Hegelian Sittlichkeit, Deweyan Democracy, and Honnethian Relational Institutions

Giladi, Paul

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to develop a distinctive Deweyan, democratic interpