

THE REIGN OF AL-ḤĀKIM BI AMR ALLĀH
(386/996 - 411/1021)
"A POLITICAL STUDY"

by

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of London

May 1971



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ABSTRACT

The present thesis is a political study of the reign of al-Ḥākim Bi Amr Allāh the sixth Fatimid Imām-Caliph who ruled between 386-411/996-1021. It consists of a note on the sources and seven chapters. The first chapter is a biographical review of al-Ḥākim's person. It introduces a history of his birth, childhood, succession to the Caliphate, his education and private life and it examines the contradiction in the sources concerning his character.

Chapter II discusses the problems which al-Ḥākim inherited from the previous rule and examines their impact on the political life of his State.

Chapter III introduces the administration of the internal affairs of the State. It examines the struggle for power between the Imām-Caliph and his Wasiṭa and its results on the internal policies of the Imām-Caliph. It also discusses the economic, social, legal and architectural reforms which he introduced throughout his reign. The progress of the Ismaili Da'wa and the problem of Ahl al-Dhimma are also examined in this chapter.

Chapter IV is devoted to the external policy of al-Ḥākim. It studies his policies concerning the maintenance of his suzerainty over the provinces of Damascus, Ḥijāz and Tripoli and his endeavour to extend it over Aleppo and other parts of the Muslim world. His policy towards the Byzantine and Abbasid Empires is also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter V examines the rebellions and uprisings which al-Ḥakīm faced and discusses his methods in dealing with them.

Chapter VI introduces the split in the Ismaili Da'wa which resulted in the creation of the Drūz Sect. It also examines the causes behind such an important event.

Chapter VII is concerned with the death or "disappearance" of al-Ḥakīm and discusses the stories and myths surrounding it.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I should like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Bernard Lewis, for his learned guidance throughout the years of my study under him. His help and encouragement made it possible to undertake and complete this thesis. To him I am greatly indebted.

Thanks are also due to the librarians and staffs of the School of Oriental and African Studies, the British Museum Library, the University of London Library, the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, for their help in making available manuscripts and books.

I should also like to thank all my colleagues and friends, especially Miss E. Bastable, Miss R.L. Hollis, Mr. A. al-Kharsān and Dr. T. Kawa for their help and constant encouragement.

S.I. Assaad

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abū al-Fidā	<u>al-Mukhtaṣar fī Tārīkh al-Bashar</u> by Abū al-Fidā.
Anṭākī	<u>Tārīkh Yahyā Ibn Saʿid al-Anṭākī</u> by al-Anṭākī.
ʿAzīmī	<u>Tārīkh al-ʿAzīmī</u> by al-ʿAzīmī.
<u>Exposé</u>	<u>Exposé de la Religion des Druzes</u> by S. de Sacy.
Ibn Abi Uṣaybiʿa	<u>ʿUyūn al-Anbāʾ fī Akhbār al-ʿAṭibbāʾ</u> by Ibn Abi Uṣaybiʿa
Ibn al-ʿAmīd	<u>Tārīkh al-Muslimīn</u> by Ibn al-ʿAmīd.
Ibn al-Jawzī	<u>al-Muntazam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Umam</u> by Ibn al-Jawzī.
Ibn al-Athīr	<u>al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh</u> by Ibn al-Athīr.
Ibn Ayās	<u>Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr fī Waqāʾiʿ al-Duhūr</u> by Ibn Ayās.
Ibn al-Dawādārī	<u>Kanz al-Durar wa Jāmʿ al-Ghurar; al-Durra al-Maḍiyya fī Tārīkh al-Dawla al-Faṭimiyya</u> by Ibn al-Dawādārī.
Ibn Hammād	<u>Akhbār Mulūk Banī ʿUbayd wa Sīratihim</u> by Ibn Hammād.
Ibn ʿIdhārī	<u>al-Bayān al-Mughrib fī Akhbār al-Andulus wa al-Maghrib</u> by Ibn ʿIdhārī.
Ibn Khaldūn	<u>Al-ʿIbar wa Diwān al-Mubtada wa al-Khabar</u> by Ibn Khaldūn.
Ibn Khallikān	<u>Wafayat al-Aʿyān</u> by Ibn Khallikān.
Ibn Kathīr	<u>Al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya</u> by Ibn Kathīr.
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ	<u>Tārīkh Baṭārikat al-Kanīsa al-Miṣriyya</u> by Severus Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
Ibn Muyassar	<u>Akhbār Miṣr</u> by Ibn Muyassar.

Ibn al-Qalānisī	<u>Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq</u> by Ibn al-Qalānisī
Ibn al-Zāfir	<u>Tārīkh al-Duwal al-Munqati'a</u> by Ibn al-Zāfir
<u>Ishāra</u>	<u>al-Ishāra Ilā Man Nāla al-Wazāra</u> by Ibn al-Ṣayrafī
<u>Itti'āz</u>	<u>Itti'āz al-Hunafa fī Akhbār al-A'imma al-fatīmiyyīn al-Khulafa</u> by al-Maqrizī
<u>Khiṭaṭ</u>	<u>al-Mawā'iz wa al-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa al-Athār</u> by al-Maqrizī
<u>Nujūm</u>	<u>al-Nujūm al-Zāhira</u> by Ibn Taghrī Birdī
Nuwayrī	<u>Nihāyat al-Arab</u> by Nuwayrī
Q ifṭī	<u>Tārīkh al-Hukama</u> by al-Q ifṭī
al-Rudhrawārī	<u>Dhayl Tajārub al-Umam</u> by al-Rudhrawārī
al-Ṣafadī	<u>al-Wāfī bi al-Wafayāt</u> by al-Ṣafadī
Sibt	<u>Mir'āt al-Zawān</u> by Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī
al-Suyūṭī	<u>Ḥusn al-Muḥadara</u> by al-Suyūṭī

Periodicals

A.I.E.O.	Annales de l'Institut d'Etudes Orientale de L'Université d'Alger
A.J.S.L.	American Journal of Semitic Languages
A.O.	Archiv Orientali
B.E.O.I.F.D.	Bulletin d'Etudes Orientale de l'Institut Français de Damas
B.F.A.E.U.	Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of the Egyptian University

B.I.E.	Bulletin de l'Institute de Egypt
B.I.F.A.O.	Bulletin de l'Institute Français d'Archeologic Orientale de Caire
B.L.R.	Boldeian Library Records
B.S.G.	Bulletin de la Societé de Geographie, Paris
B.S.O.A.S.	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies de Tunisia
C.T.	Les Cahiers de Tunisie
E.I.	Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st edition
E.I. ²	Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition
G.U.O.S.T.	Glasgow University Oriental Society Transactions
I.C.	Islamic Culture
Isl.	Der Islam
J.A.	Journal Asiatique
J.A.O.S.	Journal of American Oriental Society
J.B.B.R.A.S.	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
J.M.E.S.	Journal of the Middle East Society
J.Q.R.	Jewish Quarterly Review
J.Q.R.N.S.	Jewish Quarterly Review New Series
J.R.A.S.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
M.O.	Le Monde Oriental
M.F.O.B.	Mélanges de la Faculté Oriental Beirut

N.O.	Der Neue Orient
O.R.	Rocznik Orientalistyczny
R.B.M.L.	Repertorium für Biblische und Morgenländische Litteratur
R.C.A.S.J.	Royal Central Asian Society Journal
R.O.	Revue de l'Orient
R.E.I.	Revue des Études Islamique
R.E.B.	Revue des Études Byzantine
R.F.S.E.	Revue de la Faculté des Sciences Économiques (Istanbul)
W.I.	Die Welt des Islams
Z.D.M.G.	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

	<u>CONTENTS</u>	Page
	ABSTRACT	2
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	4
	LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	5
	NOTE ON THE SOURCES	11
Chapter I	A BIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW OF AL-HĀKIM'S PERSON	26
	His Birth	26
	Al-Manṣūr as Heir	28
	Al-Manṣūr's Succession to the Caliphate	30
	Portrait of Al-Hākim	33
	Al-Hākim's Education	33
	Al-Hākim's Private Life	37
	Al-Hākim's Character	37
Chapter II	THE LEGACY OF THE PREVIOUS RULE	45
	The Unfulfilled Promises of the <u>Da'wa</u>	45
	The growing influence of <u>Ahl al-Dhimma</u> in the Financial Administration of the State	52
	Struggle for Power among the Military Elements	59
	The Downfall of Ibn 'Ammar	78
	Barjawan's Rule, his Administration and his Downfall (387-390/997-999)	80
Chapter III	THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE STATE	97
	Political Administration	97
	Economic Policy	109
	Agricultural Policy	111

NOTE ON THE SOURCES

A satisfactory account of Fatimid history is a most difficult task. The major problem is, of course, the lack of coherent information. By comparison with the profusion of words the sources contain concerning the Umayyad or the Abbasid dynasties, the actual information relevant to the Fatimids is very small. More has been written about the Umayyad Caliph 'Abd al-Malik or al-Ma'mūn of the Abbasids than the whole dynasty of the Fatimid Caliphs. Contrary to those periods, accounts on Fatimid history are very brief and seldom give different versions of important events. In addition to that there is the biased view of chroniclers. Most of them were, directly or indirectly, influenced by bigoted religious beliefs and political hostility. They have labelled the Fatimid Caliphs as "imposters, irreligious" etc., and thus their accounts can hardly do justice to the Fatimid cause.

Unfortunately, the greater amount of the surviving Ismaili literature, which would be expected to put the pro-Fatimid view, is concerned with theological polemics. It is of great value for religious studies but contains little information on history and thus the other side of the picture remains unclear.

Sources of Fatimid history have been surveyed by a considerable

number of modern scholars.¹ Most of them of course are relevant to the reign of al-Ḥākim Bi Amr Allāh, the topic of this thesis. This note, however, is an endeavour to examine the importance and reliability of the information concerning this period.

Chroniclers may be divided into two groups: contemporary and late.

The Contemporary Chroniclers

al-Musabbiḥī (Muḥammad Ibn Abī Qāsim died in 420/1029).

According to the authority of Ibn Khallikān, al-Musabbiḥī's works appear to have been the most important source of information on Fatimid history. He wrote more than thirty books on various subjects. One of them was his greatest work Akhbār Miṣr wa Faḍā' iluhā which comprised twenty-six thousand pages.²

Unfortunately nothing of his actual works has survived, except volume forty of his large Tārīkh in which he deals with the events of a part of the year 414 A.H. and the whole of 415 A.H. There are in addition a number of Quotations made by some later chroniclers. It must be remembered,

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1. See B. Lewis, The Origins of Ismailism, Cambridge, 1940, Chapter I and "The Sources for the History of the Syrian Assassins", Speculum, XXVII (1952), 475-489; M. Canard, La Dynastie des H'amanides, Paris, 1953, Chapter I; C. Cahen, "Quelques chroniques anciennes relatives aux derniers Fatimides", B.I.F.A.O., 37 (1937-38), 1-27; P.J. Vatikiotis, The Fatimid theory of State, Lahor, 1957, 180-204; W. Ivanow, Ismaili Literature, Tehran, 1963. See also surveys of the sources by H.M. Rabī', The Financial System of Egypt (i) 564-741/1169-1341, Ph.D. thesis, S.O.A.S., 1968; S. Zakār, The Emirate of Aleppo 392-487/1094, Ph.D. thesis, S.O.A.S., 1969; B.I. Bashīr, The Fatimid Caliphate, 386-487/996-1094, Ph.D. thesis, S.O.A.S., 1970; H.A. Ladak, The Fatimid Caliphate and the Ismaili Da'wa from the appointment of al-Musta'li to the Suppression of the Dynasty, Ph.D. thesis, S.O.A.S., 1971.
 2. Ibn Khallikān, III, 88.

however, that these Quotations are not the actual words of al-Musabbiḥī. They are more likely to have been inspired by the information he gave and re-phrased by later chroniclers. A comparative study of the style of writing in his actual work and that in these Quotations would prove this point.

From that part of his Tārīkh which remains, it seems clear that it was the fullest account which was ever written on the history of the Fatimids. The volume consists of 156 folios dealing with the events of less than two years. It is a daily account of events and a brief biography of the famous people who died during that time. The value of al-Musabbiḥī's information stems from the fact that he was a high official in the service of the Fatimids, and a personal friend of both Caliphs al-Ḥākim and al-Zāhir.³ In addition, he was a regular attendant at the Caliph's court and, judging from his records, appears to have gained the Imām's confidence. Such prestige undoubtedly adds weight to his work, although it does not guarantee its reliability. No doubt his position would bias his judgement and incline him to take a pro-Fatimid view. In fact, there are strong indications which suggest that he was himself an Ismaili. Whenever he mentions the name of the reigning Imām-Caliph al-Zāhir he says, "al-Imām al-Zāhir Ṣalawāt Allāh 'Alayhi wa 'Alā Ābā' ihī".⁴ Whenever he mentions the name of a previous Fatimid Caliph he says, "Qaddasa al-Lahu Rūḥahu".⁵ Such comments are pure Ismaili and only

3. B.I. Bashīr, The Fatimid Caliphate: 386-487/996-1094, 13 ff.

4. al-Musabbiḥī, Akhbār Miṣr, fol, 134 ff.

5. al-Musabbiḥī, Akhbār Miṣr, fols. 243B, 247B, 262B, 276B, 278A, 281A.

Ismaili writers apply the phrase "Ṣalawāt Allāh ‘Alayhi" to the Fatimid Imām-Caliph. While others, who are not, apply it only when the name of the Prophet is repeated.

al-Anṭākī (Yahyā Ibn Sa‘īd, died in 458/1065). This writer, whose work is known as Tārīkh Yahyā Ibn Sa‘īd al-Anṭākī supplies the only contemporary account which has survived complete. He gives an annual recording of important events which occurred in the Fatimid, Abbasid and Byzantine Empires during the period 326/422/937-1030. Although Anṭākī offers more information about al-Ḥākīm than of any other Caliph or Emperor, his account of al-Ḥākīm's reign is brief and lacks detailed explanation of many important questions. His Tārīkh, on the whole, is merely the brief narration that he mentions in the introduction. He says that his book is a continuation of the Tārīkh which was written by Sa‘īd Ibn al-Baṭrīq (the patriarch of Alexandria who died in 328/939) and that he intended to follow the same method adopted by the earlier writer and avoid detailed explanations.⁶

The value of Anṭākī's work comes from the fact that he was a Christian living in Antioch which was a part of Byzantium. For this reason his records are hardly influenced by the religio-political quarrel between the Abbasids and the Fatimids at that time. His account is a comparatively reliable assessment and recounts, in the main, the good as well as the bad behaviour of al-Ḥākīm. Nevertheless, his own interpretation of historical

6. Anṭākī, 91.

events and his treatment of al-Ḥākim's attitude towards Ahl al-Dhimma should be examined with care. al-Anṭākī, as a number of his records show, was a pious Christian. Even the writing of his Tārīkh may have been the outcome of a request by some high Christian authority.⁷ al-Ḥākim was a Muslim ruler who had persecuted Christians throughout his empire and destroyed the holiest shrine of Christendom (the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem). To this end, Anṭākī can hardly be expected to give a completely unbiased judgement.

His interpretation of current events sometimes conflicts with his own records. He appears to be a little anxious to explain the deeds of al-Ḥākim by applying insanity to them. He says that al-Ḥākim's mental illness was easily recognised by those who saw or spoke to him.⁸ Simultaneously, he speaks of high officials who had served al-Ḥākim for a long time and after a dispute with him fled from Egypt. None of them is reported to have accused al-Ḥākim of insanity. Such interpretation of Anṭākī is, however, considered as the mark of great ignorance (Jahl 'Aẓīm) by the Muslim chronicler al-ʿAzīmī.⁹

Ibn al-Ṣābi' (Hilāl, died in 448/1056). His work, which was known as Tārīkh Hilāl Ibn al-Ṣābi', has unfortunately not survived as a whole. Later

7. Anṭākī, 92.

8. Anṭākī, 218.

9. ʿAzīmī, anno, 410.

chroniclers such as al-Rudhrawārī, Ibn al-Qalānīsī, Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn Taghrī Birdī and many others have preserved a considerable amount of it from which it is possible to obtain a clearer idea concerning his treatment of al-Ḥākim's reign.

To understand the value of Ibn al-Ṣābi's information, it is necessary to mention the circumstances under which he wrote his account. He lived in Baghdad, the centre of the Abbasid Caliphate, during a period when the propaganda war between the Abbasids and the Fatimids was at its peak. The Abbasid Caliph, in person, supervised an anti-Fatimid campaign and commanded all learned men of his court to sign a manifesto condemning the Fatimids and accusing them of atrocities and irreligious deeds. He also paid sums of money to theologians and writers to write books emphasising the same purpose. Ibn al-Ṣābi himself was a learned man newly converted to Islam and officially employed in the service of the Abbasid Caliph.¹⁰

From what has survived of his work, it would appear that he was hostile to al-Ḥākim and treated the history of his rule in accordance with the official view of the Abbasid court. He presents the events of the time in a manner which would support the allegations of the Abbasid Caliph. For example, the Baghdad manifesto accused the Fatimids of assuming divinity and committing irreligious acts. Ibn al-Ṣābi says, "Then al-Ḥākim desired to be proclaimed divine. For this end, he encouraged and supported a man

10. Ibn Khallikān, III, 628-32.

known as al-Akhram and others of his like to declare him as such. One day, al-Akhram and fifty of his men, on horse-back, entered the mosque where the chief Qādī was delivering his judgment. They handed him a sheet which bore the writing "By the Name of al-Ḥākim the all merciful (al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm)".¹¹ The obvious purpose of the Abbasid Caliph's campaign was to counter the Fatimid propaganda and halt the spread of their teaching amongst his subjects. This policy was carefully followed by Ibn al-Ṣābi' as is clearly visible in his Tārīkh. He emphatically declares that Egyptians who were under the rule of the Fatimids suffered hardships and hated al-Ḥākim and his ancestors and desired their destruction.¹² In those of his accounts which have survived, there is no mention of any of al-Ḥākim's achievements while every one of his misdeeds is emphasised. The building of Dār al-Ḥikma, the many mosques erected by him, are completely ignored, as are the social reforms and the standard of justice he endeavoured to maintain. Even his policy towards Ahl al-Dhimma is presented in a way which suggests that Jews and Christians who had adopted Islām were allowed by al-Ḥākim to abandon it and return to their previous religion.¹³

al-Qudā'ī (Muḥammad Ibn Salāma died in 454/1062). The most interesting point about this chronicler is that he was a learned man (‘Allāma)

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11. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, Mir'āt al-Zamān, fol. 207 B, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 183.
 12. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 206B, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 180-1.
 13. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 207B, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 183.

and a Sunni in the service of the Fatimids. He was a prominent Qādī and secretary of the Wazīr al-Jarjārā'ī.¹⁴ For this reason his information is probably more reliable than most of the other sources. According to his position, he would be well informed and the fact that he retained his religious faith, as a Sunni in the Fatimid court, indicates his honesty.

Unfortunately none of his actual works have survived, but Quotations from his Tārīkh and the accounts of later chroniclers who were influenced by its information, tend to suggest that his account of the reign of al-Ḥākim was a fair presentation of historical events without the unnecessary emphasis of either pro- or anti-Fatimid chroniclers.

The claim that the manuscripts which are available in the British Museum, Oxford, and Paris libraries and recorded as the actual Tārīkh of al-Qudā'ī appears to be mistaken. The manuscript of the British Museum library no. add. 23,285 seems to be the work of a later, and unknown, chronicler who lived, probably, during the latter part of the 8/14th century. It is the first volume of a book called Nuzhat al-Albāb, Jāmi' al-Twārīkh wa Al-Ādāb written in the year 774/1384. The author explains why and how he wrote his book. He says, "I found the book known as Bulghat al-Zurafa fī Tārīkh al-Khulafa of Abu al-Ḥasan 'Alī Ibn Muḥammad al-Rūḥī to have been taken from the book of al-Qudā'ī. He (al-Rūḥī) copied it word by word (Naqlan) but omitted from its beginning the part 'From Ādam (may peace be upon him) to the Hījra' and

14. Ibn Khallikān, II, 616-17.

added extracts from the history of the Umayyads in Maghrib down to the rise of Ibn Tūmart. He added at its end the history of the Fatimids down to the time of al-Fā'iz. He also omitted from Qudā'ī's book the history of the Wālis and Qādīs in Egypt. I have summarised both books and added to each of them the part which is available in the other. So my book has come as a combination of the beauties of both books."¹⁵

The manuscript of the Bodleian library, no. POC 270, is the work of an unknown writer who may have been influenced by the actual Tārīkh of al-Qudā'ī or may have merely summarised its information down to the reign of al-Zāhir (the Fatimid Imām -Caliph who succeeded al-Hākim). The title of the book is Tārīkh al-Qudā'ī Wa A'wal al-Manqūl, which suggests that the writer may have intended to summarise or copy books of famous writers and began with Qudā'ī's Tārīkh. The book contains only two and a half lines of information about al-Zāhir and that could hardly be the actual work of Qudā'ī who was alive when that Caliph was born and witnessed not only his succession to the Caliphate but also his death. It is also very unlikely that Qudā'ī would write nothing about the reign of al-Mustanṣir whom he served for a long time.¹⁶ This is in addition to the fact that the writer of this manuscript had adopted the manner of a posthumous writer and not that of a contemporary. He also committed an error concerning the date of the destruction of Qiyāma. He puts it in 403 A.H., three years later than the

15. Nuzhat al-Ālbāb, fols. 1-2.

16. B.I. Bashīr, The Fatimid Caliphate, 17.

actual time.¹⁷ It is doubtful whether such an important event would be so obviously mistaken by a contemporary writer.

A comparison of this manuscript with the work of al-Rūḥī, which is also available in the Bodleian Library under No. Marsh, 46, adds a number of interesting points. al-Rūḥī's account is actually a copy of this work but without the part from Ādam to the Hijra. It also contains the history of the Fatimids down to al-Fā'iz while this work ends with the reign of al-Zāhir. The question arises as to whether the author of Nuzhat al-Albāb really saw Tārīkh al-Qudā'ī or merely a copy of this work and assumed that it was the actual work of al-Qudā'ī. It is interesting to note that the first few sentences of Nuzhat al-Albāb, which concern the history of Ādam are identical with those used by the author of Awwal al-Manqūl. I have referred to the Bodleian Library manuscript as Awwal al-Manqūl.

The manuscript of the Paris Library no. 1490. This manuscript is clearly in two different parts when examined for handwriting and style. The first is a brief history beginning with Ādam and ending with the reign of al-Qā'im, the Abbasid Caliph (died in 467/1074). The second is a brief history of the Fatimids. The writer of the first part may have been influenced by the work of al-Qudā'ī, but for the second half it is very unlikely. The part that deals with the reign of al-Ḥākim shows that its writer was extremely hostile. For example, when he speaks of al-Ḥākim's succession to the

17. Awwal al-Manqūl, fol. 111A.

Caliphate he says, "Tasallāṭa" instead of "Tawallā" and when he mentions the duration of his reign he says "Ayyāmu Z̧ulmihi" instead of "Ayyāmu Ḥukmihi". Such an attitude is not acceptable from a contemporary chronicler in the service of the Fatimid court. This is in addition to the fact that this writer's account concerning al-Ḥākim's death is borrowed from the version of Ibn al-Ṣābi' and not from that of al-Qudā'i.

The most important fact about these contemporary chroniclers is that Ibn al-Ṣābi', whose information is the least reliable, is the most quoted and had the greatest influence among the later chroniclers. al-Rudhrawā'i, Ibn al-Qalāmiṣī, Ibn al-Zāfir, Ibn al-Aṭhīr, Ibn al-Jawzī, Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Dhahabī, Ibn Taghrī Birdī and many others have been, directly or indirectly, influenced by his account. This is, perhaps, the reason for which the majority of sources are hostile in this treatment of the history of the Fatimids. Almost all late chroniclers were Sunnis and influenced by religio-political motives. They found in Ibn al-Ṣābi' 's Tārīkh the view that suited their own conviction and accepted it without examination. An example of that can be seen in the treatment of Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī of the history of al-Ḥākim. Although Sibṭ states that he had read many books by Egyptian authors,¹⁸ he relies almost entirely on the information of Ibn al-Ṣābi'.

18. Sibṭ, fol. 206A.

It was not until the time of Maqrīzī (9/15th century) that a Sunni writer attempted to write an extensive history of al-Ḥākim's reign based on the information of other contemporary chroniclers and criticised those who relied only on Ibn al-Ṣābi'. He says, after quoting Ibn Abī Ṭayy, who adopted the version of Ibn al-Ṣābi', "This contains extreme hostility which none of the Egyptian writers had ever shown."¹⁹

The Late Chroniclers

Although late chroniclers have not added much to the information of the contemporary writers, their accounts are of considerable value. In addition to preserving a great deal of the works of the early authors, which would otherwise have been lost, some of them throw a fresh light on certain issues. These are:

Ibn al-Muqaffa'. He offers a unique explanation concerning al-Ḥākim's confiscation of the revenue of Egyptian churches and, being a Bishop who lived in Egypt during the latter half of the 5/11th century, makes his account of great value.

Ibn al-Qalānisi. His account concerning the Province of Damascus under al-Ḥākim's rule, although brief, is of great importance.

19. Iṭti'āz, anno, 411.

The names of many Walīs, duration of their appointments, and their deeds in Damascus would have been unknown without it.

Ibn al-ʿAdīm . His work Zubdat al-Ḥalab fī Tārīkh Ḥalab is indispensable to the study of al-Ḥākim's policy concerning Aleppo. He preserved a unique document, signed by al-Ḥākim himself and addressed to the population of the province of Aleppo, which gives a clear idea of the Imām's plans to win the city.

Ibn al-Athīr . His account is similar to the many of those who followed the information of Ibn al-Ṣabīʿ , but its importance lies in the fact that he gives the fullest details about the rebellion of Abū Rakwa.

al-Maqrīzī . Although he lived in a much later time, his account remains the most valuable concerning the reign of al-Ḥākim. He was the first chronicler who gave a full and details account based on the information of many earlier chroniclers.²⁰

The writing of Contemporary Religious Groups

The Ismaili Dāʿīs . The only surviving literature of the Ismaʿili Dāʿwa at that time are some works by the most distinguished Dāʿī, al-Kirmānī. Although they contain a limited amount of historical information, they are indispensable to the study of the progress of the Dāʿwa and its

20. See A.R. Guest, "A list of Writers, Books and Other Authorities mentioned by Maqrīzī", J.R.A.S., (1902), 103-125.

internal struggle culminating in the birth of the Drūz. al-Riyāḍ and Rahat al-ʿAql are of extreme value concerning the philosophy of the Ismaili doctrine. Risāla al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bishārāt and al-Risāla al-Durriyya illustrate the internal upheaval of the Duʿāt over the question of the Imām and his role in the Daʿwa. al-Risāla al-Wāʿiẓa gives the official view of the Daʿwa concerning the Drūz claim of al-Ḥākim's divinity.

The Drūz writings. Like the literature of the Ismaili Daʿwa, the Drūz writings were written to support and explain the theological views of the Drūz leaders. Historically they contain very limited information, but on some points they are valuable. It is, however, noticeable that all chroniclers fail to give a clear picture of al-Ḥākim's attitude towards the Drūz leaders after they declared that he was divine in 408/1017. The Risāla, known as al-Ṣubḥa al-Kāʾima, written by Ḥamza Ibn Ali (the founder of the Drūz Sect) gives unique information concerning the official reaction of the authorities and their persecution of the followers of Darzī. The Risāla, known as al-Taʿnīf wa al-Tahjīn, probably written by al-Muqtanā Bahāʾ al-Dīn (Ḥamza's successor) illustrates the difficulties which befell the followers of Ḥamza as a result of al-Ḥākim's commands. The Drūz writing gives an idea of the standard of Ismaili teaching in Dār al-Hikma and the progress of ʿIlm al-Bāṭin (the allegorical interpretation

of the Holy Books) during the latter part of the 4/10th century and the first half of the 5/11th century. They also mention the areas where there was strong popular support for the Fatimid mission. This is, of course, in addition to their value concerning the internal crisis among the Fatimid Du'āt and the causes of the first split of the Imām's mission since it had arrived in Egypt.

CHAPTER I

A BIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW OF AL-HĀKIM'S PERSON

His Birth

He was born during the night of the twenty-third of Rabi' the first 375/14th August 985 at the royal palace in Cairo,¹ and thus was the first Fatimid Imām-Caliph born on Egyptian soil. He was named al-Mansūr² (the Victorious) and was the son of al-'Azīz, the fifth Fatimid Imām-Caliph. Very little is known of al-Hākim's mother, but her religious beliefs have been disputed by modern historians. Lane-Poole, Vatikiotis and Canard say that she was Christian,³ while 'Inān and Majid affirm that she was Muslim.⁴ Early sources fail to offer confirmation or denial of either suggestion; and Muslim sources, with the exception of the Drūz manuscripts are completely silent on the subject. Some of the information is offered by the Christian chroniclers. Ibn al-Muqaffa'

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1. Al-Musabbiḥī, quoted by Ibn al-Zāfir, Tārīkh al-Duwal al-Munqati'a, fol. 66B; Ibn al-Sābi', quoted by Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzi, Mir'āt, fol. 206A; Drūz Ms. Milād Mawlānā al-Hākim, B.N. No. 1412, fol. 1; Ibn Muyassar, 52; Ibn Khallikan, III, 449; Al-Safadī, fol. 17; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 256; Itti'āz, anno, 386, and Khīṭaṭ, II, 285; De Sacy, Exposé, I, 280.
 2. Contrary to all other sources, the Drūz Ms. reports his name as Muḥammad,. See Milād, fol. 1.
 3. S. Lane-Poole, History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 124; P.J. Vatikiotis, The Fatimid Theory of State, 151; M. Canard, article, "Al-Hākim Bī Amrillāh", E.I.²
 4. 'Inān, al-Hākim Bī Amr Allāh, Cairo 1932, 42-44; Majid, al-Hākim Bī Amr Allāh al-Khalīfa al-Muftarā 'alayh, Cairo 1959, 25.

says that al-Ḥākim's mother was a Christian slave girl, and was a sister of the Arsenius who was appointed by al-ʿAzīz as the Patriarch of the Melkite Church in Egypt.⁵ Anṭākī states that al-ʿAzīz had a Christian wife, but does not clearly state that she was the mother of al-Ḥākim. This is somewhat strange in consideration of the reference to Arsenius and Aristos to whom he alludes as "the uncles of Sit al-Mulk, al-ʿAzīz's daughter"⁶ but gives no hint of relationship between them and al-Ḥākim. Had they been the maternal uncles of al-Ḥākim, Anṭākī would scarcely have ignored such close ties to the Imām-Caliph and emphasised the lesser importance of relationship with Sit al-Mulk. Ibn al-ʿAmīd states that "Al-ʿAzīz had married a Christian woman by whom he had a daughter".⁷ It would seem more likely that this Christian concubine or wife of al-ʿAzīz was not al-Ḥākim's mother. The Drūz manuscript states that al-Ḥākim's mother was a member of the Fatimid family and says, "She was the daughter of Prince ʿAbd Allāh, al-ʿAzīz's uncle."⁸ Therefore it is probable that al-ʿAzīz had more than one wife, one of them being the Christian of whom Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, Anṭākī and Ibn al-ʿAmīd speak and also perhaps another who was a Muslim and the

5. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, II, 113.

6. Anṭākī, 164.

7. Ibn al-ʿAmīd, Tārīkh al-Muslimīn, anno, 375.

8. The Drūz Ms., Mīlād, fol.1. This Prince ʿAbd Allāh may have been Abu ʿAbdallah, al-Ḥusayn, son of al-Mansūr, the third Fatimid Imām-Caliph or ʿAbd Allāh son of Jaʿfar son of al-Qāʾim, the second Imām-Caliph. See Ittiʿāz, 127 and 133.

mother of al-Ḥākim. The fact that al-Ḥākim became Caliph while he was still a child and his relations with his mother were reported to be very good,⁹ would more likely account for the severity of his attitude towards his Christian subjects. Had his mother herself been, as has been suggested, Christian, surely a more lenient policy towards them would have been followed.

Al-Manṣūr as heir (Walī 'Ahd)

It was during Sha' bān 383/October 993, at the age of eight, and after the death of his elder brother Muḥammad, who had already been nominated as heir (Walī 'Ahd) that al-Manṣūr was declared to be the successor of his father to the joint Imāma and Caliphate.¹⁰

The sources give no clear picture of al-Ḥākim's childhood and early education and except for some reports by Maqrīzī and Da'ī Idrīs, nothing is mentioned about him before he succeeded to the Caliphate. Maqrīzī says that from the time of his appointment as Walī 'Ahd, al-Ḥākim began to make public appearances. He was allowed to preside over official ceremonies, meet Wālīs and Commanders of the army and exchange presents with them. Sometimes he even fulfilled the Caliph's functions of

9. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 185-190, and Ibn Abī Ṭayy quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 411.

10. Ibn al-Ṣābi', quoted by Sibī, Mirāt, fol. 206A; the Drūz Ms. Milād, fol. 1; Ibn Khallikān, III, 449; al-Ṣafadī, fol. 17 all mention his nomination but not his brother. Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 56A; Nuwayrī, XXVI, 50 report the death of the heir Muḥammad and the appointment of al-Manṣūr.

leading the Friday prayer.¹¹ This indicates that al-‘Azīz was preparing his son for his important future by making him familiar with the official functions of the Imām-Caliph. Of his early education little is known, nor is there any indication by whom he was taught¹² or what kind of education he received nor how he responded to learning. Only Dā‘ī Idrīs reports that al-‘Azīz educated his son al-Ḥākim and tutored him well for his future important role.¹³ Maqrīzī says that al-‘Azīz imparted secrets and knowledge to al-Ḥākim.¹⁴ This may, of course, mean the initiation of the boy into Ismaili doctrine which is described by Dā‘ī Idrīs as ‘Ilm al-‘A’imma (the knowledge of the Imāms) and adds that God revealed it to al-Ḥākim.

11. Ittī‘āz, anno, 383, 384, 385.

12. Lane-Poole, 125 and De Lacy O’Leary, 123 mentioned that Barjawān was al-Ḥākim’s tutor which might be understood to mean that he was responsible for al-Ḥākim’s education. Here it should be noted that Barjawān was a slave working as superintendent of the Royal Palace. His relationship with the young Prince could be called "guardianship" or "mentor" in the sense that Barjawān would superintend al-Manṣūr’s affairs such as clothing, guarding his play and accompanying him outside the Palace. Barjawān is not known to have been a man of learning, therefore he could not have been a tutor in the sense of teaching. For information on Barjawān see B. Lewis, art., "Bardjawān", E.I.²

13. I had no access to ‘Uyūn al-Akhbār of Dā‘ī Idrīs and this information is based on quotations by A. Majed, Al-Ḥākim, 25.

14. Khiṭaṭ, I, 434.

Al-Manṣūr's Succession to the Caliphate

In Ramadān 386/December 996, while in the town of Bilbays¹⁵ al-ʿAzīz met sudden death, through a stone in the kidney.¹⁶ He was leading an army towards Syria to support his troops there against the Byzantines.¹⁷ Al-Manṣūr, who accompanied him,¹⁸ was immediately proclaimed Caliph.¹⁹

Al-Musabbihī, later quoted by other sources, relates the incident of succession as told by al-Ḥākim himself: "My father called me before

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15. For information about Bilbis see Yāqūt, Muʿjam al-Buldān, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig, 1866, I, 712 and Khitaṭ, I, 183.
 16. Antākī, 180, says: "al-Ḥaṣā was al-Qūlang". Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 48 adds, "al-Niqris". See also Ibn al-Zafīr, fol. 55A, Al-Ṣafadī, fol. 17; Ittiʿāz, anno, 386 and Khitaṭ, II, 284.
 17. Antākī, 179.
 18. It is difficult to ascertain why al-Manṣūr was in his father's company at that time and whether al-ʿAzīz had intended to bring his heir to the battlefield to experience an actual war or al-Manṣūr was only going as far as Bilbays to say farewell to his father, is not certain.
 19. Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 44, says that after the death of al-ʿAzīz his daughter Sīt al-Mulk tried to depose her brother and declare her cousin ʿAbd al-Lāh as Caliph. But since an incident of such importance is not reported by any other chronicler, it seems very unlikely.

his death. His body was naked except for bandages and pieces of cloth. He hugged me and kissed me and said, 'I am grieved about you, O my heart's love'. His eyes were full of tears, then he said, 'Go dear and play, I am all right.' I went out and occupied myself as children do when they play until God transferred al-'Azīz to him. Barjawān came to me while I was at the top of a sycamore tree which was in the yard of the house. He said, 'Descend, may God be with you.' I descended; he put the diamond turban on my head, kissed the ground before me and said, 'May peace be upon you Amīr al-Mu'minīn, God's mercy and blessings.' He took me out to the people and they all kissed the ground before me and greeted me as Caliph."²⁰ Al-Manṣūr was eleven years, five months and six days old.²¹

On the following day al-Manṣūr, together with the officials of his court, rode to Cairo. The body of his father was carried in a coffin on the back of a camel. They reached Cairo before sunset and immediately al-'Azīz was buried with ceremony. "On the following morning the dignitaries

20. Ibn Muyassar, 51; Ibn Khallikān, III, 525; Al-Ṣafadī, fol.19; Itti'āz, anno, 386.

21. In spite of the sources' agreement on both dates, al-Manṣūr's birthday and the day on which he became Caliph, they differ concerning how old he was when he succeeded to the Caliphate. Antakī, 180, says, "Eleven years and five months". Ibn al-Qalānisi, 44, says, "Ten years and six months". Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 48, says, "Eleven and a half years". Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 256, says, "Eleven years". Other chroniclers repeat Ibn al-Qalānisi's or Ibn al-Athīr's report. Only Ibn Muyassar, 51, and Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 386, and Khiṭaṭ, II, 285, give the correct age.

assembled in the Grand Hall to await the new Caliph. Al-Manṣūr, wearing the diamond turban, entered the Hall and walked to the golden throne, the assembly bowing to the ground meanwhile. They greeted him with the Bay'a as Imām and the title al-Ḥākim Bi Amr Allāh (the ruler by God's command) by which he was thereafter known."²² During the ceremony, a number of Kutāmī chiefs demanded the dismissal of 'Isā Ibn Naṣṭūrūs from the position of Wasāṭa and the appointment of their chief Ibn 'Ammār in his place. They claimed to have been ill-treated by 'Isā²³ which was highly unlikely, but such a demand, as will be discussed later, was an excuse to reach power by taking advantage of the inexperienced young Imām-Caliph. Al-Ḥākim was obliged to meet their demand and actually the appointment of Ibn 'Ammār was his first exercise of power as Caliph.²⁴

At the conclusion of the ceremony, Qādī Muḥammad Ibn al-Nu'mān went to the Mosque, led the prayer and delivered the Khuṭba in the name of al-Ḥākim.

22. Itti'āz, anno, 386, Khiṭaṭ, II, 285.

23. See Ibid.

24. Antākī, 180; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 44; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 48; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 56B; Itti'āz, anno, 386; Khiṭaṭ, II, 285.

The Portrait of al-Ḥākim

According to the chroniclers, al-Ḥākim was an impressive figure (‘Azīm al-Ḥayba)²⁵ - tall, broad-shouldered with a powerful voice. His eyes were big, coloured dark blue, flecked with deep reddish-gold. (Shuh!).²⁶

The picture of him thus reached may have been the result of unctuous adulations, enhanced by legends which gathered about him. His cruelty and ruthlessness as ruler, which resulted in the death of many of his subjects, has undoubtedly influenced the imagination of many chroniclers. One of them describes him as a lion searching for prey.²⁷ Another says that many people who endeavoured to attract his attention in the public streets would fall to the ground and become speechless in his presence.²⁸ A further description states that he once shouted at a man who immediately died of fright.²⁹

Al-Ḥākim's Education

The fact that al-Ḥākim became Caliph when he was still a child and assumed full power as ruler at the age of fourteen, does not seem to have effected his education. At an early age he appears to have had a

25. Ibn Abī Ṭayy, quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti‘āz, anno, 411.

26. Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, II, 123.

27. Ibn al-Muqaffa“, II, 121.

28. Anṭākī, 221.

29. Al-Rudhabāṭī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti‘āz, anno, 411.

good command of the Arabic tongue and a good knowledge of poetry. Maqrīzī says, "Al-Ḥākim had skilfulness in the knowledge of poetry which no other man had. At his court, poets and those who have knowledge of poetry would gather and the poets would recite their poetry while he would listen carefully and ask the repetition of every verse which held exceptional meaning or style. Each of them would receive gifts of money in accordance with the quality of his works."³⁰ He was a mere twelve years of age when he gained this reputation. Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, who is quoted by Maqrīzī tells a story which emphasises al-Ḥākim's superiority in the knowledge of Arabic over a number of learned men who were present in his court.³¹ In spite of such eulogy, which may have been prompted by policy, there are some verses and writings which are attributed to his personal composition, the quality and style of which gives an impression of poetic ability and penmanship.³²

Astronomy also appears to have been included in his studies as agreed by all his chroniclers. For this purpose he built and equipped an observatory on Mount Muqattam near Cairo where he studied and personally supervised the curriculum. He gave encouragement to a scientific approach to astronomy by financially helping and showing respect and admiration to

30. Iṭī'āz, anno, 387.

31. Ibid., anno, 411.

32. Ibid., anno, 390-411.

astronomers such as Mālik Ibn Sa'īd and Ibn 'Abd al-A'ālā who wrote books on astronomy.³³

Beside his interest in these fields, he appears to have extended his attention to other fields of science. He built Dār al-Hikma which he equipped with a large number of books comprising all fields of study and gave freedom to all who wished to attend its lectures or read and copy its books. He would visit it from time to time, listening to debates among its learned men and granting them generous gifts to encourage research in their professions.³⁴ The scientists and learned men of his State were, as many reports say, "favoured and loved by him".³⁵ Antākī praises al-Hākim's relationship with his private physicians and suggests that Ibn al-Muqashshar and Ibn Naṣṭās were personal friends of the Caliph, able, at times, even to influence his policy and his personal behaviour.³⁶ In addition, some reports indicate his considerate treatment

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33. On Mālik Ibn Sa'īd see Itti'āz, anno, 403. On Ibn 'Abd al-A'ālā see Qifī, 230-31 and Ibn Kathīr, XI, 341.
34. Al-Musabbihī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, I, 459.
35. Ibn Abi Tayy, quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 411; Al-Safadī, fol. 19; Ibn Ayās, I, 53. See also Ibn Abi Uṣaybi'a, II, 86-101.
36. Antākī, 186, 192. On Ibn Muqashshar see also Qifī, 438, and Ibn Abi Uṣaybi'a, II, 86, 90.

of, and the respect in which he held, the engineer al-Ḥasan Ibn al-Haytham. This man left Iraq and entered the service of al-Ḥākim for the purpose of initiating a system to accelerate agricultural progress in Egypt. Al-Ḥākim is said to have personally welcomed al-Ḥasan when he arrived in Cairo.³⁷ The surviving reports of al-Musabbiḥī testify that this historian was a personal friend of the Imām-Caliph, respected by him and generously treated in his court.³⁸

On the other hand, there are some reports which suggest that he was at times very cruel towards the 'Ulamā' and killed many of them. These records, however, give no specific examples of such cruelty; the only recorded incident being the execution of two Sunni theologians whom al-Ḥākim had previously employed to instruct in Sunni law in Dār al-Ḥikma.³⁸ Maqrīzī, who relates the incidents states that the men had flagrantly disobeyed al-Ḥākim's commands. He closed Dār al-Ḥikma, expressly forbidding meetings to be held there and when he learned of their disobedience in this respect, he angrily condemned them.³⁹ A more consistently tolerant ruler would probably have taken their personal reasons into account and have acted in a less perfunctory manner.

37. Bar Hebraeus, 189; Qifī, 166-7; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, II, 90-101.

38. Al-Ṣafadī, IV, 7; Sibṭ, fol. 206B; Al-Dhahabī, 'Ibar, III, 72.

39. Itti'āz, anno, 399.

Al-Ḥākim's Private Life

Little is known concerning the private or marital life of al-Ḥākim. It is not known when he married or how many wives he had, but from Maqrīzī's reports it appears that he had two wives who were legally recognised. One was named Āmina, the daughter of Prince ʿAbd Allāh son of Muʿiz, the other a slave girl whose identity is not reported.⁴⁰

He had two sons, al-Ḥārith born in the month of Rabiʿ I 395/October 1004, and ʿAlī born in Ramaḍān of the same year.⁴¹ Al-Ḥārith died during his father's lifetime, approximately in 400/1009⁴² while ʿAlī lived and succeeded his father to the Caliphate and afterwards became known as al-Zāhir. From the name of ʿAlī al-Ḥākim's Kinya was originated by which he was sometimes called Abū ʿAlī (the father of ʿAlī).

He also had a daughter who was nick-named Sit Miṣr. She died in 455/1063.⁴³

Al-Ḥākim's Character

Certainly, according to the information which has been recorded, he was of a complicated and contradictory nature. At times ruthless and

40. Iṭrīʿāz, anno, 411.

41. Ibid., anno, 395.

42. Ibid., anno, 403. See also Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 66.

43. Al-Dhakḥāʾir wa al-Tuḥaf, Kuwait, 1959, 240.

exceedingly cruel⁴⁴ and at others tolerant to a surprising degree.⁴⁵ By all chroniclers he is described as generous and brave, yet Sibṭ says, "He was cowardly and miserly".⁴⁶ The term "cowardice" does not seem to agree with other observations recorded. The al-Ḥākim who killed many who were of high prestige and importance in the State and who would frequently adventure impervious to the dangers to his person, by day or night, unguarded except for a slave to lead his horse or ass, could hardly be described as "cowardly". The confiscation of the properties of those he killed, which might have been the basis of Sibṭ's statement, can scarcely be termed "miserly" and peculiar to al-Ḥākim. Some designate him as a tyrant⁴⁷ and there is no doubt that he was more than usually

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44. See Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 80; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 57A; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 131; Ibn Abī Tayy, quoted by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 411; al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, anno, 411 also quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, IV, 178; *Khīṭaṭ*, II, 289. All describe al-Ḥākim as (سفاك للدماء). Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 121 says (صار يحب سفل الدمار). See also instances of his cruelty in Antakī, 185-230; *Itti'āz*, annos, 390-405; *Khīṭaṭ*, II, 285-9.
45. See al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 398, who indicates that al-Ḥākim was intending to pardon Abu Rakwa who rebelled against him, after he was captured and brought to Egypt. His treatment of Abu al-Futūh, the Sharīf of Mecca, who rebelled and deposed him is described in Chapter V of this thesis; Al-Ḥākim's pardon of 'Alī Ibn Muhammad al-Tihāmī after his rebellion, Sibṭ, *Mir'āt*, fol. 411; his Amān of pardon to Ibn al-Maghribī who caused the rebellion of Abu al-Futūh, Ibn al-'Adīm, *Bughyat al-Ṭalab*, IV, fol. 23. See also al-Dhahabī, quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Najūm*, IV, 178, who described al-Ḥākim as "Samiḥan".
46. Sibṭ, fol. 206B.
47. Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 79; Al-Suyūṭī, 11, 17; Ibn Kathīr, XII, 9; Ibn Ayās, I, 52-53.

insistent that his commands should be literally and immediately obeyed.

Yet many chroniclers say "he championed justice"⁴⁸ and Anṭākī adds that he provided justice to a degree his subjects had never known before.⁴⁹

He is further described as being of "extreme arrogance" (Shadīd al-Taʿajruf).⁵⁰

Yet another part of the man, the significance of which seems to have escaped the notice of chroniclers, was the almost monastic simplicity.

They are in complete agreement that his clothes were simple and made chiefly of wool, and that he chose an ass rather than a horse to ride.

Maqrīzī adds that he would discard the diamond turban and wear a plain white scarf in its place.⁵¹ Anṭākī says that despite the prosperity of his

State, he disliked ceremonies and feasts and they were banned in his palace. His food was simple and cooked by his own mother.⁵² Anṭākī

and Maqrīzī agree that he would frequently pause in the streets of his capital to exchange greetings or questions with his poorer subjects.⁵³

Unlike the majority of Muslim Caliphs he did not indulge in a Harīm and seems to have freed all his female slaves.⁵⁴ The life of frivolity

48. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, II, 125; Al-Ṣafadī, fol. 19; Ibn Ayās, I, 52-53; Ibn al-Dawādārī, quoting a contemporary poet, al-Durra, VI, 592.

49. Anṭākī, 205-6.

50. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 80.

51. Ittiʿāz, anno, 403-405.

52. Anṭākī, 200.

53. Anṭākī, 222; Ittiʿāz, anno, 395-405.

54. Anṭākī, 206; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 235.

seems to have been against his principles and one of his idiosyncrasies was that singers and dancers were not welcomed in his palace and once were banned from their profession throughout Egypt.⁵⁵

He is further described as "moody" (Kathīr al-Istihālāt or Kathīr al-Taluwon)⁵⁶. His dealings with the many ministerial appointments and some orders he gave and suddenly withdrew may perhaps be the basis of such a description. On the other hand many of his edicts were strictly observed throughout his reign and some of his high officials are known to have kept their positions until the end of his rule.⁵⁷

By some he is considered to have suffered from an exalted religious mania to the point of insanity, with ideas which were devilish;⁵⁸ or which others considered as the manifestation of God upon earth.⁵⁹ To some he was of "wicked beliefs" (Radi' al-I'tiqād)⁶⁰ but his internal policy and personal behaviour indicate that he was deeply religious and this is apparent in his determination to observe Muslim law, in his enthusiasm to build mosques and in his encouragement to his subjects to practice the duties of Islam,

55. Anṭakī, 202; Itti'āz, anno, 402-411.

56. Ibn Khallikān, III, 449; Al-Safadī, fol. 19; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 179-180; Suyūṭī, II, 17.

