STUDIES IN THE VĀKYAPADĪYA.

By

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An abstract of the Thesis.

The title of the Thesis is "Studies in the Vākyapadīya".

Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya is a major work in Sanskrit Linguistics and its study is a long-felt need.   In the thesis, some of the leading doctrines discussed in Cantos I and II of the work are discussed, and an attempt made to correlate them to some Modern doctrines.

The four chapters of the Thesis are arranged such as to give a picture of the system of the philosophy of the Sanskrit grammarians.   Chapter I discusses the doctrine of S'abda Brahman, the Supreme Word-principle from which the Universe of things and names is evolved. The Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads contain references to Vāk as a creative principle functioning in association with Prajāpati.   The doctrine of S'abda Brahman developed in later times by grammarians like Bhartṛhari can be traced back to these texts.

Bhartṛhari's Conception of

In Chapter II Speech as a human activity is discussed. Every speech-unit, such as the sentence, the word or the letter has two elements (1) the phonetic pattern (dhvani) and (2) the permanent speech-principle (sphoṭa) which conveys the meaning of the unit. It is a primary Speech-sound (prākṛtadhvani) which reveals the sphoṭa and the utterance itself shows the speaker's personal variations of sounds (vaikṛtadhvani).

In Chapter III the sentence is discussed as an integral unit on the speech-level and as divisible on the level of interpretation. The controversies on the topic of the integral nature of the sentence on the Speech-level and the relation between the sentence and the word are discussed.

Chapter IV discusses the word and the problems about it, such as the nature of word-meaning, the change in meaning, classification of meaning as primary, secondary and incidental and proper names.

A translation of Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya is also included in the Thesis.

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C O N T E N T S.

Preface.

P A R T   I

Some doctrines discussed in the Vākyapadīya.

P A R T   II

The Vākyapadīya : Cantos I & II.

A Translation.

P A R T   III

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

P R E F A C E

In the following pages are presented
some of the salient doctrines of the Sanskrit
Grammarians as stated and discussed in Cantos
I and II of the Vākyapadīya of the celebrated
Grammarian Bhartṛhari.   In selecting ~~and~~
~~discussing~~ topics for discussion from Bhartṛhari's
text, care has been taken to see that the general
outline, with the fundamental doctrines, of
Sanskrit Grammar as a system of Philosophy is
presented as a structural whole. Thus the order
in which the chapters are arranged follows the
arrangement of the Cantos of the text as chosen
by Bhartṛhari in developing his thought.

A translation of Cantos I and II of the
Vākyapadīya is also given in Part II of the Thesis.
For translation, and reference the edition of the Vākyapadīya with Puṇyarāja's commentary by
Messrs. Braj.B.Das & Co. at Benares (1887) is
followed.

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P A R T   I

Some doctrines discussed

in the

Vākyapadīya.

CHAPTER ONE

The Word
as the First Principle.

The Word as the First Principle.

The historical background.

The search for an unifying principle is a common feature of most systems of Indian Philosophy. The Sāṃkhya Philosophers thus arrived at Puruṣa, the Knowing Soul which surveys the functioning of Matter (Prakṛti).[1] The Monistic Vedāntins postulated Brahman as the ultimate Reality and worked out, or rather worked off the Universe from it.[2] Even the Bhuddists who scoffed at the orthodox ideas of positive realities had to conceive their Void as more or less to take its place.[3] True, the idea was first conceived as a negation of everything and thereby as a repudiation of the current ideas of positive unifying entities; but later Buddhists did interpret this rather vague idea of early Buddhism as a more or less positive entity.[4]

Sanskrit Grammarians,[4a] far from being satisfied with dealing with ordinary facts of language and grammar, extended the scope of their investigation to cover ultimate metaphysical principles. The postulation of the concept of a supreme Word - principle

(S'abda Brahman) as the Ultimate Reality out of which [5] the Universe of names and things is evolved is their [6] distinct contribution to this realm of investigation.

Historically considered, this concept has its beginnings in the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. We find it described under various names and as possessing great powers. It is identified with mind, matter and the creator (Prajāpati) and is described by terms like Vāk and Sarasvatī. As the other self of the creator (Prajāpati), speech functioned as the source of all Universe. In the Ṛgveda it is conceived as 'the active power of Brahman', is identified with him and is personified as a productive principle. [7] The four regions of the World are described as taking their being from the seas of water descending from her in streams and the Universe as getting life from the imperishable flood which flows from her. [8] In the Yajur Veda we find Vāk considered as 'the Supreme wifely Śakti of Prajāpati, [9] and Prajāpati described as Vācaspati. [10]

Coming to the Brāhmaṇas the primaeval waters are considered to have been created out of Vāk by Prajāpati. [11] Again, Vāk is described as Prajāpati's 'other self' in the matter of creating ~~the Universe~~ the Universe. [12]

Vāk was the `nivid´ of the twelve syllables which emanated from Prajāpati while he was performing sacrifice, and it was through Vāk that Prajāpati created all beings.[13]

Sarasvatī is mentioned in some of the later Mandalas of the Rgveda, in a few Brāhmaṇas and in some of the Purāṇas, and as a speech principle is identified with Vāk and conceived as the creative principle functioning with Prajāpati. She is described as carrying out the function of creating the shape of the body (possibly of Indra) by bringing together the marrow, flesh, etc., in their proper places. She also creates the internal organs and even generates the vyāna-vāyu (life-breath) which pervades the body from head to foot. She stimulates and sustains the growth of the foetus in the womb.[14]

In the Upaniṣads we find the identification of Vāk with prajñā (intelligence) and also with the world of phenomena. Thus all speech is held together by Oṁ just as all leaves are held together by one leaf-stalk and Oṁ is the world-all.[15]

The brief discussion given above is intended
to show that the position the Grammarian philosophers
take and the line they adopt in conceiving the Word
as a Universal principle and explaining it as a system
derives their authority from the scattered references
in the Veda.   The principle of speech as the cosmic
principle out of which the phenomena of life, mind and
matter evolve, the same principle functioning through
the focus of the individual as his thought and speech
which form a mutually identifiable trinity with life -
all these are found in their rudimentary form in the
references quoted above.

To the Grammarian then the Ultimate Reality is the Word.
What is Brahman to the Advaitin, or the Void to the
Buddhistic Nihilist, that is the Word for the Monistic
Grammarian.

"In the beginning was the Word" can be as much as
be the idea of the Gospel as of the Indian Grammarians'.
Out of the beginningless and imperishable Word-Brahman
has evolved the Universe of things and names. But the
Reality from which the evolution of the Universe has taken
place and the Universe itself are not separate. [17] Evolution
is an internal process which takes place within a

fundamentally changeless entity.[18] It is not like a kettle
of water turning into steam; it is more like the water
of an ocean changing in some places into ice, functioning
in some other places as currents, but all the while the
fundamental oneness of the ocean being kept intact.[19]
Finite changes taking place in the infinite Reality which
is the Supreme Word-principle and functioning in terms of
finite 'time' - that is the story of the evolution of
the phenomena of things and names.   That things exist
for us and we have cognition of them only as associated
with a name is the proof for this theory of the evolution
of things from the Word.[20]   We know a pot or a jar only
as associated with the form of clay and that the jar or
the pot is made out of the clay is also a fact.   Thus
the identity in the cognition of the two things leads us to
the establishment of one of them as the source-material
of the other.   Similar is the case of the Word and the
Universe.   That the cognition of a thing is always
associated with some form of word establishes, according
to the Grammarian Philosopher, the evolution of the former
from the latter.   Thus there is an identity between
names and things both in their pre-evolution germ-
state and in the state in which they are

products of the evolution.   Things having evolved
from a primaeval Word-principle continue to be associated
with names which are themselves verbal transformations
of the same principle\.   Things and their names being
thus mutually identifiable transformations from the
same Word--principle (SabdaBrahman), it follows that
each name, that is, each word, has this Word-principle as
its ultimate significance.[21]   True, the word 'cow' means
the species of the animal with hoofs, horns and other
characteristic features.   But the species themselves
are manifestations of the first Word-Principle.   We
have discussed this topic at length in the chapter on the
word\$.[21a]   The religious significance of this philosophical
attitude, although not of much value to the present
day linguistic thinker, is that a discussion of words
(or names) (s'abdānuśāsana) becomes the pathway to the
liberation of the soul, such discussion leading to the
understanding of the ultimate significance of words, and
this understanding, in its turn, leading to the
individual soul's identification with the ultimate
principle.[22]   Thus grammar which specialises in the study
of words becomes a subject of paramount importance.
It leads the student not only to the immediate significance
of words, but also to their ultimate significance and purpose.

#1

To restate the position briefly: There is the
Supreme Word-principle which may be conceived as Speech
(with a capital S) and the Supreme Word-principle
evolves into the Universe of names and things without
itself abandoning its integral nature. This latter
condition is possible only if the evolution itself is an
unreal process and the evolutes are not as real as the
evolving entity.   Thus Bhartṛhari says that the diversity
of words and meanings which grammar deals with is an
illusion and that the Truth exists untrammelled by the
distinctions of grammar.[23]   However, grammar and the
distinctions it deals with have their use, in that they
lead to the Supreme Truth.[24]

The Supreme-Word-principle evolving into names and
things means that it constitutes the stuff of both word
and meaning.[25]   In other words, it resides and functions
in man as his speech activity.   Thus Bhartṛhari says
that S'abda is the great Bull residing in the speaker
and identity with it is desired.[26] This S'abda in the
individual evolves into an utterance, and it forms the
essential meaning-conveying element (sphoṭa)[27] in it and is
revealed through the phonetic pattern (dhvani) of the
utterance.   Sphoṭa and dhvani are, however, discussed
in greater detail in the next chapter.

The evolution of the speech-principle in man
into an utterance is described as taking place in four
stages.[28] They are named parā, pas'yantī, madhyamā and
vaikharī. The speech-principle, in its subtlest and
undivided form, prior to any differentiation, is termed
parā, the supreme. At the next stage, and the first
stage where parā vāk is differentiated, speech is called
pas'yantī. At this stage also speech does not possess
the form it takes in utterance. At the next stage
speech is known as madhyamā and is located in the region
of the heart. Vaikharī is the word as uttered and
heard by oneself and others. Vaikharī consists of the
speech-activity of man and is the means with which he
performs his duties.

The system explained above can be diagrammatically
represented in the following manner :-

. . . .

Śabda Brahman

(The Cosmic Speech - Principle)

Śabda Brahman
as
(The individual speech-principle)
(parā)

evolution
of
speech

paśyantī

madhyamā
(āntara sphoṭa)

vaikharī
(bāhya sphoṭa)

The world of
things

dhvani   +   sphoṭa
(phonetic   (the meaning-principle)
 element)   which is essentially
                           the Speech-principle
                              (s'abda)

CHAPTER TWO

The Spoken Word

The Spoken Word.

Sphota and Dhvani.

In the previous chapter the word
as a cosmic principle was discussed and it was also
stated that this Speech-principle functioned through
man as his speech.   We refer to the speech-activity
of man as "the Spoken Word" which is different from
the word as part of his speech-activity which will be
discussed in a later chapter.

Individual speech thus is a
manifestation of the eternal principle which exists
inside man.   The same entity which expresses itself
in the form of life, mind and matter also finds expression
as his speech.   As for the structure and the composition
of speech, it is not merely made of audible sounds,
although audible sounds form an essential part of audible
speech.   In its fully expressed form a speech-unit, by
which is meant a sentence, a word or a letter, consists
of a phonetic pattern (dhvani) plus an inner principle
(sphota) which is what makes the former convey a meaning.
Every utterance which is intended to denote a meaning is

composed of ˄these two elements and of these, the phonetic
element is used to convey a meaning (or denote an object)
and the inner principle is instrumental in making the
phonetic element perform its function.[29]

Now, although these two elements in a speech-unit
are thus viewed as distinct elements,—in fact their
attributes are different—and fundamentally they are aspects
of the same reality,[30] just as speech and meaning are not
totally distinct elements.[31]

~~As we have stated elsewhere,~~ The analogy of a seed
and tree will be helpful here. In the state of the tree,
the material element, that is the trunk and leaves, etc.,
and the life-force which prevents the material element
from being a dead log of wood and dry leaves, can be
conceived as distinct elements, with distinct properties.
But in the seed stage, we can think that the undeveloped
material element and the vital force form an inseparable
unity. In the same way, the unuttered phonetic pattern
and the principle which makes it an operative unit from
the point of view of meaning, form a unity before the
utterance of speech. At the speaker's impulse to speak
the same speech-principle in him unfolds itself, through
a series of stages into two forms, the meaning-conveying
principle and the phonetic element - these two latter

combining into the total utterance.[32] We have stated in an earlier chapter the four stages through which speech is evolved.[33]

The Phonetic ~~Utterance~~ Pattern and the Principle which is instrumental in its conveying a meaning.

An utterance, thus, is a composite of the phonetic element and the principle which makes it meaningful. A string of phonetic entities becomes a meaningful utterance because it has an underlying unity in the form of a principle (Sphoṭa). The very name 'sphoṭa' is indicative of its function as that which causes the revealing of meaning.[34] A phonetic ~~utterance~~ pattern alone cannot convey a meaning as the Nyāya philosophers claim.[35] Nor is the particular sequence in which the parts of the phonetic ~~utterance~~ pattern, such as the letters in a word, are uttered sufficient to give it the potency to convey meaning as the Mīmāṃsakas claim.[36] How can the last letter of a word, coupled with the impressions of the preceding letters constitute the word, and provide it with the unity necessary for us to comprehend the meaning of a word, as the Mīmāṃsakas holds ? How can there be a combination of letters which exist - namely the last letter which has just been uttered, and letters which have already disappeared and become impressions ? The whole problem as to what is the element which conveys meaning and the

controversy around it between the Grammarians and their
opponents, will be discussed in a chapter on 'the word'
which follows.[37] Although sphoṭa as a speech-principle
functions in every kind of utterance - in the word as
well as in the sentence - we discuss this problem in the
chapter on 'the word', in particular reference to the word
and its function in conveying a meaning.

At this stage it will be sufficient to state
in general that every utterance has a phonetic pattern
and a meaning-conveying principle as its constituent
elements.

The character of Sphoṭa and Dhvani
and the relation between them.

Of these two component elements of an utterance,
the meaning-conveying principle is the primary partner.
It is so much the principal element that an utterance is
considered to be a revelation of this principle through
the medium of the phonetic element.   The speaker's desire
to convey an idea or to refer to an object sets this
restful principle into motion, and passing through the stages
which are referred to elsewhere in the chapter, it finally
becomes embodied in audible speech-sounds and is thus
revealed.   By virtue of the fact that it is revealed
through a pattern of speech-sounds, it is generally

considered erroneously as possessing the attributes of the
latter.[38] But this is only as a colourless liquid being
perceived as coloured depending on the colour of the bottle
which holds it. Thus, the meaning-conveying principle is
intrinsically time-less[39] in that it exists before the creation
of time and exists also without change in the past, present
and future, extending to eternity. (It will be remembered
here that the speech-principle functioning in the
individual is a part of the cosmic speech-principle from
which the flux of creation including 'time' evolves). It
is time-less in that the principle revealed in a word
uttered yesterday is the same as the principle revealed in
a word uttered to-day, or to-morrow. Basically, expressions
like 'a word uttered yesterday' or 'a word which will be
uttered to-morrow' are half-truths. The truth is that they
are phonetic patterns (dhvanis) produced yesterday, or in
another time-division, through which a permanent principle
is revealed.

Thus time-factors govern not the permanent principle,
but the phonetic patterns which reveal it.[40] Time is relevant
not to the existence of the principle but to its revelation.
Thus 'tangible sound' (sthūlas'abda) a term given for audible
sounds which are variously called as nāda, dhvani and s'ruti[41]
- is produced and is only relatively permanent whereas the
subtle speech-principle (sūksmas'abda)[42] is permanent. We

can postulate production which involves time as a
factor in regard to speech-sounds and not in regard to
the speech-principle.

Then there is the problem of sequence.   When
a word like 'nāda' is uttered, there is a sequence-relation
between the two ~~syllables~~ letters 'nā' and 'da'.   But this
sequence is a feature of the phonetic entity which
possesses parts and not of the unitary principle which
runs through it, which is what makes the syllables uttered
in succession - sometimes with an interval of time
between them - a meaningful entity.   Sequence is not a
feature of a partless unity.[43]

Then again it is perhaps tautological to state
that phonetic features like short-ness or length of vowel
~~and the like~~ are only features of the phonetic element
of the utterance.   But it is a necessary tautology in
so far as statements are usually made as 'this word has
a long 'a'' and the like - statements which do not seem
to appreciate the existence in an utterance of an element
which can have long vowels and the like, and another -
and a very important element-which cannot have such
features. The speech-principle has no long or short
sounds nor any such features which are essentially phonetic.[44]

Similarly the peculiarities of speech of the individual speakers (vṛibheda) are purely features on the phonetic level though on a different phonetic level from the distinction between short 'a' and long 'a' for instance, as we shall discuss later on.[45]

A particular speaker may have a personal way of uttering a word, with a slight lengthening here or a slight shortening there. Such features of individual diction do not affect the immutable character of the principle which the utterance reveals. In a subsequent paragraph we shall have occasion to discuss the place of such personal features of diction in an utterance.

The Phonetic Pattern in an utterance.

Reference was already made to the phonetic pattern in an utterance. Bhartṛhari considers that the phonetic pattern which reveals the speech principle is a primary speech sound,[46] which is a standard sound of which are the personal variations in diction. Thus there is a sound 'a' as a norm, a long 'a' ('ā') as a norm, and so on; just as there are, for instance, the letters 'na' and 'da' as norms, there is also the phonetic entity 'nāda' as a norm. On listening

to an utterance, for instance of the word 'nāda', with
personal peculiarities of diction (vaikṛtadhvani), the
listener's mind cuts through these pecualiarities without
observing them, and reaches the phonetic entity which
is the norm.   Through that phonetic entity he knows what
the word is.   Bhartṛhari contends that the listener's
perception of the personal peculiarities of the speaker's
diction, follows his knowing the word.   What acts as
instrumental to the listener's knowledge of the word
itself is his perception of the phonetic entity which
is the norm, for all personal variations.

To recapitulate, the total phonetic pattern in an
utterance is a norm plus personal variations on it (prākṛta-
(dhvani and vaikṛta ~~prākṛta~~ dhvani).

Is the standard primary sound (prākṛtadhvani) an
abstraction ?

The prākṛtadhvani, for instance the sound "a" as
having a fixed phonetic value is not an abstraction,
because in its uttered form, with whatever personal
modification such utterance is made, it can always be
delimited.[47] If a short 'a' is uttered by a speaker with a
lengthening of it, a listener will not mistake it for a
long 'a'; he will recognise the "a" (short) and a modification
of it in the utterance. The modified sound contains the
boundaries of the primary sound.

Is the primary speech-sound perceived ?

As to whether the primary speech sound is perceived, and if perceived whether such perception is in association with the perception of the speech principle it manifests or apart from it, there are varying views. Bhartrhari quotes three different views. [48] According to one, the primary speech-sound is perceived, and the perception is in association with the perception of the speech-principle. The analogy of seeing a piece of glass which reflects the image of a coloured flower is cited. The piece of glass, which reflects the flower, is perceived (and not the reflection alone), and it is perceived in association with the flower.

Another view is that the speech-sound which reveals the speech-principle is itself not comprehended. In this respect it resembles the sense-faculty which, while revealing objects, remains itself unperceived. According to this view then, the primary speech-sound exists in every utterance and the word as conveying a meaning is revealed through it; but the speech-sound itself is not perceived as such by the listener.

According to a third view, sometimes the perception of a speech-sound is possible without the speech-principle being understood from it, that is without the identity of what is uttered, namely the sentence or word or syllable

being understood.   Such a thing happens when one hears
something uttered at a distance, of which one has heard
the sound, but has not grasped what was said.   Though
the sound-pattern (which includes the primary speech-sound
coupled with the personal modification by the speaker),
is received by the listener, the reception is not followed
by the discriminative interpretation of the sound-pattern,
as being such and such a sentence, word, or syllable.
This is a result of factors like distance.

However, according to a section among those who
hold this view, in these cases also, the sphota or the
meaning-conveying principle in the utterance shines out,
but is vague due to the distance, etc.   That is, the
listener can vaguely guess what the utterance is, but only
vaguely, due to the factors which prevent clear
comprehension.

CHAPTER THREE

The Sentence

THE SENTENCE

The sentence, the most complete unit of utterance.

According to Bhartrhari, the sentence is the most
complete unit of meaningful utterance and, after discussing
in Canto I of the Vākyapadīya, the concept of S'abda as a
cosmic principle and also S'abda as a human activity with
its two constituent elements of the speech-principle and
the phonetic pattern, he starts Canto II with a discussion
of the sentence and spends large sections of the Canto
in debating with opponent schools on the question of
the nature, composition and significance of the sentence;
with particular reference to the problem of the sentence
versus the word.

In a speech-situation, then the unit, both of utterance
and of the conveying of meaning, is the sentence.   It is
an integral unit both structurally and from the point of
view of meaning.⁵⁰ The sum total of the words does not
constitute the sentence just as the sum-total of the word-
meanings does not constitute the meaning of the sentence.
To look for words in the sentence and word-meanings in
the meaning of the sentence is to treat them both as
patched-up wholes while, in truth, they are indivisible

integrals.   An integral utterance conveying an integral
meaning sums up a speech situation and this utterance is
the sentence.   This is true even when a single word
constitutes a speech-situation.[51]   Thus, for example,
utterances, Mary ! Stay ! Oh ! St ! Yes ! are one-
word sentences.[52]   To Bhartṛhari a single word in a speech-
situation is a sentence, because the unit of a speech-
situation is a sentence.   Thus the utterance 'vṛkṣaḥ'
(tree) is a one-word sentence and can be expanded into
"vṛkṣastiṣṭhati" (There stands a tree).   It is not that
the word "tiṣṭhati" has to be added to the utterance to
complete it.   The utterance itself is complete and it can
convey the meaning of the whole sentence 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati'.

On the level of speech the single word is to the
sentence what syllables and letters are to the individual
word.[53]   We may break up a word into several sounds of which
it is composed, but it is the work of the phonologist, not
of the speaker.   So too we may break up a sentence like
' Don't do that' into the four words 'Do not do that' but
this again is the conscious procedure of the grammarian.
These sentences written by Sayce in 1919 could as well be
Bhartṛhari's.   For he says that the individual word is a
fiction on the level of speech where the indivisible sentence
is the unit.[55]   But division of the sentences and through

that the demarcation and establishment of the word is
possible on the level of grammar.[56]   All problems dealing
with the word as a unit are relevant on this level.

The relation between the word and the sentence, word-
meaning and meaning of the sentence on the speech-level.

Words form the raw material out of which the
finished product, the sentence takes shape;[57]   but the
finished product is different and more than all the
component words put together.[58] In the consciousness of
the listener, the words he has listened to merge, and
out of it a unity, indivisible and integral emerges.[59] What
takes place is similar at the end of the speaker also.
It is not that the speaker puts one word after another
and thus consciously builds up a sentence.   His mind
conceives the sentence as a unity and he utters it as such.[60]
The position of the word-meanings in relation to the
meaning of the sentence is the same.   The sentence which
is conceived and uttered as a unity conveys an idea which
is a unity and it is arbitrary to say that such and such
a part of the sentence conveys such and such a part of the
meaning.   A question might be asked here.   How is one to
know that smaller units have at all gone into the making
of the sentence ? To get an answer to this, we must look

at the sentence from the level of the analysis. Analysed
there, the sentence will show the part which smaller
units play in it, both structurally and from the point
of view of meaning. To say that the sentence is an
indivisible unity on the speech-level does not mean that
there are no smaller units in it. It only means that
the sentence, as a final product, exists and functions as
a unit, and not as the sum-total of the smaller units.
A sentence is something containing the words, but more
than them all.

The nature of words and word-meanings in the indivisible sentence.

We have stated above that words are recognised in
the sentence by the listener. Similarly word-meanings
are recognised in the meaning of the sentence when the
listener understands the meaning of the sentence. The
Sphotacandrikā says that the indivisible sentence is
manifested through indivisible words.[61] What this means is,
that the material through which the sentence takes
shape in the mind of the listener is the string of
words to which he listens, although the sentence as
a finished product is a unity. These words

through which the sentence is manifested are themselves
indivisible. The listener, when he listens to them,
does not look upon them as being made up of parts like
roots and suffix*es*, but as complete units. When a person
listens to the sentence "Rāmo gacchati" his mind does
not stop to look at the word "Rāmo" as being made up of
"Rāma" the base and "S" the suffix. On the other hand,
in the process of *the* mental assimilation of the sentence, he
listens to the word as a complete and indivisible unit,
which in its turn merges in the oneness of the sentence.

Different Views.

On th*is* question of the relationship between the
sentence and the words that constitute it, different
opinions are held by different systems of thought. Some
hold that the sentence is the original of which words
are apparent parts — a view we discussed in the last
paragraph. Others hold that the sentence is built up
from the words and these words form real and meaningful
parts of the sentence.⁶² To summarise the first position
again for comparison, broadly speaking according to it,
the sentence forms an indivisible unit, and it is the
unit of utterance (Akhaṇḍavāda). The analysis of the
sentence into words is a conscious process adopted by the

Grammarians on the level of grammatical investigation and instruction. Though the sentence is amenable to analysis on this level, it is a single unit on the level of speech. It is conceived and uttered as a unity and it conveys its meaning as an integral unit. The meaning itself is a unity.[63]

The other school believes that words form the original elements of speech and the sentence is a product of words. The sentence functions as a sum of words, and we can notice the parts in the sentence, and meaning of the parts in the meaning of the sentence (Chedavāda).[64]

The supporters of both views try to derive support from a Prātis'ākhya statement. In discussing the relation between the Samhitā (the sentence in a larger philosophic context) and the Pada-text of the Veda (or words), the Rgveda Prātis'ākhya says "Pada prakrtih Samhitā".[65] Now this statement has been interpreted in two ways such as to mean that the Samhitā is the original of the Padas or that the Samhitā is made up of the Padas.[66]

The Grammarian philosophers take the view that the Samhitā is the original. They thus paraphrase the statement "Padaprakrtih Samhitā", as "Padānām prakrtih Samhitā (the Samhitā is the original of the words)." The Vākyapadīya gives both interpretations of the Prātis'ākhya statement, with the preface that the two schools of thought,

namely, the Akhandavādins and the Khandavādins, adopt different views on it.[67] Commenting on the Vākya Padīya stanza, ~~Puṣyarāja~~, which presents the views, *Puṣyarāja* says that the Akhanda-school interprets the statement as "the Saṃhitā is the original of the words".

One result of adopting this view about the relationship between the sentence and the word, is to conceive the word as a derived or created entity. That Patañjali considered this to be the case is shown by his use of the word "Padakārāḥ" in reference to the authors of the Pada-texts of the Veda. Patañjali would not have used this if the Pada-texts were the original eternal *Veda, from* which ~~presents~~ the Saṃhitā was composed.[68]

The Grammarian thus concludes that the Saṃhitā is the original one. What this means is that the sentence is the unit of speech and words are products of an analysis of it on a secondary level. The Grammarian advances other arguments also to prove that the sentence is an integral unit and that it conveys its meaning functioning as an integral unit. We do not, argues the Grammarian, understand the meaning of a word, at each one of the letters which constitute it.[69] In other words, the word functions as a unity. It is also wrong to say that the meaning of the word is the sum-total of the meanings

of the letters.   The same fact applies to the sentence
also, although it is more difficult to grasp it there.[70]
The sentence conveys the meaning as a unit, and we cannot
allot one part of the meaning of the sentence to one
word and so on.   Such division is wrong on the speech
level.

The Khandavadin who is the upholder of the theory that
the varna (letter) is the reality and that larger units
like the sentence are built up from smaller units, argues
here that the meaning of a word is as much related to the
component letters as a group, as the meaning of a
sentence is related to the component words as a group.[71]
Thus words are meaningful in a sentence, just as letters
are meaningful in a word.   The dependence of the larger
unit to the lesser units is a fact throughout, and the
larger unit far from being a unity is a collection. A
letter, individually, may be incapable of conveying the
meaning of the word; but, as an atomic particle of silver
or some other substance, which is invisible by itself,
becomes visible when in conjunction with another particle,
so does a letter, helpless by itself, convey the meaning
of the word, by association with others.[72]   But that is
different from saying that the letters do not convey
the meaning at all, that some sort of unitary super -
entity is the one which does that function.   Nor

can we say that words are meaningless as the Grammarian
would insist.   Do we not get a meaning when a word is
uttered ? What is wrong in thinking that it is the
collective existence of the letters out of which the
meaning of the word is understood[73] ?   Similarly there is
nothing absurd in considering that the meaning one gets
when a sentence is uttered, is obtained from the collective
existence of the words in the sentence.   In fact there is
no sentence apart from the letters and words which
constitute it. [74]

Further, difficulties arise in textual interpretation,
performance of sacrifice and the like if the idea that the
meaning of the sentence is understood through the meanings
of the words is not accepted. [75]   Thus (1) in sacrifices
there will be difficulties in substituting one material for
another if the latter were not available. (2) The
ignorance of the meaning of one word in an uttered sentence
should not lead to the non-comprehension of its meaning.
Yet it is seen to do so. (3) ~~The breaking of~~ the order of
precedence of the rules of interpretation of sentences, such
as the rule that as a basis of interpretation of a sentence,
a direct statement will supersede factors ~~meaning~~ will be broken
like the syntactical relation of words, and (4) all study
of words, their descriptions, and the methods adopted to
interpret them in sentences will be meaningless.

76

Let us state these difficulties in detail :-

(1) The first one, namely the difficulty with regard

76a

to substituting one material for another in a

sacrifice, can be explained in reference to the

injunction "vrīhibhiryajeta" (Sacrifice with rice).

Now the Mīmāṃsaka argues that, unless the sentence

is interpreted in terms of the component words,

such substitution will not be possible. For the

purpose of making such substitution possible, the

Mīmāṃsaka would explain the sentence as follows :-

In the injunction "vrīhibhir yajeta" (Sacrifice

the material means

with rice), either in general or in particular, of the sacrifice

by

is implied by the verb "yajeta". The question

then arises as to the purpose of the use of the

word "vrīhibhih" in the sentence.   Is it to restrict

the scope of the operation of the idea of means

implied by the verb "yajeta" to rice ?   If it is

restrictive like that, what that means is that the

idea of a means in general is sublated by a

particular means.   In other words, the possibilities

76b

of a means in general are narrowed to one. To

avoid this, the word " vrīhibhih" is understood as

just mentioning vrīhi (rice), in which case there

is no question of the use of the word "vrīhibhih"

restricting the scope of the employment of the means

in general implied by the verb. The word "vrīhibhih"
thus not enjoining the exclusive use of rice, a
substitute like nīvāra (wild rice) can be used in
case rice is not available. Now, as stated earlier,
the Mīmāṃsaka argues that it is possible to
substitute nīvāra, etc., for rice because the
sentence "vrīhibhir yajeta" is interpreted according
to the Cheda view, that is, in terms of the
component words. But if we adopt the interpretation
of the sentence according to the Akhanda view of
the Grammarian, it will be found that substitution
of something else for rice is impossible. This
school holds that the meaning of a sentence is a
unity and it is not understood through the words in
it. The undivided meaning of a sentence like
"vrīhibhir yajeta" is conveyed by the undivided
sentence. It is thus, in the Akhanda view, impossible
to substitute anything for the material rice (the
material signified by the word "vrīhibhih") since, on the
level of understanding the meaning of the sentence,
there is no word "vrīhibhih" or its meaning as real
units in the sentence. And if instead of rice, we use
wild rice, the sacrificial action becomes a different
one, and is the significance of a different sentence, namely,
"nīvārairyajeta" (sacrifice with wild rice).

We thus get here, if we accept the Akhanda
view, a substitution not of the material used
as means, but of the very sacrificial action. 76 e
This means that the action enjoined is not
performed.

(2)   Again experience shows that listeners get the
meaning of a sentence not as a total unit, but
through its component words. 77 Take the sentence
"vanāt pika āniyatām" (bring a parrot from the
forest).   In this sentence with three words
the two words "vanāt" (from the forest) and
"āniyatām" (bring) might be clear to a listener,
while the word "pikah" (parrot) might not be,
especially if he was a city-man.   Under such
circumstances, he might ask the speaker what
the word "pikah" meant.   But this doubt on
the part of the listener would be impossible
if the meaning of the sentence were, as the
Grammarian argues, conveyed by the sentence as
a whole and not through the parts. 78 As a matter
of fact, the listener does not understand the
meaning of the total sentence because he is not
familiar with one word in it,- an argument which
disproves the Grammarian's position of the
undivided sentence conveying an undivided meaning.

(3)   The Grammarian's position lands him in yet
        another difficulty regarding the interpretation
        of certain Vedic texts and the performance of
        the sacrifice which they enjoin.[79] This might
        be explained with reference to a sentence like
        "s'vetam chāgam ālabheta" ("Sacrifice a white
        he-goat). The Mīmāmsaka interprets sentences
        of this kind through the application of one or
        more of the six principles of interpretations
        (pramānas), s'ruti (direct statement), linga
        (indirect implication), vākya (syntactical
        connection), prakarana (context), sthāna (position),
        and samākhyā (name).[79a] Thus the action enjoined,
        namely, the action of sacrificing, and the means
        "chāga" which should be used for it are understood
        through direct statement (s'ruti).[79b]
        The next stage of the interpretation of the
        sentence is to explain the function of the word
        "s'vetam".   Its relation with the verb unlike
        that of the word "chāgam" is through syntactical
        connection (vākya).[79c] That is, it is connected
        to the verb, not directly through a verb-accusative
        relation but via the word "chāgam" with which it
        is in a syntactical connection. The word "chāgam"

meaning a material object, and the word "s'vetam"
(white) meaning a quality and both being in the
accusative case, they are in the first instance
connected as the qualified and the qualifier
(vis'eṣya and vis'eṣaṇa).   And through the word
"chāgam", the word "s'vetam" is connected to the
verb.   To recapitulate, the connection of the word
meaning the material to the verb is **through** direct
statement (s'ruti) and the connection of the word
meaning an attribute to the verb is through
syntactical connection (vākya).   It is through
syntactical connection because its basis is the
connection between two nouns in the accusative
construed as being connected as a result of their
occuring in the same sentence (sāmānādhikaraṇya),
besides the fact that one of them is the name of a
material while the other is the name of a quality.
~~But~~ Sometimes, however, a different system of interpretation
is employed, when the necessity arises for
substitution of something else for the material or
the quality enjoined, when, for instance, instead
of a white he-goat, a white ram or a black he-goat
has to be used, if what is enjoined is not available.

This substitution would be impossible if the
authority of vākya (syntactical connection) is
considered to be as strong as, or stronger than,
the authority of s'ruti (direct statement). For,
then, what is understood as being enjoined in the
sentence through the authority of vākya, must be
as essential and irreplaceable as what is made
known by the authority of s'ruti. That is, the
whiteness of the he-goat is a requirement which
is as essential as the action of the sacrificing
which is the significance of the injunction
understood through the authority of s'ruti
(s'rutipramāṇa). This will result in the non-
performance of the action enjoined if the enjoined
requirements are not available - a consequence
which should be avoided. The Mīmāṃsaka
therefore considers that the primacy of the
authority of s'ruti makes any of the other five
following pramāṇas non-operative, in case a conflict
arises between s'ruti and it. Thus, even if the
requirement of the whiteness of the he-goat
understood through vākya-relation cannot be
fulfilled, the action enjoined should be performed
because it is understood through s'ruti. This makes

substitution possible.   When the injunction is
interpreted like this, the material to be used and the
attribute of such material also becomes a matter^s which
comes under the scope of the s'ruti pramāṇa. - 79$\dagger$ The action
enjoined understood through s'ruti, necessarily implies
a means with a quality and therefore the idea of a means
as well as its quality is understood through s'ruti.
What the words "chāga" and "s'veta" by their mention do
is to suggest a white he-goat as a material.   The
Mīmāṃsaka thus establishes the possibility of substitution
on the basis of the primacy of the s'rutipramāṇa over
vākyapramāṇa when there is a conflict between them.

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that such substitution on
the basis of a conflict between s'ruti and vākya would
be impossible if we accepted the Grammarian's ~~way~~ method of
~~the~~ interpret~~ation~~ ing ~~of~~ the sentence. 799 The employment of the
pramāṇas like s'ruti and vākya and their conflict in
explaining a sentence is valid only if the doctrine that
a sentence is made up of words, and the technique by which
it is interpreted through the component words, are
accepted; and the Grammarian does not do this. According
to him the whole sentence which is uttered conveys the
whole meaning.   To him, there is no need to determine
the meaning of any word in a sentence in order to understand

the meaning of the sentence itself.   Thus substitution
becomes impossible, if we accept the Grammarian's viewpoint.
The whole sentence is dependent only on one pramāna,
namely, direct statement.   That is, from the utterance
of the sentence its total meaning namely "the action
of sacrificing a he-goat qualified by whiteness"
(s'vetagunavis'istachāgalambhanam) is understood.   Since
there is no question of such and such a part of the
meaning being understood through s'ruti, and another
part through vākya, there is also no question of any
conflict between the two pramānas and hence no possibility
of using a substitute either for the material or for
its attribute.   This means that in the event of not
obtaining the stated material with the stated attribute
the action which is enjoined cannot take place. This
results in the non-observance of the injunction.
(4)   Yet another difficulty arising out of the
Grammarian's position is about the position of clauses
included in a mahāvakya (complex or compound sentence).[80]
It is difficult to conceive that such a sentence conveys
its meaning without reference to the clauses which form
its parts.   The contribution which the clauses make
towards the building up of the meaning of the whole
sentence is indeed more obvious than the contribution of
words in the scheme of the meaning of a sentence, although

the principle is the same in either case.   The
unreasonableness of the idea that the sentence functions
as a total unit to convey a total meaning is more
apparent in the case of the mahāvākya. Any mahāvākya
will illustrate the point under discussion. If a
mahāvākya functions in this way, then the whole Veda
should be able to function like that; for the whole
Veda is like one very long sentence.[80a] The absurdity
of the position that the whole Vedas and S'āstras put
together convey one total meaning, and functions as
one total unit need only be imagined. If the existence and
functioning of parts are not recognised, then no Veda,
nor any S'āstra will be understood, since the Vedas and
S'āstras are much too large for them to convey their
meaning except through the understanding of their parts.

(5)   The Mīmāṃsaka raises a fifth objection[81] that, if
the Grammarian's position is accepted, then all the
and the rules of interpreting them in Vedic Texts etc
references to the features of words in a sentence become
meaningless - If words do not exist in the sentence, then
such statements as, such and such a word has the
principal meaning, or the meaning of such and such a word
is determined by the evidence provided in another sentence,
will be meaningless. In fact, it is not possible to make
any statement about the words.

The Akhaṇḍavādīn replies to the objections.

The possibility of analysing the sentence in terms of
smaller units like the clauses included in it, or the
words composing it is conceded by the Akhaṇḍavādīn.[82]
Similarly the meaning of the sentence can also be analysed
along the lines of the meanings of its component parts.
It is not uncommon for integral and eternal elements to
be described in analytical terms, as being revealed
through smaller units or through finite substrata. Thus
the universal (jāti) is described through the
particulars which reveal it.[83] Or again a composite
smell which is a unity is described in terms of its
components.[84] Or one might see in a Bos gavaeus or a
man-lion (narasimha), which has been perceived as a total
wholey, parts which resemble other things.[85] One might
see a certain part of a man-lion as resembling a man.
In reality, the whole is a unity and is perceived as such;
and it is only on the secondary stage of analysis that
one sees in these objects, parts or partial resemblance
to other things. In the same way, to repeat, there is
nothing wrong on the level of analysis in viewing the
sentence as containing parts; and on this pragmatic
basis of analysis, all the operations with words as their
basis are acceptable to the Akhaṇḍavādīn. There is thus

no difficulty about the problem of interpreting
injunctions like "vrīhibhiryajeta", or for using
substitutes for materials or their qualities in
sacrifice, or for making statements about the meanings
of words in sentences.[86] Similarly, the difficulty
about the clauses included in the mahāvākya also does
not arise on this basis. (This point about the
mahāvākya will be discussed in greater detail in a
subsequent paragraph).

The Mīmāṃsaka also pointed out that the ignorance
of the meaning of one word of the sentence was found to
prevent the understanding of the meaning of the whole
sentence, and that this was evidence to show that the
understanding of the meaning of a sentence was through
the meanings of the words. But the Mīmāṃsaka totally
misconstrues the whole position and analyses it wrongly.
When a listener does not understand the meaning of a
sentence "vanāt pika ānīyatām", it is not because he does
not understand the meaning of one word in it. Just as
the apprehension ~~understanding~~ of the meaning of a sentence is in a single
instalment with the sentence functioning as one unit,
so is the non-apprehension of the meaning. We either
understand or not understand the meaning of a sentence as
such, and not through the understanding or not
understanding of its parts.[87] So far as the parts are

concerned, the apprehension or non-apprehension of their meanings depend on whether we understand the sentence or not.   So when the Mīmāṃsaka says that a listener's ignorance of the meaning of the word "pikaḥ" (parrot) handicaps him in understanding the meaning of the sentence "vanāt pika ānīyatām" (Bring the parrot from the forest), he is erronously reversing the causal direction.   It is the ignorance of the meaning of the sentence which causes the ignorance of any word in it. But why, it may be asked, ~~does~~ is it seem that one feels that it is the ignorance of the meaning of one word which prevents the understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence.   One thinks that in the sentence "vanāt pika ānīyatām" , one knows the meanings of the two words "vanāt" (from the forest) and "ānīyatām" (bring) and that it is only the meaning of the one word "pikaḥ" which one does not know.   This, the Grammarian replies, is because the listener makes a philosophically unwarranted comparison of the sentence "vanāt pika ānīyatām" (Bring a parrot from the forest) with some other approximately similar sentence, for instance, the sentence "vanādvṛkṣa ānīyatām" (Bring a tree from the forest) whose meaning he knows.   He then believes that, because he knows the sentence ""vanādvṛkṣa ānīyatām", the part "vanādānīyatām" (Bring from the forest) of the

other sentence is familiar to him.   And so he concludes
that the unfamiliar part "pikaḥ" is standing in the way
of his understanding the meaning of the sentence.   But
all this is a mistake.   That he is familiar with the
sentence "vanādvṛkṣa ānīyatām" does not mean that he is
familiar with the part "vanādānīyatām" as occuring in
the sentence, "vanāt pika ānīyatām", because the two

88

sentences are totally different from each other.   If,

respectively

for the sake of brevity, we ∕call the two sentences A and
B, in the order in which they are given, ~~respectively.~~
we can say that we are seeing in B , a part which
resembles a part of A.   But it is only an apparent
resemblance and the knowledge of a part of A, does not
warrant the knowledge of B or part of B, on the strength
of this apparent resemblance, because A and B are
different, and function as wholes apart from parts.
People do see parts where they do not exist and as
apparently similar to parts of other things as in the case

89

of the perception of parts resembling a man in a man-lion.
But this is an error.   Similarly it does happen that
two sentences, which are both without parts in fact, are
found to be similar to each other in some parts and
dissimilar in other parts.   This does not obviate the
fact that they are two different sentences and that the

meaning of the one cannot be understood from the knowledge of the meaning of the other.   Puṇyarāja remarks that the association of the words "pikaḥ", "vanāt" and "ānīyatām" forms an entirely different sentence from that formed by the association of the words "vanāt", "vṛkṣaḥ", and "ānīyatām".[89a]

Now regarding the question of the included clauses (avāntara vākyas) which the opponent of the Akhaṇḍavādin raised, the Akhaṇḍavādin does not rule out the existence of such clauses.   They are like words in a sentence.[90] They have their meanings on the analytical level but the important point is that they will all have independent meanings if another meaning, namely the total meaning of the mahāvākya, is not recognised.[91]   In other words, unless we recognise a meaning of the mahāvākya which is more than the meanings of the clauses, these included clauses will not have the status of included clauses, nor will their meanings have the status of the meaning of included clauses.   If the mahāvākya and its meaning as different entities are not recognised the legitimate questions may be asked, in what are the clauses and their meanings included, and of what are they parts ?

The Grammarian's Criticism against the Khaṇḍavāda.

After answering these criticisms raised by the Mīmāṃsaka opponents, the Grammarian argues against the view that the meaning of the sentence is understood through the meanings of the words. There are sentences where we cannot demarcate the words.[92] How can we say, about such sentences, that we understand the meaning of the sentence through the meanings of the words. Take, for instance, the sentence "dadhyānaya" (Bring ghee). What is the authority to think that the sentence functions through the words "dadhi" and "ānaya", in conveying its meaning. These words do not exist in the sentence. The utterance takes the form of a single unit and it conveys its meaning as a single unit.[93] In fact explaining the junction and showing that two words "dadhi" and "ānaya" have coalesced to form the sentence is a later analytical process.

But this criticism about the impossibility of delimiting the word in a junction does not create difficulties for the Akhaṇḍavādin in interpreting sentences like "s'veto dhāvati"[94] which can convey more than one meaning. The sentence "s'veto dhāvati" can thus be understood in two ways — It can be "s'veto dhāvati" (The white (animal) runs) or "s'va ito dhāvati" ("A dog runs from here),

the word "s'veto" being taken as a combination of the words "s'vā" and "ito". The Akhandavādin adopting the principle of tantra[95] explains how a single form like "s'veto" can be thus understood in different ways and component words like "s'vā" and "ito" recognised in it, which recognition leads to the interpretation of the sentence in different ways.

There are also ~~other~~ the following other arguments against the Khandavādin's position ~~which considers~~ that words and sentences are nothing more than the combination of letters, which are the real units, as against the Akhanda position that words and sentences are more than the combination of letters, and are integral entities when they convey meaning, although in relation to the sentence words themselves are not real units on the level of speech.

Letters are not meaningful.

A collection of letters can be meaningful as a word or meaningless.[96] Thus the collection of three letters "ku", "tī" and "ra" can form the word "kutīra" (a camp) or the letters can form a meaningless combination as "ratīku".   We need not necessarily mean a collection of the same letters in this statement. It is enough if we state generally that a collection of letters can be

meaningful or meaningless. It is a significant fact
that a collection of letters can be meaningless. It
proves that letters are not individually meaningful.
Since letters are not, thus, meaningful, a word as a
meaning-conveying unit is not a collection of meaningful
letters. To put it in a different way, there are no
meaningful parts in the form of letters in a word.
Reference might here be made to a statement in the
Mahābhāṣya, which says that letters are meaningful since
roots, suffixes and particles, which consist only of a
single letter are found to be meaningful.[97] What is
intended in this statement is only that these
grammatical elements have a grammatical meaning. The
statement does not mean that letters are meaningful in
ordinary use. Further, if letters have meaning, there is
no need for recognising entities like the "meaning of a
word" or the "meaning of a sentence". All meaning is
conveyed by letters, which, being meaningful, possess
mutual expectancy.[98] Thus the meaning of a word will be
the meaning of meaningful letters which possess mutual
expectancy. This would meant that words and sentences as
meaning-conveying units were ruled out.

