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Affect as a technology of rule:

**Service, sacrifice and the
Pakistani military**


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Thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD
2017

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis argues that affect is a technology of rule deployed by the military institution in Pakistan to shape its relationship with soldiers and their families and draw their service and sacrifice. This affective disciplining extends to the military's relationship with the nation, in which the bodies and families of dead soldiers serve as conduits for communication. The thesis explores service and death in the Pakistani military ethnographically, privileging the lived experiences of subaltern soldiers and their families. The research material is drawn from in-depth interviews and participant observation spread over a period of 13 months in rural Punjab and at the ceremonies and recruitment centres of the military itself.

Building on Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality, according to which statecraft is invested in governing both the polity and the affective selves of subjects, this thesis situates militarism as a set of gendered governing practices which not only control affective selves but also produce them by reworking affect and attachment through the concerns of the military. It records the limits of the military's hegemonic power by documenting spaces for contestation in these complicit relationships and analyses the reasons for these moments of disaffection being folded back into tropes of sacrifice and service for the nation-state.

To support its claims, the thesis analyses various disciplinary practices set in motion by the Pakistani military, such as the manufacture of the soldier, the management of grief, the crafting of commemorative spectacles and the masking of regimes of compensation for military death. It argues that affective disciplining works closely alongside the material gains that the military offers its subjects, and that it is these two drivers, not the scripts of nation and religion, that bind soldiers and their families to the military institution.

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Let me begin with my supervisory team, Laleh Khalili, Mathew Nelson and Rahul Rao who from the beginning were supportive, encouraging and most of all keenly interested in my initial somewhat garbled attempt to put forward the subject of my inquiry. I would like to especially acknowledge Mathew Nelson who provided an immensely grounded perspective on a number of chapters and most of all for never refusing the various requests for comments that I kept sending him.

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A special thanks to Natalya Kamal, who helped me decipher legal terminology as I researched cases related to compensation offered against death in military service. Sameen Mohsin deserves special mention for consistently coming to my aid many a times for reasons too varied to mention.

¹ Lagioia, N. (2016, May 19). “Writing is an act of pride”: A conversation with Elena Ferrante. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from <http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/writing-is-an-act-of-pride-a-conversation-with-elena-ferrante>

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Glossary

<i>bacha/bache</i>	child/ren
<i>barani</i>	rain-fed
<i>chaddar</i>	loose cotton wrap
<i>charpai</i>	traditional woven bed
<i>fauj/fauji</i>	military/military man
<i>ghairat</i>	honour
<i>ghazi</i>	Muslim soldier who fights in a battle/a warrior
<i>janaza</i>	funeral
<i>jawan</i>	young man/soldier
<i>jihad</i>	holy war
<i>khateeb</i>	one who delivers the sermon for Friday or Eid prayers – used by the military to refer to religious clerics serving in the military
<i>larka/larke</i>	boy/boys
<i>majboor</i>	helpless
<i>maulvi</i>	Muslim cleric
<i>namaz</i>	Muslim prayer
<i>pakki naukri</i>	secure government service
<i>qaum</i>	nation
<i>sarkar</i>	government
<i>shalwar kameez</i>	traditional dress consisting of a loose shirt over loose trousers
<i>shaheed/shuhada/ shahadat</i>	martyr/martyrs/martyrdom
<i>sipahi/s</i>	soldier/s
<i>Vaen</i>	Punjabi mourning ritual
<i>Youm- e- Shuhada</i>	Martyrs' Day
<i>Youm- e- Difah</i>	Defence Day
<i>zehen</i>	mind

List of Abbreviations

<i>AFIRM</i>	Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine
<i>COAS</i>	Chief of Army Staff
<i>DASB/s</i>	District Armed Services Board/s
<i>DSB</i>	District Soldiers Boards
<i>FATA</i>	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
<i>GHQ</i>	General Headquarters
<i>GWOT</i>	global war on terror
<i>ISPR</i>	Inter Services Public Relations
<i>JCO</i>	Junior Commissioned Officer
<i>KP</i>	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
<i>MC</i>	Master of Ceremonies
<i>NCO</i>	Non-Commissioned Officer
<i>NoK/s</i>	next of kin/s
<i>PA Directorate</i>	Personnel and Administration Directorate
<i>PASB</i>	Pakistan Armed Services Board
<i>SRO</i>	Selection and Recruitment Office
<i>TTP</i>	Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan
<i>WO/s</i>	Welfare Officer/s
<i>WWP/s</i>	war wounded person/s
<i>YeD</i>	Youm-e-Difah
<i>YeS</i>	Youm-e-Shuhada

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Introduction

As I watched the *Youm-e-Difah* (Defence Day)² ceremony at the Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, the colourful stage surrounded by larger than life screens went dark. The music stopped playing and the master of ceremonies announced to the hushed audience that next on stage would be the mother of a *shaheed* (martyr). The father and other Next of Kins (NoKs)³ of the dead soldier had already appeared on stage, and the finale in this commemorative ceremony had been reserved for the testimony of the mother. She walked onto the stage, a woman in her mid-fifties, and stood confidently at the dais. Her eyes glistened with tears as she spoke lovingly of her son. At times she stopped, took a breath and visibly steadied herself, but when she did speak her voice was strong and she spoke with pride and poise, her head held high. Her grief hung in the air, but what was more touching and emotive to watch was her resolve, her ability to stand firm and resolute against the overwhelming grief that this death had brought to her. The tension between her unbridled grief and her stoic resolve was maintained throughout. It was a powerful moment, the camera lingered over it, the audience watched in awe, and some cried silently, others sobbed.

From the opening sequence of the ceremony, where a chosen group of Next-of-Kins (NoKs) paraded onto the pavilion to be seated (while the rest of the audience stood in respect), to their testimonies played on giant screens or relayed live on stage or in video songs, to poems dedicated to them, the families of the dead were clearly central to the imagery of these ceremonies. The show's final sequence involved homage being paid by families through flowers and prayers at the martyrs' monument. Recalling the testimony of a widow of a dead soldier at an earlier commemorative ceremony, one of the military officers in charge told me:

[It was] a brilliant moment, when she stood there with her three children, the youngest in her arms, and said she wanted

² In 2010, the Pakistan Army declared 30th April *Youm -e-Shuhada* (YeS) – Martyrs' Day – to pay tribute to the soldiers who died in the War in Waziristan, a corollary of the global war on terror. In 2015, YeS was combined with the *Youm-e-Difah* (YeD) – Defence Day ceremony instituted earlier to commemorate the 1965 war with India.

³ Term used by the Pakistani military to refer to the families of dead soldiers.

her son to go into the army like his father. It touched a chord; it was a very emotionally charged moment. It is to create such moments that these commemorations are done.

(Major 1, ISPR, 24th August 2015)

For part of the ceremony I sat with Yasmin, Nawaz's mother, a young soldier who died in the Swat operations in 2009. As Yasmin watched the mother speaking on stage, I thought back to the time we discussed these testimonies while we sat in the courtyard of her house in her village, a house they had built with money they had received as compensation for his death. She had said to me then:

The army leaves after the funeral, it doesn't look back, it throws innocents into battle and says go fight. What do they care? How would they know what happens inside the spaces of the home? It is not so easy to accept this, women will say we will send another son into the army (...) I don't know who these women are.

(Yasmin, Palwal,⁴ 24th November 2014)

When the mother on stage made the predictable offering of another son, Yasmin turned to me with a raised eyebrow and a smile and said 'Look how easily she says it'. The smile was weary and rueful and I wondered if she too remembered our conversation earlier. To me it sounded like she was saying 'as if it were that easy'. Here, within the hush of the NoKs enclosure, the rhetoric of continued sacrifice for the nation, a section of the show that held the most resonance for the rest of the audience, seemed to reverberate the least and invoked cynicism.

-Fieldnotes, GHQ, 6th September 2015



The above vignette illustrates a compressed example of the complex relationship that exists between the military institution and the subjects of militarism, the soldiers and family members of the dead who are the subject of my thesis. Two questions can be posed here. First, why does the Pakistan Armed Forces⁵ orchestrate these ceremonies

⁴ Fictitious name of village

⁵ The Pakistan Armed Forces (*Musalla Afwaj-e-Pakistan*) comprise three main branches: the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Pakistan Army, the land-based uniformed force, is the largest of the three in terms of manpower and the most powerful in terms of resources, political clout, geographical coverage and public visibility. The YeS and YeD events are coordinated by the Pakistan Army and held at the Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.

that demand affirmation of militarism from those who have suffered unimaginable losses? Or what does the investment in this theatre tell us about the nature of modern militarism? Second, what imperatives obligate the subjects of militarism, men and women, to respond to this call? The first question alludes to statecraft, the utility and meaning of these spectacles in sustaining militarism. The second question brings into focus the subjects of militarism and the uneven, seemingly antithetical practices that make these subjects possible. What I will show in my thesis is that both queries are complementary aspects of the same question: how is affect implicated in the production of gendered militaristic subjectivities in Pakistan? I contend that it is important to understand this question if we are to examine the tenacious appeal of the military institution in Pakistan. The question also responds to broader theoretical concerns around the operations and limits of the hegemonic power relations that nurture militarism and form the subjectivity of soldiers and families.

The affective as ruse or as propaganda to shape war rhetoric is one way to deconstruct the presence of sentiment within state narratives. Another is to view affect as a form of governance that combines 'restraint with affection' (Yazawa 1985:19) where familial analogies and paternalistic power define the relationships between the rulers and ruled (Hunt 1992; Verdery 1999; Banti 2008). I hold that both these explanations provide only partial answers to the operation of affect within militarism. I turn instead to Ann L. Stoler (2004:5-10) who, in the context of studying Dutch colonial authority, argues that sentiment has been mistakenly treated as 'embellishment to, rather than the substance of, governing projects'. She goes on to suggest that the centrality of affect within governing is similar to Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality, where statecraft joins 'the care and governing of polity to the care and governing of the affective self.'

The primary argument I put forward in this thesis is that affect is a technology of rule deliberately deployed by the military institution in Pakistan to contour its relationship with its immediate subjects (soldiers and families) and with the nation in general. The principle focus of the thesis remains on the symbiotic relationship between the Pakistani military as an institution and the soldiers and their families. It is a study of what makes this relationship possible and the purposes it serves. This thesis situates militarism as a sociological process (Mann 1987; Geyer 1989; Chenoy 1998; Gusterson 2007; Lutz 2011), a set of social practices that imbricate ideologies of religion and nation in an instrumental usage. I also posit that these practices involve not just an acceptance of and preparation for war, but an acceptance of violence against oneself and one's loved ones.

This acceptance is made possible through an invocation of affect that is central to the production of militarist subjectivities. The thesis will show that while material gain is a driver and cannot be refuted in the formation of these subjectivities, this is not a complete explanation of how militarism functions. Affect as a technology of rule implies a set of governing practices that are gendered, and not only control affective selves but also produce them by reworking affect and attachment through the concerns of the state, and in this case the military. There is recognition by the military that certain kinds of affect can be unsettling and counterproductive to state interest and must be managed. Also implicated within this technology of rule are the *production*, and not just the *control*, of affect and affective selves. This production creates its own *truth*, the meaningfulness of service and sacrifice in the service of the nation-state.

The thesis accentuates two aspects of this affective production. *First*, that this production of affect works through the consent and participation of protagonists, or what I refer to as collusion between the military institution and its subjects (soldiers and families). Rosalind O'Hanlon (1988:199-200), in reviewing the extensive Subaltern Studies literature, argues for the need to re-conceptualize the dichotomy created between the powerful and the subordinated through two propositions. One is theoretical, or 'a point about power', which understands domination as a power relation and not as a collective voice. Thus, in this case the dichotomy must be emphasized and the word collusion may seem inaccurate. The second proposition (more relevant to my thesis) is more substantive and is about *how* domination operates. She suggests that the categories that are used to analyse domination here should not be 'monolithic blocks'; instead these categories 'must be as multifarious and nuanced as the courses and ligaments through which power itself runs'. In other words, the experience of power is fluid and subjects themselves can participate in their own domination. As such, where I have retained the distinct categories of ruler and ruled in this thesis to emphasize the power differentials inherent within this relationship I have also stressed their collusive and symbiotic nature.

Second, the process of production does not imply a fabrication even as it does implicate a degree of manufacture. The nature of this production relies on the appropriation or rechannelling of visceral affect (such as sadness or grief) generated within the interaction between the two protagonists and is experienced as authentic even as it is disciplined and shaped by hegemonic power. For the subjects (soldiers and families) this production is based on affective residue, effluence from attachments severed, hence it is

experienced as authentic even as the military's appropriation of the affective terrain is recognized by those imbricated within it. This experience of authenticity bestows upon this affect a certain kind of sacredness and places it beyond question.

The thesis will interrogate the mechanisms through which this *truth* is created and will present evidence for the claim that subjects think through the conditions of their formation and are conscious of these appropriations. Their complicity in the scripts of service and sacrifice is not a result of ideological imperatives, but instead is driven by affective compulsions set in motion by affective productions. I argue that affect has the potential to be two things at the same time, harnessed and produced by disciplinary frameworks, yet able to decipher and stand outside them. This duality of affect is what makes for spaces that may be populated by subject positions that allow for disengagement from the project of militarism and permit complicity in it. This is evident in the vignette presented above, where the mother creates the 'brilliant' authentic moment on the national stage, while in other spaces distances herself from the militarism project.

The military controls, suppresses or invokes grief within its subjects through a process of disciplining narratives of pain. It attempts to assuage the grief of soldiers and families through a host of meaning-making processes and material mechanisms. I argue that the military not only seeks these affective bonds to ensure continued replenishment of its rank and file, but also cultivates these relationships with soldiers and their families to serve as conduits for communication with the nation in a bid to garner support for the institution. Commemorative ceremonies where families affirm their support for the military and mouth the rhetoric of sacrifice for the nation utilize the affect of families in order to invoke affective bonds with the nation. This second set of affective relationships between the military and the nation (the first being between the military and the soldiers and families) are formed in the crucible of the earlier relationship and rely on deliberately crafted narratives of grief and mourning.

In this thesis I will also delineate how this management of affect is gendered. I argue that the success of this technology of rule (the control and production of affect) rests heavily on gendering its subjects in ways that involve two contradictory moves. First, it subordinates women and emotions beneath the faculties of reason, a denigrated status where a woman's affect is considered unreasonable, excessive and beyond her control, and must be restrained (Ahmed 2004). Second, it clearly exalts the suffering of the female

and relegates it to an almost scared status. It also acknowledges the female dependent as a crucial next of kin with whom it sets out to create a transactional partnership that compensates for the death of the soldier. I argue that the masculine military institution is obsessed with the feminine subject, who remains an object of both exaltation and disdain. The exaltation belongs to the suffering mother and helpless wife, in need of protection from the masculine military and the soldier, while the disdain is for her weakness, depicted in her inability to control destructive affect that has the potential to destabilize the carefully scripted (by the military institution) narrative of willing sacrifice for the nation-state. The tension between the stoic mother and the weeping mother that we see within the vignette above, a tension between the need for affect and the need for that affect to be disciplined, is analogous to the military institution's relationship with the feminine subject.

It is important to state here that throughout my thesis religion is situated within the context of statecraft, and it is sacrifice and martyrdom as a state enterprise rather than as a theological discourse that is foregrounded. I do so not to suggest that the *Islamization* of national identity and the military does not exist, but posit this Islamization as a state driven project that instrumentalizes religion for its own ends. As such, my analysis foregrounds the state (or more specifically the Pakistani military) and not religion per se.

The attention to affect requires us to not only traverse the terrain of militarism within the larger-than-life landscapes and institutions of state, military and industrial systems,⁶ but also to turn to the intimate realm of everyday mundane life and living. This thesis privileges the lived experienced of the *sipahi*⁷ (junior and non-commissioned male soldiers in the Pakistani military) and the families of *sipahis* (dead and alive) through an ethnographic exploration of service and death in the military. The relationship between the ruler and the ruled plays out on civilian and military terrain, and as such the research for the thesis takes place both within the institutions of the military and in civilian spaces where these soldiers and their families reside.

Scholarly Debates

I engage with three sets of literature in this thesis. I first locate my inquiry within the first set of scholarship, dealing with militarism, especially in the context of Pakistan, and I then outline how I define militarism in this thesis. The second set of literature revolves

⁶ See works by Melman 1974; Kostinen 1980; Kaldor 1981; Adams 1981; Tilly 1985; Shaw 1988; Holsti 1997.

⁷ Refers to a soldier below the rank of commissioned officer. The anglicized version of the term, sepoy, is no longer in common use. However, the anglicized plural, sipahis, is still common.

around theoretical formulations around affect and how it is imbricated within statecraft. The third set looks at studies that pull together gender and affect within the context of militarism.

Approaching Militarism

Macro level analyses that look for grand narratives and explanations of militarism in larger structural, historical, political, economic and technological shifts dominate the study of militarism as a political and analytical category. Several studies have linked militarism to capitalism's inherent tendency towards imperialism defined by hegemonic militarist thinking and practices (Melman 1974; Kostinen 1980; Kaldor 1981). Other theorists, drawing on Max Weber's work, have located militarism in the nature of the state, where states are inclined towards coercion and the consolidation of political power by the expansion of state force through investment in standing armies, weaponry and military infrastructure and through collusion with bureaucracy (Fitzgerald 1972; Adams 1981; Tilly 1985; Shaw 1988; Holsti 1997).⁸

Pakistan has been ruled directly by its military, more specifically the Pakistan Army, for roughly half of its existence. The military has effectively been a joint and indirect ruler for the remainder of this time, through interference in defence and foreign policy and the manipulation of domestic politics. The emphasis of scholarship on militarism in Pakistan tends to be top down, much like the literature mentioned above, and mainly focuses on the institution of the military and debates around the civil-military nexus.⁹ First, there are accounts of the military institution, including chronicles of the British Indian Army and the martial race discourse (Gough and Innes 1984; Heathcote 1995; Roy and Dasgupta 2010), as well as the military in post-independence Pakistan (Cohen 1984; Cloughley 2000; Lieven 2011). Second, there is an abundance of literature on the relationship between civil political institutions and the military (Siddiqi 2001; Rizvi 2003) including the military's involvement in Pakistan's economy and the relationship between religious institutions and the army (Jalal 1990; Rizvi 2003; Siddiqi 2007). This latter set of scholarship interrogates the military's interference in civilian governments and its forays into the economy supported by invisible state subsidies. As Pakistani analysts have time and time again pointed out, the military stands as one of the most powerful institutions in the country, and it has a *de facto* role in politics (Jalal 1990;

⁸ Shifts in patterns of war have been theorized. Examples are 'virtual wars', 'new wars' and 'post-modern wars', which amongst other things implicate neoliberal globalization and the lessening of the state's monopoly of legitimate violence (Gray 1997; Kaldor 1999; Ignatieff 2000).

⁹ This mirrors the global trend where a substantial set of debates on militarism within the disciplines of sociology and political science deal with civil-military relations and the military's interference in politics and governance. (Kolkowicz 1966; Colton 1979; Horowitz 1980; Ben Meir 1995; Nordlinger 1997).

Abbas 2005; Nawaz 2008; Shah 2014). It may be instructive at this point to briefly examine the reasons for this as purported by scholarship. Ayesha Siddiqi (2007) suggests that the reasons for military dominance rest upon its burgeoning economic empire based on agricultural and property ownership as well as its control of business and industrial enterprises. Theorists such as Mazhar Aziz (2007) lean towards institutional theory and path dependence. Aziz suggests that repeated coups in Pakistan have led to the weakening of civil institutions, resulting in the military stepping in directly or interfering unresisted during periods of civilian rule. There is also the more dated yet still relevant postcolonial state hypothesis proposed by Hamza Alavi (1972). Alavi argues that states that came into being after decolonization were especially vulnerable to an imbalance between military and civil forces. This is because militaries were derived from the earlier colonial machinery, so the inherited overinflated military-bureaucratic oligarchy developed more autonomously than other civil institutions did. Furthermore, it has been argued that these states are shaped as client states to foreign patrons (countries) who invest through military aid and organization (Tilly 1992:208; Wendt and Barnett 1993). Because of Pakistan's geo-political location, the Pakistani military has always attracted its fair share of patrons. Ishtiaq Ahmed (2013:9), while agreeing with Alavi's basic premise, critiques Alavi for not putting sufficient emphasis on the politics of the Cold War and Pakistan's role as a client state to the US. He suggests instead that Harold Lasswell's (1997) idea of garrison states can be applied to Pakistan, taking into account Pakistan's postcolonial history as well as its vital geostrategic importance in the Cold War. According to Lasswell, modern industrial societies, faced with the constant threat of war and continual crisis, would create conditions where 'specialists on violence would capture the leadership, thus establishing the supremacy of the military over the state and society.... [so the population in these societies would be] obedient and docile [,] indoctrinated to believe in the inevitability of war and the need to maintain that garrison state' (qtd. in Ahmed 2013:14).

Much of this scholarship in Pakistan examines both the historical dynamics and the geostrategic imperatives that have allowed the military to take up political space. The primary question these studies grapple with is the ever-shifting boundary between military and civil political institutions. In his study of post-colonial Jordan, Joseph Massad (2001:8) suggests that perhaps the focus of scholarship on militarism should also be on how the military '*produces* politics rather than how it is related to it' (emphasis in original). Since the 1980s there has been an increased interest in how the military affects daily lives, public spaces and civil institutions. I would like to draw a distinction between

global and Pakistan-specific trends. While the former have involved a turn towards sociology and anthropological accounts of militarism, in Pakistan this lens has been restricted mostly to feminist critique and scholarship on the militarization of state and society. The areas studied include educational curricula (Saigol 1995; Nayer and Salim 2003) popular culture, songs, images and literary texts (Lalarukh 1997; Saigol 2013) and military symbols in various national rituals (Khattak 1997; Baber 2000).

This thesis is situated within this ambit, as I examine the mechanisms that allow the Pakistani military to access political space, an access that I argue depends in part on its ability to produce certain kinds of political and affective subjects. I am not interested in deciphering the much-studied and debated *whys* of the military's dominance in Pakistan, but instead I aim to focus on the *hows*, nuancing the ways in which the military creates its image as an institution that demands 'reverence and fear' (Siddiqi 1996: ii) and allows 'docile populations' (Lasswell qtd. in Ahmed, 2013:14) to emerge. For this I have turned to the realms of affect and gender. However, before I engage with the literature on these themes, it may be important to outline how I invoke the term militarism within this thesis.¹⁰

Militarism has been defined as an ideology, as a behavioural phenomenon, as a military build-up, as a set of institutional relationships and as a sociological process (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013:11–16). My own conceptual understanding of militarism sees it as a sociological process closely imbricated with ideology.

In the *History of Militarism*, Alfred Vagts suggests that militarism

covers every system of thinking and valuing in every complex of feelings which rank military institutions and ways above the ways of civilian life, carrying military mentality and modes of acting and decisions into the civilian sphere (1959:17).

The above definition sets up militarism primarily as not being limited to the military: a system that 'carries...into' and almost infects civilian life around it. It suggests two important aspects of militarism. The first is the ideological pervasiveness that is intrinsic to militarism: 'every system of thinking and valuing in every complex of feelings'. The

¹⁰ My analysis of militarism is indebted to James Eastwood's overview of various theoretical formulations of militarism in his doctoral dissertation at SOAS: *The ethics of Israeli militarism: soldiers' testimony and the formation of the Israeli soldier-subject*.

second aspect it highlights is the way militarism places itself above civilian modes of thinking and feeling. Vagts implicates thinking and feeling within militarism, hinting at a tendency to immerse the subject at both rational and visceral levels. Vagts' intense focus on ideology is perhaps problematic, and for a more comprehensive grasp of how militarism functions I turn to Michael Mann, who defines militarism as denoting attitudes and social practices which view war and preparation for war as normal and desirable. (Mann 1987). Martin Shaw takes this further when he extends militarism beyond preparation for war, describing it instead as 'the relationship between war preparation and society', which indicates 'the influence of military organization and values on social structure' (1991:11) including 'the penetration of social relations in general by military relations' (2013:20). In this way Shaw extends militarism beyond ideology to a range of social practices and processes, including modes of economic production, popular culture and gender norms and relations. The gendered working of power, where militant and violent solutions to conflict are inscribed in institutions and in the mind of the civilian subject is important to highlight here (De Mel 2007; Saigol 2013). There is evidence that this attitude, coupled with the valorization of violence, spills into civilian spheres and impacts gender relations. It becomes visible in neighbourhoods, households and bedrooms, where ideas of appropriate dress, women's independence, education and mobility come under scrutiny in times of rising militarization (Khattak 1995; Reardon 1996; Enloe, 2000). Aneela Baber (2000) emphasizes how a confrontational attitude towards the *other* is valorized, while restraint and pacifism are seen as unmanly and unbecoming. This was evident in both India and Pakistan when nuclear tests were being carried out, where those who expressed an anti-militarist viewpoint were feminized and called traitors (Chenoy 1998; Baber 2000).

Catherine Lutz nuances these processes further when she suggests that militarism

is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of militant nationalisms and fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action (Lutz 2006:292).

She prefers the term militarization to militarism for it allows a focus on both the 'material and discursive nature of military dominance' (Lutz 2006:294) and defines it as 'the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence' (Geyer 1989:79).

While I agree with Lutz and the other theorists mentioned above about the need to focus on both material and discursive aspects of this phenomenon, I retain the term militarism as it allows the focus to remain on ideology, which I contend it must as I will explain shortly. Let me first expand the notions of 'war preparation' (Shaw 1991:11) and 'production of violence' (Lutz, 2006:29) to include the acceptance of violence against one's own self and one's loved ones. Here acceptance does not point to a glorification or even a desire for violence, but instead to a submission to the possibility of violence on one's body and on the bodies of those we love. For any definition of the concept of militarism to hold it must take into account this intimate aspect of war preparation, the ability to produce the instruments and then subjects of violence, the soldier and his family, and their complicity in the project. The importance of this complicity is obvious for instrumental reasons, for standing armies are integral to the ability of militarism to thrive, or at least will be for some time to come. This complicity is also important for symbolic reasons, as it plays into truth claims about the nation-state and the need to sacrifice for it. As such, I revert to militarism as an ideology here and seek an explanation for how this submission (of the soldier and the family) to violence is made possible. This submission is an acceptance of violence constructed as willing, meaningful and selfless service and sacrifice for the nation and of the assertion that dying for the nation-state is noble, manly and necessary. The concept of ideology I invoke here is not a set of beliefs that lead to material consequences or practices in a causal way. Instead, militarism is a set of social practices that instrumentally and actively employ other kinds of ideologies (religious and national) and this engagement keeps these practices securely in place.

In his psychoanalytic reconstruction of the concept of ideology, Slavoj Žižek (2008:45)¹¹ suggests that '[t]he function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some real traumatic kernel.' In other words, subjects turn to certain beliefs and ideas to explain or justify their continued participation in structures of domination. Through this understanding then, ideology is something that is instrumentally drawn in to discipline and re-purpose survival, livelihoods, death and disability.

I now turn to theoretical formulations around affect that I argue provide a critical perspective from which to attempt to understand subject formation in militarism.

¹¹ I invoke Žižek's work on ideology, especially where he draws upon Lacanian psychoanalysis, but distance myself from him in his more recent work and views on multiculturalism, integration and refugees.

Bringing in Affect

The study of affect, labelled the affective turn in humanities and social science, has emerged in the last two decades as a way to theorize the social and political. The primary precursors of this interest in affect were a focus on the body, associated with feminist theory, and an interest in emotions, visible in queer studies (Butler 1993; Grosz 1994). A number of terms have been used interchangeably within this turn, including feelings, sentiments, passions, and the two most commonly and interchangeably used: emotion and affect. Traditionally, affect is used as the broader term, referring to 'states of being', of which emotions are seen as a 'manifestation or interpretation' (Hemmings 2005:551). Affect has been referred to psychoanalytically as a 'qualitative expression of our drives', energy and variations' (Giardini, 1999:150). Moving away from affects being reduced to drives alone, Silvan Tomkins (1963) suggests that they are autotelic and insatiable and give depth to our lives by allowing us to narrate our lives to ourselves and others. In the introduction to their book *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies*, Hogget and Thompson (2012) present a healthy synthesis of these differences, theorizing affect and emotions as two forms of feelings that can overlap and are not mutually exclusive, and yet have different connotations.

Affect concerns the more embodied, unformed and less conscious dimension of human feeling, whereas emotion concerns the feelings which are more conscious since they are more anchored in language and meaning (2012:2-3).

Anxiety is described here as an affect, 'experienced in a bodily way', while jealousy is an emotion, directed outwards, giving it 'meaning, focus and intentionality' (Hogget and Thompson 2012:3). The object of anxiety may shift, making it almost arbitrary. On the other hand, emotion here is externally directed and embedded in language and discourse. Affect is more abiding, while emotions are more fleeting or transient. The authors take this one step further by suggesting that if the role of passion in political life is to be understood, another aspect of affect must be described: its ability to be 'labile' and 'fluid', capable of spreading through people. This is what Sigmund Freud called 'contagion', which Hogget (qtd. in Hogget and Thompson 2012:3) also refers to as 'affective networks'. I use both emotion and affect in this thesis, based upon my understanding of their differentiations above, but the thesis remains locked into an analysis of affective ties as a model of subject formation for the project of militarism, where affect stands as more autotelic, abiding, labile, capable of contagion and less easily externally driven, directed or explained.

I now turn to how affective control and production becomes a technique of governmentality, the latter described as an exercise of power that involves ‘the conduct of conduct’ through which subjects are produced through the management of individual behaviour (Foucault 2008:87–114, 2002).

‘[E]ducating consent’¹²(...) is made possible, not through some abstract process of “internalization” but by shaping appropriate and reasoned affect, by directing affective judgments, by severing some affective bonds and establishing others, by adjudicating what constituted moral sentiments – in short, by educating the proper distribution of sentiments and desires (Stoler 2004:9, emphasis in original).

In the above excerpt, Ann L. Stoler argues, in the context of Dutch colonial authority, that affect is central to statecraft, a critical medium through which it operates. As Stoler suggests, the Dutch colonial state was ‘troubled with *distribution* of sentiment, by both its excessive expression and the absence of it’ and sought to manage these ‘affective states’ through ‘techniques of affective control’ (Stoler, 2004:5, emphasis in original). Citing Francis Bacon, who suggests that the governance of states is similar to ‘the government within’, where both require knowledge about the ‘dangerous and combustible passions of ordinary men’, she discusses statecraft as being not ‘opposed’ to the affective but more concerned with its ‘mastery’ (2004:5-10). In her study of Salvadoran refugees, Janis Jenkins (1991:139-165) puts forward the notion that states go beyond the mere control of emotional discourse, to ‘culturally standardize the organization of feeling’ thereby *producing* as well as *managing* affect. I endorse Stoler’s emphasis, placing affect as central to governing projects and furthermore position this preoccupation with sentiment not as a controlling mechanism alone but, as Jenkins suggests, a productive one, where techniques of affective management not only control but also produce certain kinds of affective subjectivities.

I also contend that the affective realm is a critical lens for studying the ambivalences and disengagements in the operation of hegemonic power. The opening vignette brought out this disengagement, where the mother on the national stage was complicit in the militarism project and yet within the confines of her home and in the darkened NoKs enclosure expressed unease and cynicism. To explain these disengagements, I first

¹² Gramsci qtd. in Stoler 2004:9

outline debates within the scholarly focus on affect around the possibility of affective freedoms.

Theorists such as Brian Massumi (1996) and John Brunns (2000) have suggested that affects are beyond social, pre discursive states, lying outside social signification. Some of this work sets up affective freedoms and autonomy as a way out of the pessimism inherent in social determinism. This is a position fiercely contested by constructivist models, which see affect as externally determined, as a social and cultural practice (Lutz and Lughod 1990; Ahmed 2004). Clara Hemmings (2005:550-551) in perhaps rightly turning away from what she regards as misplaced 'theoretical celebration of affect' as a way to theorize challenges to social order, suggests instead that affect presents itself 'not as a difference, but as a central mechanism of social reproduction in the most glaring ways'. Laura Berlant (1997) has demonstrated this in her work, citing the tendency of affective responses to strengthen rather than challenge hegemonic power. Critical race theorists have argued that affect plays a role in consolidating structures of power and oppression, while also providing the investments needed to challenge these relations (Spivak 1993; Bhabha 1994). My own position acknowledges these debates and veers towards Berlant's usage of affect, but it derives largely from an understanding of affect as an analytical lens to understand subject formation, or more specifically as a technology of rule that can be employed by the military to create subjects both immediate (soldiers and families) and secondary (nation), and contour its relationship with them. My position on the potential of affect to both affix sexed and raced relationships of oppression and provide cathexis to resist or oppose these relationships is best described by Yael Navaro-Yashin in her ethnographic study of Northern Cyprus, *The Make Believe Space, Affective Geographies in a Post War Polity* (2012:17-19). Navaro-Yashin first suggests that we re-imagine relations between human beings and space as not being reducible to the 'interpretations projected onto it through human subjectivities', as well as including a more 'object centred' perspective which allows us to acknowledge 'that there is something in space, in material objects or in the environment that exceeds, or goes further beyond the human imagination, but that produces an affect that may be experienced by human beings, all the same'. Taking this further, Navaro-Yashin (2012:21-24) challenges the traditional psychoanalytical association made between affective realm and human subjectivity, where 'affective possibility and potentiality' lie only within the inner world or interiority of human beings. Although Lacanian psychoanalysis moves away from this more exclusive connection and acknowledges that 'subjectivity is a product of relational construction', a making of the subject in relation to

other subjects, Navaro-Yashin finds it inadequate, as it still 'psychologizes' affect, and the human self or subjectivity remains the primary site for affective energy. According to Navaro-Yashin, the alternative to this is Nikolas Rose's suggestion that the psyche is constructed and resides within discourse in the Foucauldian sense, where the inside is reduced to an effect of the outside and where subjectivity is a 'product of governmentalizing practices that bring a subject into being', 'an effect of truth, the reflection of governmentality'. Navaro-Yashin places herself between the traditions of the 'agoraphobia of humanist disciplines (...) which would primarily look inward' and the 'claustrophobia' of theoretical frameworks that 'open out' and take into account 'exteriorities, outer spaces, environment and objects'. By doing so she questions the distinctions made between 'interiority and exteriority, the subjective and the objective, or the human and the object'. She proposes a study of affect and subjectivity at the same time.

The purpose is not to privilege a new theory of affect against previous constructions of subjectivity but to develop a perspective that could be called the affect-subjectivity continuum, one that attends to embroilment of the inner and outer worlds, to their co-dependence and co-determination (2012:24).

I take this understanding forward in my study of subject formation within the terms of affect, positioning affect as not purely exterior, even as it is not merely bounded within the realm of subjectivity. Affect is also about affective transmissions between human subjects and their environment, so interiority and exteriority become indistinguishable. Subjects that embody both disengagement from and complicity with the project of militarism are made possible by this potential of affect to linger, to haunt, to be two things at the same time, to be produced and harnessed by disciplinary frameworks and yet exist outside them, residing in the interiority of the subjects and in their relations with each other and with their physical environment and spaces.

For the purposes of my project, disengagement from the project of militarism includes thoughts or acts by soldiers or families that challenge or deny the demands of the nation-state for sacrifice. How this disengagement is to be acknowledged has already been the focus of much debate. Are these acts of protest that are deeply ambivalent, that allow subversion to exist within the military side by side with complicity (Gutmann and Lutz 2010), actions that are limited by the available discourses and wrapped up in power that initiates the subject (Butler 1997; Mitchell 1990), counter hegemonic 'weapons of the

weak' (Scott 1985), mere 'safety valves' or acts that reveal the 'diagnostics of power' (Abu Lughod 1990:42-47)? For me, what is relevant is how we locate these disengagements and ambivalences within our understanding of the power dynamics that operate in subject formation and in processes that allow militarism to grow and take root within society. More specifically, how do affect and affective realms provide a more critical lens for studying the formation of these militarist subjectivities that allows the subject to stand both outside and inside these webs of disciplinary power?

I move now to the last set of literature, which lays out the ways through which the masculine and militarist state actively constructs and sustains specific kinds of gendered subjectivities that are imbued with affect.

Gendering Scripts for the Theatre of War

The nation-state has what Katherine Verdery (1999:41) calls a 'parasitic' need for gendered kinship metaphors such as 'fatherland and motherland, sons of the nation and their brothers, mothers of these worthy sons, and occasionally daughters'. These kinship metaphors allow the nation-state to invoke affect and inspire what Benedict Anderson calls 'profoundly self-sacrificing love'. The nation 'is assimilated to skin-color, gender, parentage, birth-era – all those things that one cannot help' and demands 'disinterested love and solidarity' (2006 141-144). The link between nation, sacrifice and men's bodies can be traced back to the wars of the French revolution and Napoleon which mark the shift from the career officer, the mercenary soldier who served a sovereign king in dynastic wars, to the citizen-soldier who drew arms to defend and protect his nation-state (Vagts 1959; Mosse 1990; Ehrenreich 1997:187; Parker 1996). Women too play a central role within discourses of the nation as repositories of national honour and cultural and religious traditions, and as producers and nurturers of family (Kandiyoti 1991; Khattak 1995; Yuval- Davis, 1997).

Below I nuance how male and female subjects have been theorized within militarism, starting with colonial India, for the history of militarism in Pakistan is closely tied to its colonial roots.

British rule in India was heavily invested in the binary categories of the manly scientific Englishman and the primitive, effeminate native in order to justify racial privilege (Sinha 1995; Nandy 2009), and this in turn influenced the narrative of the nation that emerged in this postcolonial setting, where resistance to colonial rule was invested with the

politics of masculinity and reclaiming male honour (Sinha 1995:7). This resistance also played out along religious lines, with Hindu and Muslim identities being formed in the crucible of nationalist movements (Jaffrelot 2002). The narrative of the new nation involved a recasting of both Muslim and Hindu womanhood and manhood without challenging the 'terms of the discourse', and remained patriarchal in its possibilities (Saigol 2013:48; Chakravarti 1989). Allama Iqbal, a Muslim nationalist poet, bemoaned the loss of Muslim masculinity and honour under colonial rule and campaigned for the reclamation of this loss through the hyper masculine Muslim, *Mard-e-Momin* (the Male Believer) (Saigol 2013:98-99). The woman in this discourse was cast as the 'emotionally laden signifier and symbol of nation, self, the inner spiritual world and the home', to be shielded from Western influence, modern values and secular education (Saigol 2013:244). The post-partition Pakistani nation-state 'invented' (Gellner 1964) Pakistani nationhood through the forced homogenization of a culturally diverse geographical area under the banner of Islam. It constructed a Pakistani selfhood based on the physical and cultural purging of the other: the Hindu or the Hindu Indian State (Jaffrelot 2002; Racine 2002). This required a certain aggressive posturing, provided by the strong Pakistani Muslim male figure who would defend the nation from the 'other', which was often portrayed as effeminate and thus polluting. Religion was reiterated again and again within this identity as the primary basis of difference. The primary tropes of the nation-state, family and religion were fused such that any attack on Pakistan was an attack on Islam and on the entirety of a citizen's family and kinship structure.

The formidable appeal of militarism to a large section of men as an attractive and idealized form of masculinity lies scattered through a range of historical antecedents and socio-cultural settings and institutions. The supply of men who comprise the rank and file of the Pakistan Army comes largely from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), a trend that can be traced to the British Indian Army. The development of militarized districts in Punjab, the 'sword arm' (Barrier 1967:376) of the British Raj, was largely achieved not through coercion but through a nuanced working of power. Clive Dewey (1991:263-266) has argued that the soldier in Pakistan is made outside the military, where 'half of the army's work is done for it'. The all-volunteer army continues to draw with ease from these districts, which have benefitted economically from the military's patronage and where the community have come to understand themselves as members of martial races, with men constructed as hardy, valiant and concerned with primordial notions such as *ghairat* (honour) and *izzat* (prestige).

I nuance these militaristic and masculine subjectivities by referring to several theorists of masculinities who suggest that these subjectivities are insecure and open to anxiety as they emerge from a conscious and deliberate effort to create a distance from the other, in this case the feminine. A sociological reading of this, especially in the South Asian context, cites the separation of the boy from a feminine world and his removal to a more masculine one, where 'the sexed body [is] imagined and consciously crafted in opposition to the female body' (Chopra, Osella & Osella 2004:25). In her study of young boys in the Indian Punjab, Radikha Chopra (2004) talks about how boys learning to plough the field see the hardening of their body as a sign that they are becoming men. In a study conducted by a national rights group in Pakistan (Rozan 2010:22) young men invariably expressed their sense of maleness through a negation of the feminine, where the *real* man was 'not a woman'. Expanding these ideas to militarist subjectivities in the context of Hindutva, Dibyesh Anand (2008:163) states that the 'militarized/masculinized/nationalized self, however, from its originary moment is fearful of its own fragility and seeks to expunge from within what it perceives as non-masculine and thus weak'. Masculinity is therefore theorized within this thesis as fragile, in constant flux, 'an ambivalent complex of weakness and strength' (Chopra, Osella & Osella, 2013:8) and I will return to these ideas to explain how the male and female subjects of war are connected.

I now turn to the female subject and how she is drawn into the militarism project. Unlike men, women have often been painted as more ambivalent subjects of militarism. There has been considerable debate within feminist scholarship (Ruddick 1980; Elshtain 1994) regarding maternal inclinations toward pacifism and peace movements, examples being the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and the Mother's Front in Sri Lanka. In the first example, the refusal of women to mourn sustained the struggle for justice and the affect or grief of these mothers provided the fuel for protest (Holst-Warhaft 2000). Sara Ruddick (1980) has argued that because of their social (not biological) role, mothers are called upon to care for and tend to the young and sick of society, and thus develop values and capacities of feeling that affirm peacekeeping and preservation of life. Others (de Volo 1998, Scheper-Hughes 1998) have critiqued this move, which claims to establish a link between peace and motherhood, arguing that motherhood is a social and fluid category and citing examples of mothers willingly giving their sons up to the cause, for example in 1980s Nicaragua. Analysing the link between maternal thinking and the politics of war, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1998:229-231) draws upon her earlier work in Brazilian shantytowns afflicted by poverty and high infant mortality. She proposes the notion of

‘inevitable, acceptable and meaningful death’, a maternal thinking guided by ‘letting go’ as opposed to ‘holding on’, ‘a peaceful resignation’ in the face of death that would be too painful to accept. So in sharp contrast to the ‘mater dolorosa, the mother of sorrows’ suggested by Ruddick (1998:215), who grieves for her child and is a symbol of maternal pacifism, Scheper-Hughes puts forward the idea of ‘maternal thinking’ that accepts death and ‘resembles military, especially war time thinking’, and finds echoes in religion and its accompanying notions of sacrifice – ‘where angels (martyrs) can be fashioned from the dead bodies of those who die young’ (1998:230).

Neither of the two images presented above – the pacifist mother who resists war or the militarist mother who gives up the child as a sacrificial offering – provide the complexity that I argue exists within the figure of the grieving female and the state’s need to appropriate her. The military clearly seeks out the female subject, as is evident both within regimes of compensation, where the primary next of kin receives compensation, and within commemorative events such as the one cited in the opening section of this introduction. Reverting to the theorization of male subject formation presented earlier, it can be argued that the need for the feminine arises as the masculinized self (and state) cannot be imagined without reference to it (Chopra, Osella & Osella 2004). Women and men are symbiotically connected to the project of war for the nation in ways that seem complementary: men’s bodies protect the honour of vulnerable female bodies (Kandiyoti 1991; De Alwis 1998; Saigol 2013); in turn, women produce these male bodies and willingly give them up for sacrifice (Stobart 1913; Haq 2007; Rajan 2013). What I add to this scholarship is an analysis of affect and how it is used to produce these gendered militarized subjectivities. The woman’s affect is central (it was also central in the pacifist mother image, presented above), and is deliberately invoked for two reasons. First her affect validates and affirms the difference between the valiant soldier, symbolic of the state/military, and the helpless and vulnerable mother or wife, symbolic of the nation. Second, the female subject’s affect is appropriated by the state, which deems her ability to express and invoke grief useful in allowing contagion to occur most effectively between her and the nation that watches her. The masculine identity nurtured on the idea of separation and difference (in military training and in mourning rites) struggles with fear, expressed as a disdain for the feminine that requires constant assertion of distance from its polluting effect on men and yet is haunted by its constant need to engage with it for the reasons mentioned above. I therefore argue that the feminine must forever be central within the militaristic imagination, for its validity lies within both the espousal and the repudiation of the feminine.

Research Methodology

Before I embark upon a description of my methods, site and interlocutors, it is pertinent to lay out my own history and politics, which have not only shaped the subject matter of my thesis but have also determined how I approached its study.

I have always been interested in violence, both the conditions that make it possible and the conditions that allow it to be constructed such that it becomes socially sanctioned, sometimes ignored and invisible as in the case of child sexual abuse and violence against women and sometimes glorified and revelled in as in the case of war. Attaching these conditions to the modern state, and not just to trajectories of culture or religion or even history, although all those considerations remain relevant, is a political project for me, and hence it seemed fitting to choose militarism, a social practice as violent and modern as can be, and in the case of Pakistan affixed neatly onto the state.

Gianpaolo Biaocchi and Brian Connor (2008:140) argue for the relevance of the study of the political in spaces outside formal politics. This allows a shift away from institutional actors and sites towards the periphery where the state meets its subjects (Chatterjee 2004; Corbridge et al. 2005). I believe that these political ethnographies allow a reversal of the usual top-down view of power, representing instead a view from below, or more aptly one that brings into focus 'the myriad ways the state comes into view' (Corbridge et al. 2005:7). It was therefore a conscious choice to turn to the story of the subaltern, a view steered by my feminist politics, to document the lived experience of the instruments and subjects of war and violence: the soldiers and families of the Pakistani military as well my somewhat romanticized desire to find an alternative world view, or at least a hankering for one. The soldier in the mass standing armies of modern militaries has often been painted as an automaton, or simply as a sheep willing and ready for slaughter. I knew that sheep seldom act subversively, especially in the context of the Pakistani military (and even if they did, I did not think my research would be able to uncover this, for the military and its subalterns guard their secrets well). My interest lay in finding out if the automaton or sheep could think, or in other words did the web of the military's disciplinary power break down at any point, and how did it reconstitute itself?

My study situates subject formation as a mutually constitutive process between subjects and the powers that form them. Moving beyond the strictly post-structuralist approach, which sees subjects as 'epiphenomena constructed by culturally specific discursive regimes' (Keller 2007:353), my study argues for an approach to subjectivity where

subjectivity is not just the outcome of social control or the unconscious; it also provides the ground for subjects to think through their circumstances and to feel through their contradictions (Biehl, Good and Kleinman 2007:14).

It is this meaning making, the facility to sense their condition, the flair for knowing, that I privileged as important to capture. This sense making can be contradictory, and my intent in capturing these contradictions over time as I proceeded with my fieldwork was not to look for the resistant subject or a subject that is subversive but simply to record the experience of subject formation as incomplete, flawed, one that leaves room for manoeuvre through the expression of affect that frees them to articulate what must never be said and at the same time binds them in myriad ways to the truth that they create through it. Subjects think through experiences, sense their way through their contradictions and choose different subject positions in different contexts and in different kinds of relationships.

I believe that researchers influence the social world they seek to interrogate and do not exist in an external frame, untouched by the lives and spaces they deconstruct. Personal biographies and experiences permeate into this world. As such, in setting up these representations of participants' stories I am conscious that they reflect *my* interpretation of research participants' lives and *my* theorizing about these lives in relation to broader contextual situations and issues (Cole and Knowles, 2001). I situate myself as both an insider and an outsider within this research frame. While I come from a third generation military family, I am also an outsider to the world I have chosen to study, the world of the subaltern military soldiers who were ever present in my world yet were silenced and separated by a huge chasm of class and gender. Thus, even as I had considerable familiarity with some of the content in which I immersed myself, the setting of my study placed its own challenges. As a woman and a stranger in that setting, I acknowledge that not only did my physical presence impact what was visible (to me) and what remained veiled, but my particular worldview also affected what I observed and how I interpreted it. Reflexivity implied that I remained conscious of these influences. It implied more than vigilance: it asked me to acknowledge the 'intrusive self' as a resource, one that stops me from generalizing and simplifying other people's lives (Cohen 1994 qtd. in O'Reilly, 2005:223). Here the text did not become about me but about confronting the relationships I formed with others, what they brought up and, most of all, conveying the context and my place within it. I locate the data that my work has yielded 'within the context of the social processes that brought them about, and recognize the limits of their

representation of reality' (Woolgar 1988 qtd. in Brewer 2000:43). I see the interviewing process as dialogical, where I am present and where my life and my views must intrude upon the canvass of what is finally produced. It would be dishonest to pretend otherwise, and thus the interaction was an engagement with others, or what Linda Alcoff calls a 'speaking to' as opposed to a 'speaking for' the subject. (1992:23)

Over time as I proceeded with my fieldwork and analysis of my data, this consciousness of my imbrication within the research frame became more pronounced. This is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the subject of my thesis, affect as powerful as grief. I could not situate myself outside the stories I heard for two reasons, first simply because it was an emotive experience to listen to mothers and fathers talk about their loss and second because even before this research began I was already imbricated as the third vector, the nation, in my relationship with the military through these tropes of grief and sacrifice. Hence, tears would flow when I heard the families talk about their children, in the silences between our conversations or as we sat by the graves. My own affective self, its response to the stories, became a site of observation, an intimacy with the affect I sought to study, which was both exhilarating and exhausting at times.

Sites, Methods and Interlocutors¹³

My study privileges the study of the political in more intimate space, an inquiry into militarism not just through institutions or the generals and policy makers who purportedly shape the institution, but through people's lives, a view from below with reference to location and class. As such, the focus of inquiry was the soldier class and their families, traditionally drawn from villages in Pakistan. Much of my investigation, including the selection of officers and soldiers for interviews, examines the Pakistan Army. As the largest (in terms of man power) and most influential (in terms of political clout) of the three forces constituting the Pakistani military (the other two being the Air Force and the Navy), I contend that many of the arguments in this thesis about militarism in Pakistan are best represented through this institution. I use the words *sipahi* and soldier interchangeably to refer to the ranks of Sipahi, Lance Naik, Naik, Havildar (collectively referred to as non-commissioned officers – NCOs), Naib Subedar, Subedar Major, Subedar and Honorary Captain (referred to as junior commissioned officers – JCOs).¹⁴ I also invoke the term *jawan* (young man), a term commonly used in the Pakistani military to refer to soldiers, usually recruits and NCOs. Officers stand distinct

¹³ List of interviewees is being withheld to ensure anonymity and safety of interlocutors.

¹⁴ Subedars (or junior commissioned officers) who complete 32 years of service may be discharged with the title of Honorary Captain. This is the highest rank accorded to the soldier class.

from this class in terms of the criteria and procedure for their selection as well as their army training and service conditions. Officers are not the subjects of my inquiry, but are interlocutors as and when their proximity to the *sipahis* makes them useful. To reflect this, I index my primary subjects with names (fictional to protect confidentiality) and relationships (e.g. Yasmin, Nawaz's mother) and refer to the officer class through rank and an arbitrary number (e.g. Colonel 2). This is in contrast to the usual depiction of soldiers and the officer class in military narratives, with the soldier subaltern represented anonymously through number and sometimes rank, while officers are more humanized through name and rank.

The data in this thesis is drawn from two primary methods: in-depth semi-structured interviews and ethnographic participant observation spread over a period of 13 months. For the interviews I charted five broad domains that were useful for my study. These included reflections on association with the military, such as experiences during recruitment, training and service including combat, enlistment in villages and dying in service, including memories of funerals and local and national commemorative services and compensation packages received. Ethnographic work and participant observation was built into my research framework to provide context for the narrative and verbal realm that the interview method exposed me to. Joe Soss (2006:139) outlines reasons for the usefulness of supplementing in-depth interviews with ethnographic work, and it is important to reiterate these here. First, the 'social process of meaning making' is embedded in context, and this can be best understood within a stream of everyday reality. Second, the interest of interpretive research in indexicality – the tendency of a certain event, emotional response, identity or phrase to take on varied meanings in various contexts – is best served by this method.

There are two broad classifications of sites within my study; civilian and military

- i. Villages in Chakwal, Punjab (these were once established recruiting grounds for the British Indian Army).
- ii. Formal encounters between the state and its subjects in military or semi military institutions (Commemorative events for war martyrs at the Army General Headquarters – GHQ, an infantry regiment training centre, an Army Selection and Recruitment Office and a District Armed Services Board).

The first site allowed me to study the process of *militarization of informal civilian spaces*, while the second allowed me to study how civilian subjects participate in the

reproduction of the state, in this case military power, within formally controlled military spaces or what I call the *civilianization of military events* and spaces.

i. Parts of Punjab, including the Chakwal District, have been extensively studied as the ‘nursery of the martial races’ of the British Raj (Barrier 1967:376), a specialization that the Pakistan Army actively encouraged until the national integration policy was announced in 2001. The primary sites for my data collection were two villages in Chakwal District, situated in Chakwal Tehsil.¹⁵ I have assigned fictitious names for them and they are referred to as Palwal and Kandwal within the thesis. A small number of interviews were also conducted outside these two villages, some within adjoining Tehsils in the district. The ethnographic work was limited to Palwal, the smaller of the two villages, where I spent a considerable amount of time between September 2014 and September 2015.

Palwal is small village in the southwest of Chakwal Tehsil. It is located in the Potohar belt, which is largely rain fed and where agricultural land holdings tend to be small. The area relies primarily on services as its main source of livelihood, both the military and police and migration to the Gulf States as unskilled labour. According to current estimates¹⁶ obtained from a local NGO with an office in the adjoining village of Kandwal, the population stands at 2393 (last survey 2013) and the number of households stands at somewhere between 420 and 468 (based on records from a local NGO and a woman health worker in Palwal respectively). Records obtained from the nearest post office (also in Kandwal) in September 2014 suggest that 270 persons from Palwal draw pensions from this post office, of which 230 are males and 40 are the wives or mothers of soldiers. This puts the ratio of households with someone who has served in the military between 58 and 64 percent. This does not include serving soldiers, so the number of households with a direct relationship to the military is likely to be higher.

The selection of the two villages was based on three considerations: the presence of families of martyrs, possible contacts that would allow my entry into the village space and the presence of soldiers (on leave from service). Points of special attention in these villages were various institutions and sites such as public and private schools, mosques and other community spaces such as a graveyard and a large shrine that attracted devotees from the rest of the district and beyond. I also attended commemorations of

¹⁵ Denotes an administrative unit within a district.

¹⁶ According to the Union Council, the population at the time of the last census in 1998 stood at 1891.

national days in schools and annual commemorations of soldiers' deaths planned by the village community.

My primary interlocutors remained soldiers and family members (mothers, fathers and wives) of soldiers (dead, serving and retired) as well as other influential people from villages or the city of Chakwal who I felt had something to say to me, either indicated by their own interest or because others had pointed out their possible significance to me due to their experience, age or influence in village or district affairs. I interviewed eight serving soldiers (seven of whom had served in combat), eleven retired soldiers and five soldiers who had deserted from the army. I was in regular contact with five families of dead soldiers (fathers, mothers, wives and sisters) in Palwal and two in adjoining villages, whom I interviewed over the 13 months of my fieldwork. In addition, I also spent considerable time with two disabled soldiers and their families in Palwal and Kandwal. There were twenty-seven interlocutors in these families. I interviewed nineteen other individuals, including imams from mosques in Palwal, schoolteachers, other influential villagers including older residents and the village headman, NGO workers, a retired general from the district, a politician, the District Assistant Commissioner, a college professor, a local writer and the caretaker of the district community centre.

I had initially planned to conduct life history interviews in the village. The inability of many of my male interlocutors to spend more than a limited amount of time with me, as they were only present in the village for short periods of time and because of the constraints of my gender, implying that spending extended periods of time alone with a male could be considered inappropriate, meant that I had to reduce the scope of my inquiry somewhat. As a result, these exchanges were more structured, often with direct questions posed about the domains I have outlined above. I did attempt to maintain my interest in the individual's life as a whole, allowing the interview to be a more fluid process in my longer associations with families, and I found this helpful. I also felt this approach to be more effective, as it allowed more rapport-building and sometimes a needed shift of focus away from intense grief.

My initial visits caused little or no surprise in the villages. These villages were used to visitors from the city: journalists, filmmakers and military personnel who wanted to know the *stories* of the *shaheeds*. What aroused a certain amount of discomfort and trepidation was that I wouldn't go away. By the second month it was clear that I was

causing some bemusement and at times open suspicion. I attribute part of this to the very natural reaction in these areas to the somewhat nebulous notion of ethnography.

