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"Survival in an Age of Revolution"

Charles Malik, Philo-Colonialism, and Global Counterrevolution

On Sunday, August 29, 1976, Dr. Charles Habib Malik, Lebanese statesman, philosopher, and one of the principal drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, delivered his latest in a long line of commencement speeches. Yet this time, Malik did not address a graduating class of university students, but three thousand new militia fighters pledging allegiance to Lebanon's Phalange Party (Ḥizb al-Katāʾib al-Lubnāniyya) and to its counterrevolutionary aims in Lebanon's ongoing international civil war. Some twenty thousand citizens attended the outdoor ceremony, which was the largest event organized by the Front for Freedom and Man in Lebanon (Jabhat al-Ḥurriyya wa-l-Insān fī Lubnān, FFML) since April 1975, the beginning of "the events" (*al-āḥdāth*) that tore apart society in Lebanon.[1] "Before you, o warriors and heroes of the Phalange," Malik began his address, entitled "Why You Fight," "I stand and bow in admiration and homage."[2] Malik framed their battle as self-defense against an external, worldwide revolutionary conspiracy. He asserted that Lebanon's political identity was defined by its antipathy to subversion, forged in transhistorical continuity from the Book of Genesis to the present. He praised "Assad's Syria" for its intervention that summer—coordinated with the US, Israel, and allied European powers—to save the FFML from defeat. Speaking before placards brandishing the Phalange slogan—"God, Country, Family" ("Allāh, al-Waṭan,

1 August 31, 1976, *al-ʿAmal*. Partly because there was no consensus on whether the war was civil or international in nature, "the events" became a widespread euphemism for the war in Lebanon.

2 August 29, 1976, Charles Malik, "Li-Mādhā Tuḥāribūn." Library of Congress, Charles Habib Malik Papers (hereafter CMP), Box 228, Folder 4.

The American Historical Review, 2025, 130(2), 600-637
https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhaf007



Figure 1. The Front for Freedom and Man in Lebanon's August, 29, 1976 rally. The caption reads: "In the pattern of the heroes of Athens, Sparta, and Tyre, 3,000 young women and men are wedded to the Phalangist creed in Dīk al-Maḥdī." September 6, 1976, *al-Katāʾib*. American University of Beirut/Library Archives.

al-ʿĀʾila")—he urged the fighters to prepare for the ultimate sacrifice and "recognize that there is nothing like Lebanon in all of Asia and Africa," or even "the whole world." At the appointed time, rows and rows of men took a knee and mounted the straight-arm salute popularized by European fascists during an earlier period of counterrevolutionary furies.

Just over two weeks earlier, the FFML's constituent militias annihilated the Tal al-Zaʿtar Palestinian refugee camp, permanently expelling its nearly 30,000 inhabitants, several thousand of whom were killed over the course of seven months of bitter battles and sieges in a pivotal episode of the war thus far.[3] The act eliminated the last Palestinian and predominantly Muslim collective presence in east Beirut, which became a homogenously Christian zone under FFML control.[4] The camp, created in 1950 after some 800,000 Palestinians were expelled upon the establishment of the state of Israel, provided an important reserve of cheap, unprotected labor for Lebanese capitalists who transformed its environs into the most important industrial zone of the "merchant republic."[5] By the late 1960s, the camp also came to provide a refuge for southern Lebanese, largely Shiʿi Muslim peasants, evicted from their homes by Israeli scorched earth tactics. The area became a center of Palestinian revolutionary revival, spurring an upsurge in political and labor militancy among Lebanese.[6] For a time, Tal al-Zaʿtar, the most populous camp, appeared to hold the promise of an emerging anticolonial popular sovereignty in the Arab east, organized from the bottom up by dispossessed refugees and their comrades. This political mobilization, institutionally expressed by the alliance between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese National Movement (al-Ḥarakat al-Waṭaniyya al-Lubnāniyya, LNM) was the central nightmare of a number of Lebanese—and aligned external forces—who feared that the growth of this revolutionary power could only come at their expense.

Malik's speech exalting Lebanese counterrevolutionary exceptionalism rallied support near and far. The Phalange newspaper reprinted the speech as a pamphlet, while US Vice President Nelson Rockefeller cited it when arranging a meeting between Malik and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.[7] Yet such Washington encounters were nothing novel. In Malik's persistent campaign to secure imperial protection for Christian domination of Lebanon's sectarian regime against anticolonial challenges, he had long facilitated imperial and philo-colonial counterrevolutionary networks, discourse, and aims.

3 FFML militias laid siege to the camp on January 4, 1976, and it fell on August 12. An estimated 2–3,000 people were killed. August 14, 1976, *as-Safīr*; Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 395–403; Muḥammad Dāwwud al-ʿAlī, *Mukhayyam Tal al-Zaʿtar: Waqāʾiʿ al-Majzara al-Mansiyya* (al-Markaz al-ʿArabī lil-Abḥāth wa-Dirāsat al-Siyāsāt, 2022).

4 A pro-FFML periodical described Tal al-Zaʿtar's elimination as "liberation" ("*taḥrīr*"). September 1, 1976, *al-Numūr*.

5 Dima Abdulrahim, "From Lebanon to West Berlin: The Ethnography of the Tal al Za'tar Palestinian Refugee Camp" (PhD Dissertation, University of Exeter, 1990), 106; Hānī Mundus, *al-ʿAmal wa-l-ʿUmmāl fī-l-Mukhayyam al-Filasṭīnī: Baḥth Maydānī ʿan Mukhayyam Tal al-Zaʿtar* (Munaẓẓamat al-Taḥrīr al-Filasṭīniyya, Markaz al-Abḥāth, 1974). The literature on the 1948 *nakba* (catastrophe) is extensive; see Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oneworld, 2006); Adel Manna, *Nakba and Survival: The Story of Palestinians Who Remained in Haifa and the Galilee, 1948–1956* (University of California Press, 2022 [2016]); Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, *Colonizing Palestine: The Zionist Left and the Making of the Palestinian Nakba* (Stanford University Press, 2023).

6 Karma Nabulsi and Abdel Razzaq Takriti, "The Palestinian Revolution," 2016, https://learnpalestine.qeh.ox.ac.uk/

7 October 1, 1976, Secretary Kissinger & Vice President Rockefeller, "[Henry Kissinger's Speech; Lebanese Christian Groups]," Digital National Security Archive. That month, Malik met with Kissinger twice, as well as with Cyrus Vance, Jimmy Carter's first Secretary of State (ahead of Carter's electoral victory).



Figure 2. "Tal al-Za'tar: A Revolutionary Bastion." Poster by the PLO Unified Information Department, circa 1976. Library of Congress, Yanker Poster Collection.

While great effort has been invested in analyzing the role of revolutionary intellectuals in history and theory, much less attention has been paid to the counterrevolution and its guides.[8] This is especially the case in the former colonial world in the era of decolonization, where anticolonial politics are often portrayed as having been the default position.[9] Following Arno Mayer, this article takes as its premise that "there can be no revolution without counterrevolution; both as phenomenon and process, they are inseparable, like truth and falsehood."[10] In the twentieth century, the ideas and practices of revolution were stamped by Marxism and anticolonialism; indeed the very term "revolution" became synonymous with one or the other or, as in the case of the earth-spanning tricontinental tradition, both simultaneously.[11] It is only logical, then, that the thrust of counterrevolutionary theory and practice would be anti-Marxist and philo-colonial. The historiographical absence of the term "counterrevolution" is revealing considering the tremendous opposition revolutions generate axiomatically, and given the ubiquity of revolutionary social upheaval throughout the twentieth

8 At present, only one forum reflection—and no stand-alone research articles—in the *American Historical Review*'s catalog has "counterrevolution" in its title. Thirty-eight books have been reviewed claiming the term as a titular subject. By contrast, 98 research articles and 2,218 books reviewed address "revolution" in their titles. The singular exception is Jean Allman, "The Fate of All of Us: African Counterrevolutions and the Ends of 1968," *American Historical Review* 123, no. 3 (2018): 728–32.

9 For influential studies focusing on left-wing and anticolonial thought in the Arab world, see Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, *Contemporary Arab Political Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective* (Columbia University Press, 2009); Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914* (University of California Press, 2010); Abdel Razzaq Takriti, *Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965–1976* (Oxford University Press, 2013); Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, eds., *Arabic Thought Beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda* (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (Oxford University Press, 2016); Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, eds., *Arabic Thought Against the Authoritarian Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2018); Yoav Di-Capua, *No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre & Decolonization* (University of Chicago Press, 2018); Laure Guirguis, ed., *The Arab Lefts: Histories and Legacies 1950s–1970s* (Edinburgh University Press, 2020); Georges Corm, *Arab Political Thought: Past and Present*, trans. Patricia Phillips-Batoma and Atoma T. Batoma (Hurst & Company, 2020 [2015]); Fadi A. Bardawil, *Revolution and Disenchantment: Arab Marxism and the Binds of Emancipation* (Duke University Press, 2020). For studies of anticolonialism and revolution in other areas, see for instance Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New Press, 2007); Christopher J. Lee, ed., *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Ohio University Press, 2010); Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton University Press, 2019); Enzo Traverso, *Revolution: An Intellectual History* (Verso, 2021); Erez Manela and Heather Streets-Salter, eds., *The Anticolonial Transnational: Imaginaries, Mobilities, and Networks in the Struggle against Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2023).

10 Arno J. Mayer, *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton University Press, 2000), 45.

11 The term "tricontinental" is derived from the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, held in Havana, Cuba, in 1966. On its use as a theoretical framework for understanding anticolonial liberation movements, see Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Blackwell, 2001); Prashad, *Darker Nations*; Takriti, *Monsoon Revolution*; Roger Faligot, *Tricontinentale: Quand Che Guevara, Ben Barka, Cabral, Castro et Hô Chi Minh préparaient la révolution mondiale (1964-1968)* (La Découverte, 2013); Anne Garland Mahler, *From the Tricontinental to the Global South: Race, Radicalism, and Transnational Solidarity* (Duke University Press, 2018); R. Joseph Parrott and Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2022).

century.[12] Critics of the term allege its derogatory and polemical connotations are enough to disqualify it (and sometimes even revolution as well) from scholarly use.[13] After all, few individuals or organizations self-identify as "counterrevolutionary," nor do advertisers invoke the term to push their latest wares. Yet to feign objectivity and "to proscribe the word-concept 'counterrevolution' and to evade its clarification," as Mayer argues, "is not to eschew but to take a political position."[14]

Malik's thought and action exemplify a specifically twentieth century mode of counterrevolution that prized philo-colonialism, essentialism, civilizational hierarchy, political religion (specifically imperial Christianity), and capitalism in the age of decolonization and international civil war between 1914–1991.[15] A conscious and committed participant in the counter-Enlightenment tradition, Malik concisely identified his fundamental adversaries as secularism, materialism, and collectivism.[16] Such an ensemble of principles coalesced after the pre-1914 imperial world order decomposed, when the struggle over the state became the central site of political contention between global networks of empire, revolution, and counterrevolution. From Mao to Carl Schmitt, shared conceptions of friend, enemy, and the just order created and reinforced networks of matériel, capital, and people, intertwining domestic and international politics to an unprecedented degree.[17] Malik was aware that the explicitly discriminatory hierarchy of empire was out of sync with the age of national liberation

12 Even much of the literature on the global Cold War takes the rise of opposition to revolutionary movements for granted instead of interrogating their wellsprings. Recent exceptions include Luc van Dongen et al., eds., *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Kyle Burke, *Revolutionaries for the Right: Anticommunist Internationalism and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War* (University of North Carolina Press, 2018); Walden Bello, *Counterrevolution: The Global Rise of the Far Right* (Fernwood, 2019).

13 Eugen Weber, "Revolution? Counterrevolution? What Revolution?," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 2 (1974): 3–47.

14 Arno J. Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870–1956: An Analytic Framework* (Harper & Row, 1971), 1.

15 The term "international civil war" appears to originate with Lenin during the October Revolution. My usage of the term broadens Arno Mayer's characterization of Europe's transnational polarization between 1871–1956—which mostly ignores the colonial world. Anticommunist German exile Sigmund Neumann employed the concept prior to Mayer, but his article on the topic is rife with condescension toward the alleged "totalitarianism" inherent in revolution as well as "the revolt of the backward nations." Enzo Traverso has recently revived the concept of a "European Civil War" between 1914–1945. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works, Vol. 29: March–August 1919*, ed. George Hanna (Progress, 1974), 29; Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War," *World Politics* 1, no. 3 (1949): 333–50; Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (Abacus, 1994), 156–57; Enzo Traverso, *Fire and Blood: The European Civil War 1914–1945*, trans. David Fernbach (Verso, 2017).

