THE TRANSFORMATION FROM SUBSISTENCE TO COMMERCIALIZED AGRICULTURE: THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF RURAL CHANGE

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

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Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to present a detailed exposition of certain changes occurring in a social system during its transformation from subsistence to commercialized agriculture. This transformation has been accelerated by the introduction of an irrigation system. The analysis is constructed from general theoretical literature and data collected from an irrigated lowland North-east Thai village.

In Chapter One I discuss the distribution of certain factors of production, and the means by which they are acquired. I attempt to show how these factors previously organized through social channels are slowly becoming commercialized. I also show how the imposition of an irrigation system conflicts in certain areas with the traditional system of land tenure.

In Chapter Two I discuss the Domestic Mode of Production and identify certain factors influencing the economic intensity of households. I argue that due to the availability of irrigation water to certain farmers, production levels previously related to household composition are now more a function of resource endowment.

Chapter Three discusses opportunity response and choice. I begin by considering the different types of response to opportunity both agricultural and non-agricultural, and I show how different response patterns are related to such factors as household composition, kinship ties and resource endowment. I then continue with an analysis of the way in which certain features of the social system are conducive to

or inimical to economic change. Village expenditure patterns are then examined, and the choice - whether to re-invest in production, or to purchase consumer goods, are discussed.

Chapter Four examines the relationship between economic and social power and prestige. Notions of status, socio-economic differentiation , village leadership and the ideology of wealth are discussed in order to comment on the possibilities of an emerging class structure.

Acknowledgements

I should like to take this opportunity to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the villagers of the Lam Pao Irrigation area, especially of Ban Na Chuak Nuea, who graciously accepted my intrusion into their lives, and who taught me many things.

My thanks are also due to my Supervisor, Dr. Andrew Turton, for his encouragement and advice; and to the members of the Lam Pao Research team: Dr. Ronald Ng, Dr. Harvey Demaine and Dr. Christopher Dixon for their unstinting help and encouragement.

I should also like to thank many of the members of the staff of the School of Oriental and African Studies, too numerous to mention, who have assisted me in my studies.

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Introduction

Thailand which has one of the highest rates of population growth in the world - 3.1[1] per cent - is rapidly becoming overpopulated. Until recently, land pressure was not a serious problem, and in most regions land could be cleared to accommodate the growing population. The balance between man and land has now been altered and development projects geared to raise agricultural productivity are necessary in all four major regions of the country: the North, South, Central Plains and the North-East. The most underdeveloped of these four regions is the North-east, the subject of this thesis.

The North-east context

L.D. Stamp in 1929 wrote of the Northeast of Thailand:

"Twenty people to the sq. mile inhabit this inhospitable land, wresting from the reluctant soil crops barely sufficient to maintain an existence, which, passed amidst damp and mud for half of the year, and in a dry, hot dust-laden atmosphere for the other, is one of the most miserable imaginable"[2].

Gedney, writing some thirty years later gives a contrasting picture of the North-east, which he claims is neither Appalachia nor an Arabia Deserta but a region:

"where the climate is not unpleasant, the vegetation attractive in parts ... and where the people are full of grace, wit and wisdom" [3].

The landscape of the North-east region contrasts sharply with the other regions of Thailand, especially the Northern mountainous parts, for example the Chiengmai valley described by Potter[4] as an "arcady"

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1 See "Food and Population", Asia 1977 Yearbook. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, 1977, p.49

2 Stamp, L; Asia, 1929, p.432

3 Gedney, W; "Some Questions on the Northeast", Asian Survey, Vol.6,1966, p.379

4 Potter,J; Thai Peasant Social Structure,Chicago,1976,p.12.

and one of the loveliest places of the world. The North-east with an area of 70,000 sq. miles extends eastwards from the Valley of the Chao Phraya to the west bank of the Mekong River. There is much evidence to demonstrate the cultural, linguistic and historical association of many of the North-east's inhabitants with neighbouring Laos[1]. The North-easterners distinguish themselves from the other Thai regions, epitomized in the use of the word 'isaan' (north-east) to refer to their ethnic identity. They speak a Lao-dialect not dissimilar to central Thai, they eat sticky rice, and have a distinctive culture. Wyatt[2] comments that one of the earliest and most consistent themes in Thai history has been the process whereby cultural and linguistic minorities have been integrated into the national society[3]. Wyatt argues that the integration of substantial Thai minorities of the North, South and North-east in recent history into the national society has been less effective. These minorities have not lived in close proximity to the Central Thai, intermarriage has been less frequent and

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1 Keyes,C; "Ethnic Identity and Loyalty of Villagers in North-east Thailand", Asian Survey, no.6, 1966, p.362

2 Wyatt, D; "Northeast Thailand: An Historical Perspective", Asian Survey, vol.6, 1969, p.353

3 For example the large Mon and Khmer populations absorbed into the early Thai kingdoms of Ayudhya and Sukothai between 1300-1500 A.D. and the large numbers of Khmer, Cham, Vietnamese, Malay, Mon and Burmese captives incorporated into the later Ayudhya Kingdom. Both the Ayudhya and its successor kingdom Bangkok also assimilated large numbers of Chinese.

"they have much deeper-rooted and better developed local and regional sentiments"[1].

The economy of the North-east is still dominated by subsistence cultivation of glutinous rice. For much of the North-east soils are sandy, poorly drained, and not particularly fertile. The average rice yields per rai for the North-east in 1971 were 253.1 kg compared with the national average of 292.2 kg, and yields in the north of 386.5 kg[2]. Although rice production in the North-east expanded at a rate of 3.4% per annum in the 1960's, this was mainly due to the increase in cultivated area. The principal cash crops of the North-east are maize, kenaf and more recently cassava. Kenaf cultivation was rapidly increased after a series of very bad jute crops in Bengal in the late 1950's. The North-east is also the principle livestock region of the country.

The North-east is the poorest of Thailand's four regions. The socio-economic survey for 1971-1973[3] puts the average annual rural household income at 6,890 baht compared with 24,353 baht for the Bangkok-Thonburi area, 11,076 baht for the North, 15,816 baht for the Central region, and 11,179 baht for the South. In contrast the average incomes of the North-east municipal area stand at 28,633 baht, the second highest regional average. Disparities of income between the rural and municipal areas in the North-east are considerable, and higher than any other region in Thailand. Dixon[4] writes that as well as having the lowest per capita income of the four regions the North-east has a disproportionately small share of the national income, the lowest growth-rate, and furthermore the structure of the economy has

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1 Wyatt, D; op.cit; p.353

2 Source: Statistical Year Book National Statistical Office. Office of the Prime Minister 1972-73, p.186

3 Socio-Economic Survey 1971-1973, National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister

4 Dixon, C; "Markets, Marketing and Agricultural Change in Northeast Thailand", Institute of British Geographers Developing Areas Study Group Conference. 1974, p.3

has failed to change in line with the Thai economy as a whole. The gap between the North-east and the other regions of the country is increasing.

In recent years much of the Thai government's development effort in the North-east, their heavy investment in infrastructure, particularly communications and irrigation, has been stimulated by the political instability of the region. There has been a history of terrorist insurgency in the North-east although it is difficult to determine whether any marked increase in incidents has occurred in recent years. While most of the anti-government strongholds are in the poorest North-east provinces, no direct relationship between per capita income levels and levels of insurgent activity can be demonstrated due to the fact that the poorer provinces are the more remote areas and therefore offer the best refuge. The Communist Party of Thailand began armed struggle in 1965, and after the military take-over on October 6, 1976, announced that the only course of action now left was armed struggle based in rural areas. Long in 1966 wrote:

> "Both the Thai and American governments have apparently concluded that poverty coupled with past neglect by the centre have made the North-east region of Thailand ripe for infiltration by anti-government forces. To forestall these anticipated political developments this region has been made the centre of American and to a large extent Thai efforts for economic and social improvement"[1].

The development effort in the North-east has to be considered in this wider political context, and Wilson's statement

> "In the mid-1960's North-east Thailand is properly considered an area of strategic importance in the conflict of South-east Asia" [2],

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1 Long, M; "Economic Development in North-east Thailand: Problems and Prospects", Asian Survey, Vol.6, 1966, p.357

2 Wilson, D; "Introductory Comments on Politics and the North-east", Asian Survey, Vol.6, 1966, p. 349

is even truer in 1977.

This brief review of the economic and political setting of the region should serve to establish a context in which this present research was conducted.

The Research Area

Kalasin province is one of sixteen North-east provinces, and lies north-east of Mahasarakam which occupies the central area of the North-east region. In relation to other North-east provinces Kalasin has a moderate rice production, reasonable soil fertility and moderate areas of upland cultivation. Kalasin is neither one of the richest, nor one of the poorest provinces, but occupies a somewhat middle position in respect of its resources. The fieldwork village Ban Na Chuak Nuea is one of 119 villages in the Yang Talad district. The village lies $\frac{3}{4}$ km. east of a main access road which runs to Yang Talad and to Kalasin, the provincial capital. There is a small market in Yang Talad, but the main market centre is in Kalasin town. Occasional reference will be made to other villages in the area, notably Nong Kaw an upland village lying outside the irrigated area which lies within the same village cluster as Ban Na Chuak Nuea, and Ban Tum, the centre of another village cluster of the Yang Talad district.

The Lam Pao Irrigation Project

The Lam Pao irrigation scheme in Kalasin Province is one of the largest in the North-east. The Lam Pao is one of the major tributaries of the Lam Chi river, which together with the Nam Mun drains the greater part of the region south-eastwards to the Mekong. The irrigation scheme was designed both to control flooding, and to supply irrigation water to about 54,000 hectares during the wet season, and 40,000 hectares during the dry season. Construction of the scheme began in 1963 with the building of a 7-kilometre earth dam across the course of the Lam Pao. This dam was completed in 1968, and in 1969 irrigation water was

Map i The Lam Pao Irrigation Area



first sent down to the villages in the Northern tract of the irrigation area. This project is part of a scheme for the development of the Lower Mekong basin, under the auspices of the Mekong Committee of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. As part of this programme a research team from the Department of Geography, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, undertook to conduct research within the irrigation project area in order to monitor and evaluate the socio-economic changes occurring under the impact of irrigation. Research was conducted by this team between 1971-1976. Annual fieldwork periods were conducted, of approximately three months (with the exception of a review period in 1974). Structured questionnaires were administered to a third of the households heads in seven villages, each chosen as representative of a certain tract, within the Lam Pao area. Under this schedule five years of systematic data has been collected covering a wide range of topics: demographic features, crop production and disposal, land use patterns, off-farm employment, animal husbandry, fishing and handicrafts, standards of living, travel and contact, membership and development of credit institutions, loans, innovations, perceived changes, household income and expenditure, and irrigated farming experience. In 1975 and 1976 an additional questionnaire was administered which concentrated on dry-season cropping patterns.

This study is the result of two years experience working with the Lam Pao team as a research assistant between 1974-1976. The thesis evolving out of this research situation is of a different kind to an orthodox post-graduate anthropological thesis. Fieldwork was undertaken for two consecutive years, each period for three months, March-June. Apart from working in the village chosen for this study Ban Na Chuak Nuea, as a member of the research team I worked in the six other research

villages. As well as periods of residence in Na Chuak Nuea I spent a short period living in an upland village outside of the irrigation area.

Fieldwork Aims

This thesis aims to contribute to our knowledge of a North-east Thai peasant community, both in respect of ethnographic illustration and theoretical discussion. I shall attempt to show that the 'loose structure' paradigm, as a general model, is inapplicable as a general model for Thai society, and I shall also consider some of the generalizations made about 'peasant communities'. The thesis also aims to illustrate the way in which orthodox anthropological fieldwork, with long-term individual study periods, can, if at all, be re-organized and integrated with inter-disciplinary team-work. The issue is not whether the comprehensive understanding of a small-scale community is best achieved by one or other method. It is my opinion having concluded this research that a long, continuous fieldwork period of at least one agricultural cycle is necessary in order to fully grasp the basic principles of social organization in a community. However, at a time when financial constraints are reducing fieldwork budgets, and when development agencies, themselves geared to timetables and budgets, are accepting the important contribution which social scientists can make, the limits and parameters of the anthropologists' methods of fieldwork need to be explored.

The specific aims of the research were to understand the social implications entailed in the transformation from subsistence to commercialized agriculture, a transformation influenced by the recent introduction of irrigation. The time period 1971-1975 is too short to reveal marked changes, however the early signs and stages of change

(although frustrating for a researcher who may occasionally feel that little is happening) are important, and demonstrate the manner in which a previously balanced socio-economic system, (a system in which village communities had adapted themselves to the specific environmental setting) has become disrupted. Furthermore it is possible to indicate in which dimensions elements of change first occur. In the study village a certain proportion of the community was scheduled to receive irrigation water, which, the development officials argued, would enable them to increase their production, and extend their cropping patterns. A minority of the village, holding unirrigable land, would not benefit from this resource. The social implications of this differential allocation of a resource seemed worthy of attention.

Research Methods

The field-work village chosen, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, lies in the Northern part of the irrigation area, and thus was one of the first villages to receive irrigation water. The analysis has been constructed from quantitative data, collected by the research team,[1] some prior to my participation in the project, which has provided the context in which my own research: structured and informal interviews, and participant observation, was developed.

I will now offer a brief justification of the use of quantification in this thesis. Quantification has only recently become a respectable tool for anthropology, and as Mitchell notes:

> "... the 'anthropological method' has tended to be taken as synonymous with the intensive study of small communities through participant observation without use of quantitative methods[2]".

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1 Members of the Lam Pao Research Team include Dr. Ronald C.Y. Ng, (Team Leader), Dr. Harvey Demaine (Deputy Team Leader), and Dr. Christopher Dixon (Senior Research Associate)

2 Mitchell, J; "On Quantification", in Epstein, A; (ed), The Craft of Social Anthropology, London, 1967, p.17

Quantitative data may be used to both indicate the general features of the community (already impressionistically perceived through participant observation) and it may be used to express the underlying relationships between phenomena, either by assessing them against some theoretical model developed on the basis of probability theory or by computing one of the various measures of correlation or association.[1] Quantification, if used in Anthropology, needs careful handling. Gluckman's survey of the Lamba villages - a fieldwork training exercise, resulted, according to Gluckman, in quantitative calculations which showed the trees but not the wood. Furthermore, as Mitchell streeses, in anthropology the unit of analysis is not the individual but the social relationships in which he is involved,

"This introduces some knotty problems - a social relationship is essentially an abstraction from behaviour, and as such is not separable, isolated, and immediately perceptible phenomenon available for random selection"[2].

The validity of applying quantitative methods of analysis clearly depends on the researchers' field of interest. Some aspects of social life lend themselves to quantification more than others, but in the field of economics quantification is an essential tool of analysis particularly in studies of socio-economic change.

"the quest for quantitative economic data makes heavy demands of the fieldworker ... But it can offer rich rewards in the form of a heightened understanding of the inner workings of a society, particularly one that is in the process of rapid social and cultural change"[3].

In the thesis I refer to two analytical models, one utilized by Sahlins[4] in his work on primitive and peasant economics, and another by Shanin,[5] employed to measure patterns of socio-economic mobility. Sahlins'

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1 Mitchell, J; op.cit; p.43

2 Ibid; p.32

3 Epstein, A; The Craft of Social Anthropology, London, 1967, p.180

4 Sahlins, M; Stone Age Economics, London, 1974

5 Shanin, T; The Awkward Class, Oxford, 1972

model which aims to construct intensity profiles which indicate the amount and distributions of surplus labour, requires simply collected statistical data. These intensity profiles can then be studied, and interpreted in social terms, for example in terms of the impact of a political or kinship structure on the productivity of a community. For Sahlins, 'economy' is a category of culture rather than behaviour, and his approach abandons the entrepreneurial and individualistic concepts of 'economy' as a means-end relationship. The merit of Shanin's simple model is that patterns of socio-economic mobility can be simply extracted, if adequate data exist. Furthermore it demonstrates that these patterns of socio-economic mobility can only be extrapolated from analysis at the household level. Observations at the community level present an incomplete picture of mobility. A simple point, but one frequently ignored.

The Definition of Peasantry

Shanin[1] has identified four major conceptual traditions which have influenced the contemporary analysis of peasant societies. Firstly, the tradition of Marxist class theory, a tradition which has approached peasantry in terms of power relationships[2], i.e. the peasants as the exploited producers of pre-capitalist society. Secondly, the 'specific economy' typology, which viewed social structure as being determined by the specific type of economy; a family farm economy, a tradition developed by Chayanov[3]. Thirdly the ethnographic cultural tradition which views

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1 Shanin,T; (ed) Peasants and Peasant Societies, Middlesex, 1971, pp.13-14

2 Marx,K; and Engels,F; Selected Writings,vol.1, Moscow, 1950

3 Chayanov,A; The Theory of Peasant Economy, (Translation), D. Thorner, Smith and B. Kerblay (eds); Homeward III, 1966

peasants as representatives of an earlier national tradition, preserved as a 'cultural lag'. And fourthly a tradition originating from Durkheim's[1] division of society into traditional (segmentary; uniform and closed) and modern (organic, based on the division of labour and the interaction of specialized units). Kroeber[2] placed peasant societies in an intermediate position - partly open segments in a town-centred society, and the tradition was further developed by Redfield.[3] The difference in the definition of the peasantry depends largely upon the theoretical context in which the definition developed. Thus Shanin's 'general type' definition had developed from the review of a large number of peasant studies.

"The peasant family farm as the basic unit of multi-dimensional social organization ... Land Husbandry as the main means of livelihood directly providing the major part of consumption needs ... The underdog position - the domination of peasantry by outsiders"[4].

While Dalton's characterization of the peasantry was developed through a comparison of primitive and peasant economies,

"... most people have come to depend on production for sale as their primary source of livelihood. Market exchange has become the dominant mode of transaction; commercial production has become more important than subsistence production. (And) in peasant economies appreciable quantities of labour and land as well as produce are bought and sold; money prices and money incomes are familiar"[5].

The relative nature of these distinguishing characteristics, the primary source of, the dominant mode of, more important than, etc; complicate the analysis. This point is illustrated with an empirical example. In 1971, in the village of Ban Na Chuak Nuea a typical

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1 Durkheim,E; The Division of Labour in Society, Glencoe, III, 1960

2 Kroeber,A; Anthropology, Harrap, 1948.

3 Redfield,R; Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago, 1956

4 Shanin,T; (1971) op.cit; pp.14-15

5 Dalton,G; "The Development of Subsistence and Peasant Economies in Africa", in Tribal and Peasant Economies, New York, 1967, p.156

household delegated the greater part of its labour and utilized the larger portion of its land for glutinous rice production, and approximately 90% of this production was consumed within the household. In 1975 only 16% of the crop was sold. Commercial production, while becoming increasingly important, cannot be considered more important than subsistence production. Equally, as I shall illustrate in the analysis that follows transactions which involve factors of production are still largely organized through relationships of kinship, and although market transactions of land and labour are increasingly important they cannot be considered the dominant mode of transaction. According to Dalton's 'ideal type' characterization of a peasant community, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, in certain respects, is not a peasant village, although by Shanin's definition it fits comfortably into this category. Peasant societies fall historically in the intermediate period between tribal-nomadic and industrializing societies[1]. The community under study is undergoing a transformation from subsistence to commercialized agriculture. This analysis is primarily concerned with the social implications of this transformation, and not with a definitional discourse on the concept of peasantry. Throughout the analysis I refer to the village of Ban Na Chuak Nuea as a peasant village, and to this end accept Shanin's 'general type' characterization.

The thesis begins with an examination of the ownership, distribution and allocation of certain factors of production, and it continues with the analysis of the utilization of certain of these factors in a branch of agricultural production. Having discussed one specific branch of agriculutural production the argument broadens to cover other forms of

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1 Shanin,T; (1971) op.cit; p.247

economic activity, agricultural and non-agricultural, in the village. The discussion here concentrates on patterns of response to economic opportunity, and the notion of choice as expressed in expenditure patterns. The argument then continues with an examination of patterns of socio-economic differentiation, socio-economic mobility, and the status system. It explores the possibilities of class-formation within the peasant sector.

"only a cross-disciplinary combination of both conceptual and factual studies may overcome the astonishing shortcomings in our knowledge of peasantry, in spite of the methodological difficulties involved. Limping along main roads achieves more than strolling along side roads"[1].

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1 Shanin,T; "The Peasantry as a Class", in Shanin (ed) 1971, op.cit;p.262

CHAPTER ONE

THE OWNERSHIP, DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOCATION OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION

In this chapter the major factors of production: land, labour, water and livestock, are examined. The discussion begins with a review of different types of land, ownership of land, and its distribution, and it continues with an examination of the different methods of acquisition of land: inheritance, purchase, renting, 'free-use' and 'self-clearance'. This is followed by an examination of household labour, the division of labour, labour exchange groups, and the increasing incidence of hired labour. Water, as a factor of production, and the organization of irrigation are discussed, and finally the role of livestock for village production.

Land Types

Lowland accounts for approximately 70% of all village land, 17% is composed of upland holdings and the remaining 13% accounts for houseplots, areas under fallow, small forest areas and orchards. The upland plots (to the left of the Right Main canal, see Map 1.1) are rainfed and cannot receive gravity irrigation; although predominantly used for the cultivation of cash crops, rice is still planted if rainfall is adequate. The lowland is composed of areas of land receiving gravity irrigation and an unirrigated belt bordering the Huey Yang river; separated from the other lowland by a natural levee, this area is particularly susceptible to flooding during the rainy season. Within the lowland area there are, however, small plots of land on a higher elevation, which cannot receive irrigation. 'Lowland' therefore is not strictly synonymous with 'irrigated land' (see Fig. 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Profile of Land Types, Ban Na Chuak Nuea



Land Ownership

The 1954 Land Act, 'Kodmaithidin' B.E. 2497, made a three-fold distinction between the occupancy, utilization and legal possession of land. A reserve license or pre-emption certificate: baičhong (N.S. 2) is a document showing authorization of the temporary occupation of land, which must be cultivated within three years. The exploitation document 'nangsu'čhapčhong thamprayot' (N.S. 3) certified that the land had been put to use, and in order to obtain this document the N.S. 2 certificate had to be presented to the land official. The full title deed, 'chanotthidin' (N.S. 4) gave full rights of ownership to the holder. The land tenure system is complicated by the holding of another type of document, required by all farming families for the purposes of land taxation. This is the 'baepčhaengkanthidin' (S.K. 1), and although technically irrevelant to the acquisition of land title deeds, Kemp[1] reports that in practice S.K. 1 has replaced the 'baičhong' certificate, and this certificate is believed by villagers to guarantee possessory rights for three years.

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1 Kemp, J; "Legal and Informal Land Tenures in Thailand", presented at the Seminar on Concepts of Order and Disorder in Southeast Asia, Centre of Southeast Asia Studies, S.O.A.S., March 1977

Table 1.1 Forms of tenure by land type and area, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

Form of Tenure	No. plots	% of all plots	Area in rai	% total area	Land Type (area in rai) Lowland	Upland	Fallow	Forest	House plot	Others*
'chanotthidin' (N.S.4)	3	2.0	10.75	1.0	3	7	-	-	0.75	-
'nangsu'chapchong tham prayot' (N.S.3)	118	81.4	1035.8	91.0	773.5	151.5	60.25	30.25	17.84	2.5*
'baepchaengkanthiidin' (S.K.1)	9	6.2	66.5	5.8	49	13	4	-	0.5	-
No documentation	15	10.4	25	2.2	4	6	11	3	1.0	-

* orchard not adjacent to the houseplot

Seth has reported that "large areas are reportedly held by farmers who hold neither license nor certificate nor title deed. They are, however, listed by statements signed by the 'kamnan' (commune headman) and their possession is thus informally recognized."[1] Furthermore, the same source[2] states that out of an estimated 67.5 million rai title deeds had been issued for 15 million rai, exploitation testimonials for 11.25 million rai and reserve licenses for 2.5 million rai, which left some 38.75 million rai uncertified.

Table 1.1 shows the distribution of different forms of tenure, by land type and area for Na Chuak Nuea. The table shows that the majority of village land (91%) is held under N.S.3: the exploitation license, while only 1% of the land (10.75 rai) is held under full title deed.

The distribution of Land

Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of holdings by area for 1971 and 1975. Although the shape of the histograms suggest that there are a greater number of households with larger holdings (notably in the 30-50 rai range) in 1975, no statistically significant changes can be demonstrated.

Land cannot be considered to be evenly distributed where households in some cases own only 5 rai and others 65 rai, but the whole question of land distribution is complicated by the following factors. Firstly, there is considerable variation in the fertility of different holdings, secondly a small irrigated plot is considerably more productive than a large unirrigated holding, and access to roads is an important consideration in the grading of different holdings. Although differences in holding size are extremely relevant in discussing the very large holders and the very small, when considering the majority in-between the actual size of the holding (an important consideration

1 Seth, A; "Report on Land Reform in Thailand", in National Seminar on Land Problems and Policies in Thailand, Bangkok, 1970, p.152

2 Ibid; p.152

Figure 1.2 Distribution of Land, Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971 and 1975





in pre-irrigation times) is now of less importance and now the important factors to be considered are land location, accessibility and availability of irrigation. Thus the villagers who previously characterized the well-endowed as having a large acreage (mi lai rai) now denote them as having water (mi nam) or simply having good land (thidin di) and when asked to clarify they refer to the position of the land, its yields and access to water. Thus while no significant change has occurred in the distribution of land, a change is occurring in the evaluation of land. Land is now evaluated in a different way due to the introduction of irrigation. Previously the amount of land held was of paramount importance, a feature common to most agricultural societies. Feder notes that "as a simple rule, it can be affirmed that the greater the amount of land owned, the greater the powers of its owners"[1]. Shanin makes the same point, "... position in the hierarchy of peasant sub-groups is, to a large extent, defined by the amount of land held".[2] The whole question of power deriving from resource endowment will be dealt with in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that the size of a holding although important is now one of many factors to be considered in estimating differences in land distribution.

Acquisition of Land

A household may gain access to land through one of five methods: inheritance, purchase, rent, 'free-use', or 'self-clearance'. As Table 1.2 shows inheritance is still the most common method of acquiring lowland, while 'self-clearance' and purchase are becoming important methods of acquiring upland for cash crop production.

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1 Feder, E; "Latifundia and Agricultural Labour in Latin America", in Shanin, T; (ed.) Peasants and Peasant Societies, Harmondsworth, 1971, p.83.

2 Shanin, T; op.cit; p.241

Table 1.2

Manner of acquisition of plots (by percentage)

Lowland	1971	1975
Manner of acquisition		
Purchase	12.2	12.6
Inherited	70.7	75.0
Rented	0.0	1.7
Free-use	17.1	2.7
Self-cleared	0.0	8.0

Upland	1971	1975
Manner of acquisition		
Purchase	36.4	37.8
Inherited	45.5	48.0
Rented	0.0	0.0
Free-use	9.1	2.8
Self-cleared	9.0	11.4

Upland 1975	Kenaf	Cassava
Manner of acquisition		
Purchase	33.3	40.0
Inherited	53.7	45.0
Rented	0.0	0.0
Free-use	6.3	0.0
Self-cleared	6.7	15.0

Inheritance

Table 1.2 shows that the majority of lowland has been inherited by the present owners, while approximately half of the upland has been obtained by other means. Traditionally, in Northeast Thailand men acquired land from their wife's parents. While informants stated that both sons and daughters have equal inheritance rights, in many cases the sons of a household relinquish these rights. Division of the holding is often made before the death of the parents, and it is common on the death of the parents for the larger portion of the plot retained by the parents and the house plot, to pass to the youngest daughter: the "phu liang" (the one who cares for) and her husband who had remained in the parental household.

Demaine and Dixon comment on the uncertainty felt by the son-in-law concerning his inheritance:

"not only does he not know when he will get control of the land, but if he is one of several sons-in-law, he may not even know which part of the holding he will inherit." [1]

Such uncertainties, the writers suggest, prevent the younger generation from planning ahead and puts a brake on their challenge to the household head's authority. The inheritance rules, however, appear to be interpreted flexibly, and inheritance decisions are based on more than just the sexual status of the siblings. The present situation of each sibling is taken into consideration; for example, whether or not a sibling has already inherited from his/her parents-in-law; and of course the size and location of the land to be inherited are also important factors. This is illustrated by the following case study, in which both sons and daughters have inherited plots.



1 Demaine,H. and Dixon, C; "Land Tenure Patterns and Agricultural Development in N.E. Thailand: A Case Study of the Lam Pao Irrigation Area in Changwat Kalasin", Journal of the Siam Society, July 1972, Vol. 60, Part 2, p.51.