<u>The meaning of a sentence is not a sum-total of
the meanings of the component words.</u>

Just as the meaning of a word is not the sum-
total of the meanings of the component letters, similarly the meaning of
a sentence is not the sum-total of the meanings of the component words.
If a collection of meaningless letters can form a word
which functions as an integral unit to convey a meaning,
a collection of words which have meaning can give rise
to a sentence which functions as an integral unit to
convey a meaning which is not the sum-total of the meaning
of the words. Words like `gaurakhara,[99] and bahuvrīhi [100,]
compounds[101] prove how a combination of words can give rise
to a meaning in which meaning of the component elements
cannot be found. Thus the meaning of the component words
"gaura" and "khara" of the word "gaurakhara" respectively,
are "white" and "donkey". But the word "gaurakhara" does not
mean any white donkey. It means "a wild donkey" - that is,
it is the name of a particular donkey / Similarly
bahuvrīhi compounds (relative or adjectival compounds) are
defined as having reference to the meaning of a word other
than those which compose it. Thus the word "ūḍharathaḥ"
in "ūḍharatho' naḍvān" (a bull by which a cart is drawn) is
a bahuvrīhi compound, and it does not denote the meaning
of the component words "ūḍha" meaning "drawn" and "ratha

meaning "a cart". The meaning of the compound is not
" a drawn cart", but "a bull which draws a cart." The word
thus denotes the meaning of a word other than the component
words.

Then again about indeclinables like "adhistri"[102]
(concerning a woman or wife). We cannot partition the
meaning of the words in terms of their components. In
"adhistri" it is not the part 'adhi' which contributes the
sense of the locative case. The totality of the word does
that function.

What is a sentence ? How can we define it ?

The Vākyapadīya presents eight different
definitions of a sentence.[103] They are held by various
schools of thought, falling under the two broad sections
of the Akhandavādins, already mentioned, namely, the upholders
of the indivisible sentence and the those who hold that the
sentence is built up from smaller units the khandavādins,[104]
We shall see presently how the definitions fall in these
two broad groups. Let us look at these definitions and
examine them one by them. The eight definitions are
(1) The verb is the minimum sentence. (2) A sentence is
a union of words. (3) A sentence is a universal which
exists in a union of sounds. (4) A sentence is a speech-
entity one and indivisible. (5) A sentence is a certain

reduction of consciousness ?

order of words. (6) A sentence is a ~~essential synthesis~~.
(7) The first word of a sentence constitutes its
minimum feature. (8) A sentence consists of all its
words considered individually and possessing expectancy
towards one another.

Of these definitions, numbers 3, 4 and 6 were
held by the different sections of the Akhanda school
to which Bhartṛhari belonged. The others were held
by the Khanda school.

<u>What is meant by the definition of a sentence ?</u>

By the definition of a sentence is meant the
essential nature of a sentence. A sentence when it
appears in speech or in recorded language is not always
in its minimum form. Round its essential self there will
be non-essentials; or the unobvious essential will be
covered by the obvious and necessary sheath. Thus, when
the author of one definition says that the verb is the
essential sentence, he means that the subject, object
and such other elements usually met with in the sentence
do not constitute the essential self of the sentence.
We might note here that it is *also* his job ~~such a further~~
to say in what relation these non-essentials stand to
the essential. Again, when another theorist says that

the sentence is a universal which resides in the union
of ~~words~~ sounds, his meaning is that, although the ~~words~~ sounds in
union are essential as a medium for the sentence to
exist, such a union does not constitute the sentence.
The essential sentence is the universal. When we
examine these various definitions in detail we shall
see that they are not all conceived from the same angle
of observation. Some of the definitions are
linguistic, in the sense that they can be stated and
substantiated in terms of linguistic quantities. Some
others are different and need extra-linguistic statement
and substantiation.

Every definition of the sentence has a corresponding definition
of the meaning of the sentence.

Every definition of the sentence which bhartṛhari
considers in the text, has a corresponding definition of
the meaning of the sentence. Thus the Grammarian who
holds a particular view as to the nature of a sentence
also holds a definition of its meaning, which is different
from that followed by another school. The important
thing to note is that both the sentence and its meaning are so
defined as to make the definitions fit into the general
framework of a philosophy of speech which the particular
school holds. Thus, to the school which maintains the

integral nature of a speech-unit in the form of an

utterance, the essence of the definitions of both the

sentence and its meaning is that they are integral.

The school of thought which holds the view that a speech-unit

is built up from smaller units and is not an indivisible

unity, correspondingly holds definitions of the sentence

and its meaning as divisible wholes, with as much

emphasis on the parts as on the whole.

We shall now discuss the eight definitions listed

above.   Of these the five definitions held by the

Khaṇḍavādins are first discussed followed by the three

definitions by the Akhaṇḍavādins.

(1) The verb is the sentence.

The first of these definitions to be considered

here defines the sentence as a verb.[105]   The meaning of

the sentence is the action which is the meaning of the

verb.   In fact, the definition of the sentence follows

from the nature of the meaning which the sentence is

intended to convey.   The significance of the sentence

being an action, the word of which the action is the

meaning, is the sentence.   If we undertake a process of

eliminating element after element, from a sentence, we

will come to its irreducible minimum;[106] and that is the

verb.   The arguments for the verb being the sentence

are, thus, pincer-like in movement. They proceed from
the logical and the linguistic ends.   It must be stated
here that this definition does not mean that a single
verb-word can always constitute a sentence, although
one can use such a sentence with advantage to illustrate
the definition.   It only means that the essential being
of the sentence is the verb.   The meaning of the
sentence, we saw, is the meaning of the verb; and the
meaning of the verb is action.   An action which is the
meaning of one sentence, is different from all other
actions which latter include all actions which are
meanings of other verbs and all actions which are meanings
of the same verb occuring in linguistic relationships.
Let us explain this point.   Let us take, as an example,
the sentence 'he went to London'.   Now the meaning of
this sentence is different from the meaning of the sentence
'He bought a car' and 'I went to Oxford'.   It is
different from the first sentence, because the latter has
a totally and obviously different verb.
It is different from the second sentence, because the
linguistic relationship in which the same verb appears
in the second sentence is different, and therefore the
verb has a very different meaning.   To the question
whether the meaning of the verb is the same in the two

sentences 'He went to London' and 'I went to Oxford'
an answer in the affirmative is philosophically unsound.
The difference in the agent and the destination of going
makes all the difference to the action, that is, [15] the
meaning of the verb in the sentences. [107] The two sentences
have, consequently, different meanings. That the meaning
of the verb is different ~~~~~~~~~~ in the two sentences
does not invalidate the position that both sentences can
be defined as being essentially constituted by the verb.
Only, the verb stands in a different linguistic situation
and relationship in each sentence.

(2) The sentence is a close combination of words.

Another definition of the sentence is that the
sentence is " a close combination of words" (saṃghāta). [108]
These words must also be related to each other
(parasparānvitāḥ) grammatically.   The meaning of the
sentence is the inter-relation (saṃsarga) of the meanings
of the words.   Words, when used in a sentence, have the
same meanings as when they are isolates. [108a] But, when used
in sentences, the mutual association of word-meanings gives
rise to an additional element, which is the meaning of
the sentence. [109]   The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsa which holds
this view is classed under the designation of the
Abhihitānvayavādins.   To repeat, they hold that it is

the inter-relation (anvaya) of the word-meanings already
conveyed (abhihita) by the words, which we get in the
sentence, when it conveys its meaning.   There are two
opinions as to how the meaning of the sentence is
revealed, or conveyed.   Some hold that it is revealed
through the individual word-meanings, just as a
universal is revealed through the particulars.   Others
hold that the medium through which the meaning of the
sentence is revealed is the whole group of words in the
sentence.[110]   A mental taking in of the whole group is
necessary for grasping the meaning of the sentence.   The
understanding of numbers offers an analogy.   The number,
thirty-six, for instance, cannot be understood by knowing
the number one.   Even a statement that thirty six times
one is thirty six does not help, because the understanding
of that statement needs a knowledge of thirty six.   If we
add 1 + 1 + 1........till it makes up 36, we can know
what the number is, only by reading and knowing the whole
lot.   In other words, the knowledge of the number thirty
six is not at each constituent one, but through the whole
group of 'ones'.   We can say that thirty six reveals
itself through the group.

The Prābhākara section of the Mīmāṃsakas, like the
Bhāṭṭas, holds the definition of the sentence as a saṅghāta,

or close combination of words. But they approach the
problem of the meanings of the sentence and of the word and
their relation in a different way. [111]   On these topics
they hold what is known as the Anvitābhidhāna view. [111a]

     According to this doctrine the meaning of the
sentence is formed not through the association of the
meanings of the words as the Bhāṭṭas hold, but through
the association of the words.   Words which are compatible
to one another produce the meaning of the sentence
through their union. [112]

     The meaning of the sentence thus formed from the
union (saṃsarga) of the words is realised through the
individual words as their meanings. [112a] This leads to the
position that a word expresses its meaning only after
it enters into relation with other words in a sentence,
(anvitānameva abhidhānam) and that the meaning of a word
is not a mere object, but an object which is in a relation. [113]

     To illustrate, the meaning of the sentence
"gāmānaya" (bring the cow) is conveyed by the syntactical
connection (anvaya) of the two words "gauḥ" (cow) and
"ānaya" (bring).   The meaning of the sentence is "the
action of bringing connected to an animal with dewlap etc."
The meaning of the words "gauḥ" and "ānaya" are respectively "cow-connected-
to-bringing" and "bringing connected to-a cow".   The

meaning of the sentence is thus particularised in the words as their meanings. Now, prior to a listener's understanding of the construction of the sentence, that is, when he is in the process of listening to the sentence, the form of the meaning of the sentence might not be clear to him.[114] But, as soon as the connection of the words is clear and the particularisation of the meaning of the sentence is evident, this uncertainty is removed. That is, when a listener completes listening to the sentence "gāmānaya" it will be evident to him, ~~it will be evident to him~~ that the cow mentioned there is a cow connected to bringing and the bringing mentioned is ~~the~~ a bringing connected to the cow.   This leads him to an inference[115] of the meaning
being a connection
of the sentence as between "bringing" and "cow", namely, "the bringing of the cow (the animal with dew-lap, etc.)" The meaning of the sentence presented by the connection of the words is thus not different from the meanings of the words.

(3) <u>A sentence is a sequence</u> (krama).

Another definition of the sentence is that it is a sequence.[116]   Words uttered in a sequence form the sentence. It is this sequence which reveals the particular significance of the words used, as an agent connected to

such and such an action, or an object connected to such
and such an ~~the~~ a action, and so on.[117]   To take an example,
when the words "Devadatta", "gām", "abhyāja", "s'uklām"
and "daṇḍena" are uttered serially, they form a sentence;
and from their serial utterance is revealed the
significance of the word "Devadatta" as the agent of
the action of "driving near" of which the object is a
cow qualified by white colour, and the instrument is a
stick.   Similarly, the other words are revealed as each
having ~~their~~ its particular significance.

        The analogy of letters in a sequence forming a
word might be used to understand how words uttered
serially can form a sentence.   A word is only the letters
uttered serially;   so is a sentence only the words
uttered serially.[118]   But the similarity should not be
extended beyond that.   If through the utterance of the
words serially, their own particular meanings as subject,
etc., are revealed, no such revelation of the meanings of
letters takes place when they are uttered serially to
form a word.[119]   Therefore, ~~unlike~~ unlike words letters have
[120] no meaning.

(4)   The sentence is the first word.

(5)   It is all the components words severally, these
      words having expectancy towards one another.[121]

According to those who hold these two definitions, every word has as its meaning its connection with other words.[122] To put it in a different way, words convey their meanings in the form of an object connected to something. And this meaning is the form of a connection which words convey is also the meaning of the sentence particularised in the words. Therefore, the meaning of the sentence resides in the very first word of the utterance.[122a] Hence the sentence is defined as the first word (padamādyam).

On the same principle, the meaning of the sentence resides in every component word of the sentence.[123] Since this sentence-meaning is formed from the connection of the component words which have expectancy for each other, and since it is particularised through the individual words, the sentence is defined as 'all the component words taken severally, and having expectancy for one another.' This definition is thus a composite of two concepts. Because the meaning of the sentence is yielded from the connection of words which have expectancy for one another, we have the section 'sarvapadam sākānkṣam' (being of the form of all component words which possess expectancy for one another). The feature that this meaning is particularised in the individual words and can be realised through them is represented by the word 'pṛthak'(severally).

A few objections are raised against these
definitions.   If the first word constitutes the sentence
and if the meaning of the sentence resides in the
first word, why do we not realise that meaning when
[124]
the first word is uttered ?   To illustrate, when
the first word "Devadatta" (Devadatta) of the sentence
"Devadatta gām abhyāja" (Devadatta, drive the cow near)
is uttered, the listener is not sure what the sentence,
that is being uttered, is and consequently what its
significance is.   What he is hearing can be the first
word of any sentence which starts with "Devadatta" as
the first word.   To him "Devadatta" is not yet a
specific instance of the word (vis'esas'abda) with a
specific relational significance, i.e., the _particular_
person Devadatta to whom an instruction is given to
drive the cow near.   So long as the first word
"Devadatta" only, is uttered, it is only the word "Devadatta"
in general (samānyas'abda) to the listener and its meaning
is only a person Devadatta in general without his being
connected to something like the action of "driving near".
This means it is wrong to say that the meaning of the
[125]
sentence is conveyed by the first word, for, according
to the doctrine held by this school, it is the meaning
of the sentence which is particularised as the meanings

of the words including the first word.   *That of*

This objection is answered as follows. It is
true that, when the first word is uttered, its particular
significance and the meaning of the sentence are not
realised from it.   But this does not disprove either
of the two ~~doctrines~~ *definitions*.   The first word, when uttered
has only the appearance of being the general unspecified
word, but as soon as the subsequent words are uttered,
its status as a word in a particular connection, and as
conveying that connection, through it, both as its own
meaning and as the meaning of the sentence, becomes
evident. [126]

Further, since the meaning of the sentence is
yielded by the connection of all component words, ~~and~~
~~connection~~, there is no question of the rest of the
words becoming redundant through its being conveyed
through one of the words. [127]

(5) <u>The sentence is a universal residing in a close
combination of ~~words~~ *sounds* (jātih samghātavartīnī).</u> [128]

This is one of the three definitions of the sentence
as an integral entity.   According to this, the essential
sentence in an utterance like "gām ānaya" (Bring the cow)
is not the sounds we hear, but a universal which is
revealed by the individual sounds.   In the sentence "gām

ānaya" one does not know what the sentence is at each
of the letters in it.   But when all the letters in it
are uttered, the identity of the sentence-entity becomes
known.   The analogy of performing an action like
revolving round and round may be cited.[129]   An observer
who comes to the scene will not at first understand what
the person is doing.   But after watching the action
repeated, he decides what it is.

Even accepting that the identity of the sentence
is revealed through the individual letters in it, why
should it be considered as a universal ?   The answer
is that we find the sentence as being the same whenever
it is uttered.   Every time we hear the utterance "ayaṁ
ghaṭaḥ" (This is a pot), we understand that it is one and the
same sentence, and we say "this is the sentence 'ayaṁ
ghaṭaḥ'".   Since there is thus a persistent cognition of
the same sentence in all these instances of utterance,
there must be something which is persistent that causes it.
That cannot be the letters uttered with the same sequence
for that would be like holding that a pot is nothing more
than "clay in combination".[130] Just as a pot, although made
of clay in combination is a different and distinct entity,
similarly, a sentence although composed of letters in a
certain sequence is different from them.

It is this sentence-universal which resides in the letters in a sentence that causes the apprehension of its meaning.   Thus the jāti (universal) is the meaning-conveying entity, according to this doctrine.[131] Hence it is known as Jātisphoṭavāda, the doctrine which considers jāti as the meaning-conveying entity.

The relation between sphoṭa (the meaning-conveying entity) and dhvani (the sounds which reveal it) is conceived in the same way by this section of the exponents of sphoṭa as by the other sections like the Vyaktisphoṭavādins (whose definition of the sentence will be considered next).   Listeners do not clearly distinguish between the sounds and the meaning-conveying universal in them. The revealing sound is considered as being of the same nature as the meaning-conveying entity.[132] In other words, the sound-pattern is taken to be the entity which conveys the meaning.   This is because the revealing of sphoṭa and dhvani is at the same centres of speech activity.[133] This statement only means that it is the sound-pattern which is produced at the speech-centres that reveal the sphoṭa in its turn.   Hence metaphorically it cannot be considered that the two are revealed at the same centres.

(7) <u>The sentence is a single and part-less</u>

<u>speech-entity. (eko'navayavaḥ s'abdaḥ).</u>[134]

This is a definition of the ~~same~~ view held by a
major section of the Akhaṇḍavādins and most of the
discussion on the integral nature of/speech under the
general heading akhaṇḍasphoṭa has particular reference
to this more than to jātisphoṭa.[135] Of course, the basic
doctrines of the integral nature of ~~the~~ sphoṭa, its
eternality, the relation between ~~the~~ sphoṭa and dhvani
are more or less common to all sections of the Akhaṇḍa
school.

According to this definition, then, the sentence is
an integral entity revealed by the sound-pattern of the
utterance.   In other words, if we will apply the notions
of sphoṭa and dhvani discussed in Chapter II to a sentence,
we will get the notion of this definition of the sentence.

<u>What is the difference between the two definitions ?</u>
~~The~~ Sphoṭa, according to the conception of vyaktisphoṭa
is the Word as the supreme principle, individualised in a
a single utterance.   This is like ~~the~~ space which is
really a partless whole, being limited by a pot or a room,
which makes us designate it as the space in the pot or the
space in the room.   Similarly, ~~the~~ sphoṭa which is partless
and is a single entity is limited by the phonetic pattern

of the utterance. It then partakes of the character, of the phonetic pattern, such as sequence and so on. A sentence conveys its meaning because the speech-principle is individualised in it; and the essential sentence is this individualised speech-principle. An important point to note is that every individual utterance has an individualised sphoṭa functioning as its meaning-conveying element, just as every pot has its own section of space enclosed in it.

In the doctrine of jātisphoṭa, sphoṭa is not individualised in an utterance, but suggested by it. In other words, the sphoṭa, in one instance of the utterance "gāṃ ānaya" is the same as the sphoṭa in another instance. What these utterances do is to suggest this sphoṭa-universal which is common to them.

8. <u>The sentence is consciousness reduced to speech.</u> [137]

This is the third of the three definitions which treat the sentence as an integral entity. The sentence is defined here as consciousness externalised and expressed through speech-sounds.

Consciousness, which is a partless entity, is the speech-principle, and it is of the stuff of both speech and meaning. [138] Speech and meaning are two aspects of the same inner principle, although in their realised form they appear to be distinct entities. [139] The inner principle has the potentiality for being the meaning - *both* conveying entity and the meaning that is conveyed when it is revealed. [140] The seed of the duality of word and meaning is inherent in it. Similarly it possesses the capacity for being revealed or not revealed. It is also, while being non-sequential, perceived as having sequence. [141]

The meaning of the sentence according to the Akhaṇḍa school.

All the three sections of the Akhaṇḍa school whose definitions we considered above, conceive the meaning of the sentence as a flash of insight (pratibhā).[142] Although this flash of insight is formed in the mind of the listener after he receives the component words and understands their meanings, it is not in its nature a sum-total of the meanings of the words.[143] Nevertheless, there is the appearance of the fusion and the recognition of word-meanings in it.[144]

In its formation, this flash of insight is not a product of the deliberate mind; nor can it be interpreted by it.[145] It is the result of the activity of the total consciousness of the listener, of his whole personality.[146]

This insight which flashes in the mind of the person who listens to a sentence, exists in its intrinsic nature in all living beings at all times.[147] Listening to a sentence only provides an occasion for its manifestation.[148] Just as the softness of a ripe fruit is natural to it, similarly insight operates in its possessor without further effort.[149]

However, the causes which produce insight
might vary. While in a monkey, it exists through
instinct, in a sage it is effected through meditation. [150]
Thus good conduct, training, meditation, results of
actions in the past lives, and the words of superior
persons can produce insight. Its ultimate source,
however, is the Word in the form of the scripture,
whether the scripture is learnt in this life or in a
previous one. [150a]

It is insight which makes living beings do the
proper actions in their proper contexts. It is the
source of the knowledge of what to do (iti kartavyatā). [151]
Even animals and children perform actions which are
apparently new to them through the power of the insight. [152]
The cuckoo sings in the spring through the inspiration
obtained from ~~this~~ it insight.   In fact, all activity
whether of man or of other creatures has its root in
this insight. [153]

Other definitions considered by Puṇyarāja.

Puṇyarāja concluding his introductory note on
these eight **definitions** says that they fairly cover the
whole field of the Sanskrit systems of philosophy in
regard to the topic. He discusses a few other definitions
which are not directly mentioned in Bhartṛhari's list
and seeks to show that these can be considered as being not
very different from one or other of the enlisted
definitions.

Thus the definitions held by Kātyāyna, the author
of the Vārttika, on Pāṇinis Sūtras, by the Jaranmīmāṃsakas
and by the Buddhists are considered.   Of these the author
of the Vārttika defines the sentence in terms of the verb.
A verb accompanied by indeclinables, nominal case forms
and qualifying and modifying words is the sentence and a
sentence will have only one principal verb. 154 This
definition can be taken as representing the view held by
the ancient Grammarians on this topic.   Hence Puṇyarāja
calls it`s'āstrīyaṃ lakṣaṇam' (definition recognised and
used in Grammar).

There is also the Jaranmīmāṃsaka definition of the
sentence. According to it, a group of words which conveys a
common meaning is a sentence provided there is mutual
expectancy among the words. 155 This common meaning of the
sentence is a common purpose (prayojanam). 156 The

Mīmāṃsakas, being concerned with the performance of
sacrifice as of primary importance, considered the
meaning of the sentence as being primarily purposive
rather than expressive. These words of the sentence
have expectancy for one another; but as a combination,
they form a piece which is complete and has no
expectancy for anything outside. Like Kātyāyana, the
Mīmāṃsaka also believes that the verb is the principal
element in the sentence (karmapradhānam). Qualifying
or modifying words also form elements of a sentence
(guṇavat).

Difference between the two definitions.

Kātyāyana's and the Mīmāṃsaka's definitions
running along parallel lines to some extent are also
viewed as different in some respects by Bhartṛhari.
He finds that the two definitions do not coincide on all
kinds of sentences. There are, he says, sentences which
will satisfy the requirements of both definitions, and
sentences which will not. Kātyāyana's definition is
shown to have the widest possibilities without exception,
while the Mīmāṃsaka's definition fails to apply to some
sentences. The question is examined from one particular
angle - from the angle of the dropping of accents in
certain words ~~in certain sentences~~ in certain sentences.

Bhartṛhari argues that the acceptance of Kātyāyana's definition will prevent the dropping of the accent in such sentences while the Mīmāṃsaka's definition will cause it.[157]

Pāṇini VIII.1.28 [158] says that a finite verb in a sentence will be unaccented provided a word which is not a finite verb precedes it and the two are in the same sentence (samānavākye). Now, according to Kātyāyana's definition of the sentence, a sentence can have only one finite verb. The application of this makes the piece 'ayaṃ daṇḍo haraṇena' two sentences and not one sentence, because the Grammarian assumes the existence of the verb 'asti' after the word 'daṇḍo'. This makes the piece read 'ayaṃ daṇḍo' ('sti), haraṇena'. (This is the staff; carry by means of it). Since, thus, the verb 'hara' is not in the same sentence as the preceding word it is not accented.

On the other hand if the Mīmāṃsaka's definition of the sentence is accepted, the verb 'hara' will have to be unaccented. To the Mīmāṃsaka a collection of words having expectancy for one another, which has a verb as its principal member and which has a common purpose is a sentence. Now the piece 'ayaṃ daṇḍo haraṇena' satisfies all these conditions, above all, the primary condition of having a common purpose. The whole piece is intended as

an instruction to perform an action. Since, thus, according to the Mīmāṃsaka conception of the sentence the verb 'hara' has words which are not finite verbs preceding it in the same sentence, it should be unaccented, which is wrong.

Sentences in which the two definitions agree.

There are sentences, however, in which the two definitions agree in that it is possible by the application of either to satisfy the rule about the dropping of accent. The piece "nadyāstisthati kūlet" (He stands on the bank of the river) provides an illustration to the point. In this piece which is a sentence the word tisthati will be unaccented, looked at from either angle. The Mīmāṃsaka can call it a sentence because there is a sameness of purpose running through it; and the Grammarian can call it a sentence because it satisfies his conditions. Thus the verb "tisthati" has other words which are not finite verbs in the same sentence.

These definitions need no separate listing.

In Puṇyarāja's view both these definitions - Kātyāyana's and the Jaranmīmāṃsaka's - can be included in the definition of the sentence as "a close combination of words" (saṃghāta) given in the list of the eight definitions. Therefore, they are not listed as separate

definitions, although as we have seen above, Bhartrhari makes a study of them in comparison and contrast.

The sentence defined by the Buddhists.   160

According to the Buddhists, the sentence is an unitary entity which is subjective in character, but is revealed with the character of objectivity and as possessing a shape.   The partless and sequenceless entity is presented objectively by words, which themselves are part-less, and without sequence, and subjective in ultimate character.   But these words are, in their turn, revealed objectively as having parts and sequence of parts by letters.   The sentence thus is essentially a subjective entity and it is a result of the mind's accumulated impression of the shapes of numberless sentences from timeless eternity.   Obviously the individual mind which is the birth place of an individual sentence is, thus, not an entity in vacuum, but a part of the collective mind and the repository of the collective linguistic impressions of the race.   The utterance of a sentence, thus, is the revelation of a timeless entity in time.

The Buddhists approach the meaning of the sentence also along the same lines.   It is a subjective, timeless,

partless and sequenceless in character, but revealed
objectively with a form by word-meanings which,
essentially share the same attributes, but which too are
in their turn revealed through letters.   The meaning
of the sentence is a product of the timeless impressions of
the meaning of innumerable sentences.

Puṇyarāja holds that these definitions are more
or less the same as the ~~earlier~~ Grammarian's definition
of the sentence as a reduction of consciousness,
(buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ) and the meaning of the sentence as a
flash of insight (pratibhā) [161]

The definition of the sentence by the Nyāya school.

The Nyāya School defines the sentence as the last word
aided by the impressions of the preceding words, just as [162]
they define the word as the last letter aided by the
impressions of the letters which preceded. [162a]   This stand
of the Nyāya School is a result of their doctrine that
letters and words are perishable.   They also hold that the
sentence is perishable (nas'yadavasthānubhavaviṣayīkriyamāṇam)

Similarly the meaning of the sentence is the idea
produced by the last word aided by the impressions of the
meanings of the words which preceded.   These definitions,
according to Puṇyarāja, are not different from the
~~conception~~ definition of the sentence as a close combination
of words (saṃghāta),   with the connection of

word-meanings (saṃsarga) as the meaning of the sentence.
In either case the utterance of a collection of words
constitutes the utterance of the sentence.   The two
definitions also resemble in that they do not see the
necessity for another entity like sphoṭa as a unity in
the diversity of the words uttered - a necessity which
the Grammarian sees and meets.   There is, however, a
principal difference between the positions of the Nyāya
and Mīmāṃsaka schools.   The Nyāya ~~school~~ *philosopher* holds, as stated
above, the theory of the perishability of speech-sounds
(which he includes in the connotation of the word s'abda).
Thus letters, words and sentences are perishable for ~~x~~him.[163]
To the Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, on the other hand, letters,
words and sentences are eternal;   that is what guarantees
to him the imperishable and eternal nature of the Vedas.[164]

CHAPTER FOUR

The Word.

THE WORD 4.

We discussed briefly in the last chapter the position which words occupy in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of speech. The relation which words bear to the sentence and to the letter both on the level of speech and on the level of analysis was also shown.

Much of what Bhartṛhari discusses about s'abda in general can be applied to words as much as to sentences or letters. Thus the doctrines of the beginninglessness of the Word (s'abda), of its imperishability, of the unalterable relation between it and its meaning apply to all units of speech, starting from the sentence downwards. Therefore, in this chapter, we shall discuss only such problems as have, in the main, reference to the word as generally understood, that is, as a member of the letter-word-sentence system. Bhartṛhari uses the term "pada" when he wants, thus, to refer to words exclusively as apart from its inclusion in the general reference of the word 's'abda.' [165] We shall use "word" with a small 'w' as equivalent to the former reference, as different from the

Word with a capital 'W' as meaning s'abda, the word-
principle, both as a cosmic principle and as its
revealed form as human speech.

The Classification of words.

Words are classified into groups from various
angles.   Thus the Sphoṭacandrikā divides words into
"indivisible meaning-conveying units" and "divisible
meaning-conveying units". [166] The former is the word as
recognised in a sentence on the speech-level. The
meaning of the sentence is revealed through the meanings
of such words.   But the meaning of the word itself is
not understood on that level through the meanings of
its component elements; the word functions there as a
total whole. [167]

On the level of grammar and interpretation, on
the other hand, the word functions as a divisible unit.
On that level the word, the meaning of which is explained,
is approached through its parts. [168]

The distinction between the indivisible and
divisible word-units is thus, as in the case of the
sentence, a functional one. It is a matter of placing
them on two different levels, one of which, namely, the
level of speech being the primary level.

The notion that a word functions as a total unit is part of an application to the word of the Grammarian's general theory of sphota, the indivisible meaning-conveying entity which functions in letters, words and sentences.

Just as letters have no parts, there are no parts in a word. The meaning of the word is conveyed by an entity which is presented by the component letters. 169

An objection.

The Nyāya school, along with the Vedānta school, raises an interesting objection 170 to against the doctrine that sphota, the meaning-conveying principle is presented by the letters of a word. If it is the letters through which sphota is revealed, which of the letters do es the function of revealing it. The objection gives reasons to prove that it cannot be the first, or any one, or the last letter in the word. Take, for instance, the word "pata". The first letter, namely "pa" cannot manifest the sphota, because it, like any other letter perishes the moment it is produced. If it did that were so, the letter "ta" of the word pata would be super- 170a flous as the meaning-conveying unit. Nor can it be specifically said that the final letter in the word manifests the sphota. If the final letter manifests the sphota, then where is the need to assume an entity like sphota at all? To say that the final letter manifests

sphota is to say that the meaning of the word is conveyed
to the listener with the utterance of the final letter.
One cannot see in such a position, any need for the
assumption of a mysterious element called sphota, to
stand between the utterance of the final letter and
the conveying of the meaning of the word. Further, if
the final letter conveys the meaning-conveying unit, how
is it different from the opposing Nyāya position which
holds that the meaning of a word is conveyed by the
last letter in the word functioning in association with
the mental impressions of the preceding letters.

The Grammarian's answer. /7/

This objection, argues the Grammarian, is
meaningless. If any letter can reveal sphota and if
the first letter does it, it does not result in the
meaninglessness of the second and subsequent letters.
For instance, if the letter 'pa' of the word "pata"
manifests the sphota of the word, the second letter 'ta'
has still a function. It resolves the doubt raised
in the mind of the listener when he listens to the letter
'pa', whether the word which starts with the speaker's
utterance of the letter is "pata" or something else, for
instance, "pada". The utterance of the letter 'ta'

clears this doubt and establishes the word as "pata".

Again does the conception of sphota become superfluous if the final letter is considered as manifesting it. It does not.[172] Here a conception of the opponent himself can be made use of with advantage. According to the Nyāya School, the thing which the word "pata" means is cloth; and this referent of the word "pata" is taken to be something more than the thing completed by the weaving of the final thread in the pattern. In the same way, asks the Grammarian, what is the mistake in assuming that the word-unit which conveys the meaning is something different from the sum of the letters?

An alternative interpretation of the terms "akhandapadasphota" and "sakhandapadasphota". [172a]

The Grammarian also offers an alternative in sakhandapasphota the words 'akhandapadasphota' and sakhandapasphota, not necessarily as a view accepted by him, but to show that such conceptions of indivisibility and divisibility of word-units, particularly the former, are not inapplicable to the thoughts of other systems as well. He seeks to show that these ideas and terms can be applied to certain of the classes into which the

Nyāya Philosopher divides words on the basis of the manner in which they convey their meanings. Thus words which are grouped as yaugika, that is, as possessing an etymological meaning can well be called #1 sakhandawords+divisible meaning-conveying units. So can words classed as yogarūḍha that is, those the the meanings of which are etymologically explainable, but which, nevertheless, are fixed to certain referents. Thus the word "pācaka" is yaugika, as it is explainable etymologically (pākam karoti iti - one who cooks food). The word "paṅkajam" (lotus) is 'yogarūḍha'. It is capable of an etymological explanation (pankāt jāyate iti - that which is born ~~out~~ in the mud ~~of mind~~). But from among those many things which are born ~~out of mind~~ in the mud, the lotus is specified as being the meaning of the word "paṅkajam". These two classes of words, according to the Grammarian can very well be called divisible meaning-conveying units as the etymological method of analysing the word and interpreting it through analysis is applicable to them. The Grammarian also mentions in this context, that these words are indivisible meaning-conveying units to people who are un+tutored in grammar and lexicography. These people, who do not know the etymology of these words, use them like symbols of their meanings. To them, the

the word as a unit stands for the meaning as a unit.
Again, words which are grouped as rūdha, that is, having
a popular meaning which is not etymologically explainable,
are indivisible meaning-conveying units to all alike,
the tutored and the untutored. Such are words like
"mani", "nupura" and "vah" (jewel, anklet, you (to you, or your)
respectively).   This is because all alike understand
 the meanings of these words without any aid from their
parts. Surely, the meaning of the word "mani" is not
the sum of the parts "ma" and "ni", which in fact do
not contribute to the meaning at all.

Meaning on various levels. Formal Meaning and the
Referent as the Meaning.

The word as the name (samjñā) and the named (samjñī).

Connected with the dual status of the word
dealt with in the above paragraphs and similar in nature
and explanation is the dual capacity of the word as a
name (samjñā) and the named (samjñī) 173 To state the proposition
in different terms, the word is both a symbol and the
symbolised. It is the name for something and is the named
with reference to itself. The formal entity, the
phonetic pattern agni (svarūpartha) is the first meaning 174
of the word "agni" while the word also has a referent
as its meaning which might be called "meaning on the
semantic level.". The proposition of the word being the

the name and the named together, is based on a
conception of different levels of meaning. But it must
not be assumed that every utterance of a word calls
forth the exercise of its meanings on all levels. There
are contexts where only the phonetic meaning is relevant;
there are other contexts where the referent is the one
required.[175] The word 'agni', for instance, if uttered
in a grammatical rule, means the phonetic pattern, or
the form as its meaning.[176] In this context the word 'agni'
is used to convey the form **agni** as its meaning. It
does not mean fire. On the other hand, if the word is
used in a situation from life, such as pointing to a street fire,
the word obviously means fire.[177]

Word-Meaning Relation.

Between a word and its meaning, there exists an
unalterable and inviolable relation.[178] The nature of this
relation is defined by the phrase vācyāvacakabhāva (or the
relation between the expressing and the expressed).[179] This
relation is permanent and can be described by the [179a]
statement that a word, when uttered must necessarily
convey a particular meaning which is not conveyed by any
other word. A question might be asked here, whether
this relation is not violated when the word possesses more
meanings than one, and in any one context, it conveys
only one of its many meanings. For example, the word

'gauh' (cow) can mean either an animal or a Bahika
(the name of a people or of a person belonging to that race).
Is not the constancy of the relation between the word
and its meaning violated by the word having two meanings ?
The Grammarian's answer to this question is in the
negative, because according to his theory, the word
possesses not two meanings which are independent of each
other, but two meanings which are expressions of two
different powers of the same word and are thus mutually
related.[180] The word-meaning relation is not violated
because the word has always the power to convey its
primary meaning and all other meanings are metaphorical
derivations or contextual applications of the primary
meaning.[181] (The question of the primary, secondary and
incidental meanings is discussed in greater detail later
in the chapter).

Or again the problem of the permanence of the word-
meaning relation can be approached from another angle. A
word always conveys its form as its meaning. And
whenever it conveys an object as its meaning, it is a
case of the identification of the object with the form.
Hence the relation of the expressing and the expressed
which exists between the word and its meaning is not
violated, whatever object it denotes. The word
remains permanently connected to its form[182]

The process of a word conveying a referent as its meaning.

What is the mental process behind the use of a certain word to denote an object ? The mind first dwells on the word, which is then placed on the particular object. The utterance of the word preceded by this process results in its denoting the particular object. A mental fixation of the word on the particular object thus necessarily precedes the fruitful utterance of the word. Puṇyarāja contends that it is this establishment of a relation of identity (tādātmya) between the word and the object in the mental sphere which makes the word denote the appropriate object itself and prevents the object being conveyed by another word.

The word must be heard before it conveys a meaning.

It is the spoken word which is primarily kept in mind by the Grammarian in all this discussion. This emphasis on the spoken word is necessary and appropriate as the Grammarian's interest, as discussed in these pages, is in a philosophy of speech; of man's speaking activity and its results. But emphasis on the spoken word was relevant in the philosophy of speech, not only with reference to the spoken colloquial, but also with reference to literature; because, in ancient

India as in ancient Greece, tradition of an unwritten
literature, handed down by word of mouth from generation
to generation continued for a long time. 185

For a word to convey a meaning to a listener,
it must first be heard, received by the ear. 186 The stating .
of this apparently obvious fact becomes patently
meaningful when applied to the situation where the
speaker himself is the listener. Thus even if some one
is reading silently (as the expression usually goes),
his understanding of the meaning of the words he reads
is preceded by the words themselves being received by
his ears, however imperceptible the latter process is to
others and perhaps even to himself. In every situation
of a word conveying a meaning, it is both the perceived
(grāhya) and the causer of the perception of meaning
(grāhaka). Just as light reveals an object and is
itself revealed prior to that, so is the word received
by the ear prior to its causing the perception of meaning. 187

If precedent sense-perception of the word is not
essential for the word's conveying its meaning, then the
very presence of the word should be able to convey its
meaning. 188 Thus if a word is uttered by someone, it should
be able to convey its meaning to a person even if he does
not hear it. But this obviously does not happen. In
fact, when someone tells us something and we have not

heard it well, we ask him to repeat what he said.

There is, also, nothing wrong in the same word possessing two different powers - the power of being perceived and the power of causing the perception of meaning. We have seen in the example of light that such co-existence of different powers is not entirely unknown. It will not cause any difficulty since the powers are of different characters, and function in different spheres. The power of being perceived and the power of causing perception produce different results and hence there is an absence of conflicts in their functioning. 189

The essential element denoted by a word in its referent.

In Chapter I above, we stated the Grammarian's position that Brahman is the significance of all words. 190 If Brahman is the meaning of all words, objects the critic, then all words will be synonyms and this will result in the uselessness of the human language employing several words at the same time. 191 The Grammarian is not worried by this objection. Brahman which is the meaning of all words is differentiated into the various universals due to its connection with them. The undivided is apparently divided into the cow-universal, the horse-universal and so on. Therefore these words are used to denote these

universals.[192] Thus Bhartṛhari says that Existence pure
and simple is found in cows and co, because of its
connection with different subjects and on it all words
depend. This is called the meaning of the stem and
the root and the meaning of the suffixes like 'tva' and 'tal.'[193]
In the cow-universal and co we have Existence residing
in the forms of the Supreme Universal identified with
the lower universals like cow-ness. Hence words when
used to denote a universal like cow-ness are really
denoting the Supreme Universal, the Supreme Existence.

On this question of the denotation of a word,
whether it denotes the universal or the particular, two
views were held by Grammarians who preceded Bhartṛhari.
Thus, Vājapyāyana, an ancient teacher, considered the
universal as the essential meaning of the word. But
the later Grammarians like Vyāḍi held the theory of the
particular. Patañjali, on the other hand, considered
that both the universal and particular can be the essential
significance of a word.[194] In this Patañjali is following
Pāṇini, who states that the meaning of a word can be the
universal and the particular. As an example for the universal-

theory he

gives the sentence "Brāhmaṇa to be honoured" in which
the word 'Brāhmaṇa' stands not for a particular Brāhmin,
but for the class of Brāhmins. In another place he
uses the word as meaning an individual Brāhmin. 195

Can a word have more than one referent?

In discussing above the problem of the constancy
of the relation between a word and its meaning the
Grammarian's argument that such relation is not broken
even if a word conveys more than one referent meanings
was stated. 196 We shall examine here in detail this
problem of a word having more than one meaning from the
stand-points of the Grammarians and the opposing schools.

The two Schools of thought.

Indian thinkers held divergent opinions on
whether or not the identity of a word changed according
to a change in its meaning. If a word 'file' has more
than one meaning, as it obviously has, does it mean that
the word which conveys the meaning 'a row of soldiers'
is different from the word which conveys the meaning
"a sheaf of papers fastened to a cord". Although the
phonetic constitution of the word happens to be the same,
the same-ness of the phonetic pattern need not have more
importance than two people entirely different from each
other having the same name. The two different theories

on this can be named 'the theory of the ~~one~~ _same_ word'
(Ēkas'abdavāda) and 'the theory of different words'
(Nānās'abdavāda).

We have to state here that the conception of the
oneness or otherwise of the word as related to the many
meanings, _it has,_ is, according to Indian thinkers, only a part
of a larger question, namely, the oneness or otherwise
of any speech-element (s'abda) from the letter to the
sentence.   Thus the Mahābhāṣya presents both views in
~~a~~ discussion on _in_ ~~āhnika one~~ _I·1·1_ [197]. To the Ēkas'abdavādins
the word 'file' is the same whatever the meaning it conveys
and to the Nānās'abdavādins it is different in each
instance of _its_ occurence with a different meaning, not
because of any power of the meaning, but because, _itself_
theoretically, they believe, _respectively_ either in the oneness of
the word or the _plurality_ ~~manyness~~ of it.

As we have noticed above, one of the two
schools holds that a change in the identity of the word
ensues every change in its meaning. [198] That is, the word
'file' meaning 'a row of soldiers' is not the same as
the word 'file' meaning 'a sheaf of papers'.   Or to take
                              a familiar example

from Sanskrit, the word 'gauḥ' meaning 'a cow' is different from the word 'gauḥ' when it means 'a Bāhīka'. Although the two words happen to have the same sounds. It may be possible to consider, in such cases, that one of the meanings is metaphorical or secondary. But the Nānās'abdavādins hold that, despite any apparent resemblance between the meanings and the identity in phonetic features between the words themselves, they are really different. They explain the apparent similarity between the words themselves and between their meanings as being caused by an erroneous super-imposition, which is explained below. [199]

According to this school, then, (the word is as many as the meanings as it conveys. Support is sought for this view from the Vedas too. A Vedic hymn, the s'āmidhenī hymn, for instance, becomes altogether different in identity every time it is repeated, and this is because each time it is repeated it acquires a new meaning. In fact, any [200] hymn when repeated, becomes a different entity. This is because the meaning of the hymn changes at every time of its repetition, the meaning of the hymn relevant for an occasion of recital being its formal meaning. We have had an occasion to notice above that the first meaning of a word, or of a sentence is its form, a meaning which we called the

formal meaning of a word or sentence.   Occasions of the
"recitations of the hymn call forth the form alone as ~~the~~ its
relevant meaning) ~~of the hymn.~~   In other words, a hymn
is recited not for the sake of its literature, but for
the sake of its form.   It fulfils its function on a
certain occasion of recital by presenting its form as
its meaning.   Since every occasion of the hymn calls
for its form as a fresh presentation, the relevant
meaning of the hymn on that occasion is different from
the relevant meaning of the hymn on a previous occasion.   201

Some difficulties.

The view discussed above is not without
difficulties and its exponents try to meet some of them.
One difficulty is that ~~it have~~ they to explain the similarity
of the two different words (for instance 'file'), as they
call them, on the phonetic, structural and other levels.
This difficulty is not so impossible for the philosopher
of the ~~opposing~~ other school of thought.   He does not hold that
the word 'gauh' meaning 'a cow' is different from the word
'gauh' meaning 'a Sahika'.   He considers them as one
word, with two meanings;   and his problem, thus, reduces
itself into having to explain how one word can convey more
than one meaning and whether there is any relationship among
the meanings.   But the philosopher who holds that the word

'gauh' meaning a cow is different from the word 'gauh'
meaning 'a Bāhīka' has a sterner problem.   He has to
explain, why, in that case, the words have the same
formal existence, or phonetic pattern.   Of course, it
is easy for him to explain away the difficulty by a
suggestion of linguistic coincidence.   But the
Nānās'abdavādin attempts a more plausible explanation.
He postulates the idea of a superimposition on the word-
level and explains our experience as a fallacy.   The
basis of the superimposition is a similarity between
the two different words.   Thus, the similarity between
the word 'gauh' meaning ' a cow' and the word 'gauh'
meaning 'a Bāhīka' causes a confusion of the one for the
other.   It is suggested that the word which conveys the
better-known of the two meanings is superimposed on the
other.   That is, the latter word is taken to be for the former. 202

        Let us take the example of the word 'gauh'.
According to the Nānās'abdavādin, there is a word 'gauh'
meaning 'a cow' and a word 'gauh' meaning 'a Bāhīka'.
Of these two words, the word 'gauh' meaning 'a cow' is
better known that the word 'gauh' with the meaning 'a
Bāhīka'.   When we hear the word 'gauh' uttered to mean
'a Bāhīka' we have the feeling that it is the same as
the word 'gauh' meaning ' a cow', prompting us to consider
the former of the meanings as a metaphorical derivation

from the latter, and to consider the two words as being the same. This, explains the Nānās'abdavādin, is nothing more than a confusion on our part, which makes us super-impose the word 'gauḥ' with a better-known meaning on the word 'gauḥ' with a less-known meaning. It is a confusion of 'gauḥ' = 'Bāhīka' for 'gauḥ' = 'a cow', because we are more familiar with the latter equation. The Nānās'abdavādin thus explains our experience of the word as being the same as an error and seeks to establish the plurality of words on the basis of different meanings.

The theory of the same word (Ekas'abdavāda). 203

As against the theory discussed above, there is the conception of the singleness of the word which expresses different meanings conditioned by the context of its use or by its association with other words. This school does not accept the idea that every instance of a word's conveying a new meaning is an instance of the word becoming a new entity. Through out its career of expressing various meanings, well-known or obscure as the case may be, the identity of the word remains unimpaired. Thus it is the same word 'gauḥ' which conveys the two meanings 'a cow' and 'a Bāhīka'. 204 But the same word does not convey all its different meanings on every occasion of

its use, because each meaning requires a particular
condition, contextual or otherwise to be fulfilled
for its operation. [205] The word itself possesses
different capacities by the exercise of which it
conveys various meanings. [206] The Veda provides us with a
further illustration of this point. The same hymn is
sometimes used in reference to a deity, at some other
times in the context of a sacrifice. This is because
the hymn possesses different and independent
capacities and could be used at any time in the
exercise of any one of these without the intervention
of the others. [207]

Primary and Secondary Meanings of Words.

The questions discussed in the above paragraphs
lead us directly to the question of the primary and
secondary meanings of words. But it might be noted
here that the question is more relevant to the 'theory
of the same word' than to the 'theory of different words'. [208]
It is still less relevant to what might be called
the theory of the indivisible sentence (Akhandavāda). [209]
Nevertheless, the exponents of the two latter theories
discuss the question from their own special angles.