16 Malik succinctly identified these in Charles Malik, "The Tide Must Turn," in *To Meet the Communist Challenge*, by Edward Teller and Charles Malik (Saint Louis University, 1960). On the counter-Enlightenment, see Georg Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, trans. Peter Palmer (Verso, 2021 [1962]); Darrin M. McMahon, *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity* (Oxford University Press, 2001); Graeme Garrard, *Counter-Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (Routledge, 2004); Zeev Sternhell, *The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition*, trans. David Maisel (Yale University Press, 2010).

17 On the friend-enemy distinction, see Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," 1926, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_1.htm; Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition*, trans. George Schwab (University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1932]).



Figure 3. Dr. Charles Malik, photographed in New York circa January 1946, during his tenure as Permanent Representative from Lebanon to the United Nations. Courtesy of UN Photo.

and popular sovereignty. This only steeled his commitment: what was required was not simply a matter of defending the status quo from a position of strength, but a mobilized, global counterrevolution to purify a corrupt order. In "Survival in an Age of Revolution," his 1970 keynote to a closed Coca-Cola Company corporate seminar, Malik argued that "the great Asian and African revolution" posed the fundamental questions: Should international "rules, norms, standards" be set by "the less developed or the more developed? The relatively primitive or the relatively advanced?. . . Or, shortly and simply, the less or the more?"[18]

Historians have recently devoted considerable effort to underlining how decolonization was pregnant with numerous unrealized possibilities. Many have stressed the contingency of the proliferation of nation-states after imperial retreat, emphasizing unfulfilled federal and internationalist alternatives including social democratic federations of colonies with imperial metropoles; anticolonial regional federations; and neoliberal political federation without economic sovereignty.[19] Charles Malik's praxis

18 Charles Malik, *Survival in an Age of Revolution* (Coca-Cola Company, 1972), 15–16.

19 Manu Goswami, "Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms," *American Historical Review* 117, no. 5 (2012): 1461–85; Frederick Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective," *The Journal of African History* 49, no. 49 (2008): 167–96; Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship Between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton University Press, 2014); Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Duke

highlights an overlooked philo-colonial option: continued imperial sovereignty over a nominally independent and rigidly stratified nation-state without equal citizenship.[20] This aim was advanced not only by metropolitan imperialists, but also, distinctively, by a number of their philo-colonial subjects. A careful reading of Malik's career reveals that the struggle over Lebanon, rather than being a parochial example of endemic sectarian conflict, is best understood as part of a global struggle over popular sovereignty, "majority rule," and liberation from imperial structures.

Counterrevolution is more than mere opposition to revolution, and it is neither synonymous with conservatism nor imperialism. Drawing on European history, Mayer usefully posits the concept of an "antirevolutionary coalition" that emerges in crisis situations featuring credible revolutionary challengers. Conservatives "support the status quo" and seek accommodations, reactionaries reject Enlightenment-influenced systems of democratic representation and "advocate a return to a mythical and romanticized past" with fixed hierarchy, while counterrevolutionaries work to mobilize masses to act to purify the corrupt order by force.[21] This popular aspect distinguishes counterrevolutionaries: conservatives and reactionaries traditionally distrust the masses and seek to contain them.[22] Mayer's framework of transnational revolution and counterrevolution usefully subsumes interwar European fascism within a longer arc, as generalizing fascism beyond its classical setting often generates heated and sterile debates over whether a particular movement conforms to or affiliates with the allegedly authentic European original.[23] But it also presumes political conflict as principally contained within a sovereign state or regional system, making it insufficient for the extra-European world subject to Euro-American political, economic, military, and cultural power. Such historiographical Eurocentrism is especially pronounced in the study of conservative and counterrevolutionary thought, where questions of empire or even

University Press, 2015); Karuna Mantena, "Popular Sovereignty and Anti-Colonialism," in *Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective*, ed. Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Getachew, *Worldmaking After Empire*; Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Harvard University Press, 2018).

20 This philo-colonialism, mostly missed by historians, distinguishes him from conservative anticolonialists aligned with the US, such as Carlos Romulo, who long insisted on national independence while opposing radical social transformation. Glenn Mitoma, "*Mode d'assujettissement*: Charles Malik, Carlos Romulo and the Emergence of the United Nations Human Rights Regime," in *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law*, ed. José-Manuel Barreto (Cambridge Scholars, 2013); Lisandro E. Claudio, "The Anti-Communist Third World: Carlos Romulo and the Other Bandung," *Southeast Asian Studies* 4, no. 1 (2015): 125–56; Mark Reeves, "Carlos Romulo, Rotary Internationalism, and Conservative Anticolonialism," in *The Anticolonial Transnational: Imaginaries, Mobilities, and Networks in the Struggle against Empire*, ed. Erez Manela and Heather Streets-Salter (Cambridge University Press, 2023).

21 Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution*, 49, 60; see also Traverso, *Revolution*, 161–73.

22 Perry Anderson also identifies the curtailing of popular sovereignty as the focus of conservative European political theory. Perry Anderson, "The Intransigent Right: Michael Oakeshott, Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, Friedrich von Hayek," in *Spectrum: From Left to Right in the World of Ideas* (Verso, 2007), 15–17, 26–7.

23 The notion of non-European history as derivative is of course hardly limited to discussions of fascism. However, the national exceptionalism often claimed by counterrevolutionaries reinforces perceptions of uniqueness. For an influential example skeptical of fascism's relevance outside of interwar Europe, see Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, trans. Leila Vennewitz (Mentor, 1969 [1963]). For an anti-exceptionalist alternative, see Alberto Toscano, *Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis* (Verso, 2023).

non-Europeans are often absent.[24] Malik's philo-colonial project highlights the relative autonomy of local counterrevolutionaries and imperial metropoles, which often pursued distinct interests while sharing significant political traditions and frequent alliances.

Malik's ideological and material links reveal his entanglement in civil wars on local, regional, and international levels; the centrality of US empire in structuring civil wars in the Third World; and the contribution of so-called peripheral intellectuals to ideologies in the metropole.[25] Though he carried no weapon in his long and distinguished career, Malik's role encompassed the Ivy Leagues and the halls of power alike. A Harvard PhD in philosophy, Malik served and shaped the Lebanese state as minister and ambassador to the US (1945–55), the UN (1946–59), and Batista's Cuba (1946–55); minister of national education and fine arts (1956–57) and foreign affairs (1956–58); and as an elected member of parliament (achieved with CIA funding, 1957–61).[26] His career was no less distinguished internationally, having served as a delegate to the 1945 UN Conference on International Organization and the 1955 Bandung conference; and as the president of the UN Economic and Social Council (1948) and the General Assembly (1958–59). But his political commitments were most directly expressed in his founding role in the Front for Freedom and Man in Lebanon (FFML), the counterrevolutionary alliance in Lebanon's international civil war (1975–90). Malik actively encouraged militia leaders and fighters, spoke on their behalf, sought and acquired material support, and, most vitally, designed their war aims while providing the movement with its historical narrative and philosophical bearings.

Recent Western scholarship on Malik has omitted this pivotal phase in his life and career. Instead, Malik has been revived simply as a key figure in the evolution of the modern human rights movement due to his decisive role in co-authoring the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[27] The swift evaporation of Malik's

24 Non-European views, contexts, and the relation to empire are outside of Bee Wilson, "Counter-Revolutionary Thought," in *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2020); Corey Robin, *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin* (Oxford University Press, 2011); Corey Robin, *Fear: The History of a Political Idea* (Oxford University Press, 2004). Albert O. Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy* (Belknap Press, 1991) includes a few examples of Latin American conservativism, nonetheless the thinkers it examines are overwhelmingly European.

25 History Lab's "Declassification Engine" identified Malik as the seventh most redacted figure in the Eisenhower administration archives, ahead of Patrice Lumumba and behind Mohammad Mossadegh. History Lab, "How the Declassification Engine Caught America's Most Redacted: Eisenhower Edition," http://history-lab.org/declassificationengine/americas-most-redacted.

26 On CIA backing, see Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (W.W. Norton, 1980), 251–53; Irene L. Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958* (Columbia University Press, 2006), 222–23.

27 See Raja Choueri, *Charles Malek, discours, droits de l'homme et ONU* (Edition Felix Beryte, 1998); Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Habib C. Malik, ed., *The Challenge of Human Rights: Charles Malik and the Universal Declaration* (Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000); Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (Random House, 2001); Susan Waltz, "Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2001): 42–72; Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Harvard University Press, 2010); Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Glenn Mitoma, "Charles H. Malik and Human Rights: Notes on a Biography," *Biography* 33, no. 1 (2010): 222–41; Mary Ann Glendon, *The*

counterrevolutionary commitments exposes the conservative tenor of the post-Cold War era.[28] Yet it is more curious that works on the Lebanese civil war, even those focusing on the predominantly Maronite Christian FFML, also marginalize Malik's contributions.[29] Malik's influential articulation of a Lebanese nationalism wedded to hierarchical sectarian institutions, backed by the bullets of the FFML militias, reveals how nationalism in the colonial world could also be articulated to buttress, rather than challenge, imperial sovereignty in the age of decolonization.[30]

In many ways such politics sought a continuation of the façade of independence produced by the League of Nations mandate system.[31] The very invention of the Lebanese state by the French in 1920 was designed to weaken opposition to French rule in the political architecture of the post-Ottoman order while appealing to notions of self-determination and minority rights.[32] By French design, the autonomy of the Lebanese state was constrained externally by imperial power and internally by the hierarchy of local sectarian institutions. This sectarian regime instituted a dense and interlocking system of empire, state, and sect that structurally prioritized Christian over Muslim sectarian power—and via the expanding corpus of sectarian personal status laws,

Forum and the Tower: How Scholars and Politicians Have Imagined the World, From Plato to Eleanor Roosevelt (Oxford University Press, 2011), 199–220; Glenn Mitoma, *Human Rights and the Negotiation of American Power* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); José-Manuel Barreto, ed., *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law* (Cambridge Scholars, 2013); Sayed Matar, *Charles Malik: un défenseur des droits de l'homme* (L'Harmattan, 2017); Alexandre Lefebvre, *Human Rights and the Care of the Self* (Duke University Press, 2018); Hans Ingvar Roth, "P.C. Chang and Charles Malik: The Two Philosophers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (2023): 545–67. For a more critical analysis of Malik's contributions to the UDHR, see Jessica Whyte, *The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism* (Verso, 2019).

28 One account implausibly maintains that Malik "dedicated books, such as *Man in the Struggle for Peace*, as well as occasional pamphlets, such as *War and Peace* (1949) and *Survival in the Age of Revolution* (1972), to exposing the militaristic and undemocratic nature of the age." Lefebvre, *Human Rights and the Care of the Self*, 151.

29 Such works often focus on militia activities as opposed to their intellectual premises. Alain Ménargues, *Les secrets de la guerre du Liban: Du coup d'État de Bachir Gémayel aux massacres des camps palestiniens* (Éditions Albin Michel, 2004); Jonathan C. Randal, *Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon* (Viking, 1983); Walid Phares, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance* (Rienner, 1995). An insightful exception is Muḥammad Aḥmad Shūmān, "Qirāʾa fī fikr Shārl Mālik wa-l-Kaslik: al-ʿUnsuriyya bayn 'Ẓuhūrāt al-Kiyān' wa-l-Intiḥār," *al-Ṭarīq* 44, no. 3 (1985): 101–25.

30 While the formation of Lebanese nationalism has been well studied during the late Ottoman and French colonial periods, few have tracked its evolution in the independence era. Carol Hakim, *The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840–1920* (University of California Press, 2013); Fawwāz Ṭarābulsī, *Ṣilāt balā Waṣil: Mīshāl Shīḥa wa-l-Idīūlūjīyyā al-Lubnāniyya* (Rīyādh al-Rayīss, 1999); Raghid El-Solh, *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation* (I.B. Tauris, 2004); Michelle Hartman and Alessandro Olsaretti, "'The First Boat and the First Oar': Inventions of Lebanon in the Writings of Michel Chiha," *Radical History Review*, no. 86 (2003): 36–65; Kais M. Firro, *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and State Under the Mandate* (I.B. Tauris, 2002); Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: In Search of Identity in Lebanon* (I.B. Tauris, 2004); Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (I.B. Tauris, 1988).

31 Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford University Press, 2015); Michael Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Ussama Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern Arab World* (University of California Press, 2019).

