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Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan: 1991-2001

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List of Abbreviations

228: The 1947 February 28 Incident (二二八事件)

BSR: Benshengren (本省人) Sometimes referred to as “native Taiwanese.”
Those already living in Taiwan before 1945 and their descendents. This
includes both the Hollo (河洛) and Hakka (客家) ethnic groups.

CCP: Chinese Communist Party (中國共產黨/中共)

CSC Central Standing Committee

CSDP:	Chinese Social Democratic Party (中華社民黨)
CU:	Chinese Unification
DPP:	Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨/民進黨)
DW:	Dangwai (黨外), the Non Party opposition movement.
ESC:	Election Survey Center (At National Chengchi University) (國立政治大學選舉研究中心).
KMT:	Kuomintang (中國國民黨/國民黨) also known as the Nationalist Party.
JSP:	Japanese Socialist Party
LDP:	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
ME:	Municipal Executive (Includes city mayors and county magistrates).
MKMT:	Mainstream KMT (主流派) after 2000 known as the localised KMT (本土國民黨).
MMD:	Multi-Member (electoral) District
MRG:	Manifesto Research Group
NHI:	National Health Insurance
NP:	New Party (新黨)
NCCU:	National Chengchi University) (國立政治大學)
NMKMT:	Non Mainstream KMT (非主流派)
NTU:	National Taiwan University (國立台灣大學)

NUG:	National Unification Guidelines (國統綱領)
PFP:	People First Party (親民黨)
PRC:	People's Republic of China (中華人民共和國)
ROC:	Republic of China (中華民國)
ROT:	Republic of Taiwan (台灣共和國)
SMD:	Single Member (electoral) District
SNTV:	Single Non-Transferable Vote
SQ:	Status Quo
SVMM:	Single, Non Transferable Voting in Multi-member Districts
TI:	Taiwan independence
TIP:	Taiwan Independence Party (建國黨)
TSU:	Taiwan Solidarity Union (台聯)
WSR:	Waishengren (外省人) Those arriving from Mainland China after 1945 and their descendents. This group are also often referred to as "Mainlanders."

Note on romanisation

Throughout this dissertation I have used the Hanyu Pinyin (漢語拼音) system of romanisation. The first time any Chinese name, place name or term is used, and I have also added the Chinese characters in brackets. Therefore I use Li Denghui (李登輝) and Gaoxiong (高雄). I have Wade Giles has only been used has been for Chinese names of authors for works published in English, again The only other exception is I have used kept the commonly used spellings for Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石, Chiang

Ching-kuo (蔣經國) and Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙). Although the use of the Hanyu Pinyin system is controversial in Taiwan, I have used this system, as it is the most widely used in Chinese studies.

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Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan: 1991-2001

Abstract

The year 2001 marked the tenth anniversary of Taiwan's multi-party elections, offering a timely opportunity to take stock of the state of party politics in Taiwan. This study examines evolution of party competition in Taiwan, looking at how Taiwan's parties have adjusted to their new multi-party election environment. Have Taiwan's parties followed a convergent or divergent pattern of competition? Or has Taiwan followed the common models of many new democracies of either a hegemonic one party dominant system or a completely unconsolidated system of weak catchall parties and personality orientated, issueless campaigns?

I argue that Taiwan has developed a healthy state of inter-party competition, in which parties and issues have mattered in the evolution of Taiwan's democracy. Taiwan's parties have shown reduced polarization, as election orientated leaders have pushed their parties towards a moderate centre in response to election results and public opinion. However, they have not merged into indistinguishable catchall parties. Instead, leapfrogging of policy positions has been rare, as movement has been within limits set out by party ideology and inner party factional balance. Within ten years of democratic elections Taiwan's parties have swiftly institutionalised a pattern of competition similar to their counterparts parties of Western Europe, with the parties consistently stressing different issues and the public able to distinguish parties on core issues.

I show how the successful operation of Taiwanese democracy goes beyond the institutionalisation of party platforms. Taiwanese public opinion has been shown to be

sophisticated and moderate, consistently rejecting parties taking radical stances.

Moreover, the Taiwan case shows having genuine opposition parties really makes a difference. Firstly, the rise of new electoral issues, such as political corruption and social welfare created new cross cutting cleavages, a phenomenon political scientists view as conducive to democratic stability. Secondly, ten years of multi-party elections have resulted a rapid transformation of mainstream norms towards the opposition's position on many core issues. Products of these campaign debates include a much expanded and more inclusive welfare system, broader norms on what constitutes political corruption and stricter anti corruption legislation. Finally, on the most controversial issue in Taiwanese politics, the mainstream parties have reached a tacit understanding on many aspects of the national identity question. In short, I argue that democracy is working in Taiwan.

Chapter One: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan

1.1 Introduction

The year 2001 marked the tenth anniversary of Taiwan's multi-party elections. The National Assembly elections of 1991 and the forced retirement of the senior parliamentarians elected in the 1940s on the Chinese mainland signify the beginning of democratic elections that for the first time had the potential to bring about a change in the ruling party. Ten years have passed, offering a timely opportunity to take stock of the developments in Taiwan's party politics.

When a country makes the transition from authoritarianism to electoral democracy it is not inevitable that the move towards democratic consolidation will be rapid. Whether or not the new democracy's political parties can become institutionalised will be a critical factor in this consolidation process. Most democratic theorists agree that political parties are essential for a healthy democracy. For instance E. E. Schattschneider argues, "Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties."¹ However, newer democracies have struggled to make the transition into liberal democracies with strong coherent political parties that offer the distinct policy platforms for voters to make an informed policy choice. Instead these parties are often largely vehicles for ambitious politicians to gain office; this is well illustrated by the fluidity of party break-ups and mergers in South Korea and Japan in the 1990s.² Being the only Chinese democracy, Taiwan is an important case study for party scholars, as it has consolidated its democracy faster than most

¹ Schattschneider, *Party Government*, I.

² For analysis of the malleability of South Korean political parties, see Ahn Chung-si and Jauhg Hoon, "South Korea," 142-151.

other new democracies, and comparative studies have shown Taiwan's political parties to be comparatively institutionalised.³

The focus of this study is to analyse the pattern of party competition that has evolved in Taiwan's first decade of democratic elections. Have Taiwan's parties followed a convergent pattern of competition common in many western democracies, in which though ideological distance is limited, parties still offer consistently distinct policy platforms? Or has competition been divergent, resulting in highly polarised parties, with all its dangers for political stability? Or has Taiwan followed the common models of many new democracies of either a hegemonic one party dominant system or a completely unconsolidated system of weak catchall parties and personality orientated, issueless campaigns?

In order to study the evolution of party competition in Taiwan, I examine how Taiwan's parties have adjusted to their new multi-party election environment. Therefore this work is about party change in Taiwan. Party change is a broad concept, defined by Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda as, "any variation, alteration, or modification in how parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand for, and what they do."⁴ This research focuses on one aspect of this definition, by examining what Taiwan's parties stand for, more specifically how and why have parties altered their election platforms and what these developments can tell us about the state of Taiwan's democracy.

Contrary to previous works and the recent pessimism over Taiwan's democracy, I

³ See Stockton, "Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in East Asia," 94-119; Blondel and Marsh, "Conclusion," 337-339.

⁴ Harmel and Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 275.

argue that Taiwan has developed a healthy state of inter-party competition, in which parties and issues have mattered in the evolution of Taiwan's democracy.⁵ Taiwan's parties have shown reduced polarization, as election orientated leaders have pushed their parties towards a moderate centre in response to election results and public opinion. However, they have not merged into indistinguishable catchall parties. Instead, leapfrogging of policy positions has been rare, as movement has been within limits set out by party ideology and inner party factional balance.

Taiwan did begin democratic elections in 1991 with a predominant party and polarised positions on the one core electoral issue. However, within ten years of Taiwan's parties have swiftly institutionalised a pattern of moderate differentiation in party competition similar to their counterparts of Western Europe. In other words, although ideological distance between parties is limited, the parties consistently stress different issues and the public are able to distinguish between parties on core issues.⁶

The pattern in elections has been that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP 民進黨) placed new issues on the electoral agenda. Although the ruling Kuomintang (KMT 國民黨) initially rejected these policy proposals, later it often attempted to steal these popular issues. However, since both the public and parties see issues as owned, in most cases issue stealing has failed and issue ownership has

⁵ For examples of influential works that see a limited role for issues in Taiwanese elections see Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan*, 43-50; Similarly John Hsieh blames Taiwan's electoral system for the way elections are candidate rather than party orientated, see Hsieh, "The SNTV System and its Political Implications," 193-213; For a negative appraisal of the development of Taiwan's democracy see Kuo, "Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective," 85-111; The pessimism over Taiwan's democracy has been evident since late 2000 in Taiwan's media and in my interviews with KMT and pro KMT academics.

⁶ For patterns of party differentiation in mature democracies see Budge and Klingemann, "Finally! Comparative Over-Time Mapping of Party Policy Movement," Figures 1.1-1.25.

remained intact.⁷ A party can be said to own an issue when it dominates emphasis of this issue during a campaign and is associated in the public mind with that issue. Ian Budge and Judith Bara note the importance of such party differentiation in democracy, "The essential democratic requirements for an electoral mandate policy are that there is some difference between parties so electors can make a choice: and that once elected the party will do more or less what it promised to do when in government."⁸

However, the successful operation of Taiwanese democracy goes beyond the institutionalisation of party platforms. The Taiwan case shows that having genuine opposition parties really makes a difference, as the consequent democratic electoral debate has brought tangible benefits to Taiwanese society. Firstly, the rise of new electoral issues, such as political corruption and social welfare created new cross cutting cleavages, a phenomenon political scientists view as conducive to democratic stability.⁹ Secondly, ten years of multi-party elections have resulted in a rapid transformation of mainstream norms towards the opposition's position on many core issues. Products of these new values include a much expanded and more inclusive welfare system, broader norms on what constitutes political corruption and stricter anti corruption legislation. Finally, on the most controversial issue in Taiwanese politics, the mainstream parties have reached a tacit understanding on many aspects of the national identity question. In short, I argue that democracy is working in Taiwan.

⁷ For an introduction to the premises of issue ownership theory see Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections," 825-850.

⁸ Budge and Bara, "Introduction: Content Analysis and Political Texts," 9.

⁹ Chu and Lin, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 80.

In order to examine the pattern of party competition in Taiwan in election campaigns I focus on the following empirical questions throughout this dissertation: (1) Have issues been important in Taiwanese elections? (2) Which issues have been most salient? (3) How do Taiwan's parties differ in their issue emphasis and ownership on the core electoral issues? (4) How and why have the parties adjusted their issue emphasis and ownership? (5) What are the implications of these developments for the quality of Taiwan's democracy? I employ a combination of source materials to measure and explain party change over this period, including quantitative and qualitative content analysis of election propaganda, public opinion surveys, and interviews with experienced politicians and political scientists.

1.2 Layout of the Dissertation

In the introductory chapter I first outline the core questions driving this thesis and my main arguments. Next I place my research in the context of general and Taiwanese literature on the two core areas of this research: measurement of party policy change and explanations of party change. Also the main data sources and the research methods used to answer the questions listed above are explained. Next in chapter two I give a brief introduction to developments in Taiwanese electoral politics, both before and after democratisation, introducing Taiwan's political parties, political system, and broad trends in election results, party identification and issue emphasis. I show how Taiwan's parties have stressed issues and do stress different issues.

Chapters three to five examine party change on the core electoral issues in greater detail in three issue case studies. These are social welfare, political corruption and national identity, three of the most salient issues not only in Taiwan but also in most

contemporary democracies. In each case study chapter I the measure party change and issue ownership using election propaganda content analysis, political scientist and elite interviews, and party image survey data. After introducing the background to each issue, I show the issue emphasis trends for the whole decade and then look in more detail at the developments of the main sub-issues. In all three cases election orientated leaders and factions have moved their parties towards more centrist positions in response to public opinion and election results. However, leapfrogging has been rare, as movement is constrained by the strength of party ideology and more conservative factions and leaders. The constraining role of ideology has been strongest in the case of national identity. Parties have had more room to manoeuvre with social issues, thus the only case of successful KMT issue stealing occurred with National Health Insurance in the social welfare chapter.

Finally in the chapter six, I review the main findings on how and why Taiwan's parties have changed in the first decade of multiparty democratic elections, and outline what this study can tell us about the state of Taiwanese democracy.

1.3 Data and Methodology

This study places itself in two related fields of political science: (1) measurement of party change and (2) explanations of party change. Taiwan scholars have touched upon these two areas; however, their principal focus has been on Taiwan's transition to democracy, while the subsequent operation of party politics has been a sideshow in this literature.¹⁰ At the time of writing there are still only two academic book length studies of Taiwan's political parties in the 1990s, both rely largely on

¹⁰ Lin, "Paths to Democracy"; Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan*; Chao and Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy*.

qualitative sources and both are on the DPP, while none have been published on either the KMT or New Party (NP 新黨).¹¹ This study attempts to fill this gap, with a comprehensive examination of party platform change during Taiwan's first decade of multi-party elections.

1.3.1 Measurement of Party Change

There are numerous potential data to measure party platform change, including manifestos, public opinion surveys, elite surveys, elite interviews, and election propaganda.

Party election manifestoes or platforms issued prior to each election campaign are a rich data source on party policy priorities and have a long history as a source material to measure party change.¹² Ian Budge and Judith Bara note the importance of these documents in a democracy as they give "voters an indication of what parties would do if elected and thus offering them a basis for informed policy choice."¹³ Of course few voters have the time or patience to read through such lengthy documents but as Budge notes, "it nevertheless strongly influences media discussion during the election campaign."¹⁴ Indeed manifestoes are the core data source for the most comprehensive cross-national study of party policy preferences, the Manifesto Research Group (MRG). The MRG coding scheme was developed by a research group of the European Consortium for Political Research in 1979. This system for content analysis of election manifestoes includes fifty-seven basic policy issues, and has been applied to analyse national election manifestoes in twenty-five democracies over the 1945-98 period.¹⁵ Unfortunately, all three parties in Taiwan have only issued such documents since 1998; therefore these cannot be employed for the entire period in question.¹⁶ Liu Tsung-wei (劉從葦) made the first attempt to apply the MRG framework to the Taiwan case. He carried out content analysis of

¹¹ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*; Guo (郭正亮), *The DPP's Painful Transition*.

¹² For a review of manifesto research see Budge, Robertson and Hearl, eds., *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change in 19 Democracies*, 19-21.

¹³ Budge et al, *Mapping Policy Preferences*, 9.

¹⁴ Budge, "Parties, Programs and Policies," 699.

¹⁵ Budge et al, *Mapping Policy Preferences*.

¹⁶ Liu, "Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change in Taiwan from 1989 to 1998," 4.

the candidate policy section of electoral gazettes for Legislative Yuan elections between 1989 and 1998.¹⁷ However, the gazettes show the policy proposals of individual candidates, rather than the party as a whole, and voters may not pay much attention to the long list of candidate pledges, as in some cases there are up to forty candidates in a multiple member district.

The most common method of placing political parties by scholars applying variations of the Downsian proximity and its related directional theory has been survey data.¹⁸ Respondents are asked to locate political parties (and sometimes themselves) on various policy spectrums. Since this form of questioning has been used in the United States (US) National Election Surveys for several decades, it offers valuable data on the extent the public sees parties as having changed over time, if they have converged or diverged. The issues that have received the most attention in US politics are race, abortion and social welfare.¹⁹ Survey data is also the most commonly used method for measuring party position in Taiwan, with two main directions of research. Firstly, researchers at National Taiwan University (NTU 國立台灣大學) asked respondents if they view parties as representing certain policy opposites such as Chinese unification or Taiwan independence, tolerating or attacking corruption.²⁰ In contrast, National Chengchi University's Election Study Center (國立政治大學; 選舉研究中心) has taken a more orthodox approach. It asks respondents to place themselves and parties on key issue spectrums such as independence versus unification. These have been employed by John Hsieh (謝復生) to show changing positions of both parties and respondents in the 1990s.²¹ Although these studies are useful in showing the electorate's party image, there may well be a discrepancy between this public image and that which the party wishes to

¹⁷ Liu, "Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change," 3-4. These gazettes are issued to every voter a few weeks before the voting day. These show a picture of each candidate, their party affiliation, work experience, education, and main policy goals.

¹⁸ The initial impetus of this tradition came from Downs, *An Economic Theory of Voting*. This was followed by a number of variations on his approach such as Hinich and Munger, *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*; Iverson, "Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies: 45-74. For the directional alternative see Rabonowitz and Macdonald, "A Directional Theory of Issue Voting," 793-817. While for an approach combining proximity and direction see Merrill and Grofman, *A Unified Theory of Voting*.

¹⁹ For example Abramowitz, "Issue Evolution Reconsidered," 1-24.

²⁰ Examples of this approach have been You (游盈隆), *Public Opinion and Taiwan's Political Change*, 65-105; Chen (陳明通), "The DPP's Party Image."

²¹ Hsieh, "Continuity and Change in Taiwan's Electoral Politics," 32-49.

project.

A method that has seen growing use has been elite surveys, involving either political scientists or politicians being asked to place parties on policy spectrums. Castles and Mair, Laver and Hunt, and Huber and Inglehart carried out the most large-scale cross-national expert surveys.²² Surveys of politicians have also been on the increase in recent years. For instance, the British Representative Survey asks MPs to locate their parties on a number of spectrums.²³ Similarly, Herbert Kitschelt has created a database of surveys of mid-level party activists in four East European countries.²⁴ Such elite surveys have been less popular in Taiwan, in the only example I am aware of Lin Chia-long (林嘉龍) used the NTU party image questions mentioned above for a sample of 66 legislators between 1995 and 1996.²⁵ Although these studies have been useful for placement of parties, the use of different scales on each occasion has limited their value for showing party change.

In modern democracies election advertising is a central component of parties' campaigns. However, this source has been neglected by political science as a means of plotting party change. Systematic time series content analysis has only been conducted in the US²⁶ and to date only one comparative volume on election advertising has been published.²⁷ Election advertising research in Taiwan has mainly been carried out by advertising scholars rather than by political scientists. These content analysis studies of political advertising in Taiwan have two major drawbacks: first, they tend to focus solely on single campaigns,²⁸ and, more importantly, each uses a completely different coding scheme, making time series

²² Castles and Mair, "Left Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements," 73-88; Laver and Hunt, *Policy and Political Competition*; Huber and Inglehart, "Expert interpretations of Party Space and Party Location in 42 Societies," 73-111. This project even included left-right placements for three Taiwanese parties!

²³ See Norris and Levenduski, "The Iceberg and the Titanic. Electoral defeat, Policy Moods and Party Change,"; Norris, "New Politicians: Changes in Party Composition in Westminster," 22-43.

²⁴ See Toka, "Party Positions," 180-205.

²⁵ Lin, "Paths to Democracy," 434-442.

²⁶ For example Anne Johnston carried out a study of 1213 presidential ads between 1952 and 2000. Johnston, "Videostyle Differences in Issue and Image Ads.

²⁷ Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, eds., *Political Advertising in Western democracies*.

²⁸ For an example of a single campaign project see Zheng (鄭自隆), "An Analysis of Party Newspaper Advertisements and Media Policy During the 1995 Legislative Yuan Election," 1-32.

comparison impossible.²⁹

The final and most common method of measuring party change has been qualitative analysis of data sources such as party documents, propaganda and elite interviews. This has been popular in the Taiwan case. For example, Shelley Rigger and Guo Zhengliang's (郭正亮) treatment of the developments in the DPP and Alexander Tan's study of the KMT in the 1990s.³⁰ This qualitative approach can give the reader a colourful portrait of party developments. However, when used in isolation this can also suffer from being impressionistic and biased in favour of certain parties. Moreover, such data is rarely of value for cross-national comparison.

From the above review it is clear that though political science offers the researcher numerous potential methods to measure party change, other than opinion surveys, systematic methods have rarely been applied to the Taiwan case. Since all the measures listed above have their pros and cons, this research uses a combination of research methods to plot party change, including qualitative and quantitative content analysis of party election propaganda, existing survey data, and elite interviews. Reference is made to both Liu Tsung-wei's gazette findings, and the two main Taiwanese schools of survey data. However, the bulk of data used is original and groundbreaking. Next, these new datasets are outlined:

1.3.1 a) Newspaper Advertisements

This study represents the first attempt to use newspaper campaign advertisements to measure party change in Taiwan. Newspaper ads are relatively easy to obtain, represent the public face of a party rather than that of only a single candidate, and receive considerable media attention in Taiwan.³¹ In countries where no manifesto is issued, content analysis of election newspaper advertisements offers a valuable alternative. I carried out both qualitative and quantitative content analysis of all election newspaper advertisements for every national-level election from 1991 to

²⁹ For example, Chen (陳義彥) and Chen (陳世敏), *Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports and Advertisements during the 1989 Elections*.

³⁰ Rigger, *From Opposition to Power*; Guo, *The DPP's Painful Transition*; Tan, "The Transformation of the Kuomintang Party," 149-164.

³¹ An example of this was the wide media coverage of Chen Shuibian's (陳水扁) advertisement showing a picture of his son in army uniform, saying, "Next year he will do military service, his father is Chen Shuibian." *Lianhe bao*, March 6, 2000, 7.

2000 for the thirty-one days prior to voting day and from the three newspapers with the highest readership:³² *China Times* (中國時報, Zhongguo shibao), *Lianhe bao* (聯合報, United Daily News), and *Ziyou shibao* (自由時報, Liberty Times).³³

Advertisements were collected for Taiwan's three major parties in the 1990s: the KMT, the DPP, and the NP. A total of 1,665 advertisements were collected and a total of 27,834 "quasi sentences" coded.³⁴ All the texts in the advertisements were analysed; the only exceptions were candidates' biographical details or details of campaign rally announcements. Three main kinds of advertisements were coded: official party advertisements, candidate advertisements, and advertisements bought by anonymous or support groups.³⁵ The author has combined the scores of the three categories into a total proportion of issue emphasis for each party per election, which I term "total ads." In this research the advertising statistics used are for official ads or total ads, the former reflects the party image the party centre is trying to create and the latter shows the overall image that the voter will receive. In the first stage, the proportion of issue emphasis for each advertisement is calculated, and then this figure is used to find the proportion of issue emphasis for the party during the entire campaign. This data can offer information on the relative party issue emphasis over a single campaign and position or issue emphasis change over the entire decade. This data can show if the parties are converging towards the centre or diverging towards the poles. In addition, the scores of groups of issues or issue domains can be combined to test in which broad areas parties have the greatest conflict.

This research project follows the basic structure of the MRG coding scheme, with

³² In 2000 a nationwide survey found the following readership figures: *China Times* 38%, *Lianhe bao* 36.7%, *Ziyou shibao* 35.4%. See Zhang (章英華) and Fu (傅仰止) eds., *Taiwan Region Social Change Basic Survey Project*, 91.

³³ These three papers also reflect the main political currents, with *Zhongguo shibao* closer to the mainstream KMT, *Lianhe bao* sympathetic with the non-mainstream KMT and the NP, and *Ziyou shibao* closer to the DPP. This is apparent by the fact that throughout the 1990s the NP and Song Chuyu (宋楚瑜) in 2000 did not have a single advertisement in *Ziyou shibao*, and in the 1991 and 1992 elections *Lianhe bao* was free of DPP advertisements.

³⁴ A "quasi sentence" is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue. Since one sentence may include a number of arguments, sentences may be divided into quasi sentences that are divided by commas, semicolons, or colons. For details see Budge et al., *Mapping Policy Preferences*, 96-103.

³⁵ Although these advertisements are anonymous or taken out in the name of obscure groups, in 95 percent of the cases the political inclination of the advertisement is obvious. Of course, determining whether the party centre funded the advertisements is more difficult.

the additional categories adopted by Liu Tsung-wei.³⁶ The main difference is that I subdivided two issue categories,³⁷ and added five new categories to capture references to parties and candidates,³⁸ a list of the categories and domains employed in this project is presented in Table 1.1 The advantage of using the MRG coding scheme is that it has been used comprehensively in 25 countries over the post-war period and proved to be applicable to varying political systems. Therefore, this coding scheme also offers the potential of cross-national comparison, and in chapters three and four I do compare my Taiwanese data with MRG findings in Japan. It is encouraging methodologically that the revised MRG coding scheme is applicable to the Taiwanese data. Table 1.2 shows that my coding scheme was able to pick up the vast majority of issue references, with only 10 percent of quasi sentences falling into the uncategorizable/others domain.³⁹

1.3.1b) Television Advertisements

The importance of TV advertising in Taiwanese elections has risen rapidly since the mid-1990s. While the KMT had only 149 minutes of campaign TV ad time in 1991, it had almost 17,000 minutes in 2000!⁴⁰ However, since I was unable to collect complete sets of TV spots for every election I have only carried out qualitative analysis of TV ads for 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2000.

1.3.1c) Elite Interviews

During two periods of fieldwork in Taiwan in 2000 and 2001 I carried out a broad range of in-depth interviews. These fell into three main categories: experienced politicians, political scientists, and grassroots level party activists. Requests for

³⁶ See Liu, "Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change," Table 2.

³⁷ This paper subdivides the category "political authority" (305) into "Political Stability" (305A), "Government Competence" (305B), and "Other Parties' Lack of Government Competence" (305C). Also "Taiwan Independence: Positive" (111) and "Taiwan Independence: Negative" (112) have been subdivided to include "Pure Taiwan Independence" (111A), "Diluted Taiwan Independence" (111B), "Taiwan Independence: Negative" (112A), and "Chinese Unification" (112B). See Tables 1.1 and 5.1 for details.

³⁸ This group is designated as Domain 9. I did not use Domain 8 to avoid confusion with Agasoster, "A Framework for Analysing Local Party Policy Emphasis in Scotland," 76-89.

³⁹ Similarly, only 4.5% of issue references in Liu's study fell into the "others" category. Liu Tsung-wei, "The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan," Table 8.1.

⁴⁰ Fell, "Political Advertising in Taiwan."

interviews were sent to over 100 politicians and I interviewed a total of 66 experienced Taiwanese politicians. The list of respondents is in Appendix 1. My main criterion for selection was politicians that had been involved in a minimum of three national level elections and those that held important decision making positions in their parties during the 1990s. The respondents included 30 from the DPP, 22 from the KMT, nine from the NP, and five from the People First Party (PFP 親民黨).⁴¹ On average each interview lasted 45 minutes. Most questions focused on politicians' perspectives on their parties' issue campaign emphasis and change in their party over the 1990s. Unlike Lin Chia-long's study almost all my questions were open ended and I only attempted to quantify answers on a small minority of questions.⁴² In addition, I interviewed 15 leading political scientists in Taiwan to gain their views on party and election change during this period. They are also listed in Appendix 1 and were selected on the basis of having published journal articles on Taiwan's electoral politics either abroad or in Taiwan.

1.3.2 Explanations of Party Change

Most party theorists agree that established parties are conservative organisations averse to change. As Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda put it, "decisions to change a party's organization, issue positions or strategy face a wall of resistance common to large organizations."⁴³ However, there is less agreement on explanations for party change. I divide these into categories that focus on the following explanatory variables: 1) inner party politics, 2) electoral competition, 3) external shocks, 4) incumbent versus opposition status, 5) institutional factors, and 6) party ideology.

⁴¹ The reason for the lower KMT number was a higher refusal rate.

⁴² Lin, "Paths to Democracy."

⁴³ Harmel and Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 261.

1.3.2a) Inner-party Politics

Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda note that “party change does not just happen,” and that change tends to come from two inner party factors; leadership change, a change in dominant factions, plus an external stimulus for change, such as electoral defeat.⁴⁴ Alexander Tan made the first attempt to apply this theory to Taiwan, showing that a combination of all three factors contributed to the transformation of the KMT over the last two decades.⁴⁵

Many theorists on party behaviour in the US also stress parties’ internal dynamics.

For instance, Laurel Elder’s “Elite Power Struggle Model” argues the key determinant of change is internal power struggles among the party elites.⁴⁶

Similarly Abramowitz and Saunders contend that since the early 1990s there has been a shift in the balance within the US Republican Party in favour of its more conservative wing, as represented by figures such as Newt Gingrich, resulting in a radicalisation of the party.⁴⁷ While Edward Carmines and James Stimson’s “issue evolution theory ” argues policy change on the race issue is driven by replacement, as racially liberal Democratic representatives replaced conservative Democrats in Congress.⁴⁸ Many also see a change in party leader as a critical internal factor for party change. According to Harmel et al, “the leader and the leader’s own wishes may be the ultimate cause of change.”⁴⁹ For instance, Abramowitz and Saunders see the rise of Reagan and Clinton in the Republican and Democratic parties as contributing to the radicalisation of both parties.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 261.

⁴⁵ Tan, “The Transformation of the Kuomintang Party,” 149-164.

⁴⁶ Elder, “Theories of Party Behaviour.”

⁴⁷ Abramowitz and Saunders, “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,” 634-52.

⁴⁸ Carmines and Stimson, *Issue Evolution*.

⁴⁹ Harmel, Uk, Tan and Janda, “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party change,” 4.

⁵⁰ Abramowitz and Saunders, “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,” 634-52.

Taiwan scholars have also given considerable attention to inner-party factors in explaining party change. Because of the KMT's tradition of authoritarian leadership, change has often been attributed to its party chair. For instance, Linda Chao and Ramon Myers particularly stress the role of Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) and Li Denghui (李登輝) in the democratisation process.⁵¹ In fact, in my interviews by far the most common explanation for the KMT's changes in the 1990s was the influence of its former chairman Li Denghui. In contrast, changes in the DPP's factional balance have been used to explain the party's national identity positions. For instance, Cheng Tun-jen (鄭敦仁) and Hsu Yung-ming (徐永明) claim the DPP's passing of the Taiwan independence clause (TIC) in 1991 was the result of a factional pact.⁵²

1.3.2b) Electoral Competition

Electoral considerations are one of the most commonly raised explanations for party change in the literature. For example, much of the work on party policy change follows a Downsian tradition, which assumes one-dimensional political competition in which parties or politicians are essentially vote seeking and free to make any policy moves in search of their ultimate goal of winning office, and will converge on the median voter.⁵³ This approach has been popular among Taiwanese scholars. For example, Wu Yushan (吳玉山) argued that vote-maximizing strategies explain Taiwan's parties' movement towards the centre in the 1990s.⁵⁴ Similarly, Ming Juzheng (明居正) described how Taiwan's public opinion has had a centrifugal

⁵¹ See Chao and Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy*.

⁵² See Cheng and Hsu, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism and Party Realignment" 137-173.

⁵³ Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, 117-18.

⁵⁴ Wu Yushan, "Moving towards the Center: Taiwan's Public Opinion and Mainland Policy Shift."

impact on Taiwan's political parties.⁵⁵

Election results are often raised as an important factor in party policy behaviour.

David Robertson proposed the idea that parties adjust according to expectations of whether an election will be competitive or not. If it is likely to be competitive, parties will move to the centre, and if not then parties will move away from the centre.⁵⁶ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda have noted that for vote seeking parties, "the more pronounced their electoral failures, the more likely they are to change."⁵⁷ While Attila Agh's study on the impact of election results on the Hungarian Socialist Party shows that as well as party defeats, the effect of election successes must also be considered.⁵⁸ In fact in Taiwan many politicians and political analysts explain the parties' changes as responses to crucial election defeats or victories.⁵⁹

Some researchers stress changes in the inter-party competitive environment as a stimulus for party change. For instance, Bonnie Meguid has shown how established West European parties have adapted their positions in response to the challenge of new rising parties, such as green or far right parties.⁶⁰ Similarly Ian Budge raised the idea of a "Marker Party Model," in which parties will adjust in order to maintain the distinction between themselves and neighbouring parties.⁶¹ While Robert Harmel and Lars Svasand propose that an established party will change in response to a new party if its poor electoral results can be attributed to its new competitor.⁶²

⁵⁵ Ming Juzheng (明居正), "Centrifugal Competition and the Development of Republic of China's Party Politics," 142-156.

⁵⁶ Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition*.

⁵⁷ Harmel and Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 284.

⁵⁸ Agh, "Defeat and Success as Promoters of Change," 427-444.

⁵⁹ In my interviews the most commonly cited defeats were 1991 for the DPP and 2000 for the KMT.

⁶⁰ Meguid, "Competing with the Neophyte."

⁶¹ Budge, "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition," 443-467.

⁶² Harmel and Svasand, "The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms," 315-340.

In the Taiwan case it is likely that the appearance of new competitors such as the NP and PFP will affect the policy positions of the original dominant party, the KMT.

The final aspect of electoral competition is the sociological groups parties chose to target. In the initial post war period studies found stable party-voter linkages, therefore parties focused on mobilizing their own supporters to vote. However, the weakening of party loyalties since the 1970s has meant parties must now target independent voters to a greater extent.⁶³ This question of targeting is raised in Robert Rohrschneider's study of campaigning, which argues that parties will use a traditional ideological message when concentrating on mobilizing traditional supporters, but apply a broader inclusive approach if the focus is chasing new voters.⁶⁴

1.3.2c) External Shocks

Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda's "Integrated Theory of Party Change" also raises the possibility of external shocks contributing to party's changes in direction. The example they offer is the impact the fall of the Soviet Union had on many West European Communist parties.⁶⁵ However, in the Taiwan case the key external shock appears to have been the Chinese Communist Party's military threats.

1.3.2d) Incumbent Versus Government Status

Former opposition parties are likely to change their policy positions on coming to government office. For instance, Shaun Bowler has proposed that incumbent parties should move less as they are tied by their records and are less able to raise new

⁶³ Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck ed., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*.

⁶⁴ Rohrschneider, "Mobilizing versus chasing," 367-382.

⁶⁵ Harmel and Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 276.

issues than challengers.⁶⁶ While Susan Stokes has noted the trend that many Latin American presidential candidates have campaigned on economic expansion platforms but adopted financial neo-liberalization on coming to power.⁶⁷ This variable should also be considered in the Taiwan case as the former opposition DPP gained control of most local governments in 1997 and became the national ruling party in May 2000.

1.3.2e) Institutional Explanations

Kaare Strom offers a useful attempt to synthesize previous conflicting research on party behaviour. He divides parties' goals as vote seeking, office seeking and policy seeking, and shows how organizational and institutional constraints will affect the priorities of the parties in question.⁶⁸ This institutional approach has had some impact on Taiwan where a number of scholars have stressed the importance of electoral systems in determining party issue emphasis. For instance, John Hsieh and Lin Jih-wen (林繼文) both blame the extremist stances of Taiwanese politicians on its electoral system of single, non-transferable voting in multi-member districts (SVMM).⁶⁹ However, the impact of electoral systems should not be exaggerated, as Taiwan uses a mixed system of SVMM for Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elections but also single member districts (SMD) for local executive and presidential contests.

1.3.2f) Ideology

Party ideology refers to the set of basic core values that are taken as accepted by a

⁶⁶ Bowler, "Voter Perceptions and Party Strategies," 61-83.

⁶⁷ Stokes, *Mandates and Democracy*.

⁶⁸ Strom, "A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Party," 565-598.

⁶⁹ Hsieh, "The SNTV System and its Political Implications."; Lin, "The Consequences of Single Non-Transferable Voting Rule."

political party, which Ian Budge notes, “provides politicians with a broad conceptual map of politics into which political events, current problems, electors’ preferences and other parties can all be fitted.”⁷⁰ Therefore party ideology contributes to the conservative nature of parties, constraining party policy movement or policy leapfrogging.⁷¹ In contrast to the attention ideology has received among academics studying western political parties, Taiwan’s political scientists have neglected the impact of ideology on party change.⁷²

The role of party ideology is central to the issue saliency theory developed by Ian Budge, which offers an alternative view of party competition in which parties do not necessarily take confrontational stances on the same issues; instead, parties are more likely to “talk past each other” (i.e., are more likely to stress issues that favour their own side and ignore or deal cursively with issues that would either damage their own position or favour opponent parties).⁷³ Therefore, in electoral campaigns the key objective of party leaders is to set the political agenda on issues that favour their party or damage their opponents. Most electoral issues tend to be valence rather than confrontation positional issues; parties see the electorate as accepting one stance, and thus rather than arguing against other parties’ positions, the tactic is to target other more favourable but related issues. For example, in Britain, the Conservative Party is associated with lower taxes and reducing social welfare provisions, while the Labour Party is seen as raising taxes and preserving the welfare state. However, rather than calling for hospital closures, the Conservatives

⁷⁰ Budge, “A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition,” 446.

⁷¹ The only exception should be with ideologically contiguous parties.

⁷² An example of the ideology-orientated approach is Budge, Robertson and Hearl ed, *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change*.

⁷³ Budge, “Parties, Programs, and Policies,” 695-716; Petrocik, “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections,” 825-850.

will call for tax cuts and the Labour Party will emphasize the importance of a welfare system rather than calling for higher taxes.

Saliency theory does allow for party policy movement: parties will adjust policies or the saliency of issues in the hope of improving electoral fortunes. However, movement is within ideologically delimited areas and leapfrogging should be the exception. There are a number of reasons why this ideology is so binding. First, if a party changes its policies too radically, its image is likely to become indistinguishable from other parties. Second, by changing too much, a party may lose the support of its core supporters and activists. Third, although politicians aim to gain office, for many the goal of gaining office is to implement policy. Lastly, when a party deviates from its core values to an unacceptable degree, this shift is likely to lead to political realignment as politicians and their supporters switch allegiance according to their core values. One example is the formation of the Social Democratic Party in Britain in 1983, prompted by Labour's rapid shift to the Left. In Taiwan, the decision to form splinter parties—such as the NP and the Taiwan Independence Party (TIP, 建國黨)—was justified in terms of their original parties' "betrayal" of their national identity ideals. Changing core party principles can prove a painstaking process, even when the positions in question are the equivalent of electoral suicide. Party ideology tends to play a unifying role not only for party elite and activists but also for the party's core supporters. Instances of the difficulty of fundamental ideological change are the decades required for the Labour Party to abolish the clause in its party charter calling for large-scale nationalisation and the numerous failed attempts by reformers in Taiwan's DPP to revise its Taiwan independence clause. In short, party ideology should constrain parties from leapfrogging each other on core political issues.

In this study I test the key explanatory variables suggested in the party change literature on the Taiwan case. In each case study chapter I examine party change in terms of the following variables: 1) inner party politics, 2) electoral competition, 3) external shocks, 4) incumbent versus opposition status, 5) institutional factors, and 6)

party ideology. Under the heading of inner party politics I look at the impact of leadership change and inner party factional balance. In the electoral competition section I examine the extent that parties have followed public opinion, reacted to electoral results, adopted a strategy of mainly chasing new voters or mobilizing traditional voters, and adjusted in accordance to the inter-party electoral environment. In the external shock section the main item of importance will be the China threat. Next I look to see whether issue stress has differed when parties have been in or out of office. In the institutional section I look at the impact of electoral systems on party policy emphasis. Finally in the ideology section, I am interested to see the extent ideology has constrained movement away from core principles.

Chapter Two: The Taiwanese Context

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I first set the scene with a brief introduction to the history of Taiwan. After looking at the developments on Taiwan prior to 1945, the initial chaotic period of ROC rule is introduced. This is followed by a review of the 47-year Martial Law period of 1950-1987. This includes outlining the political and constitutional system established after the KMT regime moved to Taiwan, the rise of the opposition movement, and the limited democratic reforms under Chiang Ching-kuo. Next, I discuss the more extensive political and constitutional changes in the Li Denghui era. Section 2.3 reviews the main national elections since the end of Martial Law, trends in party vote and seat shares, and party identification. Then section 2.4 shows some broad trends of issue emphasis for the whole decade from my newspaper ad content analysis. I show how Taiwanese parties have stressed issues in elections, that three of the most salient electoral issues are social welfare, political corruption and national identity, and that Taiwan's parties do show contrasting issue emphasis.

2.2 Brief History of Taiwan

2.2.1 Taiwan Before 1945

Taiwan is an island approximately the size of Wales, located in the western Pacific, 160 kilometres from China's Fujian (福建) Province. As late as 1600 Taiwan remained on the periphery of the faltering Chinese Ming Empire. It was largely populated by the ancestors of today's aboriginal peoples (原住民), and apart from Penghu (澎湖 the Pescadores), there was little permanent Han Chinese settlement on Taiwan. However, for the last 400 years Taiwan has been dominated by two influences, China and international politics. Repeatedly, the balance between these

two forces has determined the island's fate, as Taiwan has changed hands on no less than five occasions, and in each case Taiwan's residents had no say.

The island had its first nominally unified government under the Dutch, who ruled from 1622-1661. It was during this period that the first large-scale migration of Han Chinese to Taiwan took place. After almost forty years on Taiwan, the Dutch were expelled by the Chinese Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功 also known as Koxinga), whose regime controlled the island until it was taken over by the Qing Dynasty (清朝) in 1683.⁷⁴ For the first time Taiwan was formally incorporated into the Chinese empire, becoming part of Fujian Province. Han immigration to Taiwan continued throughout the Zheng and Qing periods, so that by early in the Qing era the majority of the island's residents were Han Chinese. Initially Taiwan had a largely self-sufficient agricultural economy, but by the late 19th century it increasingly became involved in the region's growing international trade. Taiwan had a number of treaty ports and became a major exporter of agricultural products, such as tea, sugar and camphor, and an importer of opium.⁷⁵

Taiwan changed hands for the fourth time in 1895, when following the China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War the Treaty of Shimoneseke ceded Taiwan to Japan. For fifty years Taiwan was ruled as a Japanese colony, its economy was structured to supply the needs of its colonial masters. The island was cut off from Mainland Chinese influences to the greatest extent in its modern history. Although some limited modernization had taken place in the late Qing period, the Japanese era saw much faster development of the island's infrastructure, agriculture, and food

⁷⁴ For an account of the Dutch and Zheng era in Taiwan see Willis, Jr. "The Seventeenth Century Transformation," 84-106.

⁷⁵ For the Qing era see, *Taiwan: A New History*, 107-200.

processing industry. By the end of the Japanese era Taiwan had become one of the most developed parts of Asia outside Japan. Many Taiwanese who had been through the Japanese education system thought of themselves as Japanese, taking Japanese names and volunteering in the Japanese war effort.⁷⁶ Even today many older generation Taiwanese look back on this period as a golden era.

In 1911, sixteen years after Taiwan fell into Japanese hands the Qing Dynasty was overthrown and the Republic of China (ROC) was established. Although the KMT was involved in the initial founding of the ROC, the party did not hold central office until 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) achieved a partial unification of the country following the Northern Expedition, setting up his capital in Nanjing (南京). However, during most of the Republican period neither the KMT nor their communist rivals showed any interest in Taiwan. In Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) even talked of offering support to the Taiwanese in their independence movement!⁷⁷

2.2.2 Taiwan's Incorporation into the ROC

Following Japan's defeat in the World War Two and in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam Agreements, Taiwan was handed over to the ROC government in October 1945. After a fifty year gap Taiwan was once again a Chinese province. Although most Taiwanese initially welcomed KMT troops, corruption and misrule of the KMT regime soon soured relations between the Taiwanese and their new rulers. Tensions reached a climax in the spring of 1947, following what became known as the February 28 Incident (228 Incident). An accidental shooting of a

⁷⁶ See Lamley, "Taiwan under Japanese Rule," 201-260.

⁷⁷ Snow, *Red Star Over China*, 128-129.

bystander in a scuffle over the attempted arrest of a vendor selling contraband cigarettes sparked off riots and led Taiwanese to take over running most towns and cities of the island. Although the KMT governor held negotiations with the Taiwanese Settlement Committee, he had secretly telegraphed for troop reinforcements from the mainland. When these troops arrived thousands of the islanders were massacred, particularly educated members of the elite that had been involved in trying to keep order and negotiate. Since the crushing of this Taiwanese uprising the 228 Incident became a taboo subject for over forty years. The 228 Incident and the severity of KMT rule during the long subsequent Martial Law years showed Taiwanese the futility of open opposition, and for decades parents taught their children to avoid discussing politics. The legacy of the initial period of KMT rule in Taiwan was the creation of the cleavage of ethnic injustice and Taiwanese versus Chinese identity that remains significant to this day.⁷⁸

2.2.3 The Martial Law Years

Following the KMT's defeat in the Chinese Civil War, Martial Law was declared on Taiwan in January 1950 and remained in effect until 1987. There was a massive immigration wave in 1949-50, as the ROC's forces, civil servants and institutions fled to Taiwan. This group and their descendents became known as the Waishengren (外省人 henceforth abbreviated as WSR, meaning from outside the province), and make up approximately 15% of the population. While those Taiwanese that had lived through Japanese rule and their descendents, are known as the Benshengren (本省人 henceforth abbreviated as BSR, and meaning of this province), and make up approximately 85% of the population.

⁷⁸ On the 228 Incident see Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*; Phillips, "Between Assimilation and Independence," 275-319.

In late 1949 few in Taiwan or the US expected the KMT regime to survive long, however, it was saved by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. As a result of this the US protected Taiwan with its Seventh Fleet, and in 1954 signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the ROC. The KMT had initially set up a provincial government structure in Taiwan, but after the ROC central government arrived in Taiwan, the two bodies administered completely overlapping territory. However, since the ROC still claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China, it was unacceptable to remove either layer of government. Therefore a system of government was established in accordance with the 1947 ROC Constitution, a constitution designed for all China, but from 1949 could only be applied in Taiwan. The government structure included two national elected bodies, the National Assembly (國民大會) and the Legislative Yuan (立法院). The former was responsible for electing a president and constitutional revisions, while the latter was the law making institution. The Executive Yuan, headed by the premier, handled the day to day running of the government. In theory this meant there were two heads of state, the president and the premier. However, since Chiang Kai-shek, and then his son Chiang Ching-kuo held the presidency for almost all the Martial Law period, political reality dictated that Taiwan had a presidential system.⁷⁹

Although Taiwan only held its first multi-party democratic election in 1991, it has a long history of conducting competitive non-partisan elections.⁸⁰ Elections with restrictive franchise qualifications were held late in the Japanese era for village, city

⁷⁹ On the ROC government structure see Tien, *The Great Transition*, 105-161.

⁸⁰ I date the first democratic election 1991, as prior to this date elections were supplementary rather than complete re-elections of the national parliaments, only after 1991 did elections have the potential to bring about a change in the ruling party.

and county councillors. However, the scope of elections expanded most rapidly after the KMT took over Taiwan. First in 1946 elections were held for city, town and district consultative councils, and by 1955 the offices open to direct election included town, city and county councillors, municipal executives (ME: including county magistrates and city mayors) and provincial assemblymen. Taiwan established a routine of regular local elections that has continued almost uninterrupted to this day.⁸¹ Other than the Single Member District (SMD) or “First Past the Post” elections for ME, most elections in Taiwan have Multiple Member Districts (MMD), in which the top vote getters up to the district magnitude are elected.⁸² During Martial Law there was a state of ethnic segregation in central and local politics, as while the high positions of the central government and its representative organs were dominated by WSR, those elected in local elections tended to be exclusively BSR.

Although local elections were used to justify the ROC’s claim to be “Free China,” in reality they fell far short of being fully democratic. Firstly, under Martial Law it was forbidden to form political parties and there were severe restrictions on constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly. The two opposition parties played no more than a token role, becoming known as “flower vase parties” (花瓶政黨). An attempt was made in the late 1950s by WSR intellectuals and Taiwanese politicians to form a Chinese Democratic Party. However, following the imprisonment of its key instigator Lei Zhen (雷震) in 1960 the movement collapsed.⁸³ The KMT dominated elections throughout the first three decades of

⁸¹ The one occasion of elections being postponed was in 1978 following the US announcement that it would end diplomatic relations with the ROC.

⁸² The district magnitude refers to the number of candidates that can be elected in a voting district, this varies according to the district’s voting population, and the average district magnitude is 4.5.

⁸³ On the Martial Law party system see Tien, *The Great Transition*, 64-104.

ROC rule on Taiwan. Elections were actually very competitive, with competition occurring between KMT affiliated local factions rather than between political parties. When the KMT regime moved to Taiwan it lacked grassroots support, therefore it chose to establish a patron client relationship with local elites, which involved an exchange of economic privileges for political support. As a result, until the 1990s the vast majority of KMT candidates were from local factions.⁸⁴ Although there was often room for independent candidates in multi-member constituencies, the KMT did not face even a semi-organized opposition until the late 1970s.

The second democratic weakness of early elections was that they were only local elections. The highest elections were for the Provincial Assembly, while the national level Legislative Yuan, National Assembly representatives elected in 1947 on the Chinese mainland remained frozen in office. The justification was that national elections would have to wait until the recovery of the Chinese Mainland and if these bodies were totally elected in Taiwan, they would cease to represent all China. Therefore though Taiwan had regular elections, central government and parliaments remained insulated from local public opinion.⁸⁵ Other high level posts remained appointed, for instance the Provincial Governor, as well as the mayors of Taipei and Gaoxiong (高雄).⁸⁶

Although on paper there was a separation of party and state institutions during Martial Law, the two were in reality overlapping. Therefore it became a prerequisite

⁸⁴ Chen, "Local Factions and Taiwan's Democratization," 174-193.

⁸⁵ For the Martial Law era electoral politics see Tien, *The Great Transition*, 162-194.

⁸⁶ Taipei and Gaoxiong mayors had originally been elected posts, but the KMT actually withdrew these direct elections in 1967 and 1979 respectively.

for anyone seeking high office in the central and provincial government, the military and civil service to be a KMT party member. Moreover the KMT's total political domination enabled it to accumulate a vast real estate and business empire, something that became known as the party assets (黨產). Finally, even if candidates wished to challenge the legitimacy of the KMT regime, this message was hard to get across with a KMT dominated electronic and print media.⁸⁷

The state of elections only began to change in the 1970s. A combination of diplomatic, political, social, and economic developments contributed to the rise of the opposition movement that eventually became the DPP. Firstly, from 1969 the government began to open up a limited number of supplementary seats for election in the national parliaments. The subsequent pace that seats were opened up for direct election was exceedingly slow. Even in the final supplementary election in 1989 only 30% of seats were contested, with parliamentarians elected on the mainland in the 1940s still in office. However, these limited national level elections gave the opposition the platform to attack the KMT at election time. Another factor was the diplomatic setbacks of the 1970s, which damaged the KMT's claims to be the sole legitimate government of all China. Particularly harmful was the expulsion from the United Nations (UN) and loss of US diplomatic recognition. Moreover as the People's Republic of China (PRC) began to develop economically it made some proposals for peaceful unification under the one country two systems model in the 1980s. In addition, after Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father in the 1970s there was a slightly more relaxed political environment for the opposition to develop. One writer described this as a transition "from hard to soft authoritarianism."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ On the Martial Law era media system see Tien Hung-mao, *The Great Transition*, 195-215.

⁸⁸ Winkler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan," 481-499.

During the Martial Law years Taiwan experienced rapid economic growth, with an average growth rate of 8.9% between 1951 and 1984, a phenomenon that has become known as the “Taiwan economic miracle.”⁸⁹ These economic trends resulted in the creation of a much-expanded middle class, and when the new opposition emerged its initial strongest support came from urban middle class.⁹⁰

In the late 1970s and early 1980s an opposition movement began to coalesce of anti KMT figures that collectively known as the Dangwai (DW 黨外), meaning outside the party. Some had local factional backgrounds, while others were KMT defectors or democracy activists. When the DW movement began to challenge the KMT, Chiang Ching-kuo reacted harshly by rounding up and putting on military trial almost all the leading DW figures following a human rights march in 1979, which was known as the Gaoxiong Incident (高雄事件). However, the movement soon recovered, with wives or defence attorneys of the prisoners standing for election. Gradually the disparate group moved from setting up associations towards founding a political party, nominating a slate of candidates, and presenting voters with a common policy platform. In its early stage the movement was not a nationalist movement. Apart from an antipathy to the KMT, its main common denominator was a belief in democratisation. As former DW leader, Chen Zhongxin (陳忠信) recalled, “Our main demands were democracy, freedom, the right to form associations, and freedom of speech and publication.”⁹¹

⁸⁹ Tien, *The Great Transition*, 17.

⁹⁰ This support tended to be from employees of private companies or small entrepreneurs rather than those from the military, civil service and education or “jungongjiao” (軍公教) sectors, who remained supportive of the KMT.

⁹¹ Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

By the mid 1980s it was increasingly difficult for the KMT to crackdown on the opposition, as it had done in 1979. When in 1986 the DPP was illegally formed, instead of mass arrests Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated the move and in an interview with an American journalist talked of ending Martial Law. Even though not yet a legal entity, the DPP conducted its first campaign as a party in 1986. During its initial five years the DPP suffered serious factional infighting over the party's policy line and methods. While the New Tide Faction (新潮流) promoted the use of extra parliamentary methods and called for declaring Taiwan independence, the Formosa Faction (美麗島) called for reform within the existing system and maintaining the position of Taiwanese self-determination. The DPP was able to expand its support base gradually on a platform of democratisation, self-determination, and ethnic justice. However, it drifted to a more radical stance, reaching a climax when in 1991 the party passed the Taiwan Independence Clause (TIC 台獨綱領), which called for a declaration of a Republic of Taiwan.⁹²

By the termination of Martial Law in 1987 the KMT had also become a fundamentally different party from the 1950s. The WSR domination of party and government positions was gradually been eroded under Chiang Ching-kuo, a process described as Taiwanisation. Taiwanese politicians had risen from not a single member of the party's central standing committee in 1952 to 57.1% in 1993.⁹³ Also the party had almost ceased to even pay lip service to the slogan of recovering the Chinese mainland, instead it increasingly based its legitimacy on its economic record, democratic reforms and electoral performance.

⁹² Cheng and Hsu, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism and Party Realignment," 137-173.

⁹³ Huang, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," Table 5.4.

2.2.4 The Li Denghui Era

When Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, his Vice President Li Denghui succeeded him to become the first Taiwanese president. Although Chiang initiated democratic reforms, their speed and scope increased under his Li Denghui. In the 1990s a series of constitutional revisions radically altered the structure of the ROC government system. Firstly, there was a huge expansion in offices open for direct election, culminating in the first direct presidential election in 1996. Also the overlapping government structure was radically streamlined. In the late 1990s the whole provincial government structure was abolished, then in 2000 the National Assembly was frozen, moving the power for constitutional reform to the Legislative Yuan.

Another major change was in the ROC's foreign and cross-strait relations. The ROC enacted a policy known as "pragmatic diplomacy," which involved an attempt to expand Taiwan's official and unofficial relationships, even with countries that had diplomatic relations with the PRC, and to enter international organizations, even where the PRC was a member. Although the 1990s saw a huge expansion of economic links between the PRC and Taiwan, the political divide between the two sides has widened.