57. See below the Internal Policy, Chapter III of this thesis.

58. Anṭakī, 217-222; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 124.

59. See below, Chapter VI, The Movement of the Drūz.

60. Al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, Anno, 411, and quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 178.

added to many reports about his personal behaviour concerning his duties as a Muslim.⁶¹

He is further described as of "coarse manners" (Ghalīz al-Ṭab'). Yet in Maqrīzī and Anṭākī's records he appears as a pleasant man with a sense of humour. He often exchanged jokes with those to whom he spoke in the streets,⁶³ and the many anecdotes which display his sense of humour and appreciation of humorous stories indicate people's impressions about this aspect of his character.⁶⁴

Some chroniclers go much further to a point which makes their statements very difficult to accept. They say that al-Ḥākim remained seven years unwashed and he lived in the artificial light of candles both day and night for three years - suddenly changing at its end to no light during night-time.⁶⁵ The question now is: how accurate can these reports be and were they a fair description of al-Ḥākim's character? Many of his chroniclers were not contemporaries and few records appear to be in existence penned by those who knew al-Ḥākim personally and lived in Egypt during his rule.

61. See below, the Internal Policy, Chapter III.

62. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 80.

63. Anṭākī, 205-217; Itti'āz, anno, 404.

64. Itti'āz, anno, 402-411; Ibn Ayās, I, 52-53.

65. Sibṭī, fol. 206B; Ibn Abī Dahīyya, quoted by Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 298.

The surviving reports which are those of al-Musabbihī and al-Qudā'i, who both knew al-Hākim and lived in Egypt during his reign, fail to give any satisfactory explanation. Antākī and Ibn al-Ṣabī' 's records should be treated with a degree of caution since both chroniclers were hostile to al-Hākim and lived in countries far away from Egypt. The many apparent contradictions concerning his character may, therefore, be the result of the aspects of his policy as they presented themselves to the historians.⁶⁶ After such a long time-lapse it is difficult to arrive at a definite clarification of the man and his time. His ruthlessness and cruelty, for instance, may rather have been the result of circumstances rather than operated by a sadistic mind or were perhaps exaggerated according to the views of those who wrote concerning him. He ascended the throne when he was still a child and witnessed a fierce struggle and rivalry for power among the high officials of his State. This fact may have created a sense of insecurity which made him resort to cruelty as a method of protecting his power. Ibn al-Fuṭī, who is quoted by

66. Antākī, 218, explains the contradictions of al-Hākim's policy to have been caused by his mental health. Ibn al-Qalānisi adds to his description of al-Hākim's character the term "His policy was blameworthy (مذموم السياسة)". Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 131, says, "His policy was astonishing (ولات سرته عجيبة)". Sibṭ Mirat, fol. 206A, says, "His rule was contradictive (ولاته متناقضة)". Suyuṭī, II, 17, says, "His words and deeds were changeable (كثير المتغير)". Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, II, 289, says "his deeds were unexplainable (ولاته افعال لا تفسر)". Ibn Ayās, I, 52-53, says, "He loved good doing and followed it with some evil doing. He loved justice and followed it with tyranny (ولاه يحب فعل الخير ويتبعه (بشيء من الشر)). See also the interpretation =

Maqrīzī suggests that al-Ḥākim's cruelty was a part of his policy to abolish corruption resulting from the great tolerance of his father al-ʿAzīz and vengeance against those who showed opposition to the law of the State.⁶⁷ This is supported by the fact that most of al-Ḥākim's victims were high officials.

Similarly, the acts of tolerance, generosity, humility and justice may have been an endeavour to achieve popularity and to disguise the tyranny from which many people suffered. Anṭākī gives an important account on this point. He says, "Al-Ḥākim endeavoured to achieve what he himself desired by religious devotion (al-Zuhd wa al-waraʿ), refusal of the physical pleasures, by eating and drinking simple food, wearing ordinary clothes and riding asses with cheap iron saddles, and by mixing with his poorer subjects (Al-ʿĀmma).⁶⁸" By justice, tax exemption and generous gifts he attracted many people to his loyalty.

In the light of the available records, however, the riddle of al-Ḥākim's character will probably remain an enigma for ever. So many records have portrayed him as being entirely cruel, tyrannical and intolerant, with the mentality of a fiend. Others eulogised him to a superhuman degree.

= of the Drūz writing of al-Ḥākim's policy which suggests that it was a sign of divinity and miraculous power. (Chapter VI of this thesis).

67. Ittiʿāz, anno, 411.

68. Anṭākī, 222.

This portrait of the man has been intended to illustrate that as a human being al-Hākīm showed both virtue and vice in a character not, perhaps, of any specific type, with opposing forces in his nature which made him appear both unusually great and exceedingly small.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGACY OF THE PREVIOUS YEARS

On the sudden death of his father, al-Ḥākim, the eleven years old prince inherited the throne of the Fatimid Empire and became the Imām-Caliph of the richest and largest portion of the Muslim world at that time. Most of North Africa, Egypt, Ḥijāz and a large proportion of Syria, together with a number of important islands in the Mediterranean, were part of his empire. The young prince also inherited a number of unsolved problems. Most of his reign appears to have been spent in the endeavour to find a solution to them. The Ismaili Da'īs had made many unfulfilled promises to the people, both before and after the establishment of the Fatimid State. The influence of the non-Muslim personnel in the offices had grown, and most significant of all the struggle and rivalry between the two elements of the army - al-Maghāriba and al-Mashāriqa - had developed alarmingly.

The Unfulfilled Promises of the Da'wa

The Fatimids owe the establishment of their State mainly to the well organised machinery of the Ismaili Da'wa and since the early years of its inception the Da'wa emphasised the theory of Mahdism and employed it as one of the fundamental principles of its teaching. "Messianism as a

rationalisation of unfulfilled prophecies and a consolation for dissatisfied Muslims became the rudimentary appeal of the Fatimid Da'wa.¹

The Ismailis preached the rise of a saviour, al-Mahdī (the divinely guided) personified by the Imām of the Ismailis, who would destroy tyranny by the overthrow of existing political authorities. He would fill the world with equality and justice contrary to the oppression and injustice rampant at that time. He would unite all mankind under one spiritual head. Under the Mahdī's rule, life would become better and all mankind would be true believers.² "The Fatimids then viewed themselves as the avanguardia of active Islamic development and growth arising from the unification of all Muslim and non-Muslim peoples in one universal empire through an invigorated faith. Their universal empire was to be governed by one divinely-guided ruler, enabling him to establish a state of social equality and permanent peace."³

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1. P.J. Vatikiotis, The Fatimid Theory of State, p110.
 2. See extracts from Sharḥ al-Akḥbār of Qādī al-Nu'mān - traditions on al-Mahdī - edited and translated by W. Ivanow, Rise of the Fatimids, London, 1942, 98-125. Arabic text, 1 - 31. For more details and discussions of the Fatimid Mahdī, see P.J. Vatikiotis, The Fatimid Theory of State, 107-119; B. Lewis, The Assassins, London, 1967, 23-26.
 3. P.J. Vatikiotis, The Fatimid Theory of State, 115.

The politically and socially dissatisfied masses found refuge in the idea of the Messianic return of a hidden leader of metaphysical power and the Ismaili teaching gained momentum which resulted in the establishment of the Fatimid State in 296/908. The Imām emerged from concealment and was proclaimed as Imām-Caliph under the name of al-Mahdī.

With the proclamation of al-Mahdī, the Ismaili theory of Mahdism began to materialise. Its claim of universal empire and social equality, together with permanent peace under the rule of the divinely guided Imām, was, however, challenged by the insurmountable difficulty of materialising such promises. The ninety years of rule during which five Fatimid Imāms sat on the throne of the Caliphate were, to say the least, a disappointment of such hopes. The promises of the Dā'īs remained unfulfilled and the dream of the Messianic rule drifted farther from reality. The 'Abbasids, the "oppressors of the believers and the usurpers of the Imām's right", were still ruling over a very large portion of the Muslim world. The Byzantines, who were considered the enemies of Islam were stronger and more powerful than before. They not only defended their empire but made constant raids into Muslim territories. The "tyranny" exercised by the authorities of the 'Abbasids and the Byzantines, was never abolished. The society which was under the direct rule of the Imām was composed of differing religious beliefs and the unification of all people into one

faith under the leadership of the Imām could never have been achieved. Equality and justice, the ideals which most appealed to the masses, were nebulous and eluded reality. Continuous uprisings and rebellions mocked the promise of a permanent peace in the Mahdī's realm. It must be admitted that, historically, such a Messianic state had never been achieved.

The Fatimid Imāms had, at first, been anxious to materialise some of those dreams, particularly the prophecies concerning the destruction of tyranny represented by the 'Abbasid and the Byzantine authorities, but their hostile neighbours checked the expansion of their empire and limited its conquest. The Byzantine Empire, which had effectively revived under a new and strong leader, the powerful Carmetians and their interests in Syria, the rulers of some Eastern provinces who preferred to retain independence under the name of the weak 'Abbasid Caliph rather than accept the suzerainty of the new and powerful Fatimid Imām-Caliph, provided a solid front against the Fatimid conquest of the Eastern parts of the Muslim world.

This strong opposition was realised during al-'Azīz's reign and gradually the idea of a quick conquest of the Eastern provinces of the Muslim world subsided into a desire to remain in the land they already ruled and to concentrate on its internal affairs. Even the declaration of al-Mahdī's war against the enemies of Islam (the Byzantines) gradually subsided into negotiations for peace and friendly relations.

This resulted in the prosperity of the Empire, although it was perhaps a disappointment to the Da'wa and a clear admission of the impossibility of achieving its ideals. The Messianic kingdom of the Dā'īs became an ordinary State, in structure little different from that of the 'Abbasid enemy. The people still looked for the Messianic rule and the idea of other "would be" Messiahs began to appear. During the third and most of the fourth century after Hijra it is not recorded that an active Messianic movement other than that of the Fatimids was known in the Muslim world.

Towards the end of the fourth century, such movements began to appear. Abū Rakwa, who claimed 'Umayyad descent, declared that al-Mahdī, the saviour of the Muslims, was an 'Umayyad and not Fatimid, thus the tool by which the Fatimids established their State had now passed to their enemies. The success of Abū Rakwa which threatened the foundations of the Fatimid Empire in 396/1005 could be attributed mainly to the failure of the Fatimid Imāms in fulfilling the impossible promises of their Da'wa.⁴

"Both the 'Abbasids and the Fatimids, in their hour of victory confronted the dilemma which sooner or later faces all successful rebels - the conflict between the responsibilities of power and the expectations of

4. See below, The Rebellion of Abū Rakwa, Chapter V of this thesis.

those who brought them to it. The 'Abbasids, after a brief attempt to persuade the Muslims that their accession had really brought the promised millennium, chose the path of stability and orthodoxy. The radical doctrines were forgotten, the radical leaders murdered. The Messianic epithet became regnal titles, The same problem arose for the victorious Fatimids, but in a more complex form, since their victory was slower and incomplete.... The Fatimid Caliphs, like the first 'Abbasids, found that the wishes of the missionaries did not always accord with the needs of the State.... But the Fatimids, unlike the 'Abbasids, could not afford to break completely with the mission, since there was still important work for the mission to do."⁵

Subsequently the materialisation of the Messianic realm was postponed indefinitely under a convenient allegorical interpretation of the theory of al-Mahdī. "The mission of al-Mahdī is enormous. I have considerable share in it and those who are coming after me shall also share it." (And, al-Mu'iz added), "If it should be the lot of one person only, how could anything from it come to me?"⁶ According to the Da'wa's teaching, al-Mahdi became the key which opened the lock of divine bounty, mercy, blessing and happiness. "By him God has opened all these to his slaves

5. B. Lewis, "An Interpretation of Fatimid History", Cairo Conference, 1969, 5.

6. Tradition No.28 edited and translated by W. Ivanow, Rise of the Fatimids, 102; Arabic text, 20.

and this shall continue after him in his successors until the promise of God which he made to them in his bounty, might and power, will be fulfilled.⁷ Qādī al-Nu'mān, who recorded the traditions of Imām-Caliph al-Mu'iz says that the question, "Art thou the expected Mahdī under whose authority God shall gather his slaves, making him the King of the whole earth, and shall the religions of the world become one under thee?" was put to him by a certain important man (Ba'd Shuyūkh al-'Awliā').⁸ This clearly indicates that by the time of al-Mu'iz, people began to feel that they had waited too long for the real Mahdī. By the time of al-Hākim their patience had run short and desperation began to mount, threatening the Da'wa with serious troubles.

Such desperation could clearly be seen in the appearance of the Druz movement. Now more than forty years had passed since the power of the Fatimids was established in Egypt, and a new generation, even amongst the Du'āt, was no doubt tired of waiting until after Baghdad and Constantinople should be taken, before full justice and universal plenty should prevail.⁹

It could also be seen in the actions of the men in charge of the Da'wa who seemed to have realised that they could no longer postpone the appearance of al-Mahdī and to this end they declared that the rules of

7. Tradition No.28 edited and translated by W. Ivanow, Rise of the Fatimids, 102; Arabic text, 20.

8. Ibid.

9. Cf. M.G.S. Hodson, "Al-Darazi and Hamza in the Origin of the Druze Religion", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 17.

the previous Imāms were a period of preparation for the appearance of the real saviour, al-Mahdī. Kirmānī forecasts that the saviour by whom God's cause would triumph would be al-Ḥākim, the Imām-Caliph concerning whom all signs were propitious for the defeat of the enemies of the true cause. He would create justice, equality and peace, thus, at last fulfilling the promises of the Du'at.¹⁰

Thus al-Ḥākim did not only inherit a complicated insoluble problem, he was made to bear the responsibility of solving it.

The Influence of Ahl al-Dhimma

The insecurity of the conditions under which the minorities of Ahl al-Dhimma (Jews and Christians) lived in the Muslim world forced them to seek some means of specialisation or qualification by which they would be considered an asset to the progress of the State and provide themselves with some security in their political and social lives. Medicine, banking and financial administration, in which they became most skilful and efficient, were their fields of specialisation.

When the Fatimids arrived in Egypt, the need for a stable and progressive financial administration provided an opportunity for many Jews and Christians to find employment in the offices of the State. Ahl al-Dhimma, by their long experience in such matters, provided the Fatimids with the means

10. Kirmānī, Risalat al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bishārāt, edited by M.K. Husayn in, Ta'rif al-Drūz, Cairo, 1962, 55.

of steady progress in the State economy. In return, the Caliph's policy towards them was one of great tolerance. As time passed their influence rapidly grew, and the high officials of financial administration, their deputies and staff were chiefly non-Muslims. It is difficult to assess the influence of Ahl al-Dhimma on the offices of the State administration or the impact of their influence on the internal policy of the Imām. Some of the events which have been recorded suggest that it was indeed significant. The chroniclers narrate that when al-ʿAzīz dismissed and arrested his Wazīr Yaʿqūb Ibn Killis¹¹ in 372/982, the functions of the administration came almost to a stand-still. This compelled al-ʿAzīz to free Yaʿqūb and re-appoint him.¹² The dismissal of ʿĪsā Ibn Naṣṭūrus¹³ in 385/995 followed a similar pattern. It may have been that the non-Muslim staff preferred the administration of Yaʿqūb and ʿĪsā and purposely crippled the work of the administration thus demonstrating to the Imām the incapacity of their appointed

11. The famous administrator of the Fatimid State during its early period in Egypt. He was of Jewish origin, but was converted to Islam. He is said to have sympathised with Ahl al-Dhimma and encouraged their appointments to offices of the State. For his life career see Ibn Khallikān, IV, 359; Maqrīzī, Khitāṭ, II, 5; W.J. Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Mediaeval Islam, London, 1937, 45 ff. See also "Yaʿqūb Ibn Killis", E.I.

12. Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 21; Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 262.

13. A Christian from Egypt. He was appointed as Financial Administrator of the Fatimid Empire in 384/994.

successors. The fact that the Imām re-appointed the dismissed administrators confirms the Dhimmi's great influence on the administration.

Their success in commerce, banking and business had led them to prosperity and affluence. A number of influential Dhimmi's had their own courts where learned men and poets gathered to discuss current affairs, praised their patrons and received their gifts after the manner of Eastern tradition.¹⁴ Their schools of learning and religious education flourished¹⁵ and even the Imām-Caliph contributed to their finances.¹⁶

The growing influence of Ahl al-Dhimma roused indignation among the Muslim population. From their point of view, non-Muslims were not to be equally privileged nor should they be allowed to dominate the administration of finance. Added to this, it was an affront to find them so rich and prosperous in a Muslim State. The nature of their positions as tax inspectors and collectors, together with the precedence in employment which non-Muslim high officials gave to their co-religionists, increased the anger of Muslims. Bitter criticisms, as shown in the following translation, were hurled against the Imām-Caliph and those high officials who supported

14. For more information see J. Mann, The Jews in Egypt and Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs, Oxford, 1920-2, 1, 5-35.

15. Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 109; J. Mann, 1, 5-35.

16. J. Mann, 1, 38-7 states, "We thus gather the important information that Elhanan (a principle of the Jewish School of Fustāt) was sometimes the recipient of the sovereign bounty. This quite in accordance with the favourable position of the Jews in Egypt prior to al-Hākim's persecution. Elhanan very likely received a grant from the government. Likewise, Joshiah, the contemporary Gaon from Palestine, was maintained by the State."

the employment of Ahl al-Dhimma.

"Be Christian. Today is the time of Christianity.

Believe in nothing, but in the Holy Trinity,

Ya'qūb is the father, 'Azīz is the son

And for the Holy Ghost, Faḍl¹⁷ is the one."¹⁸

When the Fatimids settled in Egypt and large numbers of their troops remained unoccupied at home, the problem became more acute. The chiefs of al-Maghāribā, the Berber element in the army, who had established the Fatimid State in Maghrib and had conquered Egypt for the Fatimids, clashed with the administrators. It would seem that they themselves desired to be employed in the State's administration; but since they were mainly tribesmen and had no experience in such matters the coveted posts were not suitable for them. Disagreement mounted between them and the Wazīr Ibn Killis. The ensuing enmity caused an attempt to be made on his life.¹⁹

Towards the end of al-'Azīz's reign, the antagonism, which increased with the rapid growth of the Dhimmi's influence, had reached almost hysterical proportions among the Muslims. In a letter purported

17. Al-Faḍl Ibn Ṣāliḥ, one of the army commanders.

18. See the poetry of al-Hasan Ibn Bishr al-Dimashqī, quoted by Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 48-9.

19. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 28; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 13; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 53.

to have been delivered to the Imām, the writer accused him by saying, "By the Lord who honoured the Christians by 'Isā Ibn Naṣṭūrus and the Jews by Manashsha Ibn al-Qazāz²⁰ and humiliated the Muslims by you."²¹

The situation became very tense and exploded in riots and disturbances. al-Musabbihī who is quoted by Maqrīzī says that during 386/995 five naval ships, together with their equipment, were burnt. The Christians, who were living in the neighbourhood of the port, were accused of deliberately causing the fire. Muslim members of the public, together with a number of sailors, attacked them. They killed one hundred and seven men, threw their bodies into the streets, and looted all the houses of the Christians in the area. 'Isā Ibn Naṣṭūrus, who was the representative of al-'Azīz during his absence, together with a police force came to the area, inspected the incident and arrested many Muslims. He executed twenty men and crucified their bodies, and severely punished many others.²² The death toll of this riot indicates the large number of people involved. Although the reason given was the fire among the ships, the manner in which the Muslims behaved (according to the description by al-Musabbihī)²³ confirms that hatred was at the root of the disturbance.

20. The financial administrator of Damascus - a Jew and said to have been appointed by Ibn Killis. For more information see J. Mann, I, 5-35.

21. Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 55B; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 81.

22. Khitaṭ, II, 195.

23. Ibid.

Al-ʿAzīz's method of dealing with the problem was not conducive to its solution. He neither planned a gradual take-over by Muslims in the financial administration nor was he able to convince them of the value of Ahl al-Dhimma to the prosperity of the State. He merely replaced some of the non-Muslim high officials by Muslims when the hysteria of the Muslim population reached alarming proportions. The records show his folly. Many of the dismissed officials were reinstated and ʿĪsā Ibn Naṣṭūrus was re-appointed on condition that he would appoint only Muslims to his Dwāwīn.²⁴

The chiefs of al-Maghāribā were silenced by the bestowal of honorary places in the court of the Imām, together with generous gifts and high salaries. The indignant Sunnīs were treated with tolerance and patience. Critics, even the very bitter ones, were forgiven unconditionally.²⁵ This policy, however, merely palliated the situation and pacified the parties concerned without reaching the roots of the problem.

Little is recorded concerning the problems of the first four years of al-Ḥākim's reign. It may have been that the struggle between the elements of the army (al-Maghāribā and al-Mashāriqa), which reached its peak during that period, overshadowed other problems and made them appear less important in the eyes of the chroniclers.

The only reported incident in connection with Ahl al-Dhimma is the dismissal, and later the execution, of ʿĪsā Ibn Naṣṭūrus. It was

24. Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 56A.

25. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 48-9.

arranged by Ibn ʿAmmār after his appointment as Wāsiṭa in 386/996.

Nuwayrī, the only chronicler who explains the reason for ʿIsā's execution, says, "Ibn ʿAmmār accused him of collaboration²⁶ with Manjotgīn."²⁷ But since the death of ʿIsā occurred after the capture and pardon of Manjotgīn there were probably other reasons for ʿIsā's execution. It is perhaps more likely that it was an attempt by Ibn ʿAmmār to achieve popularity among the Muslims. It has already been mentioned that less than a year previously ʿIsā had executed twenty Muslims and crucified their bodies in Cairo. Ibn ʿAmmār is highly praised by Nuwayrī for the execution of ʿIsā because: "Ibn Naṣṭūrus was wronging the Muslims."²⁸

Hatred between Muslims and non-Muslims seems to have become so strong that to dismiss or execute a Dhimmi high official was a passport to popularity among the Muslim population. It was also expressed in the riots which occurred in 392/1002 and resulted in the destruction of a church in Cairo.²⁹ The continued rivalry between Muslim and non-Muslim officials³⁰ urged the Caliph to endeavour to find a solution.

26. For information on Manjotgīn, see below, note 61.

27. Nuwayrī, fol. 93.

28. Nuwayrī, fol. 93.

29. Khitat, II, 293.

30. *Ibid.*, 31.

The Internal Struggle of the Army

al-Ḥākim's legacy of the rivalry between the two main elements of his army, al-Maghāribā and al-Mashāriqa (Westerners and Easterners)³¹ reached the point of open warfare which resulted in four years of internal upheavals. Such a position, of course, proffered unique opportunity for internal rebellions and attacks from outside enemies.

The root cause of the upheaval was a problem created during the last few years of al-Mu'iz's reign. The discontent and unrest grew stronger throughout the reign of al-ʿAzīz. Since the inception of the Fatimid State, al-Maghāribā were the chief element of its army. It was

31. The term Maghāribā in this context applies chiefly to the Berber troops of the Fatimid army after the conquest of Egypt. The majority of them were originally tribesmen from the tribes of Kutāma, Ṣinhāja and Zuwayla. (Khitāt, II, 4, 10, 21). It is difficult to give any estimate of their members as a whole or by comparison with each other, but it is quite clear in the records that the majority of them were Kutāmis (members of the tribe of Kutāma) who were, as Maqrīzī says, "the backbone of the Fatimid army". (Khitāt, II, 10). It is also recorded by Ibn Khaldūn, VI, 148, that when al-Mu'iz moved to Egypt the whole tribe of Kutāma came with him. It is also noticeable that the two terms, Maghāribā and Kutāma, are synonymously used by chroniclers. This in addition to the fact that all the famous Maghribī personnel who played important roles in the Fatimid State in Egypt were Kutāmis. Unfortunately there is not enough information to reveal the connection between al-Maghāribā and their previous homeland.

The term Mashāriqa applied here chiefly to the Turkish and Daylamis troops in the Fatimid army. But it is necessary to mention that a group of al-Maghāribā under the leadership of Jaysh Ibn al-Ṣamṣama supported al-Mashāriqa in the struggle. In addition to these two major elements, there was a group known as al-Ṣaqāliba (see I. Hrbek, "Die Slawen Im Dienste =

al-Maghāribā who established it, defended it against its enemies, and assured its suzerainty over Maghrib. By their power Egypt and Hijāz, together with a large portion of Syria, were conquered and added to the Empire. But when al-Mu'iz moved to Egypt, a change in his policy towards the army began to emerge. This change is emphasised during the reign of his successor al-'Azīz. A new element other than Maghāribā was created and although this was of considerable importance in the history of the Fatimids, none of the chroniclers or historians have given any satisfactory reason for it. The only surviving information is that al-'Azīz encouraged the employment of Turks and Daylamis in his army and was the first Fatimid Caliph to employ Turks.

This important change appears to have been a calculated policy in an endeavour to achieve the final goals of the Fatimid ambitions. The infusion of a new element of strong and skilled fighters was the only means of fulfilling the Fatimid dream of quick conquest of the Eastern parts of the Islamic world.³² The original and sole element of the army were the Maghāribā but they had been fighting continuously for three generations and

= der Fatimiden", A.O., 21 (1953), 543-581) who, although they did not form an independent group in the army, participated in the struggle. The Ṣaqālība were divided into two factions: a group led by al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar, and Yāmis who supported al-Maghāribā. The other was under the leadership of Barjawān who also was the leader of al-Mashāriqa. For a study of the elements of the Fatimid army see B.I. Bashīr, The Fatimid Caliphate, Chapter I.

32. De Lacy O'Leary in his Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, London 1923, 120, suggests that the recruitment of al-Mashāriqa was a plan to decrease the power of al-Maghāribā whom al-'Azīz mistrusted.

had lost much of their early enthusiasm. Their defeats in Syria between 360-365/970-975 were ample evidence of their incapability of achieving their masters' dreams.³³

Turks seem to have been the race from whom al-Mu'iz desired to have the new recruits. Maqrīzī reports a conversation between al-Mu'iz and the commander-in-chief of his army, Jawhar, after the latter had captured three hundred men and presented them to his master. One of these captives was a Turk in whom al-Mu'iz appeared to be more interested than in any of the others. Jawhar said, "O Lord I notice that you have been more concerned with the Turkish captive than the rest." Al-Mu'iz replied, "You will know, Jawhar, that one of my children would employ a man of this race by whom God would grant him conquests which he had not granted to us."³⁴ This suggests that al-Mu'iz no longer hoped that the conquest of the Eastern parts of the Muslim world would be achieved by al-Maghāribā. The rest of the report emphasises Jawhar's strong belief in what his Imām had said and indicates that the idea of introducing an element of Turks into the army may have been exchanged amongst the higher officials of the Fatimid regime.

Alptigin, the Turkish general, together with his Turkish and

33. Antākī, 155; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 19; Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 262; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 49; Khiṭaṭ, II, 9.

34. Khiṭaṭ, I, 379.

Daylami troops arrived in Syria in the year 364/974. This offered the Fatimids an opportunity to augment their army. Alptigīn was a past-master in the art of war and commanded equally skilled soldiers. He was able to defeat Jawhar, the conqueror of Egypt and the best general of the Fatimid army. Aided by his relatively small number of men (about three hundred) he was able to control a large portion of Syria; both in war and negotiations his prestige was equal, if not superior, to that of the Fatimids or the Carmatians.³⁵ In addition to these qualities, Alptigīn had been a general in the 'Abbasid army and his knowledge of the regime of Baghdad was an important factor. Perhaps the bitter experience of defeat in Iraq which forced him to leave may ~~have~~ fired his ambition to lead a Fatimid army and by its aid to overthrow the ruling authorities there and achieve the final goal for the Fatimids. The determination of al-Mu'iz and later al-'Azīz to win the loyalty of Alptigīn and his soldiers is clearly expressed in the way they dealt with the rising danger of Alptigīn's presence in Syria. Al-Mu'iz offered him the governorship of Fatimid Syria in return for his loyalty to their cause.

Al-'Azīz resumed his father's policy and during the many battles which Alptigīn fought against the Fatimid forces, he noticeably repeated the same offer. Even in defeat and brought as a prisoner to al-'Azīz,

35. Anṭākī, 155; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 19; Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 262; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 494; Khitāt, II, 9.

Alptigīn was pardoned and was brought, together with all his men, to Egypt and treated as an honoured guest.³⁶ It was not only, as the chroniclers state, "because of his own tolerance", that al-ʿAzīz treated Alptigīn in that manner but also because Alptigīn and his men represented the desirable element for which he and his father were searching. In Egypt Alptigīn's stay was more like a period of preparation for his appointment as the future commander of the Fatimid army. In court his place was always beside the Imām. High officials of the State were commanded to show him every courtesy. A special bodyguard of his men was put under his command. Many of his friends and supporters began to arrive in Egypt to join the Fatimid army. His position became so powerful that jealous rivals plotted his death.³⁷

Alptigīn's men were co-opted to the army as professional soldiers and were given special accommodation in Cairo which became known as Harat al Atrāk (Quarter of the Turks) and Harat al-Daylam (Quarter of the Daylamis)³⁸ and thus a new element in the Fatimid fighting forces was created. This new element grew rapidly

36. Antākī, 155; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 19; Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 262; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol.51B; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 52; Khiṭaṭ, II, 10.

37. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 19; Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 262; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol.51B; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 53; Khiṭaṭ, II, 10, suggest that Ibn Killis was suspected of poisoning Alptigīn, but since Alptigīn was only a military officer, there would have been no need for Ibn Killis to feel jealous or afraid that his post as Wazīr might be given to Alptigīn. It is possible that the chiefs of al-Maghāribā, who hated Ibn Killis and felt jealous of Alptigīn, arranged the plot and spread rumours accusing Ibn Killis, so that they would be able to get rid of both Alptigīn and Ibn Killis.

38. Khiṭaṭ, II, 8,9.

sponsored by the Imām al-ʿAzīz and his Wazīr Yaʿqūb Ibn Killis, and before long its chiefs were appointed as commanders. In 381/991 the entire command of the Fatimid army was given to one of them known as Manjotgin with the title Amīr al-Juyūsh al-Manṣūra (Commander of the victorious armies)³⁹. His mission was to abolish the disturbances in Syria, strike the Byzantines in the North, and put Aleppo under the direct rule of the Fatimids.⁴⁰ If this could be accomplished, future expansion towards Baghdad would follow. Maqrīzī's report on the official ceremony of Manjotgin's appointment is an important piece of information. It shows the importance al-Mashāriqa had achieved by that time and also the hope that al-ʿAzīz held that they would conquer the Eastern parts of the Muslim Empire. This ceremony is interestingly similar to that of Jawhar when he was sent by al-Muʿiz to conquer Egypt. All high officials, including the sons of the Imām and his brothers, were ordered to dismount for Jawhar. All of them, even including Jawhar, were ordered to honour Manjotgin in this way.⁴¹ Al-Muʿiz had obviously hoped that Jawhar would succeed in conquering Egypt and al-ʿAzīz also anticipated similar victories by Manjotgīn and his troops.

The presence of al-Mashāriqa in the army favoured by the Imāms was a direct blow to the pride of al-Maghāriba and to their position

39. Anṣakī, 173.

40. Anṣakī, 173; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 40.

41. Khiṭaṭ, I, 379.

in the Empire. They had hitherto been the only military power behind the Fatimid Caliphate, but now they could no longer claim that privilege. The command of the Fatimid army, particularly the troops stationed in Syria, which had been under Maghribī personnel, was now given to the Turks. Even the social privileges of occupying the places of honour beside the Imām during official ceremonies or at prayer times and for the Khuṭba in the Mosque, the gifts of houses, horses, money, slave girls, etc., were now all shared by the new element. For the first time since they had joined the Fatimid cause, al-Maghārība realised that their position was weakened and was challenged by a power of a different race, culture and background; this power that had defeated them and caused their humiliation once in Syria had now arrived to share with them the glories of an Empire which they had built and defended for many years.

Even the creation of the new element was the work of their Imām, the one in whom they had believed as a divinely inspired leader. Al-Maghārība's reaction was opposition, although it did not reach open rebellion. They did not exercise military pressure on the Imām, nor did they create a special reason which would justify the use of force against al-Mashāriqa to curtail their power before it grew stronger. Their opposition expressed itself in attempts to get rid of high officials, whom

they thought were behind al-ʿAzīz's policy.⁴² They murmured criticism and dissatisfaction of his conduct.⁴³ The army had not yet attained sufficient strength to enable its leaders to bring pressure to bear to compel the Caliph to alter his policy, as had been the case in the ʿAbbasid Caliphate, and later in the Fatimid Caliphate. Al-ʿAzīz as Imām-Caliph was still at the zenith of his power. Although he had conferred some high positions in his army on the Mashāriqa, he had behaved courteously towards the Maghāribā chiefs bestowing on them generous gifts and honouring them in his court. Al-ʿAzīz was, however, aware of their dissatisfaction and their opposition to the presence of the Mashāriqa in the army, and its grave consequences to the future of the State. He seems, however, to have been unable to create any fundamental solution to the problem.

When he realised that he was dying, he summoned two of the most powerful chiefs of al-Maghāribā, Ibn ʿAmmār⁴⁴ and Muḥammad Ibn

42. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 28; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 13; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 54.

43. Khīṭāṭ, I, 379.

44. Abū Muḥammad, al-Ḥasan Ibn ʿAmmār al-Kutāmī, the most powerful Kutāmī chief during the reign of al-ʿAzīz. His career started as a commander of the Fatimid forces between 351-353/962-964. He played a leading role in defeating the Byzantines in Sicily, which brought him popularity in the Fatimid court. In 361/962 he came to Egypt, leading his troops to support Jawhar against the Carmatians. He succeeded in overpowering the rebels of the city of Tanis who were in alliance with the Carmatians. In 362/972 he led ten thousand troops and defeated the Carmatians =

al-Nūmān⁴⁵ and, as chroniclers state, "spoke to them about the future of his son". No records of the interview have been preserved but it could be assumed that, since none of the Mashāriqa chiefs were summoned al-'Azīz's motive may have been to avert future trouble which might arise from al-Maghāribā and an attempt by the dying Imām to save his son's State from possible crisis, the causes of which he had himself created. Both Ibn 'Ammār and Qādī Muḥammad Ibn al-Nūmān are said to have "sworn loyalty and obedience to his commands".⁴⁶

This, however, did not prevent al-Maghāribā from attempting to take over power, abolish the prestige of al-Mashāriqa in the army, and

= and caused their retreat from Egypt. Between 363/973 and 383/993 there is no mention of Ibn 'Ammār's activities, which indicates that he did not hold a significant position in the State, but it appears that he was an important figure in the Caliph's court as he acted as a mediator on behalf of the Imām to calm the riots which flared up between the Berbers and the Egyptians. In 383/993 he was appointed as Waṣīṭa but was dismissed shortly afterwards. For information on Ibn 'Ammār see al-Musabbiḥī, Akhbār Misr, fol. 153 ff; Anṭākī, 180 ff; al-Rudhrawārī, 222 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 44 ff; Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Ishāra, 27; Ibn Muyassar, 53 ff; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 57 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Ibn Khalikān, III, 449, 525; al-Dawādārī, VI, 256 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 47-57; Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 383, 386-390 and Khiṭaṭ, II, 36, 285; Nuwayrī, fol. 93 ff; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 391 ff; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 122 ff.

45. Muḥammad Ibn al-Nūmān, son of the celebrated Qādī Qudāt of the Fatimid State, al-Nūmān Ibn Ḥayyūn. He was appointed as Qādī Qudāt (chief judge) in 374/984 and held the office until his death in 389/999.

46. Al-Musabbiḥī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 386; Ibn Muyassar, 53.

restore their lost position as the only dominating power in the State, as soon as the opportunity arose. The death of al-‘Azīz provided that opportunity. The new Imām-Caliph was very young and could easily be persuaded, or forced if necessary, to agree with their demands. The majority of al-Mashāriqa were in Syria, so there was no military power that could intervene against them. The meeting could be interpreted as an authorisation by the dying Imām for Ibn ‘Ammār to act as administrator for his son's State.⁴⁷

In Ramaḍān 386/996, only two days after the death of al-‘Azīz, al-Maghāriba made what might be called in modern terms a "coup d'état". Maqrīzī describes the event by saying, "When al-‘Azīz died and al-Ḥākim succeeded, the Kutāmis, who were the most powerful in the State (Ahl al-Dawla) stipulated that no-one but Ibn ‘Ammār should be the administrator of their affairs. They further demanded the dismissal of ‘Isā Ibn Naṣṭūrus from the Wasāta and that this office should be given to Ibn ‘Ammār."⁴⁸

Ibn Muyassar adds that they refused to attend the ceremony of al-Ḥākim's investiture as Imām unless their demands were met.⁴⁹ They met no opposition and al-Ḥākim responded to their demand by appointing Ibn ‘Ammār as Wāsiṭa and giving him the title Amīn al-Dawla (trustee of the

47. There are some chroniclers who in fact believed that Ibn ‘Ammār was appointed as administrator of the State, according to the will of al-‘Azīz. See Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 57.

48. Khiṭaṭ, II, 36.

49. Ibn Muyassar, 53. Also Iṭṭi‘āz, ann, 386.

State) which, as chroniclers state, was for the first time given to an administrator in the Fatimid State.⁵⁰

According to al-Rudhrawārī, Ibn al-Qalānisī and some chroniclers who may have used their records, the aim of al-Maghāriba was to abolish the institution of the Fatimid Imāma and build an Empire of their own. They say that Ibn ‘Ammār's friends advised him to kill al-Ḥākim saying, "We do not need an Imām whom we have to raise and worship." Ibn ‘Ammār, who then intended to follow their advice, was later dissuaded because al-Ḥākim was too young and harmless.⁵¹ This story seems very unlikely. Such an important development is not reported by other chroniclers nor does it appear consistent with the events which followed. It is more likely a quotation from the works of Ibn al-Ṣābi’, which unfortunately have not survived. The motive behind it is consistent with the anti-Fatimid propaganda which was directed by the ‘Abbasids in Baghdad during the time of Ibn al-Ṣābi’.

50. al-Rudhrawārī, 222; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 44; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Ibn Khallikān, III, 449.

51. al-Rudhrawārī, 222; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 45; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Nuwayrī, fol. 94. De Lacy O'Leary, Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, 124-5, and P.J. Varikiotis, The Fatimid Theory of State, 151, suggest that the Maghāriba, led by Ibn ‘Ammār, seemed to have favoured a more secular trend with the hope of building an Empire through conquest.

It stresses two points: (A) It suggests that even the Maghārība, who built the Fatimid Empire, did not sincerely believe in the righteousness of the Fatimid claims: (B) It indicates that the Fatimid Imām claimed to be divine and required to be worshipped. These two points are very much emphasised in the anti-Fatimid manifesto written in Baghdad in 402/1011. Both al-Rudhrawarī and Ibn al-Qalanīsī are known to have largely followed the information of Ibn al-Ṣābi'.

Anṭākī, Ibn Muyassar and Maqrizī agree that the aim of al-Maghārība was to achieve political administration and restore themselves as a dominating power in the State and following events lead to this conclusion.

Immediately after his appointment as Wazīr, Ibn 'Ammār began to allocate high positions to his supporters, Sulaymān Ibn Falāḥ al-Kutāmī and his brother 'Alī were given command of the Fatimid army in Syria. Abū Abdullah al-Muṣily became the secretary of Ibn 'Ammār and al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar was appointed head of Diwān al Barīd was al-Inshā'.⁵² Anṭākī says that all important positions were given to al-Maghārība.⁵³ In addition to official positions, al-Maghārība were granted social privileges and precedence at official ceremonies and palace functions. They were permitted to enter first into the court and only they were allowed to sit in the

52. Itti'āz, anno, 386.

53. Anṭākī, 180.

honorary places.⁵⁴ Vast sums of money, properties, slave girls and horses were bestowed on their chiefs. Maqrīzī says that on the day Ibn ‘Ammār was proclaimed Wāsita, every Maghribi received twenty Dīnārs and each was promised an additional sixty-four Dīnārs annually. He adds that one day Ibn ‘Ammār gave one thousand five hundred horses to his Kuṭāmī supporters.⁵⁵

Al-Maghārība's aim was to weaken the power of al-Mashāriqa and abolish their prestige in the regime. The chiefs of al-Mashāriqa were dismissed and some of their supporters were even executed.⁵⁶ Annual allowances to all Mashāriqa were cancelled.⁵⁷ Many of them fled from Egypt fearing more severe measures.⁵⁸ In a short time, al-Maghārība were able to achieve the position they had failed to achieve throughout the entire reign of al-‘Azīz. They became the controlling power in the Fatimid State, and their chief Ibn ‘Ammār the real ruler of Egypt.

The manner in which Ibn ‘Ammār seized power and the situation to which his rule had led aroused the ambition of Barjawān.⁵⁹ He found

54. Itti‘āz, anno, 386-387; Khitaṭ, II, 36.

55. Itti‘āz, annos, 386-387.

56. Anṭākī, 180-1; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 46; Nuwayrī, fol. 93; Itti‘āz, annos, 386-387.

57. Itti‘āz, anno, 387.

58. Anṭākī, 180.

59. B. Lewis, article, "Barjawān", E.I.²

in these events a suitable opportunity to seize power from Ibn 'Ammār and himself become Wāsiṭa. He entered into communication with the chiefs of al-Mashāriqa promising to restore their lost position. He feigned to protect al-Ḥākim from the tyranny of al-Maghārība and spread rumours that Ibn 'Ammār's conduct was contrary to the Imām's desire. His plan succeeded and indeed many men looked on him as the saviour of the Imām from Ibn 'Ammār's tyranny.⁶⁰

Manjotgīn,⁶¹ who was with a great force in Syria, responded to Barjawan's appeal. He harangued his officers and men and compared the disorder in Egypt with the security and tolerance during al-'Azīz's reign. His impassioned speech persuaded officers and men alike to support him in any suitable measure to restore the policy of the late

60. al-Rudhrawārī, 222; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 45; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Nuwayrī, fol.94.

61. Contrary to other sources Anṭākī calls him Banjotgīn which is probably due to a different pronunciation of the Turkish dialects. His career started in 381/991 when he was appointed general commander of the Fatimid army in Syria. This occurred after al-'Azīz had feared that the Wālī of Damascus had intended to rebel and the city had fallen into confusion and disorder. Manjotgīn came to Syria not only to restore law and order in Damascus but also to attempt to put Aleppo completely under the direct control of the Fatimids. He succeeded in Damascus and also at first in Aleppo when he defeated the Byzantine forces which came to support Aleppo. But while besieging the city and trying to deal the final blow to its rulers, the Byzantine Emperor came in person with a large army and caused the defeat of Manjotgīn who retreated to Damascus awaiting the support of his Imām-Caliph al-'Azīz. The sudden death of

Caliph al-ʿAzīz and save the Fatimid State from certain destruction.⁶²

He formed an alliance with some of the Bedouin chiefs and a few days

later left Damascus at the head of six thousand troops and marched towards

Egypt.⁶³

Ibn ʿAmmār mobilised his troops under the leadership of Sulaymān

= al-ʿAzīz caused the cancellation of the preparation to wage war against Byzantium and Manjotgīn stayed in Damascus until he received the news of Ibn ʿAmmār's treatment of al-Mashariqa. For information on Manjotgīn see Antākī, 173, 181 ff; al-Rudhrawārī, 217 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 40 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49 ff; Ibn Khallikān, III, 449; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 54; Ittiʿāz, annos, 386, 387; Khitāt, I, 379, II, 285; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nuǧūm, IV, 117 ff; Nuwayrī, fol. 93.

62. al-Rudhrawārī, 222; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 45; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Nuwayrī, fol. 94.

63. Contrary to all other sources, Antākī, 180, states that when Manjotgīn received the news of Ibn ʿAmmār's oppression of al-Mashariqa, he wrote to the Byzantine Emperor offering homage (al-ṭāʿah) and asking for his support against Ibn ʿAmmār in Egypt. This information, however, does not seem consistent with the facts because Antākī adds that the Emperor refused to support Manjotgīn, which is very unlikely since, in the same year, he supported the rebellion in Tyre. The Byzantines were in a state of war with the Fatimids and the presence of the Emperor himself in Syria at that time was to defeat the Fatimids in Northern Syria and secure his interests there. If an offer of allegiance came to him from the general commander of the Fatimid army in Syria, the Emperor would not refuse it. On the other hand, it seems very unlikely that Manjotgīn would ask the help of the Byzantines in this kind of war and if such were the case Ibn ʿAmmār would have accused Manjotgīn of an allegiance with the common enemy of Islam, and since Ibn ʿAmmār accused Manjotgīn only of rebellion against al-Hākim, Antākī's report seems doubtful.

Ibn Falāh⁶⁴ and provided him with the large sums of money which would be necessary to divert the loyalty of the Bedouin chiefs of Palestine against Manjotgīn.⁶⁵ He also declared that Manjotgīn had rebelled against al-Hākīm and forced Barīawān and other leaders of the opposition to agree. Manjotgīn's name was cursed in the Mosques of Cairo and men were encouraged to join Sulaymān's army. Even al-Hākīm was made to appear in public to support Sulaymān.⁶⁶

The sources are contradictory concerning the number of Sulaymān's army; Ibn al-Qalānisi reports "sixteen thousand",⁶⁷

64. Abu Tamīm, Sulaymān Ibn Ja'far Ibn Falāh al-Kutāmī. His father, Ja'far, was the most important Kutāmī chief amongst those who came with Jawhar to conquer Egypt. Sulaymān and his brother, 'Alī, played important roles as army commanders and sometimes Walis in the Fatimid State. Sulaymān's career began after the death of his father in 360/970. From thence he was looked on as the successor of his father and in 369/979 Sulaymān was appointed the commander of a Fatimid army which was sent to restore law and order in Syria after troubles had broken out in its capital - Damascus. His campaign does not seem to have been successful and he was called back to Egypt only a few months after his arrival in Syria. Nothing is reported about Sulaymān between 369/979 and 386/996, and it seems that he did not occupy any important position, since most of the positions in the army were given to the Mashāriqa. This is probably why he became a strong supporter of Ibn 'Ammār's party. For information on Sulaymān see Antākī, 181 ff; al-Rudhrawārī, 223 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 23 ff; Ibn Muyassar, 55 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Ibn Khallikān, III, 449; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 56 ff; Itti'āz, annos, 386-387; Khīṭaṭ, II, 285; Nuwayrī, fol, 94 ff; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 115.

65. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 46.

66. Itti'āz, anno, 387.

67. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 46.

while Ibn Muyassar and Maqrīzī say "three thousand Kutāmīs, eight thousand Bedouins and seven hundred Ghilmān".⁶⁸ Sources also disagree concerning the first move in the war. Anṭākī and Ibn al-Qalānīsī say that Manjotgīn was the first to move towards Egypt.⁶⁹ Maqrīzī, who seems to have obtained his information from contemporary Egyptian sources, states that after receiving the news of Ibn Falāh's march towards Syria Manjotgīn marched to meet the Egyptian army.⁷⁰ They agree that the two armies met between Ramla and 'Asqalan and after three days of minor clashes they fought the final battle. By bribes, Sulaymān succeeded in diverting the allegiance of the Bedouins of Palestine against Manjotgīn and thus turned the tide of the battle in his own favour.⁷¹ Manjotgīn was defeated, a large number of his troops were killed and he fled towards Damascus where he hoped to re-organise another force, but the city, which had promised support, failed him. Its population were confused and in disorder and the Aḥdāth⁷² seized the opportunity to assume control. They invaded Manjotgīn's house and looted it.⁷³

68. Ibn Muyassar, 50; Itti'āz, anno, 387.

69. Anṭākī, 180; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 46.

70. Itti'āz, anno, 387.

71. Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 46.

72. For the meanings of this term see article, "Aḥdāth", E.I.,²

73. Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 47.

Manjotgīn realised that he could expect no support from Damascus, so he went into hiding. Sulaymān offered a reward of ten thousand Dinārs and a hundred robes for his capture, which made it impossible for Manjotgīn to hide amongst the Bedouins. It was ‘Alī Ibn al-Jarrāḥ, a Bedouin chief, who found Manjotgīn and delivered him to Sulaymān by whom he was sent to Ibn ‘Ammār in Egypt.⁷⁴

Although this war had resulted in victory to the Maghāribā, it also presented them with a problem – a fast growing and dangerous opposition in Egypt. The defeated Mashāriqa arrived in Egypt and created a military threat to Ibn ‘Ammār's rule, while the majority of al-Maghāribā were in Syria with Sulaymān.

To overcome the problem, Ibn ‘Ammār planned to increase his supporters and at the same time adopt a moderate line of policy towards al-Mashāriqa. He instituted a group of Ahdāth⁷⁵ recruited from amongst the Maghāribā and pardoned Manjotgīn, then received him cordially.⁷⁶

He also assured Barjawān and his supporters of his good will and promised them better prospects for the future.⁷⁷

74. al-Rudhrawārī, 223; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 47.

75. The term Ahdāth here seems to have meant young men. See Itti‘āz, annos, 386-387.

76. Anfakī, 181; al-Rudhrawārī, 223; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 47; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Itti‘āz, anno, 387.

77. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 46; Itti‘āz, anno, 387.