32 Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945* (Princeton University Press, 1987), 57–60; Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*.

the male over the female.[33] The unwritten 1943 National Pact (al-mithāq al-waṭanī) and its corollaries preserved these structures after independence.[34] These customary practices ordered the system of sectarian political representation by reserving the commanding heights of the Lebanese state for Maronite Christians: offices of the Presidency (endowed with tremendous prerogatives), the Commander of the Armed Forces, the Chief of Military Intelligence, and the Governor of the Central Bank, as well as the maintenance of a 6:5 Christian majority in parliament. At the bottom of these layers of authority was the citizen, whose political autonomy was everywhere in chains. This political form was idealized by the partisans of a Lebanese nation-state separate from the broader Syrian or pan-Arab varieties advocated by their more numerous rivals. "Perhaps the special and foremost characteristic of the Lebanese system," Malik wrote in 1973—the eve of civil war—"is that the state is not the institution *par excellence*, as is the case in many countries; rather, the state is an institution among other institutions."[35] The institutional core of philo-colonial "Lebanist" political theory ensures the Lebanese state does not achieve sovereign primacy over other local institutions or in its international relations. This arrangement was ideally compatible with imperial penetration and private capital accumulation.[36]

While scholars have argued that Malik was driven by "his deep and unwavering commitment to Lebanese sovereignty," closer examination casts doubt on this assertion.[37] He was under no illusions that actually existing Lebanese sovereignty could be maintained without imperial protection. If he publicly campaigned for the necessity of Lebanese independence—from the Arab world—his most candid thoughts record a deep ambivalence, even opposition to the concepts of national independence and popular sovereignty. In an unpublished book manuscript, Malik elaborated his feelings toward independence in the era of national liberation:

> I never believed in "independence" as others do. . . . I had fundamental questionings of [it] in 1943 when people were getting excited about "independence." I always mistrusted

33 Imperially managed sectarian political representation was pioneered in Mount Lebanon, especially after it became a semi-autonomous region within the Ottoman domains in 1861. However, this important precursor should not be seamlessly collapsed into the history of the larger colonial state declared in 1920 by the French. See Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*; Provence, *Last Ottoman Generation*; Nadine Méouchy et al., eds., *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives* (Brill, 2004). On the gendered dimensions of the sectarian regime, see Maya Mikdashi, *Sextarianism: Sovereignty, Secularism, and the State in Lebanon* (Stanford University Press, 2022); Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (Columbia University Press, 2000).

34 Edmond Rabbath, *La formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel: Essai de synthèse* (Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1986), 539–61.

35 Shārl Mālik, *Lubnān fī Dhātih* (Muʾassasat A. Badrān, 1974), 61. The instructive emphases are reproduced as translated in Charles Malik, *Lebanon in Itself*, trans. George Sabra and Kenneth Mortimer (Notre Dame University Press, 2004), 52.

36 Hicham Safieddine, *Banking on the State: The Financial Foundations of Lebanon* (Stanford University Press, 2019); Toufic K. Gaspard, *A Political Economy of Lebanon, 1948–2002: The Limits of Laissez-Faire* (Brill, 2004); Carolyn L. Gates, *The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy* (I.B. Tauris, 1998).

37 Andrew Arsan, "'A Unique Little Country': Lebanese Exceptionalism, Pro-Americanism and the Meanings of Independence in the Writings of Charles Malik, c.1946-1962," in *Decolonisation and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence*, ed. Elisabeth Leake and Leslie James (Bloomsbury, 2015), 110.

people's motives on this point. Independence meant independence from France, from Europe. I did not want, and I do not want now, [in] 1965, to be independent from France and Europe. Three forces wanted this independence, but not the Lebanese Christians: the English and Americans, the Russians and the Arabs. . . . independence in this sense was a victory over the Lebanese Christians, a defeat for Europe and her presence here. . . . I prefer to be a European colony to being a most powerful and independent Middle East state pitted spiritually and culturally against Europe. I am part of Europe and I have no desire to break away from it.[38]

If the 1960s–70s Arab left viewed the exiled Palestinians as possessing the revolutionary agency needed to transform the region, Malik and the Arab right conferred Lebanese Christians with the task of exorcising the revolutionary subversion and reviving the spirit of imperial sovereignty.

Malik was born in 1906 in Biṭirrām, a Greek Orthodox village in the al-Kūra region of Ottoman Syria.[39] By then, the Malik family was already firmly enmeshed within the overlapping and competing networks of modernizing institutions in the Levant run by American missionaries and the Ottoman state. Kūra had been a part of the semiautonomous governorate (*mutaṣarrifiyya*) of Mount Lebanon since 1861, and the leading men of the Malik family reportedly held the title of *shaykh* as landed state intermediaries since the eighteenth century.[40] Several contrasting Christian institutional traditions shaped his early life. Malik served as an altar boy in his village's Greek Orthodox church, where the priest was his father's uncle. But Malik's formal education was nearly entirely in American Protestant missionary institutions. Malik referred to his three years boarding at the Tripoli Boys School as "the most significant in my religious formation."[41] It was there that the American "God-fearing men and women, sincere, humble, hardworking" disciplined him into a daily routine of prayer, scripture, and study. Following in his father's footsteps, Malik left Kūra in 1923 to study at the American

38 He added: "Quite different in truth from what I boasted it to be the other day before the Lebanese Student Society [at AUB]. Even I, who know the truth, cannot wholly freely voice it. I consign it to these pages. I confess it to Jesus Christ. I hint it to very close friends." [c. 1965], Charles Malik, "The Race," 68.1–2. CMP, Box 243, Folder 3. Malik's comments to the Lebanese Student League appear in the June 1966 article, "Lubnān wa-l-Insān," *al-Rābiṭa al-Lubnāniyya*. A published article tackling the question of decolonization and empire echoes but dilutes these conclusions. Charles Malik, "Independence: Reality and Myth," in *The Legacy of Imperialism* (Chatham College, 1960).

39 His father, Dr. Ḥabīb Malik, was an 1898 graduate of the Medical School of the Syrian Protestant College (renamed the American University of Beirut in 1920). His mother, Zarīfa Karam, was the niece of Faraḥ Antūn, the *nahḍa* (Arab renaissance) writer, editor, and secularist from nearby Tripoli.

40 On the Malik family's social origins, see Tony Nasrallah, dir., *Charles Malik: A Universal Person*, 2016. On the war of 1860 and the history of the *mutaṣarrifiyya*, see Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (University of California Press, 2000); Hakim, *Origins*; Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (University of California Press, 1993).

41 Charles Malik, "A Near Eastern Witness to Christian Missions," *Theology Today* 5, no. 4 (1949): 527–32, here 527.

University of Beirut, excelling in his studies in mathematics and physics.[42] Graduating as valedictorian, he moved with his family to Sultan Fuʾad's Cairo in 1929. Malik's main hub there was the nearby Young Men's Christian Association, where he came to lead a philosophy and religion discussion group.[43] Malik was a sterling example of the "aspirational Anglophilia" of some Syrian Christians and the intermediary role they were assigned in the colonial social order in the early twentieth century.[44]

In 1932, Malik left Egypt to study philosophy at Harvard under Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947).[45] At Harvard he was exposed to the captains of American intellectual, political, and economic life—a ruling class and a social environment Malik would remain enamored with for life. Much later, Malik adopted "Harvard" as his nom de guerre in dispatches from the US to the FFML militia leaders. Aside from Whitehead, Malik drew formative intellectual inspiration from Søren Kierkegaard's anxiety over free will, Jacques Maritain's Christian personalism, Karl Jaspers's European exceptionalism, Saint Thomas Aquinas's Catholicism, and Friedrich Nietzsche's aristocratic reproach of Western decadence.[46] But his 1937 dissertation suggests his most impactful direct mentor was Martin Heidegger, under whom he studied in 1935–36 at Universität Freiburg.[47]

One of the most influential intellectuals of the century, Heidegger was also a member of the Nazi Party from 1933 until its demise in 1945. He had been the "Führer-rector" of the university from April 1933 until his resignation one year later. Recent publication of Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* conclusively demonstrate that he was enthusiastically pro-Hitler in the early 1930s, philosophically antisemitic, permanently unapologetic and deflective on the Nazi regime's genocidal policies, disappointed with its defeat in 1945, and radically committed to German exceptionalism until his death in 1976.[48] Heidegger's summer 1935 lectures on metaphysics contained arguments for

42 On the history of AUB, see Betty S. Anderson, *The American University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education* (University of Texas Press, 2011); Ussama Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations: 1820–2001* (PublicAffairs, 2010).

43 Malik, "Near Eastern Witness," 528.

44 Sherene Seikaly, "The Matter of Time," *American Historical Review* 124, no. 5 (2019): 1681–88, here 1683.

45 Relieved to be leaving his "hated" life in Egypt, Malik destroyed many of his papers while leaving Alexandria. Author interview with Habib C. Malik, May 31, 2017, al-Rābiyya, Lebanon.

46 Malik summarizes his view of philosophical development in Shārl Mālik, *al-Muqaddima*, vol. 1 (Dār an-Nahār, 1977). See also Habib C. Malik, "The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World," in *Kierkegaard's International Reception Tome III: The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas*, ed. Jon Stewart (Routledge, 2009); William Sweet, "Charles Malik: From Process to Reality," in *On the Philosophical Thought of Charles Malik, Vol. 1: Whitehead, Reason and Spirit*, ed. Habib C. Malik and Tony E. Nasrallah (Notre Dame University Louaize, 2019).

47 Other scholars have noted this philosophical influence—but have disregarded or misconstrued its politics. Charles Malik, *On Being and Time: The Section on Heidegger in Charles Malik's 1937 Harvard Thesis*, ed. Nader El-Bizri (Orient-Institut Beirut & Ergon Verlag, 2022); Martin Woessner, "Provincializing Human Rights? The Heideggerian Legacy from Charles Malik to Dipesh Chakrabarty," in *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law*, ed. José-Manuel Barreto (Cambridge Scholars, 2013).

48 The literature on Heidegger's politics is massive. See, for instance, Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Yale University Press, 2009 [2005]); Gregory Fried, ed., *Confronting Heidegger: A Critical Dialogue on Politics and Philosophy* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020); Richard Wolin, *Heidegger in Ruins: Between Philosophy and Ideology* (Yale University Press, 2022); Peter Trawny, *Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy*, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (University of Chicago Press, 2014); Charles Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism,*

"the inner truth and greatness" of "National Socialism."[49] Briefly, Heidegger's existential reading of geopolitics cast an essentialized German *Volk* as caught in the "great pincers" between the materialistic US and Soviet Union.[50] In order to avoid Europe's annihilation between them, it was the task of the Germans—"the people richest in neighbors and hence the most endangered people . . . the metaphysical people"—to retrieve their authentic vocation, which he called "the inception of our historical-spiritual Dasein."[51] As Jürgen Habermas noted, "the lecture of 1935 mercilessly unmasks the fascist coloring of that time."[52]

Malik wrote that Heidegger's "phenomenological method, with its imperative '*zu den Sachen selbst*,' to the things themselves," had "opened my philosophical eyes as no other method had done."[53] Drawing on Ernst Bloch, Charles Bambach reads Heidegger's project in terms of a "*pastorale militans*"—a startling synthesis of pastoral and militant themes, in a rhetoric of folkloric roots, homeland, and authenticity undergirding a militant project of exclusion and extermination amidst a cataclysmic conjuncture.[54] While Malik was repelled by many social manifestations of Nazism during his time there, he absorbed and deployed Heideggerian existential geopolitics for the remainder of his life, as we will see.[55] Their ideas, motivation, goals, and actions were, within their own contexts, qualitatively similar expressions of a deeply counterrevolutionary anxiety.

With this orientation, in fall 1937 Malik returned to French mandate Lebanon to take up a professorship at the American University of Beirut (AUB). During his 1937–45 tenure at AUB, he inspired both students and colleagues alike with his commanding vision of what Fanon called "the Graeco-Latin pedestal."[56] He was instrumental in establishing the Department of Philosophy and the Cultural Studies Program—a survey of Western Civilization. Malik cultivated a generation of influential Arab acolytes, including the journalist, editor, Lebanese education minister, and UN representative Ghassan Tueni; modernist poet Yusif al-Khal; the founder of the Palestine Research Center, Fayez Sayegh, and his brother Yusif, economist and one-time member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive Committee; noted historian Albert Hourani and his brother Cecil, a political scientist and advisor to Tunisian President

and the Greeks (Cornell University Press, 2005); Johannes Fritsche, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's* Being and Time (University of California Press, 1999).

49 Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Yale University Press, 2000 [1953]), 213.

50 See also Theodore Kisiel and Richard Polt, "Heidegger's Philosophical Geopolitics in the Third Reich," in *A Companion to Heidegger's* Introduction to Metaphysics (Yale University Press, 2001).

51 Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 41.

52 Jürgen Habermas, "Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of the Lectures of 1935," in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. Richard Wolin, trans. William S. Lewis (MIT Press, 1993), 195.

53 Charles Malik, "A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger," *The Thomist* 41, no. 1 (1977): 9.

54 Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, 4–5; Ernst Bloch, *Heritage of Our Times*, trans. Neville and Stephen Plaice (University of California Press, 1990 [1962]), 48–55.