Since the late 1980s as inter-party competition increased, inner party conflict has also been on the rise. While inner party conflict subsided in the DPP after 1991, there were constant power struggles within the KMT between pro-Li Mainstream (MKMT 主流派) and anti Li Non Mainstream (NMKMT 非主流派) factions, resulting in four splinter groups breaking away.

The Li Denghui era came to an end in 2000 when his handpicked KMT successor

Lian Zhan (連戰) was defeated by the DPP's Chen Shuibian (陳水扁) in the second direct presidential election.

2.3 Broad Electoral and Political Party Trends.

In this section I review the main national elections since the end of Martial Law, trends in party vote and seat shares, and party identification.

Table 2.1 shows the national level elections held between 1989 and 2002, and political analysts' view of which party won and lost each election. The table reflects the regularity of the election calendar, with high-level elections held almost every year. In some elections even where the KMT gained a clear majority of votes and seats it is seen that the opposition party won if it increased its seats and votes sufficiently, therefore 1992 and 1995 are seen as KMT setbacks. A number of elections are seen as especially significant. Firstly, 1989 was the first election with legalized opposition parties. 1991 and 1992 saw the first complete re-elections of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan respectively. While the DPP's 1991 defeat is seen as a repudiation of its radical Taiwan independence stance, the 1992 Legislative Yuan election is seen as the beginning of the DPP's moderation and the KMT's split, which subsequently led to the formation of the splinter NP in 1993. In 1994 the first elections for Provincial Governor and Taipei mayor were held, and are significant in placing Chen Shuibian and Song Chuyu (宋楚瑜) on the national stage.⁹⁴ Also 1995 was seen as a great triumph for the NP and it appeared that Taiwan was moving towards a multi-party party system. The first direct presidential election was held in 1996, and was the KMT and Li Denghui's greatest victory.

⁹⁴ Prior to 1994 elections for Taipei mayor were last held in 1964, after a popular independent politician had defeated KMT candidates twice in succession these elections were suspended in 1967.

While for the DPP 1997 was significant as it won over half the local executive seats, and for the first time its vote share exceeded the KMT's. 1998 is seen as a revival for the KMT and as a NP collapse. The second presidential election was held in 2000 and the DPP victory resulted in the first change of ruling party through elections. Both 2000 and 2001 were disasters for the KMT, as it lost first the presidency and then its majority party status in the Legislative Yuan. 2001 is seen as victories for the DPP and Song Chuyu's creation, the People First Party (PFP 親民黨) both of which expanded their seat shares.

The electoral trends are represented in three figures. Figure 2.1 shows the parties' vote shares, Figure 2.2 shows the parties' seat shares, and Figure 2.3 shows party identification. Although variations in patterns of both seat and vote share are affected by different levels of elections and election systems, there has been a gradual decline for the KMT from about 80% of seats and 70% of votes in 1991 to about 30% for both in 2001. There has been a corresponding rise for the DPP from 16.71% and 22.17% in 1986 to 38.66% and 33.38% of seats and votes respectively. On party identification, if the NP's score is added to the KMT's, Pan Blue⁹⁵ identification remained constant at about 40%. However, from 2000 there is a severe drop so that even if the PFP identification is added Pan Blue identification falls to about 30%. The rise of DPP party identification has been steadier, rising from only 7.8% in 1990 to 33% in 2002, making it the party with the highest level of identification in Taiwan. The trends on election results and also party identification show that compared to neighbouring democracies such as South Korea or Japan there has been much more stability in Taiwan's party system. The

⁹⁵ The term Pan Blue (泛藍軍) refers to the KMT and its splinter groups the NP and PFP. This colour is used, as the background of the KMT party flag is blue. The DPP and its allies are referred to as Pan Green (泛綠軍).

major political parties in 1989 were the KMT and DPP, and remain so to this day.

2.4 Broad Trends in Issue Emphasis

This section looks at broad trends of issue emphasis for the whole decade from my newspaper ad content analysis. I employ this data to offer some preliminary answers to my research questions of do parties stress issues at election time, if so what are the salient issues, and do the parties actually differ in their issue emphasis? In this section I argue the data shows issues do matter in Taiwanese elections, that three of the most salient electoral issues are social welfare, political corruption and national identity, and that Taiwan's parties do show contrasting issue emphasis.

2.4.1 Do Taiwan's Parties Stress Issues?

Firstly, I look at whether parties stress issues in their election propaganda. Taiwan's elections have the reputation of being candidate rather than issue centred. However, this can be tested in Table 1.2, which shows the issue domain tables for 1991-2000 from my newspaper ad content analysis.⁹⁶ This shows party positive/negative categories actually score higher than candidate positive/negative categories. Moreover, apart from the party/candidate and uncategorizable domains, actual issue domain references make up almost 70% of newspaper ad issue mentions. Therefore, it can be concluded that although candidates are important in Taiwanese elections, parties do stress issues.

2.4.2 What are most Salient Issues in Taiwan's Elections?

Table 2.2 compares issue saliency using three indices: 1) my official newspaper ads content analysis issue top ten, 2) Liu Tsung-wei's election gazette content analysis issue top ten, and 3) my elite survey. According to my official ad dataset, if party and candidate categories are excluded, the most salient issues are "Political Corruption," "Taiwan Independence," "Government Competence" and "Democracy." Using a similar coding scheme but different dataset Liu Tsung-wei

⁹⁶ Issue domains are the broad issue areas, for details of the categories within each domain see Table 1.1.

found “Welfare State Expansion” was by far the most stressed issue by Legislative Yuan candidates. In fact the only issue falling into both top tens was “Political Corruption.” To check the validity of these findings I asked Taiwanese politicians, “What have been the most salient political issues in Taiwan’s elections over the last decade (1991-2001)?” The results are shown on the Elite Survey column of Table 2.2. This shows some support for both content analyses top tens, with a consensus among politicians that the most influential issues of the decade were national identity, political corruption, the economy and social welfare.

2.4.3 Do the Parties Differ on Issues?

The next question is were parties distinguishable in their issue emphasis over the 1991-2000 decade? The similarity in top three issue domains shown in Table 1.2 implies that Taiwan’s parties are focusing on the same issues. However, a picture of party differentiation is found on closer examination of the data.

Firstly, Table 2.3 helps to answer this query by comparing Taiwan’s main parties’ top ten issues in my official newspaper ads content analysis. Excluding candidate and party categories, the top issues for all three major parties are markedly different, with “Government Competence,” “Taiwan Independence: Negative” and “Political Stability” the most stressed issues for the KMT, “Political Corruption,” “Diluted Taiwan Independence,” and “Non-economic Demographic Groups”⁹⁷ the top issues for the DPP, and “Taiwan Independence: Negative,” “Political Corruption,” and “Peace” the top issues for the NP. A similar picture of party differentiation is seen in Table 2.4, which shows the parties’ top ten issues in terms of frequency of appearing in parties’ annual issue top tens from my official ads content analysis. Out of nine campaigns, “Government Competence,” “Taiwan Independence: Negative,” and “Political Stability” were the most frequent issues in the KMT’s annual top tens, compared to “Diluted Taiwan Independence,” and “Political Corruption” for the DPP, and “Democracy,” “Political Corruption,” and “Taiwan Independence: Negative” for the NP.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ The MRG category is called “Non-Economic Demographic Groups,” but most references in this category in the Taiwan case were appeals to women’s issues.

⁹⁸ Note that the lower frequency scores for the NP are due to it taking part in seven rather than nine elections.

Table 2.5 offers further evidence of issue ownership, showing which issues from the major parties' top ten lists overlap and which ones are exclusively stressed or owned by one party. Other than "Party Positive & Negative," the only issue in the top ten for all three parties is "Political Corruption." However, as I show in Chapter Four the KMT's sub-issue emphasis of political corruption is quite distinct from both the DPP and the NP. In terms of issues, the DPP and the KMT have little in common; even the NP and KMT share only a concern for opposing Taiwan independence. In contrast, the lists for issues exclusively owned by single parties are far longer. The DPP has dominated the national identity issues of "Pure Taiwan Independence," "Diluted Taiwan Independence," and "Taiwan Nationalism," along with "Freedom and Human Rights" and "Welfare State Expansion." This is understandable as the motivation for many DPP members to participate in politics is a sense of Taiwanese nationalism and a desire to preserve the de facto independence of Taiwan. The KMT, on the other hand, controls the main economic category of "Economic Growth and Prosperity;" this reflects the KMT's confidence in handling the economy, particularly stressed since the successful withstanding of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.⁹⁹ Since the KMT was the ruling party in Taiwan from 1945 until 2000 it is not surprising that it has also owned "Political Stability" and "Government Competence" issues. The KMT, like conservative parties worldwide tend to stress "Law and order," placing considerable emphasis on a number of criminal cases involving DPP representatives, and attacking the DPP for engaging in violence.¹⁰⁰ This seems to have had much success, as voters viewed the DPP as a violent party until the late 1990s.¹⁰¹ For the NP its stress on "Foreign Special Relationships" reflects its calls for better relations with the PRC and it has emphasized "Peace" due to its frequent warnings of war with China. Other issues exclusively stressed by the NP such as "Education" and "Culture" reflects its appeal to the urban middle class.

Lastly I compare my election propaganda findings with my interview data shown in Table 2.6. I asked respondents, "What issues have you and your party stressed most

⁹⁹ See KMT advertisement in *Lianhe bao*, November 24, 1998, 1.

¹⁰⁰ See KMT advertisement in *Lianhe bao*, November 21, 1994, 25. This advertisement attacks the DPP for its record of inciting violence and drug dealing and shows a picture of a DPP campaign truck in a riot.

¹⁰¹ DPP Survey Research Department, "The 11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image," 5.

over the last decade?" Although all parties' politicians agree that their most stressed issue was national identity, the rest of the top four issues show the parties' dissimilarity, with economy, stability and prosperity most stressed by the KMT, and political corruption, democracy and social welfare for the DPP.

In short, Taiwan's parties do stress election issues. Where the parties do concentrate on similar issue domains; there are clear differences in the actual issues stressed. These findings hold across different electoral systems and levels of elections, for both advertising and elite interview data. It appears that the parties really are "talking past each other." Having proved that Taiwan's political parties have distinct issue positions over the 1990s, the next step is to look in further detail in the case study chapters to see whether issue ownership applies to individual elections and at the sub-issue level, and how the parties have actually changed, in terms of movement on the core issue areas of national identity, political corruption, and social welfare. A common claim is that Taiwan's parties have converged on the centre, particularly in regard to the national identity question.¹⁰² However, such claims need to be tested empirically.

¹⁰² For example Wu, "Moving towards the Center: Taiwan's Public Opinion and Mainland Policy Shift,"; Ming, "Centrifugal Competition and the Development of Republic of China's Party Politics."

Chapter Three: Social Welfare

3.1.1 Introduction

Social welfare remains a salient and divisive political issue in democracies throughout the world. The prominence of social welfare has increased as other features of the left right divide have faded in influence, such as nationalization versus privatisation, and relations with the Soviet Union. Although there was a consensus on the welfare state in many west European nations in the post war period, this began to break down in the 1970s with the rise of anti welfare state ideologies. The British Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher, the Scandinavian Progress Parties and the US Republicans since Reagan's presidency campaigned on platforms of welfare state retrenchment and tax cuts. The polarizing nature of the welfare issue was apparent from the controversy over the first Clinton administration's failure to introduce universal health insurance in the US.¹⁰³ While UK voters have consistently listed healthcare as the most important question since the mid-1980s.¹⁰⁴ Previous studies have also shown social welfare has been highly salient in Taiwanese electoral politics.¹⁰⁵ Indeed welfare issues are the only component of the left right debate that divides Taiwanese parties. This is a spectrum in which the far right argues government priority should be economic growth, and supports maintaining the Martial Law welfare system of benefits restricted to pro KMT vocational groups, the centre right also has an economics first perspective but believes in limited expansion in contributory and means tested welfare schemes, while the centre left calls for a universal and equitable welfare state, but this should

¹⁰³ See Skocpol, *Boomerang*.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml>

¹⁰⁵ For instance Liu Tsung-wei found welfare state expansion was the most stressed issue for Legislative Yuan candidates in their election gazette policy proposals. See Table 2.2 in this dissertation.

be done without raising taxes.

In this chapter I show how as the scope of Taiwan's elections was expanded in the late 1980s social welfare was initiated by the opposition DPP and was transformed from a latent issue into a highly salient political issue. Taiwan's parties began with quite polarized positions on some welfare questions, with the KMT at the far right and the DPP at the centre left of the welfare spectrum described above. Electoral competition and public opinion have pushed politicians of all parties to give greater attention to welfare issues and take more pro welfare expansion positions. Social welfare has been the most contested case study in this dissertation, as the sociologist Wang Fuchang (王甫昌) explains in Taiwan "everyone approves of social welfare."¹⁰⁶ In fact, the KMT's successful stealing of the DPP's National Health Insurance (NHI 全民健保) proposal is a rare instance of policy leapfrogging. To avoid universal health insurance becoming a DPP vote winner, it was pre-emptively co-opted by the KMT. Therefore social welfare is a case of sub-issue rather than pure issue ownership, with the KMT owning National Health Insurance and the DPP dominating the pensions appeal. The parties have not converged at the sub-issue level as movement has been constrained by party ideology, past record and inner party factional balance. In particular, the continued strength of anti welfare state factions within the KMT has constrained the party from stealing other popular welfare appeals. Moreover, despite the contested nature of the welfare issue, it appears the public sees the DPP's welfare promotion efforts as more convincing, with surveys showing the DPP perceived as the best able to handle social welfare issues.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taipei, October 26, 2001.

¹⁰⁷ See Table 3.3 in this dissertation.

Taiwan's party positions on the welfare issue have been governed by the interaction of electoral, inner-party factional and ideological pressures. Election orientated factions and leaders have attempted to win elections with promises of broader and more inclusive welfare provisions. The DPP employed social welfare primarily as a vote-chasing tool. Following the DPP's disastrous defeat in 1991, the DPP placed social welfare at the centre of the political agenda in its search for new issues to expand its voter support base. The most prominent of these sub-issues was pensions, and the DPP has consistently stressed the issue throughout the decade, linking it to corruption and ethnic justice. In contrast, the KMT's broad support base ensured it used welfare to mobilise existing supporters. Social welfare issue was highly divisive for the KMT, with contradictory welfare messages coming out of the KMT camp throughout the decade. Since the NMKMT's supporters were beneficiaries of the biased Martial Law welfare system, this faction called for maintaining the welfare status quo and opposing reckless welfare spending. However, the MKMT's BSR and rural followers had been excluded from the welfare pie, thus this faction took a pro-welfare stance often indistinguishable from the DPP. Therefore, shifts in the factional balance between the MKMT and NMKMT dictated whether the KMT took a pro welfare expansion or conservative welfare stance. In contrast, the issue was not divisive for either opposition party's expansion plans. The DPP's welfare stress was initiated by election-orientated leaders, but had the support of all factions. The NP's welfare conservatism made sense in its electoral appeal to the "jungongjiao" (軍公教), a collective term for the military, civil service and education sectors, and the group that had the most generous welfare in the old Martial Law system. However, electoral forces have also stopped parties becoming too generous in their welfare pledges, as tax rises for increased welfare spending are

even more a taboo in Taiwan than in the UK.

The parties have not converged on the welfare issue, as their contrasting welfare ideologies have guided their welfare positions and kept the parties differentiated. The standard welfare line taken by the KMT party centre, NMKMT and NP has been that the bias of the old Martial Law welfare system must be maintained, where welfare provisions are extended these should be contributory and means tested. Therefore though the KMT pushed the implementation of the universal NHI, it made certain the system was contributory and that its client groups paid preferential rates. It has been the conservative welfare ideology of these Pan Blue groups that ensured the KMT was able to resist calls for popular welfare schemes, such as pensions. Similarly, despite becoming the ruling party and the severe economic recession, the DPP's record of welfare appeals ensures it continues to promote increased social welfare spending.

Comparative studies have shown that competitive political parties, strong social democratic parties, and labour movements have tended to be critical factors in the creation of welfare states in democracies.¹⁰⁸ However, Taiwan only has the first of these preconditions. The development of the social welfare issue in Taiwan shows the importance of competitive party politics, as according to Nika Rudra and Stephen Haggard, "democracy also provides incentives for political elites to compete for votes on the basis of providing such (welfare) benefits."¹⁰⁹ Democratic competition has caused mainstream norms on social welfare to change rapidly.

Through electoral debate Taiwan has moved from a grossly unfair welfare system to

¹⁰⁸ Kwon, "A Comparison of East Asian Welfare Systems," 27-75.

¹⁰⁹ Rudra and Haggard, "Globalization, Domestic Politics and Welfare Spending in the Developing World," 7.

universal and more equitable welfare provisions. This is especially significant as socio-economic equality is a condition lacking in many new democracies, but widely viewed as being conducive to democratic consolidation.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the establishment of Taiwan's new welfare state is all the more remarkable considering the hostile international environment for welfare reforms described by Joseph Wong, "The international deregulation of finance, labour market segmentation, trans-national movement of labour and the collapse of corporatist consensus building arrangements sabotage state efforts at promoting welfare reform or preventing welfare retrenchment."¹¹¹ In short, electoral pressures have made social welfare a highly contested issue, promoted reduced polarization and a more inclusive and equitable welfare system. However, ideological conservatism has maintained differentiation of welfare positions at the sub-issue level.

3.1.2 Chapter Overview

Following the brief introduction, section 3.2 outlines the developments of Taiwan's welfare state before and after democratisation. Section 3.3 looks at broad trends of social welfare issue emphasis over the 1990s. Examining whether welfare issues are salient, if they are owned, if there is any change in ownership and if the parties are converging or diverging on the issue. In addition, survey data is examined to show if the public sees social welfare as an owned issue. In section 3.4 I review chronologically the welfare issue over the 1991-2001 campaigns, looking at the attention parties have given to social welfare in election campaigns, whether the issue is owned during individual campaigns, and if issue ownership has changed. In the next section I look in more detail at the evolution of the two main welfare

¹¹⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* 12-13.

¹¹¹ Wong, "Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Democratizing Taiwan," 3.

sub-issues: healthcare and old age welfare, examining whether parties have altered their positions and whether issue ownership also applies at the sub-issue level. In section 3.6 I evaluate the extent independent variables such as inter-party competition, inner party politics and ideology have pushed or constrained party change. Finally in section 3.7 I outline my main conclusions over how and why the parties have changed their social welfare emphasis and its significance for Taiwan's electoral politics.

3.2 Social Welfare Issues and the Development of a Welfare System in Taiwan

The main welfare issues in Taiwan are outlined in Table 3.1. This table shows a number of significant trends. Firstly, welfare sub-issues have tended to be raised by the opposition DPP, forcing the ruling KMT to respond. Secondly, the scope of welfare sub-issues in Taiwan is much narrower than in the UK, as questions such as unemployment and housing have yet to become salient electoral issues. Instead the main focus of the welfare debate has been on health insurance and elderly welfare. Thirdly, many welfare sub-issues have been contested. For instance, though the KMT succeeded in stealing the NHI issue, its attempt to steal pensions in 1997 failed.

Taiwan's welfare state followed the pattern common to many authoritarian developing countries, initially developing a system benefiting mainly pro government groups. Like Park Chung Hee's military regime in South Korea, the KMT was an authoritarian party attempting to employ welfare provisions to raise its political legitimacy. During the Martial Law era a generous and complex welfare system was built up that primarily benefited a number of pro-KMT occupational groups. First, in 1950 the Labour Insurance scheme was set up. The main recipients

were workers in large state owned or private industries, most being members of KMT run trade unions. Second, legislation in the 1950s and 1960s ensured that the “jungongjiao” group receives the most extensive welfare provisions on Taiwan. The “jungongjiao” are often referred to as the KMT’s “iron voters” (鐵票). According to political commentator Wang Fengquan (王奉勸), “The KMT benefited by keeping a strong hold over certain key groups, the veterans, military, teachers and civil servants with pensions, social welfare and tax breaks.”¹¹² Since a disproportionate percentage of the “jungongjiao” were WSR, the question of welfare reform was also closely linked to the ethnic injustice issue. The extent the welfare system was imbalanced can be seen from the fact that as late as 1991 74% of central government welfare expenditure was spent on the “jungongjiao” group.¹¹³ The unfair social welfare system did create resentment, however the prominence of democratisation ensured that welfare issues were not high on the electoral agenda in the 1970s or 1980s.

In the 1970s and 1980s as Taiwan’s economy grew, the existing labour, and “jungongjiao” insurance programs were gradually expanded in scope, so that by 1994 60% of the population were covered by health insurance.¹¹⁴ However, the governing framework of Taiwan’s welfare system even in the late Martial Law era remained the far right model that concentrated welfare spending on the KMT’s core support groups.

Although Taiwan’s local government revenues are largely supplied by central government, both local and central governments provide social welfare services. For

¹¹² Wang Fengquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, April 14, 2000.

¹¹³ Kwon, “A Comparison of East Asian Welfare Systems,” 47-8.

¹¹⁴ Lu and Lin, “Social Welfare in Taiwan: Past, Present and Future,” 12.

example, the NHI, pensions for low income households and “jungongjiao” welfare schemes are administered by national government bodies, but city or county governments run old age day centres, and some have offered old age payments since 1993. Therefore as the scope of elections has expanded candidates in both national and local elections have made repeated calls for welfare programs and there is a clear correlation between increasing expenditure on social welfare and Taiwan’s democratisation. Statistics reveal the link, as in 1952 social welfare accounted for only 5.61% of total government expenditure, but this rose to 10% in 1980¹¹⁵ and 16.4% in 1999.¹¹⁶ According to former DPP legislator Lin Zhengjie (林政杰), “Before social welfare was a not a major item in Taiwan’s government budget, it has expanded in the last few years and a major factor has been democratic politics. Even though the government is increasingly in debt, politicians continue to give out money.”¹¹⁷ In fact, compared to the Four Asian Dragons, China and Japan, not only has Taiwan’s welfare state grown faster, it also spends more on social expenditure as a proportion of GDP.¹¹⁸

In the 1980s as party politics was beginning to develop, the opposition did raise some social welfare demands in their election platforms, calling for a NHI from 1978, unemployment insurance from 1985 and pensions from 1991.¹¹⁹ However, it could not yet compete with democratisation or national identity on the electoral agenda, reviews of campaign reports show that prior to 1992 these issues played only minimal roles in elections. It was not until the early 1990s that welfare issues became salient and divisive at election time. However, though a regular feature in

¹¹⁵ Lu and Lin, “Social Welfare in Taiwan: Past, Present and Future,” 8.

¹¹⁶ *ROC Yearbook 2001*.

¹¹⁷ Lin Zhengjie, interview by author, Xinzhu, September 21, 2001.

¹¹⁸ Aspalter, *Conservative Welfare State Systems in East Asia*, 7.

¹¹⁹ Chen, “The DPP’s Party Image,” 39.

most 1990s campaigns, social welfare tends to be submerged by other issues and dropped in the final weeks of campaigns.

The expansion of social welfare in Taiwan has continued throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century. The most significant move away from the previous pattern of concentrating welfare on core pro KMT groups was the introduction of NHI in 1995. This trend toward more universal welfare coverage was also reflected in revisions to the constitution in 1997, which made commitments to provisions such as the NHI, and protection for disadvantaged groups such as women and the disabled.¹²⁰ The scope of welfare coverage has gone well beyond healthcare. Unemployment insurance came into operation in 1999, offering insured workers that have been laid off short-term unemployment benefit, job training and assistance in finding new work.¹²¹ Although legislation has still not been passed for a Contributory Pensions Scheme, in 1994 the Living Allowance for Middle Lower Income Elderly People was introduced, and this was followed up by the Welfare Allowance for Aged Farmers in 1995.¹²² The process reached its climax in May 2002 when legislation was passed to fulfil Chen Shuibian's 2000 election pledge of pensions.¹²³

3.3 Broad Trends in Social Welfare Emphasis 1991-2001

In this section I look at broad trends of social welfare issue emphasis over the 1990s. Examining whether welfare issues are salient, if they are owned, if there is any change in ownership and if the parties are converging or diverging on the issue. In addition, party image survey data is examined to show if the public sees social

¹²⁰ Ku, "Left or Right: The Taiwanese Welfare State at Crossroads," 14.

¹²¹ Ibid. , 16.

¹²² Ibid. , 15.

¹²³ www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/05/11/0000135552.

welfare as an owned issue.

3.3.1 How Salient are Social Welfare Issues in Taiwan?

Table 2.2 shows three indicators of top ten issue salience between 1991 and 2001.

These are my official newspaper ads issue top ten, Liu Tsung-wei's top ten issues for Legislative Yuan candidates' policy proposals in election gazettes, and my elite survey. From my newspaper ad data it appears social welfare is not salient, with the issue failing to make the combined top ten for the three parties. In contrast, Liu's content analysis study found social welfare was the most heavily stressed issue for all parties' candidates throughout the 1989-1998 period, with an average percentage of issue mentions of 10.1%.¹²⁴ Similarly, in my elite interviews, politicians cited social welfare as the fourth most influential issue. These results are similar to another large-scale elite survey conducted by Lin Chia-long in 1995-6. This found politicians saw "social equality and social welfare reform" as the fourth most important and pressing question.¹²⁵ In short, all the data except newspaper ads show social welfare to be a highly salient electoral issue.

3.3.2 Is Social welfare an Owned Issue?

The next question is whether social welfare is an owned issue. Different data sources show though the DPP does give social welfare more attention, the issue is contested. Firstly, Table 2.3 shows the top ten issues in official newspaper ads for each party over the 1991-2000 period. Social welfare appears only in the top ten of the DPP, coming tenth with an average issue mention of 2.7%. The trend is similar in the frequency of issues appearing in parties' annual issue top tens shown in Table

¹²⁴ Liu, "The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan," Table 8.1.

¹²⁵ See Lin, "Paths to democracy," 578.

2.4. Again social welfare only appears in the DPP's top ten, coming fifth, and coming in its annual top tens on four occasions. The trend of issue ownership was also revealed when I asked politicians what issues they and their parties stressed most over the 1991-2001 decade. The results are shown in Table 2.6. This shows that there is a clear difference, with the issue ranked fourth most stressed by the DPP politicians, but low on Pan-KMT priorities. Therefore at this stage of the analysis it would appear the issue is owned by the DPP. However, other studies show the contested nature of the welfare issue. For instance, Liu Tsung-wei found a similar level of stress for welfare state expansion in KMT and DPP legislators' policy proposals,¹²⁶ and Lin Chia-long's elite survey found KMT legislators actually ranked social welfare even higher in importance than their DPP colleagues.¹²⁷

The next question is has there been any convergence or leapfrogging between the parties on the welfare issue. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the three parties' relative social welfare issue emphasis fluctuation in total and official newspaper election ads over the ten-year period. These figures can show in which years social welfare emphasis was especially heavy, if the issue is owned, and if there have been any cases of leapfrogging. Figure 3.1 shows that in total ads though the DPP has tended to talk more on social welfare, at times all three parties' candidates have placed heavy emphasis on social welfare and there are a number of cases of leapfrogging. For instance, the KMT leapfrogged the DPP in 1995. The elections with the highest stress on social welfare were 1993-1995, 1997 and 2000. In Figure 3.2 there is a clearer pattern in official party ads, with the DPP dominating the issue and almost no leapfrogging between the DPP and the KMT or NP. For official ads the parties

¹²⁶ Liu, "The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan," Table 8.9. This shows the average KMT mentions of welfare state expansion was 11%, compared to 11.2% for the DPP.

¹²⁷ See Lin, "Paths to democracy," 578.



placed most stress on social welfare between 1993-1995 and then in 2000.

Throughout the decade the NP has given the least stress on welfare.

In fact the pattern of contestation and only limited ownership of the welfare issue mirrors that in Japan between the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). From Figure 3.3, which compares these parties using MRG data, we can see though the JSP gave heavier welfare emphasis in seven out of 11 elections between 1960 and 1990, there were also cases of leapfrogging, with the LDP giving higher welfare stress on four occasions.¹²⁸

In short the above data shows the DPP does give more attention to social welfare, however, the issue is contested, as KMT candidates also stress welfare at election time.

3.3.3 Public Opinion and Social Welfare

In this section I examine surveys to test whether campaign issue stress has rubbed off on ordinary voters' party images. I am interested to see whether Taiwan's voters see the parties as holding distinguishable and consistent positions over a period of time on the social welfare issue.

Unlike the unification versus independence issue, there is a lack of uniform survey questioning on party image regarding social welfare. However this can be remedied by pooling a number of different party image surveys, which reveal social welfare has increasingly been viewed as owned by the DPP. First in 1995 and 1998 the Election Study Centre (ESC) asked respondents which terms (printed on an answer

¹²⁸ Budge et al, *Mapping Policy Preferences*, (CD-ROM).

card) best described their first impressions of Taiwan's main parties. These found that "promoting social welfare" was more associated with the DPP, with 3.1% in 1995 and 3.9% in 1998 selecting this option as their first impression of the DPP, compared to only 1.3% in 1995 and 1.2% in 1998 for the KMT.¹²⁹ The ESC also asked respondents to place themselves and the main parties on a social welfare versus economic growth spectrum, in which promoting social welfare equals 0 and promoting economic growth equals 10. The results for surveys in 1994, 1996 and 1997 are shown in Figure 3.4, and show a consistent pattern of the DPP and NP viewed as being more pro social welfare and the KMT more pro economic growth, with the respondents locating themselves close to the centre. Unfortunately the wording of the question was altered to distinguish maintaining the existing social welfare system and actively promoting social welfare, the results of the 2000 survey are shown in Table 3.2. However, the trend is even clearer with the DPP seen as by far the most pro social welfare expansion, the NP, PFP, respondents and the KMT all located close to the centre, with the KMT the most passive on social welfare.¹³⁰ The final survey data relevant to social welfare party image comes from the DPP Survey Research Department's surveys in 1998 and 1999; these figures are shown in Table 3.3.¹³¹ They asked, "Which party is most able to design a fair and reasonable social welfare system." Again this shows that the DPP is viewed as a party better able to handle social welfare than the KMT or the NP. As the Director of the DPP's Survey Research Department Chen Junlin (陳俊麟) explained, "The DPP is seen as weak on cross strait, defence and the economy, and perceived as strong on environmental protection, opposing political corruption and social welfare."¹³²

¹²⁹ Data supplied by Liu Yizhou (劉義周) from the ESC.

¹³⁰ The data for Table 3.2 & Figure 3.4 were supplied by Sheng Xingyuan of the ESC.

¹³¹ "DPP Survey Research Department, "11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image," 3.

¹³² Chen Junlin, interview by author, Taipei, April 13, 2000.

These surveys show Taiwan's voters are aware of the social welfare issue, recognize the parties' positions and see the parties as offering distinct positions on social welfare over a series of elections. There are not any clear signs of party movement or change in issue ownership; instead the data suggests stability rather than change. Despite the contested state of the issue at election time and KMT's success in introducing NHI, since 1994 social welfare has been viewed by the public as a DPP owned issue.

3.4 The Electoral Politics of Social Welfare

This section reviews the development of social welfare issues in election campaigns over the 1991-2001 period. I look at the attention parties have given to welfare issues, the main sub-issues stressed, whether the issue is owned during individual campaigns, and if the issue ownership has changed

1992 Legislative Yuan Election

Although parties gave welfare more attention in 1992, it still was not the dominant issue, and was neither clearly owned, nor an issue on which parties were visibly wide apart. According to Lin Tse-min et al, "the DPP formally introduced its 'Welfare State platform' during the campaign of the 1992 Legislative Yuan election."¹³³ This view was supported by a DPP TV ad titled "Because of us" (因為有我們), which after listing the DPP's numerous policy achievements, stated one of its three main future goals was a "Welfare State" (福利國).¹³⁴ Politicians in the DPP also see 1992 as a turning point, the party's new style was summed up by their

¹³³ Lin, Chu and Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan," 463.

¹³⁴ The other two were direct presidential elections, and reconstructing sovereignty.

leading strategist Chen Zhongxin (陳忠信), “We were calling for social welfare, tax cuts and direct presidential election. It was more policy orientated.”¹³⁵ However, the picture is not so clear-cut when my newspaper data is examined in detail. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show the level of stress on social welfare was still very low. Moreover, there were signs the issue was not yet owned, as the KMT gave more attention to welfare in its TV ads than the DPP, with six ads promoting its NHI plans. An interesting trend recurring over the decade was that KMT candidates were more positive about welfare than their party centre. In a sign of how independent KMT politicians are, their candidate Chen Hongchang (陳宏昌) actually parroted the DPP’s official slogan of a “Welfare State.”¹³⁶

1993-4 Executive Elections

The elections of 1993-4 mark the first peak of social welfare campaign emphasis and set a pattern of issue emphasis to be repeated throughout subsequent elections. In fact political scientist Hong Yongtai (洪永泰) argued social welfare had its greatest electoral impact in 1993.¹³⁷ For the first time the DPP put welfare at the centre of its campaign, with welfare appearing in both years’ official slogans. The 1993 slogan was “Anti Money Politics, Clean Government, Love Taiwan, Promote Welfare, Good Government into the New Century” (反金權 清廉 疼臺灣 要福利 親政跨世紀),¹³⁸ while a year later it was “Big Promotion of Welfare, Big Cultural Progress, Rebuild the Government, Regenerate the Province and Cities” (福利大推動, 文化大推進, 政府大翻修, 省市大翻新).¹³⁹ The DPP’s increased emphasis on welfare is also evident in

¹³⁵ Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

¹³⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, December 9, 1992, 21.

¹³⁷ Hong Yongtai, interview by author, Taipei, March 21, 2000.

¹³⁸ For example see *Ziyoushibao*, November 5, 1993, 17.

¹³⁹ See *Ziyoushibao*, November 11, 1994, 1.

the newspaper ad data, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the DPP dominated the issue in both elections. In addition, welfare state expansion also featured prominently in the DPP's issue top tens but was absent from the top tens of the KMT.¹⁴⁰ The centrepiece of the DPP's new appeal was old age pensions (老人年金), which it linked to both national identity and political corruption issues. An example of the DPP linking welfare to the ethnic question was the controversial ad titled "The Taiwanese have been slaves for 50 years!" (臺灣人奴隸五十年!). This full-page ad offered comparative statistics to show the huge gap in welfare of veterans compared to labourers, farmers, fishermen or businessmen. It stated "Actually Taiwan has the best welfare in the world, but only veterans enjoy it, while the Taiwanese are seen as slaves to provide for these people" (其實世界上社會福利辦的最好的就是台灣, 對象卻只有榮民, 退除役官兵, 而台灣人被視為供養這些人的奴隸。)¹⁴¹ In these elections the KMT tried to either steer clear of the welfare issue or mock the failures DPP welfare pledges. Similarly, the NP showed it was located on the conservative side of the welfare issue when its leading figures Zhao Shaokang (趙少康) and Chen Kuimiao (陳癸淼) announced the NP is opposed to "vote buying style or free spending social welfare."¹⁴²

1995 Legislative Yuan Election

Despite the Missile Crisis, in 1995 Legislative Yuan candidates continued their social welfare pledges that cut across party lines. The contested nature of social welfare issue is visible in Figure 3.1, showing the issue emphasis for total newspaper ads, where the KMT leapfrogged the DPP. This was due to heavy

¹⁴⁰ For the DPP see Table 2.8 and for the KMT see Table 2.7.

¹⁴¹ *Ziyoushibao*, November 17, 1994, 17.

¹⁴² *China Times*, November 5, 1993, 2.

emphasis by KMT Legislative Yuan candidates. For instance, the KMT's Wang Jinping (王金平),¹⁴³ and Huang Zhaoshun (黃昭順)¹⁴⁴ placed a series of ads calling for increased welfare provisions for the old, farmers and women. Clearly the KMT party headquarters was much more cautious on welfare spending than its independent minded party legislators. Thus in Figure 3.2 the DPP maintained its lead on the welfare issue for official ads. Moreover welfare came seventh in the DPP official ads top ten issues but was absent from the KMT's top ten.¹⁴⁵

The welfare emphasis of 1995 showed both continuity and some new patterns. The NP clearly restated its conservative welfare stance in its manifesto full-page ad, stating, "There are no free lunches; the NP opposes any vote buying type or free spending social welfare policies." (天下沒有白吃的午餐, 我們反對任何賄賂或揮霍的社會福利政策)¹⁴⁶ With a new female Propaganda Chief Chen Wenqian (陳文茜), the DPP's official party ads had a new style, focusing heavily on women and childcare issues for the first time. For instance, a full-page ad DPP ad called for private and public companies to set up nurseries, child benefit, and lowering of the age to start compulsory education.¹⁴⁷ Similarly the DPP "Women's" TV Ad (婦女篇) ended with the slogan "Women's Welfare State. Give Taiwan's Women a Chance of Happiness" (女人福利國 給臺灣女人快樂的機會).

1997 and 1998 Executive Elections

After the lull in welfare emphasis in the 1996 presidential election, social welfare was once again high on the political agenda in 1997. As DPP chairman Xu Xinliang

¹⁴³ *China Times*, November 2, 1995, 47.

¹⁴⁴ *China Times*, November 11, 1995, 37.

¹⁴⁵ See Table 2.8 and 2.7.

¹⁴⁶ *Lianhebao*, November 18, 1995, 32.

¹⁴⁷ *Lianhebao*, November 24, 1995, 12.

(許信良) recalled, “Basically we campaigned on social welfare orientated issues.”¹⁴⁸ This is reflected in the higher welfare emphasis shown in Figure 3.1 for 1997. However unlike the previous three campaigns it was KMT chairman Li Denghui that set the welfare agenda, with an attempt to steal the pensions issue.¹⁴⁹ As in 1995 the main parties competed for female votes with welfare promises. For instance, in the 1998 DPP “A Pao and A Qiao’s Welfare TV Ad” (阿炮與阿橋福利篇), two comic characters complain about the costs of kindergartens and lack of social welfare, and note that social welfare is better in DPP areas. However, the KMT also made similar appeals, such as the 1998 “Gaoxiong Nutritional Lunch TV Ad,” (高雄營養午餐篇) which compared a Gaoxiong mother spending a relaxing morning at the hairdressers and drinking coffee due to free school nutritional lunches, while her friend in DPP run Taipei city spends the morning preparing her kid’s lunch.

2000 Presidential Election

As in 1996 national security issues did feature in the 2000 election, but were only central in the last week of the campaign, leaving room for social welfare issues to develop. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that once again social welfare was high on the priorities of the DPP and KMT, though the DPP retained its lead on the issue. In official ads social welfare reached ten-year peaks for both major parties, coming third in the KMT and DPP’s issue top tens.¹⁵⁰ However, there were significant differences in the welfare emphasis of the two main parties, with both focusing on owned welfare sub-issues. The KMT’s Lian Zhan again trumpeted the successful implementation of NHI and attacked reckless DPP social welfare spending. In

¹⁴⁸ Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.

¹⁴⁹ I deal with this in detail in section 3.5.2.

¹⁵⁰ See Tables 2.7 and 2.8.

contrast, the DPP's Chen Shuibian proposed his "333 Welfare Plan" (三三安家福利專案) of NT\$3,000 pensions for those over 65, child benefit for under threes and 3% first time buyer mortgage rates,¹⁵¹ and "555 Child Care Plan" (五五五安親照顧方案).¹⁵²

2001 Legislative Yuan and ME Elections

Since coming to power it appears the economic recession has made the DPP less enthusiastic about its welfare pledges. At a September 2000 press conference Chen Shuibian announced, "Social welfare can be put off, but economic development can't be."¹⁵³ In the 2001 election the KMT attempted to initiate a new social welfare sub-issue closely linked to its attacks on the DPP's failures of economic management, this was the unemployment issue. On 10 November 2001 the KMT organized simultaneous demonstrations in 22 cities and counties calling on the DPP government to tackle rising unemployment levels. KMT Chairman Lian Zhan led the Taipei march, and one of its main slogans was "DPP in power, guaranteed unemployment."¹⁵⁴ However, there were signs that despite the economic downturn and turnover of ruling parties, parties' social welfare trends remained consistent. Firstly, the KMT did not follow up its initial focus on unemployment later in the campaign. Moreover, the DPP's most controversial TV ad attacked fifteen KMT legislators for their "cruel" cutting of budgets for child welfare. This ad touched a raw nerve for the KMT as ten of these "barbarous" KMT legislators filed lawsuits against DPP officials for slander and violation of the election law¹⁵⁵ and later the ad was blamed by a number of these KMT legislators for their election defeat.

¹⁵¹ *China Times*, March 2, 2000, 16.

¹⁵² *China Times*, March 9, 2000, 4.

¹⁵³ www.taipeitimes.com/news/local/archives.2000/09/17/53615

¹⁵⁴ www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/11/09/story/0000111026

¹⁵⁵ www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/11/17/0000111883

This section has shown how social welfare rose in salience in 1993 and has remained on the political agenda since. The main sub-issues have been NHI, pensions and women/childcare welfare. The DPP has given welfare more attention than other parties and in most elections appears to own the issue. However, the issue is highly contested and there have been cases of leapfrogging, such as in 1995.

3.5 Social Welfare Sub-issues.

In this section I look in more detail at how the two main welfare sub-issues have developed, if issue ownership applies at the sub-issue level and if ownership has changed.

3.5.1 National Health Insurance

National Health Insurance is an exceptional sub-issue, as it is a rare case of successful issue stealing by the KMT. The KMT was able to steal this issue from the DPP as in the late 1980s welfare was not yet a core component of the DPP's party image. The KMT's embracing of universal health insurance was a shift away from its traditional far right stance of concentrating welfare on pro KMT occupational groups. However, the degree of KMT change should not be exaggerated, as the KMT design of the NHI dictated that it was contributory and that its client groups still received preferential treatment. Moreover, after only two years of NHI coming into operation, the KMT attempted to introduce reforms that would have reduced the level of equality of NHI. The way that the cost of NHI has spiralled out of control has also contributed to the KMT's reluctance to introduce contributory pensions.

Although the numbers covered by existing health insurance schemes had gradually risen under Martial Law, Taiwan still had a very imbalanced welfare system. As the scope of elections widened, healthcare had the potential to be a hugely divisive political issue. Throughout the 1980s the DPP called for NHI, indeed DPP legislator Hong Qichang (洪奇昌) referred to it as one of their early policy achievements.¹⁵⁶ Therefore the KMT attempted to take the sting out of the issue by pre-emptively stealing it. First in 1986 Premier Yu Guohua (俞國華) announced the government's intention to introduce NHI by 2000, and only two years later the target date was brought forward to 1995.

The KMT and government bureaucrats controlled the design of the new NHI plan. As Joseph Wong explained, "the KMT leadership played a supervisory role, ensuring that the NHI policy accorded with the party's political and policy goals while insulating the bureaucratic policy process from outside influence."¹⁵⁷ The KMT was able to ensure a degree of continuity, as the system remained biased. Its core supporters such as the teachers and civil servants, and in the light of the KMT's increasing reliance on rural votes, farmers had preferential contribution rates, while the veterans and military personnel were totally exempt from NHI contributions.¹⁵⁸ Unlike the KMT's inner party disputes over pensions in the 1990s, the move to wider welfare cover of NHI did not create divisions within the KMT. This was because there was a consensus within the high levels of the KMT that the party needed to respond to increased party competition, but also the KMT felt that it could design a welfare system to suit its own needs.

¹⁵⁶ Hong Qichang, interview by author, Taipei, September 20, 2001.

¹⁵⁷ Joseph Wong, "Resisting Retrenchment in Health Care," 5.

¹⁵⁸ For details of the contribution rates Aspalter, *Democratization and Welfare State Development in Taiwan*, 66-68.

The Department of Health drafted NHI Bill was submitted to the Legislative Yuan at the end of 1993, and completed its third reading in the summer of 1994 with limited controversy and few amendments. According to former DPP legislator Lin Zhengjie, "Our NHI was passed after only two or three days (debate), even though this affects over 5% of our GNP."¹⁵⁹ The NHI has turned out to be an extremely popular system, with a 70% public satisfaction rate and 96.8% of the population insured by 1998.¹⁶⁰ Moreover the system is highly efficient, with waiting lists unheard of and a rapid increase in the number of doctors.

However, the NHI is a drain on Taiwan's finances, with social insurance accounting for over half the government's social welfare expenditure.¹⁶¹ Therefore in 1998 the Executive Yuan proposed reforms that would reduce the level of equality of the scheme. However, a coalition of diverse interest groups was able to create sufficient cross party opposition to block these proposals.¹⁶² These failed marketisation reforms show that while the KMT could dominate the policy process in the early 1990s, later, as Joseph Wong points out, "the era of top-down policy making in Taiwan is coming to an end."¹⁶³

Although the DPP had called for NHI in the 1980s, as soon as it was clear the KMT would push through NHI, the DPP abandoned this sub-issue. In contrast, it has been consistently stressed by the KMT and has been a clearly owned sub-issue since 1992. Firstly, in 1992 the KMT placed a number of TV ads promoting its plan to

¹⁵⁹ Lin Zhengjie, interview by author, Xinzhu, September 21, 2001.

¹⁶⁰ Wong, "Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Democratizing Taiwan," 11.

¹⁶¹ www.gio.tw/taiwan-website/5gp/yearbook/chpt19-1.htm

¹⁶² For details see Wong, "Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Democratizing Taiwan."

¹⁶³ Ibid., 35.

introduce the NHI. As soon as NHI came into operation in 1995 the KMT began to trumpet its successful implementation. For instance, in a KMT TV ad a baby's heart operation on the NHI is shown. A doctor explains how the NHI saves lives, and that such operations would have previously been too expensive for many families. Four months later in Taiwan's first presidential election KMT TV ads listed the NHI among Li Denghui's many achievements. In 1998 the KMT "Government Ability TV Ad"(執政能力篇) compared the KMT's success in introducing NHI to the failure of Clinton's welfare programme. In the 2000 presidential election the KMT had its peak welfare issue emphasis, the main reason was its message that its candidate Lian Zhan had been premier when the NHI Bill was passed and came into operation. For instance, a KMT ad showed a group of people at a bus stop in the rain and then a big umbrella covers them all, symbolizing the way Lian Zhan's NHI covers everyone's health needs.¹⁶⁴ A number of full-page newspaper ads described how Lian Zhan forced through the NHI Bill despite much opposition, and how the scheme has grown in popularity.¹⁶⁵ One headline claimed, "Even if you curse Lian Zhan everyday, you still carry Lian Zhan's transcripts, the NHI Card." (即使天天罵連戰的人, 也請你隨身帶連戰的成績單-全民健保卡)¹⁶⁶

Since the KMT's defeat in 2000 the party appears to have dropped NHI as a central election issue in the two subsequent elections. However, it is possible healthcare will become a divisive issue in the future, as the KMT's Chen Hongji (陳鴻基) remarked, "Once the NHI contribution rates were fixed, it has been almost impossible to raise them, as they will be used as an election issue."¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Advertising expert Zheng Zilong rated this as one of the best TV ads of the 2000 campaign. Interview by author, Taipei, April 11, 2000.

¹⁶⁵ See *China Times*, March 4, 2000, 5; *China Times*, March 4, 2000, 10.

¹⁶⁶ *China Times*, March 4, 2000, 10.

¹⁶⁷ Chen Hongji, interview by author, Taipei, September 14, 2001.

The NHI is a case of the KMT pre-emptively stealing a marginal DPP sub-issue, then clear KMT sub-issue ownership. In addition, this case shows that western left right divisions do not apply in Taiwan. As the DPP legislator Chen Qimai (陳其邁) commented, “The KMT is a rightist party, closer to your (Britain’s) Conservative Party, but it passed the NHI, a policy which would be close to your Labour Party.”¹⁶⁸

3.5.2 Elderly Welfare

Election stress on old age welfare came later than NHI, however, it has been the most salient welfare issue of the decade. Prior to democratisation old age payments were concentrated on the “jungongjiao” group to an even greater extent than health insurance, leaving the rest of the population to fend for themselves after retirement. However, this meant universal pensions had a wider potential appeal. Two types of pensions have been proposed in the 1990s. First, the DPP proposed “non contributory pensions” (老人年金 henceforth termed “pensions”), while later the KMT’s alternative was for “contributory pensions” (國民年金). Once the pensions issue was initiated by the DPP it became an owned issue, although later the KMT did attempt to co-opt this popular issues, this failed, leaving issue ownership intact.

The DPP first called for pensions in 1991,¹⁶⁹ however this proposal did not receive any significant media attention.¹⁷⁰ One year later the issue was raised by a number of DPP Legislative Yuan candidates. For example, in Tainan the DPP’s Su Huanzhi

¹⁶⁸ Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.

¹⁶⁹ Chen Mingtong, “The DPP’s Party Image,” 39.

¹⁷⁰ I did not find any references to this proposal in either newspaper reports prior to the election or campaign reviews.

(蘇煥智) made pensions the core theme of his 1992 campaign and according to Su's 2001 campaign website he was "the pioneer of old age pensions" (老人年金的開創者).¹⁷¹ However, as the issue was not promoted by the DPP party centre and the KMT did not get involved in contesting the issue, it remained a local rather than national issue.

The turning point for pensions came in 1993, when they became DPP central party policy and one of its central campaign issues. The director of the DPP's Policy Coordination Department Chen Zhongxin recalled that, "Before when Su Huanzhi proposed pensions in Tainan (in 1992) it did not create a stir, but once the DPP proposed it, it had dramatic effects."¹⁷² The issue became even more effective by the DPP's linkage of pensions with the ethnic injustice of the existing welfare system, and arguing that if KMT corruption could be ended funding for pensions would not be a problem. An example of the DPP's new pensions stance was a two hour long campaign video titled "Dignity in Old Age" (有尊嚴的銀髮族), which argued though the older generation had worked hard to create the economic miracle, now they were being neglected and needed to be taken care of with pensions.¹⁷³

The print media reported at length on the DPP's pensions appeal. For example the China Times headline, "The DPP decides to play the Pensions Card against the Li Denghui Card." (民進黨決以-老人年金牌對抗李登輝牌) This quoted the DPP's Chen Zhongxin as saying that the DPP's most effective issue is pensions.¹⁷⁴ In the election debates, DPP candidates were very vocal on the issue, linking it with the ethnically imbalanced system and corruption. For instance in Gaoxiong County Yu

¹⁷¹ See www.a-de.com.tw/su/works06.htm

¹⁷² Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

¹⁷³ This practice of issuing campaign videos flourished for the next couple of years until it was superseded in importance by the cable news channels and paid advertising.

¹⁷⁴ *China Times*, October 28, 1993, 2.

Zhengxian (余政憲) stated that in the forty years since the KMT came to Taiwan, apart from taking care of veterans, it has done nothing for the other old people.¹⁷⁵ While DPP Zhanghua (彰化) ME asserted that the degree of corruption in the KMT authority is very serious, if the money wasted on government construction contract corruption could be removed, it would be enough to fund pensions for decades.¹⁷⁶

In 1993 though the KMT steered clear of the issue in its ads, the KMT's official position was opposed to pensions. The Minister of Interior Wu Boxiong's (吳伯雄) statement reflected the KMT's conservative position, "The government advocates that the elderly people live with or near their sons and daughters, so that care will be close by and the elderly will enjoy the natural bonds and ethical relationships between members of their family."¹⁷⁷ Some KMT candidates felt strong enough to toe the official party line on pensions. For example, the KMT candidate for Taoyuan (桃園) ME said, "Pensions are like treating people to steak, then saying they could not pay as my father has no money." (老人年金像請人吃牛排,後來又推說我爸爸沒錢.)¹⁷⁸ However, the issue was putting pressure on KMT candidates, with some attempting to steal the issue. In an article reviewing candidate policy forums it was reported that in Gaoxiong County KMT candidate Huang Baye (黃八野) offered voters NT\$6,000 pensions in an attempt to outbid DPP's Yu Zhengxian's promise of NT\$5,000.¹⁷⁹ While in Zhanghua KMT candidate Ruan Gangmeng (阮剛猛) promised that if other counties offered pensions, Zhanghua would follow suit.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ *China Times*, November 18, 1993, 2.

¹⁷⁶ *China Times*, November 18, 1993, 2.

¹⁷⁷ *ROC Yearbook 1994*, 355.

¹⁷⁸ <http://www.new7.com.tw/weekly/old/557/article022.html>

¹⁷⁹ *China Times*, November 18, 1993, 2.

¹⁸⁰ *China Times*, November 18, 1993, 2. However, Ruan failed to keep this election promise.

Following the 1993 election all six DPP elected ME began paying out pensions in an attempt to keep their election pledges. However, their appeals to central government to provide extra funding were ignored, and lack of funds forced almost all to suspend or water down payments.¹⁸¹

The pensions battle continued into the 1994 election campaigns, with DPP candidates again promising pensions, while the KMT strongly criticized these election pledges and mocked the inability of DPP local governments to deliver on their promises since 1993.

The importance the DPP placed on pensions is clear from a newspaper ad showing the many DPP policy achievements as fruit fallen from a tree, and the three remaining apples on the tree were pensions, media liberalization and UN membership.¹⁸² In response to KMT attacks, a DPP ad had the slogan, “If we can’t do it (provide pensions) we will resign”(做不到就下臺!). It had a picture of KMT corruption draining a resource pipeline, leaving nothing for the old people. The ad went on to refute the KMT’s argument that “pensions” will bankrupt the government, stating “The DPP’s Chen Dingnan promises that after being elected he will crackdown on special privileges and corruption, so that pensions can be paid out without raising taxes.” (民進黨陳定南保證當選後將掃淨特權勾結,貪污腐敗,利益輸送,不必加稅就可發老人津貼).¹⁸³

In 1994 the KMT and NP were united in attacks against DPP pensions policy. For instance in a KMT internal meeting Li Denghui made the comment that, “Making pensions pledges but asking others to wipe their arse, this is not reasonable.” (開完老人年金支票卻要別人擦屁股,更是沒道理.)¹⁸⁴ Many KMT ads attacked the

¹⁸¹ Aspalter, *Democratization and Welfare State Development in Taiwan*, 102. Only Xinzhu County was able to maintain payments.

¹⁸² *China Times*, 1 December, 1994, 47.

¹⁸³ *China Times*, November 29, 1994, 40.