However, I believe this was also partly due to the subject of my inquiry. Many had questions and some were posed directly, others conveyed through others. I was watched, people were curious, and my motives were often questioned. *Why did I need to come in again and again, they had already told me all that I wanted to know? Did the military know I was here? Who was I? Was I perhaps from the military sent to spy on people? Was my purpose to find out why people enlisted and think of ways that they wouldn't?*

The village of Palwal was loyal to the military and felt uncomfortable with this stranger who came morning after morning and said she wanted to listen to people's stories. What was obvious was the hesitation, an awareness of what could and could not be said and what might be said if I came again and again. It was a hesitation born out of increasing familiarity, the beginnings of an intimacy between researcher and researched that was uncomfortable, for it might allow an exchange that went beyond the script that is acceptable, not just to the military but also to the self. To allay in part this sense of suspicion and partly my own sense of frustration as I felt people withdrawing, I began to teach English in the village's only public school three times a week for a period of three months. Other than the somewhat useful distraction this provided for my own nerves, which were sometimes overwhelmed by the substance of my talks with families, it was also instrumental in developing a number of strategic contacts. Most of all, while it did not change my identity as *the girl from the city doing her PhD on the military* it did allow the village to place me in a role where I became more relatable and less alien.

My engagement with my interlocutors was as sets of families rather than as individuals alone. Thus, in Palwal, my primary ethnographic site, I engaged with five sets of families, all of whom had lost a son in military service in the last 16 years, one as recently as two weeks before the time I started to interact with them. Many of these interviews were held in the courtyard of the family house, with my subjects walking in and out of the space as they went about their daily chores. The lived experience I wished to capture was collective, not private, and was also highly affective. Jubilation at the coveted acceptance of the son into the military, distress at his physical condition when he returned home after his initial training, pride in his recruitment parade, rising fear and anxiety when he was posted to a combat area, dread when the phone rang, numbness when the coffin arrived, helplessness when they found it nailed shut, awe at the grandness of the funeral, the rawness of grief when the military left, and tears, always the tears, some hovering behind wet eyes and others that just rolled out unexpectedly, never wiped away but

leaving traces as they dried. I worried initially about the lack of privacy, hesitated when initiating conversations about what I felt were sensitive or painful moments, but it seemed that the stories and experiences I sought had been discussed and talked about often, and it was not so much that that I was (re-)opening these painful moments for them but simply that I was being let into conversations that were already happening.

The women, especially the mothers, went back to that time with little effort on my part, almost as if these were memories that they lived and breathed every day. Fathers too spoke to me, but that took longer. Some were reluctant or hesitant, and yet my regular presence in Palwal and in their homes drew them to speech, even though I did not intend it to have that effect. Others continued to remain silent and suspicious. With the latter I maintained an uneasy relationship, respectful (of their space), grateful (that they still allowed me into their home where I spoke to another family member) and conscious of my location as a researcher (and the desire to know).

Is there a particular moment when you feel you are hearing the 'authentic' from your interlocutors, when you feel they have finally begun to trust you and decided to open up? There were such moments, like the first time a mother expressed deep anger and regret about sending her son to the military, or when another performed a spontaneous *vaen* (a Punjabi mourning ritual) at her son's grave, wishing her son had died when he was a baby, or when a father said to me that he told the colonel that he would send his other son to the army because he felt he had to, almost like a platitude. These were hard worn testimonies, for as I started my fieldwork the cacophony of voices that reached me was full of familiar narratives of willing sacrifice. During my fieldwork they seemed like significant moments, but over time as I analysed the stream of data, the hundreds of hours of lived experience that my interlocutors were willing to share with me, I realized that the distance between such moments and those I had earlier considered less remarkable was not so significant. These moments stood out for me perhaps because they made the story more dramatic by their contrary (to the popular script of sacrifice) and almost sacrilegious nature. As I analysed my data, I began to be more interested in how these dramatic and less dramatic pieces of narratives were joined together, how the intricate lacing together of complicit and subversive narratives allowed the ambivalent subject to emerge, where contradictions and counters were not discordant notes but instead were a mosaic of experiences and felt states that my subjects identified with, lived with and accepted as their lives.

ii. The space where the state meets its subjects was the second site for interrogation. Commemorative events such as the *Youm-e-Shuhada* (YeS) – Martyrs’ Day – and *Youm-e-Difah* (YeD) – Defence Day – ceremonies are a special focus of this thesis, which includes an analysis of the recordings of five YeS shows held since 2010 and the combined YeD and YeS show held in 2015. For the latter, I was present during one preparatory meeting and attended the show itself, being backstage for part of the programme. Other sites included the Army Selection and Recruitment Office in Chakwal, where I was present during the April-May 2015 intake, the District Soldiers Board in Chakwal and an infantry regiment training centre in Abbottabad.

Within these spaces I interviewed military personnel who were significant by way of their association with soldiers, e.g. officers in charge of designing and coordinating the commemorative events, officers in the Personnel and Administrative (PA) Directorate, including the Shuhada cell, and officers as well as NCOs and JCOs involved in the recruitment and training of soldiers. These included three generals, three brigadiers, eight colonels, five majors, two captains, one serving Subedar and one Havildar.

A sense of what can and what cannot be said comes out at different points in my fieldwork. It emerges in the narratives of villagers and in interviews with military officers and soldiers. I have elaborated on this discomfort in the discussion of how my fieldwork progressed in the village, but I mention it again here to emphasize that it was not limited to the villagers as I found it echoed in my interviews with officers. It was not censorship but an openly avowed/expressed disclaimer that *this is how it is* but it cannot be said openly, open secrets that needed to be guarded nonetheless from outsiders (researchers) who may not understand. I had to go through security clearance initially, followed by repeated need for verification by each office I contacted as my research progressed, and I was sometimes refused information. The caution expressed was that in the interests of state security it was important to protect the institution from those who wished to malign it, and clearly the topic of my research was considered sensitive enough to warrant this caution. The image of the institution was sacrosanct and was to be protected at all costs, even if truth had to be compromised from time to time. This was the message that was repeated time and time again to me by my military interlocutors, the message becoming louder as I went up the ladder of ranks.

I categorize my interactions with 110 interlocutors into three types, based on the amount of time I spent with them. The first were conversations sometimes initiated by myself

and sometimes by persons I came across as I went about the villages or the city of Chakwal, including district administrative offices and the district community centre. These rarely lasted more than 30-45 minutes. These were men and women, some linked to the military and others not, but I found them helpful in providing context for the dynamics of the relationship between the village/district and the military. Twelve of these were aspiring recruits going through various testing requirements at the Selection Centre.

The second type of interview lasted between one and two hours. This type of interview was most feasible with the various serving soldiers who were home on leave for a limited time, military officers within the military institutions, retired military officers from the area, local politicians and other influential people, including teachers, professors and clerics with whom I had between one and three encounters.

The third set of interviews was with families of soldiers whose homes I visited. These interviews were often spread out over a number of visits spread over a period of 13 months. Some of these were chance encounters at other people's homes, others were more formal interviews at their houses or took place while I walked with people as they went about their chores in the village. These interviews typically entailed two to ten hours of conversation, some of which were taped, while others required note taking after the encounter. Wherever possible I attempted to record the discussion immediately after the session.

I obtained five types of primary data: typed transcriptions of taped interviews in the same language they occurred (Punjabi, Urdu or English), handwritten notes made during and after interviews when responders did not want to be taped, detailed ethnographic notes including my own responses to the situation, photographs I took during the course of my field work and artefacts, such as the diary of a dead soldier, newspaper clippings of various events or letters from the GHQ that a family had kept.

Chapter Outline

The thesis begins with an examination of the most concentrated expression of militarist ideology: the commemorative ceremonies held by the Pakistani military. Chapter 1 is based on a review of recordings of six shows held since 2010, fieldwork notes taken during a preparatory meeting for the 2015 show and the 2015 show itself, as well as interviews with military officers and the parents of dead soldiers. The crafting of these

shows for the benefit of the *nation* is under investigation here as much as much as the script that is put out at these ceremonies. The chapter also addresses content that is kept invisible on stage, including aspects of the show that are edited out and the affective tones within the NoKs enclosure. In this chapter, I argue that the body of the *shaheed* and the grief of the families is symbolic capital at the disposal of the military that it uses to communicate with the nation.

Chapter 2 explores the historical, physical and political terrain of Chakwal, a famed *martial* district in Punjab. Sites explored in this chapter are military institutions (the British Indian Army and the Pakistan Armed Forces), their policies and the local district. I draw upon interviews with officers at local military institutions, district residents including retired generals, writers, activists and politicians and ethnographic notes from my time spent within the district. I argue that while the post-colonial trajectory of the district's relationship with the military echoes the earlier paternalism of its bonds with the British Indian Army, over the years this relationship has morphed into a formidable direct social contract between the military and the soldier, his family and the district. The chapter also charts the local population's efforts to inscribe service and sacrifice for the nation on the landscape of the district.

Chapter 3 focuses on a military training school for recruits as a direct window into the dramatic disciplinary mechanisms that transform the soldier-peasant into the soldier-subject. The chapter is based on interviews with senior army personnel involved in military training, training school instructors and recruits. I argue that these disciplines, formidable as they may be, still leave spaces for consciousness and thought within the automaton that is the soldier-subject. The chapter also addresses the role of religion and nationalism within training and argues that within military training Islamic teaching represents an instrumentalization of religion that to some extent echoes how the Pakistani state conceives of religion. However, this dosage (of religion) is carefully controlled, watched and diluted within military spaces.

Chapter 4 is an ethnographic account of military death and its reception in a *martial* village in Punjab and describes the unfolding of mourning rituals and the negotiated terrain of grieving, including the local memorialization of the dead that stretches beyond the dramatic death and burial of the soldier. It is based on interviews with family members and an ethnographic exploration of village space and events such as state funerals, local death anniversaries and the commemoration of national days in local

schools and graveyards. I study grief as it shifts between the private and public realms and follows familiar (allowed) and unfamiliar (discouraged) scripts and practices of death. This chapter is about the production and harnessing of affect and about its afterlife and examines the ways in which moments that are affect laden and dissonant are transformed into junctures that allow for a reconsolidation of military power.

Chapter 5 charts the associated yet imperceptible narrative of material reparation offered for loss and damage endured for the nation through interviews with families of dead soldiers, disabled soldiers and officers in charge of implementing compensatory regimes. The chapter brings to the foreground two figures, the wife of the dead soldier and the disabled soldier, both direct recipients of compensation packages. It also highlights the subtle ways through which the female subject is pulled into the project of militarism. I suggest that these compensation economies function as *economies of loss*, compensation offered by the military and claimed by families against losses that elude reparation.

Chapter 6 investigates contestations around Pakistan's involvement in the war on terror in local spaces such as Chakwal. The chapter draws upon my ethnography of Palwal and fieldwork in its adjoining villages, including interviews with retired and serving military soldiers, ordinary men and women, local politicians and activists. I argue that these landscapes are not adapted or prepared for the new enemy system and that there is limited local buy-in to the military's narrative. The chapter argues that the terrain through which these relationships may be publicly articulated, that of nationalist and religious ideology, is not the terrain where the victory of these militarist narratives is assured. The reconciliations that smooth over the surface of these destabilizations are made possible on altogether different terrains, the affective and materialist.

To sum up the argument presented in the thesis, I examine the ways affect and meaning making work alongside material compensation as means of binding ordinary soldiers and their families to the military as an institution. I interrogate the invocation of affect that I argue is central to the production of militarist subjectivities. I argue that this control and production of affect also sustains another set of relationships, that between the military institution and the nation in general. The deliberately crafted narratives of grief and willing sacrifice that the military puts on display set up the military as the selfless saviour and garner support for its aims and policies. As such, my thesis relates the apparent enthusiasm for war to the forging of affective relationships between those who stand to

suffer significant losses (soldiers and families) and those who stand to gain (the military institution). This is not to say that these enthusiasms *drive* militarism, but instead to emphasize the myriad channels and nodes that make militarism possible and that must be deconstructed if we are to better understand its multifarious working.

Chapter 1: Spectacles of Mourning - Manufacturing the Authentic

A pleasant balmy evening, row upon row of seats laid out in meticulous symmetry on the green expanse of a perfectly manicured lawn at the Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ), familiar patriotic anthems blaring from large speakers, smartly dressed men and women in uniforms ushering guests in, three giant elevated screens arranged around a majestic stage lit with the national colours and an audience of a couple of thousand people. These are all the hallmarks of a perfectly fantastic start to the *Youm-e-Difah* (YeD) –Defence Day – ceremony in 2015.

Seated in the press enclosure, I noticed that the last enclosure on my left was already full of people. I knew before I saw the sign reading ‘NoKs’ that this would be where the families of the dead would be seated, largely because the enclosure was dominated by people from villages, men and women in *shalwar kameez*, (traditional dress consisting of a loose shirt over loose trousers) and women with white *chaadars* (large often white cotton cloth worn in public spaces) on their heads and bodies. Seated here was the group from the village of Palwal, which named its main crossroads, *Shaheeda da Chowk* (Martyrs’ Junction), after seven young villagers who died in service. My *friends* from the village saw me before I saw them, maybe because I stood out in the crowd with my uncovered head and colourful clothes. I went over to say hello, and they seemed pleased to see a familiar face.

Later, I noticed the major from the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) I had interviewed a few days before standing near the stage, so I asked him if I could come backstage for a while. The scene behind the stage was somewhat chaotic; some celebrities were getting their makeup done, while others stood at the side smoking and discussing poetry. There was nervous laughter and some last minute instructions and script changes. A Baluch man wearing a large headdress was seated silently at the side, the father of a dead soldier who was to give his testimony on stage that day. An army officer asked him if he wanted some juice, then told a soldier to make sure he was looked after as he was their most honoured guest. The father seemed very gracious but did not speak much. After a while, he was joined

by a middle aged woman, the mother of a dead soldier who was also to give her testimony. She too seemed aloof from the rest, who were talking and jesting amongst themselves. Maybe they were tense, maybe they were sad, or maybe they were rehearsing their lines? I wondered if I should sit with them or continue to stand with the organizers and celebrities. I decided instead to leave the now darkened back stage, as the show had begun, and sit with the families from Palwal for the rest of the programme, for our vantage points and locations determine not just our vision and the scope of what we see but the atmosphere we breathe.

-Fieldnotes, GHQ, 6th September 2015.



The *Youm-e-Difah* (YeD) 2015 ceremony described above aims to entertain, to inspire, with scale and colour as much as through what is actually presented on stage. This entire performance is built around death, often a brutal and violent death, and grief and loss are central themes, for which reason I call these events ‘spectacles of mourning’. What follows is a spectacular stage performance choreographed down to the last detail, a performance that is planned for effect, a visual and audio treat, one that tugs at the heartstrings, makes you weep and then makes your heart swell with pride, plunges you into deep wretched sadness as you watch the mother of a dead soldier smile through her tears and then pulls you up within minutes on waves of pride with visions of smiling young muscular men in combat clothes, sounds of machine gun fire, tales of development and prosperity, of a nation that is at peril but resilient. There are liberal splashes of the military in every scene, a sovereign country that stands on the blood of the predominantly khaki-clad martyr, visceral registers that play through the bodies of the mothers, fathers, wives, sisters, brothers and children of the dead and produce and shape the responses of the audience, of the nation that watches them. The right dose of emotion, the production and harnessing of affect, a pulling of scabs to invoke a response of awe, of gratitude and of empathy for the military.

A way to study these ceremonies is to understand them as states investing in the management of grief through carefully crafted commemorative rituals of mourning and memory making (Mosse 1990; Holst-Warhaft 2000; Acton 2007). Vigilance is required in ‘constructing grief and mourning behaviour in a way that supports rather than undermines the state’s pursuit of war aims’ (Acton, 2007:2). According to this

scholarship, grief is managed in order to curtail dissent that may arise due to conditions of mass bereavement. My thesis and this chapter position affect and grief instead not as inconvenient facts of war but as central to militarism in Pakistan, and examine these spectacles of mourning as sites where complicity in the project of militarism is created. Here, I borrow from Katherine Verdery's work on the political appropriation of dead bodies in post-socialist countries, or what she calls the 'strong affective dimension of dead-body politics' (1999:33). She suggests that the dead bodies of soldiers can be used by the state as 'symbolic capital'. First, bodies cannot speak but can be spoken for, an ambiguity which makes them useful. They can be deployed to invoke nationalist images that ask for national unity around a hero of the nation or religious images that emphasize sacrifice and continuous life. Second, bodies inspire awe as they bring to the surface questions and fears about the meaning of life and death. Third, they allow an engagement with affect and emotion through identification with the self and through invoked kinship relations, as brothers and sons. All of this makes these bodies 'good symbolic vehicles', and they are thus actively appropriated by the state in a bid to shore up and mobilize support for its aims (1999:27-33). In this chapter I extend these claims to include the families of dead soldiers, whose grief acts as symbolic capital and remains central to how the narrative of sacrifice and service to the nation is kept alive by the Pakistani military.

There are two reasons why I choose to begin the thesis with these spectacles of mourning, sites where the military and its subjects (the families of dead soldiers and the immediate audience) perform a heady mix of grief and ceremony for the nation. *First*, it defines the master narrative, one that purports to shape and discipline the nation's perception of the military and its role. These ceremonies of light and shadow showcase performances that valorize military service, speak *for* the dead and their families, construct the manly soldier and his mother (family) as willing, nationalistic beings whose hardship, pain and suffering is immense, yet they rally, stand firm and offer more. This thesis is a journey that marks its start at the most logical point, the most concentrated expression of militarist (national) ideology as framed by the military not as some static contraption fixed in time and space, like literature, song, visual art or a history book, but as performance, altogether more fleeting, more fluid with the ability to respond and engage with possible disaffection or challenge.

Second, these ceremonies represent a site for the examination of relationships that lie at the heart of militarism, between soldiers and families and the military institution. This encounter between the military and its subjects is perhaps the most dramatic, for it is

staged for the benefit of the *qaum* (nation), the third vector in these relationships. My use of the word *qaum* is taken from the script of the commemorative ceremonies, which constantly allude to the *qaum* and its relationship with the military, as well as from my interviews with military officers and soldiers. In these texts, the *qaum* is constructed as a monolithic group, whose relationship with (and more specifically support for and affiliation with) the military is considered vital. These encounters are made possible through affective bonds between the military and the families of the dead that act as conduits for the military's relationship with the *qaum*. The crafting of these spectacles for the benefit of the *qaum* is under investigation here as much as is the script that is put out at these ceremonies. The crafting that animates these spectacles brings these relationships to life through the invocation and transmission of sentiments between the military, the families of the dead and the nation.

This chapter first builds a context for these performances through a brief examination of Pakistan's war in Waziristan and the resulting contestations that have arisen around martyrdom. It then examines these spectacular performances (YeS shows) and reviews both the script, the 'deep images' (Banti 2008:54) these shows draw on, or *what must be said* and the craft, the technologies employed to convey these, or *how it is to be said*. The latter includes the production aspects of the show, the dynamics in rehearsals and backstage and the preparation of families for testimonies on stage. The subsequent section pulls into view themes within the show that lie outside the ambit of mourning and commemoration and that I argue shift this theatre of mourning into the theatre of war. The last section deals *what cannot be said* and must be invisible on stage. This includes aspects of the show that are edited out and the affective tones within the NoKs enclosure that highlight the ambivalence of these collusive relationships (between the military and the families of the dead).

The Waziristan War and its Dead

North and South Waziristan, which have been the sites of fierce combat between the Pakistan Armed Forces and the Taliban, are located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwestern Pakistan, bordering the provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Under British rule, this area was loosely governed and used as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and colonial India, a practice which continued after partition. The subsequent use of these areas to support the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and beyond has been documented (Gul 2010; Rashid 2012; Jaffrelot 2015). The Pakistani state used FATA first as a base for resistance

against various Soviet-supported governments, then to provide support to Mujahideen groups fighting for Kabul in the 1990s and later to support the Taliban and other militia in maintaining strategic depth in Afghanistan in case of an attack from India (Gul 2010; Khattak 2015). After the 9/11 attacks on US soil, Pakistan was faced with the dilemma of reviewing its hitherto largely unquestioned alliance with the *jihadi* forces it had nurtured with US support and aided during and after the Afghan-Soviet war (Haqqani 2005, Jaffrelot, 2015). Although some small-scale operations and troop deployments in South Waziristan began as early as 2002-2003, it was not until 2004 that more concerted operations were initiated by the military in these areas. This has escalated steadily over the years, with Operation Zarb-e-Azab being launched in North Waziristan in June 2014.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and Pakistan's participation in it has been a contentious subject nationally, even among the military as some have argued (Rizvi 2003; Jaffrelot 2015:527), especially its alignment with the US and the fact that the designated enemy is Muslim. For the subject of this thesis it is important to sketch out a brief trajectory of how this war has unfolded in the national landscape and the strain it has put on the military's ability to garner support for this war, and especially how the military's claim to *shahadat* (martyrdom) for its dead soldiers has been challenged by right-wing political and religious groups on two very distinct occasions during this period. I would like to posit a nuanced difference between *shahadat* and martyrdom, the former being associated with Islam and the latter with the nation-state. Until now, because of the heavy appropriation of religion by the Pakistani state and the military, this differentiation has been irrelevant in the context of Pakistan. Hence, a soldier in the Pakistani military is considered a soldier of Islam, and when he dies in the battlefield he is a *shaheed*. This differentiation has come into play during the GWOT.

In 2004, Maulana Abdul Aziz, the Lal Masjid cleric in Islamabad,¹⁷ issued a *fatwa* (religious decree) declaring the South Waziristan operation by the Pakistan Armed Forces un-Islamic and prohibiting the burial of soldiers in Muslim graveyards. There were media reports of disaffection among lower-ranking troops and resignations by commissioned officers posted to South Waziristan (Shahzad 2011). There were also reports of villagers refusing to participate in military funerals held in villages.¹⁸ In 2007, there was an armed confrontation between clerics and students of a mosque and the

¹⁷ Lal Masjid (the Red Mosque) is one of Islamabad's oldest mosques. During the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1978-1989) it played a key role in recruiting and training young men to fight in Afghanistan and enjoyed the patronage of the military regime of the time.

¹⁸ Major 2, ISPR, 16th September 2015.

Pakistan Army. The state officially acknowledged only the military dead as *shaheed*, while many religious parties labelled the students of the seminary attached to the mosque who died during the army operation as *shaheed*. This marks a distinct phase where the military's monopoly of martyrdom for religion began to be challenged in more organized and visible ways.¹⁹

In November 2013, when a US drone killed the leader of Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hekimullah Mehsud, Syed Munawar Hassan, the head of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, made two declarations:²⁰ first that Mehsud was a *shaheed* and second that the Pakistani soldiers killed fighting Islamic militants in North Waziristan were not as they were aligned with the US.²¹

I will briefly outline the response to this later questioning of military deaths, as it is instructive to the analysis of YeS events that follows. There was condemnation from the military, a delayed but resolute reaction from the civilian leadership, with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif going to the General Headquarters to pay homage at the *Shuhadas'* (Martyrs') memorial monument, a retraction by the Jamaat-e-Islami and subsequent debate in major editorials and on popular talk shows.²² Debate revolved around three primary themes: the reassertion of state policy on the right to claim *shahadat* for its armed forces, theological discussions on what constitutes true *shahadat*, and possible hurt and damage to the morale and sentiments of soldiers and their families. Where the first two remained contentious, and were hotly debated in television talk shows and newspaper editorials, the need to protect the feelings of soldiers and their families was the theme that received the most unequivocal support from both military and non-military quarters.

What was at stake in these debates was the right of the military to claim *shahdaat* in the service of Islam, a claim that had so far been synonymous with martyrdom for the state. I

¹⁹ Chapter 6 deals with the reverberations of this in the local landscape where the military recruits its troops.

²⁰ The oldest Islamist political party in Pakistan, which has traditionally enjoyed a strong alliance with the military.

²¹ Boone, J. (2013, November 12). Pakistani army blasts Islamist party for calling Taliban chief 'Martyr'. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/12/pakistan-army-taliban-hakimullah-mehsud-martyr>

²² Staff Correspondent (2013, November 11th). Controversial remarks: Army demands apology from Munawar Hussan. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/630232/controversial-remarks-army-demands-apology-from-munawar-hassan/> ;

Staff Correspondent (2013, November 18). The martyrdom controversy. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1056902>

Raza, S. (2013, November 15th). Ideological Fault. *The Friday Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/ideological-fault/>

will outline two possible anxieties on part of the military in response to this challenge from right-wing political parties and religious groups. *First*, a practical fear of disaffection among troops and their families who come from areas where mosques and *madrassahs* (religious seminaries) are aplenty and ambivalent state policies have allowed extremist and sectarian ideologies to seep into neighbourhoods, school curricula and media. The reported desertions from the army after the 2004 *fatwa* suggest that this anxiety is founded in reality, yet all men did not desert or revolt; in fact disaffection was dealt with swiftly. While this may have been managed partly through court martials (Jaffrelot 2015:563), as the 1952 Pakistan Army Act details strict procedures for court martials in cases of mutiny, desertion and disobedience, the Pakistani military did not sustain any serious damage and was able to continue recruiting and functioning. Material incentives, such as the comprehensive pension and welfare schemes offered by the military to officers and enlisted personnel, continue to be some of the most exhaustive of any public sector employer in Pakistan (Siddiq 2007:206-207). Thus the supply of troops to the Armed Forces continues to outrun demand.

The second anxiety revolves around a fear that the military narrative of sacrifice and service to the state (and Islam) would be weakened. This narrative or moral card (operationalized or made visible through the bodies of dead and living soldiers and their families) is dear to the military, for it is a terrain where the military is able to command blanket acceptance by both civilian populations and military personnel. In the debates that followed the controversy generated by the remarks of Syed Munawar Hassan, it was on the grounds of appeals made on behalf of the sentiments of soldiers and families of the dead that the military was able to win and garner most support. The status of the dead was swiftly and unequivocally defended in the national landscape, not just by the military but also in the media and among civil society activists, spaces where there has traditionally been more criticism of the military. The registers through which this debate unfolded almost always included a reference to the sentiment and feelings of the families of troops and the troops themselves as sacred and revered. I argue that this sacredness is bestowed not by Islam, as that very association was under attack, but by the power of affect, sentiments that have been deliberately cultivated within the national imagination and have come to be associated with this sacrifice. It is these feelings and sentiments that my thesis positions as central to these debates, the deliberate production, harnessing and management of feelings to make this militaristic narrative of service and sacrifice for the nation come alive, stay alive and stay relevant.

Brand Martyrdom: *Youm-e-Shuhada* (YeS)

You can't build a brand overnight. You have to sell your narrative. It has to be comparable and contemporary.

(Colonel 1, ISPR, 22nd May 2015)

Over 6663²³ security personnel have died in the GWOT, the large bulk of whom (over 5000²⁴) were military soldiers, and more than three times that number have been maimed or injured. In 2010, the Pakistani military declared 30th April *Youm-e-Shuhada* (YeS) – Martyrs' Day.

YeS is managed by the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), which was set up in 1949 as a unified public relations system for the Pakistan Armed Forces. With one exception, the Director General of the ISPR has always been from the Pakistan Army, and the more recent appointments have been generals from the army who also act as the official spokesperson for the military. A large chunk of the technical production of the YeS programme is outsourced to private production companies, but the script, including song lyrics and poems, is often handled directly by the ISPR. These are screened at each stage of concept, design, and production. The Director General of the ISPR and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) also approve the final programme on the day of the last rehearsal.

Prior to YeS, *Youm-e-Difah* (YeD) – Defence Day – was held on 6th September and was devoted to the commemoration of martyrs and the celebration of Pakistan's *victory* over India in 1965.²⁵ Although YeD is linked to the 1965 war, until that point it had been considered sufficient tribute to the Pakistani military's subsequent casualties, largely incurred against its traditional enemy India, for example in Siachen or in the Kargil War. A national televised commemorative ceremony was also held on this day. In 2010, the Pakistan Army declared the *Youm-e-Shuhada* (Martyrs' Day) to pay tribute to the martyrs of the war in Waziristan. Over the following five years, commemorations were held on this day in all army garrisons, while a national commemorative ceremony was broadcast across the nation on state television and private channels. The army leadership decided

²³ South Asia Terrorism Portal – SATP (2017, January 17). 'Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2016. Retrieved from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>

²⁴ Number announced by the COAS in his address in the YeD ceremony, 2016.

²⁵ It is relevant to mention here that the 1965 war with India is looked upon in Pakistan as a decisive victory, an unprovoked war in which India suffered major losses and the Pakistan Armed Forces won the day for the nation by defeating an enemy far greater in size and superior in technology. The history books do not discuss the fact that India's assault on Pakistan's border was in retaliation for Pakistan's initiation of Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir, nor that there was no decisive victor, with the war ending after three weeks with the declaration of a ceasefire.

not to include its tribute to the martyrs of the Waziristan war within the folds of YeD, a state event, opting instead to commemorate it separately. It may be instructive at this point to compare the YeS and YeD performances and draw out the intended or unintended consequences of declaring an exclusive day for army martyrs in the GWOT.

YeD is a national day, celebrated by the state, not just the military, and was also a national holiday in Pakistan for some time. The general tone of the YeD show in the past has been celebratory, extolling the heroism of the soldiers of the Pakistani military (not just the army) with respect to the 1965 war. Martyrs are remembered through songs, but the tone remains celebratory, with sacrifice glorified and revered, while the challenges and grief that may accompany this are not dwelled on. The show is smaller in scale than subsequent YeS ceremonies, with a limited audience, often in a civilian location, and is presided over by members of the military leadership in civilian attire and sometimes civilian leaders as senior as the Prime Minister.

The YeS ceremony is on a much larger scale in terms of the size and type of audience and its resources. This is an army affair held at the GHQ premises, presided over by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the senior military leadership in full uniform. An address by the COAS is a traditional feature of this event, and foreign dignitaries have attended it from the very beginning. It focuses almost exclusively on martyrdom, predominantly with reference to those who have died on the western border with Afghanistan or in counterinsurgencies, and it is attended by a large number of what the military calls NoKs, the families of dead soldiers.²⁶ The tone is more sombre, and there is a strong focus on emotive testimonies or experience sharing from mothers, fathers and other family members of dead soldiers. The decision to keep these two events separate gives insight into how these grand performances are deployed by the military to convey, shape and discipline narratives. YeS was an assertion by the military to mark a new phase of warfare for Pakistan: a shift from the more traditional enemy (Hindu India) and type of war to a new enemy (fellow Muslims) and an unconventional war, an assertion that was contested through the discourse on *shahadat*. For this reason perhaps, it was deemed essential to mark it separately and not fold it within an already existing day. This decision provided the military with a stage on which to brand martyrdom anew within military domains, while also giving it the flexibility to shape the new enemy while keeping the old one (India) intact (as annual YeD ceremonies were also held on the side).

²⁶ Dead soldiers from the eastern front, e.g. the 2012 Siachen landslide, have also featured on occasion.

The army officers I interviewed who were in charge of developing and producing the show suggested two primary objectives for the YeS event. The first was the need to buttress the morale of troops and families by providing a formal commemorative space, while the second was more tactical: to reclaim the 'strategic concept of the *shaheed*'.²⁷ In other words, the YeS event was the military establishment's response to the insinuation that the war in Waziristan was America's war and that the soldiers dying in encounters with fellow Muslims were not *shaheed*. Behind this lay an acknowledgement of the strategic doctrinal shift within the military that claimed that the nation had enemies within its own borders, a tacit suggestion by the military that I will show becomes bolder with each subsequent YeS ceremony.

A third theme central to the claims of this thesis was voiced by officers in charge of scripting the show. This theme speaks more to the craft of the show and determines the affective tone of the spaces within which the script will be read out, as well as who will read it. To clarify this theme further I revert to interviews with two majors.

[In the show] you [the organizers] are talking about two things, purpose and feeling. The sentiment towards the nation-state and those feelings at that time towards those who sacrificed their loved ones [families](...) you have to give [family members] space for expression of these feelings towards these [dead] relations and [space for] feelings that we [qaum] have for them [families]. So you convey that it [the sacrifice] was a purposeful thing.

(Major 2, ISPR, 16th September 2015)

In the introductory chapter's opening vignette, I shared Major 1's description of the widow as he explained to me that the objective of the YeS ceremony was to 'create' 'brilliant moments' that were 'emotionally charged.'²⁸

I draw attention to two features of these exchanges. *One* is that the sentiment of the family member towards the dead loved one, his or her grief, is central. The bodies of family members, their grief, are the conduit through which the military 'conveys' its message of purpose and sacrifice to the nation. The widow so clearly described by Major 1 is an image – 'she stood there with her three children, the youngest in her arms' – 'created' for consumption by the nation. The third vector, the nation, is clearly acknowledged here. *Second* the appeal to the nation is made on

²⁷ Colonel 1, ISPR, 22nd May 2015.

²⁸ Major1, ISPR, 24th August 2015.

affective terrain, relying on the *deliberate* 'creation' of such moments so that the family member's expression of loss 'touches a chord' with the audience. A response that seems natural, drawn as if from the depth of their being, speaks to the *illusion of authenticity* that is created in these 'brilliant moments'. I call them *illusions of authenticity* because these testimonies of families are made possible by a calculated and carefully planned mixing of the felt and the scripted. What follows now is an attempt to unpack the creation of these *illusions of authenticity*.

The Script: Gendered Narratives of the Islamic Nation-state

One way to decipher the narrative of service and sacrifice to the nation is to look at the content of these spectacular performances. While scripts are important in their explicit content, for the rhetoric that the state wants its subjects to imbibe, they also, despite the wish to exert influence outwards, become a window into the state and its anxieties. Reiterated again and again in these scripts are the threads that the military deems important but also possibly fragile, which must be reinforced to keep these bonds and bondages intact.

Begona Aretxaga (2003:396) reminds us that it is 'difficult to think of the state outside the hyphenated dyad nation-state' because states actively promote national cultures and create narratives of the nation through a range of institutions involving the use of memory and history making. These narratives of the nation rest heavily on what Katherine Verdery (1999:41) calls the state's 'parasitic' need to draw on 'kinship metaphors'. In his study of nationalist discourse in Italy, Alberto M. Banti (2008) suggests that this discourse 'derives its huge emotional power by a morphology structured around what we might call "deep images"'. These images deal with ' "primal" facts' such as 'birth/death, love/hate' and are 'elaborated through materials that come from a pre-existent discursive continuum'. This makes them 'easily recognizable' and 'adaptive within new discursive contexts' (2008:54, emphasis in original). Banti identifies these images as kinship, love/honour/virtue and sacrifice. The latter brings in 'themes of suffering, mourning and death' and has the potential to transform 'national belonging as a sacred experience (...). This sacral way of understanding the nation offers an explanatory and ennobling framework (...) for the death of "our" martyrs' (Banti 2008:56-57, emphasis in original). In other words, suffering, mourning and death are rendered meaningful and thus sufferable by the family that deals with the loss and the soldier who prepares or trains for this sacrifice.

Within the context of Pakistan, these narratives of the nation have been filtered through the discourse of gender, religion and kinship (Khattak 1995; Lalarukh 1997; Baber 2000; Jaffrelot 2002; Saigol 2013). All three feature heavily in the five YeS shows and the one YeD show that are examined as part of this thesis.²⁹

Within Pakistan, as in other South Asian states, nationalist imaginings are staunchly gendered, with women playing a central role as repositories of national honour and cultural and religious traditions (Khattak 1995; Saigol 2013). The woman is to be *protected*, and if necessary defended violently, and she is to be *revered* as a producer of virile robust soldiers who protect the nation, sacrificing them willingly for the nation (Baber, 2000; Saigol, 2013).

The appropriation of religion is reflective of a wider nationalist ideology, which though contested has had constitutional backing since Pakistan's early years. The Pakistani state has borrowed generously from popular understandings and concepts of religion, using them as fertile ground for instilling particular forms of nationalist subjectivity. The Pakistani military's use of religion and the idea of *shahadat* as a motivator for training, fighting and dying for the nation is well established (Rizvi 2003; Cohen 2004). The word *shaheed* itself has a clear religious connotation, and religion comes up repeatedly and predictably in YeS scripts. Some shows begin with a reference to a verse from the Quran which declares *shaheed* to be forever alive. More often than not the nation is mentioned within the folds of faith: the state is Islamic and the nation has a religion. The COAS's speech almost always makes reference to religious duty, and the claim that 'Pakistan is an ideology not just a geographical state' is often repeated. Videos, songs and documentaries feature shots of mothers on prayer mats or soldiers praying on the battlefield. Poems and imagery refer to Islamic history and terms with a clear connection to Islamic battle history or Islamic texts in general are often invoked.

Riste (familial relations) or kinship is a recurring discourse to which the script is tightly bound. I highlight this particularly because gender and religion often come wrapped within the appeal to these familial relations. The shows bring this 'deep image' to life through an intense focus on the families of the dead, which is clearly central to the imagery of the YeS programme (Banti 2008:54). The shows open with the entry of a

²⁹ The analysis presented in this section is drawn from content analysis of video recordings of five YeS shows and one YeD show between 2010 and 2015. In the case of specific examples drawn from a particular show, the year is provided. Where no year is given, examples refer to generalized themes that appear in almost all shows.

chosen set of NoKs walking into the pavilion. They are featured in songs and various documentaries and video clips shown during the ceremony, and their testimonies on stage are an essential feature, while the shows close with them paying tribute at the martyrs' monument. The 2014 show started with a detailed relation-by-relation dedication of the show to the families of the dead soldiers. This language and imagery of kinship is gendered just as families are gendered. The lost are the fathers and sons; those who feel their absence most are the mothers, wives and daughters. Twice in 2010 and again in 2014 the chief's speech singled out female relatives and acknowledged their grief, while in nearly all shows the tribute to the '*azeem maan*' (great mother) is underscored and draws the most emotive reaction. The mother remains central in this commemorative ceremony, with her testimony saved for the grand finale, and she is singled out as the affective relationship whose sanction is critical to making this sacrifice possible.

A mother's investment and attachment is more. The man is physically composed and it is easier to expect the man to say go my son [to death], it is harder for the mother to say this, her sanction means more, her grief is more.

(Major 2, ISPR, 16th September, 2015)

Here the passion of the mother's grief is exalted, expected to be more extreme than that of others, and hence becomes a symbolic resource just as the soldier's dead body is symbolic capital. This grief needs to be harnessed in the service of militarism, invoked and then managed to produce maximum effect. She is to grieve and then paradoxically not grieve. The invocation '*shaheedon ki maan roya nahi kartein*' (mothers of martyrs don't cry) is repeated often, yet there are numerous images of mothers crying and breaking down. What is highlighted in these testimonies is her stoicism and her willingness to sacrifice for her nation her most treasured relationship, her son. Mothers' testimonies are carefully balanced, and the mother stands for a brief contradictory moment in the public space of the nation, a nation that normally grants her little subjectivity or voice. In this moment she is on a par with and as masculine as the soldier she glorifies, even as she represents the archetypal feminine role: that of the grieving mother. She symbolizes the final moral authority, *maadar-e-watan* (the mother of the nation), who gives her blessing to the violence on the body of her loved one.

The widow, referred to as the wife (according to a religious edict drawn from the Quran and quoted often, martyrs never really die), is also routinely invited and is the second most emotive figure on stage.

A man has two relationships. One is that with the mother and other is that of romantic love; romantic love is tricky because it is considered un-Islamic. Everyone has a mother, plus one may or may not have a romantic attachment with the wife; romantic love may or may not be part of the marriage.

(Major 1, ISPR, 24th August 2015)

The above text displays some of the tensions associated with the figure of the wife. The overreliance on the mother figure is partly due to the fact that the soldiers who die are often young and unmarried. The reference to the perceived un-Islamic connotations of romantic love also points to the need for a pure asexual figure who folds more neatly into this narrative. Some wives no longer live with the family of the deceased, some move on and get remarried, thus the demands of the narrative that memory and suffering are kept alive are better met by mothers. The wife is also a contentious figure as there may be family discord because of dissatisfaction over how compensation has been divided between the heirs of the deceased. This does not mean that the wife does not appear on stage, she often does, but the challenges above point to how her inclusion is peppered with these considerations.

The father is also an important figure, for whom the son's death is constructed within these ceremonies as a loss of companionship. Fathers are also depicted as role models for sons, and sons of dead soldiers often voice their desire to join the military. For the military, this desire to enlist emboldened by the father's sacrifice and death is an important script, voiced through the on-stage testimonies of male children/brothers, as when a son came on stage wearing a mock army uniform in 2010. A popular dialogue in mothers' and fathers' testimonies is 'if I had ten more sons, I would send them to the military'. Back home, in the villages from which these men are mostly drawn, the desire to enlist another family member is often a direct reflection of the scarce options for making a living and the need to make up for the loss of income that the family was dependent upon. In recognition of this dependency, the military assures military service to a male member of the family as part of the compensation package, yet when such an offer is made it is presented as a (voluntary) desire to serve the nation and sacrifice for it.

Fathers, and mothers even more so, are portrayed as having brought up their sons in ways that made this sacrifice possible, a deliberate rearing of the child to make him more selfless and more willing to risk his life. Painted as collusion from the beginning, the sacrifice is not just about passive acceptance of a glorious death but gratitude and pride that the son is dead (in the cause of the nation).

While the testimonies of male family members are part of these events, the military clearly foregrounds the female figures – daughters, wives and especially mothers. Scholars have highlighted how these events appropriate women's agency and subjectivity and signify moments where 'patriarchal representations of women, (...), speak *for* the women by projecting the women's voice and visibility (agency) to align with broader patriarchal desires of the nation' (Rajan 2013:159, emphasis in original). I posit additionally that the military seeks female affirmation because the masculinized, militarized and nationalized self cannot be imagined without reference to the feminine, hence the feminine is invoked to strengthen and underline the differences between men and women. So the tears and helplessness of the woman are deliberately juxtaposed with the strength and resolve of the male soldier, a binary that can then be extended as a metaphor for the relationship between the military and the nation, of the nation as feminine and in need of protection by the more masculine military. The repeated reference to the feminine, to tears, serves to create the complementarity in gender relationships that the militarist project seeks to reinforce: armies (men) whose bodies protect the honour of the nation (vulnerable female bodies); and the nation (women), which in turn produces and nurtures the army (men) and then sends it to war. So the nation and the military, just like male and female subjects, become intertwined: partners in the project of war. The masculine militarist project needs this suggestion of complementariness to survive, and hence reference is continually made to relations in gendered ways.

This relationship between the *qaum* and the military figures obsessively in YeS shows, and the slogan for the 2011 YeS ceremony, *One Force, One Family, One Nation*, captures this symbolic folding in of relationships within a militarist frame. This serves to silence or hide from view voices that may not be one with this narrative, and also and more importantly does so under the shadow of metaphors of kinship: gendered familial relationships that inspire love and thus are deemed natural and rendered unquestionable. In 2013, a special video poem, '*Tum ye kaise kar lete ho*' (how do you do this?) consisted of a dialogue between the incredulous nation and the warrior soldier.

The poem first sets up a sense of incredulity at sacrifice for the nation through a series of contrasting images of supposedly happy, carefree and safe civilian family life and dangerous and risky warfronts, asking the soldier again and again how he can *choose* to do what he does. The narrative then shifts beyond the intimate to the larger landscape, where the soldier figure is shown helping and assisting those stricken by national calamities like floods and earthquakes. The question shifts to ‘How do you take on the troubles of the entire nation and make them your own?’ The soldier then responds, giving two reasons: first because his family’s support gives him the strength to fight, and second because the nation stands alongside him: *‘I am not alone; the entire nation stands with me’*. The script also highlights a tension, and in so doing speaks of an anxiety. Paradoxically, the very bonds of kinship that are invoked again and again within the script are the bonds that need to be weakened, for he has to choose the nation above his family if he is to perform his duty and be willing to fight and die. This theme is also reflected in military training:³⁰ an invocation of relationships and then their negation, representing a choice which is made easier when the mother is replaced with the motherland, the family or home by the idea of the nation as home, and the son of the mother by the son of the nation.

The Craft: Lights, Camera, Action

This section brings into focus the craft of the show. I use the word craft to denote the performance aspects of these spectacles, the techniques, gimmickry and skills involved in invoking the appropriate and necessary affect for the military’s purposes. This involves the careful and artful use of direction and technology, the performance of these emotive scripts for maximum effect on the audience through what Teresa Brennan (2004) calls ‘the transmission of affect’, referring to how we can be influenced from within and without by the affective energies of both other people and the outer environment. This contagiousness of affect allows it to travel beyond affective selves and act as relay points within sets of people.

In her discussion of the Assad regime in Syria, Lisa Wedeen (1999) argues that political spectacles restrict avenues for independent political thought and action. The claim here is that spectacles transform viable political thought or challenges to mainstream discourse and state ideology into something that is passive and incapable of action. In her account of Uzbekistan’s holiday spectacles, Laura Adams (2010:3) adds a further nuance to this ability of the spectacle to foreclose action when she suggests that the spectacle

³⁰ This is further addressed in Chapter 3.

‘has properties that enable elites to close opportunities for input from below, but without making the masses feel left out’:

[S]pectacle monopolizes discourse by privileging the definition of truth and reality belonging to the elites and by using technology such as the mass media to create a one-way flow of communication, speech without response, which isn’t really communication at all. In silencing response spectacle turns its participants into spectators (Adams 2010:3).

I complicate this apparent passiveness or silencing that reduces participants in these spectacular events to spectators and argue for more fluidity in the participant-spectator dyad through examination of the processes that enable these shifts (between participants and spectators) to happen. If we position the *qaum* as the subject of the military, produced within certain militarist discourses, and further distil from this mass the semi-militarized families of the dead and the civilian *qaum*, there are two sets of subjects that shift between participant and spectator roles in different but interrelated ways. In the context of semi-militarized families of the dead we may need to reframe these processes as collusive affairs in which families *participate* by *allowing* their affective selves to become spectacles. I use the word collusion with caution here, recognizing that the relationship between the state and its subject will always be a wildly skewed power equation with the former wielding far more power and control. To study collusion and symbiosis between the powerful and the subordinated is not to disregard the domination and coercive power of the state, but to ‘relocate their conditions of possibility and relation and forces of production’ (Stoler 2001:894). These ceremonies are collusive affairs, made possible as a function of the relationship between the military and the families of the dead and played out both on the main stage of this grand spectacle and backstage.

The second set of subjects implicated within these spectacles under scrutiny is the civilian *qaum* (I will divide the civilian *qaum* into two subsets in a later section). These spectacles of mourning are crafted by the military so as to appear to be supported not just by families but also by civilian populations, who participate as co-organisers, performers and receptive and emotive audiences both within the physical space of the ceremony and watching on television.

A 'Calculated Dose of Grief':³¹ Preparing Families for the Stage

Major 1 (teasingly): Are you wearing mascara?

Male Master of ceremonies-MC (breaks into a smile)

Major 1: I hope you checked if it was waterproof?

MC: I asked the same question when they were putting it on (laughing loudly).

Major 1: Are you going to ask any question of the father [of a dead soldier, who is to appear on stage]?

MC: I will see if it is needed, it is a live show and I don't want to cause any problems.

Major 1: No, he [father] is very strong, he is too good, don't worry. (Pause) You can decide if you want to make a prick or two. (Prick here refers to a drawing out of emotion in case the testimony of the father is unemotional.)

Fieldnotes, Back stage, YeD ceremony, GHQ, 6th September 2015



The exchange above between the military convener and the MC speaks to the concern for the right image, depicting pain yet showing the unshrinking resolve of the family member of the dead soldier. It also indicates cynicism on the part of the organizers as much as the subjects, who are 'too good' and 'very strong', something that was obviously determined in the preceding prepping session and which I will now address. The intent above is not to paint the organizers as heartless or manipulative or the subject as duped, but simply to foreground the fact that putting this spectacular event on unavoidably involves a surreal blend of the contrived and the authentic.

According to the organizers, those who appear on stage and those whose testimonies are recorded as part of video packages played out on giant screens on that day are carefully screened to convey diversity in sacrifice for the nation. It is deemed essential that all types of bodies that die in the war on terror are represented with special attention paid to markers of identities such as class and ethnicity, different military forces, army regiments and other civil law enforcement agencies. However, the selection of those who appear for public consumption is not yet over, and the next step is to prepare those who are allowed on stage. Interviews with the officers in charge of prepping the families who go on stage reveal their confidence in their ability to shape the testimonies of family members and suggest that a fair amount of backstage instruction ensures that just the right message is delivered. These exchanges determine who is (or is not) selected for

³¹ Major 1, ISPR, 24th August 2015.

participation in these spectacles of state mourning and what is to be spoken (and what will remain unsaid).

Major 2: It is a hard job because we pull at their scabs, the son died two years ago and we want him to talk about it, relive it. We have to give the right dose, injection, because he can't break down completely. I prepped this baba ji [father], who used to cry, for two days. It is a delicate task, just the right emotion and some acting. It has to be a mix. We tell him his grief is not just his grief; his son is not just his son. He needs to think about grief beyond him. He has to share his grief so others can also grieve and know what it feels like (...) he did a good job, spoke well and the whole audience was crying and he didn't cry, just a little bit, and then as he walked away he made a thumbs-up sign at me.

Major 1: In front of everyone?

Major 2: No, it was when he was back stage, but it was a strange moment because [it showed that] he was acting. It's a mix of grief and two percent of acting. That's the way it is done. It's a performance that uses real emotions.

(Conversation between Majors 1 and 2, ISPR, during preparatory meeting for YeD 2015, ISPR office, 4th September 2015)

This is a surreal exchange, where the very raw and personal emotions of the person become material for state scrutiny and crafting. Raw material, genuinely felt emotion that must now be channelled such that it becomes just the right dose of feeling. The performance on stage must invoke the right response, and the illusion of realness, of authenticity, must remain, as evidenced in Major 1's concern when he asks Major 2 if the man's thumb up sign was visible to the audience (or the camera). The testimony is made possible by entangling the fake with the authentic: 'just the right emotion and some acting'. And yet, even as the fake and authentic lie together, the ability to recognize the fake remains: the old man's thumbs-up sign speaks to that ability, that consciousness, the realization that this is a moment where he must perform and not cry or break down. The scripts of the nation then become a crutch, allowing him to stand there, a language that he can speak without breaking down, a language that will strengthen his ability to stand and not crumple, a language that when spoken often becomes devoid of emotion, though tears seep through when a deeply intimate memory of the son is 'pricked' by the MC, as per the instruction. Raw affect is reformatted and reworked through the concerns not just of the military but of the subjects. A reformatting and reworking that still permits the realization that this is acting, the thumbs up sign acknowledging a job well done but one that cannot be questioned because it rests on real emotion.

Re-enactments:³² In Search of Fictions that Happen

Our goal is to tell people we all feel pain. Before, we used to tell people we are made of stone, superheroes. When I get hit as a soldier I feel the same pain (...) [In the case of] the mother of the *shaheed*, why should I tell people that she is saying at his grave that she does not feel any sorrow, it's a lie. Does this happen? Both [the family bonds and his mission as a soldier] are important, he had a self, he had something at stake [family]. [You showed in re-enactment clips] the children, girlfriend, then he was not remembering them because he was on a mission.

(Major 2, ISPR, 16th September 2015)

The above exchange perhaps reflects frustration on the part of scriptwriters in their search for a more believable script, a script that *does happen*. The stoic mother can feel sorrow. The stoic soldier is not 'made of stone' either, and the script can acknowledge that he has a difficult choice to make between love for his family and love for his nation, the goal is no longer to show that these sacrifices are easy but instead to impress upon the audience that they are very hard and that the soldier/mother 'feels pain'. For the purposes of my analysis, this shift allows re-enactments to focus on the life of the dead man beyond his identity as a soldier in ways that can be utilized more effectively for invoking affect. Over the years the shows have become more video intensive, the videos technologically more superior and the stories more developed and personal. In 2014, the re-enactments and testimonies were no longer limited to one section of the show but were littered throughout, not so much an increase in number but a blending in of these stories so that the figure of the martyr is omnipresent even as the themes become more diverse. No longer is the soldier depicted as a one-dimensional man in uniform storming into a building with a gun or saluting a flag, nor is the mother only sitting on a prayer mat or kissing her son's brow, although there are many such scenes. Spliced into this typical imagery are newer images showcasing the *human* soldier and all his family members (not just the mother), bonds of attachment and images of pain and loss. Family members speak of him in the video, and as the documentary ends the MC reads out the script welcoming family members onto the stage in a tearful voice. At this point the camera's gaze captures the audience already close to tears, with some already crying, and then the family member they saw immortalized on screen a minute ago walks on stage. In the earlier shows, the MC stood on a separate dais, with families coming in and speaking at another. However, since 2012 the MC has stood alongside family members, often with an arm around them, ostensibly to give them support or lead them off stage in case they

³² Re-enactments refer to short video documentaries that recreate the dead soldier's life using facts from his personal life and professional career, especially the operation in which he died.

break down. The 'brilliant moment' is carefully orchestrated to deliver the 'calculated dose of grief'. In a comic twist, sometimes the relentless build-up to emotion can have unexpected results, and such moments can prove all too powerful. Major 1 recounts how in the 2013 show the female MC 'started to cry herself with the mother, the mother stopped crying (but) she was crying, she couldn't speak. This can complicate things.'

Spotlight Audience and the Gaze of the Camera

We have put every kind of mother on stage. A mother is a mother. We put a Pashtun mother on in 2012 and she spoke [in Pashto] so no one could understand her, but she was probably the best mother we have put up on stage. She made a lot of sense. Also her body language, she stood as she is, pure. Whatever we do it has to connect with our feelings [of those watching the show and it has to make] the right connection. She didn't cry. The best thing was that she was thankful and she was not overdoing it. It didn't bother us [when the mother did not cry on stage] we compensated through songs. We had a cushion in the songs, when the song was playing I could see people were crying (....).

(Major 2, ISPR, 16th September 2015)

In this section I draw upon the text quoted above to focus attention on how the 'right connection' is made between what is happening on stage and the 'crying people' in the audience, and how this 'showing' (to the people) is made possible.

One property of a spectacle is that it gives participants 'a feeling of inclusion without [them] being obligated (or allowed) to respond' (Adams 2010, 155). However, I posit that the audience in these spectacles plays a distinct if carefully controlled role. As the YeS programme unfolds with re-enactments of the bravery of dead soldiers, through recorded and on stage testimonies of mothers and other family members, with the MCs speaking in choked voices and with wet eyes, the audience is often in tears. The camera captures this display of emotion, shifting from the stage with remarkable and almost obsessive frequency and focusing on the audience, on women and men visibly moved, some shedding silent tears, others sobbing openly. For the purposes of analysis, the blanket category of the *qaum* can be divided into two sub-sets, the audience at the show and the wider nation watching on television. The audience of apparent civilians watching the show, who are not strictly military and who mourn visibly, do not remain spectators but become participants, crying with the families and sharing their grief. The camera captures this for the benefit of the wider nation watching on television. How this image is received by the nation is something that this thesis does not respond to. However, the

fact that the show is crafted so reveals much about the institution's intent to rely on affect and use it as a technology of rule.

In these spectacles of mourning, the ability of affect to resonate with other people, to spread beyond the individual, is central. I posit, however, that this transmission is more complicated. In talking of the objectivity of belief, Slavoj Žižek (2008:31-33) suggests that states such as belief, as well as the most intimate feelings like crying, sorrow and laughter, which we often associate with the interiority of the subject, can be delegated to others, an 'exteriorization' or 'transference of our most intimate feelings'. An example of this is the act of weeping, which in some societies can be delegated to professional weepers, women hired to cry instead of us, a common practice in Punjabi villages in Pakistan. The chorus in classical Greek tragedy likewise performed the same function as does canned laughter in popular TV shows. This exteriorization of affect happens in subtle yet important ways in these shows and is what I draw attention to now.

What often marks these spectacles is the composure of the families despite their deep grief. This composure and stoicism is carefully constructed, a delicate oscillation between crippling grief and resolute commitment to more sacrifice. As Major 2 suggests, 'the objective (of the show) is not to show that it (death of a loved one) is easy but to show that it is hard, very hard and yet they do it (sacrifice).'³³ So subjects (families) resonate with emotions that simmer on the surface and spill over into tears, yet their speech never falters and their words never go off script, at least as far as the audience and nation are concerned. This composure is often at odds with the unbridled and ready display of tears in the audience, and the camera seeks out and displays shots of women, and sometimes men, sobbing, heaving with emotion. These affective flows between the families and the immediate audience are crucial to complete the spectacle for the nation, where the emotive audience acts as the channel of emotional discharge for the less emotive family. There is a need to project the devastation of loss and grief, but the families cannot fulfil that purpose because that would destabilize the script of willing sacrifice. However, the loss has to be highlighted and tears invoked to garner sympathy, and the audience fulfils this function. They thus add to and further layer the ranks of those who serve as conduits for the relationship between the military and the nation. The immediate audience, representing the feminized weak nation in need of protection from the stoic more controlled and masculine family representing the institution of the military, becomes locked together in an emotive relationship through the transmission of affect. Through

³³ Major 2, ISPR, 16th September 2015.

this relationship, grief and sacrifice become the powerful *authentic* tropes through which the military and nation communicate with each other.

Mourning No More

Investigation of YeS reveals that a stage where the dead are mourned by the nation-state is never just that. While it serves to shape, define and craft a particular narrative of sacrifice and service to the nation, in some ways it slides into domains that are no longer about the dead. In this section I draw upon four specific features of these shows to investigate how this theatre of mourning shifts into a theatre of war, an assertion of military power and the validation of militarism.