55 Charles Malik, "Fourteen Months in Germany," October 29, 1936, Notre Dame University-Louaize, Charles Malik Papers. Malik's later published recollections purged his German studies from the context of Nazism. See Charles Malik, "A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger," *The Thomist* 41, no. 1 (1977): 5–9.

56 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (Grove, 1963 [1961]), 46.

Habib Bourguiba.[57] Even the indefatigable Palestinian revolutionary George Habash, who recalled how Malik "derided the idea of Arabism and Arab nationalism," was undeterred from maintaining "friendly" relations with his professor and erstwhile political adversary while in university.[58] Malik's capacity to inspire, however, was not solely positive. Though known to be an interested pupil of his at the time, Palestinian intellectual Hisham Sharabi recalled Malik's teaching in the 1940s as the pinnacle of authoritarianism.[59] Malik also made a grand impression on the precocious son of his wife's cousin, Edward Said. If the young Said was initially enthralled by Malik's "impression of extraordinary gravity and massiveness," he would later come to understand Malik's career as "the great negative intellectual lesson of my life, an example which for the last three decades I have found myself grappling with, living through, analyzing, over and over and over with regret, mystification, and bottomless disappointment."[60]

While Malik's entry into politics is conventionally dated to his 1945 appointment as Lebanon's Minister to the United States, his involvement actually began during the Second World War. Between October 1943 and March 1944, he composed and dispatched the first two parts of a projected three-part work entitled *The Problem of Lebanon: An Interpretation* to Brigadier Sir Iltyd Clayton, the Adviser for Arab Affairs at the British military's General Headquarters in Cairo.[61] *The Problem of Lebanon* elucidated Malik's political philosophy, while its prescriptions and audience meant it was the enunciation of a doctrine. The work should be viewed as Malik's philo-colonial response to the competing anticolonial Arab or Syrian nationalist manifestos of the era.[62] In this rich

57 Malik's Catholic philosophical leanings also inspired several associates to convert to Catholicism, including his wife Eva Badr; ʿAfīfʿUsayrān, a scion of Shiʿi Muslim *zuʿamāʾ* who became a priest; and Albert Hourani, who described Malik as "so far almost unknown but undoubtedly the greatest intellectual figure in the Arab world today." Albert Hourani, "Great Britain and Arab Nationalism," Chapter XIII, 2, March 1943, FCO 141/14281, British National Archives. For more on Malik's influence, see Jens Hanssen, "Albert's World: Historicism, Liberal Imperialism and the Struggle for Palestine, 1936–48," in *Arabic Thought Beyond the Liberal Age* (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Yusif A. Sayigh, *Yusif Sayigh: Arab Economist, Palestinian Patriot: A Fractured Life Story*, ed. Rosemary Sayigh (American University in Cairo Press, 2015), 130; Albert Hourani, "Patterns of the Past," in *Paths to the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Naff (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1993); Robyn Creswell, *City of Beginnings: Poetic Modernism in Beirut* (Princeton University Press, 2019).

58 Jūrj Ḥabash, *Ṣafaḥāt min Masīratī al-Niḍāliyya* (Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabīyya, 2019), 49.

59 Hisham Sharabi, *Embers and Ashes: Memoirs of an Arab Intellectual*, trans. Issa J. Boullata (Olive Branch Press, 2008 [1978]), 18–19; Hishām Sharābī, *al-Jamr wa-l-Ramād* (Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 1978), 29–31. While Georges Corm strongly criticizes the sectarian essentialism present in some of the major works of Albert Hourani and Sharabi, he misses that Malik was notably influential for both. Corm, *Arab Political Thought*, 56–57, 64–69.

60 Edward W. Said, *Out of Place: A Memoir* (Knopf, 1999), 264. Said's work and political commitments were effectively the antithesis of Malik's. A recent work centering their relationship is M.D. Walhout, *Arab Intellectuals and American Power: Edward Said, Charles Malik, and the US in the Middle East* (I.B. Tauris, 2021); see also Timothy Brennan, *Places of Mind: A Life of Edward Said* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021).

61 The Hourani brothers, British citizens both, left their teaching posts in Beirut to join the British war effort under Clayton and connected him with Malik. Author interview with Cecil Hourani, September 12, 2019, Marjʿayūn, Lebanon.

62 Particularly Antūn Saʿāda's *Nushūʾ al-Umam* (*The Emergence of Nations*, Antūn Saʿāda, 1938), Constantine Zurayq's *al-Waʿī al-Qawmī* (*National Consciousness*, Dār al-Makshūf, 1939), Edmond Rabbath's *Unité syrienne et devenir arabe* (*Syrian Unity and Becoming Arab*, Marcel Rivière 1937), and George Antonius's

text, Malik argued for the "uniqueness of Lebanon" in all of "Africa and Asia," and for its preservation by the British Empire as a "Christian-European-Arab state." This text's correspondences with, for instance, his 1976 "Why You Fight" speech, confirm that it set Malik's lifelong orientation.[63] Central to Malik's existential geopolitics is a rootedness in unabashed ahistorical essentialism, which was a crucial feature of Heidegger's philosophy and Said's conception of Orientalism.[64]

One of Malik's essential claims was that Lebanese state and society were infertile for revolution, whether anticolonial or socialistic. Unlike other British colonial possessions, Malik asserted Lebanon enjoyed the "absence of class and color lines."[65] "We do not have," Malik wrote, "at the base of the social structure a huge mass of ambiguous humanity only indulgently distinguishable from the brutes."[66] Clayton therefore need not expect entrenched oppositional blocs in Lebanon like those in Egypt and Iraq.[67] This tranquility was complimented by an allegedly scientific biological affinity to Europe. "I do not know the exact racial situation," Malik explained,

> but so far as any negro blood is concerned, I should be surprised if Lebanon did not have much less than one per thousand of this strain, or that at most one per thousand of its population had any negro blood at all. . . . Racially we are a typical "Mediterranean" people: a very fine mixture of semitic and European blood, with Africa hardly represented at all. I am not here presuming any racial doctrine, that "European swindle," as Nietzsche would call it; I am only stating the bare positive-scientific facts about the racial composition of Lebanon.[68]

As a socially harmonious, petit bourgeois, and (dissembling aside) racially fit polity, Malik argued Lebanon would be a sturdier asset for the crown, impervious to anticolonial nationalist agitation and class conflict.

The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Hamish Hamilton, 1938). Significantly, all of these authors were anticolonial and secular Christians.

63 Furthermore, Malik repeats key facets of the argument, and even exact phrases, in "The Near East: The Search for Truth," *Foreign Affairs* 30, no. 2 (January 1952): 231–64 and December 30, 1976, "Free Lebanon (Revised Version)," 3, CMP, Box 145, Folder 9.

64 Jürgen Habermas, "Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective," trans. John McCumber, *Critical Inquiry* 15, no. 2 (1989): 439; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Vintage, 1978), 246–47.

65 Malik improbably maintained "There is no landed aristocracy to speak of, no hereditary nobility, no class of Pashas and 'zu'ama [political bosses].'" Charles Malik, "The Problem of Lebanon: An Interpretation" (Beirut, 1943), 15–16, 21, Brigadier Iltyd Clayton Collection, Box 1, Middle East Centre Archive, St. Antony's College.

66 Malik contrasted this with Egypt: "The whole problem of the fellaheen [peasants], the badu [Bedouin], the 'asha'ir [tribes] is absent with us. . . . there is absolutely no comparison between our people and those 'people.'" Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 16. Emphasis in original.

67 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 19.

68 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 16. Malik's appeal to biological race resonates with efforts to construct a non-Islamic Iranian nationalism using Orientalism and race science as "a way of asserting Iran as an equal and authentic member of a trans-European modernity," as discussed in Afshin Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870-1940* (University of Washington Press, 2008), 75. However, unlike the Lebanese Phoenicianists, Malik was much more interested in constructing a political identity legitimated by religion than secular mythologies. See Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia*; Hartman and Olsaretti, "First Boat"; Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*.

However, Malik acknowledged "Lebanese sectarianism" was an "important feature which is somewhat analogous to the class problem."[69] He perceived secular nationalism as merely a passing phase: the bonds of religion were deeper, and therefore the regime of sectarian political representation was justified.[70] The division between Christians and Muslims and the issue of demographic numbers haunted the Lebanese state from its inception. The pretense of a Christian majority allowed a Lebanon politically dominated by Maronite Francophiles to appear democratic.[71] Malik, however, seldom emphasized representative democracy, because of his fundamental conviction in "the hierarchy of being" or "the order of truth."[72] Much of the text consists of Malik's phenomenological taxonomy of sectarian communities, assessed by their presumed value to his "Christian-European-Arab" ideal polity. Absurdly comparing "Moslem discrimination and persecution and slaughter of Christians" to the Nazi suppression of Jews in Europe, Malik professed that "Moslem-Arab" was inferior to "the living Graeco-Roman-Christian-humane tradition."[73] Transposing European justifications for imperial sovereignty to Lebanese Christian supremacy, Malik argued that Christians must dominate the state structure with no consideration of proportional representation or popular sovereignty:

> Thus even if the Moslems formed ninety per cent of the population, it would remain objectively true that Lebanon should not be dominated by Islam. It is no more a function of pathetic democratic procedure than is the (in my opinion) legitimate "domination" (provided it be just) of Africa and Asia by the Europeans a matter of counting heads. The higher should not be ruled by the lower; darkness should not be allowed to overwhelm light; the more advanced should not be held back by the more backward; the more primitive should not decide on the destiny of the more civilized; the actual is prior to the potential: these are the objectively true principles on the basis of which the Lebanese Christians feel that it is absolutely just for them to demand that Lebanon be not dominated by Islam.[74]

For Malik, the meeting of Islamic and Christian civilizations in Lebanon, with the relatively balanced demography created by the French-mandated borders, exposed the ultimate test of Islam and the West alike.[75] To Malik's chagrin, a more consequential

69 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 20.
70 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 58.
71 Scholars of Lebanon's two censuses emphasize how colonial authorities constructed slim Christian majorities in 1921 and 1932 by excluding resident Muslims—especially unsettled groups, refugees, and opponents of the mandate—while including Christian refugees and emigrants. Stacy D. Fahrenthold, *Between the Ottomans and the Entente: The First World War in the Syrian and Lebanese Diaspora, 1908–1925* (Oxford University Press, 2019), 137–59; Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who Are the Lebanese?," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 2 (1999): 219–41.
72 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 92, 113. "The talk about democracy, freedom, representative government, is woefully inadequate: it deals for the most part with pure form, sheer external machinery. It does not satisfy man's deepest cravings for friendship and understanding and truth and love." Charles Malik, *War and Peace* (National Committee for Free Europe, Inc., 1950), 30.
73 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 38, 95.
74 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 129–30.
75 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 101.

struggle developed over a neighboring piece of the former Ottoman domains. Though subsequently lauded for advancing the cause of Arab Palestine at the UN in 1947–48, Malik's comments in *The Problem of Lebanon* undermine claims of his anti-Zionism and foreshadow his openly Christian Zionist, anti-Palestinian positions in the 1970s and 80s:

> A free "Christian" country has something to give, not only the Moslems, but also the neighboring Jews of Palestine. If we regard the truth alone, we must confess that the Moslem Arabs have nothing to give the Jews except land! Moslem existence is fundamentally defensive, Islam having nothing positive to give the world today. If Jesus Christ were vigorously alive in "Christian" Lebanon, He would not be a simple thing to intrigue and challenge and judge the Jews with. The Lebanese would be the only Arabs from whom the Jews could learn something. One has got to know Jewish young men intimately to realize how much the heart of Israel really craves for the forgiveness and love of Christ.[76]

As with Muslims, Malik's views of Jews were stamped by his own Christian supremacy. Altogether, *The Problem of Lebanon* is the apotheosis of Lebanese Christian exceptionalist ideology. Yet despite its grandiosity of expression, Malik's practical recommendations to Clayton aimed to preserve the status quo, as established under the French mandate and envisioned by the recently concluded National Pact, rather than to rectify it. This reveals the essentially conservative nature of his thought at the time.

To return to Mayer's typology, he was neither a reactionary longing for a bygone golden age, nor was he yet a counterrevolutionary committed to reordering the world through popular mobilization. Malik did not have to be counterrevolutionary in 1943–44. The sectarian regime secured the Christian supremacy he advocated, even if inchoate domestic and foreign threats to it loomed. *The Problem of Lebanon*, however, laid the intellectual foundation for Malik's philo-colonial, Christian supremacist position in Lebanon's international civil wars of 1958 and 1975–90.