¹⁸⁴ <http://www.new7.com.tw/weekly/old/557/article022.html>

DPP's failure to fulfil its pensions pledge since 1993. For example a KMT ad was titled "The DPP, Let Me Cheat You One More Time" (民進黨; 讓我再騙一次), attacking the DPP for their failure to pay out pensions for more than four months, and how they had not kept their promise of resigning if they could not fulfil their pensions pledge. DPP party chairman Shi Mingde (施明德) is mocked for once again promising to resign this year as chairman and legislator if the pension pledge is not fulfilled.¹⁸⁵ Another KMT theme was that DPP style pensions were a form of vote buying. At a KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) meeting in the 1994 campaign Premier Lian Zhan stated "Using a few thousand dollars as a so called pension to buy votes is an insult to voters, once a party has reached that stage it will not have a future."¹⁸⁶ Similarly, a NP ad carried the slogan "Old People's Welfare Should Bring Happiness, But Should Not Be Bought" (老人福利要開心, 不要收買).¹⁸⁷ Both the NP and the KMT provincial governor candidates Zhu Gaozheng (朱高正)¹⁸⁸ and Song Chuyu¹⁸⁹ argued pensions would bankrupt the provincial treasury. However, some alternatives were also proposed. For instance, the KMT's Gaoxiong Mayoral candidate Wu Dunyi advocated a gradualist approach of increasing the scope of existing old age welfare provisions.¹⁹⁰

With increased DPP attacks against the ethnic bias of the welfare system and growing NP encroachment into the KMT's iron voters, the veterans, the KMT needed to show its commitment to veteran welfare. For instance, the 1994 KMT newspaper ad slogan, "What are they up to?" (居心何在), in which the veterans are

¹⁸⁵ *China Times*, November 25, 1994, 1.

¹⁸⁶ *China Times*, November 1, 1997, 3.

¹⁸⁷ *China Times*, November 25, 1994, 12.

¹⁸⁸ *China Times*, November 26, 1994, 4.

¹⁸⁹ *China Times*, November 25, 1994, 2.

¹⁹⁰ *China Times*, November 28, 1994, 7.

praised for sacrificing their youth to protect and develop Taiwan and in return they deserve their welfare. Also it criticized the DPP for trying to create ethnic antagonism in its attack on the veteran's welfare.¹⁹¹

Although the KMT was able to maintain more unity in the 1994 campaign, it was clearly felt the DPP's pensions pledge was attracting voters. Therefore the KMT made attempts to defuse the issue in the same way as it had done with NHI. Firstly, the Executive Yuan's Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) began to draw up plans for a contributory pensions scheme. Secondly, in a bid to sure up rural support for the KMT in the run up to the 1996 presidential election, legislation was passed for the "Old Farmer Allowance" (老農津貼). The design of the programme was almost identical to DPP style pensions, as it was neither contributory and nor means tested.¹⁹² This paid farmers over 65 a monthly allowance of NT\$3,000, and by 1999 had 703,000 recipients.¹⁹³

In 1997 pensions once more topped the political agenda, though on this occasion the KMT attempted to steal the issue. This created more press coverage of a welfare issue in just over one week than in any other campaign in the 1990s. Li Denghui sparked off the controversy on 31 October at a rally supporting KMT Taipei County ME candidate Xie Shenshan (謝深山). Li stated "In the past people have proposed this policy (pensions), but after coming to power they have not fulfilled their promises, stopping payments after just a few months. If Xie Shenshan is elected, it will not be a problem to make the payments all year, as we would not need a great

¹⁹¹ *Lianhebao*, November 17, 1994, 20.

¹⁹² For the first four years of the programme there was limited means testing, then after 1999 it became universal.

¹⁹³ Aspalter, *Democratization and Welfare State Development in Taiwan*, 75-78.

deal of funds. I have confidence in his ability.”¹⁹⁴ Following this Xie took the stage and explained that the NT\$5,000 would be paid out to all over 65, including “jungongjiao.”¹⁹⁵ This event was especially significant in that Li used the DPP term pensions (老人年金) rather than the KMT planned contributory pensions scheme. This was the first time a central KMT figure had used this term favourably. The shift was even more extraordinary considering only a few days earlier the KMT Propaganda Department had issued a media ad titled “Green Government, A Guarantee of Failed Election Pledges” (綠色執政跳票保證) following its old line of attacking the DPP for trying to cheat voters with its pensions pledge and failing to deliver.¹⁹⁶ The China Times columnist Xia Zhen (夏珍) wondered whether Li’s promise was not a form of bribe, writing, “If the DPP makes the promise, then the finances are not sufficient, but if the KMT makes the promise then there is enough money. After the election Taiwan can look disdainfully across the Taiwan straits at their one country two systems, as we have one country many systems.”¹⁹⁷

There were two main responses to Li’s pledge, supportive from the DPP and pro Li MKMT, and opposed by the NP, NMKMT, politicians from the Executive Yuan and Provincial Government. DPP chairman Xu Xinliang responded that he was very happy to see Li Denghui was willing to implement the DPP’s pensions policy.¹⁹⁸ Many KMT ME candidates such as Liao Fengde (廖風德) in Yilan (宜蘭), Hong Yuqin (洪玉欽) in Tainan County were very supportive of Li Denghui’s pledge at the controversial 5 November, KMT CSC meeting.¹⁹⁹ KMT Secretary General Wu

¹⁹⁴ *China Times*, 1 November, 1997, 3.

¹⁹⁵ *China Times*, 1 November, 1997, 3. Note that in previous DPP schemes veterans, retired teachers and civil servants that already had pensions were exempted.

¹⁹⁶ *China Times*, 1 November, 1997, 3.

¹⁹⁷ *China Times*, November 1, 1997, 3.

¹⁹⁸ *China Times*, November 1, 1997, 3.

¹⁹⁹ *China Times*, November 6, 1997, 2.

Boxiong stated that Chairman Li Denghui's support for Xie Shenshan's pensions promise was not a case of the KMT making a policy shift. As months before four or five KMT nominated ME candidates had already made similar policy promises.²⁰⁰ While the KMT Propaganda Chief Cai Bihuang (蔡壁煌) backed up Li Denghui trying to explain the difference between Xie Shenshan's "senior citizen allowance" (資深國民津貼) and the DPP's pensions, how the pensions Li Denghui called for were a precursor before the "contributory pensions" scheme came into operation and that more funds would be available for pensions following the freezing of the Provincial Government.²⁰¹

The voices of caution came from Li's rivals in the KMT such as Provincial Governor Song Chuyu and Gaoxiong Mayor Wu Dunyi; they were joined by those advocating prudence in the Executive Yuan. Song stated that there was no connection with freezing the Provincial Government and old age pensions,²⁰² while later he said "it would be better to popularise running water before giving out pensions."²⁰³ And when asked if he would claim an old age pension when he got to 65, Song replied his mother and mother in law do not receive pensions, because he and his wife can settle the problem in a "filial way."²⁰⁴ At the explosive KMT CSC meeting Wu Dunyi stated that though in 1994 DPP candidates proposed NT\$5,000 pensions, but he did not jump on the bandwagon, but he was still elected. Li Denghui's response was, "You were lucky. This year the situation is different. The DPP proposed the old age pensions, but did not complete it, now the KMT can do it

²⁰⁰ *China Times*, November 4, 1997, 6.

²⁰¹ *China Times*, November 2, 1997, 2.

²⁰² *China Times*, November 4, 1997, 6.

²⁰³ *China Times*, November 5, 1997, 4.

²⁰⁴ *China Times*, November 5, 1997, 4.

and I guarantee we can do it better.”²⁰⁵ Other voices of caution came from Executive Yuan Premier Lian Zhan who called instead for implementing the CEPD’s contributory pensions scheme.²⁰⁶ While Jiang Bingkun (江丙坤), the Head of the CEPD pointed out that pensions given out by local governments cannot be viewed as a transition measure prior to the contributory pensions scheme.²⁰⁷

The NP also stood on the conservative wing of the pensions controversy. In response to Li’s policy shift the NP’s Zhou Yangshan(周陽山) stated, “Li Denghui’s words have broken the KMT’s earlier promise, did not take into account financial conditions, and are sure to have future repercussions.”²⁰⁸ The NP’s alternative proposal was “Filial Subsidies” (孝親津貼) of NT\$20,000 per year to encourage families of three generations to live together.²⁰⁹

The DPP attempted to take advantage of Li Denghui’s policy shift by proposing a “Respect the Elderly Allowance Bill” (敬老津貼案) in the Legislative Yuan. However, despite Li’s pensions promises, the KMT and NP combined to defeat the DPP bill in the Legislative Yuan on 6 November, 1997.²¹⁰ Moreover, pensions disappeared from the political agenda when Li Denghui created a new controversy when he stated to a journalist from the Washington Post on 6 November that Taiwan is already independent.²¹¹ Although Li and his allies in the KMT had made an attempt to wrest the ownership of the pensions issue from the DPP, the KMT’s inner party disputes over the issue and its cynical blocking of the DPP pensions bill

²⁰⁵ *China Times*, November 6, 1997, 2.

²⁰⁶ *China Times*, November 6, 1997, 2.

²⁰⁷ *China Times*, November 6, 1997, 2.

²⁰⁸ *China Times*, November 1, 1997, 3.

²⁰⁹ *China Times*, November 28, 1997, 1.

²¹⁰ *China Times*, November 7, 1997, 1.

²¹¹ *China Times*, November 9, 1997, 2.

ensured that old age welfare remained a DPP owned issue.

A year later the pensions issue was less visible, but the emphasis pattern returned to normality with the DPP raising the issue and the KMT losing its enthusiasm for pensions. In Gaoxiong DPP candidate Xie Changting (謝長廷) made numerous welfare promises such as free false teeth, and old age pensions during recession.²¹² The KMT incumbent Wu Dunyi's stuck to his record of opposition to rash welfare spending, claiming that if Xie was elected implementing his welfare pledges would halt city government construction policies and all the city's people would be the losers.²¹³

Throughout the 1990s the KMT continued promoting the interests of the veterans, the group that benefited most from the existing welfare system. The KMT often played the terror card, trying to exploit the sense of crisis in the veteran community about DPP rule. For instance a 1998 KMT ad showed the face of an anxious veteran with the headline, "If this battle is lost, the Veterans will have no Guarantee" (輸了這一戰, 退伍軍人沒有保障).²¹⁴

The 2000 presidential election pitted the DPP's Chen Shuibian, with a record of supporting pensions since 1994 against the KMT's Lian Zhan and ex KMT Song Chuyu, both of whom had repeatedly opposed DPP style pensions. In the election all three candidates stuck to their previous policy positions. There were two main features to Chen Shuibian's pensions message in 2000, firstly he attacked Lian Zhan's failure to deliver on his promise to introduce the contributory pension

²¹² *China Times*, November 9, 1998, 2.

²¹³ *China Times*, November 10, 1998, 5.

²¹⁴ *China Times*, November 30, 1998, 10.

scheme, and secondly he promoted his “333 Welfare Plan,” which included pensions of NT\$3,000 per month. For example, the newspaper ad titled “Lian Zhan’s Failed Promises” (連戰跳票篇) stated, “(Lian Zhan) has said three times (he will introduce them (contribution based pension), but each time he has failed without exception.” (前前後後說了三次,結果三張支票無一例外,全都是芭樂票.)²¹⁵

The KMT message in 2000 was to again attack the DPP’s failure to deliver on previous pensions promises, the financial irresponsibility of DPP style pensions, and to promote the KMT’s alternative contributory pensions scheme. For instance, the KMT ad the headline “Let Me Cheat One More Time” (讓我再騙一次)²¹⁶ was almost identical in message to the 1994 KMT ad titled “The DPP, Let Me Cheat You One More Time” (民進黨; 再讓我騙一次).²¹⁷ This time Chen Shuibian was attacked for using the promise of NT\$5,000 pensions to get elected in 1994, and claiming his failure to make the payments led to his subsequent defeat in 1998. Chen was attacked for once again trying to cheat voters with the same proposal.²¹⁸ In the 4 March debate Lian maintained his anti pensions stance, stating, “I oppose subsidy type old age pensions. As these are against the public interest, this is policy vote buying and is not an example that should be followed.”²¹⁹ In a review of the various candidates’ social welfare policies the Minzhongribao (民衆日報) noted that Lian Zhan called for a subsidy for three generations to be encouraged to live together or close by.²²⁰ In addition, Lian was quoted as saying, “Subsidies that are

²¹⁵ *China Times*, February 15, 2000, 7.

²¹⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, February 21, 2000, 8.

²¹⁷ *China Times*, November 25, 1994, 1.

²¹⁸ *Ziyoushibao*, February 21, 2000, 8.

²¹⁹ *China Times*, March 5, 2000, 2.

²²⁰ *Minzhongribao*, March 10, 2000, 4.

paid regardless of wealth cannot solve the real needs of old people and will only increase the burden on taxpayers.”²²¹ Former Provincial Governor, and now independent candidate Song Chuyu again showed the most caution on welfare. For example, though a Song ad promised free medical insurance for over 65s and vouchers on national holidays, it stated this should be means tested and criticized financially irresponsible pension promises.²²²

In the 2001 elections the KMT’s Lian Zhan again promised contributory pensions, however, it was not a focal point of the party’s campaign.²²³ In contrast, since coming into office the DPP administration has tried hard to implement its pledge of NT\$3,000 pensions payments, either through legislation or executive decrees. And it is still the KMT that has been trying to block these welfare provisions.²²⁴ The process reached its climax in May 2002 when legislation to fulfil Chen Shuibian’s 2000 election pledge of pensions was finally passed.²²⁵

In short, after the DPP placed pensions on the political agenda, they became a DPP owned issue. Although the KMT made some attempts to steal this popular issue, these failed, leaving issue ownership intact. As KMT legislator Chen Xuesheng (陳學聖) admitted, “Looking back over the last ten years, if there is one issue that the DPP controlled, then it is the pensions issue.”²²⁶

3.6 Explanations for Party Change

²²¹ *Minzhongribao*, March 10, 2000, 4.

²²² *China Times*, March 11, 2000, 17.

²²³ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, October 19, 2001.

²²⁴ www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/12/20/story/0000116569

²²⁵ www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/05/11/0000135552

²²⁶ Chen Xuesheng, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.

In the following section I attempt to explain these trends in terms of inner party politics, electoral competition, incumbency versus opposition status, institutional factors, and party ideology. I show how electoral forces have pushed the parties to give greater emphasis to welfare issues and moved to create a more inclusive welfare system. However the parties have not converged, as the conservative welfare ideology of the Pan Blue camp has resisted welfare state expansion.

3.6.1 Inner-party Politics

The internal balance of power within Taiwan's political parties between ideological and more election orientated factions and leaders has had a major impact on parties' welfare emphasis in the first decade of democratic elections. When the former control Taiwan's parties, welfare tends to be a marginal issue and expansion of welfare provisions is resisted, while when the latter have the upper hand, calls are made for welfare expansion to win elections.

Throughout Martial Law the KMT party centre and the Executive Yuan determined welfare policy, the high levels of both being dominated by WSR, while elected representative organs remained rubber stamps for KMT policy. The KMT ensured that welfare provisions were concentrated on pro KMT occupational sectors. However, democratisation meant that for the first time elected politicians had the power to influence welfare policy. Moreover, democratisation altered the power structure within the KMT, as the party divided into two loose camps on the welfare issue. The Non Mainstream faction (NMKMT) tended to be WSR, with party centre or central government backgrounds. This group favoured only limited expansion of the existing welfare system. In contrast, the Mainstream faction (MKMT) tended to be BSR and elected officials. They favoured broader welfare provisions to enable

them to win elections. Since elected officials owe their loyalty first to their electors rather than their party, the party discipline of KMT politicians deteriorated, becoming more similar to those in the US than West Europe. Therefore, KMT politicians often went against their party line by parroting the DPP slogan of a “Welfare State” in 1992. Similarly, Liu Tsung-wei found welfare state expansion was also the most stressed issue for KMT legislators in their policy proposals.²²⁷

Leadership has been especially significant in moulding the KMT’s welfare policy as the party has a tradition of power being concentrated in the hands of the party chair. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the conservative welfare policies of the NMKMT still prevailed. However, the fall of NMKMT Premier Hao Bocun (郝柏村) and the increasing dominance of the MKMT Li Denghui meant that the KMT became more pro welfare expansion in the mid 1990s. The 1995 Old Farmer’s Allowance and 1997 pensions pledges reflect the shift towards more universal and non-means tested welfare schemes. While Huang Baye was an exceptional case in 1993, by 1997 KMT candidates were actually more likely to make pensions appeals than their DPP rivals. When I asked Li himself on the 1997 pensions issue shift his response was, “They are right. Old age pensions should be given and handicapped people need to be taken care of. However, these questions depend on whether the government has enough money. They must be done step by step...the KMT has a lot of money, we can spend much on elections, why not take care of these people?”²²⁸

However, Li’s populist policies were resisted by a coalition of the NMKMT, Executive Yuan and NP, preferring to perpetuate the welfare system that favour pro

²²⁷ Liu, “The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.1.

²²⁸ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

KMT groups and limiting new welfare to means tested or contributory schemes. The showdown between the two KMT welfare camps came in autumn 1997's pensions storm, as both factions employed pensions in their inner party struggle between Li Denghui and Song Chuyu. Song and Li had been political allies since the late 1980s, however by early 1996 Li was beginning to view Song as a threat, and an obstacle to his plans for future KMT succession. As Song Chuyu and Wu Dunyi had well known anti pensions stances Li must have known his pensions promise would cause friction within the party and supply the opportunity to attack these rivals. Li Denghui tried to link the pensions issue to the abolition of Song Chuyu's Provincial Government. Both Song and Wu risked losing credibility if they made a policy U Turn and backed up Li's pensions pledge. The pensions issue offered them a chance to hit back, and both attacked the feasibility and suitability of Li's promise. Finally Song and Wu were able to defeat Li by uniting with the KMT Executive Yuan figures to block the DPP's "Respect the Elderly Allowance Bill," and ensure that in later elections the KMT never again advocated DPP style pensions. Since Lian Zhan became KMT chairman in 2000, the influence of the NMKMT has risen; moreover it has allied with Song Chuyu and his PFP. Therefore the post 2000 Pan Blue camp has reverted to centre right welfare conservatism.

In contrast to the KMT, social welfare has not been a divisive issue for the DPP; there have been no public factional disputes or voting against the party line over welfare policy. Welfare state expansion is supported by both election-orientated factions as a vote winner and ideological Taiwan independence factions due to its link to the ethnic injustice question. At the time of formation it was not inevitable that the DPP would become seen as principally a Taiwan independence party. As Cheng and Hsu note, "Had other DPP leaders been as skilful (as New Tide leaders)

in promoting a different set of issues, such as social welfare, urban land reform, and even socialism, and had they done so before the New Tide raised the Taiwan independence issue, the DPP would have become a different type of party.”²²⁹ Research shows that all DPP factions can be seen as pro welfare state expansion,²³⁰ however the ability of the more social democratic New Tide and Welfare State Factions to maintain and increase their power within the party have helped to keep welfare on the DPP’s platform.

During the DPP’s first five years social welfare was no more than a secondary appeal for the party. This only changed with the rise of a string of election orientated leaders, such as Xu Xinliang, Shi Mingde and Chen Shuibian. Although it is hard for DPP party chairs to change fundamental party policy, they are able to control the tone of election campaigns. Thus once Xu Xinliang was able to consolidate power and control the DPP’s election campaign line in 1992, a new pattern welfare emphasis was set that has been continued by subsequent party chairs. According to Presidential Advisor Yao Jiawen(姚嘉文), the personality of the leader is important, he divided these into either reformers (改革派) or election orientated politicians (參選派), “The reason we (DPP) invest so much on social welfare is because of the personality of the leaders such as Xu Xinliang, Shi Mingde and Chen Wenqian, the party spokeswoman... I think that they are verging on the election orientated politicians.”²³¹

Since the NP’s founders were mostly WSR and former members of the anti welfare state expansion NMKMT, the NP’s conservative welfare position is understandable.

²²⁹ Cheng and Hsu, “Issue Structure and the DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment,” 139-140.

²³⁰ Liu, “The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.13.

²³¹ Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taipei, October 2, 2001.

However, when the party merged with the Chinese Social Democratic Party (中華社會民主黨 CSDP) in November 1993 it was agreed that though the NP would remain the party name, it would adopt the CSDP's Party Platform.²³² This would have given the NP a more social democratic stance, as according to political scientist Lin Shenqing (林深靖) this platform, "is the most progressive and complete party charter of any of Taiwan's parties."²³³ However, as CSDP founder Zhu Gaozheng lamented, "later the NP broke its promise" and in the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections, "Zhao Shaokang personally wrote a new policy proposal to be announced daily, it was a complete mess. The proposals had not been discussed at party meetings."²³⁴ The CSDP group was excluded from the NP's decision-making positions, and the NP remained dominated by its founders, most of whom were WSR with a conservative outlook on welfare. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that until 1997 the NP did give some attention to welfare issues. However, the departure of moderates such as Zhu Gaozheng and the rise of extremist nationalists leaders such as Li Qinghua (李慶華) caused the party to abandon social issues and focus solely on identity.

3.6.2 Electoral Competition

According to the British political scientist Richard Rose, "Most politicians believe that their continued electoral success depends on their ability to maintain or increase an already high level of state provision of welfare."²³⁵ The way Taiwan's politicians have treated the issue implies that this observation also applies to Taiwan. I look at this variable in terms of whether parties are following public opinion, attempting to

²³² *China Times*, November 13, 1993, 2.

²³³ Lin Shenqing, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.

²³⁴ Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.

²³⁵ Richard Rose, "Common Goals but Different Roles," 15.

mobilize existing supporters or reach out to new supporters, and how parties have responded to election results and the changing inter-party electoral environment.

3.6.2a) Public Opinion

Content analysis of election ads and reviews of media campaign coverage show politicians do stress social welfare and see the issue as a vote winner. Therefore it is possible Taiwan's parties' emphasis of social welfare is a case of following public opinion. For instance, according to the former KMT Secretary General Xu Shuide (許水德), "It was a gradual trend that the people wanted to increase welfare, also the elderly population was increasing."²³⁶ However, there is no clear trend of rising saliency. Moreover, if parties were blindly following public opinion we would expect a convergence of party positions on that of the median voter. However, Figure 3.4 and Table 3.2 show there was a wide gap between the welfare positions of all the major parties and the median voter. In any society there are multiple issues that the public stress but only those issues politicians chose to exploit will become politically salient. For example, there is no doubt that Taiwan has an appalling environmental problem, and that the public perceive of this problem, but politicians have rarely exploited this as a central electoral issue.²³⁷ Therefore the key factor encouraging candidates to employ welfare appeals is its instrumental value as a vote winning issue.

3.6.2b) Mobilising or Chasing?

The sociological groups targeted by parties' election campaigns affected their welfare emphasis. For while the DPP raised the issue to chase new voters, the KMT

²³⁶ Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

²³⁷ An exception to this pattern was the DPP candidate Liao Yonglai's call for a referendum on the construction of a German chemical plant in the 1997 Taizhong County ME race.

principally made welfare appeals to preserve its broad existing support base.

According to the Deputy Director of the DPP's Xu Shufen (許淑芬) the real difference between DPP and KMT welfare policy is "The KMT has offered selective social welfare to its supporters."²³⁸ The "jungongjiao" would have nothing to gain from the DPP's promises of universal benefits and felt threatened by the DPP's attacks on the existing welfare system. Therefore it was rational for the KMT to appeal to these supporters by preserving the bias of the existing welfare system. Moreover though the NHI Bill can be viewed as an attempt to use welfare policy to expand beyond its core voters, the KMT ensured the system remained biased in favour of the pro KMT groups, as they received preferential treatment in their NHI contributions. By the early 1990s support for the MKMT faction was increasingly concentrated in rural areas and local factions, groups previously marginal to existing welfare schemes and that now demanded greater welfare. This can partly explain why the many KMT legislators were prepared to vote against the party line over the DPP's amendment to Farmer Insurance Bill in 1995, and it was KMT ME candidates that initiated the pensions issue in 1997.

The primary objective of DPP welfare emphasis was to expand its support base in the early-mid 1990s. However, the issue was also used to appeal to the sociological group most supportive of the DPP, the BSR. With a disproportionate proportion of BSR involved in the private or underground economic sectors and thus excluded from the Martial Law era welfare system, it made sense for the DPP to call for universal benefits. The DPP's attacks on the ethnically biased welfare system were also playing to the prejudices of its own supporters. Almost all DPP politicians are

²³⁸ Xu Shufen, interview by author, Taipei, April 13, 2000.

BSR, of the 29 DPP politicians that I interviewed only two were WSR, and many DPP politicians cited the ethnic bias of the existing welfare system as a key factor motivating the party to stress welfare at election time.

Although most DPP core supporters are enthusiastic advocates of higher welfare, the party has been restrained from being too reckless on welfare spending by its small and medium enterprises (SME) followers. Since the 1980s businessmen from such enterprises have been an important source of votes and party funds for the DPP. This group is opposed to welfare increases that would require higher taxes and involve employer contributions. As the DPP's Xu Tiancai (許添財) explains, the DPP's "radical social welfare ideology has become a worry for SME that need the China market."²³⁹ The DPP's fear of losing the votes of small business was shown by the way it decided to drop the stock transaction tax from its 2000 election platform once it had been highlighted in the media.²⁴⁰

Initially five of the lowest support groups for the DPP were WSR, women, the elderly, rural residents and the middle class. In elections the DPP has attempted to use welfare appeals to expand into all these groups except WSR, as the probability of WSR realigning to the DPP was very low. In 1987 women made up only 32.4% of DPP supporters, while those over 60 accounted for 7.2% of DPP identifiers.²⁴¹ The DPP's appeal to women became most intense in the 1995 and 1997 campaigns, in which Taiwan's most charismatic female politician Chen Wenqian was the DPP Propaganda Chief. The kinds of issues focused on were childcare and women's safety. By 1998 women made up 43.6% of DPP supporters, implying the DPP has

²³⁹ Xu Tiancai, interview by author, Tainan, August 25, 2001.

²⁴⁰ Point made by DPP's Xu Shufen, interview by author, Taipei, April 13, 2000.

²⁴¹ Lin, "Paths to democracy," 424.

made progress in attracting the female vote.²⁴² The DPP also made pensions a core issue from 1993 to win elderly votes. However, the effectiveness of the pensions issue in increasing DPP support is in doubt, as in 1998 those over 60 only made up 8.6% of DPP supporters, a very modest increase.²⁴³ The DPP also targeted the middle class with welfare pledges. According to former DPP Secretary General Zhang Junhong, “implementing a social welfare policy was important for the middle class and below and the DPP represents the middle class and below, and for them this policy was very attractive.”²⁴⁴

In order for the DPP to expand out of its initial urban strongholds and win in ME elections the party stressed welfare issues such as pensions to appeal to rural voters. There is a perception in Taiwan that welfare appeals are more effective in the countryside. As DPP legislator Shen Fuxiong (沈富雄) stated about welfare pledges, “If we just write a blank cheque it won’t work in Taipei city, but I think it still works in rural areas.”²⁴⁵ The DPP has clearly had some success in this rural expansion, as since the late 1990s it has improved its electoral performance in agricultural counties.

The initial support base of the NP and the groups it later chose to expand into were all beneficiaries of the old welfare system, therefore the NP held a consistently conservative welfare stance. The core supporters of the NP were WSR and in particular the veterans, therefore the NP was vocal in supporting the welfare of veterans, such as promoting the reconstruction of military villages.²⁴⁶ In fact both

²⁴² Liu, “The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition,” Table 1.3

²⁴³ Ibid., Table 1.4

²⁴⁴ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001

²⁴⁵ Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taipei, September 19, 2001.

²⁴⁶ For example see *China Times*, November 25, 1994, 12

the NP and the NMKMT were able to benefit from the sense of crisis in the WSR community that a DPP government would threaten their position in society. The NP also hoped to expand beyond its initial WSR support base into the urban-based “jungongjiao,” who already had excellent welfare provisions. Therefore the NP adopted a conservative welfare stance, for instance it allied with the KMT to block the DPP’s amendment to the Farmer’s Insurance Bill in 1995. The party did make calls for targeted and means tested welfare programs. Political scientist Wu Chongli (吳重禮) recalled, “They stressed the idea of being the ‘spokesperson of the ordinary city people’ (小市民代言人) and began raising social welfare questions such as for handicapped people.”²⁴⁷ However as political scientist Chen Mingtong (陳明通) observed following the party’s collapse in 1998, “The ordinary city people are not a class and there is no such class consciousness, this cannot be the social base for a political party. For a party to try to make this its base is like constructing a building from the sand on a beach.”²⁴⁸ In the mid 1990s the NP’s Zhu Gaozheng advocated trying to expand support outside the big cities. Zhu explained, “I said (to NP leaders) you need to begin to show concern for farmers and workers. But I can tell you they are so lazy.”²⁴⁹ For the NP to make the kind of welfare appeals that would appeal to rural voters would have contradicted their conservative welfare position, therefore the NP never created a significant rural following.

3.6.2c) Election Environment

The parties’ changing welfare emphasis has also been affected by changes in the inter-party competitive environment. It was the unprecedented political challenge from the DPP that prompted the KMT to implement NHI. Therefore the KMT’s

²⁴⁷ Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.

²⁴⁸ *China Times*, December 6, 1998, 15.

²⁴⁹ Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.

early introduction of NHI was aimed at stopping health insurance welfare becoming a winning issue for the DPP. Indeed the KMT's shift was similar to the way pressure of party competition prompted the LDP Prime Minister in Japan to embrace welfare expansion in 1973.²⁵⁰

In 1994 a lack of funds forced most DPP run counties to cancel or water down their pensions payments. If at the time the KMT central or provincial governments had bailed out the DPP local governments, the credit would still have gone to the DPP as by then the party image on pensions was fixed, and the KMT would gain nothing. Instead a far safer tactic was to employ pensions as a rod to castigate the DPP's government ability.

The DPP's welfare emphasis was also a response to the new electoral environment of the early 1990s. After Hao Bocun fell from power, the Taiwanised KMT could no longer be attacked as an alien regime. The DPP needed new issues to win elections, thus the DPP hoped to use welfare issues to combat the KMT's key weapons; the Li Denghui card and vote buying. In the early 1990s campaigns Li campaigned extensively for KMT candidates, and this playing of the Li Denghui card put the DPP in severe difficulties. As the DPP's Chen Zhongxin remarked in 1993, "The DPP will use the pensions card against the KMT's Li Denghui card."²⁵¹ Similarly, Zhang Junhong (張俊宏) recalled how the DPP used welfare appeals to cope with the KMT's increasingly vote buying, "This (KMT vote buying) created a stumbling block for the DPP in elections, and the way to break through this was to use another form of vote buying. That is what the social welfare policy was, (laugh). The

²⁵⁰ Kwon, "A Comparison of East Asian Welfare Systems," 57.

²⁵¹ *China Times*, October 28, 1993, 2.

promise of social welfare is a kind of vote buying. Contractual vote buying. In order to deal with the KMT's huge corrupt vote buying methods and corrupt authority, the only way was to use this method."²⁵² The DPP's pensions appeal also had a strategic element of trying to force the KMT to treat elections as a party-to-party contest. As early as 1993 The DPP called for a party chairman's debate and according to Chen Fangming (陳芳明), by making the pensions appeal "we were trying to seduce the KMT leaders to attack us, like Wu Boxiong or Li Denghui, then we could compete party to party."²⁵³

The policy flexibility revealed by the KMT's attempts to steal DPP welfare appeals in the mid 1990s put the DPP in a serious dilemma, as every time the KMT co-opted a DPP policy appeal, the DPP needed to search for new issues to win elections. As DPP Secretary General Qiu Yiren(邱義仁) noted in 1998, "Actually many policies proposed by the DPP have been digested by the KMT. For example, the contributory pensions scheme and social military service. After the DPP proposes them, then regardless of planning the KMT announces that in 2000 or 2004 they will be implemented. Thus they digest the issue and it is hard to put issues on the agenda."²⁵⁴ However, the KMT's flexibility clearly has limits, thus since 1997 it has reverted to more conservative welfare positions, leaving the DPP dominating the welfare issue.

The arrival on the scene of the NP was a serious threat to the KMT, as the NP was appealing to the KMT's core voters with calls for maintaining veteran welfare.

Research has shown that WSR were more likely to switch their identification from

²⁵² Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

²⁵³ Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

²⁵⁴ *China Times*, November 25, 1998, 4.

the KMT to the NP.²⁵⁵ The KMT needed to prove it had the veterans' true interests at heart; therefore from 1994 KMT ads stressing veteran welfare begin to appear.²⁵⁶ This process reached a climax in 1995 when the NP's threat to the KMT was at its peak, this was reflected by the series of KMT veteran orientated TV ads in 1995.

3.6.2d) Election Results

Both election victories and defeats have had considerable effects on Taiwan's parties' welfare campaign emphasis, with greater emphasis when welfare issues are seen as contributing to victories and abandoning the issue when it appears to have lost its appeal. The fact the KMT stressed the NHI from 1992 until 2000 in almost every national level election reveals the party must have seen the issue as a vote winner. However, following the KMT's disastrous defeat in 2000 it has not made NHI a central theme in the subsequent 2001 and 2002 elections. Similarly, the KMT felt it could score points against the DPP by attacking the financial recklessness of its pensions pledge and mock the failure of DPP local governments to deliver on pensions promises. However, these attacks are not going to be repeated in 2004, as pensions were introduced by the DPP central government in 2002 and these payments have not caused the country's finances to collapse.

By the mid 1990s some KMT politicians began to consider pensions a potential vote winner, as former Secretary General Xu Shuide remarked over the KMT shift, "Of course, elections are a reason."²⁵⁷ There was a feeling within the KMT that the DPP's pensions campaigns in 1993 and 1994 had lost the KMT votes, and that the KMT needed to steal this popular issue. The pensions issue put the KMT in a severe

²⁵⁵ See Shi (施佩旋), "Analysis of Changes in Taiwanese Voters' Party Identification."

²⁵⁶ *China Times*, November 17, 1994, 20.

²⁵⁷ Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

dilemma, as KMT legislator Chen Hongji (陳鴻基) noted, “This pension policy is irresponsible. However, if we oppose pensions we’ll be attacked.”²⁵⁸ In response to the DPP’s pensions slogans the KMT was forced to devise its contributory pensions scheme. A former KMT Propaganda Chief recalled, “Since 1993 the DPP has promoted pensions, through to 1997. But the KMT didn’t know how to fight the social welfare appeal, so finally we adopted the contribution based pensions scheme to distinguish ourselves.”²⁵⁹ However, by 1997 some felt the KMT’s pensions alternative put it at a disadvantage against the DPP and for the first time DPP style pensions briefly became official KMT policy. As a former KMT Propaganda Chief recalled, “The problem was ordinary people didn’t understand the difference (between the KMT’s contributory pensions scheme and the DPP’s pensions), so we simply used their term, though in our bones we were thinking of the contributory pensions. It (Li’s use of the term pensions 老人年金) was a deliberate mistake.”²⁶⁰ However, following the KMT’s serious defeat in 1997, the party never again proposed DPP style pensions.

The DPP’s worst election setbacks were the Taiwan independence campaigns of 1991 and 1996. Most DPP leaders concluded the party needed to find new issues to fight elections on, and social welfare was one of the issues subsequently employed to try to breakthrough the bottleneck in DPP support. As DPP legislator Lai Jinlin(賴勁麟) noted, “The decision for the DPP to focus on setting up a social welfare system and old age pensions was closely related to getting more votes.”²⁶¹ The first welfare campaign of 1993 set a precedent of welfare emphasis that was

²⁵⁸ Chen Hongji, interview by author, Taipei, September 14, 2001.

²⁵⁹ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

²⁶⁰ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

²⁶¹ Lai Jinlin, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

followed in subsequent elections. Numerous DPP politicians in my 2001 interviews argued the new welfare emphasis of the 1990s has actually worked for the DPP. Former party chairman Xu Xinliang stated, "Actually social welfare issues were more popular than the basic DPP demands (independence/nationalism). The social welfare demands could attract the middle voters."²⁶² While Chen Zhongxin noted, "Our strategy (1993-4) was very successful, that was the old age pension appeal."²⁶³ The fact the DPP has continued to use social welfare to attack the KMT even in its first post turnover election reflects the degree the DPP views it as a vote winner.

In addition, social welfare pledges were part of the DPP's strategy of moving from local up to central government, a policy titled "the local surrounds the centre" (地方包圍中央). The DPP's You Qing (尤清) summed up the mood of the day, "As we gradually moved towards becoming the ruling party we had to pay attention to issues like infrastructure, transport, social welfare and education. We had to show that we were not just limited to talking about self determination and cross straits."²⁶⁴ Moreover it hoped that if it could be successful at implementing its welfare policies it would show the DPP's government ability in ME and later for national government.

Another reason for the DPP's enthusiasm for social welfare and for the issue's effectiveness was the way the DPP framed the issue as intimately linked to the salient questions of ethnicity and political corruption. Firstly, newspaper ads attacking the ethnic bias in the existing welfare system stirred up intense anti WSR passions at election times. In the same way the DPP was able to make the argument

²⁶² Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.

²⁶³ Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

²⁶⁴ You Qing, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

that rather than tax rises, by removing KMT corruption funding for welfare would be sufficient. As the DPP's Chen Fangming recalled about 1993-4, "The strategy was simple. We just said that if we can stop the corruption then we could have more social welfare. Actually I know that there are many loopholes in this kind of propaganda."²⁶⁵

Since social welfare is not a core ideological issue, Taiwan's parties are more likely to tone down such appeals as soon as the issue appears to no longer be a vote winner. For example, there is a perception in some circles that now social welfare has less potential to increase votes. As the DPP's Xu Tiancai commented "The DPP has always stressed economic redistribution, so it has struggled to attract centre voters."²⁶⁶ This partly explains why though the DPP has continued to stress social welfare it has not been as central to campaigns as in 1993 and 1994.

3.6.2e) A Mandate Model?

It is a positive sign for Taiwan's democracy that politicians are wary of voters punishing serious policy shifts or failures to deliver on their electoral mandates. Although social welfare issues offer politicians greater flexibility than national identity, change has also been heavily constrained by past record. Most politicians that took strong stands either for or against pensions" in the early 1990s debate have maintained remarkably consistent positions in the subsequent election debates.²⁶⁷ For example, in a 2001 interview Wu Dunyi showed consistency in his arguments against DPP style pensions. Firstly, he linked pensions to vote buying, stating, "It's

²⁶⁵ Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

²⁶⁶ Xu Tiancai, interview by author, Tainan, August 25, 2001.

²⁶⁷ The one exception to the rule is Li Denghui. In 1994 Li was on record as describing DPP pension as just a form of vote buying. However, since Li did not have such a strong anti pensions image, he could make the 180 degrees shift in his pensions promise.

the DPP that has used this issue (pensions) to buy the hearts of those old people.”²⁶⁸ Secondly, he claimed this policy would bankrupt the central, provincial or county finances, “Look how rich the US is, but they do not give old people NT\$5,000 a month. Does Taiwan have the conditions to do this? Of course, not.”²⁶⁹ And lastly, he argued that such universal benefits would not help those that really needed financial help the most, “To a poor person NT\$5,000 is not enough, but why give a rich person NT\$5,000?”²⁷⁰

By attacking their competitors for failing to deliver on policy promises or making unprincipled welfare policy shifts voters are reminded of previous unfulfilled manifesto pledges. For instance, the KMT has relentlessly attacked the DPP for its failure to deliver on pensions since 1994. Therefore, though DPP ME were unable to completely fulfil their 1993 pensions promises, most continued watered down old age payments. The DPP’s earlier policy commitments have meant it would be difficult to abandon the issue even if it wanted to. As DPP campaigner Xu Qiongdan (許瓊丹) noted, “In 2000 we promised NT\$3000 pensions, and it’s a promise that Chen (Shuibian) must keep.”²⁷¹

3.6.3 Incumbency Versus Opposition

In Taiwanese political circles there is a common perception that the KMT was so conservative on welfare because of its government status, while the opposition DPP could just make rash welfare promises without the responsibility of how to fund these schemes. A former KMT Propaganda Chief commented that, “The KMT is too

²⁶⁸ Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Xu Qiongdan, interview by author, Taipei, April 12, 2000.

conservative, as it was in power for over 50 years, so on the social welfare issue it always worried about financial resources.”²⁷² Similarly, KMT legislator Chen Xuesheng explained the rationale behind KMT welfare restraint, “It has felt that once you open the floodgates of social welfare, you can never close them. Once you make an election pledge you will be outbid, one promises NT\$3,000 and the next will promise NT\$5,000.”²⁷³ There was a clear trend that those most opposed to pensions were figures from the central and provincial government, such as Lian Zhan, and Song Chuyu, while KMT politicians seeking elected posts were a lot more positive about welfare expansion. A former KMT Propaganda Chief summed up the DPP’s tactics, “The DPP was the opposition party, and it didn’t care about whether there were sufficient resources. I’m going to give you a problem to solve, I will give them out and let the government worry about the necessary resources.”²⁷⁴ Similarly, some in the DPP argue now the party is in power it should have a more restrained welfare policy. For instance, DPP legislator Shen Fuxiong stressed, “In terms of social welfare, I think that in the past we always talked about how we’ve got to give those people benefits. But again now we’re in power, we have to talk about the issue from a fiscal sense.”²⁷⁵

However, there is a flaw in this argument. Firstly, when the DPP began to take power at the ME level in the early 1990s it tried hard to implement its welfare promises and continued to make welfare appeals. Moreover, despite the economic slump and the turnover in ruling parties there has been more consistency than change in parties’ welfare policies. The DPP in power is still viewed as more pro

²⁷² Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

²⁷³ Chen Xuesheng, interview by author, Taipei, September 14, 2001.

²⁷⁴ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

²⁷⁵ Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taipei, September 19, 2001.

welfare than other parties, and its recent passing of pensions legislation shows it intends to maintain this image. Similarly, since losing power, the Pan Blue camp dominated by Lian Zhan and Song Chuyu has reverted to an even more conservative welfare image than under Li Denghui.

3.6.4 Institutional Factors

According to political scientist Wu Yushan in Taiwan “The election system determines the issues and strategies (the parties pursue).”²⁷⁶ Since national identity issues are less influential in the SMD ME elections, and as much social welfare is provided by local governments, we would expect welfare issues would be most prominent in ME contests. However, my advertising data shows social welfare appeals cut across election systems, with heavy emphasis in SMD and MMD, local and national, legislative and executive elections. Campaign reviews show social welfare does receive more media attention in SMD contests, as in MMD there are just too many candidates for the media to report individual candidates’ policies. Although the most serious cases of welfare outbidding have occurred in SMD elections (1993, 1997, 2000), it also must be noted that KMT figures calling for caution on welfare were also loudest in SMD contests (1993, 1994, 1997, 2000). In short, the impact of electoral systems on welfare emphasis is at most limited.

3.6.5 Ideology

Since social welfare is not regarded as a core ideological issue in Taiwan, parties have more flexibility over whether to use this issue in campaigns, knowing that changes in policy are unlikely to lead to large scale mass or elite defections. However, in keeping with the definition that ideology is a “set of core values that

²⁷⁶ Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taipei, October 24, 2001.

are taken as accepted by a political party,"²⁷⁷ the parties have created distinct welfare philosophies, and these differences have had a major impact on their changing welfare issue emphasis.

The KMT and NP's views on the issue reflect a strain of thought common in many Asian ruling circles of avoiding what became known in Japan as the "British Disease," of over-dependence on the welfare state. Indeed the KMT line echoes proponents of Asian Values such as Lee Kuan Yew who argued that Western style welfare states are not only economically too expensive but also culturally inappropriate for Asian states to emulate.²⁷⁸ For instance, former Premier Lian Zhan argued against Taiwan adopting a European style welfare state, saying that instead of the state, the main providers of welfare services ought to be voluntary groups and private enterprises.²⁷⁹ Another feature of KMT and NP statements is that families should play an increasing role in welfare provisions, mirroring family centred welfare policies promoted by Christian Democrats in West Europe. For example, both the KMT and NP called for subsidies to encourage three generations to live together.²⁸⁰ There is also a view in the KMT that there is a trade-off between economic growth and social welfare, and as with the Japanese LDP the priority has always been economic growth.

The KMT advocates a combination of contribution-based schemes, and expansion of existing means tested welfare. The KMT has talked about contributory pensions since 1994, and like the NHI this would spread the burden of the pensions scheme

²⁷⁷ Chapter 1 1.3.2f).

²⁷⁸ White and Goodman, "Welfare Orientalism," 11.

²⁷⁹ Ku, "Left or Right," 16.

²⁸⁰ For the KMT see *Minzhongribao*, March 10, 2000, 4; For NP see *China Times*, November 28, 1997, 1.

between employee, employers and government, and only be available to those that have made contributions to the fund. Lian Zhan summed up the principles behind this scheme in the 2000 presidential campaign, "The design of the contribution based pensions scheme must be based on the principle of social justice and the idea that there are no free lunches."²⁸¹

In contrast, the DPP has built up an ideology of using universal welfare schemes to create a fairer and more inclusive welfare system. Although the political scientist Ming Juzheng claims, "The left wing parties (DPP, TIP, TSU) are like liberal, socialist or social democratic parties,"²⁸² social democracy has never even been the dominant ideology in the DPP. A more important ideological element of the DPP's welfare appeal lies in its linkage with ethnic Taiwanese nationalism. Former DPP chairman Yao Jiawen summed up this view, "Social welfare is not simply about social welfare. Social welfare is should Taiwanese enjoy the national budget. Because the veterans and overseas Chinese enjoy those benefits but why don't we? Only when you can say Taiwan is independent and the government is for the Taiwanese, then we can talk of social welfare for the people."²⁸³

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the development social welfare in Taiwan's electoral politics. As the scope of elections widened during democratisation the issue was initiated by the opposition DPP, which forced the ruling KMT to respond. At the outset of democratic elections Taiwan's parties held polarized positions on the welfare issue. However, throughout the 1991-2001 period election orientated

²⁸¹ *Minzhongribao*, March 10, 2000, 4.

²⁸² Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taipei, November 5, 2001.

²⁸³ Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taipei, October 2, 2001.

politicians of both leading parties have promoted an expansion of welfare schemes. As a result of democratic debate Taiwan has moved from a grossly unfair and inadequate welfare system to a more efficient, equitable and inclusive system. Although the gulf between parties on welfare has narrowed, change has been constrained by the conservative welfare ideology and past record of many in the KMT. The DPP has given greater attention to welfare issues and is seen by the public as more pro welfare than other parties, however, social welfare has been a highly contested issue. As former DPP legislator Lin Zhengjie commented on Taiwanese politicians, “No matter whether you’re pro unification or pro independence (統或獨), everyone seems to support the welfare state.”²⁸⁴ Social welfare is a case of sub-issue rather than issue ownership, in which the KMT owns NHI and the DPP owns pensions. NHI is the most significant example of issue stealing in this study. Although the DPP had already called for NHI, it was not yet part of its party image, thus it was possible for the KMT to take control of this marginal opposition issue. In contrast, the pensions issue revealed the difficulty of stealing an owned issue, as once the DPP had gained a reputation for promoting pensions; the KMT struggled to challenge this ownership.

²⁸⁴ Lin Zhengjie, interview by author, Xinzhu, 21 September, 2001.

Chapter Four: Political Corruption

*"Corruption is frequently an integral part of the political system- a part which we ignore only at our great peril."*²⁸⁵

4.1.1 Introduction

Until the 1990s the main focus of political corruption research was on authoritarian or developing countries.²⁸⁶ Periodically corruption scandals cropped up in mature democracies, however, these were rarely central electoral issues that led to the downfall of governments. The turning point was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent fading of ideological left/right conflicts in most western democracies, giving political corruption the space on the political agenda to become one of the most salient issues of the last decade. Almost no democracy has been immune from high-level corruption scandals and this has contributed to reduced public confidence in parties and the demise of a number of long dominant political parties.²⁸⁷ In Italy corruption investigations led to the fall of the Christian Democratic led coalition that had ruled since World War 2,²⁸⁸ in Britain accusations of "sleaze" seriously weakened the reputation of the Major administration,²⁸⁹ and in Spain a string of corruption scandals contributed to the defeat of the Socialists after 14 years in power.²⁹⁰

The issue has been equally salient in "Third Wave" democracies, such as Taiwan,

²⁸⁵ Scott, "Handling Historical Comparisons Cross Nationally in Comparative Political Corruption," 129.

²⁸⁶ For example see Heidenheimer ed, *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*.

²⁸⁷ On public confidence in political parties see Norris ed, *Critical Citizens*.

²⁸⁸ Della Porta and Vannucci, "Corrupt Exchanges and the Implosion of the Italian Party System," 717-733.

²⁸⁹ Leigh and Vulliamy, *Sleaze*.

²⁹⁰ Heywood, "From Dictatorship to Democracy," 65-84.

where there is a widespread perception that corruption has actually worsened during the democratic transition. Although national identity is considered the most influential cleavage in Taiwanese politics, at election time political corruption issues are even more visible and received more attention in the campaign propaganda than any other issue in the last decade.²⁹¹ Moreover, the opposition's anti corruption campaigns were a critical factor in the KMT's fall from office after ruling Taiwan for over fifty years.

This chapter shows how the Taiwanese opposition parties placed the latent issue of corruption on to the electoral agenda, and through repeated campaign emphasis made it arguably the most salient political issue in Taiwan. Party competition on the issue has been convergent. Although the parties started the decade with contrasting definitions of corruption, by the end of the decade of elections there was a much greater consensus on what constitutes corruption and the need for tougher anti-corruption measures. The parties are now less polarized on the issue, however, they remain differentiated, as inner party factors have constrained movement and stopped leapfrogging.

Clearly corruption is a valence rather than a position issue. All parties are officially against corruption. Even the most corrupt party will not openly advocate vote buying, gangster links or electoral fraud. However, this does not mean that it is in the interests of all parties to give the same emphasis to the issue, as voters see some parties as more corrupt than others, therefore parties viewed as clean will benefit from keeping the issue on the electoral agenda, while those tainted with corruption should try to steer the agenda on to other more favourable subjects. In this study I

²⁹¹ See Table 2.2.

show how these tenets of issue ownership theory also apply to the corruption issue in Taiwan, with the DPP, and to a lesser extent the NP dominating the issue for the whole decade, individual elections and at the sub-issue level. Despite some attempts by the KMT to tar certain DPP candidates with the corruption brush, the DPP and NP's anti corruption message has stuck in the public imagination, as surveys show Taiwanese voters have clear party images of the KMT as a corrupt party and the two opposition parties as clean.

Electoral factors were most critical in the DPP and NP's decision to focus on corruption attacks. Both parties used the issue from the early 1990s to win elections and expand support levels, but also to create a more level electoral playing field, by removing the KMT's inbuilt advantages such as party assets or vote buying. Although the KMT has grudgingly accepted many anti corruption measures, movement has been more heavily constrained than in any of the three case studies in this dissertation. The key variable for the KMT has been inner party politics, as its reliance on corrupt local factions, vote buying and party assets have prevented it from removing its corrupt image.

Democracy theorists argue that cross cutting issue cleavages are conducive to democratic consolidation.²⁹² This chapter reveals political corruption to be the most cross cutting of the three case studies I examine. For while in both social welfare and national identity the DPP and NP/NMKMT are at opposite ends of the issue spectrums, on the corruption question these bitter adversaries found much common ground in attacking KMT sleaze.

²⁹² Chu and Lin, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 80.

The Taiwan case reveals the potential positive effects of multi-party democracy for tackling political corruption, as opposition parties can challenge and alter accepted but corrupt norms of governance. Although PRC figures regularly condemn the vote buying of Taiwan's elections, the PRC has also suffered from rising corruption in its two decades of market economic reforms, and this was one of the central grievances of the Tiananmen protestors in 1989.²⁹³ However, while Taiwan has had opposition parties since 1986, there has been no legitimate avenue for China's citizens to challenge corruption associated with the CCP. Although democracy is not a panacea for political corruption, the Taiwan case offers support for Michael Johnston's argument that, "high quality, well institutionalized political competition can help reduce levels of corruption."²⁹⁴ Pillars of the KMT party state such as its party assets, vote buying and the corrupt patron client relationship with local factions were until the 1990s either openly or tacitly accepted as legitimate. The DPP has taken a latent political issue, corruption, and progressively broadened the scope of what is publicly acknowledged as corruption. Under the opposition's relentless anti-corruption attacks, the KMT has been forced to change its positions, for instance promising to give up its business empire. By exposing cases of KMT government corruption and establishing new norms of clean governance it is possible that in the long term opposition parties can contribute to the creation of a cleaner political system.

4.1.2 A Framework for Analysing Political Corruption Issues in Taiwan

There is not a consensus on a simple definition of political corruption. Michael Johnston has noted that "corruption involves the abuse of public roles and resources

²⁹³ Hao and Johnston, "China's Surge of Corruption," 80-94.

²⁹⁴ Johnston, "Party Systems, Competition and Political Checks Against Corruption," 2.

for private benefit,”²⁹⁵ while James Scott’s definition is that corruption “involves a deviation (by public officials) from certain standards of behaviour.”²⁹⁶ However, this raises the problem of how these standards are fixed and who fixes them. Moreover, the distinctions between private and public can be blurred, especially in countries undergoing a democratic or market reform transition.²⁹⁷ The commonly employed standards for defining what constitutes political corruption are based on legal standards, public interest, or public opinion. Public interest definitions argue “if an act is harmful to the public interest, it is corrupt even if it is legal,”²⁹⁸ however, the public interest tends to be defined by the incumbent elite. In addition, definitions change over time, as Pujas and Rhodes point out, “An act tolerated during a given period in a particular society may not be in another, since the values of that society will have changed.”²⁹⁹ Even within countries standards differ greatly. As the DPP’s Tian Xin (田欣) commented, “Cracking down on corruption has more appeal in urban areas and not much in rural areas.”³⁰⁰ In short, what actually constitutes corruption is a highly contested concept; standards vary cross nationally, within countries, both across party lines and over time.

Arnold Heidenheimer suggests a useful framework by distinguishing between “black, gray and white corruption.”³⁰¹ “Black corruption” occurs when a “majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and would want to see punished,” while in the case of “gray corruption,” “some elements, usually elites, may want to see the actions punished, others not, and the majority may well be

²⁹⁵ Johnston, “Corruption and Democratic Consolidation,” 5.

²⁹⁶ Scott, *Comparative Corruption*, 3.

²⁹⁷ Hao and Johnston, “China’s Surge of Corruption,” 80-94.

²⁹⁸ Gardiner, “Defining Corruption,” 32.

²⁹⁹ Pujas and Rhodes, “Party Finance and Political Scandal,” 740.