The Elusive Enemy

As shown earlier, officers responsible for planning YeS shows clearly state that one objective was to 'reclaim the strategic concept of the *shaheed*' (for the military). The fact that the enemy in the war on terror lays claim to the same Muslim identity that the ideology of the Pakistani state repeatedly enforces has been a site of contestation, as mentioned above. Interestingly, until 2014 the show reiterated the status of the dead as *shaheed* through familiar invocations from the Quran and Pakistan's history and identity as an Islamic nation-state. The COAS's speeches in 2012 and 2013 alluded to these contestations, but it was not until 2014 that the military boldly turned the debate on its head, redefining the enemy as lying outside the folds of faith (an allegation that the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan has made against the military). In 2014 there was a specific poem video/documentary about the enemy, and it is important to point out that this came after the 2013 *shaheed* controversy cited above. The poem attacks the *Muslimness* of the new enemy, calling it a mask, a curtain behind which he hides and manipulates minds. The enemy is portrayed as backward, one who uses religion and culture to exploit and manipulate young minds. The narrative focuses on progress and attachment to Pakistan as an Islamic nation-state, its progress and survival threatened by an enemy who exploits religion. The military here asserts the right to claim *shahadat* in the name of Islam, because the enemy is not a (true) Muslim in the first place; a message, which does not separate religion from nationhood, but instead questions the enemy's interpretation of *shariat* (Islamic Law).

In 2015 a slight slippage in this narrative was seen in a clip showing the army intelligence headquarters profiling the enemy. Two of the three terrorists are shown as Muslims, one an Afghan national, while the third is depicted as an unknown, whose religion and nationality cannot be ascertained, hinting at the presence of a foreign

(Indian) hand in this, without stating it explicitly. The play between the emphasis on internal Muslim enemies and external enemies reveals interesting tensions. It seems that the amount of focus that can be on the internal enemy without losing sight of the perceived threat from the external enemy, India is a concern for the military. The first three YeS programmes did not mention the external enemy, but it seems that in 2013, more forcefully in 2014 and much more clearly in 2015 there was a resolution of this tension, with both enemies being conflated as one. The COAS's speech in 2015 also referred repeatedly to external threats without naming India. These tensions highlight how the stage designed for the payment of tribute to martyrs becomes a strategic site for how the nation thinks and re-thinks the enemy.

Celebrating War

Ghazis (Muslim soldiers who fight in battles) were given a special tribute in the 2015 YeD. The short package was a re-enactment depicting how conflict played out in Zarb-e Azab, an operation declared by the Pakistan military in North Waziristan in June 2014. The clip is slick, depicting the military as equipped with modern weaponry and technology, the soldiers speaking English and the enemy as a mix of Pakistani and foreign nationals. In the final encounter, the enemy and the soldier throw down their weapons and engage in hand to hand combat, with the soldier emerging victorious. The tone here is markedly different from earlier re-enactments, where tears and pride mingled and which bordered on being heavy and somewhat morose, if resolute. Here, the mood is light, as if war is a sport, almost enjoyable. In the video's first shot, the officer takes cover behind a large rock and declares, 'Here we go, *ab maaza aye ga*' (now we will have fun). The last minute of the video breaks into a catchy song and shows troops gathered around the fire singing '*humara naam ghazi hai*' (We are warriors). Here, the stage for paying tribute to the dead becomes one where war can be glorified and violence and killing can be enjoyed and even celebrated.

Sharing the Stage

The first three YeS shows presented the dead as being from the military. Only in 2013 did the army decide to pull in other civilian law enforcement agencies, such as the Frontier Corps and the police, as well as journalists and politicians. In 2014, the ordinary man was also shown as dying in terrorist attacks. A more inclusive event that acknowledged martyrdom for all members of the nation was an admission by the military that all lives are equal and must be honoured. The opening line of a re-enactment posits an equivalence between the dead from the police and the military: *Wardi ka rang mukhtalif ho saktein hain farz ke nahi* (The colours of the uniform can be different but the colours of

duty remain the same). I suggest here that the blurring of boundaries between the military and civilian spaces creates a false equivalence, for the YeS shows hold the khaki-clad military martyr above others. The civilian dead are included in this terrain, where exaltation occurs according to militarized scripts, within parameters set by the military, and the focus remains on the military martyr. Their inclusion also serves to mask very real differences in the compensation accorded to the civilian dead, including civilian armed forces such as the police and the Frontier Corps, and creates a false equivalence in the honour and tribute granted to them, even as it also sets them up as an added, unintended consequence of the *real* war being fought by *real* soldiers from the military.

The Policy Speech

An address by the Chief of Army Staff is a traditional feature of this event. This is a space where the COAS, in the context of Pakistan considered the most powerful man in the country, having summoned politicians, foreign dignitaries, leading media personnel and leading national celebrities, speaks to the nation, standing literally in the shadow of the *Shuhada* monument, constructed at the heart of the General Headquarters, televised live across the nation.

The army chief's speeches at the first and second YeS shows were about martyrdom for religion and the state and the need for the nation to acknowledge this immense sacrifice and show support to the families. He spoke of establishing the nation and the military as one united entity, 'a *rista* (relationship) that can never end'. These themes continue in subsequent speeches, but they read more like policy statements, and martyrdom and families are relegated to the beginning and end, while the heart of the speeches is dedicated to a range of governance issues such as elections, democracy, re-assertion of Pakistan's sovereignty and foreign policy, including Pakistan's relations with its neighbours. The text of the speeches is also instructive in how it refers to the war and the enemy. The former escalates over the years from soldiers dying due to terrorism, to Pakistan going through difficult times, to Pakistan being in a state of war, to total war, where the whole citizenry and all institutions have to fight together.

Within this section I have drawn on certain features of the YeS programmes that delineate how these commemorative events go beyond mourning and tribute making and instead provide the symbolic capital for the military to legitimately spill over into domains that strengthen its hegemony and control over the state. This capital allows it to instrumentally and constantly shift the enemy, glorify and situate militarism and war as something to be celebrated, create illusions of equivalence and solidarity among civil and

military dead and provide a legitimate stage (literal and otherwise) for the military (the COAS) to address the nation and comment on affairs of governance.

Of Other Spaces and Stages

Blatant content is often but half the story, and within this content there is much which remains hidden, visible only through its conspicuous absence. Who is to be allowed on stage, what is not to be said, what is to be hidden from view is, I contend, important if we are to really imagine more clearly what the state constructs.

Going off Script

Accepting that the spectacle put in front of us is carefully crafted opens up the possibility of seeing what this illusion masks: an illusion that stands in the grey zone between fact and fiction. Officers acknowledge that when family members are on stage they can sometimes say things that are not considered appropriate. Examination of this inappropriateness reveals interesting insights into the anxieties of the military and the voices and expressions that must be managed if the narrative of sacrifice is not to be destabilized. More importantly, I turn to this examination because it reveals the tensions and ripples within these relationships, which on the surface seem untrammelled and impregnable.

Mothers and other family members are discouraged from making the death *too real*. Officers are very clear that depiction and talk of the dead must not become too vivid.

She [the mother] should not talk about the dead body of her son, some things are very gory, we don't want them to be said on stage. It is gory for example that his body had bullets in (...) when you give this kind of a message there is a line about being brutal, like you don't show blood on TV, so we tell them not to get too graphic.

(Major 1, ISPR, 24th August 2015)

Souls, eternal life and some blood are acceptable, but too much blood or too much talk of wounds to the body are not. Much as the coffin is nailed shut when it is handed over to family members and they are discouraged from opening it to touch the body, they are also discouraged from speaking of the body on stage. The body can be glorified in death only if it is seen as intact: whole, smiling and at peace, and not as a gruesome, bloodied, mutilated image. This discomfort with the mutilated body is apparent also in the ambivalence the military shows towards those maimed by the war, known as War Wounded Persons (WWPs) in military parlance. WWPs made no appearance at Yes

shows until 2012, and then only in the audience. However, short documentaries were dedicated to them in 2013 and 2014. They disappeared from the stage in 2015 except for when male celebrities paid tribute to them towards the end. The shows thus give them space and then take it away, the camera rests on them during the ceremonies, but not for too long, so that the image of glorious and joyous sacrifice and the able-bodied living warrior is not marred by the maimed, helpless and incomplete body. The disabled can be spoken for, as is obvious in the short documentaries presented, and the same symbiotic relationships that serve the military in attaining consent from the families of the deceased are at play here too. Yet their late inclusion and subsequent exclusion points to the fact that the disabled represent a cost of war that is inscribed on the body in ways that make the military anxious. The disabled occupy spaces between the dead and the living, the valiant *ghazi* and the glorious dead, a body that is incomplete, both a man and as helpless as the feminine other. They are liminal figures that refuse categorization. Despite this, the narrative has had to make space for them since 2012 in response to their growing numbers, as the number of maimed for life in this war is purported to be three times the number of dead, but it does so in constrained and ambivalent ways. The military's inability to assimilate them into these narratives more centrally points to a continuing discomfort.³⁴

The testimonies of families can also potentially threaten the official transcripts of certain events. Sometimes family members may share sensitive information about the operation in which a soldier died. At other times, a family member may express rage against the enemy in an uncontrolled, unbridled way. The military seeks to control not just the pain but also the anger, for in this case the enemy is still liminal and confrontation with him has to be carefully managed, an acknowledgement that he may not have been discredited totally with the masses or within the military. Whatever the strategic compulsions for controlling expressions of anger against the enemy, what is of interest for my thesis is discomfort with the depiction of the family member as angry. The politics of anger, of rage, can threaten the politics of sorrow, and perhaps the image of a grief-stricken family member does not sit as comfortably with the angry father who seeks revenge.

Any mention or trace of monetary compensation for the dead of the army is missing from the show, and families are discouraged from mentioning it. It is well known that compensation for military dead is greater than that received by members of other law enforcement agencies or that handed out by the state to civilian NoKs after death or

³⁴ Chapter 5 examines the disabled figure in more detail.

injury in terror incidents. Yet this materialist thread is missing to the extent that all that is made visible on the surface is the ideological narrative, almost as if compensation did not exist. The military goes to great lengths to ensure that the realities of bitter property disputes and family estrangement are hidden from public view. The intent of the show is to build the military's image as saviours and *muhafiz* (protectors), and it cannot afford to be thought of as a well-compensated security establishment.³⁵

These are terrains on which families and the military sometimes find themselves at odds, and relationships and trust become strained. This is important, for it tells us something about these relationships of power, how they are forever locked in bonds that bristle with tension and need management. What the military seeks to hide from the grand stage is equally if not more important if we are to look beyond the glare of these blinding spectacles of mourning.

The Next of Kins Enclosure

The vast NoKs enclosure is marked by a number of billboards surrounding it. Its physical separation from the rest is typical of how the military attempts to categorize and organize space as a way of maintaining discipline and making crowd management easier. Yet this physical separation also serves as a metaphor for other differences. These differences include the obvious categories of location, ethnicity and class, for the vast majority in this enclosure are from rural areas of Punjab. These differences bring into focus how the collective narratives of the nation and sacrifice mask the fact that the nation-state offers unequal representation and demands unequal sacrifice (at least in terms of military service) from different members of its community. The over-representation of Punjab is partly reflective of Punjabi dominance of the military and partly because the audience at the GHQ ceremony is drawn from the immediate environs, the Rawalpindi division. To smooth over these distinctions, on-stage re-enactments and testimonies also show soldiers and families from villages and cities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Baluchistan and Gilgit Baltistan. The number of casualties is higher in the soldier class, which is largely drawn from rural areas, and these differences haunt the show, for the NoKs enclosure is dominated by people from villages: men in traditional white shalwar kameez and women with *chaadars* on their heads. While there are some people in suits in the NoKs enclosure, as well as more fashionably dressed city folk, (parents of officers who have died), the difference between enclosures is more pronounced because of the complete absence of these rural men and women from lower

³⁵ Chapter 5 addresses military compensation regimes in more detail.

socio-economic backgrounds in the other enclosures. This is not only a sign that the nation may demand unequal sacrifice from different classes, but also that the only way rural men and women can be visible on the national stage is when they make this sacrifice.

The other difference between the NoKs enclosure and the rest is one of mood, for people within this enclosure remain uncertain, vigilant and uneasy in this vast terrain of grandeur set out ostensibly in their honour. The NoKs in this enclosure watch, relegated to audience status, while their stories are played in front of their eyes. The camera seeks them out when the re-enactments play out, when their testimonies are presented and when the COAS mentions them. Thus, every time the script speaks for them and through them for the dead, the camera rests on this enclosure. The camera's gaze serves to make them participants too, complicit by their decision to attend the ceremony, their very presence an expression of unwavering support for the military.

As shown in the vignette which opened the introduction of this thesis, the persons whose lives and stories are told on the grand stage do not always resonate in sync with the rest of the audience. Yasmin, the mother whose son had died in the Swat operation with whom I sat during the YeD ceremony, remained sceptical and cynical about the mother who came on stage and presented her other son to the army. She distanced herself from that mother, saying, 'I don't know who these women are', even as she cried openly through much of the ceremony. Yasmin herself had refused to send her second and only surviving son to the army, although a secure place in her dead son's unit had been offered to him.³⁶

When I went to visit Nawaz's (N) house a week later, I was witness to the following exchange, which brings out the complexities of this relationship.

N's sister: Mother told us about the show and how grand it was, but she remained upset by it, her heart felt uneasy. She said there were many people, there were lots of other mothers and they all cried. She was saying that they [the military] should just take this money and distribute it to the people, so that someone could benefit. She said watching the parade just made her heart sad and she missed Nawaz.

N's father: Yes, they spend a lot of money, they give us money for travel and also put us up in a fancy hotel and feed us, but if they gave us this money it would never be enough, even if they gave us a crore

³⁶ Yasmin, Nawaz's mother, 24th November 2014 and fieldnotes, YeD ceremony, 6th September 2015.

each it would never be enough. Who will remember them (the dead)?
We will forget otherwise.

N's sister: My father is a political man, he did his matric when very few people in our village had done so, he thinks, he sees things differently.

My mother is uneducated, she is emotional, she only feels.

(Sister and father of Nawaz, Palwal, 14th September 2015)

The mother, who 'only feels' and whose bonds of attachment and ability to express affect is deemed vital in these commemorations, says that the money should be distributed so that someone can benefit from it, and so seems to imply that no one really benefits from these grand shows, therefore making them pointless. She further suggests that her grief, expressed within nationalist frameworks and spaces, grows and is not eased. This signifies a disconnect and an unease, where the nation no longer figures in private scripts. The nation is also missing from the 'political' father's comments, but for him the need to remember through meaning making and memory remains an important way to ease his grief. His rejection of money as a salve for pain is deeply significant when examining the ambivalence, guilt and unease associated with receiving compensation in lieu of the dead son.

One argument for how complicit testimonies on stage are made possible, like these relationships, is that these families are militarized civilians who are producers of statist ideologies. Yet this would be hard to explain in view of the old man, whose thumbs-up sign signals awareness of the act of performing as he spoke about something that overwhelmed him. It would also be hard to explain in view of the reactions of families during and after the ceremony. I argue that these testimonies are made possible not just by the internalization of ideologies of nation and religion but by affect which is produced within the webs of the military's disciplinary power but which seeks its own response, its own balm, and not just that so glibly and clumsily offered. Much as prepping is considered essential and the language and text of the nation and religion are deemed critical, collusion with the militarism project works in subtle layered ways and is not a result of appropriations and manipulations summoned by the national and religious script alone. It is a compliance not made possible because of a firm belief and faith in ideology, but a sort of desperate clinging to, a desire not to see even as vision seeps through in the spaces where the camera (or the gaze of the military) does not reach, sometimes expressed as cynicism. The scripts offered by the nation then become the language used to stand there, a crutch leant on to face an intolerable reality that can only be made bearable if it fits within available cultural constructions of sacrifice and honour. I argue that when grief is so deep, the nation becomes an afterthought.

Other moorings, more subtle than the nation, rise up in the fog and make these compliance possible, moorings haunted by memories, the need to remember and the fear of forgetting. Yasmin, Nawaz's mother, turned to me during a video about '*ghazis*' which showcased brave, well trained soldiers, saying, 'look how fit they are, how they train and all they have to do to be able to fight'. She said this ruefully, yet with pride. I remembered the many conversations I had had with her in which she lamented how army training was very tough, how weak Nawaz had become and how she had cried when she saw him the first time he had returned from training. Nawaz's father proudly pointed out the Northern Light Infantry as his son's unit as they came into view. Yasmin pointed out the uniform and the feather in the green beret, telling me how her son used to wear it when he came home. These symbols, colours, music and wars were alien yet familiar to them. Sohaila, the mother of Imran, an 18 year old soldier from Palwal who died after seven months of service, was also seated next to us and told me, 'We come [for YeS] because, they [the army] call us, look after us. We always do because he [her son] was fond of the army'.³⁷ These moorings are evoked by hauntingly familiar terrain, for this is what was familiar to their loved one: the sounds of the army band, this uniform, the parade, and so they attend as parents because it is their child's world.

These feelings are heightened by the glare of the bright lights in the public space of the nation, feelings of groups of people that finally have a chance to stand in that space, people from villages or women suddenly allowed into the national narrative. A deep sense of obligation to honour the son's memory, an obligation felt even more keenly because of haunting unease at the amount of compensation received by very poor families. These symbiotic relationships are fuelled by deeply felt affect that leads them to cling to and be soothed by the familiar, familiar not so much to them but to the ears and eyes of their dead sons. Sounds, images and associations saturated by affect calm them: the sound of the military band, the sight of men marching in well-known garbs and so communities of sacrificing families talk about a war that is alien yet achingly familiar through the language of a keenly felt loss.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that the apparent support and complicity of the families is imperative to make grand stages like the YeS possible and sustain narratives of sacrifice for the nation. The *militarization* of civilian spaces is a manoeuvre by the military institution marked by the bringing of military discipline, control and regulation into

³⁷ Fieldnotes, YeD ceremony, GHQ, 6th September 2015.

otherwise civilian, chaotic, disorganized spaces, where a multitude of cacophonous narratives may strive for claim and attention.³⁸ In YeS ceremonies, the manoeuvre is opposite, and the unruly chaotic civilian/nation are drawn into military spaces. This move allows military narratives and spaces to seem less about military policy and the harsh realities of war and instead play out like warm, familiar scripts that are heart wrenching for the watching nation. Here, on the hardest and most fortified of terrains – the power nucleus of the country, the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army – habits of the heart are crafted. The military incorporates civilians into these commemorative ceremonies and they participate in the reproduction of military power in formally military-controlled spaces – what I call the apparent *civilianization* of military events and spaces. These spectacular events – massive celebrations of sacrifice choreographed through skilful scripting (which decides what themes are allowed on stage and what is edited out), affective management of families and the use of technology – purport to speak not just for the dead but also for their families and the nation. They create an image of families as willing, compliant selfless beings who offer up their sons to the military and an image of a nation that weeps and stands alongside these families and soldiers, which translates into standing alongside the military and its policies. The camera's gaze allows the immediate spectators to step in as participants in these spectacles, where the passion of the families' grief is harnessed (not fabricated) and then watched within these spaces, which resonate with affect. This inter-subjective transmission of affective energy between grieving families and the *qaum* allows these spectacles to become ways to speak to the nation about appropriate ways of responding to and showing support for the military.

The shifting emphasis in the content of the YeS and now the YeD programme speeches over the years shows that the subject matter expands from martyrdom and commemoration to affairs of governance, and is indicative of the military's growing confidence that it can comment on and interfere more openly in politics. This hardly represents a shift against the backdrop of Pakistan, where direct and indirect military interference in foreign policy and politics is an accepted fact (Jalal 1990; Rizvi 2003; Siddiqi 2001). What is interesting for the purposes of this thesis is the nature of the platform used for this expansion, the stage that pays homage to its dead.

In 2015, the Pakistani military decided to merge the YeS and YeD events, which perhaps reflected that the military felt it had made sufficient headway in reclaiming the narrative

³⁸ These manoeuvres will be discussed in subsequent chapters, where I discuss the *martial* district of Chakwal (Chapter 2) and village funerals (Chapter 4).

of the *shaheed* so that those who died fighting other Muslims could now stand (or lie, as they are now six feet under) shoulder to shoulder with those who died fighting in wars with (Hindu) India. This confidence is reflected in the excerpt from an interview with Major 2 below.

Back in 2006 I was asked to take the dead body of a soldier home. It didn't have a head (...) There was nobody except for the family who wanted to come for the *jananza* (funeral). (...) I gave a motivational lecture and some people rallied and came. So on that day there was nobody to bury him, but I am sure today his grave is a shrine where people come and pray. That is how we have changed the narrative.

(Major 2, ISPR, 16th September 2015)

The brief comparison of YeS and YeD made earlier in this chapter is instructive as it allows us to see the effect of the merger of these two shows in 2015. What the merger does most effectively is to take away even the illusion of civilian control over the war, the defence of Pakistan's borders and its relationship with its neighbours that the YeD had hitherto portrayed. The YeD on 6th September 2015 played out as a slightly revised version of the YeS format, complete with the GHQ venue, military uniforms, a band and a parade. It was a military affair, and the COAS made a policy speech about democracy, governance and foreign policy while the civilian leadership and the nation watched.

Chapter 2: The Making of Militarized Spaces - History, Geography and Politics

In his book *Rusticus Loquitur, or the Old Light and The New in The Punjab Village* (1930:30), Malcom L. Darling narrates how, when on a tour of Punjab in 1929, he asked villagers why they joined the army. He asked them to choose one of two options, which while simplistic were perhaps descriptive of how the motivation for military service has traditionally been explained: *shauq* (interest) or *bhuq* (hunger). He reports that they said *bhuq* first and *shauq* later.

In 2015, as I met with person after person in villages in the Chakwal district, a key recruitment area for the British Indian Army and the Pakistan Armed Forces, the first response to my research topic (which I would present as an attempt to understand why people from the district enlist) would circle around one word: *ghurbat* (poverty), followed by a second phrase: *pakki naukri* (secure employment associated with government service). Claims of a warrior past and of defending national honour and religion rarely came up first in these discussions, although they would come up later and were rarely missing.

Three features of this comparison over time are important: the *first* represents how much has not changed – the reasons for enlistment are largely materialist, as before. *Second*, over the years enlistment has come to be seen as a profession, a long-term systematic, often generational investment that may mean the difference between a life of penury and a more settled existence with the security of social welfare. *Third*, while my interlocutors nearly always articulated nationalistic or religious drivers, they were mentioned much later in these conversations.

In order to better understand the physical spaces and the persons who stand ready to serve and sacrifice in the Pakistan Armed Forces, this chapter investigates the Chakwal District by tracing patterns of relationships established during colonial times that replay and morph in modern day Pakistan. The protagonists in this chapter are military institutions and their policies (the British Indian Army and the Pakistan Armed Forces), and persons both civilian and military, both those who are alive and the dead who haunt the landscape and whose graves are visible across the district. More specifically, I explore how these martial districts have been shaped by the geographical terrain, by historical proclivities and by the whims of the Pakistani military's recruitment policy.

The conditions that drive people to continue to invest in the military are often cited as a complex mix of economic desperation, brought on by the constraints of geography and deepened by historical anchoring in the idea of martial races. The chapter argues that although these conditions act as foundations for the present context, there are also subtle shifts in both the mechanics of these relationships (the actors between whom they are conducted) and how they are portrayed. The parameters of the relationships continue to rest on welfare and economics, yet their protagonists have morphed and there is a weaving in of newer themes of the nation and religion by the military. This chapter will argue that these newer themes are also woven in by the district's population and serve as justification for continued entitlement to the benefits that military service brings to their lives: the livelihood opportunities and the accompanying generous welfare services it offers them.

I present my arguments in this chapter through the lens of demand – how the colonial state set out to create the conditions for certain districts of Punjab to enlist, conditions on which the Pakistani military later capitalized – and supply – why the people of Punjab meet this demand. I use terms such as demand and supply deliberately, for I argue that recruitment arrangements are characterized by two-way transactional market dynamics, which are often obfuscated by the paternalistic nature of military welfare policies and discourses of the nation. This maintains a façade that hangs over this exchange like a shifting cloud, sometimes opaque and at other times relentlessly transparent. The relationship between the district and the military remains firmly hinged on gratefulness, welfare, and national honour, and does not tilt into demand, economic desperation and transaction. This is managed with skill and subtlety by a host of local paternalistic and watchful military apparatus and by the subjects themselves, who strive to inscribe service and sacrifice for the nation on their imaginations, their bodies and the landscape of the district.

This chapter will first explore the historical landscape and the paternalistic relationship between the British Raj and the martial districts of Punjab.³⁹ It will then look at the post-colonial trajectory of this relationship, which over the years has morphed into a direct social contract between the soldier, his family, the district and the military, side-lining not only the more traditional feudal and kinship groups but also the government itself. It

³⁹ Here and in the first section, *Ghosts of the Past*, unless otherwise specified, Punjab refers to undivided Punjab as it stood before partition. In the subsequent section, Punjab refers to those parts of the region that fell to Pakistan after 1947.

will then turn towards the local space of Chakwal for a more detailed look at how these dynamics play out within these more intimate spaces.

Like the thesis as a whole, this chapter focuses mostly on the Pakistan Army as the largest and most influential branch of the military. However, in the context of the district it addresses all three forces (with the proviso that the Recruitment and Selection office deals only with induction into the Pakistan Army). This became necessary, as the district's population regards the three as a collective, falling within the rubric of military service. In addition, the beneficiaries of the institutions discussed below, like the District Armed Services Boards-DASBs and the Fauji Foundation, are from all three services. However, of the three the Pakistan Army is the largest recruiter of labour in the district, and thus has the largest number of beneficiaries.

Ghosts of the Past: The Making of Militarized Districts

To even begin to discuss the militarization of Chakwal District (previously part of Jhelum District) without glancing at history would render the story incomplete. This is not a symbolic perfunctory nod to the past but a necessity, because the present contours of the relationship between the district and the institution of the military are tied into structural colonial antecedents. Historicizing this present through past trajectories also throws up the dualities of how much has shifted and how much has not.

The historical processes that led to the specialization of certain districts in Punjab as the labour-pool for the British Indian Army have been extensively debated (Talbot 1988; Pasha 1998; Yong 2005; Saif 2010; Mazumder 2011). The racist recruitment doctrine of the *martial race* was set in motion after the Revolt of 1857. Muslim soldiers from the Salt Range (the hilly part of Western Punjab where Chakwal is located) had proved useful in military campaigns against the Sikhs from 1848-1849 and further proved their loyalty to the Raj during the 1857 uprising against the British. Many demonstrated their willingness to enlist because they had suffered economic hardship during Sikh rule in Punjab. For the British they were also an effective counter to the Sikhs in the British Indian Army, whose divide and rule policy meant that regiments and companies were subdivided according to religion, class and locality to ensure that if a rebellion broke out they could be used against each other (Mason 1974; MacMunn 1984; Pasha 1998; Mazumder 2011). In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, military thinking went through another shift. The British Indian Army ceased to be conceived of as just an internal policing mechanism and began to be organized as a protective force against an

attack expected from the northwest, with Russia a potential foe. The earlier divide and rule policy took a back seat, and recruiting the best possible fighting material became the foremost concern (Mason 1974; Pasha 1998; Mazumder 2011). This led to even more intensive class-specific recruitment, with intake restricted to certain races and districts. By the end of the nineteenth century this was no longer a preference but a full blown recruitment doctrine that remained in place for the next fifty years. Various handbooks for the Indian Army were produced during the last decades of the British Raj, describing the men from these regions as possessing bravery, loyalty and masculinity. In *The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and The Two World Wars*, Gajendra Singh (2014:11-17) highlights three aspects of the martial race discourses promoted by the British Indian Army: 'climatic, the division of Indian on a martial-unmartial axis, and the granting of pseudo-British qualities to sipahis'. He suggests that they represented not so much the martial race but 'colonial fantasies' or 'repeated efforts by colonial military theorists to bridge the gap between idealized images of colonial soldiers in India and the realities they lived'. These were discarded over time, sometimes to be reproduced or to include newer races due to the vagaries of demands during the two subsequent world wars.

Six territorial recruitment depots were set up in 1891 in the areas where the *martial* races (Pathans, Punjabi Muslims, Hindu and Sikh Jats, Dogras and the Hindu castes east of the Jumna River) were concentrated. Of these, four were in Punjab. (Yong 2005:65). The Rawalpindi depot was reserved for recruiting Punjabi Muslims, and was ideally suited for drawing men from the Salt Range (especially the districts of Jhelum, Attock and Rawalpindi). These localized recruiting patterns enabled the army to have close contact with the classes and districts from which it was recruiting.

Let me now turn to the supply side. In keeping with the martial race doctrine above, it has been suggested (mostly by proponents of the martial race theory) that for some of the so-called martial races a readiness to pursue a vocation in arms reflected a cultural propensity to be militarized. While cultural propensity may be an essentialist term, there may be some twisted truth in it. Muslim tribes such as Gakkars and Awans of the Salt Range had traditionally been part of armies even before British rule, and this area is located on the strategic northwestern gateway to India from Central Asia that has seen an interminable onslaught of invasions (Pasha 1998). Some of these tribes perceived military service as evidence of their high social status, an escape from manual trade and labour, which they considered beneath them. However, historians agree that by and large what drove this region towards military service as a source of livelihood was the

physically broken, rain-fed terrain that made agricultural activities unpredictable and led to low yields (Omissi 1994; Pasha 1998; Saif 2010; Mazumder 2011). Mustapha Kamal Pasha's book *Colonial Political Economy: Recruitment and Underdevelopment in the Punjab* goes one step further in suggesting that the 'concentration of recruitment to a specific region, namely the Punjab, was the historical outcome of the legacy of 1857 and the *intensification* of backwardness in the *barani* (rain fed) tracts resulting from the development of colonial capitalism' (1998:7, emphasis mine).⁴⁰ The British, by legalizing the private right to absolute land ownership, deliberately created a landowning class, a class they could then bargain with. Hamza Alavi (1980:371) notes that this 'new concept of property in land that was introduced by the colonial regime was premised on the dispossession of peasants'. According to these scholars, this economic re organization resulted in an increase in the vulnerability of the peasantry and the concentration of land in the hands of a loyal class of landowners.⁴¹ The remarkable ability of the newly created elite to meet the massive manpower demands of the war machinery in WWI is evidence of how effective the wheels of colonial capitalism were in pushing sections of Punjab's rural population towards the Army.⁴²

At the beginning of World War I, Punjab had about one hundred thousand men of all ranks in the Army. At the close of the war, no less than half a million served it. Roughly, 360,000 Punjabi recruits were enlisted in 4 years between 1914 and 1918, comprising one half of the total number raised in India (Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Michael O'Dwyer qtd. in Saif 2010:22).

Five districts of Rawalpindi division, including Jhelum (parts of which constitute today's Chakwal district), were amongst the eight most heavily recruited districts in Punjab; 33% of the total male population of Jhelum had enlisted by the end of WWI (Saif 2010:22).

Beyond official rhetoric, the colonial authorities accepted the mercenary nature of the army, which served the colonial state. The British Indian Army served the British 'when all is said and done, for the monthly wage, the other pecuniary wages and the pension' (E.E.H Collen qtd. in Yong 2005:79). As a recruiting ground, Punjab developed as a 'garrison state' that benefitted enormously from British patronage in terms of pay,

⁴⁰ Pasha suggests that with the coming of British colonial rule, the pre-colonial economy experienced three profound changes: 'the institution of private property in land, the growth of merchant capital in Punjab and the establishment of cash nexus as the primary form of surplus extraction by the colonial state' (Pasha 1998:108).

⁴¹ The land settlement policy and the Land Alienation Act served respectively to create and protect local intermediaries who were loyal subjects (Alavi 1980; Pasha 1998).

⁴² During wartime, recruitment did not always remain 'voluntary' and there are numerous accounts of forced enlistment. (Salim 1975; Leigh 1997; Yong 2005:107-108).

pensions and land allocation (Yong 2005). Here, those who stood to benefit were first and foremost the local landowning intermediaries, the deliberately fortified feudal class and *pirs* (Sufi spiritual guides), who were generously rewarded with land grants and later political status (Talbot 1988; Ali 1988; Omissi 1994). The Punjabi peasant, who was recruited *en masse*, also gained in pay, pension, land and continued military patronage.⁴³


Rajit Mazumder reminds us of this 'advantageous reciprocity':

The recruited peasantry of Punjab benefited directly from the British Indian Army. Pay and pensions bolstered economic capability, close interaction with the British raised social standing, and the policies of the government strengthened the political positions of these supposedly martial races. These advantages fed into each other, and the cumulative benefits were considerable (2011:258-260).

What is said above is undoubtedly true if one is to take the martial races as one homogenous group, but it is important to acknowledge that there were gradations among recipients in how much benefit was earned, as well as differences in how much was staked for that earning, something to which the above text does not do justice. At one end, we have the likes of Sikandar Hayat Khan of the powerful Khattar family, who became the first premier of Punjab in 1936 and whose primary claim to status and wealth, in addition to having served as an officer within the army, was his *generosity* in recruiting people from his areas to the army (Yong 2005). At the other end we have the ordinary tiller who was recruited. Mazumder (2011:259-260) goes on to cite fierce loyalty on the part of combatant troops, evidenced by censored correspondence between *sipahis* and their families during the First World War. While he cites some letters expressing anger and resentment, he suggests that many more were appreciative of the government, and peasants knew that being 'faithful to the salt of the *Sarkar*' (the government) would yield material benefits for them and their families. He cites a letter from a Sikh soldier to his wife asking her not to worry: 'Do not be anxious. If I die, you will profit greatly. For the Government will give you a pension. Why should you worry? If I live, then Government will give us still more'.

⁴³ After the First World War, land grants amounting to 420,000 acres were given to over 6000 army personnel (Saif, 2010:39).

This is really a win-win situation, unless one stops and thinks of what the former predicament means for the person in question and the level of desperation, as well as the faith in the benevolent *Sarkar* (government), it would require to suggest this to his wife.



Photograph 1: Commemorative plaque placed in Chakwal by the British government

In some annals of history, Punjab is represented as the traitorous province that helped the British to gain control of the subcontinent after the sepoy revolt of 1857 and then ensured its reign by virtue of being the recruitment base for the British Indian Army. Of course, this 'advantageous reciprocity' (Mazumder 2011:259) between colonizer and colonized existed, and it would be foolish to suggest otherwise, but a reading of this history needs to be nuanced through an analysis of class (Salim 1975). The creation of militarized districts in Punjab was only possible through the creation and protection of a class of landowners willing to exploit their mutually advantageous partnership with the British, with the cost paid by Punjab's rural population as a whole. It is therefore perhaps rightly argued that Punjab's loyalty to the colonial military machinery should not be seen in the 'context of modernization', but that a better parallel would be feudalism (Ali 1988:109). This is a more nuanced lens, for historical accounts can be harsh and can

paint the oppressor and oppressed in one colour, even when the oppressed or colonized group is more varied, and where one stands in the pecking order can determine the benefits to be derived from these symbiotic partnerships. And yet this corrective lens must also acknowledge that the peasants who served in the army also entered into a relationship with the colonizer. This relationship was perhaps marked by a starker imbalance of power, partly because of the local intermediaries who served as middle men, leaving the peasants with much less bargaining power, but it was nonetheless a symbiotic relationship that allowed benefits such as pay, pensions, status and land allocation to trickle down to them too.

Land distribution by the colonial state needs to be understood not just as an incentive to attract and retain people in military service (ex-soldiers were eligible after the completion of 21 years of service) but as a mechanism to ensure the 'loyalty of the military classes to the state'. Grants were made on assurances of continued loyalty to the state, which were verified (Yong, 2005:91). The incentives or rewards offered to the soldier were couched in a language of welfare and assistance, hand-outs by a benevolent state that was protective of its loyal subjects who had served in its military. The military was the *maa baap* (mother-father or all in all) – a paternalistic entity that gives generously and in return expects loyalty, as opposed to a professional institution that must provide for its soldiers in return for services rendered.

The successful mobilization process during World War One was due in part also to the integration of the functions of the military and civil provincial authorities and laid the grounds for the emergence of the District Soldiers Boards (DSBs). These were set up by the colonial state to offset rising discontent among demobilized troops after the war about allegedly unfulfilled promises of land grants (Ali 1988; Yong 2005:142). Economic adversity as a result of wartime controls and inadequate monsoon rains at the end of the war, coupled with growing political unrest as a result of growing nationalist movements in the rest of the country, aroused strong trepidation in the British state that the loyalty of the martial districts could be affected. It was vital for the British that the recruiting bases remained pacified and inoculated against subversion or disaffection. To ensure continued loyalty, the DSBs were introduced at district level, as this was considered a site where the soldier's loyalty could be won or lost.

By performing their functions as dispensers of 'prizes' from the government and as agencies protecting the welfare of serving and

retired soldiers and their families, soldiers' boards were visible manifestations of a caring and accessible *Sarkar* (Yong 2005:163).

The fact that the ex-soldier had an audience and a space in which to vent his grievances was essential in crafting the image of the benevolent and caring *Sarkar* that listened and was accessible in local spaces, not just in some distant and alien regimental centre. Over the years these welfare organizations for war veterans developed into local institutions that safeguarded the interests of both the military institution and those who served in it.

Drawing on this historical trajectory, I now highlight three features of the recruiting areas that constitute today's Chakwal District which are useful for my analysis. Two of these are drawn from Mustapha Kamal Pasha's (1998) work on colonial political economy in Punjab. First, Pasha suggests that these districts became 'specialized zones' for recruitment, where livelihood was reduced to a 'single major activity', military service. According to Pasha, to simply reduce this effect to economic desperation would be inadequate as '[t]he cultural effect of military specialization in the *barani* areas reproduced self-valorization of its population as a military class'. In these districts, military service assumed a 'natural order, becoming intertwined with the regularities and habits of rural life' (1998:182). Second, these backward *barani* areas became locked in a co-dependent relationship with the colonial state, where

the state could only reproduce itself (and the colonial political economy to which it belonged) by ensuring the recruitment process, the *barani* tract itself could not guarantee its survival without performing its structural role as a source of military recruitment (1998:182).

Third, another important socializing effect of the specialization of these areas as a labour market for the military lay in the details of how the paternalistic state asserted itself by uniting its military and civil functions and ruling through a militarized bureaucracy, i.e. in the emergence of the DSBs. These institutional mechanisms brought the caring *Sarkar* down to the local in ways that blurred the lines between the civil and military and set the contours of the paternalistic relationship between the soldier class and the institution of the Pakistani military. I argue in the next section that the tone of these relationships between the colonial state and its subjects had profound consequences for the relationship between soldiers and the military institution that emerged in the post-colonial state of Pakistan.

Demand and Supply in the Post-colony: Welfare, Loyalty and Recruitment

It may be pertinent to mention here that martial districts in the areas that fell to Pakistan were not restricted to Punjab, as parts of KP, then known as the North West Frontier Province, were also used as a labour pool for the British Indian Army. However, my focus and interest remains on Punjab⁴⁴, as it is the larger supplier of recruits and due to its dominance in the military after partition. At the time of partition, Punjabi preponderance stood at 80% in the military (Cohen 1988:318) and 55% in the bureaucracy (Kennedy 1987:194). It is a well-established fact that in these early days and the ensuing years the Punjabi-controlled military and bureaucracy, along with the feudal class that had been closely aligned with it in colonial times, continued with the project of the militarization of state and society (Alavi 1972; Jalal 1990; Yong 2005:308-309). Colonial economic structures remained intact, and newer exploitative groups such as the indigenous bourgeoisie were added, in the guise of industrial development, to the feudal baggage that Pakistan inherited (Saif 2010:114). This alliance further strengthened in the Cold War scenario, when Pakistan chose to become a client state of the US (Saif 2010).⁴⁵ In its early years Pakistan was led by a Punjabi-dominated pro-west and anti-communist group of politicians and bureaucrats, with military leaders actively involved in and later leading this trajectory.⁴⁶ The first budget to be announced pledged a massive amount of the central government's total revenue (over 65%) to the Pakistan Armed Forces, a trend that has continued with little variation, to the detriment of the country's social, industrial and economic development (Rizvi 2003:62-63).

The Pakistan Army is a volunteer force, as per Article 39 of the 1973 constitution (Participation of People in Armed Forces). The composition of the Pakistan Army is largely Punjabi, with Pashtuns in second place, an ethnic domination reflective of the British Army's martial races policies. Recruitment patterns remained largely localized in key districts in Punjab (Chakwal, Jhelum, Attock, Rawalpindi and some surrounding areas), along with *martial* districts from Khyber Pakhtunkwa, although the spread within Punjab and KP did expand (Rizvi 2003:240). Until 2001, 7% of the Pakistan Army's manpower came from Punjab.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ From here onwards, all mentions of Punjab refer to the territory that fell to Pakistan after 1947.

⁴⁵ Signing defence agreements in the 1950s, such as SEATO (the South East Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization), made Pakistan one of the earliest Cold War allies of the US power system. These developments facilitated the military's growing ascendancy in state policy and contributed to the first military takeover in 1958.

⁴⁶ The addition of religious factions to build anti-communist frenzy and boost Islam as a bulwark strategy further fuelled the already-appropriated idea of religion that has haunted Pakistan since its birth.

⁴⁷ Staff Correspondent (2007, September 14th). Punjab's dominance in army being reduced. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <http://www.dawn.com/news/266159/punjab>

The Pakistan Army Act 1952 states that compulsory conscription can be introduced, although the army has never had to resort to this. This is unlike the route many post-colonial states have taken, where nationalist governments have emphasized representativeness and citizenship through the use of compulsory military service. One simple reason for this may be that the army receives more applications each year than it needs to fill its ranks (Cohen 1984). According to recruitment data for 2004 to 2013 provided by the Personnel and Administration Directorate (PA), each year on average over 130,000 applicants apply to be a soldier in the Pakistan Army, from which an average of 38,000 are inducted.⁴⁸ In response to the question of why people enlist from *martial* districts, the army officers I interviewed almost unequivocally mentioned widespread unemployment, rain-fed terrain and the exposure of the area to military service over several decades. There seemed to be no mystery to solve here, it was a simple fact, presented without obfuscation, an open understanding that it was sheer economic desperation and a lack of other viable secure forms of employment that drove people in droves to the long queues at the recruitment and selection centres the military sets up in these districts. In addition, the specialization of this district as the labour pool for the military has resulted in it being locked in a co-dependent relationship based on state patronage in terms of pay, pensions and land grants. This has ensured that there is a steady stream of potential recruits who want to join, believing that this is their best possible shot at *pakki naukri* based on their historical advantage of generational service to the military.

Reluctance to introduce conscription or expand army recruitment to other areas has also been attributed to a deliberate intent on the part of the postcolonial military-bureaucratic oligarchy to continue with the Punjabi-dominated profile of the military. This adherence, referred to as the 'hangover of the martial race theory' (Rizvi 2003:128), is ascribed to a number of factors, the most significant of which would be the obvious strategic benefit to the Punjabi-dominated ruling class that Pakistan inherited. Another reason that has been cited is tactical advantage, as especially in Pakistan's early years it allowed the army to ensure that various ethno-nationalist insurgencies in Baluchistan, Sindh and KP could be handled without conflict of interest (Cohen 1984:45). Of course, the fact that many of these nationalist struggles are rooted partly in anger against unfair treatment by the Punjabi-dominated establishment at the centre, including inadequate representation in military recruitment, suggests that this tactical logic is somewhat counter-productive. The Bangladesh debacle is a case in point, as Bengalis were

⁴⁸ PA Directorate-GHQ, 15th January 2015.

underrepresented in service and their inclusion was resisted by the army (Cohen 1984:43).

Sustaining the (Old) Martial: Relationships New and Old

With 500,000 men constantly moving through their ranks, the armed forces of Pakistan are the largest employers of under-employed labour in Pakistan (Dewey 1991: 261).

Using the same recruitment pool for almost the first fifty years of its post-colonial existence has enabled the military to establish enduring roots in thousands of villages in Punjab, especially in the Salt Range. Pay and pensions form the bulk of many village incomes, and military service represents a bulwark against destitution, providing stability and social security.

The pay and pension and welfare schemes (education, health and housing facilities) offered by the army to its officers and enlisted personnel continue to be by far the most comprehensive provided by any public-sector employer in Pakistan (Dewey 1991; Siddiqua 2007:206-207). These services extend not just to men in service but also to their families, as well as ex-soldiers and their families. According to Clive Dewey (1991:271), pay scales are index-linked to inflation, and so the army dominates the labour market in these areas. The fact that this happens more effectively in older recruitment grounds than in other non-martial districts (see below) is indicative that while economic incentives may be a necessary condition for apparent enthusiasm for war, they are not sufficient. Within *martial* districts there is also considerable valence and prestige associated with military service, especially at the local district and village level. In addition to pay and pensions, two types of benefit are particularly important to highlight, as they are perhaps those that cause maximum discontent in the classes not recruited to the military. The first is urban and rural landholdings given to ex-servicemen, both soldiers and officers.⁴⁹ The second are the military's extensive industrial holdings, ostensibly intended to serve retired soldiers (Siddiqua 2007).⁵⁰ In 1954, the British Military Reconstruction Fund intended for soldiers who had fought in WWII was invested by the Pakistani military in commercial ventures with the aim of using its profits to support ex-servicemen. In 1967 it was re-named the Fauji Foundation, and it has now become a large military-owned business conglomerate with

⁴⁹ At the officer level, these are lucrative landholdings sold to officers on reduced terms, which they can then sell at market rates, resulting in large gains.

⁵⁰ In *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, Ayesha Siddiqua (2007) discusses the Pakistani military's economic empire and its impact on the country's political, economic and social landscape.

commercial and welfare wings. In addition, it offers health, educational and vocational services to families of ex-servicemen, including the families of those killed or disabled in war, and also assists them in finding jobs, mostly with its numerous businesses, including cereal companies, farms and factories producing cement, petroleum and fertilizers to name a few.⁵¹

Two other institutions – District Recruitment Offices and Centres and District Armed Services Boards (DASBs) – serve a practical facilitating purpose for the district's population. Their visible presence in the district and their extensive network allows the institution of the military to establish deep roots in these local spaces. There are 24 army Selection and Recruitment Offices and Centres across Pakistan, which open for recruitment twice a year. There are ten in Punjab, four in Sindh, five in Baluchistan, three in KP and one each in GB and AJK.⁵² Their primary purpose is to recruit from the district according to criteria and in numbers set out by the General Headquarters, using a pre-defined multiple hurdle model of selection including a medical examination and a battery of physical, intelligence and personality tests.⁵³ After partition, the DSBs were absorbed into the civil bureaucracy and renamed District Armed Services Boards (DASBs), continuing their functions in the martial districts. These boards serve all three of the Pakistan Military's forces. As membership of the military has grown, the boards' services have been extended to other provinces and their districts. There are twenty-six in Punjab, thirteen in KP, eight in Sindh, two in Baluchistan, three in GB and ten in Azad Jammu & Kashmir, with a total of 62 DASBs in various districts across the country. Six provincial directorates exist, four in the main provinces and one each in Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. These report to the Pakistan Armed Services Board (PASB), which itself reports to the Ministry of Defence. Retired military officers head the National and Provincial Boards. The District Commissioner heads the District Board, but its functions are run by the Secretary of the Board, who is also an ex-military officer. A further body of welfare officers, ex-NCOs and JCOs, act as honorary welfare officers (WOs), with the idea being to ensure that facilitation reaches into every village in the district. The DASBs continue to carry out their earlier functions, acting as localized doorstep welfare systems. Their main function is to maintain records of ex-servicemen in the area and facilitate regiment centres in verifying the information needed to provide welfare to ex-servicemen. They assist families in the preparation of the documentation etc. needed to claim pensions, benevolent funds and other compensation, as well as arbitrating disputes

⁵¹ Fauji Foundation website. Retrieved from <http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/about-us/aboutus-overview>

⁵² Pakistan Army website, Retrieved from <http://www.joinpkarm.base.pk/asrc.html>

⁵³ PA, Directorate – GHQ, 15th January 2015.

between family members on compensation and pensions.⁵⁴ They also facilitate the re-employment of ex-servicemen in the public sector, by military affiliated groups such as the Fauji Foundation and with private companies. In addition, they form a bridge between the civil and military machinery, ostensibly serving as an arm of the civil machinery, but acting fairly independently by virtue of the nature of their services and their direct links to the GHQ and the regimental centres and units. An annual general meeting is also organized, where WOs and heads of district departments such as Education, Health, and Forestry can meet, presided over by the District Commissioner. This forum allows WOs to put forward suggestions for the development of their area. The DASBs are an important local mechanism that uses the civil machinery for the benefit not only of those who serve in the army but also their dependents. Much like the earlier DSBs, one of the most important functions of these local bodies is a localized district facilitation service that ex-servicemen can count on and make claims from.

Scholars such as Anatol Lieven (2011) have suggested that over the years these relationships have come to be based on ideas of collective defence, much like a kinship group. The Pakistan Armed Forces is the only institution that is modelled along modern meritocratic lines, with opportunities for upward mobility in terms of class and socioeconomic status (Dewey 1991; Lieven 2011:55).

It has been argued that kinship loyalties undermine the Pakistani state, as

true sovereignty – in the sense of primary collective loyalty and the enforcement of collective customary law, and even the provision of effective security forces at the local level – resides in the kinship group rather than the state (Lieven 2011:56-57).

Lieven suggests that the military in Pakistan is exceptional in being the only state institution that is not plagued by traditional kinship loyalties, patronage politics or ethnic or religious divisions. Ironically, the reasons for the military's immunity to the 'demands of kinship' lie in its ability to extract a large share of resources from the Pakistani state, enabling it to function as a kinship group itself, extracting patronage from the state and distributing it to its own members (2011:62). The Pakistani military meets two essential criteria of kinship groups: the ability to look after and protect the interests of the group and affective investment in the group through ideas of honour and prestige. The *extension* of honour from families and tribes to the regiment and the military is

⁵⁴ Pakistan Armed Services Board (PASB) Islamabad and DASB Chakwal, March-May 2015.

deliberately sought by the military in training and service. The institution of the military can demand this loyalty because of the unparalleled economic benefits it offers, not as job incentives but as paternalistic welfare patronage garbed in robes of honour and collective solidarity. Entry into military service is a desire for membership in an institution that, once it takes you into its folds, protects you from the vicissitudes of life that are your fate in a state that is perceived as predatory and as failing to fulfil its promises about social justice and welfare.

The Politics of Recruitment: Cultivating the (New) Martial

In this section, I briefly examine the Pakistan Army's recruitment policies, laying bare for inspection the politics that drive these decisions and the processes involved in cultivating districts for service in the military. While the former may be somewhat tangential to my research project, the latter provides me with insights into how these relationships are formed, and more importantly provides support for my earlier argument that building districts that provide recruits is not just a simple process of handing out financial rewards. In other words, material gains on their own are not sufficient explanation, and the desire for enlistment is filtered through paternalistic ties which are crafted over time between these districts and the institution of the military.

Recruitment policies for the soldier class of the Pakistan Army can be divided into three broad phases. The *first* phase, immediately after partition, was most clearly marked by the 'martial race hangover' (Rizvi 2003:128), as British-trained native officers, who mostly came from the same region, continued British policies.⁵⁵ Clive Dewey (1991) suggests that this also made strategic sense, as due to their district's long association with the military these inductees were halfway to being soldiers already. They needed less training and were willing *volunteers*, who met the immediate demands of the Pakistani military as it struggled to fill up the moth-eaten force it had inherited after partition (Rizvi 2003; Cloughley 2000). The army's regiments were mostly *pure*, meaning that their soldiers and officers were of broadly the same ethnic origin, as most of their members were drawn from the same localized recruiting pools created by the British. The three large infantry regiments – Punjab, Frontier Force and Baluch – were comprised mostly of Punjabis, with Pashtuns in second place. After the 1965 war, the smaller East Bengal Regiment, also formed after partition, was upgraded, and there was an increase in induction from East Pakistan.

⁵⁵ General 1 (ret'd.) 20th June 2015.

After 1971, the clamour against Punjabi domination of the military increased, intensifying further in 1973 when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called in the Pakistani military to settle the insurgency in Baluchistan. This marks the *second* phase, featuring some movement towards the encouragement of induction from Sindh and Baluchistan.⁵⁶ However, the predominant groups represented remained Punjabi and Pashtun, albeit from a wider net in Punjab. The Sindh Infantry Regiment was raised by General Zia in 1980, partly to offset the popularity of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and here we see recruitment into the military army being used as a tool to win over support in areas that were resentful of a Punjabi-dominated military. Around this time, regiments stopped being pure. This move was largely due to lessons learned from the Bangladesh debacle, when pure Bengali units mutinied against West Pakistan.

The opening up of recruitment did not mean that inductees were automatically attracted from these areas. The soldier class has traditionally been rural, and in many of the newer provinces educational qualifications were not sufficient to meet the selection criteria, while many young men were also hesitant to enlist in the military. Military discipline and service – which came so easily to Punjab, or so it has been suggested (Dewey 1991) – was an alien way of living on these newer terrains that had not been disciplined through generational service.⁵⁷ The initial response from Sindhis and Baluchis was not enthusiastic. As such, even as criteria were lowered and they joined, dropout rates were higher amongst these recruits.⁵⁸ Hence the shift towards more ethnically mixed regiments was sluggish, and while men from these provinces were encouraged to apply, no serious quotas were set. Recruitment happened largely through mobilization teams working through local schools and mosques rather than through local institutional apparatus like the recruitment centres scattered strategically across Punjab, although some centres were set up in these areas. The number of Sindhis and Baluchis did increase, but they included sons of Punjabi ex-servicemen who had settled on land given to them by the army in Sindh and Baluchistan.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Two more infantry regiments were raised in this period: Azad Kashmir or AK (1971) and Sindh (1980). The former had previously been known as the Azad Kashmir Regular Force (AKRF) and had been a territorial force whose recruitment and operations were restricted to Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.

⁵⁷ General 1 (retd.) 20th June 2015.

⁵⁸ Colonel 2, infantry regiment training centre, 11th August, 2015.

⁵⁹ This information is based on interviews with a number of army officers, including two retired generals (1 and 2), two serving colonels (2 and 3) and Major 3, interviewed on 24th June, 25th June, 11th August, 17th April and 12th May 2015 respectively.

The *third* phase, starting in the late 1990s,⁶⁰ saw the Pakistani military's move away from geographical and ethnic localization towards a more nationally integrated force. From this time on, the Pakistan Army claimed to follow a specific policy of broadening its recruitment base, and in 2001 it put forward a ten-year recruitment plan not just to encourage but to ensure recruitment from Sindh and Baluchistan, as well as to increase minority recruitment.⁶¹ A purported fall in recruitment from Punjab from 63.86% in 1991 to 43.33% in 2005 was accompanied by a corresponding rise in all other areas of Pakistan. Furthermore, in 2005, central Punjab had a higher recruitment rate (7500) than northern Punjab (5000), where the martial districts are located (Nawaz 2008:571).

The GHQ maintains that soldier recruitment occurs strictly according to the new national integration policy, which sets district quotas based on male population figures from the 1998 census.⁶² Induction numbers are based upon yearly rates of *wastage*, a term used by the GHQ to refer to soldiers lost due to death, injury, desertion or retirement. While provincial quotas are fixed, district quotas can be shifted if targets within a district are not met. It is important to highlight here that these quotas are provincial, not ethnic, and second generation Punjabis who are residents of less represented provinces can apply from Sindh or Baluchistan.⁶³

The move towards a nationally integrated army is ostensibly an acknowledgment that it no longer serves the military's purpose to largely draw upon and subsequently benefit only one or two provinces. While this might be couched in language about the right to serve and national integration, it also translates into increasing military patronage in other parts of Pakistan, in districts and provinces that were marginalized in the past and did not benefit from the job opportunities and extensive welfare system that the military offers its employees. Extending the benefits of military service to a wider group garners more support and loyalty for the institution and also addresses the criticism that the military is Punjabi-dominated.

Opening up recruitment does not immediately translate into long lines at the army's door. Over the years, recruitment from less represented areas has increased gradually.

⁶⁰ The Northern Light Infantry was raised during this period, its status was changed from a paramilitary force to a regular army regiment, an acknowledgement of its services in the Kargil war. Enlistment had previously been from Gilgit Baltistan, but from this point on it functioned as a mixed regiment.

⁶¹ Staff correspondent (2007, September 14th). Punjab's dominance in army being reduced. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <http://www.dawn.com/news/266159/punjab>

⁶² These quotas have set for the soldier class only. A corresponding policy of increasing the representation of all parts of Pakistan among officers also exists, but there are no strict quotas. Christina Fair and Shuja Nawaz (2011) report that the demographics of the officer class are changing, but here too the available data is subject to the problem that numbers reflect residency in a province rather than ethnicity.

⁶³ PA Directorate- GHQ, 15th January 2015.