Less than a year later, Malik was plucked out of AUB and plunged into diplomatic work by the first president of independent Lebanon, Bishara al-Khuri. In April 1945 he was Lebanon's delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization and was appointed Lebanon's Minister to the United States soon after. Malik's diplomatic tenure was mythical not only for his personal career, but for Lebanese nationalism as well. The Syrian-American Club of Washington, DC celebrated Malik's arrival with a dinner. "The government of our ancient homeland should be congratulated," declared Princeton historian and Lebanese emigrant Philip Hitti, "on having had sense enough to choose not an aristocrat, not a politician but a scholar, a representative of the true tradition of

76 Malik, "Problem of Lebanon," 127.

Figure 4. The Lebanese delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), San Francisco, California, April 1945. Left to right: Charles Malik, ʿAbdallah al-Yafi, Wadih Naim, Joseph Salem, Subhi Mahmasani. UN Archives, S-1004-0002-04-00029.

Lebanon throughout the long ages."[77] The image of the philosopher-diplomat bolstered a vision of the Lebanese Republic as an enlightened, liberal state distinct from a former colonial world ruled by aristocrats, intemperate revolutionaries, or military generals.[78]

Malik mobilized his reputation to become the chief advocate of Lebanon's integration within the US-directed "Free World," and away from France. A significant point that Malik shared with Lebanese Francophiles concerned the necessity of Western security pacts—rather than a sovereign military—to safeguard Lebanon's independence from the Arab world.[79] Malik immediately got to work securing a US guarantee of Lebanese sovereignty, a project he doggedly pursued in his official capacities for more than a decade.[80]

The struggle over Palestine revealed Malik's commitment to a philo-colonial Lebanon withstood the greatest challenges in Arab-Western relations. Malik's defense of

77 November 20, 1945, AUB Special Collections, Philip Hitti Collection, Box 1, Folder 2.

78 For a typical statement of such exceptionalism by a leading Lebanese historian, see Kamal Salibi, "The Personality of Lebanon in Relation to the Modern World," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (John Wiley & Sons, 1966).

79 See Malik's correspondence with Michel Chiha (1891–1954), one of the state's intellectual founding fathers and a banker, publisher, and journalist. CMP, Box 10, Folder 7.

80 See Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, 113, 131, 187–88, 272–73.

Palestinian rights at the UN before the 1948 *nakba* (catastrophe) has become a celebrated facet of his legend as a liberal humanist.[81] Despite Malik's often cogent and passionate rhetoric, the Lebanese government—like all other Arab states—was unwilling to commit to stopping the Zionist conquest of Palestine.[82] In January 1949, Malik informed the US legation in Beirut that "Lebanon is now prepared to put Palestine episode to one side" and prioritize its "friendship with Western powers," offering to open its ports and military airfield to the US in the event of "possible future global war," with no expectation of quid pro quo.[83]

Following the Palestine debacle, Malik became known for his outspoken anticommunism at the UN. In doing so, he carried the authority of an Oriental but Western-trained Professor of Philosophy who engaged with the ideas of Marxism and the anticolonial movements of his region. For this he attracted the attention of both conservative Christians and liberal Cold Warriors in American politics. His consistent attacks on Communism with recourse to belief in God impressed the former; the latter were attracted by his positioning of the "Near East" as an essential partner in Western civilization's fight against totalitarian Eastern Communism. He was often able to do both at the same time, in impeccable accented English.

Malik's performances coincided with the rapid escalation of US state and popular anticommunist mobilization. Yet Malik's value as an interlocutor for the Free World foreign ministries was not solely due to his rhetorical originality, but his willingness to work with such agencies. For instance, Malik gained notoriety for his 23 November 1949 speech before the UN General Assembly's political committee on the Soviet peace resolution. "As a result of this speech," Malik boasted, "I receive scores of invitations to speak in universities, colleges, churches, clubs, conferences, and institutions. I have been accepting one to every ten that I refuse."[84] Yet recently declassified documents reveal that either the British Foreign Office or the US Department of State provided Malik a list of ten key points to emphasize at the UN. Malik's speech particularly addressed points three and four, which emphasized Communist denial of human rights, and the "hypocrisy" of the Soviet peace slogan.[85] The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.—a front organization clandestinely funded by the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense—later published and distributed the speech.[86]

81 For more on Malik's role in the diplomatic crisis over Palestine in late 1940s, see Shārl Mālik, *Shārl Mālik wa-l-Qaḍiyyat al-Filasṭīniyya*, ed. Sīmūn ʿAwwād (Muʾassasat A. Badrān, 1973); Shārl Mālik, *Isrāʾīl… Amīrkā…wa-l-ʿArab: Tanabbuʾāt min Niṣf Qarn: Taqrīr fī al-Waḍʿ al-Ḥāḍir, 5 Āb 1949* (Dār an-Nahār, 2002); Elad Ben-Dror, "'Knight of Internationalization': U.N. Delegate Charles Malik of Lebanon and UN General Assembly Resolution 303 Calling for the Internationalization of Jerusalem," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no. 5 (2021): 799–815.

82 See, for instance, Avi Shlaim, "Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948," in *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, ed. Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

83 Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, 125.

84 March 10, 1950, Malik to Michel Chiha, CMP, Box 10, Folder 7.

85 Ca. November 1949, "Important Aspects of the 'Essentials of Peace' Resolution Which Require Development in Detail in the Debate" CMP, Closed Box [former], Folder 1 (Box 95).

86 Malik, *War and Peace*. On the NCFE, see Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, 2nd ed. (New Press, 2013 [1999]); Katalin Kádár Lynn, ed., *The Inauguration*

Figure 5. President Richard Nixon and Charles Malik pose with members of the Walt Whitman High School Madrigal Choir of Bethesda, Maryland, after a Sunday Worship Service in the White House East Room. September 21, 1969. Photo by Oliver Atkins. Courtesy of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

Malik's subsequent interventions in the US political arena became so well publicized that no adequate account may be given here. A few notable examples, however, bear mentioning. Malik's influence reached at least two future US presidents before they assumed power. In July 1960, then-Vice President Richard Nixon extensively annotated a recent address by Malik, which he argued "should be required reading for all Americans."[87] Malik and Nixon would later maintain a relationship, paving the way for several personal meetings with the president on official, clandestine business. In early 1963, two Republican, white Midwestern congressmen, Gerald Ford and Melvin Laird—the future President and Secretary of Defense, respectively—resolved to publish their favorite texts in an agenda-setting collection for conservatives. Laird invited Malik to contribute the lead essay "deal[ing] with the underlying fundamentals of our entire project."[88] Malik's chapter "The Challenge to Western Civilization" launched *The Conservative Papers*, published in 1964.[89] The book included contributions from Henry Kissinger; neoliberal pioneers Milton Friedman, Gottfried Haberler, and Karl

of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee (Helena History Press, 2013).

87 July 15, 1960, Nixon to Assistant Attorney General George Doub. Richard Nixon Presidential Library (hereafter NL), Pre-Presidential Papers of Richard M. Nixon, Box 473, "Malik, Charles Habib (Hon.)."

88 March 1, 1963, Laird to Malik, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Melvin R. Laird Papers, Box A45, Conservative Papers, Malik, Charles (hereafter MLP).

89 Melvin R. Laird, ed., *The Conservative Papers* (Anchor, 1964).

Brandt; and Edward Teller, a Hungarian-American physicist and "father of the hydrogen bomb" who was reportedly an inspiration for Stanley Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove*.[90]

Malik combined such intellectual influence with appeal to a far more popular constituency: the growing evangelical movement. By 1963 Billy Graham quoted Charles Malik in his syndicated column; in 1980, Malik gave the inaugural address at the Billy Graham Center at Wheaton College.[91] Televangelist Pat Robertson attempted to arrange a meeting between then-President Jimmy Carter and Malik in 1976.[92] Malik also frequently associated with Campus Crusade for Christ, and was elected vice president of the England-based United Bible Societies (1966–72) and president of the World Council on Christian Education (1967–71). Malik's ability to synergize elite and grassroots constituencies made him a significant, if underappreciated, ideological touchstone for the budding mid-century American conservative movement. He also indicates the shared, if unequal entanglement of metropolitan and peripheral figures in a global counterrevolutionary project against the secularist, materialist, and collectivist spirit of the age.[93]

While the April 1955 Bandung conference is often portrayed as an apex of anticolonial worldmaking led figures like Sukarno, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Zhou Enlai, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the presence of numerous philo-colonial figures has received less attention.[94] Far from maintaining distance from imperial capitals, Malik coordinated with and received instructions from the governments of the US and the UK, much as he did during the 1949 UN debate. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles personally convinced a wavering Malik to attend.[95] Malik had been concerned that the conference would strengthen "Asian anti-white racialism" and that "the Communists" would secure Arab support in exchange for backing anticolonialism in Palestine and the *maghrib*. Complementing US pressure to attend and fight, the British passed Malik a memorandum outlining their aspirations for the Lebanese delegation. Malik took the instructions to heart, underlining key passages and noting on the first page: "Succinct & clear. Refer to it often."[96] At the conference, Malik emerged as a leading delegate of the pro-Western nations. He proposed the adoption of the UDHR and

90 Peter Goodchild, *Edward Teller: The Real Dr. Strangelove* (Harvard University Press, 2004).

91 Billy Graham, "Lenten Guideposts: Conversion Needs Alike," *The Oregonian*, March 30, 1963; Charles Malik, *The Two Tasks* (Cornerstone, 1980).

92 Walhout, *Arab Intellectuals*, 138.

93 This asymmetrical connection is reminiscent of the fin de siècle relations of German and Indian intellectuals around a common anti-British project identified by Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals across Empire* (Harvard University Press, 2014).

94 For works that attempt to puncture Bandung's mythical status, see Roland Burke, "Afro-Asian Alignment: Charles Malik and the Cold War at Bandung," in *Bandung 1955: Little Histories*, ed. Antonia Finnane and Derek McDougall (Monash University Press, 2010); Robert Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)," *Humanity* 4, no. 2 (2013): 261–88; Claudio, "The Anti-Communist Third World: Carlos Romulo and the Other Bandung."

95 *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), *1955–1957*, vol. 21, 82.

96 See the early 1955 British memorandum in CMP, Box CL, Folder 2, (Box 130). This document was declassified at my request in 2016.

strongly opposed creating any Afro-Asian institutional alternative to the UN.[97] Against non-alignment, Malik argued that if large states like India could afford to stand on their own, small states such as Lebanon could only feel safe if allied to the larger and stronger—meaning the imperial capitals.[98] Though Malik had prepared more overtly "pro-Western resolutions" and appeared willing to reject the final communique for not condemning "communist colonialism," he was disappointed to find little support and felt abandoned by his closest allies.[99] Afterward, Malik continued to proselytize against non-alignment in lectures, writings, and high-level consultations with US and Australian officials.[100]

Against the anticolonial aspirations of Bandung, Malik and Lebanese President Camille Chamoun favored its opposing institutionalized alliance: the anticommunist and philo-colonial Baghdad Pact. Initially a British-promoted defense treaty linking Hashemite Iraq and Turkey, signed on February 24, 1955, the US encouraged its enlargement to create a "Northern Tier" alliance of states surrounding the Soviet Union that the US and UK could support without joining.[101] The struggle between the principles of Bandung against Baghdad was embodied in the seminal contest over the limits of Arab and imperial sovereignty sparked by Nasser's July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

Malik's 1956–58 tenure as foreign minister under President Chamoun was an important facet of this competition. He took full advantage of his position to implement his vision of Lebanon—and indeed, the regional state system—as subordinate to US imperial sovereignty. From August 1956 through the Tripartite Israeli-French-British invasion of Egypt in October, Malik consistently advocated for US-sponsored regime change in Cairo, and often, Damascus.[102] Moreover, he pushed Chamoun to be the first head of state to accept the controversial Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957, gaining millions of dollars in US support. Soon after, Malik earned his first and only parliamentary term in the CIA-rigged elections in June that implausibly unseated prominent Muslim opposition leaders, sparking enormous internal controversy.[103]

Long-brewing domestic tensions over Chamoun's resolutely pro-Western authoritarianism combined with regional anticolonial upheaval exploded in May 1958, when

97 David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World* (Israel Universities Press, 1973), 68.

98 G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (Faber and Faber, 1966), 210.

99 Malik was closest to Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon, Muhammad Fadhil Jamali of Hashemite Iraq, Mohammad Ali of Pakistan, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu of Turkey, and Djalal Abdoh of the Shah's Iran, but was disappointed by their lack of vigor. May 5, 1955, "Report on Bandung; Situation in Syria," *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. 21, document 51; Burke, "Afro-Asian Alignment," 37–38.

100 Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, 113, 119; Charles Malik, *The Problem of Coexistence: The 1955 Mars Lectures* (Northwestern University Press, 1955), 20; Charles Malik, "Limitations of Neutrality," in *A Study of Nehru*, ed. Rafiq Zakaria (Times of India Press, 1960).

101 On the making of the pact, see Reem Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making: Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2019); Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 38–42.

102 Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, 213, 218–19.