Sulaymān adopted a similar policy in Syria. He endeavoured to convince its inhabitants that his plans were for peace and security. Without any hesitation he dismissed his brother ʿAlī on learning that he had ill treated the people of Damascus.⁷⁸ He gave general Amāns and issued a written proclamation in which he pardoned all prisoners. He gave strict orders to his Maghribī troops not to interfere with the Damascan population. Sulaymān seems to have proved himself to be a successful Walī, and for the first time since Damascus had fallen to the Fatimids, a Shīʿī Walī was praised by its people. Ibn al-Qalānīsī says "Sulaymān was a very good leader who possessed great understanding. His desire to create justice was real and his aims to do good deeds were true and well observed by his conduct and achievements. He freed many prisoners and introduced a high standard of equality and justice in all petitions and complaints he received from the people. On one Friday he rode through a peaceful city to the Mosque and with him were many men giving charity to the poor who gathered in numbers on both sides of the road. He became a very popular Walī and the hearts of the people turned towards him."⁷⁹ During the short time of his Governorship in Syria, Sulaymān changed the opinion of the inhabitants concerning al-Maghārība, which had previously been hostile. His policy was an astute attempt to

78. Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 50; Ittiʿāz, anno, 387.

79. Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 51; see also al-Rudhrawārī, 224.

gain the loyalty of the Syrians and make it possible for Ibn 'Ammār to withdraw some of his troops and thus strengthen his position in Egypt.

Despite his success, Sulaymān committed one serious error. He dismissed Jaysh Ibn al-Ṣamṣāma⁸⁰ from the Governorship of Tripoli and replaced him with his own brother 'Alī. Jaysh, who was a powerful Kutāmī chief, went to Egypt to revenge himself by attempting to overthrow Ibn 'Ammār. To this end he made an alliance with Barjawān and the chiefs of al-Mashariqa.⁸¹ A number of Kutāmī chiefs supported Jaysh, thus the unity of al-Maghārība was broken and the prestige of Ibn 'Ammār was weakened.

The Downfall of Ibn 'Ammār

With the presence of Jaysh in Egypt, as a Kutāmī chief opposing Ibn 'Ammār's regime, and the absence of most of Ibn 'Ammār's supporters, came Barjawān's opportunity to gain power.

80. Abū Muḥammad, Jaysh Ibn al-Ṣamṣāma, one of the powerful Kutāmī chiefs. He began his career as Wālī of Damascus when, in 363/973, his uncle, Abū Mahmūd al-Kutāmī, the general governor of Syria, was appointed by al-Mu'iz there. He stayed for a short while then was dismissed from the Wilāya and joined his uncle as one of the army commanders. In 370/980 his uncle died and he succeeded him as the general commander of the Fatimid troops in Syria. By the end of 370/980 the command had been given to a Turk named Bultigīn and from thence the sources fail to supply any information about Jaysh, who may have been appointed as Wālī of Tripoli until 386/996, when Sulaymān dismissed him. For information on Jaysh see Anṭakī, 182 ff; al-Rudhrawārī, 224 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 9, 10, 25, 48 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49 ff; Ibn Khallikān, III, 449; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 50 ff; Itti'āz, annos, 386-391; Khitāṭ, II, 285 ff; Nuwayrī, fol. 95 ff.

81. al-Rudhrawārī, 224; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 48; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49.

He created riots and troubles in Cairo and threw the blame on Ibn 'Ammār and his supporters. The Turkish Ghilmān, the Daylamis and the bought slaves ('Abīd al-Shirā') were encouraged by him to attack the Aḥdārḥ of al-Maghāribā.⁸² A number of both parties were killed and trouble flared in the streets of Cairo.⁸³

Ibn 'Ammār, who seems to have been aware of Barjawān's intrigue, decided to outwit him and his allies. He invited them to his palace under pretext of discussing with them the problems of the riots, but secretly planned their death as they entered the palace corridors. However, Barjawān, who had many spies in Ibn 'Ammār's palace, was informed of this and formed a counterplan. He and his supporters decided to accept the invitation, protected by a number of their own guards at the rear. They planned to foil the attack by retreating amongst them, which would expose Ibn 'Ammār's treasonable intentions.⁸⁴

Barjawān's plan succeeded and he and his allies returned to the Royal palace, declared Ibn 'Ammār's treason and armed their troops to fight him. With as many followers as he could muster, Ibn 'Ammār left Cairo and camped in the desert. Barjawān followed him and in a battle which lasted about a half day, Ibn 'Ammār was defeated and went into hiding.⁸⁵

82. Ibn al-Qalānisī, 48, 49.

83. Khīṭaṭ, II, 3-36; Itti'āz, anno, 387.

84. al-Rudhrawārī, 224 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 49-9.

85. al-Rudhrawārī, 225; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 48; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 49; Itti'āz, anno, 387; Khīṭaṭ, II, 36.

Barjawān's rule and administration 387-390/997-999

By the overthrowal of Ibn ʿAmmār in Shaʿban 387/July 997, Barjawān became the most powerful man in the Fatimid State. He officially replaced Ibn ʿAmmār in the office of Wasāṭa and, like him, became the real ruler in Egypt.

With his succession to power, Barjawān faced a number of problems which were consequent upon the struggle between him and Ibn ʿAmmār. These problems were: the disunity in the army which caused its weakness, rebellions and disturbances in some provinces, threatening the suzerainty of the Fatimids; and intensified raids by the Byzantine forces into Fatimid territory.

In his dealings with these problems Barjawān proved to be a successful administrator. Indeed he saved the Fatimid State from a dangerous situation and was able to restore peace and stability throughout most of its provinces.

Internally he followed the policy of the late Caliph al-ʿAzīz, where tolerance and moderation prevailed. He endeavoured to end, or at least to lessen, rivalry and struggle between the two elements of the army. Immediately after he took over power he issued strict orders forbidding his supporters - al-Mashāriqa - to cause any inconvenience to al-Maghāriba. He feared that, in the moment of victory, al-Mashāriqa might seek

revenge for the ill-treatment they had received from al-Maghārība during Ibn ‘Ammār's rule.⁸⁶ He also commanded his troops to return all looted properties to their original Maghribī owners.⁸⁷ He wrote Amāns to all Kuṭāmī chiefs and leaders, promising security and showing tolerance to the circumstances by which they had agreed to be led by Ibn ‘Ammār.⁸⁸ Even Ibn ‘Ammār himself was pardoned and, as if to emphasise his intended continuity of al-‘Azīz's policy, Barjawan granted him the same monthly allowance of money and supplies as he had received during the reign of al-‘Azīz.⁸⁹

In the appointment of high posts, he endeavoured to create an equality which would satisfy the majority of both groups. For example, he appointed Isma‘īl Ibn Fahl al-Kuṭāmī - a Maghribī chief - as Wālī in Tyre and Bushāra al-Ikhshīdī - a Mashriqī chief - as Wālī in Damascus. For the general governorship of Syria and the command of the Fatimid forces there, he chose Jaysh Ibn al-Ṣamṣāma who was a powerful Maghribī chief and was also supported by al-Mashāriqa.⁹⁰

He also tried to efface the real causes of the struggle and to re-unite the army under his own leadership in order to confront the mounting threats in Syria. Maqrīzī says, "Barjawan investigated the cases of all

86. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 49; Itti‘āz, anno, 387.

87. Itti‘āz, anno, 387.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. For these appointments see Itti‘āz, anno, 387; Khiṭaṭ, II, 285 ff.

officials and dignitaries of the regime (Awliya' al-Dawla) and removed the causes of their complaints and dissatisfaction."⁹¹ He must have realised from past experience that unity was the only strength which could control not only Syria but ensure continued rule in Egypt. In addition, Barjawān endeavoured to appear as a popular administrator whose main concern was the welfare of the people. He employed an efficient Christian Kātib named Fahd Ibn Ibrahīm as his secretary and granted him the title al-Ra'is (the master).⁹² With the help of Fahd, Barjawān was able to solve quickly and efficiently the cases of complaints and petitions he received every day. Maqrīzī describes how they both worked. He says, "Every day Barjawān waited until all those who had complaints and petitions had gathered near his house. He then took them with him to the royal palace, where his secretary Fahd sat in the first corridor to study each case. He would then pass to Barjawān, who sat in the last corridor, all those he thought merited consideration. Barjawān and Fahd would then both go to al-Hākim's court, present such cases, and al-Hākim's signed judgement on them was given immediate effect."⁹³ Maqrīzī adds that because he was so concerned about the quickness of solving these cases, Barjawān would often "hide the written

91. Itti'āz, anno, 387.

92. Anṭakī, 180; Itti'āz, anno, 387; Khīṭaṭ, II, 4.

93. Itti'āz, anno, 387; Khīṭaṭ, II, 4.

94. ~~Itti'āz~~, anno, 387.

poems presented to al-Ḥākim in his sleeves until he had signed all petitions and he would then present the poems."⁹⁴

Externally, Barjawān was able to overcome the problems which had mounted in Syria. His appointment of Jaysh indicates a shrewd policy, not only because under Jaysh's command the two elements were united again, but also because of his long experience as governor and army commander in Syria, which is apparent in his dealings with the problems.

Jaysh found four problems confronting him when he came to Syria; the rebellion of Tyre, the rebellion of Ibn al-Jarrāḥ, the unrest and disturbances in Damascus and the Byzantine raids into Fatimid territory.

The first problem he dealt with was Tyre, an important port on the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean: Its people, supported by the Byzantines, had rebelled against the Fatimid suzerainty during the fighting between Ibn 'Ammār and Barjawān. Their leader, a sailor named 'Ullāqah declared Tyre to be independent. He struck his own coinage on which his slogan was 'Uzzun Ba' da Fāqah al-Amīr 'Ullāqah (dignity and plenty instead of humility and poverty . Prince 'Ullāqah).⁹⁵

94. Itti'āz, anno, 387.

95. Anṭākī, 181. Nuwayrī, fol. 93, adds to the slogan the terms: Washatāratun Bilabāqah (and cunning with sagacity).

Jaysh appointed Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥusayn Ibn Nāsir al-Dawla al-Ḥamadānī to lead the expedition against Tyre while he remained with the rest of the army in Palestine preparing another expedition against Ibn al-Jarrāḥ. He also commanded the Walīs of Tripoli and Saida to join, together with their warships, the battle against Tyre. The battle was fought by sea and land and the Byzantine ships, which supported Tyre, were destroyed. Tyre fell before the onslaught of the Fatimid forces who thus gained a sure victory. The Fatimid troops entered the city and declared Amāns and safety for all who remained in their homes. ‘Ullaqāh was captured and taken to Egypt where he was put to death.⁹⁶

This decisive victory emphasised the power of the Fatimid army and navy and served as a deterrent on any rebellion from the coastal cities. It assured the naval supremacy of the Fatimids in the Eastern Mediterranean and forced the Byzantines to cease their anti-Fatimid activities there.

After the success of the Fatimid forces in Tyre, Jaysh moved towards the southern parts of Palestine where Ibn al-Jarrāḥ⁹⁷ was in rebellion. He raided towns and city centres and created a dangerous threat

96. See Anṭākī, 181; al-Rudhrawārī, 226; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 50; Ibn al-‘Athīr, IX, 50; Nuwayrī, fol. 93; Itti‘āz, anno, 388; De Sacy, Exposé, I, 290.

97. See M. Canard, Article, "Djarrahids", E.I.²

to the suzerainty of the Fatimids by attacking the pilgrim caravans and putting the pilgrimage route under his control. When Jaysh, together with his large army, advanced, Ibn al-Jarrāḥ realised his inability to continue rebellion and sent a delegation, begging for Amān and promising future loyalty and obedience to the Fatimid Imām. Jaysh, who was pressed by more serious problems in northern Syria, accepted Ibn al-Jarrāḥ's promise, pardoned him and withdrew his army to the north.⁹⁸

When Jaysh assured himself that the area between Cairo and Damascus was under control, he moved towards Damascus where troubles had mounted. Damascus, the main city in Syria, had at one time been the centre of the Umayyad State, rejected the Shī'ī teaching and the rule of the Fatimids. Its people never missed an opportunity to rebel against them, since Damascus had fallen to the Fatimids in 358/968. The Aḥdāth always took advantage of crises to seize power. After the overthrow of Ibn 'Ammār, a number of army commanders and troops, encouraged by Barjawān, attacked Sulaymān Ibn Falāḥ in Damascus. He fled from the city and left no ruling authority there. The Aḥdāth fought the remaining Fatimid troops and assumed power in the city, which caused anxiety and insecurity to the citizens.⁹⁹

98. al-Rudhrawārī, 228; Ibn al-Ḡalānīsī, 51; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 50.

99. See Ibn al-Ḡalānīsī, 50-51; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 50; Itti'āz, annos, 387-388.

Jaysh, who was aware that the Aḥdāth were the main cause of the troubles in Damascus, decided to get rid of them once and for all. He planned to kill all its members. Since, however, he had a more important problem which was to end the Byzantine raids on northern Syria, he decided to delay his plan until this was accomplished. By this he would appear as a Muslim hero, and any subsequent cruelty exercised in Damascus would be condoned. When he reached Damascus he endeavoured to allay any suspicion among the Aḥdāth. He invited their leaders, together with dignitaries of the city, to his camps. All received equal respect and courtesy. He declared to them that his purpose was to wage war against the Byzantines and create peace and security in Damascus. To emphasise this, he pronounced the death penalty on any one, Fatimid soldier or otherwise, who was proved guilty of disturbing the peace of the province.¹⁰⁰ He moved afterwards towards Ḥimṣ where the Wālī of Tripoli, together with his troops and a number of volunteers, augmented Jaysh's army in his fight against the Byzantines who were at that time besieging Afāmya.¹⁰¹ The city was in great distress and about to fall to

100. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 50-51; Ibn al-Athir, IX, 50-. See also al-Rudhrawari, 227.

101. A town of strategic importance and a strong fortress situated between Ḥamā and Antioch.

the Byzantines. Jaysh and his troops arrived there at the most critical time. The battle lasted only for a few days. At first, Jaysh was defeated and his army suffered many losses, but a Muslim soldier succeeded in killing the Byzantine leader causing confusion among their troops, which finally resulted in their defeat and flight from the battlefield. Jaysh followed the defeated Byzantines to Antioch. He besieged the city for a few days after which he withdrew his army and returned to Damascus.¹⁰² Chroniclers have left no explanation of this sudden withdrawal by Jaysh and it is almost impossible to ascertain why he did not attempt to conquer Antioch. Perhaps it was because he feared to engage in a more serious battle with the Byzantines, whose Emperor had begun preparations for another raid which he personally intended to lead. Alternatively, it may have been that Jaysh's mission was merely to repel the Byzantines and assure the suzerainty of the Fatimids rather than attempt more conquests. Peaceful negotiations between the two Empires were probably in progress at that time and Jaysh, like Barjawan, preferred to make peace with Byzantium in order to concentrate on internal affairs, and perhaps did not desire to obstruct that negotiation.

102. Antaki, 182; al-Rudhrawari, 228; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 51; Ibn al-Athir, IX, 51; Bar Hebraus, 181; Iṭṭi'āz, anno, 388; De Sacy, *Exposé*, I, 291; A Rustum, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, Beirut, 1955-6, II, 56-58; M. Canard, "The Byzantine Empire", *Cambridge History*, IV/I, 724.

Jaysh, however, returned to Damascus to deal a final blow to the Aḥdāth. al-Rudhrawārī and Ibn al-Qalānisi give a full description of the manner in which Jaysh executed his plans. They say that he invited their chiefs to his camps outside the city where he had them all killed, after which he besieged the city and sent his troops inside to search and kill; anyone suspected of troublemaking was beheaded.¹⁰³ Ibn al-Qalānisi adds that twelve hundred men were executed in the course of a few days.¹⁰⁴ Such action brought fear to the inhabitants of Damascus, but Jaysh declared Amāns upon the achievement of his object and called together all the city's dignitaries and gave reasons for his actions. He promised them a future of security and peace under the suzerainty of the Fatimids.¹⁰⁵ Despite the cruelty and ruthlessness of Jaysh's methods, it was the most effective way ever taken by any Fatimid Wālī in an endeavour to solve the problem of Damascus. After this event the city remained calm and peaceful for many years.

Barjawān not only overcame the problems which confronted him in Syria but also endeavoured to guarantee a peaceful future for the province which would enable him to concentrate his efforts on internal affairs. To this end he entered into negotiations for peace with

103. al-Rudhrawārī, 228-9.

104. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 51; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 51, says "three thousand men of the Aḥdāth were killed", which would seem to be an exaggeration.

105. al-Rudhrawārī, 229; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 15; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 51.

Byzantium which ended with a ten year treaty¹⁰⁶ and thus the major threat to the suzerainty of the Fatimids in Syria was lifted.

While Barjawan's administration was a great success in solving problems in Egypt and Syria, it proved a failure in Maghrib where there had been no problem. Barjawan created one and totally failed to solve. This was the administration of the affairs of Tripoli.

This province had been ruled directly by Egypt during the time of al-Mu'izz. After his death, Bulugīn Ibn Zīrī, the Ṣinhājī chief and Fatimid Wālī in Maghrib, asked al-ʿAzīz to give him rule over Tripoli. This request was granted and in 365/975 Tripoli was governed by the Ṣinhājīs.¹⁰⁷ Bulugīn appointed Tamsūlat Ibn Bakkār as Wālī in Tripoli. He governed the province for twenty successive years until the death of Bulugīn in 386/996 when a dispute arose between him and Bādīs, the son and successor of Bulugīn. Tamsūlat wrote to Cairo asking Barjawan to send a new Wālī to Tripoli, ignoring Bādīs's position in the province.¹⁰⁸ Barjawan's error was that, without declaring the official return of Tripoli to the direct administration of Cairo or making communications with Bādīs, he appointed Yānis, the Wālī of Burqa, as Wālī of Tripoli and commanded him to move,

106. For detailed discussion of the treaty, see below, Chapter V, "The External Policy of al-Hākim".

107. Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 59.

108. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 64; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 59 ff and VII, 29 ff. For further discussion see H.R. Idris, La Berberie Orientale sous les Zirids, Paris, 1959, I, 99-103.

together with his troops, to occupy Tripoli. When Yānis arrived in Tripoli Bādīs's apprehension was roused. He wrote to Yānis asking him to clarify the matter, but received no satisfactory explanation. Yānis manoeuvred for time in order to successfully use force against Bādīs. Bādīs, however, realised what Yānis was planning and sent his troops to campaign against him. Yānis himself was killed in the battle and his troops retreated to Tripoli where they barricaded themselves in, awaiting help from Cairo.¹⁰⁹

Chroniclers fail to report the reasons that caused an efficient administrator like Barjawān to commit such an error. It may have been an attempt to weaken the Ṣinhājī rule in Maghrib, knowing that there was dissatisfaction with his actions against Ibn 'Ammār and Kutāma in Egypt, or he may have tried to emulate the policy of al-Mu'iz in Maghrib. If this was so, the question may arise as to why he did not obtain an official decree from al-Hākīm to reclaim Tripoli. Perhaps al-Hākīm was against this policy of Barjawān, or Barjawān may have been aware that, with or without a decree, Bādīs would not give up Tripoli. Whatever the reasons were, the results were detrimental to the Fatimid State. The clash between the Ṣinhājīs and the Fatimid troops was the first of its kind since the inception of the State. It affected the relation between the Zīrīd and their Imām-Caliph in Cairo, weakened the suzerainty of the Fatimids

109. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 64; Ibn Khaldūn, IV 59 ff and VII 29 ff; Ifti'az, anno, 390.

in Maghrib and strengthened the idea of independence among the Zīrīds. In addition, Tripoli, over which the dispute had begun, was neither occupied by the Fatimids nor by the Zīrīd, but by the enemy of both – the tribe of Zanāta. Fulful, the chief of Zanāta, siezed the advantage of the war between Yānis and Bādīs and moved towards Tripoli. He entered the city and declared his support for its people against the Ṣinhājīs. When, however, he realised that the Fatimids would not accept him as their Wālī in Tripoli, he declared his loyalty to the Umayyads of Spain. Thus the Fatimids lost the whole of the province of Tripoli for about ten years (390-400/999-1009) when it was reclaimed by Bādīs after he defeated Zanāta in 400/1009.¹¹⁰

Barjawān's Death

In the month of Rabī' the second 390/March 1000,¹¹¹ Barjawān was killed in a plot arranged by al-Hākīm and an official of his court named Raydān or Zaydān.¹¹² Raydān, together with a number of other men, carried out the killing in a place called Bustān Duwayrat al-Tīn (a garden near the royal palace) where Barjawān was walking with

110 Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 64; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 59 ff and VII, 29 ff. For further discussion see H.R. Idris, La Berberie Orientale sous les Zirids, I, 99-103.

111. Contrary to all other sources, Ibn al-Qalānisi, 55, and Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 50, report the death in 389 A.H. Ibn Muyassar, 56, puts it in 370 A.H. which seems more like a copyist's error.

112. The name appears in both forms, but Maqrīzi, Khitaṭ, II, 139, affirms that it is Raydān and says that even though it is an Arab name it originated from the Slavonic language.

al-Hākīm.¹¹³

There is no doubt that the main cause behind Barjawān's death was that the young Imām-Caliph, whose personality was beginning to assert itself, found himself deprived of his own power by Barjawān and in order to exercise it freely he planned Barjawān's death.¹¹⁴ Barjawān, as has been mentioned before, was the person who had looked after al-Hākīm since he was a young child. The fact that al-Hākīm succeeded to the Caliphate when he was still a child seems to have been of significant influence on the relationship between the two persons. Barjawān appears to have treated al-Hākīm, even after his succession to the Caliphate, in the same manner in which he had done previously, overlooking the fact that he was no longer a child. Ibn al-Qalānisi says, "Barjawān did not allow al-Hākīm to ride on horseback when it was not the time for riding, nor to give gifts to men who did not deserve them".¹¹⁵ Despite the fact that Ibn al-Qalānisi explains this as a kind of compassion for al-Hākīm, it clearly indicates that Barjawān treated al-Hākīm as a helpless child unable to see into his own affairs. Ibn al-Muqaffa' reports

113. See al-Rudhrawārī, 231; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 55; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 50; Itti'āz, anno, 390; Khiṭaṭ, II, 4.

114. For further discussion see De Sacy, Exposé, I, 293; De Lacy O'Leary, Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, 131; S.L. Poole, History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 125; 'Inān, Al-Hakim Bi Amrillah, 49; Majid, Al-Hākīm, 130,-131; M. Canard, article, "Al-Hākīm Bi Amrillah", E.I.²

115. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 51. See also al-Rudhrawārī, 230; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 50; Bar Hebraeus, 182; Nuwayrī, fol, 93.

an interesting piece of information which gives a clearer idea about the relationship between Barjawān and al-Hākīm. He says, "The first man al-Hākīm killed was al-Ustādh Barjawān because he had nicknamed him al-Wazagha (the lizard). He summoned him, the message ran: tell Barjawān that the little Wazagha has become a large dragon and wants him now".¹¹⁶

Maqrīzī reports that al-Hākīm once said, "Barjawān was extremely ill-mannered. I summoned him one day while we were riding on horseback. He came, putting his foot on the neck of his horse, and while I was speaking to him the sole of his shoe was turned towards my face and he did not seem to think it was wrong. Incidents like this were so many that mentioning them all would take a long time."¹¹⁷ Ibn Muyassar and Maqrīzī consider this treatment as Istibdād (tyranny or dictatorship) on the part of Barjawān. It caused al-Hākīm's resentment which resulted with the death of Barjawān.¹¹⁸

There were also other reasons which appear to have increased al-Hākīm's resentment and encouraged him to plot against Barjawān. He may have feared that Barjawān was planning to supplant him and build his own

116. See Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 121; B. Lewis, article, "Bardjawan", E.I.²

117. Itti'āz, anno, 390. See also Khīṭaṭ, II, 4.

118. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Itti'āz, anno, 390; Khīṭaṭ, II, 4.

Empire. Ibn al-Qalānisī says, "Raydān said to al-Hākīm, 'Barjawān is planning to emulate the career of Kafūr al-Ikhshīdī and proposes to deal with you as Kafūr dealt with Ikhshīd's son by isolating you and eliminating your power. The right thing to do is kill him now and administer your State alone'. Al-Hākīm replied, 'If this is your opinion and advice then I need your help'."¹¹⁹ The fact that might have given weight to Raydān's accusation was that, since he had overcome the problems which confronted him in Syria and Egypt, Barjawān had adopted a new line of policy aiming at consolidating his power and prolonging his rule. He removed his rivals to a safe distance from the court and appointed his supporters to the high positions. Maqrīzī reports that in 388/998 Barjawān appointed Yānis - one of his great rivals - as Wālī in Barqa. In the same year he gave his friends key positions. Khawad was appointed chief of the police in Miṣr, Maḥīq as chief of the navy, Maysūr as Wālī in Tripoli of Syria, Yamīn, his own brother, as Wālī in Ghazza and 'Asqalān and Qāyḍ as chief of the police in Cairo.¹²⁰

Although this does not necessarily mean that Barjawān planned to build his own Empire, and it is more likely that he was trying to ensure his rule against possible coups from his rival Ibn 'Ammār, the fact remains

119. Ibn al-Qalānisī, 51. See also al-Rudhrawārī, 231.

120. Itti'āz, anno, 388; Khīṭaṭ, II, 286.

that such policy was bound to arouse the suspicions of the young Imām-Caliph and become an effective weapon in the hands of Barjawān's rivals.

The reasons which were given by al-Hākīm and circulated to all parts of Egypt, explaining why he killed Barjawān, add another element to the story. It states that Barjawān had changed from a good administrator to a bad one and suggested that he was using his position for personal gain.¹²¹ The accounts of Ibn Muyassar and Maqrīzī corroborate this and give an interesting and detailed comparison between Barjawān's administration during the first two years of his rule and that during the following year. They also add that al-Hākīm personally had to take over Barjawān's work.¹²² The reports concerning Barjawān's accumulated wealth confirm that he had used his position for his own interest. It is known that he had been a slave brought up in the court of al-ʿAzīz, yet some reports state that the officer of Bayt al-Māl found in his house: one hundred scarves (Mandīl) of different colours, with one hundred Sharābiya (another kind of scarf), one thousand pairs of trousers (Sirwāl), one thousand Armenian silk Takka (special belt), an uncountable quantity of clothes, jewels, gold, perfumes and furniture, three hundred thousand Dīnārs, a hundred and fifty horses and mules for

121. Ittiʿāz, anno, 390; J. al-Shayyāl, Majmūʿat al-Wathāʾiq al-Faṭimiyya, I, 309.

122. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Ittiʿāz, anno, 390; Khīṭaṭ, II, 4; 285.

his own riding, three hundred pack horses and mules, a hundred and fifty saddles, twenty of which were pure gold. This was in addition to a very large number of books.¹²³

By ridding himself of Barjawān, al-Hākīm was able to assert himself as the real ruler of his Empire and he gradually concentrated all political powers in his own hands and ruled until his death in 411/1020 as an absolute ruler.

~~122.~~ ~~al-Dhakhā'ir wa al-Tuhaf, 56; .~~ liti'āz, anno, 390; Khitāb, II, 285.

123. al-Dhakhā'ir wa al-Tuhaf, 232; liti'āz, anno, 390.

CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE STATE

Political Administration

As a result of the struggle for power between the two elements of his army, al-Ḥākim faced a very serious problem; a threat to his own power arising from the growing influence of Mudabbir al-Dawla (the administrator of the State Affairs), better known as al-Wāsiṭa (the mediator or executor of the Caliph's orders). Ambitious chiefs took advantage of al-Ḥākim's youth and attempted to take over power leaving to him only the title of Imām-Caliph. As has been mentioned before, both Ibn 'Ammār and Barjawān, by means of force seized power and appointed themselves as Wāsiṭas. This was the first sign of a crack in the political powers of the Imām-Caliph and showed, for the first time in Fatimid history, that he was no longer the supreme authority of his Empire. His own complete control over the administration was usurped by the Wāsiṭa who was no longer a mere executor of the Imām's orders. Orders were given by him and the Imām was invited to approve them. Neither could the Imām appoint or dismiss the Wāsiṭa or any of his great supporters. The most powerful man appointed himself until another more powerful man overthrew him. On the whole, the

Imām-Caliph's political powers were no longer his own and he was reduced to a puppet.

In the face of this threat al-Ḥākim was able to assert himself, regain his power and to rule, during the last twenty years of his reign, as a supreme ruler. His attitude towards each successive Wāsiṭa was well and carefully planned to control his exercise of power, limit his influence and prevent any danger to the political power of the Imām-Caliph. After he had rid himself of Barjawan in 390/999, al-Ḥākim immediately declared his intentions to administer his State personally.¹ Although this diminished the need for a Wāsiṭa and indeed there were occasions when none was appointed,² al-Ḥākim did not abolish the institution of Wāsiṭa. However, he clearly defined the limits of power delegated to the Wāsiṭa and reduced his position to the literal meaning of the term. He declared the Wāsiṭa to be merely a slave appointed or dismissed by the Imām according to his will. His duties were only to execute the Imām-Caliph's orders.³ The Wāsiṭa was not allowed to deal with any problem outside his own office which was in the royal palace under the supervision of the Imām. Maqrīzī says that after the appointment of al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar as Wāsiṭa in 390/999, he was ordered not to receive or deal with petitions at

1. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 391.

2. Anṭākī, 209; See also Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Ishāra, 26.

3. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 391-2 and Khiṭaṭ, II, 3, 14, 285 ff.

his own house or in public streets; those who had cases of complaint should be told to deliver them to him only at his office in the palace. He adds that al-Ḥusayn, together with his secretary Fahd Ibn Ibrāhīm, would come early to the palace, receive the petitions, study them and carry them to al-Ḥākim for the final judgment.⁴ It is also recorded by Maqrīzī that strict orders were given to al-Ḥākim's chamberlain not to prevent any petitioner from reaching the Imām.⁵ Even in addressing petitions to the Wasiṭa or while speaking to him, people were commanded not to apply to him any names or titles except his own name and the title which was specifically given to him by al-Ḥākim.⁶

With such extreme limitation of their powers, al-Ḥākim anticipated retaliation from his Wasiṭas. This made him appear very careful, cautious and mistrustful in the appointment of, and attitude towards, the Wasiṭas. He selected his men from amongst those who appeared less dangerous. Except for al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar and ‘Alī Ibn Falāḥ, none of the Wasiṭas had a military history. None of them was a powerful tribal chief or a chief of a certain element of the army. Most of them were of a poor background without the traditional descent of

4. Itti‘āz, anno, 390 and Khiṭaṭ, II, 14-15, 285.

5. Itti‘āz, anno, 390 and Khiṭaṭ, II, 15, 286. See also Ibn Muyassar, 56.

6. Khiṭaṭ, II, 15.

powerful families or tribes. Some of them were freed slaves and a considerable number of them were Christian.⁷ No Wāsīṭa was allowed to remain in office for a long period. In the course of his twenty one years of rule, more than fifteen Wāsīṭas were employed. Some of them held the office for as little as ten days.⁸ The Wāsīṭa was carefully watched, spies informed the Imām of his activities and the slightest error received the maximum punishment of the law. Cruelty and ruthlessness were the prominent features in al-Ḥākim's attitude towards his Wāsīṭas and the majority of those who occupied that office were brutally executed.⁹

Two major factors helped al-Ḥākim to maintain this policy; the rivalry amongst the high officials and the efficiency of his Da'wa. The struggle for power amongst the chiefs of the military elements did not cease

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7. See Antākī's reports on the Christian Wāsīṭas. Antākī, 196, 198-9, 227. See also the annual reports of Maqrīzī which offer some details on the names and backgrounds of the Wāsīṭas. Itti'āz, annos, 390-406 and Khiṭaṭ, II, 285 ff.
 8. See the appointment of Ibn al-Qaṣhūrī in Antākī, 196; Itti'āz, anno, 401, and Khiṭaṭ, II, 287.
 9. For examples of al-Ḥākim's punishments of high officials see Antākī, 183-230; Itti'āz, annos, 390-406 and Khiṭaṭ, II, 285, ff. See also al-Rudhrawārī, 230 ff; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 124-135; Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 55, 79; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol, 57 ff; Ibn Hammad, 57; al-Nuwayrī, fol, 54; Ibn Ḥajar and Ibn Shāhīn, in the supplement to Kindī's book, History of Egyptian Judges, 608 ff; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Raf' al-Isr ʿAn Qudat Misr, ed. H. ʿAbd al-Majīd and others, Cairo 1957-61, 207 ff.

with the death of Barjawān or Ibn 'Ammār; it continued throughout al-Hākim's reign and could be clearly seen in the plots and conspiracies they made against each other.¹⁰ al-Hākim was fully aware of their rivalry and employed it as a means to strengthen his position at the cost of the struggling chiefs. Nuwayrī clearly states that when al-Hākim planned the execution of Barjawān he relied on the help of Ibn Jawhar.¹¹ The reports of Maqrīzī suggest that al-Hākim relied on al-Faḍl Ibn Ṣāliḥ to rid himself of Ibn Jawhar.¹² The annual reports of Maqrīzī contain a considerable amount of information which supports this point.¹³ The Da'wa had undoubtedly interpreted such an action by al-Hākim with justifiable reasons. Antākī noticed the tendency and said, "They interpreted every abomination and blameful action he committed, such as executions and foolish deeds, in a way which made them appear most beautiful."¹⁴

Unfortunately, the surviving literature of the Ismaili Da'wa does not contain enough information to throw light on the method of the Dā'īs of al-Hākim's time which gives an explanation to the way they interpreted his attitude towards the Wazīras and other high officials. But other reports suggest that they had emphasised the belief in the Imām's divine guidance

10. Antākī, 222, says, "وَدَنَا قَدْرًا فِي عَوَالِدِنَا". al-Rudhrawārī, 230 ff; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 55 ff; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 182; Itti'āz, annos, 390-406 and Khifāt, II, 3, 31, 285 ff, give details on plots of high officials against each others.

11. Nuwayrī, fol.53.

12. Itti'āz, annos, 398-9.

13. *Ibid*, annos, 390-406.

14. Antākī, 222.

and superhuman qualities, perhaps to credit his actions to divine inspiration and thus become unquestionable. Anṭakī states: "They claimed that all his deeds were inspired by secrets and purposes, the causes of which were beyond the capacity of understanding of human beings."¹⁵

The Drūz writings consider such actions of al-Ḥākim as "miraculous qualities",¹⁶ and thus confirm that at least a part of the Ismaili Dā'īs interpreted them as such. It is also recorded that official orders forbidding people from discussing the Imām's actions were frequently issued.¹⁷

The Da'wa also seem to have magnified the errors of those whom al-Ḥākim had executed or severely punished and showed them in a way which made them appear as tyranny or high-treason. Ibn al-Ṣayra Fī, who usually gives the view of the Fatimid court, condemns all the Wāsiṭas who served al-Ḥākim and says, "None of them remained in office for long because of strange deeds they committed."¹⁸

In the annual reports of Maqrīzī, which are based mainly on the information of al-Ḥākim's contemporary, al-Musabbihī, it is noticeable that errors or crimes of some of those whom al-Ḥākim executed are over-

15. Anṭakī, 222.

16. See al-Risāla al-Mustaqīma, Drūz Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,558, fol. 108 ff, published in al-Muqtabas, V, 306, under a wrong title (al-Sijil al-Mu'allaq). See also Risālat Ḥaqqīqat Mā yazhar Amām Mawlānā al-Ḥākim, Drūz Ms., B.M., no. add. 11,558, fol. 79 ff.

17. Itti'āz, annos, 399-405.

18. Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, Ishāra, 26.

emphasised.¹⁹ It is recorded by a number of chroniclers that al-Ḥākim would cause a written explanation, which would justify his action, to be made and circulated to all parts of the Empire,²⁰ and sometimes he would himself explain his reasons to the high officials and dignitaries who attended his court.²¹ It is also recorded that the testimony of the victim was sometimes used to justify the action. Ibn Ḥammād reports that al-Jarjārā'ī, a high official who had lost both hands by the command of al-Ḥākim, would tell those who remarked upon such treatment that: "This was a punishment which I deserved for betraying Amīr al-Mu'minīn's orders."²²

Al-Ḥākim recognised the threat to his power which the army could present. Both Ibn 'Ammār and Barjawan used it to achieve and hold their office and al-Ḥākim was sufficiently astute to realise that there could be a re-occurrence of the threat under similar conditions. He adopted an attitude towards the army chiefs which seems to have been the outcome of his own fear and which culminated in similar cruelty and ruthlessness. Maqrīzī relates that after the appointment of al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar [the commander in chief (Qā'id al-Quwād)] as Wāsiṭa, he

19. Itti'āz, annos, 390-2, 395-404.

20. al-Rudhrawātī, 232; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 56-7; Itti'āz, anno, 390-1.

21. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Itti'āz, annos, 390-1.

22. Ibn Ḥammād, 57.

strictly forbade people to address him by the title Our Master (Sayyiduna) or to come to his own house to deliver their petitions. That was Maqrīzī adds, "Because of his fear of al-Ḥākim's jealousy"²³ - this indicates that al-Ḥākim feared that the commander in chief might achieve popularity which he seems to have considered a threat to his political power. It is noticeable that throughout al-Ḥākim's reign every chief or army commander who became popular was executed by his orders.²⁴ The execution of al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar, and his successor al-Faḍl Ibn Ṣāliḥ, are typical examples of al-Ḥākim's fear. Ibn Jawhar was one of the most popular high officials in al-Ḥākim's State. His popularity was derived from the fact of his being the son of Jawhar (the great Fatimid army commander, conquerer of Egypt and builder of Cairo)²⁵ and the son-in-law of the famous family of al-Nu'mān.²⁶ During the rule of Barjawan, al-Ḥusayn was of equal prestige and importance to that of Qādī al-Qudāt Muḥammad Ibn al-Nu'mān. Both of them

23. Khīṭaṭ, II, 14.

24. All chroniclers agree that the majority of those who served al-Ḥākim as high officials and army commanders were executed by his orders. See the annual reports of Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 390-406. See also Anṣārī, 187, 197; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 124-35; al-Rudhrawārī, 232 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 79; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 57 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 130, ff; Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 206 ff; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, annos. 390-411; al-Ṣafadī, fol. 18 ff; Ibn Shāhīn, Twārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Salāṭin, fol. 43, ff.

25. See article, "Djawhar", E.I.²

26. He was Abu Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān Ibn Ḥayyūn, the famous theologian, Qādī and Dā'ī of the Fatimid State during the reign of al-Mu'iz. =

were treated with special courtesy and respect which none of the other officials were privileged to receive.²⁷ The appointment of al-Ḥusayn as Wāsita after Barjawān's death confirms his prestige, and when the chief command of the army was added to this, his popularity was undoubtedly increased. When in 399/1008 al-Ḥākim ordered al-Ḥusayn's arrest, public indignation was strong enough to force al-Ḥākim to revoke his order and declare al-Ḥusayn's pardon.²⁸ In the following year he fled and sought refuge amongst the tribe of Banū Qurra. When al-Ḥākim asked him to return he demanded the dismissal of Ibn 'Abdūn from the Wasāta and his demands were met.

On his return to Cairo, Maqrīzī reports: "All officials of the State (Ahl al-Dawla) went out of Cairo to welcome him. When he reached the gate of the city, he dismounted from his horse and walked towards the royal palace. With him all the people walked until they reached it.... it was a great day."²⁹ The more Ibn Jawhar's popularity grew the more anxious al-Ḥākim became to get rid of him and finally in

= For general information see A.A. Fyzee, article, "al-Nu'mān Ibn Ḥayyūn", E.I.; "Qādī al-Nu'mān", J.R.A.S., (1934), 1-32; R. Gotheil, "A Distinguished Family of Fatimid Qādīs in the Tenth Century", J.A.O.S., XXVII (1907), 217-296.

27. Khīṭaṭ, II, 14, says: "When Barjawān was Wāsita, all high officials would come to his house and ride on horseback with him to the royal palace (showing courtesy and respect) except al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar and Muḥammad Ibn al-Nu'mān who would greet him only after his arrival at the palace."

28. Khīṭaṭ, II, 14 and Itti'āz, anno, 399, says that when al-Ḥākim ordered al-Ḥusayn's arrest, shops and markets (الحوانيت والأسواق) in Cairo closed. He pardoned al-Ḥusayn and declared that no one should close his shop.

29. Itti'āz, anno, 400 and Khīṭaṭ, II, 14.

401/1010 he ordered his execution. Even the high officials who showed concern and loyalty towards Ibn Jawhar did not escape al-Ḥākim's severe punishment. The Wasiṭa Ibn al-Qaṣhūrī was executed after only ten days of his appointment taking place because, "Al-Ḥākim learned that he exaggerated the honouring of Ibn Jawhar and showed much concern towards his needs", reports Maqrīzī.³⁰

The popularity of al-Faḍl Ibn Ṣāliḥ was derived from the fact that he was the commander of the army which had defeated and captured the rebel Abū Rakwa and saved the Fatimid State from disaster.³¹ The return of al-Faḍl as a victorious leader, after two years of fierce battles, was nationally celebrated. He became so popular that al-Ḥākim himself visited him twice when he became ill.³² A year later he suddenly ordered his execution.

Al-Ḥākim's attitude towards the army chiefs and commanders was reflected on the army as a whole. It is noticeable that throughout his reign he never tried to improve the conditions or to increase the number of his fighting forces. The army on which al-Mu'iz and al-'Azīz had depended

30. Itti'āz, anno, 400.

31. See below, "The Rebellion of Abu Rakwa", Chapter V of this thesis.

32. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 84; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 337; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 217.

to achieve their vital aims, became of secondary importance during al-Ḥākim's time. Its role changed from an offensive force, seeking to conquer more land, to a defensive force whose main task was to protect the Empire. Even its ability to quell internal rebellions and uprisings appears to have become doubtful.³³

Historians have generally condemned this attitude of al-Ḥākim and considered it as an act of an insane and bloodthirsty maniac, and from this angle of his policy he appears to be mainly judged and presented.

Such presentations, however, do not seem to be quite accurate and may have been "hastily arrayed without a thorough investigation."³⁴ This part of al-Ḥākim's policy may be described as cruel and ruthless but not bloodthirsty or insane. It was a method which most dictators adopted in order to silence opposition and prevent threats to their own powers. There is no evidence that confirms that, at any time, he ordered the execution of someone just for the sake of killing. His bursts of cruelty, as M.G.S. Hodgson says, "were most obviously turned against the great and the proud, the holders of positions and those ambitious to be such."³⁵ It was

33. The Fatimid army appears weak during the attempt to quell the rebellions of Abu Rakwa and of the Jarrāhids; for discussion see below, Chapter V of this thesis.

34. P.J. Vafikiotis, The Fatimid theory of State, 149.

35. M.H.S. Hodgson, "al-Darazi and Ḥamza in the Origin of the Druze Religion", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 14.

more precisely against those of whom he anticipated danger and considered a threat to his own power. A comparative study of his attitude towards Qādī al-Qudāt (the chief judge) with the manner in which he treated the Wasīṣas and military chiefs illustrates this point. It was only Qādīs who opposed his policy who were executed; others were treated quite normally. During his entire reign he employed five persons in the position of Qādī al-Qudāt. The first four were also responsible for the direction of the Da'wa. Muḥammad Ibn al-Nu'mān died in 389/998 and al-Ḥākim himself led the prayer at his funeral.³⁶ His successor, al-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Nu'mān served until 395/1004 when he was executed after being found guilty of theft. Chroniclers say he stole twenty thousand Dinārs from an orphan whose father entrusted the money to the Qādī. They add that his trial was held by al-Ḥākim personally.³⁷ 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn al-Nu'mān succeeded until 399/1008 when he was dismissed, and two years later he was executed for opposing al-Ḥākim and supporting al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar.³⁸ Mālik Ibn Sa'īd served between 399/1008 and 405/1014 and was executed for opposing al-Ḥākim's policy as will be discussed in detail later.³⁹ In 405/1014 al-Ḥākim appointed Muḥammad Ibn Abī al-'Awwām as Qādī al-Qudāt and Khatgīn as Dā'ī Du'āt (chief Dā'ī) and

36. Iṭi'āz, anno, 389.

37. Iṭi'āz, anno, 395. See also Ibn Hajar and Ibn Shaḥīm in the supplement to Kindi's book, History of Egyptian Judges, 608 ff.

38. Iṭi'āz, annos, 399-401 and Khīṭaṭ, II, 14, 286-7.

39. See below, Chapter VII. 275.

both remained in office until the end of al-Hākim's reign.

Economic Policy

i) Monetary

During the years 395-397/1004-1006, commercial life in the Fatimid State was threatened by the fluctuation of the Dirham. Maqrīzī says that in 395/1004 there was a great confusion in the markets concerning the value of the Dirham. It was declared that twenty-six Dirhams were of the value of one Dinār.⁴⁰ In 397/1006 the same problem occurred. The value of the Dirham then decreased to thirty-four Dirhams to the Dinār. The government acted by minting a new Dirham and withdrew the old one from circulation. The new Dirham was officially valued at eighteen pieces to the Dinār. Subjects were allowed a period of three days for exchange and a decree was read forbidding dealings in the old Dirham.⁴¹

ii) Prices and Taxation

From the annual reports of Maqrīzī it appears that prices of merchandise were not under strict governmental control, neither were the units of measure and weight. This caused price inflation and put subjects in the mercy of shopkeepers and merchants whenever the economy appeared

40. Itti'āz, anno, 395.

41. Ibid, anno, 397.

to be threatened.⁴²

al-Ḥākim endeavoured to overcome the problem by stabilizing the units of weight and measure and putting the prices of merchandise under the control of his government. This step was taken in 395/1004 when a decree was read commanding the stabilization of the units and threatening with severe punishment those who purposely mishandled them.⁴³ In 397/1006 Maqrīzī reports a decree which he says "fixed the prices of bread, meat and most other commodities".⁴⁴ Similar decrees appear frequently in the annual reports of Maqrīzī concerning the period 395-406/1004-1015. In addition there are also many records which state that shopkeepers and merchants who did not obey these reforms were severely punished and some were paraded in the streets and executed.⁴⁵

Tax exemption appears to be an important feature in al-Ḥākim's internal policies. Chroniclers consider it as good deeds (Ḥasanāt).⁴⁶ Records suggest that during the years of low Nile or other adversities which affected agriculture, land owners were exempted from paying tax. Sometimes exemption covered certain areas and other times the whole country.⁴⁷ It is also recorded that all imported goods were exempted from taxation.

42. The annual reports of Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 395-405, show that low Nile and rebellions were the apparent danger to the economy.

43. Itti'āz, anno, 395.

44. Ibid., anno, 397.

45. Ibid., annos, 395-406.

46. Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 259.

47. Itti'āz, annos, 398, 401, 403-4.

Local industries such as silk, soap and refreshments were exempted also.⁴⁸

Agricultural Policy

The two major threats to the agriculture of Egypt at that time were the shortage of water during the years of low Nile and the loss of cattle resulting from epidemics.⁴⁹

al-Ḥākim attempted to lessen the effects of these problems as much as possible. Maqrīzī reports that he ordered water courses and troughs to be constantly cleaned and built many additional ones.⁵⁰ al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī says that in 404/1013 al-Ḥākim paid fifteen thousand Dinārs for the cleaning of the Canal of Alexandria.⁵¹ He even endeavoured to solve the problem of the low Nile and for this purpose he employed the famous engineer of that time al-Ḥasan Ibn al-Ḥaytham. al-Ḥasan, who was living in Iraq, was known to have said, "If I were in Egypt I would have done to its Nile something which would make its water useful during both periods of flood and draught."⁵² Chroniclers speak of a special welcome made to al-Ḥasan when he arrived in Egypt. al-Ḥākim personally went outside the gates of Cairo to greet him⁵³ which undoubtedly

48. ʿAwwal al-Manqūl, III; Ibn Ḥammād, 54; Ittiʿāz, annos 398, 404.

49. See Ibn ʿIdhārī, I, 256 and Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 77 who speak of plagues spreading through North Africa killing people and cattle.

50. Ittiʿāz, 390-1.

51. Khifāt, I, 171; J. al-Shayyāl, Tārīkh Madīnat al-Iskandariyya, Cairo (1967), 56.

52. Qifṭī, 166-7; Ibn Abi Uṣaybiʿa, II, 90-1.

suggest his deep concern to have al-Ḥasan in his service. al-Ḥasan went on an expedition to study the possibility of building a dam. But as Qiftī states, "He realised that he was unable to add anything to what had been done already by ancient Egyptians".⁵⁴

To save cattle for agricultural purposes, al-Ḥākim ordered that cows should not be slaughtered except on occasions of religious ceremony or if they were unfit to pull the plough.⁵⁵ This order, however, was strictly enforced throughout his reign and was repeated during the Caliphate of his successor, al-Zāhir.⁵⁶

In addition, it may be relevant to mention that he granted most of the State land to his subjects and it was not only officials and friends who benefited but any person who petitioned for his aid.⁵⁷ He also made significant cuts in the palace spending and confiscated most of the properties belonging to the members of his family and added it to the treasury of the State.⁵⁸

In the light of this it is possible to suggest that his policy was an

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53. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronographia*, 189; Qiftī, 166-7; Ibn Abi Uṣaybi'a, II, 90-1.
54. Qiftī, 166-7; Ibn Abi Uṣaybi'a, II, 90-1.
55. *Itti'āz*, anno, 395, 403.
56. *Itti'āz*, anno, 415, says that a decree was read threatening with the death penalty those who disobeyed the order.
57. Antākī, 206. Similar information is given by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, annos, 390, 393, 395-405 and *Khīṭaṭ*, II, 285 ff.
58. Antākī, 195.

attempt to halt price inflation and to strengthen the sources of his State's economy and save it from dangerous threats.