To the Ekas'abdavādins who hold that it is the
same word which possesses and can convey, more than one meaning by
virtue of ~~the exercise~~ of its different powers, the grading of
the meaning as primary and secondary is important, for
more than one reason.   They have to explain why the
word's association with one of the meanings is better
known than that with the others; and also the fact
derived from this that the other meaning or meanings
show signs of relationship with the better-known meaning.
Thus, the word 'gauh' has a meaning 'a cow' - a very
well-known meaning accepted as the ~~basic~~ First meaning of the
word. But it has also a meaning 'a Bāhīka'. The theorist
who insists that it is the same word which has both
meanings has to grade them and explain their gradation
for the two reasons given above.

There is also a third reason - and he usually
accepts this as his principal reason - for the
Ekas'abdavādin having to relate and grade these meanings.
That reason is the logical consequence of another tenet
which he holds, namely, the inviolability ~~indisability~~ of the relationship
between a word and its meaning (s'abdārthasamb and hasya
nityatā).[210] This rule demands the exclusion of more than
one primary meaning (mukhyārtha) for a word. For a word
to possess two primary meanings independent of each other
would imply that its relationship with either of them was not

inviolable. [211] But this relationship is kept intact, if
the meanings are graded, with one of them enthroned as
primary and others considered as secondary.   In the
scheme of the concepts of primary and secondary meanings,
the word-meaning relation is not violated even in the
use of the word to convey the secondary meanings. This
is because, firstly the secondary meaning is related
to the primary meaning [212] and secondly, all meanings of a
word are expressions of the various powers of the same
word, an idea to which we had occasion to refer before.
The meaning 'a Bāhīka' of the word 'gauḥ' is thus
related to its meaning 'a cow' because of certain
identical characteristics of the person and the cow, [213]
and because the word 'gauḥ' possesses the capacities to
convey both meanings.

The Nānā'abdavādins and the Primary-Secondary conception.

How does the primary-secondary conception of word-
meaning apply and become relevant to the Nānā'abdavādins?
If they hold that the word 'gauḥ' meaning 'a cow' is
different in identity from the word 'gauḥ' meaning 'a
Bāhīka', where, then is the need or the relevance, for them,
to relate the two meanings as primary and secondary? A
grading of two meanings as primary and secondary is
possible, only if there is a and necessary Connection between their

respective relationships

~~consisting in a difference between their association~~
with the word which conveys them. In other words, we
cannot say that 'a cow' and 'ḍ̄aḥīka' are primary and
secondary meanings if they are, as the Nānāśabdavādins
hold, meanings of two different words. To say that
one of the two meanings is secondary in relation to
another requires that both are meanings of the same word.

Although, thus, the problem of primary and
secondary meanings does not logically arise out of the
Nānāśabdavādin's position, nevertheless he does raise
and discuss it as a sort of allied problem. He
recognises that the two meanings 'a cow' and 'a Bāhīka'
are usually considered to be meanings of the same word
'gauḥ', but explains it as being due to a confusion.
What happens, according to the ~~Nānāśabdavādins~~ *Nānāśabdavādin*, is that a
confusion and superimposition takes place on the word-
level.[213a]

The Akhaṇḍa school (the school which upholds the
doctrine of the indivisible sentence) and the problem of
primary and secondary meanings

The problem is also impossible from the point of
view of the Akhaṇḍa school, of whose teachers, Bhartṛhari
is an important one. We have noted that this school
of thought does not recognise complete and independent
words in a sentence, as is evident from their very

214

designation. And when they do not recognise word-entities in a sentence, all study of words, grammatical, semantic or otherwise in the context of a sentence is only a matter of relative importance to them. The question of a word conveying a certain meaning whether primary or secondary in the sentence is, on the speech-level, meaningless to them as their position is that a total sentence conveys a total meaning. The demarcation of the separate meanings of seperate words in this totality is wrong and misleading and, when it is adopted, is only of relative value and significance.

215

Let us take the sentence 'gaurbāhīka' (The Bāhīka is a cow) and explain this point with reference to that. According to the view that words are separate and separable in a sentence, the word 'gauh' has to be given a metaphorical meaning (upacaritārtha) because, otherwise, the sentence will be absurd, and will result in the co-relation and also common relation to the verb, of incompatible subjects. To explain the point, if the word 'gauh' means its ordinary meaning, namely 'a cow', then the sentence will mean 'a cow' is a Bāhīka' in the real sense – an obviously impossible statement. Therefore, the word 'gauh' is ascribed a metaphorical

meaning. 215a The exponents of the doctrine of the
indivisible sentence, on the other hand, consider that
the total sentence 'gaurbāhīka' conveys a total meaning,
namely, 'a Bāhīka specified (qualified) by the attributes
of the cow'. This concept rules out the word and the word-
meanings as real elements in a sentence. Hence in the
absence of any delimitable word or word-meaning in the
sentence, the question of a word being secondary or
primary by virtue of its relation with another word in
the sentence is impossible. How can a non-existent word
have any relation with another non-existent word? 216 But
this does not mean that the Akhanda school completely rules
out every possibility of a consideration of word-meanings
as primary and secondary. The Akhanda school accepts
and uses the concept; but it places it in its proper
limits. Since, according to this school, the word and
meaning of the word are of relative reality and are products
of an analysis of the sentence due to the necessities of
teaching and the like, classification of word-meanings
as primary and secondary also have only that degree of
reality. The concept of primary and secondary meaning
follows the derivation of the entities of word and word-
meanings by an analysis of the sentence. 217

Primary-Secondary classification of meaning viewed from
another angle.

If meaning is always conceptual, how can it
possibly be classified as primary and secondary?   If the mental
perception of the object precedes the use of a word to
denote it, then that being the same in every case of
the use of words there is no question of one meaning
being dependent on another.   When the word 'gauh'
conveys the meaning 'a Bāhīka', the mind of the speaker
fixes itself on the object to be denoted just in the
same way as it does when the word is used to denote
the object 'a cow'.   That being so where is the
justification in considering one of the meanings as
primary, and relegating the other to the status of the
secondary ?   In fact, it is not justifiable even when
two meanings entirely contrary to each other are conveyed.
Even then the word is functioning in a primary capacity
in either of the cases.218

Bhartrhari answers to this argument that, being
based on mental perceptions, it is faulty, because
perception is are no reliable guide in these matters.
Identity of perception does not necessarily argue the identity
of the perceived. A roll of rope and a coil of serpent
are perceived alike in twilight; mirage and water follow
the same pattern. A mountain and its picture on a canvas
might produce the same kind of perception. We can touch
a real circle of fire; but nobody can touch that illusory

circle of fire produced by a revolving ~~spark.~~ ^ember.^ Yet the
mental images of the two - the real and the illusory
circles are alike. The castles and fortresses, palaces
and mansions we see in a real city and in a magic city
are not really of the same degree of reality even though
they produce the same mental images. A dose of poison
bought from a chemist's can kill us; but a dose of
dream-poison has not killed anyone (unless due to sheer
fright from a nightmare), although our mind can perceive
both in the same way.[219]

On the normal level of experience the picture of
the mountain is not mistaken, nor is it treated as the
mountain. Nor are the poison in the dream, the illusory
fire-circle, or mansions, etc., in the magic city, taken
for real poison, real fire-circle or real mansions, etc.
If we start to argue that these pairs of perceived
objects must be the same because of the sameness of the
perceptions they can produce, we are obviously wrong.
In fact, where it is experienced that they are the same,
as in the case of the child's seeing a roll of rope as
a snake, we classify the experience as an error.

To connect the arguments given above to the problem
of ^The^ primary and ^the^ secondary meanings of words: There may be
a mental perception behind each of the use of the word
'gauḥ' to mean 'a cow' and 'a Bāhīka'. But that is not

sufficient to make the meanings conveyed as being of the
same grade in attributes like importance and popularity
which are at the base of their classification into
primary and secondary.   In fact, this is recognised by
verbal usage itself, as is shown by the well-known dictum
that 'language is for use about ordinary and rational
experience'.   Perceptual identity leads to mistaken
identification of the perceived in erroneous experience.
But in correct and rational experience, differences in
the degree of significance of meanings are perceived
although there may be mental perceptions of the same kind
produced.   And words are for use in rational experience. 220

Definitions of primary and secondary meanings

After discussing thus the possibility of a primary-
secondary classification of the meanings of words, Bhartṛhari presents
the various views defining them.   Some thinkers consider
that the basis of the distinction between primary and
secondary meaning is that the primary meaning is well-known
as the meaning of the word, while the secondary meaning
is not.   Thus, the meaning 'a cow' of the word 'gauḥ' is
primary and the meaning 'a Bāhīka' is secondary because
the former meaning of the word is well-known, while the
latter is not. 221 This view is held by the Ekas'abdavādins, as
can be gathered from the explanation given above, since
they consider that both are meanings of the same word.

A meaning conveyed through the aid of factors like context, another word, etc., is considered by some as secondary.[222] The primary meaning is the one conveyed by the word when uttered as an isolate. This meaning needs only the form of the word for its being conveyed (rupamātranibandhanaḥ). A word, which conveys a meaning as if by effort (yatnādiva) through the aid of contextual factors, is conveying a secondary meaning and the word itself is not well-known (aprasiddha) as having that meaning. The word is well-known (prasiddha) as having a certain meaning, if the word, as an isolate, and without any effort, so to speak, conveys that meaning. Such a meaning is the primary meaning of the word.[223]

Another factor on which the primary-secondaryness classification of meaning is based is the difference between their possession of the characteristic attributes of the thing meant by the word. If we take the word 'gauḥ' as an example, the meaning 'a cow' is its primary meaning while the meaning 'a Bāhīka' is a secondary meaning. This is because compared with a Bāhīka the cow possesses more of the attributes associated with the class cows. A Bāhīka is a cow only because he possesses some of the attributes of the cow such as dull-ness,

heaviness, etc. But he cannot, obviously, compete with
the cow in the possession of all the attributes associated
with the class cow. Bhartrhari rejects this view on
the ground that it is not a reliable basis. We find, he
says, that in some places a word is considered to convey
the better-known of its two (or many) meanings, because
that meaning covers the largest numbers of the qualities
associated with the class of which the word is the name.
In some other places, the meaning which encompasses the
fewest numbers of the class-qualities associated with
the word is considered to be the primary one. Classifying [224]
meanings as primary and secondary is not a democratic
matter,; and numbers are not the ruling gods in it.

Some thinkers hold that similarity between the
primary and secondary meanings is the reason why the same
word is used for both. Thus the word 'gauh' is used to [225]
mean 'a Bāhīka' since the Bāhīka possesses some of the
qualities of the cow, although he does not, of course,
possess the class-attribute of the cow, namely 'cowness'.
A word is primarily a class-word (jātiśabda) and when it [226]
is used to mean something which possesses the class-
attribute (jāti), it is used primarily, and its meaning
then is its primary meaning. For example, the use of the
word 'gauh' to mean 'a cow' is the primary use of the word
since the cow possesses 'cowness' (gotva) the class-

attribute. But when it is used to mean 'a Bāhīka'
it is a secondary usage, and it is secondary because
the object meant by the word possesses some of the
attributes of the cow, while it does not possess the
basic mark of the latter, namely, its class-attribute.

Confusion or error (viparyāsa) also can be the
basis of primary-secondary classification of meanings.
The first stage of this error consists in wrongly
identifying the object denoted by the word 'Bāhīka'
namely 'a Bāhīka' with the object denoted by the word
'gauh' namely 'a cow'. This error on the object-level
is then followed by a use of the word 'gauh' to mean
`a Bāhīka'.[227]

The classification of meaning into primary and
secondary is approached from yet another angle by some
thinkers.   They take the factors of form and power of
the word into consideration and base primary-secondary
distinction of meaning on them.   According to this
view, a word which is competent to convey a certain
meaning by virtue of its form and power ~~also~~ can also convey
another meaning with the aid of a different power.
This is possible since a word possesses several powers.[228]
A word, the function of which is for warfare by virtue
of its form and power, also sometimes is used for other

purposes like cutting a twig. Although its function
is of being used for fighting is fixed, its shape makes
its use for these other purposes possible.[229]

How then, it might be asked, are two meanings of
a word classified as primary and secondary, if both
meanings are expressions of the same form and *different* powers? *of the same word*
The distinction is one of the manner in which the meaning
is conveyed. If *a* meaning is spontaneously conveyed
when the word is uttered as an isolate, that is, purely
through its form and power, that meaning is its primary
meaning. But if *a* meaning has to be established by
reference to factors like context, that is the secondary
meaning of the word.[230]

A criticism of the above views.

In our discussion of the above views we have stated
Bhartṛhari's own criticism, acceptance or rejection of
some of them wherever and whenever such existed. But in
some places he seems to have been satisfied with just
stating the view, whether it is an opponent's or *a*
supporter's. Where, thus, we are lacking *in* Bhartṛhari's
own criticism of the view, we have his commentator
Puṇyarāja stepping in and supplying the need. We shall now

make a comprehensive criticism of these views as made
by Bhartṛhari ~~and~~ *or* Puṇyarāja.

Puṇyarāja summarises these views into seven
groups.[231] (1) Factors like context, verbal or non-
verbal.   (2) Factors like context aided by the currency
(prasiddhi) or otherwise of the word ~~with~~ *in* a meaning.
In this association, the factors like context will be
principal partners. (3) The same association with *the degree*
of prominence reversed. In this case, the currency or
otherwise of the word in relation to a meaning is
principal and the contextual factors subsidiary.
(4) Difference in the number of attributes possessed
by the object meant primarily and secondarily (5)
Similarity between objects. (6) Confusion or error.
(7). Form and power of the word.

Puṇyarāja criticises and rejects views nos.(3)
and (4) and accepts the rest.   The criticism, against
the view that factors like context can, unaided,
differentiate between primary and secondary meanings is
that in some cases it is found that they do not perform
that function.   In the case of the two words 'purā'
(in the past, or in the future) and 'ārād' (far, or near)
context and the like which are used in determining the
meanings of these words do not also establish them *as being*

primary~ness~ or secondary~ness~.   This is because both of
these meanings (in the past, in the future) that the word
'purā' possesses are equally primary;   similarly both
of the meanings (far, near) that the word 'arād' possesses
are equally primary.   Thus in the case of either word
as being the meaning of the word there,   as being its,
a context can establish this or that of the two meanings,
but it cannot establish that either of the meanings is
secondary.   We find thus that these factors like context
are not conclusivebases without exception for the
establishment of primary~ness~ or secondary~ness~ of meaning.   232

     The next theory to be criticised is the similarity-
theory.   It is also not a conclusive theory as it does
not work in such examples as the sentence 'Kās'yapapratikṛtih
Kas'yapaḥ' (Kās'yapa is Kās'yapa's image).   Although
there is unquestionable similarity between what the two
words 'Kas'yapa' in the sentence mean, it is wrong to say
that one of them conveys a secondary meaning, as, for
it does in
instance, the sentence 'Kās'yapa is a lion'.   The similarity
theory thus stands discredited.   233

     We thus come, through this process of elimination
to Puṇyarāja's acceptance of the remaining four views.
They are (1) factors like contexts, etc., working in
association with the currency or otherwise of the word with
a certain meaning.   In this association context, etc., will

be the principal element, or (2) currency or otherwise

functioning in association with context, etc., with

the former as the principal partner in the association or

(3) error or confusion or (4) form and power of the word.[234] We have

discussed these points above.

The Primary Meaning and the Incidental Meaning which
is inseparably associated with it (mukhyārtha
and nāntarīyakārtha).

Among the ideas which a word conveys in a context,

there may be some which are intended and therefore are

primary and some which are not intended, but are conveyed

because they are inseparably connected with the primary

idea.   If we light a lamp to reveal a wall, it cannot

but reveal the picture hanging from the wall. Yet we

have not lighted the lamp to see the picture. Our

purpose in doing so is to see the wall.[235] Again, if we

rub two pieces of wood together, it produces not only fire

but also smoke although our purpose is only to produce

fire.[236] In the same way, if a word like 'pākaḥ' is employed

so that it conveys the root-meaning, namely the completed

action of cooking, it does not stop there but conveys

also the ideas of singular gender and masculine number

due to the operation of the ending.[237] Where the meaning

of a word is a composite of various ideas and the word
is used to convey one of them, it conveys the others
also incidentally.   Like the drops of blood in
Shylock's pound of flesh, the incidental and in a sense
unwanted idea also must come on the scene along with
the main idea which is wanted. The word functions as
a unity of its various powers, and the result of its
function in any context is the expression of the many
ideas of which its total meaning is the composite.
Thus, we cannot conceive of a word functioning merely to
express the meaning of its root, and keeping the ideas
symbolised by the ending out of the picture. We can
safely say that the root-meaning is the main idea of the word
in such and such a context and the ideas of number,
gender and the like for which the ending stands are
incidental.

How are we to consider one of the several ideas
the word conveys in a context as its main meaning there ?
What is the criterion of that judgement ? The answer
given is that it is the intention of the speaker which
places one of the meanings apart as the main meaning.
The remaining ones are incidental, because they do not
constitute the purpose for which the word operates. The
fact that it is the same word which conveys the main and

incidental ideas cannot argue to give them the main status.   Irrelevance is not a crime; but it is also no argument for prominence.   The unvited guest may remain; but he should not ask for a place at the head table.

The Primary and Incidental Meanings -
Their mutual relationship.

We shall now discuss the mode in which the primary and incidental ideas in a word operate in a context and the relation between them in such context. This relation is not always the same.   Bhartrhari classifies the possible relationship between the primary and incidental meanings into four groups.[239] They may be stated as follows.   (1) In the case of some words it is impossible to classify the ideas they represent as primary and secondary (incidental). (2) Sometimes, even though the incidental ideas in a word are conveyed in a context, the understanding of these ideas is not necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the word, that is the intention of the speaker. This is because the word is used to convey a main idea. (3) In some contexts the idea which the word normally has is not the one required; the required idea is something for which the ordinary one is a pointer or a representative.

(4)   Sometimes the main idea acts as instrumental for⁶
an incidental idea to be conveyed.

As an illustration for number (1) we can take
the word 'divyati' (He or she plays dice). Now, this
word being a verb, the idea of the action is the principal
one in it and the idea of the subject is incidental
(or subsidiary).   But it is also possible to paraphrase
the word making the idea of the subject as the
principal one and the idea of action as subsidiary.
In any context of its use, the word is capable of being
paraphrased in both ways which makes it meaningless to
label any one of the two ideas as primary or subsidiary
in a permanent sense.²⁴⁰

(2)   We shall now illustrate the word for the use of which
(or incidental)
the subsidiary ideas do not form an operative cause
and have not any share in the purposing of the use of
the word. In such cases, the word's power to convey the
subsidiary ideas is there; and they are expressed too
due to their inseparable association with the main idea.
But the subsidiary ideas themselves have no relevance
in the area of the meaning of the word. The word is used
simply to convey a main idea. The word 'pākah'²⁴¹ which
we have discussed above is an example for this kind of
relationship between the main and subsidiary ideas in
a word.   We have shown there that the meaning of the

word is only the meaning of the root and the meanings
of the ending, namely, the ideas of gender and number
are
is not operative. The word 'Premier' can serve as
another illustration of the point under discussion.
The Prime Minister is at once a Minister of the crown
and the first Minister of the crown. And we can think
of the use of the word in certain contexts where the idea
of his being a Minister is not operative and the
operative idea is his headship of the council of
Ministers.   Such a context is provided when the word
is used for a gentleman who holds no Ministerial port-
folios, but confines himself entirely to his duties as
Head of the Council of Ministers. When used in this
way, the operative meaning, the meaning for which the
word is used (prayojakārtha) is his being the Prime
Minister, although the idea of his being a Minister is
also conveyed, the two ideas being inseparable
(nāntarīyaka).   This feature of the word will become
clearer if its use in a special context is examined.
For example, let us take the sentence 'The Premier
successfully supervises the work of his Cabinet'.
Obviously, the Premier's being at the head of the Cabinet
is the idea conveyed by the word in the context, although
his being a Minister or member of the Cabinet is also

conveyed, the two ideas clinging together. But the purpose for which the word is used is to convey the idea of his primacy among Ministers.

(3). In the third kind of relationship of primary and subsidiary meanings we are discussing, the normal meaning of the word is subsidiary because it is not the intended meaning in the context. The intended meaning is something else for which the normal meaning is a pointer. Bhartṛhari gives an example from Pāṇini's Sūtras, ~~where~~ 242 in which the term half-a-short-vowel (ardhahrasvam) is used, to mean half-a-mātra, which makes the expression applicable to long and prolonged vowels as well. The word 'hrasva' in the expression ~~'short vowel'~~ 'ardhahrasvam' is used figuratively for the idea of a mātra which makes the expression applicable to all three kinds of vowels. It might also be noted here that the expression 'ardhahrasvam' in the Sūtra has been explained in three more different ways, all these four explanations converging towards the same point of establishing that its meaning is not what it normally has, but that it has a figurative sense. To summarise this paragraph, sometimes, a word is used in such a way as to make its normal meaning a secondary and irrelevant one and give it a different meaning.

(4). In the fourth kind of relationship of the primary and

subsidiary meanings, the former, besides being conveyed, also implies the latter. We might take as an example the statement 'gantavyam drs'yatām sūrya' (we must go, look at the sun).[243] In this, the words 'drs'yatām sūrya' (Look at the sun) conveys the idea that only a small fraction of the day is left', through its principal meaning, namely the suggestion to look at the sun. The principal meaning hints at the subsidiary meaning. The words we hear make us look at the sun, which action caused by their principal meaning, then leads us to the subsidiary idea.

Puṇyarāja summarises this idea in the phrase 'the word conveying by implication another meaning without giving up its own primary meaning'.[244] This primary meaning, it need not be re-stated here, is the non-metaphorical meaning of the word, for instance the meaning 'cow' of the word 'gauḥ'.

Another example also might be given here. Let us take the sentence (kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpiḥ' (Protect the clarified butter from the crows).[245] In this sentence the word 'kākebhyaḥ' (from the crow) obviously means the particular birds and the obvious meaning of the sentence is ' protect the clarified butter from the particular birds' - but this obvious meaning leads by implication to the meaning 'Protect the clarified butter from any creature

which tries to steal it'.

Sometimes the ideas implied in the primary meaning of ~~the~~ words will be part of the primary meaning itself. For instance, if an instruction is given 'bhojanam asya upapādyatām (Offer him food) the primary meaning of the sentence is obvious; and included in the primary meaning of offering food are such subsidiary ideas of giving the man a seat, as well as water to wash his hands and such other ideas associated with the act of offering food. There is nothing in the words 'Offer food' which can be taken as directly mentioning these ideas. These ideas are implied in the main idea of 'offering food' which is the primary meaning of the words. 246

Factors which help in the determination of meaning.

A word or words can, thus, convey in a context a primary, secondary or incidental meaning; This makes it necessary to consider the factors and conditions which help to determine one or the other of the three kinds of meanings of a word as being the meaning intended by the speaker. It is not, of course, suggested that every word is capable of conveying a primary, secondary or incidental meaning; Our study is about such words as are capable of conveying different meanings in their appropriate contexts.

The essential point to be remembered here is that the meaning or a list of meanings which lexicographies associate with a word does not always exhaust the potentialities of the word in actual use. There is that living and powerful factor namely, the speaker whose intention is a creative force which can convert a word into a vehicle of a large variety of ideas not always listed by the lexicographer. Even among those meanings of a word recorded in dictionaries, ~~their~~ classifications are possible, as we have seen, into such groups as primary and secondary. The possibilities or capacities of words in the field of usage being such, it becomes necessary to determine what they mean when they are used. Determination of the meaning of a word consists in determining the intention of the speaker; and the intention of the speaker is determined from contextual factors.

What are the contextual factors ? Two different lists of such factors are presented in the Vākyapadīya. The two lists have a few factors in common. We shall first state and then discuss one by one the factors ~~listed~~ given in the two lists. The first list gives the following six factors which can constitute the context in which meaning is determined. They are :- (1) Syntactical connection.

(2) ~~The~~ Situation-context (3) Meaning of another word.

(4) Appropriateness. (5) Place. (6) Time. The second
list gives the following as factors:- 248 (1) Association.
(2) Dissociation. (3) Companionship. (4) Hostility.
(5) Meaning of an adjoining word. (6) Situation-context.
(7) Evidence from another sentence. (8) ~~The~~ Proximity of
another word. In giving the lists above, it is realised
that the factors as listed are not self-explanatory.
They are there intended only to be pointers to their
detailed discussion which follows. We shall now discuss
the factors given in the two lists.

L I S T 1.

(1) <u>Syntactical Connection.</u> Sometimes the syntactical
connection of words in a sentence helps to determine a
word in it as being a noun, a verb, etc., and establish its
relation with the rest of the sentence. Let us take for
example a sentence from Sanskrit 'kataṃ karoti bhīṣaṇam
udarāṃ d'arśanīyaṃ' (He makes a cremation ground,
fierce, grand and beautiful). We decide which is the
object of the verb in the sentence and which the words are
which qualify the object by testing with the syntactical rules that
govern sentences. Thus we decide that the word 'kataṃ'
(cremation) is the object of the verb 'karoti' (He makes)
ground

and that, among the triad of possible qualifying words,
namely 'bhīṣmaṃ' (fierce), 'udāraṃ' (grand) and
'dars'anīyaṃ' (beautiful) only the first is qualified to
~~be~~ ^{function as} a qualifier. How do we decide these two points ?

The word 'kaṭaṃ' (cremation-ground) is the name of
a concrete object and it is the only name of a concrete
object in the utterance we are examining. That being so
and since it is also in the accusative case it should be
the object of the verb 'karoti' (makes), with which it is
in ^a syntactical connection. None of the other three
words, namely, 'bhīṣmaṃ' (fierce) 'udāraṃ' (grand) and
'dars'anīyaṃ' (beautiful) can be the object of the verb,
since they are names of qualities and therefore can only
be qualifying words. Now these words being qualifying
words and in the accusative, any one, two or all of them
^{can} ~~should~~ qualify the noun which is the name of an object,
since they are also in the same case as the noun, and
are in the same sentence ~~with~~ ^{as} itis. At this stage a factor
of semantic appropriateness, namely, that a cremation-
ground can neither be grand nor beautiful decides the
elimination of the two words 'udāraṃ' and 'dars'aniyaṃ'
as ^{being} proper to qualify the word 'kaṭaṃ'.   We are left with
the word 'bhīṣmaṃ' to qualify the word, and from the group
of words we examine, we delimit the sentence as 'kaṭaṃ

249

bhīṣmam karoti' (He makes a fierce cremation-ground).

(2) Situation - Context (prakaraṇam).   What is situation-
context ? This term is a rendering of the Sanskrit term
'prakaraṇam' which Puṇyarāja amplifies as 'aś'abdam prakar -
aṇam' (non-verbal context).   By it is meant the particular
situation in which an utterance is made, the knowledge
of the situation helping the determination of the
meanings of the words used if there is ambiguity about them.

        To take an example, if a statement 'saindhavam
ānaya' is made, it is difficult to decide the meaning of
the statement without knowing the situation in which it
is made.   Whether response to that statement is to bring
some salt or a horse depends on that knowledge, for the
word 'saindhavam' can mean either.   If the statement is
made, while the speaker is taking a meal, then obviously
it is salt which is meant.   If, on the other hand, it
is made in the context of making the preparations for a
journey, then bringing a horse will be the appropriate
response. 250

        It is not, however, improbable that a man having a
meal asks for his horse to be brought from the stables, in
readiness for a journey to follow the meal. Even then it
becomes obvious that the word 'saindhavam' is used to mean

a horse because the impending journey provides a context
for it.   So far as the use of the word is concerned,
the speaker's taking a meal does not operate as a context.
But in a situation where eating forms the undisputed
context, the word 'saindhavam' when uttered will mean salt
to the exclusion of the idea of horse.   Similarly it is
not improbable that a person about to make a journey takes
a packet of salt with him and asks for it.   But where
he does mean salt, the context will help the word convey
the correct meaning.   For instance, if he is packing,
'saindhavam' can mean salt.   But ruling out such
possibilities, the context of a journey is more
appropriate for the idea of 'a horse' being conveyed
by the word 'saindhavam'.   A knowledge of the situation-
context is thus essential to determine the meaning of a
word.

(3) The meaning of another word.   As different from
                           can have
situation-context, we ~~have~~ a verbal context helping to
determine the meaning of a word.   Thus the meanings of
                                                   a
other words in the sentence can function as a factor in
                                          below
the determination of meaning.   We have three sentences in
which the same word is used and the meaning of this word
in each of the sentences is different from what it means
in the others.   The different meaning of the word

in each sentence is determined through the meaning of
the other word or, words in each sentence. The following
are the sentences : (1) añjalinā juhoti (He makes an
offering with his hands). (2) añjalinā sūryam upasevate
(He worships the sun with his hands) (3)añjalinā
pūrṇapātram āharati (He carries the filled pot with
his hands).   Now in each of these sentences the word
'añjali' is used. And we have, roughly, as an approximation
common to all the three meanings, translated the word
here as 'hands'.   But the word means a different thing
in each of the sentence.   In the first sentence it means
the hollow of the hands, as oblations are made with the
hollow of the hand; in the second sentence it means the
hands folded in prayer, as that idea suits the following
words in the sentence; in the third sentence, it means
the hands held together in order to hold a pot.²⁵¹

(4) Appropriateness.

(4)   The next contextual factor examined is
appropriateness. Let us take an example in order to
explain what kind of appropriateness is meant. Suppose
some one utters the word 'sīrēṇa' (with a plough). How do we
get the meaning of his utterance ; the idea which he
wants to convey through the one word?. We saw above that
such one-word-utterances are really sentences. What is ²⁵²

the intention of the speaker, or the meaning of his
utterance (s'abdārtha) in the context. In deciding
this, the appropriateness of the plough for the action
of ploughing acts as an instrumental factor. When we
hear the word uttered, we complete the utterance with the
word 'vikkhati' (He turrows). We use that verb,
because the object mentioned is
appropriate for this action. This appropriateness of
the object for a particular action creates a context
for the word. The context being created like this,
we get at the intention of the speaker. It might be
asked how the factor of appropriateness is different
from the factor of the proximity of another word
discussed in the previous paragraph. There is, in fact,
little difference. Puṇyarāja gives two more
illustrations to explain this kind of a context. 253

(5). Location. Suppose someone says ' I come from a
city north east of Madhurā', how can the listener know
which city the speaker means, or what the meaning of the
word 'city' is in the context? The reference of the word
city in the context is to a particular place which
satisfies the definition. In other words, the meaning
of the word 'city' in the sentence given above is a
'specific city'. Therefore trying to find out the meaning

of the word in the context, is trying to find out which city is meant there. In the examination of that point 'location' plays a deciding factor.

(6) **Time.** Time sometimes helps to determine meaning. Thus the word 'dvāram' (the door) if uttered in summer will have a significance different from what it has if uttered in winter. If uttered in summer, the listener will mentally associate the word with the word 'udghāṭaya' (open); but if it is uttered in winter, it will be associated with the word 'pidhehi' (close). Time functions, thus, as the factor which helps in the determination of the one-word utterance 'dvāram' (which it might be ~~repeated incidentally~~ stated incidentally, is a one-word-sentence).[254]

L I S T 2. [255]

After presenting thus his own list of factors which determine meaning, Bhartṛhari gives an alternative list compiled by others. The following are the factors which this list presents. (1) Association. (2) Dissociation. (3).Companionship. (4) Hostility. (5) Meaning. (6) Situation-Context. (7) Evidence from another sentence. (8) Proximity of another word. We shall discuss these ~~topics~~ one by one.

(1) <u>Association.</u> As an example let us take the sentence 'savatsāṃ dhenum ānaya' (Bring the animal with the calf). The problem is which animal the word 'dhenu' means, as in Sanskrit the word can mean the female of any animal species. Now the limitation of the meaning of the word to a cow is done by the presence of the word 'vatsā' (calf) in the sentence. Since the word 'vatsā' means a calf, and since the logical association of a calf is with the cow, the listener of the sentence concludes that the word 'dhenu' in the sentence is used to mean 'a cow'. The factor which decides this, according to this view, is the association of the calf with the cow. But it might be asked here whether we should import a factual association to explain a linguistic context. Cannot we use a linguistic factor to explain this linguistic context ? The fact that there is the word 'savatsā' in the sentence is sufficient to interpret the word 'dhenu' as meaning 'a cow'. But even then, it is the fact that a calf is associated with a cow and not a mare, which makes it possible for us to interpret the word 'dhenu' in the sentence because of the presence of the word 'vatsā' (calf). It is, thus, clear that factual association does help in the interpretation of the word.

It has also to be stated here, that, according to the view that the word 'dhenu' is a rūdhi-word, that is, a word which conveys a conventionally fixed meaning, it does not need to be interpreted at all to convey the meaning 'a cow'. The word does mean a cow, by convention. Although the word 'dhenu' can mean the female of any species, convention of use has narrowed down the semantic province of the word.[256]

(2) <u>Dissociation.</u> A factual association can also function negatively in the form of a factual dissociation as a basis of interpretation. Take the sentence 'avatsā dhenurānīyatām' (Bring the animal without the calf). The injunction *instruction* is to bring a certain animal in dissociation from a calf; and logical compatibility insists that the animal must be a cow. We do not usually say 'Bring the mare without the cow-calf' or 'Bring the she-elephant without the cow-calf'.[257]

(3) Companionship.

We now pass on to the third factor in the list, companionship.   Puṇyarāja gives, as an example, the expression 'Rāmalakṣmaṇau' (Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa). In deciding which of the three Rāmas—Paraśurāma, Balarāma or Dāśarathirāma-—is intended in the expression, the fact that Rāma the son

of Daśaratha always keeps company with his brother Lakṣmaṇa functions as the basis. The Rāma mentioned together ~~with~~ with Lakṣmaṇa must be the Rāma of whose constant companion Lakṣmaṇa is.[258]

(4). <u>Hostility.</u>   For example in deciding the meaning of the word 'Rāma' in the compound 'Rāmārjunau' (Rāma and Arjuna) we are guided by the fact that in the Purāṇas Paraś'urāma is depicted as being hostile to Arjuna, the son of Kṛtavīrya.   Any mention~~ing~~ together of a Rāma and Arjuna would also be, therefore, ~~be~~ a reference to the hostility which existed between these personalities.   It becomes clear ~~that~~, thus, that the Rāma mentioned along with Arjuna is Paraś'urāma eternally hostile to Arjuna.[259]

(5). <u>The meaning of another word.</u>   This point was discussed and illustrated in the previous list.[260]

(6)   <u>Situation-Context.</u>   Also discussed above.[261]

(7)   <u>The evidence of another sentence (Liṅga).</u>   We might take the injunction 'aktāḥ s'arkarā upadadhāti' (place anointed candy).   The sentence does not say with what substance the candy is to be anointed, which means that the meaning of the word 'aktāḥ' and through it that of the injunction is not definite.   We decide with what

substance the candy is to be anointed from the evidence of another sentence 'Tejo vai ghrtam (Ghee is ~~sssw~~ splendour) From this, a praise of ghee, the conclusion is ~~made~~ arrived at that the candy is to be anointed with ghee.[262]

(8).   The proximity of another word.   For example, the meaning of the word 'Arjuna' in 'Arjunah Kārtavīryah' (Arjuna the son of Krtavīrya) is decided from the presence of the word 'Kārtavīrya' near it. That makes the word mean a particular 'Arjuna' rather than others, like the Arjuna among the Pāndavas. Similarly, in the example 'Rāmo Jāmadagnyah' (Rāma, the son of Jamadagni), on the basis of the presence of the word 'Jāmadagnya', the word 'Rāma' ~~in the context~~ is taken to mean 'Rāma' the son of Jamadagni, rather than Rāma the son of Daśaratha or Rāma, the brother of Krsna.

Before concluding our discussion of the place of factors like ~~topic~~ situation-context in the determination of the meaning of a word, we might consider the angle from which the two schools of thought, the Ekas'abdavādins and the Nānās'abdavādins approach the necessity and function of these factors. We have seen that the ~~____~~ latter holds the view that it is wrong to consider that one and the same word conveys more than one meaning. According to them it the word 'gauh' ~~when it~~ which conveys the meaning 'a cow' is

different from the word 'gauḥ' which conveys the meaning
'a Bāhīka'. The function of factors like situation-
context is to show which of the two words is used in a
context and this function is essential as two different
words with different meanings happen to have the same
form. On the other hand, to the former school which holds that
the word 'gauḥ' is the same whatever meaning it conveys,
these factors function to show which of the meanings of
the word operates in a certain context. We stated above
that this school of thought holds that the word 'gauḥ'
conveys the meaning 'a cow' by virtue of one of its powers
while it conveys the meaning 'a Bāhīka' by virtue of
another power.²⁶³

Abother point to be discussed here is a different
view held by some thinkers regarding the function of
factors like situation-context. They hold that the
function of these factors is not to show what meaning a
word conveys in a context, but rather to show that the word
possesses the capacity (sāmarthya) to convey such and such
a meaning. Knowing this capacity possessed by the word,
we know what the meaning of the word is in a context.
Thus, the factor which functions to show what the meaning
of the word is in a context is the capacity (sāmarthya)
of the word - a capacity inherent in the word itself.

According to this view, thus, sāmarthya is a sort of
super-factor in the determination of meaning.[264]

The problem of the proper name.

Arising out of the problem whether a sentence functions
as a divisible unit in conveying its meaning, is the
problem whether the word allows itself to be divided in
conveying its meaning.   It was stated elsewhere that
a word conveys its meaning as a unit, although elements
like the root and the suffix are discernible in it.   But any
analytical consideration of the functioning of the word,
as such and such a part of the word-meaning is the
meaning of the root and such and such a part is the
meaning of the suffix, is only of interest when we explain
the word.   When the word functions, it does so as a
unit to convey a unitary meaning.[265]   In the case of proper
names, the idea is specially applicable.   A proper name
like 'Devadatta' which is apparently made of two parts
'deva' and 'datta' does not function in terms of these
parts.   The meaning of the word is not a sum of the
meanings of the parts 'deva' (god) and 'datta' (given)
(i.e. given by the god), but it is a total meaning,
namely, a particular person.[266]

Here, another point has to be considered.   We
sometimes see that for a proper name like 'Devadatta'

267

an abbreviated form like 'Deva' or 'Datta' is used. If parts have nothing to do with the meaning of the word, how is this possible ?   The Grammarian's answer is that these bits 'deva' and 'datta' are not parts of the word 'Devadatta';   this is because the word is functionally and structurally a single unit.   267a   In this respect the bit 'deva' is not different from the letters 'de', 'va', 'da' or 'tta' of the word `Devadatta.'   But there is one difference between the bit 'deva' and the bit 'de' (for instance) in regard to the total word.   The bit 'deva' appears as a meaningful part of the word, while nobody considers 'de' as a meaningful part.   268   Convention has also fixed that 'deva' and 'datta' thus appearing to be meaningful parts of the proper name 'Devadatta', are, themselves proper names which can individually convey the meaning of the total word 'Devadatta'.   The same convention has also fixed that out of more than one meaning that the word 'datta' or the word 'deva' has, the meaning it will convey as an abbreviation is its personal meaning.   To explain the point, the word 'deva' can mean 'a god' in general or a particular person when it is a proper name. The word having these two meanings, convention has fixed it that it will mean the personal Devadatta when it occurs as an abbreviation for 'Devadatta'.   If someone uses the

word 'deva' in the place of the name 'Devadatta', the
former will mean the person 'Devadatta' and not 'a god'.
Similarly the word 'datta' by itself can be a participle
meaning 'given' or the person 'Devadatta', if used as
substitute for the word 'Devadatta'. When it is so used,
it will mean the person, to the exclusion of its other
meaning.[269]

The Grammarian also criticises rival views on Of rival schools
this topic.   His principal criticism is against the
position they take that the bits 'deva' and 'datta' form
real parts of the word 'Devadatta'. To those who hold
this view a word is not an indivisible unit.
Philosophically, there is nothing impossible in saying
that the word has meaningful parts. Therefore, they hold
that when the bit 'deva' conveys the meaning of the
whole word 'Devadatta', it is a part of the word conveying
the meaning of the whole.[270]

The Grammarian's main criticism is against the
tenability of the position that a word can have real and
meaningful parts.   With this as the central point of his
criticism, he attacks the opposite view. It is
impossible that a word can have meaningful parts; and it
it is equally impossible that the parts can convey the
meaning of the whole. What is the process in which the
part 'deva' of the word 'Devadatta' conveys the meaning

of the whole ?   Can it be said that the part when

uttered brings the whole into view and the whole then

conveys its own meaning ?   What this means is that the

meaning of one proper noun is conveyed from the utterance

of another. and That is impossible.[271] For there is no

proof that the word 'Deva' when uttered necessarily

forms a part of the word 'Devadatta'.   There is nothing

to prevent the word 'Deva' being considered as a

separate proper name.

Looked at from other angles also it is impossible

to prove that a part of a word can convey the meaning

of the whole. In what way are the parts of a word

related to the meaning of the whole ?   If the parts

of a word can convey the meaning of the whole they must

in some way be related to that the meaning.   There must be

a relation of the expressed and the expressing

(vācyavācakasambandhah) between a meaning and the word which

conveys it. How can we say that such a relation exists

between parts of a proper noun, and its meaning ?   If

such a relation exists, which is its explanation? source We

cannot say that the parts of a word are related to its

meaning simultaneously as the whole word itself is ?

That is, it cannot be maintained that the parts 'deva'

and 'datta' of the word 'Devadatta' are linked to the

meaning of the word 'Devadatta' as expressing it just
as the total word is.[272] If it were so, we would have to
concede that the letter 'de' of the word 'Devadatta'
can convey the meaning of the whole word, for the letter
is also a part of the word, just as the letter group 'deva'
is.   Thus, any letter of the word should be able to
convey the meaning of the whole word.[273]

If we examine the problem from the stand-point
that the parts can convey the meaning of the whole
while in separation from it, then also it can be proved
to be untenable.   If parts of a word can convey the
meaning of the whole, then they should cease to be able
to discharge that function when they cease to be parts
of the word.   Thus when the bit 'deva' or 'datta' are
uttered neither of them can convey the meaning of the
word 'Devadatta' because, when they are uttered they
do not form parts of the word.   They are uttered as
single units. The capacity of these bits to convey the
meaning of the whole being associated with their status
as parts, they cease to have that when they are uttered
as single words.[274]

Can a different line of approach show that parts
can convey the meaning of the whole ?   Thus can we say
that parts of a word, when uttered, produce the recollection

of the whole which is different from it ?   And How
can a word caused to be recollected by the utterance
of another word convey a meaning ? It is a word which
is received by the sense of hearing which conveys a
meaning. [275]

The doctrine of the permanence of word-meaning relation when applied to a proper name.   We have stated in an
earlier page that a word is nitya. That is, it is
imperishable and time-less and so is its being linked up
with its meaning. This link between the word and its
meaning is also inviolable. [276] Do these statements apply
to proper names also, considering that the application
of a name to a person is manifestly an act willed and
begun in time by some human agency and can be terminated
at any time? Bhartṛhari holds the view that proper
names are no exceptions in this matter. Just as the
word 'gauḥ' is timelessly and permanently linked to its
meaning, so are the proper names like 'Devadatta' and 'Ḍittha'
linked to their meanings. [277] When a name is given to a
person, it is only a human application of a timeless
and permanent principle. [278] Thus, Bhartṛhari argues that
when the word 'Ḍittha' means any particular person, it is
only a restriction of the power of the word to convey a

certain meaning. The word itself is permanently linked
~~up with~~ this meaning; and does not necessarily require
any condition to be fulfilled to remain so linked ~~up~~.
That is, even if a condition such as the word being
used to refer to a particular person does not exist, the
word and its meaning remain connected.

Let us explain the process of the use of a proper name,
taking the word 'Dittha' as an example. The word
'Dittha' can be the name of any person on earth;
Similarly any man can have any name. When a person gives
his son the name 'Dittha', what he does is to restrict
the wide possibilities of the naming word 'Dittha' to the
named person, viz. the son. It is not that a relation
of the expressed and the expressing, previously non-
existent is newly created between the name 'Dittha' and
the person-named. It is that the scope of the name to
convey any meaning is restricted to the particular
person; and the scope of the possibilities of the person
to be given any name is restricted to the name 'Dittha',
by a human agency.
~~by a human agency.~~ The use of naming words, in grammar   or technical terms
offer a parallel to this point. Take the word 'vṛddhi.'
This naming word means the group of letters 'ā', 'ai and 'au'
(grouped together under the collective name 'ādaic).
Grammatical convention has narrowed down the range of the

application of the word to this one meaning, in grammar.

Bhartṛhari also raises and answers an objection to his theory that there is a permanent word-meaning relation in the case of the proper names also. The objection argues that it is impossible to prove the point, from whatever angle one might look at it. A word cannot be a proper name before it is used to refer to a person. If it is a naming word before that, what is it the name of ? This means the word's being linked up with a meaning is man-made and has a beginning (and can have an end also).

Let us, on the other hand, take the word as a proper name only after it is used to refer to a person. This position also presents difficulties. It creates difficulties with regard to the stipulation in a Pāṇinian Sūtra. of Pāṇini. Thus the Sūtra 'Pūrvapadāt saṃjñāyām aṇaḥ' 280 states that in the case of certain proper names like 'Kharaṇasa' the letter 'n' is changed into 'ṇ' under certain conditions, one such condition being that the word should be a proper name. The resulting word, in the example quoted above is 'Kharaṇasa', and this is the final form which is in use in language. The question here is whether the word is a proper name before the ṇ -change takes place - that is, in the form 'Kharaṇasa'. It cannot

be so if we assume that a word becomes a proper name
only after it conveys a meaning. In other words, the
two words 'Kharanasa' and 'Kharaṇasa' are different, the
former not being a proper name. This means that the
Sūtra stipulates the change of a letter `n` ≠ of one
word so that it becomes a totally different word . The
implication of this statement is that the structural
entity of the word is not inviolable; the word
'Kharanasa' could be changed into the word 'Kharaṇasa'.
Further, the position also means that the word 'Kharaṇasa'
is produced and that there is a beginning to its being linked
up with its meaning; for the word 'Kharaṇasa' becomes a
proper name as a result of the change of the letter `n`
of the word 'Kharanasa' into `ṇ`. All these conclusions
are against the concept of the (nityatva) of the word and
~~are are~~ results of the original assumption that a
proper name becomes one only after it is used in
reference to a person.

The Grammarian answers to these objections by stating
that these wrong conclusions arise directly out of the
opponents' assumption that a proper name is a proper name
only if it conveys a particular person as its meaning. To
the Grammarian, such a theory is wrong, and hence to him, the
logical difficulties arising out of it do not exist. Both

the words 'Kharanasa' and 'Kharanasa' are proper names,
because they refer to the same thing as its meaning.
Grammatical convention groups such words together as
proper names. [281]

The Use of Saṃjñas (technical terms) in the Sanskrit
Grammatical Texts.

