



Pure Soul: Conceptions and Representations

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*The self does not produce any modification in karmic matter nor in no-karma.
He who realises this is the real knower.¹*

The quest for the pure soul is the principal focus of the Jaina tradition. The soul, *ātman* or *jīva*,² is an immortal substance, free from all ties that keep a living being in this life and in a cycle of future lives. Its essential nature is consciousness.³ The experience of the self as different from the body is a key step on the path towards its salvation. Liberation, *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*, is accomplished after the removal of existing karmic ties, real or imagined, and the avoidance of new *karman*. Over its more than two millennia-long history the Jaina tradition developed different methods, connected to different perspectives, of working towards this goal. While practising non-violence, non-attachment and austerities is central to all Jaina traditions, many methods focus on self-knowledge as a mental process, but also as an experience. Jainas should understand the difference between what we perceive in this world and what is absolutely true, which is inscribed in the nature of the fundamental principles constituting reality, the *tattvas*.

The history of the Jaina philosophical discourse on the soul is yet to be written. It will inevitably focus on the ways in which the relationship between soul and body is conceived, and what practical implications the various stances carry.⁴ For Jaina metaphysics, the existence of the individual soul is an ontological fact: 'The Self is not an effect because it is not produced by anything whatever, nor is it a cause because it does not produce anything whatever.'⁵ For the history of philosophy, the soul or self is a theory, a concept, 'synthesized from knowledge about the self' through processes of self-definition.⁶ Self-conceptions and self are both seen as historical products, though not necessarily of something other than the transforming self.⁷ From this perspective, the most interesting problem is the reconstruction of the circumstances that (may have) contributed to the creation and reconfiguration of conceptions of the soul. One may ask, for instance, what are the conditions of the possibility of the concept of the soul or self to emerge? Which problems does it address? And what are the philosophical and practical advantages, compared with alternative conceptions?⁸ For philosophical phenomenology and

the sciences the question of the nature of the experiential self remains unanswered and an open challenge.

Once the unspoken rules of the games of self/other-definition and social image-construction are commonplace knowledge, the 'true self' behind the public *personas* and its social roles becomes problematic. What is the nature of the self that defines itself? Many social scientists and historians still believe that 'the concern with problems of selfhood is essentially a modern phenomenon.'⁹ Yet, the question who or what is the observer observing self-observation has pre-occupied thinkers for millennia. A 'minimal' pre-reflective form of self-awareness is universally experienced and undeniable. But what can be said about it? Kant came to the conclusion that, 'The I is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatever.'¹⁰ G. Strawson, here following Fichte, thinks otherwise, 'that the subject can apprehend itself as subject in "intellectual intuition",'¹¹ pointing to phenomenology, seeking meditative access to a pre-conceptual 'pure consciousness experience' by 'bracketing' objectifying thought.¹² He also points to Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya-Yoga concepts of 'self-realization' reflecting awareness of 'experiential presence (consciousness) as such.'¹³ It is evident that the same question remains central for modern philosophers today as for the debates between the different philosophical schools in Indic antiquity,¹⁴ whether it is 'legitimate to say that there is such a thing as the self as distinct from the human being'¹⁵ or whether we have to content ourselves with bundles of attributes of something unknowable.¹⁶

A separate question is whether it matters whether what appears in common experience as 'the minimal self' is defined as substance, process, unknowable or unspeakable except for computer science and robotics? How important are soteriological concerns of sentient of beings within a universe that is largely constituted by non-sentient matter according to modern science and Jaina cosmology?

Will we know everything if we both know and experience

the nature of our self? This question was addressed in the classical Jaina debate about the semantics of omniscience, *sarvajñā*. A minimal and a maximal view was offered. According to the original minimal view, the domain of omniscience was restricted to the 'knowledge of the essential principles,' such as the difference between soul and body and the path of salvation, 'and not knowledge of concrete details.'¹⁷ A similar position is evident in early Buddhist texts.¹⁸ According to the historically later maximal view, the unobscured omniscient soul knows everything in the universe past, present, future.¹⁹ It seems, the emergence of the maximal view was not only linked to the progressive deification of the Jina, but also to the systematisation of Jaina dogmatics whose theory of the multiplexity of reality demanded an integral principle of 'logical omniscience' that guaranteed knowledge-ability in principle. Such a principle can be based on idealisation, assumptions about implicit knowledge,²⁰ or inference, the preferred method of Jaina logicians.²¹ From a conventional point of view the theory of omniscience has many advantages. This was most clearly expressed by A.N. Upadhye: 'To the Syādvādin [who holds that all judgments are conditional] the existence is a huge complexity; human mind can not adequately apprehend it, categorial statements are out of courts; and all statements are true so far our particular point of view is concerned. This inadequacy of human understanding has led the Syādvādin to the doctrine of omniscience.'²²

It is clear from the historical record that the relationship between individual and society plays a key role in the history of self-conceptions. The creation of integral models of soul, self, subjectivity, replacing earlier concepts of the person as a combination of multiple psycho-physical functions, or 'body souls,' has been considered as one of the principal achievements of human self-reflection.²³ At the same time, it divides the human being rigidly into two irreconcilable parts, creating new metaphysical and ethical problems. The broad shift from earlier 'bundle theories' of personality²⁴ to models of the person as a single entity with attributes was initially based on 'object schemas,' later on 'process models,' such as the Cartesian 'I think' or 'I observe,' rooted in the mind/body distinctions of rational metaphysics, and then models of the 'subject,'²⁵ theorised in terms of a process of double self-reference of self-consciousness, that is, the observation of self-observation.²⁶

How were concepts of spiritual entities or processes created? Evidently, social factors played a supportive role in the popularisation of body/soul dualisms, as studies of currently perceived 'problems of the self' illustrate.²⁷ Baumeister's classification, for instance, links the quest for the 'true self' vs. the 'outer self' to experiences of instability (social mobility), separation (de-identification with the family lineage), and the desire for self-development. Theoretical correlations such as these, even if backed up by statistics, are at best indicative. They cannot explain the development of shared types of self-definitions itself. Two of the most fertile concepts in this regard have been 'objectification' and 'projection.' Only the first shall concern us here. The positive sciences, logicians and linguists, interpreted the development of reified qualities, 'terms like hunger, courage, love, sin, consciousness, death,' or 'sentience,' as effects 'of the tendency to conceive certain classes of attributes as substances.'²⁸ Growing awareness of the functions of objectification prompted cultural critics to re-discover the manifold qualities and aspects that were subsumed under the form of names, labels, legal personas, and self-concepts.²⁹ 'Life, power of action, personality belong to this group. Wherever they occur in one form or another we designate

