

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AN URBAN MEGAPROJECT: THE BUS RAPID TRANSIT PROJECT IN TANZANIA

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ABSTRACT

This article analyses the political economy of the Bus Rapid Transit project implemented in Dar es Salaam between 2002 and 2014. It discusses the recent rapid growth of Bus Rapid Transit systems and the vested interests of the actors promoting them as a “win-win” solution to tackle the crisis of public transport in developing countries. The article discredits such “win-win” narratives by showing what some Tanzanian actors stood to lose from the implementation of the Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit scheme and their capacity to resist the project. It analyses tensions over the inclusion of the current public transport workforce, employment destruction, displacement of current paratransit operators, compensation, and the affordability of the new service. The article argues that slow implementation of the transport system was rooted in the tepid commitment to the project by the Tanzanian government. In turn, this lack of political will can be explained by domestic politics, and in particular the government’s attempt to respond to the priorities of the World Bank without alienating local actors, some of whom wield considerable electoral power.

BUS RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS (BRTs) have been increasingly promoted as the solution to chronic and rapidly escalating traffic congestion and to the low quality of public transport provision, widely shared traits of urban life in developing countries today. In 2007, 40 cities across six continents had BRT systems. By July 2014, the figure had risen to 180.¹ Operating BRTs in Africa include those in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Lagos. In Dar es Salaam, a BRT is currently at an advanced stage of construction. Accra, Addis Ababa, Dakar, Kampala, Nairobi, Maputo, and Luanda are amongst the African metropolises where preparation for BRT is at an early stage.

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1. Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, ‘Bus Rapid planning guide’ (Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, New York, 2007); on the current figure see *Global BRT Data*, <<http://brtdata.org/#/location>> (29 October 2014).

'Think rail, see bus' goes the BRT motto. Proponents of BRT systems stress how they combine the flexibility of bus transit with the benefits of a rail-based mass transport system such as speed, reliability, and mass ridership, at a fraction of its costs.² While BRTs are to some extent context-specific, there are five common characteristics that help to explain what is at stake in their promotion. First, while cheaper than rail systems, BRT systems still require substantial investment. International finance, led by the World Bank, has played a pivotal role in providing the funds for their implementation. Second, although BRTs are publicly funded, a conditionality attached to World Bank lending is that private companies operate the buses. The public sector oversees the systems and carries out quality controls on the service providers. BRTs are therefore to be understood as the urban transport expression of public-private partnerships – the rationale for, and benefits of which, are contested.³ Third, BRTs entail the phasing out of privately owned minibuses from the main arteries of public transport systems, and their deployment on feeder routes. As BRT buses are new and less polluting than those which provide public transport in many developing countries, advocates of BRT outline the environmental and traffic reduction benefits of bus switching. Fourth, BRT delivers faster trips thanks to off-board fare collection, platform-level boarding, and a fundamental shift in the rights to urban road use, as BRT buses are normally granted two dedicated lanes. Finally, as a result of this, BRT systems require major upgrading of the urban road infrastructure, including the rebuilding and the widening of main roads.

Research suggesting that BRT successes in Latin America opened 'a new era in low-cost, high-quality' transport is key to the argument for BRTs in Africa.⁴ Described as the 'world reference point for bus rapid transit systems',⁵ Bogotá's celebrated TransMilenio became the 'first mass transit system in the world designated as a Clean Development Mechanism under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change' six years later.⁶ At the 2012 UN Sustainable Development Conference in Rio de Janeiro, international development banks pledged US\$175 billion over ten years to

2. ITDP estimates that BRTs are between four and twenty times cheaper than tram or light rail transit (LRT) and ten to a hundred times cheaper than metro. See 'Bus Rapid Planning', p. 1.

3. For an excellent overview of debates on PPPs in Africa, see John Loxley, 'Are public-private partnerships (PPPs) the answer to Africa's infrastructure needs?', *Review of African Political Economy* 40, 137 (2013), pp. 485–95.

4. International Energy Agency, *Bus systems for the future: Achieving sustainable transport worldwide* (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2002).

5. Quality Public Transport, 'A model BRT? TransMilenio in Bogotá' (Quality Public Transport, Briefing No. 8, 2012), p. 1.

6. International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), 'Transport toolkit: Trade union influence on World Bank projects. Case study: urban public transport in Bogotá' (ITF, London, 2010), p. 1.

support sustainable transport in developing countries, with BRTs playing ‘a key role in creating sustainable [urban] futures’.⁷ Furthermore, international development funding has been channelled into building links between Bogotá and prospective BRT systems, resulting in officials from more than 20 countries visiting TransMilenio to learn from its (alleged) success.⁸ As transport systems that benefit the economy as well as the environment and the poor, BRTs are championed as the ultimate “win-win” intervention to solve public transport problems.

In contrast to such positive accounts, this article takes a critical look at BRTs through a case study of the Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit (DART). The object of analysis is the remarkable delay in the implementation of DART. Selected as the BRT forerunner in Africa in the early 2000s, the imminence of DART has been announced time and again over the years. In 2004, and again in 2007, the project’s implementation was promised – to no avail.⁹ In June 2008, the DART chief executive declared that work would start in September and that ‘all things being equal, the project should become operational by 2010’.¹⁰ New completion targets were announced for 2011, 2013, and 2014. In 2011, as the Dar es Salaam Commuter Bus Owners Association (DARCOBOA) chairman remarked, ‘they [were] even embarrassed to mention a time for completion’.¹¹ Construction work finally gathered momentum in 2013. In May 2014, an estimated 60 percent of the construction was completed, with completion scheduled for the end of 2015.¹²

A study of the delays with DART is important as it reveals the contradictions intrinsic to BRTs in one particular context. This requires an understanding of the political economy of DART: what different Tanzanian actors stood to lose from its implementation, and the way in which they were able to resist and influence the project. Indeed, as Gordon Pirie puts it, ‘the politics of BRT are delicate: strong leadership is needed to deal with

7. For the pledge, see World Resource Institute, ‘Statement: Development banks announce “game changer” for sustainable transport at Rio+20’ (World Resource Institute, Washington, DC, 2012); for the quote, see Robert Cervero and Danielle Dai, ‘BRT TOD: Leveraging transit oriented development with bus rapid transit investments’, *Transport Policy* 36 (2014), p. 128.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

9. *Mtanzania*, ‘Mradi wa mabasi kuanza utekelezaji’, 12 March 2004, p. 8; Juma Thomas, ‘No solution in sight for Dar transport problems’, *The Guardian*, 23 January 2007.