Legal, Social and Architectural Reforms

Two of the administrative departments appear to have received more attention than others from al-Hākim; these were the Dīwān al-Mazālim and Dīwān al-Qaḍā'.⁵⁹ He publicly declared that the door of his court would be open to every man who led a case of complaint and that he himself would deal with the complaints.⁶⁰ Ibn Muyassar and Maqrīzī report that his staff were ordered to allow access to any petitioner, either at his court or while he walked in the Street.⁶¹ It is also recorded by a number of contemporary chroniclers that he would not only allow, but encouraged, access to him in the streets and would assign a time and place to the plaintiff in which he would discuss his problem.⁶²

In the light of this, it is more likely that although the responsibility of investigating the Mazālim was given to the Wāsiṭa and sometimes to Qaḍī al-Quḍāt, al-Hākim was closely supervising the function of Dīwān

59. For information on the function of these Dīwāns see art. "Diwān", E.I.²

60. See the Sijil which was written after Barjawān's death in Maqrīzī's Itti'āz, anno, 390, edited by J. al-Shayyāl in Majmū'at al-Wathā'iq al-Faṭimiyya, I, 309. See also Ibn al-Dawadārī, IV, 267, who says "

61. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Itti'āz, annos, 390-1. وَأَمَّا الْمَلِكُ فَكَانَ يَنْظُرُ فِي الْأُمُورِ

62. Antākī, 217; Ibn al-Sābi', quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol, 207 ff. and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 180, Itti'āz, annos, 391-404.

al-Mazālim.⁶³

In his selection of a candidate for the post of Qādī al-Qudāt (the chief judge) he was surprisingly unbigoted. The post, which was previously held only by Isma'ilis, was opened also to Sunnis. According to Ibn Hajar and Ibn Shāhīn, when al-Hākim appointed Muḥammad Ibn Abī al-ʿAwwām he was told that this man was not Ismaili, and he replied: "He is pious, honest and of a good knowledge of Muslim law and that is all that concerns me."⁶⁴ He ordered that al-Shuhūd al-ʿudūl (the registered legal witnesses) should be present at every court proceeding and participate in the delivery of the verdict.⁶⁵ The selection of these witnesses was given more attention and only those who were of good reputation were chosen for the post.⁶⁶ Two of these witnesses were appointed in every police department in the country and al-Hākim commanded that no punishment should befall any subject before he was tried by those witnesses.⁶⁷ Large numbers of informers, including old women, were employed to report to the authorities and help them determine the guilt or innocence of suspects.⁶⁸ Moreover, al-Hākim was very

63. See Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Ishāra, 26; Ibn Muyassar, 56; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 411, also quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 184-5; Ibn Ayās, I, 53; Suyūṭī, II, 18.

64. Ibn Hajar and Ibn Shāhīn in the supplement to Kindī's History of Egyptian Judges, 610. See also, Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Ḥamza in the origin of the Druze religion", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 18.

65. Antākī, 209; Ittiʿāz, anno, 391.

66. Antākī, 209.

67. Antākī, 205-6.

68. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, II, 124.

generous with his chief Qādīs and perhaps with all Qādīs in his State. He paid them high salaries and bestowed on them many gifts. He explains the cause of his generosity as a means of preventing material needs from influencing the Qādī's work.⁶⁹

Amwāl al-Yatāmā (money of the orphans) appears to have been a subject of temptation to the Qādīs. Muḥammad Ibn al-Nu'mān was accused of appropriating a sum of fourteen thousand Dīnārs from it.⁷⁰ His successor al-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Nu'mān was executed after being found guilty of stealing twenty thousand Dīnārs.⁷¹ The known procedure was that money and property of orphans was put under the care of the Qādī or the Amīn (trustworthy person) whom the parent chose. The Qādī or the Amīn would then act as guardian and supervise the child's expenditure.⁷² From this the problem sprang. Some Qādīs or Amīns took advantage of the situation, appropriated part of the money, and claimed that it was all spent on the child. al-Ḥākim changed this system and Amwāl al-Yatāmā were ordered to be stored in a certain place where no one had access to it except at times of payment to the orphan. Even then, four trusted witnesses together with the Qādī and the Amīn were to be present and any sum of money

69. Itti'āz, anno, 395.

70. Ibid., anno, 389.

71. Ibid., anno, 395. See also, Ibn Hajar and Ibn Shāhīm in the supplement to Kindi's History of Egyptian Judges, 608.

72. Itti'āz, anno, 389, 395.

given to the orphan was to be registered and documented in the presence of them all.⁷³

In 400/1009 al-Ḥākim created a new Dīwān which he called al-Dīwān al-Mufrad (the separated or unconnected). The function of this Dīwān was, according to Maqrīzī, to deal with the confiscated money and property of those whom al-Ḥākim executed or punished.⁷⁴ Perhaps it was a department of investigation to trace the legality of properties of suspects in order to halt corruption.

Social reforms

An interesting part of al-Ḥākim's policy was the many orders and decrees he issued concerning social life. Some of them indicate religious devotion, such as the prohibition of making, selling and drinking wine and beer; the killing of and prohibition of breeding pigs; the encouragement of his subjects to fulfil the duties of Islam by granting money and food to those who remained in the Mosques to fast during the month of Ramadān. Some of them suggest concern towards public hygiene and health. The cleaning of the streets of Cairo was ordered; the sale of decayed Tūpin seeds (Tirmus) was banned; kneading of flour by the feet was also considered against the law. The destruction of dogs was carried out on two occasions, perhaps

73. Itti'āz, anno, 389.

74. Ibid., anno, 400 and Khitaṭ, II, 14, 286.

as a result of rabies. Others could be classified as "moral" decrees.

Nudity in public baths was prohibited - subjects were commanded to

wear a towel around the waist. Brothels were strictly banned and

soliciting in the streets by women carried heavy penalties. Witchcraft

and fortune-telling were equally forbidden. People were ordered

to attend to their own business and not discuss the affairs of others.

Appropriating lost property or the removal of covering enclosing it

was regarded as an offence against the law. Some of these decrees do not

appear to make sense except, of course, to al-Hākim. It is difficult to

understand why he banned the game of chess, prohibited the sale of Jew's

mallow (Mulūkhiyya) and water cress (Jarjīn) and forbade the fishing for and

selling of scaleless fish.⁷⁵

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75. All of these reforms are reported by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 390-405 and Khitat, II, 286 ff, some by Antākī, 191-206; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 124 ff; Awḡāl al-Manqūl, fol. 109 ff; 'Azīmī, anno, 402; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 56 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 130 ff; Sibī, Mirāt, fol. 206 ff; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 411; Ibn Hammād, 54; Ibn Khallikān, III, 449 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 60; al-Safadī, fol. 18 ff; Ibn Shāhin, Twārikh, fol. 43, ff; Ibn Ayās', I, 52 ff. Some of these chroniclers tried to explain some of the peculiar orders. Antākī says that the reason which caused the dog destruction order was that al-Hākim was annoyed with their whining during the night. Ibn al-Muqaffa' says, "It was because his ass was once startled by a dog". Ibn al-Zāfir and Maqrīzī (in Itti'āz only) say that al-Hākim prohibited Mulūkhiyya because it was Mu'āwiyah's favourite dish and so was Jarjīn for 'A'isha. Although there is no serious explanation for any of these orders, it is more likely that al-Hākim was influenced by Shi'ī law. Qādī al-Nu'mān in his Kitāb al-Iqtisār, 96, clearly says that scaleless fish was not to be eaten.

Architectural achievements

His enthusiasm in this respect appears to have been influenced by love for learning and religious devotion. According to the available information, it is almost certain that he did not try to build palaces.

Meanwhile in 395/1004 he built Dār al-Ḥikma (the house of wisdom) which became the best centre of learning at that time.⁷⁶ He also built more

Mosques than any of his predecessors and, perhaps, more than any other Muslim Caliph. In 393/1002 he ordered the continuation of a Mosque, the building of which had begun during the last years of his father's reign.

al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī says that forty thousand Dīnārs were estimated for the cost and adds that in 401/1010 al-Ḥākim paid five thousand Dīnārs to furnish that Mosque which became known

as Jāmi' al-Ḥākim.⁷⁷ In 393/1002 he ordered the building of another Mosque which was accomplished in 395/1004 and was named Jāmi' Rāshida.⁷⁸

He also built another Mosque which was known as Jāmi' al-Maqs.⁷⁹ It is also recorded that he ordered the restoration of many old Mosques.⁸⁰

76. For details on Dār al-Ḥikma, see below, page 125.

77. Khīṭaṭ, II, 277.

78. Ibid., II, 282.

79. Ibid., II, 283.

80. Ibn Ḥammād, 52; al-Ṣafadī, 18 ff; Itti'āz, anno, 403. For more details concerning al-Ḥākim's enthusiasm for building Mosques see Anṣārī, 186; Awwāl al-Manqūl, fol. 110; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 130; =

Certainly a most important factor of al-Hākim's administration was his punctilious enforcement of the law. For example, since Islam existed, it forbade wine making, selling and drinking, but a total and complete enforcement of this law was never officially exercised by any Muslim Caliph. Al-Hākim was determined to enforce it. In addition to the severe punishment he ordered for disobedience he commanded his police to search and destroy wine wherever they found it. Shopkeepers were commanded not to sell grapes or raisins except in small quantities which would prevent any purchaser from making his own wine. The import of both (grapes and raisins) was banned, and on one occasion he ordered the destruction of vineyards and grape harvests throughout Egypt.⁸¹ Even non-Muslims were subjugated to the law, perhaps in order to prevent Muslims getting wine through them.⁸² Another example appears in his attempt to put an end to brothels, but when he realised the difficulties of observing this law, he ordered that no woman should be seen outside her home.

Police were authorised to arrest any woman seen in the streets unless she

= Sibṭ, Mir'āt, 206 ff; Ibn al-Dawadārī, VI, 259; Khīṭaṭ, II, 285 and Itti'āz, annos, 392-395.

81. See the annual reports of Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 391-405; also in Khīṭaṭ, II, 285 ff. See also Awwāl al-Manqūl, fol. III; Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 193, and Ibn Ayās, I, 52 ff, say: "al-Hākim ordered the destruction of vineyards throughout Egypt". Ibn Shāhīn, Ṭwāriḫ, fol. 43, adds: "and Bilād al-Shām". See also al-Sijil al-Manhī fihi 'anī al-Khamr, Drūz Ms., B.M., no. add. 11,558; Antāki, 186, 192, 200, 202; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 125; Azīmī, anno, 402; Ibn Ḥammād, 53; al-Bustān al-Jāmī', 84; Ibn al-Dawadārī, VI, 259 ff., al-Ṣafādī, fol. 18 ff.

82. Antāki, 200.

carried a license to be there. Such licenses were issued to widows, midwives, women who had to appear in court, were preparing for pilgrimage or funerals or carrying a petition to the Imām.⁸³

Offenders of the law were severely treated. The maximum punishment prescribed by the law was applied in almost every case and many people were persecuted.⁸⁴ Such extremism appears to have been an attempt to create fear amongst subjects which would force them to obey the laws. This is apparent in the many reports by Maqrizī and other chroniclers. Many of those who were punished were paraded in the streets of Cairo and other cities and posters were written explaining their crimes and penalties.⁸⁵

In spite of the stringency of his laws and the fact that many people fell victim to his ruthlessness, his administration achieved a great deal of success and was beneficial to the majority of people. He achieved a high standard of justice as indicated by many reports. Antākī, for example, says, "He provided the kind of justice which his subjects never knew before.

83. Antākī, 208; Nuwayrī, fol. 57; See also al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 411; Sibṭ, Mirāt, fol. 201, explains al-Hakīm's stringency as a method of punishing women unloyal to their husbands. He relates a story in that context which he quoted from Ibn al-Ṣābi'.

84. For example, see Antākī, 186-224; Itti'āz, 'annos, 390-405.

85. Itti'āz, annos, 390-405; 411, and Khīṭat, II, 286 ff. See also ʿAwwāl al-Manqūl, fol. 109 ff; Sibṭ, Mirāt, fol. 201; al-Bustān al-Jāmi', 84; Ibn Shāhīn, Tawārikh, fol. 43.

They slept in their homes secure in the possession of their properties."⁸⁶

He adds that many complaints, which had been brushed aside by petty officials and perhaps forgotten altogether for several years, were investigated and submitted to a fair judgment.⁸⁷ His justice became the favourite theme of writers of story and myth, and poets. Many of their stories, anecdotes and poems, which praise al-Ḥākim and picture him as the champion of justice, show the impression his rule left on people's imagination.⁸⁸ There is a fragment of Hebrew writing, evidently from al-Ḥākim's time, praising his unparalleled justice with apparent sincerity.⁸⁹

The severity which he adopted in dealing with offenders of his laws, together with the system of informers, helped tremendously in reducing the number of crimes and protecting people against monopoly of certain conditions and exploitation by merchants and shopkeepers. For example, the crime of theft was reduced to a minimum. Chroniclers say that "at times of

86. Antaki, 206.

87. Ibid.

88. For examples, see Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 125; al-Ṣafadī, fol. 19; Ibn al-Dawadārī, VI, 592; Ibn Ayas, I, 52 ff; Ibn al-Fūfī, quoted by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 411. See also Ibn Shāhīn, *Twārikh*, fol. 43; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Durar al-Lata' fa fī Dhikr al-Saltana wa al-Khilāfa*, anno, 411, who say "al-Ḥākim was a just ruler at the beginning of his reign". Ibn Ayas, I, 52, says "When al-Ḥākim succeeded to the Caliphate he showed justice". al-Ḥākim's change to a bad ruler occurred, according to Muslim chroniclers, during the later part of his rule, when, they believe, he claimed divinity. See Ibn al-Dawadārī, VI, 257.

89. D. Kaufman, "Beiträge Zur Geschichte Ägyptens aus jüdischen Quellen", *Z.D.M.G.*, 51 (1891) 442; J. Mann, I, 32 ff; Hodgson, "al-Darazī =

prayers shopkeepers would leave their shops open and unguarded without fear of theft."⁹⁰ Ibn Ayās reports a story of a man who lost a case full of money in one of Cairo's streets and when, after a few days, he passed the same place he found it untouched. Ibn Ayās comments that no-one dared to touch it for fear of al-Ḥākim's punishment.⁹¹ In 397/1006 during the peak of Abu Rakwa's uprising, merchants and shopkeepers tried to exploit the situation. The prices of food increased sharply creating difficulties and confusion to the poorer subjects. al-Ḥākim's severe punishment of offenders brought the situation under control. Maqrīzī says, "People calmed down and commercial life returned to normality after al-Ḥākim whipped and paraded a number of merchants and shopkeepers."⁹²

The Progress of the Da'wa during al-Ḥākim's Reign

A careful study of the history of the Fatimid Da'wa shows that considerable changes and developments took place as a result of the care

= and Hamza in the origin of the Druze religion", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 18. See also A. Neubauer, "Egyptien Fragment", J.Q.R., IX (1896), 24-6; S.D. Goiten, A Mediterranean Society, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1967, 434.

90. Ibn Ayās, I, 54 ff. See also the reports of Antākī, 206; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 59; al-Ṣafadī, fol. 19, which contain similar information.

91. Ibn Ayās, I, 54 ff.

92. Itti'āz, anno, 397.

and attention al-Ḥākim paid to the progress of his propaganda machine ⁹³ a progress which the Da'wa never reached before and which could be considered as its golden age.

In spite of its importance to the State, the Da'wa had not previously formed its own separate administration. It had hitherto been linked with other departments and its direction was an additional post often given to Qādī al-Qudāt or perhaps to the Wazīr. ⁹⁴ The staff (al-Du'āt) would also hold other posts or be engaged in business of their own and thus a complete dedication to the Da'wa was rare amongst its Dā'īs. During al-Ḥākim's time, this began to change and gradually the Da'wa became a separate and independent department with its own orientation and function. Its direction was given to a man whose profession was propaganda and was to devote his entire duties to its function. He was granted only one title which was Dā'ī al-Du'āt, ⁹⁵ while previously

93. This account of the Da'wa is confined only to its progress in relation with the policy of al-Ḥākim.

94. Traditionally, Qādī al-Qudāt was the person in charge of the Da'wa's activities. But during al-ʿAzīz's reign his Wazīr Ya'qūb Ibn Killis is reported to have supervised the Da'wa's function. For details see Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 56; Itti'āz, annos, 392, 398 and Khifāt, I, 403, II, 273, 286; Hodgson, article, "Dā'ī", E.I.²

95. The information available on this point suggests that, although the term Dā'ī al-Du'āt may have existed earlier, it was for the first time applied in Fatimid Egypt. See al-Nu'mān, Ta'wīl Da'ā'im al-Islam, 41; al-Kirmanī, Rāḥat al-ʿAql, 135-138, 296 and al-Risāla al-Durriyya, quoted by M.K. Husayn in Rāḥat al-ʿAql, 2, and in Diwān al-Mu'ayyad, 54, and by A.M. Majid, al-Ḥākim, 115. See also Anṣārī, 209, whose reports indicate that the application of the title to officials of the Da'wa was new; Khifāt, I, 391.

a number of other titles were applied to him, such as Hujja and Bāb.⁹⁶ Like other heads of the administrative offices, Dā'ī al-Du'āt was authorised to appoint his own secretary (Katib)⁹⁷ and a staff of professional Dā'īs trained and fully graduated and officially employed by the Imām. The first step of employing Dā'īs with official and regular payment appears during al-'Azīz's reign. In 378/988 the Wazīr Ya'qūb Ibn Killis employed thirty five men and provided them with accommodation nearby the Mosque of al-Azhar.⁹⁸ Their task was to explain the teaching of the Da'wa. From thence the idea developed and in al-Hākim's time propagation became a full time and remunerated profession. The author of an Ismaili manuscript called al-Azhār speaks of Dā'īs joining the school of Dār al-Hikma for full time courses after which they would graduate and be assigned to a certain part of the Muslim world where they would operate for the support of the Fatimid cause and the acknowledgement of al-Hākim as the rightful Imām-Caliph.⁹⁹

96. For information on these terms see Hodgson, "Hudjdja" and B. Lewis, article, "Bāb", E.I.²

97. al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-A'ṣha, X, 434-9; "Inān, al-Hākim, 255.

98. Khitāt, II, 273.

99. Al-Azhār, quoted by M. Ghālib, A'lām al-Isma'iliyya, 126. See also al-Falak al-Dawwar quoted by M.K. Husayn, Diwān al-Mu'ayyad, 57, which gives similar information.

The method of teaching the doctrine developed remarkably and the facilities provided for this purpose completely changed. Previously doctrine was read and discussed in private courts, the Imām's palace and chiefly in Mosques.¹⁰⁰

During al-Ḥākim's reign a scientific approach was adopted. A special building was constructed in Cairo and equipped with every facility to assist the Da'wa and create the atmosphere for the best possible results of its function. A large number of books on various subjects, all materials for writing, copying and studying were provided. Staff of clerks and servants were employed for its upkeep. Many scientists and learned men were employed as lecturers. The new centre was named Dār al-Ḥikma or Dār al-ʿUlūm (the House of Wisdom or the House of Science)¹⁰¹ and was esteemed the best of its kind at that time. Although Dār al-Ḥikma was principally built to facilitate the function of the Da'wa

100. Khīṭaṭ, I, 391, II, 273.

101. For information on Dār al-Ḥikma, see al-Sijil al-Muʿallaq Drūz Ms., B.M., no. add. II, 558, fol. 6, edited by Majid, al-Ḥākim, 242; Sijil Waqf al-Ḥākim ʿAlā Dār al-Ḥikma reported by Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, II, 273 ff. and quoted by ʿInān, al-Ḥākim, 252, and by A. Ṭalīʿ, Aṣl al-Muwahidīn al-Drūz wa uṣūl ḥum, 72; al-Musabbiḥ quoted by Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, I, 458 ff; Anṭaki, 188; al-Dhahabī, ʿIbar, III, 72; Ittiʿāz, anno, 395; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 222; Risālat al-ʿAzhār, quoted by M. Ghālīb, Aʿlām 126; al-Falak al-Dawwar, quoted by M. K. Husayn, Diwān al-Muʿayyad, 57; S.L. Poole, History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 129; J.W. Thompson, The Libraries of Medieval Islam, 356; Majid, al-Ḥākim, 80. See also article, "Dar al-Ḥikma", E.I.²

it rapidly became an academy of culture rather than merely a centre of religious instruction, a school where medicine, logic, mathematics, philosophy, history, languages and Muslim theology, including Sunni law were taught.¹⁰² Students from all parts of the Muslim world came there to study and specialise in an atmosphere of Shī'ī Ismā'īlī preaching and teaching, where the Du'at operated in every branch of study and the Imām in person would visit the lecture halls, often joining debates and granting generous gifts to encourage noticeable proficiency.¹⁰³

This atmosphere no doubt influenced the students who came to Dār al-Hikma and obviously enhanced the Fatimid cause by adding to it the support of many learned and intellectual men.

The lectures which the Dā'īs held were known as Majālis (sessions) and were given in different levels according to the capacity of understanding amongst the audience. Some were designated as Majālis al-Khāssa (sessions of the selected) and others as Majālis al-ʿĀmma (sessions for the public). In the special meetings of the Dā'īs read works incorporating philosophy, science, logic and ta'wīl (the

102. Antākī, 188; al-Musabbihī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Khitat, I, 458 ff; al-Dhahabī, Ibar, III, 72; Iṭī'āz, annos, 395, 398-9; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 222.

103. al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī, Khitat, I, 458.

allegorical interpretation of the Holy books). From the picture given by al-Musabbiḥī and Ibn al-Tuwayr, both quoted by Maqrīzī, it would appear that Majālis al-Khaṣṣa were attended only by Ismailis.¹⁰⁴ In the others, the lecturers read were merely explanations of the doctrines which concerned the meaning of "Imām"; the theological differences between Shī'ī and Sunnī laws and their historical background. Special emphasis was given to those parts which supported the claims of the Shi'a to be the group of the right path and the Fatimids as the rightful leaders and Caliphs of the Muslim Umma.¹⁰⁵

In al-Ḥākim's time they expanded in an endeavour to reach every group of people including even visitors to the country and women. The special meetings were divided into two. One was for the high officials and learned men and was known as Majālis al-'Awliyā'; the other was for the ordinary officials and a branch of it was specially for women of the palace. The public sessions were divided into three - one for men of the general public, one for the women and one for the visitors to the country.¹⁰⁶

During the early periods, the Du'at concentrated their efforts

104. Khīṭaṭ, I, 391.

105. See al-Nu'mān, Da'ā' im al-Islām and al-Iqtīṣār, the basic works on Ismaili law at that time. Both were taught as text books in the Majālis which gives an idea about the subjects emphasised there.

106. al-Musabbiḥī quoted by Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, I, 391; Mājid, al-Ḥākim, 80.

mainly upon tribal chiefs, wealthy merchants and public figures in order to achieve a quick political success for the cause.¹⁰⁷ After the settlement in Egypt, and particularly during al-Ḥakīm's time, the objectives of the Da'wa extended to the people as a whole. The doctrine was introduced to every person as a way of life. Women received lectures and training in order to indoctrinate their children and, apparently for the first time, women participated in the Da'wa and were even accepted to work as Dā'īs.¹⁰⁸

The Da'wa flourished during al-Ḥakīm's reign and is noticeable by the number and quality of the scholars it produced, the development of ideas in its teaching and in the success amongst people both inside and outside the Fatimid Empire. In the fields of philosophy, theology and other sciences, it produced a number of fine scholars. Amongst these are: al-Kirmānī (died 411/1020), a philosopher, theologian and great Dā'ī who contributed many works considered, even today, to be the basis of Ismaili philosophy and doctrine,¹⁰⁹ Abū al-Fawāris and al-Nisābūrī.¹¹⁰

107. This is apparent in the history of the Da'wa during its early phase. See for example, the activities of Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Shī'ī in Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 12 ff; Khitat, II, 10 ff.

108. See Ghāyat al-Mawālīd an Ismaili work quoted by W. Ivanow, Rise, 21; Majid, al-Ḥakīm, 79.

109. See W. Ivanow, Ismaili Literature, 40; M.K. Husayn in his introduction to Rāḥat al-'Aql, 1 ff; M. Ghālib, A'lām, 126.

110. W. Ivanow, Ismaili Literature, 42; M. Ghālib, A'lām, 89, 126.

In other fields there was Qādī al-Qudāt Malīk Ibn Saʿīd and Ibn Yūnis al-Masrī who contributed works on astronomy; Abu ʿAbd Allāh al-Yamanī who wrote the history of philologists, the biography of Jawhar and a number of other works.¹¹¹ There was also al-Musabbihī whose works were the main sources of Fatimid history for many chroniclers.

A study of the Ismaili literature of the periods before and during al-Ḥākim's reign shows a significant development in the quality of writing of the Ismaili scholars. Those who joined Dār al-Ḥākim appear to have acquired more knowledge and a deeper understanding of ancient philosophy and religions other than Islam. They enjoyed a wider variety of subjects than those of the earlier periods. Their method of discussion and tones of argumentation indicate a broader and less fanatical outlook. Even in their allegorical interpretation of the Holy books and traditions, al-Ḥākim's contemporaries appear more sophisticated and less bigoted.¹¹² Indeed a detailed and comparative study of the Ismaili literature of these periods would be a very interesting and useful subject for a student of Muslim theology.

111. Iṭtiʿāz, anno, 400. On Ibn Yūnis see Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, II, 90.

112. See al-Kirmānī, al-Riyāḍ, ed. A. Tamir, Beirut, 1960. The author makes a comparative study of the works of the earlier Dāʿīs al-Sijizī (d. 331/942), Abu Ḥatīm al-Rāzī (d. 331/942) and al-Nasafī (d. 331/942). He gives many examples which show the changes of the outlook of those early Dāʿīs and himself concerning doctrine, philosophy, and Taʾwīl. For information on these Dāʿīs see W. Ivanow, Ismaili Literature, 23-7. Another example could be also found in a comparative study of the Taʾwīl of Qādī al-Nuʿmān in his Asās al-Taʾwīl and that of Kirmānī in Raḥat al-ʿAql.

The results in the spread of the Fatimid teaching by the Da'wa which created a popular support for al-Ḥākim was of equal significance and importance. Externally, as will be discussed in detail later, the Da'wa played the major role in an attempt to win the Eastern provinces of the Muslim world. The influence and activities of its Dā'īs achieved a noticeable success in putting Aleppo under the direct control of Cairo and in winning the allegiance of the 'Uqaylids principality when its head Qirwāsh declared his loyalty to al-Ḥākim throughout all territory under his dominion. The tribe of Banū Asād, under the leadership of their chief 'Alī al-Asadī declared its loyalty to the Imām in the area of Hilla. Even in Baghdad itself, popular support for him was achieved.¹¹³

Internally, the teaching of Dār al-Hikma and the activities of the Dā'īs achieved success for the cause. Maqrīzī speaks of Egyptians coming from villages and towns neighbouring on Cairo to attend the lectures of the Majālis.¹¹⁴ He adds "that there were occasions when a number of people died of suffocation among the enthusiastic crowds which came to listen to certain lecturers."¹¹⁵

Perhaps the most difficult task al-Ḥākim faced in his internal policies was achieving support of both groups of the Muslim population - the Shi'a and the Sunnis and at the same time avoiding clashes between

113. See below, "The External Policy of al-Ḥākim", Chapter V of this thesis.

114. Itti'āz, 395.

115. Ibid.

them. Although his reign was the golden age of the Da'wa, it was not entirely without misfortune. As a result of his encouragements to the Da'wa's activities, the Shī'a became more active and extremism grew amongst the population as it did amongst the Da'īs. It reached its peak in 395/1004 when al-Ḥākim, under the influence of his extreme Dā'īs, issued a decree which ordered his subjects to curse some of the Prophet's companions,¹¹⁶ (al-Ṣaḥāba), who according to the Shī'a usurped the rights of 'Alī and prevented him from becoming the first successor of Muḥammad. Such an action resulted in a wave of anti-Sunni feeling and Sunnis, who were still a considerable number in Egypt, fell under pressure mainly from the Shī'a population.¹¹⁷ Outside Egypt the decree became a weapon in the hands of the anti-Fatimids, which they used to obstruct the progress of the Da'wa amongst Muslims. Adventurers and rebels, who sought to create rebellions against the Fatimid rule, found it a useful tool with which to obtain support from the Muslim masses.¹¹⁸

Al-Ḥākim, who sought support and popularity from all Muslims, was sufficiently astute to realise the consequences of his action and the

116. Majid, al-Ḥākim, 87, suggests that al-Ḥākim did not issue the order and like his father prohibited his subjects from cursing. He adds that fanatic Egyptians were responsible for it. This suggestion, however, does not appear to have much support in the information of the sources.

117. Khitat, II, 286, and Itti'āz, anno, 395.

118. Antakī, 188.

emotion it aroused amongst the Muslim Umma. He therefore reversed his attitude and adopted a moderate line of policy by which he appears to have endeavoured to maintain a kind of balance between the two groups. To reassure the Sunnis that their safety and security were safeguarded and their freedom of faith would not be disturbed, he withdrew the decree and issued others which forbade the curse and threatened with severe punishment those who disobeyed him. He publicly praised the Sahāba and commanded his subjects to do the same.¹¹⁹ In 399/1008 he issued his famous decree in which he commanded his Muslim subjects to forget the quarrels of the past and work for the future. He also allowed them the freedom of choice of the manner of prayers and Sunnis were no longer subject to the Shī'ī manner in their prayers.¹²⁰ From thence and until the end of his reign Sunnis enjoyed a complete freedom of faith without any fear of persecution. Shī'ī extremists who tried to oppress them received severe punishments. Their theologians and learned men were commanded by al-Hākim to hold debates with those of the Shī'a in an atmosphere of scholarship.¹²¹ Some of them were officially employed to

119. Antākī, 195; Itti'āz, annos, 397-404. See also Awwal al-Manqūl, fol. III; Sibt, fol. 201; al-Bustān al-Jāmi', 84.

120. See Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 60 ff; Dā'ī Idrīs quoted by Majid, al-Hākim, 88. See also Antākī, 195; Itti'āz, anno, 399 and Khiṭaṭ, II, 287.

121. Awwal al-Manqūl, fol. 112; al-Rūhī, Bulghat al-Zurafa' fi Tawarikh al-Khulafa', fol. 94, say: "وامر ان يحل على الفقهاء على اختلاف مذاهبهم" See also al-Musabbihi, quoted by Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, I, 459, who gives similar information.

teach Sunni law in Dār al-Hikma. Many Sunni judges were also employed and once the office of Qādī al-Qudāt (chief judge) was given to a Sunni as has been mentioned before.¹²²

While al-Hākim was able to halt extremism amongst the population of the Shī'a, he completely failed to halt its expansion among the Dā'is. With them it grew rapidly and resulted in the first division of the Dā'wa in Egypt. The split was not a consequence of al-Hākim's tolerant attitude towards Sunnis. It was a result of differences in views concerning his Imāma. The Ghulat (extremists) who believed that he was not merely Imām but the Deity in person, continued preaching their views until a new sect emerged and became known as the Drūz, whose origin will be discussed in Chapter VI of this thesis.¹²³

The problem of Ahl al-Dhimma

One of the most significant features of al-Hākim's policy was his attitude towards Ahl al-Dhimma (Jews and Christians) of his Empire. It was contrary to the general policies of his predecessors, a challenge to the Byzantine Empire with which he had made a peace agreement, and a

122. See Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 399, 405, and Khīṭat, II, 288; Ibn Hajar and Ibn Shahrīn in the supplement to Kindī's History of Egyptian Judges, 610. See also Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 222, who speaks of Sunni 'Ulamā employed in Dār al-Hikma and al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-Muhādara, I, 169, who speaks of Sunni Qadis employed by al-Hākim.

123. See below, Chapter VI of this thesis.

threat to the steady progress of the State's financial administration which was almost entirely dependent on the skill and efficiency of the Dhimmis. Such an attitude had aroused the curiosity of many medieval and modern historians but no study had been made which could satisfactorily answer the question; why did al-Hākim adopt such a policy?

Before trying to cope with this question, it is necessary to mention when his policy commenced and what measures he took against the Dhimmis of his Empire.

Modern historians are divided into two groups concerning the time of the commencement of the policy. De Sacy and Canard believe it started immediately after al-Hākim got rid of Barjawan and had assumed his rule as an absolute ruler. They consider the incidents of 392-393/1001-1002 which resulted in the execution of Fahd Ibn Ibrāhīm (a Christian high official), the arrest of a number of Jewish and Christian Kuttāb (clerks) and the destruction of two Churches as the beginning of al-Hākim's hostile attitude towards Ahl al-Dhimma of his State.¹²⁴

S. Lane-Poole and J. Mann on the other hand believe that al-Hākim's hostility did not commence before the year 395/1004. They both

124. De Sacy, Exposé, I, 305; M. Canard, "al-Hākim Bi Amrillah", E.I.²

say that during the first ten years of al-Ḥākim's reign (386-395/996/1004) Jews and Christians enjoyed the immunity and even the privileges which they had obtained during the tolerant reign of al-ʿAzīz.¹²⁵

The actions of execution, arrests and destruction of churches during 392-3 A.H. were indications of hostility towards Ahl al-Dhimma but the information available from the sources appears to show them as isolated incidents resulting from circumstances and not from planned policy to attack a religious community. Ibn al-Qalānisi explains in detail the reasons which led to the execution of Fahd. He says that it was a conspiracy planned by al-Ḥusayn Ibn Jawhar, the then Wāsiṭa, and his supporters Ibn al-ʿAddās¹²⁶ and Ibn al-Nahawī.¹²⁷ He continues that Ibn al-Nahawī and Ibn al-ʿAddās had presented evidence to al-Ḥākim which convinced him that Fahd had been stealing a certain sum of money

125. S. Lane-Poole, History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 126; J. Mann, The Jews in Egypt and Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs, I, 32 ff.

126. Abu al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ibn ʿUmar Ibn al-ʿAddās. Nothing is known about him except that in 381/991 he was appointed as Wāsiṭa by al-ʿAzīz, then he was dismissed in 383/993. In 392/1002 he was the head of Dīwān al-Kharāj. Khitaṭ, II, 31; Muḥaffaṭ, fol.150. See also Ibn al-Qalānisi, 53 ff; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 182.

127. Abu Ṭāhir Maḥmūd Ibn Muḥammad al-Nahawī. All that is known about him is that he was the head of Dīwān al-Hijāz during the early years of al-Ḥākim's reign. Khitaṭ, II, 31. See also Ibn al-Qalānisi, 58.

from the treasury every year.¹²⁸ Maqrīzī confirms this report by stating "After Fahd's execution, his brother brought to the palace a sum of five hundred thousand Dīnārs".¹²⁹ Ibn al-Qalānisi adds that when al-Hākim learned that both Ibn al-Nahawī and Ibn al-ʿAddās had given false evidence he executed them,¹³⁰ and Maqrīzī adds that al-Hākim returned the five hundred thousand Dīnārs to Fahd's sons and family.¹³¹

The Kuttāb (clerks) who may have been accused of making illegal money, were freed soon after a trial. On this question J. Mann consulted some of the Jewish contemporary writings from the Jewish Geniza. He states that the Jewish Kuttāb were freed because there was no evidence of their guilt and adds that the Jewish community of that time held special thanksgiving prayers to God for al-Hākim's good conduct of justice.¹³² It is possible that these arrests were part of the plot against Fahd. The Kuttāb in question formed part of his staff which were controlled by his office. Ibn al-ʿAddās succeeded to Fahd's office after his execution and probably desired to eliminate his staff. It may have been that the similar accusation he brought against the staff resulted in the

128. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 58 ff; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 182. Maqrīzī, Khitaṭ, II, 31, adds that Ibn al-Nahawī and Ibn al-ʿAddās accused Fahd of favouring Christians and suppressing Muslims. "

129. Ittiʿāz, anno, 392.

130. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 59. See also Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 182; Khitaṭ, II, 31 and Ittiʿāz, anno, 392.

131. Ittiʿāz, anno, 392.

132. J. Mann, I, 32 ff.

question of his previous and perhaps wrongful accusations of Fahd and ended with the freeing of the Kuṭṭāb and his own execution.

Antākī says that Ibn al-Muqashshar, al-Ḥākim's private physician and friend, pleaded for the Kuṭṭāb.¹³³ He perhaps pointed out to him that the accusation was coloured by personal reasons. Ibn al-Qalanīsī adds that Sif al-Mulk, al-Ḥākim's sister, also intervened and assured her brother that all charges brought by Ibn al-Nahāwī and Ibn al-ʿAddās were false.¹³⁴

The destruction of the two churches was not by order of the Imām. It was a result of an attack by a group of angry Muslims. Antākī says, "The Christian Jacobites began rebuilding a ruined church in the area of Rāshida. A group of Muslims attacked them and destroyed the building and two other churches which were nearby."¹³⁵ The reason for this attack is not clearly given by any of the sources, but it seems that al-Ḥākim was intending to build a new Mosque on the ruins of the Jacobite church. Information concerning such an intention may have been communicated by Christians, who were also government officials, to church officials who commenced its rebuilding before al-Ḥākim's intentions became

133. Antākī, 186.

134. Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 59 ff.

135. Antākī, 186. See also Ibn Abī Ṭayy quoted by Maqrizī, Khitāt, II, 283.

officially declared. Ibn Abī Ṭayy, who is quoted by Maqrīzī, suggests that, since Muslim law does not allow Ahl al-Dhimma to build new churches in Dār al-Islām, Muslims were angered by the rebuilding of the church which they seem to have considered a challenge to their law. He states that both Muslims and Christians complained to al-Ḥākim against each other. The Christians said the church existed before the Muslim conquest and Muslims said it was newly built.¹³⁶ Al-Ḥākim, however, ordered his Mosque to be built in the area and gave permission for the Christians to build three new churches in another area which was known as al-Ḥamrā. This, as Anṭakī and Ibn Abi Ṭayy state, . "Was a compensation for the three churches destroyed in Rāshida".¹³⁷ In the light of this information it would appear that al-Ḥākim's hostility against Jews and Christians as religious communities was not rampant before 395/1004 when official orders specifying new measures were declared.

The first official hostility appeared in 395/1004 when al-Ḥākim issued a decree ordering all Jews, except the Khayābira (the Jews who originally came from the town of Khaybar), and Christians not to appear

136. Ibn Abī Ṭayy quoted by Maqrīzī, Khitat, II, 283.

137. Anṭakī, 186; Ibn Abī Ṭayy quoted by Maqrīzī, Khitat, II, 283.

in public unless they wore a black Ghiyār (garment) with black belts.

He also forbade slaves to be sold to them.¹³⁹ More severe measures

were introduced as time passed. In 398/1007 al-Ḥākim confiscated

the Church's revenue and put it under the supervision of the Dawāwīn.¹⁴⁰

Jews were ordered to wear a bell and Christians a cross when in public

baths.¹⁴¹ He prohibited Christians from holding ritual ceremonies during

the times of Epiphany and Easter.¹⁴² At the end of this same year he

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138. The idea of the Ghiyār was not new to Ahl al-Dhimma. Muslim theologians claim that it dates back to the time of Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb who, they say, had made certain conditions on Ahl al-Dhimma, who decided to keep their faith under Muslim rule. 'Umār's supposed conditions are known as al-Ahkām al-'Umariyya. One of them was that non-Muslims were to wear a distinguishing "over coat" which became known as al-Ghiyār. See al-Qalqashandī, Subḥ, XIII, 356 ff; al-Nabulsi, Tajrīd Sayf al-Himma, ed. C. Cahen, B.I.F.A.O. (1958-60), 139 ff. See also A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects, 5 ff; Article "Ghiyār", E.I.2. Black, as the colour specified for the Ghiyār, in al-Ḥākim's order, is said to have been chosen because black was the symbolic colour of the Abbasids. See Maqrizī, Itti'āz, anno, 395.
139. Anṭākī, 187; al-Sijil al-Ma'allag and Risālat al-Yahūd wa al-Naṣarā, Drūz Mss., B.M. no. add. 11,558, fols. 2, 12-21; Awwal al-Manqūl, fol. 111; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 124; Ibn al-Zafir, fol. 60 ff; Ibn al-Aṭhir, IX, 131; Ibn Ḥammad, 54; al-Safadī, fol. 18; Sibṭī, fol. 206; al-Dhahabī quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 178; al-Qalqashandī, Subḥ, XIII, 356, ff; al-Nabulsi; Tajrīd, 139 ff; Khīṭat, II, 285 ff and Itti'āz, anno, 395; Ibn Shāhīn Ṭwārīkh, fol. 43; al-Nuwayrī, fol. 53; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 339.
140. Anṭākī, 195; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 127; Khīṭat, II, 286 and Itti'āz, anno, 398.
141. Anṭākī, 195; Itti'āz, anno, 404, puts this in the year 404/1014. Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 259 ff, says that al-Ḥākim ordered the Dhimmis to have their own baths.
142. Anṭākī, 197; Itti'āz, annos, 401, 402, puts these events in 401-402/1011/1012.

gave orders to destroy Qiyāma (the Church of the Holy Sepulchre).¹⁴³

In 399/1008 a number of Churches were destroyed in Egypt.¹⁴⁴

In 400/1009 Qiyāma was pulled down and a further number of churches were demolished and their properties looted.¹⁴⁵

In 403/1012 all measures increased in their severity. Jews and Christians alike were prohibited from riding horses and were only allowed to use the backs of donkeys or mules with undecorated saddles. He forbade them to employ Muslim servants and to take Muslim girls as concubines. They were prohibited from boats manned by Muslim crews. All Christians were ordered to wear a cross; Jews a piece of wood of certain measurement. Even more harshly, he allowed Muslims to spy

143. Most Muslim sources report this event in 398/1007 but accounts differ as to whether the decree or the actual destruction occurred in this year. Some say, "In this year al-Hākim gave orders to destroy Qiyāma." Ibn al-Qalānisi, 66; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 46; *Khitat*, II, 287 and *Iṭī'āz*, anno, 398. Others say that the actual destruction occurred in that year. See 'Azīmi, anno, 398; Sibī, fol. 195 ff; al-Bustān al-Jamī', 83; al-Dhahabī, 'Iḥṣān III, 66; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 399; al-Yāfi'i, *Mirāt al-Jinān*, II, 429. There are also some who give an entirely different date. The author of *Awwal al-Manqūl*, fol. III, puts it in 403/1012; al-Ṣafadī, fol. 18; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 293, put it in 408/1017, which are most likely errors. Anṭākī, 196, however, gives the precise date of the destruction; he says: "It was on the fifth of Ṣafar 400/30th October 1009." This suggests that although the order may have been issued in 398 A.H. the actual destruction occurred later. Whether that was because Christian officials tried to delay it hoping that al-Hākim might change his mind or was reluctant to destroy it fearing Byzantine reprisals, the sources do not clarify. Cf. M. Canard, "Le Destruction de l'Église de la Résurrection par le Calife Hakim", *Byzantion*, 35 (1965), 16 ff.

144. Anṭākī, 195; *Iṭī'āz*, annos, 398-9 and *Khitat*, II, 287.

145. Anṭākī, 196.

upon them and see that these orders were enforced.¹⁴⁶

The Reasons behind al-Hākim's Policy

Chroniclers fail to clarify the reasons which caused al-Hākim to take such extreme measures. 'Uthmān al-Nābulī in his Tajrīd Sayf al-Himma Limā fī Dhimmatī Ahl al-Dhimma, suggests that the reasons were political. He says that al-Hākim feared that the prosperity of Ahl al-Dhimma, their growing prestige and influence both in the State affairs and in the society, might encourage them to penetrate his State. He confiscated each Dhimmi's property when it reached a certain value and thus prevented them from accumulating wealth.¹⁴⁷

There is no supporting information, however, from any other source and no evidence indicating that al-Hākim ever confiscated individual Dhimmi property. On the contrary, many sources agree that he was very generous¹⁴⁸ to the personnel he employed, the majority of whom appear to have been non-Muslims. Moreover, there is no information which suggests that al-Hākim had ever interfered with industry, trade, or any business run by members of the community of Ahl al-Dhimma. Perhaps al-Nābulī was referring to the confiscation of the Church's revenue

146. Antākī, 195-208; Itfī'āz, annos, 398-404.

147. al-Nābulī, Tajrīd, 139 ff.

148. Antākī, 206; 'Awwal al-Manqūl, fol. 110; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 131; Ibn Hammād, 52; al-Dhahabī, quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 178; Abū al-Fidā', II, 151. See also Sibṭ, fol. 206; Ibn =

which was due to entirely different reasons, as will be discussed later.

If al-Ḥākim's fear was that Christians would support the Byzantines against his State because of similar religious beliefs, such a question could not arise concerning the Jews.

Antākī, Ibn al-Muqaffa' and Bar Hebraeus suggest the reason was to force Ahl al-Dhimma to adopt Islam.¹⁴⁹ Although it may be possible that al-Ḥākim desired to convert his subjects to Islam, whether his policy was designed particularly to achieve that aim is a debatable point. The chroniclers concerned are all Christian and no doubt would interpret all al-Ḥākim's actions with the bias of their own religious views. This is in addition to the fact that their explanations are not always consistent with events and are at times obviously contradictory. When Antākī explains why he believed that al-Ḥākim was aiming to force Ahl al-Dhimma to become Muslims he says, "The majority of his staff were Dhimīs and too many to be replaced by Muslims. He made his measures so severe that he could force them to adopt Islam."¹⁵⁰ But this is contradicted by the

= Shāhīn, fol.43; Ibn al-Fūṭī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 411; al-Safadī, fol. 19. See also examples of al-Ḥākim's generosity in Maqrīzī's reports, Itti'āz, annos, 390-404 and Khitaṭ, II, 285 ff.

149. Antākī, 207; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 124; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 184.

150. Antākī, 207.

reports of many sources, including Antākī's, which say that al-Hākim permitted all those who refused to obey his orders to leave the country safeguarded by the police and to take all portable properties and belongings with them.¹⁵¹ It is improbable that if he was unable to replace his large Dhimmi staff by Muslims that he would allow them to leave the country.

Ibn al-Muqaffa' and Bar Hebraeus state that al-Hākim would threaten those who did not adopt Islām and honour those who did so.¹⁵² Even the execution of Fahd Ibn Ibrahim was, as Ibn al-Muqaffa' says, "A result of his refusal to become Muslim."¹⁵³ On the contrary, there are many reports which show that even during the years of al-Hākim's greatest pressure upon the Dhimmis, the majority of officials in his service were non-Muslims and that he never dismissed any of them on religious grounds. There seems to have been no difference in his method of appointing high officials, for everyone, whether Muslim or Dhimmi, received similar Alqāb (titles) and grants.¹⁵⁴

151. Antākī, 207; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 63; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 131; al-Dhahabī, 'Ibar, III, 66 ff; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 339; al-Yāfi'ī, II, 429; Itti'āz, anno, 404.

152. Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 125; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 164.

153. Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 124 ff.

154. Antākī, 196-198, 199, 227; Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, 26 ff; Itti'āz, annos, 395-405 and Khīṭāṭ, II, 285 ff.

It is reported that he respected the private beliefs of his men and did not attempt to change them. Al-Musabbiḥī, the contemporary chronicler who is quoted by Maqrīzī, says that al-Ḥākim informed him when he appointed Ṣāliḥ Ibn 'Alī as Qā'id al-Quwād, that he had said, "I asked Ibn Sūrīn to write the decree and made him swear on the Bible not to tell anyone before the time was due."¹⁵⁵ Moreover, force does not seem to have been al-Ḥākim's method of conversion. A number of reports indicate that he preferred arguments and discussions.¹⁵⁶ Ample evidence of this appears in his famous Sijil which he decreed in 399/1008 and which begins with the phrase - Lā Ikrahā fi al-Dīn (Religion is not to be forced upon people)¹⁵⁷ and the building of Dār al-Hikma, which was for the purpose of convincing people by the medium of discussion.

It is quite clear in the reports of many chroniclers that obedience to Muslim law, not the adoption of Islam, was al-Ḥākim's purpose.¹⁵⁸

Had he exercised his policy in order to compel Ahl al-Dhimma to adopt

155. Itti'āz, anno, 398.

156. See Risālat al-Yahūd wa al-Naṣārā, fols. 12-21; al-Musabbiḥī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Khitaṭ, I, 458 ff; 'Awwāl al-Manqūl, fol. 112; al-Rūḥī, fol. 94; Dā'ī Idrīs, quoted by Majīd, al-Ḥākim, 111.

157. Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 60 ff. Itti'āz, anno, 399 and Khitaṭ, II, 287. See also Antakī, 195; Dā'ī Idrīs, quoted by Majīd, al-Ḥākim, 88.

158. See 'Awwāl al-Manqūl, fol. 111, Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 63; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 131; Sibṭī, fol. 195 ff; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, annos, 403 and 'Ibar, III, 66 ff; al-Qalqashandī, XIII, 66, 356; al-Safadī, fol. 18; Ibn Shāhin, Twarīkh, fol. 54; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 339; al-Yāfi'ī, II, 429; Even in the reports of Ibn al-Muqaffa' there are indications that al-Ḥākim only enforced Muslim law. See Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 135.

Islām, he would not have exempted the group of Jews known as al-Khayābira from all his measures. This was only because they claimed to have been exempted from all conditions born on Ahl al-Dhimma in Dār al-Islām, although Muslim theologians are in dispute over the Khayābira's claim.¹⁵⁹

Al-Hākīm's policy, however, appears to have been an attempt to solve a problem which socially, religiously and administratively menaced his rule. On one hand he had Ahl al-Dhimma, a large minority, with their vital importance to the progress of the financial administration of the State, and on the other there was the Muslim population which resented their presence and any policy that prolonged their influence in the State affairs or in social life. If he dismissed all non-Muslims from the offices of State, financial administration would suffer a severe blow and thus weaken the treasury which would result in grave difficulties on the power of his State. If he continued his father's policy of tolerance towards them, he would be unable to achieve popularity amongst Muslims and might lose the support which he already had. The policy of tolerance was no longer practical under the circumstances. Ahl al-Dhimma had been doing too well. They became too rich, powerful and prominent and Muslims appeared unwilling to tolerate them any longer, which left the Imām-Caliph in a dilemma.

159. al-Qalqashandī, XII, 66, 359-66.

The only solution for this problem, as it seems to have appeared to al-Hākim, was to subjugate all Ahl al-Dhimma literally to Muslim law, in which case it would not be necessary to dismiss them from the offices of the State and the Muslims would not be able to complain since their law was being strictly observed and Ahl al-Dhimma were treated according to its demands.

