pabhassara-chitta can have the kusala-mūlas (which are pure) but cannot possess the akusala-mūlas, and hence formulated a rule that the akusala-vipāka-chitta is ahetuka.

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1. akusala-vipākopekkhā-sahagata-santīraṇaṃ. A. saṅgaho V. 10.
 2. See A. saṅgaho, Navanīta-tīkā (Benaras 1941) I. 8; V.10.

13. SARVĀSTIVĀDA

The last controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra is on sarvāstivāda, a fundamental principle of the Vaibhāshika school. The Kośakāra's arguments against this Vaibhāshika doctrine as contained in his Bhāshya are well known through the pioneer works of Stcherbatsky¹ and Poussin.² An elaborate Vaibhāshika reply to these arguments of the Kośakāra as contained in the 'Shun-chêng-li-lun' ('Nyāyānusāra') of Saṃghabhadra is also available to us in Poussin's other monumental work called 'Sarvāstivāda'.³ The Dīpakāra's treatment of this topic is essentially not different from that of Saṃghabhadra.⁴ But, unlike the latter, it is brief and appears like a restatement of the Vaibhāshika position given in the Bhāshya. The same scriptures are quoted and the same arguments are advanced by the Dīpakāra. We shall, therefore, here summarise these arguments in brief and note such points that occur only in our Vritti.

The Dīpakāra opens his exposition by stating the four traditional theories on the sarvāstivāda⁴, viz., bhāvānyathātva (change of existence), lakṣaṇānyathātva (change in the aspect), avasthānyathātva (change of condition) and anyathānyathātva (= apekshā = contingency) advocated respectively by Dharmātrāta, Ghoshaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Of these, he says, Vasumitra's view is authentic because it explains the doctrine of

1. The central conception of Buddhism, pp. 76-91.

2. LVPak. V. 25-28.

3. MCB. V. (1937) pp. 1-157. Poussin here gives a complete bibliography on this controversy (pp. 7-8).

4. Adv. pp. 259-60.

three times with the theory of kāritra (activity).

He then advances the traditional four arguments in support of the doctrine of three times or 'universal existence': (1) The reality of past and future dharmas is spoken of in the scriptures; (2) There can be no production of a result without an abiding past deed; (3) A perception depends on two things, viz. an object and a base; (4) There can be no cognition without an object.

After quoting several sūtras (also quoted by the Vaibhāshika in the Bhāṣya) in his support, the Dīpakāra takes note of a counter-scripture advanced by the Sautrāntika. The latter maintains that a dharma cannot exist in past and future, because it is said in the ^aParāmārtha-sūnyatā-sūtra: "When the organ of vision (eye) is produced, it does not come from some other place; when it disappears, it is not going to be stored up in another place. (Consequently) a thing becomes having not been before; having become it ceases to be."¹

This sūtra, says the Dīpakāra, was spoken of by the Buddha to refute the Vedic and the Sāṃkhya doctrines of eternal substance. It is said, for instance, in the Veda (i.e. Upaniṣad): "When a person dies his eye returns to the sun from which it had originated, the ear to earth, the tongue to water, the body to air and the mind to the moon."² The Sāṃkhyas also maintain that an eye rises from the prakṛiti and merges back into the prakṛiti. It was in refutation of these theories that the Lord said:

1. Vide Adv. p.267, note 1.

2. Ibid.

"When the eye is produced it does not come from somewhere, etc.". The Lord wanted to show that the material elements of past and future have no location in space and, therefore, there is no coming and going of these elements (in a pre-destined direction). He further wanted to refute the Sāṃkhya theory of one eternal cause. The Sāṃkhyas maintain that the prakṛti which is one and eternal, manifests itself as different effects by undergoing changes of its own aspects. The real purport of this sūtra is that the eye having (not) performed its action (in the past), becomes active (in the present). Having once been active, it abandons its activity, and thus disappears in an inactive state (called future). The Sautrāntikas, however, not knowing the true meaning of this sūtra, repeatedly rise against us like an ill-subdued ghost, only to ruin their own position.¹

The observation of the Dīpakāra that this sūtra was directed against the Vedic and the Sāṃkhya schools is significant. There is nothing improbable in such an assertion, for the theory of an eternal substance was chiefly advocated by these two pre-Buddhist schools. Although this explanation does not help the Vaibhāshika theory of sarvāstivāda, it certainly shows, even on the part of the early Buddhists, an understanding of the historical background in which the Buddha propounded his teachings.

The second argument of the Vaibhāshika is that the reality of a past dharma is proved by the doctrines of karma and karma-phala. If the past deeds were not to exist there will be no results which can appear only

1. Adv. p.268.

in a future time. The Sautrāntika solves this problem by postulating his theory of *bīja*.¹ The *Dīpakāra* does not enter into a detailed criticism of this theory but reminds the *Kośakāra* that this theory has been properly refuted (in his discussion of the *kuśala-dharma-bīja*).

The third *Vaibhāṣika* argument is based on the theory that a cognition depends on two things, viz., an object and a base. The past and future objects must be real, for otherwise there could not arise cognitions corresponding to these objects. The *Sautrāntika* objection is that if every object of cognition were to be real, one may as well argue that even unreal things like a *pudgala* and a hare's horn are real and existing because they too become objects of our cognition.

The *Dīpakāra* here points out that one should make a certain distinction between real and unreal objects. There are *dharmas*, termed as *skandha*, *āyatana* or *dhātu* which on account of having their own eternal natures are called real in an absolute sense (*paramārtha-sat*).² There are objects such as a house, a pot or a personality (*pudgala*) which are results of mental constructions imposed on the *paramārtha dharmas*. These objects exist only in a relative sense, and therefore are relatively real (*saṃvṛiti-sat*). There are also things like earth which are real in an absolute as well as relative sense. Finally there are notions born of contingency of relationships like father and son or teacher and pupil.

1. Adv. p.265, n.3., 266, n.1.

2. *paramārthena yan nityaṃ svabhāvena saṃgrihitam na kadāचित् svam ātmānaṃ jahāti ...* Adv. p.263.

When we maintain that all objects are real and existing, we bear in mind this distinction between real and nominal (or relatively real) objects. We follow a middle course (madhyamā pratipat) and maintain that dharmas are śūnya as well as aśūnya.¹ They are śūnya because they are devoid of such misconceived things as pudgala (personality), ālayavijñāna and abhūta-parikalpa.² They are aśūnya because they possess individual as well as general characteristics. Thus we steer clear of the two extremes of eternalism (asti = aśūnya) and annihilationism (nāsti = śūnya), and follow a middle path preached by the Buddha, and declare that the dharmas described as skandha, āyatana or dhātu, whether past or future, are as real as they are when they are present.

The middle path described by the Dīpakāra is not new. It is a reassertion of the pudgala-śūnyatā advocated by the Hinayāna schools. Although the main attack on the sarvāstivāda comes from the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, the Dīpakāra's reference to the ālaya-vijñāna and to the abhūta-parikalpa unmistakably shows that his real opponents were Yogāchāra-Vijñānavādins who not only rejected the reality of past and future objects

1. ... madhyamā-pratipat pradarsitā. yad uta kenachit prakāreṇa śūnyāḥ saṃskārāḥ mithyāparikalpitenā puruṣhālaya-vijñānābhūta-parikalpādinaḥ. kenachid aśūnyāḥ, yad uta sva-lakṣhaṇa-sāmānya-lakṣhaṇābhyām iti. Adv. p.270.

2. This refers to the Yogāchāra theory of an imputed or illusory aspect of appearance. The entire world of objects is according to this school based on consciousness, and hence is unreal. The term abhūta-parikalpa occurs several times in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra: ... skandhā api Mahāmate sva-sāmānya-lakṣhaṇa-virahitā abhūta-parikalpa-lakṣhaṇa-vichitra-prabhāvitā bālair vikalpyante na tv āryaiḥ. p.69. abhūta-parikalpita-svabhāva-vikalpitatvān Mahāmate anutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ. p.62. This thought is fully developed in the Madhyāntavibhāga-sūtra of Asanga: abhūta-parikalpo'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate/ kā. 1. 1.

But even the distinction between a subject and object.

Indeed the Sautrāntika employs his argument of an unreal object (asad-ālambana) only as a prelude to his real theory of an objectless cognition. The objects like the five skandhas or the twelve āyatanas are real. The constructions like a pudgala, a house or a pot may be relatively real. But these do not exhaust the world of objects. One may even have a cognition of an absence (abhāva) or a negation (pratishedha) of a sixth skandha, a thirteenth āyatana, or even of a hare's horn. This would mean that bhāva as well as abhāva can become objects.¹ Since abhāva is not a thing, it follows that cognition can take place even without an object. The Sautrāntika, therefore, concludes that the cognitions of past and future objects are to be explained as cognitions without corresponding objects.