³⁰⁰ Tian Xin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

³⁰¹ Heidenheimer, “Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption,” 161.

ambiguous.” Finally in the case of “white corruption”, “the majority of elite and mass opinion probably would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of corruption that they regard as tolerable.”³⁰² Such a framework corresponds with contemporary Taiwanese corruption terms “Black” (黑金) and “White Gold” (白金), which refer to the “nexus of politics and criminal elements”³⁰³ and “where business interests with deep pockets are able to influence the political process”³⁰⁴ respectively. To circumvent definitional problems I have operationalised a framework that takes into account Taiwan’s fluid and ever expanding definitions of political corruption. This is outlined below in Table 4.1, which places the main sub-issues into either static categories of “White, Grey or Black Corruption,” or those that have over the last decade moved from “White-Grey, White-Grey-Black or Grey to Black Corruption.” I give details of these transitions in section 4.5, however, it should be noted that almost all sub-issues fall into the three transition rather than the static categories. Since survey data on the corruption issue in Taiwan is limited, I take the Taiwan’s leading political parties’ discourse on corruption in 2001 as my standard of which category to place each sub-issue.

I divide the development of the political corruption issue into three periods: a latent phase, a phase of issue development and the issue entrance phase. During the first phase many of the sub-issues that are listed in Table 4.1 already existed but came under the category or “White Corruption,” in that they were accepted components of Taiwan’s social and political system. In the issue development phase politicians initiated the corruption issue, and by campaigning on the issue through a series of elections the issue was placed on the public agenda and the actual parameters of

³⁰² Heidenheimer, “Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption,” 161.

³⁰³ Institute for International Relations, “Symposium Summary.”

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

what constitutes corruption became increasingly broad. Next in the entrance stage the scope of what is viewed as “grey” or “black corruption” continued to expand and the issue moved on to the formal agenda for government or ruling party action.

4.1.3 Chapter Overview

Following this introduction, section 4.2 outlines the early development of the political corruption issue, the latent phase (1947-1991). Section 4.3 covers the broad trends of political corruption emphasis in campaigns over the 1990s. I review newspaper ad, elite survey and mass survey data to show if the issue has been salient and if any party has owned it. Section 4.4 reviews chronologically the issue over the significant national elections in the issue development (1992-1996) and issue entrance phases (1996-2001). In addition, I look at whether issue ownership also applies to individual campaigns, if issue ownership and the main corruption themes changed over the decade. Section 4.5 scrutinizes the issue in more detail by examining the major corruption sub-issues, to see if issue ownership applies at the sub-issue level, and how the parties’ definitions of corruption, actual positions and the sub-issue ownership have altered over the 1990s. Section 4.6 offers some explanations for the parties’ changing attention to political corruption, evaluating the extent that independent variables such as inner party politics, inter party competition, government versus opposition status, institutional factors, and ideology have pushed or constrained party movement. Finally, section 4.7 reviews the main conclusions of the chapter and the significance of political corruption in Taiwanese politics.

4.2 The Latent Phase: 1947-1991.

KMT corruption was a central Taiwanese grievance leading up to the 1947, 228

Incident;³⁰⁵ however, following the KMT's crackdown political dissent was silenced. Throughout the Martial Law era the main demands of the domestic opposition movement were democratisation and ethnic justice, rather than attacking KMT corruption. Almost all the corruption sub-issues listed in Table 4.1 would have come under the category of "White Corruption." This was similar to how Jean Blondel described the informal system that existed in Belgium, Austria and Italy, "patronage had existed for so long and had become so much part of political and social life that it seemed to have been not just accepted, but even viewed as normal."³⁰⁶ Two significant examples of what has retrospectively become defined as KMT corruption were the patron client relationship between the KMT and local factions, and KMT party assets.

When the KMT regime arrived in Taiwan it needed grassroots support for local elections, therefore it established a patron client alliance with the local factions that remained intact and unchallenged until democratisation. Taiwan's foremost scholar on factional politics, Chen Mingtong outlined the main benefits that the local factions received in exchange for political support:³⁰⁷

1. Monopolistic economic activities in local areas with special permits from the government, as in banking, bus companies, credit unions, etc.
2. Special loans and credits with especially favourable terms from state owned commercial banks;
3. Local government public contracts; and
4. Land speculation in connection with urban planning and zoning for construction projects, or tacit permission to operate illegal businesses, such as gambling

³⁰⁵ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*.

³⁰⁶ Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage and Party Decline in Western Europe," 251.

³⁰⁷ Cited in Tien, "Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development," 19.

houses and dance halls.

Whereas in Italy patronage was divided among the leading political parties,³⁰⁸ in Taiwan the beneficiaries were local KMT factions. Under this form of institutionalised corruption the KMT was prepared to tolerate corruption at the local level, while Taiwan's central government and bureaucracy maintained a reputation of being relatively clean. In the words of political scientist Wu Yushan, "During the Martial Law era the cabinet, legislature and upper levels of the government were a self-sustaining privileged class. They were not connected to money or mafia interests. They had no need to deal with local factions. The KMT deal with local factions only existed at the local level."³⁰⁹

During the KMT's five decades in power it took advantage of its dominant position to accumulate a vast real estate and business empire, and set up monopolies for its own companies, making it the fifth biggest business syndicate in Taiwan and richest political party in the world. This meant that unlike its political rivals the KMT has never been short of campaign funds. The existence of the KMT's alliance with local factions and its party assets reflect the weakness of using legal standards to define political corruption in an authoritarian context, as the KMT was able to design the legal framework that legitimised ruling party corruption. Although after leaving the KMT its former chairman Li Denghui stated "Before (democratisation) the KMT was even more dark and corrupt,"³¹⁰ in this period most corruption sub-issues still fell into the category of "white corruption."

³⁰⁸ Della Porta and Vanucci, "Corrupt Exchanges and the Implosion of the Italian Party System," 717-733.

³⁰⁹ Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taipei, October 24, 2001.

³¹⁰ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

Initially the arrival of competitive party politics did not threaten political corruption. According to Christian Gobel, "Democratisation did not eliminate the clientelistic networks, but fostered their growth and diversification."³¹¹ Firstly, as democratic competition became more intense and the KMT became more Taiwanised, the power of corrupt local factions and conglomerates moved up to the national level, leading to increased vote buying, gangster-party links and party-consortium collusion. Ramon Myers summed up this view, stating, "President Chiang had set a tone of severity throughout the government and provincial bureaucracy for not tolerating political corruption. But under various Lee administrations, a laxness in such behaviour became persuasive. The constraints that limited corruption in the past greatly eased."³¹² The fact that both big business and local factions began to gain political influence through the Legislative Yuan is evident from the high proportion of business and factional candidates representing the KMT in elections since 1989.³¹³

The movement of corruption from local to national level politics created a window of opportunity for politicians to manipulate this issue into a critical cleavage. The DPP/Dang Wai did make some anti corruption appeals in the 1980s. For instance, it called for illegal KMT assets to be returned to the state in 1983.³¹⁴ However, it was not yet a central electoral issue. As Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min stated, "concerns about money politics, if any, had little effect on the party preferences in elections in the 1980s, when the main cleavage was the entangled issues of national identity and

³¹¹ Gobel, "Towards a Consolidated Democracy?"

³¹² Myers, Chao and Kuo, "Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China on Taiwan."

³¹³ For details see Shiau, "Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship," 223-4.

³¹⁴ Chen, "The DPP's Party Image," 38.

democratic reform.”³¹⁵ This pattern even extended to the first full national election, for the 1991 National Assembly, in which my analysis of newspaper and TV ads found corruption was only a minor issue.

4.3 Broad Trends in Political Corruption Emphasis 1991-2000.

This section covers the broad trends of political corruption emphasis in campaigns over the 1990s. I examine whether political corruption has been salient, if it is an owned issue, and if the parties are converging or diverging on the issue.

Furthermore, party image surveys are examined to reveal if the public sees corruption as an owned issue.

4.3.1 How Salient is Political Corruption in Taiwan?

Table 2.2 shows three indicators of top ten salience, these are my official newspaper ads issue top ten, Liu Tsung-wei's top ten issues for Legislative Yuan candidate' policy proposals from election gazettes, and my elite survey. All three show political corruption is one of the most salient political issues in Taiwan. Firstly, political corruption came first in the combined issue top ten for official newspaper ads, with an average issue mention of 13.2%. The issue is less salient in Liu's study coming eighth in the top ten issues for 1989-1998. However, my elite survey found politicians ranked money politics the second most influential issue of the decade (1991-2001).

4.3.2 Is Political Corruption an Owned Issue?

The next question is whether political corruption is an owned issue. Multiple data sources show a clear pattern of the issue being owned by the DPP and NP. Firstly,

³¹⁵ Chu and Lin, "Elections and Elite Convergence," 21.

Table 2.3 shows the top ten issues in official newspaper ads over the 1991-2000 period. For the whole decade political corruption came first in the DPP's issue top ten, averaging 23.9% of issue mentions, compared to first for the NP with 12.3% and only ninth for the KMT with 3.5%. A similar pattern of issue ownership is found in Table 2.4, which shows the top ten issues in terms of the frequency of an issue appearing in a party's annual official ads top ten. Political corruption featured in the DPP's top ten in each election except 1997 and 1996, coming first in five elections (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 2000), compared to four times in the NP's top ten, coming first once (1995). However, political corruption never even reached the KMT's top five in a single election. These results are similar to Liu Tsung-wei's election gazette survey, which found political corruption was the second most stressed issue for both the NP and the DPP; however, it did not feature at all in the KMT's top ten.³¹⁶

In Table 2.2 I showed that politicians see political corruption as a highly influential issue. Next I tested whether politicians see the issue as owned by asking "What issues have you and your party stressed most over the last ten years?" The results are shown on Table 2.6. There is a significant difference between the parties, with political corruption seen as the second most stressed issue for the DPP and NP, but absent from the KMT's top five stressed issues. In short, though politicians of all parties view the issue as being important, it is seen as being owned by the NP and DPP. Indeed one former DPP legislator even claimed, "The NP focused on political corruption as much as we stressed democratisation."³¹⁷

³¹⁶ Liu, "The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan," Table 8.9.

³¹⁷ Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taipei, November 9, 2001.

The next question is have the parties been converging or diverging on this issue.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 plot the parties' relative issue emphasis on political corruption for total and official newspaper ads between 1991 and 2000. A similar pattern is shown, with the issue dominated by the DPP, and to a lesser extent the NP.

Ownership is especially strong in official ads. Other than 1996 when the main parties largely ignored the issue, there is only one case of the KMT leapfrogging the DPP, in 1997.³¹⁸ Both figures also show that apart from the national identity campaigns of 1991 and 1996, political corruption has been heavily stressed in every election.

The pattern of issue ownership in Taiwan closely resembles that in Japan, with political corruption dominated by the two main opposition parties, the JSP and Komeito. From Figure 4.3, which compares the main Japanese parties using MRG data, we can see that between 1967 and 1996 there were only two cases of the LDP leapfrogging the JSP on the issue.

4.3.3 Public Opinion and Political Corruption

In this section I examine survey data to test whether Taiwan's voters see the parties as holding distinct and consistent positions on the political corruption issue. A series of surveys reveals an even clearer pattern of issue ownership than on social welfare, with the KMT increasingly seen as a corrupt party, the DPP seen as a party that attacks corruption, but is not totally clean, and the NP as a party that attacks corruption and is clean.

Firstly, Table 4.2 displays a series of Lianhebao surveys. These show the percentage

³¹⁸ This anomaly is explained in section 4.5.2.

of respondents seeing the KMT as clean dropped from 37% in 1992 to 25% in 1996, against a corresponding rise for the DPP from 26% to 41%. The percentage of respondents seeing the KMT as corrupt rose from 28% in 1992 to 45% in 1996, against a corresponding fall for the DPP from 29% to 22%.³¹⁹ ESC surveys asking voters for their first impressions of political parties also showed that while in the early 1990s none of the parties were primarily associated with corruption, by the mid 1990s the corrupt image of the KMT had sunk into the public imagination.³²⁰ For example, in 1995 6.8% saw the KMT as corrupt and 4.1% saw the KMT as having gangster links as their first impressions. While in 1998 5.3% saw the KMT as corrupt, 3% saw it as having gangster links and 8% said the KMT had links to money politics as their first impression of the party. In contrast, the numbers citing the DPP and NP as corrupt were negligible in both 1995 and 1998. The DPP Survey Research Department carried out the final revealing survey in the late 1990s; the results are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.³²¹ In response to the question why do you dislike the KMT, by far the most common reply in all three surveys was because the KMT was corrupt. In contrast, to the question of why do you like a party, the fact that the DPP was clean came second and that the NP was clean came first in all three surveys respectively.

The surveys cited above give an unambiguous picture of how the parties were viewed. Clearly the public does see the main parties as distinguishable on the issue. Increasingly the KMT is seen as by far the most corrupt, the DPP as relatively clean, and the NP as the cleanest. It can be concluded that although on occasions the KMT tried to paint the DPP as being corrupt, the DPP has retained its clean image. In

³¹⁹ Schafferer, "The 1997 City mayor and County Magistrate Elections in Taiwan," 26-27.

³²⁰ ESC Dataset, supplied by Liu Yizhou.

³²¹ DPP Survey Research Department, "11th National Opinion Survey: Party Image," 4-5.

contrast the DPP and NP attacks on KMT corruption have stuck in the public's party image.

In short, this section has shown how since 1992 political corruption has been one of, if not the most salient issue in Taiwan, and a variety of datasets reveal the DPP and the NP have owned the issue.

4.4 The Electoral Politics of Political Corruption

4.4.1 Issue Development Phase: 1992-1996

In the issue development phase the DPP and the NP initiated a latent issue, made specific anti corruption demands and expanded the issue firmly on to the public agenda in repeated election campaigns. Although my content analysis does not go back into the 1980s, the degree the issue agenda differed from the 1990s can also be seen from Liu Tsung-wei's finding that though political corruption was a top ten issue for the DPP in all three legislative elections in the 1990s, it was absent in 1989.³²² During this issue development period the scope of what was commonly viewed as corruption broadened considerably, as sub-issues began to make the transition from "white" to "grey" or "black corruption."

1992 Legislative Yuan Election

1992 was a turning point for the political corruption issue, with the issue high on the agenda throughout the campaign. The KMT came under strong attack from both the DPP and KMT dissidents for its vote buying and golden ox candidates. In contrast to the DPP's Taiwan independence orientated campaign in 1991, political corruption was its central issue for the first time. Its election slogan was "Anti Money Politics,

³²² Liu, "The Transition of the Democratic Progressive Party," Table 8.

Anti Special Privileges, Anti Military Power, Want Tax Cuts, Want Direct Election and Want Sovereignty.” (反金權, 反特權, 反軍權, 要減稅, 要直選, 要主權)³²³

Former DPP Propaganda Chief Chen Fangming summed up the strategy that the DPP began that year and followed throughout the 1990s, “In defence you can say that you are a very clean party and in offence we can single out the KMT as a corrupt party.”³²⁴ Figures 4.1 and 4.2 testify how the DPP had taken a clear lead over the KMT on political corruption, which it has maintained since. In addition, 1992 represents the peak of DPP TV ads attacking political corruption. The slogan of the TV ad “He (KMT) does, I (DPP) don’t B” (他會我不會 B) encapsulated the DPP’s message on the issue, “Land speculation, he does, I don’t, golden ox candidates, he does, I don’t, making the national treasury the party treasury, he wants to, I oppose it, corruption, he does it, I expose it.” (炒地皮, 他做我不做, 金牛候選人, 他做我不做, 國庫通黨庫, 他要我反對, 貪污, 他做我揭發.) In response the KMT was at a loss over how to deal with these accusations, thus it tried to avoid the issue. After the election it was felt that the issue had been very effective, as Chen Shouguo (陳守國) of the China Times claimed, “This election can be viewed as a battle between vote buying and anti vote buying, money politics and anti-money politics, the results show that the power of anti money politics was victorious.”³²⁵

1993-4 Executive Election

Two significant events prior to the 1993 elections reflect the high salience, divisive and cross cutting nature of the corruption issue. Firstly, despite KMT opposition, the DPP allied with the NMKMT to pass the Mandatory Disclosure and Mandatory

³²³ *Ziyou Shibao*, November 20, 1992, 20.

³²⁴ Chen Fangming, interview by author, November 2, 2001.

³²⁵ *China Times*, December 20, 1992, 2.

Trust Clauses to the Financial Disclosure Law of Government Officials. This landmark anti corruption legislation forced senior government officials to disclose all their assets and place them in a trust.³²⁶ Secondly, in August 1993 the NP was formed from members of the New KMT Alliance. According to the then KMT Secretary General Xu Shuide, the main factor inducing them to leave the KMT was "its inability to stop relying on factions and corruption."³²⁷ Whilst in the KMT they had already been very critical of their party's corruption problems and after 1993 the NP made clean government one of its central issues until 1998.

In 1993 and 1994 the DPP once again focused on KMT corruption, however, the scope of DPP attacks widened. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the gulf between the KMT and DPP on the issue widened considerably in both total and official ads. In both years political corruption came first in the DPP's official newspaper ads top ten issues, including its peak emphasis of political corruption for the whole decade in 1993 of 70.8% of issue mentions.³²⁸ The slightly higher KMT emphasis on political corruption in total ads shown in Figure 4.1 is because while official KMT ads ignored the issue, some KMT candidates made corruption accusations against incumbent DPP ME. Another new trend was the arrival of the NP as a realistic contender in elections, and it is noteworthy that political corruption came third in their official ads issue top ten in 1994.³²⁹

The main themes in DPP newspaper ads were much broader than 1992. On top of attacks on KMT money politics, and vote buying, the DPP condemned corruption of

³²⁶ Lin, "Paths to Democracy," 443-444.

³²⁷ Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

³²⁸ See Table 2.8.

³²⁹ See Table 2.9.

KMT ME and high level KMT officials, argued that by stopping corruption more social welfare could be provided, attacked the corruption associated with large scale central government projects, such as the Taipei metro, claimed that behind Li Denghui was a corrupt KMT and even offered concrete solutions to tackling corruption. Moreover, the DPP linked corruption to stability, challenging the KMT argument that only the KMT could guarantee stability. For example, one DPP ad asked, "What kind of stability has the KMT given the Taiwanese? It is a corrupted stability, a stability of government business collusion and dividing up the spoils." (國民黨給全台灣人的是什麼樣的安定! 是貪污腐化的安定, 是官商勾結, 坐地分賤的安定)³³⁰

1995 Legislative Yuan Election

Although the missile crisis made headlines in 1995, domestic issues such as political corruption were also salient. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the two opposition parties again dominating the corruption issue. The DPP's 1995 slogan was "Give Taiwan a chance," and in a number of ads this was altered to "Give Taiwan the chance of a clean government." (請給台灣一個清廉政治的機會).³³¹ The DPP slightly altered its political corruption style focusing on two major aspects: KMT party assets and gangster links. The NP gave its greatest emphasis to date on corruption, including it in its election slogan of "Chose the NP, No War, No Tax Rises, Catch Corruption and a Five Day Week." (選新黨, 不打仗, 不加稅, 抓貪汙, 週休二日)³³² Other than linking their traditional enemy Li Denghui to corruption, the NP also adopted fresh anti corruption themes, such as the claim a hung parliament could help root out corruption and attacking the way the KMT tried to sneak in big business and

³³⁰ *Lianhebao*, November 18, 1994, 48.

³³¹ *Ziyoushibao*, December 1, 1995, 1.

³³² *Lianhebao*, November 11, 1995, 38.

factional legislators on its proportional representation (PR) list. The KMT's response to the concerted DPP and NP attacks was weak, avoiding the issue in its propaganda.

4.4.2 Issue Entrance Phase: 1996-Present

The opposition's anti corruption campaigns were so effective that by the mid 1990s the concept of political corruption became closely connected in the public imagination to the KMT. During the issue entrance stage by creating a new set of norms on aspects of the corruption issue, the opposition continued to expand the parameters of corruption, as more sub-issues became viewed as either "grey" or "black corruption." The issue moved from the public to the formal government agenda as the KMT was forced to respond, first half-heartedly but later more radically on issues such as party assets, nominating "black gold" candidates and vote buying. I date this third phase from 1996 as at the National Development Conference (NDC) for the first time the KMT agreed to reform its party assets and abolish the corrupt village and township head elections.

Taiwan's village and township head elections reforms reveal the constraints the KMT faces when trying to tackle its corrupt image. These elections have the reputation for having the worst level of corruption. To resolve this problem the KMT and DPP agreed at the 1996 NDC to scrap these elections and in the future to make the positions nominated by the ME. This created an outcry among KMT politicians that have long dominated these elections. And following the KMT's disastrous performance in the 1997 ME elections and the rise of Lian Zhan to party chair, the KMT could no longer risk alienating its rural grassroots supporters. Thus it has disavowed its former promise, and since 2000 has attempted to block DPP

legislation to abolish these grassroots elections.

1997 Municipal Executive Elections

After the national identity orientated 1996 presidential campaign, the DPP returned to the political corruption question in 1997, with the election slogan of “Stability, Clean Government, New Government” (平安, 清廉, 新政府). The DPP’s core theme was similar to 1995, focusing on attacking the KMT’s record of gangster politics, while the KMT’s style was closer to previous ME contests as it attempted to tar the DPP with the corruption brush. In fact, it appears from the newspaper ad data that the KMT has stolen the issue. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that for the first time the KMT actually leapfrogged the DPP. KMT stress on the issue was the highest for the decade in official ads, with 9.8% of issue mentions.³³³ Political corruption did not feature at all in official DPP newspaper ads. In 1997 there were only two official DPP newspaper ads, which focused on women’s safety and rising crime levels. Instead for the first time the DPP placed greater emphasis on TV ads, in which political corruption was heavily stressed. The former Vice Chief of the DPP’s Propaganda Department Yu Meimei (余莓莓) stated that the objectives of these TV ads were to, “to cement images... that the KMT has political corruption and is tied up with corrupt local factions, while in contrast the DPP has a clean image.”³³⁴ The effectiveness of the DPP anti-corruption message was recalled by a former KMT Propaganda Chief, “Then (1997) the political corruption question was always on the agenda. The KMT was struggling to defend itself, so that year we suffered blow after blow.”³³⁵

³³³ See Table 2.7.

³³⁴ Yu Meimei, interview by author, Taipei, September 27, 2001.

³³⁵ Former KMT Party Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

1998 Legislative Yuan and Mayoral Elections

In 1998 the media focused on the Taipei mayoral contest, largely ignoring the legislative election. Thus though corruption attacks were at the core of DPP and NP ads, with the KMT represented by Ma Yingjiu (馬英九), the former Minister for Justice, with his reputation for cracking down on vote buying, it was harder for corruption charges to have an impact. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the DPP did overtake the KMT on the issue, however the highest scores were for the NP with a record level of 30.5% of issue mentions in official ads.³³⁶ The DPP and NP themes were reminiscent of 1995. The DPP called on voters to “concentrate votes on the holy war of green versus black gold.” (集中選票打一場綠色 VS 黑金的聖戰)³³⁷ While the NP attacked the KMT’s nomination of corrupt candidates on its PR list, stock market manipulation, and the link between corruption and their sworn enemy Li Denghui.

2000 Presidential Elections

Political corruption again received heavy media and advertising attention in 2000. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the DPP retained its dominance of the issue, as political corruption came top of its official newspaper ad top ten.³³⁸ The KMT did show more concern with corruption, as it came sixth in its top ten for official newspaper ads.³³⁹ However, this is largely due to ads attacking Song Chuyu for his role in the Xingpiao (興票) embezzlement case.

A quote from Chen Shuibian in the third TV debate exemplified the way the DPP

³³⁶ See Table 2.9.

³³⁷ *Lianhebao*, December 4, 1998, 32.

³³⁸ See Table 2.8.

³³⁹ See Table 2.7.

was able to use the issue to attack both its main opponents; “The former head of the Control Yuan Chen Lu an (陳履安) said that ‘the KMT is really rotten.’ The KMT was rotten on the mainland and it has become even more rotten in Taiwan, whose responsibility is it? Actually in this election the KMT has two candidates, both formally held high positions in the KMT, with great power, are they not responsible?”³⁴⁰ As in previous years the DPP attacked the KMT’s party assets, vote buying and “black gold” record, what was new was the way the DPP emphasized the close intimacy between its main rivals, Lian and Song with infamous “black gold” politicians and the message that only a change of ruling party could root out “black gold.” In Taiwan’s political circles many believe the DPP’s “black gold” attacks were critical to Chen’s victory. For instance, the KMT’s Zhu Xiaoci (朱孝慈) claimed, “That year the DPP’s appeal caught the public mood. People wanted to see a party turnover and political corruption swept away.”³⁴¹

2001 Legislative Yuan and Municipal Executive Elections

The first post turnover election showed signs of change and continuity. Earlier in the year the DPP came under attack for vote buying during its party primaries and also was accused of “Greenification” (綠化) of the state sector, when it gave jobs to its party members.³⁴² The DPP came to power on an anti corruption election appeal, and though corruption allegations are still made against the new ruling party, their scale and frequency is markedly less than under the KMT. Since 2000 the DPP has moved to tackle the areas of corruption that had formally given the KMT an electoral advantage, most noteworthy were reorganizing local financial institutions, and attempts to pass legislation to end KMT party assets and basic level elections.

³⁴⁰ *China Times*, March 12, 2000, 2-3.

³⁴¹ Zhu Xiaoci, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001

³⁴² See www.libertytimes.com.tw/2001/new/mar/11/today-p10.htm

Moreover, the initial post turnover elections show the DPP still sees profit to be made from the issue. For instance, on the eve of the 2001 election the DPP government has carried out highly publicized anti vote buying measures and the prosecuted an infamous KMT linked gangster politician.

This section has shown that the political corruption issue hit the political agenda in 1992 and has remained there since. The opposition parties initiated the political corruption issue and through election campaigns the parameters of what constitutes corruption have been expanded. Since 1996 the issue has reached the government agenda and serious legislation to tackle corruption has begun to appear. The political corruption issue has been owned by the DPP and NP in campaign advertising for almost every campaign, and this applies to total and official newspaper ads and there has been almost no leapfrogging between the DPP and KMT.

4.5 Political Corruption Sub-issues

In this section I review the development of the main political corruption sub-issues in election campaigns over the last decade. The questions to be answered are does issue ownership apply to sub-issues, and has this ownership altered over the decade. In addition, I examine how the parties' definitions of corruption, actual positions and the sub-issues they stress have altered over the 1990s. As in Table 4.1 I divided the sub-issues into the static category of "white corruption" and those that have made the transition to "black" or "grey corruption."

4.5.1 "White Corruption"

Election Banquets (選舉飯):

Election Banquets are the only sub-issue listed in Table 4.1 that remains in the

category of “white corruption.” While bribing voters with food and drink is a symbol of early 19th century electoral fraud in Britain, the question of election banquets has rarely been an election issue used to attack the KMT in Taiwan. Election banquets have long been the source of free meals close to voting day; candidates often compete to see who can hold the banquet with the most tables of voters. However, even on this sub-issue attitudes are changing, at least in urban areas election banquets are verging on becoming “grey corruption.” Increasingly in urban districts TV orientated rallies and fundraising events are replacing election banquets. For instance the former DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong (黃煌雄) boasted how he had filled 1,000 tables at such a fundraising banquet in 1995.³⁴³

4.5.2 “White-Grey Corruption”

4.5.2a) Business Influence over the Political Process/White Gold (白金)

As democratisation took place and the costs of election campaigning rocketed, the influence of big business on government policy and in the elected assemblies has grown rapidly. The influence of conglomerates over the policy process has become known as “White Gold.”

The scale of business influence is apparent from a report that between 1998 and 2001 41% of legislators had big business backgrounds, with construction or banking industry linked politicians most common.³⁴⁴ The popular term for such politicians is “golden ox,” which came into fashion in 1992 and has remained almost exclusively associated with the KMT. It was defined by Julian Baum as “privileged office seekers who have unlimited funds to spend on expensive advertising, lavish

³⁴³ Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taipei, November 9, 2001.

³⁴⁴ Gobel, “Towards a Consolidated Democracy?” 11.

banquets, fireworks displays and other campaign gimmicks.”³⁴⁵ The 1992 “Golden Ox TV Ad” (金牛篇) initiated the DPP’s campaign against these politicians, showing the faces of leading KMT figures such as Song Chuyu, coming up on a golden ox fruit machine. In place of the KMT’s 1992 slogan of “Reform and more reform, confidence in prosperity,” (革新再革新, 繁榮有信心) the ad ended with the rhyming slogan, “Reform and more reform, confidence in golden oxen prosperity.”(革新再革新金牛繁榮有信心) The issue was not exclusive to the DPP, as in 1992 former KMT cabinet ministers Wang Jianxuan (王建宣) and Zhao Shaokang openly criticized their party’s nomination of “golden oxen.”³⁴⁶ Although there is nothing illegal in wealthy businessmen standing for election, the KMT has become embarrassed to nominate “golden oxen” in high profile contests. The term golden ox was completely dominated by the two opposition parties and though it became less fashionable in late 1990s, it reappeared again in 2000 as the DPP denounced the KMT’s Lian Zhan as a “golden ox.”³⁴⁷

From 1995 and 1998 both the NP and DPP expanded this attack to include both consortium and local faction backed candidates. For example, in 1995 a NP ad asked, “Who let the consortiums, factions and yes men into the Legislative Yuan?” (是誰把財團派系馬屁精送進立法院?) The ad notes that voting for KMT candidates with good images helps elect consortium or factional candidates on their PR list.³⁴⁸ Similarly the DPP’s 1995 Black Gold 2 TV ad (黑金篇 2) cited statistics showing 67.77% of KMT nominated candidates had gangster, factional or consortium backgrounds. Once again attacks on both factional and consortium

³⁴⁵ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 December, 1992, 15.

³⁴⁶ *China Times*, December 12, 1992, 10.

³⁴⁷ *China Times*, March 8, 2000, 2.

³⁴⁸ *Lianhebao*, November 25, 1995, 41.

backed candidates have been dominated by the opposition parties, though perhaps due to the fact the DPP has its own party factions and growing links with certain consortiums, it has been less vocal on the sub-issue than the NP. In contrast, the KMT has been largely silent and has not attempted to publicly deny or justify its high nomination rate for such candidates.

4.5.2b) Li Denghui and Corruption

Although the NP and DPP joined together to attack KMT corruption, the way the two opposition parties dealt with the Li Denghui link to corruption has been very different. Politicians from the NP and NMKMT often blame Li Denghui for Taiwan's rising corruption problems. A comment by the KMT's Wu Dunyi reflects the depth of feeling against Li in some quarters, "Of all the political figures I've met, he's the most fascist, the most corrupt, the lowest character, and uses the most sinister methods."³⁴⁹ In repeated campaigns NP propaganda used the corruption issue to attack Li Denghui. For instance, in 1995 a NP ad had the slogan "What does Li Denghui have to fear from a hung parliament?" (三黨不過半李登輝怕什麼?!) The ad promised that if there were a hung parliament the way the land specification for Li's mountain villa was altered would be investigated.³⁵⁰ A number of NP ads linked Li Denghui to the former South Korean president Rho Taewoo, who had been imprisoned for corruption. One such 1995 NP ad demanding the authorities "Catch Taiwan's Rho Taewoo!" (抓台灣的盧泰愚)³⁵¹ This line of NP attacks was continued in 1998. For example, an ad claimed that under Li Taiwan has become an "island of greed and an island of gambling" (貪婪之島, 賭博之島).³⁵²

³⁴⁹ Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.

³⁵⁰ *Lianhebao*, November 30, 1995, 20.

³⁵¹ *China Times*, November 29, 1995, 5.

³⁵² *Lianhebao*, November 30, 1998, 17.

In contrast the DPP attempted to distinguish between Li and the corrupt KMT. For example, in 1993 a DPP ad showed the picture of a spider on the KMT badge made up of the character “貪” (corruption) and the slogan, “Behind Li Denghui is a corrupt party.” (李登輝的背後是個貪污黨).³⁵³ Similarly in 1994 a Chen Dingnan ad claimed “Li Denghui knows that the KMT is completely corrupt and he must rely on the opposition to hit corruption, that is why since becoming president Li Denghui has asked Chen Dingnan to join the cabinet twice, as he has the best record of tackling corruption in the country.” (李登輝深知國民黨從頭到尾的腐敗,肅貪的改革非借用黨外的力量不可,這是李登輝出任總統以來,連續兩次邀請陳定南入閣的原因,何況遍觀國內政壇,也只有陳定南具有肅貪的輝煌經驗).³⁵⁴

4.5.2c) Xingpiao Case(興票案):

The Xingpiao scandal was one of the most fascinating episodes in Taiwan’s electoral history, with the KMT making serious corruption allegations about Song Chuyu’s behaviour while he had been a high level party leader. This was the only occasion of a corruption sub-issue being initiated by the KMT and largely accounts for the KMT’s uncharacteristically high corruption emphasis in 2000. The scandal first emerged in December 1999 when a KMT legislator revealed the existence of mysterious deposit accounts that had been managed by Song’s sister in law. These accounts had been KMT funds when Song was KMT Secretary General in the early 1990s. As more revelations were made and the amounts cited increased, Song changed his explanations on a number of occasions, claiming first that the money was used to look after the Chiang family, and later to help a variety of politicians’

³⁵³ *Lianhebao*, November 22, 1993, 13.

³⁵⁴ *Lianhebao*, November 24, 1994, 12.

campaigns, including DPP candidates.

In February 2000 with Lian Zhan still behind in the polls, the KMT continued to use the Xingpiao case to attack Song. This reached a climax when the party funded two anonymous two full-page ads.³⁵⁵ The most controversial ad claimed Song's press conference explanations deserved an acting award and had the headline: "Money, Lies, Xingpiao case. The Oscar Golden Song award has been announced.

Congratulations! After costing one billion dollars and taking nine years filming, there are ten major awards for the Xingpiao case." (錢,謊言,興票案! 奧斯卡金宋獎提前出爐! 狂賀耗資 10 億拍攝時間長達 9 年. 興票疑雲包括十項大獎). The ad showed a cartoon of Song receiving an acting award and photos of Song at press conferences giving contradictory explanations. It also listed the awards in the style of the Oscars, with best film going to "Money, Lies and Xingpiao case" and best actor to Song Chuyu!³⁵⁶ Voters were also warned that this is an X Rated film! (限制級). This ad clearly struck a raw nerve as Song asked his lawyer to sue the KMT's Lian Zhan for breaking the election law and slander due to an ad titled "The Oscar Golden Song Awards"(奧斯卡金宋獎).³⁵⁷

Prior to December 1999 Song Chuyu had maintained a relatively clean image and was in all but name the NP's presidential candidate. However, the Xingpiao revelations damaged Song's support rates and meant he was unable to continue the NP's legacy of political corruption attacks. By the end of the campaign he was the candidate most associated with the phrase to "Aqian" (A 錢 meaning to embezzle

³⁵⁵ It is ironic that in 1994 Song Chuyu funded many anonymous ads to attack his DPP rival Chen Dingnan for corruption but in 2000 he himself became the victim of this practice.

³⁵⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, February 3, 2000, 16.

³⁵⁷ *China Times*, February 19, 2000, 4.

money) and of the three main candidates said the least on the issue. However, it was no coincidence that once Li Denghui left the KMT, the party quietly dropped all charges against Song in an effort to create the environment for a "Pan-Blue Alliance." This KMT corruption sub-issue was formally ended when in March 2003 Lian Zhan announced that, "As far as the KMT is concerned, the Xingpiao case is over."³⁵⁸

4.5.3 "White-Grey-Black Corruption"

4.5.3a) Vote Buying:

Although vote-buying allegations are made in all Taiwanese elections, it is very difficult to get firm data on the effectiveness of vote buying. There is a perception that it is less effective than before. As former KMT Secretary General Xu Shuide commented, "Before vote buying worked. Scarves or other things. Now hundreds of dollars, people don't care."³⁵⁹ Case studies conducted in the 1990s have shown mixed results with vote buying efficiency ranging from 30% in Chu Yun-han's study³⁶⁰ to 66.6% in Wang Jinshou's (王金壽) research.³⁶¹ In addition, most agree there is a major difference in perceptions of vote buying in rural and urban areas.

Vote buying only became a central election issue in the early 1990s. The regular pattern has been that the DPP uses vote buying accusation to discredit the KMT, while the KMT is either silent on the issue or denies it buys votes. For instance, at a 1992 press conference the DPP announced the KMT's market rates for buying votes

³⁵⁸ <http://news.yam.com/cna/politics/news/200303/200303060123.html>

³⁵⁹ Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001

³⁶⁰ Cited in Wang, "The Making and Operation of a Kuomintang Candidate's Vote Buying Machine," 32.

³⁶¹ Ibid, 32.

in the various constituencies³⁶² and altered its three antis slogan to “Anti Vote Buying, Anti Vote rigging, Anti Vote Spoiling.”³⁶³ (反買票,反做票,反廢票) Likewise, a DPP newspaper ad quoted KMT’s Guo Jinsheng (郭金生) as saying, “KMT candidates will buy votes. If the KMT does not buy votes, the turnout will not be so high.”(國民黨候選人是會買票,如果國民黨不買票,投票率就不會那麼高).³⁶⁴

In the subsequent elections the DPP continued to reinforce the image of KMT vote buying. For example, a 1993 DPP ad, which was repeated on the front page of the *Lianhebao* for seven days, consisted of just one slogan, “The KMT has a past record of vote buying and vote rigging. Yesterday it was crooked, today it is vote buying and in the future it will be corrupt.”(國民黨前科,買票做票,昨天他會歪哥,今天他就會買票,現在他會賄選,以後他會貪污)³⁶⁵ In 1994 the most controversial anti vote buying DPP ad had the slogan “A pig’s heart 500 dollars, how much for a human heart?” (一個豬心五百元,一顆人心值多少?) According to the ad, “The DPP campaigns 365 days a year, but the KMT only campaigns for two weeks. Fourteen days before the vote the KMT begins to madly buy votes everywhere.”(民進黨一年 365 天都在競選,而國民黨每年確只競選兩個禮拜,在投票前的 14 天,國民黨像瘋狂的散播童子,開始到處送錢買票)³⁶⁶ Similarly a full-page Chen Dingnan ad outlined the KMT’s long history of vote buying in Taiwan, and called on voters to “reject the KMT that has used money to enslave to Taiwanese people.”(唾棄這個用金錢來奴化全台灣人民的國民黨!)³⁶⁷ In response to such

³⁶² *China Times*, December 13, 1992, 3.

³⁶³ *China Times*, December 16, 1992, 4.

³⁶⁴ *Ziyoushibao*, December 18, 1992, 28.

³⁶⁵ *Lianhebao*, November 21-26, 1993, 1.

³⁶⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, November 28, 1994, 1.

³⁶⁷ *China Times*, November 28, 1994, 12.

ads KMT Propaganda Chief Jian Hansheng (簡漢生) took the often-repeated line of denying KMT vote buying and accusing the DPP of using such attacks as a smokescreen to buy votes itself.³⁶⁸

In 1995 the NP joined the DPP in its vote buying attacks, though the style of their ads differed greatly. At the time the KMT Minister for Justice Ma Yingjiu had grown in popularity with pledges to “kick vote buying out of Taiwan.”³⁶⁹ However, with the vast majority of those indicted from the KMT and high-level resistance within his party, Ma’s efforts only further discredited the KMT. The NP attempted to link themselves in voters’ minds with Ma’s anti corruption efforts with the ad slogan, “Many thanks, the NP sends its best wishes to Ma Yingjiu” (銘謝啓事, 新黨向馬英九致意), in which the NP thanked Ma for cracking down on vote buying.³⁷⁰ In contrast the DPP poked fun at the KMT with the slogan “Raise your hand if you believe the KMT will deal with vote buying” (相信國民黨會處理賄選的請舉手!), noting that nearly all vote buying cases involve KMT candidates.³⁷¹

In the elections of 1996-1998 there were less references to vote buying, as the image of KMT vote buying had been fixed in the public imagination. However, in 1998 the DPP “Aqiao and Apao Black Gold TV ad” (阿炮阿嬌, 黑金篇) continued the tradition of satirizing KMT vote buying. The two comedy characters do a mock interview with a gangster KMT legislator, who is very sensitive to questions related to corruption and vote buying. The presidential election of 2000 again allowed the DPP to use the vote-buying question to attack the KMT. At a rally in Penghu Chen

³⁶⁸ *China Times*, November 29, 1994, 5.

³⁶⁹ *China Times*, November 22, 1995, 4.

³⁷⁰ *China Times*, November 30, 1995, 5.

³⁷¹ *Ziyoushibao*, December 1, 1995, 1.

Shuibian told his audience that “It’s close to the voting day and the KMT has already begun its money attacks, trying to exchange cash for votes. Take the money but vote as you wished. For the dignity of the Taiwanese people vote Chen Shuibian, otherwise if an embezzler (A 錢) or golden ox became president it would be an international joke.”³⁷² In the past it was normal practice for the KMT to mobilize civil servants to attend KMT rallies, offering the incentives of “travel expenses” (車馬費). However, by 2000 the climate had changed. The KMT was discredited by allegations of pressurizing and paying civil servants to join KMT rallies.³⁷³ In the first post turnover election of 2001 the DPP continued to see profit to be gained from the vote buying issue. DPP legislator Tang Jinquan (湯金全) reflected this sentiment when he stated, “We can use our position as the ruling party to hit at political corruption. So we hope that Chen Dingnan can make a contribution to catching vote buying.”³⁷⁴

After ten years of DPP anti-vote buying attacks, the sub-issue is still exclusively associated with the KMT. As the DPP’s Chen Zhongxin noted, “It is possible that some people in the KMT don’t buy votes, but if you say the KMT doesn’t buy votes few will believe you. The common image is that the KMT buys votes.”³⁷⁵ Moreover, DPP attacks have also widened the scope of what is seen as vote buying, reduced the efficiency of vote buying and contributed to making this formally tolerated practice into “black corruption.”

4.5.3b) Municipal Executive (ME) Corruption

³⁷² *China Times*, March 8, 2000, 2.

³⁷³ *China Times*, March 11, 2000, 3.

³⁷⁴ Tang Jinquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 24, 2001.

³⁷⁵ Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

Local executives with their considerable power over issuing construction contracts and various business licenses were long a key player in the KMT-local faction patron client relationship, therefore allegations of ME corruption has been the mainstay of Taiwanese local election campaigns. In addition to accusing their opponents of corruption, candidates also often explain their experience or plans for rooting out corruption. However, since the DPP has held ME positions since the 1980s it also has had to face corruption allegations. As a result ME corruption has been the most contested of the sub-issues in this chapter.

In the first ME elections of the decade in 1993 the DPP placed a number of ads accusing the KMT of involvement in land speculation. For instance, a DPP newspaper ad showed the picture of a monopoly board and the slogan, "The DPP loves Taiwan, while the KMT loves land speculation." (民進黨愛台灣, 國民黨愛炒地皮) This ad had a table comparing the anti corruption work of DPP ME with the KMT ME record of land speculation.³⁷⁶ In response, the KMT Propaganda Chief Zhu Jiying (祝基鏗) claimed that the DPP was trying to slander the ruling party and government in order to divert attention from its own poor image, citing the example of a DPP ME under suspicion of land speculation.³⁷⁷ While the KMT was silent on corruption in its official ads, it went on the offensive against DPP incumbent ME. For example, a KMT ad asked how DPP Taipei County ME You Qing (尤清) has become the richest ME in Taiwan and also claimed to expose a case of You Qing's assistant using the anti nuclear movement for land speculation.³⁷⁸ However, You Qing responded with an ad outlining KMT Cai Shengbang's (蔡勝邦) long relationship with the San Chong Gang (三重幫), with a picture of Cai as a puppet,

³⁷⁶ *China Times*, November 23, 1993, 13.

³⁷⁷ *China Times*, November 5, 1993, 2.

³⁷⁸ *Ziyoushibao*, November 24, 1993, 16.

holding a bottle of Sanchong brand milk and having his strings pulled by a salivating gangster.³⁷⁹

In 1994 the KMT made corruption its central means of attacking a DPP candidate for the first and only time in the 1990s. KMT Provincial Governor Song Chuyu regularly accused the DPP's Chen Dingnan of hiring drug dealers and land speculators as campaigners.³⁸⁰ Song put out a series of ads attacking Chen for corruption during his two terms as Yilan County (宜蘭縣) ME. For example, one Song ad described Chen is described as being "number one at land speculation" (炒地他第一) and depicted him in a judge's clothes with the character "炒" (speculation) on his gown, an image repeated in numerous Song ads throughout the campaign.³⁸¹ Other ads give details of four serious corruption cases allegedly occurring while Chen was ME; the slogan here is "Cultivating Corruption Expert Series." (養貪高手系列)³⁸²

The KMT's 1994 accusations of corruption meant that apart from attacking the KMT the DPP had to defend itself. For example, Chen Dingnan accused Song of breaking the election law in his land speculation accusations.³⁸³ Moreover DPP ads reminded voters of the KMT's past false accusations. One such ad outlined how in the previous year ten days before the Pingdong (屏東) ME election the KMT's Wu Zeyuan (伍澤元) began distributing leaflets accusing Su Zhenchang (蘇貞昌) of involvement in land speculation, which lead to Su's narrow defeat. Later it was found that the land speculation was actually conducted by KMT politicians and the

³⁷⁹ *Lianhebao*, November 24, 1993, 1.

³⁸⁰ *China Times*, November 30, 1994, 4.

³⁸¹ *Ziyoushibao*, November 18, 1994, 1.

³⁸² *Ziyoushibao*, November 29, 1994, 18.

³⁸³ *China Times*, November 10, 1994, 6.

court ruled that Wu had deliberately spread false rumours and gave him an eight-month sentence.³⁸⁴ In addition, much attention was given to outlining Chen's record of fighting corruption while Yilan ME. For example, a Chen Dingnan ad showed a picture of Chen and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, with the slogan "Choosing Chen Dingnan equals Lee Kuan Yew becoming Provincial Governor,"(選擇陳定南,等於李光耀當省長) noting how Chen had followed Li Kuan Yew's model of sweeping away corruption and special privileges.³⁸⁵

In the next ME election of 1997 both parties emphasised corruption, however, serious scandals involving KMT ME in Pingdong and Zhanghua put it in an embarrassing position that was exploited by the DPP. In the DPP's "Prison TV ad" (監獄篇), to the sound of clinking chains and keys the camera went through dark prison gates, listing the corruption cases of KMT politicians sentenced or under investigation. The ad ended with the slogan, "For each vote for the KMT we may have another corrupt ME" (每一票投給國民黨, 我們可能多一各貪汙的縣市長). With two of the most serious corruption cases being in Pingdong, it was felt in the county KMT HQ that the repeated broadcast of this ad had a major impact on the party's fortunes in 1997.³⁸⁶ In the "Spokesman TV Ad" (發言人篇), a KMT spokesman tries to explain away KMT corruption cases, but with clips of KMT members being arrested and hearing Wu Zeyuan is Pingdong campaign manager and Ruan Gangmeng was still being nominated in Zhanghua County, the spokesman collapsed and was carried off on a stretcher.

In response to DPP corruption accusations a KMT 1997 ad had the following

³⁸⁴ *Ziyoushibao*, November 11, 1994, 1.

³⁸⁵ *China Times*, November 23, 1994, 1.

³⁸⁶ Interview by author, at KMT Pingdong party office, August 24, 2001.

question and answer: “Darling, who has turned the DPP black? In fact it is the DPP which has slandered itself.” (親愛的, 是誰把民進黨變黑了? 摸黑民進黨的, 其實就是民進黨自己) This ad outlined how DPP damaged its reputation with members’ involvement in drug dealing, criminal cases, violence and corruption. For example, it claimed that under You Qing the Taibei County Government had had the most officials charged with corruption of all counties and cities over the last three years.³⁸⁷ In Gaoxiong County the KMT also took the offensive against the incumbent DPP ME. An anonymous ad compared DPP ME’s wife Zheng Guilian (鄭貴蓮) to Taiwan’s most infamous criminals of the day with the headline, “Gao Tianmin shot himself, Chen Jinxing has surrendered, where can Red Envelope Lian escape?” (高天民已自弊, 陳進興棄械投降紅包蓮那裡逃?)³⁸⁸

In the 2000 presidential election the KMT tried to respond to the DPP’s anti-corruption attacks by raising certain DPP ME corruption cases. Once again the KMT sought the help of Lin Ruitu (林瑞圖) to smear their opponents, accusing Chen Shuibian of being involved in corruption over a lottery scandal while Taibei mayor.³⁸⁹ However, the sub-issue clearly still favoured the DPP as over the 1990s it had built up a reservoir of KMT ME corruption cases, and Chen Shuibian had by far the cleanest image among the serious candidates.

In 2001 the DPP was the national ruling party and defending twelve ME posts, making it much more likely that it would face corruption charges. However, the DPP acted fast to counter such accusations. For instance, when Tainan City DPP ME was involved in a corruption case, the DPP was quick to abandon him and

³⁸⁷ *Ziyoushibao*, November 11, 1997, 7.

³⁸⁸ *China Times*, November 27, 1997, 5.

³⁸⁹ *Ziyoushibao*, March 7, 2000, 9.

nominate an alternative candidate. Therefore it was not surprising that such KMT attacks did not prove to be significant issues.

4.5.3c) Central Government Contract Corruption

Since the KMT was the ruling party throughout the 1990s it has been accused of involvement in large-scale construction contract corruption in many elections. This sub-issue first became salient in 1992. For example, in a 1992 DPP TV ad comedian Kuling (苦苓) attacked the corruption associated with the Taipei metro project and the Six Year Development Plan. In 1993 the DPP continued this theme, using animals to symbolize KMT corruption. One had the picture of a bat with blood dripping from its teeth and the slogan "1993 The KMT's Ten Big Corruption Cases," (國民黨十大弊案) including the Taipei metro.³⁹⁰ A series of ads exposed embezzlement by high-level KMT government officials, with the KMT represented by an octopus grabbing cash, golf courses and buildings,³⁹¹ and as a rat stashing gold under the ground.³⁹² The NP also joined the fray, and in a 1993 TV debate its founding member Zhao Shaokang offered this sound bite, "If voters can accept the current state of contract corruption, then they should vote KMT and in the future would have no right to complain."³⁹³

The salience of the Taipei metro scandal reached its peak in 1994. The DPP had a series of ads with pictures of derailed or burnt out Taipei metro cars with the slogan, "A derailed metro, a corrupt metro." (脫軌的捷運,貪污的捷運)³⁹⁴ In Taiwan's first live televised candidate debate both the DPP's Chen Shuibian and the NP's Zhao

³⁹⁰ *Ziyoushibao*, November 10, 1993, 17.

³⁹¹ *China Times*, November 15, 1993, 13.

³⁹² *China Times*, November 19, 1993, 13.

³⁹³ *China Times*, November 2, 1993, 3.

³⁹⁴ *Lianhebao*, November 22, 1994, 1.

Shaokang were scathing in their criticisms over the project's corruption. KMT Huang Dazhou's (黃大洲) feeble response was "As to which previous mayor caused the present problems, I am not at liberty to say, you think about it yourself."

In 2000 Chen Shuibian said less than Lian Zhan on how to deal with corruption, but since Lian had made so many election promises Chen had ample ammunition to attack his failed anti-corruption pledges. A typical example was a full-page DPP ad with the picture of a guava, which in Taiwan symbolizes an empty promise. It claimed, "Lian Zhan has sworn eight times to sweep away corruption, but during his time as premier there were 55 major corruption cases, which accounted for up to NT\$14.2 billion in procurement corruption." (連戰曾經 8 次宣誓旦旦要肅貪, 結果在他主政期間發生 55 建重大弊案, 光採購弊案 142 億).³⁹⁵

As the KMT was the ruling party until 2000, it is not surprising that the DPP and NP dominated accusations of corruption over government construction contracts. However, in the first two elections under DPP rule it has yet to face similar accusations.

4.5.3d) Party Assets

The KMT's party assets were long an accepted component of the KMT party state, and it was not until the 1990s election campaigns that the legitimacy of its vast business empire was challenged. The DPP first gave this question attention in 1992, when a full page DPP ad showed a cheerful looking Chiang Kai-shek on a NT\$1000 note and asked, "Is the KMT a political party or a consortium?" (國民黨是政黨還

³⁹⁵ *Ziyoushibao*, February 16, 2000, 11.

是財團?)³⁹⁶ The two years that the DPP made KMT assets central campaign issues were 1995 and 2000. At a press conference on November 4, 1995, the DPP's Huang Huangxiong announced the formation of the "All Peoples' Alliance for the Return of Party Assets,"(全民追討黨產聯盟) claiming that KMT assets amounted to NT\$150 billion.³⁹⁷ Four days later Huang and DPP Chairman Shi Mingde led a protest outside the Legislative Yuan demanding the KMT reveal its true assets, freeze its assets, explain the seven suspicious land acquisition cases and return the illegally seized assets to the people.³⁹⁸ The DPP followed this up with the Party Asset TV ad (黨產篇) and two newspaper ads giving details of the seven cases and attacking the way KMT used its ruling status to increase its property and wealth.³⁹⁹ However, though the DPP described the party assets as illegal in 1995, this was still disputed by the KMT, which insisted that all its assets were obtained legally.⁴⁰⁰

By 2000 the political climate had changed, as the DPP had won the argument on the need to end party involvement in profit making enterprises. At the 1996 NDC the KMT first promised to reform its assets,⁴⁰¹ and at a rally on 2 January, 2000 Lian Zhan went further by promising to "end political parties' involvement in profit making business, place KMT assets in a trust and eradicate black gold."⁴⁰² However, Lian's inability to match words with deeds allowed a DPP newspaper ad to ask "Mr Lian Zhan, please pay attention, there are only seven days left before you fail to deliver on your promise of placing the party assets in a trust." (連戰先生請注意距

³⁹⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, November 28, 1992, 6.

³⁹⁷ *China Times*, November 5, 1995, 2.

³⁹⁸ *China Times*, November 9, 1995, 42.

³⁹⁹ *Ziyoushibao*, November 13, 1995, 12.

⁴⁰⁰ *China Times*, November 5, 1995, 2.

⁴⁰¹ Chao and Myers, "Promoting Effective Democracy, Chinese Style," 669-682.

⁴⁰² www.taipetitimes.com/news/2000/01/02/0000018073

離黨產信託跳票只剩下 7 天!)⁴⁰³ A DPP TV ad also mocked Lian's assets pledges.