The Vākyapadīya also discusses in this connection
the use of proper names and technical terms in the
grammatical texts. The term, 'saṃjñā' is applied mostly
to denote technical terms in the works of Pānini and
other grammarians although ~~in these~~ *in them,* there are places
where the term is used to refer to ordinary proper names.
The use of the term 'saṃjñā' in such a context as the
Chapter-heading 'saṃjñā prakaraṇam' is to mean '~~the~~
technical terms'. Such terms, for instance, as *kartā*
(subject), *karma* (object) are examples of saṃjñās

~~The~~ Technical terms are used in Grammar broadly
in four ways. They are: (1) the use of a technical
term in a non-technical sense   (2) The use of a technical
term in a technical sense   (3) the use of a *technical* term both in
the technical and non-technical sense in the same
discussion   (4) the use of a technical term in a non-
technical sense, but definitely intended to include the

technical sense also.   Let us take some examples.

In the Sūtra 'kartari karmavyatihāre' the word karma

is used not in the technical sense which it has in the

grammatical system, but in the ~~ordinary~~ sense of the

word in ordinary usage.   This latter meaning is 'action'.

But there are other Sūtras where this word 'karma' is

usedin its technical sense; viz, 'object'.   For the

word being used in its grammatical sense as in the

subject-predicate-object group, the Sūtra 'karmany an'

provides an example.   To take two other examples, the

term 'karanam' is used in a non-technical sense in the

Sūtra 's'abdavair......karaṇe' and in its technical sense

in the Sūtra 'kartṛkaraṇayostṛtīyā'.   ~~Now to illustrate~~

Now to illustrate

the use in the same context of a word, both in its

technical and non-technical sense: Pāṇini uses the word

'saṃkhyā' (number) in both senses in his discussion on

numbers.   Thus in the Sūtra 'bahugaṇavaduḍati saṃkhyā'

he defines the term saṃkhyā (number) in its technical

sense.   The Sūtra means that words like 'bahu' and 'gaṇa'

will be known as saṃkhyās (numbers), and these ~~and~~ are mentioned

in the sūtra as

~~here~~ saṃkhyās (numbers) in the grammatical sense.   In

other words when the Sūtra lays down that the word 'bahu'

is a saṃkhyā, it does not mean that it is a saṃkhya in that

it will have a numerical value when it is used in the

context.   It only means that the word 'bahu' will be

technically known as a saṃkhyā, thus bringing it under
the operation of the rules which particularly refer to
saṃkhyās.   In the scope of this _same_ Sutra are also included
saṃkhyās (numbers) in the ordinary sense, like _eka (one)_ ~~navalatata~~
(~~navalatata~~) which are referred to by implication in a later
Sutra, namely 'saṃkhyāyā atis'adantāyāḥ'.[288]

        We will now illustrate the fourth kind of the use
of technical terms.   In this group, we have the use of
words in their non-technical sense.   The scope of the non-
technical meaning of the word includes the possibility
of its interpretation as a technical term.   The Sutra
'ekas'ruti durātsambuddhau'[289] provides _us with_ an illustration.
The word 'sambuddhi' (calling) means 'calling' in its non-
technical sense;   and in its technical sense it is the
name for vocative singular.   As used in the Sutra quoted
above, it means 'calling' - its non-technical sense.   But
the technical sense of the word has also relevance in
the Sutra since 'sambuddhi' in that sense is also a word
of 'calling'.

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P A R T   I I

The Vākyapadīya.   Cantos I & II.

A Translation.

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA, CANTO I.

1. That beginningless and endless One, th**is** imperishable Brahman of which the essential nature is the Word, which manifests itself into objects and from which is the production of the Universe, 290

2.- which though described in the Vedas as one is divided on the basis of its powers, and although is not different from its powers appears to be different,

3.- whose indestructible powers functioning through the powers of Time become the six transformations, birth and the rest - the sources of all (these) manifold objects, 291

4.- to which, single One, the cause of all, belongs this manifold existence, under the forms of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the enjoyment,

5.- of that (Brahman) the Veda is both the means of
realisation and the reflection and it has been
handed down by the great Seers as if it consisted
of many paths, although it is (really) One.[242]

6. In the branches of the Veda are set out various
paths, all at the service of one action (namely
ritual) and ~~these~~ *here (again)* words are found to have a fixed
capacity.

7. Codes of various kinds with objects tangible and
intangible have been formulated on the basis of it
(ie, the Veda) from its evidence by sages who are
erudite in its meaning.

8. There are various controversies between the Monists
and the Dualists arising from their own options
regarding its explanatory sentences.

9. That true and pure knowledge alone proclaimed by
that one word (namely Om) is stated there (in the Veda)
under the form of the word Om - aknowledge which is
not contradictory to any school of thought.

10. Different disciplines which are sources of knowledge
and culture are developed as based on the divisions
and the sub-divisions of the Veda which (under the
form of the Om) is the creator of the Universe.

11. The wise say that grammar, nearest to that
    Brahman and the foremost spiritual training is
    the most important (of such) subsidiary texts
    of the Veda.[293]

12. It is a direct path towards that holiest of lights,
    that supreme essence of the kind of speech which
    has assumed distinctions of form.[294]

13. Words are the sole guide to the truths about the
    behaviour of objects;[295] and there is no understanding
    of the truth about words without grammar.

14. A gateway to liberation, a cure to the blemishes
    of speech, purifier of all (other) disciplines,
    it shines as being applied to them.[296]

15. Just as all thing-classes depend upon word-classes
    similarly, in this world, this (grammar) is the
    haven of all disciplines.[297]

16. It is the first rung on the ladder towards
    liberation; it is the straight Royal Road for
    those desirous of (reaching) that goal.

17. The soul which has passed beyond errors in it (ie, in
    grammar) and is capable of studying the Veda
    observes that (Brahman) which is the source of

the Vedas and the very soul of which is

constituted by the Veda (ie, in the form of the Oṃ).

18.   That pure light which is the form of the supreme

essence of Speech free of (any kind of) form,

which shines like fire in darkness,

19.   — which is worshipped by those who have transcended

the (manifested) speech which showing form and

action, and who have passed beyond (the duality of)

light and darkness,

20.   — in which the symbols of speech, pointers as it

were to the 'one-letter scripture' (Oṃ) shine

forth like reflections in association with that

(ie, Oṃ) which is antecedent to all (manifested)

speech,

21.—   and in which the various sorts of the letter-sounds

of the Atharvan, the Sāman, the Ṛk and the Yajus

exist with distinct identities.

22.—   and which, though one, is divided on the basis of the

various explanations (of it); — that Supreme Brahma

is attained by having recourse to grammar.

23.   Words, meanings, and their relations are

described as time-less by the sages, who are the authors of the Sūtras, the Vārttikas and the Bhāṣyas.

24.)
25.)   In this science are described, for the sake of the
26.)   code rules, word-meanings which are analytically
(ie, etymologically) derived or fixed as such (by conventions, etc), words which are indicative or descriptive, and (word-meaning) relations which are either of the nature of cause and effect or of (inseparable) identity.   These which form accessories to conduct and understanding are described through their own names, or through
                features
characteristic factors and as covering the valid and the invalid ones; some of these are also used (in non-scriptural contexts) according to rules.

27.   Even if it is found that there is no difference (between two forms) in the matter of expressing the meaning, only those which are derived from the scripture (ie, grammar) are valid as instruments for right conduct for the wise; opposite ones are invalid.

28.   Like living beings, words also have no (traceable) beginning whether they are eternal or created.

This rule (about words) is called their eternality.

29.   No one dare make this rule meaningless. Therefore,
the eternal code of rules about validity has been
composed.

30.   (Scripture is essential, not reasoning alone):-
Right conduct is not established by reasoning
dissociated from scripture. Even the knowledge
which the sages possess has the scriptures for
its source.

31.   No one can refute by reasoning or by argument of
empirical obviousness those unbroken and
traditional paths of right conduct.

32.   Rarely are the natures of substances known from
inference, since their properties vary with
variations in (their) state, place or time.

33.   The power which a substance decidedly possesses
for a particular activity is obstructed when it comes
into association with another specific object.

34.   Even a conclusion inferred after great consideration
by clever logicians is decided to be otherwise by
others more qualified.

35. Such a knowledge as discriminates between diamonds and coins, etc., - a knowledge which cannot be described to others - arises in those who possess it, only from practice; it is not inferential.

36. The supernatural powers which demons, departed-souls and ogres possess, which transcend the perceptual and the inferential, are indeed the results of their actions (in previous births).

37. The knowledge of the past and the future, which is possessed by the sages, enlightened, and undisturbed in mind, does not differ (in certainty) from direct perception.

38. The words of those who perceive the super-sensual and non-cognisable objects with the eye of a sage are not refuted by inferential reasoning.

39. When a man does not doubt the perceptual knowledge (of a reliable person) as if it were his own, how can another one make him, who (thus) stands on the side of perception, turn back ?

40. The scriptural truth is of equal use to all humanity down to the Chandālas in their judgements 'this is virtue' and 'this is sin'.

41. He, who has got the Vedic knowledge which shines
    unbroken like consciousness, is not influenced by
    the inferential arguments (of the logicians).

42. A (blind) man on an uneven path obtaining his
    knowledge (of the path) only from feeling from his
    hand, if he then relies on inference (from this
    knowledge) and runs forward, will speedily fall. 299

43. Therefore, basing themselves on the scriptures
    of impersonal origin and the tradition of the
    precept-books with their binding precepts, the
    investigation of words is undertaken by the wise. 300

44. Grammarians consider that there are two 'word-
    entities' (ie, two elements) in functional words;
    one (ie, the sphoṭa) is the cause of the
    (production) of the speech-sounds, and the other
    (the speech-sound) is used in connection with meanings. 301

45. Some, among the teachers of old considered that there
    was a difference in essence between these two.
    Others (on the other hand) speak of the same undivided
    entity being thought various, through a difference
    in conceiving it.

46. Just as the light which is in the fire-stick acts
    as the cause for further lights, similarly the Word

which is in the mind is the cause of speech-
sounds.

47. The word is examined in the mind, is then fixed
to a specific meaning and then perceived (by
the hearer) through the instrumentality of the
speech-sounds. *produced through (their) causes.* [302]

48. The Word is neither a 'previous' nor 'a
subsequent', because it is the speech-sounds
which are produced in sequence. But the non-
sequential is revealed as sequential as if it
were divided.

49. Just as a reflection formed elsewhere (ie, in
water) appears, due to the activities of the water,
to partake of the movements of the water, similar
is the relationship between the Word and the
speech-sound.

50. Just as in (perceptual) knowledge, there can be
seen both itself (ie, the act of perceiving)
and the object of knowledge (the thing perceived),
so in the word there appears the meaning-element
and the formal-element.

51. The inner principle called 'speech' which exists

egg-like, evolving into speech-activity, assumes sequence through its parts.

52. Just as a shape which is (a copy) of another shape, when it has become the object of a unified perception (having been first received by the senses as a complex-pattern of parts), is then painted on the canvas, so like-wise three stages are seen in the comprehension of speech. 303 ~~~~

53. Just as the mind of the speaker first dwells on the words (and not their parts when he wants to convey their meaning) similarly the activity of the hearers first arises out of the words (in their attempt to understand ~~it~~ their sense).

54. When certain meanings are conveyed, the words (which convey them), having (thus) become accessories to (such) meanings, and having their purpose (thus) fulfilled, they are not perceived ~~~~~~ (as accessories to action), because they are (uttered) for the sake of another (namely, meaning).

55. Just as light has two powers, namely the power of being perceived and the power of causing the perception of objects, similarly all words have these two distinct powers.

56. Meaning is not understood from words which
(them selves) have not become objects (of the sense
of hearing). Without being (thus) received, they
do not express meaning by their mere existence.

57. Therefore when the form of the (uttered) word is
not clear, the question 'what did you say' is asked
(of the speaker). But the nature of the sense-
faculty^{ies} is not similarly grasped when an object
has to be revealed by them. 304

58. The two aspects of speech, analysed and comprehended
separately, act without mutual opposition as causes
of different effects.

59. Just as the word 'vṛddhi' besides expressing its
own form is also related to the sounds named by it,
namely, those symbolised by 'ādaic' (ie, 'ā, 'ai and 'au)

60.- so this word 'agni' ('fire') besides being related
to the word 'agni' (meaning fire) is also related to that referred
to by the word 'agni', namely the form 'agni'.

61. A word which is uttered (in everyday use) is never
linked with grammatical operations. (But) its capacity
to convey that other thing (namely, its own form as
its meaning) is not obstructed.

62. The word which is pronounced (in ordinary speech)
being secondary, since it is for the sake of the
other (namely, the thing-meant) is not linked with
grammatical operations; and hence we adopt the
convention that the grammatical operations are
attached to words which symbolise themselves.

63. Whatever common attributes there exist in the
object with which anything is compared and the
thing
~~object~~ which is compared, some attributes different
from them also exist in the object to which the
comparison is made. [305]

64. Whatever quality which is the cause of the
excellence (of an object) is (itself) mentioned
in the form of an object, its (own) excellence is
caused by the qualities residing in it. [306]

65. When a word (like 'agni' in the Sūtra 'agner −
dhak'), which has its own form as its meaning is
pronounced (for conveying its form), then (from
that word) is discriminated another word (namely,
has
the word 'agni' which ~~means~~ 'fire' as its meaning).

66. Before being connected to the thing it means
    a name is capable of genitive and nominative
    constructions, because it has its own form as
    its meaning.

67. The nominative is prescribed to a name because
    it is meaningful with its form (as its meaning),
    and it is from the same meaning that the genitive
    construction in the form of it arises.

68. Some consider that the Sūtra 'svaṃ rūpaṃ' means
    that the particular is the name (ie, the particular
    instance of the word 'agni' when the grammarian
    propounds the rule 'agner dhk'), and that it is
    the universal attached to the particular (which
    is 'the named', ie, the word 'agni') which
    undergoes the grammatical operations.

69. Others think that what is meant by the Sūtra is a
    particular instance of the named, (and that it is
    the class which is the name). (And the grammatical
    operations are performed on the particular since)
    in any given instance one finds only a particular,
    the understanding of which is brought about by the
    universal.[307]

70. Both among those who uphold the ~~eternality~~ *eternity* theory
of words, and those who hold that words are created,
there are some who uphold its sameness (in all
instance of its occurence). Again among the upholders
of the doctrine of ~~eternality~~ *eternity* and of the doctrine
~~of the created-ness of words~~ *that words are created*, there are those who
uphold the plurality of words (ie, that every
occurence of apparently the same word, is really
the occurence of a different word).

71. (The doctrine of an opponent school is stated
regarding the comparitive reality of letters, words
and sentences):-
Even when the word is a different one, the identity
of the letters is not impaired; and in different
sentences the same word is observed.

72. Therefore the word does not exist as more than its
letters; nor is there a sentence existing as more
than the letters and the words.

73. (The Siddhānta is given):-
Just as there are no parts in the ~~varnas~~ *letters* (similarly)
there are no ~~varnas~~ *letters* in the word. Nor is there any
reality in the discrimination of the ~~sentence~~ *word* from
out of the sentence.

74. People follow customary usage (and talk of 'words' and 'letters') though basing their theories on different views and on this (question) what is considered as primary by one school is taken in an opposite way by us.

75. People talk of differences of diction (as belonging to the utterance) of the Word, which itself is of undivided time, but (appears to) follow the time-pattern of the speech-sounds (uttered), in accordance with the differences in the causes of its being perceived.

76. With regard to the short, long and prolated vowels, since a speech-unit (here, a vowel) is (essentially) timeless, and (therefore) fundamentally different (from the speech-sound which reveals it), it is the time of the primary speech-sound which is metaphorically considered as belonging to the speech-unit.

77. The cause of the being perceived of the letter is defined as the primary speech-sound while the modified speech-sound is the cause of the differences in dictions.

78. It is however after the word has been revealed (by
the primary sound) that the modified sounds are
presented to the mind as distinctions of diction (and
hence, a fortiori) the self of the ~~whole~~ Word is not
divided into parts by them. 308

79. There are three views among those who hold the theory
that words are manifested. 309 (1) the sounds act upon
the sense-faculty; or (2) they act upon the word
or (3) they act upon both.

80. ((1) would be analogous to the theory of sight _
perception which held that) only the sense-faculty
(of sight) is acted upon, namely, by attention and
application of ointment; 310 (2) (would be analogous to
a theory of smell-perception which held that) only
the thing (for instance, the earth) is acted upon
in order that its smell might be received.

81. (According to (3)) where however, the eye effects
the reception of a cognition, it is clear that both
the object and the sense-faculty are acted upon by
the light; and speech-sounds operate in the same
form.

82. (Certain theorists maintain that) the reception of the
sound takes place without any separation of it from

the form of the sphoṭa; others hold that the
sound
~~dhvani~~ is not perceptible. According to yet

others it is an independent manifesting agent.

83.   Just as a chapter or a single verse is apprehended
as a unit by means of saying over its component
parts in order , but of course the book is not
defined at each component parts ,

84   — so likewise the form of a word is apprehended (as
a unity) when the word is revealed by the sound
through the agency of causal factors which are
appropriate to the cognition (of the word), but
which are not themselves (as such) apprehended .
(ie the hearer is not aware of the separate sense-
data).

85.   Simultaneously with the last sound, the word is
~~not~~ apprehended by the mind in which the seed has
been sown by the (physical) sounds, and in which
ripening (of the speech) has been brought about
by the telling over (of the sounds).

86.   As for the non-existent words, which (a hearer)
considers ~~to~~ as exist ing in the interval (before the
complete word has been pronounced) , this is
merely incapacity on the part of the hearer; it is,

in fact, only a means to the apprehension (of the complete word).

87.   There is the semblance of distinctions in cognition; (similarly) the attributing of distinctions on words is always seen. The word appears to be produced in stages and cognition seems to be dependent on the cognised.

88.   Just as earlier numbers (in a series) should be apprehended for the apprehension og subsequent ones, although the latter are different from the former, so is the apprehension of parts in a unit of speech (an aid to the apprehension of the whole).

89.   When letters function as revealers (both) in words and sentences independently of their functions in each other, their functions are confused (as being the same), although they are entirely different. [311]

90.   Just as on looking from a distance or in the dark, one at first misunderstands an object, and (later on) understands it otherwise (ie, in its true nature),

91.-   similarly during the manifestation of the sentence

by its causes (namely the smaller units like letters and words), the mind first functions as comprehending the component units (as real ~~units~~ units)

92.   Just as there is a (fixed) sequence (in the stages) of the transformation of ~~the milk~~ milk (into curds) and the seed (into the tree), similarly there is a fixed sequence in the series of the hearer's perceptions (of the intervening words, phrases, etc).

93.   And even if they (ie, sentences, words, etc) are made up of real parts (granting the Mīmāmsaka's position), the difference in form (between two speech units, for instance, two words, 'nadī' and 'dīna') is due to the (difference in the) sequence of their sounds. And where words, etc., are considered as not made up of (real) parts (by the Akhandavādins), the fancying of parts is a means (to the realisation of the total unit). [312]

94.   It is considered by some that the Word is a universal suggested by a number of individuals (namely, speech-sounds); these individual speech-sounds (according to them) constitute the sound-pattern of the Word. [313]

95. Just as light (reveals objects),the speech-sounds
     produced by (their) causes become the cause of the
     immutable Word.

96. (If the Word is revealed like this, does it not mean
     that it is not eternal? The answer is in the
     negative):-
     Being revealed is not established as invariably
     pertaining to non-eternals, ^things. Universals which are
     eternal are also considered to be revealed by those
     (ie, the particulars) in which they inhere.

97. In life (only) concrete objects are found to have
     relation to place and the like (for instance,time).
     And even ~~according to~~ accepting the alternative (that difference
     in place, etc, applies also to those that are not
     concrete objects), there is no (such) difference
     between the speech-sound and the Word (it reveals).   314

98. Just as there exists an invariable competence of the
     revealed and the revealer between a perceiving sense-
     organ and the thing it perceives, so does it exist
     between the Word and the speech-sounds.

99. And it is seen (in ~~the~~ our experience) in this world that,
     in the case of (various) smells and the like which
     are perceived by the same sense-organ, there is a

separate causal factor for each substance.

100.   (The point that the attributes of the speech-sounds
revealing the Word are transferred to the Word
is again stated):-

The object revealed partakes of the attributes
of that through which it is revealed. This is
obvious in the different kinds of reflections
(of an object) ~~made~~ produced in oil, water and the like.

101.   And surely, concrete objects of the type of
mountains cannot have existence (in their
reflections) in stones, a mirror-surface and
the like of incompatible size.

102.   Therefore the time of the speech-sounds and of
(their secondary variations in the form of) diction
~~are~~ is assigned to the syllable, word, and sentence
which are (themselves) without time-distinctions.

103.   (The definitions of the sphota and dhvani by
another school are given):-
The sphota is that which is produced by the union
and disunion of the speech-organs (like the vocal
chords). And dhvanis are sounds born of this sphota.

104. (The nature of the primary and modified speech-
sounds is again stated from the Siddhānta point
of view):-

Whether the speech-sound is short or long, the
measure of the Word does not change. The
subsequent sound (ie, the modified speech-sound)
which arises out of these primary speech-sounds
is expanded or contracted in its form.

105. (The view-point of another school is stated):-
Like light from a lamp, merely the sound
(undifferentiated as primary and modified) is heard
from a distance.   But in the sound of a bell and
the like the distinction is clearly noticed.

106. (The discussion of the doctrine held by the Grammar
school is taken up again):-
The long and prolated sounds which are different
(from the short sound) are produced by the striking
of the organs of speech.   And the sounds which
modify diction arise after the cessation of the
movements (of the organs). 315

107. (The view of another school):-
Even before the vibrations of the speech-organs

(which produce the word) have subsided, other sounds are formed from the word itself, as one flame from another.

108. (Now regarding to what constitutes the substance of speech):-

It is held by some (ie, by three schools respectively), that air, the atoms, or consciousness become speech. There is an endless number of variant views in this matter.

109. (These views are expounded):-

The air which is stirred by the speaker's effort following his desire to speak strikes the speech centres and produces speech.

110. Even powerful objects are broken by air, which possesses the attributes of speech and piling together, blowing with the capacity to cause (such breaking).

111. (Regarding the atom-theory):-

The atoms, which unite and separate, transform themselves into shadows, light, and darkness and also into speech on account of their possessing all (possible) capacities (ie, the capacity to produce be transformed into all things).

112. When their capacity is being revealed
these atoms which are called speech, prompted by
the effort (of the speaker) collect together like
clouds (in the sky).

113. (Finally, regarding the consciousness-theory):-
Again, the inner consciousness which exists in the
form of speech in its quintessential character
~~again~~ turns ^back^ into (audible) speech for the purpose
revealing its nature.

114. It (ie, ~~the~~ consciousness) taking the form of the
mind and ripening in the fire (of the stomach)
enters the life-breath, and it is then uttered.

115. The breath which has become the substratum of the
mental principle is suffused with the mind's
attributes and manifested (after it passes) through
the fire (of the stomach).

116. Dividing itself into its inherent knots (namely
the letters like 'ka'), the breath reveals the letters
through the distinct speech-sounds and merges into
those letters themselves.[316]

117. (Yet another view about sound, both of speech and of ~~their~~ other kinds, is given) :-
Sound though it is ever-existing is not experienced

317

because it is too subtle. It is realised through
the appropriate causal factors just as air is through
fanning.

118. (The view of yet another school):-

The powers of speech resident in the breath and in
the mind undergoing transformation (into speech)
at the centres of speech-production assumes the
distinctions (of revealed speech).

119. The power which is based on words controls this
Universe. With words as the eye (with which it is
seen) and insight as its soul, this Universe is
experienced as manifold.

120. Because distinctions between two things, for instance,
318
between a ṣadja and another note becomes clear when
explained in words, therefore all manner of things
are determined as being only (understood through) words

121. Those who are versed in the Vedas know that this
Universe is the transformation of speech. It was
out of the Vedas that this Universe was first
evolved.

*knowledge of the proper action (in a context)
122. In life the proper of thing things entirely depends
on speech. Even a boy has this this the knowledge

proper action

or the ~~manner of doing things~~)), having in him the
accumulated experience of the past. [319]

123. That first movement of the organs (of speech),
the upward sending of the breath and its contact
with the centres – these would not be possible
but for the production of speech (within the
child).

124. In life no comprehension is possible except
as accompanied by speech. All knowledge shines as
permeated ~~with~~ *by* speech.

125. If it is denied that the permanent stuff of
knowledge is speech, then that light (namely
knowledge) will not shine (in the form of a
recollection). It is speech (ie, words) which
makes recollection possible.

126. It is speech which binds all branches of knowledge,
of arts and crafts. Everything when it is produced
is classified through it.

127. This speech exists within and without all living
beings – Consciousness can exist in ~~people~~ *all creatures* only after
it is preceded by speech.

128. It is speech which prompts all mankind to activity.

when it is gone man, dumb, looks like a log of wood or a piece of stone.

129. It is when the distinctions (such as subject versus object) obtain, (ie, in the state of life, temporal) that the agent functions, in connection with an object. But when such distinctions do not obtain (ie, in the state of emancipation) speech itself remains in the form of an object. 320

130 Whether things are (identified with) words, or are different (from them), they become established as they are introduced by words. It is words which establish things. 321

131. Even when the cause of verbal expression (ie, a thing), is entirely non-existent, description of the form of such a thing through words is found, as in the case of a circle made by a fire-brand. 322

132. Further, speech which exists within the speaker as his soul is said to be the great Bull, identity with which is desired. 323

133. Therefore, attainment of faultless speech is the attainment of Brahman. He who knows the secret of its functioning enjoys the immortal Brahman.

134. No collection of precepts is of impersonal origin. When all such collections of precepts perish, the three Vedas alone exist as the seed (of such collections).

135. (Even when different schools (of Āgamas) perish and there are no new authors, mankind does not transgress the duties prescribed by the scriptures and the books of precepts.

136. If knowledge is instinctive, then scripture is of no use; but if virtue is the root of knowledge then the source of knowledge is the Vedas.

137. (Regarding reasoning as a source of knowledge):- Reasoning which is not contradictory to the Vedas and the scriptures (s'āstra) is an eye to those who do not possess the vision (into the significance of the Vedas) - The sense of a Vedic sentence is not obtained from its form alone,

138- for which reason, various kinds of the means of interpreting sentences have been classified by logic, such as, for instance : the intended meaning of a sentence (is such and such), a statement is for a purpose different (from what is obvious) or, a meaning becomes clear from the evidence of another sentence. 324

139. Human reasoning is the power of words. That reasoning is in accordance with the Word (i.e. the scriptures) which is not based on anything other than the the scriptures.

140. Just as different colours, etc., are found to possess (different and) fixed capacities, so are words (such as the words of a hymn) found (to possess capacity) in destroying poison, etc.

141. Just as these words have power to do that, so are they understood (as possessing capacity) in regard to virtuous conduct. Therefore correct words should be used by those desirous of elevation.

142. Men learn about matters which have transcendental effects from the Vedas. Contrary results can also be always stated from the scriptures.

143. This science of grammar has the knowledge of correctness as its subject. And it is directly based on the unbroken (series of) recollections of learned men.

144. It is the highest point of Speech , threefold as Vaikharī, madhyamā and pas'yantī and having various passages (through which it is realised).

145. It is seen as being constituted by two different
features , namely, the treatment (of words, etc) in analytical
terms or as integral units. The capacities of
words are noticed by those wise in the attributes
of objects.

146. The scripture is described as beginningless,
authorless and endless. And the codes that have
been composed by the wise do not perish.

147. (Another view about the scripture and the codes is given):-
In the scripture are the utterances, which are like
dream-words, of those (ie, the sages) who have
evolved from the imperishable (Brahman). And the
codes have been composed (by their authors) after
knowing the truth about material objects through
the(appropriate) evidence.

148. Whatever impurity there exists, of the body, the
word and the mind, their purification is effected
through the sciences of physical treatment, grammar
and spiritual welfare respectively.

149. That ungrammatical form (for instance, 'goṇī')
which is employed to denote a particular object
when (a correct form for instance) 'gauh' is required
to be used, is considered as a corrupt form. 325

150. Words like 'asva' and 'goṇī' are correct forms
when used to denote other objects (ie, objects
other than a horse and a cow respectively). They
are determined as correct forms when their use is
occasioned by other things.

151. These (~~incorrect~~ *incorrect* forms) which through inference
cause the comprehension of the meaning of the
correct forms, apparently identify themselves
(with the correct forms) and convey their meaning.

152. Because these incorrect forms are followed neither
by the learned nor by grammar as valid synonyms
(of the correct forms), they are not capable of
expressing the meaning directly.

153. When a boy who is being instructed, indistinctly
utters 'aṃbā', 'aṃbā', those who know the correct
form understand it through the indistinct one.

154. Similarly by an incorrect form which is used where
a correct one ought to be, the meaning covered by
the correct form is conveyed.

155. And where there are in current *use,* forms which have
become current among corrupt speakers from generation
to generation, in such cases, the correct form is

not the one which conveys the meaning.

156.   This divine Speech (Sanskrit) has been intermixed with incorrect forms by incompetent speakers. Those who hold the view that the word is non-eternal,(for instance the Naiyāyikas), hold a contrary view on this.

157.   And even according to the view that there is no difference between correct and incorrect forms, upholders of the doctrine of the non-eternal word) (as held by the anityavādins), a word used with the intention of using some other word, does not convey the meaning of the latter.

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA, CANTO II

1   )
2   )   Theorists hold different views as to what a
sentence is. Thus a sentence is defined as
(1) the verb (2) a close combination of words
(3) the universal which resides in a close
combination of ~~words~~ ^{Sounds} (4) an utterance which
is one and devoid of parts (5) a sequence
(of words) (6) the reduction of consciousness
(7) the first word (8) all the component words
severally and possessing expectancy for one
another.

3.   The definition of the sentence given in
grammar (by the author of the Vārttika) to
establish the dropping of accent, etc., as 326
an entity whose parts possess mutual expectancy,
is not parallel (to that given by the Mīmāṃsakas)
in all respects.

4.   (The Mīmāṃsakas' definition of the sentence is):-
A sentence is one which has its parts possessing

mutual expectancy when considered separately, but not possessing ~~any~~ expectancy ~~and not~~ *for* ~~possessing expectancy from~~ anything else (outside) when in combinations, which has the verb as its principal element, and has qualifying words and one unified meaning.

5. (Certain possible objections to the Vārttikākāra's definition of the sentence are answered in ~~5~~6):-
    The word in the vocative (in a sentence) qualifies the verb; this being so, in the sentence 'vrajāni Devadatta' (*Let me go, Devadatta*), the vocative loses its accent[327].

6. Just as several infinitives can qualify a finite verb, similarly a finite verb is considered to qualify another finite verb (which, in such a case, is taken as a principal verb).

7. (The Akhaṇḍavādin's position that the sentence is an indivisible whole is stated and illustrated (7 - 12)):-
    Just as an unified perception of a composite (picture) can be analysed (into the perception

of the component parts), depending upon which parts is required to be perceived, so likewise is the understanding of the meaning of the sentence.

8.   Just as a single homogeneous picture is described through various features as being blue (green, etc) as a result of its being perceived in different ways,

9.   —similarly the sentence which is single and does not possess expectancy is described in terms of words which possess expectancy.

10.   Just as roots and suffixes are analysed from a word similarly words are analysed from sentences.

11.   Parts of some letters (like conjunct consonants) appear as separate letters (though, of course, it is well-known that it is artificial to look at them in that way); so do parts of the word appear as separate words (while in truth, they are not).

12.   The words 'Vṛṣabha', 'udaka' and 'yāvaka' are

united with parts which do not possess any
meaning.   (It should also be noted that) the
enunciation of the rule of invariable
association and (absence) of dissociation
(between the word on the one hand and the root
and suffix on the other) is only for pragmatic
purposes.[328]

13.   (Just as sentences, words, etc., are indivisible
so are their meanings):-
The Word has no parts; how then can its
meaning have any parts ? The ignorant person
gets a different idea of its formation by
splitting it into parts.

14.   (This is illustrated):-
Just as the idea of 'Brāhmaṇa' does not exist
in the meaning of the word 'Brāhmaṇakambalaṃ',
similarly words like 'Devadatta' have no
(independent) meaning in a sentence.[329]

15.   (The Mīmāṃsaka's definition of the sentence is
criticised) :-
The word which possesses a general meaning
disappears when uttered in a context, and
therefore is not associated with a particular
meaning (which the context demands). Why should

the word which exists (namely with a general meaning) be abandoned and how does a word thus abandoned continue to exist ?.

16. If the meaning of a sentence is not derived from the words in it then the meaning of the word (itself) cannot be (considered as) derived from the word. This being so, is not the word's relation with its meaning broken ?

17. (A view slightly variant is stated):-
According to the view of certain thinkers words which (at first sight) may seem like universals are revealed to the listeners as being particulars because of their connection with the other words in the sentence.

18a. According to their view, the total meaning of the sentence exists in each of the individual words.

18b. (But) listeners get the meaning of the sentence through the clear utterance of (all) the words in it.

19. (The sentence and its meaning are discussed from the point of view of the Akhanda-school):-

This speech is described as indistinct,
sequential or as uttered in a low voice.
The non-sequential appears as being stretched out
(i.e. having sequence) when the mind dwells on it.

20.   Just as (in an action of whirling round and
round) the character of the action is not
understood at each of the repeated revolutions,
but the class of the action is revealed through
the repetition of revolutions,

21.   — In the same way, in letters, words, and sentences
the speech-sounds, being produced at the same
centres as the Word-principle, appear to resemble
it, although they are fundamentally different
from it.

22.   How in reality can there be a preceding and
subsequent part in timeless entities ? This
appearance (of sequence) is a result of the
powers inherent in the integral entity itself.

23.   Just as the cognitions 'a long time' and 'a short
time' do not differ in time (because they are
cognitions and not time-measures), yet appear as
if they have different durations of time, similar

is the nature of the long and short (sound$) .

24a. (Further, can one say that an indivisible entity
becomes multiple on the basis of the media of
its revelation, because that means a change in
the character of its indivisibility. Yes):-
Does not time which is indivisible appear to
be divided into periods by intervals taken by
other things (like an atom)?

24b. (But such measur$_{ing}$ of time on the basis of the
behaviour of other things is not sound-~~because~~):-
What sequence can there be in the absence of
recurring periods ?

25a. (Further) the cognition$ arising from these
(i.e. periods measured on the basis of the
behaviour of other things) ~~are~~ ^{is} one without parts. $329a$

25b) (But can not this cognition be considered as
26 a) partaking $_{of}$ sequence, etc):-
This cognition (although it is sequence-less
in character) being describable in a sequence
appears through its (own) power, as causing
recollection of sequence, as if it (the cognition)
were different (in character).

26b. (This is wrong):-

Whatever be the seeds (of the behaviour of atoms, etc) laid in the mind, a description of it either as identified with the mind or as different from it, is impossible.

27.   The sentence which is (really) indivisible becomes capable of division when it is (analytically) conceived and due to this the meaning which is in fact indivisible, is presented to the mind as if it consisted of parts.

28.   If these words (which are distinguished by analysis) exist as real entities in a sentence and similarly exist in words, then letters themselves should be capable of division, just as atoms are (considered by some schools of thought to be divisible)

29.   Without the juxtaposition of parts there would be neither letter nor word (a consequence following the adoption of the position of the pada-school).   And when neither letter nor word can be established how can anything else (i.e. meaning) be conveyed ?

30. (The definition of the sentence as a reduction
     of consciousness is stated):-
     Others say that speech is that indivisible inner
     word-principle revealed through speech-sounds;
     and thus too it possesses unity in the sentence. 330

31a. According to them meaning is an inner principle
     which is revealed by means of pieces of meaning.

31b. Speech and meaning being the two halves of one
     fact, are not distinct and separable.

32. The power of being the revealer and the
     revealed, the cause and the effect, eternally
     belongs to the word-principle which is
     essentially internal.

33. It (the time-less speech-principle) has in fact
     the two powers of having or not having
     (attributes like sequence), the appearance of
     sequence in the non-sequential being merely
     dependent on pragmatic considerations.

34. (The following arguments numbered (1) (2) and (3)
     are given against the Pada-school):—
     Since (their) evidence for the existence of word-
     meaning (as a real unit in the meaning of the
     sentence) is its cognition, this will result in

the meaninglessness of the preceding words

in a collection of word-meanings,

since the mind leaves (cognising them as it

passes on to the meaning of subsequent words).[331]

35a.   The word 'rāja' conveys the meaning 'king'

in different forms.[332]

35b.   And the same word 'rāja' in a complex grammatical formation

being similar to a verbal form is

(nevertheless) employed in a different sense

(from the verb).[333]

36.   Just as, when the word 'as'vakarṇa' is uttered

a certain definite meaning which has no

reference to 'as'va' (a horse) is conveyed

(to the listener), the same is the case in all

verbal cognitions.[334]

37.   (If the meanings of all compounds are realised

as single units, does this not make the

distinction between rūḍhi and yaugika

(etymologically explained) words superflous? No

In reckoning (the degree) of similarity (between

a complex word-formation and the sentence

analysing it) certain words because of their

transfer to another meaning in the sentence, are

335

understood to be rūḍhi - but only in grammar.

38a. (Grammarians) propound means (for the understanding of language) which, once grasped, can be thrown overboard. 336

38b.⎫
39a.⎬   And there is nothing necessarily absolute in the methods (of grammatical analysis). The objective (or meaning) is realised by a person in any way.

39b. (Summing up:):— Therefore (all meanings of) parts (of a sentence like a word) are derived from the sentence, whether (such parts remain) as isolates or in combination.

40. When the unity between a sentence and its meaning is grasped by the mind - a unity expressible in the form 'this is that' - then, in some places, a single letter of the sentence is sufficient to convey the meaning of the sentence.

41.⎫
42.⎬   (Now to state the Abhihitānvaya definition of the sentence as close combination of words):—
42. Words, say some, when used in a sentence convey the same meanings as they convey as isolates. And

the additional meaning which arises when they
are in mutual relation - they call the meaning
of the sentence, a meaning which is
dependent on several words.[337]

43.   (According to some) the meaning of the sentence
although it resides in several words reveals
itself through the individual words (in turn),
just as a class (reveals itself in particulars)
Others hold that it is accomplished in the totality
just as numbers are.

44.   Others consider that it (ie, the meaning of
the sentence) is a unified whole in which all
the parts are mutually compatible and that it
partakes of the character of the meanings of
the parts (ie, of the words) because of the
association of the meaning of one part with
that of another.[338]

45.   As regards the uncertainty (as to the meaning
of the sentence) while it is still requiring
(other) parts for its completion, that is
removed when the meaning is localised in the
individual parts (thus revealing its nature
of being a connected whole).

47.   The connection (of the parts) is inferrable from
       its effects. It has no form.   Therefore it is
       known as being non-existent in the ultimate
       analysis.[339]

48.   The means being present, the objective is fixed;
       and a verbal action has a fixed means of
       accomplishment. Thus, the meaning of the
       sentence being something fixed shows itself
       by the mere juxtaposition (of verb and object).

49.   (But the nature of the expectancy between words
       varies):-
       The noun functions in this respect as possessing
       expectancy for the verb in the form of a
       subsidiary and the verb possesses expectancy
       for its subsidiary (ie, the noun) as a thing to
       be performed.

50.   (The sentence is a sequence of words):—
       Those functional features which already exist
       in the meanings of the words (ie the features of
       being the subject, object, etc) are conveyed
       (to the ~~reader~~ listener) by the sequence of words and it
       is not the sentence which conveys them.

51a.   As long as there is some sequence of words there

is no need for any other speech-entity to convey the meaning.

51b.   Sequence is an attribute of time and therefore there is no sentence (as understood by the Sphoṭavādins since the latter deny that the sentence has time).

52.   The functional features which are inherent in the meanings of words, but which are not manifest are revealed when the words are in each other's proximity.   But the same is not the case with the sequence of letters.

53a.   'Word' and 'Sentence' are respectively the names given to the sequences which reside in letters and words.

(But)

53b.   the status of a speech-entity (conveying a complete-meaning) is not given to them (ie, the letter and the word).

54.   Even if they did have equal status as speech-elements, understanding is seen to proceed from the word; and there is no such understanding at each separate letter.   Hence they say that meaning belongs to the word.

55. (The three different definitions of the sentence just discussed are re-stated) in the following three stanzas.) First the saṃghāta-view is re-stated):-

Just as letters, with their parts, are devoid of meaning (by themselves), but are meaningful when combined, so also is it with the sentence.

56. (The sequence-view is re-stated):-

Words which, by themselves, do not possess any meaning or alternatively (according to a different doctrine view) are meaningful through the possession of word-meanings, convey the meaning of the sentence when they are uttered in a sequence; and the meaning of the sentence thus conveyed is different in nature from the meaning's of the words.

57. (The vākya-sphoṭa view is summarised):-

Whether we consider that the individual speech-unit (here a sentence) is imperishable or that there is a generic entity (which is imperishable common) to for a group of particulars, it is the unitary sentence which has a meaningfulness of an invariable character.

58a.   Those who consider the sentence as an indivisible
unit consider (the recognition of) words (in it)
aspragmatic and as subsequent to indivisibility
(in the order of reality).

58b.   And those who take a word as a real entity
consider the indivisible sentences as subsequent
to words.

59a.   The definition of a connected discourse (given in the
Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya) is explained in different ways.

59b.   (They are):-
A connected discourse is the source of words
or it is built up from words.

60.   If the Pada-text being other (than the Samhitā)
is the indicator of the Samhita and is itself
not created, how is the Pada-text to be
constructed according to rule ?

61.   Just as one does not get the cognition of the
meaning of the word at each one of its letters,
similarly the form of the meaning of the sentence
is not realised at each of the words (taken
individually).

62. (The Pada-school replies that letters are not
     meaningless):-

     Just as the meaning of the sentence resides in
     words occuring side by side, similarly the meaning
     of the word exists in letters occuring side by side.

63. Just as a small object is perceived when it is in
     the company of another one, similarly a letter too,
     when it is united with another letter, conveys a
     meaning.

64a } (Further it is against experience to say that a
64b } letter has no meaning):-

     Just as a certain meaning is understood (by the
     listener) from the utterance of a word, similarly
     the same sense is understood (by the listener) from
     the presence of the letters. 340

65. (Again, five difficulties arise if the Pada-position
     that the meaning of a sentence is understood through
     the meanings of the component words is not accepted.
     The first of which is discussed in (65-73)):-
     Since the scriptural-hearing of that which is
     (already) implicitly legitimate is for the purpose
     of restriction, if by this particular the general
     is completely ruled out, 340a

67. — and if a substance (in general) legitimate as
     being indicated by the implicit power of the verb
     'yajeta' were to be ruled out by the word 'vrīhi',
     then no substitution would be impossible. [341]

68.   Therefore the word 'vrīhi', while prescribing
     rice in addition (to the general 'sacrificial'
     substance' implied by the verb), being (simply)
     for the purpose of providing (the general concept
     with a particular meaning), does not prohibit
     substance (in general), since the two things are
     not mutually exclusive.

69.   And when (the concept of) substance (in general)
     which accompanies (the verbal concept) is
     particularised by it (ie, by the word 'vrīhi'),
     there is then no appearance of these other
     particulars, because of the impossibility (of
     two objects occupying the same logical space).

70.   The verb (like yajati = to sacrifice) does not imply
     every particular substance (with which the sacrifice
     can be performed), as it does the idea of substance
     in general. A word, of course, does not denote (at
     one and the same time) every existent (which can be
     named by it).

71. Just as the qualities 'white' etc, though ^they are existents, are not (immediately) intended (by the word 'vrīhi') so also the various substances which accompany the concept of 'substance' are not intended (by the verb 'yajati').

72. A substitute is enjoined in the absence (of the normal material) so that the purpose of a regular ceremony, or of an optional ceremony already undertaken may not be cut short.

73. (But substitution will be impossible according to the Akhaṇḍa-position) :-
According to him who considers that the meaning of the sentence is an action (ie, ^the meaning of the verb) qualified (or accomplished through the nominal agents viz, instrument, etc), in the absence of the material and consequent substitution for it, it would be a different action.

74. (Now the second of the five objections against the Akhaṇḍa-position is stated):-
When (in a sentence, ^like 'vanāt pika ānīyatām' in which there are familiar and unfamiliar words), the meaning of the familiar word(or words) is conveyed, the question 'what is it' is asked about words like 'pika' which are not

familiar.[342]

75.   (The third objection is stated):-
       If a thing which could be understood by
       implication (directly from a statement) is stated
       for the sake of clarity through a syntactical
       connection (~~in a sentence~~), then the direct
       statement supersedes the authority of syntactical
       connection and evidence stated elsewhere.

76.   (As for the difference between direct statement
       and syntactical connection), when ideas like
       'whiteness' are conveyed not directly (from a
       direct statement), but from the proximity (of the
       relevant word to other words in a sentence), such
       conveying of the idea through a syntactical connection
       is of a different nature from ~~their~~ its being
       conveyed through a direct statement.[343]

77.   If it is considered that a sentence is an
       indivisible whole conveying an indivisible meaning
       then since all (relations) are from a direct
       statement, there is no (question of any) conflict
       ~~the direct statement,~~ (~~with~~ of syntactical connection
       or anything else). with direct statement.[344]

78. (The next objection against the Akhaṇḍa-position
is stated):-

Where we have a group of clauses (as in a
mahāvākya, is. a complex or compound sentence)
all intended to build up one principal idea and
having
~~with~~ expectancy for one another, then there would
not be any meaning for the component parts (if
the Akhaṇḍa-position of the indivisible sentence
conveying the indivisible meaning is accepted).

79. (~~The~~ ᴬ fifth objection is raised against the Akhaṇḍa-~~position~~
position
~~position.~~ The acceptance of the position will
lead to the meaninglessness of the rules employed
in interpreting Vedic texts ; in order to decide
such questions as the sequence of sacrifices, the
relation of subsidiary and principal actions and
so on (79-89)):-

This (action) should be performed as an incidental
one, while this (other) should be performed according
to the principle of tantra. (Again) this action
should be performed (by several persons) using the
same means one after another, and this (other)
action should be performed, each person using a
separate means. There is (the operation of) sublation
and combination in this place.

80.   A substitution is valid here; and here the connection of the word (is carried on from one sentence to another). A transference of the general attributes of an object is indicated here; and (in this other place) some special attributes are transferred from one object to another).

81.   Here (a person's) need to do an action (is shown) and (in this other place) his competency (is indicated). (In this third sentence), the object of the two (ie, of the person's need and his competency) is the same. He (who performs the sacrifice mentioned here) has scriptural authority to do so. He has no authority to perform (that) other action.

82.   The sequence here is fixed by direct statement; and in this, the sequence is fixed on the basis of pronunciation. The sequence, here, is powerful and no sequence is intended in this (other one).

83.   This non-operative one among the accessories is connected (to the principal) through the other (operative) accessories. Among them (ie, the accessories), this is the one which effects the action and this (other) is incidental. 344a

84. (Among ~~her~~ actions) this one is principal and this
is subsidiary; and this is the order of
performance of the two (actions).   This means
serves the action directly and this other
indirectly.

