Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on CEO Employment Risk

Yekini, Kemi; Oscar-Chidioke, M O; Adegbite, Emmanuel

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of CEO employment risk from a corporate governance (CG) perspective. Previous studies focused on the effect of CG on firm performance, we investigate the effect of CG on CEO’s employment risk. Using Probit model on a panel dataset from UK FTSE 350 non-financial companies, our results reveals that the likelihood of CEO employment risk increases as board size and board independence increases, while CEO network reduces the likelihood. The study advances CG literature by providing fresh insights into how CG mechanisms can enhance effective monitoring of CEO performance. It also offers important insight to policy makers who are interested in providing guidance on the optimal board size and board composition and those interested in the effective monitoring of CEO performance and organisational strategies for firm performance.

Citation

Yekini, K., Oscar-Chidioke, M. O., & Adegbite, E. (2017, May). Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on CEO Employment Risk. Paper presented at European Accounting Association, Valencia, Spain

• Presentation Conference Type: Conference Paper (unpublished)
• Conference Name: European Accounting Association
• Start Date: May 10, 2017
• End Date: May 12, 2017
• Acceptance Date: May 10, 2017
• Deposit Date: Nov 2, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 2, 2020
• Additional Information: Event Type : Conference