10. Zuwena Shame, ‘Dar rapid buses to use prepaid tickets’, *The Guardian*, 2 June 2008, pp. 1–2.

11. Interview, Sabri Mabrouk, Chairman of DARCOBOA, Dar es Salaam, 21 December 2011.

12. Rebel, ‘DART project Phase 1 – Project information memorandum - Final version’ (Report prepared for the DART Agency with support from the World Bank, May 2014), p. 10.

the vested interests of informal paratransit operators'.¹³ Such political challenges, which I will argue underlie the lack of leadership behind DART, are at the centre of this article. Alongside domestic politics, the article also analyses a set of vested interests behind BRTs, and one that far too often escapes scholarly attention: that of international finance and its NGO brokers, who adamantly advocate for the adoption of BRTs.¹⁴

The article starts by looking at the international lobby that promotes BRTs around the world, and its role not only in financing BRTs but also in generating evidence about global BRT experiences. Attention is paid to the manufacturing of Bogotá's BRT experience as a success story, the shortcomings of which are exposed. Following this, the article considers Dar es Salaam's experience of BRT. Drawing on policy documents, newspapers, and interviews carried out during fieldwork in 2010, 2011, and 2014, the analysis highlights the proximate and deeper causes of delays with the project. It is important to note that the type of evidence that it was possible to collect for this article was shaped by the political nature of DART and the ambiguous stance of Tanzanian leaders towards it, as most respondents were keen to avoid open confrontations as much as possible. Public authorities, for example, displayed a strong commitment to DART in words and yet a failure to act accordingly. Making sense of this gap required piecing together fragments of evidence, at times conflicting, which on their own were hardly conclusive. The process started with press coverage of DART, as this gave clues to the main issues that stalled its progress. These clues were further explored through the study of policy reports and interviews with key informants. The interviews were central to grasping the existence of incompatible versions of the same events, the tensions associated with the project, and how they played out in the bigger picture of contemporary Tanzanian politics. This entailed, as always, not taking for granted the reliability of these sources and the possible agendas of the informants.

Based on a careful and contextualized interpretation of these sources, the article explores the hypothesis that the delay in implementation, far from being the consequence of simple project-management failures, is rooted in the politics of BRTs. Precisely because DART cannot plausibly be understood as a "win-win" intervention – and there were constituencies in the transport system that stood to lose from its implementation – DART posed dilemmas to the Tanzanian government. On one side stands the World

13. Gordon Pirie, 'Transport pressures in urban Africa: practices, policies, perspectives', in Susan Parnell and Edgar Pieterse (eds), *Africa's urban revolution* (Zed Books, London and New York, NY, 2014), p. 136.

14. See Darío Hidalgo and Luis Gutiérrez, 'BRT and BLHS around the world: Explosive growth, large positive impacts and many issues outstanding', *Research in Transportation Economics* 39 (2013), pp. 8–13, who exclude lobbying by international finance among the 'reasons behind the explosive growth of BRT', p. 9.

Bank, funder of the project. On the other side stand a number of local actors, such as the current paratransit operators, their workforce, the Dar es Salaam City Council, and those who own property which stands to be expropriated and compensated for by DART. Each of these actors was compelled to make way for the project and, as a result, attempted to resist it. There are also prospective operators who tried to force their way into the project, seemingly against the will of its planners. Thus, the story that follows traces the precarious balancing act performed by the Tanzanian political leadership, which ended up caught between a rock and a hard place. It analyses the ways in which the government negotiated the agendas of various local constituencies, some of whom represent important electoral constituencies, alongside the roadmap of the World Bank.

The relationship between the government, the ruling party, and voters is particularly important to this story. Recent research on Tanzania's political landscape highlights the way in which elections have motivated the ruling party, *Chama cha mapinduzi* (CCM), to adopt policies likely to win large numbers of votes by virtue of their popularity with voters, their close association with the ruling party, and their countrywide reach – one such vote-winning policy pledge was the reintroduction of subsidies for fertilisers.¹⁵ The electoral competition faced by CCM also affects the modalities of competition within CCM and the overall functioning of the party, with an unhealthy tendency towards short-termism and corruption in politics. Tim Kelsall argues that 'party roots and branches must be generously fed and watered' from the top to prevent junior cadres from defecting to opposition parties, and to influence their choice of party presidential candidate.¹⁶ The increased prominence within CCM of business magnates like Iddi Simba and Rostam Aziz, who acted as campaign managers for the current Tanzanian president and his predecessor (Jakaya Kikwete and Benjamin Mkapa, respectively), is also linked to political competition and to the increasingly important role played by the resources of wealthy men in securing the 'support of local activists in primary elections'.¹⁷ The stance of the CCM leadership towards corruption seems ambivalent. On the one hand, important successes have been registered in fighting corruption, most notably through expenditure reforms in public finance. On the other hand, continuous corruption scandals involving senior figures such as the then Tanzanian prime minister Edward Lowassa indicate that the CCM centre

15. Anne Mette Kjær and Ole Therkildsen, 'Elections and landmark policies in Tanzania and Uganda', *Democratization* 20, 4 (2013), pp. 592–614.

16. In 1992 the party's procedure for selecting the party presidential candidate was democratized; since then delegates vote for their chosen candidate at the party's national conference. Tim Kelsall, *Business, politics and the state in Africa: Challenging the orthodoxies on growth and transformation* (Zed Books, London and New York, NY, 2013), p. 61.

17. *Ibid.*

lacks the ability to rein in ‘networks within the party who supported deals that were manifestly bad for the interests of the country and indeed for the leadership’.¹⁸

Such general reflections on the electoral implications of policies adopted by the CCM and the roles played in the project by Edward Lowassa and Iddi Simba – controversial characters in Tanzania’s recent political history – help to explain vicissitudes experienced in the implementation of DART. More specifically, these considerations point to the mixed motivations of the CCM towards the BRT project. As I will show, while the government hoped to benefit from the additional popularity that a successful initiative might bring, key players were also willing to manipulate the programme to benefit privately, while others feared that the CCM might lose support if DART’s implementation had negative effects on the hundreds of thousands of daily passengers reliant on public transport and pre-existing operators. It is this complex set of motivations that explains the tepid commitment to BRT at the heart of government, and hence the slow pace of implementation.

The BRT evangelical society

Looking closely at research on BRT and the narrative that portrays it as the solution to urban transport problems in developing countries, one realizes that a tightly-knit web of institutions lies behind it. Who the main players are, and what their stakes might be in BRTs, is therefore an important part of the story. The World Bank is the key player, for it provides not only the loans to make BRTs happen, but also funding for most of the research on them. Another important player is Volvo, which – not coincidentally perhaps – supplies buses to many BRT systems. It also supports the ‘Across Latitudes and Cultures – Bus Rapid Transit’, the BRT centre of excellence whose members include four academic institutions and Embarq.¹⁹ Embarq, which is the World Resources Institute’s Centre for Sustainable Cities, credits itself for having ‘played a major role in expanding the

18. Hazel Gray and Mushtaq Khan, ‘Good governance and growth in Africa: What can we learn from Tanzania?’, in Vishnu Padayachee (ed.), *The political economy of Africa* (Routledge, London and New York, NY, 2010), p. 352. The resignation of Edward Lowassa in 2006 was caused by the infamous electricity supply scam worked by Richmond-Dowans Limited, a company that successfully bid for the supply of electricity to TANESCO, the state-owned electricity company, despite having no previous experience in the sector and which, unsurprisingly, failed to deliver. When it became public in 2006 that its contract guaranteed Richmond-Dowans Limited the hefty fee of US\$100,000 per day even without supplying electricity, and that the company was fictitious, Lowassa was forced to resign over his role in brokering the deal. See Hazel Gray, *Tanzania and Vietnam: A comparative political economy of political transition* (SOAS, University of London, unpublished PhD thesis, 2012).