First it showed Lian making his assets promise with KMT assets chief Liu Taiying (劉泰英) at his side, then it showed Liu at a press conference making totally contradictory statements, opposing putting KMT assets in a trust. DPP legislator Lin Zhuoshui (林濁水) compared Lian's actions to the saying "When the butcher lays down his knife he immediately becomes a Buddha." (放下屠刀立地成佛)

According to Lin, "The KMT has done something bad, that is party assets. If it properly handled the party assets it would be praised and if it did not settle the matter probably nothing would happen, as people are used to the KMT's assets. The problem is that for months he (Lian) said time after time that the party assets had to be handled, but nothing was actually done. I think he was foolish. It was like getting on stage everyday and saying look how bad the KMT is, then coming off the stage. I cannot understand why someone would do this."⁴⁰⁴

In 2001 the Control Yuan carried out a thorough investigation of KMT assets and has called for Taiwan to follow the "East German model" of nationalizing the former authoritarian party's assets.⁴⁰⁵ Now that the DPP has become the ruling party it is still continuing to raise the issue of party assets at election time. For instance, in the run up to the December 2002 mayoral elections the Executive Yuan drew up a Political Party Law which would ban political parties from operating or owning any profit making businesses. However, once again the KMT has expressed its opposition.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰³ *Lianhebao*, March 11, 2000, 1.

⁴⁰⁴ Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taipei, September 24, 2001.

⁴⁰⁵ Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taipei, November 9, 2001.

⁴⁰⁶ See www.taipetimes.com/news/2002/09/10/0000167486

The party assets sub-issue is an example of how fast norms have changed in the 1990s, what was still accepted as perfectly legitimate until the mid 1990s has become “black corruption” today. However, the sub-issue reveals the constraints that the KMT faces when trying to change, as even though Lian has pledged to end involvement in profit making business, he has been unable to fulfil this promise, as it is uncertain if the party can survive without them.

4.5.4 Grey-Black Corruption

4.5.4a) Black Gold/Gangster Politics:

The term “black gold” refers to the involvement of gangsters in politics, but it has also come to be used as a general term to describe political corruption. The scale of mafia political influence is strongest in rural counties, such as Pingdong and Yunlin (雲林). For instance Zhao Yongmao (趙永茂) estimates 40% of Yunlin’s county councillors have organized crime backgrounds.⁴⁰⁷ It was not until the early 1990s that their representatives began to seek election to the national legislature, one estimate for the proportion of “black gold” legislators is 20%.⁴⁰⁸ According to Christian Goebel by gaining office these figures could, “whitewash themselves and protect their brothers,” particularly infamous was the election of Luo Fuzhu (羅福助), leader of the Tiandaomeng (天道盟) gang to convener of the legislature’s Judicial Committee.⁴⁰⁹

The DPP has consistently given heavy emphasis to this issue since 1995, when a series of scandals gave the DPP ample scope to accuse the KMT of gangster links. In “Black Gold” TV ad 1 (黑金篇 1) a mother told how her son was killed by KMT

⁴⁰⁷ Zhao (趙永茂) *Change and Characteristics of Taiwan’s Local Politics*, 284.

⁴⁰⁸ Goebel, “Towards a Consolidated Democracy?” 8.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

Pingdong County Assembly Speaker Zheng Taiji(鄭太吉), then it showed her crying over her dead son, and the picture of the KMT murderer. In “Black Gold” TV ad 2 (黑金篇 2) DPP Legislator Cai Shiyuan (蔡式淵) talks of how powerful gangster politicians have become, and how he was kidnapped and beaten by a gangster KMT legislator. The conclusion shows a bullet-ridden car in Pingdong and the message is that the only way to defeat “black gold” is by voting. The ads created quite a sensation, with the Central Election Commission (中央選舉委員會) demanding alterations to both ads but the DPP refusing.⁴¹⁰

Two years later in 1997 the DPP continued this offensive focusing on corruption charges against KMT Pingdong ME and the Zheng Taiji’s life sentence for murder. Therefore when President Li came to Pingdong to support the KMT’s ME candidate, DPP ME candidate Su Jiaquan demanded Li apologize to the county for recommending such bad people four years ago, as this had resulted in Pingdong becoming the “county of black gold collusion and gangster rule.”⁴¹¹

In 1998 the DPP was again focused on the “black gold” theme. For instance, a full-page DPP ad used a formula style reminiscent of KMT attacks on the DPP’s Taiwan independence policy, “With a full load of black gold, how can it lead? The KMT is the aircraft carrier of social and economic instability. Stability=KMT monopoly=black gold=corruption=disaster=financial crisis=incapable government.” (滿載黑金, 如何領航. 國民黨是社會與經濟動亂的航空母艦. 安定=國民黨壟斷=黑金=貪汙=災難 =金融危急=無能政府). However with Ma Yingjiu as its candidate the KMT tried to hit back with its only TV ad in the 1990s that focused on

⁴¹⁰ *China Times*, November 19, 1995, 4.

⁴¹¹ *China Times*, November 4, 1997, 4.

corruption. The ad showed images of Ma making speeches while Minister of Justice and newspaper cuttings on anti corruption measures and quoted a member of public saying, "All the gangsters that ought to be caught have been caught or have fled."

In the 2000 presidential campaign the most consistent DPP corruption theme was the link between both Lian Zhan and Song Chuyu with a number of allegedly "black gold" politicians and the idea that only a change in ruling parties could defeat "black gold." In one DPP TV ad inspired by the US film "Men in Black," the KMT was represented by gangsters, who rob a bank then press a button to make people forget. In the campaign Chen Shuibian gave far more attention to the "black gold" than the other candidates. Chen's quote from the first TV debate echoes the DPP's tone since the mid 1990s: "According to surveys about 70% of the people think that under KMT rule the "black gold" question is getting worse. From grassroots financial institutions to big public construction projects, from the insider trading on the stock exchange to corruption in military purchase cases the KMT has relied on a system of corruption that reaches all levels of our country. Since the end of martial law the KMT has relied on gangsters and money politics to maintain its power. So hoping for the KMT to tackle "black gold" is like dying charcoal white, it is impossible. Only if Abian is elected can the danger of "black gold" be dealt with."⁴¹²

The infamous figures that came under DPP attack for being KMT gangster politicians were Wu Zeyuan, the former KMT Pingdong ME, Luo Fuzhu, the independent legislator from Taibei County, and Yan Qingbiao (顏清標), the County Council Assembly speaker in Taizhong County. Late in the campaign the DPP used

⁴¹² *China Times*, February 21, 2000, 2.

large full page ads to attack KMT gangster links, with pictures of Luo, and Wu, the slogan was “With people like them supporting Lian Zhan, how can the KMT not be forced out of office?”(連他們都爲連戰站臺國民黨怎麼可以不下臺!) ⁴¹³ While on the eve of the election a full-page DPP ad showed the contrasting pictures of Chen with Academia Sinica President and Nobel prizewinner Li Yuanzhe (李遠哲), Lian with Wu and Luo, and Song with Yan, and simply asked, “Who are you going to trust Taiwan’s future with?” (你準備把台灣的未來交給那些人?)⁴¹⁴

In fact in 2000 Lian Zhan made a number of proposals to tackle gangster politics. Lian’s anti corruption pledges were compiled into the TV ad “Lian Zhan’s Proposals”(連戰的主張). However it is doubtful how convincing this was to Taiwanese voters, as when Lian declared “all out war on Black Gold” (全面向黑金宣戰), at his side his wife is seen looking bored and picking her nose.

The accusation that the KMT has nominated gangster-linked politicians has repeatedly damaged the KMT in elections. However, it was not until its disastrous defeat in 2000 that it took serious measures to avoid nominating candidates with corrupt reputations. In 2001 the KMT tried more radical nomination reforms aimed at improving the party’s image. The drafter of the new regulations, Ding Shouzhong (丁守中), summed up their key principles, “Anyone that has been convicted of a criminal offence or breaking the election and recall law, even if they have only been through the first trial, cannot be nominated.”⁴¹⁵ This meant that a number of infamous and long serving KMT politicians either did not stand or stood as independents.

⁴¹³ *Ziyoushibao*, March 9, 2000, 16.

⁴¹⁴ *Ziyoushibao*, March 15, 2000, 16.

⁴¹⁵ Ding Shouzhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 27, 2001.

Although it was no longer so easy for the DPP to use the issue to attack the KMT after it became the ruling party, it still saw value in the issue. According to sociologist Wang Fuchang, "The new ruling party wants to cut the links between the KMT and 'black gold.' The reorganization of local financial organizations and investigation into bank's political over lending. This is one matter that the new government has made the most effort."⁴¹⁶ In addition, in 2001 the DPP again targeted Luo Fuzhu, who though independent had maintained close relations with the KMT. By putting Luo on trial as a hooligan, the DPP again was trying to gain anti black gold kudos.

In section 4.5 I showed how issue ownership is also evident at the sub-issues level, with the KMT tending to steer clear of terms negatively associated with it, such as "black gold", party assets, vote buying, and golden oxen. Through the campaigning efforts of the DPP and NP the scope of corruption sub-issues have broadened significantly and the pace that norms on corruption have changed has been rapid.

4.6 Explanations for Party Change

In this section I show explain the issue emphasis trends in terms of inner party politics, electoral competition, incumbency versus opposition, electoral systems and ideology. I show how electoral factors have been the key determinant governing the NP and DPP's attention to political corruption. Both have consistently raised the issue to expand their support bases and to create a more level electoral playing field. In contrast the KMT's dependence on party assets, corrupt local factions and vote buying has constrained it from removing its corrupt image or seriously tackling

⁴¹⁶ Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taipei, October 26, 2001.

corruption.

4.6.1 Inner Party Politics

The corruption issue has been as divisive for the KMT as national identity. Factional struggle exists in all parties, but this factor has been especially significant in determining the KMT's handling of the corruption issue.

The issue has been employed as a weapon in the bitter inner party struggle between the pro Li Denghui, mainly BSR MKMT and the largely WSR NMKMT. The NMKMT supported the Martial Law system of institutionalised corruption, but inherited Chiang Ching-kuo's suspicion of both big business and local factions. This view is reflected in former Premier Hao Bocun's (郝柏村) comments, "Gradually the KMT became reliant on the local factions to win elections, rather than vice versa. This made the KMT sink into degradation, as it came under the control of factional money politics. If you didn't nominate them, they would leave the party and stop the KMT from winning."⁴¹⁷ In contrast, Li Denghui was prepared to ally with local factions and business groups to strengthen his position in the KMT.

Political corruption first became a major electoral issue in the build up to the 1992 legislative elections. As NMKMT's Hao Bocun explained, "In the one year between the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan election (1991-1992), Li Denghui was leading the KMT to money politics and rich people. I was opposed to this."⁴¹⁸ Li and Hao clashed openly over candidate nomination, as Hao recalled, "Li Denghui and I had a serious conflict over the nomination of the Legislative Yuan candidates.

⁴¹⁷ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

⁴¹⁸ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

He was nominating mafia (黑道) or money politics (金權) candidates, I didn't approve of this."⁴¹⁹ In the campaign many candidates of rival KMT factions concentrated on attacking their own party leaders rather than the DPP. However, in early 1993 Hao resigned, leaving Li Denghui in a dominant position in the KMT. In view of Li's reliance on big business and local factions to tip the balance against the NMKMT, it is not surprising that Li Denghui showed limited interest in tackling corruption while KMT chairman. Li showed his ambivalence to the question in a recent interview, "At election time people go on about corruption, I think it is a minor question that can be solved."⁴²⁰

The KMT's closer links with local factions and conglomerates were a key factor in the decision to form the NP. The NP attacks on KMT corruption and the attempt to link this issue to Li Denghui were a continuation of the power struggle between the KMT's mainstream and NMKMT factions. Although politicians such as Zhao Shaokang had thrown away their KMT membership cards, they continued in their struggle to influence the direction of the KMT but as a faction outside the party. Similarly, the Xingpiao case was also an extension of this struggle. The reason it was emphasized by the KMT in 2000 was the inner party rivalry between Li Denghui and Song Chuyu. Li only chose to make the Xingpiao case an electoral issue in a last ditch attempt to stop Song winning the presidential election and save his protégé Lian Zhan. The depth of animosity between former allies is clear from Li Denghui's claim that once Song had left, the KMT was free of corruption. Therefore, in March 2000 he stated that "now all the rotten, corrupt and smelly have

⁴¹⁹ Ibid

⁴²⁰ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

left, once the water is clear the dirty fish cannot stay.”⁴²¹

Li's business/factional alliance proved effective in marginalizing the NMKMT faction. However, this victory came at a high price, as in the words of Chen Mingtong, “once elected, representatives associated with local factions relentlessly pursued pork barrel politics.”⁴²² When the KMT did conduct anti corruption drives, the vast majority of cases were KMT members, bringing further blame and also leading to inner party turmoil, as those KMT members caught in the net complained of selective investigation and betrayal of their party. Moreover, by 1995, the KMT had only a small majority in the legislature, making it even more reliant on the local factions. According to political scientist Lu Yali (呂亞力), “As the KMT's hold on power becomes more tenuous, corruption becomes worse... Since the party needs the local factions more and more, it has to tolerate their dirty tricks.”⁴²³ Although factional politicians would probably not switch over to the DPP, the KMT could not afford to lose the party whip over any more legislators. The above problems left the KMT vulnerable to the corruption attacks and tied the KMT's hands from tackling corruption or improving its corrupt image.

Candidate nomination has been a central feature of KMT inner party factional struggle and the party has suffered from repeated opposition attacks over the rising numbers of factional, gangster and business linked candidates and their behaviour after getting elected. As KMT support levels have declined and many politicians have defected, it has become increasingly reliant on factional or business candidates

⁴²¹ *China Times*, March 13, 2000, 2.

⁴²² Chen, “Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan's Democratization,” 188.

⁴²³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 16, 1995, 31.

that in spite of bad reputations have high re-election rates⁴²⁴ and ample campaign funds. The party has found it very hard to reform its nomination system to avoid selecting candidates with corrupt reputations. As former KMT Secretary General, Xu Shuide recalled, "We wanted to show people that the KMT could challenge "Black Gold" and hold a clean election. So we didn't nominate candidates with bad images (in 1995)."⁴²⁵ However, this rule was only applied to new candidates and incumbents were excluded. As Xu admitted, "This was not a complete method."⁴²⁶ In contrast the DPP has been more sensitive to such accusations. For instance, in 2001 it swiftly abandoned the DPP Tainan City ME when he became embroiled in a corruption scandal in favour of a popular independent legislator.

Clearly the shift in power towards the new KMT leader Lian Zhan and the NMKMT since 2000 has altered the party's attitude towards corruption. During the 2000 campaign Lian did make promises to tackle KMT corruption, and since the KMT was defeated, the KMT has passed its most stringent anti "black gold" nomination regulations. However, the degree of change should not be exaggerated. For instance, though the KMT's 2000 nomination regulations appear more comprehensive, the fact that it nominated incumbent Yunlin ME Zhang Rongwei (張榮味), despite his corrupt image reveals the constraints of reform.⁴²⁷ Similarly, though the party has made numerous promises to end party involvement in business, so far this has been an empty promise. Unlike the NP and DPP, the KMT lacks a unifying ideology; the one thing that has kept the party together is its wealth. Political scientist Chen

⁴²⁴ For example in 1991's National Assembly election 97.47 of KMT factional candidates were elected compared to 80.77 for non-factional candidates. See Chen, "Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan's Democratization," Table 7.3.

⁴²⁵ Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

⁴²⁶ Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

⁴²⁷ Liu Yizhou, interview by author, Taipei, October 30, 2001.

Wenjun (陳文君) noted the danger of this in 1995, "Basically political corruption has no positions or ideals, it is a matter of interests, it can change its allegiance at any time and this leads to the instability of the KMT regime."⁴²⁸ Although party assets have become discredited and made the transition towards becoming "black corruption," the KMT's dependence on the party assets to supply the campaign funds to outspend other parties have constrained its ability to reform this problem.

Although political corruption has not been internally divisive for either the DPP or the NP, the issue has received more attention when election orientated factions and leaders have been in control, and has been downplayed when ideologically orientated factions have had the upper hand. Indeed the political corruption issue was initiated by the DPP in the early 1990s under the leadership of Xu Xinliang and Shi Mingde as they attempted to alter the DPP's party image. Subsequent DPP leaders have continued this emphasis, even after becoming the ruling party. Although the DPP focused on political corruption in most elections, an exception was the 1996 presidential election, when according to a former KMT Party Propaganda Chief the DPP's candidate showed "No interest" in the corruption issue.⁴²⁹ Similarly, under the leadership of party moderates, the NP gave much attention to corruption until 1998. However, the rise of Chinese nationalists such as Xie Qida led to corruption been dropped. As John Hsieh commented, "When it was first formed, the NP did try to downplay the national identity issue by stressing instead the clean government theme. But clearly it did not succeed. Indeed, it has been gradually "forced" to turn back to the national identity issue."⁴³⁰

⁴²⁸ *China Times*, December 4, 1995, 4.

⁴²⁹ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

⁴³⁰ Hsieh, "Whither KMT?" 941, note 22.

4.6.2 Electoral Competition

4.6.2a) Public Opinion

It is uncertain whether the opposition's political corruption emphasis was a response to public disgust over rising corruption or if the salience of the issue was created by party propaganda. However, since the mid 1990s political corruption was the most salient issues which the DPP could consistently beat the KMT and gain the support of the majority of the electorate, therefore opposition parties would have been foolish not to exploit anti-corruption sentiments. There has been a considerable widening of the sub-issues that both the public and elite view as constituting grey and black corruption. Such changes in public opinion have forced the KMT to alter its position on vote buying; nominating candidates with corrupt images and even offering to end party assets. However, the way the parties use their available survey data in planning campaigns appears to be different. Advertising expert Fu Hekang (伏和康) argues that while the KMT pays more attention to broad support rates, "The DPP's election themes have always been based on the results of opinion surveys."⁴³¹ This has meant that according to Wang Fengquan, "The DPP is more successful at catching the issue of the moment, which was "black gold" this year (in 2000)."⁴³²

4.6.2b) Mobilising or Chasing?

The link between political corruption attacks and social cleavages are not as obvious as either social welfare or national identity. It is the most cross cutting of the three issues, as the NP and DPP were at opposite poles of the national identity spectrum, but they managed to join together in attacking corruption to appeal to core groups

⁴³¹ Fu Hekang, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001.

⁴³² Wang Fengquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, April 14, 2000.

and new supporters.

On the political corruption issue the most significant sociological factor has been differences in urban/rural support levels and perception of corruption. In Taiwan there is a very different perception of corruption in the country and the city; according to political scientist Wu Chongli, "I found that the definition of vote buying in the cities and country is quite different. In the cities, people think that I give you money and you vote for me, but in the country we are friends, you give me the money and I help you out."⁴³³ The divisive nature of the political corruption issue for the KMT is linked to the party's support base. While the mainly urban-based WSR NMKMT supporters stressed clean government, the largely rural based BSR MKMT supporters held ambiguous attitudes to the issue. However, as the KMT has lost support in urban constituencies, its dependence on rural based voters and politicians has been increasing. For instance, in the 1997 ME elections the KMT was defeated in virtually all heavily urbanised counties and only won in agricultural counties. Therefore attacking corruption risked alienating rural supporters caught up in anti-corruption crackdowns and would have little appeal to rural voters.

In contrast both the DPP and NP began as largely urban-based parties, thus it made sense to focus on corruption, an issue city dwellers were more concerned about. Anti corruption attacks were also appealing to core DPP and NP supporters. For the DPP any excuse to attack the KMT are pleasing to anti KMT BSR, while for the NP those who hate Li Denghui and blame him for all the ills of Taiwan were pleased. Former DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong explained that, "We cannot deny that the

⁴³³ Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.

NP was the one that initiated some key issues. Why did we have the political corruption issue? It was aimed at attacking Li Denghui.”⁴³⁴

According to John Hsieh, the KMT’s most serious weakness is its “black gold” image, which “hurts the party particularly among the young, urban and better-educated voters.”⁴³⁵ Therefore like social welfare, political corruption was part of both opposition parties’ plan to find new issues to expand beyond their original national identity orientated support constituencies.

4.6.2c) Electoral Environment

By the early 1990s the electoral environment facing the political parties was very different from the late 1980s, this had a major impact on their treatment of the corruption issue. As in Spain and France, the newly liberalized media played a critical role in placing political corruption on Taiwan’s political agenda and opening up what Pujas and Rhodes term “coalitions of silence” on corruption.⁴³⁶ Taiwan’s media became so saturated with KMT corruption scandals, that even senior KMT figures admitted the scale of the problem. As former KMT Gaoxiong mayor Wu Dunyi stated, “In the past the KMT really did have a “black gold” question, I completely agree with this criticism. This is the area I am most ashamed of the KMT, our compromises and links with “black gold”, it was very serious.”⁴³⁷ By the early 1990s the scale and at times openness of political corruption had reached such a state that the DPP and NP would have been foolhardy not to exploit the issue. Moreover, since the issue had been jointly initiated by the DPP and NMKMT,

⁴³⁴ Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taipei, November 9, 2001.

⁴³⁵ Hsieh, “Whither the KMT?” 10.

⁴³⁶ Pujas and Rhodes, “Party Finance and Political Scandal,” 753.

⁴³⁷ Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.

neither was prepared to concede ownership of this popular issue, thus both groups consistently competed for the anti corruption vote.

The changing nature of the KMT also offered new opportunities for the NP to appeal to disgruntled KMT supporters unhappy about rising corruption levels. For instance, a 1994 NP ad noted, "We want to support party (KMT) candidates, but cannot recognize golden oxen, black oxen or water buffalo as comrades." (我們想要支持黨的候選人,可是我們不能認同金牛黑牛水牛做同志)⁴³⁸ Similarly as the NP weakened the KMT attempted to use the Xingpiao case to win back former supporters that had lost confidence in Song. For instance, one KMT ad showed a picture of a Song supporter in deep thought, asking "But if you think it's alright to Aqian (A 錢 embezzle) and to lie, can you accept it when your child says, 'Adults can all Aqian and lie, why can't I?'" (但是如果您認為 A 錢是可以,說謊是對的,您願意接受有一天,您的小孩說: "大家都可以 A 錢,說謊,我為什麼不可以?").⁴³⁹

In 2000 Li Denghui's departure from the KMT party centre again altered the political environment radically. As a result of the desire to create a united front to the "Pan Blue Alliance" in the run up to the 2004 presidential election, KMT party chair Lian Zhan dropped all the Xingpiao case charges against Song Chuyu and even offered a mild apology.

4.6.2d) Election results

Reactions to election results have been critical to the way Taiwan's parties have dealt with the political corruption issue. Although proving whether an issue has been

⁴³⁸ *Lianhebao*, November 26, 1994, 8.

⁴³⁹ *China Times*, March 12, 2000, 1.

decisive in election victory is a futile operation, media and politicians often view elections as being won or lost on certain issues. A former KMT propaganda Chief reflected the view that election defeat forced the KMT to change, stating, "Before we looked at election defeats, and saw that the KMT had to recover from defeat. We had to get rid of political corruption and become a democratic party."⁴⁴⁰ The critical election defeats that were turning points for the political corruption issue were 1991 for the DPP, 2000 for the KMT and 1998 for the NP, while the success of anti corruption attacks in 1992 set a precedent that the opposition parties followed throughout the decade.

Political corruption is perhaps the only significant issue upon which the DPP has consistently beaten the KMT and the KMT has been unable to steal. According to Shelley Rigger, "It (KMT) failed because it did not back up its rhetoric with action, and its credibility suffered."⁴⁴¹ The comments of two influential DPP legislators reflect the effectiveness of the issue: Shen Fuxiong stated, "The black gold issue, it works!"⁴⁴² While Zhang Junhong stated, "Black gold has benefits and no cons."⁴⁴³ The issue has put the KMT into what Tien Hong-mao describes as "a no win situation. Failure to prosecute guilty parties would further the KMT's image as a corrupt political machine. Successful prosecution, however, which may involve most city and county councils, could severely shake the KMT's local electoral foundation."⁴⁴⁴ The KMT's corrupt image has stuck in the public consciousness, as the KMT's former Propaganda Chief admitted, "It's the KMT's greatest burden, and

⁴⁴⁰ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

⁴⁴¹ Rigger, *DPP 2000*, 9-10.

⁴⁴² Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taipei, September 19, 2001.

⁴⁴³ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

⁴⁴⁴ Tien, "Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development," 15.

it can't get rid of it."⁴⁴⁵ Therefore, as predicted by saliency theory, it is in the KMT's interests to steer clear of the corruption issue and instead to stress favourable items such as its government ability, economic growth or stability.

While most DPP and NP candidates have maintained relatively clean reputations the reverse is true of the KMT's. Even where KMT candidates personally have clean images, they have often been dragged down by the corrupt image of their party or infamous fellow partisans. For instance, a party official at the KMT Pingdong office lamented how in 1997, "Zeng (Yongquan 曾永權) had a clean image, (but) he was tainted by the cases of Wu Zeyuan and the Pingdong County Council Speaker."⁴⁴⁶

One of the few KMT figures immune to these attacks is Ma Yingjiu. As Chen Xiulin (陳秀玲) wrote in the *China Times*, "This (1998 election result) shows that when Ma Yingjiu represents the KMT reform faction, with his reputation for cracking down on vote buying as Minister for Justice, he cannot be tainted with the KMT's corrupt image."⁴⁴⁷

After 1991's National Assembly setback most DPP leaders agreed that there was a danger of over reliance on Taiwan independence and that in order to mould a new party image the party needed to expand its issue emphasis into questions such as political corruption and social welfare. The DPP's move away from ideological identity appeals in favour of corruption attacks shows parallels to the way many European parties have replaced left right disputes with corruption accusations.⁴⁴⁸ For the DPP 1992 was an attempt to make a new start in terms of election strategy,

⁴⁴⁵ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

⁴⁴⁶ Interviews by author at KMT Pingdong party office, August 24, 2001.

⁴⁴⁷ *China Times*, December 6, 1998, 3.

⁴⁴⁸ See Heywood, "Political Corruption, Democracy and Governance in Spain."

as the DPP's Propaganda Chief Chen Fangming recalled, "I just suggested that the party has to emphasize more on how to get rid of corruption and military interference in politics."⁴⁴⁹ The success that the DPP had by stressing KMT corruption in 1992 set a precedent for employing the issue in subsequent contests. In fact, even after coming to power the DPP sees votes to be won with anti corruption appeals. For instance, in 2001 the timing of DPP's prosecution of the KMT linked gangster legislator Luo Fuzhu was according to political scientist Wu Yushan "also related to the election."⁴⁵⁰

Although corruption was partly attributed for earlier KMT setbacks, the KMT's turning point was its disastrous defeat in 2000. According to the KMT Legislator Ding Shouzhong, the KMT had succeeded in public policies such as NHI and education, but Taiwan's people had thrown it out of office, "as they wanted change, as the KMT had done badly on "black gold."⁴⁵¹ One aspect of this attempt to shape a new cleaner image meant that the KMT did not nominate candidates that had been used by the DPP to accuse it of being corrupt such as Guo Tingcai and Wu Zeyuan. Song Chuyu's PFP party has shown a similar attitude to Yan Qingbiao. Yan had been a strong supporter of Song in the 2000 election, but the DPP had used this support to label the Song camp as corrupt. As a result after the election the PFP opposed him joining the party and when he was arrested for attempted murder and corruption Song only offered limited support.⁴⁵²

The decline in NP attention to the issue after its defeat in 1998 reflects a sense that

⁴⁴⁹ Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

⁴⁵⁰ Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taipei, October 24, 2001.

⁴⁵¹ Ding Shouzhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 27, 2001.

⁴⁵² See www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20010301/20010301p7.html

the issue had served a purpose but could not guarantee either continued growth in support or strong party identification. As early as 1995 the NP's Yang Taishun (楊泰順) warned of the dangers, stating, "If the NP is unable to use the newly elected office to create grassroots organization and an image of party service, it is doubtful that the party will still be able to win votes with the appeal of highly educated candidates and anti money politics."⁴⁵³ Three years later, following its 1998 defeat the NP's Zhou Yangshan concluded, "The NP should not stress clean government. I think that it seems Taiwan's voters do not want to see a truly clean party.... The NP must face this reality. Apart from the big cities of Taipei, Gaoxiong and Taizhong, if the NP puts too much stress on clean government it is likely to be completely rejected elsewhere."⁴⁵⁴ Therefore, following the NP's peak in political corruption emphasis in 1998 the party never again gave it the same focus.

4.6.3 Incumbency versus Opposition

It is far harder for a ruling party to avoid accusations of corruption and thus more likely that opposition parties will make corruption attacks in campaigns. The KMT lost control of most local ME positions in 1997 and the national government in 2000. Therefore the question to be asked is has party turnover affected the stress of political corruption? The DPP's case is similar to the Popular Party after coming to power in Spain on an anti corruption platform, in both cases though corruption allegations still crop up their frequency and intensity appear reduced after the party turnover.⁴⁵⁵

There is a consensus in Taiwan that the issue will no longer have the same effects as

⁴⁵³ *China Times*, December 3, 1995, 11.

⁴⁵⁴ *China Times*, December 7, 1995, 16.

⁴⁵⁵ Heywood, "Political Corruption, Democracy and Governance in Spain."

in the 1990s. As the DPP's Shen Fuxiong conceded that, "If you continue to stress that (anti corruption), people still realize that it's an issue, but people will come back and say you've been in position for more than one year, how come you didn't eradicate that?"⁴⁵⁶

However, the 2001 campaign showed more signs of continuity rather than change. Firstly, despite the party turnover and the KMT's anti corruption reforms, it did not make corruption its central election theme. Secondly, the DPP was still trying to profit from the issue, for example Chen Dingnan's vigorous anti vote buying campaign in 2001. Pingdong ME Su Jiaquan explained how the DPP continues to use the issue, but that the campaign methods for a electoral challenger differ from the incumbent, "If the KMT is in power, we'll focus on their vote buying and political corruption links... but now I'm the ME, I must show my actual government achievements, how I've attacked corruption, how I've improved Pingdong and will continue to in the future."⁴⁵⁷ Moreover, the KMT's transformation is far from complete. As former KMT Party Propaganda Chief Huang Huizhen (黃輝珍) noted, "Even in opposition the KMT still has its 'black gold' problems."⁴⁵⁸

4.6.4 Institutional Factors

My content analysis of party election propaganda showed that the political corruption issue features in elections of all types, both in SMD and MMD. However, election systems partly explain the KMT's emphasis on ME corruption. As while the DPP and NP attacked the KMT on almost all the corruption sub-issues in every

⁴⁵⁶ Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taipei, September 19, 2001.

⁴⁵⁷ Su Jiaquan, interview by author, Pingdong, August 24, 2001.

⁴⁵⁸ Huang Huizhen, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

election, the KMT only attacked in SMD contests and the only sub-issue it regularly stressed was ME corruption. In short, as with social welfare, the impact of electoral systems is limited.

4.6.5 Ideology

All parties are officially anti corruption, therefore it would be expected the impact of ideology on emphasis of this issue would be lower. Unlike on national identity, opposition to corruption was not a core component of the DPP's founding ideology; therefore the initial DPP stress on the issue was due to electoral, rather than ideological reasons. However, after repeated DPP campaigning on an anti-corruption platform, anti corruption has become a core element of DPP party ideology, making the issue harder for the party to drop. For the DPP another ideological aspect of anti corruption attacks was its link to democratisation, as the political environment of vote buying, and the financial imbalance caused by KMT party assets weaken Taiwan's claim to be a true democracy. As former DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong noted, "The KMT's party assets are an obstacle to democratisation."⁴⁵⁹

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that party competition on this issue tended to be convergent. As though the parties began the decade with contrasting positions on the corruption issue, after ten years of electoral debate there is now a greater consensus on what constitutes corruption. However, as in the social welfare case, the parties remain differentiated, as inner party factors have prevented leapfrogging.

⁴⁵⁹ *China Times*, November 5, 1995, 2.

Since the early 1990s the opposition parties have relentlessly campaigned on an anti-corruption platform and progressively expanded the realm of what constitutes corruption, pushing sub-issues formally seen as “white corruption” to become “grey” or even “black corruption.” Although political analysts describe national identity as the most influential issue in Taiwanese politics, my data has revealed political corruption to be the most salient issue in the 1990s elections. The political corruption has shown a clear pattern of issue ownership with the DPP and NP dominating the issue over the whole decade. In contrast, the KMT has endeavoured to play down or avoid the issue. Clean government has been a cross cutting cleavage, with parties at opposite poles on the national identity spectrum sharing common ground on attacking KMT corruption. The survey data shows the Taiwan’s voters have responded to the unremitting anti-corruption propaganda, as by the late 1990s they increasingly saw the issue as a key distinguishing mark of the main parties’ images, viewing the KMT as corrupt and the DPP and NP as attacking corruption.

The key factors determining their treatment of the issue vary among the three parties. Internal party politics were the most significant factor for the KMT as the issue became internally divisive. The KMT’s reliance on areas that were formerly “white corruption,” such as party assets, corrupt local factions and vote buying, has tied its hands from tackling corruption or ridding itself of its negative image, as serious anti corruption drives would have resulted in a factional backlash and it losing its inbuilt electoral advantage. Moreover, both sides in the power struggle between Li Denghui and the NMKMT used corruption allegations as a weapon to discredit their opponents. In contrast, the NP and DPP, as both stressed the issue to expand beyond their core supporters and create a fairer electoral playing field. The parties have been responsive to election results. The fact that the political corruption issue

actually worked was the reason that both parties persisted with the issue in election after election. It was only after the KMT's 2000 election calamity that it attempted to seriously tackle the problem of "black gold" nominations. The 2001 election was the first since party turnover at the national level; however, it appeared that there was more continuity than change, with the DPP still trying to profit from the issue. A former KMT Party Propaganda Chief admitted the DPP's anti corruption propaganda campaign had been, "very successful. From that time (1992) the DPP started calling the KMT corrupt. Even until now the KMT is unable to remove this label."⁴⁶⁰

It is still premature to conclude whether after a decade of corruption being a central electoral issue that Taiwan has become a cleaner political entity. However, the case study has shown the value of competitive party politics in widening the realm of what is seen as corruption, promoting anti-corruption legislation and setting new cleaner political norms. Through electoral debate foundations of KMT party state such as vote buying, party assets and the corrupt patron client relationship between the KMT and local factions have been first challenged and eventually discredited. The significance of political corruption should not be underestimated, it was the one major issue upon which the DPP could consistently beat the KMT and receive a majority of public support. Based on the DPP's election results in the two years when it disregarded political corruption (1991 & 1996), it can be surmised that without the issue the DPP would never have gained either local or national power.

⁴⁶⁰ Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

Chapter Five: National Identity

*"There are some things that you can do, but cannot say" (有些事情可以做不能說), you can be independent, but you cannot say you're independent, and 'there are some things that you can say but cannot do' (有些事情可以說不能做) The KMT says it wants to retake the mainland, but if you tell the KMT not to say this it'll lose much of its legitimacy."*⁴⁶¹

5.1.1 Introduction

In the past two decades national identity issues have risen in salience in both democracies and authoritarian states. After the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, politicians in new democracies were often successful at exploiting formerly latent ethnic nationalism. In older democracies the fading of traditional left-right divisions has prompted politicians to seek new issues to mobilise support. This has led to the rise of right wing nationalist and anti immigrant parties, such as the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. In addition, nationalist separatist groups have grown in electoral strength, particularly in Scotland and Quebec. In China the CCP has also increasingly sought legitimacy as the representative of Chinese nationalism. Similarly, most political scientists working on Taiwan would agree with John Hsieh and Emerson Niu's assertion that national identity "is the most controversial and divisive issue" in Taiwanese politics.⁴⁶² In Taiwan national identity issues rather than a socio-economic cleavage separate parties. When analysts talk of a left and right in Taiwan, the left wing means independence from China and Taiwanese identity, and the right wing means unification with China and Chinese identity.

⁴⁶¹ Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

⁴⁶² Hsieh and Niu, "Salient Issues in Taiwan's Electoral Politics," 4.

In this chapter I show how in response to election results and moderate public opinion, election orientated leaders have moved their parties away from highly polarized positions on the national identity issue, towards more centrist positions. However, the parties have not converged and leapfrogging has been the exception. As party movement has been severely constrained by both party ideology and inner party factional balance. The development of this issue shows a clear pattern of issue ownership, with the parties consistently talking past each other and the public consistently able to distinguish between the parties. As in the other case studies the KMT does make some attempts at issue stealing, however, most failed and issue ownership remained intact. In short, though the electoral forces have made the parties less polarized, ideology has ensured they remain differentiated.

The development of this issue shows multi-party elections are capable of resolving conflicts. The case challenges Dankwart Rustow's proposition that a prerequisite for democratic transition is an initial consensus on national identity issues.⁴⁶³ Taiwan began democratic elections with parties holding diametrically opposed views on national issues. It was only through democratic debate during elections over the 1990s that Taiwan's parties moved towards more moderate and inclusive positions. Time and again, Taiwan's moderate electorate has rejected radical positions. As a result, by the late 1990s the parties have reached at least tacit understandings on most national identity questions.

5.1.2 National Identity Issues in Taiwan

Although not always the most visible in election propaganda, identity issues are

⁴⁶³ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 350-2.

present below the surface and generate the greatest passion at election time in Taiwan. As DPP presidential candidate Peng Mingmin (彭明敏) noted, "Election speeches do not systematically outline policy agendas. If you did the voters would not be interested. In election speeches you have to talk about what people want to hear (i.e. national identity)."⁴⁶⁴ The power of national identity is linked to its central place in the core ideology of all major political parties in Taiwan and it has become entwined with many other political issues. The contrasting historical memories and myths of the two main ethnic groups in Taiwan have produced two contradictory ideologies on the crucial national identity questions of who are the people and what are the boundaries of the state. The orthodox KMT view is that the people of Taiwan are Chinese, that Taiwan is a part of China, that the ROC government is the only legitimate government of all China, and that Taiwan and Mainland China should be reunified in the future. In contrast, the DPP position is that Taiwanese people though mainly ethnically Chinese, have the right to self-determination, and that Taiwan and China are two separate sovereign countries. As in the case of political corruption, the evolution of accepted norms on national identity has been especially rapid since democratic elections began. Opinions on identity voiced by the ROC president and viewed as mainstream in the late 1990s would have resulted in execution in the 1950s and a lengthy prison sentence as late as the early 1990s.

National identity in Taiwan is a complex and multi layered issue; therefore it is necessary to find a simplified framework of analysis. Previous studies have focused on the two most contested areas of national identity: (1) Taiwan's relationship with China, which essentially is a dispute over whether Taiwan should move towards unification with the mainland, maintain the status quo, or strive for formal political

⁴⁶⁴ Peng Mingmin, interview by author, Taipei, October 31, 2001.

independence (also known as the “TongDu” 統獨 question) and (2) The question of Chinese versus Taiwanese self-identification.⁴⁶⁵ Therefore this study tracks the parties’ movement on these two broad national identity sub-issues spectrums. I outline these two spectrums and the main terms that come under these categories in electoral propaganda on Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The far left of the TongDu spectrum incorporates calls for immediate political independence, such as the declaration of a Republic of Taiwan, an area I term “Pure Taiwan Independence.” At the centre left is the area I call “Diluted Taiwan Independence,” which incorporates Taiwanese self-determination. At the centre is the status quo. The centre right is defined as “Taiwan Independence: Negative” and includes calls to protect the ROC and attacks on Taiwan independence, while at the far right are calls for immediate unification, such as the PRC’s proposal of “One Country Two Systems.” The Taiwanese versus Chinese spectrum is very similar. Exclusive Taiwanese nationalist appeals are at the far left, a more inclusive Taiwanese identity at the centre left, dual identity at the centre, ROC Chinese identity at the centre left, and “Pure Chinese Nationalism” at the far right.⁴⁶⁶

5.1.3 Chapter Overview

Following this brief introduction, section 5.2 discusses the development of national identity issues in Taiwan before 1991. Section 5.3 offers a picture of the broad trends in national identity over the 1991-2001 decade. Looking at whether identity

⁴⁶⁵ The Mainland Affairs Council has sponsored national surveys on these two questions since the early 1990s. See www.mac.gov.tw; Academic works focussing on these two questions include Lin, “The Evolution of National Identity Issues in Taiwan,” 123-143; Chu and Lin, “The Construction of Taiwanese Identity and Cross Strait Relations.”

⁴⁶⁶ I have built upon previous research by Liu Tsung-wei, who distinguished between the two issue opposites of “Taiwan independence: positive” versus “Taiwan independence: negative, and “Taiwanese nationalism” versus “Chinese Nationalism.” Liu actually retains the original MRG title of “National Way of Life: Positive” for 601, but since 601T is referring to “Taiwanese Nationalism” it makes sense to alter 601 to “Chinese Nationalism.” For details see Liu, “Ideology, Strategy and Party Change in Taiwan from 1989-1998,” Table 1.

issues are salient, if they are owned, if there is any change in ownership and if the parties are converging or diverging. I show the principal trends in public opinion on the two main national identity dimensions and if the public sees the parties as having changed on these issues. In addition, I review the politicians' view of party change over this period. Section 5.4 reviews development of the two main national identity sub-issues in elections between 1991 and 2001, showing how election orientated leadership has tried to move parties towards the centre, but how movement has been constrained by ideologically orientated factions. I test whether issue ownership applies for individual campaigns and at the level of sub-issues, has this sub-issue ownership altered and have the parties changed their actual positions over the decade. Next in section 5.5 I evaluate the extent independent variables such as inter party competition, inner party politics, and ideology have pushed or constrained party movement. Finally, section 5.6 reviews the main conclusions of the chapter and the importance of national identity in Taiwanese politics.

5.2 Development of the National Identity Issue before 1991

After the KMT government relocated to Taiwan, the legitimacy of the ROC state was rooted on the principle that it was the sole legitimate government of all China. Any open challenge to the policy of reunification was dealt with harshly throughout the Martial Law era, and as late as 1992 advocating Taiwan independence was seditious. Democratic reforms such as full re-election of the WSR dominated parliaments or direct election of the president were deemed unacceptable, as these would create institutions that only represented Taiwan. Therefore the two issues of democratisation and national identity became intimately linked.

Since the basis of KMT authority came from its claim to be the government of all

China educational and cultural policies were implemented to create a new ROC Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. Therefore intensive sinification policies were introduced through the media and education curriculum, key components of which were the Mandarin language program and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement.⁴⁶⁷ In contrast, the use of local Taiwanese dialects was discouraged and Taiwanese opera was treated as second class. Taiwanese were taught that Taiwan was part of China and they should identify with the KMT's version of Chinese nationalism. This message was present in countless everyday symbols. For instance, all roads were renamed after KMT leaders, places in China and aspects of Chinese and KMT philosophy. In short, the position of the KMT and ROC government through the "White Terror" years was on the far right of the national identity spectrums in Table 5.1 and 5.2.

National identity issues only became an electoral issue in the 1980s, as the issue was then intimately entwined with the question of democratisation. Initially, the Dangwai opposition was essentially a democratic movement that also demanded ethnic justice, and was far from being a Taiwanese nationalist organization. Former DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong (黃煌雄) recalled why the movement initially focused on democratisation rather than independence. "As soon as we spoke on that subject (independence) we would be arrested...we had to focus on democratisation. In the schools they taught democracy. The KMT did not oppose this, so no one dared to oppose democracy."⁴⁶⁸ It was not until the 1983 Legislative Yuan election that the Dangwai took a clear stance on the TongDu question, arguing, "Taiwan's

⁴⁶⁷ See Winkler, "Cultural Policy on Post-war Taiwan," 22-46.

⁴⁶⁸ Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taipei, November 9, 2001.

future should be determined by all of Taiwan's residents."⁴⁶⁹ This concept of Taiwanese self-determination was acceptable to all within the early DPP, as it ruled out neither future independence nor unification. In its first election in 1986 the DPP party platform reaffirmed its stance of Taiwanese self-determination rather than independence.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, despite pressure from some quarters in the opposition movement, Taiwan was not included in the party name, as it was feared this would alienate its WSR leaders. In short, the DPP began as a centre left party on national identity.

In the DPP's initial five years changes in its factional balance pushed the party in a leftward direction, resulting in the leading WSR and unification advocates splitting off from the party. Party founding member Zhu Gaozheng recalled how the influence of the Formosa prisoners pushed the party to the left, "The problem was that later some old Taiwan independence dissidents were able to blackmail this group (the DPP's founders)."⁴⁷¹ As the Formosa defendants began to be released, they were able to control the DPP party chair and secretary general positions from 1988. However, though the Formosa group was more radical than the party founders, they also had to contend with the even more radical New Tide Faction. The exodus of anti independence figures such as Zhu Gaozheng and Lin Zhengjie weakened resistance within the party to its leftward direction. The shift in factional balance within the party soon resulted in the party taking more radical positions. In the 1989 legislative election members of the DPP's New Nation Alliance (新國家連線) openly promoted Taiwan independence for the first time.⁴⁷² This radicalisation

⁴⁶⁹ Chen, "The DPP's Party Image," 37.

⁴⁷⁰ Wang, "One China, One Taiwan," 171.

⁴⁷¹ Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.

⁴⁷² Wang, "One China, One Taiwan," 172.

culminated in 1991 when the DPP passed the Taiwan Independence Clause (TIC 台灣獨立綱領), which proposed that a ROT be established after being approved by a plebiscite and called for a new Taiwan constitution. This position was reached through a compromise between the two leading factions, in which New Tide agreed to Formosa's Xu Xinliang becoming party chair in exchange for Formosa accepting placing the TIC on the party charter.⁴⁷³ According to the DPP's Lin Zhuoshui, "The DPP went through five, six years to change from being not Taiwan independence to being a Taiwan independence party."⁴⁷⁴ Therefore by 1991 the DPP was at the far left of the TongDu spectrum.

Although the KMT had the image of being inflexible on its national identity positions, there were some changes in the final years of Chiang Ching-kuo's presidency and the early Li Denghui period. Firstly, under Chiang Ching-kuo the principle of "Unification under the Three Principles of the People" (三民主義統一中國) replaced the slogan of militarily retaking the mainland. In addition, there was considerable Taiwanisation of the central government and parliaments, so that by the late 1980s the ethnic imbalance was less discriminate. President Chiang himself showed a degree of localisation in his famous public statement that "I am Taiwanese." Although Chiang responded to Deng Xiaoping's (鄧小平) proposal of "One Country Two Systems" (一國兩制) with the "Three Nos" of "No contact, no communication and no compromise," there were signs of a thaw in relations at the unofficial level. A key aspect was the move in 1987 to allow the veterans to visit their relatives on the mainland. In the next few years trade across the Taiwan straits sky-rocketed. To deal with interactions and act as the government's advisory

⁴⁷³ For a detailed analysis of the DPP's shift towards TIC see Cheng and Hsu, "Issue Structure, the DPP's Factionalism and Party Realignment."

⁴⁷⁴ Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taipei, September 24, 2001.

agency the Mainland Affairs Council (陸委會 MAC) was set up, with the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (海協會) to handle practical relations. This went beyond Chiang's "Three Nos," as it allowed semi official negotiations between the two sides for the first time. However, movement away from orthodox KMT national identity was also seriously constrained by conservatives within the party. The party's commitment to unification was reaffirmed when the National Unification Council (國統會) was set up in 1990 and the Executive Yuan approved its National Unification Guidelines (NUG 國統綱領) in February 1991. These guidelines have remained KMT and government policy since. They laid out a three-stage process for reunification, and insist that before reunification is possible the mainland must be democratic, free and equally prosperous.⁴⁷⁵ In addition, the sinocentric state of the education curriculum remained intact. In short, despite moderation of some KMT positions, on the eve of the first democratic election in 1991 the KMT was located between the centre right and far right of the national identity spectrums.

5.3 Broad Trends in National Identity Emphasis 1991-2001

In this section I examine broad trends of national identity issue emphasis in campaigns over the 1990s. First, I review interview and newspaper ad data to see how salient these issues have been in Taiwan. Next I examine the extent parties have dominated or neglected national identity issues and if the parties' positions converged or diverged over the decade. Following this I look at broad changes in public opinion on these issues. Last I compare these findings with politicians' views of party change on identity issues.

⁴⁷⁵ For the NUG text see www.president.gov.tw/2_special/unification/te.html

5.3.1 How Salient is National Identity in Taiwan?

Table 2.2 shows three indicators of top ten issue salience in Taiwan, these are my official party newspaper ads issue top ten, Liu Tsung-wei's top ten issues for Legislative Yuan candidates' policy proposals in election gazettes, and my elite survey. My newspaper content analysis shows national identity has been a central issues in electoral propaganda, as both "Taiwan Independence: Positive" and "Negative" come in the top ten. In contrast, these issues were absent from Liu's combined top ten. My elite survey provided more support for the proposition that national identity is highly salient, with a consensus among politicians of all parties that national identity has been the most influential issue in elections. I followed this up with the question, "What issues have you and your party stressed most in elections over the last decade?" The results are displayed in Table 2.6, showing that national identity was the most stressed issue for politicians from all three parties.

5.3.2 Is National Identity an Owned Issue?

The next question is are national identity issues owned by any parties? Multiple data sources show a pattern of opposition to Taiwan independence being owned by the KMT and NP, and support for Taiwan independence as owned by the DPP. Firstly, Table 2.3 shows the main parties' official ads issue top tens from my newspaper content analysis for the whole decade. Taiwan independence issues have come in all three parties' top five. "Taiwan Independence: Negative" came third for the KMT, with an average issue mention of 7.6%, and second for the NP with 12.7%. In contrast, the DPP had three left wing issues in its top ten, with "Diluted Taiwan Independence" coming third with 8%, "Pure Taiwan Independence" came eighth with 4.3%, and "Taiwan Nationalism" came ninth with 3%. If these three categories are combined it becomes the second most stressed DPP issue of the decade behind

only "Political Corruption." The results for the DPP are similar to Liu Tsung-wei's study of candidates' policy proposals, as he found "Taiwan Independence: Positive" was the third most stressed issue for the DPP, however, unlike my results identity categories did not feature in Liu's top ten of the KMT or NP.⁴⁷⁶ I compare the average issue mentions for the whole decade detailed above with the frequency the issue appeared in parties' annual official newspaper ad issue top tens. These are shown in Table 2.4. Again "Taiwan Independence: Positive" has been dominated by the DPP and "Taiwan Independence: Negative" shared by the KMT and NP. "Taiwan Independence: Negative" was in the KMT's top ten in seven elections, and in the NP's top ten in four out of seven elections, coming first once, in 2000. The DPP's position is also clear with "Diluted Taiwan Independence" coming in its top ten in seven out of nine elections, coming first in 1996.

The next question is has there been convergence or leapfrogging on national identity issues? Figures 5.1 and 5.2 plot the parties' newspaper ad issue emphasis on the unification versus independence spectrum for total and official ads respectively. The figures for Taiwan independence are reached by subtracting the scores for "Taiwan Independence: Negative" from "Taiwan Independence: Positive." Therefore a positive score represents support for Taiwan independence, while a negative score represents an anti Taiwan independence stance. The figures again offer strong support for issue ownership, with "Taiwan Independence: Positive" dominated by the DPP, and "Taiwan independence: Negative" shared by the NP and KMT. While there has been some overlap between the KMT and NP, neither has leapfrogged the DPP. The figures show the parties began highly polarized in 1991 with a 40 point gap in the DPP and KMT's Taiwan independence scores, and a gap of over 20

⁴⁷⁶ Liu, "The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan," Table 8.1.

points was maintained until 1996. Since 1997 there has been a degree of convergence as the gap narrowed dramatically when the issue was de-emphasised. However, at the end of the decade, though the DPP and KMT are less polarized, the figures show they are still differentiated, with a gap of approximately eight points.⁴⁷⁷ Both figures show that the DPP's most distinctive peaks for "Taiwan Independence: Positive" were in 1991 and 1996, while the KMT was most critical of Taiwan independence in 1991, 1994 and 1995. The NP swung sharply to the right with its peak of attacking independence in 2000. The DPP has not shown a consistent trend of moderation on Taiwan independence. Though there was a fall in Taiwan independence emphasis after 1991, emphasis actually rose from 1994-1996, and moderation seems to begin only in 1997. This finding is similar Liu Tsung-wei's conclusion that DPP legislators' Taiwan independence emphasis rose from its tenth most stressed issue in 1989, to fourth in 1992, reached its peak of second in 1995, and only began to decline in 1998.⁴⁷⁸ My results for the official KMT ads show a more consistent pattern over the decade of opposition to Taiwan independence. However, in a sign that the KMT was attempting to appeal to DPP voters, it had positive Taiwan independence scores in 1992 and 1996.⁴⁷⁹

5.3.3 Public Opinion and National Identity

In this section public opinion surveys are examined to see the degree to which the public has changed its views on national identity issues and if they see the parties as having changed. I am interested to see if there is a correlation between the direction of party change shown by my propaganda content analysis and public opinion.

⁴⁷⁷ The differences are 7.65 and 8.65 points for official and total ads respectively.

⁴⁷⁸ Liu, "The Transition of the Democratic Progressive Party-Where is the Evidence?" Table 7.

⁴⁷⁹ The KMT only has a positive Taiwan independence score for total ads in 1992, but had a positive score for both total and official ads in 1996.

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show a number of significant trends from public opinion surveys on the two main identity issues of unification versus independence and Taiwanese versus Chinese identification. On the TongDu question, there has been a sharp fall in support for unification, from 55% in 1989 to 15.1% in 2002, a considerable rise for the status quo, from 28% in 1990 to over 50% since 1998 and a rise for independence, from 4% in 1990 to 19.7% in 2002. Ming Juzheng is correct in his analysis of change, stating that, "The whole public opinion distribution has altered from skewed to the right to centred on the centre."⁴⁸⁰ However, he also points out that, "Since moving here it has remained here rather than continuing to the left."⁴⁸¹ As regards self-identification the direction of change has been similar, however, the degree of change has been even greater. First, there has been a huge drop in respondents viewing themselves as Chinese, from 52% in 1989 to only 7.9% in 2002. Second, there has been a large rise in those identifying themselves as Taiwanese, from 16% in 1989 to 37.9% in 2002. Third, dual identification as both Taiwanese and Chinese has risen from 26% in 1989 to over 50% in 2002. Clearly most Taiwanese prefer to take the middle road on these contentious issues, with the majority preferring to maintain the status quo and have dual ethnic identity. However, a significant difference is that the decline in exclusive Chinese identity has been steeper than that of Chinese Unification, while the rise of Taiwanese identity has been much greater than that of Taiwanese independence. In addition, while Tongdu positions stabilized in 1996, Taiwanese self-identification has continued to grow. In short, these surveys show that Taiwan's public have moved from the right to the centre of the TongDu spectrum and from the right of the

⁴⁸⁰ Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taipei, November 5, 2001.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

self-identification spectrum to the centre left.