The Dīpakāra notes this argument and explains the nature of a negation. A negation, he says, does not negate an existing (sat) nor a non-existing (asat) thing.² It does not negate a sat. For, if it could, then the kings would have destroyed their enemies by merely denying their existence. Nor does it negate an asat, for that would result only in (an affirmation of) an existence. The negation therefore negates only a known relation. When, for instance, a person says 'there is no hare's horn', he is aware of a certain relation existing between a cow and its horn. He is therefore, not negating a non-existing hare's horn but only an existence (in the hare) of this relation found between a cow and its horn.³ It is,

1. tasmād ubhayaṃ vijñānasyālambanaṃ bhāvaś chābhāvaś cha. vide. Adv. p.271, n.2.

2. nañāḥ sad-asat-pratishedhya⁻vishayatvānupapatteḥ. Adv. p.272.

3. kārya-kārapādis trividhaḥ sambandho 'tra go-vishāpādishu pūrva-dṛiṣṭaśaśa-vishāpādishu pratishiddhyate. p.271.

therefore, wrong to say that a negation has an abhāva as its object. All objects are bhāva (existing) and all cognitions have bhāva as their objects.

Moreover, the existence of a dharma in its past condition is proved by the expression 'jāyate' (is born). The five ^{o i} modifications of a dharma, viz., being (asti), changing (viparipamāte), growth (vardhate), decay (kshiyate) and decease (vinaśyati) anticipate the prior existence of a real subject (kartā) who undergoes these modifications. Similarly the modification called birth (jāyate) anticipates the existence of a subject which is born.¹ A thing cannot be born out of nothing. Even the root jan (to be born) implies this meaning.² When we say a child is born we mean that it has come out of its mother's womb; it does not mean it comes into existence at the moment of its birth. It was existing but was not born. Similarly a dharma exists in past condition but assumes a present condition and passes into a future condition. The conditions change but the dharma survives these changes.

The Sāutrāntika does not accept this difference between an actor and an act, and says that in reality there are only causes capable of producing an effect, which we metaphorically call an actor (kartṛi).³ The Dīpakāra's reply to this objection is that the Sautrāntika cannot defend even the existence of causes or their capacity to produce an effect. According to the Sautrāntika, a destruction is inherent in every dharma.

1. Adv. p. 273.

2. ayaṃ hi janir abhinishkramanādi-vachano nāsat-pradurbhāva-vachanaḥ.
Adv. p. 274.

3. kāraṇa-śaktishu-nirātmakajani-kartr-upachāraḥ pravartate. Ibid.

Consequently, a dharma can neither be born, nor subsist, nor produce an effect. How does he then account either for a cause or for an effect? A causal relation is possible only between two existing dharmas (like past and present and present and future), and not between two unrels or between a real and an unreal.¹

This discussion on the reality of pratyayas (causes) brings the Dīpakāra to a criticism of the Vaitulika, also called vaināśika (annihilationist) on account of his rejection of the reality of not only the past and future but also of the present dharmas.² It is his contention that a saṃskṛita dharma, being a result of pratyayas is devoid of an inherent nature, and, therefore, of a reality. Such a dharma cannot subsist either wholly or in parts in its causes, nor can it subsist anywhere else. That which is not found to subsist anywhere is devoid of its own nature. All dharmas, therefore, are illusory and empty like a circle of fire (alāta-³chakra).

The Vaitulika view given above is identical with the śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamika. The arguments of the Vaitulika correspond to Nāgārjuna's polemic against the reality of pratyayas and saṃskṛita dharmas as contained in his Mādhyamika-kārikās.⁴ This is further confirmed by the Dīpakāra's description of the Vaitulika as a vaināśika (annihilationist) and ayoga-śūnyatā-vādin.

1. Adv. p.276.

2. Vaitulikasyāyoga-śūnyatā-vādinah sarvaṃ nāstīti. Adv. p.257.

3. Adv. p.276.

4. See Pratyaya-parīkṣā, Saṃskṛita-parīkṣā and Kāla-parīkṣā. See The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 166 ff.

The term ayoga-śūnyatā is not found in the traditional lists of 18, 19 or 20 kinds of śūnyatās¹, or in the Mādhyamika or the Yogācāra treatises. It is found only in our Vṛitti, where it is once attributed to the Vaitulika and once to the Kośakāra. We have noted above an accusation brought against the Kośakāra of heading for the precipice of ayoga-śūnyatā. The Kośakāra had favoured a Sautrāntika view that "there is no such thing as a seer or a seen. There are only dharmaś called cause and effect which in reality are free from any activity"². The term ayoga-śūnyatā refers there to this theory of nirvyāpāra-dharma-mātratā which effectually denied the theory of pratyayas and of their interdependent activities. The same idea is developed in the śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamika which maintains that dharmaś (both pratyaya and phala) are devoid of any activity because they are devoid of an inherent nature. This theory is also found in the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, for instance, says that bodhisattvas by their (descent) (penetration) of the doctrine of pure mind and by being free from (the thought of) the relation of production and action (utpāda-kriyā-yoga-virahitāḥ) attain the body of the Buddha.³ The term utpāda-kriyā-yoga is followed by a similar phrase, viz., 'hetu-pratyaya-kriyā-yoga'⁴. It seems certain that the term yoga is used here

1. See The central Philosophy of Buddhism, Appendix.

2. Vide Adv. p.33, n.2. v. supra, p.127.

3. sva-chitta-nirābhāsa-mātrāvatāreṇa ... utpāda-kriyā-yoga-virahitāḥ ... tathāgata-kāyam ... pratilapsyante. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, p.42.

4. tasmāt tarhi ... bodhisattvaih ... skandha-dhātvāyatana-chitta -hetu-pratyaya-kriyā-yogotpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga-vikalpa-prapañcha-rahitair bhavitavyam. Ibid. p.43.

The term yoga in this passage could hardly mean 'discipline' as it is translated by Dr. D.T. Suzuki in his Studies in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, (1930), p.98.

for the causal relation between a pratyaya and pratyaya-samutpanna. The denial of which is ayoga. The term ayoga-śūnyatā can, therefore, be understood as ayoga eva śūnyatā, and thus can refer to the śūnyavāda of both the Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

The Dīpakāra dismisses this as a piece of dialectic hardly to be taken seriously (brahmodyam etat). Since, he says, this polemic is applicable only to those dharmas which are produced by pratyayas.¹ A thing like a forest, for instance, exists only in a conventional sense, because it is produced by a multitude of causes. But the dharmas like the skandha and āyatana have their innate eternal natures, which are not produced by any pratyayas.² The pratyayas produce only different conditions, powers, forms and actions in these self-existing dharmas. Consequently, the dharmas are real in an absolute sense, whereas the conditions like past, present and future are temporary, produced by causes, and, therefore, are relatively real. A dharma is like a crown prince. The pratyayas are like his ministers. The ministers do not produce a new person when they anoint him as a king, but only confer the royalty on him at a particular time. Similarly a dharma exists at all times but becomes present, i.e., active when it is assisted by the totality of causes and conditions.³ The Dīpakāra further supports this theory by quoting Kumāralāta's example of

1. Adv. p.277.

2. na khalu dṛavya-svabhāvāstitvaṃ prati kiñchid upakāraṃ kurvanti, na chāsvabhāvasyāpekshya prajñaptiḥ. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

notes in the sunlight. The notes exist everywhere but only those are visible which are in the sunlight. Others are known only by inference.¹ Similarly a dharma exists in present as well as past and future times. But only its present condition is visible, the other conditions are inferable.³

Confronted with a quotation from a Dārṣhāntika teacher like Kumāralāta, the Sautrāntika amends his position and says that he does not dismiss the past and future dharmas as totally non-existing. They exist in a conventional sense as relatively real dharmas but they do not exist as dravya, as absolute reals.²

The Dīpakāra does not accept even this amended position. He says that such a theory will hold good only if one can prove the reality of present on which one can base the relative reality of the past and future. A prajñapti-dharma cannot exist without a reference to some paramārtha-dharma.³ The reality of present cannot be established without the reality of past, for it will involve the production of something out of nothing, a thesis which has been properly refuted (in the discussion on the Paramārtha-sūnyatā-sūtra).

The Kośakāra here points out the absurdity in the Vaibhāṣika contention that a dharma exists in three times but is endowed with activity (kāritra) only on obtaining the totality of conditions (pratyaya-sāmagrī). For surely, he says, even the pratyayas are dharmas, and must be considered

1. raśmigatasya tu darśanam asya trūṭe raśmipārśvagāḥ tv anumeyāḥ. Ibid. The text here should be corrected: read trūṭayāḥ and trūṭe instead of tutayāḥ and tute. (p.277).

2. dravyātmanā na vidyate, prajñapti-ātmanā tu sad iti. p.278.

3. Adv. p.279.

as always existing. It is wrong, therefore, to say that a dharma is past when it has ceased to be active, is present when it is active, and is future when it is not endowed with activity. Moreover, what is this kāritra? is it identical with or different from the dharma? If it is identical then it is always existing. Consequently there will be no distinction of times. If it is different, then it becomes a separate dharma and thus will require an explanation in its turn. If it requires another kāritra then the whole process will result in an infinite regress. Thus the Vaibhāṣhika contention of the sarvāstivāda is untenable whether judged by scriptures or by reason. Nevertheless, the Vaibhāṣhikas maintain that the past and future exist because the nature of dharmas (dharmatā) is deep; it cannot be explained.

The Kośakāra gives these arguments in a kārikā¹ consisting of questions and answers. The Dīpakāra also imitates this style and refutes the Kośakāra.² Read together these two kārikās appear like argumentations between two rivals engaged in a debate. After reminding the Kośakāra that the depth of the words of the Buddha cannot be understood by mere speculation, the Dīpakāra sets forth the nature of kāritra (activity). The projection of a result (phalākshepa) by a dharma endowed with a potency gained by the totality of internal and external conditions is called kāritra. Since this happens only when a (future) dharma arrives in its present state, its activity in the present moment is called kāritra.³

The Dīpakāra's definition of kāritra is identical with

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1. Akb. V. 27. vide Adv. p.279, n.1.
 2. Ad. kārikā 320.
 3. Ad. kārikā 321.

Samghabhadra's definition quoted in the Tattva-saṅgraha-Pañjikā.¹ The latter contains an elaborate examination of the doctrine of sarvāstivāda.² The main arguments given there are not different from those found in the Bhāṣhya. But it contains a detailed exposition of kāritra particularly on its relation to a dharma. The Dīpakāra says that kāritra is not different from a dharma,³ but does not meet the questions of the Kośakāra on the problems arising out of this position. Samghabhadra, however, gives the following explanation:⁴ "kāritra is not different from the dharma, as it is not found to have any nature apart from that. Nor is it the dharma only; because even though it forms its very nature, it is non-existent at some times (i.e. in past and future). It is, therefore, like santati which is neither identical with nor different from the individual units of the five skandhas. Nor can it be said that it does not exist because its effects are found to exist. But it is not a dharma, for in that case even a single moment will be called a santati. The same arguments apply to the existence of a kāritra. For it has been said: It is admitted that there are effects of the santati, and yet the santati, as such, is nowhere existent (by itself, apart from the entity); similar should be understood to be the case with kāritra bringing about difference of times (states)."⁵

1. dharmānām kāritraṃ uchyate phalākṣhepa-śaktiḥ ... kā. 1793.

2. See trāikālyā-parīkṣhā (kā. 1786-1856).

3. Adv. p. 280.

4. na kāritraṃ dharmād anyat, tad vyatirekeṇa svabhāvānupalabdheḥ, nāpi dharmā-mātraṃ, svabhāvāstitvepi kadāchid abhāvāt ... Tattva-saṅgraha-panjikā, kā. 1806.

5. santati-kāryaṃ cheshtāṃ, na vidyate sāpi santatiḥ kāchit/
tad-vaḍ avagachchha yuktyā kāritreṇādhva-sāmsiddhim//

Ibid.

It appears from this explanation that the neo-Vaibhāṣhikas, under the influence of the criticism of the Kośakāra considerably modified their theory of kāritra, and thus compromised their position on the reality of the past and future dharmas. By comparing kāritra with santati Saṅgha-bhadra virtually reduces the reality of the past and future dharmas, and thus relegates them to the status of a prajñapti-dharma like pudgala. The Dīpakāra, however, does not show any acquaintance with this development. He follows in his usual dogmatic manner a more orthodox position on the sarvāstivāda.

Having thus examined the arguments of the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, and having criticised the views of the vaimśika (Śūnyavādin) Vaitulika, the Dīpakāra once more turns to the Kośakāra. "The Vaitulika, apostate from the Sarvāstivāda¹, says: 'We too advocate (imagine) three svabhāvas.' To him we should reply: the world is full of such illusions which please only fools ... these three svabhāvas imagined by you have been already rejected. Such other illusions should also be thrown away. This is one more occasion where the Kośakāra shows his ignorance of (the doctrine of) Time."²

The term Vaitulika in this passage most certainly refers to the Vijñānavādin Kośakāra who formulated the theory of three svabhāvas, viz. parikalpita, paratantra and pariniṣpanna. This doctrine found in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra and in the works of Maitreya and Asanga is fully developed

1. atra Sarvāstivāda-vibhrasṭir Vaituliko nirāṇa-vayam api trīṇ svabhāvā parikalpayiṣyāmaḥ ... Adv. p.282.

2. ity etad āparam adhva-sammohāṅkanāsthānaṃ Kośakārakasyeti. Ibid.

by Vasubandhu in his Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa. The Dīpakāra's accusation that the Kośakāra is heading for the precipice of ayoga-sūnyatā, his criticism that the Kośakāra is entering the portals of the Vaitulika scriptures and finally his statement that the Kośakāra having deviated from Sarvāstivāda advocates the doctrine of tri-svabhāva, confirms the traditional account preserved in Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu' that the Kośakāra Vasubandhu was converted to Mahāyāna and became a leading exponent of the Vijñānavāda¹ Buddhism.

1. On a controversy on the validity of this tradition, see my article 'On the theory of two Vasubandhus' BSOAS, 1958, xxi/1, pp.48-53, which contains a criticism of Professor Frauwallner's theory that the Kośakāra Vasubandhu and the Vijñānavādin Vasubandhu are two different persons. See Frauwallner's On the date of the Buddhist master of the Law Vasubandhu, Serie Orientale Roma III, Roma, 1951.

V. DATE AND AUTHORSHIP

The controversies between the Dīpakāra and the Kośakāra discussed in the foregoing chapter lead one to believe that the Dīpa and the Vritti were written primarily with the ambition of presenting a rival treatise to the celebrated Kośa and the Bhāṣhya, and at the same time with the aim of refuting the views of the Sautrāntika Kośakāra leaning more and more towards Mahāyāna. The Dīpakāra's declaration that he will propound the essence of Abhidharma forgotten by the Kośakāra, his description of the latter as an apostate from the Sarvāstivāda, ^{and} his condemnation of him as a conceited person (paṇḍita-mānin)¹ ignorant of the Abhidharma (abhidharma-paroksha-mati-vṛittinām)² betray a certain rivalry entertained by him towards Vasubandhu the Kośakāra. By calling the latter's views unbuddhistic (abauddhiya) based on the Vaitulika scriptures leading to the doctrine of ayoga-sūnyatā, he seems to persuade us ^{over} and ^{and} again that the Kośa is not an authentic Vaibhāṣhika treatise but only a mouth-piece of the Mahāyānist Vasubandhu disguised as a Vaibhāṣhika āchārya.

Unfortunately, the name of this rival has not survived either in the Dīpa or in the Vritti. In the Vritti he is merely called Dīpakāra as Vasubandhu is called Kośakāra. He is a Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣhika as is evident from his criticism of the Bahirdeśīyaka view of the four avyākṛita-mūlas in preference to the theory of three held by the Kāśmīra school.³ He is an orthodox Vaibhāṣhika. Many of his views are identical with those of

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1. Adv. p.47.
 2. Adv. p.86.
 3. Vide Adv. pp.247-8.

Samghabhadra, and in some cases they are expressed in almost identical terms. We have noted this identity in our discussion on the definition of a dravya-paramāṇu¹, on the mutual relation between the vitarka and vichāra², on the reality of the chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāras like prāpti³ and sabhāgata⁴, on the theory of bīja⁵ and on the nature of kāritra.⁶ This identity can also be noted in their definitions of the terms like mata⁷, mada⁸, dhātu⁹, and their views on the function of three vidyās¹⁰ and on the relation between riddhi and samādhi.¹¹ Despite this identity of views, the Dīpakāra makes no direct or indirect reference to Samghabhadra or to the latter's famous works, viz. the "Nyāyānusāra" and the "Samaya-pradīpikā". The Buddhist āchāryas referred to by him, viz. (ārya) Maitreya, (āchārya) Aśvaghoṣa, (bhadanta) Kumāralāta, Vasumitra, Ghoshaka, Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, and the non-Buddhist āchāryas, viz. Kapila, Akṣhapāda, Ulūka, Kaṇāda, Vyāsa, Vṛishagana and Vindhyaśāsin, all belong to a period prior to the compilation of the Kośa.

Our main sources for the knowledge of the Dīpakāra, therefore, are all external. But even these are disappointing, because, to the best of our knowledge, neither the Dīpa nor the Vṛitti seem to have been known to the contemporaries or to the successors of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu. Tradition as preserved in Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu' knows of only

1. Vide supra, p.140.
3. Adv. p.87, n.3.
5. Vide supra, p.232.
7. Adv. p.162, n.1.
9. Adv. p.385, n.1.
11. Adv. p.399, n.1.

2. Ibid. p.147.
4. Adv. p.89, n.5.
6. Vide supra, p.257.
8. Adv. p.307, n.5.
10. Adv. p.397, n.5.

one (Vaibhāshika) rival to the Kośakāra, viz. Saṃghabhadra, and attributes him only two works, viz. the "Nyāyānusāra" and the "Samayapradīpikā", which are commentaries on the Kośa¹, and not entirely independent works like our Dīpa. Yaśomitra who quotes large passages from the "Nyāyānusāra" and criticises the views of Saṃghabhadra (and also several other āchāryas like Anantavarman, Guṇamati, Devaśarman, Rāma, etc.) makes not a single reference either to the Dīpakāra or to the Dīpa, Vṛitti and to the Tattvasaptati which as noted above was also a work by the author of the Vṛitti. Neither the works of the post-Vasubandhu āchāryas like Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (which contain an occasional criticism of the Vaibhāshika), nor the works of the Chinese historians like Hsüan Tsang or the Tibetan historians like Tārānātha and Būston, nor the extant collections of the Chinese and Tibetan Tripiṭaka show any acquaintance with these three works or with the name Dīpakāra.

It is not possible, in these circumstances, to arrive at any decisive conclusions on the authorship of the Dīpa, and consequently of the Vṛitti. For, as in the case of the Kośa and the Bhāṣya, the Dīpa and the Vṛitti too appear to be the works of one and the same author. The Kārikā text (Dīpa) as well as the Vṛitti are both critical of the Kośakāra. The former refers to him only indirectly by calling him 'paṇḍita-mānin'², and by referring to the theory of tri-svabhāva as an imagination capable of pleasing only fools³. The Vṛitti makes direct references to the Kośakāra. The Vṛitti on the kārikā consisting of questions and answers

1. Vide supra, p.119, n.2.

2. svārtha-vijñāna evānya āhuḥ paṇḍita-māninaḥ / Ad. kā. 77 cd.

3. parikalpair jagad vyāptaṁ mūrkhā-chittānurañjibhiḥ / Ad. kā. 324 ab

on the sarvāstivāda¹ (between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra) amply proves the identity of the authorship of the Dīpa and the Vṛitti. The author of the Vṛitti, commenting on the answer part of this kārīkā refers to himself in the first person, e. g., vayaṁ brūmah, vayaṁ āchakshmah and vayaṁ prativādmah.²

In the absence of positive evidence we are left with only conjecture regarding the identification of the Dīpakāra. It is very tempting to identify him with Saṁghabhadra. Both belong to the orthodox Kāśmīra Vaibhāshika school. Both hold identical views on almost all controversial points between the Vaibhāshika and the Sautrāntika. Both were rivals of the Kośakāra, and composed their works in refutation of the latter. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that Saṁghabhadra could have been the author of the Dīpa. Having composed two major works (viz. the 'Nyāyānusāra' and the 'Samaya-pradīpikā') against the Bhāshya, he could hardly have ventured on a third work. The tradition would have known it. The Vṛitti, instead of referring to the Tattva-saptati (or in addition to it) would have referred to either or one of his better known works. It is

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1. ko vighno 'nga-vaikalyaṁ na tat sarvāstitā sadā /
tat katham śrūyatāṁ sadbhyaḥ durbodhā khalu dharmatā // Ad. kā. 320.
 2. Adv. pp.279-80. Also: mama tu chandra-koṭi-prakāśa-lakṣhaṇo
drishtaṁto vidyate - ... (p.274), vayaṁ tu paśyāmah ... (p.295), vayaṁ
brūmah (p.303). All these three statements are followed by kārīkāś of
the Dīpa. It is true that sometimes Vṛitti describes certain views as
the views of the āchārya (i.e. the Dīpakāra) e.g. ity āchāryakam (p.11) and
āchāryāpām abhimateti (p.295). But it is a common practice to refer to
oneself in the third person, particularly in the commentaries. The
Kośakāra even refers to himself as 'apara'. Vide Adv. p.81, n.4.

therefore, more likely that the Dīpa was a work of one of Saṃghabhadra's followers who carried on the tradition of his opposition to the Kośakāra.

In this connection, Hsüan Tsang's account of āchārya Vimalamitra a disciple of Saṃghabhadra, is of great significance. After relating the disputes between the Kośakāra (Vasubandhu) and Saṃghabhadra, Hsüan Tsang gives the following account of āchārya Vimalamitra:¹

"Saṃghabhadra having died, they burnt his body and collected his bones, and in a stūpa attached to the Saṃghārāma, 200 paces or so to the north-west, in a wood of Āmra trees, they are yet visible.

"Beside the Āmra wood is a stūpa in which are relics of the bequeathed body of the master of śāstras Vimāla-mitra (pi-mo-lo-mi-to-lo) [wou hau yau]. This master of the śāstras was a man of Kāśmīr. He became a disciple and attached himself to the Sarvāstivāda school. He had read a multitude of sūtras and investigated various śāstras; he travelled through the five Indies and made himself acquainted with the mysterious literature of the three Piṭakas. Having established a name and accomplished his work, being about to retire to his own country, on his way he passed near the stūpa of Saṃghabhadra, the master of śāstras. Putting his hand (on it), he sighed and said, 'This master was truly distinguished, his views pure and eminent. After having spread abroad the great principles (of his faith), he purposed to overthrow those of other schools and lay firmly the fabric of his own. Why then should his fame be not eternal? I, Vimalamitra, foolish

1. S. Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol.I, p.196-7.
cf. On Yuan Chwang's travels in India, by T. Watters, Vol.I, pp.327-8.

though I am, have received at various times the knowledge of the deep principles of his departed wisdom; his distinguished qualities have been cherished through successive generations. Vasubandhu, though dead yet lives in the tradition of the school. That which I know so perfectly (ought to be preserved). I will write, then, such śāstras as will cause the learned men of Jambudvīpa to forget the name of the Great Vehicle and destroy the fame of Vasubandhu. This will be an immortal work, and will be the accomplishment of my long-meditated design.'

"Having finished these words, his mind became confused and wild; his boastful tongue heavily protruded, whilst the hot blood flowed forth. Knowing that his end was approaching, he wrote the following letter to signify his repentance:- 'The doctrines of the Great Vehicle ... contain the final principles ... I foolishly dared to attack its distinguished teachers. The reward of my works is plain to all. It is for this I die ...' Then the great earth shook again as he gave up life. In the place where he died the earth opened, and there was produced a great ditch. His disciples burnt his body, collected his bones, and raised over them (a stūpa).

"At this time there was an Arhat who, having witnessed his death, sighed and exclaimed, '... Today this master of śāstras yielding to his feelings and maintaining his own views, abusing the Great Vehicle has fallen into the deepest hell (Avīchi)!"

The account given above has several points of interest in our task of identifying the Dipakāra. Vimalamitra is said to be a Kāśmīrian,

a sarvāstivādin, a master of śāstras (i.e. Abhidharma), who entertains an ambition to 'destroy the fame of Vasubandhu' in favour of his (distant) teacher Saṃghabhadra. All these points are favourable in identifying him with the Dīpakāra. It is true that the account says nothing about his works.¹ But this must have been forgotten by the Mahāyānists in their zeal ^{for} ~~as~~ condemning him for entertaining an ambition against Vasubandhu.

Indeed, the latter part of Hsüan[#]-Tsang's account looks more like a fiction than like a history. It may well be that Vimalamitra repented his illwill towards Vasubandhu. But the account of the manner in which he meets his death, particularly the vomiting of hot blood,² and his descent in^{to} the 'deepest hell' may be taken as a Mahāyānist way of denouncing their opponents. The fact that a stūpa was built over him and that his relics were enshrined near those of Saṃghabhadra is sufficient to point out some eminent part played by this āchārya in upholding the orthodox Vaibhāshika tenets as outlined by Saṃghabhadra. He may well have been our Dīpakāra whose works were forgotten in course of time partly, perhaps, in favour of Saṃghabhadra's monumental and more authoritative works against the Kośakāra.

The identification of the Dīpakāra with Vimalamitra could also be helpful in determining an approximate date ^{for} ~~of~~ the Dīpa. Vimalamitra is not a contemporary either of the Kośakāra or of Saṃghabhadra, as he says

1. In the Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (by Prof. H. Ui and others, Tōhoku Imperial University, Japan 1934) several works on dhāraṇī (see Nos. 2092, 2681, 3112, 3814, etc.) are attributed to one Vimalamitra. But it is hardly possible that this person could have been the āchārya Vimalamitra referred to by Hsüan-Tsang.

2. Cf. atha kho Nigantṭhassa Nāthaputtassa bhagavato sakkāraṃ asahamānaṃ tattheva uphaṃ lohitaṃ mukhato uggācchhi'ti. Majjhima, (sutta 56) Vol.II p.387.

that the latter's "qualities have been cherished through successive generations". It is not possible to determine the generations that ^aseparated Saṃghabhadra from Vimalamitra. But these could not have been many, for the memories of the dispute between the Kośakāra and Saṃghabhadra are still fresh in the minds of (the generation of) Vimalamitra. Moreover, he must have flourished much earlier than Hsüan Tsang's visit to India, i.e. 629 A.D. The lower and upper limits of the date of Vimalamitra can thus be fixed between the dates of the Kośakāra and of Hsüan-Tsang.

The date of (the Kośakāra) Vasubandhu is yet uncertain. Some place him in the middle of the fourth century and some in the fifth century A.D.¹ But whether he is placed in the fourth or in the fifth century, it is unlikely that Vimalmitra can be placed beyond a hundred years after the Kośakāra's death. The approximate date of Vimalamitra could thus be somewhere between 450 ^{and} ~~to~~ 550 A.D. or even much earlier.

The same date can hold good for the composition of the Dīpa. As we have noted above, all the āchāryas referred to by the Dīpakāra belong to ^{the} ~~a~~ pre-Kośakāra period. No new doctrinal developments such as are found in the works of the post-Vasubandhu period are recorded in the Vṛitti. Indeed, the Dīpakāra's criticism of the Kośakāra, and particularly his argumentations in the defense of the sarvāstivāda give an impression of

1. Professor E. Frauwallner has given a complete bibliography on this problem in his monograph On the date of the Buddhist master of law Vasubandhu (Serie Orientale Roma, III) Roma, 1951. Also see my article 'On the theory of two Vasubandhus' in the BSOAS, 1958, xxi/1, pp.48-53.

their being contemporaries. We have no means of establishing any precise date, but one thing looks certain, that the date of the Dīpa could hardly be extended beyond a hundred years (or a few generations) after the Kośakāra, a date which we have assigned to āchārya Vimalamitra.

Restorations and Emendations

The MS. is fairly correct and needed very little correction. In doubtful places and where the MS. was erased or broken, and where the photographs were not clear, we have restored the text with the help of the ¹ Sakv. and the press-copy of Professor Pradhan's edition of the Bhāshya. All these restorations are given in square brackets.² A few letters (two or three) of the first line of a large number of folios are lost under the drawing pins used by the photographer in pinning the palm-leaves. The restorations of these letters are also given in square brackets.

The emendations are given in round brackets. ~~The~~ majority of these emendations consist of a change of the letter pa into na or vice versa. The rules of cerebralization of na are not generally observed. We may note here a few cases of such irregularity:

1. Vide supra, p.6, n.3.

2. The numbers preceding the folio numbers given in square brackets refer to the card-boards on which these photographs were placed. Thus for instance [I.B.1.] refers to the reverse side of the first photograph on the first card-board. The numbers (1 to 9) given in small round brackets indicate the beginning of a new line of a folio.

A) Words where the dental na is used instead of cerebral na:-

apramāna (p.287), aprahīna (p.238), abhinishkramana (p.274), āvenika (p.80), Airāvana (p.389), kriyamāna¹ (p.69), gauna (p.367), Nārāyana (pp.14, 101), nirvāna (p.364), paramānu (p.65), prahāna² (p.238), prahīna (p.28)³, lakshana (p.417), lavana (p.77), vakshyamāna (p.193), śonita (p.274), śrāmanera (p.130), śrāmānyaphala (p.57), etc.

B) Words where cerebral na is used instead of dental na:-

anārya (p.89), anāsraṇa (p.365), abhilapana (p.20), kīrtana (p.83), gagana (p.13), nīśraya (p.12), nishyandaphala (p.177), nīrodha (p.289), nīrvāna (p.136), darshana, daurmapasya⁴, nirvartana (p.136), paripīrvāna (p.339), paripīrvita (p.426), pāna (pp.12, 128), pravartana (p.50), mahāyāna (p.358), yonīśo manasikāra (p.296), rachana (p.192), vivarjana (p.46), śrāvākayāna (p.358), hīna (p.384), etc.

Similar irregularities are found in the case inflexions:-

1) Nominative case - trīni (p.23), dravyāni (p.405), nāmāni (p.120), balāni⁵ (p.357), mauneyāni (p.150), viśiṣṭāni (p.45), sarvāni (p.54), etc.

2) Instrumental case - atyayena (p.132), aśaikshena (p.23), upachayena (p.374), kramena (p.23), parivartina (p.412), pratyayena (p.412), mārgena⁶ (p.57) ~~and~~ samgrahena (p.8), etc.

3) Genitive case - indriyānām (pp.6, 34, etc.), kāryānām (p.38), Kauravānām (p.91), pramukhānām (p.86), mūrtānām (p.15), yogipām (p.20) ~~and~~ shannām (p.213), etc.

1. Also kriyamāna (p.259).

2. Also prahāna (pp.146-7).

3. Also prahīna (p.147).

4. These two words are always spelt in this way.

5. Also balāni (p.358).

6. Also mārgena (pp.58, 59).

It can be seen from these examples that there is a tendency to cerebralise the *na* when it is in the proximity of *ra*. This tendency can be fully observed in the combinations like *anayor nāsti* (p.344), *ādibhir nāmabhiḥ* (p.38), *chatvāro pikāyāḥ* (p.288), *chittayor aṇyatarat* (p.40), *trayor aniyamaḥ* (p.40), *pupar* etc. (p.40), *viśuddhir apāsraṇaiḥ* (p.49), etc. and compounds like *chānūra-pārāyana* (p.389), *dusṭa-nigraha* (p.154), *dharma-pirvachana* (p.44), *vaira-piryātana* (p.154), *svara-pirghosha* (p.189), etc.

It is not possible to decide whether these irregularities are to be attributed to the *Dīpakāra* or to the scribe of our MS. Judging by the chaste and cultured language of our text and the knowledge of the Sanskrit Grammar it exhibits in its discussions of the formation of several terms,¹ it ^{seems} ~~looks~~ unlikely that the *Dīpakāra* would commit such inconsistent violation of the rules of Grammar. These irregularities ^{are} ~~appear~~ more probably ~~to be~~ the result of a faulty MS. tradition, possibly due to the scribe or scribes following the dialectal peculiarities of their native land.

1. Vide Adv. pp.3, 111, 273-4.

APPENDIX

A table showing correspondence between the kārikās of the Dīpa and the Kośa. Numbers on the left refer to the kārikās of the Dīpa, and on the right refer to the kārikās of the Kośa. (Pradhan's edition - v. supra p. 6, n. 3.)

Kośasthāna I			
		40	I 40
1	I 1	41	I 39
5-6	I 20	42	I 41
7-8	I 17-18	44	I 42
9	I 27	45	I 43
10	I 22	48-9	I 46
11	I 25	50	I 47
12	I 26	51-2	I 7-8
14	I 28	53	I 19
16	I 23	54	I 45
17	I 29	57	I 44
18	I 30	71	I 48
19	I 31-32		
20	I 33		Kośasthāna II
36	I 34-5	76	II 1
37	I 36	77	II 2
38	I 37	78	II 3-4
39	I 38	79	II 5

80	II 6	136	II 43
86	II 7	138-9	II 45
89	II 13	142	II 47ab
90	II 14	149	II 47cd 48
91	II 15		
92	II 16		Kośasthāna III
99	II 17-8	150	III 101
100	II 19	151	III 102
101-7	II 21		
108-9	II 20		Kośasthāna IV
110	II 22	154-5	IV 1
111	II 23	158	IV 2
112	II 24	164	IV 33-4
113	II 25	165	IV 35
114	II 26	166	IV 36
115	II 27	167	IV 37
122-3	II 28	168	IV 38
124	II 30	169	IV 39
125	II 31	170-1	IV 40-1
126	II 34	172	IV 42
128	II 35	173	IV 43
129	II 36	174	IV 45
134	II 41	175	IV 46
135	II 42	176	IV 47

177	IV 48	209	IV 90
178	IV 50	210	IV 91
179	IV 51	211	IV 92
180	IV 52-3	212	IV 93
181	IV 54	213	IV 94-5
182-3	IV 55-6	222	IV 94
184	IV 57-8	225	IV 108-9
185	IV 59-60	231	IV 112
186-7	IV 61-2	242-3	IV 109-110
188	IV 64-5	244	IV 113
189	IV 66	245	IV 114
190	IV 67	246	IV 115
191	IV 68	247	IV 116
192-4	IV 70-1	248-50	IV 117-8
195	IV 73	251	IV 120
196	IV 74	252	IV 121
197	IV 75	253	IV 125
198-9	IV 76-8	254	IV 122
200-2	IV 81-2	255-6	IV 123-4
203	IV 83-4	257	IV 125
204-5	IV 85	258	IV 126
206	IV 87		
207	IV 88		Kośasthāna V
208	IV 89	261	V 1

262-3	V 2	320	V 27
264	V 3	325	V 28
265	V 4	328	V 29
266-7	V 5	329	V 30
268	V 6	330	V 31
269-72	V 7-8	356	V 32
273-4	V 9	357-8	V 32-3
275-6	V 10-11	359	V 34
278	V 12	360	V 35
281	V 13	361	V 36
282	V 14	362	V 38
283	V 15	363-4	V 41
284	V 16	365	V 43
285	V 17	369	V 45
286	V 18	371	V 46
287-8	V 39	372	V 49-50
289	V 19	373	V 47
290-2	V 20-1	374	V 48
294	V 22	375	V 49
296	V 23	376	V 51
297	V 24	377	V 55
299	V 25od	378	V 60
301-2	V 26	379	V 56
305	V 25ab	380-1	V 57

382	V 58	462-3	VI 73-4
383	V 52	466-7	VI 75-6
		468-9	VI 77
	Kośasthāna VI	471	VI 78
384	VI 16	472	VI 79
393-5	VI 17		
421	VI 20		Kośasthāna VII
424	VI 26-8	479	VII 7
426	VI 37-8	480	VII 9
427	VI 39	482	VII 13
428	VI 40	483	VII 16
429	VI 41	484	VII 17
430	VI 42	485	VII 18
431-3	VI 43-4	486	VII 19
434	VI 45	489	VII 20
435	VI 1cd	490	VII 21
437	VI 45cd	491	VII 22
438	VI 62, 64	492	VII 23
439	VI 65	493	VII 28-9
440	VI 66	504	VII 30
441	VI 67	505	VII 31
442-3	VI 68-9	506-7	VII 32
457-8	VI 71	508	VII 33
459	VI 72	509	VII 35

511	VII 36	550	VIII 13
512-4	VII 37-8	551	VIII 2, 3
515	VII 39	552-3	VIII 4
516	VII 40	554	VIII 22
517	VII 42	568	VIII 19, 20cd
518	VII 43	578	VIII 20ab, 21ab
519-20	VII 44	580	VIII 23cd
521-2	VII 45	581-2	VIII 24
523	VII 46	583-5	VIII 25-7
524-5	VII 48	586-7	VIII 28
526-7	VII 49	588	VIII 29
528-9	VII 50-51	591	VIII 30
530-1	VII 52-53	592	VIII 31
Kosasthāna VIII		593	VIII 32
534	VIII 1	594-5	VIII 33
536	VIII 2	596	VIII 34
539	VIII 5	597	VIII 35
541	VIII 6	<hr/> <hr/>	
542-3	VIII 7		
544-5	VIII 8		
546	VIII 9		
548	VIII 11		
549	VIII 12		

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CORRECTIONS

(Numbers refer to pages and lines of the Adv.