19. See Old BRT, ‘Members’, no date, <<http://old.brt.cl/about-us/members/>> (10 November 2014).

BRT concept to cities throughout the world'²⁰ and is one of the organizations behind 'Global BRT data', the most up-to-date dataset on BRTs.²¹ The Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), a Washington-based NGO, is unfailingly on the horizon wherever BRTs are implemented. The growth of ITDP from a small advocacy NGO to an organization with over 60 staff members in offices in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has been associated with access to BRT funding. ITDP played different roles in this capacity. It produced a BRT planning guide, carried out pre-feasibility studies in various cities, signposted potential new sources of funding for BRTs, and has been at the forefront of studies on BRT impacts.²²

In 2011, the ITDP board of directors included the managing director of the Goldman Sachs Urban Investment Group, a representative from the world giant investment firm Carlyle Group, and two representatives of the World Bank, including a retired former vice-president of the Bank.²³ This provides some indication of to whom the NGO is accountable. International finance obviously has huge stakes in the opening up of urban public transport markets – and more broadly of public utilities markets – in developing countries, and in the funding of the infrastructural work that they require.²⁴ It also seems to have established a close relationship with BRT champions such as ITDP, while Volvo, a vehicle manufacturer, funds a think-tank that strongly promotes BRT. These are examples of the vested interests of the institutions that present Bogotá's TransMilenio – and BRT more broadly – as a success.

By contrast, independent research and media coverage on TransMilenio present a more ambivalent picture, in which the positive impacts of BRT coexist alongside its negative consequences. Travel times and the quality of transport improved with TransMilenio, but claims that it is 'providing reliable transport accessibility for the poor'²⁵ sit at odds with increases in

20. See WRI, '160 cities adopt bus rapid transit', no date, <<http://www.wri.org/our-work/top-outcome/160-cities-adopt-bus-rapid-transit-%E2%80%93-key-tipping-point>> (11 November 2014).

21. See BRT Data, no date, <www.brtdata.org> (12 November 2014).

22. Naoko Matsumoto, 'Analysis of policy processes to introduce Bus Rapid Transit systems in Asian cities from the perspective of lesson-drawing: cases of Jakarta, Seoul, and Beijing' (Paper presented at the Better Air Quality Workshop, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 2006).

23. ITDP, 'Annual Report 2011', <file:///X:/Downloads/ITDP_AR_11_9.13.12.pdf> (22 February 2014), p. 24.

24. See David Hall, 'PPPs' (Public Services International Research Unit, London, 2014), pp. 5–44, for an overview of corporate interests and networks in promoting PPPs.

25. World Bank Project Information Document, 'Concept Stage, Report No. AB4561' (World Bank, Colombia Integrated Mass Transit Systems (IMTS) Additional Financing Project, 2009), quoted in Julie Porter, 'Trade unions responses to World Bank restructuring projects: The case of TransMilenio in Colombia' (Paper prepared for Public World, London, June 2010), <<http://www.publicworld.org/files/colombiabrtenglish.pdf>> (21 January 2014).

transport fares, a trend observed elsewhere.²⁶ Increased fares prevent the poor from accessing the service and have led to public protests demanding lower fares.²⁷ Such demands could not be met as the bargaining power of the public regulatory body *vis-à-vis* the private tenders was low, as is often the case with public–private partnerships. Furthermore, ownership of BRT buses increasingly became concentrated in the hands of a few private operators.²⁸ Another major problem with TransMilenio is the contraction in employment opportunities that accompanied the higher productivity of labour. The goal of replacing the exploitative informal employment relations of the pre-existing transport system with better and formal jobs ran into difficulties as workers faced new types of pressures from employers in the new system.²⁹ Access to the fewer but better jobs created by BRT for those who worked on the previous system was not straightforward. ‘Only one in seven of the bus drivers in the old system were able to find work in the new one’, and the harsh working conditions of the previous system prevented many from passing the medical test for a job in the system.³⁰ Although the World Bank has praised TransMilenio as a ‘financially self-sustaining bus rapid transit system’, the system sustains itself on the basis of higher fares and funding from international loans that will effectively be repaid by national taxpayers. These loans are used to pay for the infrastructural work, thus acting as a hidden subsidy to the private companies operating BRT.³¹

In sum, a cursory look at the record of BRT in Bogotá shows the tensions of this “success story”. This is in line with most public–private partnerships, which ‘are being promoted as being self-evidently beneficial’,³² but more often than not entail an uneasy relationship between the public sector (which provides the funding) and the private sector (which provides the services on long-term leases). From this perspective, BRTs are better understood as a solution to tackle the crisis in public urban transport in which international finance and the corporate sector have a powerful interest, as BRTs allow them to capture new markets and public funding. While BRTs

26. The inflationary impact of BRTs on transport fares has been observed in many other cities, with costs as high as US\$1.05 per trip (São Paulo). Most systems with a fare below US \$0.40 are reported to be under financial stress. See Dario Hidalgo, Paulo Custodio, and Pierre Graftieux, ‘A critical look at major bus improvements in Latin America and Asia: case studies of hitches, hiccups and areas for improvement: synthesis of lessons learned’, (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007).

27. BBC, ‘Columbia: TransMilenio bus projects paralyse Bogotá’, 10 March 2012, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17320247>> (12 December 2013).

28. ITF, ‘Transport toolkit’.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Quality Public Transport, ‘A model BRT?’.

31. Alan Gilbert, ‘Bus Rapid Transit: Is TransMilenio a miracle cure?’, *Transport Reviews* 28, 4 (2008), pp. 439–67.

32. Hall, ‘Are public–private partnerships’.

are capable of delivering improvements in the standards of public transport, they also generate a set of tensions that typically coalesce around the affordability of fares, inclusion of the previous transport investors and workforce in the new system, and the contraction of employment opportunities. This article proceeds to highlight how these issues feature in the implementation of a BRT in Dar es Salaam.

The ideology of BRT in Dar: Whose 'better city for better times'?