The idea of subjugating Ahl al-Dhimma to Muslim law was neither new nor unique in Muslim history. Many Caliphs and rulers exercised it either to satisfy the Muslim population or as evidence that they themselves were strictly religious and desired to enforce Muslim law to the letter.¹⁶⁰ Al-Hākim was influenced by both reasons: to set an example as an extreme Muslim Imam-Caliph and the demands of the Muslim population.

If al-Hākim's policy was merely to observe Muslim law, why did he include orders for the confiscation of the revenue of churches, the destruction of churches and severe measures concerning the Ghiyar, which were not a part of that law?

160. See Antākī, 63; Ibn al-Muqaffa', I, 4; al-Qalqashandī, XIII, 356 ff; M_Khitat, II, 263, 513 ff; al-Nābulī, 140 ff; Ghāzī al-Wasīfī, Rad 'alā Ahl al-Djimmā wa man Tabi'ahum, ed. by Gottheil, J.A.O.S., 41 (1921), 383 ff; Tritton, Muslim Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects, A. Fattal, Le Statut Legal des non-Musulmans en pays d'Islam; M. Perlmanns "Note on anti-Christian propaganda in the Mamluk Empire", B.S.O.A.S., X (1940-2), 843 ff.

Available information on this point suggests that behind every one of the extreme measures there were other reasons for his actions. They did not occur in 395/1004 when the first anti-Dhimmi order was introduced. The confiscation of church revenues appeared three years later, the destruction of the churches occurred even later. These actions do not appear to have been directed against the Jews. The revenues of their synagogues were not confiscated nor were they destroyed by official orders. This indicates that the severity of al-Ḥākim's attitude was not contemplated at the outset and was not aimed at Ahl al-Dhimma as a whole.

The confiscation of the Church's revenues seems to have been directed against the widespread corruption which gained increasing momentum even among official church circles. Ibn al-Muqaffa' offers a unique explanation for the incidents which led to such actions. He affirms that corruption had spread widely amongst Christian officials of that time. The Patriarch Inbā Zakhārius, he states, sold Bishoprics and Priesthoods to anyone wealthy enough to pay the price. A certain priest named Yūnis desired to become a Bishop, but was not sufficiently wealthy and the Patriarch refused to support him. Yūnis submitted a petition to al-Ḥākim denouncing the practice of bribery which was rife amongst ecclesiastic circles. Al-Ḥākim at once arrested the Patriarch and gave

the supervision of the revenue of his church to the State Dīwān.

The importance of this report lies in the fact that Ibn al-Muqaffa' was a semi-contemporary chronicler and himself was a Bishop, aware of what was happening inside the official circles of the Church. It is also necessary to point out that Ibn al-Muqaffa' does not seem to have recorded this report for personal reasons. He speaks highly of the Patriarch and says that it happened because he was overruled by his friends and family members who desired to make a fortune by selling Bishoprics and priesthoods.¹⁶¹

Antākī says that the confiscation included only the revenues of the churches in Miṣr.¹⁶² He adds that the revenues were put under al-Hākim's name in the State's Dīwān and not added to the treasury and were later restored without any loss to the church officials.¹⁶³ This strengthens the indication that such actions by al-Hākim were isolated and temporary and merely an attempt to punish what he seems to have considered injustice even inside ecclesiastic circles which were a part of his State.

161. Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 127 ff.

162. Antākī, 194.

163. Antākī, 219.

The destruction of the churches appears to have been a punishment for those who seem to have ignored al-Ḥākim's orders and persistently disobeyed them. Cruel and severe it may seem, but such attitudes were a standard treatment by him against those whom he considered offenders of the law. According to Muslim law, Ahl al-Dhimma were prohibited from holding ritual ceremonies publicly, from raising their voices loudly when praying, and even from ringing their church bells loudly. If these injunctions were disobeyed Muslim authorities had the right to treat the offenders as dwellers in Dār al-Ḥarb and not as Ahl Dhimma in Dār al-Islām.¹⁶⁴ Antākī gives some valuable and interesting details about the manner in which Christians celebrated their annual ceremonies. From his account it would appear that they persistently ignored prescribed rules for Dhimmi behaviour and opposed a number of al-Ḥākim's orders concerning their ritual ceremonies.¹⁶⁵ He prohibited their parades during Easter and Epiphany and ordered them to conform,¹⁶⁶ but his orders seem to have been completely ignored when a multitude of Christians gathered in 398/1007 in Jerusalem to celebrate Easter.

164. al-Qalqashandī, XIII, 356;ff; al-Nabulsi, 139 ff. For a general discussion see Tritton, Muslim Caliphs, and A. Fattāḥ Le Statut Legal.

165. Antākī, 194.

166. Antākī, 193-6; Itti'āz, annos, 398-404.

Yet another reason was probably the influence of Muslim advisers who doubtless emphasised and convinced him that the Christians had ignored him and disgraced Islām and Muslims by their parades and ritual displays in Jerusalem. Most of the sources say that al-Ḥākim had enquired about the relative significance of Qiyaṃa with Easter. His Dā'ī Khatgīn, who is considered by Bar Hebraeus as "Aman who hated Christians"¹⁶⁷ replied that, "Every year Christians from all parts of the world gather in that church while its monks perform fraudulent practises and pretend to produce what they call 'Holy Fire'. This fire is made to appear as a miracle from God."¹⁶⁸ It was after this that al-Ḥākim ordered the destruction of Qiyaṃa.¹⁶⁹

As a result of al-Ḥākim's order to demolish Qiyaṃa, a wave of anti-Christian feeling mounted. A number of churches were pulled down, but whether he ordered the destruction of these churches or not is very

167. Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 184.

168. Itti'āz, anno, 398.

169. Whilst Christian chroniclers, with the exception of Bar Hebraeus do not mention this story, Muslim sources relate it and most of them agree that the practices of the monks, which they consider as a disgrace to Islām, was the cause of the destruction of the Qiyaṃa. See Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭ, fol. 195 ff; Ibn al-Qalanisī, 68; al-Dhahabī, Ibar, III, 66-7; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 339; al-Yāfi'ī, II, 429. Sibṭ, fol. 195 ff, adds that Saladin had contemplated demolishing Qiyaṃa for the same reasons but was dissuaded because of possible reprisals against Muslims and their Mosques inside Christian territories. Cf. M. Canard, "La Destruction de l'Eglise de la Résurrection par le Calife Hakim", Byzantion, 35 (1965), 16 ff.

difficult to determine. Chroniclers' reports on this issue lack accuracy and are sometimes self-contradictory. The majority of them state that al-Ḥākim ordered the destruction of all churches in his Empire in 398/1007 and they were destroyed,¹⁷⁰ but according to the reports of Antākī and Maqrizī only eight churches were destroyed and many churches were still in existence after al-Ḥākim's hostility was lifted,¹⁷¹ although both Antākī and Maqrizī adopt the first statement. Concerning the churches which were actually destroyed, only Antākī and Maqrizī give details. While Antākī considers the actions to have been the result of official orders by al-Ḥākim,¹⁷² Maqrizī fails to clarify this point.¹⁷³ Hence it is possible that when al-Ḥākim officially ordered the destruction of Qiyāma, fanatical Muslims took advantage of the situation and expressed their hatred of Christians by pulling down their churches and looting their property.¹⁷⁴ Similar attacks resulting from such reasons are reported to have occurred during

170. Antākī, 204 says: "وسجل بالاسماء ان يحيى الكناش من مدينة مصر الارمن" *وأميرهم جميع المسيحيين في مملكة مصر*
 "فجعل وقتلهم في سنة 403"; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 46 says: *وأميرهم جميع المسيحيين في مملكة مصر*
 Sibī, fol. 206 and quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī,
 Nujūm, IV, 177 says: "ولم يبق من ولايتهم دياراً ولا حصناً" *وأميرهم جميع المسيحيين في مملكة مصر*
 al-Dhahabī, Ibar, III, 66, al-Yāfi'ī, II, 429, say:
 "ثم قدم جميع الكناش في السنة 403" *وأميرهم جميع المسيحيين في مملكة مصر*
 Ibn al-Dawadārī, IV, 259 ff.
 "وأميرهم جميع المسيحيين في السنة 403" *وأميرهم جميع المسيحيين في مملكة مصر*
 Itti'āz, anno, 403, says: "وكتب إلى الذمخالي بهدم مائة من دورهم"

171. Antākī, 194-200, 204, 230; Itti'āz, annos, 398-404 and Khitāṭ, II, 501-520.

172. Antākī, 194-204.

173. Itti'āz, annos, 398-403.

174. Antākī, 195.

other periods of Muslim history.¹⁷⁵ Al-Ḥākim, however, is reported to have issued orders prohibiting Muslims from such action.¹⁷⁶ But whether that was because he did not originally allow it or because he feared similar action against the Muslims under Christian rule, is again not clear. Later he gradually became more tolerant and permitted the rebuilding of destroyed churches.

The Severity of other Measures

Only Antākī and Maqrīzī give details concerning the enforcement of the Ghiyār and the restriction imposed on Ahl al-Dhimma between the years 395/1004 - 404/1013. In the reports of both chroniclers, it is clear that the orders were repeated each year and as time went by they became more severe. As M. Canard points out, this repetition of the orders indicates that they were probably not obeyed,¹⁷⁷ and since all reports show the egoism of al-Ḥākim, particularly when he was disobeyed, the resulting severity was most likely a retaliation against the offenders.

Whatever the reasons were for imposing the Ghiyār on Ahl al-Dhimma,¹⁷⁸ the fact remains that it was to distinguish them from Muslims.

175. Khitat, II, 512 ff.

176. Antākī, 197; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 68; Itti'āz, anno, 398.

177. M. Canard, "al-Ḥākim Bi Amrillah", E.I.²

178. It is very difficult to define the original reasons for imposing the Ghiyār on Ahl al-Dhimma, but it may be that security measures were the main cause. Muslim leaders who conquered a vast land inhabited by Christians and Jews may have felt it necessary, for the security of their newly established State, to distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The first decree of al-Hākīm in 395/1004 ordered them only to wear the Ghiyār when they appeared in public to emphasise that they were Jews and Christians and not Muslims. When they did not obey this order, punishment followed. He decreed that to wear the Ghiyār was not enough and that a further symbol for their religions should be carried on their person ~ a cross for the Christian and a piece of wood to be carried by the Jews was added to the order. When this was also ignored, the order was again emphasised. A larger cross and a larger piece of wood were ordered and all Ahl al-Dhimma were forbidden to ride on the backs of horses; mules or donkeys only, with undecorated saddles, were allowed for their transport. Boats manned by Muslims were also forbidden to them. When further disobedience was reported, al-Hākīm permitted Muslims to spy upon them and report to the police about offenders. He also threatened to dismiss every disobedient Dhimmi from the offices of the State and began a census of Muslim Kuttāb who would be capable of replacing them.¹⁷⁹ Eventually Ahl al-Dhimma seem to have realised the stubborn determination of al-Hākīm and that his orders should be strictly observed and at last they began to accept his measures. Those who found it intolerable applied for permission to leave the country. Al-Hākīm issued a decree permitting any Dhimmi to leave the Fatimid Empire safeguarded,

179. Anṭākī, 203.

and with his properties and belongings, as has been mentioned before. Those who decided to remain in Egypt either adopted Islām or kept their own faith but gave complete obedience to the law. Later on, the severity of the measures was lifted. Even those who had adopted Islām and wished to return to their previous faith were permitted to do so on the condition that they should wear the Ghiyār and obey the law of Islām when practising their religious functions.¹⁸⁰

If the measures taken by al-Ḥākim were merely to distinguish Dhimīs by their religious faith, which they themselves seem to have been proud of and very determined to keep, it is strange that they opposed al-Ḥākim's less harsh measures which caused them to be used more severely. It may have been that because Ahl al-Dhimma, mainly Christians, were a large part of the Egyptian population, too rich, too powerful and too prominent, they were socially and administratively playing a leading role in the political life of the country. They probably resented any kind of restriction that would affect their prestige. The ensuing enforcement of the new laws was a grave challenge to their position. It abolished their prestige and even curtailed a part of their freedom as ordinary citizens. They were not even free to choose their own dress,

180. Antaki, 231; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 135-7.

could no longer employ Muslim servants or take slave girls as concubines. Worst of all was the humiliation and ill-treatment they began to receive from the hostile Muslim crowds.¹⁸¹ Dhimmi officials, who were numerous, undoubtedly encouraged their co-religionists to ignore the orders and probably managed to convince the police not to be hard on them for offending the law in that respect. It is noticeable that there is no information which suggests that a group of Dhimmis were punished for their disobedience of these laws when it is confirmed that such disobedience had actually occurred. It has been already mentioned that in 403/1012 al-Hākim officially permitted the Muslim public to see that Ahl al-Dhimma observed his orders, which indicates that he no longer trusted his officials for that purpose.

It is very difficult to give a satisfactory account of the results of this policy of al-Hākim. Chroniclers' reports are very brief and lack accuracy.¹⁸² Apart from the destruction of the churches, there was nothing else of significant importance. The Dhimmi staff of the financial administration had retained their positions after either adopting

181. See Anṭākī, 194-224; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 125-140; Majīd, al-Hākim, 95-7.

182. Anṭākī, 203-4; 207; Ibn al-Sābi' quoted by Sibṭ, fol. 206 ff; Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 130-40; Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 68; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 63; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 46, 131; Sibṭ, fol. 195 ff; al-Dhahabī, 'Ibar, III, 66; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 339; al-Yāfi'ī, II, 429; Ibn Ayās, I, 53.

Islām or obeying al-Ḥākim's orders,¹⁸³ thus the financial administration did not seem to have suffered any setbacks. This is supported by the fact that there is no information which suggests that financial crises had occurred as a result of al-Ḥākim's suppression of Ahl al-Dhimma. A number of families of both Jewish and Christian communities migrated from the Fatimid Empire.

This attitude of al-Ḥākim had undoubtedly enhanced his reputation and increased his popularity amongst the Muslim masses. Ibn al-Qalānisi says that when he ordered the destruction of Qiyama, Muslims held long prayers of thanksgiving.¹⁸⁴ It is also apparent in all reports of Muslim chroniclers that his suppression of Ahl al-Dhimma was the most appreciated action he had ever undertaken.

183. Antākī, 203-4.

184. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 68.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXTERNAL POLICIES OF AL-HĀKIM

His Policy towards the 'Abbasid Empire

Since the inception of their movement, the Fatimids aimed at the overthrow of the 'Abbasid rule and the establishment of their suzerainty over the entire Muslim world. Maghrib was the first step towards this, followed by their conquest and movement into Egypt, from where they hoped to plan and deal the final blow to their enemies in Baghdad. But as the Fatimid conquest progressed towards the east it was met with a fierce opposition in Syria. The Qarāmita, who dominated the southern parts of Syria and received at times a tribute from the rulers of Damascus, found in the conquering Fatimid troops a serious rival that threatened their interests in the area. Although they had fought the 'Abbasids for the Isma'īlī cause, when their interests conflicted with those of the Isma'īlī Imām, they stood against him. The 'Abbasid Caliph found in his erstwhile enemies, the Qarāmita, a very convenient force which he supported in Syria hoping that they would be able to halt the advance of the Fatimid troops towards his capital. The Qarāmita succeeded in defeating the overconfident Maghribi troops and remained in Syria for a number of years, crippling the expansion of the Fatimid power towards

Baghdad.¹

Two factors occurred during this struggle and had far-reaching effects upon the situation. The sudden death of Imām al-Mu'iz, who was succeeded by his son al-'Azīz, and the introduction of the Turkish and Daylamite element into the Fatimid army, to whom rank and power were given, creating rivalry between the chiefs of both the new and old elements. In consequence, the progress of the Fatimid power was halted, the spirit of its fighting troops was weakened and the idea of a quick conquest of the eastern parts of the Muslim world was substituted by a desire for a lasting settlement in Egypt, a concentration on internal affairs and finding solutions for the problems which had already been disturbing their suzerainty in Syria and Palestine.²

Al-Hākim's dreams of conquering all parts of the Muslim world were as ambitious of those of his grandfather al-Mu'iz. The difference

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1. See Anṭakī, 139 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 1 ff; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 49 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 242 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 48 ff; Ibn Taghri Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 74 ff; Itti'āz, 248 ff. For discussion on the Qarāmita see M.J. de Goeje, Memoire sur les Carmathes du Bahrain et les Fatimids, Leyden, 1886; S.M. Stern, "Ismailis and Qarmatians" in L'elaboration de l'Islam, (1961), 99 ff.
 2. See the death-bed advice of Ya'qūb Ibn Killis in al-Rudhrawārī, 185; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 32; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 54; Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Munṭazam, VII, 56; Ibn Khallikan, IV, 359; Khitaṭ, II, 7.

between them was the method. While al-Mu'iz relied more on the power of his strong army to achieve his dreams, al-Hākim, perhaps due to circumstances, employed the power of the Isma'īlī Da'wa. In addition, he used the most effective weapon to gain support – the gifts of money.³

Since both regimes, the Fatimid and the 'Abbasid, failed to settle their dispute in the battlefield and neither of them appeared capable of conquering the others' land, they entered a period of cold war where propaganda was the main weapon.

Although chroniclers' reports are very brief and can hardly give a satisfactory picture of this issue, it appears that al-Hākim was planning to infiltrate the 'Abbasid Empire. With the aid of his active and efficient Dā'īs he endeavoured to create a popular ground, which he would be able to use to overthrow the 'Abbasids. Special efforts were made to convert the chiefs of tribes and heads of principalities under 'Abbasid rule, such as Mahmūd of Ghazna, Qirwāsh al-'Uqaylī and 'Alī al-Asadī, to the Fatimid cause.⁴

3. Antakī, 206; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 251; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 403.

4. See Antakī, 206, who speaks of al-Hākim's attempts to win the loyalty of provincial rulers in the 'Abbasid Empire. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 92; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 249 ff; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 401; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 283; Iḥī'āz, anno, 401; Ibn Taghri Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 224; Nuwayrī, fol. 56; Abu al-Fidā, II, 140, all speak of his endeavour to gain Qirwāsh's support. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 262; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 403; Ibn Taghri Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 232, mention his communication with Mahmūd of Ghazna. Nuwayrī, fol. 56, speaks of 'Alī al-Asadī's declaration of loyalty to al-Hākim.

It is noticeable that the most efficient and distinguished Dā'īs of the Isma'īlī Dā'wa at that time were assigned to operate inside the 'Abbasid Empire. Khatgīn, whom al-Hākīm chose later to be the general Director of the whole Dā'wa, (Dā'ī al-Du'āt) was operating in Iraq at the court of the Buyids, who were the true rulers of the 'Abbasid Empire.⁵ Al-Kirmānī, whose title Hujjat al-'Irāqayn, Hujja of Irāq and Western Persia, indicates the area of his operations. According to the Isma'īlī literature concerning the hierarchal system of the Dā'wa, where a Hujja operated as Dā'ī Jazīra (Dā'ī of an island) as in the case of Kirmānī, a number of one thousand four hundred and forty Dā'īs would be operating under his supervision.⁶ It may be that such numeration, in the Isma'īlī literature, is not accurate or is perhaps exaggerated for the purpose of propaganda, but it still indicates that there was a large number of efficient and skilled Dā'īs working for the Fatimid movement inside the 'Abbasid Empire. Since the activities and movement of these Dā'īs were kept in deep secrecy, it is not surprising that so little is known about the areas of their assignments and the difficulties they faced. But it is possible to suggest that the junctions of commercial routes, key towns and cities where large numbers of Muslims met, were their main targets.

5. This Dā'ī was nicknamed al-'Aḍudī (Ibn al-Qalānisi, 67) which meant that he was in the court of 'Aḍud al-Dawla, the Buyid prince.

6. See A Tāmir, Arba' Rasā' il Ismā'iliyya, 12 ff; M.K. Husayn in his introduction to Dīwān al-Mu'ayyad fi al-Dīn, 54; M. Ghālib, A'lam al-Isma'iliyya, 22 ff.

Soon the results of the well organised propaganda began to emerge. The Shī'a of Iraq, even those of the twelvers group (Ithna 'Ashariyya) began to look to al-Ḥākim as their desired Caliph. In 398/1007, and in Baghdad itself during a quarrel with Sunnis, they shouted slogans for al-Ḥākim (Yā Ḥākim Yā Maṣṣūr).⁷

In 401/1010 a significant event in the Fatimid and 'Abbasid relations of that time occurred. Qirwāsh Ibn Muqallād, the chief of the 'Uqayl tribe and Governor of Muṣīl, Madā'in, Anbār and Kūfa, acknowledged the Fatimid Caliphate instead of the 'Abbasid. He read the Khutba in the name of al-Ḥākim and struck al-Ḥākim's name on the coinage and flags throughout his principality.⁸ Also, in the same year, 'Alī al-Asadī, chief of the tribe of Banū Asad, declared his loyalty to al-Ḥākim in Hilla and the district which was under his rule.⁹

The declaration of the Fatimid Caliphate in places on the doorstep of Baghdad infuriated the 'Abbasid Caliph. He immediately began preparations to campaign against Qirwāsh. A large army, under the leadership of al-Ḥusayn Ibn Ja'far, known as 'Amīd al-Juyūsh, was called

7. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 237 ff; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 339; al-Yāfi'i, Mir'āt al-Jinān, III, 494.

8. See *supra*, note 4. Special details on the Khutba are given by Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 249 ff; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 224 ff.

9. See Nuwayrī, fol. 56.

for this purpose.¹⁰

Fearing reprisals and without Fatimid military support, Qirwāsh was forced to recite the name of the 'Abbasid Caliph in the Khutba and repudiate his loyalty to al-Hākīm.¹¹

It is strange that al-Hākīm, who had been very anxious to gain the loyalty of tribal chiefs like Qirwāsh, did not attempt to defend his friend against the 'Abbasid Caliph, knowing that Qirwāsh alone would have no chance of success. It is possible that he was not sure of Qirwāsh's sincerity; or was it perhaps because he was not too sure of the power of his own army? Chroniclers fail to give a satisfactory explanation. Although Qirwāsh may have been, like other Bedouin chiefs in the area, loyal to no-one except himself, there are reasons to suggest that he might have been genuinely sincere in his attempt to depose the 'Abbasid sovereignty and acknowledge that of the Fatimids.

After the death of 'Aḍud al-Dawla (the Shī'ī prince of the Buyid dynasty, who was the real ruler of the 'Abbasid Caliphate), in 372/982 the position of the Shī'a in the 'Abbasid Empire began to deteriorate. The decline of the Buyids, which followed his death, accompanied with the growth of power of the Sunni Saljuqs in the army, offered the 'Abbasid Caliph an opportunity to restore some of his own power. Subsequently

10. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 227 ff.

11. See *supra*, notes 4, 8, 10.

after a long time of absence, he appeared to play an effective role in political events. A part of his activities was to exert pressure on the Shī'ā group.¹² Qirwāsh descended from a family which professed the Shī'ī doctrine. His father, al-Muqallad, was known as an extreme Shī'ī.¹³ When in 380/990 his uncle al-Musayib succeeded in taking over the Governorship in Muṣil, he acknowledged the Fatimid Caliphate instead of the 'Abbasid.¹⁴ Denouncing the Sunni Caliph of Baghdad and declaring loyalty to the Shī'ī Caliph of Cairo would enhance Qirwāsh's prestige amongst the Shī'ā in Iraq. They might even turn towards him for leadership since the popularity of the Buyids had begun to fade.

It may be that the real reason for al-Ḥakim's failure to support Qirwāsh was the weakness of his army. The military power of the Fatimid State was much weaker than before. In 390-393/999-1001 it failed to ensure the Fatimid suzerainty over Tripoli in North Africa. In 396-397/1005-1006 it almost failed to defend the very existence of the Fatimid Caliphate against Abū Rakwa. In 401/1010 it failed even to control the Bedouins of Palestine.

12. A study of the reports of al-Rudhrawārī, Dhayl Tajārib al-Umam, proves this. See also al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, annos, 395-405; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 65, 206, 210, 218. More details in the annual reports of Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam; Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, Mir'āt; Ibn Kaṭhīr; al-Yafī'ī, Mir'āt al-Jīnān concerning the years 372-400.

13. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 202.

14. See al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 390; Ibn Khallikān, III, 525 ff; al-Ṣafadī, fol.101; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 116. See also Ibn al-Ṣabī', Dhayl Tajārib al-Umam, 390, who says that in 391/1000 al-Muqallad was planning to take over power in Baghdad itself.

This is in addition to its continuous failure to put Aleppo under Cairo's direct control. These events may have convinced al-Ḥakīm that his army was not strong enough to meet the 'Abbasid forces on the doorstep of Baghdad.

The 'Abbasid Caliph, who was alarmed when the Fatimid propaganda achieved such success inside his Empire, desired to retaliate against al-Ḥakīm using the same weapon. In 402/1011 he gathered a considerable number of learned men to his court and commanded them to declare in a written manifesto that the Fatimids of Maghrib and Egypt were imposters whose claim of 'Alid descent was false. It even accused them of aiming at the destruction of Islām and Muslims.¹⁵ It is noteworthy that, since the claim of 'Alid descent was the core of the Fatimid propaganda, this manifesto created a serious challenge to its success. It bore the signature of a number of 'Alid dignitaries and learned men in Iraq and was circulated and read in every Mosque of the 'Abbasid State. Indeed, it created a doubt over the Fatimid descent which up to the present time, historians have failed to determine. In addition, the 'Abbasid Caliph hired theologians and paid them large sums of money to write books in contradiction of the Fatimid cause and their doctrine.¹⁶

15. For details on the manifesto, see Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 98; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, VII, 255; al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, anno, 401, and *Iḥṣār III*, 76 ff; al-Ṣafadī, quotes Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Wafī*, fol.17; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, IV, 229; Abu al-Fidā, II, 142. For discussion see Mamour, *Polemics on the Origin of the Fatimids*, and H. I. Hasan, *The Fatimids in Egypt*, where both historians discuss the conflicting opinions of most modern scholars.

16. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, IV, 236.

The war of propaganda continued and al-Ḥākim, in 403/1012, contacted Maḥmūd, the powerful prince of the Ghaznavid dynasty. Chroniclers say that he asked him to join the Fatimid Da'wa and declare his loyalty to al-Ḥākim.¹⁷ Maḥmūd, with his powerful and well organised army¹⁸, seems to have appeared to al-Ḥākim as the ideal ally whose support, if secured, would bring about the overthrow of the 'Abbasids and spread the Fatimid sovereignty over the Eastern parts of the Muslim world. Unfortunately for the hopes of the Fatimid Imām, Maḥmūd of Ghazna does not appear to have been interested in joining in the Fatimid Da'wa. He was an extreme Sunni and there seems to have been no reason for him to acknowledge the Fatimid Caliphate instead of the 'Abbasid.¹⁹ He flatly refused al-Ḥākim's offers and, as some chroniclers state, "sent the letters of communication, after tearing them up, to the Caliph of Baghdad."²⁰

Chroniclers' reports on this issue are very brief and hardly offer any explanation for the reasons which made al-Ḥākim contact an extreme Sunni Sulṭān and ask him to change his faith and allegiance. Is it possible

17. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 262; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 403; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 232.

18. C.E. Bosworth, "Ghaznavid military organisation", Isl, 1960 (Band, 36, No. 1-2), 37 ff.

19. C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavid, Edinburgh, 1963, 50 ff.

20. See *supra*, note 17.

that Maḥmūd, at some time, had shown some response to the Ismaʿīlī Dāʿīs ? Or was it a mere plot by al-Ḥākim to scare the ʿAbbasid Caliph and create some dispute between him and Maḥmūd from which he could only benefit. It is also likely that it was a political manoeuvre to protect the Eastern Persian principalities which sympathised with the Fatimids from the growing danger of the Ghaznavid power. The tenth century had seen the triumph of political Shīʿism over many areas of the Muslim Empire. In the Iranian world Shīʿism was widely spread amongst the population. Even a number of ruling dynasties professed Shīʿi doctrine openly.²¹ The Ismaʿīlī Dāʿīs were very active and achieved a significant success there.

The rise of the young and vigorous Ghaznavid regime was a threat to Shīʿism and in particular to the interests of the Ismaʿīlī Dāʿwa. Therefore al-Ḥākim may have endeavoured to win Maḥmūd's friendship, if not loyalty, and thus ensure the interests of his Dāʿwa in the Eastern parts of the Islamic world.

Al-Ḥākim's attempt, however, did not only fail, but seems to have provoked Maḥmūd's anger. He intensified his actions against the Ismaʿīlīs

21. See C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, 51 ff. See also S.M. Stern, "Ismaili Propaganda and Fatimid Rule in Sind", I.C., (Oct. 1949), 298-307; B. Lewis, "Ismaili Notes", B.S.O.A.S., XII (1948), 599 ff; A.H. Hamdāni, The Ismaili Dāʿwa in Northern India, Cairo, 1956.

and sympathisers of the Fatimid cause. For this reason he became the defender of the faith and hammer of heretics in the eyes of the Sunnis,²² but according to the Isma'īlīs, the enemy of God and the true believers.²³

Towards the end of his reign, al-Ḥākim's concentration on winning support inside the 'Abbasid Empire began to decline. This was probably because of the division amongst the Isma'īlī Dā'īs in Egypt. For that reason, al-Ḥākim summoned to Cairo the chief Dā'ī of Iraq and Western Persia - al-Kirmānī. Subsequently the activities of the Dā'īs underwent a period of weakening. His method, however, was later adopted by his successors and in 448/1056 the Dā'īs achieved a significant success when in Baghdad itself the Khuṭba was read, for over a year, in the name of the Fatimid Imām-Caliph.

Al-Ḥākim's Policy concerning Aleppo

Aleppo, the great centre of Northern Syria, was of vital importance to all Muslims because of its proximity to Byzantium, the traditional enemy of Islām and one which remained beyond the reach of the Caliphs. The fourth/tenth century had witnessed a number of significant changes in the history of Aleppo; the decline of the 'Abbasid direct control over the area; the establishment of the semi-independent State of the Hamdānids; the

22. C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, 51 ff.

23. See Kirmānī, Risālat al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bishārāt, published by M.K. Husayn in Ta'rifat al-Drūz, 55.

revival of the power of Byzantium and the arrival of the Fatimids and their conquest of Egypt and Syria (Bilād al-Shām). Towards the middle of the century, the Byzantines became very active in Northern Syria. Their continued and successful raids threatened the stability of the area and forced the Ḥamdānids to pay tribute to the Byzantine Emperor. The situation was so difficult for the Muslims of Northern Syria that al-Mu'iz, the Fatimid Caliph, was able to exploit it for propaganda purposes. The general policy of the early Fatimid Caliphs was not to allow, if they could prevent it, dynastic rule to exist in the provinces of their Empire, especially provinces in the centre of the Muslim world which were of vital importance. Such a rule was undoubtedly the first sign of decline in vast Empires. This could be seen in al-Mu'iz's attitude towards the Ḥamdānids of Aleppo. His plan was to abolish their rule and put the city under his direct control. He said when he arrived in Egypt, that he did not come to add more land to his Empire, but to protect Muslims and Islām from the Byzantines.²⁴ This was an indirect hint and tactical propaganda manoeuvre aiming to prepare the populace's acceptance for the abolition of the Ḥamdānid's rule in Aleppo. The Ḥamdānids seem to have been aware of the Fatimid

24. Itti'āz, 148 ff.

plans and tried to counter them in a shrewd way. As soon as the Fatimid troops succeeded in conquering Damascus, they declared their loyalty to al-Mu'iz and sent a delegation to Egypt to congratulate Jawhar (the chief commander of the Fatimid army) for the successful conquest. By this they aimed at placing the Fatimid Imām in an embarrassing situation which would help to preserve their rule. Since they were on his side and prepared to support his war against Byzantium, there would be no reason for him to abolish their rule, and thus they would be able to retain their province and rely on Fatimid troops to defend it. But the Fatimid Imām was even more shrewd. He wrote to Jawhar commanding him to welcome the delegate but not to give any promises.²⁵

Both the Hamdanids and al-Mu'iz seem to have over-estimated the power of the Fatimid army. Ensuring Fatimid suzerainty in Southern Syria, which would be accomplished before any movement to the north, was not an easy task. Al-Mu'iz died before he was able to achieve it. His successor, al-'Azīz, spent a considerable number of years of his reign fighting for it and thus the army which was anticipated to march towards Aleppo after the conquest of Damascus in 360/970 was never able

25. Itti'āz, 141, and Khiṭaṭ, I, 352.

to create a serious challenge to Aleppo before 383/993. During that time a number of important developments occurred. Friendly relations began to emerge between the Byzantines and the 'Abbasid Caliphate, resulting in a signed agreement of ten years of non-aggression (Hudna).²⁶ The strategy of Aleppo was realised more fully by the Byzantines. They became more committed to the idea of keeping it as a buffer State which prevented them from direct confrontation with the Fatimids, rather than putting it under their direct control.²⁷ The death of Abu al-Ma'ālī Sa'd al-Dawla, son of Sayf al-Dawla (the most famous ruler of the Hamdanid dynasty)²⁸ and the succession of his son Abu al-Fadā'il with whose rule began the end of the Hamdanids in Aleppo. He was over-ruled by his Hājib Lūlū, who planned and eventually succeeded in abolishing the Hamdanids' dynastic rule in Aleppo and built his own.²⁹

Despite the realistic advice of his Wazīr Ya'qūb Ibn Killis,³⁰ al-Azīz decided to follow his father's policy, which was to take Aleppo by force, abolish its dynastic rule and put the province under his own direct

26. See al-Rudhrawī, Dhayl Tajārūb al-Umam, 37.

27. For details and analysis, see S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 24 ff.

28. For details and discussion on Sayf al-Dawla, see M. Canard, La Dynastie Des H'amdānides, Paris, 1953, I, 579 ff, and "Hamdanids", E.I.²

29. See M. Canard, La Dynastie des H'amdānides, I, 706 ff; S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 30 ff. See also "Hamdanids", E.I.²

30. See *Supra* Note 2

control. His efforts went as far as besieging the city but never conquering it. Defending Aleppo against direct Fatimid rule was a priority in Byzantine politics.³¹

The aims of al-Ḥākim's policy concerning Aleppo was the same as his father's, but his method was entirely different. He realised that by the present force of his army his aim would never be achieved and since he had no intentions of strengthening his army, then a different plan should be adopted, and tactical manoeuvres were the answer. The real power behind the rulers of Aleppo was Byzantium. Al-Ḥākim made peace with the Emperor and thus weakened their reliance on Byzantine help. He planned to create rivalry and local wars between the rulers of Aleppo, and their rivals the Bedouin tribes in the area. This rivalry would result in weakening the powers of all parties concerned and make the inhabitants feel insecure under their rule. The Dā'īs of al-Ḥākim's propaganda would take advantage of the situation and convince the inhabitants that the only solution for their troubles would be the direct rule of the Fatimid Caliph. If the population of Aleppo demanded al-Ḥākim's

31. Antākī, 173 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 27 ff; A. Rustum, History of the Byzantines, II, 50 ff; M. Canard, La Dynastie des H'amdanides, I, 715 ff; "The Byzantine Empire", Cambridge History, IV (Part I), 718 ff; A.A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, I, 307 ff; G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, English translation by J. Hussey, 300 ff; S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 24 ff.

direct rule, Byzantium would have no justifiable reason to interfere since al-Ḥākim had not violated the peace agreement.

The events which occurred in Aleppo after the death of its ruler Lūlū in 399/1008 facilitated al-Ḥākim's policy and helped him to achieve his goals. Lulu's son, Maṣṣūr, who succeeded his father, was faced with a number of enemies: Abu al-Ḥayjā, the Ḥamdānid Prince who came from Byzantium with Byzantine help to restore the rule of his ancestors; the Mirdāsids,³² the Kilābī tribe, which had been encouraged by al-Ḥākim to menace and weaken the rule of Lūlū and had been attempting to gain control over Aleppo.

Al-Ḥākim, who did not want to support the Ḥamdānids in regaining their province, did not agree to have a new dynasty of Lulu or the Mirdāsids ruling Aleppo and planned as follows.

He supported Maṣṣūr against Abū al-Ḥayjā and caused the latter's defeat³³ then encouraged the Mirdāsids to fight Maṣṣūr who was finally defeated. He fled from Aleppo leaving its citadel under the control of one

32. A full account of the Mirdāsids and their role in Northern Syria is given by S. Zakkār in his thesis, The Emirate of Aleppo.

33. After this defeat Maṣṣūr declared his loyalty to al-Ḥākim. On this S. Zakkār comments: "It is noteworthy that Maṣṣūr Ibn Lūlū was the first ruler of Aleppo who acknowledged the Fatimid Caliphate instead of the 'Abbasid." (The Emirate of Aleppo, 42). This, however, does not appear to be consistent with the available reports of chroniclers. A considerable number of them suggest that on earlier occasions, rulers of Aleppo acknowledged the Fatimid Caliphate instead of the 'Abbasid. Ibn al-Aṭhīr, VIII, 240; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, =

of his Ghilmān known as Fatḥ, who was in secret contact with al-Hākīm. Al-Hākīm was pleased with this result and granted Ṣālīḥ, the Mirdāsīd chief, the title Asad al-Dawla (Lion of the State) and Fatḥ the title Mubārak al-Dawla (Blessed of the State).³⁴ He commanded his troops in Syria to move towards Aleppo and prevent any agreement between Ṣālīḥ and Fatḥ, because Ṣālīḥ had suggested to Fatḥ that he should keep the citadel for himself and give the city to the Mirdāsīds and thus unite their forces to defend Aleppo against the direct rule of Cairo.

The Ima'īlī Dā'īs operated very quickly in influencing the Aleppans to gather around the citadel and declare that they desired to be under the direct rule of the Fatimids. Fatḥ, who appears to have been reluctant to decide, was offered the governorship of Tyre, Ṣaydūn and Beirut, together with all treasures which the citadel of Aleppo contained

= Nujūm, IV, 58, say that Abu al-Ma'ālī declared the Khuṭba in the name of al-Mu'iz. This is confirmed by the reports of Maqrīzī in Ifti'āz, 141, and Khīṭaṭ, I, 352. Ibn Khallikān, III, 525; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 386; al-Ṣafadī, fol. 101; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 116, all say "وفي أيامه (العزّ) فتح" "وفي أيامه (العزّ) فتح" Of course this does not necessarily mean that al-'Azīz had actually conquered Aleppo, but it strongly indicates that Aleppo was one of the provinces where his name was recited in the Khuṭba. The death-bed advice of Ibn Killis also suggests that acknowledgement of the Fatimid Caliphate in Aleppo during al-'Azīz's time was achieved.

34. For details of events which led to this see Anṭākī, 209 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 94 ff; Ibn al-'Adīm, Zubāt al-Ḥalab, I, 200 ff; Sibṭ, Mir'at, fol. 201 ff; M. Canard, La Dynastie des Hamdanides, I, 708 ff; S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 30 ff. See also article "Hamdanids", E.I.²

and an additional honorary title. He agreed, and the Fatimid troops entered the city after some minor clashes with the Mirdāsids and thus in the month of Ramaḍān 407/1017 the first Wālī appointed by a Fatimid Caliph entered Aleppo.³⁵ His name was Fāṭik and he was known as ‘Azīz al-Dawla.³⁶ Al-Hākīm's policy after he took control over Aleppo was to gain the confidence of the inhabitants and thus secure the loyalty of the Aleppans and facilitate the spread of his cause amongst them. He exempted them from paying tax for a year and sent them free supplies from the stores of the State. Ibn al-‘Adīm reports a decree addressed to the inhabitants of Aleppo and signed by al-Hākīm, which illustrates al-Hākīm's plan. The decree says, "When Amīr al-Mu‘minīn (Commander of the Faithful) learned of the tyranny you suffer from the ill treatment by those who were in power amongst you, burdening you with taxes and harsh duties out of all proportion to the ways of Islām, he, may God strengthen his power, has ordered supplies to be sent to you from the State's stores and to exempt you from the Kharāj until the year 407. By this you will know that the light of righteousness has risen and the darkness of tyranny has been dispelled."³⁷

35. See Anṭākī, 216.

36. Anṭākī, 216.

37. Ibn al-‘Adīm, Zubda, I, 214.

Although the Byzantine Emperor was angered by the success of the Fatimid diplomacy, he did not break the non-aggression treaty. His first reaction was directed against the inhabitants of the province of Aleppo. He prohibited any kind of trade between them and the subjects of his Empire.³⁸ Later he followed a similar line to that of al-Ḥākim in order to restore Aleppo to its previous position. He maintained good relations with the Mirdāsids, perhaps in order to use them against Fātik. Anṭākī says that the Emperor allowed his subjects to trade only with the Mirdāsids.³⁹ But Fātik did not seem to have been in need of forceful persuasion to rebel against his master in Egypt. The remoteness of Cairo, the threats and offers of the Byzantine influence in the area and his personal ambitions to establish his own rule, made it easy for him to turn his back on al-Ḥākim. Shortly after his appointment he began to behave as an independent ruler. He dismissed the Wālīs and government officials appointed by al-Ḥākim and employed instead men of his own choice.⁴⁰

At this stage al-Ḥākim realised that force was necessary to keep his control over Aleppo and a show of power was needed to maintain his sovereignty in the province. He commanded his Wālīs in Syria to prepare

38. Anṭākī, 214.

39. Anṭākī, 214.

40. Anṭākī, 216.

for an expedition against Fātik. At the same time the Emperor of Byzantium, who appears to have been determined to support his interest, began moving his troops from the northern borders of his Empire to the south, preparing himself for a showdown with the Fatimids.⁴¹

The sudden death of al-Hākim prevented the two Empires from breaking the peace which had lasted between them for more than twenty years.

His Policy concerning Damascus

Syria's strategic position in the Middle East and its proximity to Egypt gave it great importance in the external policy of independent Egyptian rulers. Its complete control was vital to the safety of Egypt. It was through Syria that most conquerers came and occupied the land of the Nile. The nature of the land that connects the two countries makes Egypt a target for easy invasion. The traditional foreign policy of independent Egyptian rulers, therefore, was to put Syria, or part of it, under their control and use it as a buffer State to protect their country from invasion.⁴²

At the beginning of their era in Egypt, the Fatimid Imām-Caliphs did not pursue such a policy. To them the conquest of Syria and even Egypt itself was a step towards the final goal which was the conquest of

41. Antākī, 239 ff; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, I, 218 ff.

42. See S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 30 ff.

Iraq and the Eastern parts of the Muslim world. Since their advance towards the East was halted and settlement in Egypt became imminent, the traditional Egyptian policy began to materialise but with some difference. Syria was not only a defence line but was also a garrison from which Fatimid operations were launched against the 'Abbasids in Baghdad. It was also the overland route to Arabia through which trade and pilgrims' caravans crossed every year. Thus its importance to the Fatimids was more than to other Egyptian rulers.

The Syrians, who were of Sunni majority and were once the main supporters of the Umayyads, resented Fatimid Shī'ī rule and were always ready to rebel against it. Damascus, the centre of Southern Syria, was the city which caused more troubles to al-Mu'iz and al-'Azīz than any other city in their vast Empire.⁴³ During the first three years of al-Hākīm's reign two anti-Fatimid uprisings occurred. Thanks to the efforts of the capable Wālī, Jaysh Ibn al-Ṣamsāma, in 388/998 the rebellions in Damascus were brought to an end. But Jaysh's method was to use force. Al-Hākīm, whose main aim was to win the loyalty, and not only the obedience, of the Syrians, seems to have realised that force was not the right method. His plan was to create a popular ground for his cause; people who believed in

43. For details see the accounts of Antākī, 134 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 3 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 48 ff; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 32 ff; Iḥti'āz, 173 ff.

the Fatimid doctrine and would be prepared to fight for it. This could be achieved only if the ruler showed a sincere interest in the welfare of the ruled. In order to achieve this, he adopted a line of policy which served his purpose most. He paid a sincere attention to the welfare of the Damascenes but did not underestimate their readiness to rebel and took every precaution to prevent it. He chose men whose loyalty was undoubted as governors of Syria. Amongst these were Jaysh Ibn al-Ṣamsāma, ‘Alī Ibn Falāḥ, Tamsūlat Ibn Bakkar, Shātigīn, Khatgīn, Bushāra and ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Ilyās, his cousin and would-be successor to the Caliphate.⁴⁴ He never appointed a Damascene as Wālī in Damascus, nor did he allow any Wālī to remain long enough to earn prestige for themselves which might lead to an attempt for independence. During his reign, a considerable number of Wālīs were sent there, some of whom were recalled after a few months. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi's account, twenty-one Wālīs were appointed during the twenty-two years of al-Ḥākim's rule.⁴⁵ Al-Ḥākim was very cautious concerning his chosen governors of Syria and although he appointed trusted men, he spied upon their activities and sometimes used subterfuges to examine their loyalty.

44. See details on the appointments of these Wālīs in the reports of Ibn al-Qalānisi, 49 ff; and Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 386-405.

45. See Ibn al-Qalānisi, 49 ff. See also Antākī, 180-227 and Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, annos, 386-405, and Khīṭaṭ, II, 285. Both chroniclers offer some information about the Wālīs appointed by al-Ḥākim.

Antākī says that when al-Ḥākīm began mistrusting his cousin and appointed heir ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, he dismissed him from the governorship of Damascus and commanded him to come to Egypt. But because ʿAbd al-Raḥīm obeyed the orders and moved towards Egypt, a command of re-appointment was sent to him which he received in Ramla and from there he returned to Damascus.⁴⁶ He did not hesitate to dismiss any Wālī who appeared to have misused his authority or if the inhabitants had complained against him. He dismissed ʿAlī Ibn Falāḥ when he was told that ʿAlī had expressed his dissatisfaction with the orders from Cairo.⁴⁷ Khatgīn was dismissed because al-Ḥākīm learned that the troops were not pleased with his conduct.⁴⁸ Ibn al-Naḥawī was even executed when al-Ḥākīm was informed of his cruelty and ill treatment of the people.⁴⁹ In addition, al-Ḥākīm sent Dāʿīs to the towns and villages of Syria to spread the Ismaʿīlī doctrine. From the Ismaʿīlī Manuscript Al-Azhār we learn that Dāʿīs were commanded, after graduation from Dār al-Ḥikma, to go to Syria and explain to its people the teachings of the Imām.⁵⁰

46. See Antākī, 227; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 70; Ittiʿāz, anno, 409.

47. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 57 ff; Ittiʿāz, anno, 392.

48. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 57; Ittiʿāz, anno, 392.

49. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 60; Ittiʿāz, anno, 392, and Khitat, II, 31.

50. See quotations from "al-Azhār" on the biography of Dāʿī Aḥmad Ibn Yaʿqūb, known as "Abu al-Fawaris" in M. Ghāleb, Aʿlām al-Ismaʿiliyya, 126.

Although the people of Damascus did not adopt Isma'īlism and the majority remained Sunnis, the success of al-Hākīm's policy in Syria cannot be denied. It was mostly due to his shrewd handling that, throughout his rule, Damascus never rebelled. The spread of the Fatimid doctrine in Syrian villages and towns was of significant importance. It laid the foundation for a steady progress of the Da'wa activities which resulted later in converting a considerable portion of the population to the Isma'īlī doctrine.⁵¹

His Policy concerning al-Hijāz

The political significance of Hijāz was less than that of other parts of the Muslim Empire, such as Syria and Iraq, but it was vitally important from a religious standpoint. The Holy shrines of Islām, Mecca and Madīna, are so important to Muslims that some Muslim historians do not consider Caliphs as the rightful leaders of the Muslim Empire unless their names were read in the Khutba in the Mosques of the Holy places.⁵² To the Fatimids, Hijāz meant something special; the most facilitating place for propaganda function in all of the Muslim world. It was the only place where multitudes of Muslims from all corners of the Islamic land met

51. See B. Lewis, The Assassins, 98 ff.

52. al-Mas'ūdi, Murūj al-Dhahab, I, 192; Majid, al-Hākīm, 149.

every year during the pilgrimage season. If their Dā'īs could be allowed to operate freely there, the service to their cause would undoubtedly be tremendous. It was in Hijāz during the pilgrimage season, that the meeting between Abu 'Abd Allāh al-Shī'ī and the Kutāmī chiefs occurred, which later resulted in the establishment of the Fatimid State.

Since the early years of his reign, al-Mu'iz had made special efforts to gain the friendship of both the Ḥasanids and Ḥusaynids (the two rival families in Hijāz for the supremacy of the Holy places). By diplomacy and gifts of money, he succeeded in creating an atmosphere of tolerance and friendship between the two families and peace was restored after a long term of wars.⁵³ As a result, the two families acknowledged al-Mu'iz's goodwill and a bond of good relations linked them with his Caliphate. This might have been the factor which contributed to the official declaration of their loyalty to him as soon as Egypt and Syria fell to the commander of his army, Jawhar.⁵⁴

53. Ibn 'Idhārī, I, 221; Iṭṭi'āz, 145; Mājid, al-Ḥākim, 150 ff; M. Canard, "Fatimids", E.I.2

54. It appears clear in the chroniclers' reports that the declaration of loyalty to the Fatimids was a voluntary gesture on the part of the Sharīf of Mecca. The Fatimids did not send any military force to conquer Hijāz.

The acknowledgement of the Fatimid Caliphate in the Holy places of Islām gave a great moral support to the Imām-Caliphs throughout the Muslim Empire. It also offered them an opportunity to counter the propaganda of the 'Abbasids, which had been throwing doubts over their sincerity as Muslims. It is recorded that the splendour and riches of the Imāms had reached Hijāz since the Khuṭba was read in their names there.