them as "soul." The soul represents the objectivated qualities which constitute either the ideal human being or the individual personality.'³⁰ However, 'In all these cases there is no integral association between the object and its objectivated quality. Each leads an independent existence.'³¹ 'Often the term "life" corresponds to what we call "soul." [...] "Life" is an objectivation of all that differentiates the living person from the dead body. It leads a separate existence and, therefore, continues to exist after death.' The anthropologist and linguist Franz Boas to whom we owe these observations, which helped relegating theories of 'animist' and 'pre-animist' 'mentalities' from dated research agendas, saw 'the objectivation of life and of the memory-image as the principal sources from which the manifold forms of soul concepts spring. As the life-soul may vary in form, so the memory-image soul may take varying forms according to the aspect of the personality that predominates. These two concepts of the soul do not remain isolated, but the one always influences the other. A detailed study of their interrelation and of the variety of meanings that corresponds to our term "soul" would require a close study of the forms of thought that have grown up on this general psychological background, partly through an inner development, partly owing to diffusion of ideas.' Boas concluded that received concepts of the soul as a substance are products of social processes of selection, objectification, and generalisation of qualities: 'The most important results of these considerations for our problem is the recognition of the fact that those qualities, conditions, and functions which we combine under the term "soul" are looked upon as substances and that, for this reason, body and soul have separate existence and their lives are not encompassed in the same space and time.'³²

In this and similar ways, one of the foundational narratives of 18th century Eurocentric rational metaphysics, the progressive development from Plato's theory of form to the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*, was replaced by an empirical research programme, initially fuelled by the deconstructive energy of Hume's quasi-Buddhist bundle theory and the new theories of subjectivity by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Dilthey, after which soul metaphysics became philosophically obsolete. Initially, the project was confronted by the task of classifying a multitude of terminologies across human history and geography which, for want of better terms, were often rendered as 'soul,' 'self' or 'person,' etc. This project has been abandoned in its original form, conducted under the label 'comparative religion,' but continues to be pursued in an oblique way, by way of highly specialised local linguistic and sociological investigations. The comparative study of global philosophies started with the 19th century European fascination with the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and Buddhism. Yet, comparative philosophy is still in its infancy, and to be systematically developed.

Jaina philosophers were amongst the first to develop 'a hypothetical structure for counting the number of possible philosophical and religious stances "in terms of Jain categories".'³³ They also introduced sophisticated perspectivist approaches which could inspire new research methodologies and could engage in open debate with global philosophy, although these methodologies, would need facing the paradoxes produced by the self-referential use of received scholastic 'topical' schemes.³⁴

The comparison of key Jaina philosophical text such as the ancient Śvetāmbara canonical text *Āyāra*, Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmī's all-embracing *Tattvārthasūtra*, and the Digambara *ācārya* Kundakunda's *Samayasāra*³⁵ demonstrates that the terminology and the semantics of expressions translated into English as 'soul'

are linguistically and conceptually diverse.³⁶ The term *jīva* itself is ambiguous, referring both to a 'living being' and to the 'principle of life,' the 'living personal soul,' a mysterious conception.³⁷ The Prakrit word *āyā* (Skt. *ātman*), and its variants, the preferred term in the oldest textual layers, has an even wider semantic range. Derived from the word 'breath, soul,' it came to refer in the first place to the 'I' or the 'self,' while the dictionaries offer much longer lists of extant meanings covering both mind and body: 'soul, principle of life,' the 'individual soul, self, abstract individual,' 'person,' 'body,'³⁸ 'spirit, mind,' or 'consciousness,'³⁹ etc. Compared with the term *jīva*, literally 'living,' 'existing,' 'breathing' *ātman* implies a degree of self-reference ('by oneself,' etc.). Even more complicated is the Jaina concept of the body (*śarīra*). Classical Jaina texts distinguish five bodies, that is, in addition to the visible body, four subtle special-function bodies.⁴⁰ Because of the plurality of bodies, there exists no straight soul/body dualism, only a soul/matter (*jīva/pudgala*) or sentient/insentient (*jīva/ajīva*) dualism. The term *pudgala* refers here only to an atom, not to a composite living body, for which we only have the term *jīva*, once more.

The history of these ancient terms is yet to be researched in detail.⁴¹ Evidently, there are close similarities between Jaina and Sāṃkhya-Yoga dualisms. The comparison of similarities and differences enabled W. Bohn and W. Schubring to propose the following theory of the early history of 'soul/body' distinctions and of the Jaina five-body concept: "The Jainas call *jīva* all souls, the Sāṃkhya those that exist in the concrete world. Thus, it seems that 'soul' has been abstracted from 'living being', that is to say, from a popular view." [W. Bohn] The same idea appears in the conception that the soul is as large as the body, a conception which is apparent with the Jainas, while it is at least inferable from the original Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Both Jainism and Sāṃkhya pretend a plurality of bodies. It seems that this conception replaced the primitive idea of a plurality of souls at a time when the doctrine of the One *Ātman* could not be neglected any longer.⁴²

Although some kind of basic soul/body dualism, and the soteriological goal of liberation of the soul from the cycles of re-incarnation are shared,⁴³ it is evident that Jaina philosophy, too, is a pluralistic, and agonistic, and constantly evolving field of discourse, as expected to be the case in a religious tradition of great antiquity. This is evident in the Jaina historical record of heresies, religious councils, public debates, and schisms.

I would argue that the notion of 'pure soul' (*śuddhātman*) was introduced into Jaina discourse and systematically developed to resolve the ambiguities of the original conception of *jīva*. The notion of 'pure soul' allowed to draw a clearer line between the mental and physical aspects of *jīva* and the empirical and metaphysical aspects of *āyā*, which was used as a designation for both 'I' and the 'soul.'⁴⁴ The most important contribution was made by an unknown author named 'Kundakunda,' who must have existed in South India sometime in the first millennium CE. In his work *Samaya-pāhuḍa*, which the 10th century commentator Amṛtacandra re-labelled *Samaya-sāra*, 'Essence of Self,' or 'Pure Soul,'⁴⁵ he considers different aspects of the 'self' or 'soul,' under a variety of terms, which in other texts attributed to him were rationalised into a triadic classification of the key perspectives of self-definition involved: *jīva* or *bahir-ātman*, the embodied soul which identifies itself with its body; *ātman* or *antar-ātman*, the reflective self which, in referring to itself, discriminates between self or soul and body; and *param-ātman*, the pure self or pure soul, that is, soul as an undiluted omniscient substance (*dravya*).⁴⁶ In the *Samayasāra* itself, *jīva*, the empirical living being is said to be of two types *sva-samaya*, 'true self,' and *para-samaya*, 'non-self.'⁴⁷