First announced in 2002, DART is funded through a \$150 million loan from the World Bank to the government of Tanzania. It is the most grandiose BRT yet launched in Africa, with the rebuilding and doubling in width of the main arteries in the city, for a total of 137 km of new road network, 18 terminals, and 228 stations. The idea of implementing BRT in Dar emerged as a suggestion by the ITDP to the city council. Furthermore, ITDP sponsored an investigative trip by the city council to Bogotá.³³ The delegation travelled back via an ITDP-facilitated meeting at the World Bank, at which the commitment of Dar es Salaam leaders to BRT was probed. This was arguably a success, as Kleist Sykes, the then mayor of Dar es Salaam, was subsequently informed by the World Bank that Dar es Salaam had become the forerunner of BRT in Africa, allegedly overtaking Accra in the process.³⁴

Before analysing the tensions associated with its implementation, it is important to assess critically the rationale of DART and to determine whether, as a project which aims to rethink the city's transport system radically, it adequately addresses the poor state of its services. To be sure, large-scale infrastructural work and the widening of key roads are a much-needed step towards improving transport in the city. Dar es Salaam has grown rapidly over the last five decades, while its road system has remained by and large unchanged since colonial times, and the number of vehicles has increased exponentially.³⁵ Mid-1990s estimates of the rate of growth of traffic density – 6.3 percent per year – have perhaps become conservative in

33. Ahmad Kanyama, Annika Carlsson-Kanyama, Anna-Lisa Linden, and John Lupala, *Public transport in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Institutional challenges and opportunities for a sustainable transportation system* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 2004), p. 43.

34. Interview, Kleist Sykes, Dar es Salaam, 7 December 2011.

35. A key factor behind the growth in number of vehicles in the city in the 1990s was the introduction of a monthly car allowance, twice the value of the monthly wage of the average 'middle-level', for public sector employees. Such allowance was introduced by the government as a measure to counteract the decline in real wages faced by employees as a consequence of structural adjustment. See John Briggs and Davis Mwamfupe, 'Peri-urban development in the era of structural adjustment in Africa: The city of Dar es Salaam', *Urban Studies* 37, 4 (2000), p. 805.

the 2000s.³⁶ It is also true that action is needed to improve the poor conditions of public transport in the city, currently provided by between 6,000 to 10,000 primarily old, overloaded, and unsafe *daladalas*.³⁷ However, it is important to ask whether there was no alternative to the phasing out of *daladalas* and to question the rationale for providing two exclusive lanes to BRT buses.³⁸

The 2009 National Road Safety Policy puts partial responsibility for the inefficiency of the transport system on ‘the rapid increased car ownership’.³⁹ Indeed, DART itself acknowledges this when it states that in Dar es Salaam there are ‘120,000 private vehicles that carry only six percent of residents with 480,000 of their seats lacking passengers’.⁴⁰ DART’s vision of a better transport system and its desire to avoid any clash with private car owners, the rising affluent middle class, is a political one – one which leaves the inefficient use of private vehicles, by far the largest cause of traffic congestion, unchallenged. At the same time, DART claims that ‘the current state of affairs where Dar es Salaam has more than 6,000 commuter buses that carry *only* [emphasis added] 43 percent of city dwellers is not sustainable’.⁴¹ Problematically, *daladala* are identified as the main cause of transport problems and are therefore not permitted in the two lanes exclusively set aside for public transport. It is worth reflecting on the fact that the types of buses to be operated by DART are taken as a given, and no thought has gone into supporting the improvement of the *daladala* fleet with, for example, effective regulation and a recapitalization programme to scale up the average size of buses and the reduction of their average age. Therefore, there are cracks in the rationale of DART and its prioritization of certain solutions to public transport chaos in Dar es Salaam.

Finally, there is the thorny issue of fares. A 2009 survey of 150 public transport users found that 78 percent of the sample deemed current fares

36. JICA, ‘The study of Dar es Salaam road development plan’, (Final Report, 1995) quoted in Kanyama *et al.*, *Public transport*, p.13.

37. The name *daladala* comes from the name of the 5 shilling coin, *dala*, the cost of one ride in 1983. Conductors used to ask passengers for *dala, dala*. For an analysis of the history, economic organization, and employment relations of *daladalas*, see Matteo Rizzo, ‘“Life is war”: Informal transport workers and neoliberalism in Tanzania 1998–2009’, *Development and Change* 42, 5 (2011), pp. 1179–1206. On the broader political economy of urban transport in Dar es Salaam see my forthcoming monograph, *Taken for a ride: Neoliberalism, informal labour and public transport in an African metropolis*. Oxford: Blackwell Wiley, Antipode Book Series.

38. According to the DART plan, 150-seater buses will serve the main roads, while on feeder roads smaller buses, carrying approximately 50 passengers, will operate. This increased carrying capacity of buses, from the current scenario in which the majority of vehicles are 35-seater, is aimed at easing traffic congestion.

39. United Republic of Tanzania, *National road safety policy* (Ministry of Infrastructure Development, Dar es Salaam, 2009), p. 36. The comment is about Tanzania as a whole.

40. DART, ‘BRT system to contribute to make Dar a “livable” city’, no date, but no later than 1 August 2014, <www.dart.go.tz/index.php?id=51> (1 August 2014).

41. *Ibid.*

charged by *daladalas* expensive. Whilst DART has yet to announce the official level, a further fare increase, in a context in which the mean expenditure on travel is as high as 24 percent of passengers' monthly individual salaries, is likely to generate tensions and force some people out of motorized public transport.⁴² These issues are not peculiar to DART, but rather general trademarks of BRTs.

The political economy of the delays in the implementation of DART

Peculiar to DART is the slow pace at which implementation progressed, resulting in the loss of its status as BRT forerunner in Africa. Cape Town and Johannesburg embarked on BRTs well after Dar es Salaam but completed their projects earlier – although not without similar tensions.⁴³ While DART officers exclusively attributed the slow implementation to the size of the project,⁴⁴ there is arguably more to it. The following analysis focuses on two layers of explanation behind the delay. The first layer includes the practical barriers against which DART stumbled, and around which the tensions between project implementers and affected parties coalesced. But there is a second layer, namely the deeper roots of the delays in implementation, which this article also explores.

The obstacles faced by DART implementers changed over the years, but two prolonged disputes stand out. These were concentrated around two sites of key importance to the project. In both cases resistance was orchestrated collectively and changes in the institutional set-up of DART triggered the disputes. Initially the project was owned by the city council. Shortly after its launch, however, it was felt that the project would proceed slowly if it remained under city council leadership and that, given its national importance, it required highly qualified personnel. DART was thus established as a unit under the Prime Minister's Office.⁴⁵ The prime minister at that time was Edward Lowassa. He replaced Kleist Sykes, DART's champion and its acting chief executive officer, with Cosmas Takule. A number of informants agreed that Takule, an accountant by training, lacked the skills to lead DART, and that his selection was motivated by the fact that Lowassa needed 'one of his men' as CEO, to control the

42. Merahi Teklemariam Ahferom, *Sustainability assessment of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system: The case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania* (Lund University, MSc thesis, 2009), p. 20.

43. Herrie Schalekamp and Roger Behrens, 'Engaging paratransit on public reform initiatives in South Africa: A critique of policy and an investigation of appropriate engagement approaches', *Research in Transportation Economics* 29 (2010), pp. 371–8; Herrie Schalekamp and Roger Behrens, 'Engaging the paratransit sector in Cape Town on public transport reform: Progress, process and risks', *Research in Transportation Economics*, 39 (2013), pp. 185–90.

44. Interview, Dieter Schelling, DART chief technical adviser and former World Bank lead transport specialist in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 13 February 2014.