Maqrīzī speaks of extensive efforts made by al-Mu'iz to send to Mecca the most luxurious Kiswa ever made to cover the ~~Black stone~~ Ka'ba.⁵⁵ Money was sent annually and regularly to be distributed to the pious and poor peoples of the Holy cities on behalf of the Fatimid Caliph. Care and attention towards the welfare of the pilgrims were specially emphasised by the Fatimid Imām.⁵⁶

The strategy of Hijāz as an ideal place for propaganda activities was the dominating factor in the planning of the Fatimid policy concerning the area. As long as the Khuṭba was read in their name and their missionaries operated freely, their aim was considered achieved. They neither interfered with the internal affairs of the province nor tried to put it under their direct control. Maintaining good relations with the

55. Iṭṭi'āz, 193.

56. See Sibṭ, Mirāt, fol. 194 ff; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 217; Iṭṭi'āz, 193, Khitāt, I, 492.

with the Sharīf of Mecca and the families of prestige in the Holy cities was the main method of the Fatimid Caliphs by which they hoped to achieve their ends.

Al-Ḥakīm's policy was a continuation of his father's. During his reign an event, which clearly illustrates the policy of the Fatimids in Hijāz, occurred. As will be discussed in detail later, the Sharīf of Mecca rebelled. He publicly denounced al-Ḥakīm and declared himself instead as Amīr al-Mu'minīn. Al-Ḥakīm did not send his troops to punish the Sharīf and restore the Khuṭba for himself. Instead he made communications with the dignitaries of Mecca and Medina, a number of whom were the Sharīf's own relatives. He paid them large sums of money and thus persuaded them to denounce the Sharīf and restore the Khuṭba in his name. The Sharīf, whose rebellion failed, wrote to al-Ḥakīm, apologising and asking for pardon. Al-Ḥakīm, who rarely appeared tolerant or merciful with those who disobeyed him, let alone those who denounced him, did not only pardon the Sharīf but sent him a large sum of money to compensate his losses during the rebellion and also re-appointed him as Sharīf of Mecca.⁵⁷

57. See "The Rebellion of the Jarrāhids", Chapter V of this thesis.

His Policy concerning Yaman

Very little is revealed in the sources about al-Ḥākim's policy concerning Yaman. It is very difficult to determine whether it was because of the remoteness of this country and its distance from the centre of the Muslim Empire that the Imām did not pay its affairs much attention, or because, since the collapse of the Isma'īlī State there, missionaries of the Fatimid cause fell under severe pressure and thus their communications with Egypt were maintained in complete secrecy, which is perhaps why chroniclers appear unaware of them.

Al-Ḥākim, however, appears to have been in continuous contact with his Dā'īs in Yaman. As Imām and supreme head of their mission, they reported to him about their activities,⁵⁸ explained to him their position, sent the traditional Najwā⁵⁸, collected from their followers and asked for his guidance and instruction. He appointed the Dā'īs, encouraged them to continue their struggle and supported them with all possible means to overcome the difficulties they were facing.⁵⁹

58. Voluntary money paid by Isma'īlīs to the spiritual representative of their Imām during their religious functions.

59. See al-Ḥākim's letter to Harūn Ibn Muḥammad, the chief Dā'ī in Yaman, recorded by Dā'ī Idrīs in his ʿUyūn al-Akhbār, VI, 271-273, edited by H. Hamdānī in al-Ṣulayḥiyyūn wa al-Ḥaraka al-Fatimiyya, 301, and by A.M. Majid in al-Ḥākim, 239.

His Policy concerning Maghrib

Al-Ḥākim's policies for the eastern parts of the Muslim world may be considered successful, but that which he pursued for Maghrib was a total failure. Barjawān's attempt to put Tripoli under the direct control of Cairo, which al-Ḥākim followed, did not only fail but it led to grave consequences on the interests of his Empire in North Africa. Relations between the Fatimids and their representatives in Maghrib, the Ṣinhājīs, deteriorated and thus the suzerainty of the Fatimids in the area was threatened. (The tribe of Ṣinhāja was the main force on which the Imāms relied to maintain their presence in Maghrib.) Tripoli fell under the control of Zanāta (the tribe which had always disowned the Fatimid loyalty), and later its chief declared his loyalty to the Umayyads of Spain. It also led to the disobedience of the tribe of Banū Qurra, who fell out with al-Ḥākim and later became the major support of the anti-Fatimid movements of Abū Rakwa.

The failure of this policy may be attributed to the treason of Zaydān (a high official in al-Ḥākim's court) and mishandling of the situation by al-Ḥākim. After the death of Yānis and the defeat of his army, as has been mentioned before, al-Ḥākim sent another army under the leadership of Yahyā al-Andalusī, whom he appointed as Wālī in Tripoli. He also commanded Zaydān to give Yahyā a sum of money for

expenditure. Zaydān, probably appropriated the money, gave Yahyā instead a signed order to collect the money from Barqa.⁶⁰ When Yahyā reached Barqa he realised that there was not enough money in its treasury to pay him. And since a great number of his troops were tribesmen of Banū Qurra, to whom he had promised sufficient payment, a crisis among his troops began to emerge. Banū Qurra did not only desert Yahyā, they also raided his camps, looted some of his equipment and returned to their own territory.⁶¹ With the rest of his troops, Yahyā entered Tripoli but was overpowered by the Zanāfī chief, Fulful, who humiliated him and took control over the province and declared his loyalty to the Umayyads of Spain.⁶²

Al-Ḥakīm, who appears to have begun to lose confidence in his military force, did not send another army to regain Tripoli, nor did he try to clear the dispute with the Ṣinhājīs and ask for their support. All he did was execute Zaydān when he learned of his treason and committed a great error by killing the delegation of Banū Qurra who came to Cairo to explain to him the reason for their desertion, although he promised them safe conduct.⁶³

60. Itti'āz, annal, 390.

61. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 64; Itti'āz, anno, 390.

62. See Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 64, 74; Ibn Khaldūn, IX, 59; H.R. Idrīs, La Berberie Orientale sans les Zirides, I, 99 ff.

63. Itti'āz, anno, 390.

After this the Fatimids were never able to fully recover their suzerainty in Maghrib. Their ties with the Zirids weakened and gradually the chiefs of Ṣinhāja began to rule independently and regardless of Fatimid interests in the area. Later they even abolished the name of the Fatimid Imām-Caliph from their Khutba and declared their token loyalty to the 'Abbasids.

Al-Hakim's Policy towards the Byzantine Empire

While al-Hākīm appears to have followed his father's policies and aimed to achieve what they had hoped to achieve inside the Muslim world, he entirely abandoned their plans and attitudes concerning the Byzantine Empire. His grandfather, al-Mu'iz, had always declared his intentions of invading and conquering Byzantium. His father, al-'Azīz, died while he was preparing a large army to lead against the Byzantines. Al-Hākīm, on the other hand, never declared at any time that he intended to wage war against the enemy of Islām (Byzantium) despite his extreme religious views. His policy towards Byzantium marked a new era in the Fatimid-Byzantine relations. The state of war which had long existed on the borders between the two Empires was substituted by peaceful relations and they both agreed on a ten-year

Hudna (truce).⁶⁴

Chroniclers fail to clarify why suddenly the two belligerent Empires decided to be peaceful towards each other, but it is possible to suggest that they were both forced by circumstances. The incapability of the Fatimid army to defeat the Byzantines had long been realised by wise politicians of the Fatimid court. On his deathbed, Ya'qūb Ibn Killis advised al-'Azīz to "be on peaceful terms with the Byzantines as long as they remain peaceful".⁶⁵ During the first two years of al-Hākim's reign his armies in Syria clashed continually with Byzantine forces, but failed to achieve a decisive victory. In addition, there were internal problems which needed to be solved, and Barjawān, who assumed power at that time, appeared to be more interested in solving them than waging war against Byzantium.⁶⁶

On the Byzantine side there appears to have been similar circumstances. In addition to the Emperor's realisation of his inability to totally defeat the Fatimids and capture Syria as he had hoped, he had other problems. "The menacing insurrections of Bardas Sclerus and Bardas Phocas in Asia Minor and the continuing Bulgarian war demanded Basil's

64. See Antaki, 184; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 54 ff; Ibn al-Athir, IX, 50; A. Ruseim, *History of the Byzantines*, II, 56; G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, 308; M. Canard, "The Byzantine Empire", *Cambridge History*, IV (1), p. 724; A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, I, 311.

65. See supra, note 2.

66. These problems have been discussed in Chapter II of this thesis.

undivided attention."⁶⁷

Chroniclers' opinions differ concerning who started the first move towards the Hudna. Antākī says that Emperor Basil took the first initiative by sending two envoys to negotiate peace with the Fatimid authorities.⁶⁸ Ibn al-Qalānisi says that Barjawān started the move by sending a friendly letter, composed by his Christian secretary Fahd Ibn Ibrāhīm, which expressed the desire of the Fatimids for a Hudna.⁶⁹ The date of this agreement is not mentioned in the sources, but it seems more likely that it was some time during the year 389/998, because after this year, wars between the two Empires had completely ceased.

Although the agreement was initially for a period of ten years, it was observed throughout al-Hākim's entire rule and friendly relations between the two Empires grew. Envoys and presents were exchanged between the two sovereigns.⁷⁰ Trade and commercial relations went on uninterrupted except for a brief period.⁷¹ Sometimes the Byzantine Emperor even requested

67. A.A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, I, 311.

68. Antākī, 184.

69. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 54-55.

70. Itti'āz, annals, 391 and 405. See also 'Azīmi, annal, 387.

71. Antākī, 214, reports the Emperor's command to stop trade between the subjects of his Empire and those of "Bilād al-Islām". This occurred after the success of the Fatimids in taking direct control over Aleppo, but it did not last long and trade was resumed shortly after that.

al-Ḥākim's help against a common rebel, Ibn al-ʿAdīm says that when the menace of a rebel known as al-Aṣfar became unbearable in the area of Shayzar, the Byzantine Emperor Basil asked al-Ḥākim for help. The Imām-Caliph instructed the Wālī of Damascus, who came with a large number of troops and chased al-Aṣfar from the area.⁷² It is also recorded that in 393/1002 the Emperor Basil II himself made a private pilgrimage to Jerusalem, of which al-Ḥākim was informed.⁷³ He sent a messenger to the Emperor and said, "Tell him to be of good cheer, for I have no evil intention against him."⁷⁴ Although it might be a mere legend, this story indicates people's impression about the Byzantine-Fatimid relations at that time.

One striking fact in the Fatimid-Byzantine relations at that time was that, in spite of al-Ḥākim's cruel treatment and persecution of the Christians in his State, the Byzantine Emperor never broke the peace agreement or retaliated against al-Ḥākim's attitude. Such a policy on the part of al-Ḥākim had undoubtedly greatly chagrined Basil as a Christian Emperor, but he did nothing, apparently, in the defence of the persecuted

72. Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, I, 196.

73. Khusraw, Diary of a Journey, 59; ʿAzīmī, anno, 393.

74. Khusraw, quoted by A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, I, 312, ff.

Christians and their sanctuaries.⁷⁵ It may be that the Emperor, who was fully occupied with solving great problems on the northern and western borders of his Empire, did not consider what was happening in Egypt as a grave and direct threat to Byzantine interests. Records tend to suggest that unless Byzantine interests in Aleppo and Northern Syria were seriously threatened, the Emperor was not prepared to break the peace agreement with Egypt.

The only event for which peace between the two Empires was threatened was when Fātik (the Fatimid ruler of Aleppo), under the Emperor's influence, rebelled against Cairo. When al-Ḥākim commanded his Syrian armies to march on and take Aleppo by force, Basil II withdrew his armies from the northern borders of his Empire and prepared himself for war against the Fatimids, as has been mentioned before.

75. A.A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, I, 311.

CHAPTER V
 THE ANTI-FATIMID REBELLIONS
 DURING AL-ḤĀKIM'S REIGN

The Rebellion of Abū Rakwah, 395-397/1004-1006

In 395/1004 al-Ḥākim faced the most serious challenge to his authority; a rebellion that shook the foundations of his State and, for two successive years, inflicted defeats on his armies. This was the rebellion of Abū Rakwah, an Umayyad claimant who was able to unite the forces of the Berber tribe of Zanāta with those of the Arab tribe of Banū Qurra and lead them against the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt.

Historical sources contain a considerable amount of information on this issue, but the most important accounts are those of al-Musabbihī, preserved by Maqrīzī in his Itti'āz, of al-Anṭākī and of Ibn al-Athīr which seems to have been based on the version of Ibn al-Ṣābi'.¹ There are also some valuable observations by Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn 'Idhārī and Ibn Khaldūn.

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1. Although the actual version of Ibn al-Ṣābi' on this issue has not survived, the similarities of the information given by Ibn al-Qalānisi, Ibn al-Zafir, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn al-Jawzī, Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Dhahabī, Ibn Kathīr and Ibn Taghrī Birdī suggest that all of these chroniclers were influenced by a common source. And since it is certain that Ibn al-Qalānisi, Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taghrī Birdī have been influenced by the account of Ibn al-Ṣābi', it may be that the other chroniclers were, directly or indirectly, influenced by the same source. Ibn al-Athīr's account, however, is the fullest and most detailed.

Modern works on the subject of the rebellion are very few. The earliest and fullest account is given by S. de Sacy in his Exposé de la Religion des Druzes, Paris (1838), which appears to be based mainly on the account of Ibn al-Athīr. The account of De Lacy O'Leary in A Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, London (1923) and shorter account by S.L. Poole in History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, London (1901) are both based on the work of De Sacy. In Arabic two works have discussed this challenge to al-Hākīm's sovereignty. One is given by M.A. 'Inān in al-Hākīm bi Amrillāh, Cairo (1932) and the other by A.M. Mājid, al-Hākīm bi Amr Allāh al-Khalifa al-Muftarā 'Alayh, Cairo (1959).

The Origin of Abū Rakwah

Little is actually known of his background. Even his real name does not seem to have been known to most of the chroniclers. They gave his name as Al-Walīd Ibn Hishām, the name by which he became known after the rebellion. Abū Rakwah was a nickname which Egyptians gave him.² It means the man of the leather bottle. Rakwah is a leather bottle or bag³ in which travellers, and especially Sūfis, carried water during journeys for the Wuḍū' (the wash that precedes prayers).⁴

2. Anṭakī, 189.

3. Ibn Manzūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, Beirut, 1955, XIV, 333; M.M. al-Zubaydī, Tāj al-ʿArūs, Beirut, 1966, X, 155.

4. Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58.

Almost all chroniclers are uncertain about his origin and immediate parentage. According to their accounts he may have been an Umayyad Mawlā (slave or supporter) or prince from the line of Marwān Ibn al-Ḥakam, or ʿUthmān Ibn ʿAffān. Such confusion was certainly a result of the circumstances which surrounded his movement. Abū Rakwah was not born in the area where he rebelled. He was a foreigner who came from a distant land and preached secretly against the Fatimid Caliphate amongst the tribes of the Burqa district where he claimed to be a descendant of the Umayyad dynasty. And it was by that claim he was known to the people who supported him. Chroniclers, who lived far away from the area, had never heard of him until his uprising. It was only then that they began to trace his origin and background. Their reports, therefore, were based on the information accumulated after the rebellion. No local reports have been mentioned and no thorough investigation appears to have been made. Those who said that he was an Umayyad prince from the line of Marwān did not try to trace his geneology. Some of them stated that he was al-Walīd Ibn Hishām Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn ʿAbd al-Rahmān. But none of them clarified who ʿAbd al-Rahmān was or which ʿAbd al-Rahmān they meant.⁵ Others found it easier to say, "al-Walīd Ibn Hishām, a descendent of Hishām Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Marwān".⁶ Those Who

5. Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58; Ittiʿāz, anno, 396.

6. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 62; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 81; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 233; Ibn al-ʿAmīd, anno, 399; al-Dhahabī, ʿIbar, III, 62; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 337; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 215.

stated that Abū Rakwah was from the line of 'Uthmān Ibn 'Affān have not offered any geneology. They named him as "al-Walīd Ibn Hishām al-'Uthmānī"⁷ or "al-Walīd Ibn Hishām from the line of 'Uthmān Ibn 'Affān".⁸ Even those who doubted his Umayyad name and origin suggested no alternative.⁹

The most important piece of information here is offered by the geneologist Ibn Ḥazm (died 456/1064); when he speaks about a tribe called 'Āl Numārah he says: "From them was the man who rebelled with Banū Qurra in Barqa, Yahyā Ibn Numārah, who claimed Umayyad descent. He was a son of Numārah Ibn Sulaymān Ibn Muḥammad... Ibn Numārah Ibn Lakhm."¹⁰ Al-Musabbihī supports this by saying, "It is said that he was the son of a man who was one of the Umayyad Mawālī (slaves or supporters)."¹¹

In the light of this it would appear more likely that Abū Rakwah was not an Umayyad, but he may have been a strong supporter of their cause. His real name as given by Ibn Ḥazm was Yahyā Ibn Numārah and al-Walīd Ibn Hishām was a name he assumed to support

7. Ibn Khallikān, III, 449.

8. Anṭākī, 188; 'Azīmī, anno, 396.

9. 'Idhārī, I, 257; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58; al-Nuwayrī, fol. 54.

10. Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab, ed. by Provencal, Cairo, 1948, 398.

11. al-Musabbihī, quoted by al-Maqrizī, Itti'āz, anno, 396.

his claim to Umayyad origin and by which he became known amongst his supporters. Yahyā was born in Umayyad Spain in about 360/970.¹² He grew up during a period which was towards the end of the Umayyad rule in Spain. In his twenties he fled from Spain when al-Manṣūr Ibn ʿĀmir took over power and began persecuting members of the Umayyad family and their supporters.¹³ He travelled to Maghrib, Egypt, Yamen, Mecca and Syria testing the possibility of creating a party strong enough to support the Umayyad cause and to re-establish their State.¹⁴ In this he attempted to emulate ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Dākhil, the Umayyad prince who fled the ʿAbbasid persecution and succeeded in establishing an Umayyad State in Spain during the middle of the second centry of the Hijra.

Although Yahyā was a learned man who had acquired a great knowledge of traditions and was a very efficient propagandist, he seems to have failed to find sufficient response in these places. Perhaps this was because (as O'Leary puts it) "the Umayyads had long passed out of the main current of Islamic life and it did not seem that their name could anywhere be used as a rallying cry for the dissatisfied; there was no religious attachment to the Umayyads as there was to the Alids."¹⁵ Here it is possible to understand

12. No date of his birth was given by chroniclers but al-Musabbihī, who saw Abū Rakwah in 397 A.H. says, "He was in his thirties." Ittiʿāz, anno, 396.

13. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 82; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58.

14. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 82; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58.

15. De Lacy O'Leary, A Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, London, 1923, 128.

why some chroniclers believed that Abū Rakwah was from the line of ʿUthmān ʿIbn ʿAffān; Zanāta the Berber tribe which supported his movement was believed to have borne a traditional loyalty to ʿUthmān.¹⁶ Yahyā might have realised that they were more prepared to support a descendent of ʿUthmān than any other Umayyad figure. Perhaps it was to gain their support and loyalty that he claimed some kind of relationship to the orthodox Caliph.

At last he settled in the area of Barqa where two powerful tribes among the inhabitants appeared dissatisfied with the Fatimid rule; the Berber tribe of Zanāta who had never willingly acknowledged the Fatimids and was often the source of anti-Fatimid uprisings and rebellions in Maġhrib, and the Arab tribe of Banū Qurra who had been cruelly treated by al-Hākīm.¹⁷ He began his career as children's teacher. He taught the youngsters of Banū Qurra writing and reading the Holy Qurʾān.¹⁸

By his extreme piety and religious devotion, Yahyā attracted the attention of the chiefs of Banū Qurra who asked him to lead them during their prayers and gradually became very fond of him. From thence, he began to disclose his purpose and asked them to support

16. *Akḥḥār al-Barbar fī al-Qurūn al-Wustā*, ed. by Provencal, Rabat, 1934, 50.

17. See above, Chapter IV, note 61.

18. *al-Musabbihī*, quoted by Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, anno, 396. See also *Anṭakī*, 188; *Ibn al-Aṭhīr*, IX, 82; *Ibn Khaldūn*, IX, 58.

the cause of the Umayyad Qā'im.¹⁹ (the divinely guided). The first problem which Yahyā faced was the old enmity which had existed between Zanāṭa and Banū Qurra. To solve it he acted as a mediator and as such succeeded, and the chiefs of the two tribes met and decided to unite their forces under his leadership.²⁰

The Teaching of Abū Rakwah

Very little is revealed about his teaching and the qualities and conditions which he applied to the Qā'im for whom he propagated. All sources agree that this Qā'im was to be an Umayyad. Ibn Khaldūn adds that his name as given by Abū Rakwah was "al-Walīd Ibn Hishām."²¹ al-Maqqarī adds a very interesting piece of information. He says, "He claimed that Maslama Ibn 'Abd al-Malik, who was alleged to have acquired the knowledge of the future from Khālīd Ibn Yazīd Ibn Mu'āwiya, had spoken of the rise of Ibn Hishām. He recited to them Urjūdha (a kind of poetry), which he claimed Maslama had said. It goes: "The son of Hishām shall rise in Burqa. By him 'Abd Shams shall achieve their right. Among its Berbers, his rise shall be and the Arabs of Banū Qurra shall be honored by him."²²

19. Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 57; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 82; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 233; al-Dhahabī, Ibar, III, 62.

20. Ibn al-Athīr, VI, 82; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58.

21. Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58.

22. al-Maqqarī, Nafh al-Tīb, ed. M.M. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, Cairo 1949, III, 411.

It is not certain that in his preaching he claimed any divine quality or miraculous powers for this Qā'im as did the Shī'a for their Mahdī. This may be for the lack of evidence or because of the traditions purported to state that the divinely guided Mahdī or Qā'im would be a descendent of the Prophet's family (Ahl al-Bait), thus excluding the Umayyads. It may have been that since he intended to declare himself eventually as the Qā'im, he did not apply any such qualities in order to avoid future complications. It seems to be more likely that al-Qā'im, in Abū Rakwah's teaching, was divinely assigned to appear and rule, but not to be of any divine quality. He would appear in righteousness and distribute equality and justice, but never perform miracles.

All sources affirm that Abū Rakwah's teaching was identical with that of Sunnis. There are, however, some indications that he might have expressed some Kharijite sympathy, perhaps in order to win the support of Zanāta tribe, the majority of whom were believed to have professed the Kharijite teaching. In Antākī's report the term Kharijī is often applied to Abū Rakwah.²³ But whether Antākī meant that Abū Rakwah was

23. See Antākī, 188 ff.

a Kharijite or meant by this term that he was a rebel is not clear.

‘Idhārī states, "When Abū Rakwah found some response from the people of Barqa (Intasaba Hayhim) he declared himself as one of them."²⁴

But whether this Intasab was religious, political or otherwise is not clear either. Neither is it clear what ‘Idhārī meant by the people of Barqa – whether it applied to the Banū Qurra, Zanāta or the inhabitants of the province of Barqa as a whole is difficult to ascertain. However, after he succeeded in taking over power in Barqa and declaring himself as Amīr al-Mu’minīn (commander of the faithful) he is said to have based the religious foundation of his State on Sunnī law.²⁵ But the sources fail to disclose the rite which he meant to exercise.

The Reasons which Created the Right Atmosphere for the Rebellion

Besides the rooted opposition of Zanāta and dissatisfaction of Banū Qurra with their ill treatment by al-Ḥakīm, there was the economic reason which seems to have been the main cause behind the rebellion. Barqa as a province was very poor. Even its treasury was insufficient to supply the needs of the small army which al-Ḥakīm sent in 391/1000 to

24. ‘Idhārī, I, 257. Cf. T. Lewicki, "La Répartition Géographique des groupements Ibādites", R.O., XXI (1957), 316 ff.

25. Anṭakī, 189.

restore the Fatimid suzerainty in Tripoli.²⁶ Its commercial life was very limited and its national income was subject to its small agricultural products and to the travellers' caravans which passed through the desert. Most of the inhabitants were tribes living a semi-nomadic life. Their livelihood was dependent on the products of their sheep and camels. Similar conditions to those of desert life prevailed. In addition to this, there were economical crises throughout the whole of Maghrib during the period that preceded the rebellion which resulted in 395/1004 in a general catastrophe. Ibn 'Idhārī describes it by saying, "In 395 A.H. there was a catastrophe in Afriqya. The poor died and the money of the rich vanished. The prices rose and food became impossible to find. The people of the Bādiya left their homes. Houses became empty and there was no one to occupy them. With all this there was a plague of cholera."²⁷

Abū Rakwah realised the strife of the tribesmen and their urgent need to face their difficulties and concentrated his efforts on this point. The brief information gathered in the sources about his propaganda campaigns shows that he told the tribal chiefs that his aim was not to achieve personal success, but to provide them with prospects of a better life. The glory would be theirs as would be the conquest. He was only the instrument

26. See above, Chapter IV, note 59.

27. 'Idhārī, I, 256 ff. See also Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 77.

of deliverance.²⁸ When they agreed to follow his leadership and rebel, the first agreement they made was concerning the booty and gains resulting from war. It was to be divided into three shares; one for each tribe and the third to be kept under Abū Rakwah's control in order to form a treasury to help continue the war.²⁹ Even after he achieved the first success and took over Barqa, Abū Rakwah promised to give the chiefs the palaces and houses of the Fatimid State officials in Cairo and other Egyptian cities.³⁰ He also promised the people of the tribes certain fertile areas in Egypt in which to settle and enjoy a prosperous life.³¹

Antākī suggests that the main reason behind the rebellion was the reaction of the tribes against al-Ḥākim's policy which had demanded the cursing of a number of the Prophet's companions (al-Ṣaḥāba).³² There is, however, a contradiction to this suggestion; al-Ḥākim's supposed decree which ordered the cursing of the Ṣaḥāba appeared in 395/1004 and Abū Rakwah's revolt broke out in the same year. It had necessitated at least a few years of preparation. It may have been that Abū Rakwah had begun his propaganda even before al-Ḥākim succeeded to the Caliphate in 386/996 in

28. al-Musabbiḥī, followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396.

29. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 82.

30. Al-Musabbiḥī, followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396.

31. See Ibid.

32. See Antākī, 188.

which case this reason could not have been used by Abū Rakwah during the preparation period of his rebellion, but there is no doubt that he used it against al-Ḥakīm after 395 A.H. This is, perhaps, what Antākī meant to infer but failed to make clear.

The Beginning of the Rebellion

After he assured himself of a sufficient response from the two tribes, Abū Rakwah began to canvass the tribes of neighbouring districts lecturing about Islam in a revolutionary manner, carefully constructing a better policy than that exercised by those in authority, and he called upon them to support al-Walīd Ibn Hishām, the Umayyad Saviour who would appear in the near future to abolish tyranny and construct justice and better prospects of life.³³ The tribesmen were fascinated by his eloquence and in every place he lectured he met with success. The tribal chiefs accepted his teaching and gave him the acknowledgment of leadership (Bayʿa).³⁴

Ṣandal, the Fatimid Walī of Barqa realised the dangers of Abū Rakwah's activities. He reported to Cairo explaining the situation and asked for permission to campaign against him. Al-Ḥakīm, who did not appear to have realised the urgency of the problem, neither gave permission nor

33. See supra, note 19.

34. al-Musabbihī, followed by Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, anno, 396; Antākī, 188, Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 82.

sent help but recommended diplomacy as a solution.³⁵ Ṣandal's diplomacy failed, however, and Abū Rakwah gathered his supporters and moved to invade the City of Barqa. Ṣandal and his troops met them outside the city and after fierce fighting he was defeated. He retreated and barricaded himself into the city hoping for help from Egypt. Meanwhile he communicated with Ibn Taybūn, the chief of the Berber tribe of Lawāta, with whom Ṣandal seems to have had friendly relations.³⁶ Ibn Taybūn came to the rescue and forced Abū Rakwah to break the siege of Barqa but failed to defeat him. Abū Rakwah inflicted a heavy defeat on Lawāta's forces. They lost many fighters, including the chief Ibn Taybūn himself. The rest of the tribesmen fled, leaving their equipment and supplies in the hands of Abū Rakwah's troops, who returned to Barqa victorious and more powerful.³⁷

The inhabitants of Barqa, with their Wālī Ṣandal, took advantage of Abū Rakwah's temporary withdrawal from their city. They meanwhile strengthened its walls, dug huge trenches around them and stored as much food and supplies as they could.³⁸ When Abū Rakwah returned to the siege he found it much more resistant than before. He spent several months in a vain endeavour to take the city. His threats and even his promises of

35. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 82.

36. Anṭākī, 188.

37. Anṭākī, 188.

38. Anṭākī, 189.

safe conduct and just treatment failed to convince Ṣandal and the inhabitants of Burqa to surrender.³⁹

The news of Ṣandal's defeat, together with the success of Abū Rakwah and his threat to Burqa, were treated seriously by al-Ḥākim. He sent an army of five thousand men under the leadership of Yanāl (a Turkish commander).⁴⁰ Yanāl had to cross a considerable stretch of desert before he reached Burqa. Abū Rakwah sent a body of cavalry across the route to fill in the wells. He then waited at the point farthest from Egypt to meet Yanāl's force who arrived tired, exhausted and thirsty from its desert march. The engagement which followed gave the advantage to Abū Rakwah. Yanāl's army was defeated and he himself was captured and put to death. All his equipment and supplies fell into the hands of Abū Rakwah who returned triumphant towards Burqa.⁴¹

The news of Yanāl's defeat destroyed the hopes of the inhabitants of Burqa. Its Wālī Ṣandal, together with all his family members, fled towards Cairo. The merchants and businessmen of the city fled to Egypt and some of them to Maghrib, carrying as many of their possessions as possible.⁴² In the month of Dhū al-Hijja 395/October 1005, Abū

39. Antākī, 189.

40. Antākī, 189, al-Musabbiḥī, followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83.

41. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83. See also Antākī, 189; al-Musabbiḥī, followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58.

42. Antākī, 189. See also al-Musabbiḥī, followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83, says that the army of Yanāl arrived after the fall of Burqa but this does not appear to be correct.

Rakwah reached Burqa and entered it without any resistance. He then declared himself as al-Walīd Ibn Hishām, the Umayyad Qā'im for whom he was previously fighting. He formed his new State and declared himself as Amīr al-Mu'minīn (Commander of the Faithful). His self-given title was al-Nāṣir Li dīn Allāh (the Assistant of God's order).⁴³ This was struck on the coinage; the Khuṣba was read in his name and Sunī law was declared supreme throughout the land of his conquest.⁴⁴

Despite the fact that both States, the Umayyad's in Spain and the 'Abbasid's in Baghdad, would be interested in supporting an anti-Fatimid movement, there is no indication which suggests that Abū Rakwah made any communication to gain the support of either State. He gave no token of acknowledgement nor mentioned the name of any ruling Caliph when he read the Khuṣba in Burqa. It is more likely that he planned to establish a new and completely independent State in which he would declare himself Caliph. al-Musabbihī says that Abū Rakwah's supporters regarded him as Caliph,⁴⁵ which suggests that there was no other candidate for the Caliphate in their minds. It also indicates that he did not prepare them to acknowledge any certain Caliph or Caliphate during the period of propagation.

43. al-Musabbihī followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396; Anṭakī, 189; 'Azīmī, anno, 395. Ibn al-Zafir, fol. 57; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 234; and al-Dhahabī, Ībar, III, 62, say that his title was al-Thā'ir Bi Amr Allāh. Nuwayrī, fol. 54 says "al-Thā'ir Bi Amr Allāh al-Muntaqim min A'dā' Allāh".

44. Anṭakī, 189.

45. al-Musabbihī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396.

The position of Barqa's economy did not offer Abū Rakwah a very warm welcome. The city was nearly empty when he entered it. Commercial life had been suffocated by the long siege which preceded its fall and the absence of businessmen who had fled. Anṭākī states that Abū Rakwah confiscated all money and food supplies which remained with the inhabitants of Barqa.⁴⁶ According to the estimate of Ibn Kathīr, all that money was only "four hundred thousand Dīnārs".⁴⁷

As time passed, he realised that he had to move out of Barqa. The necessity for supplies was increasing daily. Bread was becoming very difficult to find and epidemics and famine began to spread throughout the whole of Maghrib.⁴⁸

About a year after his triumphant entry into Barqa, Abū Rakwah was driven out, not by the Fatimid troops, but by the threats of famine and plagues. Anṭākī describes it by saying, "He and all his supporters, Arabs and Berbers together with their families and cattle, left Barqa as if they were migrating from one land to another. They moved until they reached the districts of Alexandria."⁴⁹

Ṣandal, who reached Cairo safely, was able to explain to al-Ḥākim the significance of Abū Rakwah's movement. He warned him of his great

46. Anṭākī, 190.

47. Ibn Kathīr, XI, 337.

48. Anṭākī, 190; 'Idhārī, I, 256; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 77.

49. Anṭākī, 190.

power and advised him to send large armies against him.⁵⁰ al-Ḥākim considered the urgency of the situation and began his preparations to meet it. He appointed al-Faḍl Ibn Ṣāliḥ as general commander of the Fatimid armies and ordered him to arrange a large force to lead against Abū Rakwah.⁵¹ But while these preparations were under way, the news of his movement towards Alexandria arrived in Cairo. al-Faḍl sent a small army under the leadership of an Armenian commander known as Qābil⁵² to intercept Abū Rakwah and prevent him from reaching the city. The two armies met in a place called Dhāt al-Ḥamām in the province of Alexandria.⁵³ Abū Rakwah won a decisive victory over Qābil who, together with a large number of his troops, was killed in the battle. From there Abū Rakwah moved towards the city of Alexandria. He besieged it and for several months attempted to capture it, but without success. The inhabitants' fear of falling under the mercy of Abū Rakwah's tribesmen offered a fierce resistance.⁵⁴ In addition to this, he does not seem to have had the necessary equipments to break through the strong walls which surrounded the city. Neither had he any naval power to threaten the sea route through which its supplies came.

50. Al-Musabbihī followed by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396.

51. Al-Musabbihī followed by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396; Antākī, 190; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83; See also, Ibn al-Qalānisi, 65; 'Azīmi, anno, 397.

52. Antākī, 190.

53. Antākī, 190.

54. Antākī, 190.

The news of Abū Rakwah's victory over Qābil and his siege of Alexandria were extremely alarming in Cairo. A general mobilisation of the regular troops was declared and high wages were offered to encourage new recruits.⁵⁵ al-Ḥākim appealed for the help of the Beduin chiefs of Syria and Palestine who came together with a large number of their tribesmen.⁵⁶ The forces of the Fatimids and those of Abū Rakwah appear to have been equally powerful and the leaders of both reluctant to make attacks. al-Faḍl did not move to rescue Alexandria and Abū Rakwah did not move to invade Cairo. Neither of them was confident of victory by one decisive stroke.

Espionage, strategy and bribery began to play their part. al-Ḥākim ordered his men to tempt Abū Rakwah to march to Cairo by promise of support and assured victory.⁵⁷ By these tactics al-Ḥākim sought to break the siege of Alexandria and draw Abū Rakwah's forces to Cairo where they could probably be ambushed. An additional fear was that if Alexandria fell to Abū Rakwah, the task of defeating him there would be infinitely greater. al-Faḍl also managed to bribe one of Abū Rakwah's chief commanders, Mādī, whom he used to obtain information concerning

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55. al-Musabbiḥī quoted by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396. See also Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, IV, 216.
56. al-Musabbiḥī followed by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396; Antākī, 190; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, IV, 216.
57. al-Musabbiḥī quoted by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396; 'Idharī, I, 258. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58, say that the high officials of the Fatimid State wrote to Abū Rakwah without al-Ḥākim's knowledge, but this does not seem to be correct.

his master's plans.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Abū Rakwah too tried to bribe the Beduin chiefs of Palestine. He contacted them through some chiefs of Banū Qurra and offered to establish an independent state for them in Bilād al-Shām if they deserted the Fatimid army and fought on his side.⁵⁹ Abū Rakwah's failure to capture Alexandria and the promises of support which he received from both the Fatimid officials and the chiefs of the Beduin tribes convinced him to move towards Cairo. He reached al-Fayyūm⁶⁰ where he camped, to plan the final blow against the Fatimid armies. al-Ḥākim sent a small army under the leadership of Alī Ibn Falāh to be stationed in Jīza⁶¹ and prevent Abū Rakwah's troops from raiding in areas very close to the Capital.⁶² Abū Rakwah learnt of this army and sent a division of his troops which ambushed Ibn Falāh, killed many of his men and took their equipment and supplies.⁶³ Skirmishes between the two forces continued and at last they met face to face in a place called Ra's al-Burka⁶⁴ in al-Fayyūm district. The agreement between Abū Rakwah and the Beduin chiefs of Palestine was that when he attacked, they would withdraw from al-Faḍl's army and thus create fear and confusion.

58. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83.

59. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83.

60. A fertile area to the north of Cairo. Khitat, I, 241.

61. A village on the Nile near Cairo, Khitat, I, 205.

62. al-Musabbiḥī followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396; Anṭakī, 190; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 83.

63. al-Musabbiḥī, in Itti'āz, anno, 396; Anṭakī, 191. See also some details in Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 84.

64. Anṭakī, 191.

al-Faḍl was fully informed of this and on the day of the attack, he called all the Beduin chiefs to his tent and at the same time warned the commanders of his army of the time and place of the attack.⁶⁵ When the attack took place, the Beduin chiefs who were kept in al-Faḍl's tent, were unable to play their part. Their troops, who were unaware of their masters' agreement with Abū Rakwah, fought fiercely. Abū Rakwah's troops, who were expecting easy victory, were ambushed and thought that they had been cheated by the chiefs of the Beduins. Consequently, they were defeated. A large number of them were killed and Abū Rakwah himself fled to the South, heading for Nubia.⁶⁶ al-Faḍl followed him and offered the King of Nubia a large sum of money for the exchange of Abū Rakwah's person.⁶⁷ He was surrendered and was brought to Cairo where he was paraded through the streets and finally put to death.⁶⁸

Ibn al-Qalānisī says that Abū Rakwah wrote a poetic letter to al-Hākim, begging him for mercy. al-Hākim read the letter but did not pardon him.⁶⁹ al-Musabbihī, however, seems to disagree and suggests that al-Hākim intended to pardon Abū Rakwah. He says, "al-Hākim told

65. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 84.

66. al-Musabbihī, quoted by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396; Anṣakī, 191; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 65; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 84; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 58.

67. al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396.

68. al-Musabbihī, followed by Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, anno, 396; Anṣakī, 191; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 84.

69. Ibn al-Qalānisī, 65. See also Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 57 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 84; al-Maqrī, *Nafḥ al-Ṭīb*, III, 413.

me, once while we were talking about Abū Rakwah, he said, 'I did not want to kill him and what happened to him was not of my choosing'."⁷⁰ Ibn al-Athīr says that Abū Rakwah died suffering from humiliation and cruel treatment during the parade and was not executed.⁷¹ So it is possible that al-Hākim did not intend to execute Abū Rakwah and was awaiting the end of the parade to grant him mercy. The sources are completely silent concerning Abū Rakwah's private life. It is not known whether he had a family or what happened to them after his defeat. Ibn ʿIdhārī speaks of a rebel named ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Walīd Ibn al-Mughīra who appeared in 403/1012 in Maghrib. He was previously a school master who propagated for himself. He entitled himself al-Nāsir Amīr al-Muʾminīn and made communications with some tribal chiefs. He commanded them to obey him and promised to appear in 404/1013 to abolish the rule of Sinhāja and construct his own. In 403/1012 he was captured and paraded in the streets of Qayrawān where he was executed.⁷² The name of this rebel, his self-given title, his profession and the time in which he appeared, indicate that he might have been the son of Abū Rakwah. But unfortunately, the lack of information makes it difficult to determine whether he was or not. Ibn ʿIdhārī makes no connexion between him and Abū Rakwah and other chroniclers fail to mention anything about him.

70. al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, anno, 396.

71. Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 84. See also Ibn Tahgrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 217.

72. ʿIdhārī, I, 260.

The Results of Abū Rakwah's Rebellion

This rebellion appears to have had significant effect on the Fatimid State and on the policy of al-Ḥākim. The economy of Egypt had suffered two long years of food and other shortage. al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī says that "prices went up sharply and fresh bread became difficult to obtain. Stale bread was wetted and sold six Raṭls for one Dīrhām, while the fresh was previously sold ten Raṭls for one Dīrhām".⁷⁴ al-Ḥākim formulated strict measures to cope with the situation. He instituted the death penalty for those who inflated prices or hid commodities.⁷⁵ The cost of the war had depleted the treasury and many millions of Dīnārs had been spent.⁷⁶ Agriculture, industry and trade had been disturbed and the loss in national income had been heavy. Many men had been killed on both sides and the war brought disease and plague together with malnutrition.⁷⁷

al-Ḥākim's attitude towards Sunnis began to change. He became more lenient and seemed opposed to the extreme views of the Shī'ī Isma'īlis.⁷⁸ His policy became more far-seeing. The tribe of Banū Qurra no longer feared his revenge and severe punishments. His attitude towards

73. Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396-397.

74. Ibid.

75. Anṭakī, 191.

76. al-Musabbihī followed by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 396. See also Anṭakī, 188 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 81 ff; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm IV, 215 ff.

77. Anṭakī, 191.

78. See above, Chapter III, notes 88 & 89.

them certainly appears to have become more realistic. He recognised the motives which made them follow Abū Rakwah and seems to have decided to eliminate the cause. They were pardoned and later granted a large area of fertile land in Lower Egypt.⁷⁹ The realism in his policy is reflected in his treatment of the Beduin tribes of Palestine when they later rebelled in 400/1010.⁸⁰

The Rebellion of the Jarrāhids

In 401/1010 al-Ḥakim faced another problem. This time it was created by Arab tribes in the region of Palestine and lasted for about three years. This was the rebellion of the tribe of Banū al-Jarrāḥ. They were a part of the Yemānī tribe Ṭayy who had settled in the Southern parts of Palestine in the Balqā' region, in the mountains of al-Sharāt and in the North of the Arabian Desert where there were the two hills of Aja' and Salma known as the mountains of Ṭayy.⁸¹ al-Mufarrij Ibn Dahghal known as Ibn al-Jarrāḥ, led the uprising. His father Dahghal was the first chief of the Jarrāhids to be mentioned in the chronicles during the second half of the fourth century A.H.⁸² Unfortunately the sources do not make his

79. Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 405.

80. See below, the Rebellion of Ibn al-Jarrāḥ.

81. M. Canard, art., "Djarrahids", E.I.². A full geographical description of the area is given in an unpublished American University of Beirut M.A. Thesis by M.A.M. al-Ḥayyārī, al-'Imārah al-Tā' iyyah fī Bilād al-Shām during the 13th and 14th Centuries, Beirut, 1969, 24 ff.

82. M. Canard, art., "Djarrahids", E.I.²; al-Ḥayyārī, 54 ff.

origin any clearer. Whether al-Jarrāḥ was actually the father of Dagħfal or merely an ancestor is not proven. Nor is it certain when he appeared and gave his name to that part of the tribe of Ṭayy.

Unlike the revolt of Abū Rakwah, Ibn al-Jarrāḥ's rebellion was not influenced by religious teaching, nor was it a severe threat to the Fatimid army. Its only important significance was that al-Ḥasan Ibn Ja'far al-ʿAlawī, known as Abū al-Futūḥ, the Sharīf of Mecca, from the line of ʿAlī and Fāṭima had been persuaded to declare himself as Amīr al-Muʿminīn. al-Ḥijāz and Palestine accepted him and as a consequence an important part of the Faṭimid Empire acknowledged an Alid as Amīr al-Muʿminīn instead of al-Ḥākim.

Abū al-Qāsim, al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī al-Maghribī is considered by the sources to have caused this anti-Fatimid movement among the Jarrāḥids and other Beduin tribes in the region and convinced the Sharīf of Mecca to denounce al-Ḥākim and declare himself as Amīr al-Muʿminīn. His motives were those of personal revenge upon al-Ḥākim who had previously ordered the death of Abū al-Qāsim and his two brothers. Abū al-Qāsim escaped with his life while his brothers were caught and executed. From thence he planned to avenge them by creating troubles for al-Ḥākim.⁸³

83. Ibn al-Qālanisī, 62, and al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 402; suggest that the execution of the members of the Maghribi family was a result of struggle for power and rivalry between them and the Christian high official Ibn ʿAbdūn. Consequently Ibn ʿAbdūn succeeded in presenting a case against the Maghribis and convinced al-Ḥākim of their guilt.

He travelled in secrecy until he reached the land of the Jarrahids and there he composed a poem eulogizing Ḥassān, the eldest son of al-Mufarrij, who welcomed him as a guest.⁸⁴ Then he began his activities until he persuaded al-Mufarrij and his son Ḥassān to rebel against Cairo.⁸⁵ But whether Abū al-Qāsim's activities were entirely responsible for the rebellion or whether his influence was strong enough to create it for no better reason than personal revenge remains an unanswered problem. By studying the records and information available on this point it would appear that Abū al-Qāsim's grievances were not the actual cause but merely instrumental in activating the result. The primary cause would seem to be that the Jarrahids desired to emulate other tribes in the regions of Muṣul and Aleppo which had established semi-independent emirates. When the central authority of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad began to weaken, independent and semi-independent States began to appear in the Muslim world, first in the distant provinces and later in those surrounding Baghdad. A number of Arab tribes who had settled in Syria and Western Iraq took advantage of the situation and succeeded in establishing semi-independent emirates such as the Ḥamdānids in Muṣul and later in Aleppo and the 'Uqaylids in Muṣul and Kūfa.

84. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 62, gives the whole poem.

85. al-Rudhrawārī, 233 ff, gives full details of Ibn al-Maghribi's activities. See also Ibn al-Qalānisi, 62; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 59; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 137; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Bughya*, IV, fol. 23; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, VII, 250; al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, anno, 402.

The Jarrāḥids who first appeared during the middle of the fourth century A.H. were less fortunate than the other tribes. They were located in Palestine which was, at that time, ruled by the powerful governor of Egypt, Kāfūr al-Ikhshīdī. The death of Kāfūr, which was followed by a struggle for power among his successors, gave the Jarrāḥids an opportunity to assert themselves. The arrival of the strong Fatimid army in Egypt immediately crushed that opportunity. The Fatimid regime was new and powerful. The policy of its Caliphs was to abolish dynastic rule in the Syrian provinces and centralise their own power. The Jarrāḥids opposed this policy of the Fatimid Caliphs and reacted against it with many anti-Fatimid rebellions during the second half of the fourth century.⁸⁶ Every opportunity to rebel was taken by the Jarrāḥid chiefs in an effort to put Palestine under their control. Whenever they were successful they made their own Capital. But this success never lasted long. The powerful Fatimid army would force them to subside. They rebelled so many times that they became considered in the eyes of Fatimid politicians as the menace of peace and a danger to the sovereignty of the Fatimid Caliphate.⁸⁷

In 401/1010 conditions appeared favourable for yet another attempt. Abū al-Qāsim al-Maghribī, who took refuge among the Jarrāḥids, had been

86. See M. Canard, art., "Djarrahids", E.I.²; al-Ḥayyārī, 50 ff.

87. See the Advice of Ibn Killis cited Chapter IV, note 2.

a high official in al-Ḥākim's court. His previous knowledge concerning conditions in the Fatimid regime made his advice valuable to al-Mufarrīj and his son Ḥassān.⁸⁸ The Fatimid army was no longer as powerful as it was before. Its weakness was realised during the revolt of Abū Rakwah when the Jarrahids themselves were requested to support it as has been mentioned before. At this time al-Ḥākim exerted severe pressure on his Christian subjects and destroyed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. Therefore the Byzantine Empire might help and support Ibn al-Jarrah if he promised to lift that pressure. It was also possible that the Christian officials of the Fatimid regime might support his rebellion for the same reasons. In fact, it is reported by Maqrīzī that Zarʿa Ibn Nasṭūrus, al-Ḥākim's Wazīr had communicated with Ibn al-Jarrah without al-Ḥākim's knowledge during the rebellion.⁸⁹ Abū al-Futūḥ the Sharīf of Mecca, who supported the rebellion, was a rich man and controlled the treasury of Mecca. He had no army nor a powerful tribe under his command, thus to proclaim him as Amīr al-Muʾminīn would be merely titular. The armed power would remain in the hands of the Jarrahid chiefs who would be the real rulers. The treasury of Mecca would be useful to expend on the operation.

88. Abū al-Qāsim had been a high official in al-Ḥākim's regime. al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 402.

89. Ittiʿāz, anno, 403.

The beginning of the Rebellion

In 401/1010 al-Ḥākim appointed a new Wālī for Damascus. He was a Turkish army commander named Yārughtigīn.⁹⁰ He, together with his family and a number of troops as escort, travelled together with the merchants' caravan towards Damascus. On the way they were attacked by the Jarrahids who raided their caravan and captured Yārughtigīn near the town of 'Asqalān. From there the Jarrahids moved towards Ramla (the main city in Southern Palestine and the residence of the Fatimid Wālī), and after a fierce battle with the Fatimid troops stationed in the city, they captured it.⁹¹ al-Ḥākim was very much alarmed by the news of these events and tried to counter the rebellion before it became a serious threat. He wrote a letter of remonstrance to al-Mufarrij and offered him a sum of fifty thousand Dīnars in return for the safety of Yārughtigīn. Meanwhile he threatened him with severe consequences if he caused him harm.⁹² But Abū al-Qāsim was able to convince Ḥassān, al-Mufarrij's son, that if Yārughtigīn was released he would return with a large army to fight them.⁹³ Ḥassān immediately executed him.⁹⁴

90. al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 402. The name of this commander is given in different forms: Anṭakī, 200, says "Barūkh or Yārūkh"; al-Rudhrawārī, 233, gives it as "Yarukhtikin; Maqrizī, Itti'āz, anno, 401, says "Barūkh". The cause of this may be that the name was foreign.