It could be argued that with the term *paramātmā* Kundakunda effectively re-introduces Upaniṣadic concepts of the supreme Self,⁴⁸ while trying to avoid the monist conception of an all-encompassing spiritual principle. This would explain, why Kundakunda's triadic classification resonates with similar distinctions in Indic philosophy, particularly in soul-oriented schools such as Sāṃkhya⁴⁹ and Vedānta.⁵⁰ The dualism of Sāṃkhya is so close to Kundakunda's philosophy that key propositions had to be expressly negated at various places in the *Samayasāra*. Buddhist and Vaiṣṇava views are also openly refuted, but not Advaita, which had an influence already on early Jainism. In contrast to Advaita, the spiritual atomism of 'Jaina' philosophy demands the liberated pure soul, *siddha*, to be conceived as a spatially bound entity;⁵¹ although the opposite view is still expressed in the *Āyāra* which, under the influence of the Upaniṣads, characterises the liberated soul, *siddha*, as, in essence, 'without form,' *arūpī sattā*.⁵² Kundakunda himself stated that even though the concept of the spatially bound liberated soul can be maintained only from the relative point of view,⁵³ it is the main difference to the alternative, equally relative, point of view. that the soul 'is really co-existent with the universe.'⁵⁴ It is not clear in this *gāthā* whether from an absolute point of view, too, the Jaina soul would retain its quantitative individuality. This is the main – maybe intentional – ambiguity of the new triadic scheme. If the idea of the atomic self is given up, Jaina philosophy loses a key element contributing to its distinctiveness.⁵⁵

There seems to be a logical inevitability in this conceptual development, since the triad is a reflective form of the monad that encompassed its opposite, the dyad, or the other way round; not as a neutral third,⁵⁶ but as an idealised form of a 'original unity,' as Hegel pointed out, who himself distinguishes between 'subjective spirit' (self), 'objective spirit' (society), and 'absolute spirit' (philosophy), and the 'subjective spirit' again into (a) spirit 'in itself' (soul), (b) 'for itself' (consciousness), (c) 'in and for itself' (self-consciousness or subjectivity).⁵⁷ A similar, equally anthropocentric, but 'physicalist,' and event-oriented triadic distinction was put forward by G. Strawson, who occasionally refers to secondary literature on Buddhist and Sāṃkhya parallels, but not Jaina philosophy. He distinguished between three conceptions of the 'subject of experience' in 'reflective behaviour':⁵⁸ 'the *thick* conception, the *traditional inner* conception, and the *thin* conception'.⁵⁹ 'The first conception, the widely favoured *thick* conception, takes the subject of experience to be the whole organism, e.g. the whole human being. The second conception, the (no less familiar) *traditional inner* conception of the subject of experience, takes the subject of experience to be something less than the whole human being, e.g. the brain, or some system in the brain. Both these familiar conceptions of the subject of experience build on the highly natural idea that subjects can exist when they're not experiencing anything, e.g. in dreamless sleep. The third and currently much less familiar conception of the subject of experience drops this idea. This is the *thin* conception of the subject of experience according to which a *subject of experience exists only when there is experience going on* – experience of which it is the subject. On this conception, there is no subject of experience at all in a human being, say Lucy, when she is dreamlessly asleep.'⁶⁰

Strawson's triad differs in important points from Kundakunda's. Effectively, he operates with five categories, firstly, by additionally presupposing an all-encompassing subject of the as yet unobjectified process of reflection, and, secondly, by splitting up the conception of the 'inner self' into 'material' and 'immaterial' variants: 'We can include under this heading

the familiar conception of the subject of experience as a “soul”, an immaterial (non-physical) being – so long as we take “inner” in a sufficiently loose sense.⁶⁴ The difference to Kundakunda’s ideas becomes clear at this point, however many distinctions he operates with in his Samayasāra.⁶² According to Strawson’s scheme, Kundakunda’s concept of the soul as a self-conscious substance, *paramātman*, would represent an immaterial variant of the reflective stance of the inner self. That is, a product of the inner self conceptually and maybe experientially objectifying itself as a quasi-object: ‘The intended reference of I is certainly to a persisting inner self, when it is not to the whole human being, and this is also its actual reference (note that an intended reference can be completely unreflective). If materialism is true, the reference is in fact to a brain-system, the “brain-system self”. If on the other hand we have immaterial souls, the reference is to an immaterial soul – the “immaterial self”. Either way we never intend to refer to 3, and we never do so in fact.’ Strawson’s third variant of self-reference (according to our count, the fourth) is the ‘reference’ to the ‘self of the living moment of experience,’ within the domain of the experiencing self.⁶³ Rather than speaking of ‘reference,’ Strawson should have used the paradoxical expression ‘experience of experience.’ Yet, unobjectified pre-reflective awareness of the ‘living moment of experience,’ unpersuasively labelled the ‘synergy self,’ is regarded as a *practical* impossibility: ‘Even in this case, though, the unthinkingly intended reference is almost always also to something considered as persisting, however vaguely’ – either the human being as a whole or inner self. But this is not to deny the fact of pre-reflective awareness.

Jaina philosophy has very little to say about the processes of reflection on and indeed the experience of the soul or self,⁶⁴ beyond a set of dogmatic classifications and the suggestion of turning inward, beginning with concentration meditation (*ekagrata*), and moving to ‘meditation on the dharma’ (*dharmadhyāna*), and progressing finally to ‘pure meditation’ (*śukladhyāna*), the main method for severing the link between soul and *karman*. But it has a lot to say about the relationship between *jīva* and *ajīva*, sentient substance and non-sentient substances.

The standard version presented in classical treatises such as the Sanskrit *Tattvārthasūtra* 8.2 presents bondage (*bandha*) of the soul by karmic particles as real. In contrast to the much older text collection *Āyāra* where violent action, even unintentional action, is said to attract and bind *karman* to the soul, Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmī, the ca 4th century author of the *Tattvārtha*, psychologises the theory of bondage by stating that ‘because if its passions,’ named elsewhere *kaṣāyas*, the soul attracts and physically binds *karman*. The concept of physical bondage by material karmic particles (*karma-pudgala*), which is not clearly expressed in the earliest surviving Jaina texts, which mainly focus on the effects of violent action on the agent, rather than metaphysics, requires the soul itself to have certain quasi-physical qualities, which created problems at the time when Jaina metaphysics was systematised.

Kundakunda addresses the question about the relation between soul and body in a living entity in two ways. Firstly, by applying the Indian⁶⁵ variant of the ‘double truth’ theory, proposing

that there are two irreducible perspectives, the ‘conventional point of view’ (*vyavahāra-naya*) and the ‘determinative’ (*niścaya*) or ‘pure point of view’ (*śuddha-naya*).⁶⁶ By combining them the reality of the complex relation between soul and body can be understood. Secondly, by proposing the functioning of an indirect relation between two forms of causality, the ‘material cause’ (*upādāna-karaṇa*) and the ‘instrumental’ or ‘efficient cause’ (*nimitta-karaṇa*).