103 Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, 245, 248–53; Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (Pluto, 2007), 128–37; Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*.

civil war erupted between regime loyalists and the opposition.[104] Malik expounded the regime's line at the UN, attributing the conflict to "massive infiltration" by the United Arab Republic, while Chamoun called in the US Marines to save it.[105] The decisive moment came on July 14, when the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a revolutionary military coup. The next day, US Marines landed in support of Chamoun's government, eventually numbering nearly 14,000 and backed with nuclear weapons offshore. Yet upon arrival, US planners were confronted with a situation more complex than the public justification of securing Lebanese independence from foreign subversion. Chamoun, Malik, and Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh, convinced that American troops landed to protect the ruling regime, not US interests in the region, requested that the US occupation forces act against both opposition rebels and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). But leading US figures were particularly incensed by this request and found Chamoun an unreliable leader with poor judgment. Instead, they credited LAF Commander Fu'ad Shihab and the army with dampening tensions and facilitating the US political role in negotiating a new president and cabinet. The general quickly emerged as the compromise candidate acceptable to most internal and external forces. As historian Irene Gendzier writes, "Shihab offered the security that Washington required in a regime whose outward appearance would be less pro-American than that of its predecessor."[106]

After the abject failure of the Chamoun-Malik project for Lebanon, American planners were able to console Malik by engineering his smooth transition into the presidency of the UN General Assembly.[107] But at the level of national politics, Malik was cast into the political wilderness. The coveted Western guarantee he pursued had finally materialized, but it was a pyrrhic victory. Even the US intervention he advocated for repudiated his leadership. Malik felt betrayed and embittered by what he perceived to be the US imposition of Nasser's solution, marking a key inflection point in his political development.

After leaving the UN, Malik returned to academia and immediately began to synthesize his bitter experience into a new, more robust political orientation. His evolution was marked by his existential confrontations with anticolonial and Marxist movements, as well as the changing face of Western liberalism. The culmination was Malik's most expansive political testament, *Man in the Struggle for Peace* (1963), based on lectures

104 See Jeffrey G. Karam, ed., *The Middle East in 1958: Reimagining a Revolutionary Year* (Bloomsbury, 2020).

105 Following Malik's claims of "massive infiltration" of arms and fighters from the UAR, the UN Security Council dispatched an Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to monitor Lebanon's borders. "In no case have United Nations Observers," a report concluded, "been able to detect the presence of persons who have indubitably entered from across the border for the purpose of fighting." Furthermore, it found arms infiltration "cannot be on anything more than a limited scale … largely confined to small arms and ammunition." UNOGIL, "Second Report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon," S/4069 (UN, July 30, 1958), 21.

106 Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, 345–47.

107 Secretary of State Dulles supported Malik's candidacy over his Sudanese rival, who Dulles claimed had widespread and undeserved support because "he is a colored fellow." Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, 241.

given at private colleges and across the US. Echoing his earlier correspondence with British intelligence officer Clayton, Malik advised Congressman Melvin Laird, the future US Secretary of Defense (1969–73), that the book was "most essential for the understanding of my thought."[108] It marked his transition from conservatism to counterrevolution.

Explicitly invoking his distinctive combination of Heidegger and the Bible, Malik opened the book with a new emphasis on struggle within his existential geopolitics.[109] For Malik, the losses of Eastern Europe, China, Dien Bien Phu, Suez, Cuba, and Algeria shook the rule of "Western civilization," revealing that "*the Communists have been winning the cold war*."[110] At this late date, nothing less than a full-fledged counterrevolution could salvage the West, and the world, from the scourge of Communism.[111] Malik, however, was not content with merely an abstract call for counterrevolution. He was determined to establish the principles of the "Western Revolution," and to sketch the outlines of the necessary policy. In vocabulary marked by the encounter with Leninism, he demanded "a revolutionary party, organized, disciplined, dedicated, working day and night for its objectives" and employing "principles and methods rooted in the political, social, psychological, and spiritual soil of the West."[112]

Malik argued the communist-materialists advanced not only through ingenuity and tenacity, but also due to the rot at the core of a Western civilization that had divorced itself from its authentic "Judaeo-Christian" roots. Consequently, Malik's counterrevolution was nearly as opposed to the postwar liberal consensus as to Marxism.[113] "Ashamed" of Christ, Western leaders relegated their activities to the realm of policy, denying "the realm of the spirit."[114] US modernization theory epitomized this secular turn, which Malik pilloried as a technical, depoliticized, managerial method of containing Communism.[115] For Malik, these "merry modernizers" obliviously used the "materialist" terms of Communism, but much less effectively. He identified three main errors in this doctrine. Cultivating local nationalisms against communism would backfire, as the two ideologies had proven eminently compatible, especially in the colonial world. Neither could Communist evolution produce permanent peaceful coexistence. Communism needed to be understood in "the character of a great religion," whose "irreducible core" would limit attempts to change it. Finally, nuclear stalemate ruled out a military victory over Communism. Most grievously, this approach failed to recognize the "radically new situation," whereby Western values were being subverted not only by foreign ideas, but from within:

108 May 24, 1963, Malik to Laird. MLP.
109 At the UNGA in 1949, Malik directly opposed "dialectical materialism" for its focus on continuous struggle over the peace of "the original state." Malik, *War and Peace*, 16–17.
110 Emphasis in the original. Charles Malik, *Man in the Struggle for Peace* (Harper & Row, 1963), 202.
111 Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, xxxii.
112 Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, 208, 216.
113 "The entire tone, the fundamental orientation, of present-day existence—political, social, literary, artistic, scientific, philosophical, cultural—is secular, nonreligious, even anti-religious and atheistic." Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, xv.
114 Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, 218.
115 Malik's opposition to modernization theory anticipated Wilhelm Röpke's neoliberal view that the paradigm promoted communism more than actual Communist power. Slobodian, *Globalists*, 159.

> Today, the enemy is as much internal as external . . . he belongs to the same race, language, culture, civilization, body politic; he cannot be automatically identified as "alien." Existentially, the enemy now is hidden; he has gone underground—so much so that he no longer appears as enemy; and the very word "enemy" has become objectionable. And yet he is as bent on destroying the ultimate values of man, truth, God, and freedom as any enemy in the past.[116]

The hidden enemy within shifted Malik's focus to civil war. Years before the *fidaʾiyin* movement became entrenched in Lebanon, he now evinced an interest in popular armed mobilization, calling for "the extensive training of guerrillas, for a dozen different areas in the world, on a scale ten times the presently contemplated one."[117] To defeat Communism, the West must "pass to the offensive on every front" and "*out-revolutionize their revolution and to outsubvert their subversion under conditions of peace, in peaceful competition!*"[118] If some Western commentators had, in his view, rightly attacked communism as a secular religion, they simultaneously "fail to draw the only valid conclusion . . . namely, that secular religion can only be met by some kind of religion, not by the no-religion at all in which they believe."[119] Man could not overcome himself, as Nietzsche, whom Malik alleged the Communists unwittingly followed, taught. Rather, Man needed God to remake Western civilization. Thus the proper counterrevolution would be anti-secular, proudly Christian, and convinced of its superiority. Coming from a man who hailed from a society that was half or more non-Christian, this prescription threatened to destroy what Ussama Makdisi identified as the "ecumenical frame"—the carefully constructed culture of multireligious coexistence in the Arab world.[120]

The ambitious and mobilizational nature of this program distinguishes it from either Cold War liberalism or conservatism.[121] Despite his bombastic rhetoric calling for a "Western revolution," Malik's call was pseudorevolutionary at best. "The deepest need of man," in his words, "is *not to rebel* in the face of truth, especially of the truth of man himself."[122] Malik used the force of revolutionary rhetoric and tactics to glorify the hegemonic values that he alleged were being corrupted by alien influences. It is from the latter, he contended, that the body politic must be cleansed. This was, as Arno Mayer argued, the classical counterrevolutionary formula.[123]

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, Malik functioned as an effective public intellectual of the counterrevolution, everywhere encouraging the morale of those who stood at the

116 Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, xxxiv.
117 Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, 211.
118 Emphasis in original. Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, 203–4, 214.
119 Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, 217–18.
120 Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*, 6–8.
121 See Samuel Moyn, *Liberalism Against Itself: Cold War Intellectuals and the Making of Our Times* (Yale University Press, 2023).
122 Emphasis in original. Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, 182.
123 Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution*, 65.



Figure 6. Caption: Charles Malik leading a Sunday Worship Service in the White House East Room. September 21, 1969. Photo by Oliver Atkins. Courtesy of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

ramparts of Western empire and who sought to defend its civilizational prerogatives. He did so through his role as Chair of the Philosophy Department at AUB, regular corporate and institutional speaking engagements, participation in international Christian nongovernmental organizations, and in his frequent interactions with the US political establishment as an erstwhile diplomatic agent and native informant.

Malik's counterrevolutionary escalation was one side of a dialogue with revolutionary currents. By the late 1960s, the character of revolutionary movements in the Arab world transformed from the coup plots and military regimes of middling soldiers of peasant extraction (modeled on Nasser's "Free Officers") to widespread popular mobilization: of Palestinian exiles, newly urbanized rural migrants, freshly assertive and expanded labor and student movements, an avant garde of committed intellectuals, and in several cases, of popular armed struggle.[124] In the years leading up to Lebanon's 1975 war, Beirut's university campuses, and particularly AUB, became sites of popular mobilization and confrontation between leftist and rightist students.[125] Malik was cast by anticolonial student activists as the arch-collaborator with an American imperialism that nourished Israeli colonization.

124 Fawwāz Ṭarābulsī, *Zaman al-Yasār al-Jadīd* (Riyāḍ al-Rayyis, 2023); Takriti, *Monsoon Revolution*; Sulaymān Taqī al-Dīn, *al-Yasār al-Lubnānī wa Taǰribat al-Ḥarb: Munaẓẓamat al-ʿAmal al-Shuyūʿī, [al-Luḥmah wa-l-Tafakkuk]* (Dār al-Fārābī, 2013); Zeina Maasri, *Cosmopolitan Radicalism: The Visual Politics of Beirut's Global Sixties* (Cambridge University Press, 2020); Guirguis, *Arab Lefts*; Di-Capua, *No Exit*; Sune Haugbolle, "The New Arab Left and 1967," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 4 (2017): 497–512; Tareq Y. Ismael, *The Arab Left* (Syracuse University Press, 1976).

125 Halim Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife: Student Preludes to the Civil War* (University of Texas Press, 1977); Makram Rabah, *A Campus at War: Student Politics at the American University of Beirut, 1967–1975* (Dar Nelson, 2009); Anderson, *American University of Beirut*.

His words and deeds made it hard to conclude otherwise. In a 1969 fundraising letter to Henry Ford, Jr., the head of Ford Motor Company, Malik argued that AUB was "the principal agency" waging "the war of ideas" on behalf of "America and the West" in the strategically important Middle East.[126] Malik took an active role in this war. His actions were instrumental in the proximate event that re-energized student activism at AUB during its own "1968"—the termination of Sadiq al-Azm, then a rising star of Arab Marxism, from the Philosophy Department.[127] From that point, Malik was horrified by the anticolonial and increasingly Marxist direction of student activism, which he surveilled closely up to the outbreak of the war. He provided guidance to the Lebanese Student League (Rābiṭat al-Tullāb al-Lubnāniyya), the conservative nationalist student group linked to the prominent Phalange Party. Malik claimed the contentious student strikes of 1971 and 1974 were "directed from the outside" by Palestinians and facilitated the Lebanese army's interventions to suppress them.[128]

Beyond Lebanon, Malik's global political horizon led him to define—and connect with—his global friends and enemies while explicitly pressing for a counterrevolutionary consolidation. As he wrote to President Nixon,

> Unless a determined counterrevolution is mounted in American and Western universities against the university revolution of degeneracy and nihilism and anti-intellectualism and irresponsibility of the sixties, a counterrevolution which will reassert in the strongest possible terms, both theoretically and practically, the fundamental values of mind and spirit without which there would have been no West and no Western civilization, I see little hope for the West and therefore for the Middle East, short of a direct intervention by God.[129]

Malik lauded some of the most extreme imperial, counterrevolutionary, and racist responses to popular mobilizations. He cited the CIA-orchestrated coup against Patrice Lumumba's anticolonial government in the Congo as a salutary development.[130] He praised the US war on Vietnam and Southeast Asia as "a great struggle for freedom."[131] In 1972, Malik deliberately crossed the most prominent global picket line by traveling as an official guest of apartheid South Africa. In letters to prominent South African officials, Malik pledged his support for the white supremacist Nationalist Party government as the guardian of the positive values of Western civilization that, as we have seen, were among Malik's most treasured principles.[132] On a trip to Pinochet's

126 April 28, 1969, Malik to Henry Ford, Jr. CMP, Box 145, Folder 2.

127 Anderson, *American University of Beirut*, 152; Stefan Wild, "Gott und Mensch im Libanon: Die Affäre Ṣādiq al-ʿAẓm," *Der Islam* 48, no. 2 (1971): 206–53.