91. Anṭakī, 201; al-Rudhrawārī, 234, ff.

92. al-Rudhrawārī, 235.

93. al-Rudhrawārī, 235.

94. Anṭakī, 201; al-Rudhrawārī, 235; Itti'āz, 403.

After this the Jarrāhids declared Ramla as their Capital. Meanwhile Abū al-Qāsim headed for Mecca to convey news of success to Abū al-Futūḥ and to urge him to come to Ramla where he would be proclaimed as Amīr al-Mu'minīn. On his way Abū al-Qāsim made contact with the chiefs of the Beduin tribes of Hilāl, Sulaym, 'Awf Ibn 'Āmīr and others. They all promised to support Abū al-Futūḥ.⁹⁵ On the arrival of Abū al-Qāsim in Mecca, Abū al-Futūḥ proclaimed himself there and received the Bay'a from the Ḥasanids of the Holy City.⁹⁶ From there he moved, together with Abu al-Qāsim and a number of tribal chiefs, towards Ramla. In Ramla he received a warm welcome from the Jarrāhids. They kissed the ground before him and greeted him with the Bay'a as Amīr al-Mu'minīn. He then mounted the pulpit to read the Khuṭba in his own name and entitled himself al-Rāshid Li Dīn Allāh (the Guide to God's Order).⁹⁷ Ḥijāz and most of Palestine acknowledged him and coinage was struck in his name.⁹⁸

The following move of Ibn al-Jarrāḥ was to endeavour to gain support from the Byzantine Empire. The Christians in his domain were well treated and he ordered the re-building of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. He also

95. Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, IV, fol.23.

96. al-Rudhrawārī, 236; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, IV, fol. 23.

97. Antākī, 201; al-Rudhrawārī, 236; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 250; Sibṭ, Mirāt, fol. 198; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 402.

98. Antākī, 201; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 402.

appointed a Bishop by the name of Inba Thawfīlus⁹⁹ as Patriarch in Jerusalem and promised him every help and protection.¹⁰⁰ So far Ibn al-Jarrāh's operation was successful. The whole region between ^bTāhriyya (North) and al-Farmā (South) was under his control except for the main cities of the coastal area.¹⁰¹ But this did not last long. The new State needed able administration and finance. All supporters of Ibn al-Jarrāh were tribesmen and except for Abū al-Qāsim none had experience of state administration. The treasury of Mecca which Abū al Futūh had brought with him, together with the money the Jarrāhids found in Yārughtigīn's caravan and the treasury of Ramla, soon vanished in an attempt to buy the support of the greedy Beduin chiefs.¹⁰² The tribes which supported Abū al-Futūh and Ibn al-Jarrāh had no stable finance on which a State could exist. They lived by breeding cattle and gains from raids on which they could hardly be expected to pay tax. The coastal cities with their organised administration and rich incomes as key centres of trade were beyond Ibn al-Jarrāh's reach and in spite of many attempts to divert them, they remained loyal to the Fatimid Caliph.¹⁰³ The Byzantine Emperor did not seem eager to support the Jarrāhids. Perhaps it was because he was faced with problems

99. Anṭākī, 201.

100. Anṭākī, 201.

101. Anṭākī, 201.

102. Anṭākī, 201.

103. Anṭākī, 201.

on the northern borders of his Empire; or perhaps he was waiting until Ibn al-Jarrāḥ had the coastal cities under his control.

When Ibn al-Jarrāḥ realised that there was no help forthcoming from Byzantium, he changed his attitude towards the Christians of Palestine. He allowed his troops to raid their homes and confiscate their properties. This forced many of them to leave Palestine and move to other regions in Northern Syria and to Byzantine territory.¹⁰⁴

al-Ḥakīm's method of dealing with the problem

By the proclamation of Abū al-Futūḥ in Ḥijāz and Palestine, the rebellion began to mount to become a serious threat to the interests of the Fatimid Caliphate. Ḥijāz which was vitally important to the propaganda was no longer under Fatimid suzerainty. This was in addition to the fact that Abū al-Futūḥ was an 'Alid and acknowledged in the Holy places of Islām which made him a serious rival. Only a few years previously an 'Alid named Abū Ḥāshim plotted in Egypt to overthrow al-Ḥakīm and a number of high officials had supported him.¹⁰⁵

al-Ḥakīm followed a most successful policy in dealing with the problem. First he planned to discredit Abū al-Futūḥ in Mecca and regain Ḥijāz. He made communications with another 'Alid in Mecca

104. Antākī, 202.

105. Itti'āz, anno, 392.

known as Ibn Abū al-Ṭayyib who had been the rival of Abū al-Futūḥ in the Holy places.¹⁰⁶ He appointed him as Sharīf of Mecca and sent him a large sum of money which he used to oppose Abū al-Futūḥ. Consequently Ibn Abū al-Ṭayyib succeeded and Ḥijāz was restored to the Fatimids.¹⁰⁷ al-Ḥākim then began to discredit Abū al-Futūḥ in Palestine. He contacted Ḥassān and offered him a large sum of money to denounce Abū al-Futūḥ. He also made similar offers to ‘Alī and Maḥmūd, sons of al-Mufarrij.¹⁰⁸ Abu al-Futūḥ realised that he was no longer Amīr al-Mu’minīn but an object for bargaining and his own life was in danger. The Jarrahids, and particularly Ḥassān, appeared willing to accept al-Ḥākim's offers.¹⁰⁹ He pleaded with Abū al-Ḥāsim and al-Mufarrij to assist him to return to Ḥijāz. They gave him protection as far as Mecca where he deposed himself openly and read the Khuṭba in the name of al-Ḥākim.¹¹⁰ He also sent a letter of apology to Cairo in which he begged for pardon.¹¹¹

106. al-Rudhrawārī, 238.

107. al-Rudhrawārī, 238.

108. al-Rudhrawārī, 237; See also Anṭākī, 201; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 250; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 402; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 57.

109. Anṭākī, 201; al-Rudhrawārī, 237, ff.

110. Anṭākī, 201; al-Rudhrawārī, 238.

111. Anṭākī, 201; al-Rudhrawārī, 238; Ibn al-‘Adīm, Bughya, IV, fol. 23.

The Jarrahids' rebellion should have ended, but in fact it did not. Although they accepted al-Hākim's offers and took his money, they retained mastery of Palestine and continued to menace the peace and security of the area by their raids on towns and cities. The pilgrims from Egypt could no longer travel to Ḥijāz to perform their annual duty because their caravans were likely to be plundered.¹¹²

In 404/1013 al-Hākim decided that force was necessary. He sent an army of twenty thousand men¹¹³ under the leadership of 'Alī Ibn Falāḥ to whom he gave the title Qutb al-Dawla (Magnate of the State).¹¹⁴ He also commanded the provincial rulers of Damascus and the coastal cities to march together with their troops in support of 'Alī.¹¹⁵ Al-Mufarrij died suddenly, perhaps poisoned under al-Hākim's instructions,¹¹⁶ and thus the position of the Jarrahids became much weaker. Ḥassan, the new chief, realised his inability to stand against the Fatimid forces. He withdrew from Ramla and retreated to the desert while his two brothers, 'Alī and Maḥmūd, surrendered to Ibn Falāḥ.¹¹⁷ Qutb al-Dawla entered Ramla and restored law and order there before he moved to punish Ḥassan.

112. Anṭakī, 224.

113. al-Rudhrawārī, 238.

114. Anṭakī, 207; al-Rudhrawārī, 238; Itti'āz, anno, 403.

115. Anṭakī, 207.

116. al-Rudhrawārī, 239.

117. al-Rudhrawārī, 238.

But the Jarrahīd chief resorted to the old trick of his fathers. He sent his mother to Cairo to beg for mercy from al-Ḥākim and to promise her son's future obedience and loyalty.¹¹⁸ Ḥassān was pardoned and allowed to return to Palestine and repossess his father's land.¹¹⁹ From this time he remained loyal to the Fatimids throughout the last years of al-Ḥākim's reign.

Abū al-Qāsim, who realised the failure of his mission, fled to Iraq where he received a warm welcome and was employed by the 'Abbasid authorities.¹²⁰ According to the authority of Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Abū al-Qāsim wrote a letter to al-Ḥākim in which he said, "O thou, Imām of Glory, you know that I possess a tongue that can build and destroy. He who is pleased when his hand is kissed is not a Clement. A Clement is one who forgives when his hand is bitten."¹²¹ On receiving this letter al-Ḥākim himself wrote an Amān which declared all charges against Abū al-Qāsim to be dismissed and allowed him to return to Egypt and to regain his office if he wished.¹²² Abū al-Qāsim, however, preferred

118. al-Rudhrawārī, 239; M. Canard, "Djarrahids", E.I.2

119. al-Rudhrawārī, 239.

120. al-Rudhrawārī, 238; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 64; Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 138; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 402; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 266.

121. Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, IV, fol. 23.

122. Ibid., fol. 24.

to remain in Irāq where he served a number of rulers until he died in 418/1027.¹²³

It may appear strange that al-Ḥākim did not use his army immediately after Yārūḡtigīn's death and the declaration of Abū al-Futūḥ and that he left Palestine at the mercy of the Beduin tribesmen for more than two years. The sources fail to offer any explanation. M. Canard, however, suggests that al-Ḥākim knew that it was always possible to suborn the members of the Jarrahīd family,¹²⁴ which is strongly supported by the events of the previous uprisings led by the chief of the Banū al-Jarrāḥ. In addition to this there may have been other reasons. It must be remembered that it was not only the Jarrahīds who were involved at the beginning of the revolt but the tribes of Hilāl, Sulaym and al-ʿAwf Ibn ʿĀmir. They all acknowledged Abū al-Futūḥ as did also the ʿAlids of Mecca and Madīna. There was also the population of Palestine, who might stand with Abū al-Futūḥ as his speeches were full of promises of better conditions.¹²⁵ Victory of the Fatimid army over all these difficulties does not seem to have been certain and if defeat was inflicted on its forces in Palestine, suzerainty of the Fatimids throughout Syria would be questionable. Damascus would probably rebel and the Byzantines and

123. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 266.

124. M. Canard, art., "Jarrahīds", E.I.²

125. al-Rudhrawārī, 236; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VII, 248-250.

‘Abbasids might attempt infiltration and claim some parts of Fatimid Syria. Even if the army defeated the Jarrahids and their allies in Palestine, there would still be complications. The Jarrahids would retreat towards Hijāz (as they had always done in previous uprisings) where they would barricade themselves in the Holy cities of Mecca and Madīna in which case al-Hākīm would face a very difficult position. If in any way his troops destroyed the Holy cities, his Da‘wa, throughout the Muslim world, would be severely shaken. If he ordered his army to withdraw, Hijāz would be no longer a part of the Fatimid Empire.

Such an outcome may or may not have been considered by al-Hākīm but the sources show that throughout his reign he never sent his army to solve a problem unless diplomacy and bribery completely failed. al-Hākīm, however, was determined to avoid any problem in Hijāz which might affect the operations of his Du‘at in that important centre. Abū al-Futūḥ was not only pardoned but was also reappointed as Sharīf of Mecca and a large sum of money was sent to him from Cairo.¹²⁶ He also was very well received in the Capital of the Fatimid Empire where al-Hākīm treated him as guest of honour a few years later.¹²⁷

126. Anjākī, 201; Majīd, al-Hākīm, 153.

127. Majīd, al-Hākīm, 153.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORIGIN OF THE DRUZ MOVEMENT

One of the most important events which occurred during the reign of al-Hākim was a division in the Isma'īlī Da'wa, a split that shook the fundamental principles of its teaching and resulted in the creation of a new sect in Islam which became known as al-Durẓīyya or al-Darziyya.¹

The question of the racial origin of the people who belong to this sect has been the theme of much speculation by many modern writers. Many saw them as a race apart, differing in religious theory from all other groups in Syria.² Others believed that they were the descendants of the Arab tribes who came and settled in the area after the Muslim conquest.³

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1. M.G.S. Hodgson, art., "Druz", E.I.²
 2. See R. Pocock, A Description of the East and Some Other Countries, (London 1745), 94; H. Mandrell, A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem on Easter A.D. 1697, (London, 1801), 51-2; G. Washington Chasseaud, The Druze of Lebanon, Their Manners, Customs and Religion, (London, 1855), 97; H. Light, Travels in Egypt, Nubia, Holy Land, Mount Lebanon and Cyprus in the Year 1814, (London, 1818), 225; "Religion des Druzes", R.D.O., Paris, X (1846), 240; J.T. Parfit, Among the Druzes of Lebanon, (London, 1917), p.33; G.L. Bell, Syria the Desert and the Sown, (New York, 1907), 103; F.K. Hitti, Origins of the Druze People and Religion, (New York, 1928), 18 ff.
 3. See Niebuhr, Travels through Arabia and Other Countries in the East, translated by R. Heron, (Edinburgh, 1792), II, 179; A.M. Taṭī', Aṣl al-Muwahhīdūn al-Druz wa uṣūluhum, (Beirut, 1961), 15 ff; A.A. Najjār, Madhhab al-Drūz wa al-Tawhīd, (Cairo, 1965), 24 ff.

Such speculations, however, have very little support in the historical sources. The people who responded to the new teaching and became known as Drūz were largely drawn from the Shi'a Ismā'īlīs and were like other people who lived in the area at that time: a mixture of migrating hordes who had settled and intermarried in Syria throughout its history. From this it would be impossible to trace the origin of any community in Syria or, at least, confine the origin of any family to one particular race.

Drūz (or Durūz) is the plural of ḥDurzī which is an Arabic corruption of the Persian term Darzī (tailor) and was the name of one of the Ismā'īlī Dā'īs. He separated himself from them and not only preached extreme views, but declared the Imām al-Hākim to be divine.

It was a curious name for a religious community, to be known by, particularly as Darzī's teachings were considered to be evil in its books. The real founder of the Drūz sect, however, was Hamza Ibn 'Alī, and the teaching of it is called Dīn al-Tawhīd (the religion of Tawhīd) and there is no reference to the term "Drūz" in any of its religious books. The followers of it are called Muwahhīdūn (those who accepted Tawhīd as their religion).

The term "Drūz" was applied to the Muwahhīdūn by the chroniclers and historians of the middle ages. This resulted from Darzī having been

the first to declare the teaching⁴ which was followed by the suppression and persecution of his followers.

Ḥamza, who was also an extremist, denounced Darzī and tried to convince the officials and the population of Egypt that Darzī was an imposter.⁵ His denouncement seems to have been occasioned by the pressure on him and his supporters, and the principles he advocated did not, fundamentally, differ from those attributed to Darzī. Ḥamza failed to convince the chroniclers of any difference between his teaching of Tawhīd and the doctrine of Darzī. In addition there was also the hostility which all chroniclers bore towards the Drūz. It is evident that they applied to them licentiousness and moral looseness⁶ which have no foundation in their doctrine. The application of the term Muwahhidūn would, perhaps, give the teaching some degree of recognition.

Since the Drūz, however, were unable to persuade their neighbours to call them Muwahhidūn, they gave themselves another name, al-A'raf (the beneficients) which developed into the term Banū Ma'rūf (those who help others). This name is still used together with al-Muwahhidūn

4. M.G.S. Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Ḥamza in the Origin of the Druze Religion", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), p.6.
5. Risālat, al-Ṣubḥa al-Kā'ina, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,559, fol. 38; De Sacy, Exposé, II, 164; al-Ridā wa al-Taslīm, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,558, fol. 71; Exposé, II, 176.
6. Anṭākī, 224; Sibt, Mir'āt, fol. 207; 'Azīmī, anno, 408; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 60; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno 408, Itti'āz, anno 408; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 184; Hodgson, al-Darazī and Ḥamza, J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 6 ff.

by those who wish to praise the Sect, while avoiding mention of the term Drūz.⁷

The Origin of the Founders of the Teaching

There is little information concerning the origins of the founders of Dīn al-Tawhīd. Chroniclers give no information about any of its leaders except Ḥamza. His full name appears in both chroniclers' reports and Drūz writings, as Ḥamza Ibn 'Alī Ibn Aḥmad. He was a felt maker (al-Labbād), born in Zawzan in Persia, but whether he is actually Persian is not certain.⁸ His titles, as revealed in the Drūz writings, are: Hādī al-Mustajībīn (Guide of the Faithful), The Imām, Sāhib al-Zamān (Master of the Time), Amīr al-Mu'minin, Mawlānā, al-'Aql (the Intellect), al-Nāṭiq (the Prophet).⁹

The other leaders' names and titles are only given by the Drūz Rasā'il. The first one who follows Ḥamza in the rank of leadership is an Arab named Abū Ibrāhīm, Ismā'īl Ibn Muḥammad al-Tamīnī. He was Ḥamza's

7. See examples of the poetry of Wadī' Talhūq; Ilyās Farḥāt, Ma'rūf al-Rasāfī, al-Shā'ir al-Qurawī and Mas'ūd Samaha quoted by A.M. Talī', Asl al-Muwahhidūn al-Drūz wa Usūlūhum, Beirut, 1961, p.163 ff. See also A. Najjār, Madhhab, 152; Y.I. Yazbik, Introduction to al-Dawla al-Durziyya, 12.
8. See W. Madelung, art., "Hamza b. Ali", E.I.². See also Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Hamza", in J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), and "Druz" in E.I.²; A. Najjār, Madhhab, 123; A.M. Talī', Asl al-Muwahhidīn, 79; A.F.J. Beeston, "An Ancient Drūz Manuscript", B.I.R., V, (1956), 286 ff.
9. See al-Balagh wa al-Nihāya, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,558, fol. 55; al-Naqd al-Khafī, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,558, 39; al-Subḥā al-Ka'ina, Ms., No. add. 11,559; al-Tanzīh, Ms., B.M., No. add.

brother-in-law. His titles were al-Nafs (the Soul), al-Mashī'a (the Will). Hamza appointed him as his successor (Khalīfa) and the chief of the Du'āt and the Ma'dhūnīn (the Licenced).¹⁰ The second in importance to Isma'īlī was also an Arab named Muḥammad Ibn Wahb al-Qurashī. His titles were al-Raḍī Saḥīr al-Qudra (the Conveyor of the Power), al-Kalima (the Spokesman).¹¹

The third in importance was Abū al-Khayr, Salāma Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Samūrī (from the town of Samurrā in Iraq). His titles were al-Janāḥ al-Ayman (the Right Wing), al-Mustafā (the Chosen One).¹²

Finally was Abū al-Ḥasan, 'Alī Ibn Aḥmad al-Samūqī known as Bahā' al-Dīn. His titles were al-Muqtana (the Trustworthy), al-Janāḥ al-Aysar (the Left Wing).¹³

According to the teaching, these five leaders embodied the five

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- = 11,559, fol. 22; Kashf al-Haqq'iq, Ms. B.M., No. add. 11,558, fol. 117 ff. See also Hodgson, art., "Druz", E.I.²; W. Madelung, art., "Hamza B. Ali", E.I.²; A. Najjār, Madhhab, 123.
10. Taqīd al-Mujtabā, Ms., B.M., No. add., 11,559, fol. 40. See also Hodgson, art., "Druz", E.I.², Najjār, Madhhab, 140.
11. Taqīd al-Raḍī, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,559, fol. 44. See also Hodgson, art., "Druz", E.I.²; Najjār, Madhhab, 140.
12. A. Najjār, Madhhab, 140; Hodgson, art., "Druz", E.I.². There is no Risala of Taqīd for al-Mustafā. A. Najjār suggests that this was a result of loss.
13. Taqīd al-Muqtana, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,559, fols. 46-7. See also Hodgson, art., "Druz", E.I.²; Najjār, Madhhab, 142.

cosmic principles (or ranks) known in Isma'īlism as Hudūd, which are al-ʿAql, al-Nafs, al-Kalima, al-Sābiq (or al-Janāh al-Ayman), al-Tālī (or al-Janāh al-Aysar).¹⁴

The major part of the writings is attributed to Ḥamza, Bahā' al-Dīn and Isma'īl Ibn Muḥammad.

Anṭākī adds Darzī to the list and considers him to be one of the founders of the Drūz teaching. He gives his name as Muḥammad Ibn Isma'īl and says his origin was ʿAjāmī (Persian).¹⁵ De Sacy, however, points out that Darzī had another name which appears in the Druze writings as Anūshtigīn (or Nashtakīn) which, to quote De Sacy, "ascertains that Darzī was a Turk".¹⁶ Although the possibility is strong, it does not follow that a name usually defines the origin. An interesting point, however, arises from this: why did Darzī have two names, and which of them was the true one? Muḥammad Ibn Isma'īl was the name by which he was known to the chroniclers and presumably also to the populace in Egypt. While Anūshtigīn was the name by which he was known to close friends such as Ḥamza and other Drūz leaders.

Darzī was an ambitious man who wanted to declare himself as

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14. Hodgson, art., "Drūz", E.I.², and "al-Darazī and Hamza", J.A.O.S. 82 (1962), 16. See also A. Najjar, Madhhab, 137 ff.
15. Anṭākī, 220. See also ʿAzīmī, anno, 408; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, I, 248; Iṭṭiʿāz, anno, 408.

al-Qā'im (the Expected Mahdī). He may have assumed the name Muḥammad Ibn Isma'īl according to a personally preconceived plan in order to rouse the emotions of the Shī'ā Isma'īlis, knowing that the name held special implication with the expected Qā'im "Muḥammad Ibn Isma'īl Ibn Ja'far al-Šādiq".

Ibn al-Zāfir adds another man named al-Ḥasan Ibn Ḥaydara al-Farghānī (from Farghāna in Persia) who was known also as al-Akhram (the One with the Perforated Nose) and considers him to be one of the Drūz leaders.¹⁷ In the Drūz writings there is no mention that al-Akhram acquired any position in the leadership of the Sect. al-Kirmānī's Risāla, known as al-Risāla al-Wa'iza is a reply to a letter sent to him by al-Akhram.¹⁸ So it is more likely that al-Akhram was one of Darzī's supporters and, perhaps, the spokesman of his group. According to Ibn al-Šābi', al-Akhram was a person who publicly declared al-Ḥākim to be divine,¹⁹ and that applies more to Darzī's supporters.

Darzī and his supporters, although they may have preached similar

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16. De Sacy, Exposé, I, 384. See also Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Ḥamza", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 5.
17. Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 59 ff. See also Ibn al-Šābi', quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 207, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 183.
18. See al-Risāla al-Wā'iza, ed. by M.K. Husayn in B.F.A.E.U., 14 (1952), 11.
19. Ibn al-Šābi' quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 207, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 183. See also Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 59.

ideas to those of Ḥamza, could not be considered among the founders of the Dīn al-Tawhīd. They were a group who separated from the movement even before it was known. They disobeyed the leader Ḥamza by making public their extreme views of the teaching. For this they were expelled. But since chroniclers were unaware of these developments inside the circles of the movement, they believed that Darzī, Ḥamza, Akhram and the rest of them belonged to one and the same party.

The Teaching

Immersed in secrecy, the doctrinal books of the Drūz which they called al-Ḥikma (the Wisdom)²⁰ were for a long time beyond the reach of historians and theologians. Even today the vast majority of the community of the Drūz are not permitted access to them. Only a small group known as al-ʿUqqāl (Wisemen or Initiated)²¹ are allowed to read them and study the teaching. The rest of the community are considered Juhhāl (not initiated). The ʿUqqāl hold their own special meetings during which they read and discuss the doctrine. The Juhhāl are invited once a week to attend a meeting and one of the ʿUqqāl reads some of the Rasāʾil which

20. There is no clear mention in the writing that the term Ḥikma was associated with the names of the Rasāʾil. The name, however, seems to have originated in a later period, perhaps in the time of ʿAbd Allāh al-Tanūkhī (d.885/1480), who is known to have collected the Rasāʾil and arranged them into six volumes. The name of al-Ḥākim and Dār al-Ḥikma may have been the inspiration. For information on al-Tanūkhī, see "al-Tanūkhī ʿAbd Allāh", E.I.

21. See Hodgson, art., "Drūz", E.I.², and "al-Darazī and Ḥamza", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 20.

does not contain much of the Ta'wīl. These meetings bear a great similarity to the special and common meetings of Dār al-Hikma²² and it may well be that the Drūz have adopted similar methods. Non-Drūz are barred from these meetings and are not even allowed to enter the prayer place Khalwa (solitude), where the meetings are held, even when it is empty. It is of little wonder that Muslim theologians and historians of the middle ages have failed to give any satisfactory account on this issue. This secrecy is undoubtedly a reflection of the hostility which forced their leaders to undertake precautionary measures and consider them as part of the religion in order to protect the community from outside oppression.

In the course of time, however, many copies of al-Hikma have found their way into the libraries of Cairo, Paris, London, Oxford and many other places, and interested scholars have been able to reveal some of the mysteries of the Drūz teaching.

Druzism, or as the members of the Sect prefer to call it, Dīn al-Tawhīd, is an extreme off-shoot of the Isma'ili Da'wa. Its method is al-Ta'wīl (the allegorical interpretation of the Holy Qurān and the traditions of the Prophet). Its founders studied in the Isma'ili school of Dār al-Hikma and it follows naturally that their methods of analogy are typically

22. Discussion of Dār al-Hikma has been made in Chapter III of this thesis.

Isma'ili. The same terms and sometimes whole phrases are repeated in both al-Hikma and the Isma'ili religious books and with the exception of a few points, al-Hikma might be classified as one of the Isma'ili books.

Many scholars have commented on the teaching of the Drūz²³ and it is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss its doctrines at length. But it seems necessary to comment on the points of difference between Dīn al-Tawhīd and its mother Isma'ilism, inasmuch as its influence on the split.

One strong point of Drūz teaching asserts the physical manifestation of the divine form and that at the end of the fourth century A.H. such a manifestation was revealed in the person of al-Hakim. To them he was absolutely and completely God in person and the term Tawhīd meant the belief in the complete unity between the spirit of God and the body of

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23. The Drūz teaching has been discussed at length by many historians. The best account is offered by M.G.S. Hodgson in his articles "Drūz", E.I.², and "al-Darāzī and Hamza in the Origin of the Drūz Religion", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962). The fullest and most detailed account is given by S. De Sacy in Exposé de la Religion des Druzes, (Paris, 1838), 2 vols. See also M. Sprengling, "The Berlin Drūze Lexicon", A.J.S.L., LVI (1939); M.K. Husayn, Tā'ifat al-Drūz Tarīkhuhā wa 'Aqā'iduhā, (Cairo, 1962); A.J. Arberry and others, Religions of the Middle East, (Cambridge, 1969), II, 230 ff; J.R. Buchanan, "The Druzes; their origins and development to the Zenith of their power under Fakhr al-Dīn II", G.U.O.S.T., XIX (1961-2), 1 ff; A.A. Najjār, Madhhab al-Drūz wa al-Tawhīd, (Cairo, 1965); M.A. 'Inān, al-Hakim Bī Amr Allāh, (Cairo, 1932); A.M. Mājid, al-Hakim, 105 ff; P.K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, New York, 1928.

al-Ḥakīm.²⁴ Although the Isma'ilis revered their Imām as a divinely appointed being, such extreme views were not acceptable to the majority of the Isma'ili followers.

From this sprang all other points. The Drūz belief that God manifested himself in physical forms only at times when a new revelation was necessary and then a new deliverer was commanded to reveal it. The new revelation was Dīn al-Tawḥid and the new prophet was Ḥamza.

Thus, since every prophet superseded previous prophets and exalted his Sharī'a over the previous ones, Ḥamza superseded Muḥammad and Dīn al-Tawḥid was exalted over Islām.²⁵ The Isma'ilis interpreted Islām by saying that it was the outward revelation (Zāhir) of the inner revelation (Bāṭin) of (Imān or Tawḥid) and considered them of equal importance, both as a continuation and inseparable.²⁶ They considered the teaching of their Imāms to have supplemented and not superseded the Sharī'a of Prophet Muḥammad.

It might be interesting to mention here the arguments of both doctrines on this point. The Isma'ilis interpret the Āya which says: "Between

24. al-Balāgh wa al-Nibāya, fol. 55; al-Naqd al-Khafī, 39; al-Tanzīh, fol. 22; Mithāq Waliy al-Zamān, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,559; fol. 23.

25. al-Naqd al-Khafī, fol. 38; al-Ridā wa al-Taslīm, fol. 20; Bid' al-Tawḥid, fol. 41 ff in Ms, B.M., No. add. 11,558, fol. 41 ff. See also Hodgson, art., "Drūz", E.I.², and "al-Darazī and Ḥamza", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 7 ff.

26. al-Kirmānī, al-Risāla al-Wa'iza, 24 ff.

them was erected a wall which has a gate. Inside it (Bātinuhu) there is mercy and joy (Rahma) and outside it (Zāhiruhu) there is suffering (‘Adhāb).²⁷ They said that the "gate" meant ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib. The "wall" meant the Sharī‘a. Inside the Sharī‘a and through the gate was ‘Imān (or Tawhīd). They supported this by the tradition of the Prophet which says, "I am the City of Knowledge and ‘Alī is its gate (Bāb)."²⁸ He who wanted to enter the City should come through its gate."²⁹ The Drūz agree with this interpretation and add that the Āya says, "Inside the gate there is Rahma" and not the inside as a whole is Rahma. So Tawhīd is inside ‘Imān and not the ‘Imān itself. They add that Islām is the door to ‘Imān and ‘Imān is the door to Tawhīd. Thus they divided Tawhīd from ‘Imān and considered it a higher stage of worship.³⁰

The Drūz differ not only from Isma‘ilism, but perhaps from all other religious sects in that they do not allow conversion. They say that the door of Tawhīd was closed in about 434/1042 and base their argument on the theory of reincarnation and that since souls are transferred from one physical body to another, all have had an opportunity to join in Tawhīd through the revelation of Hamza.³¹

27. Āya no.13, Ṣūra no.57.

28. For information on this term, see B. Lewis, art, "Bāb", E.I.²

29. A. Najjār, Madhhab, 40.

30. A. Najjār, Ibid.

31. For the closure of conversion, see Hodgson, art., "Drūz", E.I.²
For further details on the Drūz belief of transmigration of souls, see "

This interpretation of the soul's reincarnation with reference to the closure of the Da'wa is not original in the teaching. The founders of the Sect do not mention at all that the door of Tawhīd would be closed at any time. It seems likely that this happened after the death of the founder leaders and due to lack of leadership as well as to outside pressure. The leaders who succeeded Bahā' al-Dīn in about 434/1042 closed the door of the Da'wa in order to protect themselves and their followers. To justify this action, they interpreted the theory of reincarnation, which is deeply rooted in the teaching.³²

Amongst modern Drūz there is a common belief known as Nuṭq (speaking). According to this, a child newly born may be able to speak and remember some or all things about his previous life.³³ This, of course, is based on the theory of reincarnation. Modern Drūz writers are divided into two groups on this issue. Some support this belief and others consider

= Hitti, The Origins, 44. See also Risālat Su'āl wa Jawāb, Ms. Bib. Nat., No. 1144-1419, published by Eichhorn under "Bon Der Religion Der Druzen", R.M.B.L., XII (1782), 108 ff and by Regnault, "Catéchisme a l'Usage des Druses djahels", B.S.G. VII, (Paris 1827), 22 ff. This Risāla has been written at a much later date than the time of Ḥamza. The writer, who does not appear to have thoroughly understood the teaching of Ḥamza, gives a summary of what he believed to be the Tawhīd in a form of answering questions. Some of his answers are consistent with the teaching, but many others are far from its instruction.

32. See Risālat al-Ghayba, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,559, which clearly indicates that the Muwahhidūn were facing great pressure which forced many of them to abandon the teaching.

33. For further details, see Hitti, The Origins, 44.

it a kind of "myth" resulting from a misunderstanding of the doctrine.³⁴

The teaching, however, dismisses such an idea and as A. Najjār pointed out, it considers it contrary to the doctrine. But the arguments in the Rasā'il, particularly some by Bahā' al-Dīn, indicate that at his time there were some Drūz who believed in Nuṭq and asked him about it.³⁵

The political implications which resulted from the differences between the teaching of Ḥamza and that of the official circles of the Isma'ili Da'wa were far more important than religious polemics. The whole question of Imāma and Khilāfa was involved. The Drūz said that since al-Ḥakīm was God, then he could not be Imām or Caliph. "He is higher and more dignified than to be associated with names or titles such as Imām, Ṣāhib al-Zamān, Amīr al-Mu'minīn, which all belong to his slave (Ḥamza)."³⁶ Administering the State and leading the Umma through the right paths was the job of a human being chosen and appointed by him and that was Ḥamza, who claimed to be the Imām-Caliph directly appointed by the Lord.³⁷

34. A. Najjār, Madhhab, 69; A. Talīz, Ast, 100.

35. A. Najjār, Madhhab, 70.

36. Al-Ghāya wa al-Naṣīḥa, fol. 71, ff.

37. Cf. Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Ḥamza", J.A.O.S., 82 (1962), 13, and art. "Drūz", E.I.²

Following this reasoning, they maintained that the Imām was no longer necessarily appointed by his physical father, nor was it necessary for either of them to be Fatimid by descent. This abolished the hereditary system of the Imāma and in modern terms the institution of Imāma, the centre of the Isma'ili Da'wa, was nationalised by Ḥamza.

Ḥamza, however, seems to have realised that since he opened the way for non-Fatimids to become Imām-Caliphs, many other ambitious men would also try to achieve that position. It is noticeable that he over-emphasises the argument in his Rasā'il which says that only he, because he was specially chosen by God, was to be the Imām.³⁸ From this his difficulties concerning political leadership commenced. Not only did he have to fight al-Ḥakīm's son and official successor, but also some of his own followers. Darzī, who opposed Ḥamza chiefly concerning the question of Imāma, claimed that he himself was the Imām. For this he was expelled from the movement and declared to be Iblīs (the Devil).³⁹ After Ḥamza's disappearance many Drūz Dā'īs claimed his position. The Drūz writing contains a considerable number of Rasā'il which were written to reprimand those Dā'īs and warn the faithful from accepting their claims.⁴⁰

38. This point appears to be the theme of argument in almost all of the Rasā'il. For example, see al-Ghāya wa al-Naṣīḥa, fol. 71; Al-Riḍā wa al-Taslīm, fol. 20 ff; Al-Ṣubḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 38 ff.

39. Al-Ghāya wa al-Naṣīḥa, fol. 71; Al-Ṣubḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 38.

40. See Tawbīkh Lāhiq; Tawbīkh Sukayn; Tawbīkh Sahl; Tawbīkh Hasan Ibn Mu'alla; Tawbīkh al-Khayb Mahallā, all in Ms. B.M., No.add. 11,562.

The Elements behind the Origin of the Sect

Chroniclers of the middle ages have generally agreed that al-Ḥakīm himself was behind the movement. They say that he wanted to be declared divine and for that purpose he encouraged and supported the extremists of his Duʿāt. This is supported by the Drūz writings which state that Ḥamza was chosen and authorised by al-Ḥakīm to reveal the teaching of Tawḥīd.

The Ismaʿīlī writings, on the other hand, declare that the new movement was the thinking of a group of extremists (Ghulāt) whom al-Ḥakīm neither authorised nor supported. They add that those who were authorised and supported by the Imām were well known and remained the official spokesmen of the Daʿwa until his death.

Modern historians accept the chroniclers' and the Drūz information as facts and generally agree that al-Ḥakīm was behind the movement. Such reports, however, should not be accepted without investigation. There are three versions given by chroniclers. Two by Antākī and Ibn al-Ṣābi' and yet another by Ṣibt Ibn al-Jawzī, a later chronicler. Most of the later accounts have followed one or another of these versions. The fact of their dissimilarity would appear to denote confusion amongst these writers. None of them was living in Egypt at that time and all of them relied on hearsay, which is often calumnious and always reflects the attitude

of the informers. In addition, these three chroniclers were obviously hostile to al-Ḥākim and it is probable that this hostility coloured their opinions. Ibn al-Ṣabī', as has been mentioned before, was writing in Baghdad at a time when the relations between the 'Abbasids and the Fatimids were particularly strained. Antākī wrote of the al-Ḥākim who had suppressed the Christians in Egypt and had destroyed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and Sibī depicted him as he was after the Fatimid Empire had been abolished and in a society where accusing the Fatimid Imāms of heresy was considered a virtue.

Not only do the three versions differ from each other, but they are also contradictory in themselves. Thus Antākī states that al-Ḥākim approved Darzī's teaching and commanded him to contact the officials and ask them to accept the new teaching, while he adds that when al-Ḥākim was informed about Darzī's preaching he was very angry.⁴¹ He further states that Darzī was killed by a Turkish soldier while he was in the company of al-Ḥākim and adds that the gates of Cairo were closed for three days and a number of Drūz were killed. This seems to indicate that both the killing of Darzī and the closure of the city gates were ordered by al-Ḥākim. By this Antākī contradicts the assumption that al-Ḥākim supported and authorised Darzī's teaching. Neither Darzī's nor Ḥamza's

41. Antākī, 222.

names appear among those of the only people allowed in al-Ḥākim's court. The list of these persons is given by Anṭākī.⁴² In addition, neither of them was given any title or position in the administration of the State or of the Da'wa which would indicate that al-Ḥākim's support or encouragement was not given to the movement.

From Ibn al-Ṣābi' comes the statement that al-Ḥākim desired to claim divinity and employed a man called al-Akhram to declare it.⁴³ A contradiction of this appears in his own chronicles when he says that al-Ḥākim prohibited his subjects from prostrating themselves before him or from kissing the ground or his hand when they saw him. He affirms that al-Ḥākim supported and encouraged the new teaching, but contradicts himself by saying that he allowed Ahl al-Dhimma, who had adopted Islam, to return to their previous religions and permitted them to rebuild their destroyed churches, while this is completely contrary to the Drūz teaching.⁴⁴

Sibt̄ presents al-Ḥākim as fearing the results of Darzī's teaching in Egypt and as saying to him secretly, "Go to Bilād al-Shām and preach there, because its people are quick to follow."⁴⁵ Yet in another part of

42. Anṭākī, 222-3.

43. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibt̄, Mir'āt, fol. 207, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 183 ff.

44. See al-Sijil al-Mu'allaq, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,558; al-Rida wa al-Taslim, fol. 16; Risālat al Yahūd wa al-Naṣara, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,558.

45. Sibt̄, Mir'āt, fol. 207. Also quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 184.

his report he presents al-Hākim as Jabbār 'Anīd (stubborn tyrant) who killed a great number of people without fear of consequences. It is strange that, if this story of Sibṭ is correct, he was able to reveal the exact words of a secret conversation between Darzī and al-Hākim.

This story of Sibṭ, however, is more likely an attempt to explain the existence of the Drūz community who were living in Wādī al-Taym in Bilād al-Shām in his time. By the term Darzī he does not necessarily mean Anushtigīn al-Darzī. It is more likely that he meant the founder of the Drūz Sect - "Ḥamza". According to Antākī, Azimī, Maqrīzī, al-Dhahabī and the Drūz writings, Anushtigīn al-Darzī was killed in Egypt.⁴⁶ Ḥamza might have fled to Wādī al-Taym and he and his successors were responsible for the spread of the teaching there. But even this remains an assumption.

It is noticeable that some of the later chroniclers gave no credence to these accounts and seem to have concluded that they were probably coloured by the hostility of the writers rather than repeated facts. Ibn al-Qalānisi, who usually follows the reports of Ibn al-Sābi', does not mention any relation between al-Hākim and the Drūz leaders, nor is al-Hākim's desire for divinity referred to by him. Maqrīzī, who reports Antākī's story, does not suggest that Darzī or Ḥamza were at any time

46. al-Subḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 38; al-Riḍa wa al-Taslīm, fol. 20; Antākī, 223; 'Azimī, anno, 408; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, anno, 408; Iṭī'āz, anno, 408.

encouraged by al-Ḥākim. Moreover, Maqrīzī condemns Ibn Abī Tayy, who seems to have been influenced by the account of Ibn al-Ṣābi', by saying, "This is extreme hostility which no one of the Egyptian chroniclers has mentioned".⁴⁷ Ibn Khaldūn openly says, "These are allegations which no man of intellect would contemplate."⁴⁸

The Contradictions of the Drūz Writings

The writings of the Drūz affirm that Ḥamza was supported and authorised by al-Ḥākim. Some of the Rasā'il even bore inscriptions which claim that al-Ḥākim was aware of them and he approved the teaching they contained. But as A. Najjār pointed out, there is no substantial evidence to support such claims.⁴⁹ Careful research into all available information reveals that it is very unlikely that the Drūz Rasā'il were written during the life time of al-Ḥākim. There is no mention of confiscation of either books or Rasā'il during the Drūz suppression which followed the riots of 408/1017. This suggests that none were written.

In 408/1017 Darzī publicly declared al-Ḥākim to be divine, which caused the riots, thus forcing Ḥamza to go into hiding. From his concealment he denounced Darzī. It would appear very unlikely that, during a period of persecution, Ḥamza would compose Rasā'il which would emphasise that he,

47. Iṭrī'āz, anno, 411.

48. Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 60.

49. A. Najjār, Madhhab, 103.

like Darzī, was an extremist. Studying the Risāla, known as al-Sijil al-Mu'allaq which Ḥamza wrote in 411/1021 after al-Ḥākim's death, points out that none of the other Rasā'il, titles or ideas are mentioned in it, although they are supposed to have been written before.⁵⁰ Some of the Rasā'il contain information which was obviously unknown at their alleged date of composition. One striking example of this occurs in the Risāla known as al-Balāgh wa al-Nihāya fī al-Tawhīd. It speaks of al-Zāhir, al-Ḥākim's son, as successor to the Caliphate, whereas 'Abd al-Rahīm, al-Ḥākim's cousin, was the appointed successor until al-Ḥākim's death. This Risāla is alleged to have been written in 410/1019 and presented to al-Ḥākim.⁵¹ In a Risāla known as al-Naqq al-Khafī the writer mentions two lines of poetry and attributes them to al-Ḥākim.⁵² But as Dr. M.K. Husayn points out, these lines are the work of al-Mu'ayyad fī al-Dīn al-Shirāzī,⁵³ who died in 470/1077. Although the Risāla is alleged to have been written and presented to al-Ḥākim in 408/1017, The inscription on the Rasā'il reads "Wa Raf'a'a Nuskhatahā Bi Yadihi Ilā al-Ḥadra al-Lahū Tiyya (He [Ḥamza] by his own hand presented its copy to the divine presence [al-Ḥākim].)"⁵⁴ Or, "Rufi'a Ḥadhā al-Kitāb ilā

50. See al-Sijil al-Mu'allaq.

51. See al-Balāgh wa al-Nihāya, fol. 55.

52. al-Naqq al-Khafī, 37.

53. M.K. Husayn, Tā'ifat al-Drūz, 94.

54. al-Balāgh wa al-Nihāya, fol. 55.

al-Ḥadra al-Lahūṭiyya" (This book was presented to the divine presence).⁵⁵

The phrasing strongly indicates that Ḥamza did not write these inscriptions and they are the work of an unknown follower. The motive for this is quite clear. The Shīʿa Ismaʿīlīs obey unconditionally the instructions of their Imām. If they read that he had approved of the new teaching then there is a great likelihood that they would follow it. In Ḥamza's own writings there is a passage in which he states that some of the Duʿāt refused to accept his teaching unless al-Ḥākim's own signed mandate commanded them to do so.⁵⁶ It is also necessary to mention that the official leaders of the Ismaʿīlī Daʿwa declared that al-Ḥākim never supported or authorised Ḥamza or any other extremist to preach such teaching. Special Rasāʾil and even official decrees were circulated throughout the State for the same purpose.⁵⁷ It also should not escape notice that only a few of the Drūz, Rasāʾil, particularly those which emphasise the authorisation of Ḥamza, bore the inscriptions and dates.

55. al-Naqd al-Khafī, fol. 39.

56. al-Ridā wa al-Taslīm, fol. 20.

57. al-Risāla al-Waʿiza; al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bishārāt and al-Risāla al-Duriyya were all written and circulated for this purpose. See also al-Musabbihī, Akhbār, fol. 134 ff and Anṭākī, 236. Both chroniclers say that immediately after his succession to the Caliphate, al-Zāhir issued a decree denouncing the claims of the Ghulāt.

There is much evidence to suggest that al-Hākīm was not behind the movement. It is also logical to suppose that, had he given his support to this allegation of his divinity, he would have chosen one or both of them as official leaders of the Isma'īlī Da'wa in order to emphasise their authority. Neither of them received such an appointment, nor any visible signs of his favour; not even one of the lavish gifts he was accustomed to bestow on those who pleased him. He would not have summoned al-Kirmānī from Irāq and authorised him to counsel the Ghulāt and halt their extremism.⁵⁸

Both the internal and external policies of al-Hākīm strengthen the supposition that he was anxious to spread the Shī'ī Isma'īlī doctrine throughout the Muslim world and to convince the Muslim Umma that he was the rightful Imām-Caliph. It would also seem that if this were necessary and difficult, it would be even more so to convince them that he was an incarnation of the Divine. If al-Hākīm himself believed in the teaching of Hamza and Darzī it would, no doubt, have been reflected in his personal life and his activities as a ruler, all of which indicate an opposite point of view.

Druz teachings state that al-Hākīm had no father and no son; that he neither ate nor drank as did normal human beings.⁵⁹ On the contrary,

58. Dā'ī Idrīs, quoted by M.K. Husayn in his introduction to al-Risāla al-Wa'īza, p.5.

59. al-Nihāya fī al-Tawhīd, fol. 55; Mīthāq Waliy al-Zamān, fol. 23; al-Naqd al-Khafī, fol. 39; al-Risāla al-Mustaqīma, fols. 108-9.

al-Ḥākim claims al-ʿAzīz as his father and himself in direct descent from the Prophet Muḥammad.⁶⁰ He certainly married, and the occasions of the birth of his children were celebrated by money and gifts bestowed on many of his officials.⁶¹ There is also no evidence to show that he contemplated forcing Muslims to pay the Jizya as paid by Ahl al-Dhimma, although the Drūz teaching clearly stated that all Muslims would have to do so when the Tawḥīd was declared.⁶² On the contrary, his policy is known to have introduced considerable measures of tax exemption. All reports of his internal policy show that it was based on the strict observance of the law of Islam.⁶³ The assumption that al-Ḥākim aspired to be acclaimed as a divinity appears to be contradicted by the many Sijils and Amāns, written by himself. They suggest that he was pious and devoted to the fundamental principles of Islām. Each Sijil commences with the phrase "From the Slave of God" and ends with "By the assistance of God."⁶⁴ He repudiated any appellation of himself which suggested undue eulogy and

60. al-Musabbihī, quoted by Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, annos 386 and 398.

61. Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, anno, 394.

62. Budʾ al-Tawḥīd, fols. 41-2.

63. See The Internal Policies of al-Ḥākim, Chapter VI of this thesis.

64. See for example, Anṭakī, 229 ff, where a number of Sijils are mentioned; Ittiʿāz, annos 391-404; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, IV, 24. See also al-Ḥākim's Sijil of appointment of Qādī al-Qudāt reported by al-Qalqashandī, Subḥ, X, 385 ff, and quoted by ʿInān, 249, and by Ṭalīʿ, Asl, 67; al-Ḥākim's Sijil to Hārūn Ibn Muḥammad, the chief Dāʿī in Yanen reported by Dāʿī Idrīs, Uyūn al-Akhbār, VI, 271-3, edited by H. Hamdānī, al-Ṣulayḥiyyūn..., 301, and by A. Mājid, al-Ḥākim, 239.

prevented his subjects from prostrating themselves before him or from kissing either the ground, his hands or the straps of his horse's harness when any of them encountered him in the streets.⁶⁵ He considered such extreme obeisance contrary to the teaching of Islām and signs of Shurk (heresy) created by the Byzantines.⁶⁶ His instructions to Qādīs and Dā'īs alike were to obey Islām and never to question either by judgment or action the teaching of the Qurān or the traditions of the Prophet and previous Fatimid Imāms.⁶⁷

He summarises his own belief in a personal letter which he wrote to one of his high officials: "I fear no one; beg no one except my God to whom I submit and from whom I receive all bounties. My Prophet is my grandfather; My Imām is my father and my religion is sincerity and justice".⁶⁸ These and many other reports, together with the titles struck on his coinage, and his enthusiasm with which he built mosques, all indicate that he could be considered as an extreme Muslim and certainly not a believer of Hamza's doctrine.

65. Antākī, 205; Risālat al-Nisā' al-Kabīra, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,552, fol. 34; Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 206 and quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 177-8; Itti'āz, anno, 403.

66. Itti'āz, anno, 403.

67. See al-Hākim's Sijil of appointment of Qādī al-Qudāt and his Sijil to the chief Dā'ī in Yanen, note 64.

68. This is reported by a considerable number of chroniclers. See Itti'āz, anno, 403.

From a close study of the sources it is reasonable to suppose that al-Ḥakīm had no wish to be considered as divine and that he neither supported nor encouraged the declarations of Darzī or Ḥamza. On this hypothesis, it may raise the question of why they were not punished for causing the dangerous split in his Da'wa.

It is, therefore, imperative to remember that such movements, as in the case of the Drūz, were not unique in the history of the Shī'ā Isma'īlī Da'wa which had, since its inception, witnessed many crises arising from conceptions of Imām's divinity. In the life time of Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, Father of Ismail, from whom Isma'īlīs took their name, one of the Dā'īs, known as Abū al-Khaṭṭāb, declared Ja'far to be divine and himself to be his Prophet.⁶⁹

Immediately after the establishment of the Fatimid State, during the reign of al-Mahdī, a group of his followers seceded from the Da'wa on the same issue.⁷⁰ In al-Mu'izz's lifetime it was recorded that some Dā'īs also preached the divinity of the Imām.⁷¹

The source of such extremism flows directly from the teaching of the Isma'īlī Da'wa itself. The Ta'wīl (allegorical interpretation of the

69. See al-Shahrastānī, al-Mīlāl wa al-Nihāl, 136; D.S. Margolioth, art., "Khaṭṭabiyya", E.I.

70. M.K. Husayn, Tā'ifat al-Drūz, 87.

71. S.M. Stern, "Heterodox Ismailism at the time of al-Mu'izz", B.S.O.A.S., XVI (1955), 10 ff; M.K. Husayn, Tā'ifat al-Drūz, 87. The question of the growth of extremism in the Fatimid Da'wa has been fully discussed by W. Madelung in his "Das Imamāt in der Frühen Ismailitischen Lehre", Der Islam, (1960-62), 43-135.