The paradoxical (non-)relationship between body and soul is explained at a first with the help of the scholastic two-perspective approach: ‘From the *vyavahāra* point of view, it is said that *karmas* bind and are in contact with the self; but from the pure (absolute) point of view, [material] *karmas* neither bind nor are in contact with the Self. Thus from the different points of view the Self is said to be either bound or free according as it is associated with *upādhis* [conditions] or free from them.’ The first part of this remarkable statement is, seen in retrospect, standard Jaina perspectivism (*anekāntavāda*). Yet, the second part has been understood to say that by a simple switch of perspective, by ‘discriminative wisdom,’⁶⁷ the liberation of the soul from bondage can be achieved, without the need of practicing austerities.⁶⁸

There is indirect support for this interpretation in the Samayasāra, which elsewhere states that everything depends on the state of mind, even the efficacy of conventional Jaina asceticism: ‘If one performs austerities (*tapas*) or observes vows (*vratas*) without fixed contemplation on the Supreme Self, the all-knowing call all that childish austerity (*bālatapa*) and childish vow (*bālavrata*).’⁶⁹

The unconventional, ‘mystical,’ perspective introduced by the Smayasāra, is Kundakunda’s most original contribution to Jaina philosophy. Ultimately, when the *niścaya-vyavahāra* distinction is applied to itself, the point of view of the interactive self is declared to be void and delusional and the absolute dissociation between soul and body regarded as the only reality: ‘The *vyavahāra* [view] does not deal with the really existent [*bhūtārtha*], but the pure point of view (*śuddha-naya*) is said (to relate to) the real. The living being who takes refuge in the really existent is, indeed, one of right vision.’⁷⁰ Kundakunda’s insistence that self-referential *niścaya-naya* is the only perspective that can yield a clear view on the ‘pure soul,’ and that it is the only matter that counts, is controversial, and was criticised as ‘one-sided’ (*ekānta*), because – from a conventional point of view – it seems to render ethical behaviour, non-violent conduct, obsolete and could be used to justify unethical behaviour as soteriologically inconsequential. The counterargument is that a person taking the double *niścaya* perspective will never be interested in worldly matters. This absolute, soul-centred perspective presents itself only when the distinction between *niścaya-naya* and *vyavahāra-naya* is applied to itself, as one of various emerging combinations. It was B. Bhatt,⁷¹ who proposed the existence of a double *niścaya-vyavahāra* perspective underlying the Samayasāra, to make sense of many apparently contradictory statements. He suggested the following tabulation of the resulting possible perspectives on the relationship between *jīva* and *ajīva*:

	Mystic Pattern	Non-Mystic Pattern
	Self-‘realisation’	Self-‘reformation’
<i>Niścaya</i>	1 niścaya-naya	1 niścaya-naya
	2 = jīva, ‘soul’	2 = svaka-bhāva, ‘original condition’ of jīva and ajīva
<i>Vyavahāra</i>	1 vyavahāra-naya	1 vyavahāra-naya
	2 = saṃsāra, ‘world’ (psychic and social)	2 = para-bhāva, ‘secondary condition’ of jīva and ajīva

Since, from the self-reflective *niścaya* point of view, the validity of the *vyavahāra* point of view as a whole can be negated, the question remains, in what way the soul can act as a vitalising force for matter and contribute to the processes of *karman* formation and elimination, as taught by standard Jaina doctrine, codified in the Jaina scheme of tattvas. The creative answer given is that because, from a ‘realistic’⁷² determinate point of view, soul (*puruṣa*) cannot transform matter and matter (*prakṛti*) cannot transform the soul – substances can only modify themselves, not other substances – the causal relationship must be indirect, through processes of co-transformation: ‘Thus the association of the two, the Self and *karmic prakṛti* is brought about by their mutual determination as the instrumental cause. Thus by them, *saṃsāra* or the cycle of births and deaths, is produced.’⁷³ Elsewhere, the *Samayasāra* explains that while the soul can only be an instrumental cause (*nimitta-karaṇa*), or rather condition, of changes in the body, and the body the instrumental condition for modifications of the soul, while both are material causes (*upādāna-karaṇa*) in and for themselves. Clear is that in Kundakunda agency (*kāraṇa*) is associated with *upādāna-karaṇa*, not with *nimitta-karaṇa*, as one might assume.⁷⁴

Chakravarti⁷⁵ finds the theory of co-determination ‘mysterious,’ and both Jaini⁷⁶ and Johnson⁷⁷ remark that ‘the exact mechanism or metaphysics of this circular process remains, however, unexplained.’ If matter and spirit are regarded as absolute opposites their interaction remains an incomprehensible mystery.⁷⁸ It has long been recognised that by positing the question in such a way, an answer is impossible.⁷⁹ Only in their pores, in their mutual no-existence, can impenetrable substances be conceived as related.⁸⁰

One way out of the conundrum is to soften the opposition to find some common ground again, by reflecting on the matter-like qualities of the soul and the spirit-like qualities of matter and ask the question what exactly their different attributes are. In Jaina philosophy almost every form of aggregate matter, that is, molecules, etc., is considered to be alive, that is binding a *jīva*, except if the being has been damaged.⁸¹ Conversely, because even the liberated pure soul is defined as an individual monad characterised by oneness (*ekatva*),⁸² certain material qualities such as spatial delimitation, colour, etc., at a late stage even energy (*vīrya*) etc., are attributed to it.⁸³ The conceptual development thus leads logically to the ‘dematerialisation’ of matter and the ‘immaterialisation’ of karma, that is, toward spiritualisation, but also to a certain ‘rematerialisation’ of the soul, across texts. This

process has been meticulously analysed by W. Johnson, who showed that in Kundakunda’s philosophy karmic bondage is ‘lifted out of the sphere of *material karman* altogether: the soul binds itself through processes of self-modification that are interpreted as manifestation of consciousness. Such modifications are said to be brought about by contact with or proximity to material objects.’⁸⁴ Kundakunda illustrates this with an analogy of soul and crystal: ‘As a piece of crystal, itself being pure and colourless, cannot appear red-coloured of its own accord, but in association with another red-coloured object, it appears coloured-red; in the same way the Self, itself being pure cannot have emotional activities such as attachments, etc., of his own accord. Just when influenced by alien impurities, he gets tainted by such impure emotions of attachments, etc.’⁸⁵

Yet, Johnson notes, ‘the *mechanism* of this is not explained; at the level of contact the problematic gap between the material and the immaterial remains.’⁸⁶ There is no place left for the original *karman* theory.⁸⁷ Kundakunda had only two options: ‘either to make the *jīva* material (and so revert to what may have been the very origins of Jaina doctrine) or to make *karman* immaterial. This he has, in effect, chosen.’ But, by re-interpreting *karman* in a spiritualised way as a ‘modification of the immaterial self into states of consciousness,’ the states of the ‘pure self’ had to be interpreted in quasi-materialistic terms, as auspicious or inauspicious applications of consciousness (*śubha-* and *aśubha-upayoga*) qua mental actions (*bhāva-karman*) rather than physical actions (*dravya-karman*).⁸⁸ In this model, the link with physical action, through instrumental causes (*nimitta-karaṇa*), is ‘never fully broken.’⁸⁹