The father X, now in his seventies, remarried following the death of his first wife fifteen years ago and moved to a neighbouring village: that of his new wife. When he left he divided his three plots of land, totalling 50 rai between his living sons and daughters. Two sons, B and C had left the village on marriage, and the eldest son, A, was dead. The three plots 1a, 1b and 1c, are marked on Map 1.1. The numbers used on the above genealogy refer to the plot numbers on this map. Plot 1a was considered to be the best portion; it lies close to the village, and is highly productive. This was inherited by the first, third and fourth daughters. Plot 1b farther away, although a larger plot was subject to flooding and was less productive. This plot was inherited by the second daughter, whose husband had already inherited an upland plot from his parents. Plot 1c, a small upland plot, was divided equally between the four sons, including the two who left the village. B, C, (107) and (96) all sold their shares to their brother (96). Brothers B and C, living away from the village, had no use for their plots and (107) had already inherited a larger upland plot from his in-laws.

In this example the daughters have inherited the most important part of the holding - the lowland, and the sons, the upland, which according to Demaine and Dixon[1], is considered marginal to the productive system. The three plots (2) on Map 1.1 are a case of equal inheritance of lowland by (65) and (61) - two brothers, and their sister (110). In this case a large parental holding and a small number of children (one had died) were conducive to equal sibling inheritance.

As inheritance is the major channel through which access to lowland is gained, these lowland areas can be divided into kin blocks. The group of plots marked No. 3 on Map 1.1 illustrates this.

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1 Ibid; p. 52

Map 1.1 Land Tenure and Kin Groups





Here there is a large cluster of female siblings. The eldest brother (95), it will be rembered from the first example, inherited from his in-laws.

In order to understand the different patterns of land tenure for the lowland and upland it is necessary to briefly discuss the patterns of village endogamy. Table 1.3 shows the different rates of male and female village endogamy for 1971 and 1975.

Table 1.3 Village endogamy, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971 and 1975[1]

	Female spouses born in village		Male spouses born in village	
	No.	%	No.	%
1971	36	90	21	52
1975	43	86[2]	24	48

While the female spouses have been predominantly born in the village, there is an almost equal balance between male spouses born in the village and those not.

A male head of household, if born in the village, stands to inherit land from his parents-in-law, and in certain circumstances from his own parents (depending upon the composition of his sibling

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1 Married daughters and sons-in-law if resident in the household have been included in the calculations

2 The % for 1975 has decreased, while the numbers have increased due to the different sample sizes. With a 30% sample in 1971 N = 35, in 1975 N = 44.

group and on the amount of land to be divided between them). A male head of household not born in the village can inherit only through his wife.

From the 1975 sample a difference emerges between males born in the village and males marrying into the village, with respect to the holding of upland plots. Of 21 male household heads born in the village 13 currently hold upland plots, and of the 12 male household heads marrying into the village only 3 currently have upland holdings. On the upland there are a number of nearby or adjoining plots held by either pairs or a group of brothers (see Map 1.1, cases 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d).

For the majority of male household heads therefore lowland is inherited affinally (through their wives) and upland, if inherited, is acquired through ties of consanguinity. However, there are cases of males inheriting upland plots from their parents-in-law, particularly if the in-laws have little or no lowland or, as is sometimes the case, no sons.

Generally, on marriage a son-in-law will initially reside in the house of his wife's parents until such time as a new house can be built, often in the same compound.

Kemp[1] has shown how post-marital residence in the house of the bride's parents is a common feature for most of rural Thailand, and Potter states that: "Matrilocal residence..... is a basic feature of almost all Thai village societies."[2] In Na Chuak Nuea, the 1975 sample records 17 resident son-in-law units, while no daughter-in-law units are reported. Of the few cases known to the writer of virilocal post-marital residence in the village, obvious demographic imbalances (few or no daughters in the groom's parental household) had clearly influenced the choice of post-marital residence. In attempting to explain the preference for matrilocal marriage, Kemp mentions the special bond between parents and their daughters. When parents grow old they need to be cared for, mostly by women, and there is likely to be less conflict between the parents and their daughter than with their

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1 Kemp, J; "Initial Marriage Residence in Rural Thailand", in In Memorium, Phya Anuman Rajadhon, (eds.) T.Bunnag and M. Smithies, Bangkok, 1970

2 Potter, J; Thai Peasant Social Structure, Chicago, 1976, p.156

daughter-in-law[1]. The villagers of Na Chuak Nuea explained the preference for uxorilocal residence by stating that sons were strong and independent; they were able to leave their parents to find new land, but daughters needed protection.

Within the village there are clusters of married daughters of a household living with their husbands and children near the wife's parents household.

The high rate of uxorilocal residence, the clustering of compounds of close female kin, and the pattern of lowland inheritance by daughters explains the correspondence between the areas of lowland held by close kin and the residential grouping (see Maps 1.2 and 1.3). These maps also illustrate how certain residential clusters hold marginal plots of land: plots on the boundaries of the village land (see clusters marked blue and brown). Furthermore, those residences not marked on Map 1.2 (either because they are landless (No.102) or because they hold plots far from the village), are located on the perimeter of the village. The land tenure map is itself a reflection of the social organization of the village, and this correspondence will continue for as long as land is transmitted from one generation to another, regulated through the systems of kinship and marriage, rather than through market transactions. While the lowland tenure map reflects the residential clustering of close kin, the same correspondence between residential and land groupings does not obtain for the upland areas, west of the canal; except perhaps an area of land to the extreme west which corresponds to a residential grouping from the north of the village. Purchase and self-clearance are now important channels through which upland is obtained

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1 Kemp, J; op.cit; p.83

Map 1.2 Residence Map

BAN NA CHUAK NUEA



Map 1.3 Land Tenure and Residence Patterns



Purchase

R.C.Y. Ng[1] writes, with reference to the study area -

"..purchased land is mostly located in close proximity to the settlement, and transactions involve only fellow villagers..... with the advent of irrigation, most villagers have become reluctant to part with their land and land purchasing has virtually ceased in the last few years."

Map 1.4 shows the location of lowland plots that have been purchased; they tend to be situated to the east of the village and many of them border onto the track.

There is evidence that certain farmers, aware of the importance of irrigation have begun to speculate in land. One large land-owner has in the last few years shifted the main focus of his agricultural activity from the traditional family holding X, on the upland (No.108) to land east of the village, Y, purchased as forest from his brother, eight years ago, and slowly cleared. As Table 1.2 shows some 37% of the upland has been purchased and the amount purchased and self-cleared together exceeds the number of plots inherited. Land prices vary considerably, depending on productivity, and for the lowland its accessibility. From my recorded cases, upland fetches around 1,000 baht a rai, and a good piece of irrigated lowland between 3-4,000 baht per rai. While land purchases between villages is found in the peripheral areas, especially in the south of the village, where Ban Na Chuak Nuea villagers own land intermingled with land held by a village to the south (see Map 1.4), many of the land transactions involve siblings and close kin.

Other Methods of Acquisition

These other methods of access to land include land-renting, self-clearance and free-use arrangements. In these cases a household gains access to the use of land, but rights of ownership[2] are held by a third party. These forms of access are

1 Ng,R; "The Land Holding Pattern". Lam Pao Report Series No. 2, 1974, p.17

2 Although it was noted in a previous section that only 1% of land is legally held under full time deed, the N.S.3 within the village is held to be a title of ownership

Map 1.4 Recorded Cases of Lowland Land Purchase



the most fluid, and in many cases are temporary arrangements. Table 1.2 indicated that there is an absence of land renting on any large scale. This is an important point, and a feature found generally in the N.E. although there are regional variations. For example, within the whole irrigation area there is a low incidence of renting of land, although one village was remarkable in this respect, with 36% of its agricultural land obtained through renting arrangements. This high incidence is related to particularly high population presure. It is this generally low incidence of tenant farmers which distinguishes the Northeast farmer from his counterpart in the Central Plains. Renting arrangements are made between two different types of farmer: on the one hand the small holders needing to supplement the production from their own land, and on the other households already well endowed with land seeking to further maximize production. A case to illustrate the latter type is the former village headman, who had the foresight to rent land from the village school teacher at the outlet of the canal. There are also cases of renting arrangements between villages. The usual renting arrangement is for payment of one third of the total production, but because of quite large variations in yield, no standard rent can be given per rai. As land pressure increases and as the opportunity to clear new land declines there will almost inevitably be an increase in renting arrangements. Self-clearance was the traditional method for a young married couple to acquire an independent plot. A recent motivation to clear much of the forest was the kenaf boom, but before this forest areas were cleared for the cultivation of traditional upland crops such as the mulberry for domestic silk weaving.

As the transition from subsistence to commercialized agriculture progresses, land as a factor of production will become to a greater extent a marketable commodity and inevitably there will be changes in the institutionalized methods of transmission and allocation of land. Table 1.2 suggests one area of

the allocation system which does appear to have altered substantially between 1971 and 1975: the 'free-use' of land. The Table shows that the area of land under free-use arrangements has been reduced, especially for the lowland. Ng[1] writes:

> "as the irrigation programme is being implemented and with the almost certain consequential revaluation of the irrigable land, it is most likely that this type of rent-free tenancy will give way to a more formal type of tenancy."

These free-use arrangements are usually made between kin and are often inter-generational within an extended family, for example, where a son-in-law unit has recently become an independent household. This form of free-use often precedes actual partition. Recently there have been an increasing number of households growing a dry-season crop on irrigated land under free-use arrangements. As dry-season cropping increases and becomes an economically viable alternative to other forms of dry-season occupation, especially wage labouring outside the village, it is to be expected that irrigated households will be less disposed to offer free-use of land under these arrangements. While these free-use arrangements appear to be devoid of any notion of commercialism being based rather on an ethos of kinship-sharing, a notion of return is often implied. Thus a son-in-law with access to a small parcel of land is often required to contribute his labour to his father-in-law's main plot. In one example a son-in-law had "free-use" of a 10 rai plot, but was required to spend 4 hours each day for 30 days ploughing his father-in-law's 37 rai paddy plot; and a further 30 days, with his wife, transplanting. However, if this labour is valued at the going-rate for wage labour (12 bahts per day, 6-8 hours), it is only 10% of the productivity of the 10 rai plot and cannot be compared with a rent transaction which usually equals 20-30% of the production. In another example, in

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1 Ibid; p.14

which a notion of return is implied, a farmer gave out 10 rai of uncleared upland on a free-use basis, but he calculated that he was saving 40 baht per rai as the land was cleared.

In this section the channels through which one factor of production, land, is transmitted and allocated have been examined. Acquisition through inheritance: the right to land based on kinship status, is still the most important channel and kinship relations can be found behind many other forms of allocation, especially the free-use arrangements. Furthermore, the land holding pattern for the lowland because of the inheritance and residence patterns, has been seen to be a reflection of the social organization of the village. The two different branches of village agricultural production: lowland paddy cultivation and upland cropping, contrast in the ways in which they articulate with village social structure.

Human Labour

"The ties between producers tend to reach out beyond the common interest in the act of production and its rewards alone. A production relationship is often only one facet of a social relationship." [1]

A feature of primitive and peasant economies is that there are no durable social units based solely on productive activities, and the bonds which structure families, clans and kindreds are more often than not the bonds which organize economic activities[2]. In this section human labour as a factor of production is discussed; its organization and the means by which it is acquired are examined.

In the village the basic unit of production is the household which may consist of a simple nuclear family with two adult workers, or an extended three-generational household with attached son-in-law units. While the simple nuclear family is easily identifiable as a productive unit, the extended type may bifurcate into two or more productive units: a son-in-law working

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1 Firth, R; "Elements of Social Organization", London, 1951, p.136

2 Nash, M; "The Organization of Economic Life" in Tribal and Peasant Economies,(ed.) Dalton,G; New York, 1967, p.5

one plot, the father-in-law another. However, before partition, ownership is held by the elderly household head who retains control over all the land, and the products from all plots are communally held.

Division of Labour

Within the household females contribute substantially to the labour force.

"It is well known that the contribution of female labour in Thai agriculture is among the highest participation rates in the world, and it is clear that women, although they do not help with heavy ploughing, are full-time workers except when family affairs or pregnancies prevent them from taking part." [1]

Furthermore, children from the age of 10 years are also making an effective contribution to agriculture, and village schools are closed during the labour peaks. Household labour requirements for agriculture vary according to the crop and each agricultural process. Generally, one or two household members are involved in ploughing, for transplanting at least two, more frequently three or four, and for harvest most family members are employed. Figure 1.3 illustrates the participation of males and females in paddy cultivation, upland cropping and livestock rearing. It can be seen for paddy cultivation and upland cropping that female labour participation is almost identical to male participation, with the exception that the male working life is longer. For livestock rearing although females participate when they are young (under 20 years), males participate to a greater extent.

Labour Exchange

In Na Chuak Nuea and indeed in the region as a whole, the traditional labour use pattern is influenced by the erratic climate. Glutinous rice production accounts for approximately 74% of total man-days expended on agriculture and certain processes

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1 Demaine, H; "The Use of Labour Resources", Lam Pao Report Series No. 4, 1964, p.9

Figure 1.3 Labour participation Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975



in the paddy cycle have to be completed within a short period of time. Traditionally the productive units, composed of households, combined at certain stages of the agricultural cycle to form labour exchange groups. These labour arrangements are not found for the upland cropping sector and generally for paddy cultivation they are on the decline. Two forms of labour exchange arrangements are to be found in the village. Firstly 'longkhaek' the joining together of large bands of kinsmen mostly for harvesting but also sometimes for transplanting or even house construction[1]. These bands would work on each others fields in turn, the recipient household on each occasion providing food and refreshment. 'Longkhaek' arrangements are found in the other regions of Thailand and are well known for their festivity. Another arrangement involves small-scale 'mutual help groups': transfers of labour usually between two households, where one is suffering a labour shortage. These arrangements are made between kin or neighbours and may or may not involve reciprocity. Table 1.4 shows the decrease in the incidence of these labour arrangements between 1972-1975.

Table 1.4 Labour exchange, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1972 and 1975

	1972	1975
Longkhaek		
No. of households	8 (22% of sample)	9 (20% of sample)
No. of persons	12	11
No. of days	113	37
Mutual help groups		
No. of households	12 (32% of sample)	9 (20% of sample)
No. of persons	25	10
No. of days	198	87

1 In other villages in the area 'longkhaek' bands still form for fishing expeditions

It is necessary to examine some of the possible explanations for the decrease in these traditional forms of labour exchange arrangements. Referring to the 'longkhaek' arrangements, Amyot[1] writes that there is a correlation between the level of economic development and the persistence in villages of these traditional arrangements. He maintains that they are most developed and institutionalized in underdeveloped areas with a low-level subsistence type of economy, and the reliance on them declines when the economy progresses to one of surplus production for the market. Demaine[2] suggests that the adoption of semi-improved varieties of rice which have replaced many of the local Northeast strains may have contributed to the decline of 'longkhaek'. Previously a farmer would have planted a whole variety of different rice types each maturing at a different time thus staggering the harvest period. Furthermore, the increased participation in upland cropping has also removed a certain amount of labour which before may have been contributed to the assistance of their fellows.

As Demaine suggests: the general network breaks down when the system diversifies.[3] When everyone grows the same crop reciprocal labour arrangements are no problem. The general trend is therefore a move away from labour groups organized on principles of kinship, residence and reciprocity to the commercial hiring of labour. Furthermore, the introduction of irrigation can be seen to have contributed to the decline. Irrigation imposes a strict régime on the farm routine with each turn-out[4] receiving water in rotation. Farmers with adjoining plots, who are therefore very probably kinsmen, are likely to receive water at the same time, and are unlikely to have spare time to help others.

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1 Amyot,J; Provisional Paper on Changing Patterns of Social Structure in Thailand, 1851-1906, Delhi, 1964, p.105

2 Demaine, H; op.cit; p.16

3 Ibid; p.17

4 Gate through which water passes from the Main Canal to the subsiduaries. For an explanation of the irrigation system see next section

While these labour exchange arrangements have declined, the incidence of hired labour has increased. While in 1972 25% of the village households were using hired labour, in 1975 this figure rises to 54%. Table 1.5 shows the number of households wage-labouring in the village for years 1972 and 1975.

Table 1.5 Ban Na Chuak Nuea households wage-labouring in the village, 1972 and 1975

	1972	1975
No. of households	5 (13% of sample)	10 (22% of sample
No. of persons	6	17
No. of man-days	61	138

Of those 17 villagers wage-labouring for their fellows in 1971 in the village 9 were employed for weeding, 7 for harvesting and 1 for transplanting. Table 1.6 shows the numbers of villagers hired for agricultural work by Na Chuak Nuea households in 1975.

Table 1.6 Number of persons hired for agriculture, by process Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

Rice crop	No. persons	Upland crops	No. of persons
1st ploughing	15	1st ploughing	4
2nd ploughing	18	2nd ploughing	2
Transplanting	40	Planting	20
Weeding	10	Weeding	16
Harvesting	56	Harvesting	41

The data from which this table is drawn does not specify whether the labourer hired is from outside the village, or a fellow villager. Nor does it indicate whether any labourer is hired for more than one process, although it is common to hire the same labourer throughout the agricultural season if the labour is required. However, as only one person from the 1975 sample reported that he was hired in the village to help with transplanting, and from the same sample 40 persons were reported as being hired, it can be deduced that a large number of wage-labourers are coming in from other villages. This was confirmed during interviews in a neighbouring upland village, Nongkaw, situated outside the irrigation area. Here it was reported that 30-40 villagers regularly come down to Na Chuak Nuea every year. Nongkaw is one of many upland villages facing acute drought conditions. In the 1974-75 crop season only 57% of the households were able to grow rice as a result of the drought. The majority of these households produced only 500-1,000 kg of paddy, equivalent to 2-4 rai of normal paddy production on the lowland. Drought conditions affect upland village production approximately once in every three years. The upland villages therefore, under present circumstances provide a ready labour force for the irrigated lowland villages such as Ban Na Chuak Nuea.

A distinction should be made between those villagers hiring in labour during labour peaks, for one or two processes, and those farmers who employ hired labour throughout the paddy season from ploughing to harvesting. Here there is a distinction between households who use hired labour to supplement their own labour force at peak periods, and those where the hired labour component is an integrated part of the labour force (see (Table 1.7).

Table 1.7 Households hiring labour by the number of processes

No. of processes	No. of households
1	13
2	11
3	6
4	11
5	1

Those households who hire labour throughout the season have higher ratios of consumer/worker (2.1, village average 1.9) and higher ratios of rai/worker (8.34, village average 5.2). It seems therefore that hired labour is a function of the inadequacy of the domestic labour force. There is also an emergence of hired labour to replace the household labour, which is then free to engage in other activities. One example of this is the village headman, who employs two resident wage-labourers throughout the paddy season, he himself contributing very little labour.

Furthermore, there are fine distinctions between the types of labour hired. These types include resident adolescent wage-labourers, fellow kinsmen and villagers and non-villagers. In 1975, 4 households (7%) had a permanent wage labourer resident in the household. These were children, aged 10-16 years, male and female, all born in the village. They were not considered to be adopted children, and were called 'khonrapčhang' (a wage-labourer). In all these cases the child had been resident in the household for two or three years, and in two cases the child had received no formal education. The usual payment was in the region of 1,200 kg of rice. Exchange of labour of this sort was between rich and poor households, with large families with small holdings sending children to work in rich households, often with members working outside the village. In other cases, adolescents are sent to live and work in other households for the

duration of the paddy season. The village headman, for example, employs his eldest sister's son and son-in-law from another village during the paddy season. The headman's two sons, similar in age to the two labourers, left for school each day, while their cousins left to work the rice land. In some cases there are obvious reasons for adopting adolescent labour. Either the receiving household has few children or they lack children of one/or other sex. In two cases it was stated that the children were likely to become the future son or daughter-in-law.

Manning Nash writes that among the Mexican Tepoztlan hiring a fellow member of the community for labour is a "delicate social job", and the transaction must not appear as a strictly economic one[1]. Within this Thai village a large number of households employ fellow kinsmen. While in the above cases some form of status distinction occurs between households loaning children and households receiving, for the most part the hirers and the hired cannot be regarded as different status groups. If whole households were hired maybe some form of status difference would emerge, however, at the present time a household hiring a labourer for a peak period may also hire out a household member to another household at another period. 16% of the households hiring in labour also had one or more members being hired for a few days by another household. The incidence of hired kinsmen for paddy cultivation can be regarded as the 'commercialization' of the traditional 'longkhaek' and mutual help arrangements. If the hiring of kin labour was such a delicate job one would expect to see a trend towards hiring non-kin. Rather it seems that the kinship principle of sharing labour persists but the impossibility of reciprocating in kind (returned labour) has resulted in the payment of a wage, often in rice.

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1 Nash, M; op.cit; p.6

If labour is scarce in the village, men will recruit labour from other villages; mention has already been made of Nongkaw in this respect. It is in these cases that status differences are most evident. The lowlanders feel a definite sense of superiority, and the relationship between hirer and hired is on a strict commercial basis.

It has been found therefore that the basic production units in the village are not self-sufficient and need at certain times to acquire labour from outside the household. Recent diversification of cropping and the introduction of irrigation has changed the institutional means of acquiring this extra labour, and kin group sharing is being replaced by hired labour. But the importance of kinship ties still persist, and much of the recent hiring of labour within the village can be seen as the commercialization of the previous arrangements. Extended kin still work together but returned labour is replaced with a wage. While status differentials can be seen to be emerging between the hirers and the hired, especially those hired from outside the village, the persistence of exchanges of kinsmen balances this trend. Those hired out from households are often the younger members, and there are many examples of young members of the richer households contributing the odd day here and there for wage-labouring.

Water

Another important factor of production is water. Although the annual rainfall of the Northeast is not substantially lower than the other regions, it is erratic and the porosity of the sandy soil make the region a marginal area for paddy production, and some degree of flood or drought damage has been accepted as a natural phenomenon by most farmers. In 1971, 22% of the paddy crop was damaged by drought and 19.5% by flooding and approximately 4.5% of the kenaf was similarly affected. It was to these erratic climatic conditions that the subsistence rice production was geared.

Traditionally, a holding was composed of scattered plots, each plot on a different type of land "to ensure a crop in any year which might produce either drought or serious flooding, ownership of land at different elevations is the best safeguard against uncertainty." [1]

The pattern of land holding favoured plots which as far as possible extended over different elevations, the plots were sinuous in shape and were sub-divided accordingly. This is well illustrated on Maps 1-4 especially plots lying to the north of the village.

As Demaine and Dixon[2] comment, such a system of land holding arising in response to climatic unreliability is sure to be challenged by the presence of irrigation water which will remove the rationale of the system. The climatic conditions also necessitated a form of extensive cultivation.

"(The farmer) would reason that floods and drought would affect meticulously planted fields as much as crudely prepared ones. The winning strategy was to maximize the harvest yield." [3]

The Organization of Irrigation

The construction of an irrigation system has enabled approximately 60% of the village households to receive irrigation water ideally in regular and adequate amounts throughout the year. All those farmers receiving irrigation water are required to become members of the 'Samakhomphuchainam', the 'Water Users Association' [4] which was established seven years ago. At present the entrance fee is 10 baht, and no water charge is levied. Members of the W.U.A. elect a committee composed of a president, who at present is the local 'kamnan'(commune headman), an accountant, a secretary and village representatives. Every

1 Ng, R; "Rural Change in South East Asia", Geography, Vol. 59, Part 3, July 1974, p. 253

2 Demaine and Dixon, op.cit; p.56

3 Ng,R; op.cit; p.254

4 Subsequently referred to as W.U.A.

50,000 rai of irrigated land is under the supervision of a 'Nai Truat Conprathan': the Chief Engineer, and to every 10,000 rai a 'zone-man'[1] is appointed. Both holders of these offices are employees of the Royal Irrigation Department[2]. At the village level there is a 'phu chuai chonprathan': 'the common irrigator' elected by the village who organizes a number of 'nai truat na': 'ditch-riders', who are responsible for each 'turn-out'. Ditch-riders are elected by farmers whose land lies within the area irrigated by each 'turn-out'. Both the above appointments must be approved by the R.I.D. The ditch-rider, under the supervision of the common irrigator works in liaison with the zone-man, and is responsible for canal maintenance and water-sending (see Fig. 1.4).

Figure 1.4 The Organization of Irrigation



1 This term has been incorporated into the vernacular

2 Subsequently referred to as R.I.D.

The irrigated lands of Na Chuak Nuea falls under the control of four gates, or 'turn-outs' (see Map 1.5). Water from the Right Main Canal passes through the gate into a smaller canal, the 'khlongsoi'; from this canal water is passed into a smaller ditch 'khlongnam' by regulating a smaller gate. Regulation of the main gate, the 'banbitbooet' is the responsibility of both the zone-man and the ditch-rider, but the ditch-rider must consult with the zone-man before opening the gate.

Figure 1.5 Water Sending



The R.I.D. is responsible for the construction of the Main Canal and the 'khlongsoi's, and although this department surveys the farm ditches they are left to the farmers to build.

Figure 1.5 illustrates the way in which water is passed from the Main Canal to a certain farmer, B. Permission to open the main gate is sought from the ditch-rider who consults with the zone-man. When the water is sent, B must temporarily block the 'khlongnam' in order to direct water into his plot, thus cutting off irrigation from C and D.

Map 1.5 The Irrigation System



Disputes and disagreements related to irrigation and water-sending occur at two points in the organizational structure. The first critical point occurs between the R.I.D. and the W.U.A. (see Fig. 1.4). The W.U.A. to which the villagers of Na Chuak Nuea are affiliated, has a membership catchment area of 70,000 rai and so the members from Na Chuak Nuea compose only a small part of the membership and the committee is composed of representatives from each village. Large meetings are held twice a year; but in the event of a major dispute arising, emergency meetings may be proposed. Each meeting of the W.U.A. is attended by an R.I.D. observer. The main areas of dispute between the R.I.D. and W.U.A. relate to the allocation of responsibilities. The R.I.D. maintains that once the canal is constructed, responsibility for repair lies with the villager. The villager, however, when confronted with broken concrete linings caused by bad survey work, technical miscalculation and budget cutting construction work, argues that he has neither the tools nor the capital to tackle the task. The R.I.D. claim that the villagers misuse the irrigation system by allowing their buffalo to wallow in the canals and by chopping up wooden bridges for firewood, using explosives to fish in the main dam, and damaging the canal by constructing illegal pipes and pumps to siphon off water, offences for which 10,000 baht fines can be imposed[1]. This last problem is common amongst villagers such as X (on Fig. 1.5), whose plot adjoins the canal, but whose access to water is less direct than, for example, farmer B, lying further away, due to the positioning of farm ditches. Furthermore, the irrigation system has been imposed upon an existing pattern of land tenure without much consideration for the organization of that system. In some places the canal has cut across established cattle trails, with no provision for crossing made. In the south of the village certain villagers in order to receive irrigation water must reach agreement with

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1 The chief engineer told me of three recent cases of villagers (not from Ban Na Chuak Nuea) tampering with the Main Canal. In these cases fines were not imposed, but the offenders were required to repair the damage.

land owners from another village.

The second point of conflict relates to disputes arising at the lowest level of the organization structure between the farmers themselves. In a preceding section it was noted that close kinsmen are likely to hold adjoining lowland plots, and inevitably many of the disputes now occurring are between kinsmen. As Fig. 1.5 illustrates, in order for water to reach villager B, the co-operation of other farmers in adjacent plots is required. Water can only pass to B through A's land, and if A needs to irrigate his plot he must block the canal temporarily. According to one informant, refusal to send water down to a lower plot is the most common type of disagreement. If a case arises, the zone-man and ditch-rider are called and a 200 baht fine imposed on the offending farmer. Another area of dispute relates to the inheritance of plots by siblings. An earlier case cited at the beginning of the chapter (case 1, Map 1.1) is an illustration of this. Here the second sister inherited a large but flood-prone plot (1b), since the introduction of irrigation this plot has become highly productive. Disputes between kin arise because once again there has been an imposition of a new system on a previously existing system based on kinship status, with its pattern of defined rights and obligations. In certain respects the old system articulates with the new; for example, the village headman is the elected village representative for the W.U.A. and is also one of the ditch-riders. Another ditch-rider is one of the two village ritual officiants, who traditionally had special powers to mediate with the gods in bringing rain. Serious disputes also arise between different villages, especially in the south of the village where land from two villages is irrigated from one 'turn-out'. While disputes between kin involve bitter arguments, those between different villages have been known to involve physical harrassment.

This series of conflict points can perhaps be compared with Evans-Pritchard's[1] notion of lineage segmentation, where a segment of the structure in one context is united and in another opposed, and consequently some form of cohesion results. For example, irrigated villages (see Fig. 1.6) contrast themselves with the upland non-irrigated villages, from which they draw much of their hired labour. The W.U.A. unites to oppose the R.I.D. on certain issues, and different villages of the W.U.A. conflict on certain matters. Within a village, especially Na Chuak Nuea, there is a distinction made between those who have irrigation water, and those that do not. The four gates in the village sometimes create dispute groups, especially in 1975, when one gate, No. 3 was virtually unoperational and therefore members of this group were without water. And then as mentioned above disputes commonly arise between members of the same gates.