This has been made possible by relaxing criteria and boosting recruitment drives by increasing the number of recruitment and selection centres in districts, as well as by sending recruitment teams to districts, which are less amenable to military service. The military has also invested in efforts to reach out to these areas, many of which are long term mechanisms such as the construction of cadet schools and colleges, regiment centres and military cantonments to establish a visible presence and build trust with local populations. Unlike the British, the military in these provinces does not rely only on local feudal leadership – some of which may actually lean towards the ethno-nationalist struggles that the state has suppressed. Instead, it also relies on its own considerable resources and network of auxiliary organizations to slowly increase military valence within the area. This is not to suggest that economic backwardness is not an important push factor. As Colonel 3 remarked, ‘the situation in some of these areas [backward parts of Baluchistan] is dire, and I have seen soldiers cry when they receive their first pay as they have never seen so much money’.⁶⁴ Continued success in developing areas amenable to military service depends on a blend of economic desperation, embedding a positive image of the military and establishing a presence through investment in infrastructure, education or health, welfare services and steady rewards through land grants. Over the years this develops into a relationship of patronage that can be hard to dislodge, which Colonel 3 likened to a ‘*chaska*’ (taste), an addiction which once tasted is hard to let go of. Ensuring loyalty from these non-martial classes may not be such a huge obstacle, as paternalistic bonds and relationships continue to strengthen over time. However, expanding the recruitment pool to the rest of the country poses a challenge for the military in terms of how it will meet the more costly demands for welfare and surveillance that is not geographically concentrated.

Living in the ‘Land of the Valiant’: Chakwal District



Photograph 2: Entrance to Chakwal city

⁶⁴ Colonel 3, Rawalpindi District Recruitment Centre, 17th April 2015.

In this section I investigate Chakwal District in order to better understand how the dynamics I highlighted in the first sections of this chapter play out in local spaces. To contextualize this, I briefly present the geographical, socio-economic and political landscape of the district.

General Zia-ul Haq upgraded Chakwal to district status in 1985 by combining parts of Jhelum District with one Tehsil from Attock District. Chakwal District forms part of the Salt Range and the Potohar Plateau, which are characterized by uneven terrain, large deposits of rock salt in the soil and uncertain rainfall. The Salt Range is situated between the valleys of the Indus and Jhelum rivers in northern Punjab. Its terrain, covered with scrub forest in the southwest and featuring plains interrupted by dry rock in the north and northeast has been described as 'a confused medley of hillock and hollow' (Darling 1947:74). This district is what is known as a *barani* area, and 96% of agricultural demand for water is met by rainwater (Punjab Lok Sujaag n.d.:22). As a result, not only is there little land for cultivation, it is agriculturally insecure even in areas where agricultural activities are carried out. Agricultural land holdings are typically small, and the district's primary reliance is on service in the armed forces, including the army, air force, navy and civilian law enforcement including the police. The Pakistan Army is the largest employer among these, followed by the air force. Other sectors that provide some employment in the district are mining, transport and poultry. A growing employment trend has been migration to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia for work.

Chakwal's rural population is amongst the highest in Punjab, with only 12.9% of its people residing in urban settings according to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2007-2008. (Bureau of, Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of the Punjab, 2009:4). Its population has grown from 1,083,725, according to the 1998 census, to 1,384,000 today (Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab 2015:292). It has a relatively high literacy rate of over 71%, among the highest in Punjab (ibid.:152-153). Chakwal has eighty one Basic Health Units (BHUs) and dispensaries, ten Rural Health Centres (RHCs) and six government hospitals (ibid.:198).

In their paper *The Geography of Poverty, Evidence from Punjab*, which looks at patterns of poverty at the sub-provincial level, Ali Cheema et al. (2008) make some interesting observations about North Punjab, where Chakwal is located. This placement is based on Andrew Wilder's (1999:34) division of Punjab into four regions: North, Central, South

and West.⁶⁵ The North includes four of the region's traditional military recruitment areas: Chakwal, Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Attock. North Punjab has the least registered factories and the fewest adults who report daily labour as their primary occupation. It has the most concrete houses, the highest figure for remittances as a proportion of total household income, the largest proportion of houses reporting migrant labour and the greatest percentage of the working age population employed by government (Cheema et al, 2008:168). The number of those who have completed matric (the basic qualifying criterion for entrance to the armed forces) is also the highest, and Cheema et al. suggest that households in the North are 'well integrated into the national and international labour market' with the North doing better than other regions 'in spite of low levels of industrialization and dependence on rain-fed agriculture' (2008:187). It can well be argued that these statistics partly reflect the cumulative impact of years of acting as a recruitment base for the armed forces. More importantly, it highlights the district's willingness to search outside its borders for employment, as well as an inability to find secure employment locally, a socialization that has been honed over years of service in the military.

Chakwal has two National Assembly seats and four provincial assembly seats and is considered a Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz area. Chakwal's political landscape is complex, and it is claimed that the hold of the local Shia feudal landlords has lessened over time, in part due to the rise of the middle class, aided by remittances coming from abroad, the rising influence of religious-political Sunni parties and also a new political elite with military roots.⁶⁶ General (retd.) Majeed Malik, who served in WW II under the British Indian Army, has controlled one of the local National Assembly seats through five general elections since 1985, defeating Sardar Ghulam Abbas, a key Shia political rival and an important landlord. In 2002 graduation from university became a mandatory educational qualification for National Assembly members and Malik retired from active politics, but his nephew, Major (retd.) Rao Tahir, has won the same seat in subsequent elections, except in 2007 when a power sharing agreement led to the retired general backing another politician (Punjab Lok Sujaag n.d :34-37). Chakwal's political scene is considered a seedbed of organized religious influence, closely related to a rising Sunni middle class with ties to the military-derived elite (Nelson 2016).

⁶⁵ The classification is based on a mix of factors, including geographical boundaries, the borders of older divisions, differences in agricultural patterns and historical influences.

⁶⁶ These religious cleavages have played out along political lines, with the Shias of Chakwal supporting pro-Shia Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM) and Sunni support invested in Sipah-e-Sahaba, known as Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat (ASWJ).

Owing to its large military class, a sizeable portion of the district's development has been linked to senior military officers who have carried out development work in their own villages during their service or after retirement. While some of these have been private efforts only partially subsidized by the military, such as the setting up of schools, colleges and hospitals, others are district development projects, funds for which have come from provincial and district governments. Generals have facilitated the construction of metalled roads or the supply of gas to their villages, and often to villages along the way. It is important to add here that these development works are not carried out by ex-army officers acting as elected officials, but represent actions taken by former or serving senior military officers who use their influence over the civil machinery.⁶⁷ While it may be inaccurate to say that the demand to establish Chakwal District materialized only as a result of military patronage, it is an interesting reflection that the district was approved by General Zia with active lobbying from a retired general from the area, Majeed Malik, at a time when the Governor of Punjab also happened to be a General – General (retd.) Ghulam Jillani.

Five projects in Chakwal are run by the Fauji Foundation, one of which is a 70-bed hospital. The Fauji Foundation estimates its beneficiary population within the district at 70,9176, meaning that nearly half (51%) of the district's population is considered a beneficiary in terms of health, education and employment. This figure represents dependents of ex-servicemen, but does not include retired personnel themselves or families of serving personnel who are eligible for medical care in the Combined Military Hospitals (CMH) that exist in all major cantonments across Pakistan.⁶⁸ It is estimated that 2500 to 3000 ex-servicemen or their next of kins in Chakwal are employed in the Fauji Foundation's various projects in the District. In addition, five Vocational Training Institutes for women and girls train both civilian and army dependents.⁶⁹

Chakwal has its own Category A DASB⁷⁰ which was set up in 1988, three years after the district was formed. It deals with approximately 105,000 pensioners, including mothers and widows, and has a total of 68 Welfare Officers (WOs) for Chakwal's 72 Union Councils. An additional office in Talagang Tehsil has been set up to handle the greater higher number of pensioners in that area.⁷¹ The Selection Recruitment Office (SRO) in

⁶⁷ General Majeed Malik, Chaudary Zafar and Ayaz Amir, interviewed 5th Jan, 30th April, 2015 & 12th June 2015 respectively.

⁶⁸ For Chakwal this would be the CMH in the neighbouring districts of Jhelum or Rawalpindi.

⁶⁹ Colonel 4, Fauji Foundation, 3rd March 2015.

⁷⁰ Category A reflects boards in areas with a large number of ex-servicemen (over 15,000).

⁷¹ Secretary DASB Chakwal, 21st January 2015.

Chakwal was established in 2013, until when aspiring recruits had to travel to the Selection and Recruitment Office in Jhelum. It appears that the Jhelum office was having a hard time maintaining discipline and handling the large number of applications received from both Jhelum and Chakwal districts.

The Fauji Foundation's health programs, DASBs and SRO in Chakwal serve as local accessible mini versions of the military institution, especially for the extended military family, the dependents of the soldier class in these local spaces. These are friendly local reminders that the institution is invested in the district and will continue to provide it with patronage. To some extent this was the same purpose served by DSBs in colonial times, yet these relationships need to be analysed closely to uncover some of the shifts. The next section examines these dynamics through the lens of local recruitment practices.

Local Recruitment Politics

Intake from Chakwal is 4% of the national total, a ratio assigned based on the National Integration Policy announced by the Adjutant General of the Pakistan Military in 2001. This ratio is based on male population projections from the 1998 census.

Year	Registration	Total Induction	Inducted from Chakwal
2004	178,974	33,152	1,330
2005	153,917	37,355	1,587
2006	113,632	41,343	1,903
2007	80,765	30,665	1,719
2008	77,246	38,238	2,093
2009	117,678	56,243	2,494
2010	139,518	53,804	2,099
2011	143,940	27,133	861
2012	166,530	37,529	1,248
2013	146,320	21,041	650

Table 1: Pakistan Army Induction Data 2004-2013⁷²

Data provided by the Personnel Administration (PA) Directorate at the GHQ shows that Chakwal's contribution ranged from 3% to 5.6% of the total intake over the ten-year period from 2004 to 2013. There are two intakes every year, one in October/November – a more popular season as it coincides with the results of the Matriculation exams (the ten-year school certification that is a minimum qualification for entry) – and one in April/May – for which applicant numbers are lower due to the reaping season and the

⁷² Data provided by the PA Directorate- GHQ, Rawalpindi, 15th January 2015.

fact that many boys and their families work as farm labour. Another reason for the lower turnout during this intake is that police service inductions happen around the same time. Although cognizant of this, the Major (3),⁷³ in charge of the SRO, felt no great trepidation regarding targets, for an average of 7000 to 9000 apply each year anyway, of which the total intake will be between 650 and 2494 (the lowest and highest intake figures for Chakwal, in 2013 and 2009 respectively). Interestingly, this intake peaked in 2007 and 2008, with 5.6% and 5.5% of total intake, while there was a corresponding decrease in the number of applicants nationwide. As the PA Directorate informed me, district quotas can be adjusted within provinces, which suggests that Chakwal's willingness to line up outside the recruitment centre serves as a back-up in case the need for recruits is not met elsewhere. On the whole, however, there has been a steady decline in recruits from Chakwal, with only 650 men selected in 2013 (3% of the total).

The selection and recruitment process is a step-wise multiple hurdle model, with applicants screened out at each stage. An official notification in the city's newspapers announces the commencement of induction, accompanied by banners announcing the opening dates. A two to three week registration process follows, which screens the thousands of applicants who line up every day for basic eligibility criteria such as education, domicile and their father's military discharge papers if applicable. A special column allows the person applying to state whether he is a next of kin of a *shaheed*. Approximately 60% make it to the next stage, a physical examination. Large posters on the verandah where these boys wait before going in for the physical exam display various physical deformities that make them ineligible. Boys can be rejected at this stage due to their height or chest measurements falling below standards or for having knock knees, flat feet, poor muscle development, colour blindness, a depressed chest or leukoderma, the last being a skin disorder with no apparent manifestation other than a discolouring of the skin. Major 3 informed me that 'the men need to look smart, a person with this disease is disfigured, so if I have so much choice, why not? I can pick the best of the best'. Apparently the rejection rate at this stage is almost 50%, as many of these boys are undernourished and have been exposed to hard manual labour in the fields during their developmental years.

I provide here a summary of my conversations with twelve of the applicants I interviewed during the April/May 2015 intake to present a glimpse of how the district and its aspiring recruits view enlistment. A large number were from families with male

⁷³ Major 3, SRO office, Chakwal, 17th April 2015.

members who had served in the military. There was a mix of sentiments: many seemed determined to get in, some applying for the second or third time (the military allows them to re-apply provided they are under 23). Others were there to placate anxious parents who wanted them to apply and try to get into the army at least once. This rang true to my experience, for it was hard to meet a male who met the minimum educational criteria in these villages who had not at some point applied to the armed forces. Pressure often comes from parents, particularly fathers who have served in the military, and it seems the older generation is more invested in continuing with the area's specialization in this type of labour. As one young man wryly put it: 'In our village, when a child is born the village *maulvi* (local cleric) gives *azan* in one ear (a ritual which involves the Islamic call to prayer being whispered in the ear of the new born, marking the child as Muslim), and in the other the mother and father whisper, son grow up and become a *fauji* (military man)'.⁷⁴

Me: How many of you applied from your class?

Applicant: We were 60, out of which 30 passed and about 21 of us have applied.

Me: Why do people from this area apply?

Applicant: We want a bright future and also we want to serve the country. If something happens to us, then our families, brothers and sisters will benefit. Whether we serve or die, we get a pension, medical coverage. If we talk about civilians, they are not serving the nation in the same way we do. They are thinking of their own selves, like you are doing your PhD, you are thinking about yourself.

Me: Those in the *fauj* don't think about their own selves?

Applicant: No, the *fauji* is not thinking about himself, he is handing himself over to the *fauj*, he is serving his country and he is serving his family.

(19-year old applicant at the SRO office, Chakwal, 4th June 2015)

The above excerpt points to the reasons for applying to the Army and is oddly reminiscent of the letter from the Sikh soldier in the British Indian Army cited earlier. The military remains a benevolent institution that you can risk your life for because it looks after the family, and dying and living can mean the same thing in some ways. Yet it is also something different: the applicant now also looks on the army as a 'bright' career path, a path of sacrifice that is superior to the selfish civilian way of life. I will pick up on some of these themes in the next chapter, which deals with the training of soldiers and the dichotomies that are constructed between civilian and army ways of life. Much like

⁷⁴ Saleem, adjoining village local, 20th April 2015.

colonial times, when the *Sarkar* was looked on as a benevolent caregiver who would look after the *sipahi*, these relationships are set within the same paternalistic frames.

However, they are also different in three distinct ways, the first of which has to do with the process of recruitment itself.

First, in colonial times loyalties and bonds with tribal kinship groups remained strong despite enlistment in the military, as enlistment itself was bound up with membership of these kinship groups. The Pakistani military is not a foreign force that needs local intermediaries, and moreover years of sustained contact with these districts through institutional apparatus that have local direct outreach have to a large extent made this intermediary layer redundant. This distinction has come more into play since the initiation of the national integration policy. Prior to this, military recruitment at village level continued to be looked on as a kinship privilege, and a family or *biraderi* (extended clan) member who was ex-army personnel would encourage younger men in his clan to show up on recruitment day at the recruitment centre or accompany them directly to the regiment centre to which he himself was attached and where he could ensure entry. Mobile teams would also visit village schools and mosques, and potential recruits would be encouraged to visit the nearest recruitment centre for qualifying tests etc. With the announcement of stringent district quotas as well as the centralization of selection at GHQ level, the recruitment process has become more streamlined.

As a result, the role of local influential people (including ex-military officers and soldiers) has declined. In my discussions with the DASB Secretary,⁷⁵ and Major 3⁷⁶ in charge of the Recruitment Office, the fact that local influential people put pressure on them and interfered in their work was brought up repeatedly. I will deal separately with these two types of influencers, the civilian (feudal landowners and politicians) and the military (former senior officers from the area).

Considerable pressure from local civilian politicians and other influential people in the area over recruitment and the settlement of disputes around compensation was frequently reported. This is hardly surprising in the national context, where patronage politics is part and parcel of daily bureaucratic functioning. However, I highlight this with respect to the tone in which it was mentioned. Where pressure and influence was considered stressful, and where it probably impacted decision-making, in other words

⁷⁵ 26th March and 15th April 2015

⁷⁶ 21st May and 4th June 2015.

where these actors continue to be influential to some extent, they were mentioned as encumbrances not facilitators. These groups no longer act as intermediaries, as they did in the time of British rule. Their position seems to have shifted from being an important link in the chain, needed to ensure the ongoing supply of men, a link that had been created and protected earlier, to encumbrances who need to be placated but are now a nuisance who create obstacles to the delivery of service.

However, even though recruitment systems have become more formalized and criteria-driven, the *sifarish* (recommendations) that come from ex-servicemen, both the officer class and JCOs who have access to the senior officers with whom they have served, still hold weight.⁷⁷ The institution is increasingly insulated from civilian pressure, or at least tries to be, but is vulnerable to pressures from within. As suggested earlier, the military acts a kinship group, where favours and patronage are given to members of its own class in a perpetuating fashion. It provides patronage and protection directly to its constituents and increasingly regards local politicians and influentials as encumbrances that can and probably do interfere with the bureaucratic functioning of the Board and the Recruitment Office. In short, decades of the presence of these institutions in these local spaces and their integration with bureaucratic machinery has institutionalized the presence of the military in these districts and built a direct relationship with the soldier class it serves.

Second, unlike in colonial times, when loyalty was tied to the monolithic *Sarkar*, in the former colony this bond is with the institution of the military, which can at various times be locked in a power struggle with the government. In Pakistan, with its history of three distinct military coups and military interference in politics and civilian affairs even during times where power rests with the civilian establishment, the *Sarkar* is no longer perceived as an uncomplicated singular category, but instead the *fauj* (military) and the *hakumat* (government) are often viewed as two distinct entities. The opening of an exclusive office in Chakwal was welcomed by the district at large as it saves applicants the expense of the repeated visits to the SRO that the induction process entails. There was some competition between the district's civil administration and local military influentials as to who would take credit for bringing the recruitment office to the district.⁷⁸ At one level this speaks to the dynamic in the district, where facilitation of recruitment from the district is a way to score points with the population, an indication

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ DASB Secretary and Major 3, 15th April 2015 and 21st May 2015 respectively.

of the district's strong valence towards military recruitment. It also clearly points to how the *Sarkar* is no longer seen as a monolithic category in present day Chakwal, where the military establishment is seen as distinct from and sometimes in competition with the civil administration. This is more pronounced among the military class in the district: soldiers, ex-soldiers and families. They refer to *hakumati* (governmental) policies versus military polices and *hakumati* modes of working (defined as incompetent or often corrupt) and military discipline (defined as efficient and fair) as distinct and sometimes incompatible. The soldier enters into a social contract with the military and it is to this entity that his loyalty is tied, sometimes over and above loyalty to the civilian government, with the latter often viewed in pejorative terms. It would be accurate to say that over the years, with continued direct and indirect military rule and the accessibility of more systematic and organized welfare schemes for the soldier class at the district level, the relationship between the military and the soldier class has morphed into a direct relationship, with the military as a group standing distinct from the government, often without the presence of the traditional local feudal leadership.

Third, there is a need to garb this mercenary and paternalistic relationship in tropes of nationalism and religious zeal. In colonial times this was an attempt to glorify martial spirit, ideas of *ghairat* (honour) associated with caste and loyalty to the *Sarkar* (Caplan 2010; Singh 2014). In the former colony, the Pakistani military has relied heavily on constructing a more ideological and religiously motivated imagining of the soldier, as evidenced in the analysis presented in Chapter 1. I address this in more detail in the next section.

Inscribing Service and Sacrifice: Re-assertions of the Martial

In this section, I focus on the weaving in of martial spirit and the nation-state with the threads that bind the district to the military, threads intertwined with other strands of *ghurbat* (poverty), *naukri* (job) and *sahulat* (facilities).⁷⁹ More specifically, my interest lies in how this weave, often presented as an afterthought by my interlocutors (as the conversations I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter suggest) continues to be inscribed by the subjects themselves on their imaginations, on their bodies and on the landscape of the district and the purpose this inscription serves.

A hundred years and fifty years and more of steady specialization as military labour have produced a district that pronounces itself the embodiment of all that is martial. The entrance to Chakwal city, the main city in Chakwal District, is marked by a wooden

⁷⁹ These terms came up repeatedly in my conversations with villagers.

structure made of thick planks displaying its martial legacy in large silver letters: 'Well Come(sic) to Chakwal City, The Land of the Valiant'. It is a district that has served both the colonial and the national state, and it has sacrificed the lives of its loved ones for it.



Photograph 3: Martyrs' monument in Chakwal city

The sacrifices are visible across the graveyards that dot the rural countryside marked by the national flag, tombstones with regimental plaques and colours and white stone edifices left by the British *sarkar* that state the number of men who went from a particular village to the world wars as well as the number of those who did not return. Service is visible too in the new *Yaadgar-e Shuhada* (Martyrs' Memorial) monument installed in 2015 in Chakwal's main thoroughfare, in an old fighter plane installed by civil society in a public park with support from the district government and in references made to military service and sacrifice in both national commemorative events and trade and cultural promotional events in the district.



Photograph 4: A poster installed for 'Chakwal Mega Family Festival', April 2015

As a district of the *martial* belt, Chakwal continues to fashion its imagining around its martial traditions, even as competing narratives of identity creep in. These competing narratives intersect and sometimes conflict with each other, and structures of power in communities compete for new forms of subjection and new articulations of identity. Examples of this include increasingly urbanized village life and exposure to consumer culture and lifestyles that make military discipline less appealing, claims from rival militant religious groups that may be in contention with the state and competing, and perhaps more attractive, livelihood opportunities as migrant unskilled labour in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Steady remittances from abroad have translated into upward mobility for a rising middle class (Cheema et al. 2008). The shifts in fortunes of these families is evident because the improvement in lifestyle happens faster than investment in army service and perhaps because earlier migrants were from poorer families with little or no landholdings.⁸⁰ Work in the Gulf was initially regarded as demeaning, as it is largely manual labour, hence those willing to venture abroad were from the non-landholding class. This pejorative attribution has lessened over time, but the prestige and long-term security associated with military service remains, although the valence around it may have decreased somewhat due to these shifts.

Although these competing articulations of identity need to be acknowledged, my specific interest remains on the gradual unlocking of the relationship between the district and the military institution as the military turns to the new national integration policy, and the response this unlocking evokes in its subjects. Based on my interviews in the districts, it was clear that the reduction in quotas for Chakwal has given rise to anxiety

⁸⁰ Based on interviews with villagers and district politicians.

and resentment among the district's residents, especially (but not only) for its rural base, which continues to depend heavily on employment in the military for its livelihood.

Sindhis don't want to serve, they rob and steal at night, how can they work in the morning? It is still a feudal system there, very low education. Our area has been in service for a long time, war is our livelihood, the army has brought prosperity, it has brought in a regular monthly income (...) Now people don't get service in the army, many sell land and their animals and go to the Gulf. The army is taking from everywhere now, Chakwal is no longer that important.

(Retd. Havildar Sohaib Khan, Palwal, 28th October 2015)

One of the problems now is caste, this Sindhi, Balouchi, Pathan and Punjabi. Our people face a number of difficulties because of this. A Sindhi gets in, he is primary, a Punjabi goes (to the centre), he is FA or even BA, but the Sindhi gets in because there is a vacancy in the Sindhi quota. The poor Punjabi is left holding the degree in his hand, his space has been taken up by this uneducated boy. [In case of of] promotion also, the Punjabi is sitting idle and the Sindhi is getting promoted after two years. [...] the policy is ok, it is everybody's right to serve, but they should set vacancies looking at areas' needs and resources.

(Retd. Senior Technician, Air Force, Bashir, Palwal, 5th November 2014)

There is clear resentment expressed for what is perceived as unfair treatment of Punjabis. The district's residents see themselves as more suited to serve, an entitlement based on higher literacy rates, a track record of having served in the military and lower rates of industrialization and employment opportunities in their area. People from Chakwal have come to view military service as their '*muraba* and *saanat*' (land and industry),⁸¹ and they feel justified in staking the first claim to it over and above other parts of Punjab and Pakistan with irrigated land or industry.

Resentment is also expressed about the centralization of the recruitment process. The recruitment system demands that names are sent to the GHQ after selection, which then finalizes entrants. According to the PA Directorate at the GHQ this allows them to fine-tune lists based on their current induction requirements and keep a strict check on unfair recruitment practices at the district level. For the district this translates into a reduction in their ability to use their local patronage systems – local influentials and ex-army servicemen – who before this centralization were in a better position to influence the final selection. By and large the district perceives that these final lists are not always

⁸¹ Retired Subedar Mohd. Saleem, Kandwal, 4th May 2015.

based on merit, but are influenced by those who have contacts in the military itself, something that for many is out of reach. Some are still able to utilize loopholes such as direct intake at the regimental level, which they access through servicemen in their area. Army regiment centres are mandated to take in recruits for the army soldier class, a parallel system of induction through which regimental centres can carry out the selection process independently. According to the District Recruitment Officer, Major 3, this preoccupation with *sifarish* (recommendation based on unfair use of contacts) and not being given a fair chance is reflective of the district's response to reduced quotas. He suggests that many feel they are being cheated out of what they believe is their birth right, an entitlement to military service.

In response to this loosening of ties, the district holds on to its martial contribution tenaciously, with a firm grip, unwilling to let go. The district is fearful of the inevitable change this will bring and feels a sense of frustration at its paternalistic master, yet it is loath to confront it. This anxiety and resentment expresses itself through an assertion of the district's martial history, hoping to remind the military institution of the district's contributions and sacrifices. It does so to stake a claim to continued patronage from the military, much as the military institution stakes a claim to continued sympathy and support from the nation in the commemorative ceremonies discussed in Chapter 1. I draw upon some discussions and events which took place during my fieldwork in Chakwal to bring out this anxiety and the district's desire to reiterate its *martial* identity.

In the third week of December 2014, the Chakwal District Government inaugurated the Allied Bank Park. The park is centrally located in Chakwal, a small distance away from the now defunct railway station built during colonial times. It displays a decommissioned air force plane donated by the Pakistan Air Force as an acknowledgement of Chakwal's '*askari khidmaat*' (military services).⁸² A retired squadron leader and a Pakistan Air Force chief technician from a nearby village (who, along with a number of retired army servicemen, runs a welfare and development foundation) initiated this idea. On their initiative, a request was made to the Air Headquarters in Islamabad. The district government was initially not as forthcoming on funds, but with some local media lobbying it supported the installation and also donated funds for it. The inauguration ceremony was endorsed by the local civil machinery, politicians and the business community, as well as the ex-military elite of the area, and was covered extensively in the local media. The headline inscribed on the banner for the event was 'For the people of

⁸² A term commonly used by Chakwal city residents, including members of the civil administration.

Chakwal, the land of martyrs and warriors'. The banner was decorated with pictures of senior officers from Chakwal, including Sepoy Khudadad Khan, a resident of Chakwal who was the first Indian Army recipient of the Victoria Cross during World War One.

We have served the country, we call this a martial area but there is no sign that marks it. In the time of the British, they asked the soldier 'what do you want?', they said 'we want a cannon', so they installed a cannon in their village (...)⁸³ This (plane) is not a decoration piece only, there is a cause behind it. Chakwal needs to be recognized, if a person enters the city he should know that this is the area that loves the Armed Forces, the one that is called martial. (...) The idea is that Chakwal needs to be recognized, that it is not a martial area by name only, but we have sacrificed and are doing so every day and this should be visible (...) visibility is important. We have graveyards full of *shaheed*, we have their families, their parents, who instead of pain feel pride. So this pride is reflected through these things.

(Retd. Chief Technician Baber, Pakistan Air Force, village adjoining Palwal, 26th March 2015)

It is important to note here that this was a civilian affair, an initiative of ex-servicemen in the area, the media and the district government. There was no representative from the Air Headquarters, whose role was simply to respond to a request and dispatch the plane. I do not take away from the fact that the plane was dispatched to Chakwal, a district that the Armed Forces recognizes as having been over-represented in the past, nor do I neglect the fact that the request letter to the Air Force highlighted the *askari khidmaat* (military service) of the district, but my emphasis here is on the military institution's role as a passive facilitator. The desire to inscribe loyalty to and affiliation with the Armed Forces upon the district visibly comes from the district itself, or more precisely its large ex-military population.

Independence Day celebrations and other national commemorative events in Chakwal celebrate the district's martial identity and honour the sacrifice and service of the district's men in the various armed forces. Parents of martyrs will often be invited to these events and local school children will be asked to prepare speeches or stage plays on the same themes. Vernacular literature, some written by former military servicemen in Chakwal, also pays homage to the district's military service. The community centre caretaker informed me that in the light of the war in Waziristan the district government had decided to show support for the Armed Forces of Pakistan by building a white

⁸³ This is a reference to the cannon installed by the British in Dulmial village in Chakwal as acknowledgement of the many soldiers offered by this village in WWI (Minhas 2002:366).

marble memorial called *Yaadgaar e Shuhada* (Martyrs' Memorial) like the one at the General Headquarters in Islamabad. They planned to list the names of all the dead on this monument in the city's main thoroughfare so 'they could not be forgotten'.⁸⁴

I argue that Chakwal holds on to its military roots not only because the repressive mechanisms of power lead to the emergence of subjectivities but also through the productive and generative mechanisms whereby the village 'produces domains of objects and rituals of truth' (Foucault 1991:194). It is an ambivalent production, ambivalent not by the strength of its resolve to produce or ritualize, but an ambivalence that lies in its substance, where it mentions the nation-state and its martial past in an almost rhetorical way. So while it may build monument upon monument, decorate grave upon grave and fly the flag of Pakistan higher and higher on the bodies of its dead, the parameters of what drives these men to continue to invest in the military lie in *ghurбат* (poverty) and the desire for membership of a kinship group that provides social welfare. This production is made all the more desperate because of the fear that the *maa baap* may be withdrawing. Here service, sacrifice and lives become bargaining chips for claims to benefits. The nation-state comes in much later, reflecting how the nation-state is a newer invention in the long history of these people's willingness to serve and sacrifice in the military.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the historical, physical and political terrain of Chakwal, a famed martial district in Punjab that provides troops for the Pakistan Armed Forces, through the lens of the symbiotic relationship between this district and the Pakistani military. To say that the only appeal of military recruitment is the military's ability to offer a comprehensive and competitive job package unrivalled by other public sector employers would not do justice to the ways these relationships function. Generous financial incentives certainly form the foundations of these relationships, but their mechanics and substance are equally significant.

In these rural martial areas of contemporary Pakistan, the military institution functions in large part as a social welfare system that looks after its soldiers (and their families) from the 'cradle to the grave and beyond'.⁸⁵ The district's population, especially those directly affiliated to the military, regard it as a benefactor, a modern kinship group in a historically feudal society. Unlike the colonial *sipahi*, who often looked to the *Sarkar* for

⁸⁴ Community centre caretaker, 26th March 2015.

⁸⁵ Brigadier 3, PASB, Rawalpindi, 25th March 2015.

benevolent support through patronage mechanisms bound up with kinship and tribal ties in the village, the subjects of modern day militarism have a deep sense of entitlement and an ability to access and obtain patronage directly from the military institution. Furthermore, in the context of Pakistan, where different times the military can be locked in a power struggle with the civil government or even take over from it, the *Sarkar* is no longer perceived as a monolithic category. Instead the *fauj* emerges as a category independent of the *hakumat* (government) or the larger *Sarkar*. The relationship or social contract is not with the *Sarkar* but with the institution of the military, and it is to this institution that the subject's loyalty is bound.

Both the military institution and the subjects of the project of militarism have an obsessive need to garb these more mercenary and transactional attachments in robes of honour and selfless sacrifice. This chapter has outlined how subjects strive to make their martial status visible in the district, an inscription made more visible because of rising anxieties about reduced intake quotas from a district no longer considered martial by the new military recruitment policy. The chapter has argued that while discourses of the nation-state and memories and myths about a martial past and tradition are abundantly voiced and echo through this terrain, they remain just that, echoes, hollow sounds that endlessly repeat themselves. These are not the threads that hold this relationship in place. It is the systematic, organized and generous welfare services for troops and their families that legitimize the military's claim on the bodies of men. In this local terrain, narratives of service and sacrifice become a bargaining chip for continued membership and claim-making in the modern kinship group that is the Pakistani military.

Chapter 3: Regimes of Discipline, Regimes of Difference

You have to take a civilian, you cannot afford to waste a single minute, he is absolutely raw material, he doesn't know how to talk or walk. He is basically a wild animal in a *shalwar kameez*. I wish you could see the recruit when he comes to us. You should see his body language. You only have 23 weeks and you have to make him into a proper fighting soldier (...) who on completion of training must be converted into someone who is physically fit, almost hyper fit. He must be mentally robust. It is only 23 weeks of training, and there is no time to spare, it's like putting the boy through a *bhatti* (kiln), he goes through these hardships so the fear inside him comes out. He must be professionally trained in battle tactics, firing weapons and admin, and he must be a motivated soldier. By this I mean *esprit de corps*,⁸⁶ to feel a sense of pride in my unit, my platoon, my regiment. If a man learns to fight for his unit, he will fight for his country because we fight for our home and what we love. Second, there is the religious point of view: it is a sacred profession.

(Colonel 2, Chief Instructor – infantry regiment training centre,
Abbottabad, 11th August, 2015)

The above extract from an interview gives a glimpse of how the soldier figure is imagined by his superiors and the qualities they believe he must possess. It also draws attention to the methods and processes through which the shift from the civilian to the martial is made possible. Methods marked by urgency ('only 23 weeks') and a sense of incredulity that the object before turns into the object after. 'There is no time to spare' refers to the challenge of the task ahead and the need for time to be carefully managed, divided up into minutes and seconds, each to be accounted for and each planned. No time to spare and no spare time! These are processes of transformation that claim to turn the 'wild animal' into a 'proper fighting soldier', a new being that functions and changes at three levels: the body, the mind and the heart. Training aims to change all three, a '*mukammal*'⁸⁷ (complete) transformation, he looks different ('hyper fit'), he feels different ('motivated soldier') and he thinks differently ('mentally robust and professionally trained'). A sculpting of the rustic, backward body ('in *shalwar kameez*') that transforms him from an object of ridicule ('you should see his body language') into a person worthy of respect ('sacred profession'). A mind that is disciplined or put through the fire so he can think in militarized ways, in terms of tactics, where everything has a name and everything is a battle. A heart that does not fear, that is sculpted by love and

⁸⁶ The literal meaning of this French term which is often invoked by officers of the Pakistani military is 'group spirit'. Similar terms have been used to describe the morale of troops since the time of the Roman legions.

⁸⁷ Sipahi Zafar Khan, Palwal, 14th November 2014.

loyalty to new objects of attachment built on primordial essences like religion, land and home.

Two competing visions of the soldier of the modern nation-state that I find relevant to draw on as I begin this chapter are the soldier as a professional, distanced from civilian life, achieved through meticulous training and discipline (Huntington 1964; Finer 1976; Perlmutter 1977) and the soldier as an armed peasant or worker (Trotsky 1967). In his fascinating account of the Indian soldier in the service of the British Indian Army, *The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and The Two World Wars*, Gajendra Singh (2014:4-5) suggests that British imaginings of colonial soldiers operated between two poles. The *siphai* was an 'occidental soldier', subject to the military bureaucracy, laws and discipline, and yet the same time he was still 'recognizably Indian', a 'pseudo historical' subject, an accident of the ever changing definitions of the mythical martial race. In the former he is no longer a civilian or a primitive, a dramatic shift from his earlier being, while in the latter he is essentially unchanged, just armed and perhaps better trained in violence. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Pakistani military's dependence on martial areas for troops lasted until as late as 2001, and it continued to rely on a certain pool of districts (albeit somewhat expanded within Punjab and KP) as its primary recruiting ground. Many officers and soldiers I interviewed suggested that men from the martial regions of Punjab and KP had greater willingness and ability to serve due to their extended exposure to the military lifestyle. This exposure made it easier for boys coming from families and districts where the ethos of the army was not so alien to adapt to the demands of military discipline. Despite this, as the passage at the beginning of the chapter shows, what happens in the military training institution is looked upon as a transformation that completely metamorphoses the being subjected to it. It seems that the imaginings of the British Indian Army continue to haunt the modern Pakistani *jawan*,⁸⁸ a double articulation of his subjectivity that positions him as socialized into martialness and already half a soldier (Dewey 1991:263), yet also the uncouth primitive who has to be trained into an occidental soldier.

This chapter interrogates the figure of the *jawan*, the subaltern soldier of the Pakistan Army, from two primary standpoints. Addressed first is how the soldier is imagined and moulded through training, or in other words how the military institution itself sees its soldier class, the aspirations, desires and anxieties it carries and the kind of soldier it wishes to create. This imagining is shaded by its colonial antecedents and rests on a

⁸⁸ The literal meaning of this term is young man. It is used in the Pakistani military to refer to the soldier class,

number of split visions or conflicting juxtapositions of the imagined soldier: the instinctual given of the martial race versus the necessity of the monotonous steady inculcation that is soldier training; the image of the honed diamond that emerges after training versus that of the mindless automaton he is reduced to; the soldier figure who follows orders in battle much like a machine versus the soldier who is paralyzed in battle and has to be cajoled like a child or taunted and humiliated to fight. I use the words split and conflicting to convey the fluidity of these imaginings and the inability of my interlocutors to present a settled image of the soldier. Instead, the picture they present is incoherent and unstable.

The second standpoint that the chapter takes is how the soldier *lives* and experiences this moulding, the experiences he brings to these rituals of transformation and the ways he copes within these regimes of difference and discipline. This *living* traverses a multiplicity of characters and moods in myriad physical placements. The semi-naked 17-year old puffs up his chest and throws out his shoulders as the measurement tape is put around him in the district recruitment centre. The hesitant new recruit's tears and homesickness hang like smoke in the bathrooms of the regiment training centre. The 'bewakoof' (fool)⁸⁹ flees the moulding and the 'pakki naukri'⁹⁰ (secure government service), running back to the familiar village. The retired simpleton returns after service and floats about the village, forever changed, 'insoluble'⁹¹ and distinct. These varied glimpses of the soldier figure are separated by time and are presented not as stone cast edifices representing what the soldier experiences at different points of service but as elusive, blurry snapshots, colours that bleed into one another, casts that are distinct perhaps only because interpretation may be attempted more easily by the use of these lenses.

The analysis presented below follows thematic areas drawn from fieldwork notes made during my visits to an infantry regiment training centre in Abbottabad, the District Selection and Recruitment office in Chakwal and my interviews with soldiers, some of whom were home on leave, some of whom had retired and some of whom had deserted. It is also based on interviews with JCOs (junior commissioned officers) and NCOs (non-commissioned officers) and the officer class that trains these soldiers including two retired infantry generals.

⁸⁹ Waqas, army deserter, Kandwal, 4th January 2015.

⁹⁰ A reason for military service commonly given by villagers.

⁹¹ College Professor Shamil, Chakwal city, 5th January 2015.

Imagined Soldiers, Living Soldiers

Before I move on to a describe how the soldier-subject is manufactured, it is important to state that I am not attempting here to tell the *authentic* story of the soldier subaltern, but rather perhaps to simply provide an incomplete recording of the experiences that were made available to me. I say this not so much due to post-modernist pique that the authentic objective self and experience available to the other is but a myth, but more to record the sense of incompleteness that haunted these exchanges. For as I sat with these men, talking to them about their lives, their hopes, their anxieties and their hesitations, I was conscious that while they said much, much remained unspoken. This inhibition was brought on not so much by the confines of gender and class or an awareness of the watchful gaze of the military – although I am aware that that too must have played a part – but instead sprung from self-censorship, from carefully cultivated habits of the heart, mind and body, a resignation to the inability of knowing and the impossibility of accessing oneself. These were halted silent conversations, even when the words flowed freely.

Organizing Time, Space and Movement: Overstating the Automaton

This training makes you mechanical. All this training in peace-time, they have to tune your reflexes, [make them] mechanical, (...) make it conventional, expected (...) You don't have to think at that time, what should I do, but your reflexes have been automated it becomes your second nature (...) You start to think in black and white, your grey finishes.

(Retd. General 1, Served as Corp Commander, Peshawar during military operations in northwest Pakistan, 20th June 2015)

In his seminal work *Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison*, Foucault (1991:135) speaks extensively of the mechanics of disciplinary power and its ability to create 'docile bodies'. The way life is organized in the infantry training centre I visited is perfectly described by Foucault's (1991:141-154) detailed rendition of classic disciplining mechanisms involving *space* and *control of activity*. In case of space these mechanisms include the principle of enclosure (isolation), and partitioning (so that the bodies being disciplined can be distributed among partitions, making them easily locatable). For control of activity mechanisms include the use of strict timetables ('to establish rhythms'), the 'temporal elaboration of acts' (as in marching), a focus on the most efficient correlation of body and gestures (such as the correct posture for walking or running), body-tool/weapon articulation (the most efficient, predictable and aesthetic way to fire or hold a weapon) and exhaustive use ('the principle of non-idleness'). This is an artificial world,

separated from the familiar, bounded by walls and guarded by sentries. It is also separated from the known in terms of how life is organized within it, each unit of space and time accounted for. Here, each individual is marked in ways that make him forever visible, locatable and accounted for, yet this visibility also renders him invisible. As General 2 told me, 'when they finish training, you can't tell them apart'.⁹²

In her historical reading of the training techniques employed during the two world wars and the Vietnam War, Joanna Bourke (1999:67) traces similar patterns in the preparation of men for war and killing. The fundamentals of training included 'depersonalization, uniforms, lack of privacy, forced social relationships, tight schedules, lack of sleep, disorientation, followed by rites of reorganization according to military codes, arbitrary rules and strict punishments.' These mechanisms produce bodies that respond to commands that 'trigger off the required behaviour', commands that are precise and clear so that obedience becomes almost an automatic action, a 'prearranged code' set in motion as if from within (Foucault, 1991:166). This detail – a purpose to every act, gesture or movement – may seem baffling to the external observer, but as I interviewed the instructors at the training centre it became obvious that they were meticulously organized and planned.

As suggested by the colonel in this chapter's opening quote, the busloads of boys that arrive at the training centre on the first day are uncouth primitives whose lives have so far been restricted to the village. They are an unruly lot, coming from different locations with varying experiences and perceptions of military service, their uniqueness a challenge to be overcome, boys that need to be pruned, made into predictable, classifiable beings. Their bodies must look similar in dress, in haircuts and in movement and posture. However, this is only part of the transformation. What happens to their bodies perhaps reflects in more tangible ways the moulding of the mind and heart that happens or is desired. They must also feel and think in ways that are predictable and classifiable. Describing this, Subedar⁹³ Zahid, an instructor at the training centre told me, 'the *zehen* (mind) shifts slowly, it takes two to three weeks to make the *zehen*. The first week is the hardest, and most want to run away.'⁹⁴

Foucault (1982) builds a picture of modern institutions' ability to use technologies of power not only to make subjects but also to silence their ability to resist, question or

⁹² Retired General 2 (served as Director General Military Training), 24th June 2015.

⁹³ There are three ranks at the Subedar/JCO level: Naib Subedar, Subedar and Subedar Major.

⁹⁴ Subedar Zahid, course instructor, infantry regiment training centre, Abbottabad, 11th August 2015.

subvert. This seems to preclude the possibility of finding in the subaltern a worldview that might resist or even think through the conditions of its formation. As I attempt to shift the gaze to the subject, to record his response, I too cannot help but acknowledge that his body continues to respond to and meet the demands of disciplinary power. My focus below is on how these bodies experience this moulding, this subjection, even if these regimes of power seem formidable in their ability to appropriate every gesture, movement, thought and habit.

For most soldiers I spoke to, the training period, the stage marking their transition from civilians to soldiers, was experienced as the most formative period of their lives. Many were able to describe in great detail the various disciplinary mechanisms they were exposed to and why they were imposed on them. This sense of entering a new world, isolated and removed from the familiar, was highlighted by many as they spoke of their memories of the training period. Many distinctly articulated a sense of things shifting and a sense of transformation. Everything was done according to a timetable; a regulated time was even set aside for recreation, time for fun bookended between the afternoon drill and the call to dinner. There was a sense of urgency, of always being in a state of preparedness for the next slot in the timetable, predictable but rushed. Each slot in the day was a test of which they had to prove themselves worthy. Many experienced a feeling of mastery, of pride at having survived the harsh army training. Much like how Colonel 2 describes this transformation in the chapter's opening quote, they experienced the change as affecting all aspects of their being: the body, the mind and the heart. The things that shifted included tangibles like bodily fitness and a respect for routine and discipline, as well as more nebulous realms such as a sense of time and a cool-headedness that set them apart from the emotionality and animal-like nature of the folk in their villages. This change was experienced as superiority, as specialness, as becoming more than they would have been had they stayed in the village. It was also experienced in terms of financial prowess, a rise in stature coming not only from the ability to command a stable and secure income but also from a newly acquired love of discipline. A routine that was initially experienced as cumbersome and limiting became part of the self, and the unruliness and lack of order in the village became irksome and inferior.

Yet the much-coveted transition was rarely presented as smooth and welcome, and in fact many spoke of the initial few weeks as being extremely painful and bewildering. Some expressed a sense of being watched, of being constantly monitored, never free of the gaze of superiors. There was a heightened awareness of the self, a need to hide

certain kinds of emotion, especially those associated with weakness, hence homesickness had to be hidden and bottled up, to be released only in bathrooms where there was some sense of privacy or when the lights went out at 10pm.

I did not mind the hardships or the punishments, but when I returned to my barracks in the evening I would miss home. I would burst into tears, I would go to the bathroom and cry my heart out and then return dry eyed to the room. All of us were like that at the beginning.

(Havildar⁹⁵ Nasir, Kandwal, 24th June 2015)

Punishments were a regular feature of these training institutions, proof itself that the mind and body resisted this subjection, at least initially. Punishment, or the threat of it, was never far away, and it was often a test of physical endurance and humiliation. These were corporal punishments, like sit-ups or being made to stand upside down, and were always public, in full view of the other boys. The physical pain accompanying the punishment was often looked on as a mark of endurance, improving the body, as in Foucault's (1991) suggestion that corrective/coercive measures come to be looked upon as productive.

Many spoke about the challenges of settling in. For many, the first few weeks were about a secret desire to run away, while for others this desire was not secret and led to action. This action had to be carefully weighed against the reaction of family members, censure and ridicule from the village and most of all pragmatic considerations of material needs.

If your family can afford it, you may run away. I knew my family would never agree, but I used to miss my village, my heart was not in it [the military]. It was an odd feeling. I thought if I returned home my family would ridicule me, they would say 'you ran away from service, couldn't survive it'. I even thought of doing something, running away from life itself (...) My family was very happy when I got in (the army) but my *zehen* was not able to accept this. A friend I spoke to said there are many benefits in the army. It was true, but in the army you feel very odd at the beginning. We were free before this, now even if I move to this side I have to tell someone. You can't move without telling someone. I said this is not the army, this is like a prison, and you have to live in this prison for 18 years or 20 years. (...) My heart was restless and I picked up my box and ran. (...) When I returned, there was much arguing and fighting in my house. People started finding out that I was home, my parents were worried that it would bring shame to our house. One morning my father

⁹⁵ Havildar is the highest rank in the NCO cadre. There are three NCO ranks: Sipahi, Lance Naik and Havildar.

woke me up and my bag was ready and he came all the way to drop me at Mardan [the training centre]. I was 17 and half then, just a *bacha* (child).

(Havildar Nasir, 24th June 2015)

This exchange brings home quite starkly the materialist drivers and the accompanying pressure from these young men's families that bear heavily on a soldier's decision to serve in the military. Nasir, a *havildar* with over 16 years' experience, still looks back on his initiation into the army as forced and coercive, something he could not resist as he was but a child. He speaks of the army as a 'prison', a metaphor that echoes how many soldiers describe their experience as being *paband* (restricted).⁹⁶ I mentioned earlier how these boys accept gruelling bodily discipline and punishment as a sign of endurance, pride and masculinity. Resistance lies not in the body; it is the heart and mind that find it hard to conform, and the above exchange refers to the 'restless heart' that could not accept. Another *havildar* (Sohail), who was about to retire after 21 years of service, referred to his upcoming retirement, saying, 'in six months I will be *azad* (free)'. He remarked on his good luck that 'it was time to retire and that he had suffered no major loss', as if military service were a gamble he had undertaken with his life that had paid off.⁹⁷

There is a realization that fitting into the army, becoming a *fauji* (military man), means giving up the right to question or think, leading to others regarding them as automatons, incapable of independent action and thought. Sipahi Omar described the experience of mindlessly following orders as *musalsal zehni koft* (continuous mental irritation), a paradox in itself, for the *zehen* of the *fauji* is apparently is no longer meant to be capable of reacting independently. Omar goes on to describe how the *jawan* views the discipline to which he is exposed, an account somewhat at odds with the automaton imagined by General 1 at the beginning of this section, who follows orders without thinking.

The person who is a *fauji*, especially one who is a *siphai*, he doesn't need to use his brain. The reason for this is that even if he has to do something like dig a hole, he will do it on the orders of his superior, otherwise he doesn't do it. If he sits he must sit in a particular way, although in his home he is a completely responsible man (...) At home I am a responsible adult (...) I know what I need to do, dig a hole, plant a tree, work, get clothes and shoes for my child. But when I go there [army unit] I become an innocent, like I know nothing. This is because if I take

⁹⁶ This term was repeated across interviews a by a number of serving and retired *siphais*.

⁹⁷ Havildar Sohail, Palwal, 14th November 2014.

initiative there and dig a hole they will ask me 'why did you do this?'. So, in the *fauj* a person cannot have free will. If I do anything they will ask me 'why did you do this, who ordered you to do this?'. So I stopped using my brain and I waited for orders.

(Sipahi Omar, Kandwal, 18th January 2015)

This soldierly subject follows orders, yet he recognizes what this demands of him: a willingness to give up thinking. This is a conscious letting go, where he 'becomes' the 'innocent' when he is in the barracks and ceases to be a 'responsible [thinking] adult'. Here he speaks of an ability to switch and live in split worlds: as a different being back home than in the barracks. The soldier knowingly gives up his freedom and performs the 'innocent'. I will discuss this *switching* later, as I believe it is an important hallmark of the soldier figure and the toll that soldiering takes on his life.

Officers and the soldier class alike suggested three interconnected reasons for recruits running back to their villages. Most commonly mentioned was the financial condition of the family they had left behind. Those from decidedly poorer families were more likely to stay, as for them the discomfort associated with homesickness and enforced discipline was acceptable compared to the uncertainty and the hard life of work in the fields that awaited them back home. It seems that poverty and the famed martial resilience to training go hand in hand. The second reason was the geographical location from which recruits come and their consequent familiarity with the military, including having family members who had served previously in the military. The third reason cited was an inability to rise above the pangs of separation from loved ones. Those who managed to flee were referred to as *bhagoras*,⁹⁸ meaning those who run away from hardship. This is a pejorative term, but disparagement in the village is not derived from the shame of buckling under pressure and shying away from the hardship of military service or service to the nation-state. Instead, these people were censured as *bewakoof* (fools)⁹⁹ and called 'short-sighted',¹⁰⁰ as they had thrown away their chance to better themselves and their families financially and in status. The decision to so recklessly throw away this chance of *pakki naukri* was equated to madness, an act without reason. Most importantly, such people more often than not viewed themselves this way, especially when comparing themselves to their contemporaries who had decided to stay and were receiving pensions. Many expressed regret at their actions.

In this sub-section I have attempted to show how subjects live and experience these

⁹⁸ This is a standard term used by most villagers to refer to army deserters and is repeated across interviews.

⁹⁹ Waqas, army deserter, Kandwal, 4th Jan 2015.

¹⁰⁰ Jaffer, army deserter, 18th January 2015.

disciplinary techniques and thus highlight their awareness of the various mechanisms they were exposed to and why they were imposed on them. This could partly be a temporal effect, a gradual understanding over time, as many of my interlocutors were men whose training took place between five and twenty-two years ago. However, I hold these self-descriptions to be important. In his work *Weapons of the Weak*, James Scott (1985) argues somewhat problematically for the idea of penetration and the complete demystification of the prevailing ideologies by peasant classes. In critiquing Scott's work as over generous in its attribution of a complete demystification of structures of power by subjects (peasants),

Timothy Mitchell (1990:569) argues that

new modes of power, by their permanence, their apparent origin outside local life, their intangibility (...) [appear] as something non particular and unchanging – as a framework that enframes actual occurrences.

In this context, power appears to be inevitable and unchangeable, 'external to practice' (Mitchell 1990:571). The subjects of militarism thus view the world as 'enframed', and because of their inability to see it any other way they are limited in their capacity to demystify it completely. For soldiers, the transition they experience was essential for the kind of service the military demanded: they *had* to be toughened up for harsh military service and they *had* to mindlessly follow orders for military systems to work, thus they see their world as 'enframed'. And yet they had a pronounced ability to *see through* what these mechanisms did to them, which was significant for many. I stand with this idea of 'enframing', but I hold that it essentially *limits*, although does not take away, the subject's capacity to be aware of how it is itself imbricated in disciplinary mechanisms of power. I reiterate that this is a 'seeing through' that does not preclude subjects' willingness to be moulded, nor create any subversive action. Instead it just implicates subjects as conscious beings in this process, and they continue to acquiesce despite the failure of these disciplinary mechanisms to make them complete automatons.

Affective Regulations: Of Kinship and New Families

Emotions need to be streamlined and channelled, all of us have the same basic emotions, but to convert them (civilians) into standing armies they (emotions) need to be channelled, they don't just go away.

(Retd. General 1, 20th June 2015)

If modern militaries and standing armies are at least partly about controlled and regulated acts of violence and killing, then it can be argued that the manufacture of bodies for these acts is closely tied to the management of emotion. A considerable amount of scholarship has looked at the ways in which the enemy is dehumanized and/or objectified and made into an object of hate to make killing easier (Kennet 1987, Ballard and McDowell 1991, Shay 1995). After partition, the version of Pakistani selfhood constructed by the state relied on the physical and cultural othering of the other: the Hindu (Jaffrelot 2002; Racine 2002). This included the dehumanization of the Hindu enemy and the steady inculcation of an attitude of bravado and superiority over him (Nayer and Salim 2003; Saigol 2013). Yet, in his discussion of patriotism in *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson (2006:141) does well to remind us that the roots of nationalism lie not only in racism, fear and hatred of the other, but also in love. In her book *The Intimate History of Killing*, Joanna Bourke (1999) outlines the influence of psychology on soldiers' training and the turn towards crowd theories, group dynamics (84-87) and more specifically the deliberate development of affective relationships with fellow soldiers and the group leader – who signifies a father figure – to prepare men for killing (129-133). According to these theories, love and not hate is thought to provide the motivation for aggressive acts.

Intense group identification would lead to the displacement of self-love on to the group, resulting in a declining fear of self-annihilation and the consequent reduction of inhibition about the expression of aggression (Bourke, 1999:87).

Along the same lines, I argue that while amplifications of hate are central to military strategies, they are only part of the story of how fighting and dying for the nation is made possible. The YeS imagery discussed in detail in Chapter 1 can be understood as representing two images through which the institution of the military imagines its soldier figure. On the one hand there is the brave warrior who takes to war like a sport, while on the other is the self-sacrificing heroic creature. In her book *Women in War*, Jean B. Elshtain (1995:206) suggests something similar when she discusses the prototypical soldier in the West, who also stands somewhere between the 'reluctant warrior' and the 'bloodthirsty militant'. The former 'places highest value not on killing but on dying – dying for others, to protect them, sacrificing himself so others might live'. He does not say 'I will kill for my country', but his slogan instead is 'I will die for the sake of my homeland'. Training in the Pakistani military uses a mix of both images, but I will focus on the second, the willing self-sacrificing soldier, as this is the image that the military

invokes most often. As I argue in Chapter 1, this can to some extent be considered political rhetoric which deflects from the reality and actual purpose of the war to which the military sends its men. Here, I also position the willingness to serve and die as the essence of military training, achieved through the management of sadness and the production of love. I argue that this affective regulation is a critical feature of the docile bodies created by modern militaries.

In explaining the rural roots of militarism in Pakistan and the reasons that recruits from such environs are already half made, Clive Dewey (1991:276) suggests that the Pakistani military appropriates primordial notions such as *ghairat* (honour) and *izzat* (prestige) that are deeply embedded in these districts. These notions, which are traditionally associated with female members of the household or with the *biraderi* (extended clan), are extended to everything military. Affection for the regiment and determination to uphold its honour is what locks soldiers together like a family. In my examination of the dynamics that extend these kinship bonds and the notion of honour from the clan, tribe or family to the military, I do not rely excessively on the primordial instinct to explain how the soldier subject is formed, instead focus on *how* the military goes about developing these new affections, not simply as an extension of earlier bonds but to their detriment.

I mentioned above three interconnected reasons often given for recruits running away: better economic conditions at home, a lack of familiarity with army service and pangs of homesickness. Training instructors repeatedly spoke of the need to handle the homesickness of boys who were *too* attached to families, perhaps because this was the only one of the three reasons that could be dealt with by the training institute. Female family members back home, mothers and grandmothers, were singled out by instructors as stubborn objects of attachment. Despite the different reasons suggested for absconding, the dominant view at the centre was that those who wished to run away were not tough enough for army discipline and had failed to live up to the ideal of the soldier. They were often referred to pejoratively as *ladle* (spoilt) or '*beghairat*' (without honour),¹⁰¹ made weak by too much female love and attention.