85. The things mentioned here have different
potentialities and functions and the results (of
the action mentioned here) vary.   This ~~the~~
(particular) object has changed due to its
association (with something else). No distinction is
intended ~~there~~ in that (other) place.

86. (Further, besides these rules of interpretation,
there are also others which will be nullified by
the Grammarian's position (86-88).   They are):-
This is the negation of a possible case; and this
(other) is a prohibition of a particular thing
without enjoining an alternative.   This word has
a secondary meaning and this other, a primary
meaning.   The scope of the meaning of the word here
is wide.   The method employed here is a complex
one and in this other place a simple method is
employed.

87. There is a divided relation of whole and parts in
this sentence and an option of different things (in

other

this context).   A restriction is enjoined here;
and here the appropriateness of another thing
is stated.

88.   The specification of this thing is inferred
from the evidence of another sentence. The
meaning of this word is obtained by analysis,
after the word itself is detached from (the
context of) its usage.

89.   The above-mentioned methods of exposition in
sentences based on the meaning of words would
not have been considered if a word were not a
meaning-expressing agent.

90.   (The criticisms of the Padavādin are now answered):-
The objections raised (by the Padavādin) do not
contradict (our position) because (we concede
that) the meaning of the sentence which is an
undivided whole lends itself to division along
the (lines of) the included clauses on the basis
of its different aspects.

91.   Just as a single composite scent is analysed into
(the component elements such as) the smell of
flowers, etc., in the same way are different
meanings (as meanings of clauses, phrases and

words) pointed out in the sentence.[345]

92.   (The objection regarding words like 'pika'
        is answered):-
        Just as in Bos gavaeus or a man-lion which is
        the object of an integral cognition, a part
        of it assumes resemblance with another species,[346]

93.   —and when an ignorant person perceives that
        certain parts (of the Bos gavarus, etc) have not
        been seen by him before and are unknown to him,
        he is (really) having a non-understanding of
        the whole,

94.   — similarly, when, by the use of words like 'pika'
        the sentence has become totally different, (the
        ignorant person) imagines to see in it something
        which resembles a meaning which (in fact) does
        not exist in it.

95.   Just as light and the mind which are both
        integral and partless are found to be similar to
        each other in certain respects, and dissimilar
        in other respects,[347]

96.   —similarly sentences which (in reality) are
        integral wholes are imagined to be similar to
        each other in certain parts and dissimilar from

each other in certain other parts.

97. (The Akhandavādin now criticises the Pada-vādin):-
When the forms of words are impaired
(injunctions) how can the boundaries of the word
be determined?. And without determining the
boundaries of the word how can its meaning be
determined ?

98. (The objection based on sentences like s'veto
dhāvati' is answered):-
Another school (ie, another section of the
Akhanda school) holds the view that in a form
(like s'veto), there is the conjunction, so to
speak, of several forms and that the one form
(rather than the other) is preferred among the
various possible forms on the principle of
tantra (ie different forms being contained in a
combined form).

99. There is so to speak, in the one undifferentiated
form the coalescence of different words; and
hence the one form though outwardly non-different
can be distinguished (by contextual factors).

100.   (The following few stanzas discuss incidentally
        the problem whether there is identity or there
        is difference (in numbers) between a meaning
        and that which conveys meaning) :-
                                one
        In a grammatical statement the line is taken
        that there is identity between that which
        expresses a meaning, and the meaning expressed;
        while in some other places it is stated that
        there is no such identity.

101a.   Thus by the use of the identity-principle the
        sound 'ū' is used to indicate the three kinds
        of u-sounds, the short, the long and the prolated. 348

101b.   In symbolising lṛṅ and lṛṭ (by the sound lṛ)
                                            assumed
        there is a difference (in numbers) between
        (the symbolised (and the symbol). 349

102.   The form 'yasya' which is a combined form of
        'a' and 'i' expresses those symbolised by it
        (namely, the vowels 'a' and 'i' short or long). No
        apprehension of a thing is possible as conveyed
        by something which is itself 'a symbolised'.

103. This sound ū (prolonged) which is non-different
from the sounds of which it is the symbol, is also
the basis of the different sentences (into which
the original Sūtra is analysed). It is understood
in two ways just as a pararūpa is in regard to two
meanings.³⁴⁹ᵃ

104. (The view held by Kātyāyana the author of the *Vārttika*):-
~~Vārttika) :-~~   He (ie, the author of the Vārttika),
who rules out that (1) the component parts of a
                                    not prolated
prolated diphtong are themselves ~~prolonged~~ and (2)
that a conjunction of <u>vowels</u> (with udātta and
anudātta tones) is (not a svarita - vowel), has
(thus) adopted the position that there is an
                                           for instance,
ultimate distinction among speech-sounds (ie, that
there is no numerical parity between the component-
elements in the word 'sveto' on the one hand and the
word itself in the sentence 's'veto dhāvati').

105. Just as in words like 'ardharᶜa', there is a form
(assumed by the component elements) different (from
their forms while in the analysed sentence), due to
the difference in their sequence (of occurence),
so likewise, with a word remaining the same, there
is the (dèscriminative) hearing of different
words from it.

106. Letters which themselves are unchanging appear
     to become different ones when in combination
     because they assume different capacities.

107. It is observed about objects that, without their
     giving up their real nature, they are perceived
     as different due to changes in the perceiving
     sense organs (and other factors like the angle
     of vision). The same is the case with heard
     sounds (ie.the same sound is heard in different
     forms in combinations and the like).

108. (When words are uttered in combination) even
     though they remain intrisically unchanged a form
     at the very same time,
     will be heard as absolutely different due to the
        in
     changed manner of pronunciation.

109. (How does this apply to the Vedas ?) :-
     The Sāmā-verses are either only the R̄k-verses
     or only the music.   It is not a different entity
     altogether.   And these same R̄k-verses are heard
     as altered, due to the differences of the music.

     there are
110. When forms which are different among themselves,
        ʌ
     but have one of them capable of of including the
     others, the texts concede they are valid in that

manner of combined utterance.

111.	(Therefore in a situation of this kind) words even
though they are different from each other should
be uttered with a common form of utterance.	If
used otherwise they are not valid.

112.	Sentences which are similar to each other get a
common valid form which is prescribed by the texts,
when they are uttered with a common form of
utterance.

113.	Just as ~~one~~ the one (wind) takes various forms depending on
how it is received (ie) by a flute or other musical
instrument, similarly in the present instance
various forms can take a common form.

114.	(The Pada-school's objection regarding subsidiary
clauses (stanza 78) is answered):-
Again, clauses do exist and they can be compared
to words; at the same time they will have
independent meanings, if there were not another
sentence (of which they form parts).

115.	(In this connection the Mimamsaka view that "purpose"
is the significance of a sentence is criticised with
special reference to the problem of the subsidiary

clauses):—

> He who holds that meaning belongs to the word and
> that the significance of the sentence is its purpose
> cannot consistently admit any kind of relation
> between subsidiary clauses.

116. (The possibility of recognising subsidiary clauses
is discussed from the angle of the Anvitabhidhāna-
view):-

> It is the verbs (in the subsidiary ~~sentences~~ clauses) which
> expect each other.   Therefore a mutual relation is
> seen (among them), as based on the verbs.

117. (An objection about the Anvitabhidhāna view is
answered in this connection):-

> Repetition (of the meaning of the sentence conveyed
> by the first word, in subsequent words), is a
> repetition for the sake of defining the meanings of
> the (individual) words.   The meaning of the sentence
> which is completed in the individual words (thus)
> resides in the collection.

118a)Even though the meaning of the sentence ~~does~~ did not vary,

118b)various different views, as discussed in this section,

> were held on it by the ancient teachers, depending

on their (various) conceptions.

119. Others held that the complete utterance is a cause of instantaneous mental conception as a result of practice just as in the matter of conveying a meaning to children or animals.

120. Some consider this practice to be a convention which has existed from times immemorial and it imparts the knowledge of the kind "after this, this should be done".

121. (The meaning of the word according to a different view is stated):-
"Words all have a (general) meaning" - such a definition of the meaning of the word has been put forth by some, as being applicable as much to words like 'gauh' as to words like 'apūrvam,' 'devatā and 'svargah.'

122. What apprehension of (particular) form there is when words like 'gauh' are uttered is due to repeatedly using the word to denote a thing (meant), along with constantly seeing it.

123. (Another view about the denotation of words is stated):-
Some ~~categories~~ differentiating features (of the object

like the universal residing in it) are conveyed
by the word as its signification; while some
others which are incidental are (also) taken to
be the meaning of the word.

124. (This view is criticised):-
When the idea of an individual attaches itself to
the word whose meaning is the universal, that class-
word does not denote the particular.

125. The word does not denote the shape (and such other
attributes) of objects like pots, because words
denote only the mere object (divested of its
attributes). The attributes are conveyed incidentally.

126. (An example of the incidental expression of an idea
by a word is given):-
An action enjoined by a word (ie, by a verb) is never
seen except as accompanied by those which bring it
into being (like agent, instrument, etc).   The
idea of this relation of the action with agent,
etc., is an incidental meaning of the word (while
the action itself is its meaning).

127. (Still another view about the denotation of a word
is stated):-

Whatever relations (of the verb with agent etc)
~~etc,~~ are constant, and whatever instruments
(agent, etc) are ~~common~~ Constant, they form part of the
(directly conveyed) meaning of the word
according to others.

128a. (A fourth view is stated):-

The word denotes the sum-total of the attributes
of the object ,- (and it denotes the collection)
neither alternatively nor together. 350

128b. (A fifth view is given):-

Some think that a word denotes an association
(of the object with the universal, etc) - an
association which is unreal.

129a. (The sixth view):-

Or Reality revealed through (the flux of) the
Unreal is what the word denotes.

129b. (The seventh view):-

Or the word (falsely) assumes the character of
being produced and becomes (its own) meaning.

130.   When a word has its form identified with
        its meaning in the form describable as
        'this (ie, the word) is that'(ie, the
        meaning), then the word is considered as
        'produced'.

131.   Although (in theory) the identity of a
        word and the thing denoted by it is
        invariable, in some places (both in ordinary
        and textual usage) one of them does stand
        out as prominent.

132a.   (In life the thing denoted is more
        prominent):-
        In life the word functions by becoming
        identified with the thing denoted by it.

132b. In grammar the words are studied as
divided into both kinds (namely, those which
convey an external object as their meaning, and
those which convey their own form as meaning).

133. (The eighth and the ninth views regarding what a
word denotes) :-
Something (for instance, an action) which might
be looked upon either as having powers of all kinds
or as having no power of any kind, is so described
(as an action etc) invariably through words.

134. (The tenth view) :-
A conception formed about an external object is
(erroneously) understood to be the object and
considered as the connotation of the word. 351

135. (The eleventh view) :-
With some words, meaning is presented as
comprising the (detailed) appearance (of the
objects) and as producing (their) vivid
recollection; with others, it is presented as
a mere indefinite idea.

136. (The twelfth view) :-
Just as a defective sense-organ reveals an object

in an unusual form, similarly meaning is
understood from words in various different forms.

137.   (Thus) a word-meaning intended in a certain way
        by a speaker takes different shapes in different
        hearers depending upon the apprehension of each.

138.   Although the same object is perceived, its
        perception varies (from person to person). *Again,* Even
        the same person ~~again~~ perceives the same object
        in a different form on another occasion.

139.   The same person (at different times), and
        different persons, apprehend the meaning of the
        same word in different forms; due to the
        changing conditions of apprehension.

140.   Therefore, both the apprehension and report of
        people who have not seen the truth (about things)
        are defective, unrealiable and perpetually
        inconsistent.

141.   (Nor can we stabilise meaning and usage on the
        basis of the vision of sages) :-
        That vision of the sages which is based on Reality
        cannot be put to ordinary use; their vision is not

linked with words.

142. (Nor can any reliance be placed on the perceptions of people):-

If the sky is not seen as a surface, and the glow-worm not seen as a (spark of) fire, then there would not be any surface in the sky nor any fire in the glow-worm.

143. Therefore a wise man should see through (the eye of) logic even a thing which he perceives with his eye. Let him not determine a thing on the evidence of his (physical) perception.

144. When pragmatic people give pragmatic descriptions of things whose essential nature is beyond words, the wise man does not take it (as a real description of things).

145. (The meaning of the sentence as a ~~conception~~ *flash of insight* (Pratibhā) is described):-

When the word-meanings in a sentence are detached (from out of the sentence) and (thus) understood, a different ~~conception~~ *flash of insight* is produced (out of it). That (~~conception~~ *flash of insight*) presented by the word-meanings

is described as the meaning of the sentence.

146. It is by no means describable to others in such
terms as "it is like this".   Having been formed from
the function of one's inner self, its nature is not
known even to the subject.

147. It effects the fusion of the (individual) word-
meanings, without itself being logically thought out,
and it is apprehended as seemingly taking the form
of the collection (of the word-meanings). 352 ɔ52

148. In the matter of the knowledge of what to do, no one
trangresses it (i.e. this flash of insight) which is either
produced directly from speech or is a result of recollection.

149. The whole world looks upon it as authority (for their
conduct).   Even in animals the knowledge of the
beginning of behaviour dawns by virtue of it.

150. Just as qualities like softness are seen to belong to
particular objects without further effort by virtue
of their ripeness alone, so is the flash of insight to
those who possess it.

151. Who alters the note of the cuckoo in the Spring ?
By whom are creatures and the like taught to make
nests and so on ?

152. Who directs animals and birds in functions like
eating, loving, hating and leaping which are well
known to each species or family.

153. And (this) ~~understanding~~ *(flash of insight)* arises from precepts
accompanied by recollection. The precept is
qualified by either proximity or distance.

154. ~~Understanding~~ *The flash of insight* is considered to be of six kinds,
as obtained (1) by nature (2) by action (3) by
practice (4) by meditation (5) by invisible causes
(6) as handed down by the wise.

155. (A discussion of the division of words ~~into~~ as
primary and secondary commences):-
Just as the word "gauh" is applied to an object
which is in conjunction with and recognisable by,
(other) material things, but the word (itself) does
not denote those (material things) which (so)
qualify (the object), 353

_ (similarly)

156. ∧although a word functions as denoting an object,
which is associated with shape, colour and parts,
it does not take these to itself (as part of
its meaning).

157. (However), words (signifying colour, etc) employed
to refer to an object qualified by shape, colour
and parts, do not denote those (qualifying)
constituents alone.

158. The perception of all parts of any object is
rare in this world; from some perceived parts
the whole is inferred.

159. — just as we see that by the instrumentality of
the scent of a jasmine, or a lotus flower, the
accompanying qualities (of shape, colour, etc),
which are invariably associated with the scent,
are also apprehended.

160. The word ("water") functions as denoting water –
whether it is a drop or a mass – without reference
to attributes, number, quantity and location.

161. But words which function denoting oil, etc.,

which are delimited by (attributes like)
refinement denote, quantities of it and such words
do in fact function in relation to parts.

162. A word withdraws from functioning when in
separation from that meaning linked to which
it has been used.

163. Whatever non-permanent distinctions (in the object
it denotes) a word might be used to imply, the word
does not necessarily require their presence for its
operation.

164. Just as the word "gauḥ" is seen (functioning) even
in the separation of horn, hoof, etc., (from the
animal it it is used for), it does not ~~similarly~~ , likewise,
function dissociated from the universal.

165. Therefore while there is comprehension of the non-
permanent things from the word, the thing which is
never seen in separation (from the object) is the
one connected with it.

166a. (The place of root and suffix in the scheme of the
meaning of the word is now discussed according to
various views held on it):-

166a. "The suffixes denoting duality and the like
can be expressive or illuminating".

166b. "Or perhaps the aggregate of (root and suffix)
expresses the meaning including the idea of
number, etc."

167. "Or words like 'gauh' convey through a change in
their forms a meaning which contains the idea of
number, etc., without (actually) mentioning them".

168. Of those words which have a permanent connection
(with their meaning) and the powers of which
become clear when analysed ,- their meaning is
analysed (into root-meaning and suffix-meaning)
through (the test) of association and absence
of dissociation.

169. Where they (ie.association and absence of
dissociation) can be established without exception
there alone it is obligatory (that the root and
suffix are significant elements); but there is no
no such rule about 'nut', 'sap', etc. [354]

170. Where such exists (ie.the root and the suffix
having distinct meanings), the implication of one

meaning (by the other) is not conceived. The powers of word-elements (i.e. root and suffix) raise expectancy (for each other) when in combination.

171. The words "kūpa", "sūpa" and "yūpa" have no fixed parallelism of meaning; therefore the capacity for expressing another idea belongs to the group.

172. Etymological explanations of words vary; where more than one meaning is possible a derivation is stated (for each meaning).

173. Words like "vaira", "vāsiṣṭha", "giris'a" and similarly "ekāgārikā" and others are explained by various people in various ways through a host of derivations.

174. Just as description of a path is possible through a tree, an anthill or a mountain, explanation of a word through different concomitant features is not impossible.

175. (The basis of employing a word to denote an object is discussed):-

Descriptions of objects like a kims'ka tree are
made in different forms by those who can see
them in different states and based on the
partial understanding (of them).

176.   (Similarly) derivation of the word 'gauh' from
'girati' (to swallow), 'garjati' (to roar),
'gama' (to go), 'guvati' (to void by stool) or
'gadati' (to speak articulately) has been
shown by some.

177a.   (Another view as to the basis of the function of
a word is given):-   'Or the word 'gauh' denotes
the meaning 'cow', by virtue of its form 'gauh''.
No words are etymologically derived.

177b.   By some both (ie, the form of the word and
features of the object it denotes) are so
considered (ie, as the basis of the operation
of the word).

178.   In grammar several forms are pointed out by a
common form for the sake of brevity. The
particular ones are indicators of this as if it
were another universal.

179.   A word existing as linked to a different meaning
is only another stem of it.

                    fixed
where a form is ~~connected~~ to one form by convention,

the same form does not get linked with another meaning.

180. The two roots "ij" and "y͡aj" different from each

other and established as functioning in different

settings are treated in different ways by different

teachers - Indeed the treatment (of things) is

found in different ways.

181. In this way treat the word "bālavāya" as identical

(with "vidūra"), similarly as the word "jitvarī" is.

There is no (mutual).contradiction in approaching

words as different (from) or as identical with each

other.

182. In grammar roots and prefixes are assumed to be

different for the sake of establishing aṭ, etc.,

but their combination is (really) the root.

183. Thus the injunction (of the operation of aṭ) is made

from the form 'saṃgrāmayati.' Verbs are introduced in
                                            with
these ways (i.e. both in combination and separation
from
~~with~~ prefixes.)

184a. Because of this the operations to be done to roots

and prefixes are considered to be internal.[355]

184b. It is the root in that form which is related to the nominal cases.

185. (An objection is raised against this view):- When they (i.e. the roots) are to be employed, their meaning (i.e. the action symbolised) which is to be qualified is first accomplished before (it is so qualified);and before its connection with the accomplishing means (i.e. agent, instrument, etc), an action is not accomplished. [356]

186. (But), just as, through an anticipated association of the root with the accomplishing means, it is (admitted to be) a root and a verb, so let the other also be.

187. Just as the red-dye-juice, etc., which are associated (with a tree) in its stage as a seed serves the fruit through their change of colour and the like,

188. — Similarly, the modification (of an action by a prefix) which is made to exist as an internal feature between the root and the prefix by virtue

of their mutual relation which exists
conceptually, becomes manifest at the time of the
formation of the word (by their combination).

189. (The nature and function of prefixes are discussed):-
In some places possible modifications (of the actions)
not denoted by the uncompounded verbs are revealed
through their association with the prefixes like
"prā" and "parā". 356a

190. Sometimes it expresses the particular features
(of the action as its own meaning) or it might
illuminate those features which potentially exist
(in the actions themselves).   Or again it is used
 as a co-worker of the root for bringing out its
powers.

The same features as
191. "going", etc., which are understood as existing by
implication in the uncompounded roots like "sthā",
(the prefixes) "pra" and the like convey the same
features through two forms of inference.

192. The root which denotes that other action expressed
by the forms, uncompounded with "adhi" and "pari"
is meaningless (by itself) just as they (i.e. the

are

prefixes, (by themselves).

193. Similarly some suffixes of the svārthika type (like ʻkanʼ) existing in combination with other elements and coalescing with these same elements which (by themselves) do not convey a meaning (while in the combination), function as repeating the meaning of the (same) bases.

194. (Conjunctions are now discussed):-

Some particles reveal (meaning); (others (express meaning (of their own) independently; Some, like grammatical augments, convey the meaning while in union (with the words which govern them).

195. When they are used before or after and in different meanings, their being illuminators (of meaning) does not alter.

196. Particles, although they are words, are not used by themselves, (just as) a suffix is not used by itself, although it expresses meaning.

197a. And although they refer to something aggregated there is no separateness (between them and the aggregate which could necessitate the use of a genitive case in the context). _357_

197b. A particle denotes a thing which does not exist as well as something which exists, as its meaning, just as an action is also denoted by something different (ie, by a noun besides by the verb itself). 358

198. Attributives are connected with words (they qualify and) which convey particular meanings; but 'ca' and the like, on the other hand, are for the sake of others, even when they convey the idea of the combined.

199. (A discussion on karmapravacanīyas starts with this stanza) :-
Certain verbs withdraw after generating (a relationship between nouns) and thus becoming the substratum of the relation. In some places, such relationship comes into being with the verb itself heard. 358a

200. (A point about the prescription of the genitive case in the sentence 'mātuḥ smarati' is discussed):-
There, the genitive is especially enjoined in order to prevent a compound (from being employed); and the contrary example of an instrumental is given in order that it might be seen (whether the word 'gunāḥ' is an accusative or instrumental).

201. (It was stated in 199 that sometimes a verb,
after effecting a relation between nouns ceases
to exist in the context. This stanza continues
that statement):-
And when the relation has come into being and
the verb has withdrawn, the karmapravacanīya
establishes the relation (as being brought about
by the verb).

202. That (karmapravacanīya)(with which a verb starts)
which implies the existence of another verb (in
the context) is connected with (the nominal and
the pronominal) case-forms in the sentence, as
for instance, does (the karmapravacanīya) 'vi';
when used with (the root) 'likh' it has not the
status of (being) a prefix.

203a. It is found that the verb 'tiṣṭhati' is used in
the verb 'apratyajayan'.

203b. The (karmapravacanīya) 'abhi' functions
uncompounded with the verb 'sunvati' in the
sense 'in the direction of'. 359

204. 'Su', 'ati', etc., which are different in characteristics are declared ~~as~~ to be karmapravacanīyas when they are associated with verbs, in order to avoid the change of 'sa' into 'ṣa' in certain forms.

205. (Another specific function of the karmapravacanīya is stated):-
When (the karmapravacanīya) 'anu' denotes the union of a cause and effect, the instrumental which is to function in the cause is set aside.

206. (This stanza rejects the views already stated about the function of the karmapravacanīya):-
It is not an illuminator of the verb; it does not express a relation; nor does it imply a verb. It defines a relation.

207. (Having thus discussed the five parts of speech, the Akhaṇḍa vādiṅ's position is again stated):-
A collection of letters which are meaningless by themselves can be meaningful or meaningless (in combination); if meaningful, it is a word; and there are no parts in a word.

208.   A combination of meaningful words varies as
        giving rise to another meaning or as not having
        any connection among them.

209.   If one of two (letter-groups) is meaningful and
        the other is not, when they are considered in
        separation, then they do not combine into a
        connected word. But some others say that they
        do combine (into a whole) as, for instance the
        words 'kuṭīra' and the like do.

210.   (Some thinkers hold that if the aggregate is
        meaningful, the components also should be meaningful):-
        According to some, an aggregate with a distinct
        meaning is formed or not formed from meaningful
        words, as in compounds and svārthika-formations
        (respectively).

211.   Some of these have fixed meaning in combination
        and have their functions known on analysis. With
        some others functions are attributed to their
        parts based on the test of (constant) association
        and (absence of)dissociation.

212.   Only a technical significance is intended by the
        statement that syllables are meaningful; isolate

syllables which are (technically significant as)
roots and the like are not meaningful in
ordinary usage.

213.   The meaning of kṛt and taddhita suffixes by
themselves is technical. Even so, forms
ending in these have no meaning before the
addition of the case endings.

214.   And the distinct meaning which one finds in
words ending in these suffixes (kṛt and taddhita)
is derived from factors like meaning of
adjoining words and topic-context.

215.   If words and sentences are not different in
character from syllables, these syllables (and
not words and sentences) would be expressive
(of meaning) due to their power of possessing
expectancy for one another.

216.   If a collection (of letters) is meaningful when
it is less than the normal by one letter, then
(what happens is that) the whole is understood
from a fraction of it assuming that the (reduced)
form is not an entirely different word. 360

(ce the fraction)
217.   Under certain conditions it causes recollection

of the (complete) word which is to express the
meaning as if it had been actually presented
by the (whole) word.

218.   Just as in 'gaurakhara' and other such words,
there does not exist any separate meaning of the
component words and no such meaning is realised
during the comprehension of the meaning of the
combined word,

219.   —Similarly in the meaning of the sentence which
appears to be a combination of the word-meanings,
the recognition of word-meanings is of no use.

220.   If in complex formations the complete word and
the component parts have different meanings, then
there is the co-existence of contradictory
meanings , namely the analytic and the synthetic.

221.   (Another objection to the recognition of words
and word-meanings in sentences, etc., is given):-
Who will consider 'adhi', etc., as purely having
the meaning of the (locative) case ? And how can
a bahuvrīhi compound have that meaning of which
the word is not used ?

222a.   The meanings of words like 'prajñu' and `samjñu' are

not understood through their component parts.

222b.   Therefore the combination as a whole is
        connected to a specific meaning.

223.   The single word 'Gargāḥ' denotes many people.
        Similarly a combination of words known as a
        dvandva compound may denote many people.

224.   Just as 'bhuj' (to eat) and other verbs combine
        with the parts (of a collective subject)
        individually, similarly the verb is conceived
        separately for each (component) of the meaning
        (of the subject) denoted by a dvandva compound.

225.   And so far as the need of a component meaning
        in a dvan dva compound for the pronoun 'tad' is
        concerned, there is only the appearance of a
        pronoun in the expanded meaning (of the compound).

226.   Just as in cutting the khadira tree, the (act
        of) cutting has a sequence in its parts,
        similarly a sequence is seen in the meaning of
        a dvandva compound.

227.   Particular actions which pertain to groups are
        considered to function through individuals.
        Similar is the case of the parts of a dvandva
        compound.

228.   In discussing, for the benefit of the untutored,
        complex grammatical formations with (particular)
        reference to their (expanded) sentence-forms,
        the chief significance is attributed to the
        meaning of one or other of the (component) words.   *361*

229.   Since the meaning of a negative compound is
        (really) indivisible, diverse conceptions of
        the (comparitive) significance (of their parts)
        are given as optionals in the Bhāṣya; these are
        nothing more than (necessary) evils which appear
        in the grammatical explanations (of these words).

230.   The rejection of all(component) meanings is
        shown in the case of bahuvrīhi compounds by him
        (ie, the teacher) who desires the rejection of
        all component meanings according to the view-
        point that 'the individual words in a compound
        gives up ~~its~~ their meaning'.

231.   (Other arguments are given to prove that the notion
        of the reality of a word-meaning is ~~less than~~ not correct):
        ~~the truth 1~~
        In grammar the meaning of the root is expressed
        by the suffix in some places, when the root has
        ceased to function and (sometimes) the meaning

of the suffix, by the roots.

232.   The same meaning which two different suffixes
         express in the form 'pacanti' is conveyed in
         some places by one of them; and in some (other)
         places the root conveys the same meaning
         without either of them.

233.   The same suffix-meanings which in certain
         inumeratory texts are considered as linked to
         suffixes, are mentioned and designated as root-
         meanings in other texts.³⁶²

234a.   Similarly in grammar words like 'udvami' and
         'kari' are used because they are well-known (as
         substitutes),³⁶³

234b.   —since the (analytical) explanation of words
         adopted in grammar ᵢₛ (only) for the sake of
         (ordinary) usage.

235a.   It is Unreality which is described in the
         scriptures (like grammar) through various
         explanations.

235b.   And Reality itself remains untrammelled by these
         differences of textual explanations.

236.   Just as an effect is not(definably) connected
        with its cause, nor is it describable,
        similarly the true knowledge which is
        indescribable is pointed out as having grammar
        for its means of realisation.

237a.   It is practice (of grammar) which helps, in the
        meaning of words.

        to create understanding

237b.   This practice is considered as unreal like the
        beginningless nature (of things).[364]

238.   (This beginningless and unreal nature of things
        is illustrated):-
        The untutored imagines an atom as having parts;
        and a whole having parts as being linked to yet
        other parts.

239.   The world is understood as limited from the sight
        of pots, etc.   And because objects have a
        beginning, the time-less Brahman is (erroneously)
        understood as having a beginning.

240.   Means are intended as a concealment of the truth
        for the sake of the unwise who are learning.
        Remaining on the path of Unreality one strives
        after Reality.

241.   After grasping the meaning (of a word) in a certain

form through the comprehension of the word, the same meaning is again grasped in the sentence in a different form.

242. Of the many meanings (of words) presented (to the reader of a sentence) those which in the end are repudiated (by the sense of the sentence) are not operative. Therefore they should not be resorted to there (ie, in the understanding of the meaning of the sentence). 365

243. The sentence 'vṛkṣo nāsti' has a particular negation as its significance. The meaning(of the word 'vṛkṣa') cannot be considered to be connected in the mind (to the meaning of the particular 'na'), because that would mean the negation of some thing which exists. 366

244a.)
244b.) If, when the sentence is understood analytically, the knowledge 'there is (a tree)' is formed, how can that concept which is non-verbal in character be removed (by the particle 'na').

245a. Or again, the knowledge that there is (a tree) is falsified by 'na'.

245b. How then, can the knowledge of the absence (of

the tree) be obtained if the function of 'na'
is modified like this ?

246a.   Again can it be said that the particle 'na'
functions in isolation, without reference
to any of the sectional notions referred to
above ? (N.o):—

~~No !~~

If 'na' is functioning without reference to any
substratum, then it should be employed (in the
beginning) before (all the others).

246b.   (Can the use of the substratum, ie. 'vṛkṣa' be
explained by the Bheda-school as follows):—
Again, (it may be said) that it (ie 'vṛkṣa') alone
shall be its (ie of the particle's) ~~na~~
substratum.   (The defect of this position is
that) a direct statement, then, becomes a
restrictive statement.

247a.   Or (it becomes) a statement which brings out an
implied restriction. Or it might become a
repetition.

247b.   (Therefore if the sentence 'vṛkṣo nāsti' is
interpreted in the way stated in 246a, then)
only one word (ie, 'na') will have meaning there;

others will have no meaning.

248.   (The argument against the recognition of word-
meaning stated in 241 is illustrated):-
Words 'udahāri' and others enter into an
incompatible kind of relationship (among
themselves); and when the sentence is completed
the meaning of the sentence is comprehended in
a different form.

249.   In the case of sentences with praise or censure
as their import the meaning of the sentence is
not the same as is constructed by its analysis
into words.

250.   The Pada-vādin's position is again stated for
repudiation :-
Or it is the un-integrated meaning which remains
in the words; and it is (also) the means for the
construction of the integrated sentence-meaning.

251.   (But) that (meaning) which originally remains
unintegrated in the words, and is then gradually
built up is not any different from it, since it is
like something re-strung after being broken.

252.   Other investigators say that the same word has
more than one meaning; they say that the same word

has many meanings due to various causes.

253a.) The **simultaneity** (of the functioning of the
253b.) word in all its meanings) is avoided and the
word is established in one meaning at a time,
through (such contextual factors as) the meaning
(of other words) or situation context or due
to association with other words.

254. Just as the mass (of flesh) with dew-lap, etc.,
is named by the word 'gauḥ', similarly the same
word 'gauḥ' is established as conveying the
meaning 'a B̄āhīka'.

255. On the basis of the difference in the currency
of the (corresponding) meanings, ~~primariness and~~
the same word
~~secondariness are described of the same word,~~
is described as primary and secondary
~~it having all potentialities~~
it having all potentialities
and several aspects.

256. Thus the same hymn having various meanings and
possessing different potentialities, is
established as functioning in regard to the self,
to a god and to the sacrifice, without its
functions mixing together.

257. The attribution of cow-ness on the B̄āhīka for
(certain) reasons is desired by some. (Thus) only

the object denoted has changed; the word remains fixed in its meaning (namely cow-ness).

258. Again the form of the word is associated with all its meanings.   Only the objects denoted change. The word permanently remains linked to its form (as its meaning).

259. Those who adopt the line of the plurality of words say that the one-ness between principal and secondary words is butformal, and that they are fundamentally different.

260a. Thus a different Sāmidhenī hymn is associated with (each) repetition (of the hymn),

260b. Hymns become different by being employed just as they do when altered by a substitution.

261a. (Nevertheless), they too are Vedic hymns; only, certain ones are actually mentioned there (ie, in the actual texts).

261b. Or (alternatively) it is those which have no use (as Vedic hymns) which are mentioned there. (Through them), the remaining ones come to mind.

367a

262a. Others describe that the form of a hymn is its

meaning when it is recited.

262b. Hence all hymns are different; and those other
hymns (which are produced, so to say, from the
recitation of the ~~studied~~ *mentioned* hymns) are also
different from each other, they having their
distinct forms, through their connection with
the ~~studied~~ *mentioned* hymns.

263. The Sāvitrī hymn which is the source of
purification is one; a different hymn is
employed in sacrifice; and a different one is
employed in the contexts of muttering hymns.
But all these appear to be the same.

264a. The functioning of words in their meaning is
through their forms.

164b. And the functioning of a sentence in the meaning
of the sentence is through its dependence on
nothing else (other than the form of a sentence).

265. Those who follow the idea that the same word
possesses several meanings base their conclusion
regarding the meaning being primary ~~and~~ *or* secondary
on it being well-known or otherwise.

266. Others think that a word which conveys its meaning
      depending on the meaning (of other words) or
                    tuation
      similar-context or by association with other words,
      is called secondary.

267. (The definition of a word which conveys a primary
      meaning is given according to the view of the
      Samgraha) :-
      That word from which, when it is pronounced as an
      isolate, its own well-known meaning is understood
      and which depends solely on its form(in
      conveying this meaningx) should be known as
      primary.

268. That word which is made (to convey the meaning)
      as if with difficulty, through the use of another
      word is considered obscure and connected to a
      secondary meaning.

269. When a word (in conveying a secondary meaning)
      depends on itself as functioning in its own
      meaning (ie the principal meaning), then the
      principal meaning acts as the basis (for the
      secondary meaning) and the secondary meaning is
      based on it.

270.   The words 'parā' and 'ārād' which convey meanings
       which are different and contradictory among
       themselves are also understood through the meanings
       (of other words) and the situation-context.

✓ 271.   (Siddhānta):-

       When the analysis of word-meanings from the
       meaning of the sentence is artificial, how can
       any (word) properly have relation with another
       word ?

272.   Where it is seen sometimes that a single word
       possesses a complete verb 'to be' (implied in it),
       that word is considered as a separate sentence;
       and it is not used with another word.

273a.   As the answer 'cow' or 'horse' is given to the
       question 'What is it', words like 'see' are
       included in the question itself.

273b.   The criterion (of judging whether a word is
       principal or secondary) with reference to a
       meaning) is not whether it conveys more or less
       of the attributes (of the object denoted).

274.   Conveying more (such attributes) is considered

as the basis of the word being well-known
(in some places) while, in some other places,
conveying less is so considered.

275.   Others consider that a secondary meaning is that
to convey which a word whose significance is a
universal is used, without its having to signify the
universal, by virtue of it (ie, the object)
having attributes similar to those of the
individual associated with the universal.

276.   Where a meaning (of a word) is taken to be another,
apparently by mistake, then (such) words like
'gauh' are considered by some as 'secondary'.

277.   Just as objects like a plough, a sword or a
pestle which possess specific forms and powers
are invariably taken as instruments of specific
actions,

278.   — but when used for other actions they do not
possess these powers, and are invariably
associated with such actions only from their forms,

279.   — similarly a word which has its meaning settled
on the basis of its formal capacity is used (to
convey) a different meaning by virtue of a
(different) potentiality.

280.   (How then is ~~primariness and secondariness to~~ the primary-secondary distinction to

be ~~be~~ understood in this case?):—

When on merely listening, one understands the
word as having a (certain) meaning, that meaning
is considered to be principal, and the meaning is
secondary where it has to be explained.

281.   When words like 'gauh', 'yuṣmat' and 'mahat' convey
a different meaning (from what they ordinarily
mean) through the operation of the suffix 'cvi',
there we find the identification of the principal
meaning with the other meaning. 368

282.   (An objection arising from the idea of the stanza
above is stated):-
Bigness and whiteness remain in their original
state.   But that (state) when looked at in
different ways become the basis of the secondary~~ness~~ nature
(of the meanings of the words).

283.   (Yet another objection is answered):-
Words like 'Agni' and 'Soma' which are connected
to their forms (as their meanings) are secondary
when they are used to denote the symbolised
(persons) because they are well-known (as the
names of gods). 369

284. On the other hand, the word 'Agni' used as (an
      abbreviated) substitute for the word 'Agnidatta',
      having given up its own meaning conveys a
      secondary meaning since it (also) conveys the
      meaning of the word 'Datta'.

285. If their etymological derivation is approached
      from different angles there is the existence and
      the non-existence of the augment 'suṭ' in words
      like ' Hariścandra'.[370]

286. If words which have become established as names
      of sages and the like are used to denote
      something different, then changes effected in
      the body of such words (when they mean sages, etc)
      do not revert.

287. (The problem of primary - secondary classification
      is approached from a different angle):-
      Even when a meaning completely antithetical
      (to the normal meaning of the word) is conveyed
      by the word, the word is functioning in a primary
      capacity in accordance with the mind's
      comprehension (at that time).

288.   Although the comprehension of the true nature of
an object is dependent on conceiving it,
conception is not everything in it, as in the
case of an imperfect comprehension (of an object).

289.   Seeing (an object) in water resembles seeing (it)
in a mirage.   But while its apprehension, etc.,
(in the two media) are thus, similar, water is
not a mirage.

290.   What ever the effect there is which a rope and a serpent
have not in common, by that is determined a
difference between them in spite of their similar
appearance (in certain conditions like twilight).

291.   A difference (in an object) effected through a cause
which causes a contrary appearance of (such) a
well-known object, is also considered unreal. 371

292.   And digging, etc., are not possible on where a
picture (of a mountain etc) showing elevations
and depressions, which resembles the mountain.

293.   It is possible for a (real) wheel to have
continuous contact with the hand (which holds it);
but that is not the case with the a wheel of fire;
it breaks when it is touched.

294.   While a rampart or a fort, a turret in a real city

can be touched, covered and the like, the same

cannot be done with those in a magic city.

295.   Actions of the type performed by the original

animals are not performed by their models made

of clay.   Therefore (the suffix) 'kan' is added

to such words (for forming the words which denote

the models).

296.   A large space is occupied by real mountains and

the like.   But their images are found to occupy

only a small space.

297.   While real poison, etc., can cause death, they

are not able to produce those same effects of

theirs in a dream.

298.   (The argument is concluded): —

A thing which appears otherwise, due to

differences in time, place, or the sense-organs

(with which it is perceived), is, nevertheless,

finally understood in the form in which it is

well-known to the world.

299.   The knowledge whose source is an error , and the

knowledge which is not about the world (of sense-

experience) are beyond words. Words are instruments of temporal knowledge.

300. (After discussing the classification of meaning as primary and secondary, a primary-incidental classification of meaning is now discussed) :- For whatever purpose a lamp is employed in connection with a pot,etc., (ie, to reveal it) in association with that same purpose, it (ie, the lamp) reveals another object (like a wall).

301. Similarly whatever (particular) meaning, out of the many meanings (of a word), operates as the cause for the employment of the word, the word also (incidentally) conveys meanings other than that operative meaning.

302. Just as the churning of two kindling sticks performed to produce fire produces also the unintended smoke, which has the same cause as the fire,

303. - similarly, when a certain meaning which is to be conveyed is intended (when using a word), the word also conveys the unintended meaning due to its proximity (with the intended one). 372

304. Just as it is impossible to discard an object which

is in

close connection with another, similarly a word which is in (intimate) connection (with all its meanings) cannot be divided (in its function).

305. Even when an unrequired meaning is present and revealed, the meaning which is instrumental to the word (being used) is the one connected to it in spite of the same form (conveying the two meanings).

306. (A discussion follows about the relation between primary meaning and secondary meaning):-
In some places the distinction of meaning into primary and secondary is not maintained. And in some (other) places even the presence of a secondary meaning does not act as the (operative) cause of the word (in the context).

307. In some (other) places the meaning which the word actually conveys is the one which it does not mention. Elsewhere the principal meaning points to another meaning. 373

308. When the verb conveys the idea of a taddhita the inversion of the primary and secondary meaning is seen.

309a.   (Even) when gender and number are expressed,
        their presence is not the operative cause (for
        the word to function in the context).

309b.   In the case of 'short vowel' etc., it is a
        measure which is understood, though not mentioned.

310.   And that (measure) which is seen as half of a
        short vowel is equally (understood) when there
        is no short vowel there, since, 'hrasva' is used
        as implying ('dīrgha' and 'pluta') what is
        expressed is 'similar to that'.

311a.   (Three ways of interpreting the word 'ardha-
        hrasvaṃ' in the Sūtra referred to above are
        discussed):-
        It (ie, the word 'ardha') applies also to the
        long and the prolonged (vowels apart from
        applying to the short vowel). Or it might
        qualify (and apply to) ' a measure'.

311b.   Or again a class might also be understood by
        implication from it.

312.   (This stanza illustrates the point stated in the second
        half of 307):-
        'We must go now. Look at the sun' - when time is
        indicated by implication in this way the idea
        'Know the time' is conveyed through its means.

313.   (The same idea is further illustrated):-

In the ~~statement~~ _enjunction_ 'Pierce without a bow' a general
instrument is indicated by the particular. The
basis of the (instrumental) capacity is provided
for by any (object).

314.   A boy who is instructed to protect clarified
butter from crows does not ~~remain without~~ _desists (from_ _remain without-_
protecting it from dogs and the like, the
(instructing) sentence having the significance
of protecting (the clarified butter), in general.

315.   (Sometimes secondary ideas are conveyed as
accessories to the principal meaning without
making an actual statement of them):-
(From the very expression 'Give him food') the
(ideas of the) washing of the plates
and the scrubbing of the pots are conveyed
although they are not mentioned by words because
they form accessories to the act of eating.

316.   (The factors which help to determine the meaning
of a word are now discussed):-
The meaning_s_ of _a_ word_s_ _are_ determined from (their)
syntactical connection (in the sentence), situation-
context, the meaning of another word, propriety,

place, and time, and not from their mere form. ~~time.~~

317.   (Another list) :-

(Constant), association (of two things), (their) dissociation, company, and hostility, the meaning (of another word), situation-context, evidence from another sentence, and the proximity of another word.[374]

/318.   Even according to the view of the plurality of words, words which have the same form but which, on realisation are found to be different in meaning have their meanings understood after they are determined by means of situation-context and the like.

319.   Words, which, according to their application in one way or another are either nouns or verbs though of identical form, do not have the meaning which they are to convey understood from their form alone.[375]

320.   The employment of praise and censure as incentives to action and inaction is understood by a clever hearer as not literally intended.

321.   A praise is made of that action which has been enjoined (in the Vedas) as productive of result tangible or intangible; and praise is only an incentive to the performer.

322. Just as a child is dissuaded from crying by the
      pretence of a 'tiger' and the like (eating it),
      similarly an evil result (of the nonperformance
      of a sacrificial action) is stated, which is not
      true.

323   When an evil result of this sort is laid down,
      no wise man performs an action (thus) prohibited,
      by disposing ~~of~~ (ie, the evil result) ~~off~~.

324. The prohibition 'Do not eat (puroḍāś'a) with the
      teeth' should not be acted upon in a different way
      by disposing of the serpents through effective
      spells and medicines.

325a. In some places, praise and censure are made as the
      real meanings (of the passages); but even in these
      places action and ~~non-action~~ abstention are enjoined.

325b. The nature of all word-meaning is dependent on the
      meaning of the sentence.

326a. That meaning of a sentence (ie of a clause) which is itself dependent
      (on the meaning of other sentences) is comparable to
      the meaning of a word

326b. And a word which has a verb implied in it is also
      considered as a sentence. 376

327a)
327b) That verb in which a specific nominal category
is (automatically) understood (as existing by
implication) is also called a sentence because
it has a completed meaning. [377]

328a) Here the Mīmāṁsaka's view of 'words understood'
328b) ~~is given :~~ (śrutārthāpatti) is given).

The act of intellection, with the uttered word
intervening (between it and the _un_ uttered word) and
working on the unuttered word is considered as
causing the comprehension of its meaning through
inference.

329a) (The Akhaṇḍa reply):-

329b) When a certain utterance is made and a meaning
conveyed from it, that meaning is considered as
the meaning of that utterance alone. There is not
something else which is the indicator of that
meaning.

330a. In the case of secondary words with a verbal
significance, _the_ action (which is the meaning) of
the verbs whose place they occupy is understood.

330b. And the sense of 'gone' etc., is understood
from indeclinables like 'niḥ' themselves in
complex combinations. [378]

334a.)   (If thus, the meaning of the sentence

334b.)   'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati' can be obtained from the

335)   utterance of the word 'vṛkṣaḥ' then why use

the word 'tiṣṭhati' at all in such utterances as

'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati' ?) :-

They (ie, the word 'vṛkṣaḥ' as meaning an object

as its referent, and the word 'vṛkṣaḥ' as an

utterance implying the verb 'tiṣṭhati') are two

different pieces and are comparable to

synonyms in everyday language. And their own

meanings are determined by the meaning of the

accompanying words, situation-context, etc.   379

336a.)   Words which are means of the understanding

336 b)   (of the meaning of the sentence) for each

individual person are not necessarily directly

connected to their thing-meant.   380

337.   (The Mīmāṃsaka raises an objection):-

Even when there is no comprehension of meaning

(from a word) or a wrong meaning is comprehended,

such words remain fixedly connected to their

own meanings.

338.   (Therefore he re-states the 'S'rutārthāpatti-view'

stated in 328a and b) :-

When the word 'dvāram' (door or way) ~~in the~~

~~accusative~~ in the accusative is heard either

(the meaning) 'close' or 'allow to enter' is
(the meaning)
obtained according to the situation-context,
in accordance with the intention of the speaker.

339.   (An objection is raised by the Mīmāṃsaka to the
       view raised in 329b and 330a) :-
       Since a word (like 'vṛkṣaḥ') symbolises a means
       (ie, the word-meaning which is the means to the
       realisation of the meaning of the sentence) and
       is connected to an existent (as its meaning), it
       cannot convey the meaning (of a sentence like
       'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati) which is principal and is to be
       accomplished.

340.   (The Mīmāṃsaka re-states the Ś'rutārthāpatti-
       position):-
       Therefore it (ie, the word 'vṛkṣaḥ), having
       expressed its meaning alone, retires with
       expectancy; and its meaning which is connected
       (to another meaning) brings to light the
       proximity (of the latter). 381

341.   (The Grammarian criticises the Mīmāṃsaka's view):-
       Since the other meaning is not specifically given,
       the proximity of another word cannot be obtained
       from the word; nor the proximity of the word

from the meaning of the uttered word; nor the
proximity of the meaning (of the unuttered word)
from the (uttered) word.