Next I examine party image surveys to test whether voters see parties as distinct on these issues and if the parties are seen to have changed. Firstly, a series of ESC surveys asked respondents to place themselves and the main political parties on a TongDu spectrum, with 0 the fastest possible independence and 10 unification as soon as possible. Figure 5.5 shows that the position of the average voter moved from 5.9 in 1994 to the centre (5.0) in 1996 and has remained there since. The KMT is seen to have moved towards the centre, from 6.8 in 1994 to 6.1 in 1996. But following the turnover of power it has reached its most rightwing position of 7.2 under Lian Zhan in 2001. The DPP is also seen to have followed a fluctuating course, moving from 3.0 in 1994 to reach its record left wing position of 2.0 in 1996 when fronted by Peng Mingmin. It showed a degree of moderation in 2000 following Chen Shuibian's election, reaching 3.2, however the party is seen to have once again shifted to the left in its first year in office, at 2.6 in 2001. The NP is seen to have shifted to the right in 1998 and continued this move towards the pole in 2001 when it reached 7.6.

Secondly, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show a series of NTU party image surveys. These found a stable proportion of mass respondents and elite see the DPP as a party that represents BSR and supports Taiwan independence. In contrast, there is more change in the KMT's case with a rise in the respondents seeing it as a party that represents both BSR and WSR from 52.9% in 1993 to 63.5% in 1996 and a drastic fall in the proportion seeing it as supporting unification from 63.9% in 1993 to only 33% in 1996. The DPP Survey Research Department carried out the final revealing

surveys in the late 1990s; these asked why respondents dislike the major parties.⁴⁸²

The results are shown in Table 4.3. While national identity responses did not feature in the replies regarding the KMT, the second most common reason to why respondents disliked the DPP was that it advocates Taiwan independence; while for the NP it was because it does not identify with Taiwan.⁴⁸³

The above surveys have shown that Taiwan's voters not only associate national identity issues with the main parties, but also have a clear perception of the parties' positions. Moreover the voters' perception of party position and change corresponds closely to the developments shown in my advertising data. Though Taiwan's parties are seen to have changed, the change is not too radical. Parties are still seen as distinct and there is still a wide gap between the average voter and all Taiwan's parties.

5.3.4 Politicians' View of Change

Next I look at the extent politicians themselves see their parties as having changed and if their perceptions of change fall in line with those in my advertising statistics, and public opinion.

Almost all DPP respondents agree that the party de-emphasised Taiwan independence in favour of other issues. For instance, according to legislator Chen Qimai, the DPP "changed from a fundamentalist (Taiwan independence) party to a centre left and pragmatic party."⁴⁸⁴ There are different views on the degree the DPP has moderated, with the reformist side of the party arguing the party has gone

⁴⁸² DPP Survey Research Department, "The 11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image," 5.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.

through a significant transition, and those from the New Tide Faction playing down change. However, the idea that the DPP has just made an adjustment rather than a complete abandonment of Taiwan independence cropped up repeatedly in many DPP interviews. For example, former DPP legislator Li Qingxiong (李慶雄) argues, "The DPP has not given up One China One Taiwan; it's just repackaged it. Originally it was one China one Taiwan and now it's two Chinas."⁴⁸⁵ While DPP Tainan Mayor Xu Tiancai stated, "I don't think it's a change; it's a modification not change. Nothing has changed, just something modified."⁴⁸⁶ Similarly, legislator Yan Jinfu (顏錦福) remarked that it has been the DPP's spin not substance that has changed, noting that, "They (our Taiwan independence ideals) have not changed. We have been looking for the right way to propagandise our ideals that can be more acceptable to the people."⁴⁸⁷

At the same time, some in the DPP feel moderation has not gone far enough. For example, DPP legislator Shen Fuxiong explained, "In a spectrum where 0 equals independence and 100 equals unification, at this point the DPP only embraces 0-32. I think if the DPP continues to do this, then there is no chance of becoming the majority party in the foreseeable future. I think that the DPP should invest from 10-45. And gradually, invisibly or skilfully the party should give up, surrender or give to someone else the 0-10 group. I think for any party, or politician, if you stretch your arm you cannot embrace from 0-50. That's too ambitious, not practical and people don't believe you. So I say we should learn from Tony Blair and give up the 0-10 sector and invest in the 11-45."⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁵ Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.

⁴⁸⁶ Xu Tiancai, interview by author, Tainan, August 25, 2001.

⁴⁸⁷ Yan Jinfu, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.

⁴⁸⁸ Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taibei, September 19, 2001.

There is more disagreement within the KMT over the degree of change both during the Li Denghui and post Li eras. Those that split away to form the NP argue that the KMT had strayed from its Chinese nationalist roots to an unacceptable degree. Most politicians remaining in the KMT agree that Li Denghui gave the party a more localised image and shifted emphasis away from traditional party issues. According to KMT advertising expert Fu Hekang, "Before 1994 the KMT's position was clearer, it was anti Taiwan independence, so they were always attacking people as being pro independence. But after 1994 they began to use the language of localisation and betraying Taiwan and became less direct in their censure of opponents, talking of loving Taiwan."⁴⁸⁹ However, many also feel that the party had not actually forsaken positions set in the early 1990's such as NUG and the One China principle. Legislator Mu Minzhu (穆閔珠) explains the change as limited to presentation, "We've not changed on national identity or cross strait relations. We may have had different methods."⁴⁹⁰ It was much more common to hear KMT politicians explaining consistency in their national identity positions. For instance, according to former Gaoxiong Mayor Wu Dunyi, "The KMT's position on national status has always been the most conservative and steady."⁴⁹¹ A common argument was that while the KMT maintained its consistency it has been Li Denghui that has actually changed. For instance, according to KMT legislator Pan Weigang (潘維剛), "I actually think the KMT's direction is the same as in the Li Denghui era, that our government had taken. Now we base our policies on the NUG and the 1992 consensus of One China different interpretations. So there has not been a great

⁴⁸⁹ Fu Hekang interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001.

⁴⁹⁰ Mu Minzhu interview by author, Taipei, October 2, 2001.

⁴⁹¹ Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.

change. It was Li Denghui himself that had some change.”⁴⁹²

The public impression that the KMT has swung back to the right since 2000 is also reflected in KMT politicians' views. Some see a return to the KMT's core values, while others see an unwelcome rightward shift. Wei Yong (魏鏞) falls into the former category, stating, “I had a strong conviction that sooner or later the KMT would revert to its original path. I was completely convinced that the KMT couldn't completely disown its party position. It was only a matter of time.”⁴⁹³ Similarly Chen Xuesheng sees a return to orthodoxy but also hopes for more change, noting “We've returned to that (1992) position, and the next step requires internal discussions within the KMT.”⁴⁹⁴ However, the rightward shift is unpopular with those of the old MKMT. For instance, a former KMT Propaganda Chief lamented, “I do not really identify with the new position on the Tongdu spectrum.”⁴⁹⁵

There is a consensus among those remaining in the NP that it has been consistently the most ideologically pure party on the right of Taiwanese politics. For instance, NP legislator Feng Huxiang (馮滙祥) claims the NP has always “opposed Taiwan independence and promoted unification.”⁴⁹⁶ Most NP politicians accept that there has been some change since the late 1990s. For instance, NP Chair Xie Qida noted, “For a while the NP seemed to have lost its ideals, it forgot them, but now we're proclaiming our ideals loud and clear.”⁴⁹⁷ Similarly, those that have left the party also see the party as having changed, but view this change in a more negative

⁴⁹² Pan Weigang interview by author, Taipei, September 24, 2001.

⁴⁹³ Wei Yong, interview by author, Taipei, November 5, 2001.

⁴⁹⁴ Chen Xuesheng, interview by author, Taipei, September 11, 2001.

⁴⁹⁵ Former KMT Party Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

⁴⁹⁶ Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

⁴⁹⁷ Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.

light.⁴⁹⁸ For instance, former NP magazine editor Yang Taishun (楊泰順) recalled debating the categorisation of the NP, "In the summer of 1995 I could definitely say that the NP was not a unification party. Of course now if you say the NP is a unification party, I cannot disagree."⁴⁹⁹

The above comments by politicians of all three parties show a number of significant trends. Firstly, the majority of politicians see their parties as having gone through a degree of position and emphasis change on national identity issues, however most agree the change has been limited. Moreover, the politicians' view on the direction and degree of change closely follows the patterns shown in my quantitative advertising analysis and the perceptions of party change among the general public found in survey data.

5.4 National Identity Sub-issues

Section 5.4 reviews development of the two main national identity sub-issues of Taiwan independence versus unification and Taiwanese identity versus Chinese identity in elections between 1991 and 2001. The main parties have all shown a degree of change in response to Taiwan's moderate electorate as election orientated leadership has tried to move parties towards the centre; however, change has also been constrained by party ideology and the strength of ideologically orientated factions. I test whether issue ownership applies for individual campaigns and at the level of sub-issues, has this sub-issue ownership altered and have the parties changed their actual positions over the decade.

⁴⁹⁸ Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001; Yao Liming letter, December 14, 2002.

⁴⁹⁹ Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001.

5.4.1 Taiwan Independence Versus Unification

In this section I plot the parties movement on the TongDu spectrum shown in Table 5.1. For all parties there has been a degree of change and reduced polarization, but this has been within ideologically constrained limits and issue ownership remained intact by the end of the decade. I show how the DPP has moved from the far left position of an ROT to its original centre left TongDu position calling for Taiwanese self-determination. However, even after coming to central office, the party appears unable to shift any further towards the centre. Similarly, though the KMT under Li Denghui moved from the right-wing NUG towards the TongDu centre, and even briefly to the centre left when he proposed the “Special State to State Relationship,” since 2000 it has reverted to its centre right stance of the early 1990s. The NP was founded at about the same right wing position as the KMT held in 1991. During the mid 1990s the party tried to de-emphasise TongDu in favour of social issues, and briefly attempted to take a central position in 1998. However, it swung back to the centre right in the late 1990s, and after 2000 it reached a position even further to the right than the KMT.

1991 National Assembly Election

On the eve of Taiwan's the first full democratic elections Taiwan's parties were at their most polarized state on the most salient political issue of the day. The DPP's calls for a ROT and new Taiwan constitution placed it on the far left of the TongDu spectrum. In response the KMT promoted the NUG, stressed stability and warned of the dangers Taiwan independence would bring, locating itself between the far and centre right. The wide gaps between the parties shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also reflect the gulf in TongDu positions in party propaganda. This polarization and clear issue ownership was also revealed in both parties' top tens, where the radical “Pure

Taiwan Independence” came first in the DPP’s official ads top ten, while the more moderate sub-issue of “Diluted Taiwan Independence” came only ninth.⁵⁰⁰ In contrast, for the KMT “Taiwan Independence: Negative,” came third in official ads.⁵⁰¹

The DPP’s 1991 campaign was remarkable in that both the party centre and candidates of all factions stressed “Pure Taiwan Independence.” The DPP party headquarters issued a number of full-page article style ads on why it advocated a ROT.⁵⁰² Moreover, for the first and last time, the DPP party centre was even prepared to make Taiwan independence demands on its TV ads. For instance, the on screen slogan “Let us establish a sovereign, independent Republic (of Taiwan).”⁵⁰³ The cross- factional emphasis on Taiwan independence is evident from the figure that 77.4% of the DPP candidates in my sample of newspaper ads in 1991 included references to “Pure Taiwan Independence.” A few examples of DPP ads give a flavour of the DPP’s far left campaign. Many DPP candidates gave themselves independence related titles. For example, Lin Zhuoshui (林濁水) was the “Engineer of the Taiwan Nation”(台灣國工程師).⁵⁰⁴ Lin Zhuoshui’s ad promoted a charity video titled “ROT defeats the ROC” (台灣共和國大勝中華民國),⁵⁰⁵ while a Wu Mingyang (吳銘洋) ad called on voters to write to the ROT Post-box (台灣共和國信箱) with views on why Taiwan must, will and can become independent.⁵⁰⁶

Another important aspect of the DPP’s “Pure Taiwan independence” appeal was its call for a new Taiwan constitution. Therefore the newspaper ads of almost all DPP

⁵⁰⁰ See Table 2.8.

⁵⁰¹ See Table 2.7.

⁵⁰² *Ziyoushibao*, December 11, 1991, 2.

⁵⁰³ Due to the Central Election Commission’s (CEC) stricter censorship, the DPP was forced to black out the characters “Taiwan” from this slogan.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ziyoushibao*, November 20, 1991, 5.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ziyoushibao*, December 14, 1991, 1.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, December 11, 1991, 1.

candidates carried the title, "Constitution Drafting National Assembly Candidate" (制憲國代候選人).⁵⁰⁷

Only a minority of DPP candidates took a softer tone. The alternative method was to campaign on those sub-issues I term "Diluted Taiwan independence," such as opposition to unification, or calls to rejoin the UN. Such appeals are much more acceptable to Taiwanese voters. For example, Wang Xuefeng's (王雪峰) slogan was "Are you willing to see the PRC's flag flying over Taiwan?" (你願意看五星紅旗在台灣飄揚嗎?).⁵⁰⁸

In 1991 the KMT did attempt to promote its vision of long-term unification under the NUG. For instance, a KMT newspaper ad optimistically argued, "At the most favourable time the NUG would allow us to unify the mainland's resources, labour and market." (國家統一綱領是要逐步在有利的時機,把大陸的資源,勞力,市場,統過來)⁵⁰⁹ However, as former Premier Hao Bocun recalled, "That election our (KMT) main theme was opposition to Taiwan independence."⁵¹⁰ This was achieved using the terror approach, warning how Taiwan independence would bring instability and war. A total of five KMT TV ads attacked the DPP's proposals, with slogans such as, "Independence will just incite others," reinforcing this message with images the Tiananmen massacre, and the PRC invading India and Vietnam. The KMT's "Eternal Opposition Party" TV ad offers other reasons against independence; the KMT's Wang Zhixiong (王志雄) argued that the link between Taiwan and the mainland is like an umbilical cord and so he opposes Taiwan

⁵⁰⁷ *Ziyoushibao*, November 20, 1991, 1.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ziyoushibao*, November 23, 1991, 4.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ziyoushibao*, November 25, 1991, 1.

⁵¹⁰ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

independence, while Taipei City Councillor Chen Xuesheng (陳學聖) cited the cases of Northern Ireland and Quebec to show how independence movements have led to recessions. The KMT was also poles apart from the DPP on the question of the constitution and UN application. The KMT's "Constitutional Revision" TV ad (修憲篇), explained that the constitution only required minor revisions and that the DPP's proposal for a fresh constitution would bring about recession, instability and even CCP invasion! Similarly, the KMT officially opposed applying to rejoin the UN, as Foreign Minister Qian Fu (錢復) argued this would increase Taiwan's security problems by angering Beijing.⁵¹¹

1992 Legislative Yuan election

1992 saw a radical shift in the TongDu patterns as both leading parties were going through a major transition. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the parties were less polarized and that issue ownership was more contested than the previous year. The DPP repackaged Taiwan independence into a more diluted form and also de-emphasised the issue in favour of domestic questions. The term "Republic of Taiwan" vanished from its ads and "Pure Taiwan Independence" fell from the DPP's official ad top ten, to be replaced by the more moderate "Diluted Taiwan Independence," which came second.⁵¹² According to DPP party chair Xu Xinliang, "I succeeded in changing the campaign themes into a different tone, not the basic, not fundamentalism."⁵¹³

However, the KMT's total and official ad scores are markedly different, reflecting the intense factional divisions within the party on national identity. In total ads the KMT score was actually supportive of Taiwan independence, while the party centre was silent on the issue in official ads. Clearly, the KMT was making its first attempt

⁵¹¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 1, 1991, 35.

⁵¹² See Table 2.8.

⁵¹³ Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.

to gain votes from the left of the Taiwanese political spectrum.

The DPP's softer approach involved slogans such as "want sovereignty" (要主權) and anti unification appeals. For instance, the TV ad "Because of us" stated one of the DPP's three main goals for the future was "Rebuilding Sovereignty" (主權重建). The anti unification message was seen in ad slogans such as, "One China is Taiwan's nightmare" (向一個中國靠岸是台灣的噩夢)⁵¹⁴, and Zhou Huiying's (周慧英) ad slogan "The KMT's One China is," (國民黨的一個中國就是) below which an ROC flag is shown being covered up by a PRC flag.⁵¹⁵ Although 1992 is the start of the DPP's transformation, the degree of moderation should not be exaggerated. Taiwan independence was still its second most stressed issue and a small minority of DPP candidates continued their Pure Taiwan independence stance, such as Chen Wanzhen's (陳婉真) slogan "Terminate the ROC" (終結中華民國).⁵¹⁶

The change in tone of KMT ads was apparent from the dropping of references to NUG and the way official KMT propaganda steered clear of the issue. However, KMT factions did not have this inhibition and spent more energy attacking inner party rivals' TongDu positions than the DPP. The New KMT Alliance accused the KMT's Wisdom Club (集思會) of Taiwan independence. For instance, the New KMT Alliance's Li Qinghua (李慶華) had the slogan "The Protector of the ROC, Li Qinghua" (捍衛中華民國的李慶華), in which Li demanded punishment for those in the party supporting the "One China, One Taiwan" (一中一台) position.⁵¹⁷ In contrast, the Wisdom Club took a Taiwan First (台灣優先) position close to the

⁵¹⁴ *China Times*, December 7, 1992, 21.

⁵¹⁵ *Ziyoushibao*, November 22, 1992, 1.

⁵¹⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, December 7, 1992, 6.

⁵¹⁷ *Lianhebao*, November 28, 1992, 1.

DPP on the centre left. The Wisdom Club also tried to show itself as being between the two extremes of the DPP and New KMT alliance. For instance an ad stated that “The Wisdom Club’s Wu Zi: Taiwan First, the New (KMT) Alliance’s Zhao Shaokang: unification first and the New Tide (DPP) Lu Xiuyi: Taiwan independence” (集思會的吳梓台灣優先, 新連線的趙少康統一優先, 新潮流的盧修一台灣獨立).⁵¹⁸

1993 Municipal Executive Elections

Taiwan independence was not a central election issue in 1993; however, the year was critical in the KMT’s move towards the centre. Although the KMT continued to use the terror tactic of attacking the DPP for supporting Taiwan independence, the KMT spoke less about “one china,” or the NUG, and in their place began to trumpet the ROC on Taiwan’s diplomatic achievements. An example of the KMT’s shift to the left was its U Turn on the UN issue. Although the KMT had opposed UN application in 1991, by 1993 it showed the issue was just too popular to ignore and began to actively apply to re-enter. However, unlike the KMT’s success over NHI, the repeated failure to even get the Taiwan application on the UN agenda meant the KMT was unable to gain much credit from stealing the issue.

1994 Provincial Governor and City Mayor Elections

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show independence was again a central question in 1994 and the Taiwan independence gap between the two main parties had widened. Unlike in 1992 the issue was no longer divisive for the KMT, thus its ads consistently attacked Taiwan independence, with “Taiwan Independence: Negative” coming third in its

⁵¹⁸ *Ziyoushibao*, December 12, 1992, 1.

official ads top ten.⁵¹⁹ However, in a new trend the KMT also attacked the right by accusing the NP of promoting rapid unification (急統). The DPP party headquarters attempted to de-emphasize Taiwan independence, with “Diluted Taiwan Independence” only coming eighth in its official ads top ten.⁵²⁰ In the NP’s first significant election, its candidate focused on making anti Taiwan independence attacks against both the KMT and DPP.

The DPP party centre and Provincial Governor candidate took anti unification TongDu positions similar to 1992. For example, a Chen Dingnan ad had the slogan “If Song Chuyu is elected the CCP will let off fire crackers” (宋楚瑜如當選,中共會放鞭炮), arguing that Song is the CCP’s first choice as he would pave the way for unification under the “One Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制).⁵²¹ Similarly an official DPP ad carried the slogan “Taiwan has only the one way street of refusing unification” (台灣只有拒絕統一的單行道).⁵²² However, Chen Dingnan’s talk of “changing the colour of the sky” (變天), gave him a more left wing image as the term was widely associated with independence. In contrast, in the Taibei mayoral race Chen Shuibian tried to avoid the TongDu in favour of domestic issues, as Chen stated “declaring Taiwan independence or not is not the power of a mayor.”⁵²³

The KMT gave great attention to this sub-issue to attack both the DPP and NP. Many KMT ads used the terror message, warning if the DPP won, the ROC would be in mortal danger. For example, according to a KMT ad, “Now certain parties are using the election period to propagate the traitorous Taiwan independence views and

⁵¹⁹ See Table 2.7.

⁵²⁰ See Table 2.8.

⁵²¹ *Lianhebao*, November 28, 1994, 1.

⁵²² *Lianhebao*, December 1, 1994, 8.

⁵²³ *Zhongyangribao*, December 13, 1994, 2.

wantonly making the rebellious demand for a change in the colour of the sky. They plan to use democratic methods to steal ruling power. We must expose their plot and totally denounce it.” (現在有的政黨就利用選舉期間廣為選唱台獨的叛國論調並大肆傳播變天的造反主張。企圖利用民主方式竊取政權，我們必須揭穿這些陰謀詭計!).⁵²⁴ Secondly, the KMT ads set a trend for the rest of the decade by attacking the NP and the DPP as extremists, with the KMT the moderate one in the middle. For example, a KMT ad’s slogan was “Refuse the Taiwan independence, violent and drug selling DPP, refuse the power seeking, profit seeking and rapid unification NP” (拒絕台獨, 暴力, 販毒的民進黨, 拒絕爭權, 奪利, 急統的新黨).⁵²⁵ Lastly, since the NP was such a threat in Taipei, the KMT also give particular attention to attacking it directly as an ally of the CCP. For instance, one ad noted the close similarity between NP and CCP rhetoric, and concluded, “The NP shouts loudly protect the ROC, actually it is forcing Taiwan to be annexed by the CCP.” (新黨高喊保衛中華民國其實只是在迫使台灣被中共併吞而已).⁵²⁶

While the DPP was trying to play down the independence issue in Taipei, the NP’s Zhao Shaokang exploited it to attack both the right and left. The DPP’s Chen Fangming recalled that, “On the one hand he (Zhao) reduced the KMT as the illegitimate party, as he is legitimate, and on the other he can attack Taiwan independence because he is the genuine KMT. So this kind of strategy is a two way attack.”⁵²⁷ In the televised debate Zhao began by dramatically predicting that,

⁵²⁴ *Lianhebao*, November 21, 1994, 15.

⁵²⁵ *Lianhebao*, November 11, 1994, 32. Drug selling refers to a case in which a DPP official in Pingdong was convicted of drug selling, and as DPP legislator Yan Jinfu commented, “the term Taiwan independence was vilified by them (KMT) as in Chinese “independence” (獨) has the same sound as “poison/drugs” (毒), so people were afraid of Taiwan independence.” Yan Jinfu, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.

⁵²⁶ *Lianhebao*, December 2, 1994, 50.

⁵²⁷ Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

“Taiwan is going to be destroyed! Destroyed in the Nazi/Fascist hands of the DPP,” and later he challenged Chen Shuibian, “I shout ‘long live the ROC,’ do you dare to shout ‘long live the ROC, long live the ROC, long live the ROC!’” In fact in the debate Zhao even accused KMT Chairman Li Denghui of having a “Taiwan independence Timetable.”

1995 Legislative Yuan Election

In the light of the PRC military exercises, national identity issues remained salient in 1995. The KMT continued to attack the DPP's independence policy and added the NP to its terror equation. In contrast the DPP took a softer approach, with the slogan of “Give Taiwan a Chance” (給台灣一個機會). The NP attacked both the DPP's Taiwan independence and KMT's “secret independence” (暗獨). From Figures 5.1 and 5.2 it appears that while the issue is less visible in total ads as Legislative Yuan candidates were more concerned with social issues, all three parties' official ads gave it heavy attention and the parties remained wide apart. Similarly ownership is clear in the parties' official ads top ten, “Diluted Taiwan Independence” was second for the DPP,⁵²⁸ while “Taiwan Independence: Negative” was second for the KMT.⁵²⁹

The DPP was seen to be further moderating after chairman Shi Mingde's 1995 statement in the US that “If the DPP becomes the ruling party, we will not need to, nor will we, declare independence...because Taiwan has already been independent for half a century.”⁵³⁰ This new interpretation meant a declaration of independence was no longer necessary, as the status quo was already equivalent to independence.

⁵²⁸ See Table 2.8.

⁵²⁹ See Table 2.7.

⁵³⁰ Lianhebao, September 15, 1995, 2.

As in previous campaigns the DPP focus was again on attacking unification and trying to link the KMT's policies to the PRC. For instance, a DPP ad asked, "Does the KMT stand on Taiwan's side or that of the PRC?" (國民黨到底站在台灣這邊, 還是在中華人民共和國那一邊?)⁵³¹ DPP TV ads tried to justify its anti unification stance by giving examples of negative consequences of unification, showing images of the Tiananmen incident and Hong Kong. The TV ad "The Jewel of the East" (東方之珠篇) quoted "Li Denghui repeatedly states that 'Taiwan is part of China,' step by step Li Denghui's policy will Hong Kongize Taiwan. Taiwan is not willing to become a second Hong Kong." While Mangliu TV ad (盲流篇), asked why should Taiwan lose everything for the sake of unification and ended with the slogan "Does Taiwan want to become a province of the PRC?" (台灣要不要成為中華民國的一省?).

The KMT maintained a similar balance between attacking the DPP for Taiwan independence and the NP for rapid unification. For instance, a number of KMT ads used the terror appeals, with the slogan "Giving the DPP a chance is giving Taiwan independence a chance, even more it is giving the CCP a chance to militarily attack Taiwan" (給民進黨一個機會就是給台獨一個機會, 更是給中共一個武力犯台的機會).⁵³² In addition, the NP was added to the terror equation. For instance, the ad slogan "Supporting the NP=supporting the DPP=supporting Taiwan independence." (支持新黨=支持民進黨=支持台獨).⁵³³

The other way the KMT appealed to voters on the left was trumpeting its diplomatic achievements. Although President Li's trip to Cornell University was condemned in

⁵³¹ Ziyoushibao, November 30, 1995, 12.

⁵³² *China Times*, November 30, 1995, 1.

⁵³³ *China Times*, November 30, 1995, 13.

the PRC as promoting Taiwan independence, it was extremely popular in Taiwan. The KMT attempted to take advantage of this sentiment with numerous ads in 1995 and 1996. In one 1995 TV ad Li's diplomatic achievements were described as "Mission Impossible" (不可能的任務), while the 1996 "Exceptional Person TV Ad" (非常人物篇) was disguised as a news report, showing clips of Li's diplomatic successes, especially Cornell, and shaking hands with world leaders such as Thatcher and Gorbachev.

With the DPP and KMT attacking it as a rapid unification and WSR party, the NP was forced to refute these accusations by shifting its emphasis to other issues, and toning down anti independence rhetoric. For instance, a full-page election manifesto newspaper ad explained, "The NP advocates seeking both sides of the strait to accept a federal system" (新黨主張,尋求兩岸接受邦聯制) and "Although we agree with unification, it is certainly not rapid unification." (我們雖然贊成統一,但決不是急統).⁵³⁴ This centrist approach paid dividends, as Figure 5.5 shows in the mid 1990s the NP was seen as being located at around the same position as the KMT on the centre right. However, it still needed to appeal to its core voters by attacking Taiwan independence. For instance, the NP ad slogan "There is no way that we will let Taiwan independence succeed" (決不讓台獨得逞) written across a picture of a pro independence demonstration.⁵³⁵ However, in its early years the NP was not an extreme unificationist party. According to the NP's Yang Taishun, though "we talked of protecting the ROC. When we joined the NP, we hadn't seen it as based on unification, as protecting the ROC and unification are two separate

⁵³⁴ *Lianhebao*, November 18, 1995, 32.

⁵³⁵ *China Times*, November 28, 1995, 5.

matters.”⁵³⁶

1996 Presidential election

The PRC's missile tests off the Taiwan coast were a warning to Taiwan's voters not to elect unacceptable pro independence candidates. As a result, in 1996, as in 1991 national identity and cross-straits issues submerged other matters. While DPP candidate Peng Mingmin's Taiwan independence positions were moving the party to the far left, the KMT's style was quite different from previous years as rather than strong anti independence terror appeals, it took the centre left approach of stressing Taiwan's diplomatic achievements and attacking the KMT defectors Lin and Hao as PRC spokesmen. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the gap between the KMT and DPP had reached its widest point since 1991, with the DPP reaching its highest official Taiwan independence score of 37.9. The key difference with 1991 was that “Diluted Taiwan Independence” replaced “Pure Taiwan Independence” as its dominant national identity sub-issue, coming first in its official top tens, while “Pure Taiwan Independence” came third.⁵³⁷ The KMT's leftward swing is clear, as this is the only year in which it reached positive Taiwan Independence scores in both its total and official ads. In fact, “Diluted Taiwan Independence” came third in the KMT official ad top ten.⁵³⁸ The NP showed more consistency, retaining its anti independence stance.

1996 was the last DPP Taiwan independence orientated campaign, however, the language use was more moderate than 1991. A significant absence was the term the

⁵³⁶ Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001.

⁵³⁷ See Table 2.8.

⁵³⁸ See Table 2.7.

ROT, as Peng recalled, "I never mentioned the ROT."⁵³⁹ However, his election slogan of "Peace, Dignity, Taiwan President" (和平尊嚴台灣總統) was seen as being more radical than the DPP party centre's 1995 slogan "Give Taiwan a chance." Also some of the campaign terminology was reminiscent of 1991. Firstly, Peng told voters to not fear war, for instance the slogan "Use a human wall to tell the world we want peace, use a human wall to tell China we are not afraid of war" (用人牆告訴世界,我們要和平, 用人牆告訴中國,我們不怕戰爭.)⁵⁴⁰ Also as in 1991 Peng was willing to use the word independence openly. For example, the ad slogan "Want independence, oppose unification, love peace." (要獨立,反統一,要和平)⁵⁴¹ Peng's campaign outlined the drawbacks of unification as the DPP did in 1995, but also claimed independence could bring benefits. For example, a Peng ad stated that, "Unification is surrender, unification will just lead to another 228 disaster. Only opposing unification can end the civil war between the KMT and CCP. By creating country with dignity, Taiwan will become an independent country and only then can we develop friendly relations with China" (統一就是投降,統一只會帶來另一次 228 的災難. 反統一才能結束國民黨與共產黨的內戰. 建立意尊嚴的國家,台灣成為獨立的國家,才能發展與中國友好關係.)⁵⁴²

By 1996 the KMT was a very different party from ten years earlier, as Secretary General Xu Shuide noted, "By then we didn't talk of unification."⁵⁴³ As in previous years the KMT made frequent appeals to its ROC legitimacy, however, the actual term used for the national title had begun to change, as the KMT moved towards "Diluted Taiwan Independence." This is apparent from the similarity between the

⁵³⁹ Peng Mingmin, interview by author, Taipei, October 31, 2001.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ziyoushibao*, March 8, 1996, 6.

⁵⁴¹ *China Times*, March 10, 1996, 8.

⁵⁴² *China Times*, March 10, 1996, 8.

⁵⁴³ Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

KMT line and Shi Mingde's 1995 statement. As Li Denghui explained, "Though the official name was the ROC, later I began to use the term the ROC on Taiwan and later it became Taiwan ROC, to give it a more local flavour. There is no meaning in talking of Taiwan independence. There is no need. We have already established something new here."⁵⁴⁴ Another difference was that for the first time KMT's attacks against the right actually exceeded those against the DPP, and were reminiscent of the KMT's anti DPP terror ads in the early 1990s. For instance, a KMT ad added a word to each component of the Lin Hao election slogan,⁵⁴⁵ "New Leadership=Jiang Zemin, New Order=People's Liberation Army, New Hope=Unified." (新領導=江澤民, 新秩序=解放軍, 新希望=被統一)⁵⁴⁶ It is also significant that the KMT was using the term unification, not rapid unification in a negative light. In addition, the KMT took a strong stand against the PRC's military threats, making it sound like the DPP, telling voters not to be intimidated by PRC threats. An example was an ad, which urged, "Let us use our votes to show that the whole nation is united, let China understand that its threats are not enough to break our confidence." (讓我們一致用選票顯示我們全國人民團結的力量, 讓對岸中國明白恫嚇不足擊跨我們的信心)⁵⁴⁷ It is also noteworthy that this is the first time the KMT ads referred to the PRC or the mainland as "China," echoing the DPP's use. A comment by Yao Jiawen shows the degree that Li Denghui is seen to be different from the old KMT, "Li Denghui spoke so strongly that Taiwan is Taiwan, the PRC is the PRC. We are the Taiwan ROC or the ROC on Taiwan. So those people who support Taiwan independence began to support Li Denghui."⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁴ Li Denghui, interview by author, October 17, 2001.

⁵⁴⁵ The Lin Hao slogan was "New Leadership, New Order, New Hope."

⁵⁴⁶ *Lianhebao*, March 12, 1996, 1.

⁵⁴⁷ *China Times*, March 10, 1996, 1.

⁵⁴⁸ Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taipei, October 2, 2001.

In the presidential campaign the missile tests gave the NP the opportunity to blame Li Denghui's gradual independence (緩獨) for bringing Taiwan to the brink of war. For instance, the NP ad slogan, "Don't let our children become Taiwan independence's cannon fodder (不要讓我們的孩子黨台獨的跑灰). The ad went on to explain, "To balance Li independence and DPP rapid independence, you can only rely on the NP." (制衡李獨與民進黨急獨只有靠新黨)⁵⁴⁹

Although its vote share was even lower in 1996 than in 1991 many DPP politicians do not view this as a DPP campaign. For example, Zhang Junhong stated that, "Instead of saying the DPP did badly that year, we could say the DPP did very well, because that year the real DPP party chairman was Li Denghui, the actual DPP chairman was elected president."⁵⁵⁰ It is possible that if Xu Xinliang had been the DPP's candidate, it would have been made a more convincing case that the DPP had transformed from a radical Taiwan independence party into one committed to maintaining the status quo. Instead Peng's campaign helped to reinforce the DPP's radical Taiwan independence party image.

1997 and 1998 Executive elections

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that Taiwan independence was not the dominant issue in 1997 or 1998. While the DPP avoided the issue, even the KMT's emphasis was lower than previous equivalent elections.

In both years the KMT still played the save the ROC and DPP=Taiwan independence=war terror cards. For instance, in 1997 "Taiwan Independence:

⁵⁴⁹ *Lianhebao*, March 12, 1996, 9.

⁵⁵⁰ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

Negative” reached fourth in the KMT’s official ads top ten.⁵⁵¹ While a year later the KMT also used Taiwan independence to attack Chen Shuibian, though to a lesser extent than in 1994. An example of this was the KMT ad slogan, “The DPP only dares to shout about the TIC to Taiwan independence fanatics, when faced with the stability loving middle class it puts on the mask of happiness and hope.” (民進黨台獨綱領,只敢對台獨狂熱份子喊,面對期望安定的中產階級,就戴起快樂,希望的面具).⁵⁵² However, once again the KMT also made appeals to the left. Firstly, the party had cooperated with the DPP to abolish the Provincial Government following the 1996 NDC. This was something the KMT had previously passionately opposed.⁵⁵³ The new centre left tone was visible in a comment in a KMT TV ad by a superstore manager that “Taiwan has become an international country,”⁵⁵⁴ while a newspaper ad praised the KMT’s success in freezing the Provincial Government.⁵⁵⁵

By 1998 the NP had lost the momentum of its growth stage of 1994-1996. Some in the party felt that it needed to reach out to Taiwanese voters by taking a more centrist stance on the TongDu issue, and so in February 1998 a group of younger reformers led by Yao Liming (姚立明) proposed the concept of “One China, Two Countries” (一中兩國). However, the concept was rejected by the parties’ founders, such as Li Qinghua who denounced it as a form of Taiwan independence. The defeat of the “One China Two Countries” proposal was according to Yang Taishun, “a signal at that time that the NP was moving to the right.”⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵¹ See Table 2.7.

⁵⁵² *China Times*, November 20, 1998, 30.

⁵⁵³ In 1993 the KMT warned that among the dangers of the DPP winning office was that it would “abolish the province.” (廢省) See *Lianhebao*, November 19, 1993, 1.

⁵⁵⁴ Note that in the ad he says “international country” in English.

⁵⁵⁵ *China Times*, December 4, 1998, 38.

⁵⁵⁶ Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001.

In the approach to the 2000 presidential election the DPP attempted to convince voters of its moderation on the TongDu issue and its ability to handle cross strait relations. The first measure was the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” (台灣前途決議文).⁵⁵⁷ As the DPP’s Yan Jianfa (顏建發) noted after the 1998 defeat “we began to re-examine the policy lines, one of these was about the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future.”⁵⁵⁸ This document formally took the DPP back to its original centre left principal of Taiwanese self-determination and also officially recognised the ROC for the first time. Basically this formalised Shi Mingde’s 1995 statement. The second move was Chen Shuibian’s speeches on the New Central Way (新中間路線), which referred to a vague middle way in the TongDu spectrum.

While the DPP was attempting to move towards the centre, Li Denghui tried to drag his party to the centre left. On a German radio interview Li claimed that there is no need to declare Taiwan independence as since Taiwan’s 1991 constitutional revisions cross strait relations can be defined as a “Special State to State Relationship.” (特殊國與國的關係)⁵⁵⁹ These remarks were referred to by Li’s enemies as the “Two State Theory” (兩國論), and viewed as tantamount to Taiwan independence. This was seen as the KMT’s most left wing position of the decade on the TongDu spectrum. However, Chen Shuibian and most leading KMT figures, including KMT presidential candidate Lian Zhan made statements supporting Li’s concept. Although independent presidential candidate Song Chuyu attacked it, he made a similar proposal of “Quasi State to State Relations.”⁵⁶⁰ The event created heavy attacks from China and also displeasure in Washington, but was actually

⁵⁵⁷ See www.dpp.org.tw for details.

⁵⁵⁸ Yan Jianfa, interview by author, Taipei, October 4, 2001.

⁵⁵⁹ www.gio.gov.tw/info/99html/0709c.htm

⁵⁶⁰ www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/01/03/print/0000018075

popular among Taiwanese in surveys.⁵⁶¹ The PRC demanded that Taiwan retract the “Two State Theory,” and finally in October 1999 Li calmed tensions when he stated that the “Special State to State Relationship” came under the NUG.

2000 Presidential Election

The 2000 presidential election was one of the most closely fought contests in Taiwan’s history. The KMT’s campaign tone was closer to 1991 than 1996, as it concentrated on attacking the left rather than the right. It did this by playing the terror card warning that DPP Taiwan independence would bring war, and unlike 1995-1996 no mention was made of the KMT’s record of pragmatic diplomacy, seeming to view these adventures with embarrassment. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show KMT’s was considerably more anti Taiwan independence than the previous presidential contest. The trend was even more apparent in TV ads, with nine KMT TV ads attacking Taiwan Independence. While the KMT was moving to the right, the DPP moved towards the centre. The DPP’s Taiwan independence score was also much more moderate than four year earlier, with “Diluted Taiwan Independence” coming fifth in its official ad top ten.⁵⁶² The most radical results were for the NP, which had a record Taiwan independence score of -74.99 in official ads, reflecting its sharp swing to the right.

In response to the KMT’s terror message the DPP tried to show its recent moderation on cross strait relations. The classic example was the DPP’s Guantian TV ads (官田篇), which showed Chen’s relatives, childhood friends and neighbours. As the DPP’s Zhang Yishan (張益贍) recalled, “We knew the KMT would play the

⁵⁶¹ See www.mac.gov.tw

⁵⁶² See Table 2.8.

war or terror card, so we used the 90 second Guantian ad...the ad showed that Chen Shuibian would protect his people and not take any risks.”⁵⁶³ In addition, the DPP mocked the KMT’s constant use of the terror ads, “At the critical moment before every election (the KMT) frightens the Taiwanese people, wildly announcing that if Chen Shuibian is elected the CCP will attack, this is treating the Taiwanese like trying to fool a three year old child” (在最後關鍵投票時刻嚇唬台灣人民, 拼命宣傳如果陳水扁當選, 中共就會動武...把台灣人當作三歲小孩子來欺騙).⁵⁶⁴

However, it was also imperative to demonstrate that a DPP government would stand up to China. Therefore a number of DPP ads reflected the party’s principle of self-determination. For instance, a newspaper ad showed a picture of the Hong Kong leader Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) and reminded voters that “We are electing a president, not appointing the head of a special administrative zone” (我們在選總統, 不是在任命特區首長).⁵⁶⁵ In fact the text of this ad showed some inheritance from previous “Diluted Taiwan Independence” DPP campaigns, “The president is ours, the country is also ours, we have worked hard for so many years to be able to decide our own president. This is the value of democracy and is Taiwan’s baby. On March 18, let us all stand up, for our own country, choose our own president!” (總統是自己的, 國家也是自己的. 我們打平了那麼多年, 爲的就是自己決定自己的總統, 這是民主的可貴, 也是台灣的寶貝. 三月十八日, 大家站出來, 爲自己的國家, 選出自己的總統.).⁵⁶⁶

The KMT’s Luo Xingwang described his party’s basic message in 2000 as

⁵⁶³ Zhang Yishan, interview by author, Taipei, October 25, 2001.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ziyoushibao*, March 13, 2000, 5.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ziyoushibao*, March 17, 2000, 16.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, March 17, 2000, 16.

“concentrate on Lian Zhan representing stability and the DPP Taiwan independence and war.”⁵⁶⁷ Lian Zhan dropped references to the state-to-state theory, instead he talked of the NUG, something the KMT had rarely mentioned for years. However the most consistent KMT theme of the 2000 campaign was the anti Taiwan independence terror card that the KMT last used heavily in 1994. The KMT TV ad that received the most attention and TV play was the “Off to War Ad” (出征篇). This showed a group of youngsters singing “I’m off to war, I’m off to war, because of Abian’s one sentence advocating Taiwan independence, I’m off to war” (我現在要出征 因為阿扁一句台獨主張, 我要出征). The narrator explained that “because of Abian’s one sentence “Long Live Taiwan independence” Taiwan will be engulfed in the fires of war and 85% of Taiwan’s 20-29 year olds will immediately go to the battlefield” (陳水扁一句台獨萬萬歲台灣將烽火連天. 台灣 85%20-29 歲男子將立即上戰場), the ad ended with the youngsters waving goodbye and the slogan “Abian shouts Taiwan independence, war starts in the Taiwan Strait” (阿扁喊台獨, 台海起戰火).

With the fading of the NP, Song became the KMT’s rival on the right. However, in sharp contrast to previous campaigns the KMT drastically reduced its accusations of rapid unification. The only exception was when the KMT still tried to portray itself as the moderate in between the two extremes. For example a KMT ad showed the three candidates’ faces, below Chen were the words “Rapid independence” (急獨), under Lian was “no speeding” (不超速) and under Song was “rapid unification” (急統).⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶⁷ Luo Xingwang, interview by author, Gaoxiong, March 29, 2000.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ziyoushibao*, March 16, 2000, 1.

The NP's rightward swing continued under their new chairman Li Qinghua with the nomination of Li Ao (李敖) as the NP's presidential candidate. The NP resembled the DPP's 1996 campaign in that it became exclusively centred on TongDu. The party placed a series of small slogan ads on opposing Taiwan independence, with slogans such as "Concentrate votes to oppose Taiwan independence and the Two State Theory" (集中選票反對台獨, 兩國論)⁵⁶⁹ Also significant was that while previous NP's election manifestoes had talked of a Federal system (聯邦制), this term was dropped in 2000. Instead Li Ao's manifesto promised to research the PRC's "One Country Two Systems" model, despite the fact the NP was officially opposed to the model.⁵⁷⁰ As Li's running mate Feng Huxiang explained, "At the early stage the NP advocated a Federal System (聯邦制). Later we changed."⁵⁷¹

March 2000–December 2001 Legislative Yuan Election

In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election the DPP has moved towards the centre, while KMT and NP have drifted towards the centre right and far right of the TongDu spectrum respectively. However, the degree of change for the two major parties should not be exaggerated.

The DPP has continued its moderation since 2000. According to Chen Qimai, "Your (British) Labour Party spent a long time transitioning before coming to power. We (DPP) are transitioning after coming to power."⁵⁷² On being elected president, Chen Shuibian tried to reassure voters and the world in his inauguration speech on May 20. He promised that during his presidency he would not declare independence,

⁵⁶⁹ *China Times*, March 17, 2000, 1.

⁵⁷⁰ Lu Ruizhong, interview by author, Taipei, April 10, 2000.

⁵⁷¹ Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

⁵⁷² Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.

change the national title, put the state-to-state theory into the constitution, hold a referendum on TongDu or abolish the NUG or NUC. These became known as the “Five Nos.”⁵⁷³ In addition, Chen has talked of a possible future One China, One China as an issue to discuss, One China under the ROC constitution, the idea of future “integration” between the two sides of the straits on a EU model, and the DPP party chair stated that unification is a possible option in the future. However, none of these ideas have been incorporated into DPP resolutions. The only major resolution since coming to power was in 2001 when the party decided that the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” is higher in status than the TIC.⁵⁷⁴ Moreover, in a sign that Chen must still please the New Tide and fundamentalists he has not gone too far in his friendly gestures to China. For instance, after discussions the TIC was not removed and Chen has rejected the KMT’s demand that he accept the so-called “92 Consensus” of “One China with different interpretations.” Moreover, in 2002 Chen invented a new “Diluted Taiwan Independence” term, when he talked of “one country on either side” (of the Taiwan Strait) and stated that this could be a key electoral issue in the forthcoming presidential contest.⁵⁷⁵ Figure 5.5 shows the limits of DPP moderation are clearly perceived by the public who actually view the DPP to having moved back towards the left since coming to power.

Since losing central power, the KMT has reverted back to its centre right TongDu positions of the early 1990s, rediscovering an enthusiasm for the “One China principle” and the NUG.⁵⁷⁶ One of the KMT’s most consistent themes in the post

⁵⁷³ See www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/05/21/36952

⁵⁷⁴ www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20011024/20011024o1.html

⁵⁷⁵ www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/07/26/2003060978

⁵⁷⁶ Moody, “Recovering the Mainland.”

2000 period has been to blame the cross strait tensions and the recent economic recession on the DPP government's failure to accept the "One China principle." Lian Zhan's most important national identity policy proposal was his Confederacy Model (邦聯制), which was discussed in the party in early 2001 and again in 2003. In Taiwan it was viewed as moving the party to the right. As KMT legislator Chen Hongji explained, "I opposed it. It will make people think we're more pro unification. If we followed the concept, we'd be attacked and lose localized votes."⁵⁷⁷ In addition, it also has ceased its anti rapid reunification attacks on both the NP and PFP as it seeks to create the environment for Pan-Blue cooperation in the 2004 election.

The NP has also continued to move to the far right since 2000 under the leadership of Xie Qida. Firstly, the party conducted the first party-to-party negotiations with the CCP in 2001, something neither the KMT nor the PFP has yet been prepared to do. Xie described the situation of how "The biggest party in China and the smallest party in China, the CCP Taiwan office and the NP's Mainland China office sat down together to negotiate. It was really fun!"⁵⁷⁸ Secondly, in 2001 the NP announced their new official policy of "One Country Three Systems." This is a variation on the PRC's "One Country Two Systems" model that has been applied to Hong Kong. In the 2001 election the controversial NP legislator Feng Huxiang went even further when his bus poster ads claimed, "One China Two Systems Saves Taiwan!"(一國兩制救台灣). Indeed given that in 2001 the self designated "Vanguard of the Unification Movement," Feng Huxiang received the most media attention in the NP, it is not surprising that the party is seen as increasingly extreme pro rapid

⁵⁷⁷ Chen Hongji, interview by author, Taipei, September 14, 2001.

⁵⁷⁸ Xie Qida, interview by author, Taipei, September 7, 2001.

unification.⁵⁷⁹

In short, my qualitative review of election propaganda on the TongDu sub-issue shows a very similar pattern to that of the quantitative content analysis and survey data. All show the main parties have moved towards the centre of the spectrum in an attempt to claim the middle ground. However, movement is constrained and thus the parties have not leapfrogged or converged on the centre. Although there have been some attempts at issue sub-issue stealing, by the end of the decade TongDu issue ownership remained intact.

5.4.2 Taiwanese Versus Chinese Identity

The sub-issue of Taiwanese versus Chinese identity has also been a regular feature of election campaigns and the direction of party change on this issue has been quite similar to the TongDu question. For details of this spectrum see Table 5.2.

The KMT began the decade mainly stressing ROC Chinese identity symbols, such as the ROC flag, and Chiang Ching-kuo. Therefore placing itself on the right of the identity spectrum on Table 5.2. However, since the fall of Hao Bocun in early 1993, the KMT flirted with the centre left of the identity spectrum to a greater degree than on the TongDu question. It tried to steal the DPP's popular Taiwanese identity appeals. However, the KMT has tried to ensure it projects an inclusive Taiwan identity image that would not alienate its WSR supporters. However, the limits to change are apparent from the KMT's swing back to the right as it returned to traditional ROC Chinese identity symbols after the fall of Li Denghui.

⁵⁷⁹ Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

Although the DPP did not include either Taiwan or China in its party name, it has been an exclusively Taiwanese party that completely rejects Chinese identity. The DPP's badge, a map of Taiwan is the ultimate symbol of Taiwanese identity. This has been a unifying force for the party, as DPP candidates have been far more likely to employ their party badge in ads than their KMT rivals.⁵⁸⁰ Other symbols of Taiwanese identity that have been regular features of the DPP's campaigns include love for Taiwan, loyalty to Taiwan, use of the Minnan dialect, local Taiwanese culture, and the tragic appeal, which involves references to historical episodes such as the 228 Incident and White Terror (白色恐怖). The DPP has shown some signs of change, in that it has tried to drop the tragic appeal since the mid 1990s and also it now tends to use Mandarin in the national media. However, even since coming to power the DPP has retained its Taiwan centred approach.

As in the case of TongDu, the DPP and KMT began democratic elections in 1991 at opposite ends of the Taiwanese versus Chinese identity spectrum on Table 5.2. With Hao Bocun in a strong position in both the party and government, the KMT candidates were more likely to the official party title of Chinese KMT than in subsequent elections. Moreover, KMT ads employed ROC nationalist symbols such as Chiang Kai-shek.⁵⁸¹ In contrast, the DPP stressed Taiwanese nationalist symbols, such as the ROT flag.⁵⁸² One DPP candidate even raised his involvement in an assassination attempt against Chiang Ching-kuo to appeal for anti Chinese votes.⁵⁸³

In 1992 while the DPP maintained its Taiwan identity appeals from the previous

⁵⁸⁰ In my content analysis scheme this finding applied to almost every election since 1991.

⁵⁸¹ *Ziyoushibao*, November 25, 1991, 1.

⁵⁸² *Ziyoushibao*, December 11, 1991, 5.

⁵⁸³ *Ziyoushibao*, December 10, 1991, 1.

year, the issue was highly divisive within the KMT as the pro Hao NMKMT and pro Li MKMT used identity symbols in their inner party struggle. The DPP and KMT Wisdom Club tried to mobilize anti WSR feelings. In the words of Hao Bocun, “Li Denghui manipulated provincial consciousness.”⁵⁸⁴ Both the MKMT and DPP placed ads accusing WSR figures in the KMT of planning to betray Taiwan to China. There is little difference between DPP Zhou Huiying’s slogan of “The holy way to overthrow the Hao (Bocun) Zhao (Shaokang) Betray Taiwan Consortium” (打倒郝/趙賣台集團的聖戰)⁵⁸⁵ and the Wisdom Club’s “Down with the KMT’s Betray Taiwan Four Traitors” (打倒國民黨賣台四奸).⁵⁸⁶ Similarly, the DPP cast doubt on Hao’s loyalty to Taiwan in its TV ad titled “Hao Bocun’s Sayings” (郝柏村嘉言), which showed him saying, “I love Taiwan, I love the mainland even more” (我愛台灣, 我更愛大陸). The DPP extremists’ attacks were even stronger, such as Zhou Huiying’s ad showing a cartoon of her with a knife preparing to kill a fat pig with Hao’s face.⁵⁸⁷ Another aspect of the DPP’s campaign was the Taiwanese tragic appeals. Three DPP TV ads told stories of how dissidents’ families been persecuted during the white terror period.

Like the TongDu case, the turning point in the KMT’s move to the centre left on the identity spectrum was Premier Hao Bocun’s resignation in 1993. From this point the KMT increasingly gained a more localised image and competed with the DPP over Taiwan identity. This change was apparent when in May 1994 Li Denghui gave an interview to the Japanese writer Shiba Ryotaro (司馬遼太郎) in which he claimed

⁵⁸⁴ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ziyoushibao*, November 22, 1992, 1.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, November 29, 1992, 1.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ziyoushibao*, December 5, 1992, 5. Since the 1940s pigs had been a term of abuse against WSR.

the KMT had been an “alien regime” (外來政權).⁵⁸⁸ This interview created a stir both in China and in Taiwan. According to Hao Bocun, “He completely betrayed the KMT, he was taking the DPP line.”⁵⁸⁹ While in 1992 the DPP and the KMT’s Wisdom Club Faction had dominated appeals to Taiwan identity, in 1993 the KMT party centre joined the fray. There was little to distinguish both main parties’ love for Taiwan in their official slogans. The DPP’s was “Anti Money Politics, Clean Government, Love Taiwan, Want Social Welfare, Good Government into the Next Century” (反金權, 清廉疼台灣, 要福利, 勤正跨世紀),⁵⁹⁰ while the KMT’s was “Taiwan First, Love our Country” (台灣優先, 愛鄉情懷).⁵⁹¹

The KMT’s shift towards a more Taiwanese image meant that the newly formed “Chinese New Party” inherited the KMT’s ROC Chinese nationalist messages. This was apparent from the high proportion of Chinese nationalist references in its first election in 1993⁵⁹² and the party’s choice of yellow for its flag, a colour that according to the NP’s Lu Ruizhong (盧瑞鍾) “is a symbol of China.”⁵⁹³

In the four elections from 1994 to 1998 both the DPP and KMT moved in a meandering fashion towards the centre left or inclusive Taiwanese identity position on the Table 5.2 spectrum. The DPP’s identity shift began in 1994 with Chen Shuibian’s Taipei mayoral campaign, which tried to avoid ethnic mobilization. In fact, his slogan of “Happiness, Hope, Chen Shuibian” (快樂, 希望, 陳水扁) was a rejection of the old tragic appeals such as 228. As Zhang Yishan recalled, “In the

⁵⁸⁸ For a full transcript of the interview see Lei (雷鳴) *Do Mainlanders Still Have a Future?* 75-92. I have used Stephane Corcuff’s translation of this book title, Corcuff, *Memories of the Future*, 101.