[The runaway is] a child who has never left his home or his village. He has only eaten *roti* made by his mother's hands (...) so when he comes here he can't cope. There was a recruit last year whose father brought

¹⁰¹ Colonel 2, infantry regiment training centre, 11th August, 2015.

him back after he ran away; he said he hadn't slept without his *dadi* (grandmother) in all his life, so it was hard for him.

(Colonel 2, infantry regiment training centre, 11th August, 2015)

The longing for familiarity and the home is made all the more intense by the fact that the training centre functions as an artificial world, physically separated from the rest of the city by walls and gates. Glimpses of the previous world are strictly regulated, and the clean whitewashed and organized inside stands distinct from the unpredictable and unruly environment outside. General 1 suggested that 'they need to be away from the city, from other people (so) they feel like an entity, and then the *esprit de corp* develops.' It seems that the intent is not to ease homesickness but to underline it by severing contact with familiar things, jolting the individual into a sharp awareness of his new and unfamiliar surroundings. The bonds with the family arouse sadness so overwhelming that it is an almost infantile separation anxiety, threatening the ability to stay. The bonds are temporarily severed so they can then be reimagined through newer bonds, which is perhaps only possible if the shock and isolation are severe enough. The earlier bonds of attachment have to be weakened and the boys toughened up, not through the renunciation of love and attachment but by channelling the love in other directions, to the new family, the army, with the superior officer as the father and the fellow soldiers as brothers. This deliberate investment in developing ideas of love (*camaraderie* and *esprit de corps*) relies heavily on the same kinship metaphors used for the YeS ceremonies discussed in Chapter One. The military institution uses these metaphors and the love they invoke at two levels: first the larger landscape, with the homeland as mother, the nation as family and the soldiers as sons of the soil, and second within the institution itself, with its units, officers and soldiers as one family. The unit is referred as the new home and the army as the new *maa baap*, a benevolent benefactor that loves you, grooms you, shapes you and then looks after you, but which also has the right to then ask you to die or kill for it.

Your fight is here (...) you four boys in this trench, each one of you is more important to each other than your real brother. Because tomorrow if a shell lands your blood will all be in one pool and if one of you is injured and the other is not, he is the one who will help you and take you out, not your father.

(Retd. General 1, 20th June 2015)

The injunction above from a commanding officer to his troops extols the virtues of camaraderie with fellow *jawans* as vital for survival. What is also interesting is the need

to replace earlier blood relations with new attachments forged in blood. This reimagining of familial attachments through the concerns of the state doesn't just involve metaphorical reference to primordial givens, although that is an intrinsic part of this manufacture of love, but also demands a replacement. This allows a response of love, loyalty and attachment to emerge.

Motivation to stay in training is also couched in appeals to pragmatism, familial duty and masculinity.

What does real courage mean? It means you are a man, sorry to say. I am not suggesting that women can't perform, but he [the new recruit] is but a child, and sometimes children can be unwilling. They are in the *fauj* and now they want to resign. Mostly the issue is that their parents are old, they need support, so I tell them you are a man, you can't do a woman's job. Give it a year maybe two, tolerate it, you will earn money, you have a government job, you will get married, and if you are so concerned about your parents then ask your wife to look after your mother and father (...) Now if you go, you can try and look after your parents, you have no money for medical expenses or for food. Then these children understand. (...) If you stay [in the army] the CMH (Combined Military Hospital) will treat you for free. You will also get a salary when you are sick, in hospital; even if you die you get a salary, what more could you ask? (...) You have the whole *fauj* behind you. Officers are like your fathers, every soldier is your brother, and you can never find a family like this.

(Psychologist – Captain 2, infantry regiment training centre, Abbottabad,
11th August, 2015)

The desired transition is from an irresponsible feminized infant to a responsible adult man, one who can hold his head high. He is asked to make a pragmatic decision that will yield both material and affective rewards, the rejection of which is laughable for it represents a reversion to infantilism and the dreaded feminine. I will take up this need to distance oneself from the feminine in the next section.

The tightening of bonds with fellow soldiers in the unit can also mean a corresponding distancing from the family and village back home. This distancing is produced by the way the new self is experienced, a self that respects routine and discipline, a way of being that sets one apart from the emotionality and unruliness of village folk back home. I argue that this distancing is not an accidental by-product of the transformation into the soldier figure but is actively desired. It may be instructive to explore why this is considered necessary, why these newer bonds of attachment are tied to a loosening of bonds with

the home and why these bonds do not function solely as a metaphor for the newer relationships. I revert here to Chapter One, where a tension was highlighted in the discussion of the script for the YeS programmes. A delicate balancing act is required, for the very bonds of kinship – between the bodies of dead soldiers and the grief of their relatives, the conduits for the military’s message of purpose and sacrifice to the nation – need to be weakened at the training centre if the soldier is to perform his duty to the nation and be willing to fight and die. These very bonds, so vital for the military, can become the reasons for a soldier being unwilling to fight or running back to his village. In the YeS script, this rechannelling or weakening of bonds has to be handled sensitively, as the entire show revolves around an invocation of relationships. The rechannelling has to be presented as a choice that represents a willing sacrifice. Within the confines of the training centre, however, the gloves come off, and there is no longer an allusion to choice but an inculcation, a steady drilling, where the price of not conforming or failing to rechannel these objects of love can be quite high. The consequences for those who run away and are returned by their family or come back on their own can range from solitary confinement to court martial and civilian prison, depending on the severity and frequency of the offence.

For many of the soldiers I interviewed, the development of these new bonds reflects a pragmatic channelling, one that ostensibly serves the interests of the earlier bonds of affection and harnesses the deliberately heightened sadness of homesickness. The soldier flits between the two worlds of attachments, the civilian and the martial, the old and the new, the demands often pulling him in different directions even as both set of attachments lead or push him in one direction: towards military service. From the soldier’s point of view, although pride in and attachment to the unit came through in their conversations, it was when they spoke of their colleagues that they allowed themselves to smile. The camaraderie that the army sets out to inculcate was often expressed as personal friendship and shared experiences. The soldiers turn to each other as fellow travellers on the same journey, sometimes unable or unwilling to find similar camaraderie and attachment back home. Their new beings perhaps relate less to earlier bonds and relationships, and there is comfort and ease in living with people who have seen and lived through the same mouldings and speak the same language. This is perhaps best captured by a joke shared with me by a *subedar*:

Some fauji arrived in hell, yet they seemed happy. Others around them asked them why they were happy. They said, *we are together, we have created the same atmosphere here as the unit.*

(Naib Subedar Habib, Kandwal, 2nd October, 2014)

There are two implications here: *first* that army life is similar to hell and *second* that it is a hell you learn to enjoy because your bonds with your comrades or the sense of togetherness enable you to make hell your home.

The intention in this sub-section was to highlight that old and new affective attachments play a significant role in how the soldier is trained. This is a domain that is critical to the manufacture of these docile bodies, with affective regulation used as a disciplinary mechanism by the army and grasped at by the soldier figure to ease the pain of separation and the possible tension associated with *knowingly* becoming an automaton.

States of Suspension: Distancing, Differences and Dissociations

In the previous sub-sections I have described the construction of the soldier figure through ideas of transformation, a being that shifts from one thing to another, from being primitive, civilian and feminine to being civilized, martial and masculine. I now investigate this shift, an inquiry not so much into how this happens or how successful or unsuccessful the project to manufacture the soldier is, but instead a qualitative inquiry into its substance and the toll it may take on these lives.

One way this transition is experienced that many family members of soldiers articulated is as a distancing from loved ones. Soldiers describe this as an emotional distancing, a silencing from others who were once the same but who can no longer understand or relate to what soldiering is about. The home, family and village represent people and places they loved but which were different, caught in patterns of thinking and ways of doing that seem alien to the new self. Immersion in the new self demanded the severing of the communication, sharing and openness that may have existed earlier. Ijaz, a Special Services Group (SSG) commando, told me ‘they [his family] can’t understand what we do there, they will just worry and make it harder for us’.¹⁰² This is an othering not just of the enemy but of relations and acquaintances. Mothers would say that their son grew quieter over the years, and some noticed this sharp change while he was in training as a recruit, the most common complaint being that he had stopped talking. This quietness bordered on broodiness for some, irritability for others, relieved by occasional bursts of

¹⁰² Ijaz, Special Services Group (SSG) commando, Kandwal, 18th January 2014. SSG is a special operations force of the Pakistan Army, known for its gruelling training.

unreasonable temper. Ijaz's wife jokingly complained that her husband thought their home was the army and expected her and the children to obey orders and follow a routine.¹⁰³

The making of a soldier entails the creation of distance not only from civilian life and the primitive peasantry, from which most of Pakistan's soldier class has been traditionally drawn, but also from those stubborn female objects of attachment I mentioned earlier. Training involves a fair amount of cajoling, insults and humiliation that revolve around not being man enough, or worse still being called a woman. I argue that this distancing rests on the prototypical separation from the cocoon of the feminine as young boys transition into manhood. In the South Asian context, the separation of the boy from the feminine world and his removal to a more masculine one is a rite of passage that accompanies the transition into adulthood. This involves an almost physical shift like that Bouhdiba (1998) describes when the boy moves from the women's bath to the men's collective or public bath (*hammam*). This distance translates into both a physical separation and a qualitative difference from the feminine, and thereby becomes a source of a permanent anxiety and crisis that can only be resolved by moving further and further from all that is regarded as feminine. In a study conducted by Rozan, a local NGO in Pakistan (Rozan 2010:22) young men invariably expressed their sense of maleness through negation of the feminine, where a *real* man was 'not a woman'. In my conversations with army men, the *fauji* was defined as a non-civilian, non-primitive subjectivity, much as manhood is articulated through negation as not being feminine. The subjectivities of soldiers emerge from a conscious and deliberate effort to create distance from the contaminating effect of the civilian and primitive, equated to femininity. The anxiety is of evaluation and possible humiliation in front of other men (fellow soldiers and superiors) for the masculine militarist subject is informed through the approving or shaming gaze of other men.

I spoke above of sadness and love, but to look at how this distancing is made possible it may be useful to discuss fear and shame, as the mastery and manipulation of these two emotions perhaps define the very core of how the soldier is constructed. In preparing the soldier for battle, a deliberate aim of training is to sequence and break down each battle tactic and manoeuvre in such a way that when the soldier steps into the line of fire he performs the next sequential stop in series of coordinated moves that he has been practising day in and day out as a soldier in waiting.

¹⁰³ Ijaz's wife, Kandwal, 5th February 2015.

[This means] that individual bravery or chivalry is not needed. It happens, it has to happen like that, because you have been drilled like that. (...) You just have to follow the steps.

(Retd. General 1, 20th June 2015)

The goal here is to ensure that fear becomes secondary and the automaton takes over. Yet it seems that all does not always go smoothly in battle. Fear is managed better in some soldiers and is trickier to master in others; shame and consequences loom large.

The one who shows fear is lost, he has lost his honour and his reputation and he will be taken to task. His promotion may be blocked. It's the same concept at home. You try many ways to fix your child, many times he does things that you cover for him. Because you fear that you [the regiment] will be shamed if people find out (...) the senior officer might try and encourage him, so he may say get up child its ok, *shabash shabash* (verbal encouragement) come, come. If he still doesn't move then the commander will become harsh: he will push him, kick him, drag him, he will ask two other people to take the weapon from him. He will be verbally abused and they will shame him by calling him a coward, a woman.

(Retd. General 1, 20th June 2015)

Fear is real and common on the battlefield and needs to be disciplined and 'fixed'. When describing the scene above, the general also referred to the soldier's almost catatonic posture – an infantile immobility – and the soldier's dreaded return to the primitive and feminine. Fear is an unwanted aberrant emotion, and it must be hidden from others if possible because visibility will bring shame to the unit. Drawing on earlier familiar tropes of family, the first attempt will be to 'cover' for the person, but if that is not possible there are repercussions, and the punishment will depend upon rank. At first the senior will try and cajole him like a child, but this can slide into violence, and physical torture and verbal insults invoking *ghairat* may ensue.

The soldiers I interviewed during the course of my fieldwork used a double language to speak of fear. It was a perplexing discussion; nobody denied experiencing fear, and many said it was a natural emotion, yet they spoke about it as a thing of a past, something that they had once felt but could no longer relate to. Instead, some spoke of being prevented from concentrating on the job at hand, or even made to desert the battlefield, by worries about home. This seemed to be an unspoken code according to which a soldier's inability to perform is attributed to his inability to break the bonds with home and to his excessive

worry about the situation there, and never to fear of imminent injury or death on the battlefield.

There were dents in this armour of silence for those posted in areas where combat operations were going on. In halting conversations about experiences at the battlefield, fear was sometimes mentioned as a memory of the first time they saw the dead bodies of their comrades or even of the enemy. Forced proximity to the dead bodies of the enemy or their comrades was something that many had experienced and which stayed with them. Descriptions of these memories were vivid, laced with sounds, smells and sights, and they were expressed as if they had happened the day before, defining moments when they had seen death first hand and realized that they too could die. Some described it as feeling of terror, others as a deep unease, still others simply as a time they could not forget that kept coming back to them. There was an unspoken rule not to share or discuss this either back home or with other colleagues, apart from describing the facts. There was deep shame of being found out as fearful, a deep fear of fear itself and a need to dissociate and not accept the helplessness or terror experienced in that moment.

This could be expressed through other means, such as grief for a fellow comrade who had died. Many spoke about how they would cry and wail without shame for their friends who had died in battle. Havildar Nisar,¹⁰⁴ who had lost two comrades from his unit, one after the other, was particularly articulate, bordering on macabre, as he spoke of this. He described the sequence of events that led up to their deaths, the injuries his colleagues had sustained, how many minutes it took for them to die, what they said and how they looked. He had kept pictures of their mutilated dead bodies on his phone and said he looked at them from time to time so he could cry and not forget them. This seemed a less shameful release, permitted because it was not for the self. It was a deep grief for brothers in arms, perhaps tinged with fear for himself, that could be expressed openly in tears. The latter emotion has to find creative ways of expression, for it is not permissible in its own right.

Many soldiers I spoke to experienced their time in battle as a dissociative state, an ability to act without feeling or sensation. Bourke (1999:213-220) describes this as 'separation from the self – including the moral self in battle' and goes on to suggest depersonalization as a way to justify acts of killing and violence during combat. This includes a temporarily

¹⁰⁴ Havildar Nisar, Kandwal, 24th June 2015.

cessation of the being that existed earlier was and hence experiencing oneself as alien from the real self. For many this sense of alienation followed them home.

Ijaz: Your domestic life gets a little disturbed. My wife, my sister, my mother; I do not feel it, but they do, that I have become hard, (pause), I don't feel it. (lowers voice) It is true we change, for example laughing and joking, we can't do easily, I don't know why. Maybe it's because when I do that a little [laugh or joke] then my other *zehen* (mind) returns [which tells me] no, don't do this so much, this is enough.

Me: What do you mean by your 'other *zehen*'?

Ijaz: Some things happen together in life, in practical life. Some people feel at the right time: for example, when someone dies they will feel for a few days then they will move on, perk up and forget and come back to life and start enjoying it. I think as an army soldier that instant happiness or sadness that people feel, we don't feel that. The reason we can't do that (...) we have seen so much that our *zehen* is working on both sides, so today we are enjoying ourselves and at the same time another disc is playing in our *zehen* that it was so hard to pick up that person whose body had been half blown away, earlier we did that and now we do this, so both these are playing in our heads. Just like a normal man enjoys something fully, we cannot do so.

(Ijaz, SSG commando, Palwal, 4th January 2015)

Havildar Nisar echoes this sense of dissociation, of living in two parallel worlds, a sense of a splitting of the self. He also speaks of experiencing it as a sense of difference from 'normal' others, not a feeling of superiority from the primitive but a sense of loss of the ability to feel.

I don't think we stay normal. We may look normal. We are disturbed and don't feel a sense of peace. There is an odd sense of unease. I can't explain it. (...) My heart is not easy in the city with my family and it is not easy when I get back (to my station). Over time, when for fifteen sixteen years you have seen the same thing, we don't stay normal, we are disturbed, (we) forget things. Sometimes you are faced with the realization, my friend, I wasn't like that, this forgetting of things, we don't know what this feeling is.

(Havildar Nasir, 24th June 2015)

The difference so carefully sought and crafted through the meticulous organization of space, time and movement exacts a less tangible toll, a sense of dissociation. The two excerpts above are from soldiers who have been involved on the battlefield for some time. These were interlocutors who were not only able to articulate this but seemed almost desperate to. Their sense of dissociation from others around them and in many

ways from their own self is certainly more marked, and it would unwise to attribute this strong dissociative quality to all soldiers in the military. Their stories are more dramatic, coloured with blood, death and sharp contrasts between what they saw in Waziristan and their lives back home. Yet what I presented in the earlier sections speaks to similar strains, albeit less pronounced, found in the way most soldiers describe their relationships with their families and their (in)ability to *switch* back to village life when they go home on leave.

In the introduction to this section I referred to the sense of incompleteness that haunted my discussions with the soldiers I spoke to. This is how I experienced the conversations, a sense of fragmentation that seemed to intensify rather than dissipate the longer I spent with respondents. This feeling was more pronounced with soldiers I spent more time with or those I sensed were more open or willing to talk. Thus, I do not attribute this inhibition to less rapport or deliberate censorship. Rather, I experienced it as the appearance of a self that felt spilt, fragmented and incomplete, a self that was uncomfortable with appearing, but still wanted to engage. I argue that this splitting and fragmentation is a result of the experiences of the knowing automaton: the deliberate creation of distance from former objects of affection and ways of living and repeated regulation and control of fear and sadness. This regulation becomes so internalized that parts of the self become inaccessible, yet here too, as the conversations above illustrate, there was an awareness of what had been lost.

Re-entry: Chakwal's Retired Soldiers

Discussion of the manufacture of the soldier and his experiences would be incomplete without mentioning what happens to the soldier figure once he returns to his village, for return he must as the military demands his service for a defined period of time only. Charting this re-entry is important, not just for poetic or aesthetic reasons but perhaps because the dynamics of re-entry serve as further evidence of the transmutation that he undergoes in order to be a soldier.

The retired soldier returns to the village after between 18 and 32 years of service, depending on how high he was allowed to climb in the army's hierarchy. He is an interesting figure, although one I did not seek, but rather one who kept being referred to me as a possible interlocutor, or more typically one who found me because he felt I should speak to him. As someone sarcastically put it, 'there are as many Subedars in

Chakwal as there are used shopping bags'.¹⁰⁵ The reference to shopping bags here is a not so attractive image of used bags strewn across streets and fields, a common sight in overcrowded cities such as Chakwal.

He is typically envied as someone who was lucky enough to get into military service and managed to escape the *prison* in one piece, someone who has received his commutation and will continue to receive his pension for the rest of his life. Over the years, because of his steady income, he may also have accumulated a number of material comforts, such as a television set, a washing machine, a refrigerator, a computer and other household goods that set his house apart from others. In addition to this he may have installed a plaque outside his home displaying his military rank and his retired status. He may also have used his military contacts to get his brothers or cousins into service or financially helped his father and brothers to acquire more land or modern machinery for farming, resulting in a more comfortable financial situation. At retirement, depending upon his age, which can be anywhere between 35 and 50, he may also decide to invest his accumulated savings and the commutation he receives at the end of service in a business venture. He will be a welcome member of village committees, and generally people will regard him as trusted, disciplined and reliable.

This is one side of the story, applicable to those who rise higher up the army hierarchy to the rank of subedar (JCO) or those who came from relatively less impoverished backgrounds to begin with. The less fortunate ones (and the much larger proportion), who retire after 18 to 20 years of service, may find themselves too young to retire from work. The younger retired *fauji* may continue his employment through army supported mechanisms (the local DASB or the Fauji Foundation), which will facilitate his entry into other jobs. His army background, exposure, training and contacts are an asset, and he will rarely stay in the village but will continue related service elsewhere. He will also act as a reserve for some time to come, called back to his unit from time to time for refreshers.

Let me return once more to the older soldier, he who remains in the village, and the remark about shopping bags. This soldier walks a fine line between being ridiculed and revered. On the one hand he is respected and admired, as mentioned earlier, while on the other he is the butt of many jokes from the very civilians and uncouth villagers from whom he so carefully established distance and superiority:

¹⁰⁵ Professor Shamil, Chakwal city, 5th January 2015.

His mental make up is different [from others]. He can't easily readjust, but he has skills in administration, paper work. If he adjusts he can lead, those who cannot become redundant. It's a joke that there was a person in our village who wrote to the GHQ and said please don't make any person from our village a *subedar* for when they come back they don't listen to anyone. There are those that are soluble and those that are insoluble, who stay away from people, who can't mix with normal people.

(Professor Shamil, Chakwal city, 5th January 2015)

This 'insolubility' is attributed to his mind's inability to re-adapt, his '*fauji zehen* (army mind) stays and doesn't go away' (Havildar Sohail).¹⁰⁶ Sipahi Omar describes it, saying 'it is a restrictive institution, and the person inside it is also becomes restricted, can't function outside' and following orders day in and day out 'finishes their brain'.¹⁰⁷ The 'insoluble' *fauji*, (army man) is viewed as rigid and uncompromising in his ways, a stickler for detail, a simpleton who cannot understand the *real* ways of the world. He is fit only for taking orders and living in the confined space of the barracks, a self-contained world, created so deliberately. He is a target for schemers, and I was told many tales of how such and such *subedar* lost all his commutation money in a business venture that didn't pan out or was cheated of his money because he was too 'simple'.¹⁰⁸ This was often told with a chuckle and a wink; it seemed the village perversely enjoyed the idea that the superior *fauji* was brought down a notch or two, to their level.

To some extent, the retired *faujies* I interviewed also viewed themselves in the same frames. Many were acutely conscious of their limitations, their 'insolubility', and tended to view this as the defining and irrevocable influence of *fauji* life, a life that was simple and easy to predict. It seemed that their ability to *switch* had diminished over the years, or perhaps they did not want to *switch* anymore. They found themselves unprepared for the *civilian* world, which was referred to in pejorative terms, as crooked, disrespectful and unreliable. Being a retired *fauji* was an asset, it granted them status, but they were aware that it also made them somewhat vulnerable to covert ridicule. The many retired *subedars*, *havildars* and *siphais* I met in the village were easy to tell apart from the rest of the village folk in their manner of dress, posture and even language, as many could converse in fluent Urdu as well as their native Punjabi dialect. The difference that had been created so carefully seemed difficult to shake off, and this was reiterated and experienced by their wives and children, some of whom had also spent time with them in

¹⁰⁶ Havildar Sohail, Palwal, 14th November 2014.

¹⁰⁷ Sipahi Omar, Kandwal, 18th January 2015.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*

various units. They were highly nostalgic about their past: the friends, experiences and environments that had been so different from the ones they lived in now. And where there had earlier been a continuous balancing as the soldier flitted between the two worlds of attachments, the civilian and the martial, the flitting was now between past and present. Ironically, now they were finally free, back in the civilian world, they continued to live stubbornly in the martial world, for as one of them said, ‘the poor man, he stands still because he cannot do anything else, the *fauji* (military man) is only good for the *fauj*.’¹⁰⁹

Religion and Nationalism in the Making of the Soldier

Religion and the army have a deep relation. It warms the blood. Once they shout *Allah-o-Akbar* (God is greatest) then they don’t think. You say it at a particular point, when you are at a certain distance from the enemy or from danger. Then you attack. *Jazba* (passion) starts from here, because of this he will go forward, not back.

(Subedar Zahid, instructor, infantry regiment training centre,
Abbottabad, 11th August 2015)

The nexus between the Pakistani military and Islamic militancy has been the subject of much political interest, especially since 9/11 (Shahzad 2011; Gul 2012; Fair 2014). My interest in discussing religion and the Pakistani military does not reside strictly within this frame. Instead, this section attempts to provide insight into the kind of religious subjectivity the military deems appropriate for its soldiers and how it goes about developing it. To be more specific, I examine the practices through which religious nationalism is invoked in soldier training. I will also briefly explore how these carefully constructed religious subjectivities respond to the challenges of the new Muslim enemy.

Scholarship has suggested that the relationship between Islam and the Pakistan Armed Forces dates back to before the Zia era (Rizvi 2003; Cohen 2004). Many of the older officers I spoke to felt that religious influence was a facet of the pre-Zia army and that the mixing of religion and nationalism with the military ethos was a given from the beginning, particularly regarding the imagining of the enemy as a *kafir* (non-believer).¹¹⁰ The marked intensification of this under General Zia ul Haq brought religion into the military in more structured and institutionalized ways. During General Zia’s time, formal Islamic teaching was introduced in military academies when Zia established a Religious

¹⁰⁹ Sipahi Omar, Kandwal, 18th January 2015.

¹¹⁰ Examples of this are the many war songs and slogans that imagined the soldier figure as a soldier of Islam that became popular during the 1965 war (Saigol 2013:253). The officers referred to here are retired generals 1 and 2 and colonels 2 and 3.

Directorate within the Educational Directorate, headed by a brigadier, and formalized the position of the *khateeb*,¹¹¹ who until then had been a civilian (Rizvi 2003:245). The *khateeb* was inducted through a special recruitment process and became part of the order of ranks. He was given a salary and benefits and, like other soldiers, he was promoted as he grew in seniority. In 1974, General Zia also introduced the *Khutbaat-e-Askaar* (religious military sermons), twelve designated sermons printed and distributed by the Religious Directorate, into training schools, regiments and field units for use by the *khateeb* on Fridays.

In the present-day military training institute that I visited there were a number of references to Islam. I analyse these references through an examination of the use of religion in formal teaching curricula, its presence in the strictly regulated space of the training centre, as well as the figure of the *khateeb* and his positioning within the centre.

There were a number of large signs and stone edifices at the training centre inscribed with sayings from the Quran, as well as four mosques, four imams and a full time *khateeb*. The day started with recitation from the Quran. According to the *khateeb* and the course instructor, during the first few weeks boys were assessed on their ability to know the *namaz* (Muslim prayer) and read the Quran. If found lacking they were assigned to remedial training during the evening, where they were to go to the *khateeb* and learn these basic tenets. Regular soldiers who wished to memorize the Quran by rote (*hifz*) could do so with their commanding officer's permission and a recommendation from the *khateeb*. Soldiers were also encouraged to go for *namaz*.

The 23-week recruitment training course being run at the infantry centre I visited was divided into three units: Physical Training and Discipline (338 classes), Skill-based (310) and Awareness and Motivation (100).¹¹² It is instructive to look at this division in terms of the relative importance of each area. Of the 748 taught classes spread over the 23-week time frame, the bulk, 45%, were dedicated to physical training and building discipline. It is important to note that this was in addition to the general organization of the day, the use of space and the strict rules and regulations regarding movement, language and dress that had to be followed by recruits at all times. Approximately 41% were dedicated to skills such as weapons training, map reading etc. Fourteen percent of classes were dedicated to the Awareness and Motivation Course. Colonel 2 elaborated

¹¹¹ Refers to someone who delivers sermons in the mosque. The term is used by the military to refer to a religious cleric who serves with the military institution.

¹¹² Details provided by Colonel 2, infantry regiment training centre, 11th August 2015.

further on the content of this portion, saying it was a mix of religion and nationalism. But of the 19 topics offered in the 'Motivation and Awareness Course', twelve were linked directly to Islam and only seven were about Pakistan's political, geographical, cultural and military history, and I discovered on questioning that this latter portion also used liberal references to religion.¹¹³

The army is a deeply hierarchal institution and the *khateeb* is placed on the lower rungs, very much subservient to both the commanding officer and even the JCOs, and he is subject to the same disciplinary mechanisms as the rest of the soldiers, such as court martials and adverse reports. The *khateeb* thus cuts an interesting and somewhat paradoxical figure, and his treatment by the military is to some extent indicative of how religion is viewed by the Pakistani military. The first clue lies in the fact that the awareness and motivation course is taught by army-trained NCOs and JCOs (*havildars* and *subedars*), not the *khateeb*, although he is a full time appointee at the training centre. He has little or no say in the course that is delivered; he may be asked for teaching material and aids, but much of the course's outline, content and delivery is designed by mainstream army personnel. Despite the *khateeb's* superior religious credentials as a religious scholar – ten years of schooling followed by eight years in a religious seminary – he is not considered an appropriate teacher for the religious sections of the course. According to Colonel 2, who was in charge, Islam has to be taught in a way that supports the goals of nationalism, and it is important that these classes do not get diverted into pure religious instruction.

When I expressed an interest in meeting the *khateeb*, Colonel 2 first expressed surprise and then suggested I meet with the instructors of the Motivation and Awareness Course, as they would be able to tell me more. However, when I insisted he agreed. As we waited he told me he had no problem with me meeting him, as 'he is a harmless enough chap', but he didn't think I would get anything useful there. At this point both the *khateeb* and the psychologist walked in (we had called in the psychologist earlier but he had been busy). The psychologist was wearing full army attire, in combat uniform including cap and boots, while the *khateeb* wore a *shalwar kameez* and black waistcoat. I was told to meet with the psychologist first as he may not have been available later, and the *khateeb* was told to wait. When I returned an hour and a half later I found the *khateeb* waiting for

¹¹³ This is similar to the Pakistan Studies courses that were introduced and made compulsory in public education during the Zia regime, where Pakistan and its history are depicted as inextricably linked to Islam and Muslim identity (Azizi 1993; Nayer and Salim 2003).

me in the colonel's office. Unlike the privacy I was given to interview the psychologist, I was asked to interview the *khateeb* in the colonel's office.¹¹⁴

My job is to fulfil all the religious requirements and needs of this centre (...) My job is *rohani tarbeeyat* (spiritual teaching). Just as a country has geographical boundaries, there are also ideological boundaries that need to be protected. My job is to link this training with the Quran, with *namaz* and with the *masjid* (mosque). I interact with the recruits during the Friday sermon, or sometimes the *asr* or *maghrib* prayers, where I will say something to them about *iklaqiyaat* (ethics). I also start the day with *tilawat* (recitation) from the Quran in the morning at assembly and I will often leave them with something to think about. (...) We talk openly about the current war, about who is on the right path. I also talk to them about the philosophy of *shahadat* and how the purpose of war is *shahadat*, and by the grace of God they all wish for it.

(*Khateeb* at the infantry regiment training centre,
Abbottabad, 11th August 2015)

In the above exchange the *khateeb* reiterates that his role is vital and positions himself as the 'spiritual teacher' of the recruits, a position somewhat belied by the earlier description of my encounter with him and some accounts that I provide below. General 1 shared many stories of how he had confronted the *khateeb's* influence in units under his command during his years of service. A particular *khateeb* under his command during the Kargil War was asked to go to a post to motivate the troops. The cleric refused on the grounds that certain requirements of *jihad* (holy war)¹¹⁵ had not been fulfilled, so he could not support the effort:

I summoned him and told him, you talk of *jihad*, God will decide what is *jihad*, this is a war zone and I am ordering a district court martial of you and I will ensure that you are put before a firing squad right over here in front of my office.

(Retd. General 1, 20th June 2015)

He then had him posted out of the area with immediate effect. This exchange is interesting, for the *khateeb* is told here that he is in no position to adjudicate what *jihad* is, the implication clearly being that the military, in this case the commanding officer, has the right to adjudicate this over and above religious authority, whose only role is to motivate troops in the name of *jihad* as and when ordered to do so by the military officer. The *khateeb* is a 'spiritual guide', with no real official authority, an army person but not

¹¹⁴ Fieldnotes, infantry regiment training centre, 11th August 2015.

¹¹⁵ Here the word *jihad* is used in direct reference to war/combat.

regular army personnel. A 'harmless' person, yet one who must be monitored, as evidenced by Colonel 2's initial reluctance to let me talk to him. The sermon he delivers is prescribed (or at least the range of subjects is) and depending upon the commanding officer it may even be vetted the day before. It is regular policy to have the *khateeb* hand the Friday sermon in by Thursday for approval by the commanding officer.¹¹⁶ Much like his soldier class contemporaries, he is regarded by the officer class as somewhat uncouth, lacking real knowledge of religion, but nonetheless essential for the training centre. As (retired) General 2 jokingly put it, 'he is uneducated but very motivating'.¹¹⁷ It seems that the *khateeb* has the specific task of motivating troops and acting as religious mascot to lend religious credence to the militarism project.

The figure of the religious cleric at the training institution is in some ways a metaphor for what I call the *controlled instrumentalization* of religion in the Pakistani military, something that is in many ways similar to the larger state project in Pakistan. Compared to the curricula of other militaries what I describe may seem excessive exposure and inculcation of religion in military training, yet it is important to recognize that this is but an indicator of how religion has been absorbed and appropriated into most of Pakistan's public institutions. Much like the Pakistani state, the military borrows generously from popular understandings and concepts of religion and uses them as fertile ground for instilling particular forms of nationalist and militarist subjectivities in the soldier (Fair 2014; Cohen 1984).

I further support my argument about this controlled instrumentalization of religion through the analysis presented earlier of the distribution of classes in the training course. This distribution, and particularly the weight given to religious instruction, highlight two distinct features of how the development of religious subjectivity in the *jawan* is viewed by the military institution.

First, this is just one of the ingredients (and not the most important) that make up the soldier figure.¹¹⁸ Exposure to religion is deemed an essential element in the potent cocktail that is offered to the soldier, but the correct dose is mixed in so as not to upset the balance of the various factors that drive him. *Second*, and this may seem contradictory, the idea of Pakistan and the brand of nationalism fed to the soldier to

¹¹⁶ General 1 and Colonels 2 and 3, 20th June 2015, 11th August 2015, and 17th April respectively.

¹¹⁷ General 2, 24th June 2015.

¹¹⁸ This is mirrored in officer training at the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), where according to Stephen Cohen 'Islamic teaching only complements regular professional and academic disciplines' (2004:115).

motivate him to fight rely heavily on religion. In other words, the idea of Pakistan is tenable as a motivator only when attached to Islam.

I contend that while the military institution considers religious education and alignment as important for its soldier, it also seeks to ensure that it does not delve into what it regards as unnecessary theological argument and steers clear from complexity or possible contention. Here, Islam's purpose is to unify, to act as a bond and a motivator to fight a common enemy. Officers and instructors consider religion a necessary ingredient for motivating the village primitive, who in their opinion holds some notion of religion very close to his heart. Any disavowal of the necessity of religion in training would evoke a strong defensive response in officers being interviewed, but religion would also be viewed as a threat that could get out of hand and hence one that must be controlled and monitored. According to General 1, the regularization of the religious teacher during Zia's time was a strategic move, because 'he then became just another employee', bound by the same rules, subject to the same code of obedience and disciplinary mechanisms and most of all a recipient of material benefits.

This strict vetting of the kind of Islam allowed at the training centre did not prove sufficient when the controversy over Pakistan's participation in the GWOT exploded. Soldier subjectivities, so carefully crafted and considered immune due to the strict army discipline, were not sufficient to bear the weight of the ambivalence around the war, its Muslim enemy and the status of its dead. There were reports of refusal to fire on the enemy¹¹⁹ and desertions (Shahzad 2011; Qadir 2012:167; Jaffrelot 2015:563) and my interviews with officers involved in early military operations (2002-2006) suggest the same.¹²⁰ Interestingly, unlike the officers I interviewed, no *sipahis* admitted to deserting, but nearly all spoke openly about strong doubts they had had about the Muslim enemy, especially at the beginning of the GWOT. Over time, these seem to have been appeased, not so much by religious teaching but, as many told me, by the increase in the scale of terrorism in Pakistan after military operations began and the large number of casualties, especially among their own brothers in arms.

I argue that this initial insufficiency is not so much a feature of radicalization in the army but the result of interaction between forces outside and inside the institution. Within, the

¹¹⁹ Farooq, U. (2015, March). Islam in the garrison. *The Herald*. Retrieved from <http://herald.dawn.com/news/1152791/islam-in-the-garrison>

¹²⁰ General 1, Colonel 2, infantry regiment training centre and Major 2, ISPR, 25th June, 11th August & 16th September 2015 respectively.

susceptibility stems from how the military positions Islam in its doctrine. Soldier training develops ideas of nationalism which are closely tied to religion. Course topics about the state itself nearly always pull in religion, almost as if the state is not tenable as an idea without Islam. So when Islam is pitted militarily against the state, as it has been in the recent GWOT, soldier ambivalence is high. Soldiers found the neutralized version of Islam being taught inside insufficient to counter the claims of the more virulent version which alleged that the war was not *jihad* and its dead not *shaheed*. Influences outside the training centre and the military institution have more power to influence soldiers' subjectivities with respect to religion than the controlled version of Islam, subservient to army authority and discipline, taught at the centre. Perhaps outside influences have always been stronger, but the discrepancies did not matter before as there was no direct contention between the two. Now that some religious clergy stand starkly counter to the military, things became more complex and the military and its soldiers were initially unprepared.

This by no means implies that vast numbers have deserted or will desert. It merely throws light on the high level of ambivalence about the new enemy that existed in soldiers' minds at the start of this war. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, the imperatives that guide military service are largely materialist and affective and have never been religio-nationalist. Moreover, as this chapter has demonstrated, soldiers' subjectivities may be steeped in rhetoric about religion, but it is largely army discipline and affective regulation (attachment to their unit etc.) that keeps them in order and compliance.

It is unlikely that the army will ever release figures for the number of desertions or court martials (although current army policy is to let absconders go, as it prefers not to draw this issue into the limelight).¹²¹ However, the military has formally acknowledged the need to modify the narrative of *jihad* or holy war for the nation-state by incorporating the new enemy into its training curriculum. A number of sessions on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) have been added to the current recruitment course. In addition to military tactics and strategy linked to terrorism, these deal with defining the new enemy. These strategy-focussed LIC courses were included from around 2002-2003, with the more specific discussion of the enemy being a more recent addition after 2006.¹²² The objective

¹²¹ General 1, 25th June 2015.

¹²² Colonel 2, Subedar Zahid infantry regiment training centre, 11th August, 2015.

is to ensure that 'there are no doubts, for we cannot afford doubt, so when they leave they are clear who is a terrorist and that he is not a Muslim'.¹²³

In keeping with the past, Islam, and the particular version that suits current military policy, is now once again being instrumentalized by the military to shape the subjectivities of the soldiers that are to fight this war. The military continues to stand aligned irrevocably with religion, even if the religious frame may have been suitably altered to fit new military policy.

Conclusion

If we pay attention to the narratives and experiences of these soldiers we find that their ability to de-mystify and understand the disciplinary processes of manufacture that they are exposed to is often pronounced and significant. Promises of material gain and the deliberate invocation of affective domains are implicated in these disciplinary processes, and while they may seal soldiers' compliance they leave their vision intact. This is thus a seeing through that does not preclude a willingness to be moulded. I have argued in this chapter that this vision implicates them as knowing beings in this process, in which they may continue to acquiesce due to a range of affective and pragmatic imperatives.

Affective regulation involves the destabilization of stubborn familial attachments seen as feminine, a threat to the soldier's ability to stay at the centre. In their place, the military seeks to develop loyalty to the regiment. Affective regulation requires a pulling in of feelings of mastery, of masculine and rational superiority, of attachment to one's army battalion and a suppression of feelings of sadness, shame, loss and fear. Through this regulation, the soldier-subject lives and makes meaning of his life experiences and accepts the possible *koft* (or tension) associated with *knowingly* becoming an automaton.

This chapter also discusses this manufacture and transformation of the soldier as the creation of distance between the being that *was* (described as primitive, civilian and feminine) and the being that is *now* (civilized, martial and masculine). I have argued that this distancing is experienced as a sense of dissociation, an erosion of earlier ways of feeling, and articulated as a realization that one lives in two worlds and two *zehens* at the same time.

¹²³ Colonel 2, infantry regiment training centre, 11th August 2015.

I have also highlighted the role of religion and nationalism in the business of manufacturing the soldier. Much like movement, time and space are organized meticulously at the training institute; how much and what version of Islam is to be taught is controlled by the military establishment. This is Islam not as a theological frame for a person being trained or groomed as a soldier in the army, but Islam as a specific motivator in times of both war and peace, a controlled instrumentalization of religion. Thus, the Islam that is absorbed into the military academy, training centres and barracks remains a secondary but necessary ingredient, whose dosage has to be strictly monitored. In keeping with the past, Islam, and the particular version that suits current state (military) policy, is now once again being instrumentalized by the military to shape the subjectivities of the soldiers who are to fight the GWOT.

Chapter 4: Disciplining Narratives of Pain - Military Death in Rural Punjab

I would have forgotten you by now

When I cry, then I say
You were a child looked after by God

My child, I would wake
I would wake up at dawn to grind wheat
You would be lying asleep
And I would grind the wheat
Then I would leave,
Sometimes for Rupwal, sometimes for [Rawal] pindi¹²⁴
Sometimes I would leave you in the room inside
Sometimes I would throw you on the cot outside
You were a child looked after by God

When dusk approached
I would feed the cattle
Or I would pick peanuts from the field
Or I would cut sugarcane
When I returned in the evening
Only then would I feed you the little milk I had

You should have died then
I would have forgotten you by now
Why did you not die then?

I would have forgotten you by now
Why did you not die then?

Quoted above is a Punjabi mourning ritual, or *vaen*, sung by Sajjida, a mother who had lost her son in the Wana conflict, as we sat by her son Tahir's grave. The grave was surrounded on all four sides by walls (about three feet in height) that had been painted and decorated with ornate wrought iron railings. The grave itself was still un-cemented, as according to tradition the *pakki* (cemented) grave would be made one year after burial. A large Pakistani flag waved atop the grave, and there was a cupboard in the enclosure containing the Quran. Sajjida's husband had died young and left her with six children to look after. She had farmed her own small landholding and also worked as a labourer in other people's fields for much of her life. All four of her sons had applied to join the army, and two

¹²⁴ Names of a village and a city respectively.

had managed to get in. Her *vaen* today was spontaneous; she broke into it as we sat discussing the *barsi* (death anniversary) of another *shaheed* from the village, which had just concluded. The tone of the *vaen* was bitter, and her choice of words reflected a deep rejection of the narrative of meaningful death and a need for release from the pain of separation. I heard her say again and again in her deep and bitter voice that she wished her son had died when he was a child, when death would have been less painful, even if less meaningful. This was a lament full of anger, reproach and torment.

-Fieldnotes, Palwal, 10th December 2014.



This chapter continues the stories of the soldiers of Chakwal, those who have lost their lives and have been permanently marked in ways more corporeal than the transmuted body, mind and heart discussed in the preceding chapter. The son, given to the military – a new family, a new mother – returns as a dead body. The military continues to claim him in this return, and the handing over is not final. Instead, he is handed over in controlled and modulated ways and then claimed once more, balancing between split worlds, a theme picked up in the last chapter, a battle for possession first of the body and its *zehen* and later of the body and its ghost.

This chapter focuses on the family and the village through the lens of the relationship that evolves between the military and its subject at an affect-laden moment: the death of a son. In contrast to Chapter 1, which also dealt with the grief of death on the national stage, these stories unravel on the stage of the local village. On the national stage, set up on military terrain, the military's control is supreme, and the body of the martyr and the grief of his family can be utilized to its full. The local stage needs a different, more intimate management, for it is a raw moment, where the mutilated body is ever present and the grief is fresh. Here, the encounter between the military and its subjects is in a space which is not entirely predictable and where the tenor of the relationship must be set in careful precise ways. It is within these spaces that the military concerns itself with what Anne L. Stoler (2004:5) calls the 'distribution of sentiment', seeking to control both 'its excessive expression and the absence of it' by disciplining affective selves through 'techniques of affective control'.

The death of a soldier in the service of the nation is handled differently from an *aam* (regular) death. This difference is enforced by the military in both obvious, spectacular

ways, such as the performative nature of the funeral, and in more subliminal ways involving the disciplining of grief by drawing on gender and religion. These differentiations involve special attention to the expression of grief in families. The grief of women signifies a necessary, emblematic, cathartic force, making untimely, violent death both acceptable and at the same time a point of concern, a cause of anxiety dealt with by seeing the woman as irrational and primitive. Chapters 1 and 3, as well as previous scholarship, have shown how religion is visible in militarist imaginings and instrumentalized in the making of the soldier subject and his family by instilling particular forms of religio-nationalist subjectivities (Jaffrelot 2002; Racine 2002). On this local terrain, the grieving rituals for these soldiers are steeped in religious ideology and practices that seemingly sit neatly alongside the military narrative.¹²⁵ They discipline the affect of families and prescribe different ways of grieving and thinking about this death.

In this chapter I trace the grief caused by the death of a soldier in three temporal phases, marked by how the private moment shifts into the public space and moves in sync with the demands of military discipline enforced on it and yet retains its interiority. The first phase is the news of death and the point at which the body arrives at the house. The second phase is when the body is reclaimed by the military, taken out of the house and buried in the village graveyard with full military honours. The third phase begins after the trucks leave and military attention fades to some extent. There is also a fourth stage, covered in Chapter 1, where grief goes beyond the local and expands to the nation. I acknowledge that these stages are but a lens that allows me to study how raw grief for a dead son is transformed into willing sacrifice for the nation, and I do not imply a linear movement here, for in real life and real time there is a movement back and forth between personal and public grief. I present the ways in which these subjectivities experience these phases as contiguous realities, and through this try to complicate these enactments of grief by suggesting that these moments are fraught with tension and contradiction, even as they play out smoothly.

I argue that affect does not remain a disciplinary technique of governmentality or statecraft alone and that these moments and spaces are as much about the production and harnessing of affect as they are about its afterlife. Affective excesses last long after the military trucks roll out of the village, and they continue to haunt these spaces and subjectivities. At times these excesses and slippages seem to contest and challenge these

¹²⁵ Contestations in this narrative are visible in the context of a war against fellow Muslims on Pakistan's own territory, aligned with the global war on terror, as discussed in Chapter 6.

carefully disciplined narratives of pain, yet they do so without unsettling or destabilizing them. I will present the dissonances, the many times that the military script of service and sacrifice falls short. I show how although ink runs and stains these pages, the subjects nonetheless continue to read from them. This obstinacy, this desire to continue reading, is what the chapter tries to investigate by looking at the emotional and affective involvements invoked in these rituals of death and the kind of political subjects that perform, watch and emerge from these performances of grief.

Degrees of Separation: The Right Way to Grieve

The difficulty of interrogating the dead is glaringly obvious; the interlocutor is silent, no longer able to speak for himself, and yet the corpses in this chapter are not mute. The voices of the original family, the *next of kin* as the military calls them, and of the residents of the village (for in rural areas of Punjab, grief is not a private or silent affair) try to speak for him. The new family – the military – speaks too, in unison with the old, but sometimes in tones that jar, that displace and shift the notes so they hang askew, even if together they seem to play out like a finely tuned harmony. This section is an examination of how the military goes about disciplining mourning at the time of military death.

In rural Punjab, grief and mourning is heavily gendered, with women and men playing contrasting and complementary roles. Men get on with the business of grief, arranging the funeral, and although they too will weep and break down, these are more isolated incidents, tolerated for short periods. Women are allowed more extravagant displays of vocal grief featuring loud wailing, beating of the body and abandonment to the throes of pain, in which they almost refuse to accept the separation of death. They are expected to hold on to the corpse, which, irrespective of its gender, is placed in the inner (female) sanctum of the house before burial. The wailing will be loudest when the moment of separation actually happens and the coffin is taken out of the house to the mosque or a nearby field for the funeral prayer. In addition to members of the family and the *biraderi* (extended clan) from near and far, neighbours and professional female weepers will descend on the household. The weepers will undertake *vaen*, a Punjabi mourning ritual involving weeping and wailing, in which the deceased is remembered in a dramatic elegy that can convey pain, loss and anger at the parting. This is addressed to the deceased, and the women will recount the loss to the family and the fate of those left bereft (Brard 2007). Women will not accompany the body to the mosque for the funeral prayer or the graveyard for burial. Cases of military death and mourning stand distinct from the

process described above, a difference achieved through a number of moves by the military. These separations between mourning for military death and an *aam* (regular) death perhaps echo the many disconnects and separations that also mark the soldier during his life.

The News

Families recount the first phase as beginning with the news reaching them, often as a phone call, sometimes official, sometimes from a friend who was with their son. If the news is unconfirmed then the wait for confirmation is terrible, and even when the news is from an official source the wait continues as the dead body can take a few days, sometimes up to a week, to arrive. Control over information is deemed vital by the military at this point, for this is a moment that sets the tone for the relationship that emerges between it and the family. The military is concerned that the news reaches the NoKs through the right source and in the right way, before the family is informed by media reports or friends. The military's administrative machinery rolls out pre-ordained standard operating procedures which detail who will inform, who will be informed, how many will go to the funeral, which unit will be mobilized, how the body will be transferred, to whom money for funeral expenditures will be given etc. The body arrives with an NCO or JCO or an officer (a captain, major or colonel), depending on the soldier's rank. It is placed inside the house of the deceased and a soldier is assigned to guard it. If the funeral is to be held on the same day, 30 or 40 soldiers will accompany the body. If it arrives at night and the weather permits burial to be delayed, more soldiers will arrive for the funeral the next day. The military officials accompanying the body brief the male members of the family about the requirements of the military funeral. For the military, the normalcy of death, its very expectedness and their preparedness for it, is in sharp contrast to the intimate permanent rupture that the family experiences.

The military's preoccupation with appropriate grief is evident at this point in their call to the family not to cry or mourn. This refrain or concern is directed more towards women, with men called upon and expected by the military to ensure that women's affect stays within prescribed limits. I argue that management of the family and their affect during this period is heavily gendered and is made possible through two moves. In the first move, the masculine military manages the external business of dying, much like the men in a traditional Punjabi household in the case of a regular funeral. In the case of a military funeral, the men in the family are rendered passive, reduced to the helpless feminine, merely receiving instructions from the military. In a second move, the masculine military

also calls upon men to grieve differently to women by involving them both in managing women's grief and in actively paying tribute during the funeral, which in keeping with village tradition acknowledges only the male in the public space. Women and their grief must be watched and controlled, yet it is this very grief that must also be visible and emphasized to allow the separations or distinctions between the gendered bodies of stoic men and those of helpless women that are so crucial to the militarism project. The second move away from the feminine involves the male members of the family being given the opportunity to *become* male again. Differentiating the ways in which they grieve from women allows men to experience this affective regulation as less intrusive, for as I spoke to the families in the village it was the women who spoke more often about the many ways in which the military disciplined and controlled this moment.

Matam (mourning) for the *shaheed* is discouraged; instead, this is a time to rejoice. This is a religious trope repeated by military officials, the village cleric and villagers as they console the family.

In an *aam janaza* (regular funeral) the public reacts and responds in a different way. Grief and sorrow are expressed, but differently. It is true that the sadness of separation is also there in the case of a *shaheed*, but it ebbs away under the flow of emotions. Mothers will say I wish I had another son so I could sacrifice him in Allah's way. At a funeral of a *shaheed* we naturally have to sometimes give a [additional] sermon for 5-10 minutes (...) for those who have lost a dear one. He should let go of this grief and shock and instead express joy that he is the father of the *shaheed*. There is absolutely no mourning for the *shaheed*. This is a moment of pride.

(Village cleric 1, Palwal, 26th January 2016)

Martyrdom is a death that has to be treated differently, with displays of grief controlled and emotions held in check, a religious trope that folds well into the demands of military funeral rites. Yet despite this, or perhaps because of it, when women spoke of the news and the funeral they spoke within the idiom of tears and crying. The following excerpt was one of many that attested to the policing of affect by men, in this case the husband.

They did not take me to the graveyard. Women normally don't go, but when someone is a *shaheed* women will go along to watch the parade. His [the dead son's] father did not take me. He said to me a woman can bear less for she is weak. He said to me, you say *namaz*, the *shaheed* has

a high status, you can't cry for this death (...) I looked at the flag on the coffin and I felt *okha* (uneasy). I still feel that way when I see the flag.
(Ayesha, Naseem's mother, adjoining village, 18th September 2014)

Another way of trying to manage affect is through the physical access to the body the family is allowed once it is handed over before burial. Women often discuss whether the family were able to see the dead body and whether or not they were permitted to touch it. Sometimes they were allowed to touch the face, sometimes, when the body was too mutilated, the coffin was sealed, and mothers would remember the helplessness of not being allowed to touch the son one last time. For some women it signified an inability to be private in that last moment of parting, a regret they lived with. For others it became a moment of defiance, a taking back of the son given to the military but reclaimed one last time before he is claimed once again to be buried forever. One mother recalled how she prised open the glass on top of the coffin when the soldier guarding it was asleep at night.

I folded back the cloth that covered him, there was a criss-cross of bandages on his body, I saw this myself. I didn't open the coffin, I just removed the glass. There was a lock on the coffin. I took off the glass to look at him, to look at the face of my child, I saw the bandages covering his wounds. This is our fate. Then the next day they did the *janaza* (funeral), They did not let us touch the *charpai* (traditional woven bed). They took it themselves.

(Parveen, Manzoor's mother, Palwal, 26th January 2015)

The way women grieve and the way they should grieve becomes a point of concern for the military, for male members of the village and perhaps for other women as well. *Vaen* is discouraged, especially once the military has arrived. An officer I met at the military directorate who organizes funerals explained the dilemma the military faces when it tries to discipline pain. According to him, the delicate balance between good (useful) reminders of war and more painful (real) ones must be maintained so that good affect is produced and painful affect is regulated. This is important if discussions of war and the warrior are to stick to their sublime and glorious aspects and avoid mutilation and trauma. I argue that women's grief becomes a point of concern, a cause of anxiety, which is dealt with by seeing them as primitive.

The soldiers' family, especially the mother and wife, are very emotional. The soldier has gone through training, he is more educated and less emotional. Grief affects the *zehen* and can demoralize and stop future generations [from joining the army]. We don't want to distress them

[the family] further, so sometimes it is best that they do not see or touch, we want to save them from pain and distress.

(Brigadier 1, PA Directorate GHQ, Rawalpindi, 15th January 2015)

The subordination of emotions beneath the faculties of reason and thought also serves to 'subordinate the feminine and the body'. Strong, uncontrollable and unruly emotions are associated with women, who are considered 'less able to transcend the body through thought will and judgement' (Ahmed 2004:3).¹²⁶ There is an acknowledgement in the interview presented above that the need for management emanates from a desire not to upset the valence that military service has in these terrains, although it is also couched as a benevolent management of emotion for women's own good. In this case, their primitive emotions can lead them to demoralize newer generations and discourage them from wanting to join the military. This benevolence is patriarchal, with the masculine military stepping in to support the helpless woman who is to be taken care of now that her son or husband is no more. Women also become a focus because they are singled out for compensation, and money exchanges hands right from the beginning. The following is an excerpt from a widow who recalls the first few hours after the body was placed in the home:

They [the military] don't stop us from crying. They know they can't, even if they say so. They do say, though, stay away sister, have *sabr* (faith/patience), don't cry so, he is alive, but *nobody listens* at that moment. Who can listen to anyone at that moment? (...) They put their hands on our heads and say, listen sister, mother, don't cry, your brother, your son is alive, he has left you with so much, but *nobody is listening*.

(Kausar, Aslam's widow, Palwal, 5th February 2015, emphasis mine)

In the above excerpt, Kausar depicts the rawness of the emotion unleashed in this moment, a moment that the military navigates cautiously. It allows women to cry, recognizing that it has little control at this juncture, yet its anxiety at letting this grief pour out unabated is evident when it tries to discipline them with religious platitudes ('your son is alive') and by pulling into view the compensation that the mother and widow will receive ('he has left you with so much'). The compensation is used as a balm, and more importantly also as a way to bind more firmly into the militarism project the

¹²⁶ A similar disciplining of affect is visible with regard to the soldier in training (Chapter 3), where attachment to the family back home, and especially the female figures in the soldier's life, needs to be weakened.

woman who suddenly finds herself the object of attention in the discourse of sacrifice for the nation. The management of affect that transpires in this moment revolves around the grief-stricken woman whose affect is seen as primitive and irrational. While this affect is regulated, it is also highlighted in order to allow differentiations between men and women to occur. By grieving differently, the men in the family delineate their own manliness and hardiness in the face of this grief and regain their sense of masculinity, which is threatened by their own overwhelming grief and the military's takeover of death and its rites.

The Funeral

Funerals are fondly remembered events, a part of Palwal's history, re-told with great gusto by the village that serves as the audience for these grand spectacles. The colours, inflexions and moods in these descriptions change and shift according to the narrator and his or her proximity to the deceased family: the closer the relation, the more morose and intimate the recollections. However, all stories mention it being a spectacular and impressive event, citing the *sohni* (beautiful) parade, the gun salute and the large numbers of people coming from afar to watch these events.

During my year of fieldwork, no funerals were held in Palwal. However, funerals are often videotaped by families, and I was able to watch some of the recordings. Below, I describe the videotape of Aslam's funeral, and through this retelling I try and bring forth the ritualized nature of military ceremony and what it seeks to achieve. I also highlight moments in that tightly controlled choreography that are sometimes at odds with military discipline.