The question, whether this analysis is informed by a *vyavahāra* or *niścaya* point of view leads to further problems sought to be solved by the philosopher Jayasena by drawing a distinction between a ‘pure determinate point of view’ and an ‘impure determinate point of view,’ *śuddha-niścaya-naya* and *aśuddha-niścaya-naya*, which doesn’t solve the contradiction.⁹⁰

It remains to be seen, whether the aporias of the concept of pure soul seen from a pure *niścaya* perspective will drive the conceptual development further. The main question is, how a pure soul can be subject to impure mental states or thoughts (*aśuddha-bhāva*) in the first place, reflecting the self/*karman* opposition within the pure self, and at the same time considered to be ‘liberated’ while being alive (*jīvanmukti*). The second question addresses the problem created by the projection of the soul/*karman* opposition into the realm of matter, which in the *Samayasāra* as in *Sāṃkhya* is considered as the agent of

its own transformations, hence taking on functions which are associated with the embodied soul in the standard model of classical Jainism. Or will the status quo of philosophical theory, which demands permanent reflection on the difference between pure self and non-self from adepts of Kundakunda's teaching, be able to socially consolidate and crystallise into a new type of standard Jainism? There is legitimate doubt whether permanent reflection can be institutionalised.⁹¹

In contrast to the Buddhist and Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika *asatkāryavāda* theory of causality, according to which the effect is not pre-existent in the cause, Sāṃkhya and the Jainas, including Kundakunda, ultimately support the *satkāryavāda* theory, according to which the effect is pre-existing in the cause: 'The *Upādāna karaṇa* or the material cause must be identical with its effect. There can be no difference in nature and attributes between the material cause and its effect.'⁹² A substance can therefore only transform itself, not another substance. From the *niścaya* perspective, the soul can only cause transformations of the soul. If there was no soul in the first place, it could not be brought into existence by a non-soul substance. It is in this sense, that the effect is pre-existing in the cause. In other words, there is a necessary relationship between the theory of pure soul as substance and the *satkārya* theory.⁹³

From a determinate, *niścaya*, point of view, there can be no direct contact between *jīva* and *ajīva*. Only from a conventional, *vyavahāra*, point of view can causal relationships be interpreted from a non-one-sided, *anekānta*, perspective: 'Since bondage results from the coming-to-be of qualities in substances, the relation we are concerned to analyze has to do with the relation between a substance at one moment having quality A and the same substance at the next moment lacking quality A and having quality B.' 'Considering the relation of the substance at one moment to the substance at the next, the *satkāryavādin* is right, the effect is contained in the cause, but considering the relation of quality A to quality B, the *asatkāryavādin* is right, the effect is not contained in the cause.'⁹⁴

Thus, the disambiguation of the older conception of embodied self cum living being, contrasted with the liberated self, creates on the one hand greater conceptual clarity, but on the other hand new conceptual problems, namely a sharp focus on the problem of explaining karmic bondage of an essentially unfettered 'pure soul' that, according to the followers of Kundakunda's philosophy, can be directly experienced under favourable conditions. Kundakunda arguably shifts his construction too far away from early and classical Jaina *ahiṃsā* focused conceptions towards the gnostic Sāṃkhya philosophy. The one remaining difference is that Kundakunda insists that the self is active, with regard to itself, not with regard to the non-self, whereas Sāṃkhya presents the self as passive.⁹⁵ Kundakunda's statement on this point must be read as predicated on the *vyavahāra* point of view, however, since, as Schubring noted, the soul as such, seen from an absolute (*ekāntena*) standpoint alone, does not act.⁹⁶

B. Bhatt divided the text of the *Samayasāra* into 'mystical' and 'non-mystical' segments, that is, verses containing statements oriented toward the aim of either 'self-realisation' or 'self-reformation,' and considered the text as a compilation.⁹⁷ This line of interpretation was already insinuated by Schubring. On philosophical grounds, I see however no overwhelming evidence for classifying the work as a whole as a compilation of older *gāthās* from different, unnamed authors. I would suggest reading the text instead *as if* someone had composed it to present a consistent argument, while constantly switching perspectives of *niścaya*-

naya and *vyavahāra-naya* without flagging this up explicitly, hence creating the impression that the work is not of one piece. The text makes perfect sense even if one or other verse could be uncovered as an interpolation.

The way in which Bhatt divided the text into 'mystical' and 'non-mystical' portions is questionable in view of the classification of individual verses. It is certainly 'too rigid,' as W. Johnson pointed out, who also observed a lack connection to the Jaina *anekāntavāda* doctrine and a tendency to interpret Kundakunda's 'mysticism,' against the text, in Vedāntic terms,⁹⁸ which Bhatt's article shares with the English translator Chakravarti's commentary.⁹⁹

Notably, Bhatt applies a binary analytical scheme focussed on *jīva* alone, which he treats as a synonym of *ātman*, without considering Kundakunda's effectively threefold concept of soul or self.

Bhatt's classification has been adopted by Johnson, who calls the 'mystical' and 'non-mystical' applications of the *vyavahāra/niścaya* distinction 'pattern one' and 'pattern two':

- (a) According to 'pattern one,' 'the *vyavahāra-naya* is the viewpoint which considers entities in general, and the *jīva* in particular, from the perspectives of the modes (*pariyāya*). The *niścaya-naya*, on the other hand, is that viewpoint which considers entities from the perspective of pure unified substance (*dravya*).'
- (b) 'According to the other 'two truths' pattern ('pattern two'), however, the *vyavahāra*, or conventional view, – that the *jīva* acts and is subject to the fruits of action – is essentially a 'wrong view'. For the *niścaya* view, which is 'higher' in the sense of representing the complete truth, not just another aspect of it (it portrays reality), states that, by definition, the *jīva* can have no connection with *ajīva*. Thus any perceived relation between the two is nothing more than delusion, the product of ignorance.'¹⁰⁰

Bhatt's insight, echoed by Johnson, that Kundakunda operates with a 'double "two truths" theory,' i.e., a self-referential concept, should not be read as an indication of contradiction. Johnson also follows Bhatt's 1994 attempt to table theoretically possible relationships between soul and non-soul in different Jaina and non-Jaina Indic ontologies,¹⁰¹ but created his own classification for Jaina perspectives only. He distinguishes four theoretically possible solutions to the problem 'to reconcile the doctrine of the strict duality of soul and matter with the fact of bondage,'¹⁰² of which only two are historically relevant.

