The Mythology of Human Rights

Beck, Gunnar

Abstract

A special legal status is accorded to human rights within Western liberal democracies: They enjoy a priority over other human goods and are not subjected to the majoritarian principle. The underlying assumption—the idea that there are some human values that deserve special protection—implies the need for both a normative and a conceptual justification. This paper claims that neither can be provided. The normative justification is needed to support the priority of human rights over other human goods and to rank and balance conflicting human rights, but it can't be provided because of the fact of pervasive value pluralism, the fact that human values are many, incompatible and incommensurable. The conceptual justification is needed to avoid arbitrariness in the interpretation of human rights at the adjudication stage. Such a justification is impossible, however, as the concept of human rights, and the concepts used to justify them and to solve their conflicts are “essentially contested concepts.” The paper concludes that, provided that the interpretation of human rights presupposes value judgements and political choices, the special legal status accorded to human rights is not justified.

Citation

Beck, G. (2008). The Mythology of Human Rights. Ratio Juris: An international journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, 21(3), 312-347. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00393.x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2008
• Deposit Date: Dec 17, 2015
• Journal: Ratio Juris
• Print ISSN: 0952-1917
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-9337
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 312-347
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00393.x