The first shot is of a dead body shrouded in white. It is not a serene dead body. The face is mutilated, with sutures across the mouth, possibly to stop it bleeding. The white shroud has two distinct bloodstains. The eye area is discoloured, swollen and bruised. The shot captures the body from all sides, almost ruthless in how it captures the pain, the mutilation. It is not a glorious body. It is a body of someone not at peace, who was mutilated and in much pain when he died. The desire to record the body, I contend, is a need to own or re-possess the dead, despite the mutilation of the body that the army would like to veil, and it is in direct defiance of how military protocol demands that the body remain covered. There is no sound at this point. The body is inside a coffin but the lid has been opened

half way. Once the lid is closed, the body is lost to sight, with only a small portion of the face showing through the glass section. As if this distancing is not enough, a flag is draped over the coffin.

The second shot is of an all-male crowd of villagers carrying the *charpai* with the coffin through the uneven dusty terrain of Palwal village. In the background is the sound of bitter weeping, possibly a woman standing close to the person filming. There is no order to this crowd of mourners, at least to the onlooker. It seems that there is a central group holding the coffin aloft, with others swirling around it. There is the sound of men wailing, crying, chanting, a dull sound, rhythmic and repetitive. The coffin's progress is not even, it stops apparently for no reason then starts again. It almost meanders through the field, giving the impression of a lack of purpose, as if the group doesn't know where it is going or is in no hurry to arrive there. The men in the front, or at least some of them, are visibly distressed even as they chant along. Some wipe tears from their eyes.

Women follow at the back, separated from the main crowd. Hesitant, scattered, yet very much there, these women have come to see the *janaza*, unlike the men who have come to read the *namaz-e-janaza* (funeral prayer) and be part of the funeral procession. Many are perched on rooftops that dot the landscape, their more colourful clothes providing a welcome relief to the rather gloomy, drab and colourless procession that moves forward, seemingly going nowhere.

At one point the camera swerves and we acknowledge a new presence: two men, strolling along wearing combat camouflage, the Pakistan Army's battledress. The two officers have come to attend the funeral. Some soldiers can also be spotted, JCOs in the more traditional khaki uniform. They stand out as different, out of place, on the fringes of the crowd. They look deferential, almost hesitant, their downcast eyes and posture totally at odds with what is to follow. Another swerve of the camera and we see three army vehicles: one a large truck and the others a Toyota Hilux and a small bus. There is no metalled road here, just the dusty terrain, so the presence of these vehicles stands out.

There is no video of the *namaz-e-janaza* (funeral prayer) itself. I was told that the video maker stopped filming in order to join the *namaz* congregation himself.

After the earlier chanting and wailing, the silence that follows the funeral prayer is almost deafening. The body has been handed over to the military after the *janaza*. Cocks can be heard crowing in the background. Around 200 yards from the grave, the villagers are seated auditorium like, watching and waiting. Four soldiers now carry the *charpai* to the graveyard from the open field where the *namaz-i-janaza* (funeral prayer) was read. Gone is the studied nonchalance; these men are charged with purpose as they march in unison past the tombstones, through a corridor of soldiers, towards the open grave, a few villagers in sight. As the coffin moves forward, the soldiers salute by changing the position of their guns. The coffin is carried ceremoniously, each step is measured, in marked contrast to how it was carried earlier, in a burdensome manner, as if the men carrying it were grief stricken almost to the point of impotence, without purpose. But here there is purpose, order and meaning.

The *charpai* is placed on the ground, the men carrying it march away and four other men walk up to untie the flag draped over the coffin, which is folded ceremoniously and put aside. The coffin is now carried to the grave, with two men on each side, and lowered into the grave with ropes. Villagers and family members join in, and as the coffin is lowered, the camera captures it descending. There is the sound of someone sobbing, a continuous monotonous crying, uninterrupted. Someone says '*mere bache*' (my child). But these are inconsolable, disjointed sounds, almost an aside, and no one takes much notice, nor does anyone join in, as is traditional during funeral rites for other deaths. There is a shot of a man sitting next to the open grave, emitting a steady crying sound. There is a flash of colour: a woman at the grave, maybe the mother, maybe a sister, but the camera doesn't linger on her. Unlike the national stage, women are peripheral to the image here.

The soldier in charge shouts '*doje admi peeche ho jayein*' (unnecessary men please retreat) and order reigns once more. The momentary lapse in

the orderly picture when the coffin was being lowered passes and the gravesite becomes visible again. Halfway through the filling of the grave, the soldier holding the national flag walks up and affixes it to the head of the grave as earth is poured in.

The next image we see is of a mound of earth covered by rose petals. Three wreaths are now laid on the grave, one each by the regimental and unit commanders and one by the soldier's father. The wreaths are identical but their bearers differ, as does their grief, which may last longer for some than for others. The men are brought up one by one to lay their wreaths, each accompanied by two marching men. Their arms sway, their bodily movements are exaggerated and their feet stomp on the ground. Another man then marches up and moves the wreath to the side so the next one can be placed. There is a man for each job, each step is ordained, following in a seamless fashion. The master of ceremonies calls the father to step forward and take the flag and cap from the officer in charge. The father, a drooping old man clad in a *chaadar* and *pagri* (traditional Punjabi head dress), steps out and moves to where an army officer is waiting, perhaps the unit commander. He stops a few yards away at a designated point, clearly having been coached before. Holding the flag and cap, the officer and a soldier march forward and hand them to the father. The officer touches the father's arms as if to support him and then moves back. The man continues to stand there uncertainly, and then a younger man, maybe his nephew, walks up, takes the flag from him and leads him back. It looks as if the father has broken down and is sobbing. The same officer is seen walking up to the father and embracing him, an acknowledgement of the father's uncontrollable grief, which can only take place outside the prescribed ceremony. The ceremony goes on, for the chain of events cannot be broken. The guard commander, a JCO, now takes the microphone and recites two verses from the Quran:

And say not of those who are slain in the way of Allah, 'They are dead'. Nay, they are alive, though you perceive (it) not.

Quran, 2:154

Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead.
Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their
Lord.

Quran, 3:169

The commander gives a brief sketch of the soldier who has now been buried. He hesitates while he searches for his name and details, but finds them and starts again. His name, his village, his unit, his date of joining and where he died are the most significant things to remember about him here. That he played cricket in the very field where the village read his *janaza* today, that on his last leave he lied to his unit officer and stayed an extra night so he could watch the *kabadi* (traditional wrestling) match taking place in this field, that he was pale-faced and ashen when his family went to say goodbye to him as he left for Waziristan with his unit are unimportant details in this rendition of his life. The JCO then announces that there will be an *azazi salami* (ceremonial salute) and asks everyone to stand.

All are requested to stand in respect. Those of you in uniform and those civilians wearing a cap/headdress will now salute this loved son.

The call is clearly to men only and addresses all men in the gathering as one, the army and civilians, even as it addresses them separately, as those in uniform and those wearing a headdress. Women are not called on, but just watch. The complementary role assigned to them in the national script for the militarism project is to produce brave sons and then grieve in controlled ways. It is not for them to salute and honour the dead in this space, where paying tribute is the task of brave and resilient men, even if they are not equals, as civilian men need to be differentiated from men who risk their lives.

Two rows of six soldiers standing a few yards away alongside the grave come into view as the guard commander asks them to change their positions from attention to at ease and the guns go up and down in sharp coordinated moves. Their synchronized movements are impressive as they shift their weapons from *neechay fung* (the ground arm position) to

bazoo fung (the sling arm position), then to the front of the body with both hands in *salam fung* (the salute position), followed by a perfectly coordinated gun salute.

A soldier standing by the grave takes a bugle from his pouch. He plays the 'Last Post',¹²⁷ a direct remnant of the British Army, a mournful note played to signify the final farewell, symbolizing the end of the day, the fact that the soldier's duty is done and he can now rest in peace.

This is followed by an invitation to a local *maulvi* (cleric) to come and say an additional *dua* (prayer). The spectacle needs a final closure to seal the sacrifice within the folds of faith, and here too it needs to be managed so it is just the right length, hence the cleric is instructed by the military beforehand. The camera shuts off at this point.

-Notes from video recording of Aslam's funeral in Palwal village.



The entire time from the moment the news arrives, followed by the body, to the moment the last truck leaves is a zigzagged patchwork of deeply private moments of pain interspersed with ritualistic regulated grief performed for effect. There are many moments when pain threatens to take over, such as when a woman opens the coffin to touch her son's face, or the camera captures the mutilation of the body in defiance of military orders, or the father breaks down when the cap and flag is handed over to him or sobs as the coffin is lowered. These are contrasted by a sequence of calm measured steps and carefully performed military rites. In this ceremony of grief there is no attempt to hand over, unlike the national stage discussed in Chapter 1, where the mother and father will often be asked to come onto to the stage and speak. Instead, there is an anxiety to reclaim the body that has been temporarily handed over. In national ceremonies, the mother and father civilianize the military space by bringing emotion and pathos. In this local setting, the need is the opposite, to militarize this civilian space, to bring order and regulate unbridled grief. 'It would be too difficult for the father to speak, the loss is too close', says Brigadier 1.¹²⁸ This also implies anxiety that the father or mother will be incoherent and unable to portray the valiant, compliant and willingly self-sacrificing

¹²⁷ Also played at the end of the day at army training centres.

¹²⁸ Brigadier 1, PA Directorate-GHQ, 15th January 2015.

subject. There is also no question of the mother being asked to speak in this forum, even if she is the central figure on the national stage and in national iconography.

It is evident from the above that the military machinery pays careful attention to the affective content of this incident, a negotiated stance that will discipline affect and yet tolerate excess and deviance through careful benevolent management, such as accepting women who cry even as it asks them not to and going over to console the sobbing father after the ceremony of handing over the flag and cap is finished. This is benevolent gendered management, with the masculine military managing the external business of dying and tolerating the excesses of the naïve feminine, personified here by the family and village, whose permanent and devastating rupture has to be managed and controlled for their own good. These tropes also gender how mourning is carried out in the village, where men rally in more obvious ways around a military that calls on them to be men and separate themselves from the feminine, the weak, the primitive. Traditional gender roles are appropriated and re-imagined through the concerns of the military, just as they were earlier when the soldier went through similar ministering in his military training. In examining this disciplining, I argue that even though the careful choreography remains undisturbed, slippages from the script of sacrifice persist, which are sometimes folded into the narrative because they are not spoken about, or at other times are attributed to the naturalness of grief of beings less rational.

After the Trucks Leave

I turn now from this dramatic and somewhat spectacular event to the ceaseless mundane everyday life of the village and its residents that I encountered as I went about interrogating what dying for the nation means in these spaces. The picture I sketch in this section is based first on retrospective recollections by the families and friends of dead soldiers and second on physical reminders of these young men, or hauntings, visible in the homes and public space of the village. For the former, I obtained differential access to a range of gendered characters, based on my gender and their willingness to engage with me. The latter is an exercise in 'hauntology', a neologism suggested by Jacques Derrida (1994) which acknowledges the presence of the dead not just in the speech of the living but also in the spaces where they reside.

As one enters Palwal, it is impossible to avoid the main crossroads, *Shaheedan da chowk* (Martyrs' Junction), named after the dead, and the larger than life billboard that adorns it. Initially, the faces of the seven men on the sign were just a blur to me, indistinct and

inseparable from each other, not just because of the symmetry imposed by the photographer's shot and the army uniform they wore, but also because of their expressions: solemn, determined and uncommunicative. As my fieldwork progressed and I spent more time with their families, seeing pictures of their pre-military lives, reading their diaries and hearing their childhood stories, their faces started to look different. Just as the sign changed for me with time, so did the substance of the stories that emerged from my interlocutors. I will talk of these shifts in the next section, 'Grieving All Wrong', but here I will focus on the predominant narrative, one that burst out almost before I started to inquire. Like the faces on the signboard, the narratives blur and merge into one another, so there are not seven different lives and seven different stories, but one monolithic version of what happened to all these men.

My interlocutors talked about the inevitability of death, how it was preordained as God's will. There was constant reference to how this is a revered and coveted death, a sense of pride that the son of the family or the village will live on and be remembered, unlike many others whose lives and graves go unmarked. Dying for the nation was considered synonymous with dying for Islam, thus the dead soldier was a *shaheed* (martyr), to be accorded the highest place in heaven. Another common theme was that the lost son had been special, different from others, brave and loving. Many shared how these soldiers had expressed a desire to sacrifice their life and attain *shahadat*. I heard similar scripts of willing sacrifice for the nation repeated to me again and again as I was welcomed into dead soldiers' homes. It was obvious that the families were accustomed to inquiries and scrutiny of their lives, and their scripts were ready and uncannily similar in substance to those of the various YeS programmes I had reviewed. Yet, in some nebulous way they also seemed different. These conversations seemed charged with affect that bristled on the surface, and even as family members spoke of *shahadat*, the grief and sense of loss in the room was palpable. The pride they expressed seemed like a veneer that wavered over the conversation but never quite settled down. For obvious reasons, the dead haunted the content of conversation, but the physical space of the house was also infused with their presence. These homes were affective spaces, haunted by the dead, and many had been renovated using compensation money received from the military and marked with the name of the martyr and his father on a plaque at the gate. A framed picture of the dead son in his army uniform (*recruity ki photo* – a photograph taken on graduation day) or a larger than life poster left over from the commemorative ceremony the previous year would also be placed in the room. Men would dominate the conversation, but as I was a woman, the mother, sister or wife of the dead soldier would sit in. They would

share the date he died, where he had been serving, how they heard the news, who had come to tell them and how the funeral had happened. In a village space where most people cannot accurately recall their own or sometimes even their son's age, where time and space seemed suspended, there was an almost uncanny remembrance of the son's death, sometimes down to the day, the unit he was in and his military enrolment number. The details were clearly significant, and family members would share their grief. Mothers would often shed tears, not uncontrollably, but tears would slide out of their eyes as they spoke. In one of these initial encounters, a mother kept staring at a fixed spot on the floor, the spot where she told me her son used to put his army boots when he came home on leave. There were no boots there today, yet as she spoke of her son her eyes stared fixedly at that space. The men would talk of grief, but only briefly, and many moved on quickly, sometimes brushing aside the mother's conversation as less significant. They would tell me that they would like me to advocate on their behalf for greater recruitment quotas for the area or for a *pakki* (metalled) road or a dispensary in Palwal or a job for another son. The latter request would be qualified as being for a position in an army department that could not be deployed in active combat. This would be attributed to the mother's insistence that her other son should not be placed in danger, in contrast to the depiction of YeS in Chapter 1, where the father and mother willingly and unconditionally offer up their other sons to the military.

To a great extent, the content of these early encounters provides a glimpse of the militarized civilian in Palwal, militarized because of the similarity between how the military depicts sacrifice for the nation-state and how it is depicted by the dead soldier's family and the community. This rotates around scripted themes: pride in the act of sacrifice for the motherland, belief in eternal life for the dead and a plea for on-going war so the sacrifice does not go waste. This is clear evidence of state power working in a more dispersed way, with the state narrative finding its way to groups beyond its immediate gaze, where subjects are themselves producers of statist discourses (Navaro-Yashin, 2002, Weeden 1999) and affective responses strengthen rather dismantle the dominant social order (Berlant, 1997). Yet, even if the subjects did not go off script in the verbal realm, this was not all that was conveyed in these encounters. Not only was grief palpable, but the physical space, the material objects and the affective residues that lingered in them – what Yael Navaro Yashin (2012) calls 'affective geographies' – spoke of an afterlife of affect that defied easy or simple closure. These were residues that refused to be painted over with pride alone and which were visible in the posters of the men placed at the entrance to the village, the plaque on the gate, the pictures in the room,

the distinct graves – some decorated and others shabbier – and the empty space where the boots once lay.

Grieving All Wrong

In these villages, grief caused by military death shifts between the private and public realms and familiar and unfamiliar scripts and practices of death, mixing yet insoluble, like two different coloured dyes swirling around each other. I turn here to other scripts of grief that sit side by side with the military scripts, glimpses of which I have shared in earlier sections.

I have noticed him, he has taken it to heart. He has not thought about it from the other angle [of *shahadat*]. If he thinks from this angle, that *shahadat* has its own position, reputation, then he might have got some relief. He is not thinking from that angle, he is only thinking from one angle: that his son is no more.

(Schoolteacher, Palwal, 29th January 2015)

The above is a reflection from a schoolteacher about the father of Imran, who joined the army when he was a little over 17 and died in operations in Swat in his first month of active duty. The teacher suggests that Imran's father finds it difficult to follow the path that will allow him to move on and come to terms with his son's unexpected and sudden death. This is a story of grief that refuses to follow the script, despite instruction. This and other similar stories are expressed even as the parallel script of *shahadat* remains intact, flowing along unhindered and unchecked, like the tears. These are stories of grief that does not heal despite faith, stories of failed grief and failed resolution.

Sajjida, whose son's death was the most recent in the village, performed *vaen* for her son twice during my interviews with her. The first time she did so I was at her house. As she spoke to me, she asked her sister for a picture of her son. Her sister handed her two photos, one taken at the end of his training period and another at his wedding, six months before his death. Other family members were there, women who sat around her and let her sing and cry as she rocked back and forth, the pictures in her hand. The *vaen* was slow, mournful and melodic, and she asked for death for herself so she could be with him and not feel pain. The other women did not try to comfort her but joined her from time to time in chorus or in sobbing.¹²⁹ In Sajjida's second *vaen*, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, she rejected the narrative of military sacrifice and wished her son had died in childhood. Like Imran's father, it seemed that she was unable to find

¹²⁹ Sajjida, Tahir's mother, 19th November and 10th December 2014.

solace in the narrative of *shahadat* and sacrifice that the military and religion offered her, defying it almost against her own will through crying, a practice that the military tries to discipline:

I can't help it (crying). You can lock someone up in a steel cage, but she still can't help it. As for my son, it is fate, even if I try, it [his death] will happen. I tell myself it was his fate, this *shaheedi*, even then my tears don't stop.

(Sajjida, Tahir's mother, Palwal, 10th December 2014)

Three deaths happened in the village within a year. As the dead bodies and military trucks rolled in there was a growing sense of fear in the families that had sons posted in combat areas:

Families were under pressure as the situation was dangerous, yet they couldn't ask them to leave. The financial condition of the home is such that they cannot leave so they wanted them to continue. So they tried to encourage them by saying, yes, times are difficult but you have to do this no matter what. But they were burdened, stressed by the situation. There was another boy in the village, around the same age, he left the army and came back. His family told him to come back, (...) they are slightly better off materially. They said to him, you come back, our system will work, unlike the others [who died].

(Schoolteacher, Palwal, 29th January 2015)

A thread that surfaced as families spoke about the loss of their sons was regret. This was regret that he went into service, regret that they didn't insist that he desert when operations started and regret tinged with shades of guilt that they couldn't save him when he expressed a desire to leave. Some spoke about it wistfully, some in anger, some in deep grief:

The last time he went back he was very unhappy and restless. We had decided that we would not send him back, we didn't want him to go, he didn't want to go. We had thought we would somehow get him free. But people around us told us to not make this mistake they said to us let him go, he will return.

(Yasmin, Nawaz's mother, Palwal, 24th November 2014)

Nawaz's father agreed to speak to me after I had been coming to his house for over six months. As he began to speak of his son's entry into the army, his subsequent training and his deployment in Swat, the conversation became more emotional; he was visibly

distressed as he talked about his last few encounters with his son. He would stop, start again, and then stop, his eyes would become wet and his voice would break.

The following exchange was particularly emotive and he seemed to shiver as he spoke:

If he [Nawaz] hadn't gone into service he would not have become a *shaheed*. (...) He called me once from Swat. He told me that there was a boy from his unit that had died. He said to me, Abu, the shaheed boy, is lying in my lap, he [Nawaz] was agitated, sad and he was worried. He said to me, 'Father, get me out of here, I can't concentrate, things are very bad, I could become a shaheed too'. I had told my older brother take him to Saudi, but he didn't, he (Nawaz) went into the army because of the situation in the house. If it was up to him, he would have studied further.

(Nawaz's father, Palwal, 10th April 2015)

Sajjida's son never expressed a desire to come home, but she struggled with not having done enough to stop him.

Sajjida: My son, the one who is *shaheed*, I tried to stop him [from going back to his unit] I said to him, *my son, the goats and cows have to be looked after, I have to work outside the home. I am alone, your father is dead and now you also want to go. You can do so much here to help me.*

Me: You wanted to stop him because...

Sajjida: I wanted to stop him for my *sukh* (comfort). You sit here, and I sit here, who knows how we will die, what will be the means through which death will reach us, fever or vomit?

Me: Or in war?

Sajjida (sharply): I don't know anything about war. I just wanted him to retire and come home, and that's why I got him married.

(Sajjida, Tahir's Mother, Palwal, 19th November 2014)

In the family's narratives, thoughts of *what if* the son had left (or deserted) the military found their way into conversations, although they continued to refer to him as *shaheed*. That title was difficult to dislodge, even when they wished he had never gone into service in the first place. This difficulty was due to religious imperatives, which construct his death as sacred, but also because for many service is linked to one's family's aspirations for financial security. The push to enlist has always been expressed as being about *ghurbat* (poverty) and *bhuq* (hunger), as I pointed out in Chapter 2, while Chapter 3 also highlighted a tendency to label desertion and giving up a secure income as foolish. Military service is a gamble, a risk taken in the knowledge that it will result in the hardship of separation and a life away from the familiar. It could also extract a heavier

toll, and when the odds turn against them a terrible price is extracted, which is hard to face. The death of a beloved son cannot then be reduced to a desire or an aspiration for a better life, and the inner regret within for having allowed that it to happen is immense and creates anxiety that lingers and must be managed. I speak of this management in the sections below.

Keeping Memory and Hauntings Alive

This section takes forward these types of grieving, some appropriate and others more problematic, to the point where they infuse and shape local commemorative practices and bring the spectre of the military into local space. Palwal, like most of the district's villages, holds on to its military roots in an intimate way which emerges from affect associated with soldiers who have physically lived, walked, studied and prayed in the spaces where these practices are located. Palwal's landscape is overrun with images of the state and representations and recollections of the dead, both physical and concrete and those that linger in spaces and hang in the air.

Behind the main crossroads lies the village graveyard, where the graves of five dead soldiers are each conspicuously marked by a large Pakistani flag. The adornment and reverence accorded to the graves of dead soldiers is not unique to this village, although the large number (seven) brings its own dynamics. The graves of the *shaheed* are surrounded by *chardevaris* (four boundary walls), which provide space for additional people like close family to be buried alongside the *shaheed* in time. While these boundaries were made for some of the earlier *shaheeds*, the appearance of these graves themselves was not originally distinct from regular ones. Adornment has become more pronounced since the last four soldiers died, from 2007 onwards. The four most recent graves are close to each other and are remarkably similar in style in terms of colours and tombstone engraving, with ornate iron grilles and plants, while the Quran is also placed in a cupboard within the enclosure. I am told that these graves were built at personal expense, and the military has no role to play in their upkeep and maintenance. The dynamic mentioned in Chapter 2, where the district inscribes service and sacrifice on its physical landscape partly to claim entitlement to military service, is to some extent operational in this context too, yet the very visible presence of the Martyrs Junction, the ornate graves and the Pakistani flags also serves to forever mark the village as a space haunted by those who were once present on the terrain and are there no longer.



Photographs 5 & 6: Graves of *shuhada* in Chakwal

The need to remember or the desire to be haunted is strong here, but remembering carries a different ethos and meaning for different people who are differently placed in the village. For some, it is a marker of their significance in the larger landscape of the numerous villages that lie scattered across rural Chakwal. For others (the family), it is a desire to keep memory alive, claiming a status and a sacredness that is vulnerable to being challenged from within and from outside, and so has to be affirmed, necessitating reminders. Questions about the appropriateness of adorning the *shaheed's* grave, the fact that the grave occupies a larger plot and a certain rivalry about whose grave is the best looked after are themes that emerged as villagers and family members spoke about the *shaheeds*. Sometimes, other members of the village begrudged the extra space taken up by the grave, and on two occasions there were altercations about how much space could be taken up. In one, the status of military death as *shahadat* was questioned in the context of the current war against Muslims.¹³⁰ In the other incident, doubt was expressed about whether a death had been due to war injury or because of illness. Sajjida's son

¹³⁰ See Chapter 6 for more detail.

Tahir, who had been serving in Wana, had been in hospital for four months before he died. The family claims his death was due to infected shrapnel wounds from a blast, and the military gave him a ceremonial funeral, but rumours persisted. The family, poorer than most in Palwal, had set up the four boundary walls within just a few weeks, and by the fourth month, when I visited the grave with the mother, the iron grilles had been installed and painted. On the first anniversary of Tahir's death, the family held a public commemoration. However, nobody was willing to talk too much about the tensions surrounding either of the cases that led to altercations. This reluctance speaks to the discomfort at disturbing the revered status of the *shaheed* and the uneasiness and doubt that this may bring up for the honour of Palwal.

Every year, Aslam's adoptive family celebrates the anniversary of his death in a grand ceremony held in the village field, complete with tents, carpets and chairs.¹³¹ During the event, a local cleric delivers a special sermon after *Zuhr* prayers, and boys from the local school will attend, although only boys. The school announces an unofficial half-day and the boys will sing *naats* (poetry) for Prophet Muhammad (a Bareilvi¹³² hallmark) and make patriotic speeches. Many aspects of the ceremony mirror national commemorations, yet in many ways it is an altogether more intimate affair. It is a male-only event, with the women attending a more private ceremony at Aslam's house, where they read the Quran. Food is served at both venues. The large signboard at the Martyrs Junction is also renewed.

The year I was in the Palwal, Tahir's name and picture were added to the signboard, the seventh *shaheed* to return to the village. A long line of national flags adorned the graveyard, and the voice of Noor Jehan, a popular female artist renowned for motivational war songs, was blaring over the public address system, singing '*Eh wataan ke sajeele jawano*' (the handsome young men of my country), a melody that became iconic during the 1965 war with India and has since become associated with military commemoration of *shaheeds*. I was told that a group of village elders had gone to each martyrs' grave and offered *dua* (prayer) that morning. It was a clearly not just a day for Aslam but an attempt to acknowledge all of Palwal's martyrs. Aslam's adoptive father did this every year, paying for it out of his own pocket. Some villagers were bemused that someone would spend so much every year, others were slightly critical, saying he was

¹³¹ Aslam's adoptive father is a relatively well-off man in Palwal, who had been childless after many years of marriage and, as is often the case in rural Punjab, adopted a child from within the family, his sisters' son.

¹³² A dominant Muslim sect in Pakistan.

overly sentimental as Aslam was not his real son, while others felt he was asserting his social status.

Below I present two excerpts from my fieldnotes to describe some of the commemorative practices in the village:

On the day, as I attended Aslam's death anniversary, I saw young boys emerge from the school at the back. Most were between nine and fifteen, identical dots in their blue shirts and grey trousers. They grew larger as they came nearer and became more distinct, some were smaller, some older, some walked briskly, others chattered, giggled and loitered. Some recognized me as their English teacher and waved at me and I waved back hesitantly, as I knew I was already conspicuous. A woman sitting behind me who had accompanied me from the women's event shouted, *don't talk, walk in line*. Even as she said it, a man, probably a teacher, came into view and they started to fall in line, files of three waiting to enter the tented area with the line of Pakistani flags behind them. It was a surreal moment. Row upon row of young boys, not yet men, waiting to be called, to join the (commemoration of) the nation's dead, a disciplining done by the village, men and women, young boys lining up against the backdrop of the Pakistani state, represented by the flags waving at the back.

-Fieldnotes, Palwal, 10th December 2014

Dramas or debates in schools often have a nationalistic theme. This is reflective of the larger national scenario, but in Palwal this revolves around martyrdom. The private school down the road often puts on short plays for its prize distribution ceremony. The year I was in Palwal, the theme, once again, was martyrdom.

The children performed a skit where five of them stood on stage holding pictures of the village *shuhada* and sang a patriotic song. On the side, four children were dressed up in costume as the family. The mother sat crying and holding an army uniform in her hand. The boy dressed up as the father was sitting and writing. He would look up from time to time to stare into space as if thinking about his son. The younger brother was depicted playing with a ball and the sister was consoling the mother.

These are gendered depictions of who moves on, who continues to hold on, who is more modern and educated and can think and grieve appropriately. Yet it was obvious that that they all grieved. It was a sad song, even as the children sang it with spirit and with energy.

-Fieldnotes, Palwal, 2nd April 2015



It is clear that Palwal chooses to remember and eulogize its dead through very similar scripts to those seen at national military commemorations. Within the local space, we can read these reproductions of the state along the lines of the Foucauldian analysis of power, as reiterations of power in which the subject is imbricated (Foucault 1991). My slight digression from this analysis lies in the assumption of continuity, the closed circuit model of disciplinary power, the presumption that these representations, reifications and reiterations are representative only of the productive nature of power and its unchallenged hold over its subjects. I hold that where subjects reify the military, this reification is also reflective of affective residues and effluxes that remain in the interiority of the subject and also within these spaces, residues that are a mix of grief and regret. These residues create anxiety that is soothed not by challenging disciplinary webs but by grasping them even more strongly. In the next section, I seek to deepen understanding of why this disciplinary power works so well and examine the reasons for the subject 'choosing' to exist within and only within, and move within and only within the webs of disciplinary power, even though through its affective displays it sometimes seems to stand outside them.

***'Kehna parta hai':*¹³³ Compliance at the Heart of Ambivalence**

In the sections above describing the unfolding of mourning rituals, the negotiated terrain of grieving and ceaseless everyday life that stretches beyond that dramatic moment, it is instructive to see how shifts in the script of willing sacrifice happen over time. These slippages did not appear to me as a dichotomy between public and private narratives. Perhaps the slippages became more pronounced in private narratives, yet the two seemed to sit by side by side, a lacing together of both critical and statist narratives. Although this seemed contradictory to the listener, to the narrator it represented two realities that need to co-exist. I argue that villagers fluctuate between fetishizing the military and betraying a *knowing*, a *seeing through* that they express through affect even

¹³³ (You have to say this) Nawaz's father, 10th April 2015.

as they actively perform these moments and endorse the desired scripts of willing sacrifice and *shahadat* for the nation.

As mentioned earlier, Nawaz's father expressed deep regret that he had sent his son to the army and did not have the connections to get him released when the war started.

Below is an excerpt from our conversation:

As I walked back from the funeral, I received a call from the colonel of his unit. I said to him if I had ten sons, I would give them to the country. (...) You say this because we exist because of this country and [only] if the army exists then we have this country. *Kehna parta hai* (you have to say this) to the colonel [because] your *jazba* (passion) rises as the army gives you *izzat* (prestige) and *rutba* (status) and buries you with *azaz* (ceremony).

(Nawaz's father, 10th April 2015)

Yasmin and Nawaz were looking for employment for their other son but only in civilian departments of the military where there is no deployment in combat areas. In the excerpt above, Nawaz's father seems to acknowledge that what is said in these moments is sometimes rhetorical, as subjects feel compelled to say something that they may not mean because it is expected and because of the heady mix of honour, status and ceremony that goes with military death. Peter Sloterdijk (1988) puts forward the notion that the dominant mode of functioning of ideology is cynical; the cynical subject is conscious of the distance between the ideological mask and his social reality and yet he continues to cling to it. Slavoj Žižek (2008:27), citing Adorno, expands this further when he says, 'ideology is, strictly speaking, only a system which makes a claim to the truth – that is, which is not simply a lie but a lie experienced as truth, a lie which pretends to be taken seriously'. According to Žižek, ideology is not maintained by its 'truth value' but 'by simple extra ideological violence and the promise of gain'. This would be one way to explain the military's obvious and extraordinary hold on these populations: as their fear of the military apparatus and the repercussions of making their dissonance visible. They also wish to benefit from the compensation that is handed out at this point, and safeguard the possibility of future recruitment into the military. In her study of Syria under an authoritarian regime, Lisa Wedeen (1999:121) speaks of the 'shared condition of unbelief', in which Syrians acted 'as if' they revered the regime, while in the context of the Turkish state, Yael Navaro Yashin (2002:162) speaks of 'automatons' who, despite their consciousness of the notion of the state as an abstraction, continue to reproduce the state in practice. Wedeen calls this the politics of 'as if', while Navaro-Yashin names the condition cynicism, as does Lori Allen (2013) in her more recent work on human rights.

As the villagers in Palwal themselves constantly reiterate, it is a mask they have to put on, and that they know they put on. They say, '*Karna parta hai, kehna parta hai*' (You *have* to do this, you *have* to say this), clearly signifying an awareness that it is a symptom, but they are still, somehow, compelled to do it. Navaro-Yashin (2002:165-166) attempts to explain this compulsion through the notion of 'mundane cynicism' or a 'pragmatic recycling of statism in daily life':

For these cynics, the line between carrying or deconstructing the symptom is thin: it is the mark between livelihood and death; the symptom is a tool for survival.

If the symptom is a belief in ideas of sacrifice and service to the nation/military, then carrying the symptom allows a secure livelihood and social position. In Palwal's case, it is clearly about economics and material benefits. I follow Navaro-Yashin's analysis up to this point, but her description of the compulsion that makes adherence to the mask so necessary leaves the story only half explained in the case of Palwal. In Palwal it is also about grief and the strong emotions it generates, a need to make meaning out of what has been lost forever so the loss can be justified. I will complicate the compulsion to hold onto the mask through Slavjok Žižek's (2008:45) reading of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Žižek posits a resolution to the dilemma posed by the seeing and knowing automaton:

Ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our 'reality' itself: an 'illusion' which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks some unsupportable, real, impossible kernel. (...) The function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel.

Here, ideology – the belief in the narrative of sacrifice for the nation – operates not to help us evade social reality – the death of a loved one – but to build a social reality (death seen as meaningful) to escape from some traumatic real kernel (our own implication in the death). In this case, the 'traumatic real kernel' consists of guilt and regret, thoughts of *what if* and more pragmatic concerns about how to accept the compensation money that is to be received. This 'real kernel' is what that makes the discarding of the mask unthinkable. Moments that hold the potential to go beyond 'thinkable thought' (Chomsky qtd. in Acton 2007:3), moments that are affect-laden, where there is tension, unease and contestation, paradoxically become the very junctures that allow a reconsolidation of power. I bring two further elaborations of this notion of ideology as 'fantasy', 'an escape

from some traumatic, real kernel' – not that the army used the son as fodder, but that family members themselves are implicated in that fact – both of which revolve around affect. Affect makes these fantasies possible and becomes its substance, and it is affect that makes these fantasies forever tremulous, never at ease and in need of constant reaffirmation. The phrase *karna parta hai*, (you *have* to do this) speaks in the present continuous tense, a constant doing, a perpetual fixing of meaning that seems to slip, failing to stay in balance. There is compliance at the heart of ambivalence that refuses to settle.

The practices and ritual of remembering in the local space try to suture through this space, which could lead to a disequilibrium that could potentially challenge the relationship between the military institution and the district, unsettling the district's dominant source of secure livelihood and bringing in its wake unsettling affect about those willingly sent in order to improve financial status, and lost. This narrative is guarded not only by the military but also by the families and the village, expressed as reverence and love for the transcendental figure of the *shaheed* and a veiling of other narratives where grieving went awry, which are never spoken of, yet are understood: open secrets that everybody keeps.

The *next of kin* are able to see through the project of militarism; they recognize the futility of war and the use of blood to serve a construct in which they may not believe. Yet they accept this violence inflicted on them and on the bodies of those they love. They say *khen parta hai*, (you *have* to say it) and behave as if they do believe. They say it because they know the military is watching. They say it because without this frame the son's death would be futile and the grief too great to make sense of. They say it because they *need* to say it, to avoid the realization and guilt that the risk taken was maybe too great and because they must accept the money and benefits offered, as it was for material needs that the tribute to the nation was risked in the first place.

The military institution hooks onto the grief, claims it and ritualizes it, so that no other narrative can stake a counter claim, even as everyone knows that people are people and will have their own stories. For the families, collusion with the military implies that they wear a mask that does not stand for duplicity but signifies a veiling: a mask that is never at ease, for it nags and aches. This mask is held up for fear of the watchful gaze of the military and the piercing real kernel, the affect inside.

Conclusion

Through an ethnographic exploration of death and its reception in Palwal village, this chapter has highlighted the complicated ways in which affect undergirds the relationship between the military and the families of dead soldiers. The military sets death in the service of the nation apart from regular death, achieving this through the spectacular and controlled nature of the military funeral, setting out procedures and rules for each step and disciplining the affect of families by drawing on tropes of gender and religion. Control is of the essence, and is founded on arrangements which manage information and emotion, create connections with family members in gendered ways and form coalitions with local religious leaders. The military pays special attention to the female subjects of militarism, the mother and wife of the dead, and manages their grief so it can be produced and harnessed to just the right degree, for both excess and absence of grief is problematic. While unabated grief can be demoralizing, a lack of grief can weaken the separation between the gendered bodies of stoic men and helpless women.

Palwal chooses to remember and eulogize its dead through very similar scripts to those seen at national military commemorations. Reminders of the village's sacrifice for the nation and the seven lives loved and lost are visible across the district's physical landscape and in the privacy of people's homes. I have argued that these 'affective geographies' (Navaro Yashin 2012) are not just reifications and reiterations of military power, but also represent the stubborn afterlife of affect that defies easy or simple closure through the narrative of *shahadat* or sacrifice for the nation. These affective residues and effluxes, a mixture of regret and guilt, infuse families' narratives and are visible in the many ways in which mothers, fathers and wives in Palwal continue to grieve *inappropriately*, as well as being suggestive of the existence of contestations and dissonances in these subjects of militarism. Service in the military is linked to families' aspiration for financial security, a gamble taken by the soldier and his family to secure a better future. As such, death in service brings its share of guilt and regret, and thoughts of *what if* find their way into families' recollections of the dead, even as they continue to refer to them as *shaheed*. These residues create an anxiety that is soothed not by challenge but by reiterating military narratives. There is a strong desire to make peace with the permanent rupture of death, a peace that is uneasy and unsettled and must be constantly reclaimed in the interest of social status and position, and more importantly for the affective interiority of the subject.

Hence, I have argued that in these rural spaces, allegiance to the script of sacrifice for the nation is linked to the need to keep grief, regret and guilt at bay. Militaristic scripts of service and sacrifice are grasped tightly because they function as salves, a re-purposing and meaning-making that serves as protection from external and internal censure. Palwal keeps its dead alive in order to make sense of these permanent ruptures and soothe the hauntings. Moments of tension and unease, which hold the potential for subversion, paradoxically become the very junctures that permit a return to hegemonic power.

Chapter 5: Economies of Loss - The Function and Limits of Compensation

My heart explodes (in pain) when I think of him (...). Money has no value, *agar puttār nahīo labda* (if you can't find your son). If he had not become a *naukar* (gone to serve) he would not be a *shaheed* and would be alive today.

(Ayesha, Naseem's mother, adjoining village, 18th September 2014)

In the above excerpt from my interview with the mother of a *shaheed*, there is a glimpse of the monetized aspect of military death, an imperceptible narrative that exists alongside the more visible stories of pride, loss and sacrifice. This chapter charts the functions and limits of the material compensation and reparation offered by the Pakistani military for the loss and damage endured by the soldier and his family.

Compensation policies have steadily evolved in the wake of Pakistan's escalating role in the GWOT and the accompanying large numbers of casualties among both security personnel and civilians.¹³⁴ According to a review of policy and practice of compensation regimes in Pakistan carried out by the Institute of Social and Policy Sciences (2011), provincial and federal governments began introducing administrative measures to compensate civilians, including government officials in 2005. These compensation packages are often one-time cash payments and have tended to be discretionary and to vary between provinces. Moreover, these mechanisms are often criticized for uncertainty over when they are delivered, for the inadequacy of the facilitation mechanisms available to beneficiaries, and most of all for a lack of dedicated funding, which may result in the government not delivering what it claims to.¹³⁵ Compensatory regimes for security personnel such as the military and the police are more sustained and long-term, and have been upgraded considerably, although disparity between the military and police remains marked in terms of what is offered, and how readily. It is clear that lives are valued differently depending on the manner in which they are lost, a difference which is constructed as being between passive, unintended and unfortunate victims on the one hand and active defenders of the nation, sent deliberately into harm's way, on the other. In the hierarchy of sacrifices, military death is accorded the highest status in terms of both honour and material compensation offered.

¹³⁴ At least 2000 Pakistanis have been killed annually on average in terrorism-related incidents since 2003. Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal – SATP. (2017, January 17th). 'Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2016'. Retrieved from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>

¹³⁵ Khan, A. (2016, July). The price of a life: Compensating victims of terrorism. *Herald*. Retrieved from <http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153355/the-price-of-a-life-compensating-victims-of-terrorism>

I first address the policy and institutional mechanisms that deliver army compensation and then examine the logic behind compensation regimes and the precarious balance involved in keeping these economies hidden and also forever present. The lack of visibility accorded these schemes presents an interesting point of analysis for understanding how these regimes work within militaristic settings in Pakistan and yields insight into the anxieties of both the military institution and of those that receive compensation. I argue that this invisibility allows the military to construct the loss as one that cannot be compensated for, in order that the dead and their families can continue to act as conduits for (communication and) the extraction of support from the nation. I also argue that, while it cannot be denied that material gain is a factor in the formation of militaristic subjectivities, it is not a full explanation of how the compensation economy works. This chapter presents the complex ways in which material tribute offered as reparation for losses that are essentially irreparable – for death is final and the loss of limbs or faculties is permanent – becomes acceptable and even claimed aggressively, yet does not assuage the families' loss. I will show how, for both the military and for families, but for different reasons, these regimes function as economies of loss where compensation for death remains partial and does not fully mitigate the loss.

This chapter also brings to the foreground two figures: the widow of the deceased soldier and the disabled soldier, both direct recipients of the compensation packages offered. Through the lived experiences of these two subjects, this chapter will put forward conditions that make these militaristic subjects unmanageable and harder to assimilate within tropes of sacrifice and service. It would be pertinent to point out here that most of the chapter addresses compensation for death, with disability being discussed separately in the last section.

The Mechanics of Compensation

The institutional and procedural mechanisms described in this section refer specifically to the Pakistan Army, the largest, most well-resourced and most manpower-intensive branch of the Pakistani military. Compensatory mechanisms for other branches of the military closely mirror the army package, although there may be some differences in both implementation systems and benefits.

Compensation packages for the families of martyrs in the Pakistan Army were upgraded in 1999, after the Kargil War, and then in 2005 as a response to the rise in casualties from operations in the northwestern region. In 2009, the army set up the Shuhada Cell under its Welfare and Rehabilitation Directorate in an attempt to upgrade compensation

mechanisms and reach out more effectively to the families of the deceased. The Shuhada Cell's central office is located in the GHQ, with branches in each of the corps headquarters. These are further supplemented by cells in regimental centres, linked directly to the District Armed Services Boards (DASBs) in 62 districts of Pakistan. Each DASB reaches down to the local level with its extensive network of Welfare Officers. Moreover, the soldier's parent unit also acts as contact point for those receiving compensation. The services of the Shuhada Cell and its regimental counterparts include meticulous record keeping, the ceremonial handing over of the dead body, organizing funerals and regular correspondence and connection with families, including invitations to YeS ceremonies. DASBs support these cells in facilitating the compensation process, including helping families to complete the paperwork for claims and settling any disputes that arise regarding the distribution of compensation.¹³⁶

The compensation package provided by the Pakistan Army to its *shuhadas* is in two distinct parts, the first comprising 'Benefits and Facilities' given by the Government of Pakistan (GoP)¹³⁷ and the second offered by the GHQ itself.¹³⁸ The latter portion, covering the educational, vocational and health benefits included in the package, is funded partly by deductions taken by the military from the salaries of all officers and soldiers during service, and partly from the profits of the military's business activities.¹³⁹ Land allotment is reported under GHQ emoluments, and the rationale given for this by officers I interviewed is that undeveloped land which the government releases from time to time is developed using the military's own funds and as such is owned by the Pakistani military.¹⁴⁰ This division between government and military essentially serves as an explanation for the better and more comprehensive compensation packages offered to military *shuhadas* and disabled soldiers compared to those offered by the police, which rely primarily on government funding. Many of the senior officers I interviewed attributed the difference to inefficient management by the police and their lack of concern for demanding, procuring and organizing better compensation packages for

¹³⁶ Much of the institutional and procedural information given here is drawn from interviews with the Personnel and Administration Directorate, the Shuhada Cell, and DASB Chakwal, 15th January, 7th August and 21st January 2015 respectively.

¹³⁷ This set includes: pension – 100% salary, gratuity – years of service multiplied by monthly salary, death gratuity – twelve months' salary, death compensation – lump sum cash payment based on rank, child allowance and government-sponsored group insurance.

¹³⁸ This set includes: military group insurance, distress grant, subsistence allowance, children allowance, plot and/or agricultural land – applicable on merit, retention of accommodation for up to five years, education and health facilities and employment for one family member.

¹³⁹ Brigadier 2, Shuhada Cell, GHQ, 7th August 2015.

The considerable military aid which the US provides in return for Pakistan's participation in the GWOT possibly contributes to this fund. However, as much of this goes directly to the military institution and not to the Finance Department and is non-audited this could not be confirmed.

¹⁴⁰ Generals 1 & 2 and Brigadier 2, 25th June, 24th June and 7th August 2015 respectively.

their *shuhadas*. Soldiers and families are aware of what the government has allotted or will allot to them and the emoluments that they receive from the military. This distinction also strengthens the exclusive kinship bond between the military and its subjects, which, as I set out in Chapter 2, stands outside the social contract between the government and its soldiers.

The Pakistan Armed Forces recognizes the female dependent, especially the wife, as the primary beneficiary in the event of death. The military, like Pakistan's other state institutions, was inherited from the colonial past, and it has chosen to continue with the tradition of recognizing the nuclear family (the wife and children), as the foremost recipient of the compensation it accords its subjects in the event of death. According to the Joint Service Instructions (JSI) 39/60, soldiers and officers are expected to nominate next of kin/s during their service from among their legal heirs, defined in order of priority (widow, son, daughter, mother and father).¹⁴¹ The nuclear family is given preference in this list, and this nomination serves as a guide to how to divide benefits between legal heirs. If a soldier is unmarried, all emoluments are made out to his parents. Here, the mother is not specified as a category on paper, but the military will make out the pension and other deeds in her name.¹⁴² In case no nomination is made, and if the soldier was married, all emoluments are to the widow. However, if the widow is issueless, emoluments can be divided 50/50 between the mother and the widow. Furthermore, for married soldiers the primary beneficiary of most GHQ emoluments (as opposed to those handed out by the GoP) is the wife and children. Deeds for plots of residential or agricultural land are often made out jointly, with their sale and transfer requiring permission from the GHQ. Deeds are made out in the name of the widow and her children at the time of the death, with sale prohibited until the last child turns 21. If the widow is issueless, shares are also allocated to the parents, again mostly the mother.

Shifting Visibilities: The Masking of Compensation

I pointed out in Chapter 1 that the compensation packages offered by the military are completely missing from the *Youm-e Shuhada* (YeS) ceremonies. In this section, I first turn to the military to explain this mask of invisibility and then to the families of the deceased to understand why this masking is desirable.

¹⁴¹ 1982, Pakistan Legal Decisions (PLD) *Mirza Muhammad Amin etc. v Government of Pakistan*, Federal Shariat Court (FSC) @Page 146.

¹⁴² Based on discussions with the families of deceased soldiers and the DASB Secretary.

The logic behind most compensation regimes offered by the state is to address losses incurred by its citizens for which it takes responsibility. Strategically, compensation regimes serve to present and uphold the image of a benevolent state that assumes responsible for the safety and protection of its citizens. They also partly acknowledge its inability to fulfil this responsibility and pay reparation for losses thus incurred. Conversely, some have argued that the politics of compensation works instead to exculpate the state of its responsibility in cases where its action or inaction has led to the loss of life or damage to property and assure it impunity (Khattak, 2015).¹⁴³ Compensatory regimes for security personnel such as the police and the military, for whom death and disability is a calculated risk of employment, are additionally driven by practical concerns such as sustaining morale, ensuring loyalty and reducing desertions (Wasinski, 2008).

The GoP (including provincial police departments) openly publishes the compensation it provides to civilians, and to some extent to civilian law enforcement officers – specifically the police.¹⁴⁴ The deliberate effort to publicize this can be seen as an attempt to placate or appease a wounded and suffering public after particularly horrific man-made or natural disasters, and underlines the importance of preserving the image of a benevolent state. The next of kin also have a visibility and a voice other than that which is institutionally regulated. Dissatisfaction about what is being offered, expressed through questions about unfairness or corruption in implementation or disputes between the deceased's heirs and corresponding civil court cases, sometimes ensues, receiving coverage in the media.¹⁴⁵ There are also regular images of the affected receiving money or assistance in kind, such as food rations, from politicians and sometimes army officials, as when the Waziristan conflict caused people to be displaced from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.¹⁴⁶ Those who receive aid or compensation are presented as

¹⁴³ Khan, A. (2016, July). The price of a life: Compensating victims of terrorism, *Herald*. Retrieved from <http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153355/the-price-of-a-life-compensating-victims-of-terrorism>

¹⁴⁴ Staff Correspondent . (2016, May 14). Sindh Cabinet meeting: Package for martyred cops raised to Rs 5 million. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1103034/sindh-cabinet-meeting-package-for-martyred-cops-raised-to-rs-5-million/>

¹⁴⁵ Ali, N. (2013, December 22). Families of 'shaheed' Policemen being denied compensation. *Dawn* Retrieved from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1075518>

Durrani, F. (2015, September 11). Families of martyred policemen face hurdles in availing welfare package. *The News*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/61841-families-of-martyred-policemen-face-hurdles-in-availing-welfare-package>

Khan, J (2015, August 4). KP Police propose creation of 600 ASI seats for family members of fallen cops. *The News*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/54691-kp-police-propose-creation-of-600-asi-seats-for-family-members-of-fallen-cops>

Khan, A. (2016, July). The price of a life: Compensating victims of terrorism, *Herald*. Retrieved from <http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153355/the-price-of-a-life-compensating-victims-of-terrorism>

¹⁴⁶ Staff Report (2016, July 5). Martyrs widow awarded 11m under *Shuhada* Package. *The Daily Times*. Retrieved from

helpless, pitiable and sometimes 'suspect' creatures (Khattak, 2015:65), in desperate need of assistance, while the state is portrayed as benevolent and generous. Simply put, while the compensation regime may aspire to reflect the demands of the social contract between the citizen and the state, compensation can often be arbitrary, especially in the case of civilians, and can be presented as an act of charity. It is also presented in full view; in fact there is a deliberate attempt to ensure that these images go out.

Compensation for military death and damage stands distinct from these compensatory mechanisms in two ways. *First*, in the case of military deaths, compensation regimes operate according to the logic that what has been lost can be replaced through a combination of material means and affective regulation achieved by commemoration and meaning-making. Hence, there is not just a reliance on material compensation, but there is also heavy institutional investment in commemoration. While the latter also exists for civilian deaths, as in commemorative events for police martyrs or victims of terrorist attacks, these tend to be reactive and one-off events, and they are not as sustained and systematic as military commemorations. *Second*, while both material reparation and commemoration are important ways in which the military attempts to provide reparation for loss, the military seeks to separate these two functions. In the entire Yes extravaganza, set up to talk exclusively of the *shaheed*, there is no deliberate mention of compensation or the transactional part of this arrangement. No money is handed out and no announcements about the generosity of the government or military are made. The image painted of the deceased or disabled soldier and family does not inspire pity; instead we have the brave and willing soldier and the stoic and resolute family. There is also no visibility of what happens behind the scenes once the compensation regime rolls out. Instead, all martyrs are folded into the military infrastructure; any dissatisfaction or disputes that arise are managed internally within the institution and buffered by the relationship. Grievances are expressed to the paternalistic master (the military) and redress is expected from the kinship group (again the military). A later section on disputes and their resolution will detail this further.

Two pragmatic reasons for masking military compensation are obvious. *First*, compensatory packages for military dead are more generous than for civilians.¹⁴⁷ Compensation regimes for the police are not on a par with those given to military

<http://dailytimes.com.pk/khyber-pakhtunkhwa/05-Jul-16/martyrs-widow-awarded-rs-11m-under-shuhada-package>

¹⁴⁷ I use the word generous in comparison to what is offered to other *martyrs* of the state and not to imply that what is given exceeds the compensation due for the loss of life or limb.

martyrs, nor does the police force have comparable infrastructure in place to assist families in their implementation. Unlike the military compensation regimes, the Police Department often has to negotiate with provincial governments in order to improve its compensation packages.¹⁴⁸ The military seeks to downplay this disparity in the value assigned to dying for the nation on the basis of whether a uniform is worn, and what colour it is. *Second*, while the intent with other compensation packages is to appease possible discontent by building the image of a benevolent state that looks after its subjects financially, the military passes up this opportunity to build its image. This could perhaps be because its relationship with its constituents is firmly entrenched and it does not anticipate any organized dissent. The kinship group that is the military is well insulated, and its subjects are aware that they will be compensated, hence any image building in this regard is deemed unnecessary.

The military may also derive more benefit from focusing instead on tropes of honour and sacrifice, which brings me to another reason for excluding compensation from visibility. I argue that the reluctance to foreground this aspect of the relationship is reflective of the Pakistani military's desire to construct death or loss as willing sacrifice, one that is not regretted, meaning that the figure/s that now embody that loss are not be pitied. Imagined as unflinching and resolute, they cannot be depicted as needy, and more importantly they cannot be seen as desirous of compensation or engaged in a transactional relationship with the military. Generous and predictable material compensation handed out through systematic policy and structural mechanisms by the local apparatus is at odds with the narrative of *shahadat* where the reward is in the afterlife, or where precious life or limb cannot be brought down to an exchange system that values life in terms of death gratuities and plots of land. This dilemma is not intrinsic to this exchange, and in fact in the case of state compensation for civilian deaths, including the police, it seems not to exist if we are to go by the very public contestations and demands for redressal from NoKs. In these cases, those who are affected *demand* redressal and compensation and show willingness to enter openly into a system of exchange that can monetize the loss. The military instead goes to great lengths to ensure that the bitter property disputes and family estrangement that flow once this compensation economy kicks in are hidden from public view. It is a dilemma and an unease that stems from the military's desire to shield the compensation received.

¹⁴⁸ KP Police Special Compensation Package (2015, November 27th). *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police website*. Retrieved from <http://kppolice.gov.pk/news/index.php?NewsId=811>

The military's narrative of selfless sacrifice is terrain on which the military is able to command blanket acceptance. The military is at pains to not advertise the transaction with the families of the deceased because a generous monetized transaction that calculates these losses and efficiently delivers compensation for them cannot be used to justify the narrative of sacrifice that it repeatedly uses to present its image as the saviour of the nation. Calculating and transacting a loss essentially entails that the price has been paid and the transaction completed. The military must be in a position to *continue* to demand compensation from the nation for sacrifices it has made in its defence which *cannot be compensated*. Thus, it cannot publicly acknowledge the exchange system even though it exists. The reduction of transcendental sacrifice to a monetary exchange between the institution and the family must therefore be avoided. Ironically, the military's desire not to destabilize the selfless image of sacrifice for the nation results in a need to distance itself from a financial transaction that lies at the core of its ability to sustain its recruitment. In other words, the paradoxical quality of this moment is that this monetized transaction must be ever present but also masked in the relationship between the family and the military institution if this relationship is to hold. This requires an oscillation on the part of the military establishment between the ideologies of nation and religion expressed through tropes of honour and sacrifice and the materialistic drivers of service emoluments and post-death compensation regimes that form the substance of the relationship between the subject and the military institution.

I turn now to the drivers that construct the militaristic subject, the families of deceased soldiers, also invested in masking this compensation, for reasons which are perhaps more obscure. On the national stage, the invisibility of material aspects of sacrifice is easier to maintain, for this is largely about acknowledgement and commemoration of loss, although tensions on that stage were explored in Chapter 1. In bureaucratic spaces and local arenas in villages where these compensation policies are formed and unfold, this is a narrative that is hard to escape. The overriding trope is one of gratefulness, further testament to the area's deep relationship with the military. These local spaces regard the military as an institution that looks after its own and follows through on its commitments. Interspersed with these grateful narratives acknowledging the military's generosity are distinct threads of overwhelming grief and regret, as outlined in Chapter 4, and more importantly for this chapter, of unease.

He was our *jigar ka tukra* (piece of our heart), you should ask mothers, life of course goes on. He went (into the military) because we had no choice, not so much out of interest. I feel proud when people say he is a

shaheed, but my heart also feels *okha* (uneasy) (...) We used some of the money we received on the village, gave it to the local mosque, and also got boring done (a ground water well) for the graveyard.

(Yasmin, Nawaz's mother, Palwal, 15th October 2014)

Fauj ne humain paise mein tol diya hai (The army has weighed us [our grief] in money).

(Imran's father, Palwal, 5th March, 2015)

We have everything now, house, money but *puttar nahi labda* (I can't find my son).