Figure 1.6 Levels of Opposition



1 Evans-Pritchard, E; "The Nuer", London, 1940.

At any one level therefore there is group cohesion and solidarity between certain parties which at another level dissolves and disintegrates into disputes. In the north of Thailand government projects have been built in areas with a long history of traditional irrigation. Potter[1] describes how Chiangmai villagers participate in three separate irrigation systems: a traditional type, a modified traditional type and a new government irrigation system. In describing the traditional irrigation system, Potter writes:

"The successful completion of maintenance and repair tasks requires the co-operation of large numbers of men; the supervision of these men and the co-ordination of their activities requires leaders who have authority to make decisions. These leaders also need effective sanctions to ensure that each member of the irrigation association fulfills his obligations. Such a system of authority has existed for centuries in the Chiengmai valley." [2]

The lack of such a tradition of communal irrigation in the Northeast is a crucial factor, although it cannot be strictly inferred that the conflicts arising within the irrigation system are necessarily related to the lack of traditional irrigation for as Potter mentions ... there are levels of opposition and conflict within the traditional irrigation system of Chiangmai village[3].

Perhaps the most important consequence of the introduction of irrigation is that it has linked the village into a wider official administrative body. This is not to say that previously the village was an isolated unit, administrative political machinery enmeshed the village some time ago. But the irrigation system has directly imposed itself upon the agricultural production system of the village which previously was organized according to different criteria.

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1 Potter, J; Thai Peasant Social Structure, Chicago, 1976, p.82

2 Ibid; pp 88-89

3 Ibid;p. 100

Livestock

The livestock to be found in the village include water buffalo, cows, a few pigs and poultry - chickens, ducks and geese. Most of these animals are kept in kraals beneath the house, although the buffalo and cows are taken out to graze during the day. Water buffalo are an important factor of production in agriculture as work animals, both for ploughing and for pulling the traditional wooden carts used for transporting crops from the field. While in 1971, 95% of the village owned at least two water buffalos and some as many as thirteen, in 1975 this figure has dropped to 80%. There is an apparent trend towards specialization, with those owning herds owning large ones, and this can partly be explained by the reduction in available pasture land since the introduction of irrigation[1], and also by the increasing incidence of cattle theft. A group of cattle rustlers, rumoured to be led by the Indian meat sellers in Kalasin market, are active in the area. Another factor to be taken into account is the availability of labour for herding; for the most part the cattle minders are children and adolescents of both sexes. The village headman himself does not own a water buffalo as both his sons are attending secondary school. Although primary education is technically compulsory for all children, a number of under-twelves in Ban Na Chuak Nuea are regularly out of school tending the herds. The headman's household is typical of many who now rely on renting arrangements when animal labour is required for agriculture. In some cases the animals are lent out with no return, but the usual rent paid is approximately 250 kg of paddy per month. From the 1975 sample there was only one case of rent being paid in cash (300 baht for one month). There are also cases where both buffalo and owner are hired as a work team.

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1 This is particularly felt during the rainy season, and increasingly during the dry season as second cropping develops.

As well as an important factor of production in agriculture, livestock in the Northeast have been traditionally raised for sale. Recently, there has been a decrease in the demand for water buffalo, mostly sold to the Central Plains, due to the introduction of tractor ploughing in that region. Investment is now directed into the rearing of an American breed of cow; these snow white 'Brahmin' cows are much valued above the local brown breed. While cows are never used for ploughing, the local browns and occasionally the 'Brahmin' breed are employed for draught purposes. The sale price of the local breed varies, depending upon age, between 2,000 - 4,000 baht. While a pure bred white 'Brahmin' bull can fetch between 110,000 - 150,000 baht.

The number of pigs raised in the village has increased substantially from a herd size of around 10 in 1971 to one of 80 in 1975. Ng[1] comments that the total number of pigs raised in the village is a function of the rice requirement of the community as the pigs thrive on the bran from domestic milling. However, the marked increase in pig-rearing cannot be attributed solely to any increase in rice consumption, and pig-rearing has now become an important branch of investment.

Most households also keep the odd chicken or duck beneath the house, and poultry although not a daily item of diet, are kept for ceremonial feasting. Some households specialize in poultry, keeping as many as 50 chickens, ducks or geese and selling the eggs and chicks in the local market. However, a recent poultry disease has drastically depleted the chicken population. A few villagers, the headman included, raise fighting cockerels used in village contests and contests further afield.

Livestock technology in the village is underdeveloped when compared with other pastoral communities, and this is related to the role of livestock in village production. Although an important factor of production in the subsistence branch of production, as labour, cattle are rarely slaughtered in the village, thus hides and horns etc., have not been used for the variety of purposes

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1 Ng, R; "Rural Change in Southeast Asia", Geography, Vol.59, 1974, p.253.

to which they could be put. Furthermore, cattle are never milked, although cattle dung is used as a natural fertilizer.

Livestock are acquired predominantly through purchase, but on the death of a household head a herd may be distributed among all the children resident in the village, depending of course on the number of cattle. Generally, if only one buffalo or cow is owned, the youngest resident daughter inherits. There are other means of acquisition, in one case a household agreed to tend and pasture another household's buffalo in return receiving the calf from that animal.

Livestock raising as a branch of production is to be contrasted with other agricultural branches of production in the village in respect of division of labour. Pre-adolescent and adolescent labour is used for cattle tending and the trading transactions involving cattle are predominantly conducted by adult males.

In this chapter the ownership, distribution and acquisition of certain factors of production were examined. It was found that inheritance is still the major means by which lowland is obtained. While the ideology of inheritance directs the transmission of land through the daughters of a household, in the empirical case factors such as the size of the holding to be allotted, the demographic composition, and the present land holding position of the sibling group become the major factors influencing allocation. However, less than one half of the upland has been acquired through inheritance, and purchase is becoming an important method of acquisition. Upland and lowland cultivation, as two different branches of agricultural production articulate differently with the social structure. The close correspondence between kin groups and residential clusters reflected in the lowland tenure pattern, contrasts with the lack of such a correspondence on the upland, where the pattern, if one emerges, is one of groups of brothers holding adjoining or nearby plots. The differences between upland and lowland cultivation with their associated tenure patterns are fundamentally much more than a difference in types of crops grown, the crop cycles

and the labour in-puts. Both branches of production, because of the different patterns of social relations of allocation articulate differently with the socio-economic system.

The decline of traditional labour arrangements: 'longkhaek' and mutual help groups was noted together with the increasing incidence of labour hire. A number of factors influencing this trend were discussed; the introduction of irrigation, with its strict régime of water-sending, and the use of new rice varieties, both of which remove the flexibility of the previous system. A distinction was made between the different types of hirer: those hiring labour in response to sporadic household labour shortage, and those beginning to replace their own labour with hired labour. Different types of hired labourer were discussed: the resident adolescent labourers sent from a poor household, the prospective son-in-law labourer, the kinsmen (which the writer suggests is the commercialization of the previous 'longkhaek') and the labourer coming in from another village. In evaluating any status distinctions between the hirer and the hired it was argued that the diversity of different types of relation between the two preclude any over-riding status differentiation.

The introduction of the irrigation system was analysed as an imposition of a new system, requiring new forms of cooperation, onto a pre-existing system based on the autonomy of the household (an autonomy which nevertheless traditionally broke down at peak periods under labour exchange arrangements). Certain areas of conflict within the hierarchy of the organization of the water-sending system were discussed, and it was illustrated that certain levels within the structure conflict in one context, to coalesce in another.

In discussing livestock, as both a branch of production: the rearing of cattle for sale, and as a factor of production:animal labour for ploughing, a trend toward specialization was noted and the associated increase in buffalo renting arrangements. The under-development of livestock technology was briefly discussed and this

was related to the position of livestock rearing in the village economy, as one of a set of the factors of production in the subsistence branch, or as a source of investment when the subsistence branch of production furnished a surplus.

Throughout the chapter the discussion has attempted to show that the previous balance between the different factors of production has been altered. The discussion now proceeds with an analysis of resource utilization.

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING THE UTILIZATION OF .. RESOURCES

"Kinship, chieftainship, even the ritual order, whatever they may be, appear in the primitive societies as economic forces. The grand strategy of economic intensification enlists social structures beyond the family and cultural superstructures beyond the productive process." [1]

In the previous chapter the distribution, ownership and allocation of certain factors of production were examined. It was noted that the basic production group was the household; and the most important branch of production was the cultivation of glutinous rice. Having reviewed the distribution and allocation of factors of production, the discussion is now focussed on the use of certain factors. The variations in production intensities between households and the socio-economic factors which explain these differences will be discussed.

In Section 1, I briefly review the fundamental characteristics of the Domestic Mode of Production and the notion of surplus, and comment on Sahlins' argument concerning the basic orientations of primitive and peasant production. In Section 2 the differences in production levels between households in the study village between 1971-1975 are examined, and the socio-economic factors influencing these variations are discussed. I also briefly comment on changes in the disposal of the surplus.

1. The Domestic Mode of Production

'A species of anarchy'

Sahlins refers to the domestic mode of production as a species of anarchy[2]: a unit of production, independent of other units working to satisfy its own wants and needs.

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1 Sahlins, M; Stone Age Economics, London, 1974, pp 101-102

2 Ibid; p.95

"The domestic mode anticipates no social or material relations between households except that they are alike..... The social economy is fragmented into a thousand petty existences, each organized to proceed independently of the others and each dedicated to the homebred principle of looking out for itself..... In principle each house retains, as well as its own interests, all the powers that are wanted to satisfy them. Divided thus into so many units of self-concern, functionally uncoordinated, production by the domestic mode has all the organization of the so many potatoes in a certain famous sack of potatoes." [1]

This is the essence of the domestic mode of production, but as Sahlins notes, in the empirical case the household is linked to other households and to other social institutions which work to counterpose these tendencies.

The domestic mode of production has the following features: it is essentially 'production for use', it generally displays an under-use of labour power, and it is imposed upon by forces of a higher order: kinship systems, political structures, and in the case of the peasant domestic mode of production, economic forces such as the Market.

Production for use

One of the distinguishing features of a peasant society is the production of a surplus over and above the household units basic requirements. It is by selling this surplus that the peasant household becomes engaged in the market system, and thereby enters the monetary economy. As in tribal and primitive economies, the basic unit of production is the domestic group. The essential quality of a subsistence mode of production is that it is production for use, rather than production for exchange. The household was required to produce enough to reproduce itself, that is to satisfy its consumption and social needs. Therefore its aim or limit was defined and its activity discontinuous.

"The domestic mode of production entertains limited economic goals, qualitatively defined in terms of a way of living rather than quantitatively as an abstract wealth, work is accordingly unintensive, intermittent, and susceptible to all manner of interruption .....ranging from heavy ritual to light rainfall."[2]

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1 Ibid; p. 95

2 Ibid; p.86

The unit of production is therefore a social unit and inherently contains an anti-surplus principle in so far as once the socially required level of production has been reached, production ceases.

Sahlins maintains that the domestic mode of production in peasant societies is a cousin to Marx's scheme of the simple circulation of commodities[1]: C ⟶ M ⟶ C', where the manufacture of commodity (C) is sold in the market in order to obtain (M) money for the purchase of other specific commodities (C'). The exchange in this formula is directed towards consumption. This circulation of commodities is the opposite of the bourgeois entrepreneur with his interest in exchange value, characterized by the formula M ⟶ C ⟶ M' : the transformation of a given money sum into more of the same by way of a commodity. The distinction between exchange value and use value is important. In the first formula the commodity was exchanged for another and the exchange was orientated to livelihood and consumption; in the second formula the exchange is motivated by gain.

"Livelihood and gain 'production for use', and 'production for exchange' pose thus contrasting finalities of production and, accordingly contrasting intensities of production." [2]

The distinction between these two types of exchange is by no means clear cut, for although Sahlins speaks of the motivation of gain as directed towards some kind of accumulation of 'abstract wealth', wealth in peasant societies is as much directed into consumption as investment. Sahlins' statements tend to obscure the heterogeneity of peasant types, which indeed include the peasant entrepreneur, but this is a topic of a later chapter. Here the structure of a peasant subsistence economy is examined, a structure which Sahlins maintains shows certain profound tendencies of the domestic mode of production.

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1 Ibid; p.84

2 Ibid; p.83

".... a fragmented peasant economy may more clearly than any other primitive community present on the empirical level certain profound tendencies of the D.M.P.[1] In the primitive case these tendencies are concealed and transfigured by general social relations of solidarity and authority. The peasant domestic economy, articulated rather to the market by exchange than to other households by corporate kinship ..... manifests to inspection the deep structure of the D.M.P.[1] It manifests in particular an under-use of labour power." [2]

The under-use of labour

This under-use of labour was the central theme of much of A. Chayanov's work on pre-revolutionary Russian peasantry, and led to the formulation of Chayanov's Rule which states that the intensity of labour in a system of domestic production for use varies inversely with the relative working capacity of the producing unit. Therefore the smaller the relative proportion of workers the more they must work in order to reach a certain level of livelihood. The Chayanov curve can be regarded as a line of normal intensity, and what is regarded as normal intensity is physically and socially defined. Thus:

"A social system has a specific structure and inflection of household labour intensity, deviating in a characteristic way and extent from the Chayanov line of normal intensity." [3]

Production profiles and social structure

In his analysis Sahlins presents a method of depicting an intensity profile using the Chayanov Rule to present a curve of normal intensity: the domestic labour intensity increasing by a factor of the customary consumption requirement for every increase of 1.00 in the domestic ratio of consumers to workers. Sahlins then attempts to relate different intensity profiles to specific social structures. In one example Sahlins uses Thayer Scudder's data on cereal production in the Valley Tonga village of Mazulu[4]. He shows that here the Chayanov Rule holds in a general way: the acreage cultivated per gardener increases proportionately in rough relation to the ratio of consumers/gardeners. Furthermore, the

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1 Domestic Mode of Production

2 Shanin, M; op.cit; p.89

3 Ibid; p.103

4 Scudder, T; The Ecology of the Gwembe Tonga, Manchester, 1960

analysis showed that certain households were cultivating above their consumption requirements. Sahlins argues that the sub-intensive production of some households cannot be isolated from the surplus production of others, and he suggests that certain households may not have made it precisely because they thought they could depend on others. The intensity profile of the Kapauku of New Guinea who accumulate pigs and sweet potatoes, whose sale and distribution are major factors in status barg-aining, presents a different picture. The data does not initially show a Chayanov trend, but indicates rather that the community falls into two very different groups of producers. One group conforms to the normal intensity curve, with intensity increasing with the ratio of consumers/producers. The other group was far more labour intensive in proportion to their working capacity. Sahlins related these differences to the prevailing Big-Man system. The latter group of producers, working at a higher level of intensity, represented the Big-Man and his followers, whose production is intensified in order to be converted into status. The former group conforming to the Chayanov curve were those not presently or directly involved in any political machinations.

Sahlins' analysis therefore studies production intensity profiles in terms of their orientations. He argues that the domestic mode of production is essentially orientated or directed by the values and political demands of the wider society. Sahlins calls the D.M.P. a "disarray lurking in the background, always present and never happening."[1] The D.M.P. orientated as it is to satisfying the immediate needs of the family, with its inherent anti-surplus principle, is linked to other social institutions:

"everywhere the petty anarchy of domestic production is counterposed by larger forces and greater organization, institutions of socio-economic order that join one house to another and submit all to a general interest. Still these grand forces of integ-ration are not given in the dominant and immediate relations

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1 Sahlins, M; op.cit; p.101

of production ..... and if in the end anarchy is banished from the surface of things, it is not definitively exiled, it continues, a persistent disarray lurking in the background, so long as the household remains in charge of production."[1]

Sahlins states that the economic impact of the kinship system is less dramatic than the impact of the political structure[2]. In dealing with the influence of different kinship systems on production intensity he argues that labour intensity will be higher among societies with classificatory kinship systems, e.g. the Hawaiian system, than societies which categorically isolate the immediate family, e.g. the Eskimo kinship system. "The Hawaiian system should develop more social pressures on households of greater labour resources."[3] In discussing the influence of the political structure on the domestic mode of production Sahlins points out that the political economy cannot survive on that restrained use of resources which for the domestic economy is a satisfactory existence[4]. Furthermore, he argues that it is possible to isolate certain formal qualities of leadership structure that imply different degrees of domestic productivity[5]. Thus, in the Melanesian Big-Man system a leader moving beyond his own household constructs a following whose production may be harnessed to his ambitions. The leader must not only show personal industry, but he must be able to extract the labour of others. In other systems, e.g. the Polynesian, where political office is ascribed not achieved as in the Melanesian case, and where leaders are accorded tribute payment, different production intensities are to be found.

But what of the peasant domestic mode of production ? Sahlins says that it is articulated to the market rather than to other households by corporate kinship or subsumed beneath a chieftainship[6]. Do market forces operate similarly to counter-

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1 Ibid; pp 95-96

2 Ibid; p.123

3 Ibid; p.123

4 Ibid; p.135

5 Ibid; p.135

6 Ibid; p.89

act the inherent 'anti-surplus' force within this mode of production ? This is what needs further analysis, but it should be clear that while the market principle may become a dominant external force, the social structure of peasant communities is still characterized by important kinship relations and social institutions which orientate the domestic production of households. Sahlins' earlier statement that peasants articulate with the market rather than to those social institutions is too simplistic; the peasant domestic mode of production attempts to articulate with both and consequently contradictions arise.

2. Glutinous Rice Production in Na Chuak Nuea in 1971 and 1975

"The task of research is not finished by the drawing of an intensity profile, it is only thus posed. Before us stretches a work of difficulty and complexity matched only by its promise of an Anthropological Economics and consisting not merely in the accumulation of production profiles but of their interpretation in social terms." [1]

In this section I attempt to apply Sahlins' analysis, albeit somewhat modified, to production data from Na Chuak Nuea. By studying the variation in domestic production it is possible to determine the economic co-efficient of a given social system[2].

I intend to use data on glutinous rice production collected from a sample of households in 1971 and 1975. Firstly a number of methodological difficulties need to be discussed.

Definition of surplus

Most of the reports and documents relating to rice production and consumption in the N.E. of Thailand use *per capita* figures: a mechanical division of household size by number of household members. In a small-scale study it is essential to refine the analysis as much as possible. Consumption units have therefore been calculated on the following formula, used by Sahlins:

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1 *Ibid*; p.121

2 *Ibid*; p.102

adult males (1.0)

adult females (0.8)

preadolescent children (0.5)

Consumption figures for 1971 for Na Chuak Nuea were not available. The 1975 figures give an average consumption per unit of 551 kg. A report by Dixon[1], in 1973 suggests a per capita consumption figure of 327 kg, but this figure was derived from a sample of seven villages, and some variation is to be expected. Rice is also required for seed, temple contributions, barter, livestock feed, and gifts. Dixon's report of 1973 showed that households retained between 25-300 kg of rice for seed (average application 7 kg per rai). Daily rice offerings to monks and ceremonial gifts of rice to the temple were made by most households. It was found that half the village of Na Chuak Nuea were giving rice to relations, amounts ranging from 50-3,000 kg. These include cases of poor families being supported by richer ones, for example, a widowed or divorced spouse with young children being supported by a large kin-unit. Livestock feed averaged out at 200 kg of rice. The paddy required for these other purposes was found to be 27% above the average consumption figures. It is apparent that through the five-year study period there have been changes in the distribution of paddy, in particular there has been an increase in the amount of paddy used for labour payments. In order to compare surplus production in 1971 and 1975, given the incomplete data, the 1973 figures contained in the Dixon report have been utilised, with the exception of the consumption figure which was extracted from 1975 data relating to rice consumption in Na Chuak Nuea. For the analysis, deficit producers are defined as those producing below the amount required for consumption purposes: 551 kg per consumer unit[2]. Balance producers are those producing between 551-800 kg per consumer unit, and surplus producers those

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1 Dixon, C; "The Pattern of Rural Paddy Production and Consumption", Lam Pao Report Series No. 5, 1970, p.11

2 551 kg per consumer unit converts to 411 kg per capita
The consumer unit figures for Na Chuak Nuea when converted into per capita figures are 0.2 kg/day higher than Dixon's per capita consumption figures for all villages contained in the 1973 report.

producing more than 800 kg. The deficit producers therefore need to obtain more rice to satisfy their consumption needs and lack the extra amount for temple contributions and barter etc. The balance producers obtain enough to eat, and to satisfy with a small margin the other rice requirements while the surplus producers are producing a sizeable amount of rice above all those requirements.

Defining the marketable surplus is still problematic. The data for 1971 obtained information on market sales but not on the amount held in store. 25% of the farmers were recorded as having sold paddy but other surplus producers may well have been waiting for a later date and higher prices. Nor does the data take account of rice held in store from the previous crop season, so that some surplus producers are selling all of this years production and may well be using paddy in store to satisfy their consumption and other needs. Despite these methodological difficulties I believe that the limits selected are valid, and the following analysis appears to support their validity.

The relationship between surplus/deficit production and labour intensity also needs careful consideration. In his examples Sahlins equates labour intensity in one case with surface cultivated per gardener and in another with production per worker. In both instances he acknowledges that a certain error is introduced[1], as for example, in the latter case different workers expend unequal efforts per unit weight of out-put. Man-day units were recorded in the Na Chuak Nuea data; however these calculations were based on farmer re-call and no allowance was made to the length of the working day which varied according to the time of year. Even an accurate measurement of actual man-days cannot truly be seen as a measure of labour intensity as differences in land type and size of holding influence the labour intensity. The use of hired labourers and the incidence of relatives and neighbours contributing their labour further complicates the analysis. With the data at hand it is possible to present a production profile and distinguish between surplus, balance and deficit groups, but these various

1 Sahlins, M; op.cit;p.115

production performances *per se* cannot be equated with intensity of labour. Rather than to attempt to depict intensity of production it would be better to concentrate on levels of production. The task then remains to study the relationship between a number of socio-economic factors and the different levels of production in the village.

The socio-economic factors influencing production

In 1971, 48.5% of the sample households were surplus producers, 23% balance and 28.5% deficit. Analysis was done to see whether any differences emerged between surplus production and non-surplus production (balance and deficit) with respect to a range of economic factors: size of holding, areas planted, yields, incidence of hired help, availability of irrigation, livestock size, and income, and a series of social factors: the age of household head, household size, natal birthplace and household composition.

For the analysis of household composition households have been classified as follows:

I *simple nuclear*: married couple with young school-age children (under 12 years)

II *simple nuclear*: married couple with school-age and resident unmarried adult children

III *simple nuclear*: married couple with unmarried resident adult children

IV *extended*: married couple with one or more resident sons-in-law, married daughters, younger unmarried children and grandchildren

V *extended*: married couple with one resident daughter and son-in-law and grandchildren

Households containing widowed heads of household (mostly females) have been classified together with households in which both the head of household and his spouse are present. While acknowledging that important distinctions can be made between these respective types the overall classification attempts to encompass the developmental aspect of household structure. Accordingly,

rather than grouping households with widowed heads of households into one category, in each case they are classified according to the demographic composition of the other household members.

The distribution of household types for 1971 and 1975 in Na Chuak Nuea is as follows:

Table 2.1 Household composition. Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971 and 1975

	1971			1975		
Type	No.	%		No.	%	
1	12	34	simple; 68%	6	14	= 61%
2	8	23		13	29	
3	4	11		8	18	
4	8	23	extended 32	10	23	= 39%
5	3	9		7	16	

Variations in 1971 2 households of Type 3, 2 of Type 4 and 2 of Type 5 contained widowed female heads of household. 1 household of Type 4 contained a divorced female head of household. 2 households of Type 1 contained elderly resident couples. In 1975 2 households of Type 3, 3 of Type 4 and 6 of Type 5 contained widowed female heads of household.

Table 2.2 shows that for 1971 there are significant differences between the producer groups with respect to the area of land planted ($p = 0.1$) and the structure of the household ($p = 0.05$). The surplus producers tended to plant larger areas to rice, although in respect of total land owned no significant difference between the producer groups emerges. Furthermore, the surplus producers were predominantly simple-type households: a married couple with unmarried children, and the deficit producers group contained more households of an extended type: three or even four generational families.

Table 2.2 The socio-economic factors influencing rice production, Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971

	SURPLUS PRODUCERS N = 17					BALANCE/DEFICIT PRODUCERS N = 18					
	Village mean	Group mean*	Above village mean No.	%	Below village mean No.	%	Group mean	Above village mean No.	%	Below village mean No.	%	χ^2	p value =
Land holding	23.9	28.7	10	59	7	41	19.3	4	38	14	62	0.70*	ns[x]
Land planted	17.9	23.1	10	59	7	41	12.4	4	22	14	78	3.47*	0.1
Yield	266.0	279.0	8	47	9	53	241.0	9	50	9	50	0.02*	ns[x]
Livestock herd size	2.4	4.1	10	59	7	41	1.9	9	50	9	50	0.03*	ns[x]
Income	5933.0	8391	9	53	8	47	5018	5	28	13	72	1.37*	ns[x]
Age of household head	40.0	40.0	9	53	8	47	43.0	11	61	7	39	0.01*	ns[x]
Household size	6.4	6.0	5	30	12	70	7.0	10	55.5	8	44.4	1.48*	ns[x]
Natal birthplace of head of household			Born in village 9	53	born outside 8	47		Born in village 9	50	born outside 9	50	2.42	ns[x]
Hiring labour			Hiring 7	41	not hiring 10	59		Hiring 3	17	not hiring 15	83	2.57	ns[x]
Irrigated			Irrigated 7	41	not irrigated 10	59		Irrigated 9	50	not irrigated 9	50	0.27	ns[x]
Family type surplus/balance deficit			Simple 14	82	Extended 3	18		Simple 10	55	Extended 8	45	2.91	ns[x]
Surplus/deficit			Surplus 14	82	3	18		Deficit only N=10 4	40	6	60	4.75	0.05

* Corrected for continuity

x Not significant

Table 2.3 The socio-economic factors influencing rice production, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

	SURPLUS PRODUCERS N = 21						BALANCE/DEFICIT PRODUCERS N = 23					
	Village mean	Group mean	Above village mean No.	%	Below village mean No.	%	Group mean	Above village mean No.	%	Below village mean No.	%	χ^2	p value
Land holding	31	35.7	15	71	6	29	24.9	10	43	13	57	2.44*	ns[x]
Land planted	17.6	23.7	14	67	7	33	12.2	7	30	16	70	4.41*	0.05
Yield	333	396	11	52	10	48	267	5	22	18	78	3.22*	0.1
Livestock herd size	3.2	3.6	14	67	7	33	2.8	15	65	8	35	0.04*	ns[x]
Income	14206	10779	12	57	9	43	11857	10	43	13	57	0.36*	ns[x]
Age of household head	48	47.5	7	33	14	67	50	14	61	9	39	2.3*	ns[x]
Household size	7.6	7.2	8	38	13	62	7.3	11	48	12	52	0.01*	ns[x]
Natal birthplace of head of household			Born in village		Born outside			Born in village		Born outside		3.72	0.1
			16	76	5	24		11	48	12	52		
Hiring labour			Hiring labour		not hiring			Hiring labour		not hiring			
			16	76	5	24		8	35	15	65	7.59	0.01
Irrigated			Irrigated		not irrigated			Irrigated		not irrigated			
			18	86	3	14		9	40	14	60	10.04	0.005
Family type surplus/balance deficit			Simple		Extended			Simple		Extended			
			13	62	8	38		14	60	9	40	0.004	ns[x]
Surplus/deficit			Surplus					Deficit only N=17					
			14	67	7	33		12	70	5	30	0.01	ns[x]

* Corrected for continuity

x Not significant

In 1975, 48% of the households were surplus producers, 14% balance and 38% deficit. Table 2.3 shows that there are significant differences between the producer groups with respect to the availability of irrigation water ($p = 0.005$), the use of hired labour ($p = 0.01$), the area of land planted ($p = 0.05$) and the yields obtained ($p = 0.1$). Surplus producers in 1975 tended to plant larger areas, receive higher yields, use hired labour and receive irrigation water. Table 2.1 indicated that the % of extended type households has increased and Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that the age of the household head has increased since 1971. This indicates that some changes may have taken place in the rate of household formation between the two years. Figure 2.1 shows that the rate of household formation has in fact decreased between 1971-1975. The average age of the head of household has increased from 40 years in 1971 to 48 years in 1975. Hence in Fig. 2.1 the larger number of heads of households in their 20's in 1971 and the incidence of resident elderly couples residing with their daughter and son-in-law, the son-in-law being designated the head of household.

If the factors influencing production levels in 1971 and 1975 are compared, it is apparent that the influence of household structure on production levels, while evident in 1971, is not a significant factor in 1975. In this year the most important factor appears to be irrigation. However, the two sample years 1971 and 1975 are not entirely comparable; an environmental factor - the amount of rainfall-needs to be incorporated into the analysis. 1971 was a comparatively wet year and 'rain-fed' upland plots received an adequate water supply for paddy cultivation. In 1975 however, drought conditions prevailed and the rice production of unirrigated upland plots was seriously affected. It could therefore be argued that the impact of irrigation is only a significant factor in influencing production levels under drought conditions and that under adequate rain-fall, differences between surplus and deficit producers with respect to irrigation would not emerge.

Figure 2.1 Household structure, age of household head and production levels

1971

Age of household head	Expansion: Simple I — Young married couple with young children*	Expansion: Simple II — Married couple with young and unmarried adolescent and preadolescent children	Expansion: Simple III — Married couple with unmarried adult children	Dispersion: Extended IV — Married couple with son-in-law unit, and unmarried children	Replacement: Extended V — Married couple with son-in-law unit only
70+					
61-70					
51-60			XX	XXOOO	O
41-50		XXXX	O	ΔΔO	XO
31-40	XXXXΔΔO	XXΔ	Δ		
20-30	XXΔOO	Δ			

Average age of household = 40 years

1975

	Expansion: Simple I	Expansion: Simple II	Expansion: Simple III	Dispersion: Extended IV	Replacement: Extended V
70+					X
61-70			XO	ΔO	XX
51-60		O	XO	XΔΔOOO	X
41-50		XXΔOOOO	ΔO	XXO	XO
31-40	XXXOO	XXXΔO	XX		
20-30	X				

Average age of household = 48 years

X - surplus producers
Δ - balance producers
O - deficit producers

* There are two cases in 1971 of elderly couples residing with Type I family units

In order to test this hypothesis production levels for 1976 were examined, as the data for 1976 - a wet year, is more comparable with that of 1971. Table 2.4 shows a significant difference (χ^2 = 10.3 p value=.005) between surplus and deficit producers with respect to irrigation: surplus rice producers hold predominantly irrigated land and deficit producers hold predominantly unirrigated land.

Table 2.4 Irrigated and non-irrigated land holders: Surplus and deficit rice production Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1976

	Irrigated	Non-irrigated
Surplus producers	20	8
Deficit producers	3	12

Table 2.5 Household structure and surplus deficit production Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1976

	Simple	Extended
Surplus producers	14	14
Deficit producers	8	7

Table 2.5 shows however that no differences emerge between surplus and deficit rice producers with respect to household structure.

Before the introduction of irrigation the location and the elevation of plots were an important factor influencing levels of production. In a year with plentiful rainfall upland plots would receive an adequate water supply for paddy cultivation,

while some lowland plots would suffer from flooding. In a dry year with poor rainfall, low-lying land would receive adequate water but upland plots would suffer from drought. The erratic nature of the rainfall therefore influenced production levels in different ways. The introduction of an irrigation scheme has altered the relationship and now households owning lowland are tending towards surplus production irrespective of the environmental factor.

The discussion now returns to Sahlins' contention that the Domestic Mode of Production has in its deeper structure an anti-surplus principle and that the internal forces at work are essentially centripetal isolating the domestic group from the wider society. The rationale of the D.M.P. Sahlins argues is the satisfaction of consumption needs. Production over and above this level can be explained by outside forces working to extract the surplus. The data shows that the incentive to increase production levels is something more than the quantitative assessment implied in the ratio of consumer to labour units. The ratio of consumer units to labour units is not significantly different between the different production groups for 1971 and 1975. If any Chayanov curve appears at all it appears to reverse itself with surplus producers in 1975 having slightly lower ratios of consumers to labour units[1]. The analysis should rather concentrate on the composition of the producing units, especially the relations of authority between the head of the household and his domestic labour group. I would argue that in 1971 the composition of households played an important role in determining production levels. Before the impact of irrigation, production incentive while quite obviously related to the nature of the resources at hand, appears as a function of the natural developmental cycle of the family. Higher levels of production were a feature of households in the process of expansion

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1 1971 surplus Cu/Lu = 1.3, deficit Cu/Lu = 1.2
1971 surplus Cu/Lu = 1.9 deficit Cu/Lu = 2.03

which lasts from the marriage of two people until the completion of their family of procreation; "In structural terms it corresponds to the period during which all the offspring of the parents are economically, affectively and jurally dependent on them."[1] Lower production levels were found among households during the phase of dispersion or fission: "This begins with the marriage of the oldest child and continues until all the children are married"[2] and also of replacement, "which ends with the death of the parents, and replacement in the social structure of the family they founded"[3] (See Figure 2.1, p.

The domestic domain, the domestic producing unit and the wider society are not discrete entities, but are closely interconnected - a central theme of Goody's analysis. Thus he writes:

"One might put it that the domestic domain is the system of social relations through which the reproductive nucleus is integrated with the environment and with the structure of the total society."[4]

"Classificatory kinship institutions, unilineal descent corporations, age-sets and the great variety of institutions and organizations through which the medium of citzienship is exercised, are the structural lines between the two domains"[5]

(The domestic and juro-political or wider society)

It is on this issue, the interrelationship between the domestic group and the wider society that the analysis now returns to Sahlins' argument concerning the external forces operating on the D.M.P. I would argue that the influence of the external domain on the domestic group is not only the extraction of surplus laboour from favourably endowed households through pressures of the existing kinship structure[6] - a quantitative consideration, but is closely related to a system of social norms and values.

"The differentials in this structure (the domestic group) are in part inherent in the procreative relationship ..... But their character is also decisively regulated by politico-jural norms"[7]

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1 Goody, J;"The Developmental Cycle", in Goody (ed.) Kinship, Harmondsworth 1971, p.89
2 Ibid; p.89
3 Ibid; p.89
4 Ibid; p.92
5 Ibid; p.91
6 Sahlins, M; op.cit; p.123
7 Goody, J; op.cit; p.96

Thus Goody speaks of the 'pushes' and 'pulls' determining each phase of the developmental cycle, which come from the domestic and from the external structure of society. In Na Chuak Nuea during the expansion phase all forces converge on supporting the paramountcy of the parents in the domestic domain. Cultural norms require children to be obedient and respectful. During the dispersion phase children's rights to some measure of jural and economic independence become operative. Sons leave the household on marriage and a temporary son-in-law unit takes up residence for a few years, then leaves often to be replaced with a new temporary son-in-law unit. Production levels in 1971 in the village can perhaps best be seen as the expressions of the authority of the parental generation as sanctioned by the wider society, and it is this relationship of authority between the head of the producing unit and his team which leads to important differences between different household types.

During the expansion stage of the developmental cycle, the head of household from the time at which he establishes his independent household, is directing his efforts towards accumulation. He stands to inherit land from his parents-in-law and when he obtains this land the production from it must exceed the consumption needs of his young family if the households' aspirations are to be realized. The expansion stages of the developmental cycle must be accompanied by expansion in the productive cycle; and the needs of a village household are more than just the satisfaction of nutritional requirements. Cash is required for medical and educational expenses and for a variety of other consumer needs: the desire to own a watch, radio or build a new house, but this is a topic of a later chapter. At the dispersion and replacement stages of the developmental cycle many of these aspirations have been met, and savings of some sort, if not in a bank account then under the mattress, have been accumulated.

Glutinous rice production although the most important branch of production, is no longer the only means of livelihood. Cash crop production, and wage-labouring outside the village have developed into important economic alternatives. The analysis therefore, not accounting for these other methods of livelihood is perhaps unbalanced. Nevertheless, glutinous rice production is the primary economic base and in the majority of cases other forms of livelihood complement the traditional subsistence sector. Villagers prefer to grow their own rice rather than purchase it, and rice growing is still socially valued above most other occupations. Household labour is still the primary labour source for paddy cultivation, and the structure of this household domestic group needs to be incorporated into any analysis of domestic production.

"A domestic group comprising only two successive generations is at a different stage from one made up of three generations; and so is one in which all the filial generations are pre-adolescent as compared with one with some or all children of the marriageable ages. The developmental factor is intrinsic to domestic organization and to ignore it leads to serious misinterpretation of the descriptive facts." [1]

In 1975, access to irrigation water seems to be of paramount importance in influencing production levels. This is a factor at once deriving from the external domain (the political system constructing the dam and encouraging increased production through agricultural extension workers). High production levels now appear to be a factor of favourable resource endowment. But in 1975 there is a difference between production levels and natal birth-place, with surplus producers tending to be born in the village. The reasons for this pattern remain unclear, although it can be speculated using Sahlins' argument that those heads of households born in the village have a greater proportion of kinship units outside of the domestic domain which may be working to raise production

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1 Ibid; p.87

Maps 2.1 and 2.2 indicate the way in which surplus and deficit producers are located in respect of land-holding patterns. From the available cases at hand, the location of surplus and balance/deficit producer plots have been marked. While in 1971, no clear pattern emerges, in 1975 the surplus producers form a central core, with balance/deficit producers located at the periphery.

I conclude this section with the following contention. The introduction of irrigation has had a significant effect on the production levels of households. Production levels in the early data were seen to be a function of the developmental cycle, and in this respect can be regarded as fluid, although the environmental factor - the amount of rainfall contributed to variations in production levels. Under the impact of irrigation, production levels become a function of resource endowment, and as such the production profile of the village has become crystallized, surplus and deficit producer groups forming permanent groupings.

The nature of the analysis: an attempt to examine a complex set of variables over a period of time utilizing simple statistics cannot inspire great statistical confidence. Sahlins himself, in his own analysis maintains that: "the aim is merely to suggest a feasibility and not to prove a point."[1] The theoretical analysis presented here is likewise offered as a proposition. Only an intensive study of household production which overcomes the methodological difficulties of measuring labour intensity, combined with the deeper analysis of household structure, especially the nature of the relationship between the household head and his family production team can validate the propositions offered here.

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1 Sahlins, M; op.cit; p.106

Map 2.1 Location of Plots for Surplus and Deficit Rice Producers 1971



Map 2.2 Location of Plots for Surplus and Deficit Rice Producers 1975



Surplus

Deficit

The disposal of paddy

I now turn to a consideration of changes which are occurring in the distribution of the social surplus. By social surplus I refer to that part of the product (paddy) not consumed by the domestic producing unit nor sold in the market. While information is lacking on the disposal of paddy for 1971, the disposal patterns between 1973 and 1975 show certain trends which warrant discussion. The extraction of data relating to disposal is itself problematic, and only rough measures can be provided by the farmers. The main patterns of disposal, given this methodological problem, were as follows:

Table 2.6 The disposal of paddy, as a percentage of total production, Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1973 and 1975

% Disposal of paddy	1973	1975
Sale	13.5	15.0
Future sale	10.6	3.0
Seed	2.1	2.0
Livestock feed	0.9	2.0
Paddy for labour hire	1.2	7.0
Paddy for buffalo hire	1.4	0.6
Consumption	60.2	61.1
Given to relatives	6.5	7.7
Given to temple	2.6	1.7

There has been a substantial increase in the amount of paddy used to hire labour, and this is in keeping with the increased use of hired labour in the village. A number of households with surplus production are using this surplus to buy labour. In a number of cases households with a deficiency of household labour, mostly through illness, are engaging hired labour, the surplus production meeting the labour costs.

Returning again to Sahlins' contention that kinship and the ritual order appear as economic forces in primitive societies

working to extract a surplus from the labour of each household, can these forces be seen to operate in Na Chuak Nuea, and furthermore, can it be demonstrated that as the market force becomes a more important orientation for household production, that these above mentioned social factors (the kinship and social order) decline in importance ? Table 2.6 shows that no significant changes have occurred within two years in the proportional distribution of the paddy product. It may well be that two years is an insignificant period of time to measure any degree of change of this sort. However, some changes have occurred which can only be appreciated in the amounts of paddy extracted by the higher orders of kinship and the social order. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 shows the amounts of paddy contributed to the temple, and recorded as being given to relatives respectively.

Table 2.7 Percentage distribution of paddy contributions to the temple, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1973 and 1975

	None	0-25	25-50	50-75	75-100	100-150	150-200	200-300	300+ kg
1973	22.5	5	27.5	5	10	2.5	10	12.5	5
1975	18.6	38.5	27.2	-	2.2	2.2	6.8	-	4.5

Table 2.8 Percentage distribution of paddy contributions to relatives, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1973 and 1975

	None	0-50	50-100	100-200	200-400	400-600	600-1,000	1,000+ kg
1973	55	-	2.5	17.5	-	10	7.5	7.5
1975	61	4.5	2.2	4.5	6.8	9.6	6.8	4.6

Table 2.7 shows that there has been a significant change[1] in the amount of paddy contributed to the temple by each household with a larger proportion of households donating small amounts (under 25 kg)

1 Kolmogovov-Smirnov test, d = 0.29 significant at .05 level (critical value .27)

This does not imply that contributions to the temple have declined in importance. Money contributions have become commonplace and on a number of ceremonial occasions, bank notes assume ritual importance. In 1975 every household in the sample was in addition to any paddy given, contributing money sums to the temple, sums ranging from 30-500 baht (15-250 kg of paddy). A further 36.4% of households were involved in expenditure on ceremonies of various kinds; ordinations, marriages, etc., with sums of money ranging from 40-1100 baht (20-550 kg of paddy). The ritual order in this village cannot be seen as a powerful factor contributing to the extraction of a surplus through paddy production for as Table 2.6 shows the paddy contribution to the temple is only 1-2% and the expenditure on merit-making and ceremonies accounts for only 3.7% of total village expenditure.

In respect of paddy given to relatives (see Table 2.8) a larger percentage of households are giving no paddy to kinsmen at all, and the amounts given appear to have declined, although no significant change can be demonstrated. The ethic of kinship generosity codified within a system of social values is well documented in the ethnography, so too the ethic of redistribution: the social mechanism whereby accumulation by individuals is hampered so not to create dysfunction in the social system. In primitive societies these values are strongly enforced. Radcliffe-Brown[1] notes that among the Andaman Islanders all food obtained is evenly distributed through the whole camp and Evans-Pritchard[2] notes that among the Nuer, kinsmen must assist each other: "if one has a surplus of a good thing he must share it with his neighbours, consequently no Nuer ever has a surplus." Firth[3], commenting on the Maori, states that at a time of shortage individuals did not as a rule keep to themselves the product of their labour but shared it among the village.

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1 Radcliffe-Brown, A; The Andaman Islanders, Glencoe; 1948, p.43 (first published 1922)

2 Evans-Pritchard, E; The Nuer, Oxford, 1940, p.183

3 Firth, R; Economics of the New Zealand Maori, Wellington, 1959, p.162

This ethic is still present among peasant societies, even if it is in a state of erosion, and its importance as a social value may be seen as a function of the degree to which the community have emerged from subsistence to commercialized production. Nash[1] comments that peasant as well as primitive societies have a way of scrambling wealth to inhibit reinvestment in technical advance, which prevents the crystallization of class lines on an economic base.

For Na Chuak Nuea, in 1975 it was found that 70% of those households giving rice to kinsmen were from the surplus producer group. So some kind of ethic is prevailing whereby the better-off redistribute a portion of the product. However, as Dixon[2] comments:

> "the whole question of gifts to relatives becomes complicated by the fact that they may conceal repayment of debts, actual loans, or payment for land or labour."

The ethic of sharing is not confined to one's own village community, and there is evidence of deficit rice producers in the village giving small gifts of purchased rice to villagers from the neighbouring upland, who plagued by drought for the past four years, sometimes come down to beg in the lowland villages.

In this chapter the analysis has focussed on the utilization of certain resources: land, labour and water in glutinous rice production. Sahlins' theory: that each social system has its own economic coefficient was reviewed, and the factors influencing production levels were discussed. The analysis departs somewhat from Sahlins in stressing that production levels are not necessarily a measure of labour intensity. In 1971 a difference between surplus and deficit rice producers in respect of the demographic composition of their households was noted. In 1975 a difference emerged between the above producer groups with respect to the availability of irrigation water. The writer

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1 Nash, M; op.cit; p.9

2 Dixon, C; op.cit; p.9

proposed that surplus production, although previously related to resource endowment, was also a function of the developmental cycle, pertaining in this instance to the relationship of authority between the household head and his household labour force. While the developmental cycle will continue to influence production levels of households, it was argued that differences emanating from the developmental process will be subsumed under differences relating to differential resource allocation: those households receiving irrigation water and those not.

Continuing on the theme of factors external to the household working to encourage surplus production an analysis was made of certain changes in the distribution of the paddy product. The higher percentage of paddy used for labour hire in 1975 was mentioned, also the changing pattern of paddy contributions to the temple (although the percentage of total village paddy donated to the temple is of a similar order). It was found that many households are now donating smaller amounts of paddy, and money contributions are now an important component of temple donations. The amounts of paddy distributed to kinsmen has not significantly changed during the study period.

The discussion now broadens, with an examination of other types of economic activity in the village, both agricultural and non-agricultural, and specifically with an analysis of patterns of response to new economic opportunities.

CHAPTER THREE

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY RESPONSE

"The money economy is generally hailed because it fosters entrepreneurship which it is argued will produce development. These entrepreneurs, possessing the capitalist spirit, or the need for achievement, or a creative personality, or some other presumably essential quality, are thought to maximize their economic efforts, and this supposedly rebounds to the benefit of all"[1].

In the previous chapter changes in the Domestic Mode of Production were discussed, and the analysis focussed on those forces operating to boost household production. Little has yet been said of individual decision-making. Alavi[2] believes that the structural-functional approach with its implications of a role performer constrained by certain norms, is inadequate for a study of peasant societies. It is inadequate because it ignores the thrust and direction of social processes that reflect competing pursuits of incompatible values and goals by members of different classes in a society. Anthropologists turned to an alternative approach - which focussed on the purposive action of individuals: methodological individualism, which predicates that the individual, given his disposition in society, engages in social action appropriate to the attainment of his goals. The individual rather than being governed by a set of rules, determines the social action. Here the individual is the manipulator rather than the conformer of the structural-functionalist approach. Alavi criticises both approaches for objectifying society and externalising it from the individual.

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1 Stavenhagen, R; "Agriculture: Resources, Power and Change", in Bernstein, H; (ed) Underdevelopment and Development. The Third World Today, Harmondsworth, 1973, p.89

2 Alavi, H; "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties", Journal of Peasant Studies, vol.1, No. 1, 1973

"The human significance of being, implicates a whole system of social relationships which envelop and define the individual person".[1] In order to study peasant societies adequately Alavi maintains that the two approaches must be reconciled, for each individual is a decision-maker engaged in a series of social relations which generate diverse loyalties.

In the last chapter, glutinous rice production was examined, and also the ways in which each household is influenced by a set of external forces, forces originating from within the village community, and forces external to it, e.g. the market. What requires consideration now is the response of the individual to opportunities and to choice. Different households respond in different ways to economic opportunity. While glutinous rice production is still the predominant branch of agriculture, recently upland cash-cropping and dry-season second cropping have become increasingly important agricultural activities. There are also opportunities for off-farm employment outside the village, in Na Chuak Nuea for example, the employment of full-time irrigation guards. Similarly, just as each household chooses between a set of different activities through which to obtain money income, they choose between a set of alternatives in spending this income, some choosing to purchase predominantly consumer items, others choosing to reinvest. Choice and the different responses to opportunity in this peasant community need to be investigated.

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1 Ibid; p.50

Entrepreneurship

First, two ideal types, the 'entrepreneur' and the 'conservative' need to be defined. These two terms are not mutually exclusive, for as Alexander[1] remarks

"entrepreneurs can be innovative, conservative, aggressive, willing to live and let live and so on. The patterns - one may speak of typologies - cannot easily be formulated in terms of precise, quantifiable relationships".

The term entrepreneur is used here to denote the type of villager who innovates, he readily reorganizes his production activities to novel ends. 'Conservative' here denotes the villager who fails to respond to economic opportunity preferring to continue his production along traditional well-known lines.

A number of models have been used to explain entrepreneurship. Some are psychological models, e.g. McClelland's[2] model which focussed on the 'need for achievement', others are sociological, e.g. Parsons'[3] model based on the criteria of ascription and achievement. McClelland's model isolates a psychological factor at the root of entrepreneurship. The 'need for achievement' is the desire of certain individuals to do well, to improve themselves and to excel. He defines a person with a high need for achievement as someone performing challenging tasks, where skill is involved, who takes moderate risks; they search out positions of responsibility, namely action areas where they feel their individual efforts influence the group. McClelland's definition should be considered relatively, for of course every farmer, even the most subsistence-orientated, can be seen to perform challenging tasks involving skill and a risk element. Parsons' ascription-achievement model has been used as a sociological tool to explain entrepreneurship. Finney argues with reference to Polynesian and Melanesian societies that differences in their status-mobility systems (the extent to which

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1 Alexander, A; "The Supply of Industrial Entrepreneurship", Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, No. 4, 1967, p.136

2 McClelland, D; The Achieving Society, Princetown, 1961

3 Parsons, T; and Shils, E; Toward a General Theory of Action, Massachusetts, 1959

a social system emphasises achievement or ascription) results in different styles of entrepreneurship.

The Goroka, a Melanesian people, operate in an 'open-society' where achievement is emphasised. Their involvement with the market economy began with the introduction of coffee as a planatation crop and "hardly had the Gorokans begun to earn money from their coffee than they began to cast around for ways to invest their newly-acquired wealth" [1]. Finney notes that the Gorokans were more investment orientated than consumption orientated, and capital items were their first buys. Leading this plunge into the cash economy were a group of local entrepreneurs of varied backgrounds: 'big-men of business', 'pioneering entrepreneurs' who perceived new market opportunities and exploited them by combining the means of production in new ways. Some of these men were established leaders, but most were enterprising young men.

In Tahiti, a stratified society emphasizing ascription, the first men after European contact who can be identified as entrepreneurs were a group of important chiefs. These chiefs rather than using commerce to achieve leadership status, used their chiefly positions to dominate trading relations.

Alexander[2] argues that in societies where ascription is the rule the entrepreneurial class is liable to be small and lack dynamism because economic activity is unlikely to be a status-conferring variable. Where achievement is stressed the entrepreneurial group is likely to be both large and dynamic as there will be many people who seek to achieve higher status through economic activity. Geertz[3] in his study

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1 Finney,B; "Big-Men, Half-Men and Trader-Chiefs: Entrepreneurial Styles in New Guinea and Polynesia", in Epstein, T; (ed), Opportunity and Response , London, 1972, p.120

2 Alexander, A; op.cit; p.117

3 Geertz,C; Pedlars and Princes. Social change and Economic Modernization in two Indonesian Towns, Chicago, 1963

of the Indonesian economy suggests that entrepreneurship occurs in a well-defined homogenous group which has crystallized out of a larger traditional group which has a long history of extra-village status and inter-local orientation. He seems to support Hagen's[1] theory that economic development is initiated by individuals and groups marginal to the accepted social order. Parsons' ascription-achievement model may explain differences in styles of entrepreneurship between different social systems, but it does not offer any explanation of differences in economic response within any one community.

The innovators and their non-innovative counterparts in the village of Na Chuak Nuea will now be discussed in an attempt to delineate any particular socio-economic characteristics which may explain the different responses to economic opportunity. The following entrepreneurial types may be identified:

1. Agricultural innovators. i) The second croppers
   ii) Upland farmers initiating the change from kenaf to cassava
2. Itinerant merchants
3. The village 'gamblers'
4. The guards

1. Agricultural Innovators. (i) The second croppers

With the introduction of irrigation it has become possible to cultivate a second dry-season crop on the rice land. In 1971, 17% of the sample households were producing a second crop, mostly cucumbers, on a small-scale, usually less than 1 rai. A small amount: 10-20 kg would be consumed by the household and the remainder, about 125 kg sold in the market. In 1975, 57% of the sample households were practising second-cropping, again mostly cucumbers, with some water-

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1 Hagen, E; On the Theory of Social Change, Illinois, 1962

melons, peanuts and a variety of vegetables.

In Na Chuak Nuea the irrigated farmers can be divided into three groups. From the 1975 sample there are those households who began second-cropping immediately, that is in the same year that irrigation water became available, there are those villagers who had delayed second-cropping for a number of years, and lastly those who although in receipt of irrigation water have not yet begun to make use of it for dry-season cropping. One feature which distinguishes these groups is the structure of the household. Table 3.1 shows that there is a significant difference between the two groups with respect to the response pattern, simple household types tending to delay their response to the new opportunity, while extended households on the whole responded immediately.

Table 3.1: Household Structure and Response to Dry-season Irrigation, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

	Immediate response n = 19		Delayed or no response n = 18	
	No.	%	No.	%
Simple Households	7	36	13	72
Extended Households	12	64	5	28

$\chi^2 = 4.65$ (p value = 0.05)

The whole question of response is complicated by the fact that different households received irrigation at different times with some households first receiving water some 7 years ago. However, if only those villagers receiving water in 1972 are examined the same pattern of response related to household structure emerges (see table 3.2).

Table 3.2: 1975 Sample Households receiving Irrigation in 1972

	Immediate	Delayed starters
	No.	No.
Simple Households	1	5
Extended Households	5	0

Again, it must not be inferred that differences in the household composition between the groups are only differences in labour availability, as the ratio of labour units to the unit area cultivated to rice is the same. In certain cases, particularly the newly formed household with young children and only one adult male worker, labour shortage may explain why a household is not second-cropping in the dry-season, which traditionally was a favoured period of off-farm employment. In 1971, when second-cropping was being practised on a very small scale, most of the labour was contributed by the women. In 1975 this division of labour is no longer apparent, and of those households second-cropping males are now making a large contribution. If second-cropping is regarded as a novel form of economic activity involving a certain amount of risk-taking and uncertainty, certain households are clearly in a more favourable position to experiment in this direction than others. The simple household under the over-riding authority of one male responsible for raising a family is less likely to consider changing its traditional dry-season activities whatever they are, than the extended established household directed by an older man, perhaps less reluctant to leave the village in the dry-season in order to wage-labour.

ii. The innovating upland farmer

Until five years ago the predominant upland crop was kenaf, accounting for 30% of the cultivated upland area. Cassava was then introduced as a new cash crop. In Na Chuak Nuea in 1971, 51% of the

village were growing kenaf, but no-one in the sample had yet begun to cultivate cassava. By 1975 cassava growing had become as important as kenaf and in the 1976 sample there is only one farmer continuing to grow kenaf. The major upland crop is now cassava.

Table 3.3. Kenaf and Cassava Cultivation. Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1973-1976

	Kenaf			Cassava		
	1973	1975	1976	1973	1975	1976
Planted Area in rai	103	77	1	31	106	119
Harvested Area in rai	72	76	1	29	103	108
Average Yield/ rai	129	91	200	1169	827	1092
Total Village Production	9350	6980	200	34,500	85,000	118,000
Average Price/ kg	2.6	2.7	2	0.2	0.2	0.4

Kenaf is considered to be a difficult, smelly crop; it has to be soaked in water, retted, and then stripped of the fibres. While the price of kenaf is dropping, cassava prices doubled between 1975-1976. Another advantage with the new crop is that cassava companies, which have recently been built in the area, hire groups of labourers to go and harvest the cassava crop in the fields, transporting the produce back to the factory by lorry.

In 1972 two of the sample households were growing cassava. Both households were of the extended type, both with the heads of household in their forties, with resident son-in-law units. In 1973 six households were growing this new crop, four of these were households of the extended type, again with household heads in their forties. Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 show that a pattern emerges which is related to both the structure of the household, and the age of the household head. Newly formed households of types I and II (if growing an upland crop), are still growing kenaf. The most developed type of simple household III and the extended

types, if growing cassava in 1972 and 1973 have heads of household predominantly in their forties. In 1973 the heads of extended households continuing to grow kenaf are predominantly in their fifties and sixties. Here therefore the categorization of household types needs to also take account of the age of the household head. It was found that the newly formed household with a young head is persisting with his traditional upland cropping pattern, so too are the younger and much older heads of the extended households. Those innovating with cassava in 1972 and 1973 are men mostly in their forties.

Fig. 3.1. Cassava Growers, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1972 and 1973.

Age of Household Head	Household Structure * I	II	III	IV	V
60's				x	
50's					x
40's			xx	xxx	x
30's					
20's					

Fig. 3.2. Kenaf Growers, Ban Na Chuak, Nuea, 1973

Age of Household Head	Household Structure I	II	III	IV	V
60's			x	xx	x
50's			x	xx	
40's		x	xx		
30's	xxx		xx		
20's	x				

* For the key to household types see page 78.

Another pattern which emerges is that the upland innovator is more likely to be a rice deficit producer. In 1975 the rice surplus producers, predominantly farmers with irrigation, are for the most part still growing kenaf; of those growing cassava, all but one are also continuing to grow kenaf. The majority of rice deficit producers however, have completely dropped kenaf cultivation, and are concentrating on cassava. A similar pattern emerges with second-cropping: rice deficit producers in 1975 are more likely to grow a second-crop than to cultivate kenaf. In this year all those deficit rice producers who have irrigation water are second-cropping, and those who do not have gained access to irrigated land (mostly by free-use). However, only 38% of the irrigated surplus rice producers are growing a second crop. These patterns of participation, (see Fig. 3.3), suggest that those households successful in the traditional sector - glutinous rice cultivation - are displaying a traditional attitude to one form of agricultural innovation: the cultivation of new crops.

Diffusions of innovation

Diffusions of innovation have been shown to display a series of recurring traits. The most easily observed is the curve of cumulative growth[1]. If individual adopters are measured over time an S-shaped curve normally appears. The curve indicates a slow take-off stage, an intermediate stage of rapid growth, and a final stage of declining growth.