342.   (Another criticism is made by the Mīmāṃsaka):-
If the verb whose form has, so to speak, disappeared
is also brought to light by the word (in the
accusative) which conveys (the idea of) the object,
then there shall be the simultaneous presence *as primary ideas* (in
the same word) of 'be coming' and 'existence' (ie,
the verbal and the nominal notions). ³⁸²

343a. (The Grammarian replies):-
The verb is described by them (ie, by the teachers
of the school of Grammar) as having a form
similar to the noun.

343b. But usage is distinguished on the evidence of
the principle of ~~constant~~ association and
(absence of) dissociation.

344a. Even when there is doubt (as to the proper meaning
of a word), due to the (sameness of) *its* forms, the
expresiveness of the word is not affected.

344b. Just as the meaning of (the expression) 'arddham
so is it (ie .the expressiveness)
pas'oh' (Half of the sacrificial animal) is decided

on the basis of the factor of competency.

345.) (Another objection against the Akhaṇḍa-position):-

346.) If all 'existence-words' (ie, nouns) are linked
with 'becoming' (ie, the verbal notion) in
combination, and have no separate meanings as
isolates, then all such (statements of grammar)
as 'a verb 'primarily denotes an action', 'nouns
'primarily denote existence' and 'there are four
kinds of words' stand contradicted.

347.   Vārttākṣa and Āṇḍumbarāyaṇa hold that there are
no four classes of words, when it is considered
that the sentence is real (only) in the mind,
and that its being linked with word-meanings is
only (a matter of) ordinary practice. [383]

348.   In life and in grammar, the description (of a
sentence) in terms of words, as being (both) wide (in its
use) and (also) easy is artificially employed,
following (the technique of) analysis. [384]

349.   In life, listeners do not obtain (the meaning of
the sentence) through (the sentence) being linked
to word-meanings. Therefore other than the sentence
there is nothing which is not (a mere matter of)
ordinary practice.

350. The meaning of words not determinable (by themselves)
because of the lack of specification in their forms
is determined only from the sentence on the basis of
evidence stated elsewhere.

351. (A discussion of the problem of rules and exceptions):—
An exception which is 'verbally' made in a general rule,
(ie, which forms part of the significance of the
general rule) but apparently without a verbal statement
of it, is stated sporately in a statement of exception
and its meaning accrues elsewhere (ie, to the general
~~rule~~ rule 385
~~statement~~).

352. The injunction about sour-milk for Brāhmins is
previously made excluding the Mātharas (and the
statement of) the Māthara being connected with curds
declares this as a real fact.

353. It is considered by some that a rule and an exception
form one sentence even if they have several ~~words~~ verbs.
Only, they appear to be different sentences.

354. Thus a restriction or prohibition forms part of the
general injunction; and since this is so commentators
say that the prohibition of 'luk' (in Pāṇini Chapter VI)
forms part of the enjoining of 'luk' in Chapter 2.

355. (Here the upholder of the doctrine that such sentences

are really distinct intervenes):-

When the sentences have no expectancy (for anything
outside) and are at rest so to speak, they are
independent of one another. Therefore, in the
absence of a relation of one being for the sake
of the other, how can they together form one
sentence ?

356.   (The upholder of the view that the two form one
sentence replies):-
A special rule causes a sentence-remainder (ie,
the prohibitory sentence here) to be inferred
because it (the special rule) needs it. Therefore,
there is in the object to be prohibited as much
expectancy as there is in the object of the
special rule.

357.   (The recognition of parts in a word is equally
meaningless):-
There is no elision of part of a proper name.
A proper name which is formed in aparticular
shape does not cease to be in that shape.

358a.   Another name is not conveyed from (the use of)
any other name like 'Datta'.

358b.   How can the word 'Datta', the 'person-named' denote
called 'Devadatta' ?

359.   Some hold that all the parts of a name are as
        much connected to the 'person-named' as the totality
        (of the word) is.

360.   (Two objections are raised against this view):-
        In that case the syllables of a proper name will
        be meaningful through the 'person-named'.

360b.   (Further) it is the parts as they are connected
        (to the whole) which are names; (in other words)
        they are not names when they do not form parts
        386
        (of the whole).

361.   (To re-state this objection):-
        Since the 'person-named' is related to all parts
        at the same time, it cannot be conveyed by some-
        thing which looks like one part.

362.   (Another view on the subject is given):-
        According to some people recollection of the
        aggregate (of the parts) is brought about by a part.
        (And) the word which thus becomes an object of
        recollection conveys the meaning of the aggregate
        (ie, itself).

363.   (This view is criticised):-
        (But), through a part (of the word) how can there
        come about a recollection of the aggregate which is

different from it ? How can a word which is

recollected convey a meaning ? **387**

564.   (The author's doctrine is stated):-

Words which have the appearance of being parts of

a name, and have their own marks (for

distinguishing them) are fixed (as parts) in the

name because they are produced along with it.

565.   Words (like 'Deva' and 'Datta') which are ambiguous

in meaning due to their having a common form (for

different meanings), which, nevertheless convey

(through combination) a fixed meaning (namely

Devadatta) by virtue of their fixed capacity and

are, therefore, considered correct usage are

enjoined for elision and the like in grammar. **388**

566.   (But) parts like 'jye' (from 'jyeṣṭha,'for instance)

'drā' (from 'drākṣā', for instance) and 'ghā' (from

'maghā', for instance) are not valid (as capable of

conveying the meaning of the whole), although they *are*

also produced simultaneously with the whole words.

These are not (therefore) mentioned in the

inumeratory section (of grammar).

567.   Words like 'kharanaga' are technically immutable

after the change (of 'n') into 'ṇ' is effected.

They are considered as correct forms because they convey the idea of integral objects.[389]

368. They (the proper names) are described as clan-names;   and since they possess the power of proper names, they do not necessarily require an (external) cause to aid them to convey their meanings.

369. Sometimes the use of a proper name is limited to one 'named' for (convenience of) usage. But the word-meaning relation is permanent in the case of (proper names) 'ḍittha' and the like as in the case of (words like) 'gauh'.

370. And in grammar (technical terms) 'vṛddhi' and the
like, (with their meanings) a relation which is
bear
(fundamentally) is not begun (by any agent), but, which is characterised by a particularisation in its function as in the case of (the relation between a qualifier and a qualified.[390]

371. Some everyday proper names function through their
                    causal
forms aided by ~~casual~~ factors;   others in the absence of such.

374. The long technical terms used in grammar depend
on their forms (in conveying their meaning). And
inference reveals the presence of causal factors
(aiding the understanding of the meaning of these
terms).[391]

375. (On repeating such a long technical term as an
experiment to understand its relation with its
parts) the inference is either made on the basis
of the same-ness of form, that it is a repetition
(of the same word); or that they are two different
words; or that there is a difference in the
aspect of the functioning of the same word).[392]

376a.(Two kinds of technical terms used in grammar are
discussed):-
In some places (in grammar) coined technical terms
are used with different significations.[393]

376b. In the Sūtra on numbers the same technical term
(namely 'saṃkhyā') is used as a coined one and as a
natural one.[394]

377. (Sometimes) a term with a non-technical sense when
uttered might extend in application as a coined one.
It is in this way that both are understood from the
statement 'dūrātsambuddhi'.[395]

378. (The following discussion is ~~when~~ whether the verb in a
sentence with a collective subject refers to the
individual or to the group) :-
The verb (ie, the verbal meaning) (in a sentence)
is considered by some to be connected to a group,
or an individual or a dvandva compound (as the subject),
depending upon its 'meaning-capacity'. 396

379. Eating, both in regard to the result of the act
and the act itself is accomplished by the
individual. Considered otherwise the meaning of
verb cannot be understood. 397

380. All (the Brāhmins) undertake the action of eating
which assumes such forms as the taking of food,
etc., and which has the satisfaction of hunger as its
result individually unlike actions such as
dancing.

398

381. Like (the ceremony of) washing of feet the verb
'bhuj' ('to eat') remains attached to individuals
because of its 'meaning-capacity'. Unlike a lamp, 399
the verb 'bhuj' does not accomplish its purpose
(namely, satisfying hunger) on a group-basis.

382. On the other hand a verb like 'drs' ('to see')
although it is stated only once (in a sentence with

a plural subject)functions, in bringing about
the actions of such kind (as are in their
appropriate places) as pertaining to the group
without their being repeated.

383.   As for the aspects of performance, etc.,(namely,
holding the food, heating it, etc,which unite to make
up the act of cooking), the different aspects of
the agents (ie, Devadatta, the pot and the fire),
which have different tasks to perform unite to
accomplish the meaning (of the verb).

384.   The technical term 'vṛddhi' refers individually
to its 'symbolised', namely, 'ā', 'ai', and 'au'
since supporting examples are obtainable from life
and evidence is seen in grammar. 400

385.   In the matter of taking 100 (pieces as a fine from
Gargas), since the prime sense lies in the fining
which has the hundred as its object, although there
is a qualitative distinction between the
individuals-to-which-the meaning (of the word
Gargāḥ)-refers, this countable meaning is not divided
up. 401

386.   When considered from the view-point that names are
given to 'the named' (as different from the view that

the relation between a name and 'the named' is time-less), in the case of terms 'samāsa' ('compound') and 'abhyasta' ('reduplicated'), they refer in common to the aggregate (of the components of the words) to which they are used to refer.

387. When an instruction in reference to an action is made in regard to certain persons mentioning them in a representative capacity, the statement is considered to refer to them (both) in a collective and individual capacity.

388. –just as in the sentence 'Vṛṣalas must not enter this house', the entry (of Vṛṣalas) individually and collectively is prohibited. 402

389. When a collective prohibition of an action like coveting wealth is made, the application (of the prohibition to the individual) is not prevented on the grounds that they have not been severally prohibited.

390. The change of 'n' into 'ṇ' (in words) takes place in spite of the intervention of aṭ, ku, pu, āṅ ~~and etc~~ ~~num~~ because the mention of these has the representative significance of 'intervention' 403

391. (The discussion on the act of eating is resumed):-

When the act of eating is begun for the satisfaction
of the eaters does it not satisfy them without
difference in place, time, etc ?

392. That single one (act of eating) to which plurality
is attributed due to the difference of the plates
(used) and the like is alternatively considered (by
an opposite school) as being really different but
assumed to be one.

393. When the action of eating is performed collectively,
but is stated individually then they eat together
having each taken his own food separately.

394. (The sentence 'Gargāḥ s'atam daṇḍyantām' (585) is
again discussed):-
Because there is no scope for successive reference,
because another number will contradict the sentence,
and because it is impossible for the verb to have a
dual application (ie to the individual and to the
group), the word 's'atam' ('hundred') is located in
the group.

395. When eating 'with others' is prescribed by a dvandva-
compound or by a 'one-remaining' , there also the meaning of the

sentence terminates both in the individual and in the group because of its representative significance.

396. Some consider that the constituent clauses (of the compound sentence) each accomplish their its meanings separately and in this way the compound sentence is a collection of clauses (each) linked with a different form.

397. There are no separate clauses which are presented by the compound sentence (during its utterance) · (Only), after the latter is uttered, these others, which are parts are recognised. 406

398. (The Akhaṇḍavādin in this connection criticises the Padavādin):-
To those, according to whom the total meaning of the sentence culminates in the parts (ie in the 407 words) individually, what is the need for the existence of a separate word-meaning ?

399. If the sentence-meaning which is formed out of them (ie, the words) culminates in the separate parts (ie, the words) of the sentence, then either it contradicts the original word-meanings or coexists with them.

400a. If they co-exist then there shall be
incompatibility between the qualified and the
unqualified.[408]

400b. (And) in the dropping of its meaning (by the
word) the relation (between word and meaning)
shall have become inconstant.

401. (The Akhaṇḍavādin's notion of the sentence-meaning
culminating collectively is discussed):-
The expressible meaning of the sentence which
is common (to all the words) and which is
established word by word exists in the aggregate
and also in the component parts as is shown by
the proximity (of the components with each other).[409]

402. Just as there is the sense of possession, the
(meritorious) result of giving and perfect
happiness (for a group) in a common wealth, ~~like~~
similar
~~this~~ is the relation borne to meaning by those
(ie the sentence and its parts) possessing it.[410]

403. (In this connection the topic ~~be discussed~~ that
case-endings are added to the aggregate of the
letters and not to each letter, in a word, is discussed):-
If the letters are individually meaningful then
by virtue of the same meaning, it is in the

aggregate which possesses it and not individually
that the singular suffix is added.[411]

404.   Just as several people see a common treasure with
one lamp, similarly grammatical number is
expressed by one case-ending.

405a. (Therefore) meaningfulness does not exclusively
belong to letters, words or sentences.

405b. (but this does not contradict the Akhaṇḍa- view stated
originally that meaningfulness resides in the
sentence):- [tu, akhaṇḍavāda] is
when a person is accustomed to a view, other views
appear to be incompatible with it (but only
appear to be so).

406.   (The essential condition for a word to convey
its meaning is discussed):-
A word does not convey its meaning without its
being employed (for it). It is considered that
the relationship between the meaning and the
word conveying it has utterance as its gateway.

407.   Just as the eye serves for seeing, only when
directed (towards the object), so the word expresses
its meaning only when it is uttered-with-intention.

408.   The relation between the 'instrument' and 'object'
        is found to be effected through the intervention
        of the verbal action (between them); similarly
        utterance governs the relation between a word
        and its meaning.

409.   When several meanings may be conveyed by one
        word and several words may convey one meaning,
        a word operates on that meaning towards which
        the speaker directs it. *412*

410.   Some say that Vedic words are meaningless when
        they are repeated (for practice) and when they
        are being taught to others they have their forms
        as their meaning. *413*

411.   Those who uphold the doctrine of the sameness
        of the word throughout all the instances of its
        occurence consider these same (Vedic words) as
        expressing (a 'thing-meant' as their) meaning
        (when they are employed in sacrificial actions)
        due to the difference in (the purpose of) their
        utterance , and due to their being (thus) directed
        otherwise. *414*

412.   Those who consider that the word is different in
        every so-called instance of its occurence, hold
        that these are really different words and are only

treated under one class-form as, for instance, the words 'akṣa' and others are. [415]

413. (Therefore, according to them), the speaker has not got to aim the word at the meaning (it is to convey) apart from (merely) uttering it. Because a word has the fixed capacity to ~~mean~~ denote a particular object, it remains ~~located~~ connected to that meaning. [416]

414. (And) it is the (real) difference (between apparently identical words) which is understood from (factors like) the meaning of another word, and situation-context and not at all the employment of words-with-one-meaning in another meaning.

415. Our discussion is about the sentence, which appears as a word and is dependent on the verb 'asti' (for its character of being a sentence); and not about a word which is part of a sentence. [417]

416. Just as (according to the Pada- ~~your~~ School) letters which individually have no meanings present a specific word-meaning, similarly (according to our school) words which have no meanings (of their own) present (the sentence which has a specific meaning.

417. That cognition of the meaning of ~~the~~ words, which
arises in the interim is a means to the understanding
(of the meaning of the sentence), since we do not
understand (the meaning of the sentence) in the
beginning. 418

418. The nature of the meaning of the sentence is
discussed.   First the view ~~held by~~ the according to Ānvitābhidhāna-
vāde ~~school~~ of the Mīmāmsaka is stated):-
At the time when the meaning (of each subsequent
words) is associated with the meaning of the
preceding words, the coalescence (of the individual
word-meanings) resides as an accomplished fact in
these word-meanings. 419

419. According to some, the means is implied in the object
which is to be effected. The actual mentioning of
the case-relationships again is to restrict their
sphere-of-operation.

420. Without this restriction of the sphere-of-operation
no direct implication of it (ie, the means) appears.
It has a possible existence through potentiality and
the actual mention of it is to rule out other
(possibilities).

421. The action (which is the meaning of the verb), which is

different from other actions and the means of
which has a specific sphere-of-operation (ie,
itself), is here stated (as the meaning of the
sentence).   words (used in the sentence) are for
the hearers to understand the meaning (of the
sentence).

422.   (The Akhanda-position about the sentence and its
meaning is stated):-
According to others the sentence as well as its
meaning is an integral entity revealed by the words
which are in a certain order, but it itself does
not show the order of the words.

423.   We do not investigate the real nature of that
which (obviously) has a form of its own. It is
only when a thing does not have such a form that
we seek for its essential nature.

424.   There are others who think that the understanding
of the meaning of the sentence is not through
words. The words only give rise to a mental
recollection which has the appearance of the
meaning (of the sentence). 420

425.   (Illustration for the notion that the real nature
of things can be different from what one understands
from words):-

The burnt man understands burning in a certain
way from his contact with fire; but the meaning
'burning' is conveyed by the word 'burning' in a
different way.

426.   Just as the sense organs which possess separate
principles, and act on their objects independently
of each other cannot function except through the
body,

427. — similarly words which are ~~located~~ fixed to in their meanings
independently of each other have no meaningfulness
apart from sentences.

428.   The meaning of the sentence is grasped as of the
nature of a synthesis, when the individual word-
meanings are in mutual association. Its essential
nature is not presented(at the individual word-
meanings), ~~because~~ since it is seen as not being of the
form of the word-meanings. 421

429.   A perception is not identical with its actual
constituents (ie, the sense-data); and similarly
that formless one (ie, the meaning of the sentence)
is understood in the form of the synthesis of the
word-meanings.

430.   (Yet another argument to prove that the meaning of

the sentence is conveyed only by the sentence):-
Since a fact is conveyed either as existent or *as*
non-existent, only a sentence is used to convey it. [422]

431.   (The point is further clarified):-
The 'Word-meaning', whether positive, or negative,
is not in practice understood without its being
associated with a verb. Therefore it does not
exist.

432.   The statement 'existence' (which is a one-word-
sentence) is not understood in the form 'there is
existence' or 'there is *no* non-existence' except
through its association to the mention of a verb.

433.   When the meaning-expressed-by-a-verb is connected
with nominal accessories, its expectancy is not
satisfied without the mention of the 'existence-
idea' (ie, the meaning of the nominal accessories). [423]

434.   The action-part of the meaning of a sentence is
first picked out because of its primacy. The
nominal accessories used to effect the objective-
to-be-accomplished (ie, the verbal action) are
(therefore) secondary. However, the effect which the
action (itself) brings about is its *own* result (for
instance, the satisfaction of hunger in the case of
the verb 'bhuj').

435. It is only the speaker who conceives the notion
of ends and means or desires to construe the
meaning (of the sentence) as a system of relations
(between the end and means). 424

436. The action of 'cooking' is taken as an object in
(the sentence) 'I do cooking'. And when 'cooking'
is expressed as the action-meaning of a verb, it is
seen as an-objective-to-be-accomplished. 425.

437. With whatever use (in view) a meaning is sought
to be conveyed by the speaker, that meaning is
established like that (in that context), because a
meaning has several capacities. 426

438. Sometimes a connection (of contact) is said to exist
between the things which exist far from each other ;
and sometimes things in contact appear as being apart.

440)
441)   The separation of the (really) united, the union of
the (really) separated, the unity of the (really)
diverse and the diversity of the (really) single, -
(in this way) things are established (as existing in
opposition), either because they have many forms or
have no forms. The only binding factor (in the
determination of what is meant whenever reference is
made to them) is the word because it has its capacity
fixed. 427

442. A word is only a designation of an object, not an expression of (the essential nature of) such an object. It is not possible for words to ~~equal~~ touch (ie, to express the nature of) objects.

443. (Two examples are given to illustrate the point):- It is a 'conjunction' which is an attribute of the conjoined which is named by the word for it (ie the word 'saṃyoga'). Again, it is a relation which is implied in (the relation of)conjunction which is named 'samavāya' ('unseparable connection'). 428

444. Objects are known not in their intrinsic nature, but as they are described. The same object is described in different ways according to the use to which it is put.

445. The set-of-relationships (of the word-meanings) which resides in the meaning of the sentence is not localised in any part (of the sentence). But in discussions (ie, in 'every-day language') men talk of it as the self of the word-meanings.

446. Or it (ie, the meaning of the sentence) is not really localised anywhere in the individual word-meanings or in the aggregate. (Only), it is apparently divided into the word-meanings.

447. By that analysis (of the sentence) undertaken to
explain it as a means of understanding it, there
is presented another meaning (ie, the meaning of
the sentence) the parts of which, when analysed
show expectancy for one another.

448. It is the single (sentence-meaning) possessing
several meaning-capacities that is considered as
divided (on the basis of these capacities). That
the meaning of the sentence is a single (entity)
is understood from sentences of a small measure
(ie, having a single word, for instance). 429

449. It is a meaning which is external to the conceptual
meaning which is analysed whether such(external-
meaning) is real or not. The division of the meaning
after it is (thus) externalised is characterised
by the analysis of the component-faculties (ie,
the word-meanings)

450. Even when there are several finite verbs (in it),
a sentence is one, if they are mutually expectant.
The prohibition of the dropping of accent in a
finite verb preceded by other finite verbs is thus
meaningful. 430

451. As regards him (ie, Kātyāyana the author of the

Vārttika) who has fixed the characteristic of a
sentence as having (only) one finite verb; his
stipulation of 'one finite verb' does not mean
that the meaning of a sentence (which has several
finite verbs) is divided since there are several
sentences (as the opponent might wrongly argue).[431]

452.   In the case of (sentences) where (the verb) is linked to
another verb, or alternatively is linked to
another word (which is) linked to the first verb,
eg, the sentence 'mṛgaḥ pas'yata yāti' the
explanation that the sentence is (exclusively)
one or several does not hold. [432]

453.   (The question what makes a sentence complete is
discussed):-
That sentence in which there is expectancy for
the means (of the action stated) because of the
nature of its meaning, (but) which has no
expectancy on the word-level is (also) described
to be complete in meaning. [433]

454.   When a mere statement of a thing is made (in a
sentence) and there is something connected with it,
(even then) the sentence is complete from verbal
(completeness) without that (something) being stated.

455. In the two sentences 'Recite while moving about',
or ' Move about while reciting', although there is
no difference in the significance of the two, a
distinction (as to whether 'kram' (=move about) is primary or
secondary) can be gathered from the verbal form. 434

456. (If usages differ when meaning remains the same,
sometimes meaning ~~also~~ differs when usages do not differ):-
Actions which have (different) effects and are
dependent on other (subsidiary) actions (which help
their performance) are conveyed by the same verb-
form, without their being considered with (particular)
reference to the method (of their performance) or
their effects. 435

457. It is (in general and) as divorced from (particular)
differences that all actions are expressed by verbs.
It is impossible to distinguish the differences (between
actions) from their sentential forms.

458. In examples like 'as'vamedhena yakṣyante rājānah' and
'satram āsate brāhmaṇāh', the difference is not
conveyed by the verb-forms used.

459. The verb mentioned once, without repetition, with
reference to the 17 victims for Prajāpati, is divided
(so as to apply to each of the 17) by virtue of its

potential significance.[436]

460. (In the sentence 'Devadatta Yajñadatta Viṣṇumitrā bhojyautām') either the action of 'eating' is concluded in (each of the subjects) Devadatta, etc singly, or the sentence is split up (into three sentences) in terms of the (three) subjects).[437]

461. Sentences, when uttered are received in a certain form; and when understood are presented in a different form.

462. The Sūtra 'kartari...' [438] is a sentence which (at first) conveys a meaning in general. It then is particularised into (statements about particular objects like) an animal, etc.

463. (In fact such a comprehension of the meaning of a sentence at a subsequent reading is necessary):- If the expectancy about a thing which causes it is satisfied by listening to it once, then it (ie, the thing) cannot be connected with another (thing) by any means.

464. Thus a sentence which is finally a unity, but
has several meanings and is thus a substratum for,
and the source of, component sentences, remains as
it were non - different from them.

465. In some places a verb accomplishes its
objective in terms of particulars,(subject,
object, etc), while in some others it
accomplishes it in general terms. 439

466. Those distinctions (in verbs) which are
distinctions of tense and distinctions such
as are caused by words like 'ustrāsikā' do
not cause the essential verbal word to be
divided (in its signification) when it is used
to denote its action-meaning as a class.

467. (The converse case to that stated in 466 is
stated here, that is, the case of a sentence in which there
is one noun form and several verbal forms):-
when in a sentence the nominal form is mentioned only
once and there are verbs different from each other
by virtue of their class, etc., then the verbs are
related to it separately provided there is numerical
parity (between the verbs and the meanings of the
nouns),

468. — just as to a word like 'akṣāh' verbs like 'bhanj' ('break'), 'bhakṣ' (eat) and 'div' (gamble), different from each other are separately connected, even where there is no difference in the time of the utterance of the word (so far as the verbs are concerned) (ie, although there is only a single utterance of the word). 440

469. (The same idea is discussed according to the principle of tantra) :-

Words like 'akṣāh' which are capable of being used under a common form are used in that way. Their having the same form is the basis (of such use). These same words when separated from each other are used in succession; when used with a common form they are uttered in one. 441

470. There are two established methods in which different words are used. They are succession and union, and nobody bypasses these two.

471a. Words employed one after another have different forms; but words used in union have the same form. 442

471b. But even when words are used in union, the verb follows the pattern of their successive use.

472a. These two powers (of words), namely, the power
to remain apart or to be in union appear as if
they do not belong to words (while, in truth, they
are powers inherent in them).

472b. Even when several words are uttered under a
common form the utterance is split severally
(by the comprehending listener).

473. (A different way of interpreting the word 'akṣāh'
in the above-mentioned sentence is given):-
When it is desired to describe a composite of
several meanings (like the meaning of the word
'akṣāh') in terms of its components, then the
relationships which the latter have (namely,
being connected with the appropriate verbs from
the verb-group, etc) are associated with the
composite meaning. 443

474. (Yet other ways of looking at the problem are stated):-
On explaining words (like 'akṣāh') in terms of the
components they lend themselves for being split for
use in the individual sentences (formed from the
composite utterance 'akṣāh bhakṣyantām, bhojyantām
dīvyantām'). Or the word with its number altered,
lends itself for use in the individual sentences. 444

475a.   (The two alternatives are stated in reverse order):-
There the word 'akṣa' is used in the singular
number. 445

475b.   Or the word is used in its plural number in the
individual sentences. 446

476.   (The problem of the sentence with two meanings is
approached from the point of view of the Akhaṇḍa-
school):-
According to those who uphold the sameness of the
Word (s'abda), the meaning-capacity of the single
sentence is divided on the basis of the difference
(in the aspects) of that capacity, in sentences such
~~which~~ as have two meanings. 447

477.   (The upholders of the Bheda- ~~school~~ doctrine hold a different
view on this):-
Or we have there the use of two entirely different
statements, (the means of such use) being the
employment of a common form;   the coalesced form is
split according to the 'understander'.

478.   (The same point as in 477):-
Two words which have the same form and which were
originally apprehended as different are used in

such a way that the listeners are ~~caused~~ made to
apprehend them by the speaker under a common
form.

479a. (In this stanza the view of a section of the
       Bheda school is considered):-
       One of the two (words possible to be conveyed
       by a common form) is intended by the speaker;
       the other is conveyed incidentally.

479b. Without such intention on the part of the speaker
       the word will work with (both) meaning-capacities.

480.   Sometimes several capacities of the same thing
       are made use of at the same time. Fire is used
       in the same place both for heat and for light.

481.   (The views of the Bheda and Abheda schools are
       again summarised):-
       On hearing once a sentence which conveys several
       meanings, either through its being repeated or
       through the exercise of different powers,
       (respectively according to the Bheda and Abheda
       views,) it presents itself as being divided
       either through evidence got from other passages
       or through the principle that several capacities
       reside in the same ~~word~~ form.

482. In the case of the term 'samprasāraṇa' the
distinction (as to its application to)the letter
or the sentence on the evidence of other Sūtras
is quite properly included in that one Sūtra. 448

483. (An example how the Mahābhāṣya ~~makes use of the~~
makes use of the principle of tantra is discussed):-
Similarly it is described in the Bhāṣya itself that
in the aphorism (of Pāṇini) 'dvirvacane'ci' there
is through the mentioning of a thing once (the
conveying of its occurence twice) on the principle
of tantra. 449

484. (The next few stanzas trace the history of Sanskrit
grammar):-
When the Saṃgraha falling in the hands of such
grammarians as had a tendency to summarise and had
only a limited knowledge, became almost forgotten,

485) -and Patañjali, the master who was learned in all
486a) Vedic lore composed the Mahābhāṣya, the ~~sentence~~ source
486b) of all principles, unfathomable because of its
profundity, (and) shallow (ie, clear) because of its
excellence of style, the uneducated could not
comprehend its meaning.

487. And then, when that sacred text, which was ~~the~~ *a criticism*
      ~~adversary~~ of *the* Samgraha was submerged by Baiji,
      Saubhava and Haryakṣa, *450* the followers of dry logic.

488. - the science of grammar which (thus) slipped away
      from the disciples of Patañjali in course of time
      came to survive only in Southern versions.

489. And then the texts were procured from the mountain,
      and the science of grammar once again made the
      multi-branched one (that it was) by the teacher
      Candra and others who were followers of the
      principles of the Mahābhāṣya. *451*

490. This summary of the science (of grammar) was
      composed by my teacher after learning the various
      other systems and our own system. *452*

491. Here (ie, in Cantos I and II) only the bare
      essentials of a few systems are given. There will
      be a study in detail in Canto III.

492. Thought becomes clear by a study of different systems
      of thought. What points can possibly be contradicted
      by him who learns (only) his system. *453*

493. The knowledge of people who imagine things to be such
      and such, without (relying on) the ancient science (in
      interpreting them) and who have not studied the older
      teachers, will not be very clear.

—o—o—o—

P A R T   I I I.

Notes.

Bibliography.

Abbreviations.

Erratum.

N O T E S.

#1 1. Īs'vara Kṛṣṇa : Sāṃkhyakārikā 3

     Mādhavācārya : Sarvadars'anasamgraha

     (Biblio:Indica) Chapter 14 - p.149

     London 1944, Re-issue)
     (Translation: E.B.Cowell and A.E.Gough, : p.223)

     The
     Tattvasamāsa: III 25. (Trans:F.Max Muller-Six Systems of
     Indian Philosophy (1899.Edibind)PP.320-321.

2. Bādarāyaṇa. Vedānta Sūtras I-1·2·

     Also S'ankara's commentary on it. (Kāshi Sanskrit Series. No.71)PP.97-113

3. Of the four sections of Buddhists, it is the

     Mādhayamikas who hold the doctrine of a Universal

     Void, while the Yogācāra section holds the doctrine

     of an external Void.

     (Biblio:Indica) Sarvadars'anasamgraha, Chap.2. p.9

     (Cowell & Gough - pp.14-15)

     S'āntideva: S'ikṣāsamuccaya

     London. 1922
     (Trans: Cecil Bendall and W.H.D.Rouse) -pp.6,7 & 197.

     The
4· Th.Stcherbatsky : Soul Theory of the Buddhists

     (Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences in Russia-1920)

     p.825.

     N.
     S.Das Gupta. A History of Indian Philosophy Vol.I (Cambridge,1922)

     (Cambridge,1922) pp.133 & 138·On As'vaghoṣa's

     conception of soullessness as a kind of general

     consciousness (ālayavijñāna) the author says :

'This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view of an absolute unchangeable reality as the Ultimate truth than that of the Nihilistic Idealism of the 'Laṅkāvatāra' - p.138.

4a. In the Thesis, as a general rule 'Grammar' and 'Grammarian' refer to Sanskrit Grammar as a system of Philosophy, and 'grammar' and 'grammarian' to Sanskrit grammar as a technical science.

5. VP.I.1-4, 119, 121, 130 cf also. Sarvadars'anasamgraha, (Biblio:Indica) pp:139-140?.

(Cowell & Gough - pp:209-210).

Laghumañjūṣā (Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series No:213.1929 editio n) p:390.

oṁkāra eva sarvā vāk : saiṣā spars'oṣmabhir _ vyajyamānā bahvī nānārūpā bhavati.

S'aṅkara on Vedānta Sūtra : 1.3.28, p.352.ityādikā tatra tatra s'abdapūrvikā sṛstih s'rūvyate.

K.A.Subramonia Iyer: The Doctrine of Sphoṭa, Journal of the Gaṅgānāth Jhā Institute. February 1948 - p:147.

J.R.Firth - The Tongues of Men (London, 1937) - pp:3 - 4.

S'āntarakṣita. The Tattvasamgraha: stanza 128. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series.No.LXXXIII-Transl: Gaṅgānāth Jhā)quotes the doctrine of S'abdaBrahman for criticism

nās'otpādasamālidham brahma s'abdamayam param yattasya parināmo'yam bhāvagrāmah pratīyate.

6. VP.I. 1 & 12.

Punyarāja on 12. says : abhinnātsamhrtakramācchabda-
tattvādvarnapadavākyalakṣanam rūpavibhāgam prāptāyā
vāco'bhidheyatvenārthavibhāgopgrāham nityenārtha-
sambandhena prāptāyā vacah, yāto vāgeva -

vibhāgenāpannā gavādirūpenāvatisthate.

7. RV X-125. Cf. R.T.H. Griffiths 'The Hymns of the Rg Veda' Vol. 4. P.363 foot-note.

8. RV I-164

~~S'atapathabrāhmaṇa VI.1.9~~

~~Pañcaviṃs'a VI.1.3, X.2.1, XX.14.2.~~

9. Kāthaka XII.5 and ~~27.1~~ XXVII-1.

10. Vājas(aneyi)saṃhitā IX.1

11. S'atapatha VI.1.9.

12. Pañcaviṃs'a XX-14-2 ... cf also X-2-1

13. Aitareya X.1.

14. Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa II.6,4

15. Chāndgya II 23 3-4

   cf also Brhadāraṇyaka I.2. 5

16. Gospel according to St.John - Chap.I - p: 1 & 2.
    cf. also Genesis I.3.

17. See Note 6 above.

18. VP-I-2- yadvikāravikārivisayamekatvarūpam -

                          Puṇyarāja on above.

    cf. J.R.Firth, M.A. - The Technique of Semantics
    (Transactions of the Philological Society 1935)p.36
    'And change implies something permanent which changes,
     the permanent persisting in and through the change'.

19. This comparison is borrowed and adapted from Pandit
    Sri Suryanarayaṇa S'ukla. (Kāshi Sanskrit Series No.24). See his commentary on VP-I-2.

20. S'ankara on Vedanta Sutra 1.3.28, ǀ h 353.

api ca cikīrṣitamarthamanutiṣṭhaṃstasya vacakam

s'abdam pūrvaṃ smṛtvā pas'cāttamarthamanutiṣṭhatītī

sarveṣāṃ naḥ pratyakṣametat. tathā prajāpaterapi

srastuḥ sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvaṃ vaidikaḥ s'abdā manasi

prādurbabhūvuḥ,pas'cāttadanugatānarthān sasarjeti

gamyate.

Regarding words being essential for all knowledge

and action see VPI 119-130.

The Tattvasaṃgraha quotes the argument for

criticism. See Transl. Gangānath Jhā - p:119.

21. VP.III. Sambandha samuddes'a sl. 85

~~the first enumerated version~~

quoted by Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha, - Chap.XIII -

p : 146 (Cowell & Gough - p:219).

Referring to the two theories on the nature of

the meaning of words held by the two ancient

grammarians Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi, namely, that

words meant the universal, and that they meant the

particular, respectively, and also to Panini's view

that both were acceptable, the Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha

(p:146) says: 'tasmāt dvayaṃ satyam; paraṃ

brahmatattvaṃ sarvas'abdārtha iti sthitham......'

See also F. Max Muller - The Six Systems of Indian
~~(New York etc.)~~ (Longmans)
Philosophy. - p: 552.

22.   VP-I- 133.

Also VP-I· 14 which describes grammar ~~which~~ dealing
with the exposition of words as the gateway to
liberation.

Sarvadars'anasamgraha - Chap. XIII -pp:146-147
(Cowell & Cough - pp:219-220).

23.   VP-II - 233a & b. and 237.

24.   VP-II- 240.

25.   N āges'aBhatta. Sphoṭavāda (Adyar;Edition)p:101. 1946·

evaṃ ca vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca brahmaiveti dhyeyam

26.   VP-I.132 - Puṇyarāja on it :

iha dvau s'abdātmānau kāryo nityaśca; tatrādyo
vyāvahārikaḥ puruṣasya vāgātmanaḥ pratibimbopagrā-
hī antyastu sarvavyavahārayonih, saṃhṛtakramaḥ
sarveṣāmantaḥ sannives'ī prabhavo vikāraṇamas'rayaḥ.

See also VP-I. 130 -

Puṇyarāja commenting on it says :-

' sarvo hi vikāraātmamātreti kesāñciddars'anam; sa ca
pratipuruṣamantaḥsannivisṭo bāhya iva pratyavabhāsate.'

Cf also V.Krishnamacarya. Introduction to Sphoṭavāda, Adyar:
1946 - p:17) -

'etadeva s'abdabrahma sarvagatamapi prāṇinām
mulādhāre kuṇḍalinyaṃ jñātamartham vivakṣoh puṃsa

icchaya prayatnapurvakam krtavataranena pavanena

samyujyamanamabhivyajyate.

27.   cf. Sarvadars'anasamgraha (p.140) (Cowell and Gough),

pp: 209-210) using the term sphota to refer to

S'abdaBrahan.
             m
                K

........jagannidanam sphotakhyo niravayavo nityah

s'abdo brahmaiveti.

cf. also S'ankara on the Vedanta Sutra 1.3.28, p.353

kimatmakam punah s'abdamabhipretyedam

s'abdaprabhavatvamucyate ? Sphotamityaha.

                 which,
28. ' VP. 1.144, however, mentions only three, pas'yanti,

madhyama and Vaikhari.   But as V.Krishnamacharya

in his Introduction to Sphotavada (p:18) says,

Bhartrhari is, in this context extolling the greatness

of grammar and is, thus, mentioning the three kinds

of speech which come within the province of

grammar.   Even pas'yanti, although it is beyond

the boundaries of ordinary use contains in itself,

so far as the Yogis are concerned, a distinction

between base and suffix.   Only the Para Vak is

fundamentally free from every kind of distinction.

See Laghumañjuṣāvyākhyā Kalā (chowkambā Skt series N.
(1929 Edition)
218, p.179 (quoted also by V.Krishnamacarya - Introduction
Sphoṭavāda same page) '' tatra svaparo'rotraviṣayā
vaikharī ; madhyamā hṛdayades'asthā
padapratyakṣānupapattyā vyavahārakāraṇam; pas'yantī
tu lokavyavahārātītā; yoginām tu tatrāpi prakṛti-
pratyayavibhāgāvagatirasti; parāyām tu na.'
Punyarāja, commenting on the stanza says that the
three kinds of speech mentioned exist in man in
association with the fourth and the purely
impersonal kind.   He goes on to quote the oft-
quoted Vedic lines 'catvāri vāk parimitā padāni
tāni viduḥ brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ (RV I.164.45) as
referring to speech at these four stages.
cf. Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti :   The Philosophy
(Calcutta·1930)
of Sanskrit Grammar - p:20.
The Mahābhāṣya, however, interprets this Ṛg Veda
passage in a different way.   The four kinds of vāk
are described as the four parts of speech, noun,
verb, prefixes and particles. See MBh Vol.I - p13 -
lines 23-26 (Edition- F. Kielhorn. Bombay)

29.   VP. I. 44.

cf MBh· Vol.I - p:3 - line-18.

dve s'īrṣe, dvau s'abdātmānau nityah kāryaśca.

cf. Also MBh·Vol· I - p:181

dhvaniḥ sphoṭaśca s'abdānāṃ dhvanistu khalu lakṣyate;

alpo mahāṃśca keṣāṃcidubhayaṃ tatsvabhāvataḥ.

30. VP·I·45. This stanza, ~~however~~, states that according
to the upholders of the doctrine that an effect is
fundamentally different from its causeṣ, there is a
fundamental difference between ~~the~~ sphoṭa and dhvani.

31. cf. Notes 5 and 6 above and also see pages 5 - 17
above.

See Saṃgraha ₐ Vyāḍi quoted by Punyarāja in his commentary on VP·I·44
''avibhakto vibhaktebhyo jāyate'rthasya vācakaḥ;

s'abdastatrārtharūpātmā saṃbhedamupagacchati.

Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha - p:146. abhyupagatādvitīyatva-
nirvāhāya vācyavācakayoravibhāgaḥ pradars'itaḥ
(Cowell and Gough. p:219).

cf. Pandit Srī Suryanārāyaṇa Sukla: Commentary on
VP·I.47 ~~(Kashi Sanskrit series 124) p:42.~~

etaduktaṃ bhavati - bauddhasya s'abdasya
bauddhenārthenādhyāsarūpātsaṃketāt bauddhas'abdārthayo-
stādātmyamupagamyate iti bauddhe s'abde arthabodhajñkā
vācyavācakabhāvarūpā s'aktirastītyavagamyate.

On the identity between a word and its meaning cf.

E. Sapir, Language, (London-1921) p:12

'The question has often been raised whether thought is

possible without speech; further, if speech and
thought be not but two facets of the same psychic
process.'

32.   VP·I·46 and Puṇyarāja on it.
......tathaiva s'abdabhedabhāvanākhyatattvānugate
buddhitattve yoyaḥ sthānakaraṇādyanugṛhīto
vivartate sa vyañjakadhvanibhedānupātena paurvā
paryavānupalabhyamanaḥ svarūpapararūpayoḥ
prakās'ako bhavati

33.   See page 8 above.

34.   sphuṭībhavatyasmādartha iti sphoṭaḥ · The
Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha giving this etymology of the
word also presents another etymology, namely,
sphuṭyate (vyajyate) varṇairiti sphoṭaḥ.
Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha (p:141) (Cowell & Gough-p:211)
It is probably based on this latter etymology
that the term 'sphoṭa' has been translated into
English as the 'outburst of a conglomerate sound'
by Satischandra Vidyabhusana (See his History of
Indian Logic, (Calcutta, 1921) pp:131-132). But sphoṭa is not a
sound; it is a word-unit as a meaning-conveying
element (vācaka) which is revealed by the sounds.
'Its fundamental attachment is to the other side of
the linguistic situation, namely, meaning

.....The Sphota, then, is simply the linguistic
sign in its aspect of meaning-carrier
(Bedeutungstrager) ' (See 'Theories of General
Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians', a paper
read by Prof.J.Brough, D.Litt., before a meeting
of the Philological Society ~~of Great Britain~~, 3rd
March 1951)~ Unpublished)

35.   JayantaBhatta: Nyayamañjari ahnika 6.
iti vitataya varna ete dhiya visayekrtam
dadhati padatam vakyatvam va ta eva ca vacaka
na ca tadaparah sphotah s'rotre vibhatyavabodhane
naca vidhihato vacye buddhim vidhatumasau ksamah
(Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 106.   p: 355)
Also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana   -   A History
of Indian Logic - pp:148-149.

36.   Kumarila Bhatta in his Slokavarttika gives a
detailed criticism of the sphota-doctrine. See
Slokavarttika (Madras University Skt Series No.13).
pp:441-4.74
ittham kramagrhitanam yugapadvathava para
sthitih sa karanam tu syannityamarthadhiyam prati
                                                     p:467.
                A.B.   (Calcutta,1921)
Keith: Karmamimamsa, p:36

K.A.Subramonia Iyer: The Doctrine of Sphota.

(The Journal of the Gaṅgānath Jhā Research
Institute - Vol.V - Part 2. Feb.1948)pp:125-
126.

Of the other schools of Philosophy, the Sāṃkhya
school rejects the idea of sphoṭa as
incomprehensible. To them letters are sufficient
to express meaning , and as we notice no other
element apart from letters, there is no other
element. See Sāṃkhya Sūtras 5.57
pratītyapratītibhyāṃ na sphoṭātmakaḥ s'abdaḥ.
Also 5.58. na s'abdanityatvaṃ kāryabāpratīteḥ.
See also Max Muller : 'The Six Systems of Indian
Philosophy - p:539 - 40.

The Yoga school favours the sphoṭa-doctrine.
See YogaSūtra (3 . 17).17 and Vyāsa on it.
Max Muller 'The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy'
pp: 539—540

The Vedātins do not agree with the Grammarians.
See S'aṅkara on Vedānta Sūtra I. 3.28 and Max
Muller - 'The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy.'
pp: 536 - 538.

37.   See Chapter 4 - pp:76-78.

38.   VP-I 48,49.

39.   VP-I 75-78, 102 and 104.

       cf MBh·Vol. I - p:181 - lines 13-24.

       (See Note 29 above).

       siddham tvavasthitā varṇā vaktuściraciravacanādvṛttayo

       (Vārttika)

       vis'iṣyante........evam tarhi.....sphoṭaśca

       tāvāneva bhavati dhvanikṛtā vṛddhiḥ ·

               dhvani sphoṭaśca........

                       ....tatsvabhāvataḥ

40.   See Note 39 above.

41.   VP-I 46.   tadvacchabdo'pi buddhisthaḥ s'rutīnāṃ

                   karaṇaṃ pṛthak

               47.   karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so ' nugṛhyate

               48.   nādasya kramajātatvāt.......

42.   VP-I 113.

       and Pandit śrī Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla on it (112. in his text)

43.   VP-I 48.

44.   VP-I 75,76, 102.

45.   VP-I 77, 78,102

46   VP-I 77.

47.   VP-I 75, 76.

       cf. Puṇyarāja on VP I 83

       evam varṇapada vākyaviṣayāḥ

       prayatnavis'eṣasādhyā dhvanayaḥ

varṇapadavākyākhyān sphoṭān punaḥ punarā -

virbhāvayanto buddhiṣvadhyāropayanti.

The prakṛtadhvani which reveals the sphoṭa is a

produced entity - a product of the activity of

the speech-organs and the speech-centres.

Also Puṇyarāja on VP-I· 79.

tatra kecinmanya dhvanirutpadya-

mānaḥ s'rotraṃ saṃskurvañcchabdopalabdhau dvāratāṃ

pratipadyate.

The dhvani referred to in the stanza and by

Puṇyarāja, also includes the prākṛtadhvani, since

it is a dhvani which does the function of revealing

(abhivyañjana) s'abda (sphoṭa) and it is

utpadyamāna (produced).

48.   VP-I· 82.

49.   This is the significance of the akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa

(the indivisible sentence as the most complete

meaning-conveying unit) being placed at the very top

of a series of meaning-conveying units starting

from varṇasphoṭa (the letter as a meaning-conveying

unit) onwards.

50.   VP-II· 7,8,9,13,57,58a— 61.

Puṇyarāja on 7 above

yathā vākyaṃ nirvibhāgaṃ

sphoṭalakṣaṇam vācakaṃ tathā

vākyārtho'pi tathāvidha eva itya -

nayorekayogakṣematvamuktam.

cf. Alan H. Gardiner ∧The Theory of Speech and Language∧ (Oxford·1932)

pp: 62-63

'Not the least important conclusion which will

emerge from our discussion is that 'the word'

is the unit of language, whereas the sentence

is 'the unit of speech'.   Compare the statement

that 'the word is the unit of language to p:22

above - para 1).