(1) 'Both karma and the *jīva* are material;' (2) 'the material is unreal;' (3) '*jīva* and matter are quite different and totally separate from one point of view, and yet, at the same time, from another point of view they are interactive,' the standard Jaina view; (4) 'rather than positing the unreality of one of the pair of *jīva* and matter, it simply stresses the unreality of illusory nature of the relationship between them. Thus bondage is a question of ignorance and liberation becomes a matter of knowledge – a realisation of the true (non) relation.'¹⁰³

Variant four represents Kundakunda's second *niścaya* pattern, which, as Johnson notes, is 'very close to the Sāṃkhya view.' Compared to Bhatt's scheme, Johnson introduces one crucial, and no doubt necessary, by changing the change to his fourth variant, representing Kundakunda's original solution:

Soul-Body Relations in Sāṃkhya Philosophy, Classical Jaina Philosophy, and Kundakunda's Variant of Jaina Spiritualism			
Sāṃkhya Philosophy (Bhatt)	puruṣa	real	inactive
	prakṛti	real	active
	interaction	illusory	
Classical Jaina Philosophy (Bhatt)	jīva	real	active
	ajīva	real	active
	interaction	real	
Kundakunda's <i>Samayasāra</i> (Bhatt)	jīva	real	inactive
	ajīva	unreal	
	interaction	illusory	
Kundakunda's <i>Samayasāra</i> (Johnson)	jīva	real	
	ajīvai	real	
	interaction	illusory	
Kundakunda's <i>Samayasāra</i> (Proposal)	jīva	real	active
	ajīva	real	
	interaction	illusory	

'This has a similar effect to solution 2, but it is not (as Bhatt thinks) identical to it in substance.' Johnson argues, that Bhatt's characterisation of the ontological status of non-soul as 'unreal' is not reflecting textual reality, but a Vedāntic bias. For rather than positing the unreality of one of the pair of *jīva* and matter, Kundakunda's original solution it simply stresses the unreality or illusory nature of the relationship between them.

The table above summarises the key themes addressed in the reviewed debate. It does not consider the distinction between *jīva*, *ātman*, and *paramātmān*, which would require a separate investigation, but adds that for Kundakunda the soul always remains active, whether or not this is required for the state of the *siddha*, a fact that Bhatt did not consider in his choice of attribution, which moved Kundakunda's stance close to neutral monism.¹⁰⁴

The Exhibition *Pure Soul: The Jaina Spiritual Traditions* explores the practical implications of variants of two basic stances taken by different Jaina thinkers and traditions along the spectrum between

early, classical, and spiritualistic variants of Jaina philosophy. Despite its internal pluralism and diversity, which benefitted the conceptual refinement and advancement of its philosophy, the Jaina discourse remains distinct. In future studies a comparison with European and East Asian philosophical systems may be undertaken along similar classificatory lines, originally pioneered by the Jainas themselves.¹⁰⁵ At the heart of such a comparative approach to global philosophy will be the question about the observability of the self as such.¹⁰⁶

The Jaina tradition is often depicted as a radically ascetic Indic religious movement and contrasted with the meditation-oriented middle-path of the Buddha. The exhibition focuses on the *adhyaत्मik*, or spiritual Jaina traditions, in a narrow sense. That is, the traditions that adopted the philosophy of Kundakunda's work *Samayasāra*. Yet, all Jaina forms of Jainism, even those which put a premium on physical asceticism involve meditation on the pure soul and are that sense spiritual movements as well.

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- SS Samayasāra, of Kundakunda. See A. Chakravarti 1950/1989.
- SaSi Sarvārthasiddhi, of Pūjyapāda. See. S. A. Jain 1992.
- ST Samādhitantram, of Pūjyapāda. In: Samādhitantram. Supreme Meditation. Comp. & Tr. Vijay K. Jain. Dehradun: Vikalp Printers, 2017.
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Notes

- 1 SS 75. Pkt. *no-kamma*, Skt. *no-karma*, is the state of karmic matter after its fruition, when it is worn out and ready to fall off, *nirjara*. The concept is used to explain the nature of the clusters of matter used in speaking, thinking, or reflecting, and in the constitution of four of the five types of body distinguished by Jaina philosophy, except for the karmic body. See Tulsi 2009: 191. Chakravarti 1989: 93 speaks about 'body building material particles.'
- 2 These terms are most frequent. There are numerous synonyms, such as *prāṇā*, *bhūta*, *sattva*, *citta*, including metaphorical expressions, in Jaina scriptures. A thorough study of these terms remains a desideratum.
- 3 SS 49; Pkt. *cedaṇā*, Skt. *cetanā*. SS 144 defines the essential quality of the self as *samayasāra*, 'that which transcends all points of view' (Pkt. *sava-naya-pakkha-rahito*, Skt. *sarva-naya-pakṣa-rahito*), and both SS 24 and TS 2.8-9 as Pkt. *uvaoga*, Skt. *upayoga*, 'spiritual function.' According to TS 2.8-9 *upayoga* is either 'determinate' (*sākāra*) or 'indeterminate' (*anākāra*), that is, 'knowledge' or 'intuition' ('perception', Jain 1992: 55), with their subtypes. Jacobi 1906: 308 explains *upayoga* as 'imagining,' and its two types as 'knowledge' and 'belief.' Jain 1992: 55 translates *upayoga* as 'consciousness,' Tatia 1994: 39 as 'sentience': 'sentience is awareness or consciousness.' According to the commentaries to TS 3.8-9 and 2.18-19 *upayoga* is 'attention,' 'active or attentive consciousness.' It is the potential to and the act of grasping or striving for the meaning of something. See SaSi 2.8-9 & 18-19. TS and its commentators focus on empirical consciousness. Jain 1992: 65 renders the key sentence of Pūjyapāda 'consciousness is the effect of sense' and Tatia 1994: 43 as 'striving ... to produce the physical senses,' 'attention, specific mental activity, the continuing identity and transformation of the soul.' Malvania 1981: 152 pointed out that the oldest surviving Jaina characterisation of the nature of the self uses the term Pkt. *viññāya*, Skt. *viññāta*, under the influence of the Upanisadic concept *viññānamaya*, 'consisting of knowledge or intelligence,' that is, not as attentiveness, but as something known or understood: 'The Self is the knower (or experiencer), and the knower is the Self. That through which one knows, is the Self. With regard to this (to know) it (the Self) is established' (Āyāra 1.5.104). Jacobi 1884: 50 n. 3 commented: 'This means that knowledge is a modification (*pariṇāma*) of the Self, and therefore one with it, but not as a quality or action of the Self different from it.' Cf. Ganeri 2017 on the difference between self and attention with reference to Buddhist sources.
- 4 See the foundational study of Johnson 1995.
- 5 SS 310.
- 6 Baumeister 1987: 171.
- 7 Hegel 1981 10.III § 389: 49 conceived his vague preferred term 'spirit' not as an immortal substance, but as a system of movements brought about by nothing other than spirit itself. Spirit produces self-awareness of itself by means of its own products in an evolutionary development from abstract conception to reality. In the form of concrete knowledge it ideally embraces the totality of existence.
- 8 N. Elias, in Flügel 2019: 983f.
- 9 Baumeister 1987: 163.
- 10 Kant 1791/2007, A346, A355.
- 11 Strawson 2017: 209.
- 12 Cf. Husserl 1966.
- 13 Strawson 2017: 210 n. 41 with reference to Fasching 2010: 207.
- 14 See for instance Watson's 2006: 383ff. analysis of the Śaiva Siddhānta philosopher Rāmakaṇṭha's sophisticated defence of the possibility of a purely cognitive 'direct experience of ourselves' (argued without taking recourse to the concept of the self as a substance), maintaining that 'though various different thoughts and objects pass before us, we are never aware of a discontinuity in the perceiver of those thoughts and objects,' which his Buddhist opponents rejected as an imagined imposition of 'stability on to what is momentary.'
- 15 Strawson 2017.
- 16 Chisholm 1969: 20f.
- 17 E.g., Āyāra 1.3.4. Note the difference between the translation of Jacobi 1884: 34, 'He who knows one thing, knows all things [if omniscient]', and the one of Schubring 1926: 85, who focuses on merely typological similarity between singular facts: 'Wer den Einzelfall [einer dieser Regungen] kennt, der kennt sie in allen Fällen; wer [eine dieser Regungen] in allen Fällen kennt, der kennt [sie] im Einzelfall.'