N1, N2, etc. = Notes, line 1, 2, etc.)

	<u>Errata</u>	
1.1	om	om(?)
1.4	vidohaṁ	vi(d)ahaṁ
2.4	hatu	hetu
3.17	(dhvā)	(ddhvā)
6.N5	-rūchi	ruchi
7.1	(tva)	(tva)-
12.1	upādānamaulaṁ	upādāna[m]maulaṁ
14.1	-rbhātānām	-rbhūtānām
14.N1	Ākāśa	ākāśa
16.3	tiyā	trītiyā
19.11	vikalpā	[a]vikalpā
19.15	dhama	dharma
22.18	darśana(ṇa)	darśana(ṇa)
27.10	(na cha)	(nacha)
28.13	bhāktva	bhāktu
31.13	(ṣ)	[ṣ]
31.24	dharmatva	dharmatve
32.16	vṛitti-	vṛittim
33.9	[mapaha?]	[-paharāṇam?]

35.6	prāchīnī	prāchīno
35.8	indriyā(ṇā)m	indriyānā(ṇā)m
39.6	kārapau	kārapai -
44.14	kāryāt	kāryā(yā)t
46.2	(sman)	(smin)
47.N13	ou	ou
47.N16	ityaḥ	ity arthaḥ
48.N14	-mādhīty apare	-mity apare
49.N11	tad etapi	tad etad api
55.N9	14 ad.	14 ab.
56.11	-(rni)-	-rpi(rni)-
56.17	vyañjanaiḥ	vyañjanaiḥ
62.6	indriye(ṇa)	indriyena(ṇa)
64.10	mukha	sukha
64.N3	sarvālpe-	sarvālpai -
65.13	-pādāva-	pādāya
66.3	rū pa-	rūpa-
66.N2	devisé	divisé
66.N4	nommé	nommé
66.N5	devisé	divisé
66.N6	paramāṇu	paramāṇu
71.1	vartinām(nām)	vartinām(ṇām)
72.N5	kāyā	kāyo
73.2	(kshā)	(kshām)

75.9	-mtrāpyasyeti	-mapatrāpyasyeti
76.N15	founds	found
83.N10	I.200	III.200
86.5	pramukhānām(nām)	pramukhānām(nām)
86.6	tejālpānām	tejōlpānām
86.N11	Manual	Manual
90.1	vajahyāt	vijahyāt
94.N17	bhadavanta	bhadanta
102.7	vatata	vartatata
102.N4	āyuh kshyād	āyuhkshyād
104.12	Ang. A.	Ang. A. II. p. 252
105.3	sthitya-	sthitya(ti)-
106.4	ākshipet	ākshipeta
106.16	dārdhēyno-	dārdhyno(no)-
106.24	bhavatīti // tatra	bhavatīti tatra
107.7	mātrañ	mātra
108.5	nārthavāñ	nā[na?]rthavāñ
109.4	"vāchā	vāchā
109.5	nidhiyante" iti/	nidhiyanta iti
109.9	sambandhasyaisha[h]	sambandhasyaisha
109.N8	tiñgantair	tiñgantair
110.3	pratyāyatīti	pratyā[ya]yatīti
110.7	śabdo	na śabdo
110.17	vṛittih,	vṛittih

110.17	-me(di)ti	-meti
110.20	kasmimś chit / na	kasmimś chin na
111.24	pratijñāye(yai)tena	pratijñāye(a)te[.] na
111.24	-sthāna-	syāna(nu)-
111.27	-danu(nu)-	-danta-
112.2	-anya-	-antya-
112.3	utpādayat	utpādayat(n)
112.4	Mīmāṃsā(saka)	Mīmāṃsa-
112.4	Vaiyākaranau	Vaiyyākaranau
112.4	(kshe)	(kshā)
112.10	tatraidam	tatredam
120.13	-bdayam	-bdyam
120.N8	Śvetāśvatara	Śvetāśvatara
120.N11	swabhāva	svabhāva
123.9	saṁvṛittyā	saṁvṛityā
128.6	paramānā-	paramānā-
133.6	chittā-	chittā(a)-
135.11	pramāda	prasāda
137.N18	jñānam	jhānam
138.N19	546	548
143.15	da(?)ksha	da(ri?)ksha
146.6	-nochte	-nochyate
149.N30	dvashaja	dveshaja
158.2	prā pa-	prāni-

158.N30	āntyā	bhrāntyā
159.N20	563	562
168.N27	khāsa kusalamalaṃ	khvāssa kusalamūlaṃ
172.N18	201	200
175.N5	p.- n.-	p.166, n.2.
186.13	āchāryakamū	āchāryakam
196.N17	niddasa	niddesa
197.1	bodhināṃ	bodhināṃ
204.N4	vimuktis	vimuktis
204.N5	vimuktim	vimuttim
205.8	parato ghosha-	paratoghosha-
205.N12	506	508
211.13	dadāti	dadāti.
213.8-9	chetanā-yā(yāṇ)	chetanā yā
219.1	gati chakra-	gatichakra-
223.N5	Vāpsī-	Vātsī-
223.N22	Kv. IX.4	Kv. XI.1
224.N2	Kv. IX.4	Kv. XI.1
224.N24	Ṣadaw	Ṣayadaw
224.N30	anusama	anusaya
224.N34	patitṭhāni	patitṭhāti
226.2	-dattavṛi-	-datta(dantar)vṛi-
231.N2	marāmarsha	parāmarsha
231.N16	mayobhūvastā-	mayobhuvastā -

233.2	(na)	(nā)
238.N5	1261-	126-
256.N12	swabhāva	svabhāva
258.6	āgamapopanna	āgamopapanna
266.6	-śūnyatā sūtre	-śūnyatāsūtre
269.4	vishayā[yam]	vishayā(ya)m
271.7	-mātrakā-	-mātrākā-
277.22	tuṭayaḥ	truṭayaḥ
277.22	tuṭe	trute
282.N17	swabhāva	svabhāva
289.23	(kte)	(-kte)
302.1	dva	dve
307.4	saturūpa-	sa tu rūpa-
308.2	mākshy-	mrakshy-
310.17	tatram	tatra
319.7	pātayitvatam	pātayitvaitam
324.N9	593	583
325.8	yathoshma-	yathoshmā-
326.5	anagatāḥ	anāgatāḥ
332.1	-dhirmā-	-dharmā-
339.N4	kālā-	kāla-
343.N10	40 cā	41 cā
347.N3	531 and 585	583 and 587
349.N16	avijjāya	avijjāya

350.M16	456	45b
352.N16	352	351
367.7	saṅkha	saṅgha
367.9	nava śai-	navāśai-
377.17	dhajñānarmasya	dharmaññānasya
389.N4	grandha	gandha
393.9	śabdeshva	śabdesu
394.N3	Akb. 40b	Akb. VII. 40b
397.15	pūrva-	pūrve-
397.15	-tkriyā-	-kriyā-
397.17	jñā[jñayā]	-jñā(jñā)[yā]
406.19	ado(gho?)-	ado(dho?)-
415.3	sāpeksham	sopeksham
415.N20	Akv.	Akb.
417.23	traya-	trayā-
419.N3	-tkā-	-tkra-
419.N4	18	19
421.17	ākopyā	akopyā
423.N10	VIII.1.10	VIII.24
423.N13	Also Cf	Also cf.
429.N5	p.- n.	p.425, n.4.
430.6	cha chālobha-	sa chālobha-
443.8	śrayate	śrūyate
456.18	mahāyapa	mahāyāpa

(Reprinted from the *BSOAS*, 1958, xxi/1.)

ON THE THEORY OF TWO VASUBANDHUS¹

By PADMANABH S. JAINI

SINCE the publication of Professor J. Takakusu's 'Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha' in the year 1904,² several scholars have made attempts to determine the date and works of Vasubandhu. The problem is beset with several difficulties. Tradition gives three dates (A.N. 900, 1000, and 1100) based on different reckonings of the Nirvāṇa era. Vasubandhu, himself a Sautrāntika, is the author of the celebrated Vaibhāṣika work, viz., the *Abhidharma-kośa* (and its *Bhāṣya*), and is at the same time credited with the authorship of several major works of the Vijñānavāda school. The problem is rendered more complex by the mention in Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā* of an elder (Vṛddhācārya) Vasubandhu, leading to a recent theory of two Vasubandhus advocated by Professor E. Frauwallner.

Paramārtha gives two dates for Vasubandhu. In his 'Life of Vasubandhu' he gives A.N. 1100, and in his commentary on the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (of Maitreya) he gives A.N. 900. Takakusu favoured A.N. 1100 and proposed A.D. 420-500 as the period of Vasubandhu. In 1911, P. N. Péri, after a thorough investigation of all available materials on the subject, proposed A.D. 350.³ Over a period several scholars, notably Professor Kimura, G. Ono, U. Wogihara, H. Ui, and many others, contributed their views on this topic, which were summed up in 1929 by J. Takakusu,⁴ who again tried to establish his previously proposed date of the fifth century A.D. Since then the problem received little attention until in 1951 Professor Frauwallner published his monograph on Vasubandhu.⁵

Professor E. Frauwallner's views can be briefly stated as follows :

1. Of the three dates current in tradition, the first, viz. the A.N. 900, points to a time prior to A.D. 400, the last two, viz. the A.N. 1000 and 1100, refer to one and the same date, viz. the fifth century A.D. Thus there are only two dates for Vasubandhu.

2. These two dates refer not to one but to two persons bearing the same name. One Vasubandhu (the elder—fourth century A.D.) is the Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu mentioned in the *Vyākhyā* of Yaśomitra, and the other Vasubandhu (the younger—fifth century A.D.) is the author of the *Abhidharma-kośa*.

¹ This paper was read before the XXIVth International Congress of Orientalists, Munich, 1957.

² *T'oung Pao*, Serie II, Vol. v, 269-96.

³ 'À propos de la date de Vasubandhu', *BÉFEO*, XI, 1911, 339-90.

⁴ 'The date of Vasubandhu', in *Indian studies in honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman*, Cambridge, Mass., 1929, 79-88.

⁵ *On the date of the Buddhist master of the law Vasubandhu* (Serie Orientale Roma, III), Roma, 1951.

3. Paramārtha in his 'Life of Vasubandhu' confuses these two and hence the difficulty of determining the date of Vasubandhu.

4. This biography can be divided into three distinct parts :

(i) Legend of the name of Vasubandhu's native city Puruṣapura, his father, the Brāhmin Kauśika, and of the three sons Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Viriñcivatsa.

(ii) Account of the council in Kāśmīr, arrival of the Sāṅkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin, and defeat of Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu's composition of the *Paramārthasaptatikā* in refutation of Vindhyavāsin. The composition of the *Abhidharma-kośa*. Saṃghabhadra's challenge to Vasubandhu for a disputation, declined by the latter on account of his old age.

(iii) Asaṅga's conversion of Vasubandhu to Mahāyāna. Vasubandhu's Mahāyāna works and death.

Of these the first and last sections deal with Vasubandhu the elder, the second part deals with Vasubandhu the younger.

5. From this it follows that Vasubandhu (elder) the brother of Asaṅga is not the Kośakāra Vasubandhu (younger). It is the elder Vasubandhu who was converted from Sarvāstivāda to Mahāyāna by Asaṅga. This is supported by Chi-Tsang's commentary on the *Śataśāstra*, where (this elder) Vasubandhu is said to have composed 500 Mahāyāna works (in addition to 500 Hīnayāna works composed by him prior to his conversion) and hence given the nickname of 'Master of the Thousand Manuals'.

The younger Vasubandhu, the author of the *Paramārthasaptatikā* and the *Abhidharma-kośa*, belonged to the Sarvāstivāda school, but leaned more and more towards the Sautrāntika school.

This in brief is a summary of Professor Frauwallner's thesis. The conclusion that would logically follow from his thesis is that the Kośakāra Vasubandhu was not a Mahāyānist and consequently, not the author of the Vijñānavāda works credited to him. These would necessarily have to be the works of the elder Vasubandhu, the brother of Asaṅga. But Professor Frauwallner avoids such conclusions by stating that the accounts of the life of Vasubandhu 'either do not give any information at all about these works, or mention them in passages where the two Vasubandhus are confused with each other' (p. 56).¹

In this paper I propose to present some new evidence that throws some doubt on Professor Frauwallner's thesis and confirms the older and universal tradition about the conversion of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu to Mahāyāna, and his authorship of at least one work belonging to the Vijñānavāda school.

My evidence is based on the manuscript of the *Abhidharma-dīpa* (together

¹ In his recent work *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus* (1956), Professor Frauwallner includes the *Vimśatikā* and the *Triṃśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* under the heading of 'Vasubandhu der Ältere', but is still hesitant about the ascription of these works: 'Meiner Ansicht nach ist Vasubandhu der Jüngere ihr Verfasser, doch kann diese schwierige Frage hier nicht weiter erörtert werden' (p. 351).

with a commentary—the *Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti*), discovered in the Śhalu monastery in Tibet by Pandit Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana in the year 1937. He brought back photographs of this work, which are treasured in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute of Patna.¹

The MS discovered is incomplete. The last folio is numbered 150. The whole work might not have contained more than 160 folios. Of these, only 62 have been found. It contains two works, viz. the *kārikā* text (the *Abhidharma-dīpa* ²) and a prose commentary (the *Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti* ³). The work belongs to the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika school and appears, from internal evidence, to have been written either during or immediately after the time of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu. The name of the author is not mentioned in the work, but it is my conjecture that it was written by a rival of Vasubandhu, either Saṅghabhadra or one of his disciples.

The *Dīpa* and also its commentary (the *Vṛtti*) closely follow both in contents and in presentation, their counterparts, viz. the *Abhidharma-kośa* ⁴ and its commentary (the *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* ⁵) of Vasubandhu. Of the 597 *kārikās* of the extant *Dīpa*, more than 300 have their parallels in the *Kośa*, and in many cases appear to be imitations of the latter. The *Vṛtti* has about 50 large passages almost identical with the *Bhāṣya*, 32 of which are directly borrowed from the latter. Thus to a large extent, the *Dīpa* and the *Vṛtti* are written in imitation of the *Kośa* and the *Bhāṣya*.

But what is more interesting to us is the fact that the extant *Vṛtti* contains 17 hostile references to the Kośakāra (without mentioning the name Vasubandhu) criticizing his Sautrāntika views and at times accusing him of entering the portals of Mahāyāna Buddhism. I quote here a few such passages from the *Vṛtti* :

- (i) *Idam idānīm abhidharma-sarvasvaṃ Kośakāraka-smṛti-gocarātītaṃ vaktavyam.* (Fol. 37b.⁶)
- (ii) *Kośakāras tv āha—‘sarva-sūkṣmo rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramāṇuḥ’ iti. Tena saṃghāta-vyatiriktaṃ rūpaṃ anyad vaktavyam . . .* (Fol. 43b.⁷)
- (iii) *Siddhā sabhāgatā. Kośakāraḥ punas tāṃ Vaiśeṣika-parikalpita-jāti-padārthena samīkurvan vyaktaṃ pāyasa-vāyasayor varṇa-sādharmyaṃ paśyatīti.* (Fol. 47a.⁸)
- (iv) *Atra punaḥ Kośakāraḥ pratijānīte—‘sacittikeyaṃ samāpattiḥ’ iti . . . Tad etad abauddhīyam.* (Fol. 47b.⁹)

¹ I am grateful to the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute for entrusting me with the work of editing this MS. It will soon be published in the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna.

² Henceforth called *Dīpa*.

³ Henceforth called *Vṛtti*.

⁴ Henceforth called *Kośa*.

⁵ Henceforth called *Bhāṣya*.

⁶ In this bold line the *Vṛtti* criticizes the Kośakāra for his omission of a topic dealing with cessation of *dhātus* through various stages of *anāsrava-mārga*.

⁷ See Poussin's *L'Abhidharma-kośa*, chapter II, kā. 22, and Yaśomitra's *Sphutārthā Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā*, p. 123 (ed. U. Wogihara).

⁸ See *L'Abhidharma-kośa*, chapter II, kā. 41a, and *Vyākhyā*, pp. 157-9.

⁹ See *L'Abhidharma-kośa*, chapter II, kā. 44d, and *Vyākhyā*, p. 169.

(v) 'Samādhībalena karmajaṃ jīvitāvedhaṃ nirvartya āyuh saṃskārā-dhiṣṭhānaṃ, āyur na vipākaḥ' iti Kośakāraḥ. Tatra kim uttaram iti ? . . . Vaitulika-śāstra-praveśa-dvāram ārabdhaṃ tena bhadantenety adhyupeksyam etat. (Fol. 49a.¹)

In these passages the Kośakāra is criticized for his Sautrāntika views on the theory of atoms and the three *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*, viz. *sabhāgatā*, *nirodha-samāpatti*, and *āyu*. We may particularly note the last passage where the Kośakāra is said to have begun entering the portals of the *Vaitulika-śāstra*. The term *Vaitulika-śāstra* clearly refers to Mahāyāna scriptures. Asaṅga in his *Abhidharma-samuccaya* identifies *vaitulya* with *vaipulya* and explains the latter term as *Bodhisattva-piṭaka*,² which undoubtedly belongs to Mahāyāna.

This is the first allusion to the Kośakāra's leanings not only towards Sautrāntika but also towards Mahāyāna Buddhism.

While dealing with a controversial question related to perception (whether the eye sees an object or the mind sees it) the *Vṛtti* quotes the following passage from the *Kośa-bhāṣya* and says :

*Tatra yad uktaṃ Kośakāreṇa 'kim idam ākāśaṃ khādyate. Sāmagryāṃ hi satyāṃ dṛṣṭam ity upacāraḥ pravartate. Tatra kaḥ paśyati' ti ?*³ *Tad atra tena Bhadantena sāmagryāṅga-kriyā[paharaṇam ?] kriyate. Abhidharma-sammohāṅkashānenātmāpy ankito bhavaty ayoga-śūnyatā-prapātābhīmukhyatvaṃ pradarśitam iti.*

The view of the Kośakāra quoted by our *Vṛtti* is what the *Kośa* gives as a Sautrāntika view. In the *Vṛtti* the Kośakāra is identified with the Sautrāntika. He is censured for his ignorance of *Abhidharma* and also accused of heading for the precipice of *ayoga-śūnyatā*.

The term *ayoga-śūnyatā* should put at rest any doubt about the real affiliations of the Kośakāra. The term certainly refers to a Mahāyāna doctrine.

In the fifth Adhyāya of the *Dīpa*, a fundamental principle of the Sarvāstivāda school, viz. the reality of the past and future elements, is discussed in opposition to the Sautrāntika arguments advanced by the Kośakāra in the fifth Kośa-sthāna of his *Bhāṣya*.⁴ After dealing with the Sautrāntika, the *Vṛtti* criticizes the Vaitulika. He is described as *ayoga-śūnyatā-vādin* maintaining

¹ See *L'Abhidharma-kośa*, chapter II, kā. 10a, and *Vyākhyā*, p. 104.

² *Vaipulyaṃ katamat ? Bodhisattva-piṭaka-samprayuktaṃ bhāṣitam. Yad ucyate vaipulyaṃ tad vaidalyaṃ apy ucyate vaitulyaṃ apy ucyate.* (Ed. P. Pradhan, p. 79.)

³ cf. 'Opinion du Sautrāntika.—Quelle discussion dans le vide ! Le Sūtra enseigne : " En raison de l'organe de la vue et des visibles naît la connaissance visuelle " : il n'y a là ni un organe qui voit, ni un visible qui est vu ; il n'y a là aucune action de voir, aucun agent qui voit ; ce n'est que jeu de causes et effets. En vue de la pratique, on parle à son gré, métaphoriquement, de ce processus ; " L'œil voit ; la connaissance discerne ". Mais il ne faut pas se prendre à ces métaphores. Bhagavat l'a dit : il ne faut pas se prendre aux manières de dire populaires, il ne faut pas prendre au sérieux les expressions en usage dans le monde '. *L'Abhidharma-kośa*, chapter I, kā. 42.

⁴ See *L'Abhidharma-kośa*, chapter V, kā. 17-19.

that nothing (i.e. the past, present, and future) exists,¹ and is, therefore, condemned as an annihilationist (*vaināśika*).²

The main Vaitulika doctrine criticized in the *Vṛtti* is the *niḥ-svabhāva-vāda*,³ which is common to both the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika schools. Both these schools are *śūnyavādins* in a real sense and would appear, to that extent, as Vaināśikas to a Realist Vaibhāṣika.

The term *ayoga-śūnyatā* is not found in the traditional lists of 18, 19, or 20 kinds of *śūnyatās*⁴ or in the Mādhyamika or the Yogācāra treatises. The *Vṛtti* does not explain the term. If this *vāda* could mean the doctrine of non-applicability of all predications, especially of *ātman* and *dharma*s (*ātma-dharmopacārah*),⁵ then it would be equivalent to the *niḥ-svabhāva-vāda*, accepted by both the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra schools.

The passages quoted above from the *Vṛtti* indicate, in the view of the Vaibhāṣika, that the Kośakāra, even in the *Kośa-bhāṣya*, shows signs of more and more leanings towards Mahāyāna Buddhism. This in itself does not prove his conversion to Mahāyāna, but certainly indicates his inclination towards it. In the light of these findings we may now turn to further evidence which seems to anticipate his conversion and confirm his authorship of a Mahāyāna work.

After dealing with the *niḥ-svabhāva-vāda* of the Vaitulika, the *Vṛtti* again turns to the Kośakāra and says: 'The Vaitulika, apostate from the *Sarvāstivāda*, says: "We too advocate (imagine) three *svabhāvas*". To him we should reply: "The world is full of such illusions which please only fools. Rare are those imaginations that catch the hearts of the learned". These three *svabhāvas* imagined by you have been already rejected. Such other illusions should also be thrown away. This is one more occasion where the Kośakāra shows his ignorance of (the doctrine of) Time.'⁶

Three significant statements in this criticism may be noted: (i) The

¹ *Tatra Sarvāstivādusyādharma-trayam asti . . . Vibhajyavādinā tu, Dārṣṭāntikasya ca pradeśo vartamānādharma-samjñakāḥ. Vaitulikasyāyoga-śūnyatā-vādināḥ sarvaṃ nāstīti. . . .* (Fol. 108a.)

² *Yaḥ Sarvāsti-vādākhyaḥ . . . sadvādī. Tad anye Dārṣṭāntika-Vaitulika-Paudgalikāḥ . . . Lokāyatika-Vaināśika-Nagnāṣṭa-pakṣe prakṣeptavyāḥ.* (Fol. 108a.)

³ *Vaitulikaḥ kalpayati—*

*Yat pratītya-samutpannam
tat svabhāvān na vidyate/*

Yat khalu niḥsvabhāvaṃ nirātmakaṃ hetūn pratītya jāyate tasya khalu svabhāvo nāsti . . . Tasmād alāta-cakravan niḥsvabhāvatvāt sarva-dharmā nirātmāna iti. Tam praty apadiśyate. . . . (Fol. 111a.)

⁴ See Professor T. R. V. Murti's *The central philosophy of Buddhism*, Appendix.

⁵ I am indebted to Professor T. R. V. Murti for suggesting this interpretation of the term *ayoga-śūnyatā*.

⁶ *Atra Sarvāstivāda-vibhāṣṭir Vaituliko nirāha—vayam api trīn svabhāvān parikalpayiṣyāmaḥ. Tasmai prativaktavyam*

*Parikalpāḥ Jagad vyāptam
mūrkhā-cittānurañjibhiḥ/*

Yas tu vidvan-mano-grāhī

parikalpāḥ sa durlabhāḥ//

Te khalv ete bhavatkalpitās trayā-svabhāvāḥ purvam eva pratyūdhāḥ. Evam anye' py asat-parikalpāḥ protsārayitavyāḥ. Ity etad aparam adharma-sammohānkanā-sthānam Kośakāra-kasyeti. (Fol. 112a.)

Vaitulika is called here *sarvāstivāda-vibhraṣṭiḥ* (one who has deviated from the *Sarvāstivāda*).

(ii) A reference is made to the doctrine of *tri-svabhāva-vāda*.

(iii) A reference is made to the Kośakāra in a manner which shows his responsibility in the formulation of this doctrine.

Of these, the last two statements most probably refer to the *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*,¹ a work of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school, credited by tradition to Vasubandhu. It consists of 38 kārīkās and marks the culminating point of the development of this doctrine found in the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* and in the works of Maitreya and Asaṅga,² the chief founders of the Yogācāra school. The first statement saying that the Vaitulika deviated from the *Sarvāstivāda*, may be a general statement, referring only to the belief of the Vaibhāṣika that the Vaitulika branched off from the more orthodox Sarvāstivāda school. But read in the context of the above passage, it appears certain that the *Vṛtti* is alluding to the conversion of the Kośakāra to Mahāyāna Buddhism.

This in brief is our main evidence confirming Paramārtha's account of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu's conversion to Mahāyāna and his authorship of several Mahāyāna works. It does not contradict the fact of two (one elder and the other younger) Vasubandhus. The Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu certainly existed, as is clear from the statements of Yaśomitra. He may well have been the author of a commentary to the *Abhidharma-sāra* of Dharma-śrī and also author of many Mahāyāna works.

But we certainly are not justified, in the light of the evidence of the *Dīpa*, in limiting the activities of the younger Vasubandhu to Hīnayāna alone, in crediting him only with the authorship of the *Kośa* and thus relating the last part of Paramārtha's biography to the life of Vasubandhu the elder. The date of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu and his relation to Asaṅga, however, still remains unsettled. But the confirmation of his authorship of the *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa* might well lead us to accept the tradition preserved in Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu'.

¹ Sanskrit text and Tibetan version edited by Sujitkumar Mukhopādhyāya, Visvabharati, 1939.

² See parallel passages collected by S. Mukhopādhyāya in the *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*.