Holy Books and the Traditions of the Prophet) which is the basis of the Isma'īlī philosophy and teaching, is a two-edged weapon. From one aspect it is the cause of the progressiveness in its teaching which made it the most liberal movement in Islām. On the other hand, it created a fertile soil for misinterpretations and the growth of extremism. Many Dā'īs who were once official leaders of the Da'wa have expressed extreme views similar to those of Darzī and Ḥamza. Even at the present time there are some who believe in the divinity of the Imām and the explanation they give is based on their own interpretation of the Ta'wīl. One of the most illuminating examples is the book of al-Kirmānī, known as al-Riyād, in which the writer discusses the Ta'wīl of three celebrated Isma'īlī Dā'īs of the fourth century A.H. A study of this book reveals how far Ta'wīl could deviate from the official line of the Da'wa. This official line was always under the supervision of the Imām and never declared him to be divine.

The general policy of the Imāms in dealing with the growth of extremism inside the circles of the Da'wa as observed throughout their reigns was to employ moderate Dā'īs in order to halt extremism by means of discussion and debates. The Imāms would not expel or punish any of their Dā'īs for his own personal views as long as they remained private. When, however, he openly declared them and endeavoured to confirm them

with the official approval of the Imām, then action would be taken against him.⁷²

al-Ḥākim seems to have adopted his father's methods in dealing with the extremists. When their views were expressed in private he used persuasion, but when they were publicly declared and claimed to be with his approval, they were persecuted. It is reasonably safe to assume that interpretations and views of extremism were first discussed in the privacy of the Majālis al-Awliyā' (the meetings of the Du'āt) in Dār-al-Hikma. In 396/1005 we learn that al-Ḥākim ordered the closure of these Majālis.⁷³ It was, of course, impossible to close them indefinitely and they were re-opened, but under the direction of a moderate Dā'ī. Mālik Ibn Sa'id, the famous Gādī and learned man, was chosen for the position and the new leadership's teaching was based entirely on the officially accepted books of the Da'wa.⁷⁴

Mālik's leadership failed to halt the wave of extremism which caused al-Ḥākim to become angry and again in 400/1009 he ordered the

72. A study of the Fatimid Da'wa's history and doctrine would prove this. There were a number of Dā'īs who expressed views similar to those of Ḥamza or Darzī and were not expelled because they did not try to confirm them as the official line of teaching. For examples, see the poetry of Ibn Hanī' al-Andalusī in his Diwan, Beirut (1952), and the views of al-Nakhshabī, al-Razī, and al-Sujistānī, discussed by al-Kirmānī, al-Riyad.

73. Iṭī'āz, anno, 396. Anṭākī, 209, speaks of the closure but does not give a date.

74. Iṭī'āz, anno, 398, says that Mālik was handed the doctrinal books which used to be read during the meetings of the Du'āt. =

closure of the Majālis which remained so for about a year.⁷⁵ In 401/1010, they were re-opened under the leadership of Mālīk, but after an official ceremony in which he was publicly honoured and given the post of Qādī al-Qudāt.⁷⁶ This may have been to show his approval of Mālīk's leadership and line of teaching. It also indicates that he authorised him to deal with legal problems which might arise from the situation. Mālīk, again, failed in his task and al-Hākīm seems to have realised that the failure was perhaps because he was a Qādī rather than a Dā'ī and appointed a new leader for the Da'wa. This time he chose Dā'ī Khaṭgīn. Khaṭgīn was appointed as director of the Da'wa with the title of Dā'ī al-Du'āt⁷⁷ (chief of the Missionaries), thus emphasising that he was the official head of all Dā'īs and none should disobey him. al-Hākīm also gave Khaṭgīn the titles al-Sādiq al-Amin (the Truthful, the Trustworthy),⁷⁸ thus indicating that only Khaṭgīn's teaching was the true teaching of the Isma'īlī Da'wa, as far as its Imām was concerned.

= From the Druż writings we learn that some of these books were Da'ā' im al-Islām and al-Iqtisār, both by al-Qādī al-Nu'mān. See Risālat al-Nisā' al-Kabīra, fol. 33, where they consider these books as the outer revelation (al-Zāhir).

75. Iṭti'āz, anno, 400.

76. Ibid., anno, 401.

77. See Chapter III, note 66.

78. Ibid.

To aid Khatgīn and help him to overcome the growing religious polemics inside the circles of the Da'wa, al-Hākīm summoned the most distinguished Dā'ī of the time, al-Kirmānī, who was operating in Iraq. He came to Egypt and there he wrote a number of Rasā'il in which he explained the fundamental principles of the Isma'īlī Da'wa and particularly the position of Imāma and its relations with divinity. In one of his Rasā'il which is known as Risālat al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bisharāt, Kirmānī emphasises that al-Hākīm, like any previous Imām, was divinely appointed and guided, but not of himself divine.⁷⁹ Perhaps the most interesting and important of his Rasā'il on this issue is al-Risāla al-Wā'iza (the message of advice), which he wrote as a reply to questions put to him by al-Akhram. It confirms that Kirmānī, together with other official leaders, was trying to persuade the extremists to abandon extremism and rejoin the true teaching of Isma'ilism. It clearly states that the extremists have disobeyed the commands of al-Hākīm and claims that he denounced their claims of his divinity. In it, Kirmānī discusses the views of the Drūz and considers them to be Ghuluw and Kufr (extremism and heresy) and asks al-Akhram to declare to his followers the falseness of his teaching, threatening him

79. See Risālat al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bisharāt, ed. by M.K. Husayn, in Ta'rif al-Drūz, 55.

with severe consequences if he did not obey.⁸⁰ Kirmānī's writings were copied and distributed to many Dā'īs and he held many lectures in the Majālis. His campaign to halt the wave of extremism seems to have worked successfully and influenced many Dā'īs to rejoin the official line of teaching. The extremists realised that since Kirmānī's activities were officially supported by Khatgīn, their failure inside the circles of the Da'wa appeared imminent. Their only alternative was to seek outside support by declaring their views to the public. But on this issue they, amongst themselves, were in disagreement. Ḥamza believed that the open declaration of al-Tawhīd, which he called al-Kashf (disclosure), could not be revealed without the help and approval of al-Ḥakīm. In one of his Rasā'il he speaks of a meeting which he held to discuss this problem. He says, addressing al-Bardā'ī (one of the Du'at who split with Darzī), "I have told you and all those who were present that Qā'im al-Zamān (Ḥamza himself) cannot declare the Qiyāma (the open declaration of the teaching) to the people of heresy and impiety without the support of the power and sword of Mawlānā (al-Ḥakīm)." ⁸¹ Darzī and a considerable number of the Ghulāt preferred to declare the Kashf (or the Qiyāma) and then his leadership began to materialise. He commenced his campaign by sending

80. See al-Risāla wal-Wā'iza, op. cit.

It is most surprising that in both of his articles, "Drūz" and "al-Darzī and Ḥamza", Hodgson does not appear to have made use of any of al-Kirmānī's Risālas. This may account for the fact that he did not doubt the claims of Ḥamza and the chroniclers' assumptions, which both suggest that al-Ḥakīm was behind the movement.

81. al-Subḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 38.

letters to the officials of the State asking them to accept the new teaching.⁸² It is safe to assume that these letters were similar to that which was sent to Kirmānī by al-Akhram. al-Kirmānī was an official and received the letter at about the same time as Darzī's communications with the officials, which was 408/1017.⁸³ According to the information available, Darzī asked them to believe in the divinity of al-Hākim and to abandon all previous religions and join the new order.⁸⁴

On receiving these letters, the officials informed al-Hākim of Darzī's activities and he decided to employ force. The gates of Cairo were closed for three days, during which time the police raided the places of the extremists and searched their houses. Forty of them, including Darzī, were killed and many more arrested and imprisoned to await trial for heresy.⁸⁵ Hamza and a number of his supporters went into hiding for about two years while every known extremist suffered persecution. In 410/1019 Hamza attempted to reinstate himself. He denounced Darzī and tried to convince al-Hākim and his officials that he

82. Anṭakī, 222, gives the names of some officials to whom Darzī is said to have sent letters.

83. The date of the writing of al-Risāla al-Wā'iza is 408/1018, according to its author.

84. al-Kirmānī in al-Risāla al-Wā'iza summarises the major points of the letter which was sent to him by al-Akhram, who most likely was Darzī's spokesman. See also Anṭakī, 220-3.

85. al-Ṣubḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 39; al-Riḍā wa al-Taslīm, fol. 18; al-Ghāya wa al-Naṣiḥa, fol. 75 ff.

had never supported Darzī. He was, however, very cautious. He did not enter Cairo but made his headquarters in a mosque known as Masjid Tibr outside the gates of the city.⁸⁶ From there he made communication with the prisoners⁸⁷ and wrote a letter to Qādī al-Qudāt telling him that he had no legal right to try the prisoners since he himself was not a Muwahhid.⁸⁸

His activities aroused the authorities' suspicions and suddenly his headquarters were raided by the troops. A number of his men were killed, while he managed to escape through a secret door which he had prepared. He went into hiding and none except, perhaps, his closest supporters ever knew his whereabouts.⁸⁹

While chroniclers failed to reveal what happened after Darzī declared the teaching to the public, and seem to have ignored al-Hākim's official actions against the Drūz supporters, a Drūz Risāla gives a clear picture of the persecution. It says, "After their souls knew the meaning of al-Tawhīd and were purified from all disbeliefs, he almighty, (al-Hākim) appeared to them from a different angle and, contrary to his orders. He commanded their crucifixion in public roads and streets; by his orders they were cursed in meetings and public places.

86. Anṭakī, 223.

87. al-Ridā wa al-Taslīm, fol. 19 ff; al-Subḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 36 ff.

88. al-Risāla al-Munfadhā ilā al-Qādī, fol. 54 ff.

89. al-Subḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 36 ff.
M.K. Husayn, Tā'ifat al-Drūz, 82.

He allowed their wives to be raped and their money to be confiscated. Many of the Muwahhidūn were drowned and some were burnt. Jews and Christians remained unharmed, while the Muwahhidūn were humiliated, terrified and fled to distant lands."⁹⁰

The Cause of the Movement

As in many other religious movements in Islām, religion was a cloak for political purposes and the instrument by which support could be rallied. Ḥamza was an ambitious man with a great desire for leadership which is obvious from his writings. He gives himself titles and claims divinely chosen leadership of the "faithful"; and imposes total and unconditional obedience to his person from the followers of his teaching.⁹¹ His remarkable attempts to be acclaimed as Imām-Caliph by the officials of the State, the chiefs of the Fatimid army and those tribal chiefs who were under the sovereignty of the Fatimids is sufficient evidence of his personal ambition. In several Drūz Rasā'il, Ḥamza or his followers communicated with these elements, and openly asked them to depose al-Zāhir, al-Ḥākim's son and successor, and declare Ḥamza as their new Imām-Caliph.⁹² According to some Drūz writings, al-Zāhir was an

90. al-Tahjīn wa al-Ta'nīf, fol. 57 ff.

91. Bud' al-Tawhīd, 43-4; al-Riḍā wa-l-Taslīm, fol. 16; al-Naqd al-Khaṭī, fol. 37; Kashf al-Haqā'iq, fol. 117 ff; al-Tanzīh, fol. 22; Mithāq Waliy al-Zaman, fol. 23.

92. There are a number of Rasā'il addressed to tribal chiefs and important persons. See for example, Risālat al-'Arab, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,561; Taqīd Banī al-Jarrah, Ms. B.M., No. add. 22,484.

imposter who usurped the rights of the rightfully designated and divinely appointed ⁹³ Imām. The records in the Drūz writings concerning the dispute between Ḥamza and Darzī point out that the personal ambition and desire for leadership caused this disagreement. Ḥamza says that he sent a letter to Darzī explaining that he (Darzī) could not be the Imām of the order, he says: "For that you need to have, beside your body, a soul; the soul is knowledge of truth of which you are empty, while I have revealed of that knowledge an amount which you and all mankind have failed to do. If you claim to be a Mu'min (true believer) declare my Imāma as you have done before."⁹⁴ This seems to have been a reply to a communication from Darzī, the contents of which are unfortunately lost. But it is quite clear, however, that Darzī had made similar claims of leadership. In another Risāla Ḥamza explains why Darzī denounced him by saying, "In order to achieve leadership and dignified name (Ṭalaban li al-Riyāsa wa al-Isma al-Laṭīf)" and adds that Darzī claimed the position of his Imām Ḥamza because of "envy and admiration (Ḥasadan Lahu wa Iḥjāban Bi Rūhihi)".⁹⁵ Supporting Darzī or sympathising with him became considered as heresy. Ḥamza says, "You (al-Burda'ī and al-Ḥabbāl) who sympathised with Darzī and

93. al-Subḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 30; Riḍā wa al-Taslīm, fol. 20.

94. al-Ghāya wa al-Naṣiḥa, 71-2. For more discussion on this point, see De Sacy, Exposé, I, 102; II, 169; Carra de Vaux, art., "Ḥamza", E.I. Cf. Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Ḥamza", 8 ff.

95. al-Ghāya wa al-Naṣiḥa, fol. 38.

entitled him as Sayyid al-Hādīn (master of the Guides), (apparently one of Ḥamza's claimed titles), you have committed disbelief and heresy (al-Kufr wa al-Shirk).⁹⁶

The declaration of al-Hākīm to be divine appears to be merely a means to lead to the abolition of the hereditary system of the Imāma. As long as al-Hākīm was accepted as only Imām, he would be succeeded by his own son, thus there would be no chance for Ḥamza to achieve the position he desired. But if al-Hākīm was declared as God and the old teaching was abolished and new doctrine substituted then he would be able to claim leadership. Hodgson says, "For his very exaltation of al-Hākīm beyond the level of a mere Imām left the more immediate practical organisation of the faith frankly in Ḥamza's hands."⁹⁷ Had the teaching of Ḥamza or Darzī been merely another interpretation of the Holy Books and traditions, inspired purely by philosophical and intellectual thoughts, then there should have been no reason for the political implication which both leaders concluded. Druzism (or Dīn al-Tawhīd) appears to have been a radical movement within the Isma'īlī Da'wa. Its ultimate objective was to abolish the hereditary system of Imāma and Khiṭāfā and open the door for non-Fatimids

96. al-Ṣubḥa al-Kā'ina, fol. 38.

97. Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Ḥamza", 13.

to become Imāms. Its religious polemics are mere rationalizations and apologies to justify the ends.⁹⁸ The method which Ḥamza adopted was pure Isma'īlī. As Isma'īlī Imāms and Dā'īs interpreted Islām to support their claims, Ḥamza interpreted Isma'ilism for the same reason. Even when he propagated inside the circles of the Dā'wa his organisation followed the same scheme as the Isma'ilis. It is difficult to ascertain when Ḥamza came to Egypt, but it is possible to assume that it was sometime after the establishment of Dār al-Ḥikma when he began to operate as Dā'ī. From the information revealed in his own writing it would seem that he maintained secrecy in converting Dā'īs to his cause. Those who accepted his teaching would swear allegiance and acknowledge him as the leader of the Inner Revelation (Tawhīd) in contrast to Khatgīn who was considered the leader of the

98. It is quite clear that the doctrinal argumentation and allegorical interpretation in almost all of the Rasā'il is focused on this point. See for example the interpretation of Wilāya (obedience or loyalty), Hajj, and Zakāt in al-Naqq al-Khafī; the interpretation of the theory of al-Mahdī in Bud' al-Tawhīd, fol.43 ff; the interpretation of al-Hākim's commands and personal behaviour in al-Nisā' al-Kabīra, fol.34; Ḥaqīqat Mayazhar, fol.79 ff; al-Risāla al-Mustaqima, fol.108ff and the interpretations of the teachings of Majālis al-Ḥikma in al-Naqq al-Khafī, 32 ff; Bud' al-Tawhīd, fol.44ff; al-Tanzīh, fol.23 ff.

Outer Revelation (Imān).⁹⁹ Ḥamza would then appoint them to work as Dā'is for the Inner Revelation to undermine the influence of the Outer Revelation. The number of Du'āt who responded to Ḥamza's teaching, especially in Syria, and who were appointed there by the official leader Khargīn, indicates the secrecy of Ḥamza's method and the success of his activities.

Ḥamza appears to have planned to create a solid support inside the Da'wa which would lead to popular support of all Isma'ilis and would enable him to proclaim himself as the leader of the Fatimid Da'wa and State. If al-Ḥākim died, those who had accepted Ḥamza as Hādī (Guide) and Imām would not dispute his right to political leadership.

The teaching of the Fatimid Da'wa concerning the theory of al-Mahdī, together with some aspects of al-Ḥākim's internal policy, created a fertile soil for the growth of the ambitions and teaching. Apparently there was an atmosphere of desperation among the Du'āt which stemmed from the frustration of a long wait for the Mahdī and the failure of the Fatimid regimes to create the promised ideal State.¹⁰⁰ The official leaders of the Da'wa preached that the reigns of the previous Imāms were only a period of preparation for the appearance of the Mahdī who would conquer the enemies of God, abolish tyranny and construct

99. al-Balāgh wa al-Nihāya, fol. 57; al-Riḍa wa al-Taslīm, fol. 20.

100. Hodgson, "al-Darazī and Ḥamza", 17.

equality and justice. al-Kirmānī in his Risāla al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bishārāt puts forward a long argument trying to affirm that al-Ḥākim himself was the expected Mahdī.¹⁰¹ Al-Ḥākim's moralizing decrees, his reduction - and in some cases exemption - of taxes, his distribution of money and property, his endeavour to maintain a high standard of justice in the court, and his humility towards his poorer subjects, his concern for building mosques and observing the duties of Islam and his attitude towards Ahl al-Dhimma, all emphasised by the Da'wa have undoubtedly contributed to the growth of the movement.¹⁰²

Ḥamza exploited the situation for his own ends. He preached that al-Ḥākim was not only the Mahdī but the Lord Himself, and his manifestation in physical form as such was a sign to indicate the rise of al-Mahdī. He also interpreted al-Ḥākim's policies and attitudes to have been exercised for the same aim and concluded that al-Mahdī would be a human being, divinely chosen and appointed to materialise the "ideal state". That human being was Ḥamza himself.

101. al-Kirmānī, Risālat al-Mabāsīm wa al-Bishārāt, op. cit.

102. Cf. Hodgson, "al-Darzī and Ḥamza", 12 ff.

CHAPTER VII

THE END OF AL-HĀKIM

Al-Hākim's end was one of the most mysterious events in Muslim history. On the 27th of Shawāl 411/13th February 1021, he went on his usual journey to Mount Muqattam and never came back. Officials, who waited for a few days for his return, went into the mountains to search for him. They found his clothes but failed to find any trace of his body.

The mystery surrounding his end fascinated the chroniclers and writers of Muslim history. More pages are devoted to conjecture about his disappearance (Ghayba) than to the whole twenty-five years of his reign. Many stories have been written and many assumptions have been made in order to clarify that mystery, but a satisfactory explanation has never been established.

In the legends which have reached us there are two lines of thought. One suggests that al-Hākim disappeared by his own will; the other says that he was murdered. The first is found in the Drūz writings and in the works of some Christian chroniclers. The other is in the versions of contemporary chroniclers.

The Drūz, who believed that al-Hākim was the manifestation of God on earth, say that his disappearance was a punishment for the sins of

those who disobeyed his commands and refused to join in Dīn al-Tawhīd.¹

Bar Hebraeus, a Christian chronicler, says that the Lord Jesus had appeared to al-Hākīm and reprimanded him for his ill-treatment of Christians, so in order to save his soul, al-Hākīm adopted Christianity and became a monk.²

Anṭākī is the first Christian chronicler who furnished this idea. He applied to al-Hākīm a mystic behaviour and said that he often retired to the mountain for solitude and to ask God to appear and speak to him as he had done unto Moses. He even compares al-Hākīm's case with that of Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylon, who was alleged to have been punished by God for his destruction of the Holy Temple of Jerusalem.³

Ibn al-Muqaffa' enlarges upon this idea and adds that towards the end of his reign, al-Hākīm became a great admirer of Christianity and spent hours, and sometimes days, with the monks in their monasteries eating their simple food and praising their religious beliefs and way of life.⁴ At the time of Bar Hebraeus this story was believed by many Christians. He says that many imagined that al-Hākīm had gone to the desert and become a monk, withdrawing completely from public life.

1. See al-Sijil al-Mu'allag, Drūz Ms. B.M. no. add. 11,558, ed. by de Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, Paris (1826), II, 67, by 'Inān, al-Hākīm, 259; and by Majid, al-Hākīm, 242. Excerpts from this Sijil are translated into English by P.K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, 61.

2. Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 189.

3. Anṭākī, 218.

4. Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 133 ff.

He adds: "I, the feeble one, heard from Egyptian 'lawyers' when I was living in Damascus, that at the time when al-Ḥākim was persecuting the Christians, Christ, our Lord, was revealed unto him as unto Paul, and from that moment he believed and departed secretly to the desert."⁵

Such explanations, however, were mere interpretations of the mystery of al-Ḥākim's death in order to support the writer's own religious views. They have drifted from logic and reality and therefore it is unwise to give them any credence. al-Ḥākim, as contemporary chroniclers agree, was killed. The signs of several knife cuts and patches of blood stains were found on his clothes, they reported.⁶

In their reports concerning what happened before al-Ḥākim's disappearance, the contemporary chroniclers, Anṭākī, Ibn al-Ṣābi' and al-Qudā'i,⁷ agree with each other except for some minor details. al-Qudā'i's story, however, appears to be the most reliable since he was an official in the service of the Fatimids at that time. He relates that on the fateful

5. Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 189.

6. Anṭākī, 234. See also Qudā'i quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 190; Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭī, Mir'āt, fol. 209A, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 188-9; Ṣāhib Tārīkh al-Qayrawān quoted by Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 299; Ibn Sa'īd quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 411.

7. See Anṭākī, 234; Qudā'i quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 190; Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭī, Mir'āt, fol. 207 ff. and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 184 ff.

night, al-Hākīm went to mount Muqāṭṭam accompanied by two servants.⁸ While on his way he met nine⁹ Beduins from the tribe of Banū Qurra who appealed to him for financial help. He sent them to Bayt al-Mal together with one of his servants to receive a sum of money which he granted.¹⁰ Then he continued his journey until he reached a place called Qabr al-Fuqā'i where he commanded the other servant to return to the Palace. On the following morning, the officials of his Court, together with the dignitaries, gathered near the slopes of the mountain for a whole day awaiting his return. They remained there for two more days and then decided to go and search for him. After a long walk they found the ass which al-Hākīm had been riding. Its saddle and bridle were not removed but its front legs had been cut off by a sword. They followed foot steps which led them to a small pond and there they found al-Hākīm's clothes, still buttoned up, in the pond.¹¹

al-Musabbiḥī says that al-Hākīm's killer was a man from Upper Egypt (al-Ṣa'īd). He was captured in 415/1024 and confessed to having

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8. Anṣakī, 233, says accompanied by one servant only.
 9. Anṣakī, 233, says seven Beduins. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 209, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 185, says ten Beduins.
 10. Anṣakī, 233, says the sum was five thousand Dirhams. Ibn al-Ṣābi' says ten thousand Dirhams.
 11. Qudā'i quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 190 ff. See also Ṣaḥīb Tārīkh al-Qayrawān quoted by Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 299; Awṣāl al-Manqūl, fols. 112 ff.; Ibn Sa'īd quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 411.

committed the murder together with three other men who fled to different parts of the Muslim world. On the man's person, al-Musabbihī says, "al-Ḥākim's scarf and a piece of his head skin were found". He adds that the man committed suicide during the interrogation by stabbing himself with a knife which he carried on his person.¹²

Even with the approval of an authority like Maqrīzī, such a story does not appear very convincing. It is very unlikely that a murderer would keep on his person evidence of his crime for four whole years. It is also unlikely that a prisoner, being interrogated for the murder of the Imām, would be allowed to keep a knife on his person. The man, as al-Musabbihī's report suggests, was a trouble-maker. He attempted to create a rebellion against the Fatimids in Upper Egypt. It may be that his capture and execution offered the Fatimid authorities an opportunity to emphasise that al-Ḥākim was dead. There are a considerable number of reports which suggest that many people believed that he was still alive. Ibn al-Muqaffa' says that since al-Ḥākim's disappearance up to the end of his son's reign 427/1035, people imagined that he was living. Many pretended to be him and collected money from the inhabitants of the mountains. He speaks of a magician named Sharūf, who resembled al-Ḥākim, and took advantage of the tribe of Banū Qurra amongst whom he lived for two years pretending to be al-Ḥākim hiding his identity for his own reasons.¹³

12. al-Musabbihī quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 415, and Khifāt, II, 289.

13. Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 138.

Maqrīzī speaks of a Kutāmī named Aḥmad Ibn Ṭāṭawā who arrived in Egypt in 415/1024 and claimed to have come from Kūfa in Irāq where he had been in the company of al-Ḥākim.¹⁴ Aḥmed claimed, says Maqrīzī, that al-Ḥākim sent him as a messenger to warn people of their evils. He also mentions that a black servant named 'Anbar, who worked as a porter in al-Ḥākim's court, met al-Zāhir once and tried to convince him that his father was still alive and would return very soon.¹⁵ Even up to the time of al-Mustansir (427-488/1035-1095) there were some who believed such claims. Maqrīzī speaks of a man named Sulaymān whose resemblance to al-Ḥākim encouraged him to make an attempt to take over power. He organised a group of men to preach the return of al-Ḥākim and in the month of Rajab 434/February 1043, he entered the royal palace declaring himself as the returning Imām. His attempt was foiled and he was captured and executed.¹⁶

It is also possible that such an explanation by al-Musabbihī was made to counter the rumours which accused Sīt al-Mulk of plotting against her brother. Ibn al-Ṣābi', who considered these rumours factual, as will be discussed later, relies on the information of a man named Abū al-Faraj Ibn Zakariyyā al-Qarqawī who was in Egypt at the time of al-Ḥākim's

14. Iṭti'āz, anno, 415.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., anno, 434.

disappearance.¹⁷

It is more likely that the story of al-Musabbihī was a fabrication made by the Fatimid authorities to serve either, or both, purposes. The chronicler himself was an official employed by them.

Ibn al-Ṣābi' states that al-Ḥākim's death was a result of a conspiracy arranged by his sister Sīt al-Mulk and a Kutāmī chief known as Sayf al-Dawla, 'Alī Ibn Ḥusayn Ibn Dawwās. He adds that al-Ḥākim accused his sister of immoral behaviour and threatened her life. She made communications with Ibn Dawwās, who also feared al-Ḥākim and considered him a danger to his life, and promised him the chief command of the army and the administration of the State affairs in return for his help to get rid of al-Ḥākim and proclaim his son as successor. Ibn Dawwās agreed and selected two of his most reliable black slaves, paid them a vast sum of money and gifts, and planned with them how to commit the murder. They went to the mountain and waited secretly there until al-Ḥākim came. They killed him and carried his body to their master who took it to the palace of Sīt al-Mulk where she buried it.¹⁸

17. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭī, *Mir'āt*, fol. 206A.

18. Ibn al-Ṣābi' quoted by Sibṭī, *Mir'āt*, fols. 206 ff., and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, IV, 185 ff. See also Ibn al-Qalanīsī, 79; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 63 ff; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, IX, 130 ff; Ibn al-Jawzī, VI, 297 ff; al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, anno, 411, and *Ibar*, III, 106 ff; Ibn al-ʿAmīd, anno, 411; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 301; Ibn Kathīr, XII, 10; Ibn Abī Tayy quoted by Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, anno 411; Ibn Shāhīn, *Twārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Salāṭīn*, fol. 43; Abū al-Fidā', II, 151; Ibn Ayās, I, 57; al-Yāfiʿī, *Mir'āt al-Jinān*, III, 24 ff. =

This story of Ibn al-Ṣābi', although full of exaggeration and assumptions, is not without foundation. Its source was the rumours which Abū al-Faraj heard in Cairo and carried with him to Baghdad. These rumours were the by-product of some events which occurred before and after al-Ḥākim's death. In 404/1013 al-Ḥākim proclaimed his cousin 'Abd al-Raḥīm as successor to the Caliphate and ordered his name to be read in the Khuṭba and to be struck on the coinage.¹⁹ This meant separating the Imāma from the Khilāfa, which was contrary to the policy of the previous Fatimid Imāms. It was the first time since they came to power that the Caliph appointed somebody other than his own son to succeed him.

Such an important decision was opposed by some members of the royal family, and by some high officials. They preferred al-Ḥākim to follow his ancestors' line and appoint his own son.

Maqrīzī reports that the news of Abd al-Raḥīm's appointment was not welcomed favourably in Maghrib. Naṣīr al-Dawla, Abū Munād Bādīs, the chief of Ṣinhāja and Fatimid Wālī there, was very displeased with it and said, "Had it not been that Imām's orders are not to be interfered

= 'Uyūn al-Ma'ārif, Ms. Bib. Nat., Paris, No. 1490 Arabe, anno 411; Tārīkh Miṣr wa faḍā' iluhā, Ms. Bib. Nat., Paris, No. 1816 Arabe, anno, 411; al-Ishāqī, al-Rawḍ al-Bāsim fī Akhbār Man Maḍā min al-'Awālim, Ms. Bib. Nat., Paris, No. 1562 Arabe, anno, 411.

19. Antākī, 207-8; Itti'āz, anno, 404, and Khitaṭ, II, 288.

with, I would have written asking him not to withdraw this matter from his son's hands."²⁰

Malik Ibn Sa'īd, the chief judge and director of the Da'wa was executed in 405/1014 for his opposition to the appointment.²¹

Since al-Ḥākim's son was only ten years old and unable to organise an opposition to bring pressure on his father, his aunt, Sif al-Mulk appears to have assumed the role. Maqrīzī speaks of her activities as being a constant worry to al-Ḥākim.²² After al-Ḥākim's disappearance she became the real ruler in the Fatimid State. Chroniclers say that she excellently administered the State affairs on behalf of her nephew.²³

The first significant action she took was to execute Abd al-Rahīm. She made the Wazīr, Khaṭīr al-Mulk, 'Ammār Ibn Muḥammad write a letter to 'Abd al-Rahīm, who was then in Damascus, asking him to come immediately to Egypt. The letter bore al-Ḥākim's signature and was written on his behalf to appear as his command.²⁴ When 'Abd al-Rahīm arrived in

20. Itṭi'āz, anno, 404.

21. See Itṭi'āz, anno, 405; Ibn Ḥajar and Ibn Shāhin in the supplement to Kindi's book, Ta rīkh Q uḍāt Miṣr, 608.

22. Itṭi'āz, anno, 405.

23. See Anṭākī, 235 ff; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 80; Itṭi'āz, annos, 411, 412. See also Ibn al-Muqaffa', II, 137; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 196; Ibn Kathīr, XII, 10 ff.

24. See Ibn al-Sābi' quoted by Sibī, Mir'āt, fol. 209A and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 188.

Egypt he was imprisoned and later executed.²⁵ This was followed by the execution of some high officials. Ibn Dawwās was put to death after being accused of al-Ḥākim's murder.²⁶ The Wazīr 'Ammar Ibn Muḥammad was also killed.²⁷ Such events have undoubtedly raised many questions and made people suspect that Sit al-Mulk may have conspired against her brother and after she succeeded in removing him, she turned against those with whom she had plotted in order to bury her secret.

On the other hand, there are indications which contradict this conjecture. The appointment of 'Abd al-Raḥīm became uncertain towards the end of al-Ḥākim's reign. In 409/1018 al-Ḥākim is reported to have no longer trusted him and had him arrested for a while.²⁸ 'Abd al-Raḥīm realised the change in al-Ḥākim's attitude and made communication with Ḥassān Ibn al-Mufarrij, the chief of the Jarrāḥids of Palestine, seeking Ḥassān's support in case of need.²⁹ al-Musabbihī, Antākī and the Druż writings speak of another cousin of al-Ḥākim named Abū Ḥāshim

25. Antākī, 236; Qudā'ī quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 194; Itti'āz, anno, 427.

26. Ibn al-Sābi' quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 210A, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 192; Qudā'ī quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 191; Antākī, 238; Itti'āz, anno, 411.

27. Antākī, 238; Itti'āz, anno, 412. See also Ibn al-Sābi' quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 192.

28. Itti'āz, anno, 409. See also Ibn al-Qalānisi, 70.

29. Antākī, 226-7.

‘Abbās Ibn Shu‘ayb who was known as Walī ‘Ahd Amīr al-Mu‘minīn
(the Caliph's heir).³⁰

The fact that the succession of al-Ḥākim's son was not met with any significant opposition indicates that neither ‘Abd al-Rahīm nor Abū Ḥāshim were seriously expected to succeed al-Ḥākim to the Caliphate. So in the year of 411/1020 there were no reasons strong enough to encourage Sit al-Mulk to arrange her brother's death and had she been willing to kill him over the question of the succession, then she should have done it much earlier. It is more likely that she only took advantage of the situation and proclaimed her nephew as Caliph and struck ruthlessly against those who tried to create troubles. Anṭākī says that the reason behind the execution of Khaṭīr al-Mulk was that he attempted to influence the young Caliph into adopting a life of leisure while he assumed power.³¹

The story of Ibn al-Ṣābi’, however, is possible but not factual. His explanation is based on circumstantial evidence and not on recorded facts. The element of guess-work and imagination is quite apparent in its details. For example, he reports the exact words which, he says, al-Ḥākim and his killers exchanged. He also relates, in detail, what was supposed to be the

30. al-Musabbihī, *Akhbār Misr*, fol. 140 ff; *Risālat al-Tanzīh*, fol. 26; Anṭākī, 220, 223. See also *Itti‘āz*, 427.

31. Anṭākī, 238.

very conversation between *Siṭ al-Mulk* and *Ibn Dawwās* when they met to plan the murder. Then he adds that *Siṭ al-Mulk* killed everyone who knew her secret.³²

Anṭākī believes that the murder was arranged by *Ibn Dawwās* alone. He says that officials, who searched the house of the *Kutāmī* chief found there evidence of the crime. *al-Ḥākim's* own knife, which was on his person before his journey to the mountain, was found amongst *Ibn Dawwās's* possessions.³³ He interprets the cause of the murder to have been a constant fear on the part of the *Kutāmī* chief - a fear that *al-Ḥākim* might order his execution as he had so many of the high officials of his court. *al-Ḥākim's* killers, in *Anṭākī's* story, are the Beduins he met on his way to the mountain. Four of them came with the servant to receive the grant from *Bayt al-Māl* while the rest remained there to kill him. *Anṭākī* adds that these Beduins were hired for this purpose by the chief, *Ibn Dawwās*.³⁴

This story, however, appears to be a mere repetition of what the Fatimid authorities declared after the execution of *Ibn Dawwās*. It is very

32. *Ibn al-Sābi'* quoted by *Sibt, Mir'āt*, fol. 210A, and by *Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm*, IV, 192.

33. *Anṭākī*, 238.

34. *Anṭākī*, 238.

unlikely that Ibn Dawwās, if in fact he was responsible, would retain any evidence that would prove his guilt. Although he was accused of murdering the Imām, his execution was, more likely, a political manoeuvre. He and Khaṭīr al-Mulk, ‘Ammār Ibn Muḥammad, were powerful chiefs of the Kutāmī faction. With the disappearance of al-Ḥākim and the succession of his child, they might have attempted to exploit the situation for their own benefit. Ibn Dawwās was acting as Mudabbir al-Dawla (administrator of the State's affairs) before he was killed.³⁵

In their conjectures concerning al-Ḥākim's death, chroniclers overlooked two great possibilities; personal vengeance and assassination for political aims. In 410/1019 al-Ḥākim is said to have commanded his black troops to punish the inhabitants of the City of Miṣr for their disobedience of his orders. The troops entered the city and, according to chroniclers, committed many atrocities, including the burning of a part of the city and the rape of many of its women.³⁶ Such actions had undoubtedly created a great indignation amongst the people concerned and it is possible that some of them sought personal vengeance by murdering the Imām-Caliph whom they believed to have been responsible for causing the disaster.

35. Iḥṣāz, anno, 411.

36. See Antākī, 224 ff; Ibn al-Sābi' quoted by Sibṭ, Mir'āt, fol. 207A, and by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 180 ff; Ibn al-Zāfir, fol. 63 ff.

Assassination for Political Aims

There are strong indications which suggest that the extreme Dā'is may have killed al-Ḥākim in order to gain political success. The most significant fact of the whole issue of al-Ḥākim's Ghayba was the discovery of his clothes still buttoned while his body had completely disappeared. This indicates that the killer had purposely left the clothes in such a manner as to emphasise that al-Ḥākim's body was nothing but a spirit that vanished miraculously. Any other killer would have had no reason for leaving the clothes thus.

Chroniclers state that the day after al-Ḥākim's disappearance, the sun was eclipsed,³⁷ which suggested that the night of the 28th of Shawwāl 411 A.H. may have been carefully chosen for the Imām's death to make his Ghayba coincide with the eclipse of the sun. Events of this kind have great effectiveness in stirring the emotions of the masses.

In the Drūz Risāla, al-Sijil al-Mu'allaq, the writer clearly states that al-Ḥākim would never be found nor would anybody be able to determine his whereabouts. He warns people against trying to search for him and promises them that he would willingly reappear as soon as they abandoned their evils and purified their souls (the acknowledgement of

37. Qudā'ī quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 196; Ibn Sa'īd quoted by Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, anno, 411.

the new teaching and the leadership of Ḥamza).³⁸ The most important fact about this Risāla is that it was written by Mawlā Amīr al-Mu'minīn (most probably Ḥamza) and dated in the month of Dhu al-Qa'da 411 A.H. probably a few days after al-Ḥākim's death.³⁹ This raises the question: how could the writer of the Risāla be sure that the Imām would never be found while according to chroniclers' reports Sit al-Mulk and high officials waited for more than forty days before establishing such a conclusion.⁴⁰

It has already been mentioned that the leaders of the extremists had fallen under a severe pressure from the authorities during the last four years of al-Ḥākim's reign, a pressure that curtailed their activities and made the preaching of their cause a hazardous, if not impossible, task. al-Ḥākim's disappearance, as it happened, would be the most convenient event for their struggle. It would lift the pressure and emphasise their doctrine which is based on the belief of his divinity and thus give Ḥamza and his supporters a new initiative and better chance.

38. See supra, note no. 1.

39. See *ibid.*

40. Anṭākī, 235. See also Qudā'ī, quoted by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, IV, 190 ff; Itti'āz, anno, 411.

However, available information concerning al-Hākīm's end is not conclusive; the stories which have been written are mere conjectures and assumptions based on the circumstances surrounding the event and unless a new and coherent material is discovered his death or "disappearance" will remain an enigma in the history of Islām.

On the 10th of Dhu al-Hijja 411/4th April 1021, al-Hākīm was officially declared dead after reigning for twenty-five years and one month. His age was thirty-six years and seven months.⁴¹ His only son 'Alī was proclaimed Imām-Caliph on the same day and received the title al-Zāhir Li 'Zāz Dīn Allāh by which he became known.

41. This is reported by almost all chroniclers. See Maqrīzī, Imā'āz, anno, 411 and Khīṭaṭ, 289.

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III. Drūz Literature

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'Inān, al-Hākīm bi Amr Allāh, 259/1242).
A. Mājid, al-Hākīm bi Amr Allāh al-Khalifa al-Muftarā 'Alayh (partly) translated by P.K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, New York (1928), 61 ff.
2. al-Sijil al-Manhī fīhi 'An al-Khamr, ed. S. De Sacy in Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 79-81; Translated into English by P.K. Hitti in The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, New York (1928), 59 ff.
3. Khabar al-Yahūd wa al-Nasārā.
4. Nuskhat Mā Katabahu al-Qurmuḥī Ilā Mawlānā al-Hākīm bi Amr Allāh Amīr al-Mu'minin 'Inda Wusūlihi 'Ilā Miṣr, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 81-2.
5. Jawābuhu Salāmahu 'Alaynā.
6. Mithāq Waliy al-Zamān, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 82-4. Translated by P.K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, 56 ff.
7. al-Kitāb al-Ma'rūf bi al-Naqd al-Khafīy.
8. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi Bud' al-Tawhīd Li Da'wat al-ḥiq.
9. Mithāq al-Nisā'.
10. Risālat al-Balāgh wa al-Nihāya fī al-Tawhīd.

11. al-Ghāya wa al-Naṣīha.
12. Kitāb fīhi Ḥaqā'iq Mā Yazhar Quddām Mawlana julā Dhikruh Min al-Ḥazl, ed. (partly) by M.K. Husayn in Tā'ifat al-Drūz, Cairo (1962), 45 ff.
13. al-Sirah al-Mustaqīmah, ed. in al-Muqtabas, V, 306 ff, incorrectly titled as al-Sijil al-Mu'allaq.
14. al-Muwsūmah bi Kashf al-Ḥaqā'iq.
15. al-Risāla al-Muwsūmah bi Sabab al-Asbāb wa al-Kanz li man Ṭayyaganna wa Ṭajāb. ed. E. von Döblen, "Ein Tarkat aus den Schriften der Drusen", M.O., III (1909), 89 ff.

Volume II, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,559, contains the following Risālas:

1. al-Risāla al-Dāmigha li al-Fāsiq wa al-Rad 'Alā al-Nuṣayrī La'anahu Allāh : fī Kullī Kawrin wa Dawr, ed. by R. Strothmann, "Drusen Antwort aus Nusairi angriff", Isl, XXV (1939), 269 ff.
2. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi al-Ridā wa al-Taslīm 'Ilā Kaffat al-Muwahhidīn.
3. Risālat al-Tanzīh 'Ilā Jamā'at al-Muwahhidīn.
4. al-Mawsuma bi Risālat al-Nisā' al-Kabīra.
5. al-Ṣubḥa al-Kā'ina.
6. Nuskhat Sijil al-Mujtabā.
7. Taqīd al-Radī Safīr al-Qudra.
8. Taqīd al-Muqtana.
9. Mukātabah' Ilā Ahl al-Kadiya al-Baydā'.
10. Risālat al-'Inṣinā.

11. Sharḥ al-Imām Sāhib al-Kashf, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 84-6.
12. al-Risāla al-Latī ' Ursilat ' Ilā Waliy al-'Ahd, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 86-91.
13. Risālah ' Ilā Khumār Ibn Jaysh al-Sulaymānī al-'Akkāwī.
14. al-Risāla al-Munfadhah ' Ilā al-Qādī, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 91-3.
15. Munājāt waliy al-Haq.
16. al-Du'ā' al-Mustajāb.
17. al-Taqlīs Du'ā' al-Sadiqīn.
18. Dhikr Ma'rifat al-Imām wa Asmā' al-Hudūd al-'Ulwiyya Rūḥānī wa Jismānī.
19. Risālat al-Taḥdhīr wa al-Tanbīh.
20. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi al-'I'dhār wa al-'Indhār.
21. Risālat al-Gyaba.
22. Kitāb Fīhi Taqīm al-'Ulūm wa 'Ithbāt al-Haq wa Kashf al-Maknūn.
23. al-Mawsūmah bi Risālat al-Zinād.
24. al-Mawsūmah bi Risālat al-Sham'ah.
25. al-Mawsūmah bi al-Rushd wa al-Hidāyah.
26. Shi'r al-Nafs (Isma'il b. Muḥammad al-Tamīnī).

Volume III, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,560; add. 22,484.

1. al-Jiz' al-Awwal min al-Sab'at Ajzā'.
2. al-Tanbīh wa al-Tawbīkh wa al-Tawqīf.
3. Maḥalan ḍarabahu Ba'd Hukamā' al-Diyānah Tawbikhan Liman Qaṣṣar 'An Hifz al-Amānah, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 93-7.
4. Risāla 'Ilā Banī Abī Himār.
5. Taqīd Lahiq: al-Taqīd al-Awwal 'Ilā al-Shaykh al-Mukhtār Abī al-Fawāris al-Amīr b. al-Sharaf Lāhiq.
6. Taqīd Sukayn.
7. Taqīd al-Shaykh Abī al-Kaṭā' ib.
8. Taqīd al-Amīr Dhī al-Maḥamid Mu'ḍād b. Yūsuf.
9. Taqīd Banī al-Jarrāh.
10. al-Mawsūmah bi al-Jamhīriyya.
11. al-Mawsūmah bi al-Ta'nīf wa al-Tahjīn Li Jama'at man bi Sanhūr min Kutāmah al-Kātimīn al-'Iṣīn.
12. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi Risālat al-Wādī.
13. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi al-Qiṣṭānīniyya, (partly) translated by P.K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, 64 ff.
14. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi al-Ta'aqqub wa al-'Ifriqād li Adā' Ma Baqya 'Alaynā min Hadm Shari'at al-Naṣārā al-Fasaqah al-Aḍḍād, (partly) translated by P.K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion, 66 ff.

Volume IV, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,561.

1. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi al-'Iqāz wa al-Bishārah li Ahl al-Ghaflah wa al-Haqq wa al-Tahara.
2. al-Mawsūmah bi al-Haqq' iq wa al-'Indhār wa al-Ta'dīb Li Jamī' al-Khalā' iq.
3. al-Mawsūmah bi al-Shāfiyah Li-Nufūs al-Muwahhīdīn al-Mumriḍah Li-Qulūb al-Muqaṣṣirīn al-Jāhidīn.
4. Risālat al-'Arab.
5. Risālat al-Yaman wa Hidāyat al-Nufūs al-Tahirāt wa Lamm al-Shaml wa Jam' al-Shatāt.
6. Risālat al-Hind al-Mawsūmah bi al-Tidhkār wa al-Kamāl 'Ilā al-Shaykh al-Rashīd.
7. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi al-Taqrī' wa al-Bayān wa Iqāmat al-Hujja Li Waliy al-Zamān.
8. al-Mawsūmah bi Ta' dīb al-Walad al-'Āq.
9. al-Risāla al-Mawsūmah bi al-Qāṣi'ah Li al-Fir'awn al-Da'iy, al-Faḍīḥah Li 'Aqīdat al-Kadhhab al-Ma' tūh al-Shaqiy.
10. Kitāb Abī al-Yaqzān.
11. al-Mawsūmah bi Tamyīz al-Muwahhīdīn al-Tā' i' īn min Hizb al-'Uṣāt al-Fāsiqīn.
12. Risālat Min Dūn Qā'im al-Zamān wa al-Hādī 'Ilā Tā' at al-Rahmān.
13. al-Mawsūmah bi Risālat al-Safar.

Volume V, Ms., B.M., No. add. 11,562.

1. Mi'raj Najat al-Muwahhidin.
2. al-Risala fi Dhikr al-Ma'ad.
3. al-Risala al-Mawsumah bi al-Tabyin wa al-Istidrak.
4. al-Risala al-Mawsumah bi al-Isra'iliyya.
5. al-Mawsumah bi 'Ahd wa Sab'in Su'al.
6. al-Mawsumah bi 'Idah al-Tawhid.
7. Dhikr al-Radd 'Ala Ahl al-'A'wil.
8. Tawbikh Ibn al-Barbariyya.
9. Tawbikh Lahiq.
10. Tawbikh al-'Ajiz al-Khayib Sukayn.
11. Tawbikh Ibn Abi Hashiyah.
12. Tawbikh Sahl.
13. Tawbikh Hasan Ibn Ma'Ilā.
14. Tawbikh al-Khayib Ma'Ilā.
15. Risalat al-Banat al-Kabira, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 97-102.
16. Risalat al-Banat al-Saghira, ed. S. De Sacy, Chrestomathie Arabe, II, 102-5.
17. al-Radd 'Ala al-Munajjimīn.
18. al-Mawsumah bi Bud' al-Khalq.
19. al-Muwajahah.

20. Mukātabat al-Shaykh Abī al-Kaṭā'ib.
21. Manshūr 'Ilā Āl 'Abd Allāh.
22. Jawāb Kitāb al-Sādah.
23. al-Kitāb al-Munfaḥ 'Alā Yadd Sarāyā.
24. Mukātabat Tadhkirah.
25. Mukātabat Naṣr Ibn Futūḥ.
26. al-Sijil al-Wāṣil 'Ilā Naṣr.
27. Manshūr al-Shaykh Abī al-Ma'ālī al-Ṭāhir.
28. Manshūr 'Ilā Jamā'at Abī Turāb.
29. Risālat Jabal al-Summāq.
30. Manshūr 'Ilā Āl. Abd Allāh wa Āl Sulaymān.
31. Manshūr Abī 'Alī al-Tanūkhī.
32. Manshūr Li Abī al-Khayr Salāmah.
33. Manshūr al-Sharḥ wa al-Baṭ.
34. Mukātaba 'Ilā al-Shuyūkh al-Awwābin.
35. Manshūr fī Dhikr 'Ijālat Sa'd.
36. Mukātabat Ramz 'Ilā al-Shaykh Abī al-Ma'ālī.
37. Manshūr 'Ilā al-Maḥall al-Azhar al-Sharīf.
38. Manshūr Naṣr Ibn Futūḥ.
39. Mukātabat Ramz 'Ilā Āl Abī Turāb.

40. al-Risāla al-Wāṣila 'Ilā al-Jabal al-Anwar.
41. Mukatabat al-Shaykh Abī al-Ma'ālī.
42. Manshūr al-Ghayba.

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