(Saima, Zohaib's mother, adjoining village, 18th September 2014)

The sense of exchange, of giving something up to receive something else in return, is palpable in these conversations. There is also a sense of having one's grief calculated on an obscene weighing scale that can assess the damage caused by the death of a loved one. The tone of these conversations is laden with grief, a grief that in addition to being overwhelming is also described as *okha* (uneasy), signifying an inability to find peace. Mothers talked about the compensation received, and almost in the same breath bemoaned losing their son forever. The loss was referred to almost automatically, the minute they spoke of compensation, as if the knowledge of what was received must continually be juxtaposed with the impossibility of it being enough to replace what was lost.

To elaborate on this further it is necessary to first plough through the semantics of loss and compensation in the context of military deaths. I turn to Adi Ophir's book, *The Order of Evils: Towards an Ontology of Morals* (2005:35), which unpacks some of these terms:

[A]n evil is an injury worsening someone's condition so that no compensation is possible. Compensation assumes the existence of a system of exchange whose terms make it possible to assess the value of the injury. An injury involving losses that are expressible in terms of a system of exchange amounts to damage. Damage is a loss whose value is assessable. Loss is the irreversible disappearance of some irreplaceable thing. A disappearance is the transition of something from "is there" to "is not there".

Here, the evil that causes someone distress is the loss through death of a loved one, while disappearance is the physical lack of a loved one. The loss is of life, while compensation is the exchange value accorded to the damage caused by the loss. Ophir (2005:90) goes on

to suggest that the response to a condition of loss is mediated through 'interest in what has disappeared' and 'the impossibility of entering into an exchange cycle and restoring the disappeared'. He suggests that 'each one of these on its own is a necessary but insufficient condition for something to be experienced as irreparable loss'. So, the extent to which the next of kin experience this loss depends upon their interest in what has disappeared and the possibility of it being replaced through an exchange economy. There are two ways to annul a loss: first to let go of interest and second 'to reduce it to the exchange value in some sort of exchange economy' (2005:90). In the case of military death and disability the former may not be possible due to the sheer investment of affect in the relationship with the deceased. The latter too is never totally possible, for how can one calculate and put into an exchange system the value of a loved one beyond the economic earning power of his body. Thus, compensation offered for a loss that refuses to fully become damage hangs somewhere in the middle. The loss tries to articulate itself as damage, but the transformation remains flawed, an incomplete exchange that cannot annul the loss. Attempts at annulment are incomplete for, as Ophir suggests, they represent two different irreconcilable genres: first, 'the genre of loss is tragedy' and second, 'the genre of damage is the bureaucratic file' (2005:138).

In the case of military death, this is a tragedy made all the more poignant by it being a man-made and preventable loss, a death that nonetheless must be discussed as necessary, honourable and meaningful. No questions can be asked or responsibility assigned, not just because the benevolent military stands at the other end but also because of the affective interiority of the subject. The subject is pained not only by the grief of disappearance and a sense of irrevocable loss that cannot be fully converted into damage, but also because of what I argued in the last chapter are 'traumatic real kernels' (Žižek 2008:45). These are subtle workings of affect, guilt and regret, for the death was not only preventable, but also predictable. Service in the military was a choice the family made to improve its economic condition, and for this reason financial compensation takes on a significance beyond the obvious financial needs it may meet. It stands for what the son earned and what he sacrificed himself for and must be claimed as a right; the very claim is an act of loyalty to the lost son.

He was our blood, our son. Why should we let others [his widow]
consume it. Our son earned it, those who raised him, looked after him,
his mother and father, it is their right to claim what the *fauj* has given.
(Salma, Aslam's mother, Palwal, 18th January 2015)

This is a relationship of symbiosis between the military and its subjects, generated in the almost insufferable moment of separation from a loved one. The very compensation that produces unease and reduces the loss to a monetary transaction also allows feelings of loss to be assuaged to some extent, for claiming compensation amounts to making the sacrifice count, a terrible price that once paid must be claimed and owned as a symbol of love. This system of exchange is monetary and materialistic, yet populated by affect; affect, such as the grief of loss, honour and pride, that can be expressed through commemoration of the dead, and affect that must remain hidden, populated by feelings of regret and guilt.

For families, the inability of compensation regimes to annul loss completely represents the residual unease and regret associated with accepting compensation for the death of a loved one. For the military institution, the inability of compensation regimes to assuage loss reflects the desire to use the bodies of the dead to extract support and sympathy from the nation and construct the loss as if it were not *compensation-able*. As such calculation and transaction of the loss of life or faculty remains veiled in public military narratives, I suggest that these compensation economies function as *economies of loss*, with compensation offered by the military and claimed by families for losses that elude reparation.

Of Intractable Subjects and Masks that Slip

This section will present two subjects, the female subject and the disabled soldier both direct recipients of military compensation in an attempt to understand the complexities of the lived experiences that lie behind these compensation economies. I propose that the wife and the disabled soldier are intractable subjects, figures that are considered unmanageable or burdensome and harder to assimilate within the commemorative regimes of the Pakistani military despite their central placement within compensatory regimes.

Bringing in the Women

Kausar –The Erring Widow

Aslam was adopted at age 5 by his maternal uncle and aunt who were childless. His biological mother and father lived down the lane, only ten minutes away. Kausar married Aslam seven years before his death in Wana. They did not have any children at the time of his death. During the funeral the biological father was accorded the honour of receiving the flag, as the adoption had never been formalized. Kausar received a full pension and all emoluments in her name after she reassured the DASB authorities that she had no intention of getting married.

However, behind the scenes, in 'consultation' with Aslam's adoptive father, she divided all the one-time emoluments (i.e. cash payments) she received into three parts, one for herself, one for the biological mother and one for the adoptive father. She also agreed to give half of the pension she received in her name every month to the biological mother. The plot of land was allotted jointly to her and the biological mother, with her consent. Four years after her first husband's death, Kausar decided to marry his best friend. While she received the support of her brothers in this decision, Aslam's family and the rest of the village censured her for moving on and soiling the memory of her *shaheed* husband. The marriage was duly reported to the DASB by Aslam's biological father, and the full pension reverted to the biological mother. Kausar claims that she returned all the money she was holding at the time of her second marriage to the adoptive father, but there was much acrimony as both sets of parents claimed that she did not give them anything. On my last visit, Kausar claimed she was being pressured to agree to sell the plot of land. Her brothers did not want her to sell, so she was resisting this.

Sumaira – The Wife in Waiting

Sumaira was married at age 16 to her maternal aunt's son, Tahir. He died six months later in the operations in Wana. Tahir did not have time to report his marriage, and therefore he was listed as unmarried in the army's records. The initial papers were in the mother's (Sajjida's) name, but at the time of the funeral this was rectified and all ensuing payments were given to Sumaira, including the Distress Grant (which she handed over to Tahir's brothers immediately). In view of Sumaira's age and the marriage being issueless it was decided between the family and the military that the pension would be jointly allocated, with a percentage for both the mother and the widow. Sumaira, who is still not eligible for a national identity card, has been to the DASB twice for the paperwork required by the military. There was also some confusion regarding Tahir's status as a *shaheed*. The family has yet to receive any compensation from the army other than money for funeral expenses and a pension. Upon inquiry at the DASB, I found that Tahir's death was listed as an in-service death and not as *shaheed*. As they waited to find out the status of his death, the families (Sumaira's and her deceased husband's) were discussing the possibility of her being married to the youngest brother. The only hitch was that this brother was already engaged to someone. Gossip in the village was rife regarding whether Tahir's family would 'keep' Sumaira or let her go. Most were of the view that Sumaira should forgo her pension and other emoluments in favour of the mother, as a 16-year old girl could not be expected to live the rest of her life alone. Sumaira shifted her stance during my fieldwork from my initial conversations with her when she said she would never re-marry as she was the widow of a *shaheed*. In later interviews, she suggested that it would be best if she stayed within the family and married the younger brother. At the time I was leaving, one year down the road, with the family still undecided about her fate, she shared a fair amount of weariness and said she would like to go home to her parents' house, but that the brothers of the deceased would not let her.

These two sketches how the mechanics of the compensatory regime play out in complicated ways in the lives of two Pakistani military widows in the village of Palwal, and I will refer to them in my analysis below.



Photograph 7: A *shaheed*'s widow at her husband's grave

To understand the military's relationship with its female subjects and its obsession with and disdain for the feminine, it may be useful to pick up from the last chapter, which laid out how grieving is gendered as a function of the relationship between the military and its subjects, particularly women. Women, with their excessive emotion, are seen as primitive, irrational and dangerous, to be managed by both the military and male members of the village. It is this *subordinate* being that the military turns towards to formalize the relationship with the soldier's family in contractual and binding ways. Thus, the military singles out for bureaucratic and contractual purposes the subject that causes anxiety and concern, and money exchanges hands right from the beginning, with the salary of the deceased soldier and/or the Distress Grant handed over to the widow or mother to help pay for funeral arrangements.

As I walked towards the coffin placed in the courtyard, I started to shiver as if from cold, and I felt faint when I came near the dead body, [then] I fainted. Then the army man who had come, he had Aslam's three months' salary with him. He said to my cousin, who was a *subedar*: *call his widow. Sign this page sister*, he kept saying to me. He gave me his (Aslam's) things. I told him to give it to my brother, he said *no, I am not allowed to do that*. He is ordered to give it to the widow if he is married and to the mother if not. Later, I gave it to my brother.

(Kausar, Aslam's widow, Palwal, 5th February 2015)

This marks the beginning of the compensation process, visible in certain local spaces, where the materialist narrative cannot disappear, and hidden in other (national) spaces where the ideological narrative must remain dominant. The woman suddenly finds herself centre stage. From here on she becomes a visible political subject and a citizen who will now need to engage with the state and its institutions. This may involve getting a national identity card, attending the District Soldiers Board to be allotted a pension book, monthly visits to the local post office to collect pension or becoming a litigant in court.

The military's relationship with its two female subjects, the widow and the mother who are the recipients of attention, regulation and emoluments, is not the same. For commemorative practices, it is the mother figure that is invoked, placed on the higher rung to articulate the narrative of sacrifice and martyrdom. The reasons for this, discussed in Chapter 1, stem from how a mother's love is depicted and portrayed in popular culture as pure and asexual, as opposed to the romantic love associated with the wife. The mother represents the archetypal selfless mourner, whose love is unconditional and unadulterated, a love that everyone can relate to. It is ties of this kind that need to be foregrounded within the militarism project to elicit the kind of nostalgia and emotion that runs through the invocation of death and loss for the spectator nation. The wife, on the other hand, is an embodiment of romantic or sexual love, her capacity for which continues beyond the soldier's death, creating a set of anxieties. Some of this anxiety has to do with her unsuitability as a figure in commemorative practices that demand more durable and unquestionable bonds, while some is linked to contestations that can arise in the deceased's family and draw attention to the compensation process, thereby threatening its invisibility.

In cases where a soldier is married, the main beneficiary of benefits provided by the Government of Pakistan is the widow, unless the deceased has nominated another recipient. GHQ benefits are allocated to the widow and children, and nomination is not a consideration unless contested.¹⁴⁹ In both cases, the widow is clearly preferred over and above the parents of the deceased, especially if she has children. Dispute Committees at regimental and GHQ levels can decide distribution in cases of dispute. This authority can override nomination by the soldier, based on an assessment of the situation on the ground. Considerations that the DASB and military officers in dispute committees use to

¹⁴⁹ Much of the institutional and procedural information provided here is drawn from interviews with the Personnel and Administration Directorate, the Shuhada Cell, and DASB Chakwal, 15th January, 7th August and 21st January 2015 respectively. It is also based on interviews conducted during fieldwork in villages.

decide the 'suitability' of the widow to receive full emoluments are her age, the number of years of marriage, the number of children and the financial conditions of the deceased's parents, as well as the presence of other sons who can support the parents. If she is older, with children and especially if there are other sons to look after the parents of the deceased, then the widow is *protected* against claims to the emoluments. The reasons suggested for this by officers interviewed were principles of pragmatism and fairness, as the mother has other sons or a husband to look after her, whereas the wife loses her main source of income. Many officers recognize the vulnerability of the wife in a joint family system after the death of the husband and defend the need to safeguard her against male members of both her husband's family and her own, who seek to control her.¹⁵⁰

In the case of 17-year old Sumaira sketched above, the family of the deceased fears that she may marry again or move away from the deceased's parents, taking the emoluments with her. They seek to hold on to her either through remarriage within the family or, as in the case of Kausar, making claims to the DASB or regiment centre if she does marry and/or move away. Even though marriage in rural settings is almost always within the extended family, these disputes can be especially bitter. Stories of widows like Kausar who married again or moved out of the deceased husband's home and parents who as a result did not receive due share of military benefits and facilities, are common in villages. The military is thus faced with the challenge of trying to appease two distinct sets of next of kin. The primary question is whether the widow will move back to her parents or stay in the house of her deceased husband. This is not merely a question that lurks in the minds of the deceased's family or the villagers or a subject of idle gossip, but one that is asked of the widow when she is taken (for she does not possess mobility) to the local DASB office at the time the property deed and pension book is made out. The military accommodates these anxieties, and policy states that the pension reverts to the mother in cases of re-marriage, and in cases where the widow is young and issueless, making her chances of re-marriage more likely, property deeds and pension are allocated jointly.

The Pakistani military prefers to settle disputes through its own internal mechanisms: the DASB and the dispute committees set up at the regimental centres. Disputes have rarely found their way to civil court, but when this happens they are mostly settled in favour of the military compensation procedures. The purported repugnance of the compensation scheme to Islamic laws of inheritance has often been cited as grounds for

¹⁵⁰ Brigadier 2, Shuhada Cell, GHQ, 7th August 2015.

filing a case, but these concerns have been addressed by the military and other government departments that offer compensation by labelling the emoluments as gifts or grants by the employer after death, and thus not being part of the heritable estate of the deceased.¹⁵¹ This distinction between heritable and non-heritable property has been consistently upheld by various reported judgments from courts at all levels, and the law has thus created a distinction between benefits to which Islamic laws of inheritance can apply and to those to which it does not.¹⁵² When disputes are brought to the notice of the military institution, most often at the regimental level, the first step is the verification of the claims made by both parties, which is done locally by the DASB's extensive network of welfare officers (former army soldiers). The DASB makes a recommendation, based upon which the regimental centre makes a decision, often regarding the two most contested emoluments, ownership of land and pension allocation, which is then communicated to the contesting parties. The DASB may play more than just a verification role here, and often acts as a mediator between the two groups. A common plea from the dispute committees to both parties is to not tarnish the glory of *shahadat* by dragging the sacred name of the *shaheed* through the courts.

I try and talk to them and remind them about their son's sacrifice. I say this is your son's sacrifice. These people forget that this is the money of a shaheed. I tell them your son was lucky to have received shahadat and you people are just not sensitive to that, the shaheed lives forever. I tell contesting mothers that they should let the widow take the pension and remind them do you think it would be acceptable to the shaheed that his widow goes about borrowing money from people for day to day expenses.

(Captain 1, Secretary DASB Chakwal, 21st January 2015)

This theme is often brought up during mediation in the military apparatus and also tacitly runs through the civilian judicial court system. Brigadier 2 shared the story of a civil judge who had called him to tell him that a *shaheed's* family had come to the courts regarding a dispute over compensation money, and that when he told the judge about the presence of Dispute Committees right up to GHQ level, the judge told the families to go to

¹⁵¹ 1982, Pakistan Legal Decisions (PLD) Shariat petition No. 6/R of 1980, *Mirza Muhammad Amin etc. v Government of Pakistan*, Federal Shariat Court (FSC) Pg. 143-151.

¹⁵² According to this ruling, service benefits which an employee can claim from his employer in his lifetime are considered part of his estate upon his death, and are heritable. They are to be distributed amongst all his heirs according to the respective shares allocated to them by Islamic law. Service benefits that can be defined as grants or concessions on the part of an employer are to be distributed only to those members of his family stipulated by the rules and regulations of the service [2011, Civil Law Cases [CLC] Page:1528, *Zaheer Abbas v Pir Asif and others*].

the GHQ:

He [the judge] told them that by dragging the case through a civilian court you insult the *shaheed* (...) you see money is the root of all conflict, the family of the *shaheed* wants to control the widow as they want the money to stay in the family. So they will try all tactics, sometimes even get her married to a younger brother and then mistreat her.

(Brigadier 2, Shuhada Cell, GHQ, 7th August 2015)

The widow becomes an intractable, unpredictable suspect figure in the compensatory regime. Her motives are considered suspect and need to be questioned, and unlike the mother, whose devotion to her son is unquestioned, she is painted as a somewhat tragic figure, in need of protection but also unpredictable, whose sexuality must be watched. Her *suitability* for the role of primary next of kin and to receive the emoluments assigned to her is conditional and cannot be taken for granted. Garbed in talk of the *shaheed's* honour, what is often at stake is a set of anxieties of the family (their ability to stake claim on the emoluments given) and of the military (that the disputes and contestation not become too public). For the latter, control over the management of disputes ensures that they are addressed internally and do not find their way to the civil courts or the media, a motivation in line with the need for invisibility discussed earlier. The affective tenor of these mediations constantly draws upon notions of the sanctity of *shahadat*. In other words, these tales of disputes are folded in again and again by the military and its local institutions in the district and by the families and the larger village through the refrain that the sanctity of the *shaheed* must not be damaged by open talk of money or family disputes over money.

Based on this attention to the female subject and her significant role in compensation regimes one may argue (or hope) that her entry into the formal institutional mechanisms of the state as a citizen enables more autonomy. The DASB secretary highlighted the need to protect the interests of the female recipient, and the DASB authorities will in principle insist that the mother or widow be physically present for the pension books to be made, that they must physically make a trip to the post office every month to collect the pension, and in case of transfer or sale of land that they must once again appear before the DASB or the GHQ, depending upon the nature of the case. However, a closer look at how these women's lives change (or not) perhaps unsurprisingly reveals a different scenario. The case of Sumaira cited at the beginning of this section is evidence of that. Much like the war widow in Israeli society, studied by Lea Shamgar-Handelman in *Israeli*

War Widows, Beyond the Glory of Heroism (1986), the Pakistani military widow is subject to stereotyping and gender discrimination, and is abandoned by the state if she decides to remarry. Male members of the family further compound these problems through active control and interference. It is often the father or the brothers of the deceased, or male members of the widow's family, who will actually control the emoluments and take decisions regarding their use.

While it would perhaps be easy to attribute the failure of policies to translate into meaningful autonomy for women to the conservative rural environs where they unfold, I argue that this failure lies in part with the logic of the policy of itself. In analysing welfare policies for women, Elieen Boris and Peter Bardaglio suggested in *The Transformation of State Patriarchy* (1983:72) that the 'nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (....) saw not the decline of patriarchy but its transformation from a familial to a state form'. In other words, modern social policies protect the status quo, reflecting dominant male interests and regenerating patriarchal norms, even as they may unsettle or disturb relations between men and women within families. In *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present*, Mimi Abramovitz argues that American social policies have in fact 'functioned to enforce a *family ethic* about women's proper roles' (qtd. in Skocpol 1995:31 emphasis in original). Such policies tend to reward certain kinds of women, whose lives include marriage, motherhood and in the case discussed here, fidelity to a deceased husband. Conversely, in her book *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* (1995:34), Theda Skocpol has argued for an optimistic recognition of the 'crucial differences' between the 'paternalist' British social policy of the early 1900's, which was based on male bread-winning ideals and was devised by men in an attempt to benefit women through male wage-earning capacity, and 'maternalist' early US labour policies, which even though they were based on similar ideals, were advocated for by women and also applied directly to women, such as pensions awarded directly to war widows.

I position myself within earlier feminist scholarship, concurring with its conclusion that the transformative potential of modern welfare state policies is severely limited because they are essentially paternalist even when they benefit women directly. In fact, these policies further embed women in sets of gendered relations, which reinforce male domination and control, in this case compliance with the militarism project. The singling out of the female dependent by the military policy is reflective of the patriarchal state that enforces a 'family ethic' that recognizes women as dependents, in keeping with the

trope of the helpless women who is taken care of when the male breadwinner dies and whose honour is at stake if the nation is undefended. Furthermore, women's ability to access these emoluments depends upon the benevolence of the state patriarch, here the institution of the military, which determines her suitability as a subject. A set of conditions that she must meet further enmeshes and controls her, and transgressing those boundaries will result in the favours being taken away, as with the reversion of pensions in cases of re-marriage. The state then turns to a more suitable female subject, the mother. Moreover, even when she stays within these boundaries, the male patriarch of the family will step in to control management of these emoluments. As recounted above, Aslam's widow Kausar handed over the money to her brother almost immediately. This transfer from the state patriarch, the military institution, to the woman for a brief moment and then back to the patriarch of the house is significant.

Thus, it is no surprise that these policies yield limited autonomy to the female subject, even when land deeds and pension books are made out in the names of women. The terms of policy, progressive and affirmative as it may be in principle and at least in its early implementation, are doomed as much by the status and position of women in rural Pakistan as by the logic of the policy itself. This logic hands out benefits and services to dependents belonging to the weaker, primitive sex, who are pulled into the project of militarism in ways that further enmesh them in the institutions of family and nation-state. The masculine state's erosion of the family patriarch (initially with the grieving processes and then through compensation procedures that name the female as primary next of kin) is to be seen not as an erosion of patriarchy but its subtle transformation from familial to state form. This transformation does not weaken the patriarchal structure of relationships between men and women, nor does it translate into visible agency for women, but instead positions them as pawns between men, first between the military and the family and then between the male members of the family.

The female subject receiving emoluments serves the military in two ways. First, she is perhaps the ideal subject of a compensatory regime that seeks to remain masked and unimportant. The giving of monies in exchange for the loss of death seems less transactional and materialistic when the recipient is the grief stricken female subject and supports the trope of the vulnerable women (or nation) in need of protection and the narrative of selfless sacrifice that the military holds dear. Second, the pulling in of the female subject in more binding contractual ways also serves to bring in a more intractable subject, one perhaps less readily swayed by the notions of *'izzat* (prestige),

rutba (status) and *azaz* (ceremony)' that Nawaz's father is drawn to,¹⁵³ one who, as I documented in Chapter 4, also articulates the regulation of her affect at the time of soldiers' deaths as intrusive. This difference, expressed below by Nawaz's sister as she describes the divergent responses of her mother and father to the YeS ceremony, is created by how the male and female subjects are imagined and brought into the militarism project rather than by any essentialist biological variance.

My father is a political man, he did his matric when very few people in our village had done so, he thinks, he sees things differently, my mother is uneducated, she is emotional, she only feels.

(Nawaz's sister, Palwal, 14th September, 2015)

In addition to my field work, I base this assertion on the considerable amount of scholarship which supports the notion that the bonds between women and militarism can be more tenuous, as the direct focus of these projects has been men and notions of masculinity (Ehrenreich 1997:19; Mosse 1990; Nagel 1998). In part, the sudden attention that the female subject may get as she is drawn into these projects, the meaning it accords to a senseless death and the framing of her being the rightful claimant of the emoluments may help bring her closer to this project. However, what ties her to militarism in more inextricable ways are the myriad social relations that define her in a patriarchal society and which stand to benefit from emoluments. The channelling of compensation through her ensures that she is firmly enmeshed in the militarism project and remains a disciplined subject. In other words, keeping her invested and complicit becomes the goal not just of the military institution but also of the male members of the family, who need her to access benefits and facilities.

Fitting the Disabled Body in

In this section, I present another intractable subject, the disabled soldier who, unlike the *shaheed*, defies simple categorization and management. In *Dismembering the Male, Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (1996), Joanna Bourke details the fluctuations in public and policy attention to the bodies of the disabled after WWI. Compared to disabled civilians, constructed as 'passive sufferers', the war wounded and disabled were set up as 'active sufferers' (1996:39). The 'sentimentalization' of disablement in these times constructed the disabled man as 'not less but more of a man'. The subject of attention from poets, films and photographers, they were 'England's broken dolls', whose absent parts represented 'patriotic power' (1996:56-59). Over time, the special status accorded

¹⁵³ See Chapter 4; Nawaz's father, 10th April 2015.

these disabled veterans faded and they started to be 'identified with passivity – the helplessness of children who needed to be looked after for the rest of their lives' (1996:75). I trace similar fluctuations in representations of the disabled figure in the context of the current war in Pakistan and suggest that the Pakistani military has only just begun to assimilate this cost of war, inscribed onto the living body. At this juncture, reparation regimes rely mostly on the monetized contract, and attempts to *sentimentalize* the disabled are unconvincing for a host of reasons that I will elaborate below.

The on-going war in Waziristan has resulted in the deaths of over 5000 soldiers, with more than twice that number maimed or injured.¹⁵⁴ These War Wounded Persons (WWPs), as they are called by the military, have three types of disabilities, largely due to IED (Improvised Explosive Device) blasts: spinal cord injuries, amputations (uni-, bi- and tri-amputations) and traumatic brain injuries. In addition to the network of Combined Military Hospitals (CMH) that serve the injured, the army has set up specialized centres across the country, specifically in Lahore, Pano Aqil, Malir, Mirpur Khas, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. The Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitative Medicine (AFIRM) in Rawalpindi is the largest of these facilities. Medical treatment and rehabilitation services provided at this centre include fitting prosthetics, vocational training, psychological support and hostel facilities.¹⁵⁵ Compensation packages for WWPs were upgraded around the same time as *shuhada* compensation.¹⁵⁶ The current policy calculates loss based on the degree of disability and assigns one of three categories – A, B or C – to the soldier, with category A representing the highest level of incapacitation. Discharge with full benefits implies a loss of earning power, as the disabled soldier receives a percentage of his salary depending upon the category to which he is allocated. In 2009, the army announced a new policy whereby WWPs were given the option of returning to their units to be assigned suitable and secure employment. A corresponding guarded visibility was accorded these incomplete bodies through their appearance in the audience at the YeS ceremony in 2012 and also on military-sponsored TV programmes. In the 2013 and 2014 YeS ceremonies, short documentaries were dedicated to WWPs, but they disappeared from the stage in 2015. When questioned about this disappearance, the organizers said that this was because of time limitations.¹⁵⁷ Clearly the disabled are not prioritized as highly as the *shaheed*, or more aptly the uncomplicated affect and support that the

¹⁵⁴ Various soldiers and senior officers of the Pakistan Army that I interviewed suggested this ratio between the dead and the disabled.

¹⁵⁵ Presentation by army doctor, AFIRM, Rawalpindi, 17th February 2015.

¹⁵⁶ This includes disability pensions and one-off disability compensation from the government allocation and allotment of land, group insurance and disability allowance from the GHQ allocation..

¹⁵⁷ Colonel 1 and Major 1, 22nd May 2015 and 16th September 2015 respectively.

shaheed and his family can invoke is prioritized over the kinds of affect that may be invoked when these disabled bodies are on display. The image of the military wants to present is that of the steadfast soldier, undeterred by the loss, wanting to return to the field to continue fighting like a man. However, the disabled soldier cannot return, and heroism is harder to attribute to the incomplete body. So it is not surprising that not only is their inclusion into the narrative more constrained than in the case of the *shaheed* and the other masculine able-bodied *ghazi*, but it is also more ambivalent in that they are sometimes allowed a presence and sometimes made invisible.

I did not go looking for disabled soldiers in the villages I visited; they discovered me through the villagers that pointed them out to me. ‘Why don’t you visit Shakeel?’ or ‘Have you heard of Bashir, he just returned, he doesn’t have any legs?’ For the villagers, the connections between my interest in those who had died in the war and the lives of these disabled men was much clearer. The fact that at the time of planning my fieldwork I had not thought I would also come across them reflects to some extent my own internalization of the grand narrative that spoke only of the *shaheed*.

I discuss the experiences of the disabled body through my conversations with Shakeel and his family.¹⁵⁸ Shakeel had been in the Army for one year and 22 days when he was maimed in an IED blast in Mahmud Agency in Waziristan in 2011. He remembers that day clearly:

Shakeel: One minute I was standing facing one direction and then suddenly there was dust everywhere, I was lying far away facing another direction (...) I remember that the major put me in his lap, it was a terrible moment, I was sobbing, I was reading the *kalma* (Muslim confession of faith).¹⁵⁹ I thought I would stop breathing (...) I stayed in the hospital for nearly two years, they kept operating on me. I did not tell my family immediately but later my friend told them and my mother and older sister came to Peshawar.

The way he spoke about the field of combat was in stark contrast to how most other soldiers I had interviewed spoke about it – he spoke of fear, panic, dust and grime and didn’t mention the glory and excitement that others often alluded to. Shakeel’s left leg is amputated from the knee and the other has had a permanent rod inserted in it. During my interviews with him he would often pull up his *shalwar* and take off his artificial leg

¹⁵⁸ Drawn from four interviews with Shakeel and his family, Kandwal, 2nd October 2014 to 14th August 2015.

¹⁵⁹ Implies that he was thought he would die.

and point to the other where there was an angry row of stitches running down from his knee. Shakeel's family also spoke obsessively about the loss; it figured repeatedly in their conversations and discussion would revolve around the injury. They expressed how he was different, not complete anymore. Sometimes the mother and sister would refer to him in the past tense, talking of the way he was or what he could have been had he not been maimed. This incompleteness was feminized, and the sister refers to him below to him as someone who is not much different from women: defenceless and no longer able to defend others.

Sister: What happened to my brother is *zulm* (cruelty). We are thankful to Allah that he at least breathes, when he comes through the gate our heart is glad, but when he takes off his leg, he is defenceless; if someone comes into this house and takes away his leg, he can't do anything. We don't have any male in the house, our father is sick and he is like this. If he had been ok, we would not have needed for anything.

Shakeel also spoke hesitantly about how sometimes he was teased in the village and made fun of for not being physically fit any more. He said the villagers said it jokingly and was willing to concede that maybe they meant no harm, but he reiterated that it hurt him. His fiancée's family broke off the engagement after his injury. The sense of having being changed forever, of loss that can never be resolved, whether in military or civilian environs, was intense. The tears fell freely, he was able to express sadness, just as he was able to express fear, something which his other brothers in arms have difficulty articulating.

Mother: He still cries when he looks at his leg. Only a few days ago, he was sitting on the *charpai* and looking at his leg with a mirror. He kept looking and looking and sobbing and sobbing. When I walked in, I found him like that, I asked him, have you gone mad?

Shakeel echoes the shame of being feminized by the injury. The inability to perform, a fear of being found inadequate, makes him unwilling to return to service where he knows he will be assigned *feminized* tasks: tasks that women can do too, like cooking or gardening.

Shakeel: I will decide [about staying or leaving the army] after some time. I want a [medical] board.¹⁶⁰ It is difficult to be a *ghulam* (servant) now. Earlier I was fit, I was *ghulam* because I chose to be one, now I am

¹⁶⁰ Board here refers to the medical board that can sanction release from army service because of a medical condition.

unfit, now I will choose my own work (...) Like earlier, if they asked me to do anything, I could perform, I could do it. I can't walk now, I am dependent on others. How can I work for others, follow orders? Others around me will run and do this. It will be difficult to bear that. (...) Earlier, when I went into the army, you are not aware [of the risks], somebody says come join the army, nothing will happen. But now (...) I have told them, that now I will work and do what I want.

His choice of words, that he will no longer serve, be a *ghulam* (servant), also hints at defiance, a taking back of control, for he says that he will choose his own work from now on. His mother regrets his decision to join the army. Themes of regret and disavowal that the decision to go into the army was in any way promoted or pushed by the family echoes a familiar guilt I spoke about in Chapter 4.

Mother: I wish he had never left for the army, never become a *ghulam* (servant), even if it meant him working as a labourer. He was our only son, our only support (...) we only educated him, we did not have money to educate the girls (...). He wanted to go, we didn't force him, we thought we would live more comfortably, some money will come into our home, we will pass our time well.

An investigation into the differences between the dead and the disabled is one way to look at the figure of the disabled soldier, for it is a comparison that haunts him and his family and troubles the military. Death is permanent, death is sudden and the dead are silent. Death is also something that we must all face, and that makes it all the more intimate and familiar, almost comforting. It also brings with it finality and closure. The disabled body continues to live after sacrifice; it continues to breathe even though the life it lived earlier has died.

Shakeel: He who is hit by a bullet, he becomes a *shaheed* (but) our grief stays and people feel pity for us. They [*shaheed*] get shot and they finish. When others see us they see with what difficulty we are living our lives. When they see them [*shaheed's* family] they sympathize with them. Their son is dead, he is a *shaheed*, all is over, in our case, they will ask us, 'how did it happen, when did it happen?' It becomes alive again.

Sister: We can see his face; at least we can see his face, even if he is disabled. Those who are *shaheed*, their mother can't look at them, their children can't look at them. They are sad, and we are sad.

In Shakeel's case there was frankness, an immediate ability to express regret about earlier decisions and much less need to constantly refer to the narrative of sacrifice for the nation or religion. His family called the *sacrifice* of a limb *zulm* (something that is

unjust, exploitative, cruel) in contrast to the families of the *shaheed*, who in their initial conversations with me referred to the *sacrifice* of life as a *nazrana* (offering) to the nation. I posit that these articulations or digressions from disciplined subjects that Shakeel and his family allow themselves are a function of his continuous and visible loss, which has yet to find adequate placement or closure in the narrative of willing sacrifice that the military so effectively crafts around the figure of the *shaheed*. The *shaheed* is far more visible in nationalist discourse, and the nation constantly hears of lives sacrificed for the nation, but rarely of the countless and larger number of men who are disabled for life. While the bodies of dead men serve as 'symbolic capital' (Verdery 1999:33), the mangled bodies of the disabled are not glorious enough to be depicted by the military. Heroism and willing sacrifice is easier to paint on the dead body of the soldier than on maimed incomplete bodies. I argue that the inability to fully absorb the incomplete body into military narratives, with WWP appearing in some YeS programmes but being less visible in others, hints at a psychic anxiety that lurks in the narrative crafted around the disabled, anxiety about the imperfect body that can no longer be representative of hardness, bravery and masculinity. In the military institution, the body is revered; an aspiration of perfection haunts the soldier from the moment he enters the institution, undergoing a series of exacting physical and medical examinations and measurements. His body is literally paraded to show strength and discipline. So how this body is to be portrayed now that it is imperfect, the very antithesis of all the military stands for, poses a problem. This mutilation cannot be shrouded and nailed up in a coffin; this body will be viewed by all and sundry, an object of pity, feminized as it can no longer defend itself.

As Ophir (2005:90) suggests, the ability of loss to be annulled depends upon either letting go interest or reducing the loss to some sort of exchange economy. Much like the loss of life discussed earlier, this loss tries to articulate itself as damage, but the transformation remains even more incomplete, for unlike families of the dead, WWPs lack recourse to a system of commemoration that helps them make meaning of the loss. Constant comparisons to the *shaheed's* greater sacrifice, and by default to the disabled's inferior sacrifice, render efforts at reparation ineffectual. Because of its acute sense of continuous loss, this lived experience of sacrifice seems to them more painful than death. Shakeel's family has been unable to situate themselves within this discourse. They hint at equivalence – 'they are sad, we are sad' – but shy away from it, for 'at least' the loved one can be 'seen'. Part of the reason that the bonds between these families and the military are not as intense is also because the relationship in the case of the *shaheed* is directly between the family and the institution, and the family becomes directly dependent upon

and exposed to the rhetoric of the military. Disabled soldiers serve as intermediaries for their families, who are not invited to commemorative events other than as carers of the disabled, and they are missing from the military narratives that highlight the *shaheed's* family. For these reasons, in the case of the disabled the transition from *zulm* (cruelty) to the *nazrana* (offering) remains unconvincing. The two irreconcilable genres suggested by Ophir, loss (tragedy) and damage (bureaucratic file), remain even more irreconcilable in this case.

It is therefore solely the compensation regime, or the genre of the bureaucratic file, that supports families in handling this loss. The military recognizes this, and ensures that the incentives offered are sufficiently generous that they cannot be refused. On my last visit, Shakeel informed me that he had realized that it was better for him to complete at least 15 years of service, as that allowed him to retire with full benefits. He will receive full medical support even if he decides to opt out of service, but he also recognizes that his chances of receiving better care are higher if he stays in service. He said he had been thinking emotionally earlier and he was thinking more sensibly now. He had also become engaged to a young woman and said he needed to be practical and clear-headed. As the AFIRM psychologist told me, depression is common and patients can initially be non-compliant, but the policy of assured service and benefits helps to alleviate their principal concerns around livelihood.¹⁶¹ The binding of the disabled subject to the military is thus made possible largely because of the compensation regime. Loss continues to haunt this subject and perhaps makes him more intractable than others. He must be zealously guarded and kept close to the military, something which the military recognizes.

All interviews that you see on TV are first approved by the ISPR to see if they are appropriate, and in fact an officer accompanies these people when they visit the hospital. They then submit the video or article before they are allowed to screen or publish.

(Deputy Commandant, AFIRM, 17th February 2017)

The military would rather retain him than let him go, even if this means a greater burden on its resources. As suggested by Brigadier 2, 'in case he wishes to retire, we first try and persuade him not to. We show him the benefits of continuing service. If he is adamant then we will let him go. More than 60% will continue'. This proximity is desired because, as Brigadier 2 suggests, the disabled soldier is a *'zinda lash* (a living corpse). It is a very

¹⁶¹ AFIRM psychologist, 17th February 2015.

precarious situation, for he suffers the most, as everything changes for him'.¹⁶² He is a subject that occupies the spaces of the dead and the living, a man and yet as helpless as the dreaded feminine, from whom distance has been so carefully created. The 'precariousness' mentioned here is not just the life-changing experience of disability, but also his positioning within the narrative of sacrifice. He is a liminal figure who refuses categorization, and in that refusal threatens to destabilize the carefully crafted narrative of sacrifice. A narrative that holds this liminal figure in place is yet to be crafted, although the dangerous and non-final nature of the affect of the disabled and his family can apparently be disciplined through monetized regimes of compensation.

Conclusion

This chapter has interrogated the compensation regimes rolled out by the Pakistani military in cases of death and disability and has suggested that these regimes operate as 'economies of loss': compensation offered for losses that for disparate reasons elude reparation for the military institution and its subjects.

By exploring the desire for the invisibility of material compensation on the part of the military and its subjects, this chapter has drawn attention to the anxieties and unease associated with these regimes. It has argued that reluctance to bring this aspect of the relationship to the foreground is reflective of the military's desire to construct death and loss as willing sacrifice. The military's desire to play up the sacrifice and play down material compensation is an attempt to extract maximum leverage from the nation as well as to garner support for its image as a selfless defender of the nation. For the families of the deceased, because death was predictable as a possible outcome in a gamble for a better life, loss, damage and the possibility of compensation play out in even more complicated ways. The military draws upon ideologies of nation and religion, including tropes of honour and sacrifice, as well as materialistic drivers, to cement its relationship with the families of the deceased, emphasizing different aspects of the relationship at different times. For the families, the relationship at this juncture is driven by a need to make meaning and quiet the unease that emanates from entering into a transaction involving the death of a loved one. Counter intuitively, they do this by fighting for the very compensation that makes them uncomfortable, for this allows them to claim what their son earned, and by doing so make the loss worthwhile. The substance of the relationship between the subjects and the military institution is constructed from the interaction between the two, an interaction that masks the logic of compensation for

¹⁶² Brigadier 2, Shuhada Cell, 7th August 2015.

military death from each other, from the nation and perhaps in the case of the families, from themselves.

This chapter has also investigated how the mechanics of compensation regimes imbricate the female subject (specifically the widow) and the disabled soldier, both of whom are deemed intractable for different reasons, into the militarism project.

The wife represents romantic or sexual love, a capacity that does not end with the death of the husband and hence makes her a less appropriate subject than the mother, whose bonds of love are considered more durable. This creates a set of anxieties for the military, as in addition to being less suitable for depiction in commemorative practices, the wife also threatens to draw attention to the material aspects of this transaction in cases when re-marriage leads to dispute over the distribution of compensation. The deceased's family also stands to lose if the wife remarries outside the family or decides to move out. The chapter has argued that, as the recipient of emoluments handed out by the military at the time of death, the female subject becomes further enmeshed in the social relationships that define her in a patriarchal society. It is rare that she has control over what she has been given, and she often becomes a pawn between the male members on either side of the family.

In conditions where those who have sacrificed do not die, but continue to live, reflect and speak, reparation is even more challenging. The military has yet to place the disabled securely within the narrative of sacrifice, which it crafts much more effectively in case of the *shaheed*. Its attempts to *sentimentalize* the disabled remain unconvincing for a host of reasons, some to do with the continuous nature of loss and some to do with the challenges of categorizing this incomplete body as part of the image of the able-bodied warrior. At this juncture, its efforts at reparation rely mostly on using monetized contracts to rein in this intractable subject.

Chapter 6: Battles Won and Lost - Service, *Shahadat* and the Enemy Revisited

The *qanoon* [law] of the shaheed is that one group is defying religion and the other is standing firm on the side of the right and there is clash between them and there is a declaration of war. [Only] then he is *shaheed*. These *shaheed* are at the orders of America, America wants to rule the world and wants to take over with its men, there is no right or wrong in this.

(Cleric 2, Palwal, 2nd February 2015)

Since 9/11, the Pakistani military has grappled with a new system, fighting a war inside Pakistan's borders against an enemy that is not yet *othered* but bears an uncomfortable familiarity in terms of religion. In the above excerpt from an interview with a cleric in Palwal, the *shaheed* being questioned are the soldiers of the Pakistan Armed Forces dying in the GWOT. This chapter investigates how changing narratives about the enemy influence the meaning assigned to dying for the state in local spaces such as rural Chakwal.

The chapter presents the ambivalence and discomfort that emerge due to the current war, in spaces long considered the military's heartland. This discomfort strains at the relationship between the military and its subjects and produces certain kinds of anxieties that are smoothed over by both protagonists, lest the cleavages become more obvious.¹⁶³ On the surface, it seems that it is business as usual. Whatever the doubts created by these ambivalences, they are resolved and soothed, for we do not see mass disaffection among troops in these districts, hence some may posit that they are not worthy of analysis. I argue that examining these doubts and the dynamics of their resolution provides a useful window to understand the relationship between the military institution and its subjects. Studying this relationship through the prism of this war strips away the rhetoric of Islam that too often shrouds it. This is helpful, for it lays bare the materialist and affective inducements that secure service and sacrifice in the Pakistani military. The chapter will argue that the 'battle of narratives' (a term used by Colonel 1), that seeks to (re)claim the right to *shahadat*, is won by the military not through the discourses of nation and religion, but on totally different terrain, populated by materialist and affective drivers.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ The military's anxieties were foregrounded in Chapter 1.

¹⁶⁴ Colonel 1, ISPR, 22nd May 2015. This refers to the perceived need to battle the assertion of the religious right (Jammat-i-Islami and some Deobandi groups) that the military dead are not *shaheed*.

This chapter first articulates how I locate religion within the idea of the state of Pakistan. In this section I present a broad-stroke trajectory of the events that have led the Pakistani military into this current war, starting from the genesis of the state and its legitimization through religion and the nexus between sectarianism, jihadism and Pakistan's rulers (both military and civilian). These entanglements are discussed as an essential context, wherein ambivalent subjects of the Pakistani military (soldiers and families) are formed. The chapter then draws upon my ethnography of Palwal village and interviews with retired and serving military soldiers, local politicians and ordinary men and women from Palwal and adjoining villages to document responses to the new Muslim enemy. The last section investigates contestations around dead soldiers from these areas, looking at how they are expressed and resolved and the imperatives that make resolution possible.

Locating Religion in the Pakistani State and Military

The use of religion as a tool of legitimization has a long and complicated history in Pakistan, and its roots lie in the genesis of the Pakistani state itself. Christopher Jaffrelot describes Pakistani nationalism as one 'where the ideological construction of the national project precedes the formation (in sociological terms) of the nation' (Jaffrelot 2015:189). Like many scholars before him, he suggests that this nationalism has relied heavily on the instrumentalization of Islam, allowing an elite Muslim minority to convince Muslim majority provinces to participate in the division of what was then British India. A nation that, as Salman Rushdie suggested, was not 'sufficiently imagined' and was born as a result of what Younus Samad calls 'a brief moment of political unity' (Rushdie 1983:87; Samad 1995:90). In his examination of the political idea that lies at the root of Pakistan, Faisal Devji argues that Muslim nationalists nullified history, geography and even demography to lay the foundation of their political mobilization, focusing instead on an 'empty' idea of religion. Religion here was not an

old fashioned theological entity, but an abstract idea and modern idea, (...) whose sense of brotherhood provides a people with the foundations of its nationality. For Muslim nationalism, in other words, religion was conceived of not as a supplement to geography but as its alternative (Devji, 2013:47) .

This was religion 'in the peculiarly secular sense' (Devji, 2013:139), as 'Jinnah had attempted to turn Islam into an ethno-territorial ideology that could be exploited to political ends' (Jaffrelot 2015:459). Whatever Jinnah may have imagined for the Pakistani state, scholars have argued that this very ambiguity, and the indeterminate nature of how

Islam was conceived for the purpose of legitimizing the struggle for Pakistan, has led to it being exploited by both political and military leaders alike; a usage that has also played out through alliances with and appeasement of the religious right. Starting from the constitutional debates between the *relatively* secular Muslim League, which viewed Islam as an identity marker, and religious scholars, who embodied a more Islamist vision, Pakistan's history is chequered with the state's dangerous obsession with the 'empty' idea of religion.

Stemming partly from the ambiguity mentioned above, the state of Pakistan 'invented' (Gellner 1964) a Pakistani selfhood based on purging the other: the Hindu or the Hindu Indian state (Racine 2002; Saigol 2013). Religion was underlined in this identity as the primary basis of difference. This was a simpler version of Islam, an internally undifferentiated category that emerged in sharp relief *only* when posited against the enemy, Hindu India. Pakistani nationhood, perceived as under threat from both neighbouring India and the internal challenges posed by nationalist movements and ethno-linguistic conflicts after partition, continued the process of deepening its religious character through two routes. First, the culture and identity of a culturally diverse geographical area was forcefully homogenized around a single – Muslim – identity, while the second inter-related trajectory involved strengthening the predominantly Punjabi military over and above other state institutions (Rizvi 2003; Jaffrelot 2015:123-124)

Against this backdrop, religious extremism in Pakistan can be traced to the coming together of two elements in the late 1970s, around the time of the General Zia-ul Haq's 1977 takeover. The first was religious sectarianism, involving antagonism between Shia and Deobandi Sunni sects, which intensified largely as result of a mix of domestic and regional factors. These factors included Gen. Zia's 1979 Islamization policy, largely Sunni in flavour, and the dynamics set in motion by the Iranian revolution, with Saudi and Iranian funding trickling in to enhance Sunni and Shia influence in the region respectively (Nasr 2002; Abou Zahab 2002; Ahmed 2013). It might be useful to clarify here that three of the four dominant sects Pakistan (Barelvi, Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith) are part of the Sunni branch of Islam. Within this, the Barelvi sect has the deepest roots in Punjab, outnumbering the other two groups. The fourth sect is the Ahle- Tashi Shia minority. What is referred to as the Shia-Sunni conflict is a misnomer, especially in Punjab, and can better be described as antagonism between Shias and Deobandi Sunnis, who are supported by Ahle-Hadith in their anti-Shia stance. At one point, the Sipah Sahaba Pakistan, a Deobandi political organization, renamed itself Ahle-Sunnat wal Jamaat

(ASWJ). This blurring of identities among Sunni sects is important to highlight, for reasons I will take up in the following sections.

The second element that played a pivotal role in rising extremism in the country is the heavy investment in jihadism, a state project to shore up support for the *jihad* in Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s, and later in Kashmir during the 1980s and 1990s. This was firmly rooted in the Pakistani establishment's obsession with India, starting with the strongly felt inferiority and vulnerability that Pakistan inherited at partition in 1947, reinforced in 1971 when Bangladesh became independent. The route taken by the establishment to ease this sense of inadequacy is the legacy that haunts Pakistan to this day. This included the arming of jihadist movements to fight in Afghanistan in order to acquire strategic depth (Cheema 2003:3) and then in Kashmir in order to bleed India (Rashid 2012), as well as allowing its own soil in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, its Northern Province, KP and parts of Punjab to be used to nurture the radical ideologies that supported these groups (Gul 2010; Rashid 2012; Jaffrelot 2015). The roots of this can be traced back to before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a civilian ruler, played the religion card both internally, when he pandered to religious parties and used a 1974 constitutional amendment to declare Ahmedis to be non-Muslims, and externally, when he offered his support to Islamist groups fighting to overthrow the pro-USSR regime in Kabul (Gul 2010). After the Soviet invasion, under the martial regime of General Zia, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) invested in the Afghan Mujahideen with active support from both the US and Saudi Arabia. The ISI relied partly on Jammat-i-Islami (JI), a religious political party, to carry out its strategy, which involved mobilizing young men for *jihad* in Afghanistan (Roy 1995; Jaffrelot 2015). Once Afghanistan had been *won over*, the Pakistani jihadist movements turned their attention to Indian Kashmir, with continued support and aid from the ISI and the military (Rashid 2012). It is relevant to mention here that JI claims the first *shaheed* in Afghanistan. Posted at the gate of its headquarters in Mansoor (Lahore, Punjab) is a list of hundreds of Afghan and Kashmiri *shaheeds* (qtd. in Jaffrelot 2015:502). This is instructive to the discussion in Chapter 1 about the challenge from these same groups to the Pakistani military regarding its right to claim martyrdom for its soldiers and the discussion in this chapter about how dying for the state is understood in local spaces where the military-mosque nexus is challenged.

These two elements, sectarianism and jihadism, have a natural affinity for each other, although, as mentioned above, their trajectories in Pakistan have been different. Both elements converge and must be viewed collectively if we are to understand how the political use of religion by the state and its proxies, and now anti state elements, plays out in entangled ways in local spaces.

While the Pakistani military has been a primary driver in the steady Islamization of the state and its population, it has not itself been insulated from these influences. Since partition, it has relied heavily on the construction of a more ideological and religiously motivated imagining of the soldier (Rizvi 2003, Saigol 2013). This was a shift, as the rhetoric employed by the British Indian Army, which depended on the same regions for recruitment, revolved around the myth of the martial race and loyalty to the Raj (Caplan 2010; Mazumder 2011; Singh 2014). The Pakistani military uses religion to construct its image as the defender of faith, not just national boundaries (Ishtiaq 2013; Fair 2014; Jaffrelot 2015). As a result, in the four wars with India, the martyr for the nation and the *shaheed* for religion have been imagined side by side with little or no contestation. It may be useful to highlight that this is not the first time that the Pakistani military has taken on a Muslim enemy. The 1971 break-up of Pakistan and the killing of Bengali Muslims did not pose challenges similar to those faced by the soldier in the GWOT. For those in West Pakistan, the 1971 war was constructed as 'The Betrayal of East Pakistan' (Niazi 1998), and killing was made possible by *othering* the Bengali and playing on his constructed affinity with Hindu India. The army labelled the *Mukti Bahini*, the Bangladeshi guerrilla movement, as *kafir* (non-believers) (Cohen, 2004). Operations in Baluchistan, especially in the so-called fourth war of 1973-1977, which resulted in the loss of over 5,300 Baluch Muslim lives, did not pose much contention either, as the enemy were constructed as Baluch nationalists (Urmila Phadnis qtd. in Jaffrelot 2015:139; Titus 1996). In both these instances, ethnicity trumped religious identity and did not pose a threat to the construction of the soldier as a fighter for Islam and the military institution as a defender of faith.

Since 9/11, pressure from the United States has forced Pakistan to take on the very Islamic militants that it had nurtured and groomed for proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This turnabout in military state policy has taken place in fits and starts, as evidenced by the initially half-hearted troop deployment and operations in Waziristan, as well as a number of failed peace agreements. It has been suggested that this ambivalence towards sections of the Taliban that promise strategic depth in Afghanistan or Islamists

that restrict their operation to India continues in current military policy (Fair 2014). This thesis does not attempt to add insight to this particular line of inquiry, but instead mentions this backdrop as a context to help understand that the subjects produced in these ambivalent frames are bound to be ambivalent as well. In other words, ambivalence among those who participate in the militarism project (soldiers, families and districts) has a social, political and historical basis. I first turn briefly to the immediate historical backdrop of the province of Punjab to contextualize its complicated history of mobilization in the name of religion.

Punjab and Shifting Enemies Within and Without

Since the 1980s, the influence of various competing Muslim religious alignments and sects has grown steadily in Punjab. These have now become integrated into the socio-political system, allowing them significant outreach in society through religious and political parties, madrassas and welfare organizations (Jaffrelot 2015; Siddiqi 2013). Although there are less Deobandis than Barelvis in Pakistan as a whole, as of 2012 there are approximately 9,500 Deobandi madrassas registered across Pakistan, compared to 6,500 associated with other Muslim sects (Bano 2012:70-71). 41.4 % of the total number of seminaries in Punjab are Deobandi, while the Deobandi population stands at 22.45 % of the total (Ramzan 2015).¹⁶⁵ Parts of Punjab are Shia-dominated, specifically by Shia landlords. Sectarianism has firm roots within the province and religio-political Shia and Sunni identities have resulted in sectarian violence from time to time. Sectarian tensions are rarely restricted to religious grounds, and have often folded into other conflicts, for instance over land or electoral rivalries (Waseem 2001, Abou Zahab 2002, Nelson 2016). Punjab, especially the south, has been a prime recruitment and training ground for *jihad* in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Siddiqi 2013). The spectre of the Punjabi Taliban has been repeatedly pointed out by analysts as a formidable force that potently represents the merging of sectarian and jihadist forces, made all the more toxic by their past and, many argue current patronage by the establishment, including state bureaucracy, military intelligence agencies, political parties and trading communities (Siddiqi 2013; Jaffrelot 2015; Nelson 2016).

While the rising Deobandi presence and the inter-related jihadist project has largely been concentrated in southern Punjab, there are also distinct pockets in northern Punjab, where Chakwal is located (Siddiqi 2013; Nelson 2016). Shiites are an influential minority in Chakwal district, but its rural areas are largely Barelvi-dominated. Here, Deobandi

¹⁶⁵ Between 1988 and 2000, the number of *dini* seminaries in Punjab grew from 1320 to 3153, a higher growth rate than in the province of KP, usually associated with extremism (Fair 2008).

numbers have increased at a rapid pace, and certain areas, such as the administrative subdivision of Talagang, are more open to this influence.¹⁶⁶ Both Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith religious and militant organizations operate in these areas, with support from the business-trading community, religious leaders and the state machinery (Siddiqi 2013:13). In Chakwal, this steady indoctrination is apparent in the Shiite/Sunni cleavages that have appeared as a result of Deobandi influence. In 2009, a suicide attacker blew himself up inside a *bargah* (a Shiite place of worship) in Chakwal city.¹⁶⁷ Maulana Akram Awan (a former army soldier) of Tanzeem-ul-Ikhwan (The Brotherhood Organization) of Chakwal threatened General Pervez Musharraf with a million-man-march to Islamabad to demand the implementation of Sharia law in the country in 2000. (Phillipon 2016:160). In a more recent incident, in 2016 an Ahmedi place of worship was attacked by a mob in Dulmial Village in Chakwal.¹⁶⁸

Increasing radicalism in Chakwal, a traditionally martial district, poses the question of how soldiers who come from this area may be affected by these local dynamics, which until Pakistan's participation in the war on terror posed few dilemmas for the military or for the local population. The slow but definite turnabout in policies that has come with the increased deployment of troops and the intensification of operations in Waziristan makes visible in both dramatic and (more often) undramatic ways the unravelling of the alliance between religion and the military as a result of the inclusion of a new(er) enemy within its scope: radical Sunni Deobandi groups that have turned against the state. In the next section, I build a case that this unravelling has implications for the Pakistani military's ability to demand unquestioned loyalty from this (martial) district.

The Enemy as One of Our Own

I now turn to the intimate space of the villages of Chakwal district in order to understand how the new(er) enemy is viewed there. I start this interrogation with the caveat that much of my fieldwork took place in five villages in the Chakwal Tehsil of Chakwal District, all of which are Barelvi-dominated. While there is some Deobandi influence there, it is not significant in terms of population figures. Results may indeed be different among Shia populations, in urban parts of Chakwal where Sunni-Shia cleavages go deeper, or in areas where there is more organized Deobandi influence, such as Talagang Tehsil. While the conclusions I draw must be analysed in this context, I believe that as

¹⁶⁶ Interviews with district officials and local politicians.

¹⁶⁷ Staff Reporter (2009, April 9). Bloodbath in Chakwal leaves 26 dead, 40 injured. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <http://www.dawn.com/news/455393>

¹⁶⁸ Dhakku, N. (2016, December 14). Fear stalks Chakwal after attack on Ahmadi place of worship. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1302240>

many areas of rural Chakwal present a similar picture, the following examination is significant for understanding how the war and the enemy is viewed in areas that are not considered contentious because of their long association with the military and their relatively small Deobandi population. In other words, if contestations of the military's current war exist despite these factors, they are perhaps all the more significant.

The following excerpt from an interview with a college professor in Chakwal sets out some of this debate around the war. It refers to an attack by Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on an army public school in Peshawar in December 2014.

