Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind

D'Oro, Giuseppina; Giladi, Paul; Papazoglou, Alexis

Abstract

This paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind fit within nature? Its goal is to make room for forms of non-reductivism that have challenged the fruitfulness of this question, and which have taken a different approach to the so-called “placement” problem. Rather than trying to solve the placement problem, the forms of non-reductivism discussed in this paper have put pressure on the metaphilosophical assumptions that have given rise to the question of the place of mind in nature in the first instance.

Citation

D'Oro, G., Giladi, P., & Papazoglou, A. (2019). Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind. Inquiry, 62(5), 477-503. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484001

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 1, 2019
• Publication Date: May 1, 2019
• Deposit Date: Sep 8, 2023
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 8, 2023
• Print ISSN: 0020-174X
• Electronic ISSN: 1502-3923
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 477-503
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484001
• Keywords: Naturalism, non-reductivism, post-Kantian idealism, metaphilosophy of mind
• Publisher URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484001