1974 data for Na Chuak Nuea is not available; however the available data for 1971-1973 and 1975-1976 indicates that the adopter distributions for cassava cultivation and second-cropping are somewhat dissimilar. The curve for cassava cultivation (Fig. 3.4) conforms to the S-shaped curve, while for the second-croppers there is a composite curve, with an increase in adoption between 1971-1972, a decrease between 1972-1973, an increase

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1 Pemberton, H; "The Curve of Culture Diffusion Rate", American Sociological Review, 1, 1936, pp 547-556

Figure 3.3

Surplus and deficit rice production in relation to participation in other agricultural sectors



Figure 3.4 Adoption of Innovations: Cassava and Second Cropping, Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971-76



--- data for 1974 not available

in 1974, followed by another decrease in adoption in 1975. The development of second-cropping has been somewhat erratic, and can be partially explained by the poor market for dry-season crops, erratic prices[1], and technical problems relating to water-sending.

The different stages of diffusion of innovation can normally be shown to have a spatial distribution[2]. The theory suggests that in the initial stages adopters are usually concentrated in a small cluster or set of clusters. In the intermediate stage of expansions adoption of the innovation is more likely to occur in the vicinity of existing adoptions, although sometimes a jump occurs and a new centre of dispersal may be formed. Map 3.1 indicates the location of plots of those households growing cassava in 1972 and 1973 (the initial stage) and also of households growing cassava in 1975 (the intermediate stage). A certain spatial distribution is apparent; and two of the farmers cultivating in 1973 (nos. 59, 36) hold adjoining plots close to the two early adopters (nos. 3, 28). Furthermore, in 1975 many of those households growing cassava hold adjoining plots of upland.

This spatial distribution of adopters is perhaps more evident on Map 3.2; the initial cassava adopters form two residence clusters, with those households beginning to cultivate the crop in 1975 (the intermediate stage) emanating outwards from these centres. The map also shows that cassava adopters are for the most part resident to the north of the village.

From the 1975 sample there are nine households who have resisted the change in the upland cropping pattern, and despite the general trend they are continuing with kenaf cultivation. Map 3.2 shows that they form a

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1 Average Price of 1 kg cucumbers: 1972 1.9 baht, 1973 0.3 baht, 1975 1.9 baht, 1976 1.6 baht.

2. Hagerstrand, T; "Quantitative Techniques for Analysis of the Spread of Information and Technology", in Anderson, C; and Bowman, M; (eds) Education and Economic Development, Chicago, 1965.

Map 3.1 Diffusion of Innovation: Cassava and Kenaf Cultivation 1972-1975 (Land Holding)



Cassava cultivation 1972

Cassava cultivation 1973

Cassava cultivation 1975

Kenaf cultivation 1975

Map 3.2 Diffusion of Innovation: Cassava and Kenaf Cultivators 1972-1975 (Residence Pattern)

BAN NA CHUAK NUEA



Figure 3.5 Kinship Ties between Upland Croppers, Ban Na Chuak Nuea



relatively close residence cluster in the central and northern sections of the village. Fig. 3.5 shows that a number of the households marked on the residence map are kinsmen of varying degrees of relatedness. One of the initial adopters (no. 28) is a member of the village temple committee and the other (no. 3) is the divorced sister-in-law of the village headman. The two assistant village headmen (no. 70, 128) have both resisted the change to cassava cultivation. Many of those farmers still cultivating kenaf are growing this crop on upland areas within the lowland, (See Map 3.1) while it is apparent that the bulk of the new cassava cultivation is confined to a section of upland proper to the west of the irrigation canal. It could be argued that the location of plots is a decisive factor here, particularly accessibility. However the two households continuing to grow kenaf in 1975, who were also enumerated in 1976 (no. 70, 119) had in 1976 changed to cassava cultivation.

The discussion now turns to a consideration of the non-agricultural innovators in the village.

2. Itinerant traders

Within the village there are a number of individuals engaging in trading activities of some kind; they are best termed sporadic because their trading activities are in many cases on an irregular basis and in all cases these villagers devote part of their time to the family farm. The range of their activities is such that no precise typology of activities can be offered. Some trade in agricultural produce, others in livestock and others in consumer goods. Sometimes the transactions are on a regular basis, for example one woman buys toys and sweets from Kalasin which she exchanges around the villages for scrap metal which she then sells in Khonkaen, a neighbouring provincial capital, 80 km away. She makes four trips annually, netting 400 baht profit, not an outstanding sum; and in order to finance the venture she originally

borrowed 1,000 baht. In another transaction recorded, a villager exchanged two cows valued together at 12,000 baht for a car which he then sold for 14,000 baht. There is also a livestock dealer buying and selling cattle on the same day; with the profits he purchased himself a truck and he runs a pick-up service down the irrigation access road which links many of the villages to the main road to town.

Compared with the agricultural innovators, these occasional traders conform more exactly to the classical entrepreneur. While the agricultural innovator can be seen to reorganize his traditional means of production to novel ends, these individuals in most cases are devising novel means to an end. They operate as individuals outside the context of the village, often far afield. Their ventures are uncertain, depend on extra-village contacts, and require a sense of financial calculation. Most of these individuals are in their fifties, or older. They are heads of either large simple households with adult unmarried children, or extended households, and for the most part they have large land holdings. The range of profits from the various ventures is between 400-20,000 baht. In many cases they act as money lenders, charging interest rate of 10% a month. Map 3.3 shows that these villagers can be found in two residence clusters - one to the north and one to the south of the village.

3. The 'gambler'

The entrepreneur figure involved as he is in risk-taking ventures is often called a gambler. In a discussion of the different types of entrepreneurship in the village the 'village gambler' should be examined. Gambling with cards and dice appears to be becoming popular in the village, although as yet only small sums of money are involved. Another very popular form of gambling, involving considerably larger sums of money is cockerel fighting. A few of the villagers own fighting cocks, a good one costing between 2,000-3,000 baht. The village headman,

Map 3.3 Residence Clusters: The Guards and Traders 1975

BAN NA CHUAK NUEA



owner of five fighting cocks, holds the village licence and is entitled to 10% of all stakes placed in the village. Owners also take their cockerels to other villages, or even other North-east provinces for matches; the winnings often amount to hundreds of baht. Cock-fighting is entirely a male sport; women never own fighting cocks, and are never spectators at village contests.

4. The guards

With the construction of irrigation works in the area, opportunities arose for off-farm employment, and a number of male villagers now work part-time as construction labourers. A number of villagers have also been employed as irrigation guards, and receive monthly salaries of between 700-2,000 baht. Dressed in khaki uniforms, these villagers together with the village headman symbolically bridge the gap between the peasant villager and the government official. The irrigation guards are included in this discussion on economic response because these individuals have chosen to re-organize their livelihoods; they have exchanged a role of full-time farm management for salaried office in an administrative structure outside of the village. While some continue to supervise their farms, others have rented out their land to other villagers. Guards were first employed by the Royal Irrigation Department in 1963. Recent regulations stipulate that employees must have completed military service, but in 1963 employment was open to any able-bodied males. This opportunity was advertised through a poster displayed in the irrigation engineer's office, and news of it spread by word of mouth down to the villagers. Na Chuak Nuea, lying close to the dam site, has at present thirteen villagers employed as guards, and nine of these were first employed between 1963-1965. For the most part the guards are heads of households, in their forties, although there are two young men in their thirties, who are still living with their in-laws. Among the group there are four pairs of brother, and in one kin

group two sons, the mother's brother and the mother's sister's son-in-law are all guards. Furthermore, a certain residence cluster is apparent (see Map 3.3). Three of these guards are considered to be the wealthiest members of the community; they are large landowners, one owns a village rice mill, and their holdings are worked by hired labourers. Many of the guards are money-lenders, charging 10% monthly interest rates. Most of those not lending money are themselves receiving loans, their salaries proving good credit.

Socio-Economic factors influencing Innovation

Returning to Hagen's notion of social marginality, it is necessary to determine whether there are any individuals or groups in the village that can be considered marginal to the social order, if so, can it be demonstrated that these individuals or groups are leading the plunge into the monetary economy either by initiating agricultural innovation, developing trading activites, or displaying any forms of entrepreneurial activity?

In some respects females can be considered to occupy marginal roles in village society in that they never occupy roles of formal leadership, they are excluded from joining the religious order of the Sangha, and in certain contexts they are considered as a defilement[1]. In reality the authority of the female, both at the household and the village level is not insignificant. The headman's wife performs informal duties, acting as consultant and intermediary, takes a vocal part in village meetings, and is herself referred to as 'phuyaiban', (village headman).[2] Furthermore, the social structure though based generally on bilateral

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1 A Buddhist monk becomes 'polluted' if in physical contact with a woman, and requires ritual cleansing.

2 Which as one informant suggests may be related to the ineffectiveness of the Headman, who is constantly conducting 'business in town'.

principles of kinship has a marked matrilineal bias expressed through matrilineal residence, matrilineal inheritence and the structure of kinship terminology. Therefore, although women occupy marginal roles within certain dimensions of the social order - the formal roles of authority in the political and religious domains; any tensions emanating from this marginality are certainly counteracted by other principles of the social structure.

Within the village a distinction can be made between those males born in Na Chuak Nuea and those who have been resident only since marriage. It could perhaps be argued that those males coming into the village on marriage are more marginal to the social order, composed as it is by ties of kinship; and it has been postulated that in-marrying males with their extra village orientation are more likely to be innovators.[1]

Relative age is another factor of great importance in village life. Throughout all Thai society social respect accrues with age. Traditionally a junior must subordinate himself to his elders, who excercise political, jural and economic authority over him. Formal leadership positions were the traditional monopoly of the village elders.

From the discussion of response to opportunity and entrepreneurial activity no general pattern emerges which indicates that groups marginal to the social order are being encouraged to enter into new ventures. However, analysis has shown that there are different types of entrepreneurship - there are the agricultural innovators, both on the lowland and the upland, the itinerant traders, the part-time 'gamblers', and those who had sought permanent salaried positions outside the village.

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1. Ng, R; "The Demographic Pattern". Lam Pao Report Series No. 1, 1974, p.4

Those involved in upland innovation were for the most part farmers without access to irrigation water (therefore marginal in respect of the allocation of a resource), and,it could be argued, marginal to the social order, in that the social order itself is expressed through the landholding pattern. However, even if the theory of social marginality can be shown to be the decisive factor in entrepreneurship, it is a complex concept to deal with in an analysis of a peasant village such as Na Chuak Nuea, where there is a rapid erosion of gerontocracy due to education, where marriage patterns are being transformed, resource distribution profiles changed, and where in short, basic principles of organization are being altered.

To review the main points: in the village of Na Chuak Nuea different types of entrepreneur can be identified. The term entrepreneur has been employed loosely to cover a range of activities: agricultural innovation (initial and imitative), both on the upland and lowland, trading activities, off-farm employment and occasional gambling.

It was found that innovation within the traditional branch of the village economy was a function of household structure: simple nuclear households delaying in their response. Innovation on the traditionally marginal upland was a function of household structure, the age of the household head and resource availability. Those villagers unsuccessful in the traditional branch: lowland rice production, (now more a function of lack of irrigation), were leading the upland innovation. It was noted that older heads of households well-endowed in land were conducting various trading ventures, and large landowners, utilizing kinship links had monopolised jobs offered by the Irrigation Department.

Earlier the various theories purporting to explain entrepreneurship, were briefly mentioned including McClelland's model which sought to explain the phenomenon psychologically. The domains of psychology and social structure are of course not discrete, and the social values of a society become a part of the psychology of the individual. Equipped with neither a method for measuring psychological indices such as the "need for achievement", nor the theory of the discipline I conclude by emphasising that while psychological factors may play an extremely important part in determining economic response, a variety of social and economic factors such as household structure, residence patterns, kin relations and the household's position and standing in the system of resource distribution are still important factors influencing patterns of response to new economic opportunities. Furthermore it is necessary to distinguish between different forms of entrepreneurship: agricultural innovation on the lowland is to be distinguished from innovation on the upland, and the agricultural innovator reorganizing his traditional means of production is again to be distinguished from the individual seeking new opportunities outside the village, whether as a trader or as a low-grade government official.

The Development Potential of the Village

The previous discussion was concerned with the different responses to opportunity within a peasant community. It is now necessary to consider the problem on a wider comparative level. Much has been written on the development potential of different societies, that is the degree to which the established social order of a community is inimical to change. This problem was the theme of a

collection of papers edited by Epstein and Penny[1].

"All our contributors have found that the social system each studied is composed of a set of socio-economic variables some of which helped to promote development while others hampered it"[2].

Epstein argues that the development process consists of the suitable interaction of three major sets of factors; resource endowment, type of social system, and manner of external contact. External variables operating on any particular social system are of major importance. The importance of agricultural extension work on Highland New Guinea coffee growers, the influence of Dutch colonialism on the Karo Batak of Indonesia, the stimulus that European business firms provided for Tahitian elites, or the impact of the foreign ideology of socialism on the Burmese socio-economic system are cases in point.[3] Epstein concludes this study by categorizing a certain number of variables relating to resource endowment, the social system and the manner of external contact as contributing to either high or low development potential. An abbreviated version of Epstein's summary is presented in Table 3.4. The table presented on page 122 is inevitably simplistic covering as it does such a large range of factors.

"The study of development requires the simultaneous analysis of a large number of variables and relationships on both the individual and the social level, and in several major institutions of any community ... To focus on only one aspect is to invite distortion"[4].

Epstein remarks on the almost impossible task of constructing a general model of development,

"there are so many different factors to take into account, each of which has a range of possible qualities, that it seems impossible

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1 Epstein, T; and Penny, D; Opportunity and Response. Case Studies in Economic Development, London, 1972

2 Ibid; p. 245

3 Ibid; p.245

4 Ibid; p.241

Table 3.4

Abbreviated version of Epstein's 'Dimensions of Rural Development'[1]

	Resource Endowment	
	High Development Potential	Low Development Potential
Land		
area under society's control	Largely exceeds subsistence needs	Just meets subsistence needs
Labour		
working population	Not fully employed in subsistence	Fully employed in subsistence
Capital Goods		
tools and equipment	Readily available	Absent
Technology and skills	At a sophisticated level	Crude
	Traditional Social System	
Economic		
Productive unit	Small, socially integrated	Heterogeneous
Entrepreur-ship	Stress on innovation	Stress on conformity
Specialization	Division of labour	Most tasks performed by most families
Exchanges	Generally accepted means of transaction	Barter
Consumption	Falling short of output	Absorbing total production
Savings and investment	Thriftiness an important prestige criterion	Conspicuous consumption
Social		
Organization	Egalitarian	Hierarchical
Status	Achieved	Ascribed
Kinship system	Patrilineal	Matrilineal
Family structure	Three generation joint-family	Nuclear family
Residence patterns	Patrivirilocal	Avuncovirilocal
Land tenure	Individual tenure	Vague group tenure

1 Ibid p.248

Table 3.4 continued

	High Development Potential	Low Development Potential
Inheritance	Main property intact	Fragmentation
Reciprocity	Group members supporting their economic leader	Group members acting as drag on ambitious men
Leisure	Readily forgone	Valued highly
Time horizon	Long term effects considered	Short term gains only taken into account
Prestige criterion	Conspicuous investment	Conspicuous consumption
Religious beliefs	Sanctioning thriftiness	Encouraging lavish expenditure on feasts and places of worship
Political		
Independent state	Stress on economic growth	Overriding emphasis on social factors
Factions	Encouraging rival leaders to greater achievements	Diverting leaders' interests from economic matters
Leadership	Based on individual qualities	Hereditary succession
Qualities of Leadership	Able men interested in achieving common good	Selfish men out only to maximize their own welfare
	External Contact	
Cash crops	Sound world markets	Strictly limited outlets
Crop prices	Stable or steadily increasing	Declining or fluctuating
Marketing	Efficient, large scale arrangement	Individual small traders
Shop goods	Amply available	Unobtainable or scarce
Transport facilities	Network of roads	No roads linking villages with marketing centre

to advance any all-embracing development hypothesis"[1].

However Epstein's analysis, constructed as it is from a number of research papers on New Guinea, Indonesia, Malaya and Burma offers a good starting point in any attempt to assess the development potential of a social system. How then does the village of Na Chuak Nuea rate in terms of developmental potential?

Resource endowment, the Social System and External Contact, Na Chuak Nuea.

Land. The average land holding is considered more than adequate for subsistence needs; but recent population pressure has exhausted the forest margins, and little land remains to be cleared. The size of a holding however, is a somewhat crude measure and land productivity needs to be considered. Crop damage, flooding and drought are still major problems to many farmers. 'Second-cropping', - one of the main aims of the development officials, implies an extension of the agricultural cycle throughout the whole year. Thus, response to this opportunity does not require land over and above that required for subsistence cultivation. In 1972, 67% of the village had upland plots (with an average holding of 3 rai) suitable for the cultivation of cash crops, and 4% of the village held fallow land. The labour requirements of subsistence agriculture need not conflict with those for dry season cropping, except in certain cases of early rains where the harvesting of a second crop may converge with the ploughing of the paddy. Nor need there be any conflict between labour requirements for upland cropping and rice cultivation. A conflict does emerge however, between labour for dry season cropping and the traditional dry season off-farm labouring. Wage-labouring opportunities outside the village are increasing, and many

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1 Ibid; p. 244

young people enjoy this opportunity to leave the village and meet new people. Tools, equipment and inputs are readily available but financial constraints, especially the cost of fertiliser are impediments for large scale adoption. Many farmers still carve their own wooden ploughs, although most households are now making annual purchases of hoes and metal plough heads. The land holding pattern, with the traditional system of raised dykes (bunds), and the inaccessibility of much of the land are barriers against adoption of tractor ploughing. The level of traditional technology can be said to be highly adapted to the environmental setting; but the imposition of the irrigation system can be seen in many ways to conflict with this traditional adaption. The traditional land-holding pattern: elongated plots, extending through different elevations, is not best suited to irrigated agriculture, and in some nearby villages land consolidation programmes are being introduced. Furthermore, the traditional system of paddy cultivation favoured extensive cultivation, while irrigated agriculture requires intensive cultivation.

The productive unit, the household, is small and socially integrated. The head of the household, in his role as husband, father or father-in-law manages the farm unit. In discussing patterns of innovation it emerged that those villagers without irrigation are more ready to experiment with agriculutural innovations than those receiving irrigation. There is little division of labour in agriculture, although men traditionally plough. Certain villagers can be considered livestock specialists, others skilled housebuilders, but apart from this there has been no great degree of specialization nor technical division of labour within the village. The Thai baht is a generally accepted medium of transaction, although barter and payments in rice still constitute important items of exchange. There has long been a traditional

rice surplus for many households although for some consumption still absorbs total production. Savings and investments, traditionally in the form of gold, jewellery or livestock were necessary insurances under such erratic climatic conditions, where flooding or drought could deplete production. Conspicuous consumption, the building of a fine new house, the ownership of watches, radios and a set of town clothes have an important prestige value.

The social organisation of the village can be described as egalitarian, it lacks a strict hierarchical arrangement of status groups, and nothing resembling a caste system can be identified. Certain status distinctions between lay and clergy, male and female and in particular senior and junior are important indicators for role behaviour and they structure most social relationships. Status in the village community is based on achievement, as was to be expected under a pioneering system where a young man would leave his village on marriage to clear his own land. There are no hereditary offices, either in secular or religious leadership. Economic status will increasingly depend upon inheritance and therefore ascription, as land pressure increases, and as the value of irrigated land rises. The kinship system is bilateral with a matrilateral bias; this was well suited to a pioneering spirit, the sons leaving to clear land, the daughters inheriting the parental plot. However, as the irrigation programme is implemented these patterns are likely to change, and already sons in the village are less willing to leave, and are keen to jointly inherit the parental plot, especially if it is irrigated. The household structure is characterized by both nuclear and joint extended families, but recently the rate of household formation has declined. Residence patterns are strongly uxorilocal, there is individual land tenure, and a general process of fragmentation of property through the traditional system of inheritance. The economic efforts of an individual are to no great extent constrained by his duties

of kinship real or fictive. Certain mechanisms of redistribution operate, especially through the temple, but the product so distributed is small. Reciprocity of kin labour enabled some households favourably endowed with land to produce above their own labour capabilities. Leisure is highly valued, "Pai thiaw", to travel around other villages, to take trips into town, especially during the dry-season, is a much favoured, and not easily relinquished, pastime associated with much merry-making. Much of the dry-season is devoted to ritual and ceremonial festivities, especially during the New Year when festivals can extend through two months. The village time horizon has traditionally been geared to one agricultural season. In any subsistence economy short-term considerations - the satisfaction of immediate consumption requirements - necessarily were of overriding importance. Recently, cassava production has increased substantially on the upland, although some agriculturalists have argued that the upland cultivation of cassava will in the long term drastically reduce soil fertility. However, some farmers who have speculated in land prior to the implementation of irrigation certainly considered the long term effects of their actions. Prestige is associated both with the ownership of consumer goods: a new house, watches, radios and town clothes, but also with investment - for example, ownership of livestock. As Buddhists and animists there is nothing in a villager's religious values system comparable to the Protestant ethic which sanctions thriftiness. There is a certain amount of expenditure on religious ceremonies and the village as a whole supports the abbots, monks and novices supplying food and clothing and constructing and repairing temple buildings.

The Government of Thailand's main target for the North-east is economic growth which, it is argued, will foster political stability. Leadership is based on individual qualities, but the styles of leadership are changing as village headmen, now salaried Government

employees are drawn more and more out of the village into the local administrative centre. The role of the headman has changed from that of a village father figure to an administrative intermediary. The position of headman now more than ever brings with it opportunities to maximise their own economic standing. The production of the cash crop kenaf was in response to the failure of a jute harvest in Bangladesh. Its importance as a cash crop has declined and has been replaced by cassava from the roots of which a type of flour is extracted, which is an important export. Villagers complain of a lack of a local market for the dry-season vegetables which can explain to a degree the slow development of this cropping practice. Prices for most crops are rising although there are fluctuations. Marketing arrangements are various, the most organized system is for cassava, where companies hire labourers to come into the villages to harvest the crop. Villagers either transport their own rice to the market or traders purchase the crop in the village. Shop goods in ample supply in the local town find their way into the village shop and travelling merchants sell goods in the village. The village is reasonably accessible, pick-ups transport villagers to the main road and the journey to town takes approximately half an hour. Table 3.5 offers an abbreviated summary of the analysis.

Table 3.5. Development Potential, Ban Na Chuak Nuea.

	High Potential	Low Potential
	Resource Endowment	
Land	Area adequate for subsistence needs	Increasing land pressure, soils marginal
Labour	Not fully employed in subsistence	Traditional off-farm dry season labouring
Tools	Readily available	Capital constraints
Technology & skills	Highly adapted to environmental setting	
Economic	Traditional Social System	
Productive unit	Small, socially integrated	
Entrepreneurship	Certain sections of the community readily accepting innovations	
Specialization		Little specialization
Exchange	The baht generally accept-form of transaction	
Consumption	Generally falling short of output	
Savings and investment		Conspicuous consumption
Social		
Social Organization	Egalitarian	
Status	Achieved	
Kinship system	Bilateral	
Family structure	Increase in extended households	
Residence Patterns		Uxorilocal
Land Tenure	Individual tenure	
Inheritance		Fragmentation
Reciprocity	Declining	
Leisure		Highly valued
Time horizon		Traditionally 'short-term' gains only taken into account
Prestige criteria	Conspicuous investment (livestock and land)	Recently prestige associated with ownership of consumer goods
Religious beliefs		Expenditure on feasts and the temple

continued:

Continuation:

Table 3.5:

	High Potential	Low Potential
Political		
Independent State	Stress on economic growth	
Leadership	Based on individual qualities	
Qualities of leadership		Increasing opportunities for leaders to maximise their economic standing
	External Contact	
Cash crops	World markets	
Crop prices	Rising	Fluctuations
Marketing arrangements		Various, no efficient large scale arrangement except for cassava
Shop goods	Readily available in town	
Transport	Road links to town	

What may be concluded from this excercise? It first suggests which dimensions of the social system are suited to development, and which on the other hand are likely to impede it, and, for the social scientist, it indicates in which areas of social life conflicts are likely to arise. Those factors under the heading of the traditional social system (see Table 3.5.)which are labelled of low development potential include the lack of specialization, residence and inheritance patterns, and certain aspects of the value system of the community: the importance of leisure, the traditional time-horizon, prestige criteria and religious beliefs. The patterns of inheritance and residence, and the values of the community were adapted to the traditional village socio-economic system, based as it was on subsistence cultivation; however, many aspects of the traditional system can be seen to accommodate themselves to economic development[1], even to foster it. The model, as Epstein is quick to point out, needs more refinement[2]. Actual social relations rarely enable precise categorization. A variable is not entirely one thing nor another (for example status is often ascribed and achieved). Nevertheless the model as it stands is important as it illustrates the way in which a traditional social system contains elements which are likely both to foster and impede economic development, and it indicates in which areas of social life, conflict is likely to be engendered through economic change.

Choice

Response to economic opportunities often but not always involves a choice between alternatives. Whether to continue a well-tried, traditional branch of agriculture, or to try one's hand at a newly introduced crop or method, is but one example. Of course the choice may not be open to certain villagers; if a household's land is unirrigated, and if access to such land through other means is not possible, the choice to second-crop or not is not open to them. Another area in which choice becomes an important concern is in village expenditure. Previously when surplus rice from a good harvest was sold in the market the small

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1 Economic Development here specifically referring to the transformation from subsistence to commercialized agriculture

2 Epstein op cit; p. 246

amounts of income received were enough to purchase small consumer items, or to convert into investments such as livestock or jewellery. As rice production is boosted, and as cash cropping and dry-season cropping increase in scale, larger sums of money enter into the household, sometimes, in the case of the village salary owners, on a regular monthly basis. The choices excercised in the spending of this income, whether to purchase predominantly consumer items, or whether to re-invest in the productive cycle say a great deal about the primary values of the village community.

A household re-investing in the productive system should not be regarded as behaving more rationally than another household donating a large sum of money to the temple, or spending their income on a fine new house; these are all different types of investment. The first is investment in the economic sphere, the second in the religious sphere (increasing merit, believed to be a guarantee for the next life) and the third, investment in the social sphere through ownership of prestige items. Furthermore, these different types of investment often complement each other. Investment in the religious sphere: a donation to the temple, or the organization of a ceremony, may be made with the expectation of an increased yield during the next season. Investment in the economic sphere: the purchase of improved seed, or the application of fertilizer, may be calculated to raise a household's income and savings, soon to be directed into the purchase of a new house, or radio. Furthermore, the use of capital in-puts (re-investment in the production cycle) does not necessarily go hand in hand with the notion of the commercial farmer. The commercial farmer purchasing in-puts reckons to increase his productivity for a maximum money return. While in the village there are households doing exactly this, there are others beset

by a particularly disadvantageous situation who reinvest their income in the productive system in order to maximise a poor perhaps even subsistence production. There are many cases where insecticide has been purchased and applied at the last minute in a usually futile attempt to save a bad crop. In other cases a chronic household labour shortage may be met through the hiring of labour. The patterns of village expenditure for 1975 will now be examined, in order to ascertain whether any patterns emerge relating to the choices excercised in the spending of household incomes.

Consumer Goods

House construction

The standard of house construction found in the village varies considerably. There are small flimsy constructions of rough wood, bamboo, rattan, dried leaves and rushes (see Photograph 1). Items such as these can be collected around the village, and houses of this type require a minimum of skill and time to construct. Most dwellings of this sort are found on the margins of the village. The most elaborate houses are large, with three or four rooms, a kitchen area, and a large sitting area. Still predominantly built of wood, they have sturdy corrugated iron roofs, staircases, often elaborately carved, and shuttered windows (see Photographs 2 and 3). In some cases the traditional style of the North-east Thai house is being radically altered. Some houses are now built on ground level with a concrete floor (the traditional house is raised on stilts) and there are internal staircases. These houses offer more security against thieves - an important consideration now that items of value: radios, cassettes and watches are owned by most villagers. The style of a new house is a development towards privacy and must have some impact on the tone of social life, traditionally characterized by open-ness.

Styles of House Construction

1

2

3

Certainly the ownership of a new-style house is considered to be an important status symbol by many villagers. In 1975 the new headman frequently displayed his shame at owning a small house, built by his in-laws some 30 years ago. Within a year he had purchased a new house from his brother-in-law, emigrating from the village. The construction of a new house may take as long as fifteen years, but the usual time period is three and it seems that much prestige is associated with speedy construction. One of the village irrigation guards, for example, constructed a new house in three months. The speed of construction is of course related to the availability of capital. The cost of a new house is estimated to be between 20,000 - 30,000 baht. A tin roof would cost about 3,000 baht and each wooden post approximately 200 baht. The increasingly high standard of village house construction is likely to cause some conflict in certain areas of the village ideological system. Traditionally, certain natural phenomenon such as lightening striking a house, are considered to be inauspicious omen. If any house met such a fate it was immediately dismantled, and the author witnessed such a case in 1975. When houses could be reassembled swiftly with little effort or expense, no great hardship or financial loss was entailed. However, when houses are valued at 30,000 baht compliance with traditional beliefs will surely be questioned. Previously, villagers constructed their own houses with kinsmen and neighbours lending a hand. Now it is more common to employ a skilled house builder of which there are two or three in the village, but craftsmen are often employed from other villages. The ownership of a fine new house is not always an indicator of economic standing nor of capital availability. A number of households are said to have obtained wood illegally and kinsmen still contribute their labour, so hired labour costs need not be a factor.

