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THE 'ABBASID CALIPHATE

(575/1179 - 656/1258)

bу

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Thesis submitted for the degree

o f

Doctor of Philosophy



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ABSTRACT

Although the history of 'Abbasid 'Iraq in the second half of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century has been least studied, yet the events of this period were of marked importance in the history of 'Iraq in particular and the Muslim world in general. Within this period fall the decline of the Seljuq rule, the rise of the Khwarizmian power, the subjugation of many Muslim countries by a heathen monarch, the Mongol, and finally the abolition of the traditional 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad.' Iraq lost its position as the centre of the Muslim world and became a vassal province of this heathen empire.

- 1. The theme of the present work is to study the period of the last four 'Abbasid Caliphs: al-Nasir (1180-1225), al-Zahir (1225-6), al-Mustan-sir (1226-1242) and al-Musta'sim (1242-1258) and their political, religious, social and economic activities which aimed at restoring the lost authority of the Caliphate.
- 2. Chapter I treats of the political status of the Caliphate and the attempts of the Calipha to establish their temporal rule and to extend their small principality. Al-Nasir succeeded in extending his dominions northwards to Takrit, northeastwards to Daquq and Southeastwards, by conquering Khuzistan.
- 3. Chapter II describes the religious policy of these Caliphs and their steps to confirm their spiritual position. Al-Nasir tried to reconcile in his person the different classes of the people by adopting and patronizing the chivalrous order, al-Futuwa, and by transmitting the Hadith. Although

he was successful in reviving the position of his Caliphate among the Muslims of his time, yet he was not able to achieve either the unity of Islam or the abolition of the rivalry between the Sunni and the Shi'a communities in his kingdom. This rivalry persisted and because of it the internal stability of the Caliphate was undermined in the reign of al-Musta'sim.

- 4. Chapter III deals with the non-Muslim communities the <u>Dhimmis</u> and their political, social and economic position in the Caliphate.
- 5. The relations with the Muslim rulers are treated in various chapters of the thesis.
- 6. Chapter IV treats of the Wazirate, with short biographical notes on the Wazīrs and Nā'ib Wazīrs (acting Wazirs) who came to power in this period, with a special emphasis on their position in administering the internal and external affairs of the Caliphate.
- 7. Chapter V describes the revenue and the financial administration.

 Al-Nașir's fiscal measures were adequate enough to bring more revenue to the state but the economic decline of 'Iraq which occurred during the reign of the last Caliph resulted in a deficiency in the revenue. Subsequently the government was obliged to reduce its expenditure on its military organisation by reducing the number of troops. This, no doubt, made impossible the Caliphate's resistance to the Mongol invasion.
- 8. The ease with which the Caliphate was conquered by the Mongols in 1258 can be attributed to the internal state of affairs in Baghdad and to the superior organisation of the Mongol military forces.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.C. Acta Orientalia.

B.A.S.I. Beitrage zur Arabistik, Semitistik und Islamwissenschaft hrsg. von. R. Hartmann und H. Scheel. Leipzig, 1944.

B.C.A. Bulletin of the College of Arts (Majallat Kuliyyat al-Adab, Baghdad).

B.E.O. Bulletin d'etudes orientales.

B. J.R.L. Bulletin of the John Rylands Library.

B.S.O.A.S. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

D.I. Der Islam.

E.H.R. The Economic History Revue.

E.I./I Encyclopaedia of Islam 1st ed.

E.I./II " 2nd ed.

E.O. Etudes Orientales.

H.J.A.S. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.

J.A. Journal asiatique.

J.E.S.H.O. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient.

J.R.A.S. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.

J.S.S. Journal of Semitic Studies.

R.C.E.A. Repertoire chronologique d'epigraphie arabe.

R.E.I. Revue des etudes islamiques.

S.I. Studia Islamica.

W.G. Welt als Geschichte.

INTRODUCTION

SURVEY OF SOURCES

I. Iraqi Sources

The contemporary 'Iraqi sources, in general, constitute the major source of material for the study of the late 'Abbasid Caliphate. Their information is, without doubt, invaluable for the light it throws on the internal affairs of the Caliphate. They also provide the most detailed account of events that took place during the life times of their authors, as eye witnesses of these events, or of those events that took place shortly before their time.

Below is a quick look over these sources and their authors.

A. The Chronicles.

Ibn al-Sa'i.

Abu Talib 'Alī ibn Anjab Taj al-Dīn al-Khazin was born in 593/
1196 and died on 20 Ramadan 674/8 Mar. 1276. About his youth very
little is known but, after the opening of al-Mustansiriyya College (in
631/1234), he was appointed librarian (Khazin al-Kutub) there. This

lbn al-Fuwati, p. 386; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 270; al-Nuwayri, Nihayat al-Arab, (Paris MS. Supp. Ar. N. 739) XXIV, fol. 58b. On his life and works see Brockelmann, G.A.L., Supp. I, p. 590; see also the introduction of M. Jawad to his edition of al-Jami al-Mukhtasar, Baghdad 1934.

²Ibn al-Furat, The History of Ibn al-Furat, ed. by Q. Zurayq, VII, p. 61.

office, no doubt, allowed him to see many works on different subjects, but his main concern was with history, on which he wrote many works.

Below is a list of some of his writings:

- 1. Al-Inas fi Manaqib Khulafa' bani 'l-'Abbas.
- 2. Ghazal al-Zurraf.
 - Both these works were dedicated to al-Mustansir and the author received 100 Dinars for each of them.
- Nuzhat al-Absar, dedicated to al-Musta'sim on the occasion of the circumcision of the two sens of the Caliph. 2
- 4. Sirat al-Nașir.
- 5. Sirat al-Mustansir.
- 6. Ta'rikh Nisa' al-Khulafa'.
- 7. Ta'rīkh al-Wuzarā'.
- 8. Al-Ta'rikh al-Atabiki; this was written at the request of the ruler of Shahrazur, Nur al-Din Arslanshah.

From these works one can say that Ibn al-Sa'i was a professional historian and had close relations with the ruling class in Baghdad, as well as being

Ibn al-Sa'i is called, by the following historians, al-Mu'arrikh, "The Historian": see Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 270, Dhahabi, XXI, fol. 22b, Nuwayri, op.cit., XXIX, fol. 58b.

²Dhahabi, XXI, fel. 22b.

³ Ibid.; for the full list of Ibn al-Sa'i's works see M. Jawad's introduction to al-Jami' al-Mukhtasar, but none of these works is extant.

⁴Cf. F. Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography, Leiden 1952, pp. 51-2.

under the patronage of the Caliphs. He was, therefore, likely to be a court historian rather than an ordinary chronicler; thus one expects him to be loyal to the 'Abbasid rule and to view events from the angle of Baghdad and the court. This patronage, no doubt, affected his style in recording his facts in his work al-Jami' al-Mukhtasar; for instance he puts the word "'Azīz" - the mighty one - whenever the word Dīwan occurs, and the formula "May God be pleased with him" whenever the name of the Caliph al-Naṣir occurs.

Of his work al-Jami' al-Mukhtasar fi 'Unwan al-Tawarikh wa 'Uyun al-Siyar there is one volume still extant, that is the ninth volume which covered the period 595-606/1199-1210. According to Ibn al-Furat this work was in 30 volumes. It is the most detailed work on the internal affairs of the Caliphate. The system followed by the author was that of giving the events at the beginning of every year, followed by the biographies of those who died during the same year. Ibn al-Sa'i, in this work, gives a great deal of information about the late 'Abbasid institutions by narrating every appointment to every post and the dismissals of these officials too, with the biographies of those officials who died in

See al-Jami' al-Mukhtasar, pp. 210, 221, 229, 258 etc.

²This volume was edited by Mustafa Jawad and published in Baghdad in 1934; this edition is very poor, with many errors, especially in identifying the names.

³Ta'rīkh, VII, 61; while Ibn al-'Imad says that this work was in 26 volumes, Shadharat, V, p. 344.

the year in question. He pays slight attention to the economic status of the country, except when there is some economic crisis. He preserves many valuable documents in this work, such as the decree which was issued by al-Nasir to re-organise al-Futuwwa, and the decree of the appointment of Naqib of the 'Alids.²

The works of Ibn al-Sa'i have been used extensively by later historians such as al-Dhahabi, Ibn al-Fuwati and Ibn Kathir. 5

Ibn al-Fuwați.

Abd al-Razzaq ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Shaybani was born in Baghdad on 17 Muharram 642/25 June 1244 and, when the Mongols conquered Baghdad, he was taken captive by them but was released by Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, and became his student. He went to Maragha and there he was appointed in charge of the library of the observatory which was founded by al-Tusi in 657/1258-9. He stayed in Maragha for several years; this

Al-Jami al-Mukhtasar, pp. 224-6.

² Ibid., pp. 193-99. Naqib; chief, leader.

³Ta'rikh al-Islam, XIX, fels. 252a, 230a, 14, 231 etc.

⁴Al-Hamadith al-Jami'a, pp. 252, 260.

⁵Bidaya, XIII, p. 192.

⁶Ibn al-'Imad, VI, p. 60.

⁷ Ibn Hajar, II, p. 364.

⁸Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 341.

office, no doubt, gave him the opportunity to see and read many valuable works on history. Ibn al-'Imad relates that Ibn al-Fuwati obtained some information from al-Mubarak, the son of al-Musta'sim, in the year 666/1267-8 in Maragha. It is highly probable that the information he obtained from al-Mubarak was that concerning the fall of Baghdad and the death of the last Caliph. 3

Ibn al-Fuwați returned afterwards to Baghdad where he was appointed as a librarian of al-Mustansiriyya College; probably this appointment took place after the death of Ibn al-Sa'i, the former librarian of this College. Ibn al-Fuwați stayed in this office till his death on 3 Muharram 723/12 Jan. 1323.4

Ibn al-Fuwati worked on different fields of knowledge, he even studied philosophy and astrology with al-Tusi. History received a considerable part of his attention, judging from the list of his works which was mentioned by Dhahabi, but unfortunately there are, so far, only two books extant: the first is called Ta'rikh Majma al-Adab, Vol. IV,

Ibn Hajar relates that it has been said that there were 400,000 books in this library, see al-Durar, II, p. 364.

Shadharat, VI, p. 60.

³Al-Mubarak was born in 640/1242-3 and when Baghdad was conquered he was spared and sent to Maragha, where he stayed till his death which occurred in 677/1278-9; see al-Kaziruni, fol. 95b.

⁴Ibn Hajar, II, pp. 364-5.

⁵Ibn al-'Imad, VI, p. 60.

Ibid., p. 61; for further detail about these works see the preface of M. Jawad to his edition of al-Hawadith al-Jami'a; Brock, S. II, p. 202

the second al-Hawadith al-Jami'a. The latter work covered the period between 626-700/1228-1301. This work is the most detailed work on the history of 'Iraq during this period; therefore, it is the main source for the internal affairs of the Caliphate up to its destruction. The author follows a chronological order in relating his narratives, with great attention in recording all officials, their appointments and dismissals together with their biographies, without neglecting the events which occurred during the period, especially the political and economic crises.

Because of his post and his patronage under al-Tusi one would expect him to favour the Mongols, but this is not always the case; for instance, he mentions the defeat of the Mongol army in 'Ayn Jalut' without giving any reason for this defeat which would have helped the Mongols to save face.

He describes the fall of Baghdad in detail and mentions most of the actions which followed this event. Like the other 'Iraqi historians

⁽cont.)
Rosenthal, op.cit., pp. 350, 414; see also A. al-'Azzawi, al-Ta'rif bi'l-Mu'arrikhin, Baghdad 1957, pp. 160 ff.

⁷This work is extant in MS. in al-Zahiriyya Library in Damascus, see A. al-'Azzawi, p. 162.

Edited by M. Jawad and published in Baghdad in 1932, this edition is very poor with many errors in stating the names and in ordering the events, see the years 643 and 653 of the text.

²Al-Hawadith al-Jami'a, p. 344.

³¹ bid., pp. 331 ff.

Ibn al-Fuwați does not ascribe any role to Ibn al-'Alqami, the Wazir of al-Musta'sim, in the fall of the Caliphate, while all the Syrian and Egyptian historians of this period accused this Wazir of an act of treachery towards the Caliph. In any case, either Ibn al-'Alqami was innocent of this accusation, or Ibn al-Fuwați deliberately exenerated him from this act by keeping silent because, if he had mentioned this treachery, he would have put the Mongols in a weak position and suggested that they could not have conquered Baghdad without the aid of a traitor.

Ibn al-Athir.

'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm 'Izz al-Dīn ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī was born at Jazirat Ibn 'Umar in 555/1160. His father took him to Mosul, where he began his scholastic career. He travelled to Baghdad and Damascus, where he studied under notable scholars. He finally settled in Mosul, and died there in 630/1233.

He wrote several works, but the most important one among them is his universal history, al-Kamil fi 'l-Ta'rikh. He lived under the patronage of Badr al-Din Lu'lu', the governor of Mosul and wrote this work at

Cf. below pp.

²Al-Subki, V, p. 127; Ibn al-'Imad, V, p. 137; Ibn Taghri Bardi, VI, p. 282; for his life and works see Brock. I, p. 345, and S. I, p. 587; see also E.I./I, s.v. Ibn al-Athir; Rosenthal, p. 49.

³This work was printed several times, but the best edition is Tornberg's (1851-76) in 14 vols.

the request of his master. He, therefore, views events from the angle of Mosul. 2

The narratives of this work stopped at the year 629/1231-2, therefore the last part of this work, which covered the period 575-629, A.H. is of direct value to this study.

His narratives of Baghdad and the Caliphate are, in general, short and confined to the main events only. His account of the biographies of al-Nasir and al-Zahir are of considerable value. Although he shows a great prejudice against al-Nasir, no doubt because of the latter's religious policy, he shows a great deal of favour towards al-Zahir and showers him with his praise. Therefore a certain caution must be maintained in accepting any of his information about the 'Abbasid Caliphate and especially any which concerns the Caliph al-Nasir.4

B. Biographical Works

Ibn al-Dubaithi.

Muḥammad ibn Abi 'l-Ma'ali Sa'id ibn Yaḥya ibn al-Ḥajjaj al-Dubaithi al-Wasiti was born in Wasit on 26 Rajab 558/30 June 1163. He

Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 337; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 214.

²See B. Lewis, "The sources for the history of the Syrian Assassins", Speculum, XXVII, 1952, p. 483.

See al-Kamil, XII, 285 ff.

The al-Athir's accounts of events that happened outside Mosul are not always reliable; see H.A.R.Gibb, "The Arabic sources for the life of Saladin", Speculum, XXV (1950), pp. 58 ff; idem, "Notes on the Arabic materials for the history of the early Crusades", B.S.O.A.S. VII (1933-5) pp. 747 ff.

⁵Ibn Khallikan, I, p. 660.

started his scholarly career at Wasit, and afterwards went to Bagh-dad where he settled and was appointed 'Ald till his death on 8 Rabi' II 637/8 Oct. 1239. Ibn al-Dubaithi wrote two works on history: the first is Ta'rikh Wasit, and the second is a continuation, in three volumes, of the history of Baghdad of 'Abd al-Karim al-Sam'ani. Parts of the latter work are still in manuscript form in Paris and in Istanbul. His style in this work is that of the biographers. The work consists of the biographies of the notables of Baghdad arranged in alphabetical order. This work is abridged by Dhahabi, who called it Al-Mukhtasar al-Muhtaj ilaihi min Ta'rikh al-Hafiz Abi 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Sa'Id ibn Muhammad ibn al-Dubaithi. 5

From the biographies of al-Nasir and al-Zahir one can judge his 'Abbasid leanings and his loyalty to them.

For instance he several times refers to al-Nasir thus,

¹Al-Subkī, V, p. 26; <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fol. 188b; see also Brock. I, p. 330, S.I., p. 565.

²Ibn Khallikan, I, p. 660.

In the B.N., Arab. 5921-2; see Brock, S.I., p. 565.

In Shahid 'Ali Pasha Collection, No. 1870. The biographies of al-Nasir, the Wazir ibn al-Qussab and al-Qummi were published by M. Jawad in his appendix to Dhahabi's al-Mukhtasar, pp. 29 ff (of the appendix).

The first volume of this Mukhtasar was ed. by M. Jawad and published at Baghdad in 1951.

The Appendix of M. Jawad, op.cit., p. 34 ff.

⁷Sahid Ali Pasha MS. No. 1870, fels. 17b-18a.

"Our Master and our lord the leader, to whom obedience is a duty of all mankind, al-Nasir li Din Allah."

Ibn al-Sa'i was a student of Ibn al-Dubaithi and relates much information from his teachings.

Al-Kaziruni.

'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Mahmud Zahir al-Din al-Kaziruni was bern in 611/1214. He died in 697/1297. He studied with many famous scholars such as Ibn al-Dubaithi. He was well-known for his mathematical knowledge and wrote a book on this subject. This knowledge, probably, helped him to enter the service of the <u>Diwan</u> in Baghdad. 5

Al-Kaziruni wrote a large historical work called Raudat al-Arib in 17 volumes, but none of it is extant. This work seems to cover the events in 'Iraq till shortly before the death of the author. However, it seems that this work was one of the important 'Iraqi chronicles on the conquest of Baghdad and the events following it, for Dhahabi, who

Al-Jami al-Mukhtasar, pp. 72, 86, 87, 155..etc.

²Al-Subkī, VI, p. 242; Ibn Hajar, III, p. 119.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 497; Ibn Hajar, III, p. 119; but al-Subki says that he died about 700 A.H., Tabaqat, VI, p. 242.

⁴Ibn Hajar, III, p. 119.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 397, where he adds that al-Kaziruni served in very important posts in the <u>Diwan</u>.

The Hajar, III, p. 119; but Cl. Cahen says that this work was in 27 volumes, "Les Chroniques Arabes..." R.E.I. X (1936) p. 342; al-Subki puts the title of this work as Raudat al-Adib, see Tabaqat, VI, p. 242.

was very careful in selecting his references, used it to state some of his information about the fall of Baghdad and to give the biographies of Hulagu and Abaqa. In spite of this al-Dhahabi criticises him, in the biography of Hulagu and says,

"Al-Kaziruni says that Hulagu lived for 50 years, he was well acquainted with the art of ruling, and he treated the scholars with sympathy and the people with mercy. But I (al-Dhahabi) say how can a historian live in a heathen country or under a tyrant Sultan without telling lies and praising this Sultan."

The second work is called Mukhtasar al-Ta'rikh min Awwal al-Zaman ila Muntaha Dawlat banī 'l-'Abbas, and is extant in manuscript. In this work he follows the style of the biographical dictionaries, but confines himself to the Caliphs only. He narrates all the important events which occurred during the reign of the Caliph in question; for instance, in the biography of the last 'Abbasid Caliph he mentions the fall of Baghdad, the death of al-Musta'sim, the biographies of his sons and daughters, and then the names of his Wazirs, Hajibs and Judges.

This manuscript is supposed to be the autograph of the author and is dated 663/1264-5, but there are some events mentioned in this

¹Ta'rikh al-Islam, XX, fols. 212, 260, 261; XXI, fol. 71

²<u>Ibid.</u>, XX, fol. 261b.

³ Istanbul, Jarullah Collection, No. 1625.

The text fol. 96a, where is the sentence: "It was written and corrected by his author Zahir al-Din al-Kaziruni in 663."; see Cl. Cahen, op.cit., p. 342.

work which occurred later than the date above mentioned, such as the death of al-Mubarak, the son of al-Musta'sim, in 677/1278-9, and the date of the death of Fatima, the daughter of the same caliph, in 676/1277-8. These facts, however, suggest that this manuscript was written after 663/1264-5.

The attitude of the author towards the 'Abbasid Caliphate appears to have been respectful, judging from his style in narration; for instance he always puts the formula "May God have mercy on him" whenever he mentions the names of the Caliphs.

He puts the blame for the fall of Baghdad upon , 3

(Masters of the affair) without referring to any certain name, and thus he exonerates the Caliph, al-Musta'sim, from any misconduct and his Wazir, Ibn al-'Alqami, from any mischief towards the Caliphate. 4

Ibn al-Tiqtaqa.

Safi al-Din Muhammad b. 'Ali b. Tabataba b. al-Tiqtaqa was bern in 660/1261-2; he wrote his book, al-Fakhrī fi 'l-Adab al-Sultaniya wa 'l Duwal-al-Islamiyya, in 701/1301-2 at Mosul and presented it to the

The text fol. 95b.

²Ibid., fol. 96a.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 94b.

⁴Cf. below pp.

⁵ Ed. Derenbourg, Paris, 1895; Eng. tr. C.E.J. Whitting, London, 1947.

governor of Mosul, Fakhr al-Din 'Isa b. Ibrahim. He was an 'Alid and his father was one of the prominent personages among them. 1

Although al-Fakhri is considered as a fine piece of literature Ibm and/al-Tiqtaqa's historical accounts are not biased, yet one must bear in mind that Ibm al-Tiqtaqa was a Shī'ite, wrote his book under the Mongols' control and dedicated it to one of their lieutenants. Therefore, one does not expect him to be entirely neutral towards the 'Abbasids' history. His bias towards the Mongols is very clear throughout this book and he often called their empire "The conquering dynasty"; his prejudices against those Caliphs who ill-treated the Shī'a is apparent also.

Regarding his account of the last four of the 'Abbasid Caliphs, he recorded some useful information about their life and their Wazīrs.

In fact his prejudices do not appear in the biographies of the first three of these Caliphs, al-Naşir, al-Zahir and al-Mustansir, no doubt because of their mild religious policy towards the Shī'a, but his prejudice is quite clear against the last Caliph, al-Musta'sim, because the Shī'a community in Baghdad had suffered during the reign of this Caliph.

For the life and works of this author see Brock, S., II, pp. 201-2; and A. al-Azzawi, pp. 131ff.

See R. A. Nicholson, A literary history of the Arabs, Cambridge 1953, p. 454; E.I./I, s.v. Ibn al-Tiqtaqa (by Cl. Huart).

³Al-Fakhri, p. 190.

⁴See below, Chapter II., pp. 99 bb

⁵See al-Fakhri, pp. 63 ff, 448, and pp. 49ff.

His account of the fall of Baghdad is very concise, and his attitude towards this event, which is considered by many Sunni chroniclers as the worst calamity that befell Islam, is peculiar. He says, "Nothing happened in the reign of al-Musta'sim worthy of record save the looting of al-Karkh, and how bad /an incident that was7."

'Abd al-Laţif al-Baghdadi.

'Abd al-Latif ibn Yusuf ibn Muhammad Muwaffaq al-Din Abu Muhammad al-Baghdadi was born in Baghdad in Rabi' I or II 557/Mar.-Apr. 1162 and died there on 12 Muharram 629/9 Nov. 1231. He travelled widely and lived for a long period in Aleppo.4

He wrote several works on many subjects, one of which is still extant, al-Ifada wa 'l-I'tibar, a short description of Egypt. Although none of his historical writings are, so far, extant, yet al-Dhahabi preserved several quotations from the writings of this scholar in his Ta'rikh al-Islam; these quotations are:

1. The account of the Mongols' rise to power; Genghis Khan and his efforts to combine all the Tatar tribes; their

Al-Yumini, Dhayl Mir'at al-Zaman, I, p. 85; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 202; see also al-Subki, V, pp. 109ff and p. 114.

²Al-Fakhri, p. 451.

³ Dhahabi, XIX, fels. 81 ff; see also al-Subki, V, p. 132; Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, II, pp. 201-13; see also E.I./II, s.v. 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (by S.M.Stern); cf. J. Semegyi in J.R.A.S., 1936, pp. 596-7.

⁴Dhahabi, XIX, fel. 82a; al-Subki, V, p. 132; cf. A. al-'Azzawi, pp. 15 ff.

E.I./II, s.v. 'Abd al-Latif.

expansion westwards to Khurasan and their conflict with the Khwarizmian empire, and the destruction of the latter. The Mongols' advance towards Jibal province and Irbil, and how the army of Irbil and Baghdad were able to stop their progress. 2

- 2. The biographies of the last two Khwarizmian sovereigns, 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad and his son Jalal al-Din Mangubarti, with a fair description of the character of their troops.
- 3. The biography of al-Nasir, with a detailed account of his personality.4
- 4. The succession of al-Mustansir.5

Judging from these quotations one can presume that al-<u>Dh</u>ahabī copied these passages from a large work, perhaps a universal chronicle, written by al-Muwaffaq.

Al-Muwaffaq's account of al-Nasir's life is of great value, shedding light on the activity and personality of this Caliph. His point of view is that of 'Iraq, and he was favourable to al-Nasir and the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

Dhahabī, XVIII, fols. 222b-225a; see Somagyi in J.R.A.S., 1932, p. 854 ff, and idem in J.R.A.S., 1936, p. 598.

Dhahabi, XVIII, fols. 244-7; see also below Chapter I, pp. 7/- 1.

³Dhahabi, XVIII, fols. 172-73; XIX, fols. 76-7, and fol. 239b.

Lbid. XIX, fels. 10b ff.

⁵Ibid. fels. 222-3.

See below, Chapter I, pp.84-5and Chapter III, pp. 128-9.

C. Geographical literature.

The 'Iraqi geographical literature of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in general, is very limited in quantity as well as in value to this study. Yaqut al-Rūmī (564-626/1168-1229) wrote Mu'jam al-Buldan in this period. This geographical dictionary contains a considerable amount of information about the Caliphate principality and sheds some light on the economic condition of 'Iraq. Yaqut drew most of his information from earlier sources, which have nothing to do with this study. His description of the Sawad is good but, while he relates the revenue of this province during the time of 'Umar I, he mentions nothing about his own time. Thus the value of this work in regard to the fiscal and economic life of the late 'Abbasid Caliphate is very limited.

II Non-Traqi Sources

A. The general chronicles.

Although most of the non-'Iraqi chronicles pay slight attention to the affairs of the Caliphate, yet their information constitutes a good source of material for the history of 'Iraq. Their information, in

For the life and works of Yaqut see: Brock, I, pp. 479 ff, S. I, p. 880; Ibn Khallikan, II, pp. 277 ff; also A. al-Azzawi, pp. 10 ff.

This work was edited by Wustenfeld (1866-73) in 6 volumes.

The text, III, p. 178.

general, serves to supply another point of view towards the Caliphate affairs and also serves as a check for all the complementary evidence in the 'Iraqi sources. They also represent the attitude of the other Muslim rulers and a common impression of the Caliphate, and also clarify the relation between Baghdad and the other Muslim rulers. The most important among these general chronicles are:

Sibt ibn al-Jawzi.

Shams al-Din Abu 'l-Muzaffar Yusuf ibn Qirughlu al-Baghdadi al-Hanafi, usually called Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, was born in 582/1186 at Baghdad. He studied with his grandfather Ibn al-Jawzi, the celebrated Hanbali Shaykh. Sibt went to Damascus after 600/1203-4. He entered the service of the Ayyubid ruler, al-Mu'azzam, who persuaded him to adopt the Hanafi school. Sibt was kept in the service of the Ayyubid rulers as Wa'iz (preacher), until his death, which occurred on 21 Dhu 'l-Hijja 654/10 Jan. 1257.

Sibt wrote several works and on history he composed a universal chronicle called Mir'at al-Zaman, the events of which stopped at the be-

For the life of Sibt see Ibn al-'Imad, V, pp. 266-7; Ibn Abi 'l-Wafa', II, pp. 230-31; see also Abu Shama, pp. 195; Brock. I, p. 347, S.I. p. 589; Rosenthal, pp. 412-3.

²See the list of his works in A. al-'Azzawi, p. 71.

The last volume of this work (the eighth volume), which covered the events between 495-654 A.H., was published in facsimile by J.R.Jewett (Chicago 1907); another edition of the same volume was printed in Hyderabad (1951-2) but the latter edition is inadequate with many errors in identifying the proper names.

ginning of the year 654/1257, shortly before the death of the author.

However, it seems that because Sibt changed his school - Madhhab - from Hanbali to Hanafi, Dhahabi criticising his authenticity in dealing with history called him "Adventurer". Ibn Rajab also says about Sibt "But Abu 'l Muzaffar was not an authority () in what he relates..."

In Mir'at al-Zaman Sibt followed the method of his grandfather, Ibn al-Jawzi, in combining together the narratives as well as the biographies of the notables. Although his main concern was the events in Syria and Egypt, yet he recorded valuable information about the history of the Caliphate. Because of his patronage and service to the Ayyubid rulers he undoubtedly represents the official Ayyubid tendency towards the Caliphate. He tried, all the time, to represent his masters as good allies and vassals of the Caliphate. When, in 622/1225-6, Jalal al-Din Mangubarti - the last Sultan of the Khwarizm-shahs - asked al-Mu'azzam to help him against the Caliph, al-Mu'azzam, says Sibt, denied him his aid and told Jalal al-Din, "I am with you against anybody, except the Caliph, for he is the Imam of all the Muslims".

Ta'rikh al-Islam, XVIII, fel. 231a.

²Ibn Abi 'l-Wafa', II, p. 231; see also A. al-'Azzawi, pp. 72-3.

³ Mir'at al-Zaman, ed. Jewett, p. 417-8; cited also by Abu Shama, p. 144.

In general, he was neutral towards the Caliphate's affairs and recorded what he heard, saw, or could copy from other chronicles.

His work, Mir'at al-Zaman, became a source for later historians such as Abu Shama, who copied Mir'at in many instances word for word (see below), and Ibn Taghri-Bardi, Dhahabi and others.

Abu Shama

Shihab al-Din Abu 'l-Qasim 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Isma'il al-Maqdisi was born in Damascus on 23 Rabi' II 599/10 Jan. 1203. He died on 19
Ramadan 665/13 June 1267.

Abu Shama wrote several works on history, but the most important are:

- 1. <u>Kitab al-Rawdatayn fi Akhbar al-Dawlatayn</u>, a history of Nur al-Din and Salah al-Din.
- 2. Al-Dhayl 'ala 'l-Rawdatayn, a continuation of the preceding work. The latter work is the important one to this study, for it covers the events between 590-665 A.H., until shortly before the author's death. His information about the 'Abbasid Caliphate was derived mainly from Sibt's Mir'at al-Zaman, in fact, on many occasions, he quotes Sibt word

On the life and works of this author see E.I./II, s.v. Abu Shama (by Hilmy Ahmad); al-Kutubi, I, p. 322; Ibn al-'Imad, V, p. 318; Subki, V, pp. 61-2; Brock. I, p. 386, S.I., p. 550; and A. al-'Azzami, pp. 84 ff.

The Dhayl was printed in Cairo (1947) with the title: Tarajim Rijal al-Qarnayh al-Sadis wa 'l-Sabi'.

for word.

As one expects from him, as a Syrian historian, the affairs of Syria and Egypt occupied a very prominent place in his <u>Dhayl</u>. He was an accurate historian and was in his fifties when the Caliphate of Baghdad was brought to an end. His report on the fall of Baghdad is short but he includes in it the treachery of Ibn al-'Alqami, the Wazir of the Caliphate; this accusation is of great importance, for Abu <u>Shama</u> was the earliest Muslim historian to report this allegation.

Al-Yunini.

Qutb al-Din Musa ibn Muhammad al-Yunini al-Hanbali was born at Ba'labak in Sefar 640/Aug. 1242. After the death of his brother he became the Shaykh of the town. He himself died in 726/1325-6.4 He wrote a Dhayl to Mir'āt al-Zaman of Sibt ibn al-Jawzi. This Dhayl begins with the events of the year 654/1256-7 and his account of the history of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad confines itself to the fall of the Caliphate and the biography of the last Caliph, al-Musta'sim. His point of view is a Syrian one; his comment on the fall of the Caliphate is, "No calamity has befallen Islam like this calamity".

See E.I./II, s.v. Abu Shama; compare Sibt, ed. Jewett, p. 407, and Tarajim, p. 128; Sibt, p. 348 and Tarajim, p. 60, etc.

See D. Ayalen, "Transfer of the 'Abbasid Caliphate..", Arabica, VII, 1960, p. 51.

³ Tarajim, pp. 198-9; see below pp.

⁴Ibn Hajar, IV, p. 382; cf. Ibn al-'Imad, VI, pp. 73-4.

Two volumes of this Dhayl were printed in Hyderabad (1954-5).

See Dhayl, I, p. 85.

Bar-Hebraus.

Abu '1-Faraj Gregorius, the son of Aaron, was born in 526/1225-6 at Malitene (Malatiya). His father was a distinguished physician of Hebrew descent. Abu '1-Faraj studied philosophy, theology, Syriac and Arabic; he also acquired from his father a considerable knowledge of medicine. He visited Aleppo and, in 1246, he was ordained as Bishop of Jubas. In 1264 he was elected a Morphian of the East. He held this office until his death on 30 July 1286 at Maragha.

He composed several works on different subjects and two on history; the first, in Syriac, a universal history, the second, in Arabic, also a universal history translated by the author himself from his Syriac work with certain abridgment.

In his Arabic work he usually omits all the paragraphs which carry down curses on the Arabs (as he usually calls the Muslims in his Syriac book). In his early information about the history of Iraq in general, and Baghdad in particular, he draws mainly from Ibn al-Athir. As a

On the life of Bar-Hebraeus see the introduction of Salhani to his edition of Mukhtasar and the introduction of E.A.W.Budge to his English tr. of the Syriac history of Bar-Hebraeus; E.I./I, s.v. Bar-Hebraeus; and the chapter on this author by Th. Noldeke in Sketches from Eastern History, London 1892; see also A. al-'Azzawi, p. 119 ff.

This work was edited and translated into English with the title The Chronography of Gregory Abu 'l-Faraj, by E.A. Wallis Budge, Oxford 1932.

³Mukhtaşar Ta'rikh al-Duwal, ed. Salhani, Bayrouth 1890.

Cf. E.I./I,s.v.Bar-Hebraeus.

⁵Compare, for instance, <u>Mukhtasar</u>, pp. 404-5, and Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 217-8.

matter of fact, the two works are nowhere near alike; for example in the biography of al-Nasir, in his Arabic Mukhtasar, he reports the death of al-Nasir very briefly, while in his Syriac book he reports the biography of this Caliph in detail and describes his personality fairly well, but with harshness and prejudice. He relates how al-Nasir forced the Khatun, the daughter of Qilj Arslan, to marry him. She was very beautiful and he cites the doubtful death of her husband which allowed al-Nasir to take her as a wife. As one might expect, this story is not included in his Arabic chronicle.

As a Christian, one expects him to have a special point of view towards the history of the Caliphate. He is in favour of the Mongols' invasion and considers this invasion a great victory for the Christians and Christianity. However, his information about the Christian community in Baghdad is of great value (see below).

He treated the history of the Mongols with great detail and favour and, as he says, he derived all his information about them from Juvaini's work; he says:

"...Now his brother was 'Ala' al -Din, who was governor of Baghdad and who two years earlier had wellnigh died a natural death in Mugan; ... and he composed a marvellous Persian work on the chronology of the Kingdoms of the Seljuks, the Khawarazmians and Ishmaelites and Mongols; what we have introduced into one work on these matters we have derived from his book."

Mukhtasar, p. 414.

Chronography, I, p. 387 ff.

³ Ibid., p. 473; cf. J. A. Boyle in his introduction (p. XXVIII) to his English translation of Juvaini's work.

Juvaini.

'Ala' al-Din 'Ata Malik al-Juvaini was born in 1226 at Juvain (or Juwain) in Khurasan. He was descended from a family acquainted with the fiscal administration, his father and grandfather served the Seljuqid and Khwarizmian Sultans. In 1255 'Ala' al-Din entered the service of Hulagu and accompanied him to Baghdad. In 657/1259 he was appointed by Hulagu as governor of Arabian 'Iraq and Khuzistan. He died in 1283.

He composed a history, Ta'rikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, which consisted of three parts. The first deals with the Mongels' rise to power and the activities of Chingiz-Khan up to Hulagu's military operations against the Assassins of Persia. The second deals with the history of the Khwarizmian empire until its destruction at the hands of the Mongel. The third deals with the history of the Assassins of Persia and the destruction of their rule by Hulagu. This work is very useful to this study for it provides, with detail, the relations between the Caliphate and the Isma'Ilis, the Khwarizm-shahs and the Mongels. Juvaini's information on al-Naşir's military operations in Persia is of great value. He supplies a great deal of information on the hostile relations between al-Naşir and the last three Khwarizmian Sultans, Takash, Muhammad and

On the life and works of Ata-Malik, see Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 339; al-Kutubi, II, p. 45; C. A. Storey, Persian literature, section II (London 1935) pp. 260-1; see also the introduction of J. A. Boyle to his English tr. of Jahan-Gusha, pp. XV ff; and A. al-'Azzawi, pp. 102 ff.

This work was edited by M. Qazmini, in 3 vols. (G.M.S., Old Series, XVI/1, 2, 3) London, 1912, 1916 and 1937; J.A.Boyle translated this work into English with the title "The History of the World Conqueror", Manchester, 1958, 2 vol.

Jalal al-Din.

Although Juvaini was denied freedom of expression, for he wrote his work under Mongol control, yet he recorded most events with considerable honesty and accuracy. And being in their service did not affect his style and honesty, though he relates with modesty and tolerance all the destruction resulting from the Mongols' invasion of the Muslim lands. 2

Al-Rawandi.

Abu Bakr Najm al-Din Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Sulaiman al-Rawandi. He was in the service of the last Seljuqid Sultan Tughril II (571-590/1175-94). In 599-1202 he began to write his Rahat al-Sudur, which he dedicated to Chiyath al-Din Kay-Khusraw, the Seljuqid Sultan of Asia Minor.

Rahat al-Sudur wa-ayat al-Surur, a history of the "Great Seljuqs" from the rise of the dynasty to the year 595/1199. His account of the last Sultan, Tughril II, is of special importance for the author was an eye witness to most of the activities of this Sultan and his relations with Baghdad.

See Chapter I below, pp. 50 4.

See the introduction of J.A.Boyle's English tr. of Juvaini's work, I, pp. XXIX, ff; cf. Barthold, <u>Turkestan</u>, pp. 40 ff.

³C.A.Storey, Persian literature, section II/I (London 1935) pp. 256-7.

⁴Edited by M. Iqbal, London, 1921.

Abu 'l-Fida.

Isma'il ibn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Taqi al-Dīn 'Umar ibn Shahan-shāh ibn Ayyub, the Ayyubid prince of Hamāh, was born at Damascus in Jumada I, 672/Nov. 1273. He served the Mamluk Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qala'um, who appointed him to the governorship of Hamāh. Abu 'l-Fidā died at Hamāh on 23 Muḥarram 732/27 Oct. 1331. He was well known as a historian and a geographer. His work, Mukhtasar Ta'rīkh al-Bashar, as its title indicates, is a concise universal history covering the pre-Islamic period and Islamic history down to 729/1329. Al-Kamīl of Ibn al-Athīr was his main source for the history of the late 'Abbasid period and, after the year 628/1230-31, the year al-Kamīl was ended, Abu 'l-Fidā's narratives about the 'Abbasid Caliphate become very rare and concise.

Al-Dhahabi.

Shams al-Din Muhammad ibn 'Uthman ibn Qaymaz al-Turkumani, the celebrated theologian and historian, was born at Damascus er at Mayya-fariqin in 673/1274 and died at Damascus 748/1348.4

For his biography see Subki, VI, p. 84 ff; Ibn Hajar, I, pp. 371-2; al-Kutubi, Fawat, p. 20 ff; Ibn al-Imad, VI, pp. 98 ff; see also E.I./II, s.v. Abu 'l-Fida (by H.A.R.Gibb).

²This work was printed at Istanbul in four volumes in 1286/1869-70.

³Cf. E.I./II, op.cit.; also Barthold, <u>Turkestan</u>, p. 2; compare the biography of al-Naşir in <u>Mukhtasar</u> of Abu 'l-Fida, III, pp. 142-3 with that of Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 285 ff, and the biography of al-Zahir, Ibn al-Athir XII, pp. 287-8, <u>Mukhtasar</u>, III, pp. 143-4.

⁴Subkī, V, pp. 216 ff; Ibn Hajar, III, pp. 336 ff; cf. <u>E.I.</u>/II, s.v. al-<u>Dhahabi</u>; A. al-'Azzawi, pp. 183 ff.

Al-Dhahabī studied several subjects and wrote many works on Tradition, canon law and history. The most important historical work he composed is Ta'rīkh al-Islām (History of Islam). He wrote this work in twenty-one volumes, starting with the biography of the prophet Muhammad and ending with the year 700/1300-1. In this work al-Dhahabī follows the system of Ibn al-Jawzī in al-Muntazam. He combined both the general narratives and the obituary notices. He always mentioned his sources and sometimes quoted contradictory statements regarding a certain event or a certain biography; moreover, he used a large variety of references in compiling this work. Although he was a Syrian and not contemporary with the 'Abbāsid Caliphate of Baghadā his fine method in selecting his references and the large number of sources he quotes make his work very useful and indispensable for the study of the late 'Abbāsid history. In his account of al-Nāṣir's biography he quoted Al-Muwaffaq 'Abd al-Latīf, Tho al-Athīr, Ibn al-Sā'ī, Sibt ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Wāṣil. No doubt,

E.I./II, s.v. al-Dhahabi. The manuscript of Ta'rikh al-Islam which was consulted in this study is that of Aya Sofya Library (Istanbul), Nos. 3010-3014; these five volumes which cover the period 580-700 are the autograph of the author himself and written in large characters and very clearly; see the description of Brock. II, pp. 46-8, S.II, pp. 45-7; and Cl. Cahen in R.E.I., X (1936) pp. 345 ff.

²For further details on his method see E.I./II, s.v. al-Dhahabi.

³Ta'rikh al-Islam, XIX, fol. 10b.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 14b.

^{5&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 14a.

^{6&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 229b.

⁷ Ibid., fols. 13-14.

with the various points of view of these historians, Ta'rikh al-Islam, mostly, does not represent any particular point of view, but is a collection of narratives. With this laborious method al-Dhahabi preserved for the later historians a vast quantity of information, especially from those works which are no longer extant such as the works of 'Abd al-Latif and Ibn al-Sa'i.

Ibn Kathir.

'Imad al-Din Isma'il ibn 'Umar ibn Kathir was born in 700 or 701/1301-12 at Başra. When he was seven years old his father took him to Damascus where he studied with many famous scholars such as Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya. On history he wrote al-Bidava. He died in 774/1371-2.1

Al-Bidaya wa 'l-Nihaya, a universal chronicle, is very useful to this study. In this work Ibn Kathir preserved many valuable narratives concerning the history of the late 'Abbasid period. On the biography of al-Nasir Ibn Kathir quoted Ibn al-Sa'i and Ibn al-Athir. His point of view is that of Syria and to some extent favours the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

His quotations from earlier sources, especially from 'Iraqi sources such as Ibn al-Sa'i, 4 add to the importance of his work.

lbn al-'Imad, VI, pp. 231; Ibn Hajar, I, p. 373; Breck. S.II, pp. 48-9.

This work was printed in Caire, 135//1932.

³See Bidaya, XIII, p. 106.

⁴<u>Ibid.,pp. 161, 192.</u>

B. Biographical works.

Al-Nasawi.

Shihab al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Nasawi, the secretary (Katib al-Insha') of Jalal al-Dīn Mangubirti. He served Jalal al-Dīn after the latter returned from India (in 1223) until his death which occurred in 1231. In 639/1241 he wrote the history of his sovereign; this was entitled Sīrat al-Sultan Jalal al-Dīn Mangubirti. This work begins with the account of Muḥammad's - the father of Jalal al-Dīn's - campaign to 'Iraq in 614/1217. His account of the relations between Baghdad and the last two Khwarizm-shah Sultans is of great importance, for he was an eye witness as well as being in a position which enabled him to see everything closely. Although one expects him to represent the Khwarizmian point of view towards the struggle between the Khwarizm-shahs and the Caliphate, yet he discussed fairly these relations in terms of respect to the 'Abbasid Caliphate in an almost unprejudiced manner. 3

Al-Kutubi

Abu 'Ali Muhammad ibn Shakir ibn Ahmad al-Dimashqi al-Kutubi died in 764/1336. 4 Al-Kutubi wrote Fawat al-Wafayat as a supplement to

On the author see Barthold, <u>Turkestan</u>, pp. 38-9; Brock. S.I., p. 552; <u>E.I./I</u>, s.v. Nasawi.

²This work was edited and translated into French by O. Houdas, Paris, 1891-5.

³See below, Chapter I, pp. 62 H.

⁴For the life of the author see Ibn Hajar, III, pp. 451-2; Ibn al-'Imad, VI, p. 203; Brock, S.II, p. 48.

⁵This work was printed at Caire in 1283/1866-7 in two volumes.

Wafayat al-A'yan of Ibn Khallkian (608-681/1211-1282).

The dictionary of al-Kutubi is more important to this study than the biographical dictionary of Ibn Khallikan, for it contains a detailed account of the biographies of the last 'Abbasid Caliph, al-Musta'sim and his Wazir, Ibn al-'Alqami.²

Al-Subki.

Taj al-Din 'Abd al-Wahhab ibn Taqi al-Din al-Subki died in 771/
1369/70. His work Tabaqat al-Shafi'iyya al-Kubra4 is of special importance for it contains a detailed account of the fall of Baghdad and the destruction of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, with the biography of al-Musta'sim and a good description of the conditions of the Caliphate before its downfall. Al-Subki also reported the treachery of Ibn al-'Alqami.

C. The Travellers.

Ibn Jubalr.

Abu '1-Husayn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Jubair al-Kinani al-Andulusi (died in 614/1217). 6 He wrote an interesting account of his pilgrimage

See Fawat, I, pp. 302 ff.

²Ibid., II, pp. 189 ff.

³⁰n his life and works see Brock. G. II.89, S.II./05see also A. al-'Azzawi, p. 196.

⁴This work was printed at Cairo in 1324/1906-7.

See Tabagat, V, pp. 109 ff.

For the life of the author see Brock. I, p. 478; the introduction of the edition of De Goe je of the Travels of Ibn Jubair (Leyden 1907) pp. 13 ff

from Granada to Macca and of his journey back through 'Iraq during the years 579-81/1183-5. His account of what he had seen in Baghdad is of great importance, as an eye witness of the conditions of the Caliphate in the reign of al-Naşir, as well as his description of the agricultural lands of the Caliphate. Although his account of Baghdad was not detailed, yet it contains very useful remarks and observations about the people of the Caliphate and the financial life of the country.

Henjamin of Tudela.

Rabbi Benjamin ben Jonah of Tudela, the famous Jewish traveller. 2

He travelled from Tudela, in the north of Spain, through Rome to Constantinople, then to Anatolia and then he proceeded to Damascus, Baghdad and Persia. He completed his travels in 1173. 3 Thus he visited Baghdad shortly before the accession of al-Nasir to the throne of the Caliphate. His account of what he saw in Baghdad, especially of the conditions of his co-religionists, is of remarkable importance. He describes in detail the position, leadership and religious foundations of the Jewish community in

On the editions and translations of this work see J. Sauvaget, <u>Introduction a l'histoire de l'Orient Musulman</u>, ed. by Cl. Cahen (Paris 1961), p. 169.

²His travels have been translated into many languages, and into English by A. Asher, (London 1840); and also by M.N.Adler (London 1907); it was also translated into Arabic by E.H.Haddad (Baghdad 1945). These three translations were consulted in this study, for they contain some differences.

³E.N.Adler, <u>Jewish Travellers</u>, London 1930, p. 38; see also Benjamin <u>Itinerary</u>, tr. A. Asher, II, p. XI ff, and pp. 251-2; cf. the Arabic tr. pp. 23 ff.

'Iraq. His interesting remarks on the social and economic position of this community throw light on the conditions of all the non-Muslim communities living under the Caliphate and reveal the nature of the relation between the Caliphate and the non-Muslim people.

Petachia of Ratisbon.

Rabbi Petachia, son of Rabbi Jacob, born in Ratisbon in the first half of the twelfth century. He lived in Prague and from this city he set out upon his travels prior to 1187, probably some time between 1175 and 1185. Thus it seems that he visited Baghdad during the reign of al-Naşir. His account of the Jewish community in Baghdad supplemented the account of Benjamin of Tudela.

Although his <u>Itinerary</u> did not become as famous as that of Benjamin because the account of his travels was written down by his follower R.

Jahuda ben Samuel and because his notes were incomplete and without any order, yet his account of the Jews in Baghdad is of great importance, for he describes in detail the Jewish leadership and the offices, as well as the relation of the Jews with the Caliphate.

See below, Chapter III, pp. 159#.

²Benjamin of Tudela, tr. of E. Haddad, pp. 17-8; cf. <u>Jewish Travellers</u>, p. 64.

For the editions and translations of these travels see <u>Jewish Travellers</u>, p. 64.

See Dr. Zunz's, "An Essay on the geographical literature of the Jews", in Asher's tr. of Benjamin's Itinerary, II (London 1841), p. 253.

III. Coins and Inscriptions.

Coins and inscriptions in general add valuable information to what is known from chronicles and other works and thus they constitute a very important source of information for the Caliph or period in question. In certain cases they provide new facts, or clarify doubtful points. They are also a means of checking facts contained in chronicles which are liable to distortion, intentionally or unintentionally, by their authors. Although information from this kind of source is concise, yet it is to the point and almost certainly truthful. Although the coins and inscriptions belonging to the last epoch of the 'Abbasid Caliphate are limited in number, nevertheless those that do exist provide valuable and interesting facts. Coins provide, besides the name of the Caliph, the name of his heir-apparent and the year and place of the mint. Al-Nasir's coins bear the title of his heir-apparent as 'Udat al-Dunya Abu Nasr (عُدة الدنبا الوناس), later al-Zahir. This was done, without doubt, as a further means of confirming and publicizing the position of his heir-apparent. Furthermore, study of the weight and fineness of the gold and silver coins reveals the financial conditions of the state and the economic life in general and whether it was stable or otherwise.

¹ See Naqshabandi, al-Dinar al-Islami, Baghdad 1953, p. 182.

²Ibid., pp. 178 ff.

³See below, Chapter V, pp. 136 #.

The inscriptions on buildings provide another means of information, especially the name of the Caliph and some of his titles; the year of the construction or restoration and, often, the name of the official in charge are given.

IV The Modern Studies.

This period of the 'Abbasid history is almost entirely neglected by the modern historians and Orientalists save for some studies on the Futuwwa of al-Naşir by F. Taeschner and P. Kahle, with some other studies on the biographies of the last four 'Abbasid Caliphs. But the history of the Caliphate in general has not been investigated thoroughly. Even the most recent work, A History of the Crusades, devoted several chapters to the Seljuqid of Persia and Anatolia, to the Ayyubids of Syria and Egypt, but only two pages were given to the Caliphate. This neglect is, perhaps, due to the fact that most of the information and narratives available about this period of the history of 'Iraq are short, contradictory and scattered in many works, the majority of which are still extant in manuscript. In the words of the historian Barthold,

"The second half of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth century belong on the whole to the darkest

For example see R.C.E.A., X, p. 28, and pp. 185 ff; see also below Chapter II, pp./3964.

Edited by Kenneth M. Setton (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), second vol.

³<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 665-7.

pages of Muslim history. The testimony of the sources which have come down to us is contradictory in the extreme, and the establishment of the chronology even of the most important events presents great difficulties."

This statement is, perhaps, true for the history of central Asia and Persia, but it could not be applied to the history of 'Iraq in this period for the flourishing state of affairs of the Caliphate continued up to the reign of the last Caliph, al-Musta'sim (640-656/1242-1258) and then the decline appeared and was completed with the fall of Baghdad. Many chronicles and biographical dictimnaries were compiled in 'Iraq during this period by famous historians such as Ibn al-Sa'ī, Ibn al-Dubaithī and Ibn al-Najjār but, unfortunately, some of these works were lost and the rest were not published.

No doubt, in the history of 'Iraq, the darkest pages of history prevailed after the conquest of 'Iraq by the Mongols and not before it.

¹Turkestan, p. 30.

Chapter I.

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF

THE ABBASID CALIPHATE

575/1179 - 656/1258

The great Seljuq Sultanate had collapsed during the twelfth century and broken up into many minor states; 'Paq was ruled by a local dynasty of these Seljuqs. But towards the middle of the twelfth century those Sultans lost their control over Baghdad. The state of the their position and to regain their authority over 'Iraq. The most active among them was al-Nasir, who came to power in 575/1180. He was able to pursue a consistent policy, which was directed towards restoring the temporal power of the Galiphate. He started his policy of expansion by conquering some of the provinces around Baghdad. In 579/1183-4 he conquered Daquq, in 585/1189-90 he was able to restore his authority over Takrit, and in 586/1190-91 he took Hadithat 'Ana.

¹ Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, ed. Tornberg, XI, pp. 140-42.

²E.I./I, s.v. al-Nasir li-Din Allah (by F. Taeschner).

³sibt ibn al-Jamzi, Mir'at al-Zaman, ed. Jewrett, p. 240.

⁴Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 27.

^{5&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, XII, p. 38; see also Sibt, p. 256; but Ibn <u>Khaldun</u> puts the date in 585/1189-90, <u>al-'Ibar</u>, Cairo (1867), III, p. 530.

But soon this policy of al-Nasir was confronted with a very serious obstacle, which was the growing power of the last Seljuq sultan, Tughril II.

Tughril II succeeded to the throne in 571/1175 at the age of seven with no real power; the power was in the hands of Atabeg Muḥammad Pehlewan. The Atabeg was able to subject all 'Iraq 'Ajam (or 'Iraq 'Ajami), Adharbayjan, and Arran to his rule. Al- Nasir's ambitious policy of extending his territory led to a collision between him and the Seljuqid government. The Atabeg persuaded the Sultan Tughril to deprive the caliph of his temporal power. According to Rawandi, a contemporary historian of these events, the adherents of the Sultan and the Atabeg discoursed to the people declaring that the main duty of the Caliph was the performance of Namaz and condemned as senseless his interference in the affairs of temporal rule, which had to be entrusted to the Sultans.

On the death of Atabeg Pehlewan in 581/1186⁵ or 582/1186-7⁶
Tughril II found a favourable opportunity to seize power himself. He

E.I./I. s.v. Tughril II, (by M. Th. Houtsma).

Al-Jibal or 'Iraq 'Ajam are two names for one country, but the latter name was used by the Persians, and apparently introduced during the later Seljuq period. Yaqut al-Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buldan, ed. Wüstenfeld, II, pp. 15-16.

Husaini, Zubdat al-Tawalikh, ed. M. Iqbal (1933), pp. 171-2.

⁴Rahat al-Sudur, ed. M. Iqbal (1921), p. 334; see also Barthold, Turkestan, (1928), pp. 346-7.

Abu Hamid, "Dhayl Seljuqname Zahir-i-Nishapuri", Mihr II (1313), p. 241.

Husaini, p. 172; also Sibt, p. 250; Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 346.

was assisted by the fact that Pehlewan's successor, Qizil Arslan, had quarrelled with the widow of his deceased brother and her two sons, Qutlugh Inanj Mahmud and Amir Amīran. Besides these two Pehlewan had, by female slaves, two other sons, Abū Bakr and Ozbeg. The former was brought up by his uncle Qizil Arslan, who treated him as his own son. Pehlewan had divided his territory amongst his sons under the supremacy of his brother, and after his death the latter controlled the government. The ambitious princess felt much aggrieved by this course of affairs, above all because her sons would be made inferior to the son of a slave by the predilection of Qizil Arslan towards Abū Bakr. She, therefore, rebelled, aided by some Amīrs, but as Qizil Arslan marched against her at Rayy, the Amīrs left her and she was forced to abandon the city and accompany Qizil Arslan, who married her, though he allowed her to reside in the castle of Sarjahan.

When the Atabeg reached Rayy, Tughril left him and went to Simnan in Jumada I 583/July-Aug. 1187, where he was able to make arrangements with a number of Turkish Amirs. By this alliance Tughril was able to capture Hamadhan and to put Qizil Arslan to flight. Moreover, Qutlugh Inannj and Amir Amiran deserted their uncle and followed Tugh-

Husaini, pp. 172 ff; cited by M. The. Houtsma, "Some remarks on the history of the Seljuks", A.O., III (1924), pp. 143-4.

Abu Hamid, in Mihr II (1313) pp. 241-2. According to Husaini Tughril went to Damghan, Zubdat, p. 175.

ril; as a result of this act the Atabeg found himself in a weak position. He, therefore, left 'Iraq 'Ajam on 4 Ramadan 583/7 Nov. 1187 and went to Adharbayjan. In order to destroy his opponent, Qizil Arslan sent a message to the Caliph al-Nasir asking his help against Tughril and at the same time warning him of the increasing power of this Seljuq Sultan.

Tughril was able to subject a considerable part of 'Iraq 'Ajam to his rule; after he had achieved this success, he sent an envoy to Baghdad asking the Caliph to acknowledge his rule with the title of Sultan, and asking that the Sultanate Palace Dar al-Saltana should be repaired because he was intending to come to Baghdad to reside there. Al-Naşir was very quick in his response to these requests by issuing orders to demolish this Palace and even to remove all trace of it; and in the meantime he ordered an army to march against Tughril. The expedition was prepared, and its leadership was given to

l_{Husaini}, p. 176.

²Abu Hamid, p. 242; cf. Husaini, p. 176.

³Husaini, p. 176; Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 371.

⁴Abu Shama, Dhayl, Cairo (1947), p. 6.

⁵Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 371; Rawandi, p. 334; cf. Nakhjavani, Tajarib al-Salaf, Tahran (1313), pp. 323-4.

⁶Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 371; cf. Nakhjavani, pp. 323-4; see also Ibn Khaldun, III, p. 529.

⁷According to Husaini, the Caliph spent 600,000 Dinars on this expedition, Zubdat al-Tawarikh, pp. 177-8.

the Wazir ibn Yunus. This army left Baghdad at the end of Safar 584/April 1188 for 'Iraq 'Ajam, intending to wait for Qizil Arslan and his army in a certain spot; but Ibn Yunus proceeded towards Hamadhan without waiting for the coming of the Atabeg. On reaching Daymarg this army attacked Tughril on 6 Rabi·I 584/5 May 1188, but the army of Baghdad was defeated as a result of the desertion of the Turkoman troops under their chieftain Mahmud ibn Barjam al-Ivai; and Ibn Yunus was taken captive.

On receiving this news, al-Nasir did not give up his intention to destroy his foe, but ordered another army to set out against Tugh-ril. This army left Baghdad and proceeded to Hamadhan. In the meantime, Tughril prepared his own ruin by a breach with his Turkish Amirs. He ordered the death of two of the greatest Amirs, Aiaba and Ozaba, in Jumada I 584/July 1188. This act caused Qutlugh Inanj to desert him and to join his uncle, Qizil Arslan. Thus, instead of one enemy, Qizil Arslan, he had also to fight against Qutlugh Inanj. With this

Abu Hamid puts the number of this army as 15,000 horsemen, Mihr II, p. 242.

²Abu Hamid, p. 242; Cf. Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 10-11.

³Husaini, pp. 177-8.

⁴Abu Hamid, in Mihr, II, p. 242.

⁵Husaini, p. 178; see also Houtsma in A.O. III, p. 148; also E.I./I, s.v. Tughril II; Nakhjavani, pp. 327-8, On this expedition see also Kafesoglu, pp. 111-2.
6Husaini, p. 178; cf. Rawandi, pp. 346-8.

⁷Abu Hamid, in Mihr II, p. 242; also Houtsma, in A.O., III, p. 149.

reinforcement, Qizil Arslan returned to 'Iraq 'Ajam, where he joined the army of Baghdad. The allied army was able to capture Hamadhan. In Rajab 584/Aug.—Sept. 1188 the Atabeg proclaimed Sanjar ibn Sulaiman Sultan instead of Tughril. Tughril lost his authority over 'Iraq 'Ajam and, as a result of many skirmishes between his followers and the troops of Qizil Arslan, he found it was impossible for him to stay in this province; he, therefore, left it for Adharbayjan, where he found a refuge at the castle of a Turkoman chief named 'Izz al-Din Hasan ibn Qifjaq. He tried to strengthen his position by applying for help to several Muslim rulers, including Saladin, but without success. 4

Tughril realised the bad consequences of opposing the Caliph.

He, therefore, tried to come to terms with al-Nasir. He sent an ambassador with his son, Alp Arslan, to Baghdad, to apologise on behalf of his father and ask forgiveness for what he had done to the Wazir

Ibn Yunus, with the promise that he would henceforth respect the orders of the Caliph. He also sent a message to Qizil Arslan, but the latter refused to listen to his proposals. Thus all his efforts to settle the

Houtsma, in A.O., III, p. 149; while Husaini says that the army of Baghdad alone captured Hamadhan and Qizil Arstan arrived afterwards, see Zubdat, p. 178.

²Abu Hamid, p. 243.

³Husaīni, pp. 179-80; also Houtsma, in <u>A.O.</u> III, p. 149; cf. Abu Hamid, p. 243.

⁴E.I./I, s.v. Tughril II (by Houtsma).

Husaini, pp. 179-80: Abu Hamid (Mihr II), p. 243; Cf. Houtsma, in A.O. III, p. 150. Sibi puts the date of this embassy on 7 Muharram 586/14 Feb. 1190, Mirat, p. 256.

dispute with his enemies peacefully were in vain, and he was obliged to surrender to Qizil Arslan. He was imprisoned with his son in the castle of Kahran near Tabriz in Ramadan 586/Oct. 1190. The Atabeg, who had before proclaimed Sanjar ibm Sulaiman Sultan instead of Tughril, now put aside this puppet Sultan and went to Hamadhan where he took possession of the Seljuqid throne with the approval of the Caliph. Thus the danger of Tughril was checked and 'Iraq 'Ajam was controlled by a good ally of al-Naşir. Tughril was kept in prison till the death of Qizil Arslan, which occurred in 587/1191. He resumed his activities to subdue 'Iraq 'Ajam after he regained his freedom. Qutlugh Inanj, on hearing this news, marched against Tughril, but the latter was able to defeat him. After this victory, Tughril marched towards Hamadhan and was able to capture it; in fact, he was able to resume his authority over a large part of 'Iraq 'Ajam.

Abu Hamid, pp. 243-4; Husaini, pp. 180-81; see also Houtsma in A.O., p. 150.

²Houtsma, in <u>A.O.</u>, p. 150; cf. Rawandi, pp. 346-7.

According to AbuHamid (p. 244) the Atabeg was killed in Shawwal 587/Oct.-Nov. 1191; while Rawandi (p. 363) puts the date on 5 Sha'ban 587/28 Aug. 1191. For more details on the relations between Qizil Arslan and Tughril see I. Kafesoglu, Harezmgahlar Devleti Tarihi, Ankara (1956), pp. 116 ff.

⁴Abu Hamid, p. 244; Cf. Husaini, pp. 181-2.

J. A. Boyle, I, p. 299; Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 69-70.

Now a new enemy for the Sultan appeared, the Khwarizm-Shah, who had profited from the reigning disorder in 'Iraq 'Ajam and Adhar-bayjan to occupy al-Ray. Jughril assembled a huge army but the Khwarizm-Shah entered into negotiations because of his dispute with his brother, Sultanshah, which forced him to withdraw his troops from 'Iraq 'Ajam. Tughril marched towards al-Ray and expelled the Khwarizmians from it. This action of Tughril aroused the anger of Takash - the Khwarizm-Shah, who prepared an army and led it personally against him. In the meantime, al-Nasir gave Takash another legal means to attack Tughril, by sending an envoy to him to ask for help against Tughril.

The Sultan, instead of preparing himself for the more serious war with the Khwarizm-Shah, passed his days at al-Ray in merry-making and refused to hear the advice of his Amirs. The Khwarizmian force arrived at al-Ray, and after a short battle Tughril was defeated and put to death on 29 Rabi I 590/24 Mar. 1194; his head was dispatched to Baghdad, where it was hung on the gate of al-Nubi. This victory raised Takash from the status of a local ruler to a ruler of a great

Abu Hamid, pp. 244-5; see also Houtsma, in A.O., pp. 150-51.

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 70.

Abu Hamid, p. 245; also Juvaini, I, p. 303; but Husaini puts the date on 9 Rabi I, see <u>Zubdat</u>, p. 193. Ibn al-Athir (XII, p. 70), puts the date at 24 Rabi I; cf. Kafesoglu, pp. 125-6.

⁴The al-Athir, XII, p. 70; cf. Abu Hamid, p. 245; Abu Shama says that this head was afterwards stored in فزانة الرؤسى Dhayl, p.6.

empire and henceforth he called himself on his coins no longer

Khwarizm-Shah, but "Sultan son of the Khwarizm-shah".1

Takash became master of 'Iraq 'Ajam; the Caliph realized the danger of this neighbourhood and tried by means of negotiation to control this province. According to Juvaini, he sent messengers to Takash asking him to surrender 'Iraq 'Ajam or part of it to the Caliphate, but Takash refused this; then the Caliph sent his Wazīr, Ibn al-Qaṣṣāb, with robes of honour and gifts, to persuade the Sultan to obey the Caliph. But the misconduct of the Wazīr, who demanded that the Khwarizm-shāh should appear before him on foot and show great humility, aroused the anger of Takash, who marched to punish the Wazīr. The conflict between the two armies was avoided by the act of the Wazīr, who retreated to some mountains when he heard of the advance of Takash towards him. 3

Ibn al-Qassab, after he had failed in his mission, returned to Baghdad, where he was received withgreat honour and the Caliph bestowed on him the robe of the Wizara (in Shaban, 590/July-Aug. 1194).4

E.I./I, s.v. Takash (by W. Barthold).

²But Ibn al-Athir reports that ibn al-Qassab had been already in this province with an army, sent as reinforcement to Takash in his struggle with Tughril; see al-Kamil, XII, p. 70.

³Juvaini, I, pp. 303-4; see also Kafesoglu, pp. 126-7.

Till this date Ibn al-Qassab was only deputy Wazir (نائب في العزارة)
but from now on he was placed as a Wazir. Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 70-71.
See also below, pp. 186-7.

After the death of Tughril II, al-Nasir was free to fulfil some of his ambitions for expansion; therefore, he sent his Wazīr in Ramadān 590/Aug.-Sept. 1194 to Khūzistan, soon after the death of the ruler of this country, Ibn Shamlā. Ibn al-Qaşsāb was able to conquer this province and to annex it to the 'Abbāsid principality. From Khūzistan, Ibn al-Qassāb marched northwards. When he reached Misan he was joined by some forces under the leadership of Qutlugh Inanj, the Khwarizmian's viceroy in 'Irāq 'Ajam. This army reached Karman-shāh and from there they marched against Hamadhan, which they were able to capture, and the son of Takash and the garrison left it. Afterwards the Caliph's army marched to al-Ray, which was captured also. At the same time there was another expedition sent from Baghdād to Iṣpahān, at the request of Ra'īs al-Shafi'īva in that city, because the Khwarizmian rule there was unpopular.

¹ Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 71; Sibt, pp. 285-6.

Qutlugh Inanj joined the Caliph's army as a result of a dispute between him and the leader of the Khwarizmian army, Mayanchuq. Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 72. But Juvaini reports that Qutlugh Inanj came to al-Ray to assist Mayanchuq against the Baghdad army. But after several days Maganchuq attacked Qutlugh Inanj and killed him. He sent his head to Khwarizm claiming that he had been meditating rebellion. Juvaini, I, p. 307.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 72-3; see also Kafesoğlu, pp. 132 ff.

⁴Ibnal - Atha XI 76; see also Bar-Hebraeus, Chronography, I, p. 345.

Thus al-Nasir was able to restore his authority over the western part of Persia, but this was only temporary. Takash, who claimed western Iran as a successor to the Seljuq Sultanate and regarded al-Nasir's extension of territory as a usurpation, was angry at this act and, therefore, sent to be al-Qassab asking him to leave this province. When he received the refusal of the Wazīr, he marched with his army towards 'Iraq 'Ajam. But in the beginning of Sha ban 592/July 1196, Ibn al-Qassab died in Hamadhan, and thus the Caliphate army was deprived of its active leader. Soon after his death, Takash reached Hamadhan where a collision between his army and the Caliphate troops took place and resulted in the defeat of the latter. Takash entered Hamadhan in triumph, stayed there for a while and returned back to Khurasan.

In 593/1196-7 al-Nasir sent another army to control Hamadhan but this expedition was unsuccessful.²

By the year 594/1197-8 the Khwarizm-shah could finally subdue all 'Iraq 'Ajam, and he demanded the Khutba and the title of Sultan from al-Nasir - i.e. that the Caliph should hand over to him the secular

lbn al-Athir, XII, p. 73; Juvaini, I, pp. 307-8; cf. Kafesoğlu,
p. 135.

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 81-2.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 88; see also Minhaj-i-Siraj, <u>Tabaqat Nasiri</u>, <u>English</u> trans., I, pp. 241-2.

power in Baghdad itself. The Caliph realized that he could no longer resist Takash and his increasing power alone; he, therefore, appealed for help from Ghiyath al-Din, the Ghurid Sultan, to stop Takash from penetrating into the possessions of the Caliphate. Ghiyath al-Din offered his services to the Caliph and engaged in a battle in Khurasan against Takash, the latter appealed for help to the Qara-Khitays and received an army from them. The allies were defeated by the Ghurs; therefore Takash entered into negotiations with Ghiyath al-Din, who demanded that Takash should obey the Caliph. 2 Al-Nasir realized that he could gain nothing from his struggle against Takash and that it was far better for him to settle the dispute peacefully. Therefore, in 595/1198-9, al-Nasir sent the robe of honour with gifts and the patent of ruling to Takash, according to Juvaini, "a patent conferring the title of Sultan of 'Iraq /i.e. 'Iraq 'Ajam/, Khorasan and Turkistan". 4 This patent, according to Ibn al'Sa'i, was sent at the request of Takash himself. If Ibn al-Sa'i is to be believed.

E.I./I, s.v. Takash (by W. Barthold).

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 88-90; Tabaqat Nasiri, I, p. 243; for further details see Barrthold, Turkestan, pp. 344-5.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 100.

⁴Juvaini, I, p. 312.

⁵Al-Jami'al-Mukhtasar, ed. M. Jawad (1934), pp. 34-5.

Takash contented himself with this title and gave up his intentions to have the Khutba in his name in Baghdad. Thus the dispute between al-Nasir and Takash was settled, and it seems that the peaceful relations between them existed till the death of Takash on 20 Ramadan 596/4 July 1200. Although Sibt and Abu Shama report that Takash died on his way to conquer Baghdad, yet that seems unlikely since Takash, at this time, was occupied with the struggle against the Ghurs and the Assassins. Furthermore, Juvaini states that Takash died on his way to wreak vengeance on the Assassins, after they had murdered his Wazīr, Nizam al-Mulk.

In the period 596-611/1200-1214 Muhammad Khwarizm-shah, the son and successor of Takash, was occupied with the wars against his enemies, the Ghurs and the Qara-Khitays; because of this, he was unable to pay any attention to the west. Al-Nasir took this opportunity to strengthen his position inside and outside Baghdad against expected strife between him and the Khwarizm-shah.

Al-Jami al-Mukhtasar, p. 19 and p. 24; where he reports: "In Ramadan (596/June-July 1200), Takash sent his nephew, Saif al-Din, to Baghdad, where he paid tribute to the Caliph, and apologized on behalf of his uncle for demanding the Khutba from the Caliph."

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 103; also ibn al-Sa'i, p. 35. But Juvaini puts the date of his death at 19 Ramadan, Juvaini, I, p. 315; cf. Hamdallah Mustawfi, Tarikh-i-Guzida, p. 493; see also Kafesoğlu, p. 146.

³Mir'at, p. 304; and Abu Shama, p. 17.

⁴Juvaini, I, pp. 313-4; Hamdallah Mustawfi, p. 493; cf. M. Hodgson, The Order of the Assassins, (1955), p. 215. According to Ibm al-Athir, Nizam al-Mulk was murdered in Jumada II, 596/Mar.-Apr. 1200, al-Kamil, XII, p. 104.

In Baghdad he tried several means to strengthen his position, in order to enable him to carry out his ambitious policy and to check the menace of the Khwarizm-shah. He had, early in his reign, adopted and patronized the Futuwwa order in order to approach the Shi'ite element to support him; he issued the edict to re-organize this order in 604/1207, placing it under his sole leadership. At the same time, he tried to satisfy the Sunni element, especially the 'Ulama', by obtaining a Mashyakha from famous scholars in tradition. He even composed a book called Ruhal-'Arfin (the spirit of sages) and authorized many scholars to recite this work to their students.

In 604/1207-8 he opened 20 houses for the poor to take their food in Ramadan, but this practice was short lived. At the same time, outside Baghdad, he maintained his good relations with the Ghurid sovereign, Shihab al-Din, by sending many envoys to this Sultan. It seems that the Caliph offered Shihab al-Din the title of Sultan, and the honour of being called نشير الرئيني ابر الرئيني (The Partner of the

See below, pp. 113 ff.

²⁵ibt, p. 354; Abu Shama, p. 69; see also below, pp.124 ff.

³Sibt, p. 348; Abu Shama, p. 60; Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 229-30; Cf. Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 184.

⁴Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 286.

⁵Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 143, 167-8, and p. 262.

The inscription of Qutb Manar, RCEA, X, p. 13; cf. Hasan al-Basha, al-Algab al-Islamiyya, pp. 204-5.

Commander of the Faithful - in his sovereignty). This title was, in fact, the highest title offered by the 'Abbasid Caliphs to the Seljuq Sultans; and it was even considered as an emblem for the Seljuqid Sultanate.

As a result of al-Nasir's policy of seeking allies in the east, the Assassins of Alamut declared in 608/1211-12 their conversion to orthodox Islam.²

It seems that the motive for Hasan III to declare his conversion was his fear of the Khwarizmian's increasing power and control over Persia. Even Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir was aware of this threat and ascribes the action of Hasan to this reason. Thus the cause of this conversion was a merely political one, without any intention of destroying the doctrine of the sect. 4

The Khwarizmian's menace to the Assassins of Persia started with the expedition led by Takash in 590/1194 against the last Seljuq sultan, Tughril II. This menace was increased at the end of the reign of Takash, when the latter was able to resume his control over 'Iraq 'Ajam and to settle the dispute between him and the Caliph. Thus Takash was free to

Abu dl-Fada'il al-Hamawi, al-Ta'rikh al-Mansuri, Moscow (1960), fol. 132b.

²Ibn Wasil, fol. 169; Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 195; Cf. B. Lewis, "The Isma'ilites and the Assassins" in A History of the Crusades, Pennsylvania (1955), I, pp. 127-8.

³Ibn 'Abdal-Zahir, Siyrat al-Malik al-Zahir, fols. 141b-142a; also Nuwairi, XXIX, fol. 62a; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 13b-14a.

⁴Van-Berchem, "Epegraphie des Assassins de Syrie", J.A. IX, (1897), p. 477.

uproot the Assassins. He started the hostile action by his attack on Mazendaran, and then on Arsalan-Gushai fortress, of which he was able to take possession. The hostile relations between the Assassins and Takash resulted in the assassination of the latter's Wazīr, Nizām al-Mulk, because they noticed that the Sultān's hostility was due to the efforts of this Wazīr. They may have aimed by this assassination to threaten Takash himself in order to stop any further action against them. 5

In the period between 596-607 (i.e. between the death of Takash and the succession of Hasan III) the Khwarizmian authority in Persia was at a standstill; and Muhammad Khwarizm-shah could not pay much attention to restoring his authority in this province because he was occupied with his wars against his enemies in Khurasan and Turkestan. Thus, when Hasan III came to the throne of Alamut he found the opportunity favourable for strengthening his position against any attack of the Khwarizmians. In order to achieve this purpose he had to settle the dispute between the Ismā'īlīs and their Sumnī neighbours. This settlement could not be reached unless he would abandon his faith, outwardly at least, and that is what he did. In 608/1211-12 Hasan III

¹ Juvaini, I, p. 312.

²Rawandi, p. 390; cf. Hodgson, p. 212.

³This fortress situated near Qazwinon the border of Rudbar of Alamut, see Juvaini, I, p. 312; Qazwini, Athar al-Bilad, ed. Wüstenfeld, p. 194.

⁴Juvaini, I, pp. 213-4. Cf. Hodgson, p. 215; see also above, p. 54.

⁵Sibt reports that the Assassins tried to assassinate Takash but they could not; Sibt, pp. 303-304; also Abu Shama, p. 17.

declared his conversion to orthodox Islam and sent messengers to the Caliph, to the Khwarism-shāh, and to the rest of the Muslim rulers, to notify them of this decision. However, al-Muwaffaq 'Abd al-Latif reports that this conversion took place as a result of an active part played by al-Nāṣir, after long negotiation, and suggesta that al-Nāṣir aimed at winning the Assassins to his side in an alliance against their enemies. Juvaini confirms the strong relation between al-Nāṣir and Hasan by saying, the Caliph asked Jalal ad-Dīn for a band of Fidā'is, and he sent him a body of men whom he had ordered not to deviate from whatever the Caliph commanded.

For a while Hasan continued the Khutba to Muhammad Khwarizm-shah but al-Nasir succeeded in making a breach between them; 5 when Hasan's mother entered Baghdad on her way to Macca, al-Nasir received her with great honour, and ordered the standard of Hasan to be carried in front of that of Muhammad, who received this news with much distress.

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 195; Juvaini, II, p. 699; cf. Rashid al-Din, ed. M. T. Danesh-Pajuh, Tahran (1960), p. 174.

²<u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fols. 13b-14a; where he says:
[راقام-النامر سنين (٩) يراسل جلال الدين جسن مساحب المرت يرادده أن يعبد شمار الإسلام]

³<u>Ibid</u> (ديتول - النامر - النكم الما نعلتم ذلك كنا يدأ راحدة دم يتغير عليكم من احوائكم ننسيت كالتسلام]

⁴Huvaini, II, p. 391.

⁵See Hodgson, p. 224.

Gluvaini, II, p. 391; Nasawi, p. 12. Cf. Rashid al-Din, p. 175. Juvaini in another place in his work /Vol. II, p. 7017, says that Hasan's mother went on the pilgrimage in 609, while the other sources put the date in 608, that is to say immediately after the declaration of Hasan. See Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 195, Sibt, p. 363; Abu Shama, p. 78; Ibn Wasil, fol. 169.

Hasan was not only in alliance with al-Nasir, but at first with the Khwarizm-shah, and also with Oz-Beg, the latter alliance being based, according to Juvaini, upon real friendship, evidenced by the long visit to Oz-Beg's capital at the beginning of Hasan's reign. 2 He helped Oz-Beg to remove both Mengli and his successor, Ighlamish, who were both revolted Mamluks of Oz-Beg in 'Iraq 'Ajam. Moreover, according to Juvaini, Hasan was the first Muslim ruler to send ambassadors and give allegiance to Chingiz-Khan when the latter had entered the lands of Islam. 3 Judging from this active policy. Hasan would be very ambitious and he might aim at following this line of policy to strengthen his position and to stop the hostile action of his Sunni neighbours against his followers. It seems likely that this ambition had led him to declare his conversion to orthodox Islam: a declaration by which he would lose nothing but gain the respect of the other Sunni rulers, and become one of them. What is more, the Assassins of Syria adopted the Shafi'i school; 4 they may have aimed at satisfying the Ayyubid rulers, who were Shafi'is themselves.5

¹Juvaini, II, p. 701; Rashid al-Din, p. 176; cf. Hodgson, p. 224.

²Juvaini, II, pp. 701-2.

³<u>Ibid.</u>, II, p. 703.

⁴Ibn Wasil, fol. 169 cited by Van Berchem, J.A. (1897), p. 475.

⁵E.I./II, s.v. Ayyubids (by cl. Cohen).

Towards the end of the reign of Takash, in 596/1200, al-Masir lost his authority over 'Iraq 'Ajam province: but he had never given up the intention of controlling this province. Therefore, in 608/1211 the Caliph received with honour the former governor of this province. Aydoghmush. The Caliph seized this opportunity and bestowed on him the robe of honour and provided him with money and soldiers, and sent him to Hamadhan. But this expedition failed to achieve any success, and Aydoghmush was killed in Muharram 610/May-June 1213 and Mengli succeeded in keeping his control over 'Iraq 'Ajam. However, on receiving this news the Caliph did not abandon his intention, and sent to Oz-Beg and to Jalal ad-Din Hasan, the master of Alamut, for help against Mengli. After they had reached an agreement to divide the province of 'Iraq 'Ajam among the three of them, the Caliph sent his army, which consisted of some reinforcements from Irbil, Jazira and Aleppo. The allied army was able to defeat Mengli, who was killed and his head dispatched to Baghdad. But according to Juvaini, the instigator of this alliance was Oz-Beg, not the Caliph; because Mengli was a revolted Mamluk of Oz-Beg, and his troops were planning an attack on the lands of Jalal al-Din Hasan. Oz-Beg and Hasan III concluded an

Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 194-5; Sibt, p. 363. Aydoghmush lost his authority as a result of a conflict between him and Mengli, a Mamluk of Oz-Beg, the ruler of Adharbayjan and Arran. See Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 200; cf. Kafesoğlu, pp. 181-2.

²Ibn al_Athir, XII, p. 197; Sibt, p. 366.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 200-201.

alliance and in 610/1213-14 Hasan III entered Adharbayjan to join Oz-Beg. They sent joint ambassadors to Baghdad, Syria, and the other lands to seek assistance in expelling Mengli from 'Iraq 'Ajam. In the year 611/1214-15 they defeated Mengli. Abhar and Zanjan were given to Jalal al-Dīn as a reward for his assistance. The rest of the province was taken by Oz-Beg who entrusted it to his mamluk "Ighlamish. It is evident that al-Naşir did not control, or demand to control, this province; this suggests that al-Naşir, this time, attempted to form a buffer-state between his principality and the Khwarizmian dominions. But it seems that this policy failed, since the new governor of 'Iraq 'Ajam, "Ighlamish, was in close relations with the Khwarizm-shah. Ighlamish shortly after his appointment introduced the Khutba in the name of Muhammad Khwarizm-shāh in his province.

Juvaini, II, pp. 701-702; cf. Rashid al-Din, pp. 176-7.

²Juvaini, II, p. 702; while Ibn al-Athir puts the date in Jumada I 612/Sept.-Oct. 1212, al-Kamil, XII, p. 200.

³Juvaini, II, p. 702; Ibn al-Athir says that Jalal ad-Din was given what the allies agreed upon previously, <u>al-Kamil</u>, XII, pp. 200-201.

⁴Juvaini, II, p. 702; Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 201. The most likely form of this name is Ighlamish as it was identified by Qazvini in his edition of <u>Jahan Gushai</u>, III, p. 246, n.6, and p. 414, n.3. Ighlamish in Turkish means "He wept", Juvaini, II, p. 391, n.6.

Ighlamish, originally a slave of the brother of Oz-Beg, afterwards entered the service of Sultan Muhammad Khwarizm-shah. See Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 201.

⁶ Ibid., XII, p. 206.

By the year 1215 Muhammad became sole master over Turkestan and Khurasan. Therefore, he demanded of the Caliph that the Khutba should be introduced in his name in Baghdad; with this in view he sent as his envoy to Baghdad the Qadi Mujir al-Din, who there announced the claims of his master, but the government of Baghdad rejected them. According to Nasawi, this rejection was due to al-Nasir's awareness of the troubles of Muhammad in Turkestan. Al-Nasawi, quoting the words of Mujir al-Din, reports the following argument: that when the Qadi presented his Master's claims to the Diwan in Baghdad, they rejected them firmly and said that wrong circumstances led to the Seljuq Sultans being Masters of Baghdad, but this did not mean that there should al-ways be a sultan holding the power of the Caliphate.

The Qadi Mujir al-Din returned to his master without success.

He was accompanied by ShaykhSahrawardi, the Caliph's envoy. According to Sibt the Shaykh was received at the court of Muhammad with far less honour than was due to his learning and personal qualities⁴, while al-Nasawi states that the Shaykh was received with honour and respect.⁵ The

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 206. According to Abu al-Fada'il al-Hamawi, Muhammad sent an embassy in 611/1214-15 to Baghdad with his claim to the Khutba and to be called by the title of the Seljuq Sultans, "The Partner of the Commander of the Faithful". al-Tarikh al-Mansuri, fol. 132b.

²Nasawi, p. 11. See also Kafesoğlu, p. 217 ff.

³Nasawi, pp. 11-12, where he says: [رالا نليسي يعتم ان يكر ن مع الزمان على النان الثلاثة تعلم يأ مر بيلا ربنهي كيف شاد] ⁴Sibt, p. 382; Abu Shama, pp. 100-101; cf. Kafesoğlu, p. 217-8.

⁵Nasawi, p.12.

Shaykh asked permission to recite a Hadith; the Sultan granted it. The sense of the Hadith was that the Prophet warned the Faithful against causing any harm to the family of 'Abbas. The Sultan answered:

"Although I am a Turk, and know the Arabic language badly, yet I have understood the meaning of the Hadith; but I have not caused any harm to the family of Abbas. Meanwhile I have heard that a number of them are in the prison of the Commander of the Faithful, and even multiply and increase there; if the Shakh were to repeat this Hadith in the presence of the Commander of the Faithful, it would be better and more to the point."

The Shaykh attempted to prove that the Caliph in his capacity as an interpreter /Mujtahid had the right to imprison individual people for the good of the whole community; but in vain. Thus the embassy of al-Suhraward failed to achieve any success.²

But Sibt, who quotes from the words of the Shaykh himself, reports that when Suhrawardi entered the tent of Muhammad, he recited a Khutba, in which he mentioned the good personality of the Caliph, and how he was very pious and religious; then Muhammad said, through an interpreter, "The person you describe does not exist in Baghdad, but I will go there and set up a Caliph with these qualities". This shows the intention of the Khwarizm-shah to destroy al-Maşir's rule and to replace him with another Caliph. After the failure of these nego-

Nasawi, p. 13; cited by Barthold, <u>Turkestan</u>, pp. 373-4. cf. Ibn Khaldun, V, p. 109.

²Nasawi, p. 13.

³Sibt, p. 382; also Abu Shama, p. 101.

tiations, it seems likely that al-Nasir took further steps to check the ambition of the Khwarizm-shah, when Ighlamish, the governor of 'Iraq 'Ajam, was stabbed and killed by the Assassins.l According to Juvaini, the Caliph himself sent some Fida is to stab and kill him.²

The Khwarizm-shah, seeking for the support of the religious men in his kingdom and to legitimize his struggle with the Caliph, succeeded in obtaining Fatwa from the Imamsof his kingdom to the effect that:

"the 'Abbasids had no right to the Caliphate; that the title belonged to the Sayyids of the line of Husaini, and that who ever had the power to do so was under an obligation to redress wrongs. Moreover the 'Abbasid Caliph had been backward in undertaking holy wars in the way of God Almighty and, though possessing the means thereto, had failed to defend the frontiers, to extirpate the heterodox and the heretical, and to call the infidel to the true faith, as is incumbent on, nay obligatory to, all in command; and so had neglected the pillar, which is the main pillar of Islam. With such arguments as his pretext, he designated 'Ala al-Mulk of Termidh, one of the chief Sayyids, to be set up as Caliph". 3

Juvaini adds, in another place in his history, the following argument of this Fatwa:

"...when such an Imam made an attack upon a Sultan who succoured Islam and had passed a lifetime in Holy war, that Sultan had the right to reject that Imam and to set up another in his place".4

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 206.

²Juvaini, II, p. 391.

³ Ibid., pp. 364-5. Hamdallah Mustawfi states the name of this Caliph as: Sayyid 'Imad al-Din of Termidh, Tarikh-i-Guzida, p. 496.

⁴ Juvaini, II, p. 392.

This Fatwa shows the new phase of struggle between al-Nasir and the Khwarizm-Shah, in which Muhammad used every effort to crush his foe; and in obtaining this Fatwa a legal support to his rivalry was provided.

Juvaini gives a brilliant argument about the purpose of this Fatwa by saying,

"However, the Sultan needed some excuse where by he might be secured from the reproach of mankind and the rulers all around him; and such as might prevent its being said that a Sultan professing Islam had, out of lust for empire, attacked that Imam to do homage to whom is to complete the pillar of Islam, and in so doing cast his faith to the winds".

But the problem was not solved by this argument, and the main question was still not answered: why did Muhammad set up a Shī'ite Caliph, apart from the argument of the Fatwa about the Shī'ite right to this office? It seems likely that Muhammad either aimed by this act to centralize the Shī'ite community around himself, thereby strengthening his position in his struggle with his mother, in which the military class and the priesthood were on the side of the latter; or he tried to compete with al-Naṣir in patronizing the Shī'ite element, but went too far and appointed a Caliph from them, probably to undermine the strength of al-Naṣir, especially in Baghdad, where a large Shī'ite community was living. But since no Arabic source, so far known, mentions

Juvaini, II, p. 392.

The mercenary army constitutes the sole support of the Sultan. About the struggle between Muhammad and his mother, see Barthold, <u>Turkestan</u>, pp. 375-7.

³ Abu Shama, p. 24.

this Fatwa or this Shi ite Caliph, it seems that this action of Muḥammad had very little consequences at this time, otherwise the other contemporary historians would mention it. Instead there are two reports: the first is that of Ibn al-Athir who says that when Muḥammad returned from his campaign to conquer Baghdad, he reached Khurasan and, at Nishabūr, he ordered the name of al-Nasir to be omitted from the Khutba and said that the Caliph was dead. The second report is that of Sibt, who refers to the intention of the Khwarizm-Shah to set up a new Caliph. 2

About the Shi'ite Caliph there are no Arabic sources, so far known, to support the narrative of Juvaini; moreover there is no information whatever about the fate of this Caliph.

Muhammad the Khwarizm-Shah did not lack excuses to attack the Caliph; in addition to what was mentioned in the <u>Fatwa</u>, the historians mention other excuses of which the <u>Kharizm-Shah</u> took advantage, in order to find a legal basis for his struggle with the head of Islam.

The first excuse is that, when Hasan III was converted to orthodox Islam, he sent a <u>Sabil</u> on the pilgrimage, in order to make his conversion widely known. The Caliph commanded his standard to be carried in front of that of Sultan Muhammad, and when news of this reached the

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 207.

²Sibt, p. 382.

³See Barthold, Turkestan, p. 375, n.6.

Sultan he was much distressed and offended. The second is the assassination of lighlamish, the viceroy of the Khwarizm-Shah, in 'Iraq 'Ajam. According to Juvaini, this assassination took place at the instigation of al-Nasir. 2

The third is as follows: Muhammad revealed the secret of messages dispatched from al-Nasir to the Qara-Khitays and the Ghurs, asking them to help him against the Khwarizm-Shah. These secrets came to light when Muhammad came to Ghaznin and, a search being made in the treasuries of the Ghurs, this correspondence was found, in which the Caliph egged on Shihab ad-Din to attack the Sultan and asked him to render aid to the army of the Qara-Khitay.

These excuses were not more than a cover for his main purpose which was to have the Khutba proclaimed in his name in Baghdad and to be recognised as a Sultan, like the Sultans of the Buyids and the Seljuqs.4

In 614/1217 Muhammad took a further step to fulfil his aim, this time by marching with his troops to conquer Baghdad. 5 He had

¹Juvaini, II, p. 391; cf. Nasawi, p.12.

²Juvaini, II, p. 391.

³<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 390-391.

⁴ Ibid., p. 391; cf. Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 206.

⁵Sibt mentions the number of this army as 40°,000 or [as it was said] 660,000, among them 70,000 Khitays (?), Sibt, p.382; see Abu Shama, pp. 100-101; also Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 219.

proceeded into 'Iraq 'Ajam and he was able to restore his authority over it. He entered Hamadhan in triumph and made it a headquarters for his military operations. There he succeeded in persuading Oz-Beg, the ruler of Adharbayjan, to introduce the Khutba in his name - i.e. to be his vassal. Thus al-Nasir had lost one of his allies in Persia.

On receiving the news of the advance of the Khwarizm-Shah, al-

According to Ibn al-Athir, Muhammad sent from Hamadhan a division of 15,000 men towards 'Iraq and, when this division had reached Halwan, he sent another division in the same direction; but the second division was overtaken by snow-storms in the mountains of Kurdestan and sustained heavy losses, its remnant was all but exterminated by the Kurds and the Turks. Thus Muhammad took this as anevil omen, abandoned his intention, and returned to Khurasan. But according to Juvaini and Nasawi the

lbn al-Athir, XII, pp. 206-7; cf. Juvaini, II, p. 366.

²Sibt, p. 382; Abu Shama, p. 100. cf. Ibn Taghri-Berdi, VI, p. 119; Dhahabi, quotes al-Muwaffaq 'Abdallatif, XIX, fol. 116.

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 207. Barthold used Ibn al-Athir, but he says that this division was overtaken by the snow storms in the <u>winter</u> of the year 1217, <u>Turkestan</u>, p. 375. But Ibn al-Athir does not mention this particular <u>winter</u>. Moreover, Juvaini says that by the time the Sultan had reached Asadabad it was mid-autumn. Juvaini, II, p. 360. Also al-Muwaffaq reports that this snow fell not at its usual time; <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fol. 11. On this expedition see also Kafersoglu, p. 219.

⁴Juvaini, II, pp. 366-7. 5Nasawi, p.20.

main body of Khwarizmian army, with Muhammad himself, received this blow when he proceeded from Hamadhan and reached Asadabad.

A cruel blow thus attacked the prestige of the Khwarizm-Shah?

As for the causes of his retreat to Khurasan, Ibn al-Athir reports
that Muhammad returned to Khurasan for fear of the invasion of the
Mongols. Al-Muwaffaq, however, without specifying the Mongols, says
that the Turks - meaning either the Qara-Khitays or the Mongols took advantage of the absence of Muhammad from his kingdom, and planned
an attack on his dominions, and Muhammad on receiving this news abandoned his plan to capture Baghdad and hurried back. 4

Most of the historians attribute this bad luck of Muhammad to his sacreligious campaign against the 'Abbasid House.' Some of these historians go too far and say that this very attack on the 'Abbasid House is one of the causes of the sad end of Muhammad Khwarizm-shah and his Empire.

The sudden retreat of Muhammad towards Khurasan raises the question of the accusation against al-Nasir found in some historians,

Nasawi, p. 20, he adds that this snow-storm lasted for three days, while al-Muwaffaq says that it lasted for 20 days; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 11. cf. Hamdallah Mustawfi, Tarikh-i-Guzida, p. 496.

²Hamdallah Mustawfi, p. 496; cf. Juvaini, II, p. 367.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 207.

⁴Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 11.

⁵Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 207; Nasawi, pp. 20-21; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 11; su Barchold, 2.375.

Juvaini, II, p. 364 and pp. 366-7; see also Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 207.

who say that it was he who was responsible for the Mongol invasion of the Muslim lands, and that al-Nasir sent an envoy to Chingiz-Khan to seek his assistance to stop the advance of the Khwarizm-Shah into Baghdad. Ibn al-Athir says, "If there is truth in what the Persians (Ajam) said of al-Nasir - that he called the Mongols into the land of Islam - then this is a calamity so great that every other great sin appears small in comparison". It is highly probably that this story was fabricated by Jalal al-Dīn, the son and successor of Muhammad, in order to legitimize his attack on the Caliph's dominions. 2

Muhammad left 'Iraq 'Ajam to return to Khurasan, but it seems that he did not abandon his intention of conquering Baghdad, because, when he left this province, he appointed 'Imad al-Mulk al-Sawi to act as Atabeg and administer the country; 3 the latter was vehemently desirous to subdue 'Iraq.4

According to Ibn al-Athir, Muhammad did not renounce his feud with al-Nasir and, when he arrived in Nishapur in Dhu'l-Qa'da 614/Feb.

1213, he immediately ordered al-Nasir's name to be omitted from the Khutba and said that the Caliph was dead. The same measures were carried

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 287; see also: Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 143; Maqrizi, Suluk, I/I, p. 218; cf. Barthold, Turkestan, p. 375, n.3.

Sibt, pp. 417-8; see also below, p. 77; cf. Barthold, <u>Histoire</u> des Turks de Asia Central, Paris (1945), p. 124; cf. Kafesoglu, pp. 243-5.

³Juvaini, II, p. 474.

⁴Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 207.

out in other towns such as Marv, Balkh, Bukhara and Sarakhs, but did not extend to Khwarizm, Samarquand or Helat, as those towns were not in such close dependence on the government. Al-Nasawi affirms that Muhammad himself, after his misfortune, expressed his repentance and endeavoured, atwardly at least, to make peace with the Caliph. It is very likely that Muhammad, in fact, considered it necessary to make this concession to public opinion, and that the omission of al-Nasir's name from the Khutba was made before the expedition to Baghdad.

After the Mongols had swept the Khwarizmian empire they reached by their raids the western part of Persia. Thus the Caliph was confronted by a new and very dangerous enemy. In 613/1221-2 the Mongols attacked Karman-Shah, which was not far from Baghdad. According to al-Muwaffaq 'Abd al-Latif, when the Mongols reached al-Jibal province they split into two parties, the first aimed at Adharabayjan, and the second reached Hamadhan and Ispahan and almost reached Hulwan on their way to Baghdad. Ibn al-Athir, on the other hand, does not mention anything about this split; he only says that, after the Mongols had plundered Adharabayjan and captured Maragha, they proceeded in the direction of Irbil. 6

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 207, cited by Barthold, Turkestan, p. 375. Nasawi also refers to this and says that when the Sultan had left Hamadhan, without fulfilling his aim of conquering Baghdad, he ordered al-Nasir's name to be omitted from the Khutba throughout his kingdom, the text, p. 187.

^{2&}lt;sub>Nasawi</sub>, pp. 20-21.

Barthold, p. 375; Juvaini affirms that Muhammad omitted al-Nasir's name from the Khutba, thoughout his kingdom, immediately after he had issued the <u>Fatwa</u> of the deposition of the Caliph. Juvaini, II, p. 392. Al-Muwaffaq puts this omission before Muhammad's expedition to Baghdad, see (cont.)

When the Mongols proceeded towards 'Iraq, the Begteginid ruler of Irbil, Muzaffar al-Din Gokburi, sent many Kurds to control the Derband and to protect it; meanwhile the Caliph concentrated all his troops on Baghdad. The Caliph also sent his envoys to Irbil, Mosul and to Syria calling upon the rulers of these countries to render him help and to send their troops to join his in order to protect Baghdad. Muzaffar al-Din marched with his troops and encamped in Dagug. The Caliph sent him a reinforcement of 800 soldiers; Muzaffar al-Din was disappointed by this small number and could not venture to attack the Mongol with his little army. When the Mongols heard of the arrival of the armies to meet them, they did not go any further and, moreover, they retreated from the frontiers of 'Iraq without any assault on the Caliphate army. But according to al-Muwaffaq, the Abbasid capital was spared from the Mongol invasion because the Muslims received the Mongol's ambassador, who was probably sent to spy out the enemy's camp, with great military parades and great ceremony in Irbil, in Dagug and finally in Baghdad, and his report on his visit discouraged and frightened the Mongols, who this time desisted from attacking Baghdad.4

⁽cont.)
Dhahabi, XVIII, fol. 173a, and also XIX, fol. 11.

⁴Sibt, p. 407; also Abu Shama, p. 128.

⁵Dhahabi, XVIII, fols. 245-6.

⁶Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 247.

¹⁰n Muzaffar al-Din see E.I./II, s.v. Begteginids (bycL. Cohen).

²Dhahabi, XVIII, fols. 245-6.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 247-8.

After the death of Muhammad Khwarizm—Shah in 617/1220-21 his empire fell to pieces and was overwhelmed by the Mongols. But the Mongols could not subdue the western parts of Persia; they had only covered it by their plundering raids.

The sons of Muhammad were dispersed, along with their armies, by the Mongols. But soon afterwards those sons were able to restore their authority over some parts of their dominions, especially Chiyath al-Din, who by the year 620/1223-24 was able to restore al-Jibal and Fars provinces to his rule. Chiyath al-Din started his activities in Fars in 619/1222-23 and subsequently subdued Chiraz. His menace to the Caliph's dominions beganafter he had subdued Fars to his rule. He soon marched from this province to Khuzistan, where he met, in a short assault, with the governor of this province, Muzaffar all-Din Wajh all-Sabu', a mamluk of the Caliph; but he soon retreated from the territories of the Caliphate principality to al-Jibal.

Al-Nasir was alarmed by the progress of Chiyath al-Din into his territory and therefore prepared defensive measures in Baghdad and sent envoys to Irbil, Jazira, and to Diyar Bekr for help in checking the

⁽cont.)

4Dhahabi, XVIII, fols. 245-6; also cited by J. De Somogyi, "Adh-Dhahabi's 'Ta'rikh al-Islam' as an authority on the Mongol invasion of the Caliphate". JRAS (1936), pp. 600-601.

Abu '1-Fida, III, p. 139; also Juvaini, II, p. 417. According to Juvaini, Kerman was assigned to Ghiyath al-Din by his father in 617/1220-21 shortly before his death, Juvaini, II, pp. 468-9.

²<u>Ibid</u>. p. 469.

progress of Ghiyath al-Din, and at the same time sent an envoy to Ghiyath ad-Din asking him to leave his territory in peace, and it seems that the Caliph's injunction was obeyed.

Al-Nasir did not stop in his action against Ghiyath al-Din at this point, but according to Ibn al-Athir he tried to undermine the strength of Ghiyath al-Din from within, by sending secret messages to the uncle of the latter, Ighan Ta'si (or Ta'isi)² urging him to revolt against his nephew, with the offer of the patent of governorship of 'Iraq 'Ajam. The uncle separated from his nephew and started a war against him, but without success.³

Chiyath al-Din did not enjoy his rule very long, for soon after that, in 621/1224-5, his brother, Jalal al-Din, marched from India through Kerman to 'Iraq 'Ajam, which was subdued by him, and his brother Chiyath al-Din was also made subject to his authority.4

By the coming of Jalal al-Din to western Persia a new menace to the Caliph sprang up and, this time, a more powerful and dangerous foe than Chivath al-Din came to be a neighbour of the Caliph's dominions.

Nasawi, p.78; where he says that Ghiyath al-Din marched from Fars to the frontier of Amhar(?) which is a dependency of Baghdad, and Alam ad-Din Qaysar, the viceroy of the Caliph there, retreated before the Khwarizmian progress.

²Abu 'l-Fida mentions another form of this name, (معيان طابسي) عدد) عدد (معيان طابسي) Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 139.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 270. (He puts this event in the year 620.)

⁴Ibid. XII, p. 276; Juvaini, II, p. 420.

Jalal al-Din, for his part, immediately after he had destroyed the rule of his brother, marched into Khuzistan to pass the winter there. According to Ibn al-Athir, Jalal al-Din marched to Khuzistan and laid waste the country, and besieged Tustar in Muharram 622/Jan.-Feb.1125. Muzaffar al-Din Wajh al-Sabu', the governor of this province, put up a great resistance and did not submit to Jalal al-Din. The Khwarizmian troops dispersed in every direction and laid waste this province. Some of Jalal al-Din's troops reached Başra, which they plundered, capturing a lot of booty, but the Shihna was able to drive them back from this city. Al-Nasir, alarmed by the attack of Jalal al-Din, therefore took immediate steps to save his capital; he sent his mamluk, Jamal al-Din Qush Temur with an army, to stop the advance of Jalal al-Din, but the mamluk was unable to stop the Khwarizm-shah. 2 At the same time, carrier pigeons were dispatched to Irbil with the message that Muzaffar al-Din, its ruler, should send 10,000 men to the aid of the Caliph.

Al-Nasir prepared his defensive measures in Baghdad and distributed arms among his troops. 4 Jalal al-Din reached Ba quba, stayed there

Nasawi, p. 109; also Juvaini, II, p. 421.

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 276-7.

Juvaini, II, p. 422; where he adds that the ruler of Irbil marched with his troops against Jalal al-Din, but the latter was able to check him after a short battle; while Ibn al-Athir reports that Jalal al-Din entered into negotiations with Muzaffar al-Din without a real clash taking place between them. See al-Kamil, XII, pp. 277-8.

⁴According to al-Yafi'i the caliph spent 1,000,000 Dinars on his troops, see Mir'at al-Janan, Hyderabad (1918-20), IV, p. 49.

for a while, and marched towards Adharbayjan. When he reached Daquq its citizens cursed him openly for his attack on the Caliph's dominions. Angered by the action of the citizens of the city, Jalal al-Din besieged Daquq and after a severe battle captured it; and the Khwarizmians laid waste and plundered it. Then he left 'Iraq for Adharbayjan.'

Here a question arises as to what the aim of Jalal al-Din was in attacking the territory of the Caliphate? On the one hand, Juvaini gives the following argument to this question: he says that Jalal al-Din set out for Baghdad expecting the Caliph to render him assistance and make of him a bulwark against the Mongols. He sent a message in advance to announce his arrival and explain his intentions. But the Caliph paid no attention to his words, for he still harboured resentment for what he had suffered at the hands of the Sultan's father and grandfather. Instead, al-Masir deputed Qush-Temur to lead an army of 20,000 valiant men to expel the Sultan from his territory.

If Jalal al-Din was sincere in his claims, he should not, then, have laid waste Khuzistan and plundered all the territories he passed through on his way to Baghdad.

¹Nasawi, p. 109; cf. Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 277-8.

²Juvaini, II, pp. 422-3.

Sibt, on the other hand, says that Jalal al-Din attacked the territory of Baghdad to wreak vengeance on al-Nasir because the latter was the cause of the death of his father, and the calling of the infidels to the countries of Islam. It seems that this is the excuse which Jalal al-Din claimed in order to legitimize his attack on the principality of the Caliph.

It seems very likely that his main purpose in attacking the territory of the Caliph was not to conquer Baghdad but to obtain as much booty as possible. For, as Ibn al-Athir reports, when Jalal al-Din with his army entered Khuzistan, they were in great need of everything, especially of horses and mules. And this explains why he did not attack Baghdad while he was encamped a few miles away from it.

About the sudden retreat of Jalal al-Din from 'Iraq there are two reports. The first is that of Sibt, who says that Jalal al-Din had, before he reached the outskirts of Baghdad, sent an expedition to Georgia. But when he marched to conquer Baghdad, a messenger from this expedition reached him, and asked him urgently to render help to

Sibt, in this narrative, quotes the words of al-Malik al-Mu'azzam who received a letter from Jalal al-Din to this effect and, moreover, asking al-Mu'azzam's help against the Caliph; Sibt, pp. 417-8; Abu Shama, p. 144. The same narrative appears in Ibn TaghYi-Berdi, al-Nujum, VI, pp. 260-261.

²cf. above, p. 69-70.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 277; cf. Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 14a.

them against the Georgians; therefore he left Baghdad and marched towards Adharbayjan. But Abu al-Fada il al-Hamawi states a fantastic story of the reason of Jalal al-Din's retreat from 'Iraq. He says that when Jalal al-Din entered 'Iraq he plundered and took captives. He came near Baghdad where he encamped for 18 days. When al-Nasir heard of this, he sent oxen and ploughed the lands which the Khwarizmian reached, and thus there was nothing left to feed the mounts of Jalal al-Din's army and, because of this, he desisted from attacking Baghdad. 2 Al-Nasir realized the danger of Jalal al-Din and, therefore, returned to his policy of seeking allies in Western Persia. The Caliph found a favourable opportunity in the separation of Ghiyath al-Din from his brother, after a dispute between the latter and one of the Amirs of Jalal al-Din. Ghiyath al-Din sent his Wazir, Karim al-Sharq, to Baghdad asking for help against his brother. Al-Nasir honoured Ghiyath al-Din with presents and provided him with 30,000 Dinars. 4 But Ghiyath al-Din could not achieve any success, and he was soon killed by the governor of Kerman, Baraq Hajib.

¹Sibt, pp. 417-8.

Abu 'al-Fada'il al-Hamawi, al-Ta'rikh al-Mansuri, fols. 149b-150a.

³Juvaini, II, pp. 471-2.

⁴Nasawi, p. 143.

⁵Juvaini, II, p. 473.

The Caliph turned again to Ighan Ta'isi, the uncle of Chiyath al-Din, who was wandering with his army in Adharbayjan. He sent to Ighan, encouraging him to march against Hamadhan to capture it, by giving him the patent to rule it. Ighan marched to Hamadhan, but Jalal al-Din met him and after a sudden attack from the latter, Ighan was captured and submitted to the authority of Jalal al-Din. Thus al-Nasir's attempts to crush the power of the last Khwarizmian Sultan was in vain. But his threat was over and, from now on, the Khwarizmian danger to Baghdad was at an end.

The relation between al-Nasir and the rulers of the no longer closely integrated provinces of the 'Abbasid Caliphate was a peaceful one. He tried to strengthen the position of the Caliphate among them by sending envoys from time to time, and yearly sending for each of the rulers the patent of rule to give them the legal means to rule their provinces. He accompanied this investiture with several gifts of symbolic rather than of material value such as: robes of honour, Futuwwa clothes and titles. This practice was for the purpose of "maintaining outward prestige and /so that/ their name /the Caliphs!" names/ might appear in the Marches on the coinage and in the Khutba".4

Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 280-281.

²Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, pp. 41-2.

³For example see Sibt, p. 333; Abu Shama, p. 33; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 261.

⁴Ibn Tiqtaqa, p.42.

Al-Nasir sent envoys to these rulers especially when there were conflicts between them, to settle their differences and at the same time to place himself in a favourable position for interfering in their local affairs.

In spite of his good relations with the Ayyubid rulers, nevertheless he was anxious concerning the powerful one among them. Therefore he opposed al-'Adil's action to conquer Sinjar in 606/1209-10, and sent a message to him asking him to leave this city to its ruler. And when al-Malik al-Ashraf marched to nothern 'Iraq in 615/1218-9 to capture Irbil, at the request of the ruler of Mosul, the Caliph sent an ambassador, who asked al-Ashraf not to march against Irbil, the latter obeyed the Caliph's request and returned to Sinjar.

Although the relations between Baghdad and the Ayyubids were smooth and peaceful, yet the relation between Mecca and Baghdad was at a stand-still.

After Hasan III had declared his conversion to Orthodox Islam in 608/
1211-12, he sent his mother to go on the pilgrimage. On the day of
'Arafat certain Isma'ilis attacked a noble from the family of Qutada,

Ibn al-Sa i, p. 288; Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 187-8; Sibt, p. 353.

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 225-6; Ibn al-'Ibri, Mukhtasar, pp. 405-6.

³see above, pp.

⁴⁰n Qutada see Ibn 'Utba (or 'Unba), 'Umdat al-Talib, ed. Najaf (1961) pp. 138ff; Qalqashandi, Subh al-A'sha, IV, pp. 271 ff.

the ruler of Mecca, called Abu Harun 'Azīz, and killed him. In fact, they aimed at Qutada himself. Qutada understood this and seized this opportunity to plunder and sack the caravan of the Traqi pilgrims. After mediation from Ayyubid Amīrs, who accompanied the Syrian caravan, Qutada agreed to stop his attack on the Traqi pilgrims and allowed them to continue their religious performances, after he had imposed on them a fine of 100,000 Dīnars. It seems likely that al-Naşir was the instigator of this assassination -as Juvaini suggests. This attitude of al-Naşir towards Qutada was due either to the attitude of Qutada towards the 'Abbasid Caliphate and to his claim that he had more right to the Caliphate than al-Nasir, or to the fact that he controlled from "the frontiers of Yemen to al-Madīna and also Yanbu', and his army had increased". Moreover, Qutada refused to accept the invitation of al-Naşir to visit Baghdad.

Maqrizi, Suluk, I/I, pp. 175-6.

²Sibt, pp. 363-4; Abu Shama, pp. 78-9; Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 195. But Barthold says that Qutada was killed by those Assassins. <u>Turkestan</u>, p. 374. This is incorrect since most of the sources agree that it was a cousin of Qutada who was killed. Moreover Juvaini says that it was his brother that they stabbed and killed; see Juvaini, II, p. 391.

³ Juvaini, II, p. 391.

⁴Sibt, pp. 406-7; Abu Shama, p. 123.

⁵Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 195.

⁶Sibt, pp. 406-7; Abu Shama, p. 123.

Therefore the motive of al-Nasir to remove Qutada is very clear.

Afterwards, Qutada realized the foolish consequences of opposing al-Nasir so openly, therefore he sent his son with some of his courtiers to Baghdad, to apologise to the Caliph.

Al-Nasir did not abandon his attention of interfering in Meccan affairs in order to set up a loyal governor. When Qutada died in 617/1220-21² or 613/1221-22³ he was succeeded by his son, Hasan. But there was another son called Rajih, who demanded the governorship for himself. Rajih asked for help from the Caliph, and he received it at the hand of Aqbash, the Amir of the Iraqi pilgrimage caravan. Hasan met this expedition with his army and, after a short battle, Aqbash was killed and his army fled. But shortly afterwards Hasan sent an envoy to Baghdad offering his apology and asking the forgiveness of al-Nasir. Thus al-Nasir's attempt to control Mecca failed and, furthermore, the Iraqi caravan of pilgrims often met with a very unfriendly reception at Mecca, as had happened in 619/1222-3 when al-Malik al-Mas'ud, the Ayyubid governor of Yemen, captured Mecca. He prevented the Caliph's standard

lbn al-Athir, XII, p. 195.

²Sibt, pp. 401-2; also Abu Shama, pp. 123-4.

³ The al-Athir, Vol. XII, p. 195.

⁴ Tbid., Vol. XII, pp. 261-2. According to Sibt Aqbash did not agree to offer his assistance to Rajih, but Hasan mistakenly thought that Aqbash was collaborating with his brother and attacked the Iraqi caravan. Aqbash for his part came alone to meet Hasan's army in order to settle the dispute, but they killed him. Sibt, pp. 401-2.

⁵Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 262.

being carried up on the 'Arafa mountain until sunset, after which he allowed them to carry it up.

Al-Nasir was not free from troubles inside his principality. In 606/1209-10 the governor of Khūzistān, Qutb ad-Dīn Sanjar, tried to break out of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. But al-Nasir was quick to take the necessary measures to stop this action; at first he attempted to settle the dispute by peaceful means, therefore he called upon Sanjar to come to Baghdad, but the latter refused to obey the Caliph. Therefore al-Nasir sent his Wazīr Mu'ayad al-Dīn al-Qummi and his cupbearer, Najah al-Dīn with an army. They were able to drive Sanjar out of Khūzistān, and later on they were able to capture him.

In spite of the failure of al-Nasir's policy of expansion in western Persia, he was able to keep his authority over Khūzistan, in fact this province was kept under the control of Baghdad till the fall of the Caliphate in 656/1258.

In spite of the political weakness of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, its moral power was great and effective, especially over the rulers of the different parts of the Muslim world. These rulers needed the patents to rule their provinces. Ibn at-Tiqteqa was clever enough to put this as follows:

lsibt, pp. 410-11.

² Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 190-91. See Sibt, pp. 354-5.

"No doubt the rulers of the Marches, such as those of Syria and Egypt, and the prince of Mosul used to transmit to them (the Caliphs) annually something by way of a present to secure their good offices. They sought from them (the Caliphs) investiture in the government of their territories, thereby to rule absolutely over their subjects and by this means to impose on them obedience as a duty."

From this al-Nasir took advantage by withholding these patents from those rulers who opposed him, such as the Seljuq Sultan, Tughril II, and the Khwarizmian Sultans, and granted it to those who showed him their obedience. And what is more those rulers needed his approval and encouragement against their enemies, especially the Crusaders, as when the Franks attacked Damietta, al-Nasir sent (in 616/1219-20) messages to all the rulers of the Marches to help al-Malik al-Kamil. And when the Franks attacked al-Tur fortress, al-Mu'azzam of Damascus sent to the Caliph a message, asking for his assistance against the Crusaders.

Al-Nasir had also increased the capacity of his intelligence service, by sending spies to the different provinces to spy out the internal affairs of the rulers. Al-Muwaffaq Abdal-latif gives a good example of the activity of this Caliph in the spying out of the number of the troops of Muhammad Khwarizm-Shah when the latter marched to attack Baghdad in 614/1217-18.4

¹ Al-Fakhri, p. 42 (Eng. tr. 28).

²Abu'l-Fada'il al-Hamawi, al-Ta'rikh al-Mansuri; fol. 136b. According to Sibt, al-Nasir refused to help the Ayyubid sovereign against the Crusaders; Abu-Shama, p. 147.

^{3 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 103; Sibt, p. 383.

⁴Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 12a-b. For some other examples of al-Nasir's espionage see: al-Fakhri,pp.433-4; Bar-Hebraeus, Chronography,I,p.387. See below,pp

Al-Nasir was the last strong and powerful Caliph of Baghdad, and the best statement to conclude this short sketch of his political activities is the narrative of al-Muwaffaq 'Abd-al-latif, who says:

"Al-Nasir filled all hearts with fear and awe and resuscitated the prestige of the Caliphate after it had died on the death of al-Mu tasim, and it was dead on his own death."

Al-Nasir died on the night preceding the first of Shawwal 622/6 October 1225. He was succeeded by his son al-Zahir, who came to the throne at the age of 52. Although he was praised and esteemed by all the historians of this period, he remains obscure as regards his ability as a politician, because he reigned for a short period, nine and a half months only. He died on 13 Rajab 623/10 July 1226, and was succeeded by al-Mustansir.

Al-Mustansir was a capable ruler; ⁵ he tried to follow the same lines of al-Nasir's policy to strengthen his position. However al-Nasir tried to shake the power of Jalal al-Din Khwarizm-Shah, but Jalal al-Din was still the great opponent of the Caliphate; his power was

Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 13b.

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 285; also <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fol. 14a. Ibn al-'Ibri, p.414.

³sibt, p.419.

⁴Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 33b; while Ibn al-Athir puts his reign as 9 months and 14 days, Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 298. Cf. al-Kaziruni, fol. 9la; E.I./I, sv. al-Zahir.

E.I./I, s.v. al-Mustansir.

increased after the death of al-Nasir and he controlled all western Persia, i.e. from Kerman in the south to Adharbayjan and Armenia in the north. Jalal al-Din, in fact, needed the approval of the Caliphs of Baghdad, as well as their/gifts, to strengthen his position before the increasing menace of the Mongols. Therefore he asked these Caliphs to invest him with the title of Sultan but they refused his requests. Al-Mustansir realized that he could gain nothing from opposing Jalal al-Din, but he would gain a strong ally by settling the differences between Baghdad and the Khwarizm-Shah, especially if he settled the dispute over al-Jibal province. Therefore, when Jalal al-Din in 626/1229 laid siege to Akhlat, the Caliph dispatched his chamberlain, Sa'd al-Din, to negotiate with Jalal al-Din, and to represent the claims of his master. The claims of the Caliph were: first, that Jalal al-Din should not interfere in the affairs of Badr al-Din lu'lu', the ruler of Mosul, Muzaffar al-Din Gok-buri, the ruler of Irbil, Shihab al-Din Sulaiman-Shah, the ruler of the Ive Turcomans and Imad al-Din Pehlewan, the ruler of al-Jibal: and moreover that he should consider them as vassals of the Diwan. Second, that the Khutba on the name of the Caliph should be introduced in all the Khwarizmian dominions, this practice having been suspended at the time of Muhammad Khwarizm-Shah. Jalal al-

Nasawi, p. 247.

²Sibt, p. 434.

Din agreed to these terms and dispatched his approval by his Chamber-lain. The Caliph received the envoy of the Khwarizm-Shah with great honour and sent many presents with him to his master, the gifts included the Futuwwa clothes², and, calling Jalal al-Din in his message (ابناء العالي النام العالي العالي

Akhlat⁵ at this time belonged to al-Ashraf, the Ayyubid ruler of Damascus and Mesopotamia. Al-Ashraf, alarmed at the increasing menace of Jalal al-Din, decided to expel him from his territories. He concluded an alliance with the Seljuq Sultan of Rum, 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh, and the allied army marched towards Jalal al-Din, and they were able to defeat him at Erzinjan and to put him to flight. Jalal al-Din retreated to Tabrtz in Adharbayjan. There he received the news of the advance of the Mongol army against him. He was alarmed at this progress and sent to the Caliph, to al-Ashraf and to the Sultan of Rum, asking them for help and drawing their attention to the fact that he was like a damage of the sultan army against him to the fact that he was like a damage of the and drawing their attention to the fact that he was like a damage of the sultan army against him to the fact that he was like a damage of the sultan army against him to the fact that he was like a damage of the sultan army against him the sultan army against

Nasawi, p. 187 ff.

²Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 4-5.

³Nasawi, pp . 187-90.

⁴Ibid., p. 191; also Abu al-Fada'il al-Hamawi, fol. 185b. According to Juvaini (II, p. 443), the citizens of Akhlat asked the Caliph to mediate with Jalal al-Din.

Akhlat or Khilat, was one of the largest cities in Armenia; see le Strange, The lands of the Eastern Caliphate, p. 183.

⁶Ibn al-'Ibri, Mukhtarsal, pp. 429-30; Sibt, pp. 436-7.

between them and the Mongols. But they did not pay any attention to his appeal. The Mongol army advanced against him and after a short battle he was defeated and put to flight. Soon after this battle Jalal al-Din died as a fugitive in the middle of Shawwal in 628/16 Aug. 1231.

With the collapse of the Khwarizmian empire and the death of Jalal al-Din, the last obstacle between the Mongols and 'Iraq was removed. Al-Mustansir realized this danger and tried to protect his dominions by the annexation of Irbil. Irbil has a very important strategic position near the mountain pass (Darband), by which most of the enemies coming from the east had to pass on their way to 'Iraq. In order to achieve this aim, the Caliph received with great honour and tremendous celebration the ruler of this province, Muzaffar al-Din Gok-bori, when the latter came to pay a visit to Baghdad in 628/1230/1. Muzaffar al-Din was so impressed by the honour bestowed upon him by the Caliph that, when he returned to Irbil, he imposed an oath on his Amīrs to the effect that they should surrender his province to the Caliph after his own death. However, when Muzaffar al-Din died

¹ Ibn al- Ibri, op.cit., pp. 430.32.

²Nasawī, p. 247; Sibt, pp. 442-3; cf. Juvaini, II, pp. 459-60.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 19 ff; Sibt, however, says that when Muzaffar al-Din visited Baghdad he brought with him the keys of Irbil and its dependencies; Mir at, p. 450.

in Ramadan 630/June-July 1233, those Amirs refused to surrender Irbil to the Diwan; therefore the Caliph sent his army with Iqbal al-Sharabi and the Amir Qush-Temur; this army laid siege to Irbil and after a few days they were able to conquer it. On receiving the news of this victory the Caliph rejoiced, and immediately ordered a complete staff of officials to be sent to this province. Soon after the death of Jalal al-Din, the Mongols covered with their raids all Adharbayjan and in Dhu 11-Hijja 628/Sept.-Oct. 1231 a band of them penetrated into the province of Irbil and plundered it and continued their attack as far as Daquq.

Their raid was repeated in 629/123-2 and this time they attacked Shahrazur. The Caliph sent for help to Syria and Irbil; and for his part he prepared his troops. 4 The allied army reached Shahrazur, but the Mongols, on hearing of its advance, retreated to Adharbayjan. 5

It seems that the main aim of the Mongols from these raids and plunders was to collect booty and to test the strength and military power of these provinces.

¹Sibt, p.452; Ibn al-'Ibri, p. 435.

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 44 ff; cf. E.I/II, s.v. Begteginds (bycl. Cahen.)

³ Ton al-Athir, XII, pp. 327-8; Magrizi, Suluk, I/I, p. 241.

Abu al-Fada'il al-Hamawi, fol. 212a.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 27 ff; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 24lb. On these raids see also Tabaqat-i-Nasiri, Eng. tr. II, p. 1117.

The Mongol's raid was repeated in 633/1235-6, they attacked Irbil, Mosul and Sinjar. The Caliph ordered his army to proceed into Irbil to drive the Mongols back, but when this army reached the Darband (the mountain pass) they discovered that the Mongols had retreated.

In 634/1236-7 the Mongols attacked Irbil and were able to force their way into the town, but they were unable to capture the citadel. The army of Baghdad marched towards Irbil, but the Mongols retreated from this town. At the same time, the Caliph ordered the fortification of his capital.

In 635/1237-8 the Mongols marched into Irbil, but its governor took all the necessary precautions to defend his city. Therefore they turned towards Baghdad, they penetrated into Iraq till they reached Daquq, and laid waste this province. The Caliph sent his army out of Baghdad under the leadership of al-Sharabi and Qush-Temur, who were able to drive the Mongols back. In Baghdad the Caliph ordered the

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 84-5; Ibn al-'Ibri, Mukhtasar, p. 436; al-Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 245a. On this raid see also 5. D. Goitein, "Glimpses on Naval warfare in the Mediterranean", S.O. Levi Della Vida, I, p. 399 and pp. 405 ff. Sibt (p.460) quotes a letter dispatched from Lu'lu', the ruler of Mosul, to al-Ashraf, telling him that the Mongols had crossed the river Tigris in 100 divisions and every division consisted of 500 soldiers. It seems that this estimation of Sibt is much exaggerated.

²Sibt, p. 462.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 98-9; Abu Shama, p. 165; cf. Bar-Hebraeus, Chronography, p. 402; idem Mukhtasar, p. 437.

the wall of his capital to be repaired and that engines of war be set up on it. According to Bar-Hebraeus a band of those Mongols reached Samarra' and killed most of its population.²

Another raid took place in the same year (Rajab 635/Feb.-Mar. 1238). This time they attacked Khāniqin.³ The Caliph sent for help to many Muslim rulers, and received some reinforcements from them. But the Mongols were able to defeat the Muslim army and to obtain a lot of booty, and they left Khāniqīn on their way to al-Jibāl.⁴ They even sent an envoy to Baghdad in Rabi II 636/Nov.-Dec. 1238 and after a short visit he left it withthe envoy of the Caliph. Al-Mustansir recognised the increasing danger of the Mongols and in order to meet this danger, he tried to increase the number of his troops; he, therefore, sent money to al-Malik al-Kamil, the Ayyubid ruler of Syria and Egypt, to collect soldiers for him. Al-Kāmil did so and sent 3,000 soldiers to Baghdad. The Caliph also obtained a religious Fatwa in

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 109 ff.

²Chronography, p. 404; Mukhtasar, p. 438.

³Chronography, p. 404.

⁴Ibn al- Fuwati, pp. 111 ff; Bar-Hebraeus, Ch., p. 404; Mukhtasar, pp. 438-9.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 1143. According to Dhahabi, three embassies had been exchanged between Baghdad and the Mongols until 639/1241-2, but there are no indications to reveal what were the topics dealt with on these embassies. Ta'rikh al-Islam, XIX, fol. 253a.

Ibn al-'Amid, edited by Cl. Cahen in B.E.O., XV (1955-7), fols. 238-9; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 246b; cf. Magrizi, Suluk I/I, pp. 257-8. For further details see below, pp.218.

634/1236-7 to the effect that in such a circumstance to prosecute the Holy War was more necessary than to prepare the pilgrimage caravan.

In fact the Iraqi pilgrimage caravan was stopped from this year till the death of al-Mustansir in 640/1242.

The Caliph aimed by this to stop the expenditure on this religious practice in order to concentrate his efforts on dealing with the Mongols.

As a result of the military weaknesses of the rulers of the Marches, and the increasing menace of the Mongols, those rulers found themselves in great need of more of the moral authority of the Caliphate. In spite of the fact that al-Mustansir followed the classical practice of bestowing patents of rule and robes of honour upon those rulers, by now they followed another practice, that of coming to Baghdad and enjoying the honour of being in the capital of the Caliphate. When Muzaffar al-Din, the ruler of Irbil, came to Baghdad in 628/1230-31, he saw the Caliph twice and, on receiving this news, the rest of the rulers of the Muslim world envied Muzaffar al-Din this great honour, and even asked permission of the Caliph to come to Baghdad; but he refused this and advised them to stay where they were to keep order in their provinces.

libn al-Fuwati, p. 98.

²Ibid., pp. 163-4.

³Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 129.

In 634,1236-7 the ruler of Shahrazur came to Baghdad, where he was honoured with the Futuwwa clothes. In 637/1239-40 al-Jawad, the Ayyubid ruler of Sinjar, visited Baghdad after he had sold Sinjar to Badr al-Din Lu'lu'; it seems that al-Jawad discussed a proposal to give 'Ana to the Caliph which, in fact, surrendered to the deputy of the Diwan in the same year. 3

The Caliph also encouraged the remaining troops of the Khwariz-mian to come to Baghdad so that he might employ them; in 631/1233-4 the Caliph employed 4,000 cavalry from them. 4 In 638/1240-41 the Caliph received with honour some of the Khwarizmian Amirs. 5

In the days of al-Mustansir, there was comparative peace at Baghdad, learning flourished and schools and libraries were established, such as the famous Mustansiriyya College. He followed also the policy of his grandfather, al-Nasir, of approaching the Shi ite community through the Futuwwa organisation, and of visiting their shrines and offering money to them. However, he kept his good relations with the

Ibn al-Fuwați, pp. 88-9.

²<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 121-2.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 131; also Sibt, p. 483.

⁴Abu 11-Fada'il al-Hamawi, fol. 226b.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 143-4.

^{6&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 53; see below, pp. 144#.

⁷ Ibn al-Fawati, p. 95; see also below, pp. 146 86.

Sunni community by several means.

Al-Mustansir died on 10 Jumada II 640/5 Dec. 1242. He was succeeded by his son al-Musta'sim (640-656/1242-56). This Caliph, as related by some historians, was a weak sovereign, although he tried, vainly, to follow the policy of his predecessors. He tried to make his reign popular by resuming the sending out of the pilgrimage caravan, which had been suspended since 634/1236-7.4

Soon after his succession to the throne, he was faced with a serious danger inside Baghdad itself. In Sha ban 640/Jan.-Feb. 1243 the Mamluks of his father and grandfather demanded an increase in their salaries, but Iqbal al-Sharabi, the powerful cup-bearer, refused to grant their request. They, therefore, declared that they were intending to leave Baghdad and, in fact, they left the city and encamped outside its walls, thus threatening the peace of the population. As a

Cf. below, pp.1446.

The al-Fuwati, pp. 155 ff; al-Kaziruni, fol. 92b; Ibn al-'Ibri, Mukhtasar, p. 442; Dhahabi, Duwal al-Islam, II, pp. 110-11; cf. Ibn al-'Amid, fol. 246a, Ibn Khaldun, III, pp. 536 ff; see also Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 179; E.I./l, s.v. al-Mustansir (by K. G. Zettersteen).

³See Bar-Hebraeus, Chronography, I, p. 409; idem Mukhtasar, p. 443; al-'Umari, XXVI, fol. 129a; and E.I./I, s.v. al-Musta sim (by K. V. Zettersteen).

⁴Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 163-4.

result of the mediation of a certain pious man, the dispute was settled after seven days of the Mamluks' strike.

The Mongols' raid on 'Iraq continued during the reign of this Caliph: in 642/1244-5 a Mongol army attacked Shahrazur; they were able to force their way into the town, but retreated after a while, with the booty.²

In 643/1245-6 another raid took place and the Mongols reached Ba'quba, 30 miles north-east of Baghdad, but the army of Baghdad, under the leadership of the young Dawadar (al-Duwaydar al-Saghir), 3 a mamluk of the Caliph, was able to defeat them and to force them back. 4 The Caliph was alarmed for his capital, and therefore asked the Beduins to come to Baghdad to assist his army. 5 In 647/1249-50 another raid was made on Khaniqin, and the Mongols marched to Daquq, where they killed many people and captured many prisoners and much booty.

libn al-Fuwați, pp. 168 ff.

Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 256b; Ibn al-'Ibri, Mukhtasar, p. 446; Ta'rikh
Ibn al-Furat, Vatican MS. (No. 726 Arab), fol. 46a.

Dawadar or Duwaydar means the bearer and keeper of the royal inkpot; see E.I./II, s.v. Dawadar (by D. Ayalon).

⁴Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 258b; also Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 168. On the one hand Ibn al-Fuwati reports that the Mongols retreated without making assault on the army of Baghdad; Hawadith, pp. 199-200. On the other hand, Bar-Hebraeus reports the Mongols went to Baghdad, but they were not able to capture it because a great crowd of people rose up and opposed them with a violent assault. Chronography, I, p. 410.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, p.200.

The Caliph took all the available precautions todefend his capital.

While Baghdad and the Caliphate were in serious danger of the Mongol invasion, it is to be observed that in 650/1252-3 a large number of soldiers left Baghdad for Syria, because their salaries had been suspended. It seems very likely that the financial resources of the Caliphate were so limited that the government could not maintain a large number of troops. Although ambassadors went to and fro between Baghdad and the Mongols, 4 there are no indications as to the topics discussed at these meetings.

In Baghdad the government was very weak and its authority declined so that it could not even keep order in the city. In 644/1246-47 the burglars increased and became a nuisance to the citizens; in 648/1250-51 these burglars had a leader called Ghayth. The 'Ayyarun also became a dangerous element in Baghdad. In 648/1250-51 they attacked in bands, and even sacked the houses of the Amirs. In 653/1255-6 the 'Ayyarun became so powerful that they attacked and robbed

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 241-2; see also Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 265a; al-Maqrizi, I/II, p. 355.

Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 261.

³See below, pp. 121-1

⁴Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 290; see also <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fol. 261b, and XX, fol. 210a.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 213.

⁶Dhahabi, XIX, fol 268b.

⁷Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 254. 'Ayyar, literally "rascal or tramp". From the 9th to the 12th century it was the name for certain warriors who were (cont.)

the people openly, and robbed the shops of Darb Zāḥil. The disputes and the fights between the different quarters of Baghdād continued; and the fights between the Shī'ite and Sunnī communities were repeated throughout the reign of this Caliph. Baghdād was flooded several times, because the government was too weak to undertake the irrigation system. Moreover, the messengers of the Mongols reached Baghdād in 655/1257-8 and openly and fearlessly granted Firmans (safe-conducts) to certain people and, in fact, the government did not take any steps to stop their activities. The Pilgrimage Caravan from Baghdād had been stopped since 643/1245-6 not only because of the menace of the Mongols, but also because the government was too weak to keep order in southern 'Irāq, where the Beduins were threatening the pilgrims and attacking their caravan, and extorting as much money as possible for guiding and guarding the pilgrims.

The last blow to the Caliphate came in 656/1258, when Hulagu marched with his huge army towards Baghdad and laid siege to it. The

⁽cont.)
grouped together under the <u>Futuwwa</u> organization; <u>E.I</u>/II, s.v. 'Ayyar' (by F. Taeschner); cf. A.A.Duri, "Nushu' al-Asnaf wa'l-Hraf fi al-Islam", <u>B.C.A.</u> I (1959), pp. 157 ff.

lIbn al-Fuwați, p. 278.

² Ibid, pp. 298, 314; for more details see below, pp. 151 Ht.

³ see below, pp. 120-21.

⁴Dhahabi, XX, fol. 210a.

⁵ Ibid., XIX, fol. 269a; also Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 290.

Caliphate army engaged in a battle against the Mongols, but it was defeated and overtaken by the Mongols. The siege was continued for more than a month, and the Mongols were able to force their way into the city, through a breach in the wall near al-'Ajami tower, but the defenders were able to drive them back. At this stage of affairs the Caliph and his advisers recognised that they could not maintain their city any longer. Therefore, the Caliph sent a delegation to Hulagu to negotiate the terms of their submission.

On 4 Safar 656/10 Feb. 1258 Baghdad was surrendered to the Mongols, and the Caliph with his household were taken captive and then put to death. The people of Baghdad were put to the sword for a week, and thus the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad was abolished.

On the fall of Baghdad see: Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 323 ff; Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Dhayh of Jahan Kusha of Juvaini, ed. Qazmini, III (1937) pp. 282 ff; (the English tr. of this Dhayh by J.A. Boyle in JSS, M/2 1961"pp:); Ibn Khaldun, III, pp. 537-8; Ibn Kathir, XIII, pp. 200 ff; Yunini, I, pp. 86 ff; Abu Shama, pp. 198-9; Bar-Hebraeus, Chronography, I, pp. 429 ff; idem, Mukhtasar, pp. 473 ff; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VII, pp. 47 ff; Abu 'l-Fida, III, pp. 202-3; Ibn al-'Amid, fols. 261-2; Dhahabi, XX, fol. 155-6, and fols. 211 ff.; al-Kaziruni, fols 93 ff; Ibn Tiqtaqa, pp. 452 ff.; Tabaqat Nasiri, (English tr.) II, pp. 1228 ff; E. Bretschnider, I, pp. 118 ff. On the story of the death of the last Caliph, see G. le Strange, "The Story of the Death of the last 'Abbasid Caliph..." JRAS, (1900) pp. 293 ff. ..etc. etc.

Chapter II

THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF AL-MASIR

AND HIS SUCCESSORS

Al-Nasir's ambitions to restore the temporal power of the Caliphate led him to follow a very peculiar religious policy. In fact, he showed a certain favour to the Shī'a of the Imamī sect throughout his reign wishing, perhaps, to reconcile in his person the claims of the 'Abbasids and 'Alīds.' Nevertheless, some historians have gone further and accused him of being Shī'ite himself.

However, it seems that he followed several religious policies during his long reign; even al-Muwaffaq 'Abd al-Latīf was aware of this and accused him of following a contradictory religious policy; he says:

"The Shia creed flourished because of ibm al-Sahib and was abolished by his death. Then the extreme Sunnism appeared, and disappeared in its turn. Then the Futuwwa, the Bunduo³ and the Carrier-pigeons appeared..."

E.I./I, s.v. al-Nasir, by F. Taeschner.

²Ibn al-Tictaqa, p. 433; Abu al-Fida, III, p. 142; Ibn al-Fuhat, fol. 206; Ibn Wasil in al-Dhahabi, XIX, fols. 13-14; and al-'Umari, XXVII, fol. 99a. This accusation seems untrue, since none of these historians was contemporary with al-Nasir; even Ibn al-Athir, who clearly displayed his hostility to al-Nasir, did not mention this matter; see al-Kamil, XII, pp. 286-7.

The <u>Bundud</u> is a certain kind of cross-bow especially made to shoot missiles resembling, in shape, hazel-nuts; it was used by the notables for sporting purposes, especially for hunting birds. For further ex-

In fact, al-Muwaffaq's statement describes accurately the stages of al-Nasir's religious policy. The following are the three stages:

1. The first period between 575/1180 and 583/1187.

During this period al-Nasir followed a purely Shī'ite policy. However, it seems that this attitude was not of his choosing, but arose from the circumstances of his succession to the throne, which affected his career and led him to follow this trend of policy. His father, al-Mustadī', followed an extreme Sunnī policy, favouring the Hanbalīs and appointing the Hanbalīte, Ibn al-'Aṭṭār, as treasurer Sāhib al-Makhzan/and, later on, installing him as Deputy Wazīr Nā'ib fi al-Wizāra'. The Caliph also took a deep interest in the teaching of the Hanbalite shaykh Ibn al-Jawzī, and even put five schools under the supervision of this shaykh to teach in them his Madhhab. By this policy, to be sure, the Shī'ite community suffered considerably and was humiliated. Even Ibn al-Jawzī, by the support of Ibn al-'Aṭṭār, was given a free hand to abolish the innovations Biday because, "It

⁽cont.)
planation about a similar arms, seecl. Cahen, "Un traite..." B.E.O.
XII, (1947-8), pp. 108 ff, 129 ff, 151 ff.

ADhahabi, XIX, fol. 11; see also Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 286, where he says: "He (al-Nasir) used to do the thing and its contradiction".

¹ Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, Hayderabad ed. X, p. 275.

² Ibid., pp. 252-3, 256, 258, 260, 272, 283, 284...etc.

³ Ibid., p. 284; see also Sibt, ed. Jewett, p. 206.

⁴Ibn al-Jawzi, Xpp. 285-6.

had reached the understanding of the commander of the Faithful that Rafd was increased. Although al-Mustadi' followed this pro-Hambalite policy, yet the Shi'ite community were represented in the court by Ibn al-Sahib, the Ustadh al-Dar. At the end of al-Mustadi's reign the issue of designating an heir-apparent was raised, because the Caliph had two sons, Abu Mansur and Abu Al-'Abbas (later on al-Naṣir). However, it seems that the court was divided into two parties in regard to this issue, the Hambalites under the leadership of Ibn al-'Aṭṭār, and the Shi'ite party under the leadership of Ibn al-Saḥib. Each party supported one candidate, the Shi'ite supported al-Naṣir, and the other supported Abu Manṣur. According to al-Dhahabi,

"al-Mustadi' was suspicious of Abu al-'Abbas /al-Nasir', therefore he put him in prison, and started to favour his other son, Abu Mansur, Ibn al-'Attar with the majority of the courtiers were in favour of Abu Mansur, but the concubine of the Caliph /Banafsha/ and al-Majd ibn al-Sahib, with a few followers, supported Abu al-'Abbas."3

Ibn al-Jawzi, p. 259. About the religious policy of al-Mustadi' see also H. Lasuri, "Le Hanbalisme sous le Califat de Baghdad," REI, 1959, pp. 113 ff.

This title used to designate the officer who was in charge of the Caliphal household, with power to look after the revenue of the personal estates of the Caliph, and the expenditure of the Palace. See al-Qalqashandi, V, p. 457; also Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, Osmanli Devleti Taskilatina Medhal, Istanbul 1941, pp. 87-8. The form of this title, as it appears in the contemporary chronicles, is: Ustadh al-Dar, see for examples: Ibn al-Jawzi, X, p. 259; Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 304; Ibn Jubair, p. 228; Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 163; and Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 16 and 25. etc. But al-Qalqashandi criticised those who used this form, because in his opinion the correct form is Istadar/ J; Subb al-Asha, V, p. 457.

³Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 10b; see also Sibt, pp. 224-6.

Although al-Nasir's supporters were fewer than his opponents, nevertheless, his father proclaimed him heir-apparent on 22 Shawwal 575/21 March 1180. A few days later he was proclaimed Caliph, on 2nd Dhu al-Qa'da 575/30 March 1180, after the death of his father.

Al-Nasir was very quick in his reaction against Ibn al-'Attar and his party. On 7th Dhu Al-Qa'da (4th April) he deposed him from his posts and put him in prison with all his followers, some of whom held high positions, such as the cup-bearer of his father and Naqib Bāb al-Nūbī, Mas'ūd. The common people looted their houses and their properties were confiscated. On 1lth (8th April)4 or 18th (15th April)5 of the same month, Ibn al-'Attār was killed in prison and, when the corpse was taken for burial, the common people took it and dragged it through the streets of Baghdād. According to Sibt this action of the common people was due to the bad career of Ibn al-'Attār, who illutreated all the people, especially "The Shī'a of al-Mukhtāra, al-Karkh and Mūsa ibn Ja'far quarters, and had suspended their salaries and dispersed them".

Dhahabi, al-Mukhtasar al-Muhtaj ilaihi min Ta'rikh al-Dubaithi, ed.
M. Jawad, Baghdad (1951), p. 180, and the appendix of the editor (at
the end of the book) p. 32; Ibn Kathir, XII, p. 305; but Sibt puts
the date at the end of Dhu al-Qa'da 574/May 1179, Mir at al-Zaman, p. 224.

²Ibn al-Athir, XI, p; 304; Sibt, p. 225.

³Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 304; Sibt, pp. 226 and 228.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 228.

⁵Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 304; according to ibn Khaldun, the death of ibn al-Attar occured on 10th Dhu al-Qa'da, see al-Ibar, III, p.528.

⁶Sibt, p. 229.

This indicates that the Shī'a's reaction was against the fanatical Sunnī policy which was undertaken by the deputy Wazīr.

Soon after the removal of the influence of Ibn al-'Attar,
Ibn al-Sahib found a favourable opportunity to exercise his own influence on the Caliph. In fact, he became the strongest person in
the court. Ibn Jubair, who visited Baghdad in 580/1184-5, recorded
the following account about Ibn al-Sahib,

"He /al-Nasir has a Guardian over all the 'Abbasid regions, and Trustee over all the remaining dignities /of the Caliphate ... who is known as al-Sahib Majd al-Din Ustadh al-Dar...,"

and that his name was mentioned in the Khutba after that of the Caliph. In spite of the fact that Ibn al-Sahib did not reach the position of Wazir, nevertheless, having his name mentioned after the name of the Caliph in the Khutba was a great privilege, which indicates his influence and power. As a result of this influence the Caliph followed a very clear pro-Shi ite policy. According to al-Muwaffaq, "The Shi ism flourished because of Ibn al-Sahib". Moreover, the Caliph allowed this community to practice all their religious rituals, including the cursing of the Companion of the Prophet, in public. According to al-Qadisi, the continuer of the Muntazam of Ibn al-Jawzi,

Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 304 and p. 372; see also ibn Khaldun, III, p. 529; and Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 10b.

²Ibn Jubair, p. 227.

³Dhahabi, XIX, fol. lla.

"On the day of 'Ashura' in the year 582 (1186) [The Shi a community of Baghdad celebrated the anniversary of the death of al-Husain ibn Ali publicly. Their procession was marching in Baghdad, while the robes of honour were distributed among them. They even cursed Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, Talha, Zubair and Aisha / the wife of the prophet/. The people of Karkh shouted 'there is no more Kitman', [i.e. there is no fear from the authority, because it has not any objection to this anti-Sunni action. Then they gave the platform to a woman called Ibnat Qaraba /the daughter of Qaraba, whose father had been killed previously because Ibn al-Attar seized him and found in his possession books with the curse of the companions of the prophet written on them. She stood on a stone bench under the balcony of the Caliph in al-Rayhaniyin quarter and thousands of men and women gathered around her, while she was reciting the poems of al-'Umi and others and cursing 'Aisha, and says 'Curse the rider of the camel' /referring to 'Aisha'. She has also mentioned the Ufuk story and the prophet in the worst terms and insults. He said /al-Qadisi/, and all this was ascribed to the affect of Ustadh al-Dar, Ibn al-Sahib. 12

It is evident from this account, if it is true, that the Caliph allowed the Shi a community immense freedom to declare their anti-Sunni tendency. However, distributing the robes of honour among those who participated in this ceremony indicates that the government did not only tolerate this anti-Sunni action, but encouraged it; otherwise the Caliph would have taken severe measures to stop it. Moreover, al-Qadisi openly accused Ibn al-Sahib of instigating this policy.

Pace Lelow, pp.

lbn al-Jawzi named this man as Abu al-Sa'adat ibn Qaraya, and put his death on 24th Ramadan 574/5th Mar. 1179; al-Muntazam, X, pp. 285-6; see also ibn Kathir, XII, p. 300; and ibn al-Imad, IV, p. 246.

²Sibt, pp. 246-7.

Meanwhile, this influence of Ibn al-Ṣaḥib aroused the alarm of al-Naṣir, who tried to find some backing from the common people of Baghdad by associating himself with the Futuwwa order in 578/1182-3.1 Even Ibn JubaIr says about the Caliph, "He /al-Naṣir/ was very fond of appearing to the common people and making himself popular with them". However, it seems that al-Naṣir finally found some support and was able to remove Ibn al-Ṣaḥib from office. In Rabī 1583/May-June 1187 the Caliph ordered Ibn al-Ṣaḥib to be killed, and all his wealth was confiscated by the government. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the final blow to Ibn al-Ṣaḥib came through the intrigues of one of his close associates called Ibn Yunus, in whom, perhaps, the Caliph found the effective supporter to undermine the power of Ibn al-Ṣaḥib and to bring about his downfall.4

Hambalite, had formed the Sunni bloc in the court, and took the intrigues as a means of reaction against Ibn al-Sahib and his Shi ite policy; and, on the other hand, the Caliph profited from this situation and arranged with him the overthrow of Ibn al-Sahib. Nevertheless, the appointment of Ibn Yunus as Wazir in Shawwal (December) in the same year, might have

See below, pp. 113 H.

²Ibn Jubair, p. 229.

³Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 372; also Ibn Khaldun, III, p. 529; Ibh Khallikan says that Ibn al-Sahib was killed on 19 Rabi I 583/29 May 1187, see Wafayat, II, p. 334.

⁴Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 372; and Ibn Khaldun, III, p. 529.

⁵See below, p. 106.

some connection with this plot.

With the death of Ibnal-Sahib the first period of al-Nasir's religious policy came to an end. This period was marked by the extreme Shi'ite policy undertaken by the Caliph as a result of the influence of the Shi'a community through their powerful representative in the court, Ibn al-Sahib. However, this policy clarifies al-Nasir's reasons for taking harsh measures in 579/1183-4 against employing the DhimmIs in the Diwan.

2. The second period between 583/1187 and 590/1194.

With the appointment of Ibn Yunus to the Wazirate the second stage of al-Nasir's religious policy started, which, according to al-Muwaffaq, was marked by an extreme Sunnism.² This seems quite true, since the new Wazīr was a Hanbalite.³ However, appointing a Hanbalite Wazīr was a clear shift in the Caliph's tendency. Whether this shift in his religious policy came as a result of the Sunnī's discontent, or not, nevertheless the real reasons for this shift remain, with the lack of evidence, obscure.

Ibn Yunus was installed as Wazir in Shawwal 583/Dec. 1187,4 and

See below, p. 155-6

²Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 11; see also above, p.99.

³Ibn Rajab, Dhayl Tabaqat al-Manabila, ed. H. Laoust and S. Dahan, Damascus (1951), I, p. 153; Ibn al-'Imad, IV, p. 313; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 142; see also H. Laoust, "La Hanbalism sou la Califat de Baghdad", R.E.I. (1959), p. 114.

⁴Ibn al-Athir, XI, p. 372; Ibn Kathir, XII, p. 328.

to be sure he followed a pro-Hanbalite policy. He installed his correligionists in many offices, such as 'Abd al-Wahhab, the son of the celebrated Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jili, who was appointed in charge of the Mazalim (investigation of grievances), and others.²

The rule of Ibn Yunus was short for, in 584/1188-9, he led an army against Tughril II, but was defeated and taken prisoner. He was released after a while and returned to Baghdad, where the Caliph assigned to him the treasury (al-Makhzan) and the Diwan and, afterwards, appointed him as Ustadh al-Dar. On his return Ibn Yunus resumed his anti-Shiiae tendency. In 588/1192-3 the Caliph, on the advice and intrigues of Ibn Yunus, discharged and imprisoned the Shiiite Amir of the Hajj caravan, Mujir al-Din Tashtakin.

The last blow came to Ibn Yunus and his party in 590/1194, after Ibn al-Qassab had been promoted from deputy Wazir to Wazir. 6 Ibn Yunus

Ibn al-Imad, IV, p. 314.

²<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 339-40.

³See Chapter I, pp. 45-6

⁴Sibt, p. 281; Abu Shama, p.12.

⁵Sibt, pp. 266 and 343; see also Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 61. Although Tashtakin was an extreme Shi ite (see Ibn al-Sa i, p. 186), yet the charge against him was "Ibn Yunus envied him and said to the Caliph that he corresponds with Saladin, and he /Ibn Yunus/ fabricated a letter /to this effect/..." See sibt, p. 343; also Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI. p. 190.

Sibt, p. 281; according to Ibn al-Athir, in Sha'ban 590/July-Aug. 1194 Ibn al-Qassab was invested with the vestment of the Wazirate; al-Kamil, XII, pp. 70-71.

was expelled from all his posts and arrested with all his Hanbalite followers in the Court, such as the Shaykh Ibn al-Jawzi, who was arrested and exiled to Wasit.²

Although Sibt mentions that Ibn al-Qassab was a "Shī'ite", yet it seems that Sibt is quite prejudiced against Ibn al-Qassab, who prosecuted his beloved grandfather, Ibn al-Jawzī; and thus tried to represent this action of the Wazīr as a Shī'ite reaction. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that the government, in removing Ibn Yunus and his followers, aimed by this act to remove the extreme Hanbali element and was not against all the sect, because even the grandson of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jīlī, 'Abd al-Salam, was among those who helped Ibn al-Qassab to prosecute Ibn Yunus and his followers. Moreover, after the arrest of Ibn al-Jawzī, another Hanbalite shaykh took his place as preacher (Wā'iz/.5

Sibt, pp. 281-2, and p. 289; Abu Shama, p. 9; see also Ibn al-'Imad, IV, pp. 339-40.

²Sibt, pp. 281-2; Ibn al-Jawzi returned from Wasit in 595/1198-9, and died in 597/1200-1; see Sibt, p. 310; see also H. Laoust, in R.E.I. p. 115; for further studies on Ibn al-Jawzi and his position in the Hanbalite school, see idem, La Profession de foi d'ibn Batta, Damascus (1958), pp. CXXI ff.

See Sibt, p. 281; Abu Shama, pp. 55-6; cf. M. Jawad, who suggests that Ibn al-Qassab was not a Shi ite, see his appendix to al-Dhahabi's al-Mukhtasar al-Muhtaj..., p. 30 n. (i).

⁴Sibt, pp. 281-2; Abu Shama, pp. 55-6; also Ibn al-'Imad, V, pp. 45-6; But it seems that the hostility of 'Abd al-Salam to Ibn Yunus was based on personal motive, because he, previously, suffered prosecution by Ibn Yunus, who accused him of following the doctrine of the Greek philosophers, see Ibn al-Qifti, ed. J. Lippert, Leipzig, (1903), pp. 228-9.

⁵Ibn al-'Imad, V, p. 48.

3. The third period between 590/1194 and 622/1225.

This was al-Nasir's most active period and, in fact, he followed in it several lines of religious policy.

When al-Nasir came to the Caliphate he saw his subjects divided in the issue of their religious beliefs - Sunnis against Shi a and Hanbalis against the rest of the Sunni schools. Their rivalries were so deep rooted that no one could bridge the gap easily or quickly. When he, by the aid of the Shi a, came to power, he favoured them and allowed them the utmost freedom to practice their religious rituals; perhaps he tried to explore the real power of this community in Baghdad and Iraq; but it seems that they could not provide him with the power he required. He, therefore, turned to the other extreme group, the Hanbalite, who, perhaps, could aid him to remove Ibn al-Sahib from office; but again he could not find what he required of power and support.

Now he realized that neither the Shi a, nor the Hanbalis, alone, could help him to achieve his wide vision and dreams. But, to be sure, all the people of his kingdom, whether Shi a or Sunnis, could form a strong power to back him in order to fulfil his ambitions, because he realised that favouring one sect or another would lead him nowhere but to the increase of the disorders and resentments. But how could he bring all the people of his principality, with their different attitudes and beliefs, together? This aim could be achieved by adopting a moderate religious policy and by the reconciliation of the different sects and groups. In fact, this is exactly what he had done; he tried to reconcile the claim of the 'Alids and the 'Abbasids in his person, the Shi ite and

Summis and finally the notables and the common people, by adopting the Futuwal and transmitting the tradition. All this for one purpose and one goal: to strengthen the position and prestige of the 'Abbasid Caliphate within his principality, as well as without, and to make out of a worn shabby image a real power, if not possible in the real sense of the word 'power' at least to "create a kind of state of the Church for the Caliphate in Baghdad and 'Iraq". However, he tried to reconcile in his person both the 'Alads and 'Abbasids by proclaiming himself, on several occasions, as the "Savyid of the family of the prophet". Moreover, he had defended the rights of 'Ala to the Caliphate; see, in the following letter how he expressed his sentiment:

When al-Afdal, the son of Saladin, had been defeated by his uncle al-'Adil and his brother al-'Aziz, he wrote a letter to the Caliph, in which he mentioned the following verse:-

Oh, My Master, Abu Bakr and his comrade

"Uthman have taken the light of 'Ali
by the power of the sword.

Then look at this name / Ali, referring to
himself how he was illtreated by the
later, like it was treated by the earlier."

He refers to his uncle by Abu Bakr, and to his brother by 'Uthman. Al-

¹F. Taeschner, "Islamischen Orden...", <u>W. G.</u>, IV, (1938), p. 403.

²E.I./II, s.v. 'Abbasids (by B. Lewis).?

³al-Kaziruni, fol. 88.

"Your letter, which reveals truly your pure origin, has been received.

They have usurped the rights of 'Ali because he had, after the death of the prophet, in Yathrib no helper.

Be-thou-patient, tomorrow I will judge them, and be pleased for your helper is the Imam the Aider /al-Nasir/."

Furthermore he displayed his pro-'Alīd sentiment by appointing the Naqīb of the 'Alīd, Ibn Mahdī, 2 as deputy Wazīr in 597/1200.3 He was honoured by the vestment and title of Wazīr on 8th Dhu 1-Hijja 502/16th July 1206.4 However it seems that he exercised wide authority, which enabled him to install his son, Rukn al-Dīn Abu 'Abd Allah Muḥammad, as Ṣadr al-Makhzan - in charge of the treasury. 5 He was deposed from office on 12 or 22 Junāda II in 604/3 or 13 Jan. 1208, after his son was expelled a day earlier. 8 However, according to Sibt and Ibn al-Athīr, this Wazīr was expelled for his increasing power, and for the discontent of the people of Baghdād with his rule. 9

Bar-Hebraeus, Mukhtasar, pp. 413-4; see also Shafa' al- mlub, B.V. MS. p.71.

²⁵ibt, p. 371; Abu Shama, p. 85.

³Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 44; Sibt, p. 307; but Ibn al-Athir puts his appointment in 592/1195-6, al-Kamil, XII, p. 81; see also below p.

⁴Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 168-9; Sibt, p. 342; Abu Shama, pp. 52-3.

⁵Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 143-4.

^{6&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 220-21.

⁷ Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 182.

⁸Ibn al-Sa i, p. 220.

⁹Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 182-3; see also Sibt, pp. 347-9; Abu Shama, p. 60; see also below pp. 189 14.

Although in 590/1194 the Caliph turned against the extreme Hanballs yet after the deposition of Ibm Mahdi the Hanballs regained their position in the court, and some of them were appointed to the highest posts. In 604/1207-8 Muhyī al-Dīn ibn al-Jawzī was appointed Muhtasib¹ of Baghdad.² In the same year Ahmad ibn Bakrūs, the Hanbalite Shahid Adl, was appointed to control the police force in the Nubī Cate Nivabat Babal-Nubī/.³ In 605/1208-9 the Caliph installed another Hanbalī Abū al-Qasim ibn Anushtakīn, as the agent of the Caliph over Bab Tirad.⁴ Al-Naṣir's personal estates were put under the management of a Hanbalite official, Ismā'īl ibn 'Alī ibn al-Husain (died in 610/1213-4).⁵ Moreover the Caliph appointed a Mushrif /Inspector over all his agents - those in charge of his properties - a Hanbalite Facīh, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Makī, who died in 622/1225-6.6

Censor, or an official in charge of the markets and public morals; see E.I./I, s.v. Muhtasib (by R. Levy) and Hisba (by E. Zambour).

Muhyi al-Din remained as Muhtasib till 609 A.H., and was reappointed to the same office in 615 and dismissed in 617; see Sibt, pp. 326, 347, 366 and p. 389; Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 231; Abu Shama, p. 26; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 49; and H. Laoust in R.E.I. (1959), p. 117.

³Sibt, p. 373; Abu Shama, pp. 87-8; Ibn al-'Imad, V, pp. 39-40.

⁴Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 261; but Ibn al-'Imad named this man as Ibn Abi Sukain, see Shadharat, V, p. 31.

⁵Sibt, pp. 369-70; Abu Shama, p. 84; Ibn al- Imad V, 40-41.

⁶Ibn al- Imad, V, p. 103.

The Futuwwa of al-Nasir.

Although "the origins of the <u>Futuwwa</u> are extremely obscure" yet its closer association with the <u>Sufi</u> order and the craft guilds is remarkable. However, it seems that the <u>Futuwwa</u> associated with <u>Sufi</u> order since early periods, and the teaching of both orders were exchanged between them. What is more curious is the close association between the <u>Futuwwa</u> and <u>Shi'a</u> in regarding 'Ali ibn Abi Talib as the Head and founder of this order. Thus al-Nasir, by adopting this order and then by reforming it, placed under his command an immense power.

Al-Nasir entered the <u>Futuwwa</u> organisation in 578/1182-3 merely as a simple member. He was initiated by the chief of the <u>Futuwwa</u>,

The following remarks are not intended to present a complete picture of al-Nasir's <u>Futuwwa</u>, but only to present a certain aspect of the close relations between <u>Futuwwa</u>, <u>Shi'ism</u>, and <u>Shari'a</u> law. For more detailed studies on the <u>Futuwwa</u> in general and the <u>Futuwwa</u> of al-Nasir in particular, see the studies of F. Taeschner on this subject.

²B. Lewis, "The Islamic guilds", E.H.R., VIII/II 1937, p. 27.

³F. Taeschner, "Der Anteil des sufismus an der Formung des Futuwwaideals", D.I., XXIV (1937), pp. 43 ff; see also Abudl- Ala Afifi, Al-Malamatiyya wa al-Sufiyya wa ahl al-Futuwwa, Cairo (1945), pp. 24 ff; and A. A. Duri, "Nus hu al-Asnaf...etc." B.C.A., 1 June 1959, pp. 161-2.

L. Cahen, "Mouvements popularies et Autonomisme urbain", Arabica, VI, 1959, pp. 233-4.

The Futuwwa is a group of young men, bound together by an ethical and religious code of duties and an elaborate ceremonial. They are under obligation to practise certain virtues and usually to render military service to the cause of Islam. The Futuwwa, as will thus be seen contitutes in a certain sense a Muslim parallel to the European conception of chivalry." B.Lewis, op. cit.,p.27.

The member of this order is called Fata(pl. Fityān).

Abd al-Jabbar ibn Yusuf ibn Salih al-Baghdadi. Although the only source known to Taeschner, who mentions this date (578) is Hajji Khalifa, yet al-Sakhawi (died in 902/1496-7) in Tuhfat al-Ahbab mentions this date also; and, according to him, al-Nasir joined the Futuwwa order at the suggestion of his boon companions Mudama Tand they arranged a meeting between the Caliph and Abd al-Jabbar in one of the Gardens of the Caliphal palaces, where the Shaykh bestowed on al-Nasir the Futuwwa trousers.

Apart from all the virtues of the Futuwwa the most important basic element in it was its close connection with 'Ali ibm Abī Talib as its head and founder. To be sure, there was no Muslim, whether

F. Taeschner, "Islamischen Orden...etc." W.G., IV, 1938, p. 393; idem, "Das Futuwwa - Rittertum des islamischen Mittelaters", B.A.S.I., Leipzig 1944, p. 354; P. Kahle, "Ein Futuwwa Erlass des Kalifen an-Nasir aus dem Jahre 604 (1207)", Festschrift Max Freiherrn von Oppenheim, Berlin 1933, p. 58; G. Salinger, "Was Futuwwa an Oriental form of Chivalry?" Pro. Ame. Philo. Society, 94 (1950), pp. 490-91; see also L. Cahen, "Note sur les Debuts de la Futuwwa d'an-Nasir", Oriens, VI, (1953), pp. 18 ff.

²F. Taeschner, in <u>W.G.</u>, IV, 1938, p. 393; <u>idem</u> in <u>B.A.S.I.</u>, p. 354, etc. ³Taqwim al-Tawarikh, Istanbul 1146/1733, p. 73.

⁴Tuhfat al-Ahbab, Cairo ed. 1356/1937, pp. 16-7; see also M. Jawad, in his introduction to <u>Kitab al-Futuwwa</u> of Ibn al-Mi mar, Baghdad (1958) pp. 52-3, where M. Jawad see cited another quotation from a contemporary chronicle called al-Ta'rikh al-Mzaffari of al-Qadi Shihab al-Din ibn Abi al-Damm al-Hamawi (died in 642/1244-5) supported the evidence of Hajji Khalifa.

⁵See B. Lewis, "The Islamic guilds", E.H.R., VIII/II, 1937, p. 27.

6
Ibn al-Sa'I, p. 223.

Sunni or Shi'i, could do anything but respect 'Ali for his good qualities and his highly esteemed character and, from this, al-Nasir derived advantage, in order not to be reproached, at least openly, by the Sunni people for his association with this order.

Before he ordered its reform in 604/1207 he had practiced its rituals, especially by looking after the carrier-pigeons, which was one of its basic military and sporting characteristics. In 590/1193-4, according to al-Qadisi, as cited by Sibt,

"The Caliph ordered that all the old carrier-pigeons were to be slaughtered and all traces of them to be removed. He looked after the young ones, and sent them to the Mashhads to fly back to Baghdad. He put these pigeons under the supervision of the chief judge, Ibn al-Bukhari, and Yusuf al-'Uqab, the chief of the Fityan. He classified them / the pigeons into twelve categories, and named them after the Twelve Imams. Then he named them: al-'Alawiyat, al-Hasaniyat, al-Muhammadiyat, al-Fatimiyat, al-Hashimiyat, al-Baqiriyat, al-Sadawiyat, al-Zihat1(?), al-Mahdiyat, al-Sadiqiyat and al-'Abidiyat..."

This narrative indicates al-Nasir's pro-Shi'ite tendency and that, until 590/1193-4, the Caliph was not the Chief of the Fityan but Yusuf al-'Uqab; the latter is mentioned again in 599/1202-3 when the Caliph sent him to invest al-'Adil, the Ayyubid ruler of Syria, with the Futuwwa trousers.² Thus it seems that up to 604/1207 the Caliph was

Sibt, p. 280; L. Cahen observes that there are eleven names in the list, not twelve, as the narrative says at its beginning, and that the chain was also broken in order to insert in it the names of some of the family of the prophet, who were acceptable to the Sunnis. Oriens, 6, 1953, p. 19. But this narrative suggests that after the Caliph had classified the pigeons into 12 groups, he then renamed each group by the abovementioned names:

²Sibt, p. 333; Abu Shama, p. 33; see alsocL. Cahen, Oriens, 6, p. 19.

still a simple member of the <u>Futuwwa</u>. Judging from the frequent occurrence of fights between the various quarters of Baghdad - Sunni against <u>Shi</u> i² - and between the Sunni quarters themselves, and from the frequent attacks on the government officials, it seems that whatever al-Nasir sought by adopting the <u>Futuwwa</u> order failed to give him the stability he had wanted in Baghdad.

In 604/1207 the Caliph took action to reorganize the <u>Futuwwa</u> because the extent of the disorder permitted no further delay. Ibn al-Sa'ī preserved the document reforming this organization; ⁵ this document is dated 9th Safar 604/4 Sept. 1207. According to Ibn al-Sa'ī's introduction to this decree,

"In this year 2604/1207 the old <u>Futuwa</u> was abolished and the Commander of the Faithful, al-Nasir li-Din-Allah (May God be content with him) was made the <u>QIBLA</u> the direction towards Mecca therein and the one who is to be referred to."

CL. Cahen, <u>Oriens</u>, 6, pp. 19-20.

² Ibn al-Sa·i, pp. 148-9, 200-201; ibn/al-Athir, XII, p. 133.

³Ibn al-Sa·I, pp. 146-8; Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 133.

⁴Ibn al-Sa·i, p. 46, and p. 148; Cf below pp. 234.

The al-Sa'i, pp. 221 ff; this decree also edited by Kurd 'Ali in al-Muktabar, 1908, pp. 98-100; P. Kahle edited it with a German translation in his article, "Ein Futuwwa - Erlass des Kalifen en Nasir aus dem Jahre 604 (1207)", Festschrift Max Freiherrn von Oppenheim, Berlin 1933, pp. 52-58; G. Salinger translated extracts of it into English in "WAs Futuwwa...", Proc. Ame. Phi. Society. 94, 1950, pp. 485 ff.

¹bn al-Sa i, p. 221; G. Salinger, p. 485.

Thus it is evident that al-Nasir up to 604/1207 was still not the Head of the organization but he became the Qibla after he issued this decree; otherwise there was no need to re-invest upon the Muslim rulers the trousers after this date. For, according to Abu '1-Fida, in 607/1210-11, the messengers of the Caliph came to the Muslim rulers to the effect that these rulers should wear the trousers and drink the cup of the Futuwwa () to the Caliph, and to make him their pattern in shooting with the Bunduq and to refer to him in doing so. 2

According to Ibn al-Sa'i this decree was issued because -

"It happened that the 'Alid al-Fakhir was a Rafiq of the Wazir Nasir ibn Mahdi, and he himself also had rafigs. Then one of his rafigs quarreled with a rafig of 'Izz al-Din Najah al-Sharabi and a great fight occurred at Mahallat Qutufta with the result that they fought with swords. And this was known by the Imam al-Nasir li-Din Allah (May God be content with him) and he disapproved of it. And he ordered the Wazir to convoke the chiefs of groups and to have a decree written on this matter, compelling them to maintain orderly behaviour and accord and prohibiting them from mutual hatred. And the decree was to be read in their presence and in its contents submitted to them before witnesses. And those who disobeyed it would be deprived of their trousers, their Futuwwa would be abolished, and a punishment deemed appropriate would be applied to them."

Cf. F. Taeschner, "Islamischen Ordenritartum..." W.C., IV, 1938, p. 394, n. 3; idem, "Das Futuwwa-Ritterertum...", B.A.S.I., pp. 354, ed. 370; see also P. Kahli, in Festschrift Max F. Oppenheim, p. 58.

²Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 119; see also al-Magrizi, Suluk, I/I, p. 172.

³Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 221-1; it is cited also in G. Salinger, op.cit., pp. 485-6.

From this it seems that even among the Futuwwa followers there was sectarian rivalry between the Rafiqs of Ibn Mahdī, the Shī'ite, and al-Sharabī, the Sunnī, which caused fights and bloodshed; in order to stop the disorder the Caliph issued his decree. This intention of al-Naṣir is clearly illustrated by Ibn al-Mi'mar, in Kitab al-Futuwwa, which was probably written for al-Naṣir or during his reign, where Ibn al-Mi'mar describes the Futuwwa thus: "The Futuwwa of the distinguished /people/ is to respect the opinion; and the Futuwwa of the common people is to obey orders". Ibn al-Mi'mar also repreached those people who joined this order and directed their main attention and concern to attacking and killing the police members and the security men, and describes the behaviour of this group as "This is the behaviour of ignorance /Jahiliya/ the sediment, the vulgar" and, "/some of the ignorant people/ intended by associating themselves in the Futuwwa to be aided in attacking and looting the people and their

This book was edited by M. Jawad, M. T. al-Hilali et. Baghdad 1958. The name of the author of this work appears on the manuscript as: Abu 'Abdullah Muhammad al-Sharim (?) Ibn al-'Ammar al-Faqih al-Hanbali al-Baghdadi; see P. Kahle, Festscrift G. Jacob, p. 112. In fact, under the name "Ibn al-'Ammar" this work is quoted by P. Kahle, and F. Taeschner in B.A.S.I., p. 349, n.ll, and pp. 350 ff. and p. 359. But one of the editors of this book, M. Jawad, identified the author thus: Abu 'Abdullah Muhammad ibn Abi al-Makarim who was known as Ibn al- Mi'mar al-Baghdadi al-Hanbali (died in 642/1244-5), see M. Jawad's second introduction to this book, pp. 118-9. P. Kahle also translated into German chapters 6 and 7 of this book in Opera Minra, Leiden, 1956.

²Ibn al-Mi'mar, <u>Kitab al-Futuwwa</u>, p.155.

³Ibid., p. 289.

properties, and they considered anyone who helped them in doing so as the best Fata, while their duty should have been to restrain each other from doing so in order to remove the cause of disturbance".

However, al-Nasir in reforming the <u>Futuwwa</u> did not only try to be the <u>qibla</u> of this organization but endeavoured to gain control over the Fityan association in order to strengthen the position of the authority in dealing with these groups. 3

In the introduction of his decree, al-Nasir emphasizes that 'Alī ibn Abī Tālib was "the origin and source of the <u>Futuwwa</u> and its honourable virtues..., and on the pattern of his brotherhood with the prophet the <u>Fityān</u> based their relations". Although this is clearly a pro'Alīd sentiment, yet there is no objection by the Sunnī to it. And,
"In accordance with the perfection of his <u>Alī's Futuwwa</u> and the abundance of his wisdom applied all the limits of the <u>Shar'</u> with its various aspects of punishment provided by this law, without being culpable in applying it. He did so for obedience to the order of God Almighty". By this not only, as Salinger suggests, did al-Nasir strike at the Fityān with their own weapons, but also tried to satisfy the

libn al-Mi mar, p. 290.

² Tbn al-Sa·i, p. 221.

³ See G. Salinger, p. 490.

⁴Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 223; about the relation between 'Ali and the prophet and their position in the <u>Futuwwa</u> tradition see F. Taeschner, "Das Futuwwa - Rittertum..." <u>B.A.S.I.</u>, pp. 362-3; and H. Ritter, "Zur Futuwwa", <u>D.I.</u>, X, 1920, p. 245.

⁵Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 223, cited also in G. Salinger, p. 490.

G. Salinger, p. 490.

various Muslim groups and associations, whose main purpose in their teaching and revolts was to demand from the authority the application of the Shar. Then the decree reads,

"He ('Ali) did so (applied the Shar') before the pious ancestors of the chosen companions of the prophet without being reproached by any one of the community for that. Thus it is obligatory on whom God has given the rank of 'Ali (referring to al-Nasir), who has been entrusted with the religious law (Shari'a) and who had associated himself with the good qualities and deed of 'Ali', to follow the same pattern in his own deeds and to apply what God has designed in 'Ali of good example, without being reproached for that, and also should be obeyed in every issue he orders."

This indicates that there was some objection among the Muslims, probably the Sunnis, to the association of the Caliph with the <u>Futuwwa</u> organization; therefore, in order to persuade those people of his good intentions, he stressed that he was just following the pattern of 'Alī in applying the religious law.

Moreover, Ibn al-Mi'mar, in the fourth chapter of his work, states the conditions on which a person is eligible to be a member of the <u>Futuwwa</u> by saying,

"The fourth condition is the religion, because the religion is the origin and the <u>Futuwwa</u> is a branch of it. There is no <u>Futuwwa</u> to him who has no religion, 2 it the <u>Futuwwa</u> does not disagree with the <u>Shari'a</u>."

¹ Ibn al-Sa i, pp. 223-4.

²Kitab al-Futuwwa, p. 167; moreover, Ibn al-Mi'mar emphasized this idea in several places of his work, see pp. 172, 175, 243, 287.

Thus al-Nasir attempted to present his <u>Futuwwa</u> to all Muslims: a chivalrous order with a strong basis of religion. Moreover combining together the virtues of the <u>Futuwwa</u>, 'Alī and the <u>Sharī'a</u> means assembling together many ideas, which also have a certain appeal to the Muslims. In fact, on this combination the power of al-Nasir's <u>Futuwwa</u>, as well as his success in propagating it, rested. For the application of the <u>Shar</u> was the aim of the various Islamic movements and groups, especially the oppressed ones among them. And 'Ali was the cousin of the prophet, the first of the <u>Sh</u>i'a Imams, the fourth of the Rashidīn Caliphs and finally, by lapse of time, he had become a symbolic figure of justice and righteousness. Moreover, 'Alī was, for the Fityan, the head and founder of the order. Thus al-Nasir in adopting this order and reforming it became the successor of 'Alī to the leadership of the <u>Futuwwa</u>, as well as being already the successor of the great 'Abbasids.

If his goal was to achieve the unity of Islam, why did he not try to adopt the principle of the Holy War (Jihad) instead of the Futuwwa?

Although the idea of the Holy War was already established firmly in lislamic soil yet it seems that the appeal of this idea to the Muslims of the period was not strong enough to achieve this unity. Moreover, Nur al-Dīn and, later on, Saladin, adopted, sincerely, the Jihad principle, and did their best to liberate Syria from the Crusades but did

¹F. Taeschner, in $\frac{W_{\bullet}G_{\bullet}}{134-5}$. IV, 1938, p. 402; see also G. Salinger, p. 487; see also below pp. 134-5.

² H.A.R.Gibb, "The achievement of Saladin", B.J.R.L., 35, 1952, pp. 44 ff.

they succeed in restoring the unity of Islam to face the danger of the Crusades? The answer is simply no. The disintegration of the Muslim world still existed and the local rivalries between the Muslim princes continued.

However, al-Nasir realized that unless he adopted a new idea, one may call it a revolutionary idea, in which he could combine the glorious past with the necessary requirements of the moment, he would be unable to achieve his dreams of uniting all the Muslims and restoring the prestige of his Caliphate, the glorious past of the Rashidin Caliphate, with its justice and righteousness, by setting 'Ali as his pattern and putting himself as his successor. And the requirements of the moment of adopting an idea which could unite all the Muslims, whether Sunnis or Shi'is, rich or poor, notables or commoners, together and to attach them to his person.

Thus al-Nasir started his campaign to attach the Muslim princes to his person by investing them with the <u>Futuwwa</u> trousers, in other words, enlisting them in the membership of this order and, as a result, make it an obligation on them to obey him, not only because he was a Caliph but because he was the head of the <u>Futuwwa</u> order. Moreover, it seems that he was so successful in making this association popular that many people and rulers joined it. According to Ibn al-Sa'i, the Caliph, prior to his reformation of the <u>Futuwwa</u>, had

"Honoured 'Abd al-Jabbar by accepting the Futuwwa

F. Taeschner in W.G., IV, 1938, p. 405.

from him and the latter was an ascetic Shaykh. Then all the people entered nobles and commoners and the Kings of the remote countries asked for the Futuwwa. So he sent to them messengers and men who were to invest them with the Futuwwa trousers by way of the delegation of the Caliph. And this spread through Baghdad and the younger ones received the Futuwwa from the older ones.

This evidence is supported by Ibn al-Athir, who says,

"And he gave his utmost attention to shooting with the Bunduq, to the carrier pigeons and to the Futuwwa trousers. So he abolished the Futuwwa in the whole country except for those who downed the trousers bestowed by him and who referred to him. And many kings put on the Futuwwa trousers bestowed by him. And he also forbade others /to have/ carrier pigeons, except for the carrier pigeons which he gave. He also forbade anyone who did not refer to him to shoot with the Bundua [without referring to his authority]. People in 'Iraq and elsewhere obeyed him in this with the exception of one man whose name was Ibn al-Sift of Baghdad, for this one fled from 'Iraq and reached Syria (al-Sham, probably Damascus). Then he (al-Nasir) sent him a message to arouse his greed for great riches in order that he might shoot in his name and refer to him in shooting. But /the man/ did not do it. I was told that a friend of his disapproved of him because of his refusal to accept the riches. But he replied 'It was sufficient for my glory that except for me there is nobody in the world to shoot except in the name of the Caliph! . #2

As it is suggested by Ibn al-Sa'i and Ibn al-Athir this movement widely spread among the population of 'Iraq and elsewhere and probably people of different sects (Sunni and Shi'a mainly) joined it. Furthermore, many rulers were invested with its trousers, with the right to act

¹Ibn al-Sa·i, pp. 221-2; cited also by G. Salinger, p. 486.

Ibn al-Athir (XII, pp. 286-7) as translated by G. Salinger, p. 484.

as agents to the Caliph in bestowing the <u>Futuwwa</u> trousers on their subjects.l

Al-Nasir, out of his desire to show off his pious qualities. and to make it clear to the people that his policy of adopting the Futuwwa did not contradict religion, undertook to transmit the tradition. In 607/1210-11 the Caliph accepted the diploma of the shaykhs of Baghdad, in which they had granted the Caliph the right to transmit the Hadith through them. 2 These shaykhs, some thirty-two in number, granted him the Ijaza . They were drawn from all the Sunni schools and especially from the Hambalite school. Moreover, he composed a work in the tradition called Ruh al-'Arifin (the spirit of sages), in which he wrote seventy Hadiths with complete chains of transmission back to the prophet. By granting diplomas (Tjazas) he authorised four shaykhs representing the four Sunni schools, to recite this work to their students. He also authorized deputies to recite it to the public, and he recompensed them for doing this. Meanwhile he sent envoys with diplomas to the rulers of many parts of the Muslim world to this effect.

About the granting of the <u>Futuwwa</u> trousers to the Muslim rulers see: Sibt, p. 333; Abū Shama, p. 33; al-Maqrizi I/I, p. 172; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 261; Abu al-Fada il al-Hamawi, fol. 135a; <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fol. 11a; and also Cl. Cahen in <u>Oriens</u>, VI, p. 20.

Out of 23 shaykhs identified by G. Vajda there are 7 H anbalite, see G. Vajda, "Une liste d'Autorites du Calife al-Nasir", Arabica, VI, 1959, p. 173 ff.

³Sibt, p. 354; Abu Shama, p. 69; and Cl. Cahen, op.cit., p. 21, n. 1.

Al-Kazirumi, fol. 87b-88a; ibn Hammad, Qui al-Arwah, fol. 9la; see also al-Magrizi, I/I, p. 218. A copy of Ruh al-Arifin is in the British

Furthermore, al-Nasir commissioned four Hanbali shaykhs to teach his son and heir, al-Zahir, the hadith, by means of the <u>liaza</u>.

1
from him.

Most of the seventy traditions of Ruh al-'Arafin had a moral purpose: to promote justice and abolish oppression, to propagate religion and to detest heresy, and to praise generosity and to despise meanness.² Thus it seems that the main aim of this work of al-Nasir was to propagate the noble virtues among the Muslims. Furthermore, it seems that al-Nasir transmitted much more serious Hadiths, in which he propagated the refutation of the doctrines of the Greek philosophers, which had been favoured and developed by the Isma'iliya. These hadiths were probably directed, as propaganda, against the Assassins and their creed. 'Umar al-Suhrawardi wrote a book entitled Rashf al-Nasa'ih al-

Museum, No. Or. 6332. This copy was written in 614/1217-8 and consists of 25 fols. and is accompanied from fol. 30 to 82 by another work called Futuh al-Waqt, which is a commentary on Ruh al-'Arafin, composed by al-Muwaffaq 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi. See A. G. Ellis, A descriptive list of the Arabic Manuscripts..., London, 1912, pp. 16-18; see also G. Vajda, op.cit., p. 173.

Sibt, p. 354; Abu Shama, p. 69; Ibn Abi il-Wafa', al-Jawahir al-Mudi'a, II, pp. 125-6; see also Nakhjavani, Tajarib al-Salaf, p. 32 4; and Cl. Cahen, Oriens, VI, p. 21.

Ohahabi, XIX, fol. 13a.

libn Al-Kaziruni, fol. 90b; see also Ibn al-Imad, V, pp. 184-5; see below, pp. 143.

²See the MS. of B.M. OR. 6332, fols. 2 ff.

Imamiya wa Kashf al-Fada'ih al-Yunaniya which was based on traditions related by al-Nasir.1

However, it seems that many <u>shaykhs</u> transmitted the tradition from the Caliph, and even this practice spread beyond the limits of 'Iraq. Ibn al-Duba<u>īthi</u>(died in 637/1239-40) describes this undertaking of the Caliph thus:

"His /al-Nasir's noble virtues and his generous manners are beyond account... but his most noble virtue, by which he ornamented the community /Milla, is relating the traditions of his cousin /the Prophet."

He also says that the Caliph composed Ruh al-'Arifin which was widespread in many directions over the Muslim world and that it was recited in every mosque in Baghdad and that, by reciting this work, "the Hadith houses were reinhabited, and their people were honoured by hearing and relating it".²

Moreover, the Caliph tried the transmission of tradition as a means to settle the religious rivalry between the Hambalites and the Shi'a, a rivalry which led, on several occasions, to widespread rioting. According to Sibt,

"In this year (608/1211-2) the Caliph ordered the Musnad of Ahmad ibn Hanbal to be recited in the sanctuary of Musa ibn Ja far, by a diploma from him... The first chapter of the Musnad, which was recited was that which concerns Abū Bakr and Fadak..."

H. Ritter, "Autographs in Turkish libraries", Oriens, VI, 1953, p. 88, see also below pp.132 #

See the Appendix of M. Jawad to al-Dhahabi's al-Mukhtasaar al-Muhtaj..., pp. 36 ff.

³Sibt, p. 363.

This indicates that al-Naşir tried to settle some of the main differences between the two sects. Thus al-Naşir attempted to associate himself with the intelligentsia class which was well represented by the traditionists, as he had done before with the <u>Futtuwa</u>, by which he aimed to centralize these <u>shaykhs</u>, in their different schools, around himself to back him politically as well as morally. Moreover, mentioning his name as an authority in tradition would give him the reputation of being a good Muslim on the one hand and strengthen his position in the eyes of the common people, whose affection for the religious men was very great, on the other. It might be suggested that al-Naşir tried to benefit from the <u>Shī</u> ite conception of the Imam's capacity, a conception which regards the Caliph - or Imam - as the sole authority in the determination, precision and interpretation of the <u>Sharī</u> and not only, as the Sunnī stress, the guardian of the religious law.

Furthermore al-Nasir undertook another policy to manifest the resemblance between his capacity and the Shi'a's conception of the Imam's capacity and that is his increasing the efficiency of the espionage system of the state. Many historians describe him as being very alert, watchful and very careful; and he was very anxious to know the details and particulars of the things which were done, not only in his own dominions,

¹c1.Cahen, in Oriens, VI, 1953, p. 21.

but also in the dominions of the rulers of the other countries. Al-Muwaffaq 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdada relates the following interesting anecdotes:

"...when the messenger of Mazendaran reached Baghdad, he stayed there for several days. He received daily a slip of paper recording everything he had done on the previous night. One certain night a woman came to him in great secrecy, but the paper delivered to him the next morning, in which was recorded what had happened Zeven described the blanket they slept under. This messenger was amazed and left Baghdad fully believing that the Caliph knew the invisible, because the Shi'a believe that the Imam knows what is behind the wall and what is in the womb of the pregnant."2

And,

"One day an envoy of Khwarizm-shah reached Baghdad with a message kept in secret and sealed; but he was told, before he delivered it, that the Caliph knew his message. Therefore this messenger returned to his master with the strong conviction that they knew the invisible."

Al-Muwaffaq relates also,

"Another person came from India with a parrot taught to recite the <u>Sura</u> (say God is one), as a present to the Caliph. But when this man reached Baghdad his parrot died. While the man was sitting sadly because of his loss, a servant of the Caliph came to him and asked him about his parrot. The man told him that it had died. The servant told the man 'We know already, but what reward did you expect for it from the Caliph?'. The man answered, 'Five hundred Dinars'. The servant gave him the exact amount, and told him, 'Take it,

See Bar-Hebraeus, Chronography, I, p. 387; Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 288-9; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, pp. 52-3, and pp. 433-4; al-Yafi'i, Mir'at al-Junan, IV, p. 50; al-Maqrizi, I/I, pp. 217-8; al-Magrizi, I/I,

²Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 12a.

³ Ibid.

the Caliph sent this amount for you, because he knew your intentions and your condition since you have left India.

If al-Muwaffaq is to be believed the Caliph used the espionage system to collect information, and this enabled him to pretend to know everything to impress the people by his unique knowledge of everything, especially the strangers, to affect them in order that they might return to their countries and recite what they had seen of his ability and understanding. No doubt, if the story of the man with a parrot is true, this man would have made excellent propaganda for al-Nasir. To be sure, according to al-Muwaffaq, the Caliph was quite successful in this aim and, even more, he was able, in some cases, to turn the messengers of many rulers into spies against their previous masters by his temptation and presents. Moreover, al-Muwaffaq says about his own experience and observation,

"When I was attending meetings of Kings and notables, in Syria and Egypt, and the name of al-Nasir was mentioned they used to lower their voices out of respect and awe to this Caliph. He has filled the hearts with fear and respect, he was feared by the people in India, Egypt, as well as the people of Baghdad."4

Whether al-Nasir deliberately tried to inspire the idea that he knew the invisible, or this impression was just due to his great efforts and

Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 12b.

²Al-Naşir must have had some more practical use for his spies than merely to impress casual visitors - though this would, no doubt, have had some value too in projecting the charismatic image of himself.

³Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 12a.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 13b.

activities to strengthen the temporal power of the Caliphate, there is no doubt he had left a very deep impression of respect and fear among the Muslims of his time.

Alongside the Futuwwa, al-Nasir showed a special interest in Sufism because of the close relation between Sufism and Futuwwa. Moreover, out of his desire to make every effort to restore the Caliphal power and prestige, he leaned heavily upon the scholars and shaykhs in general to propagate his cause inside and outside Baghdad. He, therefore, built Ribats (Suffi convents) and assigned endowments () to allow them to carry out their functions of teaching religion and Figh. Although these Ribats were the centre of Sufism and its teaching, yet they were also residences for the poor students and the visiting scholars who came to Baghdad to teach or study. The Caliph appointed famous scholars and Sufis to look after these Ribats, such as the famous Sufi 'Umar al-Suhrawardi who was given several Ribats to look after (see below). Moreover, al-Nasir used these shaykhs and their reputation to confirm his position in the eyes of the Muslim princes, by sending them as his ambassadors and envoys. His ambassador to the Ayyubid al-'Adil was the above mentioned 'Umar al-Suhrawardi, who went to Syria on several oc-

For the development of Ribat in Islamic history from fortified frontier posts to Sufi monastery, see E.I./I, s.v. Ribat (by G. Marcais).

² al-Kazirumi, fol. 87b; ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 37, and 284; Sibt, p. 419, and pp. 384-5; and also Ibn al-Imad, V, pp. 38-9.

³Sibt, p. 348; Abu Shama, pp. 63, 64-5, and 89.

casions to deliver the vestments and the patent of ruling: and in fact each time he went there he made a speech, in which he mainly declared the pious qualities of his master. He also went to Qonia. to Kayqobadh, the Seljugid ruler of the Rum. Umar also led the delegation of the Caliph to Muhammad Khwarizm-Shah to negotiate peace with the latter when he prepared his forces to conquer Baghdad. His ambassador to the Ghaznawid sultans was Majd al-Din Yahya ibn al-Rabi, 3 the Shafilite professor of al-Nizamiyya college. He went several times to Ghaznin to deliver the patent of ruling and negotiate alliance against the Khwarizm-Shah, Takash, and his son. The ambassador to India was Abu 'al-Fada'il al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Saghani, the Hanafite shaykh (died in 650/1252-3). Moreover, al-Nasir favoured the orthodox Sufi order of the Suhrawardiya, whose chief was the above mentioned 'Umar al-Suhrawardi. 'Umar was born in 539/1145 at Suhraward. He studied mysticism under his uncle Abu 11-Najib and under the celebrated shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jili. He settled in Baghdad, where his fame and career were established. He died in 632/1234. In Baghdad he established himself as a preacher

¹ See Ritter, op.cit., p. 88.

²Sibt, p. 382; Abu Shama, pp. 100-101; Nasawi, pp. 12-13, and pp. 20-21; see also Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, pp. 219-220; see also above, pp. 61-3.

³He died in 602/1205-6. Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 187.

⁴Ibn al-Sa·i, pp. 45, 83, 143; Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 145-6. See also Tabakat-i-Nasiri, Minhaj-i-Siraj. En. tr. I, p. 243.

⁵See ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 262 ff; see also H. Ritter, p. 88.

Ibn Khallikan, ed. de Slane, I, pp. 529 ff; Yaqut al-Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buldan, ed. Wüstenfeld, III, p. 204; H. Ritter, "Philologika IX", D.I., XXV, 1939, pp. 36 ff. See also E.I./I, s,v. Suhrawardi (by S. Van Den Bergh).

(Wa'iz) in several quarters of the city; then he became the chief of the Sufis and the Caliph assigned to him several Ribats to teach and propagate Sufism. He became something like a spiritual adviser to the Caliph. His distinguished position among the Sufis, and his close relation with the Caliph, caused the latter to choose him in every important mission to represent him at the courts of the Ayyubids of Syria, the Seljuqids of Qonia, and, once, to Muhammad Khwarizm-Shah, when the latter marched to conquer Baghdad in 614/1217-8. Moreover, the Caliph built for him a Ribat in the Ma'muniya quarter in 599/1202-3, and later on built another Ribat for him in al-Murzabaniya quarter to which was attached a large house with a bath built in a large garden for the personal use of the Staykh.

Al-Suhrawardi composed many works but the most interesting among them are 'Awarif al-Ma'arif, which was one of the most popular treatises in Sufism, and Rashf al-Nasa'ih al-Imamiya wa Kashf al-Fada'ih al-Yunaniya; based on traditions related by the Caliph himself, in which

¹ H. Ritter, "Autographs...", Oriens VI, 1953, p. 88; see alsocL. Cahen, "Mouvements populaires...", Arabica, VI, 1959, p. 242.

²See above pp. 62-3

³Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 99.

⁴Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 74.

the author directed this work to refuting the Greek philosophy and its adherents.

Thus al-Nasir, by patronizing the religious people and associating himself with them, could direct some of their activities towards propagating his policy, and succeeded remarkably in making their religious foundations - Ribats and mosques - instruments in his hand. For it was clear that his traditions, which were directed to refuting the Greek philosophy, and the books which were written for this purpose were, in fact, propaganda against the Isma ilis, who favoured and developed this philosophy. Moreover, this campaign against the beliefs of the Isma'ilis succeeded in 608/1211-12 in making Hasan III, the Master of Alamut, declare his conversion to orthodox Islam. Whether Hasan was sincere in his declaration or not, nevertheless he paid allegiance to the Caliph and acknowledged his overlordship. Al-Nasir received this conversion with delight and joy, for this action of Hasan gave him an ally in the east who could help him in checking the increasing menace of the Khwarism-Shah Muhammad.

H. Ritter, "Autographs...", Oriens VI, 1953, p. 88; idem in D.I., XXV, 1939, pp. 36 ff; see also E.I./I, s.v. Suhrawardi.

²See H. Ritter in Oriens VI, 1953, p.88.

³For further details about the conversion of Hasan III and the circumstances which led to it, see Chapter I above, pp. 56 H.

Although al-Nasir tried several methods to restore the unity of Islam, nevertheless the Jihad principle played no role in his religious policy. Wittek suggests that al-Nasir became the supreme head of the Futuwwa in order to organise a front against the Crusaders; and that by this means tried to unite the fighters of the Holy War under his command, because the Chazi corporations in Khorasan, as early as the minth and tenth centuries, followed the Futuwwa. Thus the Caliph, by placing this order under his leadership, aimed to unite the Chazis under his banner. this suggestion of Wittek is based on no documentary evidence. 2 Moreover Taeschner shows without doubt that al-Nasir disassociated himself from the Holy War /Jihad7, and it was not the idea of a Holy War which caused the Caliph to occupy himself with the Futuwwa. Taeschner also points out that although Saladin devoted his time and energy to the struggle against the Crusaders, and he was practically in great need of the material and moral aid of al-Nasir, yet the Caliph stayed far away from the battlefield sending very little aid with some words of encouragement. Moreover the Caliph's lack of interest in the Holy War is clearly reflected in a negative manner in the Futuwwa books, in which there is found no word about the Jihad. In spite of all the zest and

P. Wittek, "Deux Chapitres de l'histoire du Turks de Roum", <u>Byzantion</u> XI, 1936, pp. 306-7; see also G. Salinger, pp. 486-7.

²G. Salinger, p. 487.

³ Ibid., p. 487.

devotion of Saladin to restoring the unity of Islam under the direction of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, and his previous record of abolishing a rival state - Fatimid Caliphate - and restoring the moral power of the 'Abbasid Caliphate over the Fatimid kingdom, nevertheless al-Naşir desisted from rendering him what he had need of: moral and material support. This negative attitude of the Caliph towards Saladin and his struggle with was the Crusaders, due either to the fact that the 'Abbasid Caliphate was not affected by the menace of the Crusaders, or to al-Naşir's suspicion of Saladin. In fact, al-Naşir showed his suspicion of every strong ruler throughout his reign, and Saladin was no exception.

However, al Nasir might have realized that there was a power vacuum in the Muslim world as a result of the absence of a strong Sultan, a vacuum which could be easily filled by an ambitious ruler who could gain the confidence and the moral support of the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

Saladin was the most eligible one to be Sultan, for he had established his career and reputation as the defender of Islam against infidels on the one hand, and he had enough power to endanger the safety of the Caliphate on the other. Thus it seems that the Caliph aimed, by withholding moral support from Saladin, to check his ambition and not to give him the power which might be used against the Caliphate itself.

H. A. R. Gibb, "The achievement of Saladin", B.J.R.L., 35, 1952, pp. 53 ff.

Furthermore, al-Nasir's struggle with Tughril II and the Khwarizm-shah was an outcome of his refusal to grant them the title of Sultan, in other words, he refused to acknowledge their control over the Caliphate.

It seems that he did not adopt the <u>Jihad</u> principle because he could neither practice it personally nor gain any advantages from it.

The enemies of Islam were far away from his territories and did not form any menace against him. But his main enemies were the Muslim rulers themselves, against whom it was impossible to declare the Holy War.

Moreover al-Nasir's lack of interest in the Holy War lasted to the end of his rule. Abu dl-Fada'il al-Hamawi illustrates the disappointment of the Muslims of Egypt in the following quotation:

"In this year (615/1218-9) the son of Shaykh al-Shujukh with the envoy of the Caliph al-Nasir reached al-Kamil at Damietta. The people hoped and expected every good from the Caliph (i.e. they expected some assistance against the Franks, who occupied Damietta). But he (the envoy) explained (the purpose of his visit) that it was for shooting the Bunduq, and he (the Caliph) wanted to be its Qibla (i.e. to shoot in his name) not Yazdajard (?). Thus the people were amazed at the Imam of the time and his ambition."

There was another aspect of the Caliphal interest in religious matters and that is the preparing of the pilgrims' caravan, and sending with this caravan the Ka'ba clothing. Al-Nasir took a deep interest in

See above Chapter I, pp.

Abu dl-Faça'il al-Hamawi, fol. 135 a.

this matter, he even established a guest house (Dar al-Diyafa) for the pilgrims when they arrived in Baghdad on their way to Mecca. He also provided the needy pilgrims with food and money. In 579/1183-4 he built a bridge in al-Hilla for the convenience of the pilgrims. Moreover he appointed guards on all the roads between Hilla and Baghdad to guard and regulate the crossing of the caravan over the canals in that crowded area of agriculture.

The Caliph usually appointed an Amir to lead the caravan who was accompanied by some number of soldiers to protect the caravan from the Beduins; this Amir also carried with him money for charity purposes. When the caravan reached Mecca, the Amir encamped outside the holy city and, from there, he sent the clothing of the Ka'ba with the Chamberlain of the holy sanctuary (Hajib al-Bayt).

The Qadi of Mecca was also appointed by the Caliph, which indicates the spiritual influence of the Caliph.

Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 258-59; Sibt, p. 351; and Abu Shama, p. 64.

²Ibn Jubair, p. 215.

³<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 216.

⁴Sibt, p. 372; Abu Shama, pp. 85-6; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 209; see E.I./II, s.v. Amir al-Hajj (by J. Jomier).

⁵Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 74, n (I); see also Ibn al-Fuwati, p.6.

Ibn Jubair, pp. 176-7, and p. 181.

⁷ Ibid., p. 180.

However, it seems that the Amir of the caravan exercised a big influence in the Holy cities, for Ibn Jubair states how in the year 579/1183-4 a dispute resulted on the matter of seeing the new moon to identify the month of Dhu al-Hijja, in order to undertake the usual rituals on 'Arafat. The judge was not satisfied with all the witnesses who said that they saw the new moon, but the judge was satisfied with the statement of Amir al-Hajj.

According to Ibn Jubair nobody could spend any sum of money for the purpose of establishing or repairing any place or building in the holy cities unless he obtained the permission of the Caliph; the latter usually appointed some officials to look after the repairing of the holy buildings.

Al-Nasir showed his favour to the Shi'a by appointing an Amir al-Hajj from among them, for Tashtakin (died in 602/1205-6) held this post for twenty six years.

Furthermore the Caliph used the caravan as a means of displaying his favour to the Muslim rulers, by ordering the standard of the favoured ruler to be carried in front of the others. When Hasan III was con-

libn Jubair, p. 172.

²Ibid., p. 126.

³See Ibn al-Sa·i, p. 18.

⁴Tbn al-Athir, XII, pp. 159-60; Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 186; see also Sibt, pp. 309-10, and p. 343; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 190.

verted to orthodox Islam, he sent a Sabil on the pilgrimage, in order to make his conversion widely known. The Caliph commanded his standard to be carried in front of that of Sultan Muhammad Khwarizm-shah, who was much distressed and offended by this action of al-Nasir. 1

Al-Nasir's authority over the Hijaz was nominal and spiritual rather than factual, and his attempt to extend his control over the holy cities was met with a strong resistance from its ruler, the Hasanid Sharif Qutada. In 608/1211-12, after Hasan III declared his conversion to orthodox Islam, certain Isma'ilis went with the 'Iraqi caravan to Mecca and, on the day of Arafat, they attacked and killed a noble from the family of Qutada. In fact they aimed at the latter. Qutada understood this and seized the opportunity to plunder and sack the caravan of the 'Iraqi pilgrims. Thus al-Nasir's attempt to control Hijaz failed and, furthermore, the Iraqi caravan of pilgrims often met with a very unfriendly reception at Mecca, as had happened in 618/1221-2 and in 619/1222-3.2

Among the buildings known from inscriptions to have been built by al-Nasir is the Talisman Gate in Baghdad (618/1221-2). This gate is interesting for its inscription and decoration. In the inscription,

Juvaini, II, p. 391; Nasawi, p. 12; also Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 206; see also above Chapter I, p. 66-7.

For further details about the relation between al-Nasir and Mecca rulers see above Chapter I, pp. 80 %.

according to Van Berchem, al-Nasir used an innucuous-sounding formula to express his devotion, naming al-Da'wa al-Hadiya "the true-guiding summons", as his leading principle. "But this happens to be the standard Isma'ili phrase for the Isma'ili Da'wa." But according to the reproduction of this inscription in R.C.E.A. the formula is not al-Da'wa al-Hadiya but Da'watihi al-Hidaya (دُعُوْتِهِ البِدَايُهُ and if it is so there is no need to confuse it with the alleged Isma'ili formula al-Da'wa al-Hadiya. Moreover it seems that even the formula al-Da'wa al-Hadiya was not completely Isma'ili and confined to their use only; for Abu Shama, in Kitab al-Raudatayn, describes the 'Abbasid Caliphate by this formula. He says under the year 575/1180 at the succession of al-Nasir the following, "... and al-Shaykh Sadr al-Din Shaykh al-Shuyukh went to Pehlawan and ordered him to introduce the Khutba in the name of al-Nasir, and Pehlawan did so, thus al-Da'wa al-Hadiya covered the whole of Khurasan". Therefore even if Bab al-Tallism had borne this formula, it does not imply any Isma'ili tendency nor any significance.

M. van Berchem, "Baghdad Talismantor", Archaeologische Reise im Euphratund Tigris-Gibiet, ed. by F. Sarre and E. Harezfeld (Berlin 1911), I, p. 34; M. G. Hodgson, pp. 222-3; see also E.I./I, s.v. al-Nasir li Din Allah (by F. Taeschner); F. Taeschner in B.A.S.I., p. 378.

²R.C.E.A., No. 3873, X, pp. 185-7.

Abu Shama, al-Raudatayn, II, p. 15.

The decoration of this gate shows a human figure seated between two dragons, and tearing their jaws apart and grasping their tongues. According to Berchem's interpretation, this was al-Masir represented as victorious over two enemies, who had disputed his spiritual power: the Grand Master of the Assassins, Hasan III, and the Khwarizm-shah. This interpretation may not be taken for granted, because, as is shown by the date of the inscription, the Talisman Gate was built in 618/1221-2. and by this time the Khwarizm-shah was dead. His death as a fugitive made it unexpected from a Caliph, who devoted most of his time and energy to propagating the Futuwwa and its chivalrous virtues, to celebrate his victory over his fellow believer, who had been defeated by the mutual enemy of all Muslims. Although some historians record that al-Masir was secretly in alliance with the Mongols against the Khwarizmshah, yet it seems that this allegation was fabricated by the last Khwarizm-shah, Jalal al-Din Mangubarti, who, perhaps, invented this charge as an excuse to attack the Caliph's principality. 2 Moreover, Hasan's adoption of orthodox Islam could be regarded as a victory for al-Nasir, but Hasan did so by his own choice, not by force. His friendly

Van Berchem, op.cit., I, p. 34; E.I./I, s.v. al-Nasir li-Din-Allah (by F. Taeschner); M. G. Hodgson, pp. 222-3, n.31, where he states another interpretation; he says, "It is more likely to be a simple astrological figure: a child between the nodes of the Dragon, i.e. the points at which sun and moon can pass and may be eclipsed".

²See above pp. 69-70.77.

relations with al-Nasir were built on equal ground as an ally and he hardly could be represented as a subdued enemy. Therefore this interpretation could easily be replaced by another and more likely one.

This decoration represented al-Nasir's success in his reconciliation policy; who could bring together, around his person, the Sunni and Shi ite communities. Moreover, grasping the tongues of the two dragons may suggest that the Caliph could finally put an end to their verbal sectarian controversy, which had led on several occasions to wide spread rioting and disorder.

To conclude al-Nasir's religious policy, one must admit that all his activities and enterprises to revive the prestige of the Caliphate, were of short success and duration; in fact one can not draw a clear line between his success and failure. Although he favoured the Shī'ite community throughout his reign, nevertheless it seems unlikely either that he was a Shī'ite himself, or that he opposed the Sunnī openly. The 'Abbasid Caliphate remained a Sunnī state dominated mainly by the Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī schools. This fact is indicated by the appointment of the Qādī of Qādīs from among these two schools.²

Al-Zahir (622/1225-623/1226):-

Although al-Zahir ruled for a short period, nine months and a half, yet the Muslim historians bestow the highest praise on him for his

Ibn Jubair, pp. 100-102.

According to Ibn al-Fuwati (pp. 86-7), the only occasion on which a Hanbalite person was installed as chief judge was during the reign of al-Zahir, see also below, p.143.

high moral qualities. He was regarded as just and pious as 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Umayyad Caliph, and "In his justice he had revived the tradition Sunna of the two 'Umars". He followed a Sunni policy with a special leaning on the Hanbalis. This, perhaps, due to the effect of the Four Hanbali shaykhs, who were commissioned by his father to teach him the Musnad of Ibn Hanbal; these shaykhs were: Abu Salih Nasr ibn 'Abd al-Razzaq ibn 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jili, Abd al-Aziz ibn Dulaf, Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Jawzi, and Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Shafi. 3 These shaykhs had played a leading role in the Caliphate when al-Zahir came to power. Immediately after his succession to the Caliphate, al-Zahir installed Abu Salih ibn 'Abd al-Razzao al-Jili /died in 633/1236-77 as chief judge /Qadi of Qadis/. Abu Salih accepted the office on the condition that he would be allowed to give the inheritance to its legal heir. 4 This chief judge was, according to Ibn al-Fuwati, "the only Hanbali appointed as Chief Judge".5

Ton al-Athir, XII, pp. 283-9; Sibt, p. 423; Abu Shama, p. 149; Dhahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, XIX, fols. 33-5; idem Duwal al-Islam, II, pp. 96-7; Ibn Kathir, XIII, pp. 112-3; E.I./I, s.v. al-Zahir; and H. Laoust, in R.E.I., 1959, p.117.

²See H. Laoust, p. 117.

³A1-Kaziruni, fol. 90b; Ibn al-'Imad, V, pp. 184 ff; and H. Laoust, p. 120.

⁴Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 265; Ibn al-Imad, V, pp. 161-2; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl, II, pp. 189-92; see also H. Laoust, p. 117; Cf. below, pp240.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 86-7.

The Caliph also appointed 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Dulaf (died in 637/1239-40) in charge of "Diwan al-Tarikat al-Hashariya".

Munyi al-Din ibn al-Jawzi (died in 656/1258) became the ambassador of the Caliph to the Ayyubids of Syria. Although al-Zahir followed this extreme Sunni policy, nevertheless he did not turn against the Shi a community, but on the contrary he treated them with respect. Even when the sanctuary of Musa ibn Ja far caught fire, and was partly destroyed, he ordered it to be repaired, but this was not completed during his reign but during al-Mustansir's.

Al-Mustansir (623/1226-640/1242):-

Al-Mustansir is considered by the historians to be as pious as his father and as active as his grandfather, al-Nasir. Although some of the historians emphasized that he was, unlike his grandfather, a pure Sunni in his beliefs, nevertheless he did not stand against the Shi a community, but on the contrary he tried to satisfy both the sects.

The al-'Imad, V, pp. 184-5; Dhayl, II, pp. 217-20; also Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 288; and M. Laoust, p. 120.
"Diwan al-Tarikat al-Hashariya" was in charge of the properties of dead people who had left no relatives to inherit them, see al-Qalqashandi III, p. 464; for more details see below pp. 23866.

²⁵ibt, p. 326; Abu Shama, p. 26 and p. 147; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 263; Magrizi, I/I, p. 219; Abu 41-Fada'il al-Hamawi, fol. 153a; see also H. Laoust, pp. 120-21.

³Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, pp. 443-4; see also R.C.E.A. X, pp. 251-2.

⁴Sibt, p. 424 and pp. 489-90; Bar-Hebraeus, Mukhtasar, p. 442; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 445 ff; Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 179; Ibn Hammad, fols. 92 ff; Dhahabi, XIX, fols. 222 ff; idem Duwal al-Islam, II, pp. 110-111; Ibn al-Furat, fols. 21-2; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI. pp. 345-6; see also E.I./I, s.v. al-Mustansir (by K. V. Zettersteen).

⁵Ibn al-Furat, fol. 20b; see also Abu 'l-Fida III, p. 144.

In 634/1236-7 he established a water fountain / J near the tomb of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, for the convenience of the visitors to this place. In the same year he visited the shrine of Musa ibn Ja'far, and gave 3000 Dinars to the Naqib al-Talibiyin to distribute among the needy persons of the 'Alids.' In 640/1243-3 the Mashhad of 'Ali al-Hadi and Hasan al-'Askari - the two Shi'a Imams - in Samara', caught fire and, as a result, nearly all the shrine was destroyed. He ordered its reconstruction.'

However it seems that al-Mustansir had a very liberal mind towards religious matters, even Sibt describes him thus, "He has not any
prejudice for a certain Madhhab (sect or religion)". This fact is
clearly reflected by the establishment of al-Mustansiriyya College in
631/1233-4. This college, apart from being a religious and educational
centre, was made for the Four Sunni schools of Figh; thus, for the
first time in Islamic history, the Four Sunni schools combined together
in one College. Moreover the Caliph, after the opening of this school,

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 91-2; see also al-Kaziruni, fol. 92b.

²Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 95.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 152.

⁴Sibt, p. 489.

For further details about this school see: Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 53 ff; Dhahabi, XIX, fols. 243-4; Ibn Kathir, XIII, pp. 139-40; Ibn Hammad, fols. 92 ff; al-Kaziruni, fol. 92; Ibn al-Furat, fols. 20b-21a; the most recent and detailed studies on the establishment of this school are to be found in: Husain Amin, al-Madrasa al-Mustansiriyya, Baghdad 1959; and Naji Ma'ruf, Tarikh 'Ulama' al-Mustansiriyya, Baghdad 1960. See also H. Laoust, in R.E.I., 1959, pp. 117-8.

ordered seating accommodation to be provided in the Mosque of the Caliphate Palace / Jāmi al-Qaṣr / for the Imams of the Four Schools to deliver their speeches, sermons and debates after the Friday prayer. By this policy, no doubt, the Caliph aimed at centralizing all the Sunni people around himself to back him politically and morally. Furthermore, he established many charitable and religious foundations such as: hospitals / Maristans , Ribats for the Sufis and soup-kitchens for the poor people to take their meals in Ramadan.

Al-Mustansir treated the Shī'a community with respect and sympathy. He visited their holy sanctuaries such as Mashhad 'Alī, Mashhad al-Hasan al-Husain, and he was very generous to them. He also assigned some posts to the 'Alīds, such as 'Alā' al-Dīn Abu Tālib ibn al-Amīr al-'Alawī, who was appointed the pay master of the troops / Ārid al-Jaysh in 630/1232-3. And appointed the Shī'ite ibn al-'Aloamī as Ustādh al-Dār in 629/1231-2.

Ibn al-Furat, fol. 21.

²Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 222b.

³Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 2.

⁴Tbid., p. 44; also Sibt, p. 490; and al-Kaziruni, fol. 92b.

⁵Sibt, p. 489.

Ibn al-Fuwati, p.50.

⁷ Ibid., p. 35. As a part of the responsibility of Ustadh al-Dar to look after the construction of the Caliphal charitable foundations, Ibn al-Alqami was in charge of building al-Mustansiriyya College. See Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 53-4; see also Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 140.

Al-Mustansir, like his grandfather, adopted and practised the Futuwwa. He received his trousers from an 'Alīd Naoīb of the Futuwwa called Jalāl al-Dīn 'Abd Allah ibn al-Mukhtār al-'Alawī; the latter persuaded the Caliph to wear these trousers in Mashhad 'Alī. The Caliph went there and received the trousers from this Naoīb near the holy tomb of 'Alī.' In 626/1228-9 the Caliph authorized the 'Adl Ibn al-Damghanī to act as his deputy in granting the Futuwwa trousers.²
He also practised the sporting phase of the Futuwwa, such as shooting the Bundug and long distance running. Moreover he offered the Futuwwa trousers to some of the notables of Baghdad, on the one hand, and to several Muslim rulers on the other. He bestowed these trousers on Jalāl al-Dīn Mangabartī, the last Khwarizm-shāh, in 626/1223-9.6 And on Nūr al-Dīn Arslān Shāh, the Zangid ruler of Shahrazūr, in 634/1236-7, when the latter visited Baghdad. In 637/1239-40 the Futuwwa trousers

libn al-Fuwati, pp. 256-7.

² Ibid., p. 5. See also F. Taeschner, in B.A.S.I., p. 357.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 143.

Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 234a.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 90-91.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 5 and 14; also Dhahabi, Fol. 223a. See also F. Taeschner in B.A.S.I., p. 357.

⁷ Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 89.

were bestowed upon Prince Shiha, the ruler of Madina, when he came to Baghdad to pay his homage to the Caliph.1

During the reign of this Caliph. the Caliphate was no longer confronted with Muslim enemies, as it was during al-Nasir's reign /by the Seljugs and later on by the Khwarizm-shah : but now the Mongols emerged as a very serious danger to the Caliphate. This fact explains why al-Mustansir, unlike his grand-father, adopted the Jihad principle. In 634/1236-7, when the Mongols penetrated into the frontiers of 'Iraq, the Caliph obtained a religious Fatwa from the Fagins and shaykhs of Baghdad to the effect that in such a circumstance to prosecute the Holy War was more necessary than to prepare the pilgrimage caravan. Therefore he ordered all the Sufis, Faqihs, and Shaykhs to practise shooting and warfare, in order that they would be able to perform the Jihad against the infidels. 3 According to Ibn al-Najjar, a contemporary 'Iraqi chronicler, "al-Mustansir exercised the Jihad as best he could, and he collected troops to defend Islam and to guard the frontier posts".4 In his days there was comparative peace at Baghdad and the disorders which are recorded by Ibn al-Fuwati are very few; in fact there were

Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 126.

² See above pp. 134 H.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 98.

⁴Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 222b.

only two disorders, one occurred in 629/1231-2 between Bab al-Azaj (Sunni) and al-Mukhtara (Shi'a), and as a result several were killed and injured. The Caliph ordered the army to march to these quarters; they did so and were able to settle the dispute. The other disorder took place in 635/1237-8 and by appointing the Amir 'Imad al-Din Tughril as Shihna of Baghdad he stopped the disorders. 2

Al-Musta sim (640/1242-656/1258):-

He was described as "pious, religious, and the repository of the Sunni beliefs, following the pattern of his father and grand-father - al-Zahir". Although he had favoured the Shi a during his reign by appointing a Wazir, Ibn al-'Alqami, from among them in 642/1244-5, and visited several of their holy shrines, yet it seems that he tried to make a balance of power between the Shi a and the Hanbalis by appointing at the same time a Hanbalite Ustadh al-Dar, Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Jawzi.

Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 31.

²Ibid., p. 102.

³Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 161; see also Ibn al-Furat, fol. 24b.

⁴Ibn al-Furat, fol. 46a; Dhahabi, XIX, 256b; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 164; Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 279 ff.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 185 and pp. 187-8. See also H. Laoust in R.E.I., p. 118.

Sibt, p. 494; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 164; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 256b. See also H. Laoust, in R.E.I., 1959, pp. 120-21. Muhyi al-Din played a leading part as ambassador of al-Musta sim to the Ayyubid of Syria and Egypt (see Sibt, pp. 499-500, and Ibn al-Furat, fol. 46a) and to the Seljuqid of Rum, Kaykhosru, see Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 185-6.

But during his reign the liberty of the Shī'a in undertaking their traditional practice of reading the story of the death of al-gusaIn came under a certain restriction; for, in 641/1243-4, the Caliph ordered the Muhtasib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzī, not to permit the recitation of this story on the day of 'Ashura', except in Mashhad Musa ibn Ja'far. This was probably done to avoid the disorder which usually took place between the Shī'a and the Sunnī people on this occasion. This prohibition was repeated in 648/1250-51 and Ibn al-Fuwatī states the reason for this prohibition clearly by saying, "The Caliph did so for fear of the disturbances which accompanied this celebration".

This Caliph also practised the <u>Futuwa</u>, especially the sporting side of it. In 641/1243-4 he visited the tomb of Salman al-Farisi, who was, to the Fityan, one of the earlier heads of the <u>Futuwa</u>. In 643/1245-6 he ordered that the carrier-pigeons should be classified into four groups, and called them al-Yamaniyat, al Qadisiyat, al'Askariyat and al-Ghanawiyat, and these pigeons were much praised by the poets.4

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 183-4.

Al-Hawadith al-Jami'a, p. 248.

³Ibid., p. 185.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 203-5.

The notables of Baghdad indulged in the sport of pigeon racing; in 641/1246-7 the Cup-bearer of the Caliph and Naquib al-Talibiyin sent their pigeons to 'Abadan and Khashabat to fly back to Baghdad and the result was that the Cup-bearer won the race. However it seems that, during this period, the high society of Baghdad with the Caliph were over- indulged in practising this sport which led later historians, who did not understand the merit of the Futuwwa, to criticize the Caliph; such as Bar-Hebraeus, who says about al-Musta'sim, "This man possessed a childish understanding, and was incapable of distinguishing good from bad; and he occupied his time in playing with doves, and in amusing himself with games with birds".

Long-distance running was another sport for which the Caliph showed a certain enthusiasm. In 643/1245-6 a certain man called Ma'tuq of Mosul ran from Daquq to Baghdad, and when he succeeded in this he was given a big sum of money. In 646/1248-9 the same distance was run by 'Ali of Irbil, who was able to break the record of Ma'tuq by half an hour; he was also granted money and presents. During the reignoof al-Musta'sim many fights and disorders took place in Baghdad between

Al-Hawadith al-Jami'a, p. 212-3.

²Chronography, I, p. 409, and Mukhtasar, p. 445.

³Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 291.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 234.

the various quarters of the city, and especially between the Sunni and Shi'a quarters.

In 640/1242, shortly after his succession, a fight took place between the Ma muniya and Bab al-Azaj quarters, which involved the Nizamiya market, and between Mukhtara and Suq al-Sultan quarters, and between Qutufta and Qurayya quarters. Many were killed and shops pillaged. Moreover the common people openly derided the government and its officials. Thus the disorders increased for lack of government control. In 653/1255 fights took place between Rusafa (Sunni) and Khudayriyyin (Shi'a) and soon people of Bab al-Basra supported Rusafa while Karkh supported the others. Furthermore the authorities could not rely on the soldiers to settle the disorders because, on several occasions, these soldiers sided with the Sunni people and attacked the Shia. In Muharram 653/Feb.-Mar. 1255, a fight took place between Karkh and Bab al-Basra: the soldiers were sent to stop it, but instead they pillaged Karkh and that made the situation worse. The climax came in 654/1256, when someone was killed by the people of Karkh, and the soldiers sent to keep order were joined by crowds of the common people and pillaged Karkh, burnt several places in it, killed many and took away women. Thus the Caliph was not able to

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 175-7; cf. Ibn Abi 1-Hadid, II, p. 554, see also E.I./II, s.v. Baghdad (by A. A. Duri).

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 298-9, A. A. Duri, op.cit.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 276-7.

⁴Ibid., pp. 314-5; also E.I./II, s.v. Baghdad (by A. A. Duri).

hold the balance between the two communities, and this was due to the weakness of the government. Although the Wazīr, Ibn al-'Alqamī, was a Shī'ite, yet it seems neither had he enough power to stop the disorders, nor was he able to persuade the Shī'a of Karkh to cease their attacks on the Sunnī quarters. Moreover Ibn al-Fuwatī openly puts the main responsibility of these disorders on the Shī'a.

The court was divided into two groups, the group of the Shī'ite Wazīr, and the group of the young Dawadar, the most powerful Amīr in Baghdad, who was aided by the eldest son of the Caliph. The rivalry between the Wazīr and the Dawadar came to boiling point in 653/1255-6, when the Wazīr accused him of making a plot to install the eldest son of the Caliph in his place. The Dawadar, on hearing this slander, was outraged and collected his troops around himself to fight the Wazīr. The Wazīr for his part did the same. The clash between them was avoided by the mediation of the Caliph, who took great pains to settle the dispute. This split in the authority, was not without response from the common people, who had already supported the side they preferred; the Sunnīs sided with the Dawadar and the elder son of the Caliph, and the Shī'a sided with the Wazīr.

Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 322; Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi, II, pp. 139-90; see also Dhahabi, XX, fols. 163-4.

²Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 304-5.

³ Ibid., pp. 294-8; see also below pp. 201-2.

⁴Abu 'l-Fida III, p. 202; and al-Yunini, Dhayl Mir'at al-Zaman, I, p.86.

The atrocities which were committed in Karkh by the soldiers of the Dawadar gave, to many historians, the impression that the Wazīr, Ibn al-'Alqamī, would have been a traitor to the Caliphate, and would have helped the Mongols to conquer Baghdad, in revenge on the Dawadar and the eldest son of the Caliph for what they had done in Karkh.

Thus the sectarian rivalries played a considerable role in the weakness of the Caliphate and finally in its downfall. As a result of the fall of Baghdad both the communities lost their position as citizens of the seat of the Caliphate, which was, spiritually and traditionally, the centre of the Muslim world.

Al-Yunini, I, p. 86, Abu 'l-Fida III, p. 202; Ibn al- Amid, fol. 261b; Dhahabi, XX, fols. 163-4 and 210-11; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VII, pp. 47-8; Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi, II, pp. 189-90; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 196; al- Umari, X, p. 529; and Ibn Khaldun, III, pp. 536-7; cf. below pp. 100 ff.

Chapter III

THE DHIMMIS.

The Jewish and Christian Communities who lived in the Islamic Empire were called Ahd al-Dhimma. When the Dhimmis are, individually, mentioned by name in the works of Arab historians, the reason should be sought in their particular importance for the public life of their period. They were mentioned either for their services to the government, or were merely mentioned for their position among their own communities, such as the head of the Jews and the head of the Christians.

The Dhimmis played a leading part in the economic and administrative life of the Caliphate, and continued to play their role to the end of the 'Abbasid Caliphate.²

Shortly after his succession to the Caliphate, al-Nasir issued in 579/1183-4 a strict order against employing the Dhimmis in the Diwan. 3
When somebody enquired from the Caliph about Ibn Zattina - the Christian - who was well acquainted with the art of clerkship, the Caliph answered angrily "Ibn Zattina is dead; what are we going to do?". The problem

¹ See E.I./II, s.v. Dhimma (bycL. Cahen).

About the part played by the Jews see W. J. Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Mediaeval Islam, London (1937); A. A. Duri, Studies on the economic life of Mesopotamia in the 10th century, Baghdad (1948); D.S. Sassoon, A History of the Jews in Baghdad (Letchworth, 1949).

On the reason for this order see abovep. 106.

was solved by the conversion of this clerk to Islam. However, it seems that this policy was of short duration, for there are many indications which prove that the <u>Dhimmis</u> continued to play their part in the <u>Diwan</u>. Moreover, judging from the complaints of some of the Muslim jurists it seems that al-Masir did not only employ the <u>Dhimmis</u> but he treated them with tolerance and respect. Ibn Fadlan, the chief judge (died in 631/1233-4) says in a letter submitted to the Caliph, "They (the <u>Dhimmis</u>) have never had better conditions, higher respect and dignity, in any other country, than they have (now) in Baghdad". 5

In the social and economic life of the Abbasid Caliphate, the Dhimmis established their position long before the reign of al-Nasir.

But towards the 12th and 13th centuries they penetrated into nearly every field of activity especially the industrial and commercial ones. In the different crafts they held leading positions, and Ibn Fadlan, in his letter, distinguishes the various crafts and occupations held by the

¹Sibt, VP. ,241 0. 378; Cf. Ibn al-Sa·i, pp. 161-2.

²Ibn al-Sa·i, pp. 162-3; 166, 219-20.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 63-70; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 142.

The full letter is recorded in Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 64-70. A. Ben-Jacob translated this letter into Hebrew with comments in his article, "New sources with regard to the history of the Jews in Babylon in the 12th and 13th centuries". Zion, XV (1950), pp. 62-5.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 66.

⁶Cf. S. D. Goitein, Jews and Arabs, New York (1955), p.7.

Dhimmis in Baghdad. He says "...some of them in the service of the Diwan, ... others physicians, ... some of them shopkeepers as druggists ...etc., others craftsmen and artisans like coldsmiths... and others Bankers (Jahabidha) and money-changers (Sayarifa)".

Diwan al-Jawali was in charge of collecting the poll-tax from the Dhimmis. It seems very likely that, during al-Nasir's reign, this tax was collected with laxity, and also that the revenue from it was not high; for in 626/1228-9 al-Mustansir discharged Muhyi al-Din ibn-al-Jawzi from his post as the head of this Diwan and appointed Ibn Fadlan to this post. The Caliph ordered the new official to "apply the Shar'" in collecting the poll-tax. Ibn Fadlan, therefore, increased the tax on those who paid less than one Dinar to one Dinar. Moreover, Ibn Fadlan followed strict method in collecting this tax judging from the following narrative:

"At the beginning of Muharram (of the year 627/1228) Muhyi al-Din Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad Ibn Fadlan sat in Diwan al-Jawali and demanded the polltax from the Dhimmis. One of these stood before him and waited till his poll-tax had been weighed and a receipt given to him. This was humiliating and they suffered greatly therefrom. There was an Abu 'Ali ibn al-

The al-Fuwati, pp. 64-68; also cited by A. A. Duri, "Nushu al-Asnaf... etc.", B.C.A., I, June (1959), p. 145.

²See below pp. 141-1.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 7-8; see also below p. 241-2.

Masihi, the chief of the physicians. He enjoyed privileges and free access to the house of the Caliph. He pretended that he was sick, excused himself (to the <u>Diwan</u>) and, therefore, applied to have his poll-tax paid by his son. That was not permitted and he appeared and paid it. Once there came Ibn al-Shuwaikh, the head of the Academy of the Jews, to his house (i.e. that of the chief of the <u>Diwan</u>) at night, and requested him to receive his poll-tax from him then. But the other would not accede, explaining, 'It is unavoidable for you to come to the <u>Diwan</u> by day and pay the poll-tax'. He was very strict regarding this and would not respond to any wish."

This anecdote indicates that the notables of the <u>Dhimmis</u> used to pay their poll-tax, at least during the reign of al-Nasir, through their representatives, in order to avoid complying with the humiliating procedure accompanying the payment of this tax. Moreover, Ibn Fadlan observed this in his letter, where he says,

"And now some of them (the Dhimmis) do not come personally before the 'Amil (of <u>Diwan al-Jawali</u>) to pay their poll-tax, but send it with their followers."3

Although the non-Muslim communities received harsh treatment under the Muslim rulers in various parts of the Islamic world, and were forced to wear distinctive dress, or colour of dress, yet in 'Iraq, under al-

The al-Fuwati, p. 13; also cited by Fischel, Jews in the economic..., pp. 129-30; see also Rafa'il Babu Ishaq, Ta'rikh Nasara al-'Iraq, pp. 72-3; and S. W. Baron, A social and religious history of the Jews, 2nd ed., III, p. 167 and p. 311 n. 53.

²See Fischel, p. 130.

³Ibn al-Fuwatii, p. 69.

⁴E. Strauss, "The social isolation of Ahl adh-Dhimma", E.O., Ala Memoire de Paul Hirschler, pp. 73 ff.

Masir and his successors, it seems that they enjoyed better conditions and more liberty, for there is no evidence to show that any Caliph of this period forced them to wear any distinctive colour, to distinguish them from the Muslims. Moreover, Ibn Fadlan, in his letter, discussed how al-Muqtadi (476-487/1075-1094) ordered that the Jews should put on yellow caps and the Christians should wear black dresses, and also forbad them to ride horses but only mules and donkeys; but "Now they (the <u>Dhimmis</u>) are free from all these restrictions, therefore, does not this (liberty) justify doubling their poll-tax:" Nevertheless the Caliph did not respond to this request of Ibn Fadlan.

The Jewish Community:-

At the end of the reign of al-Mustanjid, the Jewish traveller Benjamin of Tudala visited Baghdad - between 1166 and 1171 A.D.4 He

lbn al-Fuwati, pp. 68-9; also E. Strauss, op.cit., pp. 78-9.

²Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 69.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p.70.

⁴The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela, tr. by M. N. Adler, London (1907), p. 2; while E. H. Haddad, in his Arabic tr., suggests that this travel took place between 1165 and 1173 A.D. See the Arabic tr., pp. 28-30.

gives a detailed account of the position of the Jewish community there. He says, "They (the Jews) dwell in security, prosperity, and honour under the great Caliph". He estimated the number of this community at one thousand living in Baghdad, and that there were twenty eight synagogues situated either in the eastern side or in al-Karkh. Benjamin describes this community thus: "Many of the Jews of Baghdad are good scholars and very rich". 4 This seems very likely because of the participation of this community in the economic life of Iraq. It is evident that the Jews continued to hold their economic position and participation in the financial administration; even Benjamin was aware of this fact and says, "This great 'Abbasid is extremely kind towards the Jews, many of his officers being of that nation". There are several examples of officials from this community, such as: Abu Tahir ibn Shibr, the Jahbadh (Banker) of the Diwan, he was also the chief of the Jews and died at the end of the month Ramadan in 601/1205. In the same year his son, Abu Ghalib ibn

Adler's tr., p.39; Asher's tr. (London 1840) p.100: Arabic tr. p.135.

Asher's tr. p.100; however, Adler's tr. has 40,000 Jews living in Baghdad, p.39, see also the Arabic tr. p.135. Although the figure of Asher's tr. is mentioned by Petachia of Ratishon, who visited Baghdad shortly after Benjamin, yet Petachia says, when he mentions the head of the Academy, "The head of the Academy has about 2000 disciples at once, and more than 500 sit around him". See A. N. Adler, Jewish Travellers, p.70.

B. of T. Asher's tr. p.104; Adler's tr. p.42; Arabic tr. p.139. But Petachia mentions three synagogues only; see <u>Jewish Travellers</u>, p.76.

⁴Asher's tr. p.104; also the Arabic tr. p.139; while Adler's tr. (p.42) reads "The Jews of the city (Baghdad) are learned men and very rich".

⁵Asher's tr. p.94; Arabic tr. p.132.

⁶ Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 162-3; cited by Fischel, p.133.

Abi Tahir ibn Shibr, also died. He was in charge of the Mint (*Amil Dar al-Darb). 1 Thus, it seems that the Shibr family had a dominant position in the financial administration at Baghdad. The other example is Ibn Karam who held the post as 'Amil of the Mint, probably during al-Nasir's reign. 2 Ibn al-Fuwatī refers to Ibn Karam as one of the chieftains of the Dhimmis, when he mentions the death of Abu'l-Tulaiq (under the year 639/1241-2), he says "When Abu 'l-Tulaiq... met one of the leaders of the Christians or the Jews riding, he made him dismount and insulted him. He did so with the physician Ibn Toma' and later with his son, and also with Ibn Karam the Jew". 3 Al-Dhahabī recorded the following interesting story about Ibn Karam, which shows how highly he was respected by the Muslim personages:

"Nasir ibn 'Abd al-Razzaq, the chief judge (died in 631/1233-4), said, 'One day while I was sitting in the house of the Wazir al-Qummi, with a group of people, a distinguished looking man entered the house. All the company stood in respect for him, I did the same. But then I was told that this person "is Ibn Karam, the Jew, who is in charge of the Mint". When I heard that I became very angry and I called him before me, and I told him, "Look, you do not deserve any respect from me, and I have stood for you because I thought that you were one of the Muslim jurists, sit there far from us". ""4"

lbn al-Sa·i, p. 166; Fischel, p. 133.

²Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 142a. The Karam family was an influential family in Baghdad Jewry: see Fischel, p. 134.

³Tbn al-Fuwați, p. 150; also cited by Fischel, p. 134.

⁴Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 142a.

The Caliph usually appoints both the Exilarch and the Catholicus to their offices. According to Benjamin of Tudela the Caliph appoints the Exilarch, and the latter appoints the heads of the Academy. It seems that later on - during the reign of al-Nasir - the Caliph also appoints the chiefs of the Academy, for there are several items of information in Ibn al-Sa·i³ and Ibn al-Fuwati⁴ respecting the appointment of Ra's Mathība⁵ to his office.

Although there is a lot of information about the heads of the Academy and their appointment to their offices in Ibn al-Sa'i and Ibn al-Fuwați yet, unfortunately, there is nothing, in these two chronicles, concerning the Exilarch. However, Benjamin of Tudela and Petachia of Ratesbon furnish some information in regard to the Exilarch.

According to Petachia the appointment of the Exilarch took place as a result of the recommendation of the principal men among the Jews.

Benjamin describes the ceremony of the installation of the Exilarch

See E.I./II s.v. Dhimma (by Cl. Cahen).

²B. of T. Asher's tr. p.104; Adler's tr. pp. 41-2; Arabic tr. pp. 135-6.
Benjamin mentions 10 Academies in Baghdad; see Asher's tr. p. 100;
Adler's tr. p.39.

³Al-Jami al-Mukhtasar, pp. 266-9.

⁴Al-Hamadith al-Jami'a, pp. 218, 224, 248-9.

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⁷ Jewish Travellers, p.64

as follows:

"At the time of the installation of the Prince of the Captivity he spends considerable sums in presents to the King, or Caliph, his princes and nobles. The ceremony is performed by the act of the laying on of the hands of the King, or Caliph, after which the Prince rides home from the King's abode to his own house, seated in a royal state carriage and accompanied by the sounds of various musical instruments; he after—

wards lays his hands on the gentlemen of the university."

The authority of the Exilarch extended over all the Jews who lived within the Muslim world and without, 2 for Benjamin says,

"The authority of the Prince of the Captivity extends over the following countries viz. over Mesopotamia, Persia, Khorasan, S'ba which is Yemen, Diarbakh (Diyar Baker), all Armenia..., over the country of the Aranians (Adharbayjan)..., over Sikbia and all the provinces of the Turkmans... and the country of the Georgians unto the river Oxus, and as far as the frontiers of the provinces and cities of Tibet and India. Permission is granted by the Prince of the Captivity to all the Jewish congregations of these different countries to elect Rabbis and ministers, all of whom appear before him in order to receive consecration and the permission to officiate, upon which occasion presents and valuable gifts are offered to him even from the remotest countries."4

This shows that the Exilarch exercised a wide authority over the Jews, who lived inside and outside 'Iraq. Thus, it seems, this very special

B. of T., Asher's tr.p.104; cf. Adler's tr. pp. 41-2; see also Arabic tr. p. 138.

²Cf. S. D. Goitein, "The unity of the MediterraneanWorld in the 'Middle' Middle Ages", S.I. XII (1960), pp. 33-4.

³E. H. Haddad, in his Arabic tr., p. 138, translates this to Siberia.

⁴B. of T., Asher's tr. pp. 102-3; Arabic tr. pp. 137-8.

position of the Exilarch made the active Caliph al-Mugtafi, soon after he was able to liberate his capital from the yoke of the Seljug's authority, restore the old 'Abbasid tradition of appointing the Exilarch to his post with all the ceremonies accompanying tit. This act of the Caliph would give him a special position in the eyes of allthe Jews everywhere and, moreover, make Baghdad the seat of their Head and their scholars. It might enable the government of Baghdad to use the Jewish financial resources and commercial ablities to gain some economic support to carry out the ambitious policy of the Caliph to restore his temporal rule. Nevertheless, appointing the Exilarch was, no doubt, a role of the 'Abbasid Caliphs, when they were in complete control of their affairs, so its revival meant the revival of a phase of a lost authority which, since the reign of al-Mugtafi, all the Caliphs had been longing to practice and pursue. Al-Mugtafi appointed as Exilarch the rich Baghdadian merchant Sulaiman (or Solomon) ibn Hisdai, and provided him with a decree respecting his appointment. After the death of Sulaiman his son Daniel succeeded him: during the reign of the latter Benjamin of Tudela visited Baghdad and he describes Daniel as follows:

See the Arabic tr. of B. of T. p. 136 n (6). For the position of the Exilarch in the early Muslim rule see S. D. Goitein, <u>Jews and Arabs</u>, pp. 120-21.

²E. Haddad's article "The Gaonim of Baghdad..." which supplemented his Arabic translation of the <u>Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela</u>, pp. 200-201; and p. 136 n (6).

"The city (Baghdad) contains ten colleges (and he states the presidents of these colleges)... The principal of all these, however, is Rabbi Daniel Ben Chisdai, who bears the titles of: Prince of the Captivity and Lord and who possesses a pedigree, which proves his descent from King David. The Jews call him "Lord Prince of the Captivity" and the Muhammadans "Saidna Ben Daoud" noble descendant of David, and he holds great command over all Jewish congregations under the authority of the Emir al-Mumenin (Commander of the Faithful) the Lord of the Muhammadans, who has commanded to respect him (sic), and has confirmed his power by granting him a seal of office."

After the death of Daniel in the year 1174 A.D. there was a serious crisis in the history of the Exilarchate. The deceased Exilarch left no son, and consequently the Jews of Baghdad looked elsewhere for a member of the Davidic Dynasty. Such a family existed in Mosul. Here lived two descendants of this family, namely Daniel and Samuel. However, it seems that Samuel was installed as Exilarch.

After the death of the Exilarch Samuel in 1190 A.D. the Gaon Samuel (Ibn al-Dastur) tried to put an end to the dignity of the Exilarchate. According to him there was no need for such an institution. Not worldly but spiritual leadership was the need of the Jews in the

Adler's tr. (p.39) reads Hisdai.

²B. of T.; Asher's tr. pp. 101-2; Adler's tr. p. 39; Arabic tr. pp. 136-7.

³D. S. Sassoon, p. 67; also E. Haddad, op.cit., pp. 200-1, and p. 136 n (6). But the traveller Petachia, who visited Baghdad "A year after the death of R. Daniel", mentions Eleazar as the Exilarch; see <u>Jewish Travellers</u>, p. 70.

⁴D. S. Sassoon, p. 69.

Diaspora. It was a waste of money to keep up an expensive Exilarchate instead of combining all forces for the material and spiritual wellbeing of the Academy, which is really the Throne of the Torah. However. it seems that R. Samuel the Gaon succeeded in his project of abolishing the Exilarchate. Thus all the rights vested in the Exilarch was, later on, transferred to the Gaon. And the Gaonim concentrated all the religious as well as political privileges in their hands. 2 Moreover. it is very clear from the sense of the unique document of the installation of Danyal ibn al- Azar ibn Hibat Allah as the Head of the Academy, which is preserved in Ibn al-Sa i, that the Head of the Academy was considered as the sole leader and representative of the Jewish community. 3 About the ceremony of appointing the Head of the Academy, Ibn al-Fuwati gives two examples in regard to the appointment of both Danyal ibn Shamu'il ibn Abi al-Rabi (appointed in 645/1247-8), and 'Ali ibn Zakhariya of Irbil (appointed in 648/1250-51); about the latter he says:

"In the year 648/1250-51 'Ali ibn Zakhariya of Irbil requested to be appointed Ra's Mathiba - Head of the Academy - he was given the approval by the Wazir, who had sent him before the chief Judge. The Chief Judge let him take a place before him and spoke to him:
'I have appointed thee leader of the folk of they

D. S. Sassoon, p. 69; but E. Haddad says that as early as the death of the Exilarch R. Daniel in the year 1174 R. Samuel ibn al-Dastur was able to combine the Exilarchate to himself, and thus he became the spiritual and temporal leader of the Jews. See Haddad's Appendix, op.cit. pp. 200-201, and p. 136 n (6).

²D. S. Sassoon, pp. 90-91.

³See the complete document in Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 266-9; cited by Fischel, pp. 128-9; see also A. Ben-Jacob in Zion, XV (1950), p. 66; D. S. Sassoon, pp. 73-4.

community, over the folk of thy faith which hath been abolished by the law of Islam... that thou mayst lead them within the boundaries of their religion. Thou shalt order them regarding those things commanded by their religion and those things forbidden by their religion. Then he left for the corridor, where he put on his Tarha (Pallium). Then he walked out with a company consisting of a band of Jews and a band of police force from Bab al-Nubi. He carried with him the official statement of his appointment which was issued by the Diwan."

Although Benjamin mentioned only the religious duty of the Head of the Academy as his sole occupation, 2 yet it seems that the Gaon exercised wider authority over his community inside and outside 'Iraq, for Petachia gives the following information about Rabbi Samuel (1160-1208). He says:

"In all the land of Assyria and Damascus, in the cities of Persia and Media, as well as in the land of Babel, they have no judge that has not been appointed by Rabbi Samuel, the head of the Academy. It is he that gives licence in every city to judge and to teach. His authority is acknowledged in all countries, and also, in the land of Israel. They all respect him."3

This explains why the government of Baghdad, in this period, was much concerned in appointing the Heads of the Academy. Petachia adds.

"Every Jew in Babel pays a gold florin anually to the head of the Academy as a poll-tax. For the monarch requires no taxes, but only the head of the Academy."4

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 248-9; cited by Fischel, pp. 131-2.

Asher's tr. p. 101; the Arabic tr. p. 136.

³Jewish Travellers, pp. 71 and 85. Goitein says, "The Head of the Academy regarded by Jews all over the world as the highest authority in all religious matters," see <u>Jews and Arabs</u>, p.121.

⁴ Jewish Travellers, p. 71; see also D. S. Sassoon, p.64.

If this is to be believed, the head of the Academy was a representative of his community, especially in collecting the poll-tax from them to deliver it to the government, and this duty, no doubt, beyond the religious one.

Petachia also says that the head of the Academy gave him

"a document with his seal, directing that he should have safe conduct whithersoever he should go... Rabbi Petachia carried the seal of Rabbi Samuel with him, and the people did all that he required, and they feared him."

And,

"The head of the Academy has many servants. They flog anyone not immediately executing his orders; therefore people fear him. He, however, is righteous, humble, and full of knowledge of the law. He is clothed in golden and coloured garments like the King; his palace is hung with costly tapestry like that of the King."²

Although the Jews were treated with tolerance and respect by the government of Baghdad, and "they lived in peace" as Petachia says; 3 yet sometimes, as individuals, received rather harsh treatment from some of the people in Baghdad, especially during the reign of al-Musta'sim, when the government was too weak to keep order inside Baghdad. For there are few examples of individual attacks on Jews recorded by Ibn al-Fuwati, but the government did not tolerate this aggressive

¹ Jewish Travellers, p. 73 and p. 78.

² Ibid., p.81. For the full list of the Gaonim of this period see Fischel, pp. 126 ff; and D. S. Sassoon, pp. 72 ff.

³Jewish Travellers, p.71.

attitude and, indeed, punished the offenders severely. However, it seems that the rarity of these attacks attracted the attention of Ibn al-Fuwati to record them in his chronicle. They are as follows: After the installation of Danyal ibn Shamu'il ibn Abi al-Rabi', in 645/1247-3, as head of the Academy, he left the Diwan with his procession, which consisted of a band of Jews and some officials. On the way to his house a number of the common people ('Awam) tried to insult him, they were prevented from doing so, and several of them were imprisoned and punished. In 648/1250-51 Husain Taj al-Din, a relative of the Wazir Ibn al-'Alqami, committed suicide, because he insulted a Jewish shop-keeper, and the latter made a complaint to the government about it. When the Wazir sent for him to be questioned about this offence, Taj al-Din refused to go there and hanged himself.²

The Christians

The members of this community also participated in the social and economic life of the Caliphate principality. They practiced nearly all fields of hand-crafts, as well as participating in the financial and administrative life of 'Iraq. Some of the Christians reached a high position in the service of the Diwan, such as Ibn Sawa, who was killed in 604/1207-8

Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 218.

Thid., p. 248; for more examples see also pp. 255-6, and p. 318; and Dhahabi, XX, fol 96a.

According to Ibn al-Sa'i, Nasr ibn Sama was the controller (Nazir) of the provinces of Dujail and Daquq. He was accused of poisoning the Muqta' of these provinces; therefore he was killed, although he tried to ransom himself for 10,000 Dinars. But Sibt gives a detailed account of the death of Ibn Sawa; he says:

"Ibn Sawa - the Christian - was in charge of administrating Dujail and Daquo provinces, he was appointed in this office by the Wazir ibn Mahdi. He acted with dignity and he even appeared riding in a procession like that of the Head of the Diwan (Sahib al-Diwan). He used to bring the revenue of these districts before the Wazir to take whatever he liked and the rest was given to the Caliph. Then the Caliph gave these two districts as fiefs to the Amir Tutamush; the latter went there and discovered the falsification and extortion of the Wazir and his agent Ibn Sawa. The Wazir tried to keep the secret, arranged with bn Sawa to poison Tutamush, and Ibn Sawa did so. The Caliph discovered what the two parties did to Tutamush, therefore, he ordered Ibn Sawa to be handed over to the followers of the Amir to kill him. The Wazir tried to save Ibn Sawa, wrote to the Caliph to the effect that the Christians of Baghdad agreed to pay 50,000 Dinars as ransom to save Ibn Sawa; 2 but the Caliph refused that. And Ibn Sawa was killed.

From this narrative it is evident that Ibn Sawa participated in the administrating of the Caliphate principality as the financial administrator of Daquq and Dujail provinces; moreover he tookpart in the intrigues of the Court, sided with the Wazir against the interest of the Caliph.

Ibn al-Sa i, pp. 219-20.

²Sibt, pp. 348-9; also cited by Ibn al-Imad, V, p.9.

Some of the Christians held the post of Wakils (agents) of some of the personages in Baghdad.

There is nearly a complete list of the physicians of the Court preserved in the historical works. These physicians held some administrative posts beside their medical occupation; they are:

It is recorded that in 591/1194-5 Sa'id ibn Hibat-allah ibn al-Mu'ammil, who was the chief physician of the Court, died. 3

In 608/1211-2 Abu '1-Baqa' al-Nīlī died. He was the physician of al-Nāṣir, and reached a high position in the Court. He was awarded great wealth, but this wealth was spent by his unwise son, Abu 'Alī. Although he followed the pattern of his father's profession he was young and lived a life of pleasure and spent his wealth in merry-making. He even committed adultery with several Muslim women, and as a result he was fined 6,000 Dīnārs. 4

In 620/1223-4 Abu '1-Karam Sa'id ibn Toma' was killed; it seems that the latter was a gifted person, because he held besides his post as a physician of the Court, several posts: He acted as private secretary

See Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 121; Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 94, 198.

For the early Christian physician see Rafa'il Babu Ishaq, Ta'rikh Nasara al-'Iraq, pp. 80-4; idem, Ahwal Nasara Baghdad, pp. 100 ff.

³Ibn al-'Ibri, p. 416; Ibn al-Qifti, Ta'rikh al-Hukama', ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig 1903), p. 214; see also Ishaq, Ta'rikh, p. 103; idem, Ahwal, pp. 209-10.

⁴Ibn al- Ibri, pp. 419-20; al-Qifti, pp. 332-3; Ishaq, Ahwal, pp. 220-21.

to al-Nasir to carry the correspondence between the Caliph and his Wazir. He was also given a certain administrative authority over some districts. Moreover he acted as agent of the Diwan to deliver the salaries of some retired officials. However, it seems, he established an influential family in Baghdad, for his son, later on, served the young Dawadar (al-Duwaydar al-Saghir) as an agent. According to Bar-Hebraeus Ibn Toma' was killed as a result of a court intrigue worked up against him by two servants of al-Nasir. One of them was a woman who served the Caliph as a secretary to write his correspondence and orders, because the Caliph's eyes were too weak to enable him to write himself. She, with the aid of another servant, forged the signature of al-Nasir . Ibn Toma' had discovered the treachery of these servants and revealed it to the Wazir. Therefore, they planned his death, to keep their secret. The Caliph was much grieved by Ibn Toma's death and punished the offenders severely. But Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi states another story for the death of Ibn Toma'. He says that Ibn Toma' was given some provinces to serve in as financial administrator and, one day, several soldiers came to him to receive their salaries, but he treated them roughly. Therefore,

Ibn al-'Ibri, p. 421.

²Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi, I, p. 244.

³Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 142b.

⁴Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 94.

Mukhtasar, pp. 421-2; al-Qifti,pp. 212-4; also Ishaq, Ahwal, pp. 206-8.

they harboured hatred for him, and two of them waited for him at night and killed him. The Caliph ordered his wealth, which amounted to 813,000 Dinars, to be forfeited to the Treasury.

In 643/1245-6 the physician Shams al-Dawla Abu 'l-Khayr ibn
Toma' died. He held a high position in the court: acted as a secretary
to al-Mustansir, as well as being financial administrator. On his death
his hereditament, which amounted to 600,000 Dinars, was confiscated by
the government, but later on it was returned to his brothers, who were
also appointed in the service of the <u>Diwan</u>: Fakhr al-Dawla Mary was
given all the posts of his deceased brother, and Taj al-Dawla was
appointed agent of <u>Bab 'Anbar</u>.

In 656/1258 the physician of the last 'Abbasid Caliph, Mas'ud ibn al-Qass al-Baghdadi died. He reached a high position during the reign of al-Musta'sim, and when Baghdad was conquered by the Mongols and al-Musta'sim was killed, he confined himself to his house without serving anybody until his death which occured in the above mentioned year.

The chief of the Christian community, the Catholicus, was also appointed to his office by the Caliph.

Fawat al-Wafayat, I, p. 244.

²Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 198.

³Ibn al- Ibri, p. 478.

⁴For the persons who held this title in the first half of the 13th century see Ishaq, Ta'rikh, pp. 110-11; idem, Ahwal, pp. 47, 83-4, 228-9; and Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 300.

Ibn Hamdun preserved in his Tadhkira a patent of appointment of the Nastorian Catholicus at Baghdad. It is addressed to Ebd Jesu (or 'Abd Yashu'), Catholicus and Patriarch, who in 533/1138-9 received his patent of appointment and the Tarha (Pallium) in the presence of the Wazīr, and was conducted by the head of the police and other officials to the church in Suq al-Thalatha'. This being the first occasion on which a Patriarch had been thus homoured. Ebd Jesu died in 542/1147-8. This document runs as follows:

"This patent is issued by the order of our lord, the Commander of the Faithful, to Abd Yashu, the Catholicus, the Patriarch..., after the Calibh was assured of your exemplary life, and of your possessing the most deserving qualities, which your co-religionists were agreed distinguished you from them, ... and according to their persistent need for a Catholicus to look after their affairs; they, therefore, agreed to choose you as their leader to watch over their concerns, to manage their charitable foundations, and to deal equally between weak and strong as a just arbitrator ... Thus thereby, the Caliph ordered you to be appointed Catholicus of the Nestorian Christians both at Baghdad and over the rest of Islamic territory; and to be the representative of the members of that and of the other communities, whether Rum, Jacobite or Melkite, whereever they might be. You have to be singled out from your community by wearing the vestments appertaining to the office at divine worship, neither sharing the name with anyone else nor permitting any Patriarch, Bishop, or Deacon to assume the same to the prejudice of your office and dignity. In case any of these should enter the gate of disputation, and interfere with or disregard

H. F. Amedroz, "Tales of Official life from the Tadhkira of Ibn Hamdun", J.R.A.S., 1908. I, pp. 449-50. For further description of the procession of Catholicus' appointment to his office see Ishaq, Ahwal, pp. 48-50.

your authority, punishment would surely follow as a warning to others and as a safeguard to your ordinance. However, you should be escorted in state according to the precedents applicable to your predecessors, as also to you and to your successors; and protection should be extended to you and your co-religionists in your life and property, by good management, and to establish usage in the matter of the burial of your dead, and to protect your churches and monasteries, in accordance with the practice of the first Caliphs (Rashedin Caliphs) towards your forefathers, and the care for your sacred and inviolable rights on the part of those Imams of the past. In regard to the payment of the poll-tax, you should confine yourself to exacting it from persons of sound mind and of sufficient substance, from the men and not from the women, nor from non-adults, its collection to take place once a year, according to the approved legal method. You are to be at liberty to intervene in all disputes between the Christian sects, to obtain justice for the weak against the strong, to redress equitably any deviation in the direction of violence or injustice, and to manage the charitable foundations on the basis of justice and good faith, in conformity with the ordinances and their plain course. Therefore, you should requite this favour which has encompassed you, and which has fulfilled your wishes and secret hopes, by prayers such as should indicate and make manifest your sincere gratitude. And all Patriarchs, Priests, and Bishops of the above mentioned sects are to punctually obey the foregoing directions... etc."

Amedroz, "Tales of Official Life... etc.", J.R.A.S., 1908, pp. 447-9 and pp. 467-70; cf. Ishaq, Ahwal, pp. 52-4.

Chapter IV

-1-

THE 'ABBASID WAZIRATE. (575/1180 - 656/1258)

Although the late 'Abbasid administrative institutions were the continuation of the Seljucid ones, yet there were some changes and development in these institutions. The changes, however, mainly occurred in the terminology rather than in the nature of the administration. The Wazirate was one of those institutions which underwent a change. Towards the reign of al-Nasir the holder of this office, usually, was called Wazīr, but sometimes this office was assigned to an official called Na'ib Wazīr (Deputy Wazīr, or rather acting Wazīr) who, in fact, exercised the same authority as a full Wazīr, but without the dignity of the title and the vestments of this office. Furthermore, the contemporary chronicles, sometimes, call the Na'ib Wazīr: al-Na'ib 'An Dīwān al-Majlis (The Deputy of Dīwān al-Majlis). This acting Wazīr occupied a certain room (office) in the House of the Wazīrate.

The first one mentioned by this title was Ibn al-Attar, who was appointed as Na'ib Wazir in 567/1171-2 by the caliph al-Mustadi'; see Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, X, pp. 237-8; see alove p. 100.

The al-Sa'i, pp. 114, 251, 287; see also Ibn al-Dubaithi as quoted by M. Jawad in his appendix to Dhahabi's al-Mukhtasar...etc., p. 32. The Fatimid Diwan al-Majlis was the central Bureau of the government; see E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A. A. Duri).

³Ibn al-Sa·I, p. 221; Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 34.

When al-Qummi was appointed as Na'ib Wazir on 12 Rabi' II 606/14 Oct. 1209, the decree issued by al-Masir on this occasion describes him as, "The representative (or deputy of the Caliph) over the lands and the population". However, this position was not, always, enjoyed by the Na'ib Wazir. In the period between 575/ 1130 and 583/1187, when all powers were held by the Ustadh al-Dar, Ibn al-Sahib, the Caliph appointed four Na'ib Wazirs successively, but they played a very limited role in the affairs of the state. In the words of Ibn Jubair, who visited Baghdad in 580/1184, the sole occupation of the acting Wazir was to supervise and to manage the finance of the Caliphate. He says, "Nowadays he (the Caliph) has no Wazir, but he has a servant (employee) known as Na'ib al-Wizara, who attends the Diwan which embraces the finance of the Caliphate (to handle its affairs)". This indicates that the rule of this official, in this period, was confined to the financial matters only.

During the long reign of al-Nasir, 13 Na'ib Wazirs were appointed, of whom only two were promoted to full Wazirs; and only two men were appointed as Wazirs from the beginning (see below). However, it seems that, out of al-Nasir's desire to revive the prestige of the Caliphate, he preferred to handle everything in his Caliphate rather

Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, pp. 205-6.

²Ibn Jubair, p. 227.

than appoint Wazīrs to share with him, morally at least, the management of his affairs.

By the reign of al-Mostansir the distinction between Wazir and Na'ib Wazīr had disappeared, as in the case of the appointment of Abu di-Azhar ibn al-Naqid in 629/1232, who according to some historians was appointed as Na'ib Wazīr and, according to others, was appointed Wazīr. Although Ibn al-Fuwațī mentions that he was installed as Na'ib Wazīr, yet elsewhere in his chronicle he mentions the following titles bestowed upon this official, "Al-Malik al-Wazīr al-A-zam...etc.". This example, however, indicates that the distinction was not clear between Wazīr and Na'ib Wazīr. Furthermore, even during al-Naṣir's reign, usually the Na'ib Wazīr acted as Wazīr, and the following summary of the biographies of the Wazīrs and Na'ib Wazīrs of this period will show some of their activities and authorities in the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

The ceremony of the appointment of Wazir was still conducted in a dignified manner. The person on whom the choice fell was summoned to the Caliphal Palace. He would come in a large procession to the Door

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 34 ff., and p. 156; al-Kaziruni, fol. 93a; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 241b.

²Ibn Kathir, p. 132; Ibn al-Tigtaga, pp. 446 ff.

³Al-Hawadith al-Jami'a, pp. 34 ff and p. 156.

⁴Ibid., pp. 34-5.

of the Cabinet (Bab al-Hujra), where the Caliph bestowed on him the symbols of the office and provided him with a decree of this appointment. The vestment consisted of a robe, a garment and a turban. Then he would leave the Door of the Cabinet for his office, mounted on a horse given to him as a gift from the Caliph, and all the dignitaries of the State walking around him. In this procession the decree of this appointment would be carried in front of the Wazīr, as well as a huge ink-pot. As soon as he entered his office (the Wazīrate House) he would write a statement, stating his obedience to the Caliph and his anxiety to serve him with all his power and sincerity. Then the Caliph would reply to him in a decree sent by the hand of one of the close servants of the Caliph, and this would be read to the assembly of the dignituries of the State gathered in the Wazīrate House to witness this ceremony.

The Caliph also bestowed on his Wazir titles of honour which were long and very dignified, such as the following titles offered to the Na'ib Wazir Ibn al-Naqid (appointed by al-Mustansir in 629/1232,

Bab al-Hujra was a large building affiliated to the Caliphal Palaces; it was constructed by the Caliph al-Mustarshid (512-529/1118-1135). It was used as an office by the Caliphs to summon their Wazirs there for consultation and to invest them with their office, as well as receiving them in time of feasts; see Yaqut al-Hamawi, Mu jam al-Buldan, I, p. 444.

²Sibt, p. 371; Abu Shama, p. 85; Dhahabi, XVIII, fol. 215.

³sibt, p. 342; Abu Shama, pp. 52-3.

⁴Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 168-9; Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 34 and pp. 280-81.

and these titles, remarks Ibn al-Fuwati, were the titles of the Wazir Ibn Mahdi al-'Alawi):

"Al-Mawla al-Wazir al-A.zam, al-Sahib al-Kabir al-Mu'azzam, al-'Alim al-'Adil, al-Mu'ayyad al-Muzaffar, al-Mujahid, Nasir al-Din, 'Imad al-Mulk, Ikhtiyar al-Khilafa al-Mu'azzama, Muhyi al-Imama al-Mukarrama, Taj al-Muluk wa Sayid Sudur al-'Alamin, Malik Wuzara al-Sharq wa 'l-Gharb, Ghiyath al-Wara, Abu 'l-Azhar Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Naqid Zahir Amir al-Mu'minin etc."

The position of the Wazīr was still the highest one in the state, that aform is to say that of the Caliph; and, in fact, this authority depended largely upon the personality of the Wazīr and the strength of his master, the Caliph. He controlled the central bureau of the government, which by now was called al-Dīwan al-'Azīz. He was also considered as the Head of the administrative staff, and therefore called "Katib al-Kuttāb" (the Clerk of the Clerks). However, the close connection between the Wazīrate and clerkmanship is remarkably clear, for even one of the insignia of this office is the "ink-pot". And the closing, by an order of the Caliph, of this ink-pot of the Wazīr was a sign of his dismissal.

The al-Fuwati, pp. 34-5; however, the practice of offering such pompous titles was an old established practice; see A. Mez, <u>Die Renaissance</u>

<u>Des Islams</u>, Arabic tr. (1940), pp. 155-6; on the Seljuqid Wazir's titles see A. Iqbal, <u>Wuzarat</u>, pp. 25-6, 163, 251.

²E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A.A. Duri).

³ Ibid.: see also below pp. 223-4.

⁴Tbn Abi al-Hadid, IV, p. 138; cf. Mez, op.cit., p. 144.

On the relation between the Wazirate and clerkmanship, in the first 'Abbasid epoch, see A. A. Duri, al-Nuzum al-Islamiyya, pp. 213 ff. and D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbasid, Damascus (1959), Vol. I, pp. 41/4.

6Sibt, p. 342; see also E.I./II, s.v. Dawadar (by D. Ayalon).

(cont.)

He also controlled the military organizations and, in times of war, he led the army of the Caliphate, as did the Wazīrs Ibn Yunus, Ibn al-Qassab and al-Qummī (see below).

During al-Nasir's reign it seems that the Wazirate kept its supremacy over the military element of the state. Although there was some strife between the Wazir Ibn Mahdi and the Amirs of Baghdad, yet this strife did not play any part in the dismissal of this Wazir, but because he became dangerously strong the Caliph expelled him. I Thus the military personnel could not establish their authority under the powerful Caliph al-Nasir.

The situation was quite changed during the reign of al-Musta'sim where most of the power passed to the hands of the Amirs of the Caliphate and, in particular, to the hands of the Young and Great Dawadar, who became the strongest Amirs. These two Amirs did not, even, attend the ceremony of the appointment of the Wazir Ibn al-'Alqami, no doubt because they were too great persons to attend it. In 650/1252-3 the Great Dawadar, 'Ala' al-Dīn al-Tubrisī, died, and by his death all the influence and power passed to the Young Dawadar, Mujahid al-Dīn. How-

⁽cont.)
7See Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 102; Ibn al-Tigtaga, p. 430.

See below pp. 189 H.

²Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 279-80.

³ Ibid., pp. 264 ff.

ever, the rivalry between Ibn al-'Algami and the Young Dawadar caused a lot of harm to the internal stability of the Caliphate, and played a considerable part in the destruction of the 'Abbasid Caliphate.2

When al-Nasir came to power he kept Ibn al-'Attar, the acting Wazir of his father, in office for several days only - about one week - and dismissed him.3

In the period between 575/1180-583/1187 four Na'ib Wazirs succeeded Ibn al-'Attar. The first Na'ib Wazir appointed by al-Nasir was Abu Dawud (or Da'ud) Sulaiman ibn Shawush who was kept in office for two months only.

Then the Caliph appointed Muhammad ibn Hibat Allah ibn al-Bukhari, who held this office for four years until his death which occurred in Muharram 580/April-May 1184. The third was Abu 11-Fath Sadaqa ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad, who was appointed on 15 Muharram 580/28 April 1184 and was dismissed on 13 Rabi II of the same year (24 July 1184). The fourth was Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Baql, who held this

See above pp. 153-4.

See below pp. 200 H.

³⁰n his dismissal see Chapter II above, pp. 100-103.

According to Ibn Qaninu al-Arbilli, the name of this official was Sulaiman ibn Sawars, see Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 60, n.l.

⁵ Ibn All-Kaziruni, fol. 89a.

⁶Ibid.; see Ibn al-Sa i, p. 60.

⁷Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 60-61; according to the al-Kaziruni (fol. 89a) this deputy Wazir held this office six months.

office for three years, and was dismissed in 583/1187.

In fact very little is recorded about these four Na'ib Wazirs and this was, no doubt, due to their insignificant role in the affairs of the Caliphate, where all the power and influence were exercised by the Shi'ite Ustadh al-Dar, Ibn al-Sahib. However, it seems that their sole occupation was, as observed by ibn Jubair, supervising the financial affairs of the state. This limited power of the acting Wazir indicates the jurisdiction of the office he held, at least during this period. On the other hand Ibn al-Sahib played the role of a real and powerful Wazir.

Ibn Yunus.

Abu'l-Muzaffar 'Abd Allah ibn Yunus was the first full Wazir appointed by al-Nasir. Prior to his installation he had served the government in several departments, such as managing the Diwan of the buildings (Diwan al-Abniya) and as Sahib Diwan. He was Hanbalite in belief, and it seems that the Caliph appointed him Wazir as a reward for his active part in plotting the dismissal of Ibn al-Sahib.

¹ Al-Kaziruni, fol. 89a.

²For his position in the Caliphate, see Chapter II, pp. 103-5.

³Ibn Jubair, p. 228; see above p./77.

⁴Abu Shama, p. 12.

⁵Ibn al-'Imad, IV, p. 313.

⁶See Chapter II, pp. 105.

He was appointed as Wazīr in Shawwāl 583/Dec. 1187 and honoured by the title of "Jalāl al-Dīn". Apart from his religious activities the only significant role he played during his short term in office was that he led the Caliphate army in Safar 584/April 1188 into 'Iraq 'Ajam to fight the last Seljuqid Sultan, Tughrīl II. This expedition was defeated and he was taken prisoner. Thus he held this office for about six months only. He was kept in captivity for a while and then he was set free. He returned to Baghdad where the Caliph assigned to him the treasury (al-Makhzan) and for a time he became Na'ib Wazīr (for several months) and then he was appointed Ustādh al-Dār. The last blow came to Ibn Yūnus at the hand of Ibn al-Qaṣṣāb in 590/1194 on the charge of being responsible for the defeat of the Caliphate army in 584/1188. Ibn Yūnus, however, died in prison in 593/1196-7.9

lbn al-Athir, XI, p. 372; cf. Ibn Kathir, XII, p. 328.

²See Chapter II, pp./06ff.

³⁰n this expedition see Kafesoglu, pp. 111-2; and above, Chapter I, pp. 45-6

⁴ Al-Kaziruni, fol. 89.

⁵Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, pp. 435-6; according to Nekhjavani, Ibn Yunus was kept in captivity several months. See <u>Tajarib al-Salaf</u>, p. 329.

⁶ Al-Kaziruni, fol. 89.

⁷Abu Shama, p. 12; Nekhjavani, p. 329.

⁸Abu Shama, p. 12; Ibn al-Imad, IV, p. 314.

⁹Ibid.; see also Nekhjavani, p. 329; Ibn Taghrī-Bardi, VI, p. 142.

When Ibn Yunus was captured in 'Iraq 'Ajam the Caliph assigned the office of deputy Wazir to the chief judge, Abu Talib 'Ali ibn 'Ali ibn Hibat Allah ibn Muhammad al-Bukhari; the latter held this office several months only and then was dismissed.²

Ibn Hadida.

Then the Caliph appointed Abu 'l-Ma'aly Said ibn 'Ali ibn

Abmad ibn Hadida as a full Wazir and invested him with the full in
vestiture of the Wazirate in 584/1188-9. According to Sibt this in
vestment consisted of: a shirt, a robe, and dark blue turban - made

of linen and embroidered with gold - and given a sword, and then

offered a special horse - mare - from the Caliph's stable.

Ibn Hadida was a rich man and one of the notables of Baghdad.⁴
He held this office for about one year,⁵ and it seems that his role
was not significant.

Although he was quite sympathetic towards the Shi'a, and even when he died (died in 610/1213-4) he was buried in Mashhad 'Ali, 6 nevertheless, it seems that his close relations with the Hanbalite

Ibn al-'Imad, IV, pp. 314-5.

² Al-Kaziruni, fol. 89.

³Sibt, p. 371; cited in Abu Shama, p. 85.

⁴Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 436.

⁵ Al-Kaziruni, fol. 89.

⁶Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 436; Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 198.

Shaykh, Ibn al-Jawzi, was the cause of Ibn Mahdi al-'Alawi, then the Naqib of the 'Alids, to slander him before the Caliph and to cause his deposition. When he was deposed he was fined a large sum of money. The enmity of Ibn Mahdi did not stop at this point, but when he became Wazir in 602/1205-6 he imprisoned Ibn Hadida, but the latter was able to flee and to take refuge in Adharbayjan. He stayed there until the deposition of Ibn Mahdi, which occurred in 604/1207-8, and then he was able to return to Baghdad, where he lived for the rest of his life.

Ibn al-Qassab.

Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn 'Alī ibn al-Qassab. In Ramadan 584/Oct.-Nov. 1188 he was appointed in charge of <u>Diwan al-Insha</u> and, after a while, he was given charge of all the other government departments (<u>Diwans</u>) and called Na ib Wazīr. He was promoted to complete Wazīr in Rajab 590/Jun.-July 1194 and the Caliph bestowed on him the vestments of Wazīrate. Ibn al-Qassab came from a poor family and his father was a butcher in Baghdad, but his talent and ability as a scribe and his knowledge in clerkmanship enabled him to attract the

Sibt, p. 371; Abu Shama, p. 85.

²Sibt, p. 342 and pp. 371-2; Abu Shama, p. 85.

Dhahabi, al-Mukhtasar..., the appendix p. 29; see also Sibt, p. 289; and Abu Shama, p. 9.

⁴Dhahabi, op.cit., p. 29; cf. Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 70.

attention of the government, and subsequently entered the service of the government.

Apart from his role in oppressing Ibn Yunus and his Hanbalite followers. his achievement as Na'ib Wazir and Wazir in Baghdad was not significant; but his reputation rested on his military qualities and achievements. He emerged as an able general and a gifted leader. The Caliph, for his part, took advantage of this and assigned to him the leadership of his army, and deputed him to lead several expeditions to Khuzistan and into 'Iraq 'Ajam. Ibn al-Qassab was able to conquer Khuzistan and to restore it to the 'Abbasid Caliphate; and he was able to conquer a large part of 'Iraq 'Ajam, but only for a short period. 4 However, his sudden death on 4 Sha'ban in 592/3 July 1196 near Hamadan⁵ was a great loss to his expedition, which intended to conquer Persia, and to the Caliphate, for it deprived al-Nasir of the service of a great general. Ibn al-Najjar, the contemporary historian, made the following obituary note on the death of this Wazir: "If the life of Ibn al-Qassab had been lengthened, he might have possessed (conquered) Khurasan."6

lbn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 437; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 12.

²See Chapter II. above, pp. 107-8.

³Sibt, p. 289; Abu Shama, p. 9.

For further details on these military operations see above pp. 50 H.; and see also Kafesoglu pp. 126 ff.

⁵Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 81; <u>Dhahabi, op.cit.</u>, appendix p. 30 and text, p. 96; cf. Sibt, p. 289; Abu <u>Shama</u>, p. 9; Ibn Taghri Bardi, VI, p. 139; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 12; and al-Kaziruni, fol. 89.

Dhahabi, al-Mukhtasar..., appendix p. 31.

Ibn al-Bukhari.

After the death of Ibn al-Qassab, al-Nasir appointed the chief judge, Ibn al-Bukhari - for the second time - as Na'ib Wazir; the latter occupied this office for two years, until his death, which occurred in 593/1196-7.

Ibn al-Nagid.

Then al-Nasir assigned the office of Na'ib Wazir to his treasurer (Sahib al-Makhzan), Abu 11-Qasim al-Hasan ibn al-Naqid, in 594/1197-8.

Ibn al-Naqid occupied this office until Safar of the year 597/Nov.-Dec. 1200. Although he was just acting Wazir, nevertheless he was given the right to supervise all the Diwans of the state plus his original post as treasurer. He was given a free hand to manage this office and, subsequently, he dismissed many officials and appointed others in their place; he also invested al-Qasim ibn al-Shahrazuri with the office of chief judge. However, this is the first Na'ib Wazir who exercised the semi-Wazir jurisdiction in appointing and dismissing the high officials of the state. According to Sibt this official was of a bad character, a tyrant and very corrupt. He died on 9 Ramaqan 604/28 Mar. 1208.

lal-Kaziruni, fol. 89.

² Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 15.

³Ibm al-Sa'i, pp. 250-51.

⁴Sibt, pp. 349-50; cited by Abu Shama, p. 62.

⁵Ibm al-Sa*I. p. 251.

Ibn Mahdi.

Abu 'l-Hasan Nasir ibn Mahdī ibn Hamza al-'Alawī. He was originally from Ray, came to Baghdad with the Wazīr Ibn al-Qassab after the latter had conquered al-Ray (in 590-591/1194-5). On his arrival he was appointed Naqīb of the 'Alīds in Baghdad. On 19 Safar 597/29 Nov. 1200 he was appointed as Na'ib Wazīr. Then he was honoured by the vestment and title of Wazīr on 8 Dhu 'l-Hijja 602/16 July. 1206.4

However it seems that this Wazīr exercised wide authority, which enabled him to install his son, Rukn al-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allah Muḥammad, as Sadr al-Makhzan - in charge of the treasury. He was deposed from office on 12⁶ or 22⁷ Jumada II in 604/3 or 13 Jan. 1208, after his son was expelled a day earlier. 8

Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 72-3; and p. 81.

² Abu Shama, p. 85; Sibt, p. 371.

³Ibm al-Sa'i, p. 44; Sibt, p. 307; however ibm al-Athir puts his appointment as Na'ib Wazir in 592/1195-6 (al-Kamil, XII, p. 81) which is a mistake.

⁴Ibn al-Sa'I, pp. 168-9; Sibt, p. 342; Abu Shama, pp. 52-3; Dhahabi, XVIII, fol. 215. See above, p. 180 for the titles offered to him by al-Naşir.

⁵Ibn al-Sa·I, pp. 143-4;

^{6&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 220-21.

⁷Ibm al-Athir, XII, p. 182.

⁸Ibm al-Sa'I, p. 220.

Although Ibn al-Athir and Sibt give a variety of reasons for his deposition, nevertheless it seems that he was expelled either for his increasing power, or as a result of the reaction of the Sunni people against the 'Alid Wazir.

According to Ibn al-AthIr the WazIr was expelled because he illtreated the AmIrs of the Caliph, an act which resulted in the departure
of some of those AmIrs from Baghdad, such as Qush-Temur, who had left
for Kurrestan (in Fars), and Wajh al-Sabu, the AmIr of the Haj caravan,
who had departed the caravan on his way back in 603/1206-7 to Syria.
Wajh al-Sabu, wrote a letter to the Caliph explaining his departure from
the service of the Caliph due to, "Ibn MahdI does not want to leave any
Mamluk to the Caliph, and no doubt he wants the Caliphate for himself".
Sibt confirms the emmity of the WazIr with the AmIrs of Baghdad in his
story of the death of AmIr Tutmush at the hand of Ibn Sawa, the Christian.

About his claim to the Caliphate, Sibt listed it as one of the reasons for his deposition. He says.

"Al-Makin al-Qummi, the scribe of <u>Diwan al-Insha'</u>, slandered the Wazir before the Caliph and told him that the Wazir was covetous of the Caliphate, and

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 170.

Ibid., pp. 182-3; for the departure of this Amir see also: Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 192; Sibt, p. 344; Abu Shama, p. 55; and ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, pp. 191-2; where all of them recorded that Wajh al-Sabu left the service of the Caliph for fear of the Wazir.

³Sibt, pp. 348-9; see Chapter III, above, p. 169-70.

that the Wazir used to say 'I am 'Alawi, and we /the 'Alids' have more right in the Caliphate /than anybody else/.' And that the Wazir was sending money in date boxes to al-'Ajam (Iran, probably he means al-Ray, the native town of Ibn Mahdi), and asking the people there to recruit an army and to set up a King, in order to come to Baghdad to conquer it."

The story of sending money to Persia is mentioned with more detail by Abu 'l-Fada'il al-Hamawi, who says,

"The motive of the Caliph to expel his Wazir Nasir alDin al-'Alawi, was that this Wazir sent 300 mound-loads
carrying boxes of dates, in which he hid 1000 Dinars in
every load. When this caravan had reached a certain
post, one of the Caliph's officials of that district
asked for some dates to eat, but the guards of this
caravan would not allow him to have anything. He insisted on that and, by force, took two loads and opened
one of the boxes and distributed the dates among his followers. When he had done so he found the gold. He
opened another box and he also found the same amount
/of money in it. He, therefore, confiscated all the
loads, and sent to the Caliph telling him what he had
found. For this reason the Caliph expelled the Wazir
and put him, with all his sons, in custody..."2

However, it seems that the deposition of this Wazir was an outcome of the discontent of the Sunni people of Baghdad, who expressed
their resentment of the rule of this Wazir by composing poems and,
probably, by spreading rumours, such as the dates story and his claims
to the Caliphate. According to Sibt, "When the fame and influence of
the Wazir became very high, the people of Baghdad satirized him, and

Sibt, pp. 348-9; Abu Shama, p. 60.

²Al-Ta'rikh al-Mansuri, fols. 132b-133a.

composed poems to this affect and sent them to the Caliph." Itm al-Athir gives one example of those poems: in it the poet warns the Caliph from his Wazir and his claims to the Caliphate. Abu Shama records a very curious anti-Shī'ite poem in which the poet clearly praises Yazid ibn Mu'awiya (the accursed one to the Shī'a) and describes him as a very powerfulman and able to remove all his enemies with ease. If this poem, as Abu Shama says, was truly written and sent to the Caliph, it reveals that the Sunnī discontent reached its peak during the Wazirate of Ibn Mahdī. Thus al-Naşir, under this pressure, found himself in a very critical position; he, therefore, took a positive step to abolish this discontent by removing the figure who had become the main goal - and cause - of this discontent. Ibn al-Tiqtaqa says, "The Caliph, against his own will, arrested Ibn Mahdī, for reasons demanded this". Moreover, the Caliph

Sibt, p. 348; cited by Abu Shama, p. 60. On the deposition of this Wazir see Ibn 'Utba (or 'Unba), 'Umdat al-Talib fi Ansab Al Abi Talib, ed. Nijaf (1961), pp. 77-8; where this 'Alid author relates the following inaccurate story: he says that al-Nasir expelled his Wazir as a result of a threat sent to him by Saladin (sic); the latter asked the Caliph to dismiss his Wazir otherwise he would set up another Caliph, because ibn Mahdi did not pay his respect to Saladin.

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 183; see also Abu Shama, p. 60.

³ Abu Shama, p. 60.

⁴Al-Fakhrī, p. 439.

part wherever he wished, but Ibn Mahdi preferred to be kept under arrest because, "in order not to make his enemies able to kill him".
This good treatment lasted till the death of Ibn Mahdi, which occurred in 617/1220-21, and even after his death the Caliph ordered the Mosque of the Palace to be opened for praying for him, and all the notables of the state attended the procession of his burial.
2

Ibn Amsina.

After the deposition of Ibn Mahdi, al-Naşir assigned the office of Deputy Wazirate to Sadr Diwan al-Zimam (in charge of Diwan al-Kharaj), Fakhr al-Din Abu 'l-Badr Muḥammad ibn Amsina, on 12 Jumada II 604/3 Jan. 1208. Although Ibn al-Athir remarks that this official was not in full control of his office, yet it seems that ibn Amsina exercised his duty well within the jurisdiction of his office, by receiving the ambassadors of the Ayyubids and the Khwarizm-Shah, as well as bestowing on them the vestments offered to them by the Caliph.

Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 183.

Tbid., p. 261; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 439; Abu Shama, p. 124; but Abu 1-Fada il al-Hamawi (fel. 143a) puts the death of this Wazir in 619/1222-3.

³Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 221.

⁴A1-Kamil, XII, p. 183.

⁵¹bn al-Sa'i, pp. 259-60, and p. 262.

Furthermore on 6 Ramadan 605/14 Mar. 1209 he was commissioned to inspect Khuzistan and investigate the rumours about the intentions of its governor to revolt against the central authority of the Caliphate. 1 Ibn Amsīna was deposed on 10 Rabī I 606/12 Sept. 1209 and detained in prison. 2

Al-Qummi.

After Ibn Amsina, al-Naşir assigned the office of Na'ib Wazir to the scribe of <u>Diwan al-Insha'</u>, Makin al-Din Abu 'l-Hasan Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Qummi on 12 Rabi' II 606/14 Oct. 1209. He was granted the title of "Mu'ayyid al-Din". According to Ibn al-Dubaithi, the contemporary chronicler, al-Qummi was appointed as Na'ib <u>Diwan al-Majlis</u> (synonym of Na'ib Wazir - see above p. 176), and was given charge of all the affairs of the central <u>Diwan</u>. Al-Qummi was the last Na'ib Wazir appointed by al-Naşir, for he held this office until 629/1232; in other words he stayed as Na'ib Wazir for 23 years and witnessed the reign of three Caliphs: al-Naşir, al-Zahir and al-Mustanṣīr. Throughout the long reign of al-Naşir many Wazīrs and

Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 265.

²Ibid., p. 285; see also Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 189; cf. al-Kaziruni, fol. 89.

³Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 286-7; al-Kaziruni, fel. 89; cf. Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 189-90.

⁴The appendix of M. Jawad to the Dhahabi's al-Mukhtasar..., p. 32.

Abu al-Fada'il al-Hamawi, fol. 143a. Although Ibn al-Sa'i, Ibn al-Athir, and Ibn al-Dubaithi (see above n.3 and n.4) describe al-Qummi as Na'ib Wazir, yet Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, alone, describes him as Wazir, see al-Fakhri, pp. 205 ff. and 439 ff.

Na'ib Wazirs came to power, but only few of them played a real role in the affairs of the state; their main function was simply to execute the orders of the Caliph. Perhaps this decline of this institution was brought about deliberately by al-Nasir himself in order to keep the upper hand in fulfilling his ambitions, without having any strong person sharing this power with him. This attitude of the Caliph, probably, resulted from his earlier experience with Ibn al-Sahib.

But with the appointment of al-Qummi it seems that this attitude of al-Naşir changed and, now, he tried to restore the dignity and prestige of this office for, on the occasion of this appointment, the Caliph issued the following decree to be recited to the dignitaries and notables who gathered in the <u>Diwan</u>,

"In the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful, Muhammad ibn Buraz al-Qummi is our representative (Na'ib) in the lands and over the people. Whoso-ever obeys him obeys us. Whosoever obeys us obeys God. Whosoever obeys God, He will cause him to enter Paradise. Whosoever disobeys him, disobeys us. Whosoever disobeys us, disobeys God. Whosoever disobeys God. Whosoever disobeys God. Whosoever disobeys God. He will cause him to enter Hell."

Thus, according to ibn al-Tiqtaqa, by this decree al-Qummi was ennobled in the eyes of the people and his position was strengthened.

See Chapter II above, pp. 103-5.

²Al-FakhrI, pp. 205-6, (English tr. p. 146).

Al-Qummi played an important role in subduing the rebel governor of Khuzistan in 607/1210-11 by leading a strong army to this province.

However, it seems that this Na'ib Wazir was able to revive the prestige of his office; he became angry because the chief judge appointed a judge to Wasit without his consent and subsequently ordered his dismissal. This event, clearly, shows that al-Qummi was outraged because the chief judge overlooked consulting him in this appointment.

In 628/1230-31 he ordered a special window to be constructed in the Wazirate House for him to review the troops at the feast of Ramadan.³

This power and influence, however, aroused the alarm of al-Mustansir who, therefore, planned his overthrow. The Caliph commissioned the two strong personalities in his court to arrange the removal of al-Qummi from office; the first one was Ustadh al-Dar Ibn al-Naqid, and the second was the supervisor of Diwan al-Tashrifat Ibn al-'Alqami. These two planned the plot carefully and, on 17 Shawwal 629/6 Aug. 1232, they executed it; they captured al-Qummi with all his sons and followers. This elaborate plan which was adopted to remove him indicates his power and influence.

See Chapter I above, p. 83.

²Ibn al-Fuwațī, p. 32.

³ Ibid., p. 24.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 33-4; ibm Kathir, XIII, p. 132; see also <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fol. 241b; al-Kazirumi, fol. 93a.

On this occasion the poets composed poems, and the example which is recorded by Ibn al-Fuwați compares this incident to that of Abu Muslim al-Khorasani; at the same time the poet requested the Caliph to kill the deposed Na'ib Wazir in order to remove any harm that might be caused by him.

The two officials who were involved in this plot were rewarded for their service: Ibn al-Naqid was appointed Na'ib Wazīr, and Ibn al-Alqamī was appointed as Ustadh al-Dar.

As for the beliefs of al-Qummi, it is not clear whether he was Shi'ite or not, for Ibn al-'Imad describes him as a Shi'ite and, on the other hand, the Shi'ite Ibn al-Tiqtaqa showers on him the highest praises and esteemed him highly; no doubt this attitude of Ibn al-Tiqtaqa was due either to the fact that this Na'ib Wazir was sympathetic towards the 'Alīds, or because he was of Shi'ite beliefs.

¹Ibn al-Fuwați, pp. 35-6.

² Ibid., pp. 34-5; Ibn Kathir, XIII, p.132.

³Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 35; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 241b.

⁴Shadharat, V, p. 43.

⁵Al-Fakhri, pp. 439 ff.

^{6&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 443.

Ahmad ibn al-Naqid.

In the very day of the deposition of al-Qummi (17 Shawwal 629/ 6 Aug. 1232) al-Mustansir promoted the Ustadh al-Dar, Shams al-Din Abu 'l-Azhar Ahmad ibn al-Naqid, to the position of Na'ib Wazir, with the privilege of being called by the titles of the Wazir Ibn Mahdi. which include, of course, the title of Wazir. However this indicates that by this time the distinctions between Wazir and Na'ib Wazir were abolished. Furthermore, Ibn al-Fuwati contradicts himself in dealing with the title of this official. When ibn al-Nagid was appointed, he mentions that he was appointed Na'ib Wazīr, 2 and confirms this when he mentions the biography of al-Mustansir by saying, "He (the Caliph) did not appoint a Wazir during his Caliphate, but he kept al-Qummi in the Deputy /Niabat Wazirate until he dismissed him, then he deputed Naşir al-Din Abu !1-Azhar Ahmad ibn al-Naqid /who was/ promoted from Ustadh al-Dar, until the end of his (the Caliph's) life".3 Then he describes Ibn al-Naqid as Wazir in the biography of this official.4

Ibn al-Naqid came from a rich family, and one of his uncles served al-Naşir as Na'ib Wazir (between 594-597A M, see above p. 188)

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 34-5; also mentioned as Na'ib Wazir by al-Kaziruni, fol. 93a; and by Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 241; but he was mentioned by the title of Wazir by: Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 132; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 446 ff; and by Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, IV, p. 41. See above pp. 178-9.

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 34-5.

³ Ibid., p. 156.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 291 ff.

His father was one of the wealthy merchants of Baghdad, who served the court as agent for the endowments of the mother of al-Naşir.

He succeeded his father in holding this post and, in 627/1229-30, al-Mustansir appointed him as Ustadh al-Dar. Then in 629/1232 he was installed as Wazīr (or Nā'ib Wazīr). Although in 634/1236-7 his health deteriorated and he could no longer walk, nevertheless he was kept in office for the rest of his life. He died on 6 Rabī 1642/12 Aug. 1244. He was described as a religious man, pious and very honest. After his death a great honour was done to him by the Caliph in preparing the procession of his burial, where all the notables of the state attended the prayer for him in the Palace Mosque. 2

Ibn al- Algami.

Mu'ayyad al-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn 'Alī al-'Alqamī, the Shī'ite. He was the last Wazīr of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. He played a leading part in the overthrow of the Na'ib Wazīr al-Qummī and, as a result of this he was appointed as Ustadh al-Dar in 629/1232. He held this office till 642/1244 and, when Ibn al-Naqid died, the Caliph al-Musta'sim appointed him as Wazīr on 8 Rabī' I 642/14 Aug. 1244.3

For his biography see Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 291 ff; ibn al-Tiqtaqa, pp. 446 ff. Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 165; Dhahabi, XX, fol. 13; and ibn al-Furat, fols. 47-8.

²Dhahabi, XX, fol. 13b; and ibn al-Furat, fol. 47.

³Ibm Kathir, XIII, p. 164; Dhahabi, XX, fel. 256b; Ibm al-Furat, fel. 46a; cf. Ibm al-Fuwati, pp. 279 ff.

Ibn al-'Alqami is described as a man of letters and very able scribe, his enthusiasm for literature led him to establish a library in the Wazirate House and to patronize many scholars who wrote several works and dedicated them to him.²

The attitude of al-Musta'sim towards this Wazīr was a favourable one, and the Caliph used to send him presents and gifts. Although all historians who mention the biography of Ibn al-'Alqamī state that he was an able Wazīr and a very good scribe, yet all of them, except Ibn al-Fuwatī and Ibn al-Tigtaqa, denounced him in bitterest terms as a betrayer to the Mongols in assisting them to conquer Baghdad and to abolish the 'Abbāsid Caliphate.

Before questioning the authenticity of this allegation, it is appropriate to establish the picture these historians tried to give of Ibn al-'Algami and of his motives and methods behind this treachery.

His motives are: the first was his eagerness to wreak vengeance on the Duwaydar al-Saghir /Young Dawadar/, the strongest Amir in Baghdad, and the eldest son of the Caliph, for what they had committed, on several occasions, of atrocities against the Shi'a people of al-Karkh. The second motive was also his desire to avenge himself on

lbn Kathir, XIII, p. 172; cf. Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 209.

The al-Tiqtaqa, p. 456; cf. E.I./I, s.v. Ibn al-Alkamī (by T. H. Weir).

3Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 457.

⁴Tbn al-Fuwați, pp. 219-20, 249-50, and p. 259.

⁵Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 196; al-Kutubi, II, pp. 189-90; cf. Dhahabi, Duwal al-Islam, II, p. 122. For further details on the sectarian quarrels in Baghdad see Chapter II above, pp. 15/14.

the Dawadar because the Wazir lost all his authority and influence to this Amir.

Concerning his position in Baghdad, it seems that he did not enjoy much power and influence, while the Dawadar became his strong rival and opponent and subsequently held the most powerful position in the state.

The following couplet, ascribed to Ibn al-'Alqami, indicates his weak stand and his powerless position.

(himself)

Wazīr contented with folding sheets (of paper) full of poems and prose, instead of (exercising) his power and influence.

Like the singing of the ringed one, and she is a dove, but she has not an obeyed word or order.2

And he composed the following couplet when Hulagu marched towards
Baghdad:

How could goodness be expected for people, who have lost the prudence in their (affairs) what a loss!

(For) who is obeyed is not wise, and he who has wise judgment is not obeyed.

However the rivalry between the Wazīr and the Dawadar came to boiling point in 653/1255-6, when the Wazīr accused him of making a plot to

Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 449.

²Dhahabī, XX, fol. 164a; and al-Kutubī, II, p. 189.

³Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 322.

install the eldest son of the Caliph in his place. The Dawadar, on hearing this slander, was outraged and collected his troops around himself to fight the Wazīr. The Wazīr for his part, did the same.

The clash between them was avoided by the mediation of the Caliph, who took great pains to settle this dispute. Furthermore the great anxiety shown by the Caliph towards the anger of the Dawadar and then the great courtesy and honour showered upon him after the settlement of the dispute, indicate clearly the influence and power of this Amir.

This state of affairs gave the impression to al-Dhahabī that this loss of power was one of the motives for Ibn al-Alqamī to invite the Mongel to conquer Baghdad.

The last motive is that he wanted to transfer the Caliphate to the 'Alīds after abolishing the 'Abbasid Caliphate.'

Concerning the methods he followed to fulfil his ambition, some historians mentioned the following. Firstly, by sending letters and dispatches to Hulagu, encouraging him to march on Baghdad. According to al-Maqrizi, as early as 654/1256-7 the Mongol spies came to

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 294 ff.

Ta'rikh al-Islam, XX, fol. 164a.

³ Ibid., fol. 213a; see also ibn Taghri-Bardi, VII, p. 47. However, according to al-Yunini, this Wazir intended to set up a Fatimid (sic) Caliph, see <u>Dhayl Mir'at al-Zaman</u>, I, p. 90; and ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 202.

Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 202; Dhahabi, XX, fol. 163; Ibn Daqmaq, Kitab al-Jawhar al-Thamin, p. 69; ibn al-'Amid, fol. 261; Tabaqat Nasiri, English tr. II, p. 1232.

Baghdad and made contact with Ibn al-'Alqami, and they tried to seduce some of the Amirs of the Caliphate to side with them.

Al-Kutubi recorded the following fantastic story how the Wazir, for once, could forward his dispatch to Hulagu by:

"He (the Wazīr) took a man and shaved his head very close, and he wrote (on the scalp) what he wanted by needles and put on the writing antimony (i.e. tattooing the head of the man with writing). He kept the man until his hair had grown and covered the writing. Then he sent him to Hulagu...etc."2

The second method he followed to enable the Mongol to conquer Baghdad was that of reducing the number of the Caliphate troops. In short, this is the picture of the alleged treachery of Ibn al-'Alqami, as it was recorded by several historians.

Before, however, passing judgment on all these allegations, one must admit that this allegation was mentioned in contemporary sources, such as Abū Shāma, and Tabaqāt-i-Naṣirī and, if their statements are to be dismissed it is because these two historians were extreme Sunnis and might have had some religious motives for fabricating this accusation.

Suluk, I/I, p. 400.

² Fawat al-Wafayat, II, p. 190. See also Subki, V, pp. 110.

³Tabaqat-i-Nasiri, II, p. 1232; see also ibn Taghri-Bardi, VII, p. 48; see also al-Subki, V, p. 110; ibn Habib, Durat al-Aslak fi Dawlat al-Atrak, II, fel. 16a.

^{4&}lt;u>Dhayl</u>, p. 199.

Minhaj-i-Siraj of Juzjan (p. 1232) completed his history in 1260, see E. G. Browne, A Lit. His. of Persia, II, p. 470.

But this accusation also appeared in a neutral chronicle, neither Sunni showering Ibm al-'Alqami with his curses, nor a Shi'ite trying to exonerate him, like Ibm al-Tiqtaqa, but a Christian historian, Ibm al-'Amid, whose sentiment is supposed to be pro-Mongol, or, at least, because he wrote his chronicle in Arabic and in Egypt, he could drop the whole matter all together, if this allegation was not well established then, like Bar-Hebraeus, who did not report anything concerning the treachery of this Wazir.

Ibn al- Amid says,

"And the reason (for Hulagu to conquer Baghdad) is that the Caliph al-Musta'sim Bi-llah ordered the pillage of al-Karkh, and all of it (its inhabitants) were the Shi'a of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib; the common people pillaged it and took all their properties, riches with their women, and their children, and even they sold their daughters. And this atrocity was too much for the Wazir, whose inclination is that with the 'Alids, to bear /therefore/he wrote to Hulawwon (sic. i.e. Hulagu) to come to Baghdad and to possess it; and this is a famous matter."

Although one is not in a position to dismiss or confirm all these historians, yet many questions arise concerning this matter. If Ibn al-'Alqami was an innocent man, why did these historians, bluntly, record this accusation? Did they record the rumours spread among the people only? If so, why did these people accuse him? Did they accuse

¹ Al-Fakhri, pp. 457-8.

²Ibn al- Amid, fol. 261b, ed. L. Cahen, <u>B.E.O.</u> XV, 1955-7, p. 167.

him because he was a Shi ite? Or did they do so because the Orthodox 'Abbasid Caliphate was abolished during the term of his office? And thus he was a bad omen on it! Or just these historians, or people, as their custom was to find a person responsible for every mishap, found Ibn al-'Alqami and let him be the scapegoat, and let everybody shower him with curses!

Or just because he was spared by the Mongol and kept in office under their rule, as well as his house, with those who took refuge in it spared from any harm gave the impression to the common people that the Wazir must have been a betrayer to them. However, on the other hand, the houses of Sahib al-Diwan, ibn al-Damghani, and Hajib al-Bab, ibn al-Dawami were also spared by the Mongols, but no one accused these two high officials of any treachery.

However, it seems very likely that this charge was made against him prior to the fall of Baghdad by his opponents at court, especially by the Dawadar. For the Wazir was against the idea of fighting the Mongols; instead he had offered the council to the Caliph to satisfy the Mongols by bribing them to keep out of Baghdad by presents and valuable gifts, instead of preparing the army. When the Caliph tried to fulfil this advice, the Dawadar and others restrained him from doing

Ibn al-Fuwați, pp. 329-30.

²Ibid., p. 330.

so and pointed out to him, "The purpose of the Wazīr is to arrange his own affairs with the Sultan (Hulagu)". As a result of this the Caliph dropped the advice of his Wazīr. This statement, however, indicates this allegation. The Wazīr, no doubt, offered this advice because he was quite aware of the weak stand of the Caliphate, and its incapability to defend itself by force against the mighty power of the Mongol. Ibn al-Ţiqṭaqawarmly defends him against this charge and puts the following reasons for Hulagu's sparing him:

"The people accused him of conspiracy, but that was incorrect. And one of the strongest proofs that he was no conspirator is his secure position in this Empire, for when the Sultan Hulagu conquered Baghdad and put the Caliph to death, he entrusted the town to the Wazir, treated him well and gave him authority. Had he conspired against the Caliph he would not have been trusted."

He says also that when Ibn al-'Alqami went to Hulagu to negotiate the terms of surrender, the Sultan was impressed by his appearance and address and, as a result of the recommendation of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, the Shi'ite Wazir of Hulagu, the latter took him into his favour and when the town was conquered it was put under his management with a Mongol Shihna.

Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 319; Ibn al-'Ibri Mukhtasar, pp. 471-2; see also ibn Kathir, p. 200.

²<u>Al-Fakhrī</u>, p. 457 (English tr. p. 325); cf. E. G. Browne, op.cit., II. p. 464.

³Al-Fakhri, p. 458. For further details on the role of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in saving his co-religionist, ibn al-Alqami, see E.G. Browne, op.cit., pp. 464-5.

However, it seems very likely that Hulagu kept the Wazir with the rest of the civil staff in charge of the administration of 'Iraq because there is no doubt that the Mongol were in need of their experience and knowledge in everything concerning this country. But, on the other hand, Hulagu ordered the execution of the Caliph with his household as well as all the Amirs of the Caliphate.²

If Ibn al-'Alqami was guilty, then to what extent did his requests and letters to the Mongol participate in the actual surrender of Baghdad?

His part, however, was very little, for the Mongel had tested the strength of the Caliphate on several occasions. For over twenty years they repeated their raids on the frontiers of Iraq and, even, penetrated many times into it and reached the outskirts of Baghdad without facing serious opposition. Therefore, even if Ibn al-'Alqami wrote to them about the weakness of the Caliphate, they had tested it practically. Furthermore, when Hulagu made his final arrangement and marched on Baghdad, he marched with a huge army, which indicates his belief that he would meet great resistance in 'Iraq.

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 331-3.

²Ibid., pp. 327 ff.

³See above pp. 89 H.

⁴Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 325.

About the dismissing of the troops, it seems that the decline of the finance of the state made it necessary to reduce their number.

Moreover, some historians accused the Caliph himself of reducing the number of the troops, and not the Wazīr.

Finally, although one is not in a position to dismiss all the statements of the historians who recorded the treachery of Ibn al'Alqami, yet, as Browne observes, "the matter is doubtful, and will, in all probability, never now be certainly cleared up".

See below pp. 120-122.

²Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 320-21; Abu 'l-Fidā, III, p. 202; cf. <u>Dhahabī</u>, XX, fol. 211a.

³A Literary History of Persia, II, p. 465.

Chapter V

THE FINANCE OF THE CALIPHATE

I

The Revenue

By the middle of the 12th century, when the 'Abbasid Caliphate had finally liberated itself from the Seljuq domination, the Caliphate controlled Baghdad with the southern part of 'Iraq. By his active policy al-Nasir was able to extend his small territory northwards to Takrīt, north eastwards by conquering Daquq and westwards to Hadīthat 'Ana. Lastly Khūzistan was restored to the Caliphate. These territories were the full extent of the Caliphate during al-Nasir's reign. In 630/1233 Irbil was also annexed to the 'Abbasid principality. No doubt with this small dominion the revenue of the Caliphate was limited also.

The Kharaj, however, constituted the bulk of the revenue of the state, with some other resources such as: Mukus, poll-tax of the non-Muslim communities living under the Caliphate and escheated properties.3

See above, Chapter I, pp. 42,51.

^{2&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 88-9.

³See below, "Financial administration", pp. 123//.

It seems that the Caliph al-Nasir in his policy of strengthening his Caliphate and creating an aggressive power out of it, followed
a certain financial policy to provide him with the amount of money
necessary to carry out all his ambitions. There was no solution but
to increase the taxes imposed on his subjects. This method was, in
fact, the only one available then to increase the revenue of the state.

Although there is not any clear idea concerning the government's agricultural policy, yet Hamd Allah Mustawfi of Qazwin mentioned the following concerning al-Nasir, "in matters connected with agriculture and farming, (things) had reached such a pitch that it was forbidden any more to slaughter cattle". This was to increase the production, no doubt.

However it seems that agriculture was quite flourishing, and the irrigation system was that of the early 'Abbasid period, except that some of the canals had been destroyed earlier, such as the Nahrawan canal; but most of the other canals were still in existence, such as Nahr 'Isa, Nahr al-Malik, Nahr Şarşar and Nahr Kutha, all of which took their water from the Euphrates and flowed into the Tigris southwards of Baghdad, irrigating the central part of 'Iraq. There

The geographical part of the Nuzhat al-Qulub, English tr. by G. le Strange, p. 36.

Yaqut, Mu'jam al-Buldan, IV, pp. 846-7.

were some other canals which took their course from the Tigris river.

The traveller Ibn Jubair, who visited 'Iraq in 580/1184 describes in detail the central province between Kufa, Hilla and Baghdad, and how this province was crowded with villages and canals, and that its agriculture was prosperous.

2

Although no one mentioned the percentage of the Kharaj, yet it seems that during al-Nasir's reign this tax was high, for Ibn al-Athir remarks that the village of Ba'quba used to yield, in the old days, about 10,000 Dinars, but when al-Nasir came to power it was usual to collect from it 80,000 Dinars yearly. Although one may suspect the validity of this statement of Ibn al-Athir, because this historian was quite prejudiced against al-Nasir, yet this information is supported by Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid, the Baghdadi and the pro-'Abbasid writer, who says,

"I heard that Abu Muhammad ibn Khulaid who was the controller (Sahib) of Diwan al-Kharaj in the days of al-Nasir li-Din Allah says to any who inquired from him, 'It was said about you that Wasit and Basra were destroyed because of the harshness committed against their inhabitants to obtain money (from them)'. Then Abu Muhammad said, 'As long as this river (referring to the Tigris) stays as it is and the palm-trees still planted, Wasit and Basra can not be destroyed'."4

For further detail on the irrigation system see Ja far Khasbak, "Ahwal al-Iraq al-Iqtisadiyya", B.C.A. IV, 1961, pp. 117 ff.

²Ibm Jubair, pp. 214 ff.

³Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 287; see also Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 107; Dhahabi, XIX, fol. 34.

⁴Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, IV, p. 136.

Furthermore Ibn 'Utba (or 'Unba) recorded the following interesting story of how the Wazīr Ibn Mahdī farmed out Qusān - a dependancy of Wāsiṭ - to Jalal al-Dīn, the Naqīb of the 'Alīds in Baghdād and how, when the latter refused to accept the contracted sum, because it was several fold higher than the usual yield of this district, the Wazīr obliged him to accept it. Jalāl al-Dīn, therefore, treated the peasants of this district harshly and collected most of their agricultural produce and crops and brought it to Baghdād and stored it there. He requested the Wazīr to close down all the grain stores in order to make the price go up; the Wazīr did so and the Naqīb was able to sell all his crops and collect the 120,000 Dīnārs, the contracted sum, with an extra sum as a profit for himself. From this one may presume that the tax rate (Kharāj) was very high, and that the government used to help the tax farmers to collect as much as possible from the peasantry.

The <u>Kharaj</u>, however, seems to have been collected in kind rather than in cash. Even the treasury was called <u>al-Makhzan</u> which indicates the proportionate increase of presentation in kind rather than in cash.²

Some parts of the Kharaj lands were administered directly by
the central government at Baghdad, and some other districts were farmed
out to Damins (tax farmers) to levy their taxes, in return for a con-

^{1.} Umdat al-Talib, Najaf ed. 1961, pp. 166 ff.

²E.I./II, s.v. Bayt al-Mal (by Cl. Cahen) I, p. 1145/II.

tracted sum of money to be paid to the government. The rest of the <u>Kharaj</u> lands were assigned to military personnel as <u>Iqtā's</u>, as the equivalent of their salary and without any attached condition except for their military service to the state. 2

The government also adopted the following unorthodox method in getting indirect taxes; the Makhzan used a heavier Sanja (= scale of weight) than the ordinary one which was used by the public, in receiving money from the tax-payers; and when the government paid any sum, it used the ordinary Sanja which was less in weight. The gain from this operation yearly was 35,000 Dinars. This practice was abolished by al-Zahir. Although there is no detailed information about the exact revenue of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in this period yet, according to Hamd Allah Mustawfi, "Further, at the time when I myself was at Baghdad in charge of the tax office there, I saw an official copy of the assessment drawn up in the reign of the Caliph Masir, and herein the province of Arabian Traq was set down as yielding above 30 million currency dinars". However, one may suspect the validity of

See below pp. 129-30.

²E.I./II, s.v. Bayt al-Mal (by Cl. Cahen). For further detail on the nature of the Icta of this period see Cl. Cahen, "L'evolution de l'iqta du IX au XIII siecle". Annales E.S.C., 8 (1953) pp. 25 ff; and Ja far Khasbak in B.C.A. IV, 1961, pp. 126 ff.

³Ibm al-Athir, XII, p. 288; cf. Ibm Kathir, XIII, p. 107.

Anuzhat al-Qulub, English tran. by G. le Strange, p. 36; and the same author remarks that the revenue of this province in the year 1335 A.D. amounted to some 3 million dinars only.

this statement, for the figure is incredible, in comparison with earlier figures about the assessment of the revenue of the Sawad.

In the time of 'Umar I the amount of the revenue of the Sawad was 128,000,000 Dirhams, which was equivalent to some 10,666,666 Dinars; while in the list of 'Alī ibn 'Isa of 306/918 the assessment of the Sawad was set down as about 1,500,000 Dinars. And the assessment of the year 358/968 was about 42,000,000 Dirhams, which was equivalent to some 2,800,000 Dinars.

From the following figures of the yield of the provinces of Wasit and Başra, the only figures which are available so far of the assessment of the provinces of the Caliphate, one can judge that the figure of Hamd Allah was rather exaggerated. In Rajab 597/April-May 1201 the Daman of Başra was given to the Amir 'Imad al-Din Tughril for a contracted sum of 115,000 Dinars. And about 592/1195-6 Ibn Ra'is al-Ru'asa' was the Nazir of Wasit and his duty was to provide the government at Baghdad with 30,000 Dinars monthly, that is to say

Yaqut al-Hamawi, Mu'iam al-Buldan, III, p. 178.

The rate of exchange during 'Umar's time 1 Dinar = 12 Dirhams, see A. A. Duri, Ta'rikh al-'Iraq al-Iqtisadi, p.222, n.1.

³Duri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 193-4.

⁴Ibid., pp. 194-5.

The rate of exchange in 358/968 was 1 Dinar = 15 Dirhams, see Duri, p. 222.

⁶Ibn al-Sa·1, pp. 46-7.

⁷ Ibn Khallikan, II, pp. 334-5.

360,000 Dinars annually.

Whether the statement of Hamd Allah is correct or otherwise, al-Nasir pressed hard on his subjects to provide him with a great amount of money to fulfil his policy; and this explains why some of the historians describe him as greedy, a tyrant and of bad character. Even Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, who shows a great admiration for this Caliph, says,

"Al-Nasir's benefactions and foundations exceeded computation. He built soup-kitchens, mosques and Ribats, of which the number passed all limit, yet, despite this, he was parsimonious. His time was spent in organizing the affairs of his kingdom, in appointing and dismissing officials, in levying fines and acquiring wealth. It is said of him that he filled a cistern with gold, and one day saw that there remained something lacking in it to fill it full, so he said, 'May you see me live to fill it', but he died before doing so. It is said that al-Mustansir saw that cistern, and said, 'May you see me live to empty it'."2

However, it seems that this attitude of these historians was the same towards every ruler - or Caliph - who adopted a sound financial policy. This policy of al-Nasir, no doubt, resulted in a certain surplus in the finance of the government; he was able to save a lot of money, which enabled his successor, al-Zahir, to follow an exactly contradictory policy. Al-Zahir followed a pious policy and had some laxity in the matter of assessing the revenue. According to Ibn al-Athir, he adopted the following fiscal measures to bring relief to his subjects.

See Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 286; Ibn al-'Amid, fol. 227b; Dhahabi, XIX, fols. 13-4.

Al-Fakhri, p. 434, (English tr. p.310).

The al-Athir begins his statement by the customary formula that this Caliph abolished the <u>Mukus</u> in all his domains, as well as ordering the old scale of taxation to be returned to, and all the increases, which had been introduced during the reign of his father, to be abolished.

"Ba'quba village used, in the old times, to pay 10,000 dinars, but when al-Nasir li-Din Allah came to power. (he) collected from it 80,000 dinars annually, so its population came (to al-Zahir) with a complaint and mentioned that their properties were taken in order to provide this amount of money. He (the Caliph) ordered the original Kharaj, which is 10,000 dinars, to be levied from it... and of his pious deeds he ordered the exaction of the original Kharaj from the rest of the lands. Many of the people of Iraq came and mentioned that most of the properties, which used to be taxed by the original Kharaj in the old days, are now dried up and denuded, and if the original Kharaj is to be demanded from them, the income of the rest (of the properties) is not enough to provide it. He (therefore) ordered that the Kharaj should be exacted from every good tree (or sound, grove) and that the destroyed one was not to be taxed."

He also ordered that the scale of weight of the treasury (Sanjat al-Makhzan which was used for weighing gold and silver money) should be exactly, in weight, like that of the city - the ordinary one. Thus al-Zahir followed a mild economic policy and a very pious one. However, it seems that the surplus of wealth accumulated during the long

Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 287-8; see also Ibn Kathir, XIII, p. 107; Dhahabi, XIX, fols. 34 ff; cf. Abu 'l-Fida, III, pp. 143-4.

²Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 288; see also above p. 113. For further fiscal reforms ordered by al-Zahir see below pp. 235, 240.

reign of his father, helped him in adopting these fiscal reforms.

Al-Mustansir also adopted the policy of his father, al-Zahir; this is indicated by the praise of the historians for his good and pious character. He was described as a good spender and a very just Caliph. Ibn al-Tiqtqaq describes him thus,

"Al-Mustansir was energetic, most lavish, rivalling the wind in generosity and charity. His gifts and presents were too well known to need mention, and too great to be reckoned. If it were said that there were none among the 'Abbasid Caliphs like him, the sayer would be speaking truly. His are noble monuments, the greatest of which is the Mustansiriyya which is too great to be described, and too well known to need description... His reign was good, in his time the world was at peace, good deeds abounded, and the provinces were populous."2

From a glance at his expenditure, one can presume that this caliph was indeed very generous (within the limited means of his Caliphate).

For instance the establishment of al-Mustansiriyya College, no doubt, cost him a great deal of money. According to al-Dhahabi the endowment (waqf) which was assigned to this college exceeded 138,000 Jaribs of agrarian lands, which was worth about 900,000 dinars, and the income of this endowment exceeded 70,000 dinars yearly. He established

Sibt, p. 424, and pp. 489-90; Ibn al-'Ibrī, Mukhtasar, pp. 424-5;
Abu 'l Fida, III, p. 179; Dhahabī, XIX, fols. 222b ff; Ibn al-Furat,
fol. 21b ff; Ibn Taghri-Bardī, VI, p. 345.

²Al-Fakhri, p. 445 (English trans. p. 317).

³Ibn Hammad, fols. 92 ff.

Ta'rikh al-Islam, XIX, the margins of fols. 243b-244a, which was written in the same hand-writing.

also many other pious foundations such as Ribāts, mosques and inns for the travellers. However, it seems that this pious financial policy of al-Mustansir resulted in peace in Baghdad and the stability of economic life and even the sectarian rivalries were very few and limited during his reign. He spent huge sums of money on his army, no doubt to meet the increasing danger to the Caliphate from the Mongols, and to stop their frequent attacks on his frontiers. His army exceeded, in number, 100,000 troops.

Many rulers of the Muslim world visited Baghdad during his reign and huge sums were lavishly spent on them. In 628/1230-31 Muzaffar al-Din Gökbori came to Baghdad to pay the Caliphhis respects; the Caliph, in his turn, welcomed him well and made many feasts for him and, when Muzaffar al-Din left Baghdad, the Caliph provided him with robes of honour and 50,000 dinars as travel expenses for the journey, and another 10,000 dinars for the expenditure of his courtiers.

Judging from this large expenditure of al-Mustansir, the revenue of the state, at his time, must have been very great, or the surplus of

See Ibn Hammad, fol. 94a; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, p. 445, al-Kaziruni, fol. 92b; ibn Taghri-Bardi, VI, p. 345.

See Chapter II, pp. 148-9.

Dhahabi, Duwal al-Islam, II, p. 111; Ibn al-Furat, fol. 21b; Maqrizi, I/II, pp. 311-2.

See above Chapter I, pp. 92-3.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 22.

his grandfather, al-Nasir, still existed, or at least the economic situation of his Caliphate was quite stable and flourishing; otherwise he could not have afforded all these expenses unless he returned to the oppressive method in collecting extra taxes. However, it seems that he had adopted, partially, the last resolution, for although at his succession he had abolished the Ma'una - the taxation of the production and transactions - he had imposed it again at the middle of his reign, and he had increased the poll-tax alse.

No doubt with this generous policy and attitude the treasury must have suffered a lot and, perhaps, by his death his treasury was empty or even in deficit, which made it quite hard for his successor to follow a clear line of financial policy. During al-Mustaisim's reign the decline occurred clearly in the finance of the government, whether this decline was due to the incapability of this caliph to handle his affairs, as some historians emphasised, or because of the bad intentions of the Shi ite Wazir Ibn al-'Alqamī, no doubt the consequences of this decline were very prejudicial.

See below, pp. 233 4.

²See below, pp. 141-1.

³Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 203; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VII, p. 48; Dhahabi, XX, fol. 211.

⁴See chapter IV, pp. 200 ff.

However, it seems that al-Musta'sim came to power and his treasury was empty; this is clearly indicated by the following incident. In Sha'ban 640/Jan.-Feb. 1243 the Mamluks of his father and grandfather (al-Mamalik al-Zahiriyya wa 'l-Mustansiriyya) demanded an increase in their pay, but the government refused this demand. Therefore these troops rioted and went to the outside of the walls of Baghdad; they continued this mutiny for seven days until the dispute was settled peacefully but without fulfilling the demand of the troops.

As a result of the instability of the government, and the quarrel between the military and civil authorities, the disorders were repeated in Baghdad and affected the economic life of the Caliphate. What worsened the financial position of the government was the repeated climatic crises such as floods and storms. In 641/1243 floods reached Nizamiyya and ruined some quarters. In 645/1247-8 a violent storm took place and caused a lot of harm to agriculture, as well as breaking a lot of palm-trees. In 646/1248-9 Baghdad was flooded, and great destruction happened to many of its quarters. In 651/1253-4

¹ Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 168-70.

See above Chapter II, pp. 151-3.

³Ibn al-Fuwați, pp. 186-7.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 224.

^{5&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 229 ff.

the Tigris river flooded and a large area of agrarian land was destroyed by this flood. In 652/1254-5 another flood took place and caused a lot of harm to agriculture. In 653/1255-6 both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers flooded. The Euphrates caused much harm to 'Ana, Haditha, Hit, Hilla and Kufa, this flood spoiled about 70,000 palm-trees. It was followed by a storm which uprooted 3.000 palm-trees in Kufa alone. The Tigris flooded Baghdad and destroyed about 12,370 houses, and as a result of this flood the rents of houses were doubled and the prices of foodstuffs were increased. In 654/1256-7 Baghdad suffered the worst flood, both the eastern and western parts of the city were covered with water; ships and boats were used as means of communication on the streets of the city. Many offices, public buildings, and houses were destroyed, and prices went up. 4 With these climatic crises and bad weather, no doubt, agriculture must have been affected, and in its turn affected the revenue of the government and limited its Thus with this financial decline the Caliph could not but reduce his expenditure. He, therefore, reduced the number of the troops.

¹ Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 267-8.

²<u>Ibid., p. 273.</u>

³Ibid., p. 277 and p. 303.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 317-9; cf. Sibt, p. 528; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VII, p. 35.

Although some historians ascribe this action to the bad intentions of the Wazīr, Ibn al-'Alqami, and others ascribe it to the Caliph himself and his anxiety to accumulate wealth, yet Ibn Khaldun describes the situation brilliantly by saying,

"The circumstances became difficult to al-Musta'sim, /therefore/ he reduced the number of the troops, and ordered the pay of the rest /of the troops/ to be imposed on the /taxes of/ sold articles, on the markets and on the other /means of/ livelihood. /Thus/ the people were disturbed, and conditions became unbearable, and the disorders increased in Baghdad."3

This state of affairs, undoubtedly, participated noticeably in the economic decline of the country. Therefore the prices of food-stuffs were increased and fluctuated. This instability of the economic life, in fact, resulted in the increase of the disorders in Bagh-dad during the reign of al-Musta sim.

See Chapter IV, pp. 203, 208.

²See Magrizi, Suluk, I/II, p. 412; Ibn Taghri-Bardi, VII, p. 64; al-'Umari, Masalik, XXVII, fol. 129a; cf. Abu 'l-Fida, III, p. 202.

³A1-'Ibar, III, p. 537.

⁴See Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 193-4, 202, 218, 226, 303; see also <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fol. 263a.

⁵Cf. Chapter II, pp. 151-3

Financial Administration

Although the volume of wealth and revenue was decreased by the dismemberment of the 'Abbasid empire, which by now consisted of 'Iraq 'Arab (al-Sawad) and Khuzistan only, the administrative machine still operated and continued to exist on the same scale as in the 10th century. The late 'Abbasid administrative departments (Diwans) were basically related to the early 'Abbasid Diwans, but in this period many changes and developments occurred in this machine. The developments, however, occurred mainly in its terminology rather than in its nature. In spite of the fact that the information about these institutions, of this period, is scarce and lacks detail, nevertheless there are some clues which enable one to form a concise, but quite useful, idea. Below are the departments which mainly dealt with the finance of the state.

Al-Diwan.

The <u>Diwan</u> was the central bureau of the government, which was also called <u>al-Diwan al-'Aziz</u> (the mighty <u>Diwan</u>). It was headed by the Wazir or the acting Wazir (Na'ib Wazir). Al-'Umari specified

Ibn al-Sa i, pp. 17, 24, 35, 41, 42, 43 etc. See also <u>E.I./II</u>, s.v. Diwan (by A.A. Duri).

See above Chapter IV, p. 180; cf. E.I./II, op.cit.

the term al-Diwan al-Aziz thus,

"The Caliph is addressed, in writing, by al-Diwan al-'Aziz... and the reason for addressing (him) by al-Diwan al-'Aziz is the submissiveness (which required not) to address the Caliph himself, but to address the Diwan, which means Diwan al-Insha'."

The same sense is expressed by de Slane, who describes this term thus:

"This term designed (sic) the government of the Khalif of Baghdad, and, in the time of Saladin, it was applied to the Khalif himself."

Since the reign of al-Nasir up to the fall of Baghdad, however, the simple term al-Diwan means the Diwan of the Zimam. Diwan al-Zimam in this period, in fact, lost its identity as a department of control and audit, and took on another function. It replaced Diwan al-Kharaj. For in 606/1209-10 Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn Mas'ud ibn Khulaid was appointed in charge of Diwan al-Zimam al-Ma'mur, as is described by Ibn al-Sa'i; but the same official is described by Ibn Abi al-Hadid, the contemporary writer, as "Sahib Diwan al-Kharaj". Judging from the following examples, one may point out that both the terms al-Diwan

lal-Ta rif bi'llmustalah al-Sharif, p. 5.

The Khallikan, English tr. by de Slane, III, index; see also Dozy, Sup. I, p. 479.

³E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A.A.Duri).

⁴Al-Jami'al-Mukhtasar, p. 287.

Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, IV, p. 136.

and <u>Diwan al-Zimam</u>, in this period, were synonymous, and, perhaps this was done by the historians for reasons of abbreviation. In 603/1206-7 al-Şafi al-Armawi was appointed as Mushrif <u>Diwan al-Zimam</u>, as ibn al-Sai says, but under the year 604/1207-8 the same author mentioned this official by the title of Mushrif al-Diwan al-Aziz.

Ibn al-Fuwați did the same: in 627/1229-30 Fakhr al-Din Ahmad ibn al-Damghani was appointed as Mushrif al-Diwan, 4 in the year 630/1232-3 he mentioned him by the same office, 5 but under the year 631/1233-4 he mentioned the same official as Mushrif Diwan al-Zimam.

Abu 'l-Ma'ali Hibat Allah ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Dawami, who died in 646/1248-9, was appointed as Sahib Diwan to al-Nasir, according to Ibn al-Fuwati, but according to al-Dhahabi this official was appointed as Sadr Diwan al-Zimam.

In 633/1235-6 Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Mukharrami was appointed in charge of Diwan al-Zimam, but the same author (pp. 101, 184, and pp.

Inspector, according to A. A. Duri, "Ishraf replaces the old Zimam." See E.I./II, s.v. Diwan.

²Ibn al-Sa·i, p. 201.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 285.

⁴Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 15.

⁵Ibid., p. 43.

^{6&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 62.

⁷Ibid., p. 227.

⁸ Dhahabi, XX, fel. 64a.

⁹Ibn al-Fuwati, p.82.

196 ff) mentioned this official as Sahib al-Diwan only. Then in p.202 he mentioned the same official as "Sadran bi Diwan al-Zimam" (المديوان الزما) (in charge of Diwan of the Zimam).

This <u>Diwan</u> looked after the assessing of the revenue and the expenditure of the government. This explains why it was a central bureau, which caused some historians to call it <u>al-Diwan</u> only. This naming was, in fact, old because <u>Diwan al-Kharaj</u> during the Umayyad period was usually called <u>al-Diwan</u> to indicate its importance; furthermore, during the Buwayhid period the central bureau for finance was called <u>al-Diwan</u> also. But in the Seljuqid administration the <u>Diwan al-Ziman</u> wa'l-Istifa' was concerned with finance and the keeping of accounts.

The head of this bureau was called "Sahib Diwan al-Zimam", or "Sadr Diwan al-Zimam". This <u>Diwan</u>, as Duri pointed out, had two sections; the main <u>Diwan</u> under its superintendant (Sadr or Sahib), and

See also Uzunçarşili, Osmanli Devleti Taşkilatina Medhal, pp. 7-8;
M. Jawad comments on this <u>Diwan</u> "Katib al-Salla (the clerk of the basket), is a clerk in <u>Diwan al-Zimam</u>, and this <u>Diwan</u> was the head of all the <u>Diwans</u> and called <u>al-Diwan</u> only." Ibn al-Fuwaţi, p. 147, n.1.

²Nasawi, p. 191.

³E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A.A. Duri).

⁴Ibid.

⁵A.K.S.Lambton, Contribution to the study of Seliua Institutions (Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1939), p. 56; Uzunçarşili, op.cit., p. 43 and pp. 45-6; cf. A. Iqbal, Wizarat, p. 31.

⁶Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 98-9.

⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 119.

the other section headed by a Mushrif (supervisor) who supervised the work of this department and the revenue.

The position of the controller of this department was very high, for in 653/1255-6 the people of al-Nil killed their Shihna because he was a tyrant, they had "complained to the Caliph, the Wazir and to the Sahib al-Diwan" but without any response to them, therefore they killed this Shihna. However, Ibn al-Fuwati, in putting these high ranking personages in this sequence, indicates that the office of Sahib al-Diwan came next to that of Wazir.

There was a deputy to the head of this Diwan. The Sadr and Mushrif of this department, sometimes, went to the districts to collect revenues. This department looked after preparing the Haji caravan, as well as clearing the wells of the posts of the Haji route to Hijaz.

Each district of the 'Abbasid principality had such a <u>Diwan</u> in charge of its revenue. Some of these districts were administered

lE.I./II, s.v. Diwan.

²Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 302.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 184.

⁴Ibid., pp. 178-9 and pp. 151-2, cf. p.82.

⁵Ibid., p. 173.

⁶E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A. A. Duri).

directly by Sahib Diwan al-Zimam, and he used to appoint a Nazir and Mushrif to their <u>Diwans</u>. But the important districts, however, it seems, had a certain independence from this <u>Diwan</u> judging from the following examples; and the <u>Diwans</u> of these districts were administered by Sadr.

- 1. The district of Nahr 'Isa, Nahr al-Malik, Hit and al-Anbar; in other words, the district of central 'Iraq westwards of Baghdad. This district, sometimes, was administered by Sadr, who used to have "Diwan Mufrad" (Diwan of the special bureau). 2 Jamal al-Din 'Ali ibn al-Buri was appointed by al-Naşir (after 618/1221-2) as Sadr of this district and he was given a free hand to administer this district without any interference of Diwan al-Zimam. 3
 - In 635/1237-78 the Sadr of the <u>Diwan Mufrad</u> of this district was deposed, and the affairs of this district were returned to Sahib al-Diwan, Fakhr al-Din al-Mubarak ibn al-Mukharrami.
- 2. The district of Wasit had a Diwan which was headed by a Sadr. 5

Cf. E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A. A. Duri); see also Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 285.

Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 63.

³<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 145-6.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 101.

⁵Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 126-7; Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 244.

- 3. Khuzistan, after it had been restored to the Caliphate, usually was administered by a <u>Diwan</u> with a Sadr dealing with its financial affairs.
- 4. After Irbil was acquired in 630/1232-3 its financial affairs were assigned to a Sadr to its <u>Diwan.</u>²

But the rest of the 'Abbasid principality was administered by Nazirs assisted by Mushrifs.3

Ibn al-Sa'i, however, points out clearly that Sadr of Diwan is quite a different thing from Nazir of Diwan. He says, "Abu 'l-Shukur Mahmud ibn Ahmad ibn Sa'ada (died in 600/1203-4)... was Nazir in the districts of Wasit and Sadran () of its Diwan..." 4 Judging from the following example, it seems that the only occupation of the Nazirs was to collect the revenue of their districts. Ibn al-Sa'i says,

"Aflah ibn Aflah (died in 595/1198-9) the Nazir of Qusan (a dependency of Wasit) had the courage and ability to take the wealth (revenues) for himself. He was several times in prison for that, but when he was released and appointed to any post he used to do the same. The Hajib Qaysar said, 'Al-Nasir al-Samiri, the Mushrif of Diwan al-Zimam al-Ma'mur, told me an astonishing story about the above mentioned (man i.e. Aflah), he said, "They (the author-

lIbn al-Sa'i, p. 60; Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 168.

²Ibn al-Fuwați, pp. 71-2, 141-2, 168, 106-7.

³Cf. E.I./II, s.v. Diwan; see Ibn al-Sa'I, pp. 44, 76, 78, 130, 115, 213, 219-20, 260-61, 278, 285...etc.

⁴Ibn al-Sa'I, p. 126.

ity) sent me with him (with Aflah) to Qusan, and by then I was one of the 'Adls in the city of Peace (i.e. Baghdad) in order to evaluate and assess the revenue of this district. As soon as we reached it he oppressed the people there and collected 10,000 Dinars, nothing of it (this sum) was with the clerk or the Mushrif. I said to him, 'What is this money which you have collected? It is not mentioned in the record! He said. This money is for me and for you and for the Mushrif and for the Katib (as well as) for the bribes and for the subsistence of prison.' I said, 'What is the meaning of this talk?' He said, 'This district is farmed out to me by so many thousands of Dinars. I want to (get quickly) for myself ten thousand Dinars; to give you a thousand, and to the Mushrif a thousand and to the scribe a thousand; and to bribe with a thousand and to spend on myself, in prison, another thousand; and (thus) will remain 5,000 Dinars to my family. If I lose, at the end of the year, this ten thousand the case will be easy. If it is more than that (at least) I have already got this amount. "etc.'"1

This statement indicates that this district was farmed out to the Nazir to levy its revenue - Kharaj - in return for a certain amount of money to be paid to the government. Thus in this case, the Nazir acted exactly like a Damin.²

The government, in fact, adopted the method of farming out most of the districts to Damins to levy their taxes. Sometimes, the authority

¹Ibn al-Sa.i, pp. 16-7.

²Cl. Cahen defines the tax-farmer (Damin) thus, "An individual who, often for one or more provinces and for a number of years, pays annually to the state a contracted sum, less than the calculated revenue from the tax, and afterwards undertakes its recovery on his own account, which will, of course, reimburse him with profit."

E.I./II, s.v. Bayt al-Mal, I, p. 1144/II.

³see Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 40, 46-7, cf. p. 22; Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 129.

obliged certain notables to accept a heavy <u>Paman</u> on certain districts. By this method, no doubt, the government could secure a high assessment; but it would result in much abuse, tyranny and oppression on the part of the tax-farmers, and the people would be its victims.

Al-Makhzan (the treasury).

Al-Makhzan or al-Makhzan al-Ma'mur, as it is usually called by Ibn al-Sa'ī, was the treasury, and the main department for keeping all the revenues of the state. The term al-Makhzan, in fact, replaced the term of Bayt al-Mal. Cahen remarks about this bureau, "... the general term of Makhzan appears to have almost replaced, in the administration of the late Caliphate, the term of Bayt al-Mal, the change reflecting, undoubtedly, the proportionate increase of presentation in kind and the diminution of fiscal receipts in hard cash".4

The superintendent of this bureau was called Sadr al-Makhzan. 5

However, it seems that al-Makhzan took over some functions of <u>Diwan al-Makhzan</u> (the <u>Diwan</u> of expenditure which does not exist in this period);

for the expenditure on the pious purposes was carried over from this

Ibn 'Utba (or 'Unba), 'Umdat al-Talib, ed. Najaf 1961, pp. 166-8.

²Al-Jami al-Mukhtasar, pp. 2, 15, 40, 43, 81...etc.

³E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A. A. Duri).

⁴ Ibid., s.v. Bayt al-Mal (by Cl. Cahen), I, p. 1145-/II.

John al-Sa'i, pp. 88, 143, 227-8, 229-30, 250-51, 220, 260; Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 86, 84, 99, 203, 287; but the head of this department was mentioned by the name Sahib al-Makhzan by: Sibt, p. 349; Abu Shama, pp. 62, 120; Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 187, 275; Abu 'l-Fada'il al-Hamawi, fol. 142b. See Uzunçarşili, p. 12.

bureau. It was also responsible for paying the pensions to the retired poor officials of the state. Furthermore the expenditure on public purposes, however, was the direct concern of the head of this department, for when al-Nasir intended to establish the soup-kitchens for the needy people of Baghdad in 604/1207-8 the Sadr of the Makhzan, Qawam al-Din Nasr ibn Nasir, was commissioned to establish these houses, and, no doubt, supervise their function. Moreover, the expenditure on the celebration on the arrival of a great visitor to Baghdad was also provided by this bureau, and also the robes of honour - Khila - which were offered by the Caliph were usually brought from the Makhzan, where there was a tailor to make them.

The position of the Sadr of the Makhzan was very high, for in 573/1177-8 Ibn al-'Attar, who was in charge of al-Makhzan, was appointed as acting Wazīr (Nā'ib Wazīr), and in 594/1197-8 the Sadr of this bureau, Abu 'l-Qasim al-Hasan ibn al-Naqid, was given authority over all Diwans, and called Deputy Wazīr. Furthermore, it seems that the position of

¹Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 18, 289.

² Ibid., p. 43; see also Ibn Khallikan, II, p. 26.

³¹bn al-Sa'I, pp. 229-30.

⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 264.

⁵Ibn al-Fuwaţī, p. 77.

⁶Ibn al-Jawzi, X, p. 233.

⁷Ibid., p. 275.

⁸Ibn al-Sa I, pp. 250-1; see also Chapter IV, p.188; E.I./II, s.v. Diwan.

the Sadr of the Makhzan was very important, and perhaps profitable also, which caused Abu Ja'far Ahmad ibn Ja'far to offer money in order to be appointed in charge of this bureau.

Sometimes the Sadr of this bureau was given the right to administer, directly, certain districts of the Caliphate, besides his work as treasurer. There was a deputy to the controller, and a Mushrif to supervise the work of this bureau.

However, it seems that during al-Nasir's reign the controller of this department was in charge of collecting the Mukus. The Mukus constituted another source of revenue for the state. The Mukus, or the illegal taxes - according to the Muslim jurists - were the taxes imposed on industrial and agricultural production, or in general all the taxes imposed on transactions. The term Mukus was still in use now, but sometimes it was replaced by the term Ma'una (pl. Mu'an).

¹ Tbn al-Sa'I, p. 127.

²Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 287.

³Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 265-6; Ibn al-Fuwaţi, p. 217.

⁴Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 265; Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 62, 82, 95, 119; A. A. Duri remarks that the Ishraf replaced the old Zimam (the department of control and audit), see E.I./II, s.v. Diwan.

⁵Ibn al-Sa'I, pp. 227-8.

⁶Cl. Cahen, "L'Histoire Economique et Sociale de l'Orient Musulman Medieval", S.I., III, 1955, p. 110.

⁷In the early 'Abbasid period Ma'una was a regular support of officials, who had their expenses covered by it, and it was imposed on the tax payers. See F. Lokkegaard, Islamic Taxation, pp. 186-7. According to 'Abbas al-'Azzawi, the Mu'an was gift in origin, but it was increased in the late 'Abbasid period and took on the nature of a fixed tax. Ta'rikh al-Dara'ib al-'Iraqiyya, Baghdad, 1959, p. 23.

Al-Naşir abolished this tax on 17 Rajab 604/6 Feb. 1208. Ibn al-Sa'ī says that on 17 Rajab 604 the Caliph al-Naşir ordered the abolition of, "What was collected of al-Mu'an by the Ba'a on the commodities of every kind". The Caliph commissioned Qiwam al-Din Abu Firas Naşr ibn Naşir, the Şadr of the Makhzan, to summon all the Ba'a - the officials in charge of levying this tax - and to tell them what the Caliph had ordered. The amount of this tax reached 200,000 Dinars yearly. Thus from this evidence, one may understand the Ma'una was the tax imposed on every kind of transaction, and that the term of Ba'a designated the officials who were in charge of collecting this tax.

However, it seems that this tax bore heavily upon the means of the populace of Baghdad, who expressed their discontent by rebelling against the government on 17 Rajab 604/6 Feb. 1208 and attacked the police force of Bab al-Nubi and Atba al-Ba and were able to kill and injure many of them. This incident, probably, caused the Caliph to announce the abolition of this tax the same day. But Ibn al-Athir gives another reason for the Caliph to abolish this tax; he says,

"A daughter of 'Izz al-Din Najah al-Sharabi (the cupbearer of the Caliph) died; they bought cows to be slaughtered and to give the flesh as alms for her (for the deceased woman), they listed on the bill of the

lbn al-Sa'i, pp. 227-8; cf. Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 183-4; but al-Maqrizi puts the figure as 3,000,000 Dinars, see Suluk, I/I, p. 167.

²Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 228.

price the <u>Ma'una</u> of the cows (i.e. the tax due on these cows) and it was great (amount), the Caliph noticed that (the heavy dues), he₁(therefore) ordered the abolition of all the <u>Ma'una</u>."

However, it seems that this abolition was of short duration because when al-Zahir (622-23) came to power he ordered the abolition of all the Mukus, this indicates its existence on his accession. During the reign of al-Mustansir this tax was introduced again. In 635/1237-8 the Caliph appointed Taj al-Dīn 'Ali ibn al-Dawami, the Hajib of Bab al-Nubī and the superintendent of the police force, in charge of Hujar al-Bay'the posts of the Ba'a in Baghdad. When al-Musta'sim was declared Caliph after the death of his father he ordered the abolition of this tax. The Wazīr ordered Ibn al-Dawami, who was in charge of assessing this tax, to be protected with his house from the anger of the common people, "for fear on his behalf from the common people, because he was in charge of assessing the Mu'an and the deputies (who collected it) belonged to him, and in his time it was introduced (sic)."

However, it seems that this tax constituted a good source of revenue to the last 'Abbasid Caliph, for one notices, for the first time, that this tax was given to a special official called "Nazir Hujar al-Bay.".

Ibn al-Athir, XII, pp. 183-4.

²See Sibt, p. 419; Dhahabi, Duwal al-Islam, II, p. 97; Ibn Kathir, XIII, pp. 112-3; Ibn al-'Ibri, p. 428.

³Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 100.

^{4&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 162-3.

⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 270.

The mint was under the supervision of the treasury [al-Makhzan].

The mint, no doubt, yielded a certain income to the government. The bimetallic system of currency was still in usage in the 'Abbasid Caliphate until the fall of Baghdad. But at this period the gold coins - Dīnars - were used more than the silver dirhams. The people had used the Dīnar and its subdivisions, as well as clippings from it - in their daily life, and the clipped dīnars were used largely. It seems that the quality and fineness of the dirhams was deteriorated, in this period, which made the people use instead of it the clippings of the Dīnars. This, perhaps, resulted from the shortage of the silver supply, which made it disappear from the market and, subsequently, its price went up.

The gold of al-Nasir was, in general, below the standard of the early 'Abbasid period; and from the specimens studied by Ehrenkreutz the fineness of al-Nasir's dinars fluctuated between 90% and 93%. The weights of his dinars also fluctuated between 1.32 gms. and 18.38 gms.

E.I./II, s.v. Diwan (by A. A. Duri).

² Ibid., s.v. Dar al-Darb.

³Ibn Jubair, p. 218.

Ibn Khallikan, I, p. 561.

⁵P. R. Blake, "The circulation of silver in the Moslem East down to the Mongol Epoch." H.J.A.S., 2 (1937), pp. 291 ff; cf. E.I./II, s.v. Dirham (by G. C. Milles).

Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz, "Monetary History of the Near East in the Middle Ages". J.E.S.H.O., II/2 (May 1959), pp. 145 ff.

⁷Cf. Ibid., pp. 147-8; see N. Nagshabandi, The Islamic Dinar in the Iraq Museum, Baghdad, 1953, pp. 178 ff., and p. 203. See also S. Lane Poole, Catalogue of Oriental Goins in the British Museum. I, pp. 163 ff.

However, it seems that the peace and the prosperity of the trade during the reign of al-Mustansir, had encouraged the flow of silver into 'Iraq. The Caliph, therefore, tried to reform the coinage system in order to bring more stability into the economic life of his Caliphate. He issued a new silver Dirham, with better quality than the existing Dirhams, and fixed its rate of exchange, every dinar to be worth 10 Dirhams. The people were happy with this action of the government. This high rate of exchange of the new dirham, no doubt, indicates that the price of silver was still high.

Furthermore, the standard of fineness of the Dinars of al-Mustansir was also high, in comparison with the standard of al-Nasir's Dinars.

During the reign of the last Caliph the condition and standard of fineness of the Dirham deteriorated, and this is indicated by the decrease in its value. This was, no doubt, due to the bad quality of the Dirhams of this Caliph. The government, it seems, in its desperate need of money issued bad Dirhams to meet its deficit. But the result was that the numbers of Dirhams increased while the Dinars disappeared.

Ibn al-Fuwati, pp. 70-71; al-Yafi'i, IV, p. 75; <u>Dhahabi</u>, XIX, fols. 244b-245a. A number of these Dirhams are in the British Museum (see tray No. 36), see S. Lane Poole, I, pp. 169 ff.

²A. S. Ehrenkreutz, op.cit., pp. 145 ff; For examples of al-Mustansir Dinars, see Naqshabani, pp. 53, 185, and plate (8). See also S. Lane Poole, I, p. 167.

This state of affairs led al-Musta's im to issue a new Dirham in 645/1247-8, with a better standard of fineness, at the rate of exchange of 12 per Dinar. The Dinar of al-Musta's im was, more or less, stabilized, and its fineness was not too low, it fluctuated between 91% and 94%.

Diwan al-Tarikat al-Hashariyya.

Heirless property was another source of revenue to the government, which was administered by <u>Diwan al-Tarikat al-Hashariyya</u>. Qalqashandi defines the heirless property thus,

"Al-Mawarith al-Hashariyya is the property of a deceased who has no special heir through relationship, by way of marriage, or Wala'; or the residue of the property of a dead person who has an heir who is not entitled to all the heritage...etc."3

The early jurists differed in their view of the heritage and to whom it should belong; some argue that the only immediate and legal heirs of the dead person should have the right to this heritage, and if this kind of relationship does not exist, the property should accrue to the state; while the other argue that the heritage should be given to all the relations, whether they were direct or indirect heirs of the

Ibn al-Fuwați, pp. 223-4.

Ehrenkreutz, pp. 145 ff., see also <u>E.I./II</u>, s.v. Dinar (by G.C.Milles). See also Naqshandi, pp. 53, 186 ff; S. Lane Poole, I, p. 168.

³ Subh al- Asha, III, p. 464.

dead person and the government should not have the right to any proportion of the heritage.

However, it seems that the 'Abbasid government followed the first argument, and acquired those properties which had not direct heirs, no doubt for the benefit of getting a lot of revenue from such a source. This practice was first introduced during the reign of al-Mu'tamid (256-279/870-892). During the reign of al-Naşir the state fellowed the same method in getting this kind of property and, in fact, there was a special Diwan which administered this revenue and assessed This bureau was headed by Nazir, 3 who was usually one of the Shuhud 'Adl of Baghdad. 4 The duty of this official was also to make a list of the wealthy persons who had not direct heirs in order that, on receipt of the news of their death, he could go and collect their heritage.5 As well, he was to provide the state with statistics of the number of deaths in Baghdad. Furthermore, sometimes, this Nazir collected the property before the death of the person, if he was sick. 7

¹See the full argument in A.A.Duri, Ta'rikh al-'Iraq al-Iqtisadi, pp. 198 ff. ²Ibid., p. 198.

³Ibn al-Sa'i nn 35 259: see Ibn al-Fuwati nn 229 269, 305-6.
Fuwati, p. 114. Shāhid 'Adl, witness of good E.I/II,s.v. 'Adl(by E.Tyan) 259; Ibn al-Fuw Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 107. Fuw Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 107.

T. I/II, s.v. 'Adl(by E.Tyan).

⁵ Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 107.

⁶Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 229.

⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 305-6.

However, it seems that the revenue of this department was considerable, for in 602/1205-6 this department acquired 2600 Dinars from a dead person. In 651/1253-4 200 Dinars entered this Diwan. 2

And in 653/1255-6 a worker in a public bath died and his property which consisted of 7 Ratls of gold and 12 Ratls of silver, were found and taken to this Diwan. 3

When al-Zahir came to power, he appointed 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn
Dulaf, the Hanbalite Shaykh, as the Nazir of this Diwan, the latter
refused to accept this office unless the Caliph would allow him to
"give the inheritance to the uterine kindred", (العربة فري الرحا),
the Caliph agreed to that and gave him a free hand to follow the just
policy in managing this Diwan. The new Nazir, subsequently, returned
many legacies to their legal heirs. But it seems that this just policy
in levying the heirless property disappeared after the short reign of
al-Zahir; and his successors, al-Mustansir and al-Musta'sim followed
the policy of al-Nasir in levying the heirless property. This practice

Ibn al-Sa'i, p. 180.

²Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 269.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 305-6.

⁴Ibn al-Athir, XII, p. 288; see also Ibn al-'Imad, V, pp. 184-5; cylabove, p. 143.

⁵Ibn al-'Imad, V, pp. 184-5.

⁶See Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 229, 269, 305-6, 114.

was still in existence after the fall of Baghdad in 1258, until it was abolished by 'Ata' al-Mulk al-Juvaini when he was appointed to the governorship of Baghdad.

Diwan al-Jawali.2

This <u>Diwan</u> was in charge of assessing and levying the polltax from the <u>Dhimmis</u>. This bureau was administered by Nazir, who was usually appointed from amongst the religious men - Faqihs, Qadis or <u>Shuhud</u> 'Adl. The time of collecting the poll-tax was at the beginning of each Hijra year - at the beginning of Muharram. During the reign of al-Naşir, it seems that this tax was levied with laxity, and also that the revenue from it was not high. For in 626/1228-9 al-Mustanşir discharged Muhiy al-Din ibn al-Jawzi from his post as the Nazir of <u>Diwan al-Jawali</u> and appointed the <u>Shafi'ite Shaykh</u> Ibn Fadlan to this post. The Caliph ordered the new official to "apply the <u>Shar's</u> in assessing the poll-tax. Ibn Fadlan, therefore, increased the tax on those who paid less than one Dinar. For according to the <u>Shafi'ite</u> school it was forbidden to collect less than one Dinar, if the <u>Dhimmi</u> was poor, and if he was middle class levied from him two

¹Juvaini, I, p. 34.

²Jawali (sing. Jaliya) originally meant a group of emigrants or refugees.

The Dhimmis were called Jaliya because the Caliph 'Umar I ordered them (sic) to leave Arabia. Later on this name served to identify all the protected subjects even though they have never left their homeland; see Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'Arab, Beyrouth ed. XIV, p. 149. Later on Jawali means a tax, more or less, a synonym of Jizya; see A.A.Duri, Ta'rikh al-'Iraq al-Iqtisadi, p. 196; E.I./II s.v. Djawali (by Cl. Cahen); cf. R. Fattal, Le Statut des non-musulmans en pays d'Islam au Moyen Age, p. 265; also Uzunçarşili, pp. 11-12.

(cont.)

Dinars, and in case that the <u>Dhimmi</u> was rich the amount should be four Dinars. This indicates that during al-Nasir's reign there was a tolerance in the amount of this tax imposed upon the non-Muslim subjects.

Furthermore, Ibn Fadlan followed a very strict method in levying this tax and treated the <u>Dhimmis harshly</u>. However, it seems that the <u>Dhimmis paid</u> this tax in gold.

Diwan al-Muqata at.

Concerning the administration of the lands of the Caliphate principality, there was a new <u>Diwan</u> called <u>Diwan al-Muqata'at</u>, which was administered by a Nazir, 4 and a Katib. 5

Cl. Cahen defines the term Muqata'a thus, "...the state was content with a contracted tribute, without concerning itself with a theoretical scheme of taxation: equivalent to the primitive 'Ahd... etc."

This kind of land, no doubt, paid far less than the ordinary

⁽cent.)
3Ibn al-Sa'i, pp. 259, 281; Ibn al-Fuwaţi, pp. 7-8, andl3.

⁴Ibn al-Fuwați, p. 13; see A. A. Duri, op.cit., p. 196.

lIbn al-Fuwati, pp. 7-8.

For further details see above Chapter III, pp. 157-8; and Ibn al-Fuwati, p. 13.

³See above p. 167.

⁴Ibn Khallikan, II, pp. 333-4; Ibn al-Fuwaţi, p. 178.

⁵Ibn al-Sa'I, p. 282; Ibn <u>Khallikan</u>, I^I, p. 25.

E.I./II, s.v. Bayt al-Mal; for the nature of this kind of land see F. Lokkegaard, Islamic taxation, pp. 102 ff.

Kharaj lands; for, according to Ibn al-Tiqtaqa al-Mustanjid the grand-father of al-Nasir - committed a horrible act, "He abolished
all the Muqata at estates and returned them to the Kharaj system, a
thing which bore hardly on the 'Alids in al-Kufa and the sacred shrines..."
Al-Mustanjid, no doubt, did so to increase the income of the state as
a part of his fiscal reform.

Thus it seems that this new <u>Diwan</u> was formed to look after and administer these estates, which returned to the <u>Kharaj</u> system.

Al_Fakhri, p. 425.

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