45. Interview, Kleist Sykes.

funds associated with its implementation.⁴⁶ While no major corruption scandal has emerged over DART's implementation so far, the involvement of Lowassa in other corruption cases makes such claims plausible. Furthermore, as this article will show, the inadequacy of DART's new chief executive seems evident in his poor leadership and his failure to negotiate the support of the local authority to facilitate the implementation of the project.⁴⁷

The first conflict was over the use of Ubungu Station, for which the city council and DART had conflicting agendas. Ubungu is Tanzania's largest terminal to upcountry destinations. As the funds that the government pledges to transfer each year to the city council rarely materialize in full, revenue from Ubungu is an important asset to its policy makers.⁴⁸ However, Ubungu Station is key to DART as well. Ubungu was planned as one of DART's five main terminals and one of its two bus depots, using 52 percent of the existing terminal area. The proposed change of land use posed no threat to the council while it administered DART. Having lost ownership of DART, however, the council faced a future loss of revenue, with no control over the new planned use of the Ubungu terminal area. These circumstances explain the hostile remarks of the Ubungu station manager, who complained that 'what is wanted is for them to find another place rather than taking an area which already has a specific and important function'.⁴⁹ The council's objections had some purchase, as a revised plan for the construction of a temporary upcountry terminal ensured that in making space for DART at Ubungu, the city council at least secured new land nearby. However, the Tanzanian president intervened, condemning the move as 'a misuse of public funds'.⁵⁰ In blocking the initiative, he sent the two parties back to the drawing board to find a permanent rather than a short-term solution. Two months later Takule lost his job. Local press explained his dismissal as due to the 'president's doubts about [Takule's] request of 2 billion Tanzanian shillings to build a temporary terminal'.⁵¹ It is also significant, however, that Edward Lowassa was no longer prime minister by this point: Takule, having lost his political protector, lost his job soon afterwards.

46. The three informants that made this link asked to remain anonymous.

47. The same three informants converge in underlining these weaknesses in Cosmas Takule's leadership.

48. Ubungu's station manager claimed that revenue from the station was worth 50 percent of the council's direct revenue. Interview, Ubungu station manager, 14 December 2011.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Alvar Mwakyusa, 'Tanzania: bus terminal cost irks Kikwete', *Daily News*, 20 September 2012, <<http://archive.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news/9703-dar-es-salaam-bus-terminal-cost-irks-kikwete>> (12 October 2013).

51. Mary Victor, 'Bosi wa mabasi ya kasi Dar ang'oka', *Raia mwema*, 21 November 2012, <<http://www.raiamwema.co.tz/bosi-wa-mabasi-ya-kasi-dar-ang'oka>> (13 October 2013).

The second conflict around DART was compensation, not for lack of funding but rather as a result of the lack of support by the Tanzanian institutions executing it. The Tanzanian president blamed the ineptitude of DART's management, when he 'blasted [its] Chief executive ... whom he accused of stalling the project by failing to pay compensation on time to people who are supposed to be relocated'.⁵² However, lack of clarity over which Tanzanian public institution had to support DART in the compensation process was also to blame. Thus in January 2011 the Tanzanian Minister of Works 'warned that if the city authority will not take immediate measures to pay compensations, his ministry will start to demolish places where the project is expected to pass'.⁵³ A few days later the city council director responded that 'it was the government responsibility to pay compensation – not the city authority' and that the city council was 'longing for the project to take place'.⁵⁴

Notwithstanding this confusion over the role to be played by different state institutions, the responsibility for evaluating properties to be compensated undoubtedly lay with the city council. The council's principal valuer commented that the council 'will no longer continue with the exercise due to other commitments as communicated to DART agency', which suggests that the council undertook this role with a tepid commitment.⁵⁵ Taken together, the slow pace at which evaluations were undertaken and the lack of clarity on which institution had to pay compensation meant that considerable time passed between the valuation and the payment of compensation, resulting in numbers of claims for revaluation due to inflation.⁵⁶ Furthermore, managing the compensation of business tenants for their loss of profit was complicated by the fact that most of the tenants formally renting from the council had sub-leased. The council considered that they had 'no legal contracts with the city council, thus [they] do not qualify for compensation'.⁵⁷ John Mnyika, the Ubungu MP from Tanzania's leading opposition party CHADEMA since 2010, disagreed and supported the resistance of informal (and formal) tenants to resettlement until a place of comparable value for their businesses could be found.⁵⁸ These multiple

52. *Ibid.*

53. Sebastian Mrindoko, 'Tanzania: Dar es Salaam City denies role on Dart delays', *Daily News*, 16 January 2011.

54. *Ibid.*

55. E. N. Chidaga (Kinondoni municipal council principal valuer), 'Progress report on valuation of properties of affected persons under resettlement action plan of Dar Rapid Transit Project' (Dar es Salaam, no date but no earlier than 2010), p. 4.

56. DART, 'Resettlement action plan for construction of Dar Rapid Transit (DART) infrastructure. Phase 1B report' (Dar es Salaam, 2010), pp. 24–249.

57. Chidaga, 'Progress report', p. 3.

58. Anonymous informant, but see also several entries on Ubungo Station in John Mnyika's personal blog, no date, <<http://mnyika.blogspot.co.uk/>> (10 November 2014). On opposition parties in African urban settings, see Danielle Resnik, 'Opposition parties and the urban poor

turf wars at Ubungo Station, some resolved as late as 2014, have long delayed the project.

The second main site of resistance to the project is Gerezani, in Kariakoo, in the city centre, where DART planned to locate a terminal, its main office, and its control tower. Within this area there are 53 twin houses with a total of 106 owners. Twenty-nine owners accepted the proposed compensation, while the rest brought a court injunction against it. However, the court judged that the occupiers of these Gerezani houses had no right of occupancy and ordered their demolition.⁵⁹ Taking advantage of delays over the demolition, in itself a sign of the limited urgency accorded the project by public authorities, the occupants registered themselves as the Kibasila Society Group and made a further court appeal. Fuelling this prolonged battle was the fact that DART had overlooked ‘the importance of disseminating correct information about the project’⁶⁰ and sidelined local councillors. In the words of Mr Natty, acting director of Dar es Salaam City Council in 2011, ‘If they had used local councillors to mediate with these residents it would have been easier than using DART technical experts. You know communities have a lot of respect for their leaders.’⁶¹ In addition, the fact that ‘PAP [project-affected people] are given contradictory information like the project has been abandoned’⁶² suggests that those who intended to boycott DART exploited its public relations failure. The Gerezani case contributed to the delays in the project and was resolved only in 2012, when the Tanzanian court settled the issue by setting the value of the compensation and by allowing DART to demolish the houses.⁶³

These contestations, which highlight the local politics of resistance to DART, suggest that the project was perceived as a threat by some, notwithstanding its own “win-win” rhetoric. In summary, those who risked being made worse off, including the city council who faced a loss of revenue, tenants who had to be relocated, and individuals threatened with expropriation of their property, resisted the project by leveraging a number of strategies such as withholding or slowing down the public support that the project needed to make progress, legally challenging the process of expropriation and compensation, and drawing on an opposition MP who

in African democracies’, *Comparative Political Studies* 45, 11 (2012), pp. 1351–78; Gina M. S. Lambright, ‘Opposition politics and urban service delivery in Kampala’, *Development Policy Review* 32, 1s (2014), pp. 36–60.