However, generally the standard of house construction is an approximate indicator of economic standing. Turton comments in his study of a Northern Thai village:

" a large and well-built house is the most conspicuous evidence of wealth differences in the village"[1].

Other consumer goods

Consumer goods purchased include clothes, radios, watches and bicycles. All these items are associated with the widening contact of the village with the outside. Clothes and watches are only worn on special occasions in the village and are mostly kept for trips to town. Radios are an important channel for communication and bicycles, owned mostly by the irrigation guards, are an important means of transport. The purchase of clothing from the town has increased recently but mostly among the younger villagers. Everyday wear for village women is still the cotton sarong, often woven on a home loom and a simple cotton blouse, and for men a 'pakhama', a strip of cotton tied round the waist and between the legs. Photograph 4 shows the village headman setting off after the rains to clear a blocked ditch in the village. Photograph 5, the same man returning from a trip to town. Around his neck he wears a string of lucky charms to protect him from evil spirits and bullets while out of the village. The percentage ownership of watches, radios and bicycles for 1971 and 1975 is given in Table 3.6.

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1 Turton, A; Northern Thai Peasant Society. A Case Study of Jural and Political Structures at the Village Level and Their Twentieth Century transformations, (Ph.D) London, 1975, p.170

The Village Headman Dressed for Village Work

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

The Village Headman Dressed for Town Business

5

Table 3.6. The ownership of certain consumer items, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971 and 1975

	1971		1975	
	No. owning	%	no. owning	%
Watch	17	49	19	43
radio	17	49	35	79
bicycle	10	29	18	50

Re-investment in Production

Almost everyone in the village is investing to some extent in the productive system. Village expenditure on fertilizer, seeds, insecticide and labour and tools per household ranges between 18-8000 baht. It is also common for villagers who rent out their land for a share of production to provide seed and fertilizer. Information from a supplementary questionnaire in 1975 indicated that of those farmers growing glutinous rice no-one had used purchased seed, nor had any households used tractors for ploughing. Fertilizer had been applied to 60% of the area under glutinous rice, and insecticide to 15% of the area. Insecticide was clearly being applied to already badly affected crops, as those farmers using insecticide obtained substantially lower yields. There is a greater use of agricultural inputs for second-cropping. All those households growing a second-crop had used purchased seeds, fertilizer and insecticide. Villagers generally expressed the opinion that fertilizer and insecticide are only required for dry-season cropping, and are of little value during the paddy season. For upland cultivation a small number of households had hired tractors for ploughing, and insecticide was used by one household, but purchased seed and fertilizers had not been used.

In 1975 the majority of the village - 87% - were re-investing

part of their income in livestock. Sums of money of between 25-31,000 baht were spent, mostly on poultry and cattle. One household purchased two white brahmin cows costing 15,500 baht a head. Livestock has traditionally been an important form of investment, and as noted in Chapter 1, there has been a recent trend towards livestock specialization. Although a number of households who have no access to lowland are specializing in livestock as a viable alternative to rice cultivation, there are a number of large landowners on the lowland who are still re-investing income from the sale of their rice surplus into livestock.

Other Expenditure

Other items of expenditure include medical expenses (ranging from 20-40,000 baht), education (15-4,000 baht), repayments of loans (100-11,000 baht) and the purchase of food and rice (30-4000 baht).

Table 3.7. Expenditure patterns: Percentage Distribution, Ban Na Chuak Nuea,* 1975.

Food and Rice	11.12
Medical	19.16
Education	1.85
Making Merit & Ceremonies	3.70
Clothing	10.99
Consumer Goods	5.63
House Construction	3.88
Repayment of Loans	7.75
Agricultural inputs and Equipment	11.59
Livestock	22.46

* The sum total is not equal to 100.00 due to rounding.

Table 3.7. shows that the expenditure for medical treatment, education and food purchases (32.13% of total expenditure) is not far short of expenditure on production (agricultural inputs, equipment and livestock) 34.05%. Consumer items: clothing, housing and other goods account for 20.5%. Looked at in this way the village is re-investing more in the productive process than spending for consumption.

When the analysis is focussed at the household level it is difficult to identify within the village any clear distinction between the consumer spenders and the re-investment orientated spenders. In any one year a household may make a heavy expenditure on consumer items, and in another on livestock or capital inputs. It is important in this respect to appreciate that the range of consumer goods available for purchase is limited in a certain way. There is within the village a ceiling to material aspirations. Watches, radios, a set of town clothes and a new house virtually exhaust the range of items found in the village. Some form of transport may be purchased if a household has a member working on a regular basis outside the village. Consumer aspirations are limited by the social values and the present circumstances of village life. This situation will undoubtedly change in the near future when the village becomes electrified. In a nearby village, Ban Tum, which has recently received electricity, there has been a marked increase in consumer spending, led by the headman, who purchased a fridge and a television as soon as his cables were laid. At the present time in Na Chuak Nuea many villagers are re-investing a larger proportion of their income into the productive system rather than on consumer spending, not I would argue because they are more 'investment oriented' but because their immediate consumer needs are satisfied. Consumer needs in a peasant society cannot be considered infinite, as in western society, but are limited by the circumstances of village life.

Credit

Another opportunity available to the villagers are loan facilities. The availability of loans from both institutional and non-institutional sources, and the uses to which the loans are put, will now be considered. Within the area there are a number of farmer associations. Their main functions have been the supply of credit, agricultural inputs, and the marketing of farm produce. Table 3.8. shows the membership of various institutions for Na Chuak Nuea in 1971 and 1975.

Table 3.8. Membership of Farmers' Associations, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971 and 1975

1971			1975		
	No.	%		No.	%
Agricultural Credit Association	1	2.9	Multi-purpose Co-op	7	20
Land Co-op	2	5.7	Land Co-op	12	27
Farmers Group	2	5.7	Farmers Group	1	2.2
Water Users Association	7	20	Water Users Association	25	57

In order to apply for co-operative membership a farmer must be in possession of the N.S. 3 certificate, or have two other society members act as guarantors. For the Land Co-op one guarantor is required for a loan up to 5,000 baht but the loan must be no more than 60% of the total annual value of his farm produce. Demaine comments that

"such regulations on participation and the fact that only 25% of the farmers interviewed ... were members of farmers' associations lead to the hypothesis that co-operative societies at work are tending to restrict their activities to a select group of farmers, usually the richer ones with the larger holdings'[1].

1 Demaine, H; The Role of Farmers Associations in Agriculutural Development. A Case Study from N.E. Thailand. S.O.A.S. Occasional Paper 1976, p.17. (Reprinted from the 1974 Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operatives).

In his analysis Demaine shows that there were significant differences between members of the co-ops and non-co-op members. Co-operative members were typically owners of larger holdings, and they also held larger paddy areas. They were also richer with higher total incomes, and incomes from crop sales. Demaine concludes

"the co-operatives seemed only to be used by those most capable of increasing their agricultural production through further capital investment out of their own resources ... in this way they have been helping to increase income disparities at the local level and to create rifts in the traditional society"[1].

Some of these propositions will now be examined with reference to Na Chuak Nuea. Land Co-operative. The former village Headman was president of this co-operative, and one of his assistants was also an early member. All those farmers (from the samples) who have joined the co-operative since 1971 are close relatives of either the old Headman or his Assistant, with the exception of one case. Five members of the co-operative are related to the former Headman, through his wife's mother, and four of the members are related to the assistant (see fig. 3.6).

Fig. 3.6. Members of The Land Co-operative, from the 1975 sample, by year of entry, Ban Na Chuak Nuea

Year of Entry	
1971	Thongcan (former Headman)
	Khamta (Assistant Headman to both former and present Headman)
	Daeng (Khamta's Father's younger brother)
1972	Phutta (Nong[2] of Thongcan)
1973	Bua (no kin relation)
	Sing (Phi[2] of Khamta)
	Pim (Nong of Khamta)
1974	Nae (Nong of Thongcan)
	Wandi (Nong of Thongcan)
	Somorn (Nong of Thongcan)
	Paeng (Nong of Thongcan)
	Udom (Phi of Khamta)

1 Ibid; p.18

2 Nong denotes a younger classificatory sibling.
Phi denotes an elder classificatory sibling.

From the sample, seven households were kinsmen of the former Headman and all but two were Land Co-op members. While some of these Co-op members can be considered the rich of the village with large land holdings and high incomes, half of them do in fact have below average incomes, and four of them are smallholders. Kinship relations, here with the Headman or his Assistant seem to be an important factor. Furthermore the former Headman was known to have distributed free Co-op fertilizer among certain of his relatives who were not Co-op members. Six of the Land Co-op members in 1975 had unpaid loans (with an interest rate of 12%). The former Headman obtained the largest, 10,000 baht, for the purpose of land clearance. The other loans were all in the region of 3,000-5000 baht. Those in receipt of loans were the wealthier members, although there were two cases where small holders received loans for non-productive purposes (a 2,000 baht loan for general consumption, and a 4,500 baht loan for house repairs). If membership of the Multipurpose Co-op is examined no clear pattern of close kinship ties between members emerges. Another distinction between this Co-operative and the other is that while the majority of Land Co-op members derive their largest source of income from traditional sources: crops and livestock, the Multi-purpose Co-op members, for the most part, derive most of their income from off-farm sources, and in fact have below average crop incomes. Five of these Multi-purpose Co-op members have received loans of between 600-10,000 baht (again at a 12% interest rate). The purpose of these loans included purchase of agricultural equipment and inputs, land development, labour hire, and in one case, land purchase; so many of those who have been earning income from extra-village sources are ultimately investing these incomes in the village.

In the years 1971-1974 there has also been an increase in the number of people loaning sums of money to their relatives. In 1971, 20% of the sample, compared to 30% (13) in 1975 were receiving interest-free loans from their kinsmen. In 1971 the average loan was 442 baht and in 1975, 1,213 baht, an increase approximately equal to the increase in village incomes (bearing in mind the inflation rate) within this period. A small number of loans are made from traders, with interest rates varying from 5-10%. While many of those receiving loans from kinsmen can be categorised as the 'poorer-relation' - small-holders with at present no access to the co-operative associations - there are a number of wealthy families making use of these loan arrangements. In 1975, one of the richer farmers with 4,500 baht in a bank account borrowed 600 baht from a relative for a one month period in order to purchase livestock. Another wealthy farmer, a member of the Land Co-operative, borrowed 1,000 baht each from three sets of relatives, all repaid within one month, one loan to cover medical expenses, another for livestock purchase, and another to help repay a 3,000 baht loan from the Land Co-op. While the majority of loans from the Co-operative institutions were used for production, those from relatives were utilized mainly for consumption purposes (See Table 3.9). Only 4 out of a total of 20 loans are for productive purposes. The procedures involved in obtaining a co-operative loan are often lengthy and kinsmen are still an important source of ready cash to meet sudden cash needs.

Table 3.9. Loans by source and by purpose, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975.

	Land Co-op	Multi-purpose	Relatives
Land purchase	-	2	1
Land development	2	1	-
Tractor hire	1	-	-
In-puts	-	1	-
Hiring labour	2	1	1
Livestock purchase	-	-	2
General consumption	1	1	11
Medical expenses	-	-	4
House repair	1	1	-
Loan repayment	-	-	1

The period of loans made by kinsmen varies from 1-12 months depending in the size of the loan. While a figure in the region of 80,000 baht had been borrowed from the co-operative institutions and an 18,000 baht from kinsmen, 8 members of the 1975 sample (18%) were holding in total 52,000 baht in bank accounts, sums of money ranging between 5,000-10,000 baht. The whole question of savings is difficult to examine due to the fact that in many cases money is saved 'under the mattress'. Amounts of money held in the home are usually small, usually under 500 baht. Fear of theft usually deters most householders from keeping larger sums of money. Those keeping bank accounts are usually saving for a particular purpose, to buy livestock and in one case a tractor. Once the required sum is obtained the money is withdrawn and the account closed.

In this chapter certain patterns of response to opportunity were examined. Different types of opportunities, both agricultural (cash cropping and second cropping) and non-agricultural (trading activities and salaried employment outside the village) were discussed, and for each different type of opportunity a different pattern of response emerged. The different patterns related to a number of factors: structure of the household, the age of the household head, the wider

kin group, residence clusters and resource endowment. Those innovating on the upland were predominantly extended families, and the first adopters were predominantly men in their forties. Those households marginal to the traditional subsistence system, namely those deficit in their rice production, were displaying a higher response to agricultural innovation, both in changing to the new cash crop and in their experiments with second-cropping. Those successful in the traditional sector, namely the surplus producers, displayed a traditional attitude towards agricultural innovation, and many of these households were participating either in trading activities outside the village, or had monopolized certain opportunities for salaried office with the local irrigation department.

Having considered a number of socio-economic factors influencing opportunity response within the village the discussion continued with an analysis based on Epstein's model of those elements in the socio-economic system inimical or conducive to economic change. It was shown that certain features of the social structure: the residence and inheritance patterns, and certain ideologies: the value of leisure, the traditional short 'time-horizon', and the expenditure on ceremonials and places of worship were inimical to development. The chapter continued with an examination of choice, as expressed through village expenditure patterns, and it was argued that no clear distinction can yet be made between investment and consumer-oriented spenders. The membership of agricultural co-operatives in the village was examined, the conclusion being that the new opportunity of institutional credit in the village may well have been limited under certain circumstances to restricted groups, namely certain clusters of kinsmen.

The range of choices now open to villagers, both in the methods of acquiring money income, and in spending it, have recently been expanded. An explanation of the patterns of response to choice and opportunity must take account of basic principles of social organization: the demographic composition of households, residence patterns, and kinship networks, as well as economic factors relating to resource endowment. The various responses to new opportunities can never adequately be explained by psychological factors alone.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND CHANGING PATTERS OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

The discussion so far has been concerned with certain changes that have been occurring in a village community during its transformation from subsistence to commercialized agriculture. Innovations, whether the use of irrigation, the introduction of a new crop, or whatever, modify pre-existing institutions and radically affect the complex network of relationships between them. It is useful here to recall the distinction between structural changes: changes in the character of the social system when conflicts are not resolvable in terms of the existing values of society, and Firth's concept of organizational change, changes in ways of doing things, which themselves continue to be done and in the extent and range of particular complexes of social relationships which remain formally unaltered.[1] Firth's concept of organizational change does involve some change in the nature of social relationships and so in their structure. So as Beattie comments:

"a decision as to the point at which organizational change, which may be gradual and cumulative, becomes important enough to qualify as structural change, must to some extent be arbitrary"[2].

Beattie suggests that these two types of change are best considered as two different stages of the same process. In this study of a Northeast Thai village change for the most part is at an early organizational stage. This chapter discusses certain specific implications of these changes for the community under study.

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1 Firth, R; Social Change in Tikopia, London, 1959

2 Beattie, J; Other Cultures, London, 1964, p.247

It has often been argued that economic advance, the increased division of labour, the establishment of market relations and the accumulation of capital necessarily leads to a continuing cumulation of economic advantage and disadvantage with a polarization of peasant society into rich capitalist farmers and poor small land-holders, or wage labourers. Ng, speaking of the transition from subsistence to commercialized agriculture writes:

"The obvious result of this rapid transition is a basic transformation from the harmonious village community into a divisive society with large land owners and landless share-croppers, money lenders and chronic debtors"[1].

The Measurement of Socio-Economic Change

Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility in Peasant Communities

First of all it is necessary to present an analytical model of socio-economic change, for the major conceptual sub-divisions most generally accepted as aptest for the analysis of stratification relate to a man's position in the socio-economic system. Shanin[2], delineates four basic types of peasant mobility expressible on two major scales of possible change,

a) an aggregate shift expressing general bettering or worsening of the socio-economic position of a peasant society as a whole;

b) differentiation, the processes expressing changes in the socio-economic differentiation of the society.

An aggregate upwards or downwards (see graphs (i) and (ii), will be recorded as a movement of the second curve to the right or left respectively. Polarization, see graph (iii) will flatten the second

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1 Ng, R; "Rural Change in South-east Asia", in Geography, Vol.59, Part 3, July 1974, p.256

2 Shanin, T; The Awkward Class, Oxford, 1972

Figure 4.1 Types of Mobility in Peasant Society (Graphs of Socio-Economic Change)[1]



Figure 4.2 Changes in Household Income, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975



[1] Source: Shanin, T; op.cit; p.51

curve (more households at either end of the scale) and levelling (see graph (iv) will round the curve (a higher concentration of households in the middle range).

In the empirical case there is often a combination of aggregate movement and differentiation. Fig. 4.2. illustrates the changes in household income for Na Chuak Nuea 1971-1975. Here there is no clear cut pattern of total aggregate movement, polarization or levelling. The curve in 1975 appears flatter, indicating a relatively higher degree of polarization. However, some polarization can be identified in 1971 with a clear gap between the mass at the lower end and a small group of rich at the upper end. The 1975 curve flattens but with a shift to the right indicating a movement of lower middle range households to the higher end of the scale. Change may be expressed in this way: from the viewpoint of the total community, or alternatively, the analysis may focus on the individual household. Shanin argues that the mobility of individual households in a peasant society is multi-directional in character and consists of opposing movements of individual households which cancel themselves out when analysis is confined to the study of the mobility of the society as a whole.

"The net mobility of a peasant society can be seen as the tip of an iceberg, the summary results of socio-economic changes of much greater magnitude"[1].

Furthermore, Shanin argues that there is a strong centripetal mobility of peasant households in relation to the median wealth of a particular society with rises of poorer households and descents of wealthier ones. Thus, he argues:

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1 Ibid; p.74

"given the existence of demonstrable centrifugal forces in a society in which socio-ecohomic stratification does not disappear, it follows that centrifugal tendencies must be operating to countervail the centripetal forces. A complex multi-dimensional mobility involving centripetal and centrifugal tendencies simultaneously operating among peasant households is at work and underlies the gross differentiation process in peasant society" [1].

Work on the pre-revolution Russian peasantry also indicated that there was some cyclical mobility with certain households consistently fluctuating between different stratas. Shanin argues that multi-directional and to a lesser extent cyclical patterns of mobility at work check the crystallization of the Russian peasant socio-economic strata into classes.

Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility in Ban Na Chuak Nuea.

The use of categories representing the various socio-economic strata permits the identification of socio-economic mobility within the village of Na Chuak Nuea over a period of four years. The following factors are used: the area planted to rice, rice production, herd size, off-farm income, the number of working males in the household and the household size. In Fig.4.3, the figures in squares A,A', B,B' .... E,E' indicate those households which are in the same category for 1971 and 1975. Those figures falling to the left of the diagonal bar represent those households in various degrees of descending mobility, and those to the right of ascending mobility. A weakness of the model is that it does not take account of cyclical mobility. For example, a household who has not changed stratum may well have fluctuated in the intervening years. In Shanin's analysis, data with a ten year interval was used.

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1 Ibid; p.74

Figure 4.3 Household mobility. Land planted to rice

No. of households	1971	1975 A'	B'	C'	D'	E'
		2	2	7	4	4
A = Nil	0	0	0	0	0	0
B = 1-10 rai	1	0	0	0	1	0
C = 11-20 rai	7	1	1	4	0	1
D = 21-30 rai	6	0	1	3	2	0
E = 31+ rai	5	1	0	0	1	3

(10 changes in strata)

	A	B	C	D	E
1971	0	1	7	6	5
1975	2	2	7	4	4

Changes = (+2) (+1) (0) (-2) (-1) = 3

Figure 4.4 Household mobility. Rice production

No. of Households	1971	1975 A'	B'	C'	D'	E'
		3	3	8	3	2
A = Nil	0	0	0	0	0	0
B = 1,000-3,999kg	7	2	1	4	0	0
C = 4,000-6,999kg	10	1	2	3	3	0
D = 7,000-9,999kg	2	0	0	1	0	2
E = 10,000 +	0	0	0	0	0	0

(15 changes in strata)

	A	B	C	D	E
1971	0	7	10	2	0
1975	3	3	8	3	2

Changes = (+3) (-4) (-2) (+1) (+2) = 6

Figure 4.5 Household mobility. Herd size

		A'	B'	C'	D'	E'
	No. of Households 1975	3	0	12	2	2
	1971					
A = Nil	1	1	0	0	0	0
B = 1	8	2	0	6	0	0
C = 2-4	4	0	0	2	2	0
D = 5-7	3	0	0	3	0	0
E = 7+	3	0	0	1	0	2

(14 changes in strata)

	A	B	C	D	E
1971	1	8	4	3	3
1975	3	0	12	2	2

Changes = (+2) (-8)(+8) (-1) (-1) = 10

Figure 4.6 Household mobility. Off-farm income (measured as % of off-farm to total income)

		A'	B'	C'	D'	E'
	No. of households 1975	3	3	8	3	2
	1971					
A = Nil	0	0	0	0	0	0
B = 0-25%	7	2	1	4	0	0
C = 25-50%	10	1	2	3	3	0
D = 50-75%	2	0	0	1	0	2
E = 75-100%	0	0	0	0	0	0

(15 changes in strata)

	A	B	C	D	E
1971	0	7	10	2	0
1975	3	3	8	3	2

Changes = (+3) (-4) (-2) (+1)(+2) = 6

Figure 4.7 Household mobility. The number of working males

	No. of households 1971	1975	A' 0	B' 8	C' 6	D' 2	E' 3
A nil	0		0	0	0	0	0
B 1	11		0	7	3	1	0
C 2	5		0	1	3	1	0
D 3	2		0	0	0	0	2
E 4+	1		0	0	0	0	1

(6 changes in strata)

	A	B	C	D	E
1971	0	11	5	2	1
1975	0	8	6	2	3
Households changing	(0)	(-3)	(+1)	(0)	(+2)

(changes = 3)

Figure 4.8 Household mobility. Household size

	No. of households 1971	1975	A' 0	B' 8	C' 8	D' 3
A 1-3 members	2		0	2	0	0
B 4-6 "	7		0	4	3	0
C 7-9 "	7		0	2	5	0
D 10+	3		0	0	0	3

(5 changes in strata)

	A	B	C	D
1971	2	7	7	3
1975	0	8	8	3
Households changing	(-2)	(+1)	(+1)	0

(changes = 3)

It is apparent from the analysis that there is a high degree of multi-dimensional mobility. In Fig. 4.3. the area planted to rice, it is apparent that an attempt to measure the mobility of the village by comparing differentiation in 1971 and 1975 would have indicated that 15% of the group had changed strata (3 cases) whereas an examination of individual household mobility indicates that 52% of the group have in fact changed strata.

Table 4.1. Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971-1975

	No Change		Ascending Mobility		Descending Mobility	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Land Planted	9	47	2	10	8	42
Rice Production	4	21	9	47	6	31
Herd size	5	26	8	42	6	31
Off-farm income	4	21	9	47	6	31
No. working males	11	58	7	37	1	5
Household size	12	63	5	26	2	10

Two of these factors: "Area Planted" and "Rice Production" will have been influenced by the environmental factor; in 1971 there was substantial rainfall, in 1975 drought conditions prevailed. Table 4.1. shows that the highest rate of mobility occurred with respect of rice production, with mobility in herd size of almost equal magnitude. In all cases, except the area of land planted, the rate of ascending mobility is greater than that of descending mobility, indicating a general pattern of an aggregate move upwards. The greater number of cases of descending

Figure 4.9 Socio-economic Change in Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971-1975



mobility in the case of an area planted is explained by the general trend of intensification of agriculture. "The number of working males" and "Household-size" showed the least number of changes between the two years.

These changes in the area planted, in the production, herd-size and off-farm income are expressed diagramatically in Fig. 4.9. The histograms I, II, and IV show that there has been an increase in the range of variations: polarization (the histograms for 1975 on the right are horizontally wider) and for rice production and for off-farm income they show a movement of households into the higher classes, something of an aggregate shift upwards.

Table 4.2. shows the actual mobility of each of the households. It can be seen that there is no pattern of one-directional movement within each household with respect to the different classes; the household acquiring another male worker does not necessarily increase area planted, production or its herd-size. There are only seven cases of households who have not descended in any of the strata (Nos. 1, 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 19). All these households except no. 19 are extended households with a resident son-in-law unit. The four households displaying the greatest rate of downward mobility were all of the simple nuclear type (see Fig. 4.10).

Fig. 4.10. Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility and Household Composition, (1) Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971-1975

Household Type *

Age of Household Head	I -- S	II i m p	III l e --	IV -Extended--	V
60's			↓		↔
50's			↓	↔	
40's		↓	↓	↔	↔
30's			↔		
20's					

↓ downward mobility
↔ no change

* For an explanation of Household types see page 78

Table 4.2. Household Mobility, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971-1975

Farmer No:	Land Planted			Rice Production			Off-Farm Income			No. Male Workers			Household Size			Herd Size		
	'71	'75	M*	'71	'75	M	'71	'75	M	'71	'75	M	'71	'75	M	'71	'75	M
1	D	D	0	C	D	+	B	E	+	D	B	+	D	D	0	C	D	+
2	E	D	-	C	C	0	D	E	+	B	B	0	B	B	0	B	A	-
3	E	E	0	D	E	+	C	B	-	C	D	+	C	C	0	B	C	+
4	E	E	0	C	D	+	E	C	-	C	C	0	B	C	+	D	C	-
5	D	D	0	C	D	+	A	B	+	B	B	0	C	C	0	B	C	+
6	C	C	0	C	D	+	E	E	0	B	D	+	C	C	0	C	C	0
7	E	A	-	C	A	-	C	E	+	C	B	-	C	B	-	A	A	0
8	E	E	0	D	E	+	B	B	0	D	E	+	D	D	0	E	E	0
9	C	B	-	C	B	-	D	B	-	C	C	0	C	C	0	E	C	-
10	C	C	0	B	C	+	A	B	+	B	B	0	A	B	+	B	A	-
11	C	E	+	C	C	0	C	E	+	E	E	0	D	D	0	B	C	+
12	C	A	-	B	A	-	A	E	+	B	B	0	A	B	+	B	C	+
13	D	C	-	B	A	-	A	D	+	C	C	0	C	B	-	C	C	0
14	D	B	-	B	B	0	A	C	+	B	B	0	B	B	0	B	C	+
15	C	C	0	B	C	+	B	E	+	B	B	0	C	C	0	B	C	+
16	D	C	-	B	C	+	B	E	+	B	B	0	B	C	+	D	C	-
17	B	D	+	C	C	0	B	B	0	B	C	+	B	B	0	D	C	-
18	D	C	-	C	B	-	D	A	-	B	C	+	B	B	0	C	D	+
19	C	C	0	B	C	+	A	A	0	B	C	+	B	C	+	E	E	0

*M = mobility

0 = none

+ = ascending

- = descending

In Fig. 4.11. each household has been designated as showing predominantly upward mobility (↑) predominatly downward mobility (↓), no change (→) or equally represented combinations, such as upward mobility and no change (↑→), upward, downward mobility and no change (↕→).

Fig. 4.11. Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility and Household Composition (II). Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971-1975

Age of Household Head	Family Type: I	IIa	IIb	IIIa	IIIb
	----- Simple ---------			--Extended -----	
60's			↓		↑↑↑→
50's			↓	↔↑→	↕→
40's		↑↓⇄	↓	↔	↑→
30's	↓	↑↔	↔		
20's					

From this composite picture a pattern emerges of simple nuclear-type households tending to display a static or descending pattern mobility and extended type households ascending or static patterns of mobility.

A number of generalhypotheses have been formulated to explain the mobility of households in a peasant society. The developmental cycle of the household, the cumulation of advantage and disadvantage, the random oscillation of peasant households, crises and strokes of luck play an integral part in peasant life. A detailed study of the causes of this mobility would be of value. An equally important consideration relates to the consequences of this mobility, and it is to this problem that the discussion now turns.

Definitions of Class and Status

"Social scientists have been particularly interested in structural changes, i.e. those creating qualitatively new social structures and organizations. Yet the social significance of repetitions, fluctuations, oscillations and cycles seems beyond doubt and time and time again has

provided exciting and illuminating insights into social reality"[1].

The processes of socio-economic mobility will inevitably be affected through the transformation from subsistence to commercialized agriculture. The regulation of irrigation water, and an increase in the number of regular salary earners are just two features which will regulate the farm economies, and this in turn will to some degree alter the mobility patterns. In order to comment on the possibility of some form of class formation in the North-east of Thailand, it is necessary first to review briefly some of the main conceptual distinctions between the notions of social stratification, class and status.

Although problems of social inequality have been a major concern of social and political philosophers for thousands of years, most of the modern thinking on the subject has been influenced by Karl Marx. Marx was concerned with the causes of inequality, and these causes he argued arose from man's position in the productive system. Thus he argued that the objective differences in these positions and the differing interests which arise from these positions are the determinants of social aggregation, organization and conflict.

> "The owners of mere labour power, the owners of capital, and the landowners, whose respective sources of income are wage, profit and rent - thus wage labourers, capitalists and landowners, constitute the three great classes of modern society based on a capitalist mode of production"[2].

By 'modern society' Marx referred specifically to bourgeois society which developed historically from the Ancient and the Feudal epochs. Furthermore, Marx argued that property is the essential condition that determines the mode of production of an epoch,

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1 Ibid; p.116

2 Marx, K; Capital. A Critique of Political economy, vol.III, Moscow, 1959, p.862

"The property question relative to the different stages of development of industry, has always been the life question of any given class"[1].

The notion of property to be meaningful must, however, be comprehended as an opposition between labour and capital. The basis of social classes according to Marx therefore rested on relations of property and authority.

Béteille distinguishes between two aspects of social inequality: the distributive and the relational.

"The first refers to the ways in which different factors such as income, wealth, occupation, education, power, skill, etc., are distributed in the population. The second refers to the ways in which individuals differentiated by these criteria are related to each other within a system of groups and categories"[2].

The relational aspect of social inequality is an essential component of the Marxist conception of social class. Class, in the Marxist sense, implies a social ensemble characterized by its place in the process of production, and characterized by a consciousness of itself in relation to other ensembles. Hence Marx's dilemma is classifying the French peasantry:

"In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnexion among these small-holding peasants and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class"[3].

Max Weber[4] extended Marx's theory of social class, for while conceding that control over productive property gives crucial control over life in general, he maintained that similar positions in the production system are not sufficient causes to motivate men to identify with each other and form common purpose groups

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1 Ibid; p. 459

2 Béteille, A; (ed) Social Inequality, Harmondsworth, 1969, p.13

3 Marx,K; "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in Feuer, L; (ed) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings,London, 1959, pp. 377-9 (First published 1852)

4 Weber, M; Class, Status and Power", in Tumin, M; (ed) Readings on Social Stratification, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970 (article first published 1922)

"the rise of societal or even of communal action from a common class situation is by no means a universal phenomenon"[1].

Weber contrasted the notion of class with that of 'status group'. A status group being a community determined by a notion of social honour.

"We wish to designate as 'status-situation' every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honour"[2].

Weber argued that property is not always recognised as a status qualification:

"very frequently every rational economic pursuit, and especially 'entrepreneurial activity' is looked upon as a disqualification of status"[3] .

However the social evaluation of economic wealth varies with different systems of social stratification, and Weber suggests that the predominance of stratification by class or by status is related to general economic conditions, specifically conditions of stability or change.

"When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favoured. Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground"[4].

Tawney likewise argues that social class formation is an inevitable consequence of economic development, if such development is accompanied by specialization.

"Clearly, the emergence of new social groups is a natural accompaniment of the differentiation of economic functions, of the breaking up, for example, of relatively simple and undifferentiated society into a multitude of specialized crafts and professions, each with its different economic métier"[5].

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1 Ibid; p.30

2 Ibid; p.32

3 Ibid; p.36

4 Ibid; p.37

5 Tawney, R; "Inequality and Social Structure" in Tumin, M; (ed) op.cit, p.40

The principles of social stratification in Thai society will now be discussed, and the possibilities of an emergence of class structure, consequent to economic development, examined.

Social Stratification and the Thai Social System

A theory that runs through most studies of Thai social structure is the notion of a loosely-structured system. Embree[1] described Thai social structure as lacking clear definition and rigid enforcement of role behaviour. The concept of 'loosely-structured' served to contrast the Thai system with other systems not so loosely structured and in Amyot's words,

"it remains particularly un-informative until the question 'What kind of a loosely structured system?' is answered"[2].

Amyot characterises Thai society as a hierarchical ordering of status groups, and he denies the existence of any class distinctions.

"Thai society today is organized into a hierarchy based on economic standing, political power and connections, education, outlook on life and family background ... The traditional division of Thai society into a ruling group, freemen and slaves has been modified into occupational classes of government officials, merchants, artisans, and unskilled labourers, etc; However, consciousness is of status rather than class. Social status is graded, but there is no rigid line of class division"[3]

The absence of a class structure in the Thai social system is reiterated by Hanks[4], who argues that Thai society, with its hierarchy of fixed ranks describes a military organization more than an occidental class-type society. This system of ranks has its roots in the traditional 'sakdi na' system whereby Thais were assigned a numerical status index according to their position or occupation within this system of fixed

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1 Embree,J; "Thailand: a Loosely Structured Social System", American Anthropologist, vol.52,1959, pp.181-193

2 Amyot,J; Provisional Paper on Changing Patterns of Social Structure in Thailand 1851-1965, Delhi, 1965,p.162

3 Ibid; p.171

4 Hanks,L; "Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order", American Anthropologist, vol.64,1962, p.1252

ranks. Hanks argues that considerable mobility of movement is permitted, "The Thai social order roots individuals in no permanent rank"[1]. Hanks supports this proposition with the example of the 'lowest man' catapulting himself to a position effectively superior to the king by taking vows and becoming a priest. However, although the estate of the clergy is analysed in most of the literature as a part of the social hierarchy it is somewhat outside of it, a point made by Ingersoll[2]. Hanks suggests that the hierarchy and mobility of the social system is sanctioned by the Buddhist value system:

"As good Buddhists, the Thai perceive that all living beings stand in a hierarchy of varying ability to make actions effective and of varying degrees of freedom from suffering ... this hierarchy depends on a composite quality called 'merit' (bun)[3]".

Merit is continuously gained or lost depending on the behaviour of each individual. Hanks argues that the coherence of Thai society rests on 'clientship',

"groups form only when a man has gathered resources and can distribute them as benefits others"[4].

In a more recent work Hanks characterizes the Thai Social order as a collection of self-sufficient units rather than specialized and differentiated ones.[5] He maintains that:

"there are no publics, no masses, nor even a proletariat"[6], and

"concepts of class, elite and specialised institutions becloud our vision" [7].

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1 Ibid; p.1248

2 Ingersoll, J; "The Priest Role in Central Thailand". In Nash, M; (ed) Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddism, New Haven, 1966, p.166

3. Hanks, L; Op.cit, p. 1247

4. Ibid; p.1249

5. Hanks, L; "The Thai Social Order as Entourage and Circle", in Skinner, W; and Kirsch, T; (eds) Change and Persistence in Thai Society: Essays in Honor of Lauriston Sharp, Ithaca, 1975, p.197

6. Ibid; p.207

7. Ibid; p.218

Hans-Dieter Evers suggests that a class system is in the process of evolving in Thailand. He writes that the growing size, the monopolization of certain status symbols, the development of a distinct sub-culture and the concentration of economic and political power are indications that the bureaucratic elite are developing into a social class[1]. Evers presents data to show that mobility between certain strata of Thai society has in fact declined. This notion of mobility is of central importance in discussing the distinction between a class and a hierarchical structure. Decline of mobility within a system of hierarchally ranked status is conducive to class formation.

Although Wijeyewardene[2] states that internal stratification is universally low in rural Thai villages, and therefore Thai villages must be characterized as egalitarian, there is abundant ethnographic evidence which illustrates that important status differences exist within the village, and Mulder has written that the concept of social equality is unknown in the Thai cultural tradition.[3] Age, sex, involvement in religious affairs, education, occupation and wealth are all major factors influencing rank and status differences within the Thai village.

Status Indicators

Senior/Junior

The notion of age differences is implicit in the use of the pronouns phi and nong - older and younger, and in general kin terminology which for

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1 Evers, H; The Formation of Social Class Structure. Urbanization, bureaucratization and Social Mobility in Thailand, Clayton, 1965, p.19

2 Wijeyewardene, G; "Some Aspects of Rural Life in Thailand" in Silcock, T; (ed) Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development. Canberra, 1967, p.74

3 Mulder, J; "Origin, Development and Use of the Concept of 'Loose Structure' in the Literature about Thailand: An Evaluation", in Evers, H; Loosely Structured Social Systems: Thailand in Comparative Perspective, New Haven, 1969, p.19

ego makes clear age distinctions between his own siblings together with the siblings of his parents. Age differences are also expressed in body movement, salutations with the hands and the lowering of the head and body. Moerman, in his study of Ban Ping writes,

"in formal status, indicated by such things as pronouns used, order of being served, and bowing ... but not always in power and influence .... seniors outrank juniors"[1].

In the village of Na Chuak Nuea, formal role behaviour associated with seniors and juniors is only clearly visible on formal occasions. By this I mean that everyday village life, on the face of it, lacks the formal behaviour noticeable in urban areas. On ceremonial occasions, seating arrangements, order of being served, and body movement is strictly enforced, but the salutation of a senior by a junior on entering the house, which I have observed in towns, occurs less frequently in the villages, although it is very much a feature of school life. I would therefore generalize here and suggest that formal role behaviour associated with age, and indeed other status indicators, is not an all-pervading system, but is 'situational'. Status differences emerge and are symbolized in various ways only on certain occasions, thus status distinctions in certain contexts are of a relative nature. More specifically the status of the elder is realized in the religious life of the village. Male village elders monopolize the temple committee, and the two village ritual officiants are both men in their late sixties. The female elders are responsible for the preparation of ceremonial objects, child-birth rituals, and they organize the presentation of the daily food offering to the temple.

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1 Moerman, M; "Ban Ping's Temple: The Centre of a 'Loosely-Structured' Society", in Nash, M; (ed) op.cit; p.140

Male/Female

Status distinctions between males and females exist to the extent that females are not able to join the religious sangha, nor are they elected to political office. On ceremonial occasions seating arrangements reflect the subordinate female position, males and females sit separately, females behind males. However, as noted in a previous chapter, the matrilineal ideology prevalent in the village as expressed through kinship terminology, inheritance and residence patterns, together with the powerful role of the female in household management, in effect reduces any status inferiority which might result from exclusion from the sangha, and from formal political office.

Lay/Clergy

One of the most obvious status differences within the village is between the lay and clergy. The shaven heads and saffron robes of the abbot, monks and novices are distinctive status indicators realised on all occasions. Most men in the village become monks for an average period of between one week and three months, between the ages of 17-20, usually before marriage. While secular positions associated with religious and ceremonial activities are mostly confined to the older members of the lay community, the position of the abbot, monks and novices are occupied by young men. The village abbot is 26 years old and novices are boys, aged 10-12 years, usually from the poorer village households. Therefore the status indicators of age and to a degree wealth (to be discussed later) become submerged under an indicator of another order, religious merit. The importance of the village priest is well documented in the literature. Yatsushiro[1] argues that the priest clearly outranks the position of headman and school principal, and Ingersoll[2] remarks that the status of the priest is the most highly elaborated and formalized role in Thai society. The role of the priest is not confined to the realm of the sacred,

1 Yatsushiro, T; Village Organization and Leadership in North-East Thailand a study of the Villagers approach to their Problems and Needs, Thailand, 1966, p.38

2 Ingersoll, J; op.cit; p.51

a point Kaufman makes in his study of Bangkhuad[1]. The temple of Na Chuak Nuea performs an important banking function and loans of between 1,000 - 4,000 baht with monthly interest rates of 5 baht are given from a central fund rumoured to amount to 100,000 baht. This fund is accumulated from money contributions made throughout the ceremonial year. Although the abbot controls the fund, any loans must be agreed to by the village headman and the temple committee.

Education

An important status-group within the village are the school teachers. Excepting the religious Sangha, the school teachers form the most distinctive group within the village. They are the wealthiest village households, and their life-styles contrast sharply with their fellow villagers. One of the primary school teachers, living in a neighbouring village, is a very large landowner who owns a rice mill, pick-up truck, and a motor-bike. He has educated two of his children in the United States, and he lives in a large house expensively furnished and decorated. Another school teacher married the niece of one of the largest landowners in Na Chuak Nuea. He rents out his holding, a particularly good piece of land bordering the irrigation canal, to another villager.

Education is beginning to play a decisive role in creating different status groups within the village. By law all children are required to attend four years of primary education, however children from poorer households often attend irregularly, if at all, because their labour is often required on the family farm, or for livestock tending. Many of the wealthiest households are now sending their children to secondary school in the local town, and the case of one of the school teachers

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1 Kaufman, H; Bangkuad: A Community Study in Thailand, New York, 1960,p.69

noted above, educating his children abroad, is an example of the extent of the educational aspirations that the wealthier village members now hold for their children.

Village Leadership

The action of a 'party' in Weber's sense, is orientated to the acquisition of social power.

"In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through a 'class situation' or 'status situation' and they may recruit their following respectively from one or the other. But they need be neither purely 'class' nor purely 'status parties', but sometimes they are neither"[1].

There are within Na Chuak Nuea a group of individuals elected to occupy positions of leadership. The ultimate secular head is the 'phuyaiban', the village headman. The title 'phuyaiban' implies the notions of adult, elder and superior. Moerman in analysing the role of the village headman in Thailand characterizes him as a synaptic leader,

"In Ban Ping, and quite generally in Thailand, individual autonomy is highly regarded. Within the constraints of community life, the headman is probably more powerful than any other villager. In directing labour groups, organizing community enterprises, and conveying government orders his control over the behaviour of others is quite straightforward"[2].

Kaufman[3] characterizes the Thai village headman as a local 'big-man', and he stresses the dependency of the villagers on him.

The duties of the headman, according to the villagers of Na Chuak Nuea are to safeguard village welfare, maintain law and order, and to mediate between the village and local government officials. The style of leadership associated with the village headman has become radically transformed in recent years. Previously the village headman was completely identified with the village; his role as mediator or synaptor between the village and the nation-state was less developed. The village headman is now a regular government official with an annual salary, govern-

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1 Weber, M; op.cit; p.38

2 Moerman, M; "A Thai Village Headman as Synaptic Leader", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 28, No.3, 1969, p.543

3 Kaufman,H; op.cit; p.34

ment uniform and duties which more days than not, take him from the village to the local administrative centre. The necessary qualities of the present day village headman are an adequate level of education, administrative ability and a personality type which permits easy communication with government officials. The former headman of Na Chuak Nuea was elected at the age of 40, and retained the post for twenty-five years, until 1974 when the government set a maximum age limit of 60 years on holders of the office. The previous headman although greatly respected in the village had caused considerable discontent during his last years in office, when he set up house in another province with an eighteen year old minor wife, an arrangement which took him away from the village for long periods. During the years of his headmanship his role was that of a village father-figure, uniting the community and leading them. The new headman, Nai Thawin, 37 years old at his election, personifies the new style of leadership. He has relinquished all participation in the family farm, conducts his administrative business in town each day, and is completely at ease with local government officials, many of whom visit his house socially for evening drinking sessions. The new headman was not born in the village but came from another neighbouring village seventeen years ago to ordain in the temple, and on leaving the monkhood he married a local girl. Prior to his election,he worked for the Royal Irrigation Department on survey work. On his election Nai Thawin retained the two former assistant headmen, Nai Khamta and Nai In. Nai Khamta, assistant headman for fifteen years, seemed to be the natural successor to the old headman, however, he declined to stand in the elections because he felt he lacked the necessary administrative abilities. Furthermore, his mother-in-law forbade him to stand, arguing that if elected he would have to neglect

his farm and family. Nai Khamta fulfills many of the functions of the traditional headman, an expert farmer, familiar with all aspects of village life, he acts as a mediator and adviser in disputes arising within the village.

Yatsushiro has remarked on the lack of a single village pattern for solving group problems or resolving common needs,

"which problem solving pattern and which village personalities appear as leaders depends upon the problem at hand"[1].

This is certainly true in Na Chuak Nuea, and is illustrated by the roles of the headman and assistant headman, as discussed above. Furthermore, there are within the village a number of committees and associations, the members of which are elected by the community. These members form another important group of village leaders. The committees in the village for which representatives are elected include the Temple Committee, the School Committee, the Village Committee, the Water Users Association and the Water Senders Association, and there are also elected representatives of the Land Co-operative. There is a certain amount of overlap in membership and this reflects the varying degree of importance of the leaders (see Fig. 4.12).

Thawin, the village headman, member of the School Committee, representative of the Water-Users Association and ditch-rider is rivalled by Sawat, a ditch-rider, member of the Temple Committee, and representative of the Land-Co-operative. The same age as the headman, 38, he unsuccessfully contended for village headmanship. As the Land-Co-op representative, responsible for the organization of village loans, he holds an important position in village politics. Table 4.3. indicates

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1 Yatsushiro, T; op.cit, p.112

Fig. 4.12: Village Leaders, Ban N.a Chuak Nuea, 1975



that this group of village leaders are drawn from different segments of the village community. There are young heads of nuclear households in their thirties and also older men, heads of extended households in their sixties. Many of these leaders have been born in the village; others have become residents since marriage. For the most part they are holders of adequate, if not substantial, land-holdings; village leaders, it would appear, are not drawn from the small land-holder class. All but two are irrigated, which is of some significance. This does not necessarily mean that those with access to irrigation monopolize positions of leadership, because of their access to this new resource for as mentioned earlier, those now receiving irrigation water previously held the favourable low-lying paddy.

Table 4.3 Socio-economic profile of village leaders

	Age	Family type	Born in village	Land holding (rai)	Irrigated or not	Total income
Headman:Nai Tawin	38	IIb	X	35.75	✓	1
Assistant Headmen:						
Nai Khamta	41	IIa	✓	44.5	✓	3
Nai In	31	I	✓	17.5	✓	3
Village Committee:						
Nai Lun	38	IIb	X	34.75	✓	1
School Committee:						
(Nai Tawin)	38	IIb	X	35.75	✓	1
Nai Chali D	66	IIIa	X	43.5	✓	4
Water Users Assoc.:						
(Nai Tawin)	38	IIb	X	35.75	✓	1
Water Senders Assoc:						
(Nai Tawin)	38	IIb	X	35.75	✓	1
Nai Sawat	38	IIa	✓	26	✓	3
Nai Orn	65	IIIb	✓	29	✓	3
Temple Committee:						
Nai Daeng	49	IIb	✓	22	✓	4
Nau Bua	48	IIa	X	40.75	✓	1
Nai Chali P	49	IIb	✓	50	X	2
(Nai Sawat)	38	IIa	✓	26	✓	3
Nai Sayan	40	IIIa	X	25	✓	3
Ritual Officiants:*						
Nai Ta	67	IIb	X	31.75	X	2
(Nai Orn)	65	IIIb	✓	29	✓	3

* Also Honorary Members of the Temple Committee

Key:

Total Income Group

1 = over 24,000 Bh.
2 = 24,000-16,000 Bh.
3 = 16,000-8,000 Bh.
4 = 8,000 Bh. and below

In discussing village leadership it is necessary to mention the ritual officiants. There are two officiants in the village, Nai Orn and Nai Ta who are both in their 60's. They are called 'khon boran', men of ancient tradition, and hold their offices, not through election, but in virtue of special power and knowledge which they are believed to hold. Their power in the magico-ritual sphere stems in part from their previous temple experience. Nai Ta, who emigrated from another North-east province 40 years ago, entered the monkhood as a novice, where he was instructed in 'special knowledge'. He is well-versed in Pali, and has in his possession certain magical texts. The ritual officiants have considerable power over the villagers, officiating at most village ceremonies, such as the Sukhwan and Sadg khrg', and the placation of house spirits. The Sukhwan and Sadg khrg' bind the 'Khwan' - the soul - to the body, and are performed at times of uncertainty and transition: for example, during the marriage ceremony, prior to a long journey, during illness and after pregnancy. The animistic beliefs of the villagers are deeply embedded, and of fundamental importance, and the role of these ritual officiants as mediators between the mundane and the supernatural, and particularly as 'protectors' of the village, needs to be fully realized. The power of these officiants extends into all spheres of village life; they set auspicious days for ploughing, advise on the compatibility of marriage alliances, act as intermediaries in dispute cases, especially in cases of theft. During the last elections for headman, Nai Ta had an influential role in choosing the headman, advising many villagers to vote for Nai Thawin.

A distinction may be made here between the various positions of village authority on the basis of their primary orientations. Certain leadership roles are extra-village orientated, and the best empirical criteria for making this distinction rests on a) the location of meetings

and activities associated with certain positions of authority and b) the nature and scope of the contacts made by the incumbents of these positions. The meetings of the Temple, School and Village Committees are all held in the village, and the duties of the ritual officiants are for the most part also confined to the village community. Meetings of the Water Users Association and the Land-Coperative are both held in the local administrative centre, and the job of the 'ditch-rider' is to consult with a zone-man in an office close to the district town. These latter positions require liaison with government officials and representatives from other villages. Of course this distinction is not entirely clear cut, for the village as part of a 'tambon' (village cluster) is no longer an isolated unit, and the various committees which I suggest are 'village orientated', on occasions involve themselves in extra-village activities. Nevertheless, I believe the distinction is an important one, and it has consequences for different styles of leadership. The incumbents of positions with an extra-village orientation are all younger men, and they represent the new style of village leader.

Kaufman has suggested that the Thai villager is not interested in power for its own sake, but because it exists as a prestige factor,[1] and he argues that Buddhist values which emphasise non-aggressiveness, honesty and indifference to fortune and misfortune mediate against any strong drives for leadership and power. In Bangkhuad, Kaufman comments that households were autonomous, farmers were neither leaders nor followers. Foster makes the same point, he comments that in traditional peasant communities, villagers do not compete for authority by seeking leadership roles, "in peasant villages one notes a strong desire to look and act

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1 Kaufman, H; op.cit; p.69

like everyone else, to be inconspicuous in position and behaviour"[1]. Within Na Chuak Nuea it is possible to identify both political ambitiousness and reticence. I find it hard to make any meaningful generalization; not I believe as a consequence of any incomplete grasp of the situation, but because of the nature of the situation itself. Village leadership includes a range of different styles, each with its different orientations, goals and rewards. Village leaders are both ambitious (the headman planning to stand in the 'tambon' elections) and unassuming (the assistant headman declining to stand in the village elections). Thai village leadership is no longer simply one thing or the other, but a combination of different styles.

Wealth

The discussion now turns to a consideration of the role of wealth in the village; and its importance as a status indicator. In earlier chapters the increase in off-farm work opportunities was noted. The village economy can no longer be regarded as solely agricultural, although it is still predominantly so. The village income from crop sales for 1975 was 24% of the total income. Statistical tests show that those farmers with high crop incomes tend to be irrigated and those with low crop incomes, unirrigated ($p = .01$). The following table highlights the differences in incomes between irrigated and non-irrigated farmers.

Table 4.4. Average Annual Income for Irrigated and Non-Irrigated Households Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

Average annual household income	Irrigated	Non-Irrigated
Total Crop Income	4,465.78	2,257.71
Rice Income	2,649.91	315.33
Upland Crop Income	900.23	1,400.67
Income from Wage Labouring	308.63	251.33
Salaries and skilled Labour	368.17	1,551.33
Total cash Income	12,144.48	8,962.2

1 Foster, G; 'Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good", American Anthropologist, vol.67, 1965, p.303

It can be seen that the non-irrigated farmers are receiving higher incomes from off-farm sources and from the upland cash crop sector. However, their significantly lower crop incomes are already beginning to be reflected in the total income figures. As second-cropping is still at an early stage it is to be expected that its development will increase the emerging trend of an income disparity between those households receiving irrigation water and those who are not. Of course much depends upon the increase in off-farm work opportunities, although it seems doubtful that an increase in these opportunities will eradicate the income disparity already existing. What then are the social implications of this growing disparity? To answer this question it is necessary to understand the role of wealth in the village.

Yatsushiro has written that the possession of wealth in North-east Thailand does not automatically accrue to a person any appreciable degree of influence in the community. He states that wealth must be employed in some recognised manner in order for the possesor to achieve prestige and status.[1] A wealthy person acquires status or prestige by either loaning money, or by making substantial contributions to the local temple. Yatsushiro, in what he terms an "attitude-survey", found that only 6% of his sample recognised any relationship between leadership and wealth.[2] Kaufman suggests that wealth plays an important, though at times subtle, role in Bangkhuad[3]. He notes that a wealthy farmer in the village is in a position to exert pressure on many other farmers. Others turn to him in order to borrow or rent tools and land, and for loans, and once the transaction is made the debtor is obligated in many small ways throughout the year. However, Kaufman notes that wealth without proper behaviour results in contempt and malicious gossip. Kaufman also suggests

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1 Yatsushiro,T; op.cit; p.94

2 Ibid, p.65

3 Kaufman,A; op.cit; p.36

that the status of the land-less in the village is not so low as they percieve it to be, and he suggests that their feelings of inferiority are only partially due to the attitudes of others and has much to do with their own feelings of guilt at not being able to contribute to the temple. Nevertheless, Kaufman notes that the village headmen are usually wealthy persons elected because of their financial status.[1] So it would appear that there is some correlation between wealth and power. However, in many cases it may well be that wealth is accumulated during headmanship. This appears to be the case in Na Chuak Nuea where the headman's wealth has increased substantially since his election, mostly due to his ability to acquire large loans.

A related issue is the peasant attitude towards the accumulation of wealth. Foster, with his model of "Limited-Good"[2] argued that a peasant society is characterized by certain irreducible characteristics which have to do with economic conditions. Land is completely allocated, agricultural technology is relatively inefficient, and wealth is both scarce and unexpandable, the 'pie', so to speak, is of constant size. Foster analysed the peasant community as a closed system with fixed resources, and this he argued accounts for the peasant's "cognitive orientation" which views one man's gain as another man's loss. Furthermore, he argued that the peasant sees little relationship between work and production techniques on the one hand and the acquisition of wealth on the other. He writes,

"wealth, like land is something inherent in nature, it can be divided up and passed around in various ways, but within the framework of the villager's traditional world, it does not grow" [3].

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1 Ibid; p.56

2 Foster, G; "Interpersonal Relations in Peasant Society". Human Organization, no. 19, 1960, pp.174-178

3 Foster, G; (1965), op.cit; p.298

Criticism has been levelled against Foster's characterization of peasant societies as closed systems, notably by Kennedy[1] and Piker[2]. I do not feel qualified to speak in depth on the cognitive orientations of the villagers of Na Chuak Nuea; however, a few comments may be made in respect of Foster's statement. Wealth in Na Chuak Nuea is visibly expandable. Rising crop prices, the rising productivity of land, increased opportunities to earn incomes outside the village are constant indicators that the 'pie' is expandable. Certainly in the village there have been and still are strong levelling mechanisms, kinship ethics and religious duty stress giving and sharing, but these values are based on strong community ties, rather than on any notion that a rich man must redistribute his wealth because he could only have gained that wealth through depriving others of it. This is not to say that wealth is not envied. Most of the cases of malicious gossip I encountered were directed against the richer members of the community, and were made not by the poorest, but middle-range households.

Wealth can be defined as the sum total of assets, property or the value of legally established rights possessed by an individual household. The researcher faces a number of problems when attempting to assess the wealth of peasant households. Fine distinctions have to be made between assets productively used, and assets held (perhaps unproductively due to labour constraints), also different land types make land pricing difficult. In a peasant society estimation of wealth is based on more than a mere calculation of certain quantitative factors, a series of qualitative factors need to be considered. These qualititative factors relate

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1 Kennedy, J; "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good. A Critique". American Anthropologist, 68, 1966, p.1217

2 Piker, S; "The Image of Limited Good:Comments on an Exercise in Description and Interpretation". American Anthropologist, 68, 1966,p.1206

to a society's system of values. It is only by comprehending this 'ideology of wealth' that a researcher can with any validity comment on the implications of an emerging income disparity. If the possession of certain assets or the acquisition of different sources of income are differentially evaluated, then an expansion of different branches of the village economy will have different implications for the social system.

The Ideology of Wealth

In order to understand the village ideology of wealth in Na Chuak Nuea it was necessary to discover who the villagers themselves considered to be rich and who poor, and to examine these statements in the light of available data, to determine which criteria had been used in each estimation. Here I am interested in finding out whether wealth is assessed on the amount of land owned, the income coming into a household, herd size or whatever.

Firstly it was necessary to treat the notion of wealth as a relative concept. To ask a Na Chuak Nuea villager to name a rich man in the village (khon ramruay) would result in a response such as "no one is rich here, the rich all live in the town". Nevertheless, they are very aware that certain of their fellows are richer and some much richer. Thirty-eight farmers during individual interviews were asked to rank each other (i.e. the 37 others) as richer (mi kwa, to have more), of equal wealth standing (muankan, the same) or poorer (conkhwa, to be poorer). A ranking was then made on the basis of the responses, that household being ranked richer by the greater number of other households being ranked first and so forth. This ranking was then compared with the income ranking for the same year. Statistical tests[1] showed that there

1 Spearmans Rank Correlation with tied correction

was a weak correlation between the two (r = 0.373). This is a reflection of the instability of income; the income entering into a household in any one year fluctuates, and therefore the income figures provide only a rough measure of wealth. Throughout each interview it was clear that each villager had a very clear picture in his own mind of the relative wealth of each household compared with his own.

Before discussing the ideology of wealth in this Thai rural village it is pertinent here to refer to a study by Turton, conducted in Chiengrai Province. Turton[1] found that in his village households divided themselves into wealth categories for the purpose of temple contributions. The three-fold categorization made by households revealed not only differences in wealth but also different patterns of consumption and different relations of production. Category 1 contained households with large land holdings; they owned good houses, had money to spare and never worked for a wage. Category 2 contained households who have some land, but also work for wages, and Category 3 was composed of land-less households predominantly wage-labouring. Turton comments:

"villagers can conceptualize the three categories as distinct socio-economic types of household"[2].

The self-ranking wealth index of the Na Chuak Nuea villagers suggests that a similar categorization of socio-economic classes. The ranking has been reduced to three categories, those households ranked 1-12 fall into category 1, those ranked 13-26 constitute category 2, and households ranked 27-38, category 3.

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1 Turton, A; Northern Thai Peasant Society. A Case Study of Jural and Political Structures at the Village Level and their Twentieth Century Transformations, (Ph.D), London, 1975

2 Ibid; p.164

Table 4.5. Economic Characteristics of Households by Category, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

	Average Land Owned	Average Land Planted	Number Hiring Labour	Number Wage Labouring	Number Irrigated
Category 1 (N = 12)	36	23	8	2	10
Category 2 (N = 14)	34	17	7	5	9
Category 3 (N = 12	19*	9	4	8	3

* 1 household is landless.

Category 1 are the large landowners; most of these households hire wage labourers for agriculture, but only a few themselves wage-labour. Furthermore they are predominantly households with irrigated holdings. Households in Category 2 are also large land holders, but they cultivate smaller areas of their holding. Many of these households hire in labourers, some are also wage labouring, and most of them have irrigated holdings. Category 3 is composed of the small land holders. While some of these households hire in labourers the majority of them are wage-labouring, and for the most part they are households without access to irrigation.

The wealth rank clearly reflects different socio-economic classes within the village, distinguished by the amounts of land owned and planted, and in the relations of production. In some respects the ranking falls into two distinct groupings. Those households with irrigation being ranked at the top, those without irrigation water at the bottom. The wealth index also reflects the developmental cycle of the household: those households at the initial stage Types 1 and II (newly formed households with young and adolescent children) congregate at

the bottom end of the scale. Established households (III, IV, V), both simple nuclear types with adult unmarried children, and the extended type with attached son-in-law units are consistently ranked at the top end of the scale.

Table 4.6. Wealth-Rank and Household Structure, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

	Household Structure	
	Types I, II	III, IV, V
Ranks 1 - 18	5	14
19 - 38	12	7

($\chi^2 = 5.2$, p= .025)

It was noted previously that the wealth-rank produced a weak correlation with the total income figures. Table 4.7. indicates that although category 1 households are predominantly in the top income brackets and category 3 are predominatly in the lowest income bracket; nevertheless the middle group income earners for 1975 are drawn from all three categories:

Table 4.7. Wealth-Rank and Total Household Income. Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

	Total Income in baht		
Wealth Ranking	16,000+	15,999-8,000	7,999-0
Category 1,N=12	5	5	2
Category 2,N=14	5	4	5
Category 3,N=12	1	4	7

Table 4.8. Wealth-Rank and Major Source of Income. Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975

	Source of largest portion of Income[1]				
Wealth Ranking	Salary	Crop Sales	Livestock	Wage Labouring	Others
Category 1,N=12	4	4	2	0	2
Category 2,N=14	2	7	2	0	3
Category 3,N=12	2	2	2	6	0

Others = trading, remittances, rents and interest

Table 4.8. shows that households in Category 1 have attained most of their income from salaries and crop sales, while households in Category 2 are deriving most of their income from either crop sales, or 'other' sources: trading, remittances etc; the major source of income from category 3 households is wage-labouring.

There is also a spatial distribution evident, both in respect of the location of the holdings, and the residence patterns of the three categories. Map 4.1. shows that all households in Category 1, excepting one case have holdings to the right of the Main Canal (irrigated or potentially irrigated land). Many of these plots form a belt to the North-east of the village, close to the road. This belt has traditionally been considered one of the most fertile areas. Households in Category 3 have holdings in the west of the Canal (3 of them lie off the map). The plots owned by households in Category 2 are somewhat more dispersed. Map 4.2. illustrates the way in which the village residence patterns also reflect the grouping. Category 1 households are found in the central portions of the village, Category 3 households occur on the perimeter, and category 2 households, for the most part, are found in between the two.

Map 4.1 Land Holding Pattern and the Wealth Rank 1975



Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Map 4.2 Residence Patterns and the Wealth Rank 1975

BAN NA CHUAK NUEA

It appears from this analysis that the village ideology of wealth is still to a degree constructed around an evaluation of the traditional systems of resources. Those households ranked at the top of the wealth scale hold plots of land which prior to the introduction of irrigation were located in the most fertile areas. Irrigation and its possibilities for second-cropping, and the expansion of upland cash-cropping have transformed the production profile of the village. In certain respects the evaluation of a household's wealth is related to the ownership of certain types of resource, rather than the use of that resource. An upland farmer growing cassava and obtaining a high crop income is still considered poorer than a household holding a good piece of lowland but doing little with it. In this respect the village ideology of wealth is still embedded into the traditional system of subsistence rice production rather than being orientated to the commercialization of agriculture.

The socio-economic categories implicit in the village wealth ranking take account of a number of factors: resource endowment (the size of a holding, its location, and access to irrigation), relations of production (whether a household is hiring in labour or wage-labouring), the major sources of income, and the developmental cycle of the household.

The Emergence of Class Structure

In a recent work Potter proposes a new model of Thai social structure. He argues that despite the immense variation in Thai village structure certain fundamental structural features may be seen to generate rural communities. One of these principles is class.

"Class stratification based upon ownership of land is one of the principle social structural elements in all Thai villages"[1].

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1 Potter, J; Thai Social Structure, Chicago, 1976, p.149

For those rural communities where a tenancy problem exists the notion of class is applicable. Potter refers to studies made in Bangkhuad[1], Bang Chan[2], and Banoi[3] in the Central Plains where large numbers of households own no land. In Bangkhuad, 34% of the households rent in all their land; in Bang Chan 44% are renters and in Banoi 80% are either landless or own holdings of less than 5 rai. In Chiangmai village where Potter conducted fieldwork, 32.5% of the community owned no land at all. However, when discussing those rural areas of Thailand where tenancy problems on the whole are undeveloped, Potter appears to construe classes from economic strata distinguished by holding size. In a study of Baan Phraan Muan in the North-east Tambiah comments;

"there is very little renting in or renting out of land, and landlord tenant categories are not important in the village economy... The hierarchy in the village is primarily of a generational nature rather than a creature of economic maldistribution"[4].

Although Tambiah maintains that class divisions in Baan Phraan Muan do not exist, Potter, on his reading of the data maintains that there must be important class differentiation based upon the different amounts of land owned; and in wealth differences. Potter writes:

"The North-eastern villages, located in the poorest part of Thailand, show internal class differentiation, but it is less marked than in other regions of Thailand"[5].

In attempting to integrate rural communities, with low incidence of land renting and landlessness into an all-embracing model, Potter invalidates his own argument by equating social class with differentiation. In the last analysis Potter's class divisions are no more than socio-economic

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1 Kaufman,H; op.cit.

2 Janlekha,K; A Study of the Economy of a Rice Growing Village in Central Thailand, Bangkok,1955

3 Piker, S; An Examination of Character and Socialization in a Thai Peasant Community, (Ph.D), Washington, 1964

4 Tambiah, S; Buddhism and Spirit Cults in North-east Thailand, Cambridge, 1970, p.23

5 Potter,J; op.cit; p.183

strata. The 'class situation' only emerges when a common consciousness between class-members arises.

"In fact, a class does not constitute a unity simply because, from the point of view of economic analysis, its income has a single and identical source; from all appearances, there must also be a certain psychological community, and a possibly a sense of unity or even a desire for common action" [1].

Turton concludes in his analysis of Northern Thai peasantry:

"It is certainly true that the classes of peasantry discussed ... by and large, lack the autonomy of classes which possess their own specific forms of consciousness and political organization"[2].

In Na Chuak Nuea wealth differentiation reflected a division of households into three strata-based on ownership of land, relations of production, and major sources of income. It was also found that the scheme of differentiation reflected the developmental cycle of the household. Therefore an element of mobility is implicit within the system. This mobility is one factor which will hinder the emergence of any class structure based on the present socio-economic categories. Turton in discussing socio-economic categories in his analysis comments:

"mobility between categories may be to some extent a phenomenon connected with the developmental cycle of domestic groups"[3].

and furthermore

"To the extent that there is some mobility due to developmental factors this is likely to add to the blurring of the sharpness of economic differentiation in the consciousness of villagers"[4].

As well as an inherent element of mobility within the scheme of differentiation, there exists a variety of ties of a vertical nature linking households in one group with another. If the kinship ties

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1 Aron, R; Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Harmondsworth, 1965, p. 165

2 Turton, A; op.cit; p.186

3 Ibid; p.173

4 Ibid; p.174

between households in each of the three socio-economic categories are mapped for Na Chuak Nuea, there is no apparent clustering of kinship ties within each category, ties of kinship create vertical alliances between the categories.

Furthermore within the village there is an ethic of egalitarianism. Villagers maintain that everyone in the same '<u>chuk khon pen muan kan</u>', Turton found a similar ethic in his Northern village, where individuals were reluctant to be regarded as different from others. In this context Turton speaks of a lack of fit between ideology and daily reality[1]. It is the multiplicity of vertical ties within the local village community which prevents at present the realization of class structures.

"The vertical segmentation of peasants into local communities, clans and groups and the differentiation of interests within these communities themselves has made for difficulties in crystallizing nationwide aims and symbols"[2].

The emergence of class differences within the village is also prevented to an extent, by the solidarity felt by a rural community viz a viz the non-peasant classes: the town dwellers, and the government officials. Although some villagers are aligning themselves with the urban sector (for example the irrigation guards and the village headman) and imitating urban styles of life (adopting urban dress, eating non-glutinous rice) they nevertheless are still more a part of their own local community than any other.

It was noted earlier that the wealthiest households are aware of the importance of secondary education, and many of their children are now being sent to Kalasin town to further their education. From the

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1 <u>Ibid</u>; p.188

2 Shanin, T; "Peasants as a Political Factor", in <u>Peasants and Peasant Society</u>, Harmondsworth, 1971, p.255

1975 sample, 5 of the category 1 households and 3 of the category 2 households were providing their children, both sons and daughters, with secondary education, while none of the children of category 3 households have received more than four years (if that) of primary education.

The chapter began with an analysis of socio-economic mobility in the village between 1971-1975. It emerged that patterns of mobility are still a function of the developmental cycle with simple nuclear households displaying stability or descending mobility and extended type households displaying stability or ascending mobility. Shanin suggests that this fluctuation in the peasant system of stratification prevented, in the case of the pre-revolutionary Russian peasantry, the crystallization of class lines. The introduction of irrigation, by increasing production, and through the employment of salaried guards, will tend to regulate the village economy which traditionally has been unstable. The possibilities of a resultant formation of socio-economic classes were examined. To this purpose stratification by status was discussed and the importance, as status indicators, of age, sex, religious office, education, leadership and wealth were considered. A distinction was made between status distinctions expressed contextually, e.g. the senior-junior relationship expressed on ceremonial and formal occasions, and those status distinctions that permeate all spheres of village life in the clergy-lay distinction and distinctions relating to levels of education. In discussing the positions of leadership it emerged that different styles of leadership, exist within the village; a traditional form, characterized by mediation between fellow villagers, and a new

style, monopolized by younger men, characterized by mediation between the village and local officials outside the village. In analysing wealth differentiation, as perceived by the villagers themselves, certain patterns emerged. The scheme of differentiation reflected both fluidity: the developmental cycle, and rigidity; resource endowment; the availability of irrigation water. The scheme of differentiation also reflected a division of households into three strata.

Category A: a group of large landowners, mostly irrigated, predominantly hiring in labour, with some renting out land; Category C, a group of small holders, some landless, most unirrigated, predominantly selling their labour, and Category B, a middle group sharing a number of the features of the other two, many wage-labouring, and many hiring in labour. It was argued that superimposed upon this system of differentiation there is a pattern of status distinction, which together with ties of kinship and locality produce, in the last analysis, a criss cross of ties of alliance of a vertical nature which effectively blur any horizontal ties emanating from a stratification based on resource endowment and the relations to the means of production. However, the indications are that certain categories of villagers are re-investing a portion of their wealth in the education of their children. This fact alone, will play a decisive role in creating a new status group within the village, a status group which, with superior earning ability and a town orientated consciousness, may ultimately crystallize into a social class.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapters some of the salient characteristics of a socio-economic system were examined. In this chapter I shall draw together the main points of the argument in order to assess a) the theoretical contribution of this study to our knowledge of rural Thai communities, and more generally, to peasant studies, and b) the value of the anthropological perspective to a multi-disciplinary project.

In Ban Na Chuak Nuea land, an important factor of production, is of two types: low-lying irrigable land, and higher land which can not receive gravity irrigation. The lowland is still predominantly allocated through inheritance, and the distribution of land on the death of parents, or before, articulates with a matrilineal ideology (that is, from the point of view of the new male head of household, affinal inheritance, through his wife). This articulation is adjusted by factors such as the amount of land to be distributed, the structure of the sibling group (number of siblings and age-sex ratios) and each sibling's present standing (whether each sibling has already inherited affinally, through their own spouse).

Allocation of the upland by purchase is becoming increasingly important. The upland, traditionally considered marginal to the productive system was frequently inherited by sons. Recently, since the kenaf boom in the 1950's the upland has become increasingly important for cash crop production. It was found that the different patterns of acquisition between these two types of land contribute to two distinct

forms of land tenure which articulate differently with the social structure.

Much of the lowland is composed of adjoining plots, held by close matrilineal kinsmen, but not entirely, depending upon the compromise made between ideology and demographic fact (number of siblings and their sexes). For the lowland the pattern of tenure reflects approximately the residential structure of the village. For the upland the correspondance is slight, although in some areas brothers hold adjoining plots.

The new irrigation system: water sent according to schedule, an organization requiring new forms of co-operation among fellow villagers and non-villagers, has been imposed upon a pre-existing system of land use. The irrigation system has created certain areas of conflict at different levels within the structure, kinsman and kinsman, villager with non-villager, village with village, village with the government official. However, the hierarchical and segmentary nature of the organization, producing contexts of dispute to be reconciled on another level, offers some stability overall. The impact of irrigation can be seen to have altered the traditional labour exchange groups, and hired labour especially from outside of the village is increasing. Livestock - water-buffalo to plough, are now commonly hired from other villagers as livestock specialization, another result of irrigation, develops.

From the consideration of the distribution and allocation of certain factors of production, the analysis proceeded with an account

of the utilization of certain resources, and glutinous rice production was reviewed. Following Sahlins it was argued that production levels in this still predominantly subsistence branch of production could be examined, in order to determine the economic co-efficient of the social system, that is, the degree to which elements of social organization influence the economic intensity of household production. The introduction of irrigation has fundamentally altered the overall system. Prior to the introduction of irrigation, production levels, while obviously influenced by the environmental factor, were also closely related to the development cycle of the household, with nuclear households producing above subsistence levels. It was proposed that the relations between the household labour force and the head of household (complete dependence of the labour force on the head of the nuclear household, and a labour force striving for independence from the head of the extended household) were an important factor. Expansion and dispersion, as different stages in the developmental cycle of the household, had different implications for resource utilization. Resources, whether utilized adequately or utilized optimumly, depended upon the structure of the household. The irrigation system was to superimpose itself upon this pre-existing system of resource utilization. Those households now producing above the basic subsistence needs of its members are predominantly those receiving irrigation water. Before the implementation of the irrigation system resource utilization (specifically glutinous rice production) was subject to fluctuations which related to the environmental factor, and to the structure of the household. Since the introduction of irrigation a measure of stability has been imposed, there are now two distinct groups in the village those who have water (mi nam) and those who do not (mai mi nam).

As rice production has increased, the pattern of distributions made to the temple (another example of an institution outside of the household impinging on production levels) has significantly altered since the introduction of irrigation, with many villages donating smaller amounts of paddy, but money has recently become an important component of temple contributions. Having considered the most important sector of the village economy, glutinous rice production, the discussion then broadened to examine other forms of economic activities, both agricultural: cash cropping, dry season cropping and non-agricultural, and here the analysis was confined to trading activities, and occupations outside of the village. In this section certain patterns of response to opportunity were discussed, and it emerged that opportunity response could be related to resource endowment, and certain structural factors: the composition of the household, the age of the household head, the wider kin group, and residential patterns. Those marginal to the traditional subsistence system were displaying higher responses to cash-cropping on the upland, and second-cropping on the lowland; those favourably endowed: the large land-holders, were seeking salaried office outside the village, and many were engaged in trade activities. Epstein's model was employed in order to determine which features of the socio-economic system were inimical or conducive to economic development, the conclusion being that certain features of the social structure were likely to impede economic development, in particular the patterns of residence and inheritance, and certain village values: the value of leisure, the traditional time-horizon and expenditure on the temple. Choice, whether to re-invest in the productive system or to buy a consumer item and village expenditure patterns were also examined. It was postulated that

no categorization of households into investors or consumers was valid, given the limited range of consumer items. The recent opportunity to obtain credit was reviewed; while the richer members of the community appear to be in a more favourable position to utilize the credit facilities, the analysis of the membership of one co-operative suggested that kinship ties were an important factor in determining membership.

In the final chapter the patterns of socio-economic mobility between the two study years were examined and these patterns were then related to the structure of the household. In order to examine the hypothesis that economic development often results in the crystallization of rural communities into classes, the patterns of village stratification were discussed. The major status distinctions: senior-junior, lay-clergy, male-female were reviewed, and the importance of education, leadership and wealth as status indicators was examined. On the basis of a scale of wealth differentiation, as perceived by the villagers, it was argued that the system of stratification can be viewed as the emergence of a three-class system, with a group of large irrigated landowners, predominantly hiring labour, a middle group both hiring labourers and wage labouring, and a bottom group: small unirrigated landowners, predominantly wage labouring. However the horizontal lines between these strata are criss-crossed by vertical alignments relating to the status-system and to ties of kinship and locality. Thus it was concluded that the three strata-distinguished by relations of production, as yet have produced no class consciousness, although the role of education in the village (specifically the educational aspirations that the wealthier households now hold for their children) will play a decisive role in creating class differences. Socio-economic differentiation, as perceived by the villagers, is both a process, (the developmental cycle, it was demonstrated, is a component in their evaluation) and a permanent fact (to have irrigation water or not).

The analysis has evolved around two main themes, resource endowment and certain social structural principles. Resources, whether land, labour or water are organized and utilized in correspondence with structural principles; whether they be the composition of the household, the wider kin group (and the associated residence pattern). I would stress that I do not postulate any kind of causative relationship here between these two conceptual abstractions: resources and structural principles. For example, it cannot be argued that the land holding pattern is what it is because of a prevailing ideology of inheritance, when that ideology itself was generated by the resources at hand. Resources - their distribution, allocation, organization and utilization are components of a socio-economic system. The introduction of a new resource into this system can be seen to alter the relationship and balance between resources and certain structural principles.

The transformation process, especially in the early years of change, is a process whereby a previously balanced ecological system becomes disrupted. The transformation process has altered a socio-economic system which was to a degree fluid, and subject to fluctuations relating to environmental conditions and to the structure of the household. Since the introduction of irrigation this fluidity has tended to crystallize; the variations in environmental conditions and household structure now play a less significant role in influencing production levels.

One of the aims of the research was to illustrate with empirical data that the 'loose-structure' paradigm was inapplicable as an all-embracing general model for Thai society, a paradigm initiated by

Sharp et al who wrote of

"The exceptionally amorphous, relatively unstructured character of all Thai society ..."[1],

an argument which gave credence to Embree's work[2], thus setting a tradition followed by Wilson[3] (who described Embree's concept of loose-structure a 'felicitous bit of jargon'), Phillips[4], Piker[5] and Hanks[6]. The tradition generated a modified approach begun by Hanks[7] and developed by Van Roy and Cornehls[8]: the loosely-structured "entourage" - an approach labelled by Potter as "loose-structure in a new guise"[9]. The tradition has long had its critics: de Young[10], Amyot[11], Moerman[12]

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1 Sharp,L; et.al; Siamese Rice Village: A Preliminary Study of Bang Chan, 1948-1949,Bangkok, p.26

2 Embree,J; "Thailand, a Loosely Structured Social System", American Anthropologist, 52, 1950, p.181-93

3 Wilson,D; Politics in Thailand, Ithaca, 1962, p.46

4 Philips,H; Thai Peasant Personality: The Patterning of Interpersonal Behaviour in the Village of Bang Chan; Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965

5 Piker,S;"'Loose Structure' and the Analysis of Thai Social Organization" in Evers,H; Loosely Structured Social Systems: Thailand in Comparative Perspective, New Haven, 1969

6 Hanks,L; Rice and Man, Chicago, 1972

7 Hanks,L; "The Thai Social Order as Entourage and Circle", in Skinner,G; and Kirsch,M; (eds) Change and Persistence in Thai Society: Essays in Honor of Lauriston Sharp,Ithaca, 1975

8 Van Roy,E; and Cornehls,J; "Economic Development in Mexico and Thailand: An Institutional Analysis, Part Two", Journal of Economic Issues, 3,1969

g Potter,J; Thai Peasant Social Structure,Chicago, 1976,p.18 p.21-38

10 de Young,J; Village Life in Modern Thailand, Berkely and Los Angeles,1955

11 Amyot,J; Provisional Paper on Changing Patterns of Social Structure in Thailand,1851-1965, Delhi, 1965

12 Moerman,M; "Bang Ping's Temple: The Centre of a 'Loosely Structured' Society", in Nash,M; (ed) Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism, New Haven, 1966

and recent studies by Turton,[1] Davies[2], Tambiah[3] and Keyes[4], in Potter's words

"Shatter once and for all the loose-structure paradigm"[5]

But as Potter remarks

"old myths have a way of persisting; and even today the loose-structure paradigm, although controversial, influences anthropological thinking within the ranks of Thai specialists. Outside the field of Thai studies, the loose-structure model remains the most widely accepted characterizat- of rural Thailand" [6].

In Potters most recent work he isolates a number of structural elements which, he maintains. can be seen to generate Thai rural communities: the extended-stem family cycle, the bilateral kindred, neighbourliness and formal neighbourhoods, co-operative labour exchange groups, the junior-senior relationship, class and status divisionss, entourages, political factions, administrative hamlets, the village community and the temple[7]. His analysis can in certain respects be criticized together with the tradition he attempts to discuss, for overly broad generalization. Although the concluding chapter of his latest work is entitled 'Form and variation', in the final analysis the variation is omitted from his paradigm due to the too strict imposition of structural form. While such an exercise may be required for the purpose of debunking a tenacious theme as a theoretical contribution the analysis, which

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1 Turton, A; "Matrilineal Descent Groups and Spirit Cults of the Thai-Yuan in Northern Thailand". Journal of the Siam Society, 6o,1972,pp.217-56

2 Davis,R; "Muang Matrifocality"; Journal of the Siam Society, 61,1973, pp.53-62

3 Tambiah,S; Buddhism and Spirit Cults in North-east Thailand, Cambridge, 1970

4 Keyes,C; "Review of 'Thai Peasant Personality', by Herbert P. Phillips", American Anthropologist,68,1966,p.793-94

5 Potter,J; op.cit; p.148

6 Ibid;p. 10

7 Ibid;p.149

isolates certain structural principles, fails to synthesise the expression of these principles. Thus I argued that class-structure, in my view inappropriately employed by Potter (taking no account of class consciousness), exists within the system but is counterpoised, and thus not realized in an empirical sense, due to the interaction of the other structural elements. Potter's work is invaluable as a contribution to the theoretical literature of Thailand, but is incomplete, and thus open to misinterpretation until the exact interaction of all structural elements as a synthesis is formulated.

Shanin in 1966 wrote that the main stream of contemporary sociology had by-passed the traditional peasantry, and that a few sociologists had so far elevated the peasantry from the footnote to the page[1]. During the last decade a large number of anthropological works have contributed to our knowledge of the peasantry. The task is now to re-consider a number of accepted generalizations of peasant types. I refer here specifically to certain labels; the 'hirer' and the 'hired', and the 'innovator'. I attempted to illustrate in this study that a range of types exist. Households hiring labour were those requiring additional labour to meet a household shortage, and also those replacing their labour - two distinct types, with different theoretical implications. Those hired cover a wide range of types: whether resident adolescents, temporary kinsmen hired on a day by day basis, workers from outside the village, poor households supplementing the labour of richer ones, or replacing it, or wealthy large households providing a younger member (the commercialization of previous labour-exchange groups). In

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1 Shanin,T; "Peasantry as a Political Factor", in Peasants and Peasant Societies, 1971, p.261. (First published Sociological Review, vol.14, no.1, 1966, pp.5-27)

a study of change and transformation, especially when it is at an organizational stage[1], theoretical types: 'the hirer', typified as the well-endowed, with ownership of the means of production, and the hired - as the landless labourer, on application threaten to obscure the multiplicity and variation of empirical facts. Again, for the innovator there is no one type, but an array of types, each type to be explained by different factors, whether resource endowment or structural form.

Generalization, an invaluable tool of analysis, frequently pre-empts theoretical development. Furthermore while attempts are made to compound the features of a peasantry into an all-embracing type[2] the variation in form and type of peasant communities equally needs to be accommodated into the theoretical literature. Having conducted this study, it seems clear that the study village is representative of a type of peasant community, at an intermediary stage of development between one village Ban Nong Kaw, some six kilometres to the west, and to another, Ban Tum, some 10 kilometres to the south, two other villages in which I worked. These three villages differ in their size, accessibility and the resources at hand, their household structures, styles of village leadership, and marriage patterns. Nong Kaw - a remote upland, unirrigated village, produces rice at a subsistence, and in many years, sub-subsistence level. It has a strong expression of local community spirit expressed through music and dance, a tendency towards hereditary leadership (the present headman is the son-in-law of the former office-holder), and a high rate of village endogamy.

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1 Organizational as opposed to structural change. For an explanation see page 148

2 Shanin,T; op.cit; p.14

Na Chuak Nuea, twice the size of Nong Kaw, now with two distinct types of leadership in co-existence represents a village at an intermediate stage of development between Nong Kaw and Ban Tum: a very large village, a sub-district centre, headed by an entirely new type of leader - a charismatic 'big-man', very wealthy by village standards, and well educated (the former headmaster). The form of Thai villages albeit in a general manner has been elucidated, the task now remains to accommodate features of variation into a theoretical model.

As a social scientist working with geographers and economists my own perspectives, if not changed, have been altered. The importance of the environmental factor, the value of carefully collected quantitative data, and the value of statistical analysis are only a few of the benefits resulting from this research experience. The contribution of this study to the multi-disciplinary project from which it evolved, is a contribution of perspective. I have attempted to elucidate the manner in which social structural principles whether they be the structure of the household, of the wider kin group or of residence, pattern the organization, allocation and utilization of resources, and also the response to opportunity. The anthropological perspective needs to be fully integrated into the final analysis, and not relegated to the footnote. Human labour is something much more than activity to be divided into 'man-days' (a unit of measure whereby the number of workers and number of days worked are compounded into one figure)[1]. Demographic differences between households with respect to rice production are something more than differences in household

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1 See DeMaine,H; The Use of Labour Resources, Lam Pao Report Series No.4, 1974

size[1], upland and lowland contrasts are fundamentally much more than differences in the inundation potential of soils, differences in crops grown, and differences in the size of holdings[2]. Lack of response to opportunity need not go hand in hand with unprogressiveness, irrationality, inertia, nor the failure of extension work. Resource endowment and social structural principles interact, coalesce and reflect each other. Any discipline seeking to understand the organization of a peasant agricultural community must take account of the multi-dimensional nature of the situation.

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1 See Dixon,C; The Patterns of Rural Paddy Production and Consumption, Lam Pao Report Series, no.5, 1974

2 See Ng,R; The Land Holding Pattern, Lam Pao Report Series, no.2,1974

Appendix

Transcription

The Thai words used in this thesis (except for common place names) have been transcribed according to the general system of the Royal Institute (see 'Notification of the Royal Institute concerning the Transcription of Thai characters into the Roman', Journal of the Siam Society, vol.33, part 1, March 1941,pp49-59). The system is as follows:

Vowels

Italian vowels except that

ae = sound of ea in English 'bear'

ǫ = sound of aw in English 'dawn'

oe = sound of eu in French 'peuple'

u' = sound more open than German u

Consonants

English consonants except that

Initial k p t are unaspirated as in French

Final k p and t are unexplosive and unaspirated

kh = k aspirated

ph = p aspirated

th = t aspirated

čh = hardened form of ch as the cz in Czech

ch = always as in English 'church'

ng = as in English 'singer'

Conversions

1 *rai* = .40 acre

1 acre = 2.5 *rai*

34.5 *baht* = £1

1 *baht* = 2.9p.

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