51.   VPII 327a, b, ~~and~~ 328a, ∧and∧ 430-434.

52.   A. De Groot, Word ∧1949·∧ Vol.5 No.1 - p:3

      B.Malinowski (Coral Gardens and ∧their∧ Magic, Vol.II̅ p. 22) (London·1935)

      however, says that 'a one-word sentence such as

      a command 'come', 'go', 'rise', a 'yes' or 'no'

      may under exceptional circumstances be significant

      through its context of situation only. Usually

      a one-word sentence will have to be explained by

      connecting it with utterances which preceded ∧it∧ or

      ∧which∧ followed ∧it∧

53.   VP.II. 10

54.   A · H · Sayce. Introduction to ∧the∧ Science of Language Vol.I∧ - p:112 (4th Edition·London·1900)

55.   VP·II· 13.

56.   VP·II· 7-13.

57.   VP·I · 91,92,93·

58.   See Note 50 above.

above

59. See Note 55. Also VP·I· 85, II· 57.

The listener is as important as the speaker in the scheme of the concept of sphota. In fact, since sphota is primarily conceived as an integral *meaning-* conveying element, the question can be considered to be approached *primarily* from the listener's angle. See Note 34 above. However, the question of the integral nature of the sentence at the receiving end is complementary to the question of its integral nature at the speaker's end. Hence the Sphoṭa-vādin's concept of an integral speech-entity being revealed as an integral meaning-conveying entity.

60. VP·I· 52.

Punyarāja on it: yathā mūrtyantarasya puruṣādermūtirālikhitumiṣṭā kramo *pa* labdhāpyeka-buddhiviṣayatvam prāptā paṭakudyādiṣu kramenākriyate, tathā vyavahāriko vaikharīrūpaḥ s'abdaḥ kramagrāhyo'pi pratisaṃhṛtakramaḥ ekabuddhiviṣayo bhūtvā niravayavakramarūpena buddhiviṣayo'ntaḥkaraṇe bhū*t*vāntaḥkaraṇavṛttirū-padhvanidharmapratipatyā punarapi vyavahāra-mavatarati.

Contrast: Otto Jespersen *The* Philosophy of Grammar, *(London. 1924)* p: 26.

'Apart from fixed formulas a sentence does not spring into a speaker's mind all at once, but is framed gradually as he goes on speaking'.

cf. this view with the definition of the sentence as 'a sequence of the words' - see p:55 above.

Contrast this view with: Alan H. Gardiner: The Theory of Speech and Language - p:29 -

'And is it not, at first sight a plausible view that words constitute the whole truth of speech?'

61. Sphotacandrikā (Reprint. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series Benares,1929) p.9.

tatrākhandah padātirikto'khandapadavyangyo lāghavātsvīkriyate.

62. VP.II. 58a and b.

63. See pp.20-24 above.

64. VP.II. 62.

65. Rgveda prātis'ākhya II . 1.

66. VPII.59a and b. The Taittirīya prātis'ākhya III.1 considers the Samhitā as the original text The same V. 2 takes the Pada text as the original one cf. Siddheswar Varma: Critical Studies in the Phonetic Observations of Indian Grammarians (London 1929) - p:24 .

67. VP.II.59a and b .

Punyarāja on VP.II.59b - akhandapakse padaprakrtih samhitā iti sasthisamāsena vyākhyāyate ityarthah.

68. cf. MB·Vol.III - p:117 - lines 18 and 19.

na lakṣaṇena padakārā anuvartyāḥ; padakārairnāma
lakṣaṇamanuvartyam. *yathā lakṣaṇam padam kartavyaṃ*

69. VP·II· 61.

70. VP·II· - 61.

71. VP·II - 62.

72. VP·II - 63.

73. VP·II - 64a and b.

74. Puṇyarāja on ~~the~~ 64 b :

tasmādyathā samudita parasparas'aktyāves'ādvarṇā
vācakā evam padānyapi tathaiva iti varṇapadavyatirktaṃ
vākyam nāma nāstiti

cf. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: Slokavārttika : Section on
Sphoṭavāda. See Note 56 above.

75. Puṇyarāja on VP·II·65.

yadi ca padārthanibandhano vākyārthāvabhāso
naṅgīkriyate tadā pratinidhikalpanam
pikādiniyatapadapras'naḥ s'rutivākyayorvirodhe
s'rutirbalīyasītyavāntaravākyanāmarthavattvam
ca na syāllakṣaṇāmupapattiśceti pañca coadyānyāpatanti

76. VP·II· 65-73.

76a. VP·II· 72 above.

76b. 66 and 67 above.

76c. 68 above.

76d. 69,70,71 above.

76e. II·73 above.

77. VP·II - 74.

78. Punyarāja on above :

asti ca tadarthe kasyacitsandeha

iti pṛthagevārthavanti padāni

vijñātāni vākyamityeva

vaktum yuktam.

79. VP·II - 75-77.

79a. Punyarāja on VP·II, - 75 above :

iha s'rutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthāna -

samākhyālakṣaṇāḥ saṃdigdha vākyārthavicāre

vākyavidāṃ prasiddhāḥ.

Also see s'āstradīpikā (Transl. D. Venkatramiah No. LXXXIX) p. 3. foot-note 8. *Gaekād's Oriental Series*

79b. VP·II - 75 above.

79c. VP·II - 76 above.

79d. Punyarāja on VP·II - 75 above :

teṣāṃ (lakṣaṇānāṃ) ca parasparavirodhe pūrvaḥ pūrvo

balīyāniti vyavasthāpyate

79e. Punyarāja on on VP·II - 75 above :

ataḥ s'rautasyaiva sambandhasya

vākyādbalīyastvādanyatarabhāve'pi

s'rutiprāpitamālambhanamanuṣṭhitamiti na

kaścicchrutibādhaḥ.

79f. Punyarāja on VP·II - 75 above :

nirgunasya dravyasyabhāvacchveta -

guṇasaṃyuktasyālambhanam kriyā -

samarthyaprāpitam s'rautameva vyaktā -

rthasphuṭīkaraṇāya s'vetamālabheta iti

s'vetaṭi tat saṃṛddhyate..... tatas'ca

sākṣād dravyaguṇayoḥ s'rutāvanuṣaṅgo'bhi -

sambandhaḥ s'rutireva tatra liṅgavākyayor -

bādhiketi na vākyasambandha s'tatra bhavati.

79g. VP.II - 77 above and Puṇyarāja on it.

80. VP.II - 78.

80a. Puṇyarāja on above :

tatas'ca yugapatsakalas'āstrasya grahaṇam

pratipādanam vā na sambhavati iti

sakalavyavahārocchedaḥ.

81. VP.II - 79-89.

82. VP.II - 90.

83. Puṇyarāja on 90 above :

tattaditarapadārthavyāvṛttisamā -

s'rayaṇena ca jātyādivyavahāraḥ kas'cinnirvāhyate

84. VP.II - 91.

85. VP.II - 92.

86. Puṇyarāja on 92 above :

evamapoddhārasamās'rayaṇena

sarvanyāyasamarthane kṛte

tatsamānayogakṣematayā pratinidhiḥ

s'rutivākyavirodhas'ca samarthita eva

(The Benares Text reads " stutivākyavirodhaśca "

:This is obviously an error. It is corrected

into '' s'rutivākyaviroddhaśca'').

87. VP.II - 93.

Puṇyarāja on the same :

paramārthatastu saṃvittasya sarvatra

nirvibhāge tasmin kutaścitkāraṇānnopapannā :

sarvatrāyamasaṃvidaṃ tāvatpunaḥ pratipadyate.

88. VP.II - 94.

Puṇyarāja on the same : paramārthatastu

pikādiyogātsakalamevātyantavilakṣaṇam.

89. VP.II - 95, 96.

Also 92 above.

89a. See his commentary V.P.II. 94

90. VP.II - 114.

91. VP.II - 114.

92. VP.II - 97.

93. Puṇyarāja on 97 above :

yadi padāny eva satyāni tadā dadhyanaya ityādi

saṃhitāyaṃ rūpavinās'ātpadasya niyatasyābhāve

kamavadhiṃ gṛhītvā tadartho vivicyate; ataḥ

pravibhāgas'ūnyam vākyamevaikam abhyupagantavyam satyam

94. VP.II - 98, 99, 111-113, 477. See also Puṇyarāja on V.P.II.477.
     on the two meanings of the sentence

95. See below, same page. See also
     See also note 399 above

96. VP.II - 207.

97. VP.II - 212

Also see 213 and 214.

98. VP.II - 215.

99. VP-II - 208.

100. VP-II - 218, 219.

~~anyavṛttiḥ~~

101. VP-II - 221 - See Pāṇini II.2-24.

anyapadārthapradhāno bahuvrīhiḥ —MBh. vol. 1. p.379 . ℓ 2.

102. VP-II - 221

cf. Pāṇini II.1.6

103. VP-II - 1 and 2.

104. Puṇyarāja on the same :

tatrākhandapakṣe jātiḥ saṃghātavartiinyekonavay avaḥ

s'abdo buddhyanusaṃhṛtiriti trīṇi lakṣaṇāni.

khandapakṣe tu ākhyātas'abdaḥ kramaḥ saṃghātaḥ

padamādyaṃ pṛthaksarvapadaṃ sākāṅkṣam iti pañcalakṣaṇāni.

~~105. VP-II - 3-6.~~

105. cf. ~~See~~ VP-II-1, 327b and 328a.

The verb, on the other hand, was not considered by the

Nyāya school as essential to a sentence.

Jagadis'a:
See Sabdasaktiprakas'ikā. Kārikā 13.

A.V. Isac'enko's definition of the sentence quoted by

106. cf. J.R.Firth - ''Atlantic Linguistics'' ~~~~

(Archivum Linguisticum ~~III~~ I. ii 1949) p. 113

107. kriyā kriyāntarādbhinnā niyatādhārasādhanā-VP-II -421.

cf. The problem of Bedeutungsverschiebung as

included in Bedeutungslehre as a linguistic discipline

in German.   See J.R.Firth 'The Technique of

Semantics'. (Transactions of the Philological Society

1935) p:38.

~~Also cf. F.W.Thomas – Transactions of the~~

~~Philological Society 1943 – p. 13.~~

108. VP-II – 41—49 and 55.

109. VP-II-1, 42. cf. S'āstradīpikā – p: 22.

~~See~~   '' As against such an objection the
Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa states that the meanings of
words themselves discarding all dependence
either on relation (between the word and its
sense) or on convention become the valid means
of apprehending the import of propositions. ''
(This is the Abhihitānvayavāda).''

See also: Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana – A History
of Indian Logic – pp. 147-148

Also: C.Kunhan Rāja : Introduction to Bṛhatī Part II
University Sanskrit
(Madras Series-No.3) P.26 ·

'according Again to Kumārila the words convey the meaning of
the object as a mere thing and in a sentence these
things are brought into relation.'

D.M.Datta : 'The Six ways of Knowing.' (London, 1932) –pp: 289-293

110. VP-II – 43.

111. Puṇyarāja on VP-II – 44 :

athātra samghātapakṣa eva prakārāntareṇānvitābhi-
dhānapradars'anātpadārtha eva vākyārtha iti
prakramituṃāha.

111a. For a discussion of the differences between the
Abhitānvayavāda and the Anvitābhidhāna vāda see
Pārthasārathi Mis'ra, S'āstradīpikā ~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~ Chapter VII.

112. VP-II - 44.

112a. Same as above.

113. cf. C Kunhan Rājā - Introduction to Bṛhatī Part II
(Madras Oriental Series) p:26
Satis Chandra Vidyābhuasana - A History of Indian
Logic' - ~~ pp. 147—148
D.M.Datta: The Six Ways of Knowing' pp. 289— 293
A. Berriedale Keith. Karmamīmāṃsā - p:39.

114. VP-II - 45.

115. VP-II - 47.

116. VP-II 1, 50-54 and 56.

117. VP-II 50 above - Puṇyarāja on the same :
padārtheṣu devadattādipada ~~~~~ yāeyeṣu
gokarmikāyāṃ abhyājakriyāyāṃ devadattapadārthasya
kartṛtvaṃ gopadārthasya devadattakartṛkāyāṃ
karmatvamityā dayo vis'eṣā santa eva padebhyaḥ
krameṇa pratītebhyo'vaganyanta iti krama eva vākyam

See S'āstradīpikā - p:226.

The author who is a Bhāṭṭa, quotes the Prābhākara view of a sequence(krama) of words being considered as the sentence "If it be said that the words indicate the identical relation which they were observed to indicate when, juxtaposed in a particular order, they were used by the elders, and none other, that (argument) applies equally to the meaning of words. And those meanings of words also (brought together consciously) in order that the meaning of one word may get into relation with that of another, yield the meaning of the sentence (as a whole) so that there is no blemish" Thus while the Prābhākaras hold the 'sequence-definition' of the sentence, sequence also forms an essential part of the Bhāṭṭa doctrines about the sentence. Only, in the place of the Prābhākara notion of 'the sequence of words' the Bhāṭṭas have the notion of 'the sequence of word-meanings'. See also Note 56 above.

118. VP.II - 53a above.

119. VP.II - 52 above.

120. VP.II - 54 above.

121. VP.II - 2, 17, 18a and b.

cf. The above definition of a sentence as a sequence

of words. In fact, all the three are held by
the Anvitābhidhānavēdins, ie, the Prābhākara School
of Mīmāmsā.

122. See the Anvitābhidhāna view discussed above
p:53-55.

122a. Puṇyarāja on VP.II.17 :
Sakalaviś'eṣakhacitaśca
prathamataramevopakrāntaḥ samsṛṣṭa
evārtho vākyārthaïti

123. VP.II - 17 and 18a.

124. Puṇyarāja on VP.II - 18b. :
na ca tasmādeva vākyārthapratītirdṛś'yate.

125. Puṇyarāja on the same :
atho samastebhya eva tebhyaḥ sarvathottarāṇi
padāni vākyārthapratītaya upādīyanta evetyanvi-
tābhidhānamasamañjasameva.

126. VP.II - 17 and 45.

127. VP.II - 18b. Puṇyarāja on VP.II.17 :
uttarakālam gavādipada sambandhādviś'iṣṭā
pratipattirabhivyajyate iti tadevavākyam ·
                    (Puṇyarāja on VP.II.17)
abhivyaktābhivyañjaka vākyārthāvagatiriti padā-
ntarāṇām vākye nāstyeva vaiyarthyam.....
                    (Puṇyarāja on VP.II - 18b.)

128. VP II 1,20,21.

129. VP II - 20.

130. cf. Nāgeṣabhaṭṭa:Sphoṭavāda - pp:96-97.

'idaṃ ghaṭapadam, idaṃ ghaṭapadam iyaṃ pravṛkṛtih, iyaṃ

pravṛkṛtih, ayaṃ pratyayah, ayaṃ pratyayah, idaṃ

ghaṭamānayeti vākyam, idaṃ ghaṭamānayeti vākyam'

ityekākārapratītyā ghaṭapadajñānatvādinā kāraṇatve

kāraṇatāvacchedaka kotipraviṣṭatayā ca

jātiviśeṣasyavaśyakatvāt. na ca varṇānupūrvyaiva

pratītikāraṇatvayornirvāhaḥ, ghaṭa derapi

ⁱsamyogaviśeṣaviśiṣṭamṛdādibhirevānya-

thāsiddhyāpatteḥ.

131. See VP. I - 94.

cf. Sphoṭavāda p:99 on the same:

anekābhirvarṇavyaktibhih vyaṅgyā jātireva sphoṭo

vācikābhipretā kaścit.

132. VP II - 21

atyantabhede tattvasya sarūpeva pratīyatē

133. VP.II same :

tulyopavyañjanā śrutiḥ

134. VP II - 19.

Puṇyarāja on the same :

anenaiko'navayavah ityuddiṣṭasya vyaktisphoṭasya ˢ'abda

svarūpamuktamiti bodhyam.

135. Bhartṛhari, in fact, states the Jātisphoṭa-
     position as the view propounded by 'some'(kaiścit).

136. cf. V.Krishnamācārya - Introduction to The
     Sphoṭavāda. pp. 27-28.
     tathā ca tattadupādhyavicchinnaḥ sphoṭa eva
     vyaktipadenocyate; tattadupādhyupalakṣito
     jātipadenocyate ityaṅgīkarsnīyam

137. VP.II - 1, 30-33.

138. Puṇyarāja on above : VP II-30
     anavayavam bodhasvabhāvam s'abdārthamayam
     nirvibhāgam s'abdatattvam.

139. VP.II - 31.

140. VP.II - 32.

141. VP.II - 33.

142. VP.II - 31a
     Puṇyarāja on the same :
     na kevalam vākyam tathā yavadvākyārtho'pyakhaṇḍaḥ
     pratibhātmakaḥ padārthabhāgairabhivyajyata iti
     prasaṅgādāhā.

143. VP.II - 145.
     Puṇyarāja on same :
     ekā pratibhā padārtha matīvyatiriktaiva jāyate.

144. VP.II - 147.

145. VP.II - 146.
146.   - do -
148. VP.II - 148-152

148. VP II - 148.

149. VP II - 150.

150. It is interesting to note that in the saint and in the monkey fundamentally the same insight functions through speech.

cf. J.R. Firth 'The Tongues of Men' - p:109.

'A great deal of language behaviour is a manifestation of all these feelings or "senses" many of which it must be remembered we share with the animals'.

The insight (pratibhā) which functions in men and animals and other creatures is, however, more than the manifestation of the 'feelings' or 'senses' which Professor Firth mentions in this context. It is the function of the soul, of a personality constituted by more than feelings and senses, something of the like of which Wiclif says :

'All the personality of man standeth in the spirit of him'. (See citation in N.E.D. quoted in by J.R. Firth — The Sociological Review - Vol. XLII. Section Two. 1950 'Personality and Language in Society' ∧ - p: 46).

See page 65 and Note 146 above.

150a. VP II - 148, 153, 154, also 119.

cf. Again J.R. Firth - 'Personality and Language in Society' p.46 (The Sociological Review - Vol. XLII, 1950).

'If we accept the view expressed in Johnson's citation of Locke, we must consider language, like personality, as a systematic linking of the past with the present and with the future'.

By 'The scripture learnt in a previous life', Bhartṛhari, however, means the soul's scriptural (special sense, ~~one~~ in a linguistic) experience in a past life although the idea of the soul's connection with the past in the form of the generations of the human race is not entirely absent. cf. (p:71 - ~~below~~ above paras 2 and 3) the Buddhistic notion of meaning which according to Puṇyarāja is not different from the notion of pratibhā.

151.   VP-II - 148, 149. Also 120.

152.   VP-II - 149. Also 119.

153.   VP-II - 151 and 152.

154.   ākhyātaṃ sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam ekatiṅ
        See also VP-II - 3, 5 and 6, and   - Vārttika on Pāṇini
        Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP-II - 1 and 2. P.64.   II. 1.1.

155.   VP-II - 4.
        See also Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP-II 1 and 2. P. 64.

156.   VP-II - 4, 115,
        ~~See also Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP-II 1 and 2. P.64~~
        Puṇyarāja on VP-II - 4 :

        ekārthamekaprayojanaṃ

                                        (Göteborg: 1931)
        cf. Gustaf Stern - Meaning and Change of Meaning ʌ
        pp:19-21.

'The effective function must, I think, be the most

important of the primary functions......' (p:20).

cf. B.Malinowski - Coral Gardens and their Magic Vol.II

.p:52.

'Language is primarily an instrument of action
and not a means of telling a tale, of entertaining
or instructing from a purely intelligent point
of view.'

See also same - p:7.

158. VP.II - 6,450

158. tiṇatinaḥ. See also II.1.1, VIII.1.19 &
VIII.1.22.

See Aṣṭādhyāyī (Transl: S.C.Vasu Vol.I (Allahabad.1891) - p:1502,
1503 and 1508.)

cf. MBh - Vol.I - p:367 - lines 18-21 (also VOL III
p:373 - lines 10-13)

sāmānavākya iti prakṛtya nighātayuṣmadasmadādes'ā
vaktavyaḥ. kim prayojanam. nānāvākye
mā bhūvan. nighātādaya iti. ayam daṇḍo haraṇena. odanam paca
tava bhaviṣyati odanam paca mama bhaviṣyati.
See Notes 326 & 327 below

158a. cf.MBh.Vol I - p:368 - line 7.

159. See p:52 above.

160. Puṇyarāja on VP.II - 1 and 2 - p:66.

tattadanādivākyarthavikalpāhitavāsanāprabodhajanmā...
na tanmatānusāreṇa vākyavākyārthayorihāsamgraho
veditavyaḥ.

161. See pages 64 and 65 above.

162. See Puṇyarāja on VP·II – 1 and 2. P. 66·

naiyyayikanam tu......

...........................prāyas'aḥ

samsargapakṣa evāsyāntarbhāva iti natadasamgrahenā-

vyāptiratra vaktavyā

See Jagadīs'a. S'abdas'aktiprakās'ikā karikā 3

Sākānkṣas'abdairyo bodhastadarthānvayagocaraḥ

so'yam niyantritārthatvanna pratyakṣam na cānumā Kārikā 3

asti tāvadgaurasti gamanayetyadisākānkṣas'abdebhyaḥ

svasvavṛttyā padārthānāmupasthityuttaram

gavadavastitvaderanvayāvagāhī vilakṣano bodho,

yatrānvayavyatirekadyama –

kānkṣādimattayā

s'abdasyāvagamo

hetuḥ, natu padārthā –

nāmupasthitimātram vis'iṣṭa –

materānubhavikatvādanyathā –

numiterapyapalapapattvaḥ.

162a. See Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana : 'A History of
Indian Logic – p:131 & on Udyotakara's Theory of
Verbal Knowledge.

See also Note 35 above.

163. See NyāyaSutra 15 and Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on it
(Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra. Poona Oriental series
No.59 - Transl: Gaṅgānātha Jhā) p:202.

164. See S'āstradīpikā (Transl: D. Venkataramiah)

Chapter VI.

165. See for instance VPI - 71,72 and 73.

166. Sphoṭacandrikā p. 6

167. See above - p:24.

168. VPII - 10,

Puṇyarāja on VPII 11. 12

pade vā nirams'e ye bhāgāḥ

prakṛtipratyayarūpāstevasthitāḥ

169. VPI - 73.

170. See quoted in Sphoṭacandrikā - p: 7

170a. MBh. discussing the sequence of letters - Vol.I -p:356

line : 4.

caritapradhvaṃsitvacca varṇānām. [Vārttika]

171. Sphoṭacandrikā - p: 7

172. Sphoṭacandrikā - p: 7

172a. Sphoṭacandrikā - p : 7-8

173. VPI - 58-69.

173a. VPI - 66.

174. VPI - 59-61

cf. The Technique of Semantics - p:61 :

'The form bɔ:d can be used in
contradistinction from the other forms and
has its phonetic or purely formal place at
the phonetic or the formal level of understanding.'

175. VP.I - 61 and 62.

176. VP.I - 62

tasmāttadarthaiḥ kāryaṇāṃ sambandhaḥ parikalpyate.

cf. MBh. Vol.I - p:175 - line 27, and

p:176 - line 1.

iha vyākaraṇe'rthe kāryasyāsambhavaḥ; agnerdhak

(Pāṇini IV.2.33)

iti na s'akyate'ṅgārebhyaḥ paro dhak kartum

177. VP.I - 61.

cf. MBh - Vol.I - p:175 - line. 26-27.

s'abdenoccaritenartho gamyate; gamanaya

dadhyas'enetyartha aniyate arthas'ca bhujyate.

178. VP.II - 257, while discussing the question of

arthopaqara in the context of ~~primary-secondary~~ the discussion ~~of~~ on the

primary-secondary distinction of meaning ~~as judged and most large meaning distinction~~ says : sabdaḥ svarthe

vyavasthitaḥ.

Puṇyaraja on ~~the~~ same : etasmimśca s'abdopacare

s'abdarthasambandhasyanityatvam syadetyas'ankyar~~aha~~

179. See Puṇyaraja on 341 :

ato anyas'abdarthasya s'abdantarasya ca

vacyavacakatavirahatkathamarthena s'abdasyakṣepaḥ

179a. cf. O.Jespersen - The Philosophy of Grammar -

p:40

'It should be the grammarian's task always to

keep ⟨the⟩ two things in his mind, for sound and

signification, form and function are

inseparable in the life of language...'

180. VP.II - 252, 254.

181. VP.II - 257.

182. VP.II - 258.

183. VP.I - 47, II 406, 407.

184. tasmādbuddhikṛtamarthasaṃspars'aṃ prāpita eva (śabdaḥ)

kvacidarthaviṣaye nives'ito bhavati —

(Punyarāja on VP.1.47)

185. See O.Jespersen. ⟨The⟩ Philosophy of Grammar - p:1.

186. VP.I - 53,56. II - 406, 407.

187. VP.I - 55.

188. VP.I · 56

189. VP.I - 58.

190. See p:6 above.

191. See Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha - p:143

(Cowell & Gough - pp:215)

192. Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha - pp:143-145.

193. VP.III ⟨Jātisamudd-es'a · 33⟩ (also quoted by Sarvadars'ana-

⟨Cowell & Gough p. 215⟩ saṃgraha ₹ p. 144,

194. Sarvadars'anasaṃgraha - p:145 (Cowell & Gough- pp:217-218)

jātis'abdavācāno vājapyāyanasya mate gavādayaḥ
s'abdāḥ bhinnadravyasamavetajātimabhidadhāti;
.... dravyapadārthavādivyādinaye s'abdasya
vyaktireva̅bhidheyatayā pratibhāsate.

MBh. Vol.I - p:242
ākṛtyabhidhūnādvaikam
vibhaktam vajapyāyanaḥ [vārttika]
.... nahi gaurityukte
vis'eṣaḥ prakhyāyate s'uklā
nīlā kapilā kapotiketi......

Again on p:244
dravyābhidhānam vyādiḥ [vārttika]

195. I.2.58 and I.2.64.

196. See p: 82 above.

197. MBh. Vol. I - p:16
tatrānuvṛttinirdes'e savarṇāgrahaṇamanantvāt [vārttika]
                                        line 19

ekatvādakārasya siddham [vārttika]
                                line 23.

See also Puṇyarāja on VP.II - 256.
etacca bhedābhedasvabhāvam
dars'anadvayam s'abdānām
bhāṣyakāreṇa vārttikavyākhyānāvasare dars'itam.

198. VP II - 259

tehiarthabhedā[cc]abdabhedam manyante -

(Punyarāja on the same.)

199. See Note 202 below.

200. VP II - ~~260b~~ 260a

201. VP II - 260-263.

202. Punyarāja on VP. II - 263.

tadevamanekas'abdadars'ane' —

rthabedācchabdabhede ga[u]no'rtho

anyaḥ mukhyo'rthas'ca anya eva kiṃ tu

sārupyādabhede mukhyā -

rthasya prasiddhat[)]vāt -

tadvācaka upacaryata eva .

203. VP II - 252.

204. VP II 252, 254 - Punyarāja on 252.

vapyorthes

Sarveṣāka eva gos'abdo vācakaḥ.

205. VP II - 252, 253a, b

206. VP II - 255.

207. VP II - 256.

208. Since the word 'gauh' meaning 'a cow' is
fundamentally different from the word 'gauh'
meaning 'a Bāhīka', the question of the primary
and secondary meaning of the same word is not
real to them.

209. Since in the view of the Akhaṇḍa school, words

themselves are less real than the sentences,

and are products of its analysis; questions

about the meaning of words are equally unreal.

See VP. II - 271.

210. See pp. 81 - 82 above

211. Puṇyarāja on VP. II - 257 :

etasmiṃśca s'abdopacāre s'abdārthasaṃbandhasya -

nityatvam ayādityas'aṅkyārthopacāramaś'rityāha.

212. VP. II - 257.

213. Puṇyarāja on VP. II - 257.

tatra nimittajjāḍyādergotvam bāhikepyanuṣajyate

It is obvious thus that the meaning of the word

'gauḥ' when it means a 'Bahīka' has also the

element of the emotion of the speaker as a

constituent of it.   When the word is applied to

a Bahīka, there is also included in its meaning the contempt of

the speaker for the Bahīka's cow-like qualities like

dull-ness.

cf. in this connection Ogden & Richards - G.K I.A The Meaning

(London 1949 edition)

of Meaning - p. 223.

'Besides symbolising a reference, our words also are

signs of emotions, attitudes, moods, the temper,

interest or set of the mind in which the references

occur'.

213a. See pp. 91 - 92 above

214. See Chapter 2 above.

215. cf MBh. Vol.I - p:71 - lines 19 & 20

215a. Puṇyarāja on VPII -271.

gaurbāhīka ityatra padapadārthābhyupagame

viruddhasāmānadhikaraṇyānyathānupapatyā gopadasya

upacaritārthatvam ucyate.

216. VPII - 271.

Puṇyarāja on the same :

yadātu gaurbāhīka ityanena akhandenaiva

gogatadharmāvacchinno bāhīkalaśano'rtho'khaṇḍa eva

pratipādyate tadā padapadārthanāmasatyatvāt

kasyaikasyāvidyamānasyaiva tathābhūtenaivetareṇa

sambandha iti kutastyo gauṇamukhyavibhāgaḥ

217. Puṇyarāja on 271 :

apoddhārasamāsʼrayaṇena padapadārthavibhāgamupak-

alpya prasiddhy aprasiddhinimittako gauṇamukya-

vibhāgo' bhyupagantavya ityabhiprāyaḥ.

218. VPII - 287.

219. VPII - 288-297

220. VPII - 299.   - See Puṇyarāja on the same.

221. VPII - 265.

222. VPII - 266.

223. VPII - 267 and 268.

224. VPII - 274a and b.

225. VPII - 275.

226. See pages 85 and 86 above.

227. VP.II - 276.

228. VP.II - 279.

229. VP.II - 277-278.

230. VP.II - 280.

231. See Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP.II - 280.

232. VP.II - 270.

233. Puṇyarāja on VP.II - 280.

234. Puṇyarāja on the same.

235. VP.II - 300.

236. VP.II - 302.

237. VP.II - 301, 309a. See Puṇyarāja on the same.

238. VP.II - 305.

   Puṇyarāja on the same :

   yastasya prayojakaḥ sa eva

   vācyo'rtho'nyo nāntarīyako, na

   tasya prayojakatvam.

239. VP.II - 306 and 307.

240. VP.II - 308.   Also Puṇyarāja on the same.

241. See VP.II - 309a and Note 237 above.

242. Pāṇini I.2.32 - VP.II - 309b , 311.

243. VP.II - 312.

244. Puṇyarāja on above :

   prathānena arthena anyārtho-a

     palakṣaṇamiti lakṣitaparārthamukhyas'aktyartho'-

        pi na tyakta iti.

cf. also Kāvyaprakās'a 2.9. mukhyārtha bādhe

tadyoge rūḍhito'tha prayojanāt, anyórtho lakṣyate

yatsā lakṣaṇāropitākriyā.   It will be noticed

that this stanza refers to the two kinds of

secondary meaning (1) that, which is conveyed after the

principal meaning of the word has been sublated

(mukhyārthabādhe) and (2) that, which is conveyed in

addition to the principal meaning (mukhyārthayoge).

The kind of relationship between principal and

subsidiary meanings discussed by us is the same as

is raised in (2) in the stanza from Kāvyaprakās'a.

A point of some importance which chiefly

arises out of the example discussed ~~by us~~ by us

has also to be mentioned here. To prove the fourth kind of

relationship between primary and secondary meanings, the

example quoted is not one word, but a group of two words,

namely, dr̥śyatāṃ sūrya (look at the sun). Does this mean

that the discussion of primary and incidental meanings

(in fact, of all the three, primary and secondary and

incidental meanings) concerns not only single words, but

also to word-groups. The answer to this question is, in the affirmative. yes.

The problem which Sānskrit Grammarians deal with in these

places, is the problem of the meaning (artha) of s'abda.

This word s'abda is used with a large scope, it sometimes

meaning a word, sometimes a word-group, sometimes a sentence, and sometimes speech in general, by which is meant an abstract entity. In the discussions on the kinds of meanings, the reference is not only to single words, but also to word groups. It will be remembered that even where the discussions were focussed on the meanings of single words *and* single words were given as examples, their meanings were considered in a context, verbal or otherwise. Besides, the point *which* we have emphasised in the beginning of this Chapter and in preceding Chapters that the isolate word is an ~~abstraction~~ *unreal ~~entity~~*, and the study of the isolate word is real only in so far as it is a hypothetical necessity, should also be remembered.

245. VP.II - 314.

246. VP.II - 315.

247. VP.II - 316.

248. VP.II - 317.

249. See Puṇyarāja on 316.

See also p:32-36 above.

250. Puṇyarāja on VP.II - 316.

cf. The Technique of Semantics - p:62.

'The whole sentence is semantically neutral. In a definite context of situation, you would have the

semantic functions determined (1) positively

by the use of the words in relation to the rest

of the situational context and (2) <u>negatively</u>

<u>by what is termed contextual elimination.'</u> (The words

'positively', 'negatively' and 'contextual elimination' in author

(italics) (underlining mine)

251. See Puṇyarāja on VP. II - 316.

252. See page 21 above.

253. See ~~Puṇyarāja~~ commentary on VP II - 316.

254. See Puṇyarāja on VP II - 316.

255. See VP II - 317.

256. Puṇyarāja on VP II - 317.

257. Puṇyrāja on VP II - 317.

258. Puṇyarāja on VP II - 317.

259. Puṇyarāja on VP II -. 317.

260. See Pages 120-121 above.
261.   "   " 119-120   "
262. Puṇyarāja on VP II - 317.

263. Puṇyarāja on VP II 317 :

iha kaiścidarthabhedāccabda -

bhedo' bhyupagataḥ tadaparairekas'abdas teti dvau

paksau.; tatra nānātvapakṣe sva bhāvābhinneṣu

tulya s'rutiṣu rūpabhedādavacchinneṣu nimittāntaraiḥ
                          na

saṃsargādibhiravacchedaḥ kriyate; ekat vapakṣe

tu arthābhidhāne bhinnāsu s'aktiṣu

s'rutisarūpyamatradalabdhavibhāgāsu

yathaiva samsargādibhirarthanirṇayaḥ kriyate iti
ubhayatrāpi prakaraṇādayaḥ s'abdārthanirṇayanipuṇa
iti tadupanyāsaḥ

264. Puṇyarāja on VP.II - 317. p. 215

tadatra kecitsāmarthyamevaikam
s'abdārthanirṇayanimittamiti manyante;
yo'pyarthaprakaraṇādinā tatra bhedaḥ samadhigamyate
so'pi sāmarthyādevātra pratīyate iti.

265. See pages 75-80 above.

266. VP.II - 357.

cf. Bertrand Russell An Inquiry Into Meaning and
(London. 1940)
Truth - p:32 -

names
'A proper name ~~means~~ something of which there are
not a plurality of instances, and names it by a
convention ad hoc, not by a description composed
with
of words previously assigned meanings!

267. cf. MBh. Vol.I - p:111 - lines 23-24.

267a. These bits like 'deva' and 'datta' are only ekades'a-
sarūpaḥ, having the semblance of parts.
VP.II, 357, 364.

268. VP.II, 366.

269. VP.II. 365 : See also Puṇyarāja on the same.

270. VP.II - 359.

271. VP.II - 358a and b.

272. VP.II - 359.

273. VPII - 360a.

274. VPII - 360b.

275. VPII - 363.

Puṇyarāja on the same :

s'rutipathamavatīrṇāh s'abdā vācakā

iti prasiddham.

See also pages 83-85 above.

276. See p:81 above.

277. VPII - 369.

There is, thus, according to Bhartrhari no
difference between common names and proper
names, and proper names are not without
meaning. O. Jespersen and Alan H. Gardiner,
giving different arguments arrive at the
same conclusion, namely, that proper names
have a meaning just as common names have.
Thus Jespersen (The Philosophy of Grammar -
pp:70-71) says : 'Our inquiry, therefore,
has reached this conclusion, that no sharp
line can be drawn between proper and common
names, the difference being one of degree
rather than kind.'

Alan H. Gardiner concludes his brief discussion
on proper names with the statement :

'Enough has been said to show that proper names

are not different in essence from other words'.

(The Theory of Speech and Language-p:43).

278. Puṇyarāja on VPII - 369

yathā'smin gṛhe 'dyaprabhṛti dithas'abdavācyo'-
yamiti boddhavyam, s'abdārthasambandhastu
ditthādiṣvanādiryogyatālakṣaṇo nitya eva (not eṣa
as is printed which obviously is a mistake).

279. Technical terms and proper names are, however,
not quite the same problem, although there are,
as indicated here, points of similarity between
them. Both are, as the grammatical texts say,
saṃjñas, both differing from other names in this
respect that their specific application to denote
a particular thing-meant is begun by an
individual or individuals.

280. Pāṇini VIII.4.3

281. VP.II - 367.

282. VP.II - 376a, b and 377.

283. Pāṇini I.3.14.

284. The Sūtra when interpreted with the word karma
having this meaning will mean: The verb is used
in the ātmanepada when the action reverts back
to the subject (instead of reverting to the object
as is the case with a transitive verb vyatilunīte,
The Sūtra is concerned with the use of verbs in the
ātmanepada.

cf. MBh. Vol.I - p.277 - ~~lines~~ lines 20-23

(on the sūtra above)

kriyāvyatihāra iti vaktavyam.....kriyāṃ hi loke

karmetyupacaranti. kāṃ kriyāṃ kariṣyasi, kiṃ

karma kariṣyasīti - evamapi kartavyaṃ

285. Pāṇini III.2.1

286. Pāṇini III.1.17 and II.3.18.

287. Pāṇini I.1.23

288. Pāṇini V.1.22

cf. MBh - Vol.I - p.80 l.4-8 on Pāṇini I.1.23 above.

saṃkhyāsaṃjñāyaṃ saṃkhyāgrahaṇaṃ (Vārttika)

.....saṃkhyāsampratyayārtham (Vārttika)....

ekādikāyāḥ saṃkhyāyāḥ saṃkhyāprades'eṣu

saṃkhyātyeṣa sampratyayo yathā syād

289. Pāṇini I.2.63

290. The words 'artha' and 'prakriyā' are doubtless

used in the stanza with a double reference,

'artha' being also the 'thing-meant' and

'prakriyā' being also the grammatical formation

of words.

291. cf. Yāska, Nirukta 1.2. ṣaḍ bhāvavikārā

bhavantīti vārṣāyaṇiḥ; jāyate' sti vipariṇamate

vardhate' pakṣīyate vinas'yatīti.

This is in reference to the definition of the verb

as having 'becoming' as its chief aspect

(bhāvapradhāna).   Similarly in MBh.Vol.I. p:258 -
lines 13-14.

292.   cf. MBh. I - p:43 - line 22.   mahatā devena nah
sāmyam syādityadhyeyam vyākaraṇam
Kaiyata commenting on this line says : 'mahatā
Pareṇa brahmeṇa ityarthah'.

293.   cf. MBh. Vol. I - p: 1 - line 14-20
kāni punah s'abdānus'asanasya prayojanāni
rakṣohāgamalāghvasandehah prayojanam .
.........................pradhānam ca
sadaṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam;   pradhāne
ca kṛto yathah phalavān bhavati

294.   This stanza discusses the scope of the function
of grammar.   Of the two aspects of speech, namely,
the Supreme Word-principle and its manifestation
in the form of human speech which exists in such
distinct forms as syllables, words and sentences,
it is the second which is the concern of grammar.
upanibaddham yāvataśhā sha carisṇu ca.

295.   Words are employed to state the behaviour of objects
and not the fundamental truth about them
(arthapravṛttitattvam vivakṣā na tu vastunah svarūpem
sattvamasattvam vā - Puṇyarāja).
See also VP.II - 442 and 444.
Puṇyarāja also gives two alternative interpretations

of the stanza.

(1) Or the behaviour of objects is general before
it is associated with words. It is words which
gives them a specific form by describing them.
(yadvā , arthapravṛttitattvaṃ sāmānyaṃ
tasya s'abdā nibandhanamityarthaḥ) See also:
VP. I - 120.

(2) Or the actions of objects, ie, the six changes
like birth (production) which are conveyed by
the verbal forms, the fact of their being
manifested in Time, similarly the nature of
words and their validity - all these when
understood from grammar are valid; otherwise
not (yadvā·arthānāṃ pravṛtterākhyātopāttajanmādi-
kriyāyāstattvaṃ sādhyatvaṃ sādhanākāṅkṣārupaṃ
kālābhivyaktihetutvaṃ ca tathā s'abdānām̐ sa   tattvaṃ sādhutvaṃ ca
sādhurasya vyākaraṇāvagataḥ saṃskāro'vikalaḥ   ⅄
tadvikalāstvapabhraṃs'ā iti).

296 . cf VPI 132, 133
297.   Thing-classes (arthajātayaḥ).

The significance of words is, the thing-classes,
and words themselves which convey them are
conceived differently either as a class or as an
individual. See Introduction p:85 and p:62.

298.   For translation the second line is read as
....vyavasthā nityatā ucyate.

Sūryanārāyaṇaṣ'ukla takes vyavasthānityatā as a compound and interprets it as pravāhanityatā (relative eternity) as different from absolute eternity (kūṭastha nityatā). But cf.MBh.Vol.I. p:7 621-22

athavā nedameva nityalakṣaṇam dhruvam dhruvam kūṭastham avicāli anapāyopajanavikāri anutpatyvṛddhyavyapayogi yat tannityamiti . tadapi nityam yasmiṃstatvam na vihanyate - This, as the quotation shows is a definition, a vyavasthā (a convention) about the idea of nityatā (eternity). See also VP I 29 using vyavasthā as an isolate and directly referring to its use in the previous stanza. That use shows that the previous stanza has been discussing a certain vyavasthā (convention), and not using vyavasthā as an adjective forming part of a compound vyavasthānityatā.

299. The text is emended to "hastaspars'ādibodhena." Puṇyarāja's commentary does not follow the reading given in the text. See kañcideva maṇaikadeṣ'am hastaspars'anāvagamyam....... The reading accepted in Sūryanārāyaṇaṣ'ukla's edition is 'hastaspars'ādivandhena viṣamapathi dhāvatā' makes the stanza about which is the same in sense as our emended text.

The foot-note reading 'bandhena' is puzzling.

300. The foot-note reading 'ca' is adopted. Puṇyarāja also follows that reading.

301. The interpretation of the second line differs from Puṇyarāja's.   He takes 'eko nimittaṃ s'abdānām' as referring to 'dhvani' and 'aparo'rthe prayujyate' as referring to 'sphoṭa'.   But cf. Kārikā 46 below which clearly states that sphoṭa is the cause (kāraṇaṃ which is the same as nimittaṃ), of s'ruti's which are the same as dhvanis.   The production of speech-sounds is caused by the need for the sphoṭa to be revealed, ie., when the meaning-conveying principle is to function.

   Sūryanārāyaṇa S'uklaš interpretation is the same as given here; he also gives Puṇyarāja's as an alternative interpretation.

   However, the difference in the interpretation of the stanze does not make any difference in the notions themselves about sphoṭa and dhvani.

302. The Causes ~~such as~~ are the vocal chords. The alternative reading 'karaṇebhyaḥ' given in the foot-note directly mentions this.

303. Puṇyarāja explains the three stages as follows :-
tathā vyāvahāriko vaikharīrupaḥ s'abdaḥ krama -
grāhyo'pi pratisaṃhṛtakrama ekabuddhiviṣayo bhūtvā

niraveyavakramarupena buddhivisayo ' ntah karane
bhutva ' ntahkaranavrttirupakramarupadhvanidharma-
pratipattya punarapi vyavaharamavatarati

304. There are points of similarity and contrasts between
words and the sense-faculties. The similarity
between them is that both are instruments through
whichh the nature of objects is understood. But
there is the contrast between them that in the
case of the word its form must be received before
it conveys its meaning while in the case of the
sense-organ the knowledge of the faculty itself
is an essential pre-requisite for it to act as
the instrument of the perception of the object.

305. It was stated above that the word 'agni' which is
uttered in everyday life to convey a thing-meant
is not linked with grammatical operations. But
this does not mean that thet utterance of the word
is not necessary for grammatical operations to be
linked with it. There is, between the word as uttered
in life and as used in a grammatical situation, the common
feature of being uttered. But as distinct from and
in addition to that, there is also in the word
uttered in a grammatical situation, the capacity
to be linked with a grammatical rule. In other
words, the common point of utterance between the word

used in the two situations, is still further

qualified by association with grammatical

operations in the grammatical situation. This

is illustrated in the stanza.

Puṇyarāja takes 'upamāna' as meaning 'the common

attributes of comparison.'

306.	The stanza is interpreted in a different way from

Puṇyarāja's.   According to his interpretation, the

stanza means 'whatever quality is mentioned along

with an object (svātantryeṇa), ~~that causing~~ and as that causes the

excellence of the object'. But, if the stanza is

to illustrate the same point as above, the structure

of the idea must have a third storey, so to speak.

~~To explain,~~

To explain; Uccāraṇa, the common point between the

utterance of a word in life and in grammar, is

qualified in the case of grammar by its being linked

with grammatical ~~operations (62).~~ operations (62).

The common feature between an upamāna and an upameya

is still further qualified, in the case of the

upamāna, by other ~~attributes. (63).~~ attributes (63).

In the same way, the attribute which qualifies an

object is itself qualified by other attributes (ie, there

a third link in the chain of relations). For instance

s'uklam paṭam = white cloth (a case of 'white'
being a qualifier). But in s'uklataram rūpam
a colour which is whiter (clearer whiteness) the
whiteness is qualified, and there it is mentioned
as a dravya (svātantryeṇa). Puṇyarāja himself
has difficulty in constructing the stanza, and so
he writes 'yato guṇaḥ prakarṣahetuḥ ato yaḥ
padārthaḥ svātantryeṇa dravyarūpeṇa upadis'yate
tasya svās'rita guṇādeva prakarṣaḥ ityanvayaḥ.'
But this is not an anvaya. This is an explanation.
On the other hand, the 'yaḥ' in line one happily
lends itself for correlation with the 'tasya' in
line two, according to the interpretation adopted
in the translation

Sūryanārāyaṇa S'ukla also takes the same line.

307. Pāṇini I.1.68
Kās'ikā on it: iha s'āstre s'abdasya svarūpam
bodhanīyam. na bāhyo'rthaḥ......aṅgārādibhyaśca
na ḍhak........
In grammar the meaning of the Word is its form.
Thus the word 'agni' in the Sūtra 'agnerḍhak' means
                                    the thing
the form agni and not, fire.   The Sūtra does not
mean 'add ḍhak to embers'!

cf. MBh. Vol.I - p:175 - lines 25-27 and P176 -lines
1 and 2.   s'abdenarthagaterarthasyā -
sambhavāttadvācinaḥ saṃjñāpratiṣedhārtham
svamrūpavacanam (Vārttika) s'abdenoccāritenārtho
gamyate, gamānaya dadhyas'ānetyartha ānīyate arthaśca
bhujyate arthasyāsambhavāt iha vyākaraṇe'rthe
kāryasyāsambhavaḥ ''agnerdhak'' iti na s'akyate '
ṅgarebhyaḥ paro dhak kartum

Regarding the question whether a word is a genus
or a particular see VPI 15 above and MBh.Vol.I -
p:6-8 - where the ākṛṇityatva of words is discussed
under the topic ''nitye s'abdārthasambandhe·Ākṛti' as
conceived there refers both to words and things, and
when considered as nitya (eternal) it means 'genus'.
See also P.S.Subrahmanya Sastri - 'Lectures on
                              (Annamalainagar, 1944)
Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya' - p:56.