128 June 17, 1971, George Hakim, "...Discussion Between President Suleiman Frangié and President Kirkwood, Dr. Malik and VP Hakim." CMP, Box 129, Folder 1.

129 July 13-20, 1970, Charles Malik, "A Memorandum By Charles Malik on the Lebanese Presidential Elections of 1970," 50, A2, SNF, Box 2446, POL 14 LEB, 1-1-70.

130 Malik, *Man in the Struggle*, 185.

131 September 10, 1966, Malik to W.W. Rostow, CMP, Box 184, Folder 5.

132 See, for instance, September 11, 1973, Malik to BJ Vorster. CMP, Box 177, Folder 8. Malik met the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Under Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, Minister of National Education, and many others.

Chile, he declared in a press conference "in Chile, there is no suppression of human rights."[133] In another one of his existential geopolitical dispatches, this time to President Nixon in 1970, he called for reversing "mounting communist domination" of the Middle East through "fundamental political changes . . . *as happened in Indonesia.*"[134] Like other counterrevolutionaries the world over, Malik effectively advocated replicating one of the Cold War's worst atrocities: the 1965 US-backed mass murder of nearly half a million Indonesians accused of proximity to the Communist Party.[135]

As Lebanon again became an arena of international contestation on a scale greater than ever before, Malik translated this ideological work into political action. In November 1969, a protracted crisis between pro-regime elements and Palestinian guerrillas (*fidaʾiyin*) and their allies resulted in an Egyptian-brokered agreement securing Lebanese state legitimation of Palestinians' right to carry out anti-Zionist armed struggle from Lebanon.[136] The agreement—which the government acceded to with great reluctance—manifested an emerging dual power situation in Lebanon, with the state and its loyalists confronting the revolutionary popular sovereignty of the *fidaʾiyin* and their massive following. Support for the Palestinian resistance catalyzed progressive forces seeking to revise the rigid sectarian regime and its domination by Maronite Christians, the unbridled laissez-faire economy, and the pro-Western orientation of the state.[137] Regime loyalists feared the political fervor the Palestinian revolution commanded and the growing, predominantly Muslim, Palestinian refugee presence as a grave ideological and demographic threat.

Recalling 1958, loyalists first appealed to imperial intervention to resolve the internal legitimacy crisis in their favor. Behind the scenes, Malik reentered the Lebanese political arena at the forefront of such efforts. In April 1970, Malik traveled to Washington and met with President Nixon, National Security Advisor Kissinger, and Secretary of State William Rogers, among others, to urge the US provide arms to "Christian elements in Lebanon" and "to use their influence [with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait] to call off the fedayeen in Lebanon."[138] Malik's meeting with the president likely influenced the State Department's decision, taken just days later, to provide the Lebanese government with thousands of automatic rifles intended for raising a counterrevolutionary militia in the southern villages against the *fidaʾiyin* and their allies.[139] Though American planners in the various policy bureaucracies

133 October 14, 1978, *El Cronista* and *La Tercera*.

134 Emphasis added. July 13-20, 1970, Charles Malik, "A Memorandum ..." 49, A2, SNF, Box 2446, POL 14 LEB, 1-1-70.

135 Geoffrey B. Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66* (Princeton University Press, 2018), 3; Bello, *Counterrevolution*; Vincent Bevins, *The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade & the Mass Murder Program That Shaped Our World* (PublicAffairs, 2020).

136 Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 188–94; Farid El Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976* (Harvard University Press, 2000), 140–75.

137 Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 156–83; Taqī al-Dīn, *al-Yasār al-Lubnānī*.

138 April 21, 1970, State 59088, A2, SNF, Box 2447, POL 23 LEB, 1-1-70.

139 April 22, 1970, State 60606, A2, SNF, Box 1765, DEF 12-5 LEB, 1-1-70; July 8, 1970, Beirut 5651, A2, SNF, Box 1765, DEF 12-5 LEB, 6-1-70; July 22, 1970, Beirut 6048, MDR Box 2447. These arms deliveries and their purpose are absent from prior accounts of Malik's visit in James R. Stocker, *Spheres of Intervention:*

were divided on the means and extent of US opposition to the *fidaʾiyin*, Malik renewed this request many times over the next years, often speaking for the Lebanese president.[140]

The struggle in Lebanon was a component of a larger battle to resolve the question of Palestine. In the eyes of US planners, the Arab-Israeli wars threatened to escalate into a direct confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union and, especially after 1973, impede access to oil. After the 1967 war, the US began attempts to impose a permanent settlement between US-backed Israel and the Soviet-supported Arab states, notably Egypt and Syria. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pursued a strategy of dismantling the Arab coalition via a string of piecemeal negotiated agreements and suppressing any Palestinian claim to sovereignty.[141] Being the last refuge of the PLO, Lebanon became the arena of an international civil war over the structure of political representation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The struggle for Lebanon threatened to shift the balance of power within tightly interlinked spheres: the Arab states, the Arab states and Israel, and the United States and the Soviet Union. By spring 1975, Kissinger had orchestrated disengagement agreements between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, and appeared on track for further settlements excluding the PLO and Palestinian sovereignty. Meanwhile, with covert support from the Lebanese state and the US, the counterrevolutionary paramilitaries resolved to arm and train in preparation for a final confrontation with the Palestinians and their supporters. "The cutting off of Lebanon from the West," Malik warned in a speech ostensibly about AUB's uncertain fate weeks before Lebanon's protracted war opened, "is a most potent motive in current tendencies and discussions . . . Let me assure you, however, that entirely apart from the fate of the University . . . Lebanon is not going to succumb to this desire."[142]

The threat was not empty. Open war erupted on April 13, 1975, when a series of confrontations culminated in Phalangist gunmen killing 29 passengers on a bus destined for the Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp.[143] From the beginning, Malik held close to his old commander-in-chief, Camille Chamoun, and became a founding member of the formal alliance of counterrevolutionary parties, which he christened the "Front for Freedom and Man in Lebanon" (FFML). He was the sole non-Maronite and the only leader that did not represent a specific militia, organization, or source of capital.[144] United by an adamant rejection of the rival Lebanese National Movement's (LNM) call to abolish

US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967–1976 (Cornell University Press, 2016), 79; Walhout, *Arab Intellectuals*, 83–84.

140 See June 18, 1973, Beirut 7203, NL, NSC-CF, Box 621, Lebanon Vol. III [2 of 3]; and June 29, 1973, State 128591, Box 621, Lebanon Vol. III [3 of 3].

141 Salim Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and US-Middle East Relations in the 1970s* (Cornell University Press, 2016), 20–54, 145–82.

142 January 4, 1975, Charles Malik, speech at AUB Alumni Club, 2-3. CMP, Box 228, Folder 3. Years of escalating student mobilization included calls for nationalization of the private, American, missionary institution—by that time primarily financed by US government funding. See, June 2, 1971, *an-Nahār*; Nadim G. Khalaf, *The Economics of the American University of Beirut: A Study of a Private University in the Developing World* (American University of Beirut Press, 1977), 37–38.

143 April 14, 1975, *as-Safīr*; El Khazen, *Breakdown*, 286–87.

144 The executive leadership of the FFML, formally declared on January 31, 1976, included the heads of the Order of Lebanese Monks; National Liberal Party; Phalange Party; Maronite League; *al-Tanẓīm*; the Guardians of the Cedars; and Charles Malik.

Figure 7. A political poster by the Guardians of the Cedars, a constituent group of the Front for Freedom and Man in Lebanon, depicting a boot stomping on "The Palestinian Cause," ca. 1978. Collection of Abboudi Bou Jawdeh. Courtesy of www.signsofconflict.com.

sectarian political representation and support the Palestinian revolution, the group nevertheless struggled for years to put forward a positive political program.[145]

145 The FFML eventually published a Christian-centric manifesto on December 23, 1980. Its ambiguous suggestion for "a kind of decentralization, or federation, or confederation," contrasted with its unequivocal

By June 1976, the Joint Forces of the LNM and the PLO had secured control of some 80% of the territory and population and appeared on the verge of victory. Unlike 1958, direct intervention by the US was off the table due to the fresh US defeat in Vietnam and wider Southeast Asia. Instead, a grand alliance of the US, Syria, Israel, and the FFML negotiated a carefully executed intervention by the Syrian army to crush and rollback the anticolonial forces.[146] By fall 1976, the FFML had eliminated Palestinians and most Muslims from east Beirut in a campaign of counterrevolutionary white terror culminating in a series of massacres.[147] Meanwhile, the Syrian Baʿth's turn against the LNM-PLO shocked not only the Joint Forces, but the militant rank and file and historically anti-Syrian social base of the FFML as well. Malik welcomed the intervention of "Assad's Syria," but remained suspicious of its intentions.[148] As Syrian tutelage and occupation began to draw on, Malik grew impatient with the FFML's elderly leadership, lack of vision, and compromises with the overtly Arab nationalist Syrian regime. Instead, he became closer to the younger generation of counterrevolutionary militants and militia fighters, who were deeply attached to Malik's Lebanese Christian exceptionalism; inspired by Israel as model of a powerful non-Muslim, ethnonationalist, pro-Western power in the *mashriq*; and repelled by Arab and Islamic attachments.[149]

As early as 1970, Malik theorized this contest as a geopolitical struggle over "the Great Land Bridge" (al-Jisr al-Arḍī al-ʿAẓīm) between the Taurus Mountains in the north, the Syrian desert in the east, the Red Sea and Suez Canal to the south, and the Mediterranean in the west. In his schema, this area included five peoples (Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese), four states (Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon), three religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam), and two cultures (Israeli and Arab). How

pursuit of "total liberation from the two occupations," meaning Syria and the exiled Palestinians—notably omitting Israel. Malik was almost certainly its main author. al-Jabhat al-Lubnāniyya, *Lubnān al-lādhī Nurīd ʾan Nubannī* (al-Jabhat al-Lubnāniyya, 1980), 5, 8. On the LNM, see Nathaniel George, "'Our 1789': The Transitional Program of the Lebanese National Movement and the Abolition of Sectarianism, 1975–77," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 42, no. 2 (2022): 470–88.

146 Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 194–201; Osamah F. Khalil, "The Radical Crescent: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and the Lebanese Civil War, 1973–1978," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27, no. 3 (2016): 496–522; Stocker, *Spheres of Intervention*.

147 The FFML razed the diverse, multinational shantytowns of Karantina and al-Maslakh, the Palestinian refugee camps of Jisr al-Basha, Dbayya, and Tal al-Zaʿtar; and the predominantly Shiʿi neighborhoods and slums of Nabʿa, Harat al-Ghawarina, and Sibnayh. In retaliation for Karantina and Maslakh, the Joint Forces expelled some 20,000 predominantly Christian residents of the town of Damur. However, there was never a campaign to evict Christians *in toto* from LNM-PLO controlled areas of Lebanon. For a history of Karantina, see Diala Lteif, "The Conditions of the Working Class in 1960s Beirut: Fire and Everyday Struggles in Karantina," *Antipode* 57, no. 3 (2025): 1041–61.

148 August 29, 1976, "Li-Mādhā Tuḥāribūn." CMP, Box 228, Folder 4. Malik expresses his significant reservations over the alliance with Syria in "Free Lebanon (Revised Version)," 3.

149 Such Israeli inspiration was confirmed to the author in an interview with one of Bashir's lieutenants, Sāmī Khuwayrī, Kaslik, Lebanon, March 17, 2016. On the Israel-FFML relationship in the war era, see Yitzhak Kahan et al., "Kahan Commission Appendix [English]," 1983; Jūrj Frayḥah, *Maʿa Bashīr: Dhikrīyāt wa Mudhdhakirāt* (Dār Sāʾir al-Mashriq, 2017); Ménargues, *Les secrets*; Beate Hamizrachi, *The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt: Major Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975-1978* (Praeger, 1988); Kirsten E. Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (St. Martin's, 1998); Robert Maroun Hatem, *From Israel to Damascus: The Painful Road of Blood, Betrayal, and Deception* (Pride International Publications, 1999); Elaine C. Hagopian, "Redrawing the Map in the Middle East: Phalangist Lebanon and Zionist Israel," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (1983): 321–36.

were these factors to relate? In June 1977, in a memorandum apparently written for Israeli interlocutors, he outlined his vision for remaking the regional state system into

> an independent and free Alawite State, an independent and free Jordanian State comprising as much of Sunni Syria as possible, an independent and free Christian Lebanon, and an independent and free Israel . . . without such an arrangement eventuating there will never be peace and stability in the area and everybody in the Great Land Bridge will be the loser.[150]

The theory was an assault on multireligious coexistence and integrative, secular nationalism. "We are not fanatics," Malik told the *New York Times*, "but our religion is our nation because we are a minority and Islam is fanatical."[151] Yet the challenges to executing such a grand reorganization were formidable. From the earliest stages of the war in April 1975, Malik diagnosed "the problem of leadership" and pined for the appearance of "the commanding voice" of a "great leader."[152] In Bashir Gemayel, the youngest son of lifetime Phalange Party founder-leader Pierre Gemayel, he found what he was looking for.[153] In the early 1970s, Malik advised him on studying in the US, where Bashir allegedly entered the CIA payroll as an informant.[154] By late 1976, Bashir became the most influential commander of the FFML military forces, which had begun to coordinate under the loose banner of the Lebanese Forces (al-Quwwāt al-Lubnāniyya, LF). Malik became a close advisor and confidant and encouraged Bashir's transformation of the LF into his party-militia resolutely committed to Christian supremacy and US and Israeli aims in Lebanon.[155] "The interests of Israel and of the kind of Lebanon we envisage," Malik wrote in June 1977, "appear almost wholly to coincide."[156] Counterrevolutionary theory merged with counterrevolutionary practice.