⁵⁸⁹ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ziyoushibao*, October 29, 1993, 7.

⁵⁹¹ Point made by Zhu Xiaoci, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

⁵⁹² See Table 2.9.

⁵⁹³ Lu Ruizhong, interview by author, Taipei, April 10, 2000.

past the DPP had stressed the tragedy of the Taiwanese (台灣人的悲哀), and activities tended to have a tragic atmosphere (悲情的氣氛). In 1994 the tone was completely different, with the slogan happiness and hope.”⁵⁹⁴

However, the DPP party centre and Provincial Governor candidate Chen Dingnan preferred a more traditional Taiwanese ethnic appeal. Facing a WSR candidate and an electorate that is over 90% BSR, it was believed that the message Taiwanese should vote for Taiwanese, not a WSR, would be effective. For instance, a Chen Dingnan ad outlined the importance of the election with its slogan “This is the first time Taiwanese have the chance to change history, choosing the Provincial Governor, of course Taiwanese must support Taiwanese.” (台灣人第一次有機會改變歷史, 選省長, 台灣人當然要支持台灣人)⁵⁹⁵ Other ads attacked the hypocrisy of KMT candidates, claiming, “They just love Taiwan for votes. At election time they do not dare say they are Chinese, but show how much they love Taiwan.” (爲了選票才來愛台灣. 選舉到了, 他們都不敢說自己是中國人, 並爭先恐後表示他麼愛台灣).⁵⁹⁶ The DPP also opened up a new vein in the sub-issue by attacking the KMT and Song for oppressing Taiwanese culture while head of the Government Information Office. A Chen Dingnan ad asked, “Who suppressed Wen Xia and Hong Yifeng?” (誰封殺文夏洪一峰?) This attacked Song for imposing restrictions on the broadcasting of Taiwanese music and so ruining the careers of Taiwanese singers.⁵⁹⁷ Another DPP ad focusing on linguistic issues showed the picture of an infant crying with the slogan “Ten Dollar Fine for Speaking Taiwanese” (講台語罰十塊), bringing back memories of fines for speaking Taiwanese.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁴ Zhang Yishan, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ziyoushibao*, November 26, 1994, 32.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ziyoushibao*, December 1, 1994, 13.

⁵⁹⁷ *Lianhebao*, November 27, 1994, 21.

⁵⁹⁸ *China Times*, November 30, 1994, 12.

In 1994 the KMT also ran quite distinct campaigns, appealing to the centre left in the Provincial Government race and centre right in Taipei. In the former campaign, it did not need to worry about defection of the WSR, as the NP lacked a serious candidate. Therefore Song's ads did not stress ROC nationalist symbols; instead, they needed to show Song's Taiwanese credentials. This was achieved by Li Denghui's vigorous campaigning for Song, and also Song had learned enough Taiwanese to make parts of his speeches in this language. Song was also able to refute the DPP's attacks on his anti Taiwanese attitude with the fact that the most popular Taiwanese entertainer Zhu Geliang (豬哥亮) actually actively campaigned for Song. KMT ads also attacked the NP in a tone similar to the 1992 Wisdom Club. For instance, an ad called the NP claim to be able to delay a CCP military attack by making five phone calls "Five Phone calls sell out Taiwan"(五通電話賣台).⁵⁹⁹

In Taipei the KMT faced both strong DPP and NP candidates, but also a much larger WSR population. This meant that it was essential for the KMT to show its ROC nationalist credentials, thus in many of the Huang Dazhou ads the ROC flag featured prominently. For instance, a half page ad showed a picture of Huang Dazhou, the ROC and KMT flags, with the dramatic slogan "This is a battle for survival" (這是一場生存之爭).⁶⁰⁰ In addition, Huang's ads specifically attacked Chen Shuibian's patriotism; by showing a picture Chen's controversial 1989 ad with the slogan "Would this kind a man raise the ROC flag?" (這樣的人會升起中華民國國旗嗎?)⁶⁰¹ The KMT was also trying to place itself as the moderate option at

⁵⁹⁹ *Ziyoushibao*, November 10, 1994, 13.

⁶⁰⁰ *China Times*, November 19, 1994, 41.

⁶⁰¹ *Lianhebao*, November 22, 1994, 18. This 1989 Chen Shuibian ad carried the slogan, "Long Live Taiwan Independence."

the centre right. For instance, a KMT ad carried the slogan “We are all Taiwanese, even more we are Chinese” (我們都是台灣人, 更是中國人). This ad went on to attack the DPP for stirring up ethnic tensions and shouting “Chinese pigs go back” (中國豬滾回去).⁶⁰²

In 1995 the DPP’s new propaganda chief, Chen Wenqian tried to give the DPP a more inclusive image. The DPP’s party centre projected a theme of reconciliation between parties and ethnic groups in the face of the CCP’s threats. This shift was symbolized in the famous coffee meeting between the NP and DPP leaders in 1995⁶⁰³ and the DPP’s election ad slogan “Time of reconciliation, towards a united government” (迎接大和解時代, 走向大聯合政府). The text of a DPP ad explained that “Only through democratic procedures, and learning mutual tolerance, can Taiwan’s 21 million create the consensus of being in the same boat, and together face the Chinese challenge” (只有經由民主程序, 互相學習包容與寬容, 台灣二千一百萬人才可能凝聚共識, 同在一條船, 共同面對來自中國的挑戰).⁶⁰⁴ However, the message of reconciliation was probably not totally convincing as some DPP candidates such as Chen Sansi (陳三思) did try to mobilize anti WSR sentiments in Gaoxiong County.⁶⁰⁵

In 1995’s legislative election the KMT came under pressure from the NP thus it had to appeal to its traditional supporters. Therefore it released a series of TV ads focusing on the life stories of WSR veterans and their contribution to Taiwan. In addition, for the last time, Li Denghui was portrayed as the inheritor of the KMT

⁶⁰² *Lianhebao*, December 1, 1994, 1.

⁶⁰³ www.new7.com.tw/weekly/old/490article032.html

⁶⁰⁴ *Lianhebao*, November 28, 1995, 12.

⁶⁰⁵ *China Times*, November 24, 1995, 1.

mantle by showing him below pictures of Sun Yat-sen and the two Chiang presidents.⁶⁰⁶

In 1996's presidential election the DPP turned its back on the party headquarters' reconciliation slogans. For example, a Peng ad called on voters to "Wake Up Taiwanese. Save Taiwanese, Support Peng Mingmin." (醒醒吧!台灣人,搶救台灣人,支持彭明敏).⁶⁰⁷ Peng's badge was a whale in the shape of Taiwan; this also symbolized Taiwan's maritime culture as opposed to the conservative continental China. Similarly a Peng ad carried the slogan, "Protest against the brutal China, fight for the civilized Taiwan." (向粗暴的中國抗議, 爲文明的台灣打平)⁶⁰⁸ Peng's campaign also returned to the tragic appeals that Xu Xinliang and Shi Mingde had been trying to move the party away from. As the DPP's Zhang Zhihong (張志弘) explained, "In 1995 the DPP tried to use the new style image, but this was reversed with the 1996 Peng Mingmin campaign."⁶⁰⁹ For instance, a Peng ad argued that the blame for the 228 incident lies with the KMT, and Li Denghui is a continuation of such rule.⁶¹⁰

By 1996 the KMT's Taiwan identity tone reached its most centre left position to date. In TV ads the ROC and Taiwan were used interchangeably. Moreover, many Li Denghui ads used maps of Taiwan, for instance one TV ad showed many sticks coming together in the shape of Taiwan.⁶¹¹ Although the ROC flag again featured prominently, there were none of the old style appeals such as Sun Yat-sen or to

⁶⁰⁶ *China Times*, November 24, 1995, 1.

⁶⁰⁷ *Ziyoushibao*, March 9, 1996, 11.

⁶⁰⁸ *Lianhebao*, March 12, 1996, 1.

⁶⁰⁹ Zhang Zhihong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, March 30, 2000.

⁶¹⁰ *Ziyoushibao*, March 1, 1996, 1.

⁶¹¹ *China Times*, March 12, 1996, 20.

veterans, these were surrendered to the NP. In one KMT ad the language used was also similar to the DPP, “Every one of our votes may influence whether in the future we will continue to be our own masters or again become the fat meat in the mouths of alien rulers” (我們每一個人的一票, 都可能影響我們將來是繼續做自己的主人, 還是再度淪為外來統治者口中的肥肉).⁶¹² Moreover the KMT’s new Taiwan first views were shown in an ad quoting Li Denghui as saying “If we can not succeed in Taiwan, what can we say of cherishing the Mainland?” (不能立足台灣談啥胸懷大陸?).⁶¹³

In the mid 1990s the NP stance was close to the traditional KMT identity approach, with much ROC flag waving and use of ROC nationalist symbols. In addition, the NP spared no efforts attacking the symbol of Taiwanese identity, Li Denghui and his unorthodox national identity views. For instance, one ad questioned Li’s loyalty to the ROC by citing his comments that the KMT was an “alien regime”⁶¹⁴ and in one 1994 ad NP leader Wang Jianxuan (王建宣) accused Li of transforming the Chinese KMT (中國國民黨) into the Taiwan KMT (台灣國民黨).⁶¹⁵

Identity issues once again appeared in the 1998 elections for Taipei city mayor, as in 1996 time the KMT took a more centre left position. The DPP once again gained a extremist far left identity image when the DPP’s Chen Shuibian’s team briefly accused the KMT’s Ma Yingjiu of being in a “Betray Taiwan Consortium” (賣台集團). However, the most significant identity issue of 1998 was Li Denghui’s promotion of the inclusive “New Taiwanese” (新台灣人) concept. Back in 1992 the

⁶¹² *China Times*, March 10, 1996, 1.

⁶¹³ *China Times*, March 18, 1996, 1.

⁶¹⁴ *Lianhebao*, November 24, 1994, 5.

⁶¹⁵ *Lianhebao*, November 26, 1994, 8.

“New Taiwanese” had been a DPP slogan for ethnic harmony, however, Li was able to successfully steal the sub-issue.⁶¹⁶ At an election rally Li Denghui asked in Taiwanese, “Ma Yingjiu, where do you come from?” Ma replied, “I am a New Taiwanese, who grew up drinking Taiwan water and eating Taiwan rice, a true Taipei man born in Wanhua District.”⁶¹⁷ Li Denghui defined New Taiwanese in the following terms, “No matter if you came 400 or 500 years ago, or 40 or 50 years ago from the mainland, or if an aboriginal, we are all Taiwanese, so long as we all work hard for Taiwan and the ROC, then we are New Taiwanese” (不論是四、五百年前來的, 或是四十年、五十年前從大陸來的, 或是原住民, 攏是咱們台灣人, 爲台灣, 爲中華民國在這裡打平, 就是新台灣人).⁶¹⁸ The inclusiveness of the New Taiwanese concept was highly popular among all ethnic groups and according to advertising expert Zheng Zilong (鄭自隆) it had a considerable effect on the result (Ma’s victory).⁶¹⁹

Identity was once again a key tool in the 2000 election. The KMT made its strongest use of ROC Chinese identity appeals since the early 1990s, but also mixed these with Taiwanese appeals. The DPP returned to inclusive Taiwanese identity appeals. Both the DPP and KMT were critical of Song’s patriotism, highlighting the fact that most of Song and Zhang’s families were US citizens, to imply that they would not be loyal to Taiwan. An example of this was a KMT TV ad that began with Song and Zhang standing to the ROC national flag and anthem, then the music changed to become the US anthem and pictures of Song’s five US houses were shown. However, the DPP also used this theme of patriotism to attack both Song and Lian.

⁶¹⁶ *China Times*, December 17, 1992, 21.

⁶¹⁷ Quoted from Corcuff, *Memories of the Future*, 187. Corcuff correctly points out that Ma was actually born in Henan and not Taipei. Note I have altered the romanisation to pinyin.

⁶¹⁸ *Lianhebao*, December 3, 1998, 5.

⁶¹⁹ Zheng Zilong, interview by author, Taipei, April 11, 2000.

For instance, the ad showing Chen Shuibian's son in military uniform stated, "Lian Zhan's two children and son in law did not serve in the army, Song Chuyu and Zhang Zhaoxiong's sons are all Americans and also don't need to serve in the army. No president is willing to send their people into war, all of Abian's family are in Taiwan, moreover next year his only son is going to serve in the army. So he's the president that least hopes and is most unwilling for Taiwan to go to war." (連戰的兩個兒子與女婿都沒有當兵, 宋楚瑜和張昭雄的兒子全是美國人也不用當兵, 天下父母心沒有一個願意將自己的子民推向戰爭, 阿扁所有親人都在台灣, 更何況他唯一的兒子明年就要去服兵役, 他才是最不希望, 也最不願意台灣發生戰爭的總統)⁶²⁰ However, the ad that was seen as the most successful in 2000 reflected Chen Shuibian's Taiwanese roots, that was the Guan Tian Ad that showed the small town where he had grown up, his neighbours, relatives and people that had known him as a child.

Although Lian Zhan was born in Xian, he is officially Taiwanese, and like Chen Shuibian calls Tainan his hometown. However, despite his ability to make speeches in Taiwanese, Lian struggles to portray a Taiwanese image in the same way as Li Denghui. To compensate the KMT placed a number of ads to raise Lian's Taiwanese credentials. For instance, one KMT ad carried the slogan "Who loves Taiwan more than I?" (愛台灣嗰人甲我比!). The ad explained how much Lian and his ancestors had contributed to Taiwan and how Lian loves Taiwan the most.⁶²¹ As in previous campaigns the KMT tried to place itself in the middle compared to the two extremist parties. For instance, a KMT ad showed the three faces of the main candidates, below Chen's were the words "sorrowful Taiwan" (哀台灣), below

⁶²⁰ *China Times*, March 6, 2000, 7.

⁶²¹ *Ziyoushibao*, March 9, 2000, 11. Note this slogan itself uses a Taiwanese linguistic structure.

Song was “depreciate Taiwan” (矮台灣) and under Lian was “love Taiwan” (愛台灣).⁶²²

While since 1995 the KMT had largely disowned the old KMT symbols of the two Chiangs and Sun Yat-sen, in 2000 as election day approached the KMT campaign once more tried to employ these to attract traditional KMT supporters and stop them defecting to the Song camp. The most significant such ad was a letter from Madame Chiang imploring voters to support Lian.⁶²³ Lian also made heavy use of the ROC national flag and other ROC national symbols. For instance, the one of the KMT’s most widely broadcast TV ads showed a group of youngsters singing the national anthem as the national flag was raised and ended with the slogan “Let this beautiful flag welcome the blue sky of the next century.” The DPP’s Lin Zhuoshui noted the KMT “began to stress old KMT style symbols. An example of this tone was the (TV) ad singing the national anthem. Only old WSR thought it was right.”⁶²⁴

Since the KMT’s disastrous defeat in 2000 it has continued and even accelerated trends of identity emphasis present in that campaign. The KMT has increased its use of old ROC Chinese nationalist symbols, with TV ads and wall posters featuring Chiang Ching-kuo and Sun Yat-sen in the run up to the 2001 election. Li Denghui summed up the degree the KMT had changed stating, “To use a bad sounding description, it has once again the image of the alien regime.”⁶²⁵

The NP’s Chinese nationalist appeals have also become even stronger since 2000,

⁶²² *Ziyoushibao*, February 26, 2000, 1.

⁶²³ *China Times*, March 15, 2000, 1.

⁶²⁴ Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taipei, September 24, 2001.

⁶²⁵ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

especially since Xie Qida became party chair. An example of this was the NP's election rally of 23 September 2001 at the Gaoxiong Culture Centre, which was almost all patriotic Chinese nationalist songs such as the Victory Song (凱旋歌) and China must be strong (中國一定強).⁶²⁶ Condemning the symbol of Taiwanese identity, Li Denghui, has been a favourite theme for all three parties of the right since 2000. As Li explained, "Before Lian Zhan didn't dare to go to the veterans villages in election campaigns like last year (2000), but now he's always going there shouting 'I oppose Li Dengui, come back, come back!'"⁶²⁷ However, the NP's anti Li attacks have been the strongest, for instance Feng Huxiang called himself the "Anti Li (DH) vanguard" (反李先鋒).⁶²⁸ Feng's accusations became so outrageous that there was a joke going around political circles in 2001 that, "If the glass of water on this table were to fall over, Feng Huxiang would blame Li Denghui."⁶²⁹ However, there has been a price for such attacks, according to Wu Chongli, "Later I think they (NP) were too strongly affected by Li Denghui, so when Li Denghui did anything they began to attack and criticize. The result of this was that everyone felt they were moving further and further to the right."⁶³⁰

Since coming to power, the DPP has been quieter on Taiwanese identity appeals than in the past, and the exclusive Taiwanese message has been taken over by the TSU. An example of this was a proposal in 2002 that future Taiwan presidents must have been born in Taiwan,⁶³¹ as such a move would disqualify all of Chen Shuibian's potential opponents Lian Zhan, Song Chuyu and Ma Yingjiu, all of

⁶²⁶ I was able to observe the NP chair planning this rally at her campaign headquarters.

⁶²⁷ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

⁶²⁸ Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

⁶²⁹ Huang Xiuduan, interview by author, Taipei, October 31, 2001.

⁶³⁰ Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.

⁶³¹ www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20020307/20020307p1.html

whom were born on the mainland. Even the DPP was unable to support this far left proposal. However, in both the 2001 and 2002 elections the DPP has also had to return to many of its old ethnic mobilization appeals. For instance in 2002 DPP TV ads again referred to tragic appeals, such as “White Terror.” Similarly, by asking Li Denghui to speak for their candidates at election rallies, the DPP are employing one of the main symbols of Taiwanese identity. Another sign of consistency has been accusations that the Pan Blue camp is disloyal to Taiwan. The DPP made such accusations in 2001 following the release of a US research report that KMT delegations to China had been urging Beijing to attack and refuse to negotiate with the DPP administration.⁶³²

On the Taiwanese versus Chinese identity issue the parties have also become less polarised, moving towards more inclusive Taiwanese identity appeals. Although under Li Denghui, the KMT did successfully steal Taiwanese identity from the DPP in the mid 1990s, since Lian Zhan’s rise to power there has been a return to its centre right identity position. Similarly, change in the DPP has also been constrained, as though it has reduced use of the tragic Taiwanese appeals, it still has not appealed to those with dual identities and still remains essentially a Taiwan identity orientated party. Therefore by 2001 issue ownership remained intact with the DPP owning Taiwan identity and the Pan Blue parties dominating ROC Chinese identity.

5.5 Explanations for party change

In this section I evaluate the principle explanatory variables that have promoted both party change and inertia. I show how electoral factors have tended to have a convergent impact, as orientated party leaders have tried to drag their parties

⁶³² www.taipeitimes.com/chnews/2001/09/1/print/0000101023

towards more moderate national identity positions. Their motivation has been to respond to election results and moderate public opinion, and the desire to expand their parties' support base. All the parties have been affected by the threats from the PRC; however, this Chinese pressure has had its main impact via public opinion. Parties are constrained from being too extreme on either pole, as they will be rejected as either defeatist or reckless. Therefore CCP threats have been counterproductive, as they encourage convergence towards the centre left. However, I also show that the parties retain a state of moderate differentiation, as movement has been heavily constrained by party ideology and the strength of ideologically conservative factions. At times in order to preserve ideological purity and party unity, Taiwan's parties have been prepared to stick to electorally unpopular positions.

5.5.1 Inner-party Politics

The inner party struggle for power between election orientated and ideological factions and leaders has been a critical determinant of party policy on national identity, with the former pushing for popular centrist policies and latter demanding adherence to ideological orthodoxy. The comments of former DPP Chairman Yao Jiawen regarding his party are actually applicable to all three parties. "If the DPP is controlled by people from the election faction (選舉派), they're interested in talking about elections. If people like me (reform faction 改革派) control it we'll be more concerned with political reform, political issues." He laments that throughout the 1990s the leaders have all been from election factions.⁶³³

With its tradition of authoritarian leadership it is not surprising that leadership

⁶³³ Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taipei, October 2, 2001.

change has had the greatest impact on the KMT's policy direction. In 1991 the KMT's right wing position was directly related to the fact conservative Premier Hao Bocun was at the height of his power. As Hao recalled, "I controlled the executive resources and the propaganda mechanism, it was very easy for the anti-Taiwan independence message to reach down to the grassroots."⁶³⁴ However, Hao's resignation in early 1993 altered the balance of power within the KMT. According to Hao "I had left the government in 1993. So that 1993 was turning point."⁶³⁵ Moreover, the departure of the New KMT Alliance politicians to form the NP further weakened resistance to KMT movement towards the centre. Therefore the triumph of the populist Li Denghui and the MKMT altered the party's issue emphasis. As the political scientist Xu Yongming points out, "Li Denghui moved the KMT from its original position on the right to the centre."⁶³⁶ In my interviews 14 out of 22 KMT respondents saw Li Denghui's leadership as the key factor in its move to the centre left on the national identity spectrum. For example, KMT legislator Ding Shouzhong felt the shift was "100% Li Denghui."⁶³⁷

Similarly, there is a consensus among politicians that the ideologically more orthodox Lian Zhan and the NMKMT's rise to power in 2000 has led to a return to many centre right positions from the early 1990s, such as the NUG. Li's departure from the KMT seriously weakened the localised KMT and its ability to resist Lian's new policy direction. In addition, as Lian attempted to stamp his own authority on the party, politicians that had fallen out with Li saw the chance of a return to power via Lian. Former KMT Propaganda Chief Huang Huizhen explained change in

⁶³⁴ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

⁶³⁵ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

⁶³⁶ Xu Yongming, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.

⁶³⁷ Ding Shouzhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 27, 2001.

KMT in these terms, "A group of the KMT's leadership level's ideology is close to the NP type. They have taken control over explaining the KMT's ideological power. They have some distance from localisation."⁶³⁸ Similarly, Li Denghui explained the rightward shift saying, "These people have come back to make trouble. Lian Zhan has been caught by this group."⁶³⁹ Of course the degree leadership change brought the convergence of the NP and KMT since 2000 is seen in a more positive light by those on the right. As NP Chair Xie Qida explained, "It was like in Snow White, where the father married a stepmother (Li), and the stepmother kicks out Snow White. We (NP) were like Snow White. We had been kicked out. But after the stepmother had been kicked out we could have a good relationship with the family."⁶⁴⁰

A DPP chairman has far less power than the KMT's; therefore change in the DPP has tended to be more consensual, resulting from factional compromises and open policy debates. Although DPP leaders cannot easily alter fundamental policies they can change the campaign emphasis and party image. Indeed 12 out of 29 DPP respondents cited leadership as a key factor in the party's moderation. The leaders that are viewed as playing the greatest role in transforming the DPP are Xu Xinliang, Shi Mingde and Chen Shuibian. As Xu Xinliang explained, "Shi Mingde and I tried to transform the DPP's image, since 1991 we tried to transform the party. The policies, the campaign issues and concerns."⁶⁴¹ A key figure in this transition was the Propaganda Chief under Xu and Shi, Chen Wenqian. Chen Fangming evaluated her role in these terms, "I think that she (Chen Wenqian) is the one that succeeded in

⁶³⁸ Huang Huizhen, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

⁶³⁹ Li Denghui, interview by author, October 17, 2001.

⁶⁴⁰ Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.

⁶⁴¹ Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taipei, October 28, 2001.

transforming the party image, but she is also the one that destroyed the party image as well. Because for a lot of fundamentalists, no matter how we change the strategy, we still keep in line with the independence principle, but when she took over she didn't care about these policies and images. She just wanted to transform the DPP into a middle class party, this middle class party in the context of a normal democratic society would be fine, but we still needed the support of the fundamentalist and grassroots supporters, especially in southern Taiwan. Her propaganda is far away from this basic line.”⁶⁴²

In the late 1990s and since coming to power the DPP has continued its cautious moderation. As Chen Qimai noted, “Those Taiwan independence leaders are all presidential advisors, but they have no real influence...there are very few fundamentalists left in the Legislative Yuan or party headquarters, only one or two people like Lin Zhuoshui, that are stuck in a cold war way of thinking. The decision makers in the party headquarters and Legislative Yuan now are very pragmatic.”⁶⁴³

The NP's election orientated leaders initially were able to broaden its appeal in the mid 1990s, but the shift in factional power in favour of extremist WSR party activists and Chinese nationalist leadership drove the party sharply to the right. The party's exclusive identity message was critical in their failure to expand beyond Taipei. In the mid 1990s Zhu Gaozheng had encouraged the party switch to a more inclusive tone to expand into BSR areas, but according to Zhu this was resisted as “It's a WSR party,” and among the WSR elite provincial prejudice “was very

⁶⁴² Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

⁶⁴³ Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.

serious.”⁶⁴⁴ The shift to the right can be dated from the defeat of the “One China, Two Countries” proposal and the electoral setback of 1998. Since then the party has been led by a string of extremist Chinese nationalists, such as Xie Qida. As the NP’s support base declined in the late 1990s it became increasingly reliant on its extremist supporters. As Yang Taishun explained, “As its (NP) zealots are all those veterans, or WSR. I think that this group may only make up 40% or 50% of the NP voter structure, but for a political figure, no one dares to give up this group, even though they are not the majority. As a result everyone compromises with them.”⁶⁴⁵ In addition, since 1998 many of the reform faction of the NP have left the party, for example Yao Liming, paving the way for Chinese nationalists to dominate the party, move to the right, and destroy the party electorally.

National identity issues have not only been used to fight elections, but also groups in all three parties have employed these identity issues as a tool to delegitimize their inner party opponents. Firstly, the national identity disputes within the KMT in 1992 were fuelled by the open power struggle between the pro Li Denghui Wisdom Club and pro Hao New KMT Alliance. This was also the driving force in the KMT’s policy swing to abolish the Provincial Government in late 1996. In this case Li Denghui allied his faction of the KMT with the DPP to freeze the Provincial Government and thus destroy the power base of his inner party rival, the Provincial Governor, Song Chuyu. In the words of former Gaoxiong Mayor Wu Dunyi, “If the KMT was the Ming Dynasty, then Li Denghui would be Wu Sangui (吳三桂), he’s bringing in the DPP into the palace to defeat Hao Bocun, Li Huan (李煥) and now

⁶⁴⁴ Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 9, 2001.

⁶⁴⁵ Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001.

Song Chuyu. To defeat all his enemies.”⁶⁴⁶ Similarly, politicians on the right of the NP used strong attacks against the “One China Two Countries” proposal to appeal to conservative party activists and gain power in the party. As Yao Liming recalled “The party founder Zhao Shaokang was looking for a chance to return to the NP, so he did this by using a mass meeting to attack “One China Two Countries.”⁶⁴⁷

In both the DPP and KMT factional balance has also ensured that the dominant leader or faction cannot move the party too far. In 1999 the NMKMT was able to block the “Special State to State Relationship” from becoming government or party policy. Moreover, since 2000 though Lian and the old NMKMT dominate the KMT, there are still factional checks on their power. This is apparent from the localised faction’s success in temporarily shelving Lian Zhan’s Confederacy System proposal in 2001. A Former KMT Propaganda Chief described inner party opposition to Lian’s unificationist style, “Many people oppose this, especially those from the central and southern regions and the localised faction.”⁶⁴⁸

The factional balance within the DPP has meant that though the Taiwan independence policy position moderated, Chen could not go too far for fear of a factional backlash. It is often better to please party faithful and keep unity than risk wider electoral appeals with uncertain results and likely factional strife. Since the DPP has the highest degree of inner party democracy, any change to the party charter requires a majority vote. Therefore since most party’s members support Taiwan independence movement towards the centre is constrained. Xu Xinliang

⁶⁴⁶ Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001. Wu Sangui was a Ming Dynasty general that betrayed China by allying with the Manchus and allowing them through the strategic Shan Haiguan Pass.

⁶⁴⁷ Yao Liming letter, December 14, 2002.

⁶⁴⁸ Interview with former KMT Propaganda Chief, October 19, 2001.

recalled the difficulty of reforming the party in the early 1990s, "Of course you know the DPP's hard core supporters are fundamentalists, so they didn't think there was anything wrong with that campaign (1991), so it was difficult to bring this into party discussion among the party elite, but I intentionally did and stressed that we've got to learn a lesson from this and I was chairman and led the party. But you know that that effort, my efforts were always been challenged by the DPP's rank and file, our hard core supporters, the fundamentalists you could say."⁶⁴⁹ However, there appears to be a factional consensus that though the TIC should not be removed, it also must not be raised again at election time.

5.5.2 Electoral Competition

The first full national elections were an experiment in what voters were willing to accept on the national identity spectrum. With so many of Taiwan's election campaigns centred on identity questions inter-party competition has been a major factor on party movement on national identity.

5.5.2a) Public Opinion

On the TongDu question the average voter has moved from the centre right to the centre and on identification as Taiwanese or Chinese from the centre right to centre left. Therefore if parties' positions are guided purely by public opinion they should support maintaining the status quo and promote a dual national identity but with more stress on Taiwan. According to political scientist Ming Juzheng, as the public opinion moved to the centre, "then the parties have begun to change, they shifted accordingly."⁶⁵⁰ Similarly, Li Denghui claimed the key factor pushing the

⁶⁴⁹ Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.

⁶⁵⁰ Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taipei, November 5, 2001.

localisation of the KMT was, “local public opinion.”⁶⁵¹ The rise of Taiwanese identity has been far greater than support for Taiwan Independence, while the fall in support for unification and Chinese identity has been comparable. This partly explains why at election time parties try to show their love for Taiwan, but tend to avoid exclusive Chinese identity, “Pure Taiwan Independence” or unification. For instance, Li Denghui’s promotion of the “New Taiwanese” concept was so widely supported by the public and politicians from all parties. Although future Chinese unification is an integral part of Pan Blue parties’ ideology, the term was hardly ever used positively in their election propaganda.⁶⁵² As the KMT’s Zhang Ronggong (張榮恭) explained, “We know that Taiwan’s public is afraid of unification.”⁶⁵³ Public opinion has even had an effect on the NP. According to sociologist Qu Haiyuan (瞿海源), “If you look at their (NP) policies carefully, if it’s not Taiwan independence, then I don’t know what Taiwan independence is. There’s no great difference from the DPP. They are basically advocating Taiwan independence. In their hearts they support unification, but their policies are the same as Taiwan independence, as they know unification will not be accepted in Taiwan.”⁶⁵⁴

Throughout the 1990s the DPP has been very sensitive to the changes in issue salience when planning election strategy. Although the DPP has been more willing to raise independence than the KMT unification, other than 1991 and 1996 it has steered clear of “Pure Taiwan Independence.” The DPP’s Tian Xin noted the influence of Taiwan’s moderate public opinion on the party line, “If our people were like the Palestinians or Israelis, with agreement that whatever it takes we’ll protect

⁶⁵¹ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

⁶⁵² A rare exception was a NP ad demanding that Song Chuyu make clear his position on unification in August 2001. Point made by Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.

⁶⁵³ Zhang Ronggong, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

⁶⁵⁴ Qu Haiyuan, interview by author, Taipei, October 25, 2001.

ourselves, you want to exterminate us, but there's no way we will, we'll fight, we're ready for it. If Taiwan's people were like this then the DPP's position would not have changed. We'd have the peoples' support. But if the people are satisfied with the present economic development and are unwilling to do anything to destroy the status quo, then we know we do not need to go that far yet. In this situation the DPP must take a more pragmatic position, a more flexible position.”⁶⁵⁵ Similarly, the party also dropped the old tragic appeals, because as Wang Fengquan pointed out “By the mid 1990s fewer people were interested in the 228 or white terror appeals.”⁶⁵⁶

However, it must be stressed that the parties have not converged at the centre. ESC data in Figure 5.5 show though the direction of party movement corresponded with public opinion in the 1990s, there is a wide gap between all parties and the average voter. Moreover, since 2000 it appears though the average voter has remained at the centre, all four parties are viewed as moving away from the centre. In addition, public opinion cannot account for why the Pan Blue parties stress Chinese identity symbols so much in the post 2000 period when Chinese identity has continued to slide. Also since those with dual identity outnumber those with Taiwanese identity, we would expect the DPP to make broader identity appeals, but on the contrary it has consistently refused to use the term “zhongguoren” (中國人), making “huaren” (華人) the limit. Thus, though public opinion encourages convergence, ideology maintains some degree of differentiation.

5.5.2b) Mobilising Versus Chasing

⁶⁵⁵ Tian Xin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

⁶⁵⁶ Wang Fengquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, April 14, 2000.

The contrast in voter support base at the onset of democratic elections in Taiwan has had a major impact on policy positioning as parties face the dilemma of mobilising existing supporters and chasing new ones.

In the early 1990s the KMT still had a huge following, gaining over 70% of the votes in 1991, limiting its scope to expand, it has been more of a struggle to keep its disparate supporters together against the appeal of competing parties on the left and right. The mixed ethnic support base of the KMT partly explains why it has preferred to take a middle position of attacking both Taiwan independence and rapid unification, and promoting both Taiwanese and Chinese identity. Since the majority of its supporters are BSR it made increasing Taiwan identity appeals from 1993. Although WSR are a minority of KMT supporters, they are seen as the party's traditional iron voters, therefore in every election the KMT did make disproportionate direct appeals to them. For instance, the former KMT legislator Wang Tianjing (王天競) explained, "To people from Mainland China, it's (opposing Taiwan independence) very important and I'm a WSR, and so I want to get my people's votes. Most of them, maybe 99% are against the Taiwan independence movement."⁶⁵⁷

Appealing to new supporters has been most significant for the DPP. In 1990 its party identification was still only 7.8%, but by 2002 it had risen to 33%.⁶⁵⁸ In my interviews 17 out of 29 DPP respondents saw the need to expand its voter base as a critical factor in the DPP's change on national identity. The DPP's Yang Qiuxing (楊秋興) reflects these sentiments, "I think the most important factor was elections; to

⁶⁵⁷ Wang Tianjing, interview by author, Taipei, October 16, 2001.

⁶⁵⁸ See Figure 2.3.

win elections you need to get the support of the majority. So the DPP has moved from a movement party to an election party.”⁶⁵⁹

One of the most common themes in interviews with DPP politicians was the sense that in order to expand its voter support base the party needed to tone down radical Taiwan independence and de-emphasise the issue in favour of domestic issues. This interpretation is seen in the comments of two DPP politicians. Firstly, Yan Jinfu noted that by 1991, “the DPP discovered that these issues (national identity) were appealing to the lower classes, workers. The middle class in Taiwan felt that Taiwan independence was not favourable to them. If we wanted to expand our vote base we could not solely rely on the lower classes, so we had to raise industrial policies and how to coexist peacefully with the CCP...The goal was to please the middle class, we had to compete with the KMT for middle class votes.”⁶⁶⁰ While Pingdong Mayor Su Jiaquan argued, “If the DPP had kept the same election methods, I think the DPP’s vote share would still be restricted to those voters close to the DPP. It couldn’t make a breakthrough in its vote share.”⁶⁶¹

In addition, just as the British Labour party moved to remove its Clause 4 on Nationalisation, the DPP has diluted its Taiwan independence emphasis and moderated positions in its bid to convince voters of its government ability. In fact, the desire to show the DPP’s governing ability was cited by ten out of 29 DPP respondents as a key factor in their parties’ shift to the centre. By the early 1990s the DPP began talking about having a timetable for becoming the ruling party, and following its 1997’s election victory it was already running the county governments

⁶⁵⁹ Yang Qiuxing, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 24, 2001.

⁶⁶⁰ Yan Jinfu, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.

⁶⁶¹ Su Jiaquan, interview by author, Pingdong, August 24, 2001.

for the vast majority of Taiwan's population. You Qing summed up the effect "As it gained more ME posts it became aware that in terms of policies and politics, people need more than just cross straits issues and diplomacy, people most stress their quality of life."⁶⁶²

Since the early 1990s the DPP has expanded its support base in almost all sociological groups except WSR, therefore it is not surprising that it has not experimented with appeals to Chinese identity or even dual identity.

Like the DPP, the NP initially used nationalist appeals to attract core voters, but soon toned down national identity emphasis and used broader issue appeals to expand its voter base. According to Yang Taishun, "When the NP began it called for protecting the ROC, choosing an even more right wing position on the spectrum to attract core supporters. In my view this was just an instrumental move. In fact at the same time the NP had the slogan 'the spokesman for the ordinary city resident' (小市民代言人), to say 'I'm a middle class party.'⁶⁶³ This dual approach enabled the NP to expand its vote share rapidly between 1994 and 1996. Although the NP has a mixed support base, its leadership and activists have been overwhelmingly WSR; therefore of the three parties the NP's core support base has had the greatest impact on its policy direction. For instance, Yao Liming argues, "Most of the NP's leadership were just active in Taipei with its many WSR, therefore the 'right wing route' had mass backing."⁶⁶⁴ In addition, from 1998 the NP appeared to abandon chasing new voters and concentrate on its core voters. According to Yao Liming, "As the NP's total vote share declined, the parties' candidates were fighting for a

⁶⁶² You Qing, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

⁶⁶³ Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001

⁶⁶⁴ Yao Liming letter, December 14, 2002.

limited number of votes, and thus they became more and more radical.”⁶⁶⁵

5.5.2c) Election Results

Although general elections are not fought on single issues, the KMT and NP propaganda often described elections as plebiscites between Taiwan independence and the ROC or between war and peace.⁶⁶⁶ According to Wang Fuchang, “If we look at the question of whether they (election results) have an impact on the next policy direction of political parties, then I think they do have an impact.”⁶⁶⁷ However, the key determinant of the impact of the election result is its interpretation, as Wang explained “In fact the internal power struggle inside the DPP has made use of these interpretations, saying this election defeat means that this policy line has been rejected.”⁶⁶⁸

The victory in the 1991 National Assembly election convinced the KMT it had found a formula for winning elections.⁶⁶⁹ Therefore it has employed protect the ROC and the DPP=Taiwan independence=war terror message as relentlessly as the DPP stressed political corruption throughout the 1990s. Later these attacks were combined with anti rapid unification attacks against the NP, which also were seen as effective in marginalizing the NP.⁶⁷⁰ The DPP’s Zhang Junhong also notes the electoral benefits the anti independence attacks brought the KMT, “The KMT is not afraid of Taiwan independence; the KMT used Taiwan independence to divide the DPP, as not everyone in the DPP supports strong Taiwan independence. They used

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁶ See *China Times*, March 16, 2000, 10.

⁶⁶⁷ Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taipei, October 26, 2001.

⁶⁶⁸ Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taipei, October 26, 2001.

⁶⁶⁹ Hao Bocun and other KMT figures make this point.

⁶⁷⁰ Point made by former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

Taiwan independence to intimidate the Taiwanese people, they used Taiwan independence to threaten WSR so they can unite with the KMT, and they used Taiwan independence to intimidate the CCP to deal with it. We can say that Taiwan independence was the KMT's perfect tonic!"⁶⁷¹

As in the case of political corruption, the KMT has altered its position in response to electoral defeat in 2000. The first lesson the KMT has learnt is the old terror message is no longer effective. For instance, former KMT Propaganda Chief Huang Huizhen described the 2000 "Off to War" TV ad, as being "counterproductive,"⁶⁷² by sending voters away from the KMT, to either Song or the DPP. Moreover the central message that once the DPP comes to power it will declare the ROT and incite the PRC to invade has not come true. As the KMT's Zhu Xiaoci remarked, "We are not going to focus our attacks on Taiwan independence, as now they are the governing party they do not dare to shout Taiwan independence. Now the DPP shout ROC with us. If you attack them now as Taiwan independence it won't be effective enough."⁶⁷³ The second lesson was the KMT needed to move to the centre-right. In 2000 though the KMT did attack the left more than the right, it hoped to still give the impression of being at the centre. However, it was felt that this contradictory tone lost the KMT votes on both sides; as a result the post 2000 KMT stopped trying to be a catchall party. As political scientist Xu Yongming explained, "The centre should be the best place to stay, but it can also be the most unstable place. In 2000 Lian Zhan aimed to be at the centre, but it turned out that the centre was deserted (by voters) in 2000. So post 2000 Lian has moved to the centre right and this has

⁶⁷¹ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

⁶⁷² Huang Huizhen, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

⁶⁷³ Zhu Xiaoci, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

forced the NP even further to the right.”⁶⁷⁴

The impact of election results appears to be even greater on the DPP. While a number of elections are seen to have been lost on Taiwan independence, as Zhang Junhong points out “Where there were elections victories (for the DPP) it wasn’t because of Taiwan independence.”⁶⁷⁵ In fact ten out of 29 DPP respondents cited election setbacks as being critical in the party’s moderation, and the defeats blamed tended to be 1991, 1996 and to a lesser extent 1994 and 1998. Li Qingxiong reflects this view, “The changes in the DPP have come from internal decisions, in order to improve its election performance. It’s self adjustment, as it saw that radical Taiwan independence would not work.”⁶⁷⁶

After steadily increasing its vote share in previous elections the disastrous defeat in 1991 was a turning point for the DPP. Most academics and DPP politicians would agree with political scientist Liu Yizhou’s (劉義周) point that “The DPP’s ROT stance did damage the party in 1991, as the KMT was able to link the TIC with chaos and war, and the national security question.”⁶⁷⁷ Even the DPP’s Chen Zhongxin recalled, “At the time I was in the DPP Headquarters, we later realised that the strategy was wrong....from the 1991 election it was very clear that Taiwan independence was electoral poison (票房毒藥).”⁶⁷⁸ Comparing the degree the DPP dropped “Pure Taiwan Independence” in 1992 can show the effect that 1991 had on the party.

⁶⁷⁴ Xu Yongming, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.

⁶⁷⁵ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

⁶⁷⁶ Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.

⁶⁷⁷ Liu Yizhou, interview by author, Taipei, October 30, 2001.

⁶⁷⁸ Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

The DPP's response to the 1996 defeat was similar to 1991, with Taiwan independence again blamed. According to political scientist Wu Chongli the result "showed them that they (DPP) couldn't go on like this, so they began to revise their line and they moved towards the centre on many issues."⁶⁷⁹ Another lesson the DPP had learned from 1996 was that when the KMT used the Taiwan independence terror card the best response was not direct calls for Taiwan independence, but the softer approach that the DPP used in 2000.

In the aftermath of its 1998 defeat some in the DPP blamed the "Betray Taiwan Consortium" accusation, which according to Tian Xin "polarised the state of the election."⁶⁸⁰ As a result in 2000 Zhang Junhong noted how Chen Shuibian "was too scared this time to use nationalism." Zhang recalls that in 2000 he proposed to the Election Strategy Committee that "we have to fight the CCP, everyone was terrified, and no one was willing to use my method."⁶⁸¹ Also the idea of revising or removing the TIC was raised, as Taiwan independence was made a scapegoat for the poor performance in 1998. Although the TIC survived this debate intact, the DPP did move try to reach out to central voters and remove its radical Taiwan independence image in preparation for the 2000 presidential contest. A key move was the 1999 "Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Future," which Li Qingxiong explained, "was to help Chen get elected president. Without that he could not have been elected."⁶⁸²

The de-emphasis and repackaging of Taiwan independence are seen to have succeeded in subsequent elections, particularly in 1992, 1994 in Taipei and in 2000.

⁶⁷⁹ Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.

⁶⁸⁰ Tian Xin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.

⁶⁸¹ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

⁶⁸² Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.

In fact a number of politicians compare Chen Shuibian's success in Taipei with the failure of the more fundamentalist approach of Chen Dingnan in 1994. The sociologist Qu Haiyuan explains how the DPP has learnt from defeats, "If they (DPP) took that stance they would not only be defeated in the presidential elections but also other elections too. So that is why Shi Mingde said Taiwan is already independent, it's a very clever explanation, as you don't need to change anything. So as long as we do not unify, we're independent."⁶⁸³ Clearly it was felt that the "Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Future" had also convinced voters of the DPP's moderation in 2000. The political scientist Sheng Xingyuan explained the DPP moved to the centre "as respondents are concentrated at the centre; otherwise the party (DPP) would have remained a missionary party. For example, they have upgraded the "Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Future" (in 2001), this was for electoral benefit."⁶⁸⁴

The convergent effects of elections in Taiwan were even visible in the campaigns of former KMT Provincial Governor Song Chuyu. Clearly Song learnt from the failure of the NP that a broad inclusive identity was essential to gain widespread support beyond the WSR heartland of Taipei. Therefore, Song selected a BSR as his running mate, spoke Taiwanese, Hakka, Mandarin and Aboriginal in his election speeches and chose the inclusive title of "New Taiwanese Service Team"(新台灣人服務團) for his campaign.

Electoral results have had less impact on the NP's national identity stance. Unlike the DPP's response to 1991, the series of disastrous election defeats since 1997 have

⁶⁸³ Qu Haiyuan, interview by author, Taipei, October 25, 2001.

⁶⁸⁴ Sheng Xingyuan, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

not led to a serious policy re-evaluation, instead the NP has continued to drift towards the far right pole. Although NP defectors and academics blamed the party's decline on its shift to the right, its current leaders dispute this view. For instance, the party chairman Yu Muming (郁慕明) stated, "The NP's problems do not lie in these demands."⁶⁸⁵

5.5.2d) Electoral Environment

Parties do not exist in isolation but react to the competitive environment around them. Although the pan Blue and Pan Green parties have not leapfrogged or converged, they have also not been static. Parties have reacted to moves from other parties, as most parties prefer to be distinct from their competitors.

With Taiwan's moderate electorate concentrated at the centre, it has been in Taiwan's parties' interests to paint themselves as the moderate centre and the others as extremist rapid unification, independence or minority parties. As KMT legislator Huang Defu (黃德福) explained, "Often in Taiwan's elections at the final stage the campaign centres on a single issue. The KMT tried to make this anti unification and anti independence. The goal is to put opponents into extreme categories. This has resulted in the decline of the NP and failure of the TIP."⁶⁸⁶ There is also much to Zhan Junhong's analysis of how the Taiwan independence issue has allowed the KMT to control the centre ground, "What the ruling party needed was a radical adversary. As without a radical adversary in the Li Denghui era, it (KMT) wouldn't have been able to play such a prominent role, it's moderate role. The DPP's greatest help for Li Denghui was playing the role of a radical Taiwan independence party as

⁶⁸⁵ Yu Muming, interview by author, Taipei, October 5, 2001.

⁶⁸⁶ Huang Defu, interview by author, Taipei, September 12, 2001.

this made the CCP view Li Denghui as the lesser of two evils.”⁶⁸⁷

As the party at the centre of national identity politics the KMT has been affected by moves from its competitors on the right and the left. Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu Yong-ming argue that the DPP New Tide’s success in passing the TIC was the root of the 1992-3 power struggle in the KMT. In Xu’s words, “By putting the issue on the agenda the KMT candidates were forced to take a stand (on the TongDu issue).”⁶⁸⁸ This was particularly the case in 1992 and they claimed that this ultimately led to the splitting off of the NP from the KMT.⁶⁸⁹ The subsequent arrival on the scene of the NP also prompted the KMT to differentiate itself using Taiwanese identity appeals. As the KMT’s Zhu Xiaoci explained, “The NP promoted rapid unification, so we opposed independence and rapid unification, so that the KMT remained at the centre of the spectrum...the (KMT’s) stress on nativisation was in response to the formation of the NP.”⁶⁹⁰

In addition, there is a pattern that when the KMT is under threat from the right, it swings back to a more right wing position. This was clear in the KMT’s reversion to old ROC symbols in the 2000 presidential campaign. As former chairman Li Denghui explained, “Song Chuyu also stood for election, Lian Zhan felt he was in danger of losing and perhaps he began to appeal to those of the old KMT. The first problem was when he invited Chen Lu an to help, the second was Madame Chiang’s letter. He used all kinds of methods to appeal to the WSR old ruling class.”⁶⁹¹

Similarly, since losing power the KMT has also stressed ROC nationalism in its

⁶⁸⁷ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

⁶⁸⁸ Xu Yongming, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.

⁶⁸⁹ Cheng and Hsu, “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment.”

⁶⁹⁰ Zhu Xiaoci interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.

⁶⁹¹ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

fight for dominance on the right of Taiwanese politics with the PFP. According to the KMT's Lin Yuxiang (林鈺祥), "There is an overlap of KMT and PFP supporters and the PFP is declining in support," therefore, "this year the KMT has a new policy, we've arranged all the leading KMT figures to go to the martyrs shrine at Yuanshan (圓山) to pay respects. It's a clear move to attract those voters between the KMT and PFP."⁶⁹²

Recently, the KMT has also been put in a dilemma by the DPP's move to the centre since becoming the ruling party. Wu Yushan explained that, "If the KMT stays at the centre, it will sound like it is echoing the present government's positions. So the KMT moved to the right."⁶⁹³ According to political scientist Ming Juzheng the KMT's post 2000 shift to the right is a rational positioning as, "They have calculated that if they can rebuild the party they can be sure of exceeding 55%, maybe even 65%, that is a comfortable majority, so there is no need to move to the left. It's best to stay at the centre right."⁶⁹⁴

Both the DPP and NP reacted to moves by KMT. Firstly, the KMT's localisation under Li Denghui and adoption of Taiwan identity appeals made it much harder for the DPP to mobilise on ethnic issues and its accusation that the KMT was a WSR regime became unconvincing. In the case of the NP, the KMT's move towards the centre from 1993 left space for the NP on the right. However, the post 2000 KMT move to the right and rise of the PFP has meant there is no room at the centre right, pushing the NP further to the right. According to Wang Fuchang, "The market has forced them to do this (move to the right). There has to be someone playing the

⁶⁹² Lin Yuxiang, interview by author, Taipei, October 4, 2001.

⁶⁹³ Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taipei, October 24, 2001.

⁶⁹⁴ Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taipei, November 5, 2001.

extreme right role. As the KMT are trying to regain NP seats, so the NP must strengthen its TongDu position.”⁶⁹⁵

5.5.3 External Influence

Taiwan’s political parties have been very sensitive to the international environment when making party policy, and the two main sources of external influence have been the US and the PRC. While the US affects parties directly, the PRC does so directly, and indirectly via elections. The words of Li Qingxiong reflect the degree the international environment has become unfavourable for Taiwan independence, “Before we thought Taiwan independence could be achieved, we thought the US and Japan would support Taiwan, the CCP would be defeated and Taiwan would be independent. That was ten years ago, now things have changed.”⁶⁹⁶

China’s impact on parties’ policies has increased since the 1996 missile crisis. Parties have been more concerned about whether policies will be acceptable to Beijing. According to the KMT’s Lin Yuxiang, “I see the KMT as responding to both internal and external factors in our China policy. But the biggest influence is China.”⁶⁹⁷ The PRC’s impact since 1996 can be seen by the way the DPP has moderated its Taiwan independence rhetoric. As Qu Haiyuan has noted, “Look how unfriendly the CCP was to Li Denghui. If you have a strong Taiwan independence position, he (Chen Shuibian) knows that he wouldn’t be able to rule. So he continuously shows how friendly he is to China and that he’s not calling for Taiwan independence, that he will not declare Taiwan independence in his term.”⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁵ Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taipei, October 26, 2001.

⁶⁹⁶ Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.

⁶⁹⁷ Lin Yuxiang, interview by author, Taipei, April 11, 2000.

⁶⁹⁸ Qu Haiyuan, interview by author, Taipei, October 25, 2001.

However, CCP impact is strongest indirectly via public opinion. The CCP threats against Taiwan discourage parties from taking extreme left or centre right positions, which will be rejected by voters as either reckless or defeatist. Instead, parties are forced into centre left or "Diluted Taiwan independence" positions. As the DPP's Tianxin explained, "If we do not consider foreign factors, China does not exist, we can imagine what would happen, the DPP might have stayed where it was in 1991, remain at the position of the TIC. If we imagine China completely gave up Taiwan, and had no views on Taiwan, I'm sure that very quickly Taiwan would draft a new constitution, have a new national title and the DPP's advocacy would become accepted and mainstream."⁶⁹⁹ PRC pressure has backfired repeatedly, as in 1996 and 2000 the candidates on the PRC's blacklist won the presidential election. When the PRC takes a tough line against Taiwan's parties or politicians, parties must respond strongly against the PRC, otherwise they will face a voter backlash. Both in 1996 and 2000 Taiwanese politicians were able to manipulate these PRC attacks to their advantage by employing ethnic nationalism. Zhang Junhong has a perceptive way of interpreting how parties should employ national identity appeals, "If the CCP does not get involved, and you use Taiwan independence to attack it, people will be scared and you'll be given up. But if the CCP attacks and you do not attack back, then you'll lose, people will think that you have no guts, you are a coward. The key point is will the CCP get involved, if the CCP does not get involved, then you must not use nationalism. If the CCP attacks and you do not use nationalism, then you'll be seen as a coward."⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁹ Tian Xin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2000.

⁷⁰⁰ Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taipei, September 26, 2001.

5.5.4 Institutional Factors

Although the Legislative Yuan's use of MMD election system gives room for extremist candidates, the predominance of SMD elections for both president and ME contests ensures that overall Taiwan's election system tends to encourage moderate national identity positions. For instance, DPP Pingdong ME Su Jiaquan stated that, "I think that radical issues, either on the left or on the right, I mean ideological issues have fixed supporters, but they're not suitable for ME campaigns."⁷⁰¹ We can also see the centrifugal effect of SMD in NP Chairwoman Xie Qida's complaints on Song Chuyu's vague national identity position, "Some say Song Chuyu is fine, he can do this job, but Song Chuyu has a problem, Song Chuyu wants to be president, so to be president he can't just rely on Pan Blue votes, he wants to get middle, even Taiwan independence votes. So on this point he can't be clear on China policy, he dares not state his position, he takes the middle line always."⁷⁰²

5.5.5 Ideology

National identity is central to the ideology of all three Taiwanese parties; therefore ideology has had a greater impact on the national identity platform change than the other two cases. While ideology has a unifying power among the party faithful, it also has been an electoral liability that reforming party chairs wish to remove or sweep under the carpet. In this case while inter party competition has encouraged convergence; ideology has established limits on convergence. The strength of party ideology has constrained parties from removing unpopular policy positions such as Chinese unification or "Pure Taiwan Independence" and discouraged movement

⁷⁰¹ Su Jiaquan, interview by author, Pingdong, August 24, 2001.

⁷⁰² Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.

towards the centre.