- 18 Jaini 1974: 119.
- 19 See Singh 1974, Fujinaga 2000, 2006, Qvarnström 2006. Early references to the maximal view are in the *Āyāra* 1.2.15.26, *Jinacarita* 121, and *ĀvN*.
- 20 Stalnaker 1999: 490: 'Knowers or believers are logically omniscient if they know or believe all the consequences of their knowledge or beliefs. That is, x is a logically omniscient believer (knower) if and only if the set of all of the propositions believed (known) by x is closed under logical consequence' (p. 498).
- 21 See for instance Akalaṅka's theory on *sarvajña* in *Tattvārtharājavartika* 5.9.3-4, tr. Fujinaga 2000: 721. Also, Samantabhadra in *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā* 5. Samantabhadra in *Āptamīmāṃsā* 5, tr. Fujinaga 2006: 109: 'Whatever exists in this universe must be the object of perception (*pratijñā*). Because (whatever exists in this universe must be the object of inference. And incomplete all) the objects of inference must be perceived by someone (*hetu*). Like fire on a remote mountain (*dr̥ṣṭānta*).'
- 22 Upadhye 1930/1935: lxxxix.
- 23 Jaspers 1949/1953: 2.
- 24 Under the guise of cultural criticism these are currently making a rapid comeback. See for instance O'Neil's 1985 modern 'five body theory.' Earlier: Nietzsche 1885.
- 25 Kant 1791/2007.
- 26 Luhmann 1994: xxxix. See also Metzinger 2003/2004, Raymond & Barresi 2006.
- 27 Baumeister 1987: 164.
- 28 Boas 1922: 598.
- 29 Nietzsche 1985.
- 30 Boas 1922: 599.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid., p. 600.
- 33 Folkert 1993: 218.
- 34 On self-reference and autopoiesis, see Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, Luhmann 1995.
- 35 For a comparative analysis, see Johnson 1995.
- 36 Schubring 1935/2000 § 70: 152f.
- 37 Monier-Williams 1899/1986: 422.
- 38 Ibid., p. 135.
- 39 Turner 1962-1985: 51.
- 40 Unnata Pragma 2019.
- 41 Building on Johnson 1995.
- 42 Schubring 1935/2000 § 6: 14.
- 43 Malvania 1981: 153 pointed to the lack of a clear dualism in the oldest surviving textual layer: 'it should be noted that the word *ajīva* is nowhere found in the *Ācārāṅga* ... *jīva* (*citta*) and *acitta* (*ajīva*) are the two categories with which the Jains were concerned at the times of *Ācārāṅga*.'
- 44 Schubring 1935/2000 § 70: 152.
- 45 Johnson 1995: 235 in his exhaustive discussion of the term interprets *samaya* as 'the realised self.'
- 46 MP 4: Prakrit *bahirappā*, *aṃtarappā*, *paramappā*. Also, many other Digambara texts such as ST 4-5.
- 47 SS 2.
- 48 Bhatt 1989.
- 49 Cf. van Buitenen 1981: 196 n. 2, Johnson 1995: 292-5.
- 50 See the analogy of triads in Rājacandra's 1951/1995: 238 Letter 160 on *Viśeṣādvaita* and Jainism. Cf. Upadhye 1937: 29ff., Bhatt 1974: 280, 283, 1994: 448, Johnson 1995: 243, Caillat & Balbir 1999: 44ff.
- 51 TS 10.7.
- 52 *Āyāra* 1.5.5.6.4. See *Āyāra* 2.1.5.127, and Malvania 1981: 152.
- 53 SS 56.
- 54 SS. 343 implies monistic Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. Hegel 1981 10.III § 389: 43-45 (*Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*) also articulated the view that the aporias of the conceptual opposition between 'immateriality' of spirit and 'materiality,' which becomes 'imponderable' under the hands of modern science, can only be resolved (as in Plato) if the soul is not only regarded as immaterial in itself but as representing the general immateriality of nature, that is, the unity of thinking and being, soul and matter, and at the same time as substance, the co-existence of individual soul and universe understood as 'absolute spirit': 'Diese Einheit macht schon die Grundeinstellung des Orientalismus aus.' With Dumont 1980: 242f., one could say that, rather than as an incomprehensible mystery, Hegel interprets the soul/body opposition as an asymmetrical opposition. Despite the perceived contrast between Hegel's dialectical and traditional hierarchical logic, Dumont posits that in both logics 'in order to grasp one level, we must see it in relation to the superior level, that is, we must transcend it,' transcendence is 'at the heart of social life' (p. 454).
- 55 Johnson 1995: 260 concludes that the perspectivist *vyavahāra-niścaya* point of view 'is essential for the survival and cohesion of the Jaina community.' General depictions of the distinctive contribution of Jaina philosophy privilege this perspective as well. See Potter 1963: 115.
- 56 This would lead to the *trairāśika* theory which Jaina orthodoxy rejected as 'heretical.' See Flügel 2019: 131.
- 57 Hegel 1981 10.III § 387: 38.
- 58 Strawson 2017: 219.
- 59 Ibid., p. 7.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Ibid., p. 7 n. 16.
- 62 Bruhn & Tripathi 1974: 290. This question requires further research.
- 63 Strawson 2017: 219 indicates this in his Venn diagram.
- 64 Bruhn 1997-98: V.1 characterised Jaina types of meditation – especially *dharma-dhyāna* – as methods for the "realization and internalization of important dogmatic subjects." Cf. Schubring 1935/2000 §§§ 91, 185, 186.
- 65 Overviews of the two truths theory, such as Thakchoe 2022, often focus on the oldest, that is, Buddhist, texts. See Bruhn & Tripathi 1974: 290, Bhatt 1974: 280f., 1994: 448, Johnson 1995:249, 252f., 285f., and Balcerowicz in this volume on the similarities and differences of Kundakunda's philosophy with Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka* and Śāṅkara's *Advaita*, with regard to the two-truth theory, in particular. Notably, Kundakunda criticises the Buddhist theories of momentariness and non-self in SS 345-348.
- 66 SS 7-8, 11-12. Bhatt 1994: 456 n. 1 pointed out that SS 7-8 borrows almost verbatim from Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.
- 67 SS 296.
- 68 SS 141. The commentaries interpreted SS 141-144 'auf einen geistig höherstehenden Gläubigen' according to Schubring 1957: 569.
- 69 SS 152.
- 70 SS 11. The translation amalgamates parts of Johnson's 1995: 242.
- 71 Bhatt 1974: 287.
- 72 Cf. TS, and the structure imposed on the SS itself by the commentator Amṛtacandra.
- 73 SS 313.
- 74 Chakravarti 1989: 84.
- 75 Chakravarti 1989: 192.
- 76 Jaini 1979: 113f.: 'The Jains view the soul's involvement with karma as merely an "association" (*ekakṣetrāvagāha*, literally, occupying the same locus); there is said to be no actual contact between them, since this would imply a soul which was, like karma, material in nature. Just how a nonmaterial thing can in any way interact with a material one is not well clarified.'
- 77 Johnson 1995: 256, 261.
- 78 *Tattvādīpikā* 2.82, in Johnson 1995 : 128f.
- 79 Hegel 1981 10.III § 389: 48.
- 80 Ibid., p. 44. The current use of term 'porous self' in the sense of Charles Taylor designates the opposite: 'The porous self has a less developed sense of interiority, of the importance of inner experience for identity, of a boundary between the inside and the outside world.' (Luhmann 2012: 150).
- 81 When, say, stones have been smashed, it is assumed by classical Jaina thought that the fragments are dead for about one *muhūrta*, that is, ca. 48 minutes, before they are re-animated by contact with a different soul.
- 82 SS 3.
- 83 Johnson 1995: 129f., 143, 262f., 304.
- 84 Ibid., p. 130.
- 85 SS 278-279. See also Amṛtacandra's *Tattvādīpikā*-commentary on *Pavayanāsāra* 2.83, in Johnson 1995: 129. The other favoured analogy is between non-adhesive gold and soul on the one hand and mire and karma on the other. See SS 218-219.
- 86 It is interesting to note that Hume 1969/1985 struggled with similar questions without coming to satisfactory conclusions either. See Fogelin 2009 ch. 6, Weintraub 2010.
- 87 Johnson 1995: 130.
- 88 Ibid., p. 143. SS 46.
- 89 Johnson 1995: 281.
- 90 Ibid., p. 258f.