Malik orchestrated a diplomatic counterrevolution against his rivals in the LNM and PLO, at all times seeking to enlist vast US support for FFML aims. He regaled militia rallies with motivational speeches—notably in his speech "Why You Fight" following the Tal al-Zaʿtar massacre. He lobbied American politicians—mostly Republicans such as Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Kissinger, Senators Jesse Helms, Howard Metzenbaum, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, but also Jimmy Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—as well as corporate heads at Westinghouse and The Business Council. He

150 June 22, 1977, [Memorandum], CMP, Box 146, Folder 2.

151 Marvine Howe, "Christians of the Mideast Uneasy Among Moslems," *The New York Times*, September 15, 1979.

152 April 22, 1975, "Address…[to] the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas, Austin," CMP, Box 228, Folder 3.

153 Elie A. Salem, *Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon: The Troubled Years, 1982–1988* (I.B. Tauris, 1995), 4.

154 August 2, 1972, Malik to Bashir Gemayel, CMP, Box 18, Folder 7. Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987* (Simon & Schuster, 1987), 204.

155 Bashir echoed Malik's views of Western betrayal and abandonment of its values. See for instance his February 23, 1979 speech in Bashir Gemayel, *Words From Bashir*, ed. and trans. Rani Geha (CreateSpace, 2010), 14–27.

156 June 22, 1977, [Memorandum], CMP, Box 146, Folder 2. Although much remains to be uncovered, see Malik's August 8, 1977, letters to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann, and Mossad Director Yitzhak Hofi.

Figure 8. Lebanese Forces leader and Malik protégé Bashir Gemayel portrayed in the manner of Uncle Sam. "Our Lebanon needs YOU." Designed by Pierre Sadek. Courtesy of www.signsofconflict.com.

joined the editorial committee of the Front's journal, *al-Fuṣūl al-Lubnāniyya* (*The Lebanese Seasons*), and mobilized pro-FFML Lebanese diaspora organizations. He solicited Martin Ryan Haley & Associates, Inc., a New York lobbying firm involved in international governmental relations and anti-abortion activism, to devise a "Public Affairs

Program for Free Lebanon."[157] He leveraged his network in the American evangelical movement to render *his* Lebanon legible to a wide swath of US Christian conservatives. Such efforts were rewarded when, in 1979, a small group of American evangelicals founded the "Voice of Hope" radio station in Israeli-occupied south Lebanon—what renegade pro-Israeli Lebanese Army Major Saʿd Haddad termed "Free Lebanon."[158]

Recalling the US intervention in 1958, Malik had his second encounter at the rendezvous of victory in 1982 when the US-backed Israeli army invaded Lebanon. He would again be bitterly disappointed. Long in the making, the LF saw the invasion as a deus ex machina to eject the PLO, Syria, and install Bashir Gemayel as president.[159] The invasion featured joint operations between Israeli and LF troops, the ten-week siege of Beirut, heavy bombardment of predominantly residential areas, and the killing of nearly 19,000 people, overwhelmingly Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.[160] With US backing, the Israeli occupation orchestrated the election of Bashir on August 24, but (notably Christian) rivals in the Syrian Social Nationalist Party assassinated the president-elect on September 14. In revenge, the LF-Israeli alliance committed the infamous massacres of thousands of unarmed civilians at Sabra and Shatila, condemned by the UN General Assembly as "an act of genocide"—another atrocity prepared by Lebanese exceptionalist ideology.[161]

Bashir's older brother Amin was installed as president thereafter. Despite his significant US backing, Malik and the LF saw Amin as insufficiently committed to the Christian cause. For Malik, Amin failed when he abrogated the May 17, 1983 Lebanon-Israeli agreement brokered by the US. Though Amin pushed through the agreement, its extensive concessions to Israel sparked widespread popular resistance in Lebanon and external opposition from Syria that he could not overcome.[162] A deep rift opened in the once-united FFML between the partisans of Amin—who were largely aligned with the US, and favored an accommodation with Syria—and the Lebanese Forces—who were closely associated with Israel.[163] Malik remained bitterly disappointed with the lack of vigorous US or European intervention in support of Christian supremacy and Western hegemony in West Asia. If in the early 1940s Malik contemplated "the problem of Lebanon," by the mid-1980s Malik instead concluded that "the problem is the West" and its absence of will.[164] Severely demoralized in politics, the eighty-one-year-old Malik died in 1987.[165]

157 See the "Prospectus" dated October 11, 1976, and Haley's December 7, 1976 letter. CMP, Box 145, Folder 8.

158 Laila Ballout, "Vanguard of the Religious Right: U.S. Evangelicals in Israeli-Controlled South Lebanon," *Diplomatic History* 46, no. 3 (2022): 602–26.

159 Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 205–19.

160 Israeli conduct was notably catalogued in Seán MacBride et al., *Israel in Lebanon: Report of the International Commission to Enquire into Reported Violations of International Law by Israel During Its Invasion of the Lebanon* (Ithaca Press, 1983).

161 The victims were mostly Palestinians, but Lebanese and other nationalities were also killed. Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, *Sabra and Shatila: September 1982* (Pluto, 2004); UN General Assembly, *The Situation in the Middle East*, 37/123 § (1982).

162 Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon* (Monthly Review Press, 1987), 309–34.

163 For an insider's account of the fracturing of the Christian supremacist camp, see Phares, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism*, 141–48.

164 Charles Malik, "The West Misses Its Calling in Lebanon," *Wall Street Journal*, March 28, 1984.

165 Author interview with Habib C. Malik, June 20, 2017, al-Rābiyya, Lebanon; Salem, *Violence and Diplomacy*, 157.

The Lebanese war continued, but by this time the contending factions were largely ideologically spent. Social fragmentation defined the remainder of the conflict under decentralized militia rule, intracommunal and intrafactional fighting, heavy-handed Syrian tutelage, and Israeli occupation of the south. The fracturing of the FFML into violently opposed factions was a major factor in enabling a settlement of Lebanon's war in the October 1989 Taʾif Agreement, which modestly reformed the sectarian regime by surrendering some Maronite Christian political power to Muslim communities.[166] The agreement, brokered in Saudi Arabia with Syrian and US support, came with the end of the Cold War and the onset of the first US invasion of Iraq. If revolution and counterrevolution were spent forces at the end of the age of extremes, imperial sovereignty remained vigorous.

Philo-colonial counterrevolutionary partisans, theories, and structures played an underappreciated role in shaping a global struggle with imperial and revolutionary counterparts over the configuration of state and society in the twentieth century. The forces opposing anticolonialism, popular sovereignty, secularism, and socialism were not simply after an "alternative revolution," as skeptics of counterrevolution might prefer.[167] Charles Malik's theory and practice reveal an acute consciousness of a formidable reality of accomplished and ongoing revolutions whose institutions, practices, and assumptions needed to be countered. No mere rhetorical bludgeon, counterrevolution was a determined goal and violent practice of mass movements and their theorists, who worked toward the maintenance of explicitly discriminatory hierarchy under imperial hegemony in the age of decolonization.

Centering Malik's praxis of philo-colonial counterrevolution reveals how the contentious history of the struggle over the Lebanese state was not a provincial, sectarian curiosity but an instructive window into the global battle between imperial, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary conceptions of sovereignty and political representation. It moreover exposes the limits of dominant framings of Malik's role as a founding father of universal human rights. To paraphrase Mark Mazower's critical interrogation of South African settler statesman Jan Smuts' influence on the League of Nations, what do we make of the fact that Charles Malik played a considerable hand in composing the UDHR's preamble?[168] At the risk of associating Malik with far more influential intellectuals, the legacy of philosophers such as Heidegger and Nietzsche continue to be contested due to a plausible deniability of their responsibility in the actual practice of Nazism and other counterrevolutionary movements. No such plausible deniability exists with Malik. As Lebanese ambassador, UN representative, foreign minister, and a prominent official of the Front for Freedom and Man in Lebanon, Malik took

166 On Taʾif, see Albert Manṣūr, *Mawt Jumhūriyya* (Dār al-Jadīd, 1994); Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 240–46; Reinoud Leenders, *Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon* (Cornell University Press, 2012).

167 Weber, "Revolution? Counterrevolution? What Revolution?," 17–18.

168 Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton University Press, 2009), 19.

a leading position in political wars in Beirut, Bandung, Washington, DC, and at the United Nations. He did so on behalf of imperial primacy—and not merely as a subservient proxy. Rather, his counterrevolutionary project envisioned the political reorganization of the former Ottoman domains into sectarian statelets as a step toward a world order expunged of social equality. Well attuned to questions of power and process, he proposed the might of a United States newly recommitted to Western Christian civilization as the enforcer of this order. Unapologetic, Malik never attempted to distance himself from the atrocities the FFML perpetrated. On the contrary, he continued to praise the "saga of the heroic Lebanese Resistance" and "especially . . . its superb leadership" even after its most infamous acts.[169]

With this understanding, Malik's oft-quoted position during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that "the state existed for the sake of the human person" appears as little more than a red herring.[170] The crux of his political thought and action was that the hierarchical state—with Lebanon and the United States particularly in mind—must be protected from its people. Although Malik feared becoming a "protected minority" (*dhimmī*) at the hands of local Muslims, his political answer was for the Christians of Lebanon to exercise minority rule protected by the US or Israel.[171]

Philo-colonial counterrevolutionary politics have not disappeared. After the end of the Cold War and the attendant retreat of a conscious, global, and extant alternative to capitalist imperialist structures, Malik's civilizational politics resurged with a vengeance, in both metropole and periphery. "Counterrevolution," Arno Mayer reminds us, "is the product of a constellation of world history and not of localized national aberrations."[172] Such trends have shaped world history at least as much as their revolutionary rivals. It is time they drew the forthright attention they deserve.

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This article has benefitted from the incisive comments and support of Ussama Makdisi, Fawwaz Traboulsi, Susann Kassem, Nathan Citino, Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Irene Gendzier, Reem Abou El-Fadl, Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi,

169 Charles Malik, "Lebanon and the World," in *Lebanon and the World in the 1980s*, ed. Edward E. Azar (Center for International Development, University of Maryland, 1983), 2.

170 Commission on Human Rights, "Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting" (United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 5, 1947), 6, E/CN.4/SR.14.

171 Malik protégé Bashir Gemayel notably introduced the term "*dhimmitude*," which was later popularized by Bat Ye'or's highly polemical scholarship. In Lebanon and the Arab arena, Gemayel's rhetorical use of the concept was fleshed out by one of his intellectual advisors, Anotine Najm (alias Amīn Nājī) in Amīn Nājī, *Lan N' aysh Dhīmmiyyin* (1979). See Bat Ye'or, *The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude*, trans. Miriam Kochan and David Littman (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996 [1991]).

172 Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution*, 2.

Anne Sa'adah, Rashid Khalidi, Lila Abu-Lughod, John Hayden, Gabrielle Magro, Laure Guirguis, As'ad AbuKhalil, Raed Charaf, and Jens Hanssen. I also gained from the feedback of numerous audiences, including at Columbia, Harvard, and Goldsmiths universities, the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Orient-Institut Beirut, the Institut d'études de l'Islam et des sociétés du monde musulman, the Hoover Institution, and the annual meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. Research was generously supported by the Social Science Research Council's International Dissertation Research Fellowship, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations' Samuel F. Bemis Research Fellowship, SOAS, and Rice University. I am further grateful to Habib C. Malik, Tony Nasrallah, Cecil and Zelfa Hourani, Sami Khoueiri, and the many helpful librarians and archivists I encountered for their time and assistance in my research. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful engagement and the *AHR* editorial team for their unwavering support.

The American Historical Review, 2025, 130(2), 600-637
https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhaf007