Peter Binyaruka
Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment
Binyaruka, Peter; Andreoni, Antonio; Balabanova, Dina; McKee, Martin; Hutchinson, Eleanor; Angell, Blake
Authors
PROF Antonio Andreoni aa155@soas.ac.uk
Professor in Development Economics
Dina Balabanova
Martin McKee
Eleanor Hutchinson
Blake Angell
Abstract
Background: Informal payments for healthcare are typically regressive and limit access to quality healthcare while increasing risk of catastrophic health expenditure, especially in developing countries. Different responses have been proposed, but little is known about how they influence the incentives driving this behaviour. We therefore identified providers’ preferences for policy interventions to overcome informal payments in Tanzania. Methods: We undertook a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit preferences over various policy options with 432 health providers in 42 public health facilities in Pwani and Dar es Salaam region. DCE attributes were derived from a multi-stage process including a literature review, qualitative interviews with key informants, a workshop with health stakeholders, expert opinions, and a pilot test. Each respondent received 12 unlabelled choice sets describing two hypothetical job-settings that varied across 6-attributes: mode of payment, supervision at facility, opportunity for private practice, awareness and monitoring, measures against informal payments, and incentive payments to encourage noninfraction. Mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) models were used for estimation. Results: All attributes, apart from supervision at facility, significantly influenced providers’ choices (P<.001). Health providers strongly and significantly preferred incentive payments for non-infraction and opportunities for private practice, but significantly disliked disciplinary measures at district level. Preferences varied across the sample, although all groups significantly preferred the opportunity to practice privately and cashless payment. Disciplinary measures at district level were significantly disliked by unit in-charges, those who never engaged in informal payments, and who were not absent from work for official trip. 10% salary top-up were preferred incentive by all, except those who engaged in informal payments and absent from work for official trip. Conclusion: Better working conditions, with improved earnings and career paths, were strongly preferred by all, different respondents groups had distinct preferences according to their characteristics, suggesting the need for adoption of tailored packages of interventions.
Citation
Binyaruka, P., Andreoni, A., Balabanova, D., McKee, M., Hutchinson, E., & Angell, B. (2023). Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment. International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 12(1), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2022.6877
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Oct 24, 2022 |
Online Publication Date | Dec 3, 2022 |
Publication Date | Jun 1, 2023 |
Deposit Date | Dec 27, 2022 |
Publicly Available Date | Dec 27, 2022 |
Journal | International Journal of Health Policy and Management |
Print ISSN | 2322-5939 |
Publisher | Kerman University of Medical Sciences |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-13 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2022.6877 |
Keywords | Informal Payment, Preferences, Policy Options, Discrete Choice Experiment, Tanzania |
Publisher URL | https://www.ijhpm.com/article_4336.html |
Files
IJHPM43361667075400.pdf
(1 Mb)
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Licence
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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