- 91 Cf. Schelsky 1957. The 20th c. neo-*adhyātmik* Jaina movements of Gujārāt started by Śrīmad Rājacandra, Kānaḥ Svāmi, and Dādā Bhagavān, generally known by their epithets, vigorously resist the self-description such as 'sect,' 'religious group,' or 'tradition,' but have given in to the pressures to institutionalise as their mushrooming trusts, temples, and *āśramas* testify.
- 92 Chakravarti 1989: 107.
- 93 Singh 1974: 27
- 94 Potter 1963: 114f.: 'The Jains are closely allied with the Bhedābheda-vādins on the one side and the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas on the other, since all three schools attempt to provide a theory of relations wherein two things are in some sense the same and in another distinct. This middle of the road position is also occupied by Kumāriḥa's Bhatta school of Mimāṃsā, which shares its sympathies between Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika on one side and Jainism on the other, as well as Sāṃkhya and Rāmānuja's Viśiṣādvaita, which sympathize in certain respects with the Bhedābheda-vādins and in certain others with Jainism' (p. 115).
- 95 SS 340-341.
- 96 Schubring 1957: 574. The matter is not clear across texts. According to Paṇṇavanā 22 v. 1573 non-liberated souls are active, but liberated souls not (with some exceptions). See Flügel 2019: 64 n. 71.
- 97 Bhatt 1974: 287f. In line with Schubring's 1957 analysis, Bruhn and Tripathi 1974: 290 pointed to the need to differentiate the layers of the apparently composite text not only on philosophical but also on linguistical grounds. Johnson 1995: 96, 265 echoes Bhatt by proposing to view the works under his name 'as heterogeneous repositories of accumulated Digambara teaching,' as does Balcerowicz in this volume, even if core sections of these works may have been composed by an author of this name.
- 98 Johnson 1995: 255.
- 99 Chakravarti 1989: 100-110: "Both Śāṅkara and Kundakunda ... maintain that the individual soul is identical with the ultimate reality, the Supreme Self' (p. 103), 'In this connection it is worth pointing out that both Kundakunda and Śāṅkara in their [?] commentaries used the word "Advaita", the indication of oneness of Jīvātmā and Paramātmā, a term which becomes the central doctrine of Śāṅkara's philosophy. It only means that the doctrine is common to both the Upaniṣadic thought and the Jaina thought' (p. 104). Bhatt 1974: 280f. follows this interpretation: 'The mystic pattern, as is the case with Indian mysticism in general, aims at self-'realisation'. It considers the soul (*jīva* or *ātman*) as one and as the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), and further regards the world (*saṃsāra*) to be an apparent reality like the reflection of an object in a pure crystal [SS 278-9]. As the mystic pattern is concerned with the nature of the soul, it shows very limited interest in the ajīva. The contact of *jīva* with *ajīva* is an *upacāra* [SS 105] and not reality, it brings forth various illusory experiences constituting the worldly sphere.' Johnson 1995: 243 rightly criticises Bhatt's 1974: 281 n. 10 translation of *uvayāra* (Skt. *upacāra*) as 'pure fiction' rather than 'metaphor' – as Chakravarti 1989: 88 translates – and his Vedāntic interpretation of Kundakunda's concept of reality. Bronkhorst 2010 also highlights that in contrast to Sāṃkhya the self of Kundakunda has little relation to the Upaniṣads and Vedānta.
- 100 Johnson 1995: 254f.
- 101 Bhatt 1994: 448.
- 102 Johnson 1995: 261.
- 103 Johnson 1995: [261-] 263.
- 104 Cf. Johnson 1995.
- 105 Outside India, Karl Potter has pioneered this work.
- 106 Cf. Chisholm 1969, Metzinger 2003/2004, Watson 2006, Fogelin 2009, Weintraub 2010, and others.