308. That is, in A's pronunciation of the word 'suta'
the 'u' may be of the same length as in B's
pronunciation of the word 'sūta'; but it is only after
the listener has understood the word via the prā-
kṛtadhvani, that he can say that the length there
belongs to the prākṛtadhvani.

309. The Abhivyaktivādins are the Mīmāṃsakas :
cf. S'āstradīpikā (Transl:D. Venkataramaiah) p:196.

'A s'abda (dhvani) that comes to light after an effort is made, need not be an effect exclusively; that it comes to light after the effort fits in with the view that s'abda is revealed (abhivyaṅgya)'.

310. Those who hold this type of view, according to Puṇyarāja, argue that if the object also were acted upon, then the object could equally well be perceived by another sense.

311. Thus, there is a letter in the sound-pattern which reveals the word 'gauḥ'; and listeners when they hear the sentence 'gām ānaya' will think that they are listening to the letter 'ga' which reveals the word 'gauḥ' and that they recognise the word 'gauḥ' in the sentence. But this is an illusion. What we get here is a confusion of two different 'ga-letters.'
cf. VPII - 91,92 and 94.

312. See page 25 above, on the Mīmāmsaka notion as to what a word is.

313. See Note 307 above.
cf. also Mbh.Vol.I - p:26 - lines 1 and 2 athavā ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātram nirdis'yate. ras'ruter - las'rutirbhavatīti; this view, according to Puṇyarāja is the view of the Jātis'abdavādins, and Patañjali means the sound-genus by his use of the word sphoṭa.
See also page 62 and 63 above.

314. Puṇyarāja gives two reasons for this, namely,
'since both sphoṭa and dhvani are placed in
the same substratum namely space', or
'since it is the inner speech-principle which
is revealed in the form of the sounds.'

315. It was stated above *earlier* that the lengthening or
shortening which takes place as a feature of
individual diction is a secondary feature of
sound.   This stanza seeks to remove a possible
misconception that the long or prolated vowels
could thus be grouped as a secondary modification
made by the speaker on the primary short-sound.
No. The long and prolated sounds are like the
short one, ~~a kind of~~ primary sounds (prākṛtadhvani).

316. This stanza explains the process of the
transformation of breath into speech-sounds, and
the letters (ie, meaningful speech-sounds) being
revealed through that.   The breath which in the
beginning is an unbroken current, but which
contains the potentiality for transformation into
speech-sounds like 'ka', 'ca', etc., undergoes such
transformation at the centres of speech production.
Through these speech-sounds are revealed the
meaningful units like letters and words.

The breath dividing itself into various speech-
sounds might be usefully compared to a flow of molten
metal ~~flowing~~ *passing* through various grooves in a machine and
forming itself into various shapes according to the
shapes of the grooves.

317. One of the two foot-note readings, namely, 'sūksma-
      tvaunopalabhyate' is adopted for translation.
      Puṇyarāja has adopted the reading 'sūksma –
      tvaccopolabhyate' in his commentary.

318. Ṣadja. Name of the first or (according to some)
      of the fourth of the 7 Svaras or primary notes of
      music (Monier-Williams): *A Sanskrit - English Dictionary)*

319. cf. VP. II - 148.

320. kārye pravart~~ate~~ – *caitanyam* nirvṛttikriyāprāptibhiśca
                                kāryeṣu pravartlate ~~(Puṇyarāj~~

      svarūpavibhāge tu saiva
          vāk bāhyavasturūpatayā *sva*
      nirvṛttivikriyāprāptiṣu karmabhāvaṃ prapadyate ity-
                                                    arthaḥ. (Puṇya
                                                         rāj

321. Puṇyarāja also explains the two terms 'svamātrā'
      and 'paramātrā' as the descriptive names of two kinds
      of cosmology. According to the theory of svamātra,
      all manifestations are apparent externalisations of
      the inner soul. ~~It~~ *The soul* remains inside, but ~~~~ appears

as if it exists in the form of external objects.
According to the other doctrine (paramātra) the
relation between the All-soul and the created
world is something like that between a fire and
a spark which flies away from it.

322. cf. The Theory of speech and Language - p: 31, para. 2.

323. cf. Catvāri s'ṛṅga trayo'syapādā dve s'īrṣe

saptahastāśo asya ;

tritha baddho vṛṣabho roravīti maho devo

martya āvives'a.

— R.V IV.58.3 (quoted in MBh. Vol. I – p: 3.)

324, cf VPII – 309a, 310 – For the theory of the interpretation of one
sentence through the evidence from another sentence
see p:126, -127 above.

325, cf. MBh. – Vol. I – p:2 line 24.
gaurityasya s'abdasya gāvī goṇī, gōtā, gopotalikā
ityevamādayo 'pabhraṁs'āh.

326. See Pāṇini VIII.1.28 and 22.

VIII 1.28 says : 'A finite verb is unaccented
when preceded by a word which is not a finite verb.
Eg: Devadattaḥ pacati.

VIII .1.22 says : 'Yuṣmad' and 'asmad' are substituted
for the Genitive and Dative singular 'te' and 'me'
respectively, (when these are preceded by a word);
and they are unaccented.

See also pages 69-70 above - The 'ādi' in the

~~Kārikā~~ stanza refers to the~~f~~ substitution of 'yuṣmad' and

'asmad.'

cf. MBh. Vol. III - p.373 - lines 10-14.

samānavākye nighāta yuṣmadasmadādeś'āḥ (Vārttika)

samānavākya iti prakṛtya nighātayuṣmadasmadādeś'ā

vaktavyāḥ. kim prayojanam . nānāvākye mā

bhuvanniti· ayam daṇḍo harāṇena, odanam paca tava

bhaviṣyati mama bhaviṣyati . *See Notes 158 above & 327 below*

327. Pāṇini VIII.1.19.

All the syllables of a vocative are unaccented when

a word precedes it and it does not stand at the

~~beginning of a hemistich.~~

begin*ing of a hemistich* Eg. vrajāni, Devadatta. But the condition for

a vocative being unaccented is that it should be in

the same sentence as the preceding word which causes

the dropping of the accent (samānavākye). Now the

vocative is not included as forming part of the

sentence as defined by the Vārttikakāra. Hence

it might seem that
in our example it is not in the same sentence as the

preceding word. Therefore the rule regarding the

dropping of the accent seems to be violated. This

stanza answers to this objection. The vocative is

included as forming part of the sentence, since it is

considered as belonging to the category of adverbs.

Hence the definition of the sentence 'ākhyātaṃ
sāvyayakārakaviś'eṣaṇamekatiṅ (Vārttika on Pāṇini
II.1.1) includes the vocative also as the kind of
word which can exist in a sentence consistent with
the definition. *See Notes 15 & 326 above*

328. Two arguments are given in this stanza in favour of
the contention that the word is a complex whole
and parts in it are not real.   One is that the words
`vṛsabha', `udaka' and `yāvaka' are not found to possess
meaningful parts.   Another is that assumptions
such as that a word is formed wherever there is a
combination of roots and suffixes, and nowhere
where there is none such are only pragmatic
assumptions.   They do not prove that words are
composed of real parts like roots and suffixes.

329. cf. MBh. VOL. I - p: 362 *lines 12 -13*
ime taruyekārthibhāvaviś'eṣāh. saṃkhyāviś'eṣo
vyaktābhidhānamupasarjanaviś'eṣaṃ cayoge . *lines*
Also lines 21-22 .   vyaktābhidhānaṃ bhavati vākye, brāhmaṇasya
kambalastiṣṭhatīti .   samāse punaravyaktaṃ brāhma-
ṇakambalastiṣṭhatīti.   (The context is a discussion of the
difference between a sentence and a compound, in the
latter of which there is a fusion of the meanings of
the components).

329a. The foot-note reading is adopted for translation.

350. This is a variety of the Akhanḍa view. According
to then speech and meaning are aspects of the same
reality.

351. If the Padavādin says that the evidence for the
existence of real units of word-meanings in the
sentence is that they are perceived, then they can
be proved to be non-existent if the evidence be
proved non-existent. That is what the stanza seeks
to do.   The mind perceives word-meanings in a
sentence in a series according to the Padavādin. That
means that the perception of a preceding word-meaning
has to terminate when the mind passes on to the
next word-meaning. The meaning of this statement
is that the evidence for the existence of the
individual word-meaning does not exist. Consequently
the doctrine that the meaning of a sentence is
formed from the meaning of words also stands
discredited.

352. -in different forms like `rājā`, `rajñā`, `rājñī`, etc.
This shows that there is no fixed form of the word.
Different forms convey the same meaning.

353. The word `rāja` in a compound like `rājapuruṣa` has the
same form as `rāja`, the imperative second person
singular of the verb `rāj` - to shine. Hence an
expression like 'he rājapuruṣa' (the 'king's servant!)

can also convey the meaning 'Man shine!'

('bhrājasva puruṣa).

334. cf. the English, blackbird - Just as the idea of 'black' plays no part in the scheme of the meaning of the word, similarly the idea of as'va (horse) has no part in the semantic realisation of the word ∧ *as'vakarn̄ 'As'vakarṇa' is the name of a tree. Even though originally the tree got that name from its leaves being shaped as the ears of a horse (See Monier Williams∧, (Sanskrit-English Dictionary) every time the word is uttered, the listener's mind does not picture the ear of a horse in understanding the meaning of the word.

335. rūḍhi - words whose meanings are not derived etymologically, but conventionally fixed. tailapāyikā, does not mean 'a woman who drinks oil' as the explanation of the word from the component words (taila-oil, pāyikā - a woman who drinks)∧ would convey. The word is fixed as meaning a cockroach.

336. cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein 'Tractus Logico - Philosophicus'∧ (London 1933) - p:189. 'My propositions are elucidatory in this way. He who understands them finally recognises them as sense-less, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it). He must

surmount these propositions; then he sees ~~them~~ *the world* rightly.

357. For discussion of the Ābhihitānvaya view, see Pp:52-53 above

358. See p:53, 54 and 55 above.

359. The numbering in the text is not correct. But to avoid confusion it is adopted here.

340. In other words, the same meaning as is conveyed by a word can be considered as being conveyed by the collection of the letters which form the word.

340a. See objections against the Akhaṇḍa-positions and ~~341~~ the answers ~~for~~ to them discussed above pp:26-42.

341. This is serious as it will result in the non-performance of the sacrifice which means the violation of injunction 'yajeta'. *The wrong numbering of the stanza in the text is adopted for translation*

342. This would be impossible if the total meaning of the sentence ~~was~~ *as* conveyed in one instalment without reference to the meaning of the words. In such cases the listener's familiarity or otherwise with the meaning of any word or words is a matter of no significance.

343. The reference is to the sentence s'vetam chāgam ālabheta (Sacrifice a white goat).

344. The essential difference between s'ruti and vākya is that s'ruti conveys the meaning of a sentence right from listening, while, to get its meaning from a syntactical connection, the sentence has, quite

obviously, to be interpreted with reference to the relationship between the component words.

344a- The reading given in the foot-note is followed in the translation.

345. The idea is that the meaning of a phrase, or a clause or a word in the sentence is the meaning of the total sentence viewed in terms of analysis.

346. The example is given to show that perception of parts in integral cognitions is commonly seen.

347. The translation takes a different line of interpretation from Puṇyarāja's.   Puṇyarāja interprets the stanza as follows :

Just as two cognitions, for instance, the cognition of 'blue' and the cognition of 'yellow' are alike in that they are both cognitions, and at the same time different when viewed from the angle of the objects cognised
~~perceived~~....(~~ie,~~ since one is a cognition of 'blue' and the other a cognition of 'yellow').....

348. See Pāṇini I.2.27.

349. See Pāṇini III.1.33.

349a. See Pāṇini I.2.27

350. Thus the word 'ghaṭa' means not 'roundness' and 'being made of clay', nor 'roundness' or 'being made of clay' It means 'roundness', 'being made of clay', etc., without having any such inter-relation of combination or alternation.

351. The illusory idea which the mind forms on hearing a

word is its meaning;   and this idea is linked up
with an external object and thus we get the word —
meaning-object triangle.

352. The meaning of individual words find unity in the
meaning of the sentence. Yet the meaning of the
sentence itself is obtained by a process above
logical thinking , a sort of intuitive process
functioning and presenting the meaning in a flash.

353.   The word 'gauḥ' means 'a cow';but the idea of a
bell which hangs from the cow's neck or a flea
which rests on the Cow's head is not included in
the ~~limit~~ area of the reference of the word.

354, 'nuṭ (n) is an āgama and is found in words like
kartṛṇām, and gurūṇām. It is not a significant
element in words because we can find genitive forms
like 'bhavatām' without it. Similarly 's'ap' (the
conjugational sign 'a) is not found, in examples like
'atti', whereas it is found in examples like 'pacati'
cf. MBh. (on Pāṇini III.1.67) Vol. II. p.57 lines 22-27
bhāvakarmakartāraḥ sārvadhātukarthāścedekadvibahuṣu
niyamānupapattiratadarthatvāt (Vārttika)....
vikaraṇārthā iti cetkṛtābhihite vikaraṇābhāva
(Vārttika).   ~~MBh. Vol.II – p.57 – lines23,27.~~

355. The foot-note reading is ccepted for translation.

356. In other words the verb getting its 'being' in a
sentence through its association with the nominal

cases has to precede its being associated with
prefixes. Why? Because for an action to be
accomplished, nominal agents or instruments, are
necessary and a verb is the name of an action.

356a. 356a. The reading given in the footnote is followed in the
translation.

357. cf MBh. Vol.I - p:454 - lines 9 and 10 -
kah punascena krtorhah; samuccayo 'nvācayah
itaretarayogah samāhāra iti.

358. See Pānini I.4.57 and MBh. Vol.I - p:341 line 1-9.

358a. The Foot-note reading is adopted for translation.

359. See Pānini I.4.91·

360. The view that individual letters are not
meaningful is exemplified. Example: the form
'iskartāra' which is 'niskartāra' minus 'n' conveys
the meaning of the latter. Assuming that the two
are not two different words, having the same meaning,
the interpretation of this is that a part of a word can stand
for the whole which means the missing syllable is not
significant from the point of view of meaning.

361. The footnote reading 'vākyapūrvikām' is accepted in the
place of 'vācyapūrvikām'.
Punyarāja also follows the former reading.

362. The foot-note reading 'nirdiṣṭāste' is adopted for translation.

363. 'udvami' is used as an abbreviated form of 'udvamati' = to vomit, and 'kari' is used for representing 'karomi' = I and 'karoṣi,' = Thou doest

364. Grammatical rules are not everything. They do not deal with Reality in its ultimate aspects. Their concern is with the manifested world of things and names.

365. The foot-note reading is adopted.

366. The argument in the stanzas 243-247 is that the meaning of the sentence 'vṛkṣo nāsti' (there is no tree) is a total and undivided one and it cannot be built up from the meanings of the components, since according to the doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence and sentence-meaning, such components or their meanings do not exist.

The author examines and rejects the three possible ways in which the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence through analysis is possible. First can the meaning of the single word 'vṛkṣa' be negated by the particle 'na.' That is, the negation of the object tree. The answer is no. The object cannot be negated if it exists. That is making an existent into a non-existent and is impossible.

Next can <u>the existence of the tree</u> be nega\
by the particle `na´. No, because such a concept is
non-verbal in character (because it is a concept,
a buddhi). Therefore its negation by the particle `na´
is not possible. The particle `na´ negates only the
knowledge which is verbal in character.

Or again a third alternative is considered.
Can we say that the particle `na´ states that the
<u>concept of the existence of the tree is false.</u> This
way of looking at the sentence is also wrong. This
give_s `na´ a function which it generally does not have, is different from its normal func
which is to state a non-existence, rather than to
satisfy a concept of existence. falsi

Again, can it be said that the particle `na´ functions
without any reference to a substratum. In that case,
`na´ should be stated first in the sentence and not as
we have in the sentence under examination.

Or
Again, can it be argued that the word 'vṛkṣa'
is used to limit the substratum of the operation of
`na´ to 'vṛkṣa' (the tree). This also is wrong, because
it would make a direct statement (ie, a statement of
a positive fact) into a statement laying down a
restriction, or which indicates a restriction. Again one
if the word 'vṛkṣa' is stated to limit an already
understood substratum, then it is a repetition and
the statement is a statement of a repetition.

~~in the meaning of the sentence 'vṛkṣa nāsti' is impossible.~~

367. See the problem of the word with different meanings discussed above - pp. 87 - 93

367a. A hymn when employed becomes different. And these latter hymns which get their entity from the repetition of the already existent hymns of the Veda are also Vedic. Indeed, those are the really meaningful hymns and the stated ones are only pointers to them. In other words the significance of a hymn is derived from its use. Thus if the Sāmidhēnī hymn is repeated, we have as many different hymns as there are number of repetitions.

368. According to Pāṇini V.4.50, 'the affix 'cvi' comes after a word when the agent has attained to the new state expressed by the word, what the thing previously was not and when the words kṛ (to make), bhū (to be) and as (to be) are conjoined with it'. (C.S. Vasu, Aṣṭādl yi Transl. Vol 3 (Allahabad 1897) Thus we get as'uklaḥ s'uklaḥ sampadyate, taṃ karoti = s'uklīkaroti.

In the same way there can be a form 'gorbhavati' from 'agur gauḥsampadyate go'bhavat' (some one who is not a cow has attained to the state of a cow, he became a cow). Now, some one like a Bāhīka can become a cow only when cow-ness is attributed to him (as'ritapūrvāvasthopacaritottarāvasthātmake -Puṇyarāja) In other words the meaning of the word 'gauḥ' is

secondary (gauṇa) in that context.

In 's'uklībhavati', on the other hand, something which is not white can become white in a real sense (uttaravasthā vastusatyaiva-Punyāraja). Therefore the meaning of the word 's'ukla' is not secondary.

The grammatical significance of 'gauḥ' in the example quoted above being considered as conveying a secondary meaning is that it will not have the designation of 'pragṛhya' (as required by Pāṇini I.1. 15) in association with I.4.61 which respectively say that a nipāta which ends in the vowel 'o' will be known as 'pragṛhya' and 'ūrī' and other words (uryādayaḥ) ending in the affixes 'cvi' and 'ḍac' when in association with verbs will be known as gatis. This is because between the primary and the secondary meanings of a word it is with reference to the primary meaning that the grammatical operations apply to it. Thus the Mbh:evaṃtarhi gauṇamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyaya iti-Vol.I, p:71.
Line 17

A question might be asked here. If grammatical operations take place only in such words as are used as conveying their primary meaning then how do the Sūtras VII.1.90 and VI.1.93 operate in regard to words like 'go' as occuring in the resultant forms in sentence like 'gaurbāhīkastiṣṭhati' and 'gāṃ bāhīkamānaya' respectively when obviously the word is used in its

secondary sense.

The answer to this question is that
the statement about grammatical operations not
taking place in regard to words which convey a
secondary meaning applies only when such words
refer to words as distinct from prātipadikas or
bases. The rule about vṛddhi in VII.1.90 applies
to prātipadikas, for instance to ' go', which with
the change of the vowel ' o ' into ' au ' becomes
'gauh' in the sentence ' gaurbāhīkastisthati ' ;
similarly the ' ā ' in accordance to VI.1.93 in
such examples like ' gām bāhīkamānaya '.
cf. MBh. Vol. I - p: 71 - lines 14 - 21.

atascvipratiṣedhah (vārtika) . adan

369.   Pānini VIII.3.82.

370.   Pānini VI.1.153.

371.   - such as a defect in vision, etc., causing the vision
         of a duplicating moon.

372.   The reading given in the foot-note is corrected to
         'pratyāyyerthe' and is adopted for translation; 'pratyāpyo'
         in the stanza and 'pratyāphe' in the footnote are obviously
         'pratyāyyo' and 'pratyāyye' wrongly printed.

373.   The four cases stated above are explained and illustrated
         in 308, 309a, (309b, 310, 311a, 311b), (312, 313, 314)
         and 315 respectively.
         See also pages 110 to 115.

374.   The Addenda gives an additional stanza between 317 and 318.
         sāmarthyamauciti des'ah
         kālo vyaktih svarādayah
         s'abdārthasyānavacchede
         vis'esasmrtihetavah .

375.   An altered reading of the text is suggested and adopted in
         translation.   Instead of 'vācyās'ca' in the 2nd line
         read 'vācyas'ca'.

376.   The reference is to one-word-sentences such as 'vrksah'.
         The word implies the verb 'tisthati' (one of the possible
         verbs). Thus 'vrksah' means 'Here stands a tree'.

377.   Eg: (Punyarāja) varsati - (devo) varsati
                           varsati - (jalam) varsati

378.   More examples to prove the point that an uttered piece

can convey more than what is warranted by its form alone.   In other words, it also conveys the meaning of some word or words implied in it.

On 330a, see Pāṇini II.3.14.

Regarding the function of upas'argas (stanza 330b) see MBh. Vol. I - p:365 - lines 17-19 in a slightly different context.

upasargāśca punarevamātmakāḥ, yatra kaścitkriyā - vācī s'abdaḥ prayujjyate tatra kriyāvis'eṣamāhuḥ'

379. They : the utterance 'vṛkṣaḥ' and the utterance 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati'. It was stated earlier that the piece 'vṛkṣah' can convey the meaning of 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati'. Then why should the latter be used at all ? Why not always 'vṛkṣah' for 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati'.

That question is answered in the stanza.

The numbering of the stanzas, 334a onwards is wrong, but it is adopted he

380. Thus the way one student analyses a sentence as an aid to his understanding of the meaning of the sentence will be different from that adopted by another student.   And these are all nothing more than devices.

381. Puṇyarāja constructs the third line as 'tasya sambandhī arthaḥ' (the meaning connected to it, that is, its meaning). This is, ~~possible~~ possible. But it seems it is better to interpret the line as

'its meaning which is connected to the meaning of
another word not uttered, but inferable'
'sambandhī' correlating the word 'artha' with the
word 'arthāntarasya' understood. (Puṇyarāja, in
fact, uses the word in this connection). However,
the general idea of the stanza, is the same which
ever way it is interpreted.

382.   The reference there is to the definitions of noun
and verb. Nouns have existence (sattva) as their
pradhāna; verbs have becoming (bhāva). The
contradiction here is that the same s'abda (eg.
dvāram), if it also brings to light, the verb has both
functions nominal and verbal.
cf. Yāska, Nirukta I.1 on nouns and verbs.

383.   cf. Yāska, Nirukta I.1.

indriyanityam vacanam audumbarayaṇah.
indriya is here rendered as buddhi
Also: Nirukta I.2 - tatra catustvam nopapady-
ate...s'āstrakṛto yogaśca; vyāptimatvattu ...

The meaning of the word 'arthayogam' is taken in
the translation in a different way from Puṇyarāja's
He interprets it as: 'tasyaiva arthena
pratibhālakṣaṇena yogam sambandham dṛṣṭvā.....'

The translation interprets 'vākyasya
arthayogam' as the connection of artha(word-
meanings) to the sentence; and this connection
is laukikam, ie, something that is ascribed to
it as different from being a fundamental fact in
it and of it. cf. 349 below

'na lake pratipatrnam

arthayogatprasiddhayaḥ ; which also
Puṇyarāja interprets in a different way. He
takes artha as ' a thing in reality'.

384. cf. Nirukta quoted above :
vyāptimatvāt tu śabdasya anīyastvācca śabdena samjñā kar-
aṇam loke.

385. An exception which is implied in a statement
strictly forms part of the statement of the rule
itself, and therefore it can be considered as being
verbally made in the rule itself; but since there
is no distinct statement of it, apparently it is
not verbally made (as'abdamiva). As the next
stanza says, the s'ruti, ie, the statement about
Brāhmaṇas and dadhi (sour-milk) is made including
the exception of the Māṭharās. And the further
statement that Māṭharas should be given takra (butter-
milk) makes a re-statement of this fact.

386. Reading : The foot-note reading `saṃbadho` is
accepted. The second line reads

' saṃjñā praviveke na kalpyate (and not as
'saṃjñāpraviveke' in combination).

387. According to this it is the word which has become
an object of sense-perception, ie, the ear,
which conveys the meaning. cf. P.P. 83-84 above, and notes
186,187,188

388. According to the dictum 'caturthāt, anajādau,
ca lopaḥ pūrvapadasya ca' etc quoted by Puṇyarāja
lines 2-22
See Bh. Vol.2.p:425 (on Pāṇini V.3.83;
thajādāvūrdhvam dvitīyādacaḥ) caturthāt ,
caturthāllopo vaktavyaḥ , bṛhaspatidattakaḥ
bṛhaspatikaḥ . prajāpatidattakaḥ prajāpatikaḥ.
anajādau ca · anajādau ca lopo vaktavyaḥ .
devadattakaḥ devakaḥ. yajñadattakaḥ yajñakaḥ,
lopaḥ pūrvapadasya ca. pūrvapadasya ca
lopo vaktavyaḥ. devadattakaḥ dattakaḥ.
yajñadattakaḥ dattakaḥ. and so on.

389. Pāṇini VIII.4.3.

390. cf. VI.16 and Pāṇini II.1.57
See above pages 138 -140

391. Long technical terms such as samkhyā (according
to one view) (MBh. Vol.I - page 81 - lines 26-29).
upasarjanam (MBh. Vol.I - p:215 - lines 7-11).

kāraka (MBh.Vol.I p:324 - lines 7-9)

karma pravacanīya (MBh.Vol.I p:346 - lines 15-18)

These are called long technical terms because they are longer than a saṃjñā aught to be and are explainable through their component elements.

nimitta: Puṇyarāja explains 'nimitta' as the component element of the word. In a long technical term which is interpreted in terms of the component elements, they, obviously, form the causal factors in the understanding of the meaning of the term. Patañjali explains a nimitta as some thing known and a nimittī as something unknown. (nirjñāto'rtho nimittaṃ anirjñāto'rtho nimittī. MBh.Vol.II p: 1 lines 16 and 17).

392. It is on repetition that the meaning of such a technical term is conveyed via its elements. In the case of a technical term which is not a product of smaller units, such a secondary stage is not necessary, to explain its meaning. To resume the explanation of the understanding of the meaning of a long technical term; for instance, the term kāraka; One gets the explanation of the term 'karoti kārakam' on the repetition. (MBh.Vol.I p:324 line 9) Indeed, the purpose of coining such long terms is that such terms must be understood as being expressive of

their significance (tatra mahatyā samjñayaḥ karaṇa
etatprayojanamanvarthasaṃjñā yathā vijñāyeta.karoti
kārakamiti MBh. same as above - lines 8 and 9).

393. See pages 138-140 above.

394. Pāṇini I.1.23 and V.1.22. See also MBh.Vol.I
pp:80-82

athavā ~~ācārya~~pravṛttirjñāpayati bhavāyekādikāyaḥ
saṃkhyāyaḥ ~~saṃkhyāyaḥ saṃkhyāyaḥ~~ saṃkhyāprades'eṣu
saṃkhyāsampratyaya iti, yadayam saṃkhyāyaḥ
atis'adantāyahkan iti tis'adantāyaḥ pratiṣedham
s'āsti — p:81 lines 20-23.

#h

395. Pāṇini I.2.33 and II.3.49.
See also MBh. VOL.I p:20 - lines 1-4.

396. cf. MBh.Vol.I p:41 - lines 1046.

397. cf.MBh. same
na cocyate pratyekamiti pratyekam ca bhuji
samāpyate — line 12

398. A service done to Brāhmins while performing sacrifice

399. The employment of the same lamp by several students
to read is an example of the operation of the
principle of tantra - or the principle by which
something discharges its function on a group-basis.

400. Pāṇini I.1.1
See MBh. Vol.I - pp:37-41.

atha samjñeti prakṛtya vṛddhyādayaḥ s'abdāḥ
paṭhitavyāḥ (p.37.1.26).....yathā laukikavaidikeṣu
(p.38.1.14 - Vārttika) .....liṅgena va (p.39.1.1.
Vārttikka).....pratyekaṃ vṛddhiguṇasamjñe bhavata
iti vaktavyam. kiṃ prayojanam.. samudāye mā
bhūtāmiti (p.41 l. 5-6).....pratyavāayaṃ ca vākya-
parisamāpteh (p.41.1.10. Vārttika).

401. See MBh. above p:41 - lines 11-14.

402. This is because the fact of vṛsala-ness is
satisfied by 'one of them'.

403. See Pāṇini VIII.4.2. MBh.Vol.III p:453.
A non-technical illustration : MBh.above. lines 16-17
gargaih saha na bhoktavyamiti pratyekam ca na
bhoktavyam samuditaiśca.

404. When the senteene is given in the form 'Devadatta-
Yajñadatta-Viṣnumitrāḥ bhojyantām'.

405. Vīpsā. Cf Pāṇini VIII.1.4.

406. See stanza 416 for a similar use of the word
'abhidhīyate'
Just as words are not recognised in the sentence
when the listener comprehends the sentence, so is the
case of clauses in a mahāvākya.

407. That is, according to the Anvitābhidhāna view of the
Padavādi-Mīmāṃsakas (See VPII 44). According to them,
then, the meaning of the sentence is realised in
parts at the focal points of the words. The

Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, uphold the notion of
'pratyekaṃ parisamāpti' (culmination of the meaning
of the sentence in the component parts
individually) in interpreting the meaning of the
sentence, its nature and realisation.

408. The original meaning of the word is an unqualified
meaning and the meaning which the word gets from
its connection with other words in the sentence is
a qualified meaning. Thus the word 'gauh' which as
an isolate means 'the animal with dew-laps,etc'
means the same thing qualified by the act of
'bringing' while in the sentence 'gām ānaya'
(Bring the cow). See pp:53 -55 above.

409. pratyekaṃ tu samāptosrthah sahabhūteṣu vartate —
VP.II - 117.

410. The reading which Puṇyarāja adopts in his
commentary is :
2nd line : sambandho 'rthena tadvatām
It is adopted for translation.

411. cf. MBh. Vol.I p:220 -lines 10-24.
samghātasyaikārthyāt subabhāvo varṇāt — 1. 12 - 13
This occurs in the context of the discussion whether
individual letters in a word are meaningful or not.
The notion stated in 403 is not accepted by Patañjali
himself and Bhartṛhari follows him in that. The

Vākyapadīya states it, not necessarily approving of it, though it does not make a statement of its disapproval.

412. cf. MBh. VOL. I p:219₍₆₂₆₎ and 220·ℓ. 1-2

#₁ bahavo hi s'abdaekārthā bhavanti. tadyathā.
indrah s'akrah puruhūtah purandarah........ekaśca
s'abdo bahvarthah . tadyathā . akṣāh pādāh māṣā iti

413. cf. MBh. Vol. II - p:386 - lines 4 and 5
evam yo ᵔ sāvamnāye ᵔ syavāmas'abdah padyate so'sya
padārthah

414. The first line is emended to 'arthasya pratipādakān'

415. See Note 412 above.

416. The text is wrongly printed here. It should be as
Punyaraja takes it 'prayogādabhisandhānamanyatpadeṣu
na vidyate.'

The Nānās'abdavādin is speaking here. Since according
to him, all so-called instances of the same word are
really different words, there is no question of the
same word having several meanings, thus necessitating
the special aiming of the word at the meaning which is
to be conveyed (409) as the Ekas'abdavādin holds.

417. cf. VPII· 327a, 327b and 328 a.

418. cf. VP·I·86, where, however, the understanding of
parts which are unreal is stated to be the incapacity
of the speaker.

419. According to the Anvitābhidhāna-view, thus the
synthesis between the various word-meanings is the
meaning of the sentence and that synthesis is not
something built up word by word but something which
already exists in the very first word.
See pp:55-59 above.

420. cf. MBh.Vol.III p:57 - line 14.
See also lines 15-28 and page 58 - lines 1-7.
Siddham tu dharmopades'ane ' navayavavijñānāt-(Vāyttika
— p.57.line 14.

421. Nāges'aBhatta : Sphotavāda. p:14
evam ghatamānaya ' ityādau samsargarūpo vakyā -
rthah samudāyas'akyah.

422. The argument is continued from the previous stanza.
Reality is expressed in the form of statements, and
statements, either positive or negative are in the
form of sentences. It follows from this that only
sentences and not words can convey reality, which as
the meaning of the sentence. Therefore it is wrong
to conceive that the meaning of a sentence is
conveyed from the words composing it. Even when we
mention the name of a single object it takes the form
of a sentence.
cf.VP.II 327a - 328a, 329b and 340a.

423. MBh. Vol.I - p: 367 - lines 10 - 16.

424. They are not final truths in the ultimate analysis.

425. The term 'karaṇa' in line 2 does not mean instrumental; it means 'action', the word being used as the noun form, of the root kṛ = to do. Puṇyarāja explains this as follows: In the sentence 'pacikriyāṃ karomi' (I do cooking) 'cooking' is a noun and is used as an accessory to the action of 'doing' and therefore is a sādhana. In the sentence 'pacāmi' (I cook) ~~the verb is~~ is the verb 'cook' and hence its meaning is the sādhya, the thing to be accomplished, the objective.

426. The same point is made that objects, that is, the referents of words have several and sometimes conflicting possibilities and that it is the use of the word with a specific intention by the speaker which specifies a particular aspect of a meaning as operative in a certain context (442) cf. Tractus Logico-Philosophicus p: 35 'Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs'.

427. The numbering of the first stanza as 440, in the text is wrong. It is, however, followed here.

428. In other words since 'conjunction' is an attribute of the conjoined, a description of the conjoined objects is necessary to describe the character of

'conjunction'. This means that the mere word 'samyoga' does not describe the nature of the relation it names. Similarly the relationship known as 'samavāya' is expressed by implication in the relation samyoga.

429. **Mātrayā** - yadā tasya mātrayā niyatasaṃkhyākena alpīyasā s'abdena yogo 'bhisaṃbandho dra'yate - Puṇyarāja. Example : igyaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam Pāṇini I.1.45. The Sūtra means that the substitutes i, u, ṛ and ḷ which comes in the place of y, v, r and l will be known as samprasāraṇas. Eg. yaj = iṣṭam, vap = uptam Or, alternatively, the sentence 'igyaṇaḥ' meaning the substitution of ik (i,u,ṛ,ḷ) for yaṇ (y,v,r,l) will be known by the name samprasāraṇam.

Now the point of quoting this example is to present an argument in favour of the Akhaṇḍa-position that sentences convey their meaning as indivisible units. The sentence of which the name is samprasāraṇam, that is, which is constituted by the single word 'samprasāraṇam' conveys the meaning of substitution of 'ik' for 'yaṇ'. Being a single-word-sentence, it cannot be argued by any one that the sentence conveys its meaning through its component parts.

cf. MBh. Vol. I - p:111 and p:112.

430.   Pāṇini VIII.1.28 also VIII. 2-6.

431.   The reading 'vidyate' is corrected to 'bhidyate.'

432.   mṛgaḥ pas'yatD yāti (See, there goes a deer)

433.   Eg. vrīhayo bahavo vahanyantām (Let lots of
cultivated rice be threshed) Here, there is a
logical incompleteness, since the agent,
instruments, etc., of the action of threshing are
not mentioned; but there is no incompleteness
in utterance. Hence the sentence is considered as
having a complete meaning.

434.   In this connection the point is made ~~it is stated~~ that there need not
be complete parity between the manner of the use
of words in sentences and the meanings they convey .
Thus, of the two sentences 'cankramyamāno' dhīṣva'
(Recite while moving about) and 'japaṃścankrmaṇam,
kuru' (Move about while reciting), the word
'cankramyamāna' is secondary in the first sentence
and primary in the second, it being a subsidiary verb
in the former and a principal one in the latter.
Similarly with the word 'jap' (or adhīṣva) also there
is a difference in the manner of ~~their~~ its use. But
despite this distinction in the nature of the use of
the words, there is no difference in the meaning
that they convey since the meaning of the sentence

in either case is an injunction to perform the
act of reciting.

Punyarāja also gives an alternative explanation
of the examples. According to this explanation it
is only the word 'cankramyamāna' whose nature and
use is studied here. There is no difference in the
function of the word in the two sentences. In both
it serves the purpose of being an action subsidiary
to recital. But there is a distinction in the
nature of ~~their~~ its usage. In the first sentence it is
used as an auxiliary verb, while in the second
sentence, as a principal verb.

435. 1. the method which ~~must~~ consists in the order in which
the subsidiary actions are to be performed, thus
gradually building up the main action.
2. the effect, ie, whatever is stipulated as the
fruit of the action, heaven, children, and so on.

436. The passage referred to is 'saptadas'aprājapatyā -
nekavarnānajamstuparānalabheta' (He should sacrifice
for Prajāpati, 17 hornless he-goats all of one
colour).

437. 'Bhedo na pravibhajyate' in the 2nd line is
emended to 'bhedena pravibhajyate'.

This stanza cites and explains another example for
the point ~~stated~~ made in 459, that the same verb can be

applicable to several sentences. The verb bhuj =
to eat in the sentence 'Devadatta-Yajnadatta-Viṣṇumitra
bhojyantām' (Devadatta, Yajñadatta and
Viṣṇumitra are to be fed) refers individually to
the three subjects combined in the compound
'Devadatta Yajñadatta Viṣṇumitraḥ'. That is the
meaning of the sentence pertains to the three
individuals individually.

438. Pāṇini III.4.67 (kartari kṛt) which says : the kṛt-
suffix (occurs) in the sense of the agent (eg,
pācakaḥ). This is a general statement which means
the Sūtra has a general meaning. This meaning is
later on particularised in specific examples like
pas'u.

439. E g: 'Devadattaḥ pacati', 'Yajñadattaḥ pacati'. In
these sentences the action is particularised by the
individual subject and other particular factors.
Thus we can paraphrase the verb in sentence (1) as
Devadattakartṛkā pacatikriyā (the action of cooking
with Devadatta as its agent). In sentences like
'pacate', 'yajate', etc., on the other hand, the verb
has a general signification.

Even when verbal forms show distinction of
(see stanza 466)
tense, as for instance in 'pacati', 'apākṣīt', 'pakṣyati'
(cooks, cooked, will cook respectively), or

distinctions caused by the nouns associated with
them, as for instance in 'uṣṭrāsikā āsyante' (There
is the sitting like the sitting of camels), or in
'hatas'āyikā s'ayyante' (There is the lying like the
lying of the dead), the verb fundamentally conveys
the verbal idea in general when used to do so (see
next stanza). cf.MBh Vol.I p.256 lines 19 & 20.

kathaṃ punarjñāyate bhāvavacanāḥ pacādaya iti.
yadeṣāṃ bhavatinā samānādhikaraṇyam, bhavati pacati,
bhavati pakṣyati, bhavatyapākṣīditi.

Vol.II p.57 lines 3 and 4.

tiṅabhihite cāpi tadā bhāve bahuvacanaṃ s'rūyate.
tadyathā. uṣṭrāsikā āsyante. hatas'āyikā s'ayyanta i

  uṣṭrāsikā āsyante (There is the sitting like the
sitting of camels); hatas'āyikā s'ayyante (there is
the lying like the lying of the dead) ; in both
cases the verb is used in the impersonal passive
(bhāve) and conveys the verbal idea in general
as its meaning.   Nevertheless, the verb is used
in the plural, as an exception to the general
rule that when ~~they~~ verbs are used in the impersonal
passive, ~~verbs~~ they will be in the singular.   Thus in
these two sentences the verb shows the plural
number of the noun (sādhanam) with which it is
linked.   Camels have various ways of sitting

and a plurality is inherent in the meaning of
the noun form 'ustrāsikā' itself.   This plurality
 also appears in the verb āsyante.'   Similarly
the dead lie in many ways, and the plurality
thus inherent in the very meaning of the noun,
'hatas'āyikā' appears also in the verbal form
's'ayyante.' cf. Nāges'aBhatta's Mahābhāṣyapradī -
podyota (Biblio : Indica. No. 1251) Vol. 4 -
pages 332 and 336. Foot - note.

ustrāṇām hi āsikāḥ svarūpata eva vilakṣaṇāḥ
hatās'ca nānāprakāram s'erate uttāna avatānāḥ
vikīrṇakes'āḥ vis'rastavastāḥ ityādi.
tatsādṛs'yādākhyātavācyasyāpi bhāvasya
svarūpagatabhedāvabhāsādbahuvacanam bhavatyeva.

440.   akṣāh=a certain kind of seed,

             the pole of a cart, or

          the seed of a plant used in dice.

akṣāḥ bhakṣyantāṃ bhojyantāṃ dīvyantāṃ (Let akṣas

be eaten, bent or thrown). This kind of composite

utterance is not usual in actual life. But like

the sentences 'sveto dhāvate' it can be ~~quoted~~ used

for illustration.

441.   When the word akṣāḥ is used as stated in the

previous stanza, it is a common form under which

three different words, 'akṣāḥ', 'akṣāḥ', 'akṣāḥ' are

uttered. cf. The explanation of the word 's'veto'

in 'svetodhāvati' according to the principle of

tantra (See V.P.II.113).

442.   Thus the two words 'akṣa' and 'yakṣa' for instance

have necessarily to be used one after the other,

because they do not possess a common form under

which they can be uttered in union. But in the

word 'akṣāḥ' we have according to one view three

different words, 'akṣāḥ,' 'akṣāḥ' and 'akṣāḥ'

uttered in union. This is because they have a

common form; ~~and~~ They are different words because

they have different meanings.

443.   That is, this view, instead of considering that akṣāḥ

~~akṣah~~

is a composite of three different words considers its meaning as a composite of three different meanings.

444. Thus the word 'akṣāḥ' is a composite of the three words 'akṣāḥ', 'akṣāḥ' and 'akṣāḥ' and from the composite utterance 'akṣāḥ bhakṣyantām bhojyantām dīvyantām ' we get 'akṣo bhakṣyatām, 'akṣo bhojyatām' and 'akṣo dīvyatām.'

445. See Note on 474.

446. See Note on 474.

447. Examples of such sentences :

'sveto dhāvati' (VP.II 115) and 'igyaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam (Pāṇini I.1.45) . See Note 429 above.

cf. MBh. Vol. I - pages : 111 - 112.

vibhaktivis'eṣanirdes'astu jñāpaka

ubhayasaṃjñātvasya.—(Vārtika, p. III . l . 14)

448. See Notes 429 and 447 above.

The term linga = jñāpaka of MBh. (See quotation above).

449. The Sūtra referred to is Pāṇini I.1.59. The Kās'ikā paraphrases the Sūtra as : dvirvacananimitte ci ajādes'aḥ sthānivadbhavati dvir vacana eva kartavye - kās'ikā. That is, when followed by an

affix having an initial vowel, which causes re -
duplication, the substitute which takes the place
of a vowel is like the original vowel only for the
purpose of re - duplication. Eg. papatuḥ

. (The formation of this form in the 3rd person
dual number from the root pā = to drink will
illustrate this Sutra.   To form this, the affix
'atus' is added to the root. So we get pā + atus =
p + zero + atus according to Pāṇini VI.4.64 which
states that the ' ā ' of the root is elided before
ārthadhātuka affixes beginning with a vowel and which
are 'kit' or 'nit' and before 'it.'

The next stage is the re-duplication of the
root according to Pāṇini VI.1.8 which states that a
root consisting of a single vowel is re-duplicated
before the terminations of the perfect. Now, since
what remains of the root after the elision of ' ā '
is only 'p,' the provision according to VI.1.8 of the
root consisting of a single vowel does not exist.
To remove that difficulty we have the operation of the
rule under discussion (ie. I.1.59). According to
this Rule, the zero which comes in the place of the 'ā'
in the root 'pā' (ie, in the setting p + zero + atus),

must be treated like the ` ā ` itself.   That is,
for the purpose of the operation of re-duplication
we should consider that the ` ā ` is still there.)
Hence it may be considered that the root which is
to be re-duplicated is ` pā ` - thus satisfying the
condition of VI.1.8/.

Now the point of the Vākyapadīya referring
to Patañjali's discussion of this Sūtra is to
quote a remark which is made in that connection in
the Mahābhāṣya regarding the employment of the
principle of ekas'eṣa or tantra in the use of words
or word-combinations. To explain, if a single use
of a word or word-combination is intended to
convey its occurence more than once, then the word
is used according to the principle of ekas'eṣa or
tantra.   In the Sūtra in question, namely,
` dvirvacane'ci `, the word ` dvirvacana ` (re-duplication)
is used to stand for the occurence of the word twice
in the Sūtra.   It will be noted that the para-
phrasing of the Sūtra by the Kās'ikā, given above,
contains the word ` dvirvacana ` mentioned twice. (See
underlined). According to the Mahābhāṣya the single
mention of ` dvirvacana ` in the Sūtra is a combination

of two instances of its occurence and therefore
can stand for both.

See MBh. - Vol.I - p:156 - lines 17 and 18 -
katham punarekena yatnena ubhayam labhyam.
ekas'esanirdesodyam.   dvirvacanam ca
dvirvacanam ca dvirvacanam.

450. S.K.Belwalkar suggests the possibility that Baiji,
Saubhava and Haryaksa are traditional elaborat̶i̶o̶n̶s̶ ors
of the Paninian system somewhere between 470 AD -
650 AD.   See Systems of Sanskrit Grammar, p.35
(Poona, 1915)
foot-note 1.   But this obviously is impossible
as the three authors must have been before Candra's
time if Bhartrhari's account is to be relied upon, and
Dr
Belwalkar himself d̶o̶e̶s̶ summarises it on p.41 of his work.

451. The mountain referred is Trikuta.   The legend is
that on Trikuta was found the text of the Science
of grammar composed by Ravana.   A certain
Brahmaraksas took it away and gave it to teachers
like Candra and Vasurataguru.   They then developed
it into a science with many branches.   On Candra and

Vasurāta^{guru}, see Systems of Sanskrit Grammar
pp: 57 - 62.

452. The teacher referred to is Vasurāta guru
mentioned in 451 above. According to Puṇyarāja, the
statement 'this was composed by our teacher' only
means 'composed through the blessings of the^{our}
teacher'.

453. cf. Tractus Logico-Philosophicus p:77
'The object of Philosophy is the logical
clarification of thoughts......

'The result of philosophy is not a number of
''philosophical propositions'' but to make
propositions clear'.

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in Society (The
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ABBREVIATIONS

Biblio : Indica   =   Bibliotheca Indica.

Transl.   =   Translation.

MBh.   =   Mahābhāṣya

VP   =   Vākyapadīya.

RV   =   Ṛg Veda.

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<u>Erratum.</u>

The following are the verses among the Sanskrit passages
quoted on pages 298 - 342 (inclusive of both) besides those
from the text of the Vākyapadīya .

Page
298   dhvaniḥ sphoṭaśca ....tatsvabhavātaḥ
318   sākankṣaśabdairyo ....na cānuma
325   mukhyārthabādhe ....lakṣaṇāropitakriyā

Any other passage typed verse - like is so by mistake.