59. United Republic of Tanzania, ‘Government Notice No. 193 of April 18th, 2008’ (United Republic of Tanzania, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 2008).

60. DART, ‘Resettlement Action Plan’, p. 4.

61. Interview, Mr Natty, Dar es Salaam City Council acting director, 15 December 2011.

62. DART, ‘Resettlement Action Plan’, p. 4.

63. The court case was No. 44 of 2012. See Kilasa Mtambalike, ‘Dart compensation saga settled’, *Daily News*, 31 May 2012, <<http://archive.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news/5728-dart-compensation-saga-settled>> (12 November 2013).

championed the grievances of the citizens affected by the project. In so doing, they exploited the ineffectiveness of DART's leadership.

An aspect that stands out when scrutinizing the main hindrances to the implementation of DART is the mismatch between the relatively small nature of the problems that caused the delay and the time that it took to overcome them. Given the strategic importance of DART, it is puzzling that 97 house owners slowed the project by five years and that the compensation process proceeded at such a slow pace. Could no institution above the Ministry of Works and the council step in to clarify their roles? And were there no other ways to solve the quarrel with the resisting house owners so that it did not result in years of standstill? Arguably, a lack of high-level commitment to the project by the Tanzanian government underpinned the impasse, the reasons for which are explored in the next sections.

The deeper roots of lack of government support

DART advocates promoted it as a solution to urban transport problems that is beneficial to society and the economy at large, but as the implementation of DART neared, some groups stood to be affected negatively by the project. A document entitled '*Daladala* grievances plan', written by a consultant to the project in early 2010, provides clues to the tensions between the real politics of DART and its rosy portrayal, and to the contradictory way in which these tensions were met. The document outlines how to manage 'the grievance process with *daladala* bus owners and operators in order to bring about a *win-win* situation for everyone involved'.⁶⁴ Such optimism sits alongside awareness of how delicate the issue of incorporation of previous operators is: 'DART has to clearly inform the *Dala dala* owners and operators how the introduction of the BRT is likely to affect their overall employment opportunities in the public transport sector otherwise there might be strikes and violence due to lack of appreciation of the BRT system.'⁶⁵ Along the same lines, one reads that 'it is important for DART to let stakeholders understand that introduction of the BRT system is an opportunity and not a threat to their existence'. However, no evidence is given for why this might be the case.

There are different reasons for resistance to the project by affected parties, other than the 'lack of appreciation' of BRT. The unknown yet likely negative impact of DART on employment and on the estimated 20,000 to 30,000 workers in the sector is problematic for the Tanzanian

64. Godfrey L. Kamukala, '*Daladala* grievances plan' (Dar es Salaam, no date), p. 1, emphasis added.

65. Kamukala, '*Daladala* grievances', p. 2.

leadership and arguably one of the two key causes for its half-hearted support. Talking at a dialogue on unemployment organised by Japan International Cooperation Agency in July 2013, President Kikwete expressed his concern about the gravity of the problem of under- and unemployment, identifying the decrease in the rate of unemployment amongst the youth in Africa as central to future political stability. As he put it, 'The Arab springs were about government that overstayed but the unemployment spring is coming to Africa and will not spare democratic governments.'⁶⁶ The president also openly voiced his worry about the employment implications of DART. At a show to publicize the project in Dar es Salaam in 2006, Kikwete stated that DART was going 'to reduce employment'.⁶⁷ Kleist Sykes, Mayor of Dar es Salaam from 2001 to 2005 and a major force in the project since 2002, protested that this fear of unemployment was misconstrued, as DART would 'create rather than reduce employment', thanks to training programmes for all affected parties, including workers, station attendants, and mechanics.⁶⁸

Yet there is ground for scepticism about the smooth integration of pre-existing operators into DART predicted by its promoters. As 'a single DART bus will displace about 10 minibuses', job destruction will be considerable.⁶⁹ Although there are funds earmarked to train some drivers to qualify for driving on BRT buses, DART operators will be under no obligation to hire them.⁷⁰ In sum, DART entails a shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive urban bus transit, with a contraction in the quantity of jobs and, ideally, their replacement with more secure and better-quality jobs. The role of the sector as a source of demand for employment for the urban poor seems to be a goal of secondary importance to increasing the carrying capacity of buses. From this perspective one can understand the dismissive tone with which the 'grievance management planner' addressed workers: 'Some of these drivers will be re-routed; absorbed in the BRT system; lose jobs etc. *They should categorically be informed what would be their fate.*'⁷¹ The government, and first and foremost the president, seem less inclined to such a stance.

Difficulties in incorporating *daladala* owners in DART constituted the second main reason behind the lack of support by Tanzanian leaders for the project. As previously discussed, the involvement of pre-existing transport

66. Masato Masato, 'Kikwete cautions against "unemployed anger"', *Daily News*, 4 June 2013, <<http://in2eastafrika.net/kikwete-cautions-against-unemployed-anger/>> (14 July 2013).

67. Interview, Kleist Sykes.

68. *Ibid.*

69. Deogratias Mushi, 'Tanzania: Rapid Transit Project takes shape', *All Africa*, 24 August 2012, <<http://www.itssa.org/blog/2012/08/24/tanzania-rapid-transit-project-takes-shape/>> (15 March 2014).

70. Interview, Dieter Schelling, 20 December 2011.

71. Kamukala, 'Daladala grievances', p. 6, emphasis added.

providers in BRT has often proved to be a thorny issue. Dar es Salaam is no exception. Such difficulties stemmed from the fact that the place of *daladala* owners in DART was an afterthought to its planners. A study in 2009 found that although there was a ‘strong will to involve current *daladala* operators’, there was ‘no clear plan on how that will be accomplished’.⁷² In May 2014, weeks away from the actual tendering process, the persistent lack of clarity was evidenced in DART’s ‘Project information memorandum’, the latest statement on the ‘daladala transition policy’.⁷³ One of its pillars is the redeployment of *daladalas* to routes on the outskirts of the city. The memorandum concedes that ‘some *daladala* owners may then decide to withdraw from the public transport business altogether and invest in other sectors’ but concludes that ‘the fast population growth and rapid spreading of suburban neighbourhoods will create sufficient need to absorb most of this freed capacity’.⁷⁴ However, as DART aimed to capture more and more of the market share controlled by *daladalas*, thus pushing them out of their areas of operation, the expectation that supply will create its own demand and that their business can be sustained when displaced to feeder routes is implausible.