The KMT and NP's guiding ideology can be summarized, as a belief that the ROC is the sole legitimate government of China; its duty is to promote Chinese unification, nationalism, and culture. The document that is the KMT's official guideline is the NUG.⁷⁰³ Until the early 1990s it was essential for anyone wanting to gain high positions in the central government, military or civil service to be a KMT party member. This meant many joined the party through career motivations and thus many Taiwanese KMT politicians had little conviction in KMT ideology. As Hao Bocun lamented, "Li Denghui could offer them official posts, so with the attraction of political office, people didn't insist on their political ideals."⁷⁰⁴ Hao named Lian Zhan as one such individual, noting that, "In the past Lian Zhan knew that Li Denghui was wrong, but he didn't dare to say anything."⁷⁰⁵ Li Denghui attempted to create a new counter ideology for the KMT that involved popular inclusive Taiwanese identity appeals and a form of "Diluted Taiwan Independence." This line of thinking is evident in Li's explanation of the reforms to abolish the Provincial Government, "The PRC talks of the ROC as being a province, but now we are no longer a province. Isn't that right? This is very important. A change in the political system."⁷⁰⁶

However, even when Li was at the height of his power the KMT's movement to the centre left was constrained by the strength of party ideology. Moreover, Li's alternative localisation ideology has not taken root in the party, as the old KMT

⁷⁰³ Though officially the NP called for the abolition of the NUG throughout the 1990s, in an interview the party's most extreme candidate Feng Huxiang actually stated he approved of the NUG.

⁷⁰⁴ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

⁷⁰⁵ Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.

⁷⁰⁶ Li Denghui, interview by author, Taipei, October 17, 2001.

ideology has made a comeback since Li resigned. As a result the party has returned to ideological orthodoxy by reverting to many positions from the early 1990s such as NUG. Therefore the power of ideology is evident from the KMT's promotion of unification and Chinese identity, both of which survey data show are increasingly unpopular among Taiwanese voters.

Since the KMT's localisation and diluting of ROC Chinese nationalism were key factors pushing the New KMT Alliance to form the NP, national identity has been the core ideological issue for the NP. The NP has shown itself even less flexible than the DPP on national identity matters. From my interviews with NP politicians reoccurring themes were Chinese nationalism and attacking Li Denghui. This is apparent from the comments of NP Chairwoman Xie Qida, "As soon as he (Li) had power he began to persecute the WSR and eradicate WSR power. We realized what he was doing. Taiwan is clearly China's territory, he wanted to desinify Taiwan and remove Chinese thinking from Taiwan. We could see what he was doing, so we decided to form the NP. The NP is protecting the ROC, protecting Chinese culture."⁷⁰⁷ Therefore although the NP did initially attempt to broaden its appeals, these ceased after 1998. Like the KMT, the NP has attached itself to two concepts declining in popularity, unification and Chinese identity, contributing to the party's decline. When reformers did propose a more centrist position of the "One China, Two Countries" concept in 1998 it was immediately denounced as a form of Taiwan independence. The seriousness of the crime in making this proposal is apparent from Lu Ruizhong's comment that those reformers "have apologised."⁷⁰⁸

⁷⁰⁷ Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.

⁷⁰⁸ Lu Ruizhong, interview by author, Taipei, April 10, 2001.

In contrast the DPP's guiding document is its party charter, in which key identity principles are democratisation, Taiwan independence, Taiwanese self-determination and promotion of Taiwanese identity and culture. Although "Pure Taiwan independence" is clearly unpopular among voters the DPP has repeatedly resisted calls to remove or revise the TIC. Lin Zhuoshui remarked that the main reason for the failures to revise the TIC was because "the majority of DPP members are Taiwan independence"⁷⁰⁹ In fact even attempts to change the tone of campaign propaganda have faced resistance from the ideological left of the party. As former Propaganda Chief Chen Fangming explained, "Actually this (1992 de-emphasising independence) strategy invited so much criticism from the fundamentalists. They said you are diverting the party's direction from our basic line of the democratic movement. They regarded independence as the most important goal we have to pursue. So if you want to change the slogan, that means you're going to violate the original goal that we want to pursue."⁷¹⁰

The strength of belief in "Diluted Taiwan Independence" and Taiwanese identity among DPP politicians has ensured that national identity sub-issues have been central to most DPP national level election campaigns to date. In addition, these beliefs also deeply effect their treatment of other interrelated issues. For instance, the DPP desire to abolish the Provincial Government was not aimed at administrative efficiency but due to the fact it symbolised that Taiwan was a province of China, not an independent country.

Although the DPP has not removed the TIC, I argue that it would be more accurate

⁷⁰⁹ Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taipei, September 24, 2001.

⁷¹⁰ Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taipei, November 2, 2001.

to say the belief in Taiwanese self-determination rather than an ROT unifies the party. The DPP's party charter has played a similar role to the NUG for the KMT. Both give a broad framework for handling national identity questions, but also give room for manoeuvre. According to Tang Jinquan, "In fact the DPP's party charter is quite flexible. We have not declared Taiwan independence on coming to power and we're maintaining the ROC, these are all aimed at stabilising cross strait relations. He (Chen Shuibian) can even say long live the Three Peoples' Principles (三民主義)." ⁷¹¹ The fact that the ROT was never mentioned by the DPP in campaigns after 1991 reflects Xu Xinliang's view stated in 1997 that the TIC is just a "historical document." ⁷¹² The DPP has shown a degree of ideological flexibility by de-emphasising and repackaging Taiwan independence, and by passing and later upgrading the "Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Future," the DPP has effectively removed the TIC.

5.6 Conclusion.

This chapter has shown how national identity has been one of the most salient electoral issues in Taiwan. There is a clear pattern of issue ownership with the DPP dominating "Taiwan Independence: Positive" and the KMT and NP sharing "Taiwan Independence: Negative." There has been a degree of convergence, but this has been constrained and there has been no leapfrogging between Pan Blue and Pan Green parties. Although there have been instances of attempted issue stealing, on the whole issue ownership remained intact. There has also been a high degree of parity in the direction of party movement shown in my qualitative and quantitative advertising, elite and survey data.

⁷¹¹ Tang Jinquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 25, 2001.

⁷¹² *Ziyoushibao*, December 8, 1997, 2.

The leading parties began the 1990s at highly polarised positions with their alternative national identity solutions of TIC and NUG. However, both have moderated their positions in response to public opinion and election results. The DPP has de-emphasized and repackaged its Taiwan independence appeals, returning to its original position of Taiwanese self-determination. It has employed Taiwanese ethnic appeals, though it has gradually dropped the tragic Taiwanese appeals. After Li Denghui consolidated his power, the KMT moved towards the centre by increasingly appealing to Taiwanese identity and briefly even promoting a diluted form of Taiwan independence. However, the strength of party ideology and ideologically orientated factions has ensured that movement has been constrained and the parties remain differentiated. Since 2000 the NP and KMT have both moved to the right, returning to positions occupied by the KMT in the early 1990s, while the DPP has been unable to move too close to the centre since coming to office.

This case study has shown that democracy is working in Taiwan. Through electoral debate consensus has been reached on many formally controversial national identity issues. The speed that norms have changed on these issues has been astonishing. Much of what were formally the seditious DPP demands have become mainstream and accepted by all political parties. For example, the complete re-election of parliaments, direct presidential elections, abolition of the provincial government and national assembly, Taiwanised education, application to join UN, pragmatic diplomacy, and constitutional revisions. The comments of the TIC's author Lin Zhuoshui reflect the degree norms have changed, "In my view the Taiwan independence movement is basically like a hire purchase, I mean that you have already had the first, second and third payments. The remaining payment is

international recognition, and even now we are not completely unrecognised, now is an incomplete recognition... The point is that once most of the (TIC) goals have been achieved, why continue focusing on the question? I cannot just make a speech shouting 'Taiwan independence!' 'Taiwan independence!' all the way through for ten minutes, then come off the stage."⁷¹³

⁷¹³Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taipei, September 24, 2001.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

In this final chapter I return to the core questions, raised in the introduction chapter. Namely, how and why Taiwan's parties and party competition have changed, and what are the implications of these developments for the state of Taiwan's democracy?

In 1991 the consolidation of Taiwan's democracy was still in doubt. In the first multi-party election competition appeared to be divergent, with the parties taking diametrically opposed positions on a single core electoral issue. Moreover the overwhelming KMT victory and intense factional divisions within the main opposition party implied that Taiwan could follow the Japanese LDP model of a one party dominant system.

However, this study has shown it is possible for a new democracy to rapidly institutionalise a pattern of inter-party competition similar to its mature counterparts in Western Europe. Generally the competition in Taiwanese elections has been convergent, as Taiwan's parties have moved away from extremism towards more moderate centrist positions and tacit agreement on many issues. Taiwan's election orientated politicians have been highly responsive to perceived signals from opinion polls and election results, by moderating and adjusting their issue emphasis.

However, unlike other new democracies, the parties have not merged into indistinguishable personality centred catchall parties. Instead party ideology and inner party factional balance have constrained party movement and maintained moderate party differentiation. Moreover, Taiwan has not followed the one party dominant model. Instead, it has moved towards a two party and at times a

multi-party system, and peaceful transfers of ruling party have occurred at both the local and national government levels.

After showing the parties are differentiated in broad trends of issue emphasis for the whole decade, I looked at party change in three issue case studies. The direction of change has been determined by the interaction between centrifugal electoral pressures and the constraining role of party ideology and conservative party factions. In all three cases, the opposition parties placed new issues on the political agenda in a bid to expand support bases and win elections. Despite initial KMT dismissal of these opposition policy proposals, it has often tried to steal these popular issues. However, with the public and parties viewing issues as owned, in most instances issue stealing has failed and issue ownership has remained intact. Leapfrogging has been rare, as party movement has been constrained. The constraining role of ideology has been strongest in the case of national identity. The pressures from the PRC have also limited parties' room for manoeuvre on national identity, as voters will reject extreme positions both on the left and right of this spectrum. While on the political corruption issue inner party factional balance has prevented the KMT from removing its "black gold" reputation. The parties have had more scope for movement with social issues, thus the only case of successful KMT issue stealing occurred with NHI, in the social welfare chapter. However, this was an exceptional case, only possible because NHI was a marginal opposition issue. In contrast, the pensions episode of 1997 showed the difficulty of stealing an issue once the public views it as owned. In short, electoral forces have promoted convergence of parties, while party ideology and the strength of conservative factions have maintained party differentiation.

Recently, many observers in Taiwan have become pessimistic over the state of Taiwanese democracy, particularly in the light of the inter-party fighting and economic recession since the DPP came to power. For instance, the NP's Feng Huxiang claims things are so bad that, "many people think that early unification is better than continuing to be tortured by the DPP. Taiwan's economy and future seem more and more hopeless, so people think it's better to negotiate unification."⁷¹⁴ In contrast, I argue this study shows numerous positive signs for the state of Taiwan's democracy.

I have shown that in Taiwanese elections issues do matter, as parties have repeatedly stressed issues. By consistently offering distinct patterns of issue emphasis, parties have thus given voters a real policy choice at election time. The study has revealed the sophisticated and moderate nature of Taiwanese public opinion. Taiwan's voters are able to accurately locate parties on a number of issue spectrums, a key prerequisite for policy voting. Moreover, time and again, voters have rejected parties whenever they have taken radical stances.

The Taiwan case shows having genuine opposition parties can really make a difference, as the consequent democratic electoral debate has brought tangible benefits to Taiwanese society. Firstly, though national identity remains the main dividing line between parties, the rise of new electoral issues, such as political corruption and social welfare created new cross cutting cleavages, a phenomenon political scientists view as conducive to democratic stability. Secondly, we can see the conflict resolution benefits of democracy, as elections have allowed important and contested issues to be debated in a democratic manner. By the end of the decade

⁷¹⁴ Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taipei, October 19, 2001.

there have been huge changes in the accepted norms on all three issues in this study and broad consensuses on solutions to these questions have been reached. Products of these new mainstream values include a much expanded and more inclusive welfare system, broader norms on what constitutes political corruption and stricter anti corruption legislation. Thirdly, on the most controversial issue in Taiwanese politics, the mainstream parties have reached a tacit understanding on many aspects of the national identity question. In short, I argue that democracy is working in Taiwan.

Methodologically this study is significant in a number of ways. Firstly, this study has employed a variety of datasets to analyse party change in Taiwan. However, the general patterns of party movement and issue ownership have been consistent regardless of the data source. Secondly, this is the first attempt to systematically plot party change in Taiwan using election propaganda as the major source material. The results show the potential for using newspaper election ads as a source for plotting party positions, particularly where manifestoes are not regularly issued. Thirdly, the applicability of the revised MRG coding scheme shows this system can be used in a variety of electoral systems, not just in Western Europe. The study has also suggested some prospective directions for future research. As Taiwan's parties have begun to routinely issue manifestoes since 1998, it would be useful to compare party issue emphasis in manifestoes with election advertisements. Moreover, as the use of newspaper advertising declines, other new propaganda sources should receive more attention, particularly party and candidate websites, and Internet and TV advertising.

Finally, despite the optimistic appraisal this dissertation has given of the state of

Taiwan's inter-party competition, I end with a note of caution. Although I have shown that Taiwan's parties do show a pattern of reduced polarization but maintained policy differentiation in the first decade of multi-party elections, it cannot be taken for granted that this will continue indefinitely. The possibility of the parties again becoming polarised on national identity cannot be totally ruled out. In addition, the most salient cross cutting issues of the 1990s can no longer arouse the same enthusiasm and controversy of past campaigns, and may gradually fade in salience. The maintenance of party differentiation will depend on whether Taiwan's politicians continue to run issue orientated campaigns and if they can find the new issues to mobilise voters and win elections.

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Lianhebao (聯合報) United Daily News

Minzhongribao (民眾日報) Commons Daily

Taibei Times

Zhongyangribao (中央日報) Central Daily

Ziyoushibao (自由時報) Liberty Times

Appendix One: List of Interviewees

KMT Politicians

Name	Date and Place of interview	Background
Luo Xingwang 羅興旺	Gaoxiong, 29 March, 2000, 17 August, 2001	Cadre in Gaoxiong City KMT Propaganda and Youth sections.
Zhang Kuanxiu 張寬修	Taibei, 11 April, 2000	Cadre in KMT HQ Propaganda section
Lin Yuxiang 林鈺祥	Taibei, 11 April, 2000, 4 October, 2001	Taibei City Councillor, Legislator, Deputy Director of Policy Research Department
Huang Zhaoshun 黃昭順	Gaoxiong, 17 August, 2001	Gaoxiong City Councillor, Legislator, KMT CSC
Jiang Yiwen 江綺雯	Gaoxiong, 20 August, 2001	National Assemblywoman, Legislator
Zhang Zhenwei 張振偉	Pingdong, 24 August, 2001	Cadre in Pingdong Party Branch Propaganda Section
Chen Xuesheng 陳學聖	Taibei, 11 September, 2001	Taibei City Councillor, Legislator
Huang Defu 黃德福	Taibei, 12 September, 2001	Political Scientist, Legislator
Chen Hongji 陳鴻基	Taibei, 14 September, 2001	Legislator
Pan Weigang 潘維剛	Taibei, 24 September, 2001	Legislator
Ding Shouzhong 丁守中	Taibei, 28 September, 2001	Political Scientist, Legislator
Huang Huizhen 黃輝珍	Taibei, 26 September, 2001	Party Propaganda Chief
Mu Mingzhu 穆閏珠	Taibei, 2 October, 2001	Legislator
Wu Dunyi 吳敦義	Taibei, 8 October, 2001	Nantou ME, Gaoxiong Mayor, Legislator
Xu Shuide 許水德	Taibei, 11 October, 2001	Gaoxiong Mayor, Party Secretary General, Examination Yuan President
Wang Tianjing 王天競	Taibei, 16 October, 2001	Legislator
Li Denghui	Taibei, 17 October,	President and Party Chairman

李登輝	2001	
Zhang Ronggong 張榮恭	Taibei, 17 October, 2001	Head of the KMT Mainland Affairs Department
Former KMT Propaganda Chief	Taibei, 19 October, 2001	Legislator, Propaganda Chief,
Fu Hekang 伏和康	Taibei, 1 November, 2001	Director of the We Can Advertising Company
Wei Yong 魏鏞	Taibei, 5 November, 2001	Political Scientist, Legislator
Hao Bocun 郝柏村	Taibei, 7 November, 2001	Premier, Party Vice Chairman, independent vice presidential candidate

DPP Politicians

Liu Shizhong 劉世忠	Taibei, 23 March, 2000	Deputy Director of the Department of International Affairs
Zhang Zhihong 張志弘	Gaoxiong, 31 March, 2000	Campaign Manager for Zhang Junxiong and Chen Shuibian
Xu Qiongdan 許瓊丹	Taibei, 12 April, 2000	DPP Campaign Manager
Xu Shifen 許淑芬	Taibei, 12 April, 2000	Deputy Director of the Policy Research and Coordination Committee
Chen Junlin 陳俊麟	Taibei, 12 April, 2000	Director of the Survey Center
Li Qingxiong 李慶雄	Gaoxiong, 14 August, 2001	Legislator
Su Jiaquan 蘇嘉全	Pingdong, 24 August, 2001	Pingdong County Councillor, Legislator, Pingdong ME
Pan Meng'an 潘孟安	Pingdong, 24 August, 2001	Pingdong County Councillor, Director of Pingdong County Party Branch
Tang Jinquan 湯金全	Gaoxiong, 24 August, 2001	Gaoxiong City Councillor, Legislator
Yang Qiuxing 楊秋興	Gaoxiong, 24 August, 2001	Gaoxiong County Councillor, Legislator, Gaoxiong County ME
Xu Tiancai 許添財	Tainan, 25 August, 2001	Legislator, Tainan ME
Gong Zhemin 龔哲民	Gaoxiong, 27 August, 2001	Gaoxiong County Branch cadre
Shen Fuxiong	Taibei, 19 September,	Legislator, Director of the Policy

沈福雄	2001	Research and Coordination Committee
Hong Qichang 洪奇昌	Taibei, 20 September, 2001	Legislator
Lin Zhengjie 林正杰	Xinzhu, 21 September, 2001	Dangwai leader, Legislator, Xin Zhu City Deputy Mayor
Lin Zhuoshui 林濁水	Taibei, 24 September, 2001	Legislator, author of TIC.
Lai Jinling 賴勁麟	Taibei, 25 September, 2001	National Assemblyman, Legislator
Zhang Junhong 張俊宏	Taibei, 26 September, 2001	Dangwai leader, political prisoner, Party Secretary General, Legislator
Yu Meimei 余莓莓	Taibei, 27 September, 2001	Vice Director of Propaganda Department
Yan Jinfu 顏錦福	Taibei, 28 September, 2001	Political prisoner, Taibei City Councillor, Legislator
Xu Xinliang 許信良	Taibei, 28 September, 2001	Dangwai leader, Party Chairman, Independent presidential candidate
Yao Jiawen 姚嘉文	Taibei, 2 October, 2001	Dangwai leader, political prisoner, Chairman, legislator, Presidential Advisor
Yan Jianfa 顏建發	Taibei, 4 October, 2001	Director of the Mainland Affairs Section
Tian Xin 田欣	Taibei, 23 October, 2001	Director of the Department of International Affairs
Zhang Yishan 張益贍	Taibei, 23 October, 2001	Campaigner in Chen Shuibian camp
Chen Zhongxin 陳忠信	Taibei, 23 October, 2001	Dangwai leader, political prisoner, legislator
Peng Mingmin 彭明敏	Taibei, 31 October, 2001	Martial Law era dissident, presidential candidate (1996), Presidential Advisor
You Qing 尤清	Taibei, 2 November, 2001	Dangwai leader, DPP founding member, Taibei County ME, legislator
Chen Fangming 陳芳明	Taibei, 2 November, 2001	Propaganda Chief, NCCU Chinese literature professor
Huang Huangxiong 黃煌雄	Taibei, 9 November, 2001	Legislator, Control Yuan Member

NP Politicians

Name	Place and Date of Interview	Background
Lu Ruizhong 盧瑞鍾	Taibei, 10 April, 2000	Political Scientist NTU and Director of NP Policy Department
Mei Zaixing 梅再興	Gaoxiong, 20 August, 2001	Gaoxiong City Councillor,
Chen Mingrui 陳明瑞	Gaoxiong, 7 September, 2001	Gaoxiong Li Head
Xie Qida 謝啓大	Gaoxiong, 7 September, 2001	Legislator, NP Chairwoman
Lai Shibao 賴士葆	Taibei, 25 September, 2001	Economist, Legislator
Yu Muming 郁慕明	Taibei, 5 October, 2001	NP founding member, Taibei city councillor, legislator, NP Chairman
Zhu Gaozheng 朱高正	Gaoxiong, 8 October, 2001	DPP founding member, CSDP founding member, NP Provincial Governor candidate, legislator
Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥	Taibei, 19 October, 2001	National Assemblyman, NP vice-presidential candidate (2000), Legislator
Yang Taishun 楊泰順	Taibei, 1 November, 2001	Editor of NP magazine, Provincial Assemblyman,

PFP Politicians

Name	Place and Date of Interview	Background
Zhang Zhenhuan	Gaoxiong, 10 August, 2001	Head of Propaganda Section, Gaoxiong Branch
Wang Qicong	Gaoxiong, 10 August, 2001	Vice Director, Gaoxiong Branch
Zhong Shaohe 鍾紹和	Gaoxiong, 15 August, 2001	Provincial Assemblyman, Legislator
Chen Junqin	Gaoxiong, 17 August, 2001	Campaign Manager for Legislative Candidate Lin Shoushan (林壽山)
Zhou Xiwei 周錫緯	Taibei, 11 October, 2001	Provincial Assemblyman, Legislator

Academics and others

Name	Place and Date of Interview	Background
He Wenqi 何文杞	Gaoxiong, 20 March, 2001	Artist, Taiwan Independence Party Chairman
Wu Yushan 吳玉山	Taibei, 21 March, 2000, 24 October, 2001	Political Scientist, NTU
Liu Yizhou 劉義周	Taibei, 21 March, 2000, 30 October, 2001	Political Scientist, NCCU
Hong Yongtai 洪永泰	Taibei, 21 March, 2000	Political Scientist, NCCU
Lin Congji 林聰吉	Taibei, 23 March, 2000	Political Scientist, Tamkang University (淡江大學)
Chen Wenjun 陳文俊	Gaoxiong, 30 March, 2000	Political Scientist, National Sun Yatsen University (國立中山大學)
Zheng Zilong 鄭自隆	Taibei, 11 April, 2000	Advertising Professor, NCCU
Wu Chungli 吳重禮	Jiayi, 13 April, 2000, 12 November, 2001	Political Scientist, National Chungcheng University (國立中正大學)
Wang Fengquan 王奉權	Gaoxiong, 14 April, 2000	Broadcaster, Gaoxiong Broadcasting Station (高雄廣播電台)
Zhang Qingqing 張卿卿	Taibei, 14 May, 2001	Advertising Professor, NCCU
Hong Yahui 洪雅慧	Taibei, 18 June, 2001	Advertising Professor, Fujen University (輔仁大學)
Lin Shenqing 林深靖	Gaoxiong, 8 October, 2001	Political Scientist
Lin Jiwen 林繼文	Taibei, 25 October, 2001	Political Scientist, Academia Sinica
Qu Haiyuan 瞿海源	Taibei, 25 October, 2001	Sociologist, Academia Sinica
Wang Fuchang 王甫昌	Taibei, 26 October, 2001	Sociologist, Academia Sinica
Huang Xiudian 黃秀端	Taibei, 31 October, 2001	Political Scientist, National Soochow University (國立東吳大學)
Ming Juzheng 明居正	Taibei, 5 November, 2001	Political Scientist, NTU
Zhang Zhenxiang	Taibei, 6 November	Taiwan Solidarity Union Director of

張禎祥		International Affairs
Sheng Xingyuan 盛杏媛	Taipei, 7 November, 2001	Political Scientist, NCCU
Xu Yongming 徐永明	Jiayi, 12 November, 2001	Political Scientist, National Chungcheng University



(platform)

Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan: 1991-2001

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Table 1.1 Revised Manifesto Research Group Coding Scheme

<u>Domain 1: External Relations</u>	<u>Domain 4: Economy</u>	<u>Domain 7: Social Groups</u>
101: Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	401: Free Enterprise	701: Labour Groups
102: Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	402: Incentives	702: Labour Groups: Negative
103: Anti Imperialism	403: Market Regulation	703: Agriculture and Farmers
104: Military: Positive	404: Economic Planning	704: Middle Class & Professional Groups
105: Military: Negative	405: Corporatism	705: Underprivileged and Minority Groups
106: Peace	406: Protectionalism: Positive	706: Non-Economic Demographic Groups
107: Internationalism: Positive	407: Protectionalism: Negative	
108: European Community: Positive	408: Economic Goals	
109: Internationalism: Negative	409: Keynesian Demand Management	
110: European Community: Negative	410: Productivity	
111: Taiwan Independence Positive	411: Technology and Infrastructure	
111A Pure Taiwan Independence	412: Controlled Economy	
111B Diluted Taiwan Independence	413: Nationalization	
112 Taiwan Independence Negative	414: Economic Orthodoxy	
112A Taiwan Independence Negative	415: Marxist Analysis	
112B Chinese Unification	416: Anti Growth Economy	
	420: Economic Growth and Prosperity	
<u>Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy</u>	<u>Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life</u>	<u>Domain 9: Candidate and Party</u>
201: Freedom and Human Rights	501: Environmental Protection	901: Candidate: Positive
202: Democracy	502: Culture	902: Candidate: Negative
203: Constitutionalism: Positive	503: Social Justice	903: Party: Positive
204: Constitutionalism:	504: Welfare State Expansion	904: Party: Negative
	505: Welfare State	904V: Party Negative: Violence

Negative	Limitation 506: Education Expansion 507: Education Limitation	
Domain 3: Political System	Domain 6: Fabric of Society	
301: Decentralization: Positive	601: Chinese Nationalism	
302: Decentralization: Negative	601T: Taiwan Nationalism	
303: Govt and Administrative Efficiency	602: National Way of Life: Negative	
	603: Traditional Morality: Positive	
304: Political Corruption	604: Traditional Morality: Negative	
305: Political Authority	605: Law and Order	
	606: Social Harmony	
305: Political Stability	607: Multiculturalism: Positive	
305B: Party Government Competence	608: Multiculturalism: Negative	
305C: Other Parties' lack of Government Competence		

Note 1: The categories featuring in my case study chapters are in bold print.

Note 2: This revised MRG coding scheme is similar to the one used by Liu Tsungwei, for the differences see Chapter 1, notes 39-40.

Sources: Ian Budge, Hans Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara & Eric Tanenbaum, Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) Appendix 3; Liu Tsung-wei, "The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan 1989-1998: with particular reference to Single Non Transferable Vote" (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Essex, 2002)

Table 7.1

Table 1.2 Official Newspaper Ads Issue Domains Tables (1991-2000)

	KMT	DPP	NP	Average
Domain 1: External Relations	13.1% (3)	14.6% (3)	23 (2)	16.9% (3)
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	3.4% (6)	8.9% (4)	4.6% (6)	5.6% (5)
Domain 3: Political System	32.2% (1)	27.7% (1)	15.3% (3)	25.1% (1)
Domain 4: Economy	8.6% (4)	2% (8)	2% (8)	4.2% (7)
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	2.2% (8)	5.3% (7)	7.4% (4)	5% (6)
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	6.7% (5)	8% (5)	6.3% (5)	7.1% (4)
Domain 7: Social Groups	2.5% (7)	6% (6)	2.2% (7)	3.5% (8)
Domain 9: Candidate and Party	20.3% (2)	17.9% (2)	29.4% (1)	22.5% (2)
Uncategorizable/others	11%	9.5%	9.9%	10.1%

Note 1: This table shows the percentage of issue mentions for each party in the eight issue domains and the uncategorizable/others domain.

Note 2: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative domain rankings.

Note 3: For details of the composition of each issue domain see Table 1.1

Source: These figures are based on my content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national level election between 1991 and 2000

Table 2.1 Principal Elections and verdict on results 1989-2001

Year	Election held	Result verdict
1989	Legislative Yuan (Supplementary) & Municipal Executives	DPP won
1991	National Assembly	KMT won DPP lost
1992	Legislative Yuan	DPP won
1993	Municipal Executives	KMT won
1994	Provincial Governor, Taipei & Gaoxiong Mayor	Tie
1995	Legislative Yuan	NP won
1996	President & National Assembly	KMT won DPP lost
1997	Municipal Executives	DPP won KMT lost
1998	Taipei and Gaoxiong Mayor & Legislative Yuan	KMT won NP lost
2000	President	DPP won KMT lost
2001	Municipal Executive & Legislative Yuan	DPP won PFP won KMT lost

Note: The result verdict is based on my reading of individual campaign reviews and the views of interviewed politicians and political scientists. For a list of interviewees see Appendix 1.

Table 2.2 Top Ten Issues in three categories

Ranking	Official Ads	Liu Study	Elite Survey
1	Political Corruption (13.2)	Welfare State Expansion (10.1)	National Identity
2	Party Positive (9.5)	Technology and Infrastructure (5.9)	Political Corruption
3	Taiwan Independence: Negative (6.8)	Non Economic Demographic Groups (5.2)	Economy
4	Candidate: Negative (5.8)	Education Expansion (4.2)	Social Welfare
5	Government Ability (4.6)	Social Justice (3.9)	Democracy
6	Party: Negative (4.1)	Law and Order (3.9)	Government Ability
7	Democracy (4)	Environmental Protection (3.5)	Law and Order
8	Other Parties' Lack of Government Competence (3.6)	Political Corruption (3.5)	
9	Taiwan Independence: Positive (3.3)	Efficiency of the Legislative Yuan (3.1)	
10	Political Stability (3.2)	Productivity (2.8)	

Note 1: The official ads top ten represents the top issues for the KMT, DPP and NP between 1991 and 2000. The numbers in brackets are average percentage of issue mentions. The source is my content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from the nine national level election between 1991 and 2000.

Note 2: Liu's top ten represents the top issues for all Legislative Yuan candidates between 1989 and 1998. The numbers in brackets are average percentage of issue mentions. The source is Liu Tsung-wei's content analysis of legislative candidates' policy proposals in election gazettes. See Liu, 2001, Table 8.1

Note 3: The top elite issues are based on my interviews of 61 experienced Taiwanese politicians, and specifically their reply to the question, "What have been the most salient political issues in Taiwan's elections over the last decade? (1991-2001)" See Table 2.6 in this dissertation for details.

Table 2.3 Official Party Newspaper Ad Top Issues for the decade 1991-2000

	KMT	DPP	NP
1	Government Competence (11.6)	Political Corruption (23.9)	Party Positive (12.8)
2	Other Parties' Lack of Government Competence (9.5)	Party Positive (8.4)	Taiwan independence: Negative (12.7)
3	Taiwan independence: Negative (7.6)	Diluted Taiwan independence (8)	Political Corruption (12.3)
4	Political Stability (7.6)	Non-Economic Demographic Groups (5.9)	Candidate: Negative (11.8)
5	Party Positive (7.3)	Democracy (5.7)	Peace (5.5)
6	Economic Growth and Prosperity (6.1)	Party: Negative (5.6)	Democracy (4.2)
7	Candidate: Negative (4.2)	Pure Taiwan independence (4.3)	Chinese Nationalism (3.8)
8	Law and Order (3.5)	Freedom and Human Rights (3.2)	Party: Negative (3.3)
9	Political Corruption (3.5)	Taiwan nationalism (3)	Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (3.3)
10	Party: Negative (3.5)	Social welfare (2.7)	Education expansion (2.1)

Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for each party between 1991 and 2000

Note 2: Numbers in brackets show the average percentage of issue mentions for each party in national elections between 1991 and 2000.

Source: My content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national level election between 1991 and 2000. For the annual issue Tables details see Tables [1.9](#), [1.10](#) & [1.11](#)

Table 2.4 Official Party Newspaper Ad Top issues for frequency of getting into annual top ten (1991-2000)

	KMT	DPP	NP
1	Government Competence (8)	Party Positive (8)	Party Positive (5)
2	Taiwan independence: Negative (7)	Diluted Taiwan independence (7)	Democracy (4)
3	Political Stability (7)	Political Corruption (7)	Political Corruption (4)
4	Other Parties' Lack of Government Competence (7)	Democracy (6)	Party Negative (4)
5	Political Corruption (6)	Social Welfare Expansion (4)	Taiwan independence: Negative (4)
6	Party Negative (6)	Social Justice (4)	Candidate Negative (3)
7	Economic Growth and Prosperity (5)	Non-Economic Demographic Groups (4)	Peace (2)
8	Party Positive (5)	Candidate Positive (4)	Environmental Protection (2)
9	Party Negative: Violence (4)	Party Negative (4)	Education Expansion (2)
10	Candidate Negative (3)	Taiwan nationalism (4)	Culture (2)

Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for each party on the basis of frequency of featuring in parties' annual issue top ten. The figures in brackets are number of occasions each issue has appeared in parties' annual issue top tens in the nine national elections between 1991 and 2000.

Note 2: Frequencies are lower for the NP as it only contested seven elections.

Source: My content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national level election between 1991 and 2000. For details of annual top tens see Table 1.9, 1.10 & 1.11

Table 2.5. Party Issue Overlap on Official advertisement Top Tens

Only KMT	Political Stability (305A), Party Government Competence (305B), Other Parties' Lack of Government Competence (305C), Economic Growth and Prosperity (420), Law and Order (605), Party Negative: Violence (904V)
Only DPP	Pure Taiwan Independence (111A), Diluted Taiwan Independence (111B), Freedom and Human Rights (201), Social Justice (503), Welfare State Expansion (504), Taiwan Nationalism (601T), Non-Economic Demographic Groups (706), Candidate Positive (901)
Only NP	Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (101), Peace (106), Education Expansion (506), National Way of Life: Positive (601), Environmental Protection (501), Culture (502)
KMT & DPP	
KMT & NP	Taiwan Independence: Negative (112A), Candidate Negative (902)
DPP & NP	Democracy (202)
All Three Parties	Uncategorizable/others (000), Political Corruption (304), Party Positive (903), Party Negative (904)

Note 1: This table shows the degree of issue emphasis overlap from parties' top ten tables shown in Table 2.3 and 2.4.

Note 2: Numbers in brackets are the MRG issue category code numbers, for details see Table 1.1

Source: My content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national level election between 1991 and 2000.

Table 2.6 Elite Views on issue saliency and ownership

	KMT	DPP	NP
What have been the most salient political issues in Taiwan's elections over the last decade? (1991-2001)	1. National identity 2. Economy 3. Money politics 4. Social welfare 5. Crime	1. National identity 2. Money politics 3. Social welfare 4. Economy 5. Democracy	1. National identity 2. Economy 3. Money politics 4. Social welfare 5. Social justice
What issues have you and your party stressed most in elections over the last decade? (1991-2001)	1. National identity 2. Economy 3. Stability 4. Prosperity 5. Education	1. National identity 2. Money politics 3. Democracy 4. Social welfare 5. Environmental protection	1. National identity 2. Money politics 3. Economy 4. Social welfare 5. Democracy

Note 1: The top elite issues rankings are based on my interviews of 61 experienced Taiwanese politicians, the sample included 22 from the KMT, 29 from the DPP and ten from the NP. For a full list of respondents see Appendix 1

Table 2.7 : Annual KMT Official Ads Top Tens

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	2000	Average
1	305B (36.3)	305A (27.7)	903 (21)	605 (20.1)	305B (16.8)	901 (12.3)	305C (24.7)	305B (15.1)	902 (18.8)	305B (11.6)
2	305C (11)	420 (18.3)	706 (14.3)	305C (18.2)	112A (15.8)	902 (11.1)	605 (11.4)	903 (13.7)	305B (7.9)	305C (9.5)
3	112A (10.3)	305B (8.9)	305A (11.1)	112A (15.5)	904V (10.9)	111B (9.3)	304 (9.8)	420 (6.9)	504 (7.4)	112A (7.6)
4	204 (9.7)	305C (8.9)	305C (9.5)	904V (7.9)	904 (8.4)	202 (8.2)	112A (8.9)	904 (6)	305C (7)	305A (7.6)
5	903 (7)	903 (8.9)	305B (8.2)	305 (6.8)	202 (8.2)	305A (5)	903 (6.2)	305 (5.8)	304 (6.1)	903 (7.3)
6	420 (4.6)		420 (7.7)	904 (5.9)	420 (6.4)	112A (4.7)	902 (6)	606 (5.7)	901 (5.9)	420 (6.1)
7	904 (3.7)		112A (7.6)	304 (4.7)	903 (6.3)	305B (4.6)	411 (4.9)	904V (4.7)	601T (4.6)	902 (4.2)
8	305A (3.4)		411 (5.6)	305B (4.2)	305C (6)	606 (4.32)	904V (4.8)	503 (4.1)	305 (3.6)	605 (3.5)
9			904 (2)	104A (4)	106 (3.8)	304 (4.2)	904 (3.1)	304 (3.2)	112A (3.2)	304 (3.5)
10			202 (0.9)	607 (2.8)	304 (3.5)	411 (3.9)	111B (3)	101 (2.84)	106 (3.1)	904 (3.5)
104A: Military: Positive				305C: Other Parties Lack of Government Competence			607: Multiculturalism: Positive			
106: Peace				411: Technology and Infrastructure			706: Non Economic Demographic Groups			
111B: Diluted Taiwan Independence				420 Economic Growth & Prosperity			901: Candidate Positive			
112A: Taiwan Independence: Negative				503: Social Justice			902: Candidate Negative			
202: Democracy				504: Welfare State Expansion			903: Party Positive			
304 Political Corruption				601T: Taiwan Nationalism			904 Party Negative			
305A: Political Stability				605: Law and Order			904V: Party Negative: Violence.			
305B: Government Competence				606: Social Harmony						

Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for the KMT in each election between 1991 and 2000.

Note 2: Issue categories are shown by their MRG code number. For instance 304 stands for "Political Corruption."

Note 3: Numbers in brackets are the percentages of issue mentions for the top issues that year.
Source: My content analysis of 261 official KMT party newspaper ads from each national level election between 1991 and 2000.

Table 2.8: Annual DPP Official Ads Top Tens

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	2000	Average
1	111A (27.7)	304 (29.8)	304 (70.8)	304 (37.4)	304 (36)	111B (26.9)	706 (42.9)	903 (49.6)	304 (22.4)	304 (23.9)
2	202 (27.3)	111B (18)	305B (4.8)	601T (9.3)	111B (13.4)	111A (10.5)	904 (32.9)	304 (13.3)	901 (10.3)	903 (8.4)
3	201 (17)	202 (9.2)	504 (4.8)	904 (8.8)	903 (9.8)	106 (9.1)	605 (23.5)	305 (3.7)	504 (9.4)	111B (8)
4	304 (4.3)	402T (7.1)	503 (4.3)	607 (7.7)	901 (5.9)	201 (8.3)	903 (0.7)	904 (2.2)	601T (8.2)	706 (5.9)
5	901 (2.8)	903 (4.3)	601T (3.4)	503 (6.4)	202 (5.6)	601T (5.9)	/	305C (1.5)	111B (5.7)	202 (5.7)
6	903 (2.7)	105 (4.1)	903 (3.3)	504 (5.6)	606 (5.5)	903 (3.5)	/	111B (0.7)	902 (3.8)	904 (5.6)
7	904 (2.5)	706 (3.1)	501 (2.7)	305C (4.6)	504 (4.1)	902 (3.4)	/	/	305 (3.4)	111A (4.3)
8	111B (2.2)	503 (2.5)	706 (1.1)	111B (3.7)	305B (3.3)	901 (3.2)	/	/	202 (3.3)	201 (3.2)
9	503 (1.9)	902 (2.5)	202 (0.9)	202 (2.9)	706 (2.9)	104A (2.5)	/	/	607 (3.1)	601T (3)
10	706 (1)	904 (1.9)	904 (0.6)	903 (1.8)	607 (2.6)	503 (2.1)	/	/	303 (3.1)	504 (2.7)

104A: Military: Positive	305B: Government Competence	605: Law and Order
105: Military: Negative	305C: Other Parties Lack of Government Competence	607: Multiculturalism: Positive
111A: Pure Taiwan Independence	411: Technology and Infrastructure	706: Non Economic Demographic Groups
111B: Diluted Taiwan Independence	420 Economic Growth & Prosperity	901: Candidate Positive
201: Freedom and Human Rights	501: Environmental Protection	902: Candidate Negative
202: Democracy	503: Social Justice	903: Party Positive

304 Political Corruption	504: Welfare State Expansion	904 Party Negative
305A: Political Stability	601T: Taiwan Nationalism	904V: Party Negative: Violence.

Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for the DPP in each election between 1991 and 2000.

Note 2: Issue categories are shown by their MRG code number.

Note 2: Numbers in brackets are the percentages of issue mentions for the top issues that year.

Source: My content analysis of 236 official DPP party newspaper ads from each national level election between 1991 and 2000.

Table 2.9 Annual NP Official Ads Top Tens

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	2000	Average
1	902 (75)	903 (17.9)	304 (23.7)	106 (24.5)	101 (20.8)	903 (30.5)	112A (75)	903 (12.8)
2	601 (25)	304 (12.2)	903 (14.4)	903 (19.2)	202 (13.3)	304 (30.2)	106 (12.5)	112A (12.7)
3		901 (6)	202 (11.9)	112A (6.2)	506 (12.6)	904 (7.8)	304 (12.5)	304 (12.3)
4		504 (4.3)	502 (7.3)	606 (5.6)	903 (7.7)	902 (3.3)		902 (11.8)
5		305B (3.5)	904 (6.5)	109 (4.62)	304 (7.6)	112A (1.9)		106 (5.5)
6		904 (3.3)	112A (5.6)	420 (4.3)	706 (6.7)	705 (1.4)		202 (4.2)
7		502 (3.2)	503 (4.8)	902 (4.2)	504 (5)	305C (1.3)		601 (3.8)
8		503 (3.2)	303 (1.9)	202 (2.7)	705 (5)	403 (1.1)		904 (3.3)
9		501 (2.7)	410 (1.6)	104A (2.4)	501 (4.2)	202 (1)		101 (3.3)
10		904V (2.3)	606 (1.5)	305 (2.1)	904 (4)	305B (0.9)		506 (2.1)
101: Special Foreign Relationships: Positive			403: Market Regulation			705: Underprivileged Minority Groups		
104A: Military: Positive			410: Productivity			706: Non Economic		

		Demographic Groups
106: Peace	411: Technology and Infrastructure	901: Candidate Positive
112A: Taiwan Independence: Negative	501: Environmental Protection	902: Candidate Negative
202: Democracy	502: Culture	903: Party Positive
303: Efficiency of Legislative Yuan	503: Social Justice	904 Party Negative
304 Political Corruption	504: Welfare State Expansion	
305: Political Stability	601: Chinese Nationalism	
305B: Government Competence	606: Social Harmony	

Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for the NP in each election between 1993 and 2000.

Note 2: Issue categories are shown by their MRG code number.

Note 3: Numbers in brackets are the percentages of issue mentions for the top issues that year.

Source: My content analysis of 86 official NP party newspaper ads from each national level election between 1993 and 2000.

Table 3.1 Social Welfare Issues in Taiwan

Sub-issue	Initiator	Ownership	Saliency
NHI	DPP	Originally DPP but stolen by KMT before becoming salient	Medium
Pensions	DPP	DPP, KMT unsuccessful at stealing	High
Children and women's welfare	DPP	Contested	Medium
Jungongjiao welfare (including veteran welfare)	DPP initiates attacks against unfair welfare system NMT/NT/PP defend old system	KMT/NT own support for jungongjiao welfare, while DPP attacks unfair welfare.	Medium
Welfare state	DPP	DPP	Low
Unemployment benefits	Not initiated as electoral issue	Free	Low
Housing	Not initiated as electoral issue	Free	Low
Disabled welfare	Not initiated as electoral issue	Free	Low

Note 1. This table shows the main social welfare issues in Taiwan, the party that initiated them as electoral issues, the party that owns the sub-issue and the saliency of the sub-issue.

Note: 2. The ownership and saliency of sub-issues is judged by the author of the basis of my interviews, and analysis of election propaganda and campaign reviews.

Table 3.2 Where would you place yourself and the main parties on a spectrum in which passively maintaining the existing social welfare system equals 0 and actively promoting social welfare equals 10?

Year of survey	Respondent	KMT	DPP	NP	PFP
2000	5.6	4.8	6.5	5.2	5.3

Note: 89.1% of respondents could place themselves, 69.2% could place the DPP and KMT, 48% could place the KMT, DPP & NP, and 44.5% could place all four parties.

Source: Data supplied by Sheng Xingyuan of the ESC.

Table 3.3 Which party is better able to design a fair and reasonable social welfare system?

	KMT	DPP	NP	Don't know/other
10/1998 Survey	18%	30.7%	4.7%	46.5%
3/1999 Survey	21.7%	27.8%	4%	44.4%
8/1999 Survey	20.7%	32.9%	2.7%	43.8%

Note: All three telephone surveys were conducted nationally by the DPP's Survey Research Department. The number of valid cases were 1090 in October 1998, 1034 in March 1999, and 1346 in August 1999.

Source: "11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image" (Unpublished paper by DPP Survey Research Department, 1999), 3.

4.1 Political Corruption issues in Taiwan

Category	Sub-issue
White	1. Election Banquets (選舉飯)
Grey	
Black	
White-Gray	1. Government Business Collusion (官商勾結) 2. White Gold (白金) 3. Factional Candidates (派系候選人) 4. Grassroots Elections (基層選舉) 5. Golden Oxen (金牛) 6. Xingpiao case (興票案) 7. Link between corruption and former president Li Denghui.
White-Grey-Black	1. Party Assets (黨產) 2. Vote Buying (買票) 3. Municipal Executive Corruption (縣市長貪污) 4. Land Speculation (炒地皮) 5. Corruption of high level central government officials (中央政府高級官員貪污) 6. Corruption involving national construction projects.
Grey-Black	1. "Black Gold"/ Gangster influence on politics (黑金/黑道)

Note 1: This table places the corruption sub-issues into categories according to how mainstream norms have changed over the 1990s. The fact that almost all sub-issues have made the transition to either grey or black corruption reveals the pace that perceptions of corruption have changed over the decade.

Table 4.2 United Daily News Survey on the percentage of respondents viewing the KMT/DPP as clean or corrupt (1992-1997)

Year of Survey	KMT is clean	DPP is clean	KMT is corrupt	DPP is corrupt
1992	37	26	28	29
1993	32	41	36	19
1994	31	39	34	17
1995	23	41	43	20
1996	25	41	45	22
1997	21	47	50	23

Note: This table shows the percentage of respondents viewing the main parties as either clean or corrupt in six national surveys carried out by the Lianhebao (United Daily News) (聯合報).

Source: Christian Schafferer, "The 1997 city and county magistrate elections in Taiwan," 26-27.

Table 4.3 Why do you dislike a party?

Survey Date: October 1998			
	1	2	3
KMT	It embezzles	It's inefficient	It's corrupt
DPP	It's violent/extreme	It advocates Taiwan independence	It often creates political conflict
NP	It's divided/internal struggles	It does not identify with Taiwan	All words and no action
Survey Date: March 1999			
	1	2	3
KMT	It embezzles, It's corrupt, It's black gold	It's inefficient	Just hate it/no reason
DPP	It's violent/extreme	It often creates political conflict	Just hate it/no reason
NP	Just hate it/no reason	All words and no action	It does not identify with Taiwan
Survey Date: August 1999			
	1	2	3
KMT	It embezzles	It has links to gangsters	It's inefficient
DPP	It's violent/extreme	It advocates Taiwan independence	It often creates political conflict
NP	All words and no action	It does not identify with Taiwan	It's divided/ has internal struggles

Note 1: This table shows the three most common reasons respondents gave for liking a party in three separate surveys.

Note 2: The number of valid cases were 1090 in October 1998, 1034 in March 1999, and 1346 in August 1999.

Note 3: Answers especially relevant to the case study chapters have been highlighted in block letters.

Source: "11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image" (Unpublished paper by DPP Survey Research Department, 1999), 5.

Table 4.4 Why do you dislike a party?

Survey Date: October 1998			
	1	2	3
KMT	Good government ability	Used to the KMT in power	Its contribution to democratic politics
DPP	It gets things done	It's clean	It cares about public opinion
NP	It's clean	It can get things done	It cares about public opinion
Survey Date: March 1999			
	1	2	3
KMT	Stability/Safety	Just like it/no reason	It can get things done
DPP	It can get things done	It's clean	Just like it/no reason
NP	It's clean	It has talent	It can get things done
Survey Date: August 1999			
	1	2	3
KMT	Used to KMT in government	Just like it/no reason	Good government ability
DPP	It can get things done	It's clean	It supervises and balances
NP	It's clean	It can get things done	Just like it/no reason

Note 1: This table shows the three most common reasons respondents gave for liking a party in three separate surveys.

Note 2: All three telephone surveys were conducted nationally by the DPP's Survey Research Department. The number of valid cases were 1090 in October 1998, 1034 in March 1999, and 1346 in August 1999.

Note 3: Answers especially relevant to the case study chapters have been highlighted in block letters.

Source: "11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image" (Unpublished paper by DPP Survey Research Department, 1999), 4.

Table 5.1 Independence Versus Unification (TongDu) Spectrum

Far Left: Pure Taiwan Independence	Centre Left: Diluted Taiwan Independence	Centre: Status Quo	Centre Right: Taiwan Independence: Negative	Far Right: Chinese Unification
The Republic of Taiwan (ROT), Taiwan Nation, Taiwan independence, new constitution, TIC	Anti unification, anti one country two systems, arguing that Taiwan must not follow the Hong Kong model, abolish the Provincial Government quo=independence, UN application, anti one china, pragmatic diplomacy, ¹ self determination, anti rapid unification, special state to state relationship, one country on each side.	Maintain the Status Quo	Anti Taiwan independence, Pro ROC, Protect the ROC, anti ROT, anti TIC, Anti new constitution, protect Provincial assembly, anti plebiscite, anti slow independence, anti state to state.	Any positive references to unification, NUG, One Country Two Systems, One Country Three Systems, unification under a federal system (聯邦制) unification under a Confederacy (邦聯制), anti pragmatic diplomacy.

Note: This table shows the main sub-issues on the TongDu debate and where I judge them to fit on this spectrum.

¹ The inclusion of pragmatic diplomacy may be disputed by some analysts, however, it is denounced by the PRC as TI.

Table 5.2. Taiwanese Versus Chinese Identity Spectrum

Far Left: Exclusive Taiwanese Identity	Centre Left: Inclusive Taiwanese Identity	Centre: Dual Identity	Centre Right: ROC Nationalism	Far Right: Chinese Nationalism
White Terror, 228, accusations of betraying Taiwan, ROT flag, BSR ethnic appeals, anti WSR appeals, loyalty to Taiwan, tragedy of being Taiwanese	Identification with Taiwan, Formosa, Map of Taiwan, Love Taiwan, Taiwan first, Taiwanese culture, New Taiwanese.	Dual Identity	ROC flag, ROC national anthem, ROC anthem, ROC symbols such as Chiang Ching-kuo	Chinese identity, WSR appeals, Chinese nationalist symbols such as Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, anti Japanese references, references to the Anti-Japanese war, Chinese KMT

Note: This table shows the main sub-issues in the Taiwanese versus Chinese identity debate and where I judge them to fit on this spectrum.

Table 5.1 National Identity issues (see other file)

5.2 Taiwanese versus Chinese identity (see other file)

Table 5.3 Do you think the KMT/DPP/NP is a party that represents the Mainlanders (WSR), the native Taiwanese (BSR) or both?

	The KMT is a party that represents:			The DPP is a party that represents:			The NP is a party that represents:		
	WSR	BSR	Both	WSR	BSR	Both	WSR	BSR	Both
1992	16.8	6.5	53.8	1.1	55.7	16.3			
1993	19.7	6.5	52.9	0.4	59.6	17.7			
1996	11.6	7.5	63.5	1.2	44.6	22.1	32.8	2.4	34.5
Elite	15.2	37.9	46.9	0	60.6	39.4	66.7	0	27.3

Note 1: The 1992, 1993 and 1996 rows show the percentage of respondents viewing the parties as representing the Mainlanders (WSR), the Taiwanese (BSR), or both.

Note 2: These surveys were carried out by the NTU using face-to-face interviews. The number of cases was 1,384 in 1992, 1,398 in 1993 and 1,376 in 1996.

Note 3: The elite survey was carried out by Lin Chia-long, interviewing 66 legislators from all three parties between 1995 and 1996.

Source: Lin Chia-long (1998) Table 12-7

Table 5.4 Do you think the KMT/DPP/NP is a party that supports independence, Chinese unification or the status quo?

	The KMT is a party that supports:			The DPP is a party that supports:			The NP is a party that supports:		
	TI	CU	SQ	TI	CU	SQ	TI	CU	SQ
1992	1.3	67.7	3.5	65.9	2.1	2.7			
1993	1.8	63.9	6.5	65.9	3	3.5			
1996	7.3	33	22.7	66.4	1.4	3.8	4.1	36	16.9
Elite	1.5	66.7	31.8	98.5	0	1.5	0	100	0


Note 1: This table shows the percentage of respondents viewing the parties as supporting Taiwan independence (TI), Chinese Unification or maintaining the status quo (SQ).

Note 2: These surveys were carried out by the NTU using face-to-face interviews. The number of cases was 1,384 in 1992, 1,398 in 1993 and 1,376 in 1996.

Note 3: The elite survey was carried out by Lin Chia-long, who interviewed 66 legislators from all three parties between 1995 and 1996.

Source: Lin Chia-long. (1998) Table 12-8

Figure 2.1 Parties Vote Shares



%




Figure 2.3 Party Identification Trends: 1987-2002




Figure 3.1 Total Ads Social Welfare Issue Emphasis




Figure 3.2 Official Ads Social Welfare Issue Emphasis




Figure 3.3 Social Welfare Issue Emphasis in Japanese Elections




Figure 3.4 Public Party Image on the Social Welfare Versus Economic Growth Spectrum




Figure 4.1 Total Ads Political Corruption Issue Emphasis




Figure 4.2 Official Ads Political Corruption Issue Emphasis




Figure 4.3 Political Corruption Issue Emphasis in Japanese Elections




Figure 5.1 Total Ads Taiwan Independence Issue Emphasis




Figure 5.2 Official Ads Taiwan Independence Issue Emphasis




Figure 5.3 Public Opinion on Taiwan Independence Versus Unification




Figure 5.4 Public Opinion on Taiwanese Versus Chinese Identity




Figure 5.5 Public Party Image on the Taiwan Independence Versus Chinese Unification Spectrum