There are different reactions to this school incident that has just happened. Some people believe that what happened should not have happened, others believe that this is bad but that what happened in the Lal Masjid is also bad, and [then] there are those who say that what has happened is what should have happened. These three perspectives are like stairs; as you go up you move towards extremism, the third stair is the most extremist. (...) This extremist thinking is in some Deobandi groups: they think the *fauj* is *murtid* (apostate), those who accept Islam first and then reject it later.

(Professor Shamil, Chakwal city, 5th January 2015)

The above excerpt sums up the various views about the war and the new enemy in Chakwal. There is clearly no single interpretation of how the local space regards this war and this enemy. What is interesting is that these perspectives are presented not as distinct categories but as a continuum, which permits a slippery range of positions that suggest not, duplicity but allow for ambivalence to be expressed.

An array of mosques and competing religious ideologies dot the landscape of rural Punjab. These mosques represent different schools of Islam, with the most clear-cut division being between Shiite (Ahle-Tashi) and Sunni (Ahle-Sunnat) mosques, which differ architecturally as well as in their adornments. In Palwal, the two dominant sub-sects are Barelvi and Deobandi, with the former in the majority. There are a total of four mosques in the village, of which two are exclusively Barelvi. The largest and most well attended mosque is located right next to a large *darbar* (shrine), where steady streams of people from inside and outside the village pay homage. The villagers claim that this is a Barelvi mosque, but it is attended by both Barelvis and Deobandis and has a Deobandi cleric.

Adherence to sub-sects within Sunni Islam was often not expressed outright, but emerged only upon direct questioning. Questions about sects would be taken to mean the Shiite and Sunni divide. The *other* was the Ahle-Tashi (Shia) or the Marzai (Ahmedi), and to some extent the Ahle-Hadith. There was a tendency to regard Barelvis and Deobandis as being the same, resting within the folds of the Ahle-Sunnat label, and my interlocutors generally did not bring up Barelvi or Deobandi identities. When they did, it was often in a pejorative sense, as disapproval of increasing sectarianism in Islam and an almost ostrich-like desire to pretend they did not exist (Nelson 2009). As the conversation continued, however, differentiations between the groups would be pointed out by Barelvis, who slightly disapproved of the Deobandis' perceived lack of reverence for Prophet Muhammad and sufi shrines, and often alluded to Deobandi ideology as being more antagonistic towards Shias. Deobandis tended to gloss over these differentiations as *weaknesses* of the Barelvi groups, who they felt were in need of reform. They insisted that these were minor differences. The Deobandis I interviewed perceived themselves as more orthodox, disapproving of shrines and grave ornamentation and stressing *tableegh* (propagation of faith) and *jihad*. As mentioned above, the largest mosque in Palwal is attended by both Deobandis and Barelvis, and the cleric selected by the largely Barelvi mosque committee is a Deobandi from Attock, a neighbouring district. Kandwal, the village next to Palwal, which is also Barelvi-dominated, has a large well-attended madrasah, run by a Deobandi group, to which the local Barelvi population send their children. This mixing between these two sub-sects seemed to pose little contestation for the villagers. In keeping with the above-mentioned more pronounced differentiation from Ahle-Tashi this would be unthinkable in the case of an Ahle-Tashi madrasah or mosque.

Cleric: There is no mosque that is Barelvi and no mosque that is Deobandi. Deobandi and Barelvi are not real sects, these are just the names of cities. Our imam is the same, Hanafi. This is not a clash of *fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence) (...) Shiites are different, their imam is different.

Me: Do they stand in agreement on their stance towards Ahle-Tashi?

Cleric: I can show you a book for Barelvi, they have used very harsh language against Shias too. Maybe they don't follow it. When you take a stand against something then you have to be willing to die for it too, and Deobandis have [done that].

(Deobandi village cleric 1, Palwal, 4th May 2015)

The conversation above with the Deobandi cleric of the largest mosque in a Barelvi-dominated village highlights a subtle distinction between how the groups regard the

variance between their two sub-sects. Barelvīs tolerate Deobandī influence, allowing them space within their own spaces. They view them as somewhat problematic in their more extreme views, but nonetheless regard them as their own. On the other hand, Deobandīs are more organized in leadership positions and are able to thrive through their ability to highlight similarities between the two sub-sects and at the same time differences with the Ahle-Tasīh (Shīa). Addressing the question of religious education in Pakistan, Mathew J. Nelson (2009:603) proposes that there is a deliberate effort to emphasize 'doctrinal uniformity' as opposed to religious differentiation when it comes to sectarian difference among Muslims. In the context of the Shīa-Sunni divide, Nelson suggests that because Sunnis are in majority, their ascendancy is considered justifiable (at least among Sunni populations) and supports the belief that there is only one true Islam and difference is to be abhorred. I argue that in the intra-Sunni context, this desire not to see or acknowledge differences is strategic and plays out in favour of the more organized (minority) Deobandī Sunni groups, who through this assimilation into the Sunni sect are rendered less visible. I highlight this politics of assimilation as important, for it influences the (in)ability to see the enemy as an internally differentiated category within the Sunni faith. The enemy is seen as one of us, with his religious affiliation only marginally different, unlike the Ahle-Tashī, who has been more effectively *othered*.

Below, I highlight three themes that stood out in my discussion with villagers about Pakistan's participation in the war. First, the consensus, or at least something that was articulated openly by most, including Deobandī, was that rebellion against an Islamic state was not permissible under Islam and that army action in Waziristan was justified. On the surface, the Pakistan card was stronger here, yet it is important to point out that this was only possible within the framework of religion and not on nationalist grounds alone. In other words, the Pakistani state was worth defending only when Islam was attached to it. Another justification suggested for putting Pakistan first was that in order for Muslims to thrive, the Pakistani state must be viable, hence the anti-state rhetoric of the Taliban was short-sighted and counter-productive. In both cases, the nationalist argument only held when it was coupled with religious identity.

Second, this support for the military was couched in a language of unease, and the war was often subjected to muted and sometimes open questioning. Villagers criticized the Pakistani state for aligning with the US and taking on a war that was not its own. This criticism emerged most clearly when the 2007 Lal Masjid operation was discussed. This war was seen as a distraction from Pakistan's real enemies: those on the eastern border or those who were weakening Muslim unity. I suggest that only muted critique was

voiced because many of my interviews were conducted after the 2014 Peshawar army school attack. This was followed by widespread state and public condemnation of the TTP and the formulation of the National Action Plan in 2015 by the Government of Pakistan. The latter included strict action against extremism and sectarianism, including militancy in Punjab.¹⁶⁹ As such I can only assume that any sympathy for the enemy I was allowed to witness was a watered down version of sympathies that may actually exist.

Third, there were two common types of narrative about the enemy. First was a complete rejection of the enemy as Muslim. This narrative projected them as foreign militants, funded by Israel or India or the US and did not see them as Deobandi or aligned with any particular sect in Islam but as mercenaries. This did away with any angst that may have been provoked by the Pakistani military's killing of Muslims and also provided a justification for supporting the war effort, as well as mirroring the rhetoric used by the military to conflate this enemy with India.¹⁷⁰ I hold that in light of the contestation that exists around the figure of the *shaheed*, which I will detail below, it is the second narrative that holds most sway in these local spaces. This narrative saw the enemy as Muslim but misguided, as being from within and ideologically not at fault but with a problematic methodology. Here, the enemy was categorized as *gumrah bhai* (brothers led astray) or sons whose intentions were not at fault but who had an erroneous *modus operandi*. There was a suggestion that this brother and/or enemy had been mishandled by the state or the military because of Pakistan's alignment with the West. Although this narrative categorized the enemy as brothers led astray, it nonetheless did not challenge the war effort outright. There was a tendency to treat the Muslim enemy as an undifferentiated category in terms of religious sect. Discomfort at talking about the enemy's alignment with a particular Sunni sect was an echo of the earlier desire not to acknowledge sub sects of the Sunni faith and was a feature of my conversations with both Bareilvis and Deobandis. In their conversations with me, most villagers were hesitant to assign a particular sectarian leaning to the enemy, although a few were bolder, suggesting upfront that it was sections of the Deobandi school of thought that were leading the war effort on the other side. In discussions of the enemy, his Pashtun, and more specifically tribal, identity would sometimes be brought up instead.¹⁷¹ Othering came more easily in this context, and there was often a reference to the Taliban as members of *qabyle* (tribal) areas, in reference to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

¹⁶⁹ National Action Plan (NAP). *National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)*. Retrieved from <http://nacta.gov.pk/NAPPoints20.htm>

¹⁷⁰ See the section on the 'Elusive Enemy' in Chapter 1.

¹⁷¹ It is likely that this would be different in KP districts, which identify more closely with Pashtun identity.

(FATA), and they would then be caricatured as uneducated and barbaric. These accounts were often tinged with grudging admiration for their fierce ability as fighters. It might be useful to mention here that as early as 1948, the Pakistani state mobilized militias from FATA to fight in Kashmir, and the subsequent use of these areas in the Afghan *jihad* was discussed briefly in Chapter 1. Humeira Iqtidar (2016) suggests that the residents of FATA are ‘enmeshed in a complex web of colonial and post-colonial legal and political regimes that separates them definitively from the rest of Pakistan.’¹⁷² As such, the unease that haunted these conversations about war hung around the Muslim identity of the enemy, and the *qabyli* (tribal) identity helped to ease this ambivalence. The *othering* of the enemy based on the tribal and perhaps even Pashtun identity of these areas came easily in the heartland of Punjab, reminiscent of the *otherings* of other ethnicities (Bengali and Baluchi) mentioned earlier.

It is clear from these discussions that these local landscapes are not adapted or prepared for the new enemy system. Sectarian and jihadist ideology has been allowed to fester and the state has turned a blind eye, or worse has provided active patronage, and there is limited local buy-in to the state’s narrative. The enemy remains a category that is undifferentiated from other Sunni Muslims (Barelvi and Ahle-Hadith), largely due to the manner in which Deobandi groups (both welfare organizations and seminaries) propagate assimilation versus differentiation between Sunni sects in these rural spaces.

Assimilating the ‘New’ *Shaheed*: Whispers in the Night

I turn now to the contestations that are expressed in these villages around the figure of the *shaheed* soldier who has fought and sacrificed in this war. Dying in uniform, and the honour associated with it, has a long history in the village of Palwal, located in the heart of the so called martial belt. Some still have memories of great-uncles and grandfathers who fought in Japan in World War II and did not return, tinged with melancholy about never finding out what happened to them or where exactly they died. There was a clear acknowledgement that some of this recruitment happened under conditions of duress, running side by side with the intertwined themes of the sheer economic desperation that drove many into service and the *pakki mahana amadani* (secure monthly income) that it secured. Some referred to these dead as *shaheed*, others simply as those who did not return or who were *killed* in WWII. In either case they were respected and their stories were told with pride. Many drew a clear distinction between the pre- and post-partition army. The British Indian Army was a *ghair mazhab* (non-Muslim) force, while the

¹⁷² Iqtidar, H. (2016, February). Pakistan’s Apartheid Regime. *Tanqeed*. Issue 10. Retrieved from <http://www.tanqeed.org/2016/02/pakistans-apartheid-regime/>

Pakistani military was a Muslim force that had fought to save Islam from the Hindu enemy. It is important to emphasize that the earlier British Indian Army and participation within it was respected, its dead were honoured and the reference to it being a non-religious force was not pejorative. Very few used the honorific *shaheed* in this context. Post-partition military service continued to be referred to as an economic necessity, a *pakki naukri*, however, what changed was the reverential status accorded to the dead. From here onwards, martyrdom for the state and religion merged and the dead were always referred to as *shaheed*. After partition, dying in military service was synonymous with dying for Islam, and on the surface this practice of revering the military martyr continued irrespective of whether these men died on the border with Hindu India or in the recent war fighting against Muslims. The dead soldier was a martyr of the Islamic nation-state, a *shaheed*, to be accorded the highest place in heaven. In the Barelvi-dominated village of Palwal, he became something of a saint, with his ornately decorated grave painted with verses from the Quran and fitted with shelves carrying *siparas* (chapters of the Quran). His grave also featured state symbols, like the flag atop his grave and the name of his unit and the operation in which he died carved onto his tombstone. To the occasional visitor, the ideas of state and religion would seem to sit comfortably alongside each other.

In Palwal village, I encountered three types of references to *shaheed* apart from the military-owned *shahadat*. The first two were typical of what one would find in a rural Barelvi dominated village. One was a common reference to Karbala, in which Hussain is mentioned as the preeminent embodiment of *shahadat* in Islam in both the vernacular and in the sermons of clerics. The other was to a pre-partition Muslim man of the area who had killed a blasphemer and had then been executed by the British, thereby attaining *shahadat*.¹⁷³ The third reference was to *shahadat* in war. I will unpack this third reference further, as it is indicative of the tensions and ambivalence mentioned above. In a sermon given by the local cleric on the occasion of the death anniversary of a soldier who had died in Waziristan, Pakistan was not mentioned.¹⁷⁴ The absence of the state from the commemoration of the death of a soldier of the Pakistani military is an interesting paradox, which brings out the complexities of how the death of a soldier fighting a different enemy and in a different war was received in these local spaces. In his one and a half hour sermon, the cleric spoke about the concept of *shahadat* in Islam, wars in the time of the Prophet and tales of the bravery of Muslim soldiers and their leaders.

¹⁷³ A number of older villagers referred to this incident.

¹⁷⁴ Sermon by village cleric 1, in Palwal, 10th December 2014.

He described how the *shaheed* feels no pain at the time of death and talked about the *shaheed's* reception in heaven. Pakistan was not mentioned, even though the entire graveyard next to the mosque was decorated with Pakistani flags. A possible explanation for this omission could be his own ambivalence to the current war as a Deobandi *maulvi*, a passive antagonism whereby he honoured the village's dead without condoning the military's current war. Another explanation given to me by villagers was that the cleric wanted to avoid controversy, just in case someone did not agree that these men are *shaheed*. In other words, he was playing it safe.

If the second explanation holds true, three things stand out, the *first* being that unease about these *shahadats* is an open secret. People may speak of it amongst themselves in small groups, but it will not be openly addressed, either with the military when it comes to the village for the funeral or in large gatherings. *Secondly*, the way to deal with this unease is to steer clear of the state and discuss only the religious narrative, because that is considered indisputable. However, the reverse may not be true. In other words, the idea of *shahadat* can be discussed without any reference to the state, but the same cannot be said of the state, which needs to draw on religion to legitimize itself. The YeS events organized by the military rely heavily on religious inflections (see Chapter 1). The village funeral, which is choreographed by the military, draws in religion constantly to position this sacrifice for the nation within the folds of faith (see Chapter 4). It may be useful to repeat here what was suggested in an earlier section, that the nationalist argument for supporting the military operation against fellow Muslims holds only when it is coupled with religious identity. In other words, the state is worthy of being defended only because it is Islamic. One may suggest that the reason the religious narrative is foregrounded at the cost of the state is because I am after all discussing a religious sermon by the local cleric. However, the very idea that a private commemoration by the father of a dead soldier is considered incomplete unless it is followed by a religious sermon by the local mosque is an important indicator that Islam must be drawn in, and that when it becomes risky to use the religion-state dyad, it is the state that can be discarded.

Thirdly, and most importantly for my project because of the practical and affective imperatives involved, the village dead are honoured and owned, no matter what the nature of contestations may be. The village honoured its dead in the past when they fought for a *ghair mazhab* (non-Muslim) army, and they will continue, at least for now, to honour their dead even when the bonds between state and religion may be questioned.

This ability to smooth over destabilizations or the loosening of bonds adds another layer of complexity to the relationship between the military army and its subjects, and will be addressed below.

The discomfort and anxiety around the war which was mentioned earlier filtered into conversations about those who had died fighting this war. This discomfort was not articulated outright, but was quantified as a difference from earlier *shaheed*. Villagers referred to those who fought and died in wars on the Indian border or on the Siachen Glacier as '*asal* (authentic) *shaheed*', implying, although never saying outright, that soldiers returning from Swat and Waziristan were not (as) authentic.

Mazoor was *asal* (authentic) *shaheed*, he was at the border [with India].
Those who are *shaheed* now, they are Muslims fighting with Muslims.
The real enemy is at the Lahore and Sialkot border. Hindu and *Kafir*
(non-believers) [are the real enemy].

(Havildar Sohail, Palwal, 14th November 2014)

What is insightful in the text above is that the dead in this war continue to be referred to as *shaheed*, but are differentiated from those who die fighting against Hindu India. The excerpt below is from an interview with a villager who compares a soldier from Palwal who died in the 1999 Kargil War with four younger men who have died more recently in the current war:

There was a lot of feeling generated in the Kargil War, there was a lot of patriotism, and they [people in the village] were annoyed when there was a compromise, and the reason was that a dead body from Kargil had come into our village (...) There is more open talk [now]. During those times patriotism was stronger (...). There is talk that it is the army's doing that our children are dying. And then it was raised at the national level whether these are *shaheed* or not (...) The clash with India is clear, it arouses strong sentiments, it's like the cricket match between India and Pakistan, but this is different. When the operation started inside the country, people have a different perspective on that. They say that these Taliban, they are like our sons, they are also taking the name of Islam. Are they [army soldiers] *shaheed* or are they [Taliban] *shaheed*?

(Ali, Palwal village local, 18th December 2014)

In the above excerpt it is clear is that there is a difference between support for a war with India and for a war with fellow Muslims. Earlier the village rallied round the state, and there was even annoyance when Pakistan pulled its troops back from Kargil. In the

earlier instance, the death of a soldier from the village actually intensified the desire to battle, for it became a matter of honour and of making the sacrifice count. It is instructive to note here that the speaker still hints at a layering of narratives in saying that there is more 'open talk' now, implying that people would express doubt even in the narrative of glory and honour in the war against India. However, in this current war these doubts are aired more openly: that the enemy is not Hindu or linked to India and that the enemy is like 'our son', he is a Muslim, fighting in the name of Islam.

Those currently serving in the army and those who had lost a loved one rarely brought up this differentiation between *shaheeds*, yet their critique of the war and army policy was along the same lines. Their challenge was more personal and raw, and came from deep grief and anger at being used as cannon fodder in a war that they did not own. For Nawaz's mother Yasmin, it was all the more raw after the TTP's attack on the army school in Peshawar:

Yasmin: If we had not stung them [Taliban] they would not have done this to us. Musharraf (former COAS) is a dog, he brought this on Pakistan and he should be kept in jail and never let out.

Sister: My brother died fighting these people.

Yasmin: (cutting her short) Would Musharraf have got into this war if his son was in the army? He should have sent his son. How many sons have become *shaheed* because of his decisions?

(Nawaz's sister and mother [Yasmin], Palwal, 25th January 2015)

These were affective tones that ran counter to and challenged military narratives, ruptures in the relationship between the military and the families of the dead similar to those mentioned in Chapter 4's discussion of practices and rituals of grieving that go awry.

It is clear from the ambivalence seen above that the 'battle of narratives', which Colonel 1 of the ISPR suggested had been won by the military, is still up for grabs in the very constituency the military considers its heartland: a village in a martial district of Punjab province with four dead soldiers from this war buried in its graveyard. As discussed in Chapter 4, what is also obvious in these spaces is continued loyalty to the military. Yasmin and her husband display the flag of Pakistan on their son Nawaz's grave, and in addition to his name and date of birth, his tombstone carries the name of his regiment and the operation he died in. Whatever ambivalence exists in them about the current war, they continue to attend the YeS ceremony, and they show no sign of tangible

disaffection. Also, an overwhelming number of young men turned up for recruitment in the summer of 2015: 4000 young boys aged 17 and above from Chakwal district who were willing to risk death for *pakki naukri* and die against an enemy they do not consider their own.¹⁷⁵ To explain these seemingly contradictory moves, both towards and away from the military, I now move on to a description of how these contestations about the current war are resolved.

Reconciliations, Resolution and Hierarchies

Saleem, a young man who is currently unemployed, explains the nature and resolution of these tensions below:

Saleem: A small percentage of people will talk, but most will not discuss the death. Why did he die, was it right or wrong? In those last rites, they feel joy in their hearts, they are respecting him by doing this. Other deaths are not like this. When someone dies it is a regular feeling, but when a *fauji* dies he is a helpless man, he may not be correct in terms of religion but he has died wearing a uniform we respect so much that we don't look at his character and what he was like, we just look at how he died.

Me: So what does the small percentage say?

Saleem: This problem happens when you use the word *shaheed*. I think people who understand don't talk about this and understand why he is called a *shaheed*, because those who are in the *fauj* use this term, although the real meaning (of *shahadat*) is that it is used for a person who dies in the way of Allah (...). The word *shaheed* is used because he was an army man, and we say it to give him respect. I too think like this. Some who are *shaheed* like this are not very strong religiously, yet we call them *shaheed*. Those who serve the country and die, their religion is their country. He thinks the land is his mother. This is his intention, and he is *watan ka shaheed* (martyr for the nation-state). *Mazhab ka shaheed* (martyr for religion) is a different category. Those who cannot understand this are more extremist. They will say, he died fighting in his own country, he is not *shaheed*, he died while killing other Muslims (...). Until after the burial nobody talks. But then in private gatherings people will say this. How can we call him a *shaheed*, he died like this. But he is a *shaheed*, only his level is different, for there are different levels. These are two different things, why should we debate them. We call him *shaheed* because when he died he was wearing Pakistan Army uniform on his body.

Me: How do different sects see this?

Saleem: Deobandi will say this more but not all (...). Shia and Barelvi will not get into this discussion. Deobandi will, and that is because they

¹⁷⁵ Fieldnotes, Chakwal, 21st May 2015.

prioritize religion in everything. If for me my country comes second to my religion then naturally I will think like this.

(Saleem, adjoining village local, 20th April 2015)

Saleem had obviously thought this through, and the reconciliation he proposed was something that also echoed in my conversations with other villagers. He proposed a hierarchy of the *shaheed* that resonates with the pre-partition understanding of those who died for the British Indian Army. This reconciliation came from the subjects themselves, troubled by the competing narratives around *shahadat* coming from the military and local discourses. In the village, the resolution was the emergence of a hierarchy of the *shaheed* that unsettled the link between nation and religion in ways that allowed co-existence. This reconciliation is perhaps made possible by the fear that these whispers could strain the relationship between the district and the benevolent army, but also by the strong affective bonds with the dead, who are easy to identify with, as at some point in their lives most young men in the district will have tried to join the military or will have been expected to. This sense of affinity is made possible by the shared socio-economic realities of the district and the desire for *pakki naukri*. These pragmatic concerns and affinities allow a new (for the post partition era) category to emerge, the *watan ka shaheed* (martyr for the nation-state), which differentiates itself from the *mazhab ka shaheed* (martyr for religion).

The cleric cited at the beginning of this chapter, vehement in his criticism of the war, has a son serving in the army. He was unhappy with what he perceives to be an exaggerated reverential status of the *shaheed* of the village, who he claimed had died fighting *America's war*. In response to my question about whether it was difficult for him to accept his son being a soldier in the Pakistan Army fighting in what he called *America's war*, he said:

It is the rules and regulations of the government [the military] for the one who is serving. God has written down his fate. He can die at home or he can die there, this is the natural cycle. It is not true that he will only go to heaven if he is a *shaheed*. You can go to heaven for other reasons too. God has written down how we all will die, so it is futile to argue about this.

(Cleric 2, Palwal, 2nd February 2015)

In his opinion, the above conversation was 'futile', and it was clear that he would rather not discuss this. For him, as for the interlocutor above, the 'helpless' soldier is simply following orders, and as such is absolved of blame, while death in service is not *shahadat*

in the name of Islam. He sought to honour the soldier who dies and loosely alluded to the fact that he can still be respected and find his way into heaven through his other deeds, suggesting other kinds of *shahadat* that are not *shahadat* for *mazhab* (religion).

In the village space there was an assertion of a new (or a reversion to an earlier) category of *shaheed*, one who dies because he fights for his country, not necessarily his religion. To enable this shift, the village pulled in an imagining of the soldier that already existed in the vernacular. This was an imagining at odds with the more public image of the soldier as the brave and fearless defender of the nation-state, constructing him instead as a simpleton, a yes man who undergoes harsh army discipline and training. Two moves allowed this, the first being the claim that he was but a *bacha* (child) or a *larka* (boy) as opposed to being a man:

These *bacha* [the three who died within one year] were brave boys. Once they were recruited they never looked back. They were brave, but the one who died before in the Kargil War, he was very brave. (...) He was a real man.

(Havildar Sohail, Palwal, 14th November 2014)

The second move was an assertion that army discipline does not allow dissent and that the soldier is *majboor* (helpless):

Many of our (Deobandi) elders are in the army. Everyone knows that the army system is such that one can't say I don't agree and I will not go [to the front]. Nobody discusses this, in other words he is the most *majboor* person. He has to do his service, and whatever he does, he does because he is ordered. So nobody discusses it if a *fauji* is Deobandi and he is deployed in Wana. When he comes back he will not be asked 'what were you doing there?' Because everyone knows he is not fighting there of his own will.

(Saleem, adjoining village local, 20th April 2015)

This *shaheed* was less authentic than the *asal shaheed*, for he was a *bacha* and *majboor*; he did not fight the (original) enemy, but instead fought the *gumrah bhai* (brothers who have been led astray). He was thus absolved of any blame; he deserved pity but also reverence and respect. In the village imagination, the *shaheed* was no longer constructed as the fearless, determined or willing soldier but as one who is helpless, infantilized and unable to desert or reject this war. These tropes of infantilizing the soldier and of helplessness ran through the narratives of soldiers and the families of the dead, an imagining of the soldier that already existed in villages even outside the context of the

current war, as discussed in Chapter 3, and was actively pulled in to settle doubts and unease as they talked about the deaths of those who died in this war.

It may be pertinent to mention here that the two attempts at reconciliation mentioned above, which permit resolution of the doubt and unease that assail these local spaces – the separation of religion and state and the less masculine imagining of the soldier – are not the reconciliations that the state narrative proposes. The former reconciliation directly contradicts the state's efforts, which forbid the cleavage between religion and state from appearing and assert the religion-state dyad, as in the YeS programme. The state does not look for a co-existence that the village has come to accept, but desires to revert to earlier unquestioned bonds. The second reconciliation, in which the soldier is seen as *majboor* and the dead as *bache* or *larka*, caught up in a war that is not his own, is also a far cry from the masculine and determined soldier that YeS ceremonies project. Thus, the reconciliations that emerge in these local spaces are often hushed or muted, for they are at odds with military narratives and speak to the dissonances that exist in these seemingly complicit relationships.

Against the backdrop of the current war in which the military is engaged, religion no longer exists as a simple attachment to the state or the military, but instead becomes a site of contestation. Islam becomes a more complicated terrain; the subject is faced by two opposing Islamic spaces here: the Islamic state of Pakistan and Islamic militants. For the subject, the dilemma becomes *how can Islam fight itself?* This should cause significant contestation, yet we see two opposing moves in the spaces that provide the army's fodder. Ambivalence, doubt and unease predictably occur, yet we also see continued loyalty, readiness to serve and honour accorded to the *shaheed*. So, how are these mutually exclusive moves possible, such that doubt or unease is not associated with disaffection or desertion? When I put this apparent contradiction to my interlocutors, they responded with bemusement, a look that seemed to say *what an odd question to ask*. As one villager put it, 'This is a *fauji*-dominated area, their livelihoods are attached to the army, they will not turn against the military and they will continue to serve.'¹⁷⁶ To understand this contradiction we perhaps need to question our own propensity to see these moves as contradictory in the first place. This propensity comes from a view that places Islam and the nation as central drivers in the readiness to serve and sacrifice, a view that the state and military propaganda apparatus takes pains to project. As a result, we see these moves in a one-dimensional space, where the state and the now splintered domain of religion demand or pull at subjects in opposing directions. One way to

¹⁷⁶ Chaudary Zafar, Palwal, 30th April 2015.

understand this co-existence is to see that these moves happen on two separate terrains, or 'battlefields' to revert to the earlier analogy used by the ISPR officer. The military may suggest that it is fighting a 'battle of narratives' on religio-nationalist grounds, reclaiming the right to martyrdom for religion, and assert that the loyalty which subjects display during funeral rites, their presence in YeS ceremonies and the endless lines for recruitment are signs that this battle has been won. Yet, in the hilly tracts of Punjab, where rain is unpredictable and other livelihoods are insecure, military service and sacrifice, whether under the British or in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, has never been about religion or nation alone, but also about mundane materialism and affective drivers. Islam and nationalism, and more aptly Islamic nationalism in the case of Pakistan – a state it is hard to imagine without Islam – is a rhetoric offered by the military. It is embraced by the subjects of power in an almost psychological way, as a bid to displace the reality of materialism that makes this readiness to serve possible. It also serves as a way to offset some of the intense grief that accompanies the death of a loved one, a way to make meaning and dispel the discomfort and guilt that accompanies a death that is coupled with the exchange of material compensation. Hence, despite these deep contestations in the current setting, we see very little disaffection, and recruitment continues.

Conclusion

The chapter has documented unease in local spaces in Chakwal as troop deployment and military operations in northwest Pakistan became more intense, and more importantly as coffins start to roll into villages. National contestations, including *fatwas* (religious injunctions) against the Pakistani military and the Lal Masjid incident in 2007, have filtered into local narratives and resonate with local understandings, despite overt loyalty to the state being expressed and notions of honour being strongly articulated in a district that has long been considered martial. Beyond the initial phase of the war, these contestations have had limited impact on the district's actual willingness to contribute recruits and work inside the state-military framework. I have argued, however, that this should not shield from view the local frameworks in which soldiers and their families reside or imply that they are completely benign. Both the local and military sides of the evolution of soldiers and their families need to be acknowledged, even if the end result is yet to pose any significant sustained challenge to the military.

The Pakistani state and military are haunted by a desire to use religion as a political tool to legitimize their current policies and the original idea of the state.¹⁷⁷ The parameters of the debate continue to be on religious grounds, with the state asserting its right to retain the status of martyrdom for the country as a religious exercise. Within local spaces, this assertion is contested. The obsession with the ever changing and narrowing definitions of the Pakistani Muslim and the forces of sectarianism and jihadism that have mushroomed in these environs have confounded the evolution of national identities that may rally to the call of nation alone. Within the village, the resolution of these contestations is the emergence of a hierarchy of the *shaheed* that unsettles the link between the nation-state and religion, and there is an assertion of a different (or reversion to an earlier) category of *shaheed*: one who died because he fought for his country, not necessarily his religion. The splintering between the nation-state and religion poses a dilemma, for it threatens the use of religion as a crutch, which has served the subjects well in the past. Islam is now a more complicated terrain, and the subject must traverse this terrain in ways that allow Islam to exist in the spaces of both the state and militants. The resolution is to separate *mazhab* (religion) from the *watan* (nation-state), a resolution that if we look closely is a slippage from the earlier exalted position of the *shaheed* for religion. Here, those who subscribe to this view – a hierarchy of the *shaheed* that regards the *shaheed* who fights non-Muslims as more authentic than the *shaheed* who dies fighting the Muslim enemy – are clearly acknowledging a slippage, much like the ladder of attitudes towards extremism that was pointed out earlier by my interlocutor. As such, the move in these local spaces to separate martyrdom for the state from martyrdom for religion threatens the state-religion ideology that the military still considers to be the core of the image of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

This chapter claims that the battle of narratives on ideological grounds, especially one that draws on religion as its primary affective repertoire, is far from being won. Doubts and questions are abundant, resulting in a hushed ambivalence. What is interesting, however, is that it remains hushed, and I have argued that this silence is not just due to the obvious coercive mechanisms of the military crushing dissent, or to the huge propaganda apparatus available to the military, such as YeS ceremonies, but that it is due to bonds of another nature altogether. These bonds are held in place by symbiotic relationships that when threatened generate a powerful set of anxieties, and a battle that

¹⁷⁷ Religion comes up repeatedly in YeS scripts, and more often than not, predictably, the state is mentioned within the folds of faith; the state is Islamic and the nation has a religion. This was echoed in Chapter 3, where the military's response to the challenges posed by the new war was to insist on the state's right to claim *shahadaat* in the religious sense and designate the enemy as non-Muslim.

is lost on ideological grounds is won on another other terrain. In local spaces, this resolution is on affective and material grounds, terrain bolstered by the district's history, which keeps the emerging reconciliation very much in favour of the military, even if the military's narrative of the war and the enemy may be rejected.

Conclusion

At its heart, this thesis has been an examination of the affective relationships that are crafted within militarism. Foremost, it is an interrogation of the relationship between the Pakistan Armed Forces and its immediate subjects, soldiers and their families. A second relationship, between the military and the *qaum*, is studied not directly, but as a function of the first relationship, with the bodies and families of dead soldiers serving as conduits for communication with the nation.

The voluntary nature of enlistment in the non-conscription military of Pakistan, where war or the threat of war is never far away, has often been explained as a function of economic desperation. In the rain-fed hilly tracts of Punjab, where opportunities to make a living are scarce, historical proclivity has also been cited as reason. This thesis has attempted to complicate this explanation by positioning affect as a technology of rule employed by the military. This involves putting in place a set of gendered governing practices that are pivotal in sustaining collusive partnerships between those who stand to suffer significant losses (soldiers and their families) and those who stand to gain (the military institution). This thesis has traced this relationship and followed it through various spaces and critical moments, beginning in Chapter 1 with a grand spectacle of mourning and power: a commemorative ceremony held by the Pakistani military. Chapters 2 to 5 responded to the master narrative put out at these ceremonies and examined the subjectivities of the protagonists of the militarism project, as well as the institutions and topographical spaces in which they reside. Chapter 6 studied this relationship through the lens of a war that strips away the rhetoric of religion and lays bare more clearly the inducements that secure service and sacrifice in the military.

Manufacturing the Affective Subject

In this thesis, affect and its control, production and stubborn afterlife emerges as a consistent theme running through the relationship between the military and its subjects. A wide range of military practices have been examined that work and rework both affect that is considered productive for military interests and affect considered counter-productive. Affective regulation and the formation of affective attachment are visible in the disciplinary techniques employed in military training institutes, which seek the transformation of the peasant-subject into the soldier-subject. This includes the suppression and severing of bonds with family and all things familiar at the time of recruitment into the army. The military demands the acceptance of violence on one's body and secures this acceptance not through materialist incentives alone but also

through affective realms, desiring the reimagining of familial attachments through the concerns of the state. This reimagining allows the emergence of a response of love, loyalty and attachment to the benevolent benefactor, who has the right to ask you to die or kill in its name. In cases of deaths of soldiers, this affective regulation extends to the family, and militarism also demands that the subject accept violence to the body of its loved ones. Mourning rituals for the dead are meticulously disciplined by the military in local spaces, re-drawing the lines between appropriate and inappropriate grief by crafting spectacular funeral ceremonies replete with military, national and religious meaning-making and compensation regimes that are set in motion from the moment the body arrives in the village. During commemorative ceremonies, the grief of the families of the dead becomes material for military scrutiny and crafting. Here, families are expected to draw on their reservoir of grief to produce deeply moving performances for the *qaum*. Affective management that seeks to enhance certain kinds of affect and downplay others is evident in the careful preparation of families for their on-stage testimonies, including skilful use of the camera and strict control of what is allowed on stage and what is edited out. Collective, predictable and productive mourning is made possible in these affective spaces, both local and national, where the military and the family perform for the nation and the dead body in a coffin is transformed into the revered transcendental figure of the *shaheed*, turning meaningless and avoidable death into meaningful sacrifice.

The productive ability of power, in this case the ability of the military to produce certain kinds of affect and response in its subjects, is evident in these appropriations. In the context of grief, subjects perform for the military and reify national scripts of sacrifice, whether in commemorative ceremonies, military funerals or memorialization sites and practices in local rural environs. While these representations of the military can be read along the lines of Foucauldian analysis as reiterations of power in which the subject is imbricated (Foucault 1991; Butler 1997), I have claimed that they are not just reflective of the productive capacity of power and its unchallenged hold over its subjects, but are also a function of affective residues and effluxes that remain in the interiority of the subject and in the physical spaces where they reside. This thesis has documented examples of such residues that resist being folded into the militaristic scripts of sacrifice for the nation and hence lie outside them. An example of this is how grief that has been disciplined by the military spills out again and again in both public and private narratives, and refuses easy closure. Realizations of *what if* (their sons had not been sent on military service or had left military service) on part of the parents, that induce emotions like guilt and regret; accounts of the soldiers in training as they knowingly

became automatons and experience feelings of numbness and dissociation; the uneasiness of parents locked in compensation regimes; and nostalgic families blinded by the glare of the national spotlight in commemorative ceremonies are some other evidences of my claim that the afterlife of affect that has been regulated, haunts people and spaces. This afterlife of affect binds the subject more closely to the militarism project, and in order to understand this contradiction, this thesis has turned to the role ideologies of religion and nation play (or not play) in militarist subjectivities.

Enter the Nationalist and Religious Subject?

I have suggested in this thesis that the apparent complicity of the subject is not only a matter of the appropriations and manipulations invoked by the national script (which in the case of Pakistan is also religious). Instead, I have argued that a set of materialistic and affective imperatives sustains the relationship between the military institution and its subjects. In Chapter 2, I presented the evolution of the military as a modern kinship group that rewards its subjects through pay, pensions, benefits and land grants (Lieven 2011). While the Islamic nation-state and memories and myths of a martial past and tradition were voiced as reasons for people going into military service, this articulation was nearly always secondary to the more emphatically stated reason, *pakki naukri*. I have suggested that on this local terrain, nationalistic narratives of service and sacrifice act as bargaining chips which permit continued membership in the military kinship group and allow claims to be made from it. The soldier-subject's attachment to all things military, nurtured by the military institution, and the regulation of grief at the time of soldier's death are ways in which the military uses the control and production of affect to bind its subjects even closer to it. I have argued that the compliance of the deceased soldier's family and their willing alignment with the military represent attempts to make sense of this death and ease the terrible burden of loss, rather than being due to some essentialist, ephemeral and transcendental love for the Islamic nation-state. This is also evidenced in the military's ability to largely override the ideological challenges entailed by the shift away from the traditional Hindu enemy to the new(er) Muslim threat, as documented in Chapter 6. In these local spaces, the desire to serve in the military is unabated, despite deep ambivalence and sometimes outright rejection of the new enemy and war. I have explained this contradiction by positioning Islam and nationalism as rhetoric offered by the military and embraced by the subjects of its power in an almost psychological way to displace and offset both the reality of the materialism that makes this readiness to serve and risk death possible as well as the grief caused by the death. The institution and its subjects draw in nationalistic (including religious) ideology almost cynically in order to

discipline and re-purpose livelihoods, death and disability. This re-purposing is made possible by the collusion of the subject with the power that forms it, allowing the corporality of the mutilated body to be reconstructed into a revered, objectified, flag-draped coffin or by shrouding, veiling and hiding from view the reasons people volunteer for the military. Where in the first re-purposing, ideology serves as a way to deal with grief and disciplines pain, in the second, ideology masks the material benefits of militarism for the soldier, his family and the institution.

Moreover, my thesis has argued that the subject is conscious of his or her appropriation and manipulation by hegemonic power. As voiced by the families of the dead, the script of sacrifice and service for the nation-state is a rhetorical crutch from which they feel compelled to read. The phrase *karna parta hai, kehna parta hai* (You *have* to do this, you *have* to say this) clearly signifies an awareness of the mask, which they are compelled to wear. I have complicated this compulsion through Slavjok Žižek's (2008:45) scholarship on ideology as 'fantasy-construction'. In the case of military service and death, nationalist and religious ideology operates to build a social reality in which death is meaningful, which in turn provides some escape from the 'traumatic real kernel' of families' own implication in the death. Families are driven by a need to lessen their intense guilt and regret at partaking in and losing a gamble taken in order to improve their economic condition. This realization brings its own set of affective residues that trouble them and linger, and are assuaged not through subversion or challenge but rather through further compliance. The material compensation offered by the military produces guilt and unease, for it implies the reduction of grievous pain to a crude monetary transaction, but it also works to assuage this loss to some extent. Claiming this compensation amounts to making the sacrifice count. This is a relationship of collusion with the military, spawned in the unbearable moment of separation from a loved one. Affect-laden moments of separation in which there is tension and an ability to decipher disciplinary frameworks become the very sites that permit a reconsolidation of power.

My contribution in this thesis has been to provide two further elaborations of this notion of ideology as 'fantasy', an escape from the unacceptable reality, not that the nation-army used the soldier as cannon fodder but that they (family) themselves are implicated in that fact. Both these elaborations implicate affect: it is affect, both produced and disciplined by the military, that makes these fantasies come alive; and it is also affect – its afterlife and residues – that makes these fantasies forever vulnerable, never still and therefore in need of constant validation.

I thus argue that power and ideology work to make us subjects in flawed, incomplete ways, and that spaces for disaffection and ambivalence are part of these relationships between the military and its subjects. In this context, the affective selves produced in nationalist and religious discourses react, respond and bond with the discourse in more complicated ways than simply duping through ideology or buying off materially. These symbiotic relationships are fuelled by deeply felt affect that leads families to cling to and be soothed by these narratives of sacrifice for and service to the Islamic nation-state. The scripts of nation and religion that are offered then become a language that allows them to stand either on the national stage or in the local space, available cultural constructions of sacrifice and honour that can make an intolerable loss breathable.

Gendering the Subject

This thesis has paid attention to four specific sites where the female subject of militarism become a preoccupation for the masculine military, and has used these sites to understand how the military engages with the female subject. Through depictions of the exalted mother of the *shaheed* (Chapter 1), the desire for distance from the feminine as a rite of passage for the soldier subject (Chapter 3), the military's preoccupation with the ways men and women grieve (Chapter 4) and the military's engagement and discomfort with the widow figure and the incomplete *feminized* body of the disabled soldier (Chapter 5), this thesis has nuanced the relationship between the military and its female subjects, the mothers and widows of dead soldiers.

The military finds women's affect problematic and in need of regulation, yet at the same time it is also craved by the militaristic project. The subjectivities of soldiers at the training centre emerge from a conscious and deliberate effort to create distance from the contaminating effect of the civilian and feminine. Here, boys become men, or soldiers, by giving up stubborn bonds of attachment and mastering fear, both of which are associated with the feminine. The female subject's grief also becomes a point of concern for both the military and the men of the village at the time of the soldier's death. This is dealt with by the military institution by subordinating women and their emotions beneath the faculties of reason, a denigrated status where her affect is considered unreasonable and in need of restraint (Ahmed 2004). The military calls upon men to manage the grief of the women in their family and grieve differently from them. This differentiation allows the men in the family to regain their sense of masculinity, which is momentarily threatened by their own overwhelming grief and the military's takeover of death and its rites. These examples construct the feminine and the female subject as polluting, troublesome and in

need of restraint, even though they are important in producing differentiations between men and women.

I also present how the affect of the female subject is actively appropriated and in some cases exalted. Military compensation favours female dependents, the mother or wife of the dead soldier. Here, the female dependent perhaps represents the ideal subject for a compensatory regime that wishes to be masked. The exchange of money in return for the sacrifice of life is deemed less transactional and materialistic when the recipient is the female subject, for this supports the trope of the vulnerable woman (the nation) in need of protection from the masculine soldier (the military). The military institution also deems the female subject's ability to express grief and invoke it in others, which was previously considered problematic, vital for the spectacles of mourning that it orchestrates. In commemorative events, this excessive primitive affect of women is the very substance of what is re-worked and appropriated to fuel these performances for the *qaum*.

The militarized self (the soldier) and the military are gendered not just in an instrumental way, to fight wars or defend the nation, but because it cannot be imagined without bringing in the feminine: 'The female is the ground from which the male imagines, produces or transforms himself' (Chopra, Osella & Osella 2004:23). Without this engagement with the feminine, the militarized self (the soldier) and the masculine military are capable neither of delineating their own boundaries nor of capitalizing on affective manipulation. I thus argue that the masculine military institution, nurtured on the idea of separation and difference from the feminine, contains both a discomfort with the female subject and yet a constant need to engage with it.

The Growing Shadow of the *Shuhada* Monument

In September 2016, as I write the concluding section of my thesis, three years on from when I began it, General Raheel Sharif, one of the most popular of the generals who have headed the military establishment since Pakistan's inception, has just delivered what can be dubbed a 'State of the Union' address at the YeD commemoration ceremony.¹⁷⁸ The fact that in a democracy this address can be made by the Chief of Army Staff, broadcast live across the nation and quoted the next day in the press, electronic media and newspapers alike, and that the subject matter of this address covers issues of governance, the criminal justice system, economic development, foreign policy, terrorism

¹⁷⁸ Sattar, B. (2016, September 10). State of the Union. *The News*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/149153-State-of-the-union>

and corruption, without as much as a raised eyebrow, powerfully demonstrates how the military establishment positions itself in the polity of Pakistan.

The military's ability to create this space (YeD & YeS) to communicate directly with the nation or interfere in state affairs may come as no surprise in the context of Pakistan, but what is perhaps significant to note here is the nature of the platform it uses to assert its power: the stage that pays homage to its dead. An examination of the YeS/YeD stage, with which this thesis began as a site for investigating the *hows* of military appeal and its dominance in Pakistan, brings into sharp focus the centrality of carefully crafted narratives of grief and mourning in the messaging the military puts out for the nation.

In 2007, General Raheel Sharif's predecessor, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, inherited an army that desperately needed to rehabilitate its image in the wake of General Pervez Musharraf's long and contentious military takeover. The threat of terrorism, directly associated with the GWOT, was also increasing, and the military was coming under attack from both Islamic militants and Islamic political parties. General Kayani's primary focus during his tenure was to acknowledge the military rank and file, and according to some analysts there was an unprecedented focus on the welfare of soldiers.¹⁷⁹ General Kayani also declared *Youm- e- Shuhada*, upgraded compensation packages and administrative procedures and improved the GHQ's mechanisms for handling *shuhada* and WWP's. While General Sharif continued these policies when he took over in 2013, he is believed to have had a stronger external focus, with his period featuring more interference in civilian affairs. However, I contend that the line drawn between General Kayani's focus on internal military matters and General Raheel Sharif's more outward and popular public persona is illusory. The inward focus and image building around the *shaheed* and sacrifice that intensified during General Kiyani's time acted as a powerful enabler, legitimizing the military and helping it re-build its reputation and image. At this particular juncture in Pakistan's history, with the army at war, power ostensibly rests in civilian hands, but rising casualties and the commemorative stage at its disposal give the military more ammunition and leverage to retain their hold over civilian affairs of the state. It is this vast arsenal at the disposal of the military establishment, allowing it to produce and discipline affect through the tropes of martyrdom, service and sacrifice, that it zealously and relentlessly deploys in its relationship with the nation. Much like the

¹⁷⁹ Gul, I. (2016, September 16). Armed but not dangerous. *The Friday Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/armed-but-not-dangerous>

soldier trained at the regimental centre on tropes of honour, love and family, the nation is also disciplined and made docile through affect, grief and love.

To understand how affect operates as a mediator in the militarism project, this thesis has traced the different treatment meted out to the civilian dead and the dead in uniform. In the case of civilians who die as a result of an act of terror, commemoration serves to honour the dead and thus hide the ineptitude of the state, or worse, its complicity. The logic behind most material compensation regimes offered by the state is to address losses incurred by its citizens for which the state takes responsibility. In cases of military death, commemoration and compensation regimes are driven by different imperatives. Commemoration of military deaths acts not just to deflect criticism of the state or military institutions, or to distract from their culpability, but serves the far more strategic goal of creating an image of the dead as selfless and willing martyrs for the nation-state. While a systematic military compensation regime exists, in contrast to the compensation regime for civilian dead, which is visible and bitterly contested, it remains masked in military commemorative spaces. This is made possible by a number of watchful institutional mechanisms that filter out this aspect on the national stage and address grievances in local spaces. I suggest that this masking is desired because calculating and transacting a loss essentially entails that its price has been paid and the transaction completed. The military instead seeks a position where it must be able to continually extract compensation from the nation, in the form of support and loyalty, for the sacrifices that *it* has made that *cannot be compensated*. Simply put, in cases of civilian death, the purpose is to assuage or lessen the grief and affect around death, and compensation regimes are a visible means of doing so. With military deaths, there is a deliberate attempt to produce and appropriate grief and affect, which is more potent if compensatory regimes remain masked.

Commemorating the dead and compensating for their deaths involves two sets of relationships, the first of which is between the military and its direct subjects and involves cultivating a relationship moulded by material compensation and accompanied by rituals of meaning-making and commemoration in local spaces and on the national stage. The deliberate masking of the former allows a second set of relationships to develop between the military and the nation, for which the transaction of compensation is extractive, i.e. aimed at extracting legitimacy and unquestioned support for the military institution and its policies.

Mediating Militarism through Affect

While my analysis has been concerned with the centrality of affect as a technology of rule in militarism in the context of Pakistan, this thesis also responds to broader theoretical concerns about the working of the hegemonic power relations that nurture militarism, and their limits. The focus of this thesis has been on the military institution. However, what has been examined is the affective relationships crafted within militarism, and hence I suggest that these claims also extend to states where military or militaristic goals may be subsumed under the state. The call to militarism, which in the context of state armies is closely associated with nationalism, can be a project of the state as much as of the military per se.

To decipher the insidious appeal of militarism it is perhaps vital to understand the experiences and motivations of its foot soldiers, those who die and those who let their loved ones die for projects or ideologies by which they may not be duped. This opens up more intimate and perhaps more obscure avenues to study the mechanisms through which the militarism project works and which sometimes place it beyond meaningful scrutiny and question. There are two inter-related reasons why a focus on the affective domain represents a much-needed window for understanding how militaristic narratives of sacrifice and service to the nation-state have valence with populations. First and foremost, it allows us to recognize that affect is the substance that makes these fantasies or beliefs in militaristic narratives possible. By attending to this substance, we are able to see the disjuncture between the hegemonic project and its reception at the local level, cracks that are also allowed expression through affect. The focus on affect permits us to record the incomplete and fractured processes through which modern militarism claims its subjects. It also allows us to understand how this disjuncture functions as a further reconsolidation of hegemonic power where anxieties and guilt tightly bound together with economic imperatives underlie the apparent complicity between the powerful and the powerless. Second it enables an understanding of how the affect associated with military death and grief can act as a formidable deterrent to any challenge to or questioning of the militarism project. This ability to stifle dissent, whether among the direct subjects of militarism or within the larger group that I refer to in this thesis as the nation, needs more scrutiny. In 2007, around the time of the Iraq War, the British government rolled out a campaign with the backing of *The Sun* which aimed at bringing public attention to the working conditions of military employees and through that it 'remind[ed] the nation of the debt of honour it owed to the soldiers who fought on its behalf' (Ware 2012:267). The campaign also intended to sever the connection between

the army and the unpopular war in Iraq by 'separat[ing] the men from the mission'. (Ingham and Dandeker 2010 qtd. in Ware 2012:267). The ability of affect to stifle challenge has been documented in studies of anti-war activism that have shown how criticism is weakened by a desire to show respect for the families of the deceased and the sentiments of soldiers (Wasinski 2008). Even where state policies or actions that have led to combat have been challenged, or when movements are fuelled by a realization of the unjustness or meaninglessness of war, limits are placed on this critique by an 'emotional pull' that demands that protestors 'support the troops', if not the war, and there remains a concurrent reverence of the troops, who can be pitied for being misled while remaining heroic in the act of sacrifice (Managhan 2011:43).

In the context of the US perpetration of the Iraq war, Christophe Wassinki suggests that

[t]he most important part of the contestation of the war expresses itself as a sort of pity policy, taking an attitude focused on the suffering of the deceased presented only as victims. In this situation, death is not presented as the result of an unjust system but, mainly, as something to be regretted because of the suffering borne (2008:125).

Does this lead us down a blind alley, where challenge to the sacredness of martyrdom for the nation-state becomes sealed inside the affect attached to the grief and suffering of death? I contend that this would perhaps be too hasty a conclusion. Below I address the barriers and potential for challenge in each set of subjects separately.

This thesis has outlined the many times that, despite overt compliance with affective regulation, the affect of soldiers and families escapes discipline and expresses itself through emotion that frees it up to challenge regimes of power. Affect, deemed so appropriate for consolidating hegemony's hold over its subjects, becomes the very medium that allows subjects to express discontent. While these may be deeply ambivalent acts of protest that allow subversion to exist in the military side by side with complicity (Gutmann and Lutz 2010) and also possibly function as 'safety valves' (Abu Lughod 1990:47), they do reveal an interesting trajectory in how subjects escape subjection at various points in time. I contend that understanding these 'diagnostics of power' is important (Abu Lughod 1990:47). I do not suggest that this trajectory leads to resistance and subversion of militarism, in fact my thesis has consistently recorded otherwise, but I posit that laying bare these mechanisms and recording these dissonances is not just an important theoretical exercise for understanding power and how it works, but also a political one, as I will explain below.

In the case of the second set of subjects, the nation, modern militarism operates through a blurring and mixing of spaces, so that the lines between the civilian and the military are redrawn or constantly shift (Lutz and Bartlett 1995; Lalarukh 1997; Baber 2000; Altinay 2004; Lutz 2006; Saigol 2013). I have shown how events that commemorate war martyrs represent a *civilianization of military spaces*, an opposite move to that which is normally studied in militarism, *the militarization of civilian spaces*. This move is in fact an incorporation of the civilian within military spaces, with civilian subjects participating in the reproduction of military power. This mixing of the civilian with the military creates a powerful illusion of participation, compliance and support. The illusion created is that of families willingly suffering this violence against their loved ones. I call this an *illusion of authenticity*, because while it draws on experienced affect and pain, and thus represents genuineness, it is carefully crafted and presented. This *illusion of authenticity*, representing an alliance between the victims of war and its perpetrators, is not questioned, because to challenge these ‘spectacles of power’¹⁸⁰ is to refute or dishonour both the nation-state, personified by state policy, and the genuine affect of the families on display. The state (the military) creates a false equivalence between the affect produced in response to the death of its soldiers and itself as an institution. Just as authentic grief and loss cannot be questioned, the state (military) cannot be questioned. This false equivalence acts as an arsenal at the state’s (the military’s) disposal to be used to discipline and control public opinion in its favour.

If we are to understand militarism’s ability to establish preparation for war as normal and necessary (Mann 1987) and demand sacrifice from its subjects, it is important to make visible the mechanisms through which it makes this appeal. This appeal is meshed together deliberately with the bodies of the dead and the affect associated with them. Any attempt to study this appeal must record the centrality of affect (especially around death) to militarism and how it is deployed to mask the illusory nature of this appeal. There are three sequential ways in which this opens up the possibility of a more potent and political challenge to militarism: first, by understanding that the subjects’ complicity in militarism does not reflect a willingness to sacrifice based on some transcendental notion of sacrifice for the nation-state; second, by challenging the false equivalence highlighted earlier which suggests that questioning war or the hegemony of the military state is the same as disrespecting the affect produced in response to the death of its soldiers; and third, and perhaps most challenging, by deconstructing narratives of

¹⁸⁰ Khaled Fahmy (1997:8) uses this term to describe images that represent the power of the state. I invoke it to describe commemorative ceremonies organized by the state that are crafted as deeply touching and poignant events that leave the viewer with a sense of awe at the state’s ability to summon such sacrifice.

heroism, pity for suffering and meaningful death in war and acknowledging that war can never be glorious and participation in it is always dishonourable, so that 'the dead soldiers who had participated in that enterprise should not be considered as heroes, should not be mourned for long by the community, and should not be taken as social examples' (Wasinski 2008:125). As long as war is glorious and the dead are heroes, even if they are to be pitied as *bache* or *majboor* (as I documented in Chapter 6), and as long as service in the military is not called out for what it is essentially is, a viable source of *pakki naukri* for the more economically disadvantaged (as I documented in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5), the state's (military's) ability to weave service and sacrifice as noble and draw in its foot soldiers will be sustained. This thesis has shown that the very subjects whose affect is constructed as sacred, a sacredness that in turn is used to stifle questioning and debate, acknowledge at least some of these threads. The political potential of this look at militarism which adequately deconstructs the moments of disjuncture between the hegemonic project and its reception by its immediate subjects lies in its ability to trouble the apparent untroubled association between the military and these families. By doing so it reduces to some extent the military's ability to use affect as a technology of rule with both its immediate subjects and members of the general public.

Michel Foucault (1998:86) reminds us that '[Power's] success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms'. My intention in scrutinizing these technologies of rule was to contribute to opening a debate that can resist interrogation because of the reverence and respect accorded to the feelings of the families of the deceased and the tightly-knit tropes of martyrdom and sacrifice purportedly undertaken through ideologies of nation and religion. These ideologies of nation and religion are but an afterthought, and it is in part through the construction of subjectivities through affect that militarism maintains its tenacious hold over the nation-state and its politics. If studies of militarism can document subjects in their lived complexities, both complicit in and disengaged from these projects, if the affect of militarist subjectivities can be recorded as both manufactured and authentic, then perhaps scholarship on militarism, as well as anti-war critique, can begin to challenge the foundations of the carefully manufactured *truth* that men, women and sacrifice for the nation-state go hand in hand.

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