The real issue is how *daladala* owners can become part of DART proper. Their inclusion is complicated by the fact that the bidding document for tenders for the two companies that would operate DART buses required that bidders must have experience of successfully doing something similar in the past.⁷⁵ As there are no Tanzanians with experience of this kind, this ruled out domestic investors from fully owning DART and constructed tensions between foreign and national ownership of BRT implementation in Dar es Salaam, thus adding another chapter to the growing, if also long-standing, debate on the extent to which Tanzanian interests have been guarded by its government when dealing with foreign investors.⁷⁶

Indicative of the deep-seated tension that characterizes Tanzanian leaders’ thinking on urban transport, Tambo Mhina, former secretary of the Dar es Salaam Region Transport Licensing Authority (DRTLA), recalls how in 2003, when the City Council had already endorsed the BRT proposal, his office prepared a plan to consolidate ownership of (larger) buses in Dar into two or three companies. Such a plan did not convince high-level decision makers. ‘These people who own one or two buses, they are original Tanzanians.

72. Ahferom, ‘Sustainability Assessment’, p. 21.

73. Rebel, ‘DART project’, p. 38.

74. *Ibid.*

75. Interview, Dieter Schelling, 20 December 2011.

76. Siri Lange, ‘Gold and governance: Legal injustices and lost opportunities in Tanzania’, *African Affairs* 110, 439 (2011), pp. 233–52; Stefano Ponte, ‘The politics of ownership: Tanzanian coffee policy in the age of liberal reformism’, *African Affairs* 103, 413 (2004), pp. 615–33; and Ronald Aminzade, *Race, nation and citizenship on post-colonial Africa: The case of Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013).

If you advertise a tender for large buses and large companies, investors of international calibre will come. They [Tanzanians] have already invested in the sector and will be sidelined. Where will they put their capital?⁷⁷

Therefore, as late as 2003, the year in which the council formally endorsed DART and its planning began, the Tanzanian leadership clearly prioritized the interests of indigenous investors over and above foreign investors and considerations on how to improve urban transport. With the latest attempt to roll out DART, the problem presented itself again, and more pressingly so. How then are the interests of Tanzanian investors being protected this time?

At the official inauguration of the construction of DART in 2010, President Jakaya Kikwete urged *daladala* owners not to 'just remain idle complaining about the arrival of foreign investors'.⁷⁸ By this, he intended that owners should know and meet the requirements to operate the smaller buses on BRT feeder routes, and should form collective enterprises to join the operations on BRT main routes (as opposed to its feeder routes). Some owners had indeed been preparing for this, most notably the Dar es Salaam Commuter Buses Owners' Association (DARCOBOA), which registered a company to this end.⁷⁹ But a major barrier to joining BRT was the cost of buses and the lack of finance. Organized lobbying by bus owners of various ministries, including those of Transport and Finance, to facilitate support in the form of a loan guarantee and tax exemptions yielded promises but no tangible results. DARCOBOA responded by setting up a meeting with 'the Member of Parliament for Dar es Salaam and councillors who intend[ed] to be involved in the 2010 country election as candidates, to help them to sell the idea', as they felt the issue required 'political will'.⁸⁰ The government offered public funds to promote the incorporation of *daladala* owners into DART in September 2012, when it announced that it would purchase all old *daladalas* six months before DART was due to start operations.⁸¹ Thus, as in the cases of Johannesburg and Cape Town, political pressure resulted in public funds becoming available to owners for the purchase of 'free' shares in the new BRT.⁸² However, the bus owners' association

77. Interview, Tambo Mhina, former DRTLA Secretary (1999–2005), 9 August 2010.

78. Ansom Stewart, 'BRT in Dar es Salaam', no date, <<http://ansoncfi.com/watson/brt-in-dar-es-salaam/>> (14 March 2014).

79. The company is called Cordial Transportation Services (PLC). See Deusidedit S. Mutasingwa, 'Public transport reform in Tanzania – Dar es Salaam City as a case study' (Consultancy report for the Institute for Transportation and Development, Dar es Salaam, no date), p. 5.

80. *Ibid.*

81. Abduel Elinaza, 'Dar to remove old *daladala*', *Daily News*, 25 September 2012.

82. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, 'Rea Vaya/BRT – Transforming the face of public transport. End of Term Report 2006–2011' (City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, Johannesburg, 2011); Herrie Schalekamp, 'Reflecting on progress with Cape Town's MyCiTi bus system', *Mobility*, January/April (2011), pp. 10–12.

turned down the offer, as the compensation that could reasonably be offered for fairly old vehicles was expected to be low.⁸³ Furthermore, many bus owners doubted the possibility of making a profit on shares without being cheated. Instead, owners have restated their request for government support in the form of its guarantee to access finance for purchasing new buses. But as the chairman of the bus owners' association explains, the failure to achieve any breakthrough had to do with reasons beyond government control: 'In the words of the World Bank, there is no way we would give a loan guarantee to the private sector. ... I told people at the World Bank, that if we continue like this, it means that you want us [*daladala* owners] to get out. To us this is an elimination process.'⁸⁴

Furthermore, the World Bank and DART were merely paying lip service to the importance of local ownership of the project, since 'whatever we do with *daladalas* has to be compatible with the market. We cannot sell the project unless this is the case.'⁸⁵ These words, by DART's chief technical adviser and a retired World Bank transport specialist, imply that the foreign companies that successfully bid to operate DART, and from whom *daladala* will have to subcontract, will have a key role in determining the terms and conditions of these subcontracted services.

What remains unsaid is the way in which Tanzanian bus owners are expected to compete in the market with much larger and wealthier foreign transport companies without any external support. In the words of DARCOBOA's chairman: 'Even in boxing, Prince Naseem [a featherweight world champion], you cannot put him with Mike Tyson [a former heavyweight world champion]. He will kill him, you cannot do that. This should be the logic, people with the same weight compete.'⁸⁶ Along the same lines, Professor Mfinanga, an engineer, urban transport researcher, and member of DART's Board of Directors, 'cautioned that expecting [owners] to form companies and compete in an international bidding contest is "insulting to them"'.⁸⁷ This is the way things stand, unresolved, as tendering becomes imminent. However, one would not remotely sense this from the rosier version of the situation presented in the DART memorandum quoted earlier: '[Bus owners] are generally supportive of the DART initiative. ... This industry restructuring and reorganisation process is also meant to give *daladala* owners a chance to associate with local and international parties in bidding for the Dart system and participate in the tender process.'⁸⁸

83. Interview, Sabri Mabrouk, 13 February 2014. The value of the buses became a hotly contested issue in other cities. On Bogotá see Gilbert, 'Bus Rapid Transit'.

84. Interview, Sabri Mabrouk, 13 February 2014.

85. Interview, Dieter Schelling, 13 February 2014.

86. Interview, Sabri Mabrouk.

87. Stewart, 'BRT in Dar es Salaam'.

88. Rebel, 'DART project', pp. 38–9.

While the inconclusive search for ways to incorporate previous bus owners continued, DART faced a new challenge in the rapid growth of Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam (UDA), a Tanzanian company that seeks to claim a key role in the project. UDA was the state-owned company that provided public transport in Dar es Salaam under a monopoly regime from 1970 until 1983, when private operators were allowed into the sector to satisfy the demand for transport that UDA could not match. As the decrease of its fleet progressed over the years and buyers could not be found when it was initially offered for privatization, UDA lay moribund, operating an average of as few as seventeen buses a year from 2002 to 2008.⁸⁹ However, the scenario has looked much brighter recently. In February 2014, UDA owned just under 400 buses and had ordered a further 1,000, which when delivered would make it the largest urban passenger transporter in Africa. Its ambitious plan was to field 3,000 buses by the end of 2014.⁹⁰

Such dynamism is a result of UDA privatization in 2011 at a price and through a process that generated controversy and a legal challenge.⁹¹ Through privatization, Simon Group became the largest shareholder of UDA, and Robert Kiseni, the Executive Chairman of Simon Group, became the new CEO of UDA. Kiseni is purportedly closely connected to the son of the current president of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, who is believed to be the main man behind UDA's rise.⁹² While there is no evidence to verify this claim, UDA's ambitious 'future plan ... to be involved in DART' is clear.⁹³ Unlike DART, UDA's public statements seem more attentive to the employment dimension of its operations. As Kiseni explained when commenting on the introduction of 300 new UDA buses, 'the company's move will also help in the fight against unemployment as

89. National Institute of Transport, 'Report on the participation of local bus and truck operators in the DART project' (DART, Dar es Salaam, March 2010).

90. *The Guardian*, 'Transport logistics experts rare species in Tanzania', 17 February 2014, 'Business and Foreign' insert, p. i; Antony Tambwe, 'Divested parastatals' owners counselled', *Daily News*, 11 February 2014, p. 5.

91. Florian Kaijage, 'UDA scam: Simon's damning version', *The Guardian*, 29 January 2012. Prominent CCM leader and businessman Iddi Simba, then chairman of UDA board of directors, was involved in the controversy as he was charged, and then declared innocent of forgery and abuse of office for selling UDA shares at far too low a price, and cashing in the money from the transaction. See Faustine Kapama, 'State files fresh charges against Iddi Simba', *Daily News*, 1 May 2013, <<http://allafrica.com/stories/201305010352.html>> (11 November 2014).

92. See discussions in this forum: *Jamii Forums*, no date, <<http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/159840-uda-connection-ya-robert-kiseni-na-msharika-wake-ridhiwani-kikwete-4.html>> (12 November 2014). Three informants, whose identities cannot be revealed, concurred with this rumour. Robert Kiseni was an MP candidate in the parliamentary elections for CCM in 2010, when he lost to an opposition candidate. See Kaijage, 'UDA scam'.

93. See UDA leaflet, 'For better transport', no date, <<http://www.jamiiforums.com/great-thinkers/154281-uda-imebinafishwa-ili-iingie-biashara-na-dart-siri-ya-kuuzwa-bei-chee.html>> (4 August 2014).

the 300 buses, once operational, would provide 900 direct employments and about 2,000 people will be employed indirectly'.⁹⁴

Although UDA's rapid growth and self-promotion as a DART operator has been well received by public institutions, it has caused bitterness amongst *daladala* operators and DART.⁹⁵ For DART, a particular concern surrounds UDA's procurement of thousands of vehicles without consulting DART. As DART's chief technical adviser explains, 'UDA buses are not the buses we need. We cannot use them. Our stations are designed for specific buses, with bus stops and lanes designed to match them.'⁹⁶ Therefore, the foundations for a new clash are laid between the technicalities of bus designs and project specifications and the "made in Tanzania" version of BRT promoted by the UDA. While the accusation of a connection between the UDA's new owner and President Kikwete's son is unverifiable, there is strong evidence that UDA intends to seize a lucrative contract as one of the DART service providers by virtue of being the only large Tanzanian transport company that could supply buses to DART. As the UDA directly addresses the anxieties of Tanzanian leaders towards the impact of DART, most notably because it is owned by Tanzanians and aims to employ a larger workforce, it is likely to continue enjoying the support that Tanzanian authorities have afforded it since its revival.

Conclusions

This article reveals the way in which the narrative of BRTs as a "win-win" intervention to solve the public transport crisis in developing countries obscures the many tensions associated with its implementation. Such a narrative stems from research sponsored by international finance, its NGO brokers, and BRT vehicle manufacturers, and is functional to their interests in opening up public transport markets in developing countries. While public transport in most African cities is indeed experiencing a serious crisis, BRT is a solution that must be understood as one of the latest – and most rapidly expanding – fronts for the promotion of neo-liberalism in Africa through PPPs in urban public transport. Debunking BRT rhetoric, this case study of Dar es Salaam helps to illuminate the real politics and the main tensions and contradictions associated with one instance of BRT. More specifically, the article highlights the lack of any serious attempt to include the current public transport workforce by DART, and documents the destruction of employment opportunities and tensions over the

94. *Daily News*, 'UDA gets 15 buses', 8 October 2012.

95. Gadiosa Lamtey, 'Freewheeling UDA operation irritating, says DARCOBOA', *The Guardian*, 15 February 2014, <<http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=64816>> (20 February 2014).

96. Interview, Dieter Schielling, 13 February 2014.

incorporation of previous owners, compensation, and the affordability of the new service.

The article argues that such tensions proved to be problematic for the Tanzanian government and thus go a long way towards explaining its unwillingness to resolve the conflicts that DART generated. Above all, it shows that the slow progress of DART stems from the tepid commitment to the project by the Tanzanian government, which reflects its attempt to bring into harmony the conflicting interests of the World Bank and the demands of a number of local actors to whom it is electorally accountable. As DART's operational debut approaches, like the 2015 presidential elections in Tanzania, the political heat surrounding the project is bound to increase. The stakes in incorporating bus owners in the new system (or excluding them from it) are very high, and the displacement effects of DART will soon become tangible. The chairman of the bus owners' association stated in May 2014 that 'we [current bus owners and Tanzanians] need to run the system on our own'.⁹⁷ But a meeting for prospective bidders a month later saw investors from seventeen countries attending, including from 'South Africa, Brazil, China, Sweden, USA, and Mexico'.⁹⁸ Mr Mushi, speaking on behalf of the Dar es Salaam district commissioner, urged Tanzanian bus owners to strengthen their newly formed company 'to be able to compete in tenders'. Meanwhile DART, through its website, calls for 'politics [to] be left aside and [to] leave experts to do their jobs'.⁹⁹ By contrast, this article hopes to have shown that DART is inherently political, and that its plea is implausible, as different political constituencies continue to clash to promote, influence, or resist the project.

97. *The Guardian*, 'Dar bus owners challenged to compete for BRT tenders', 26 May 2014, <<http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=68231>> (18 June 2014).

98. *Daily News*, 'Bus Rapid Transit: An exemplary project in Africa', 22 June 2014, <<http://dailynews.co.tz/index.php/features/32833-bus-rapid-transit-an-exemplary-project-in-africa>> (16 July 2014).

99. DART, 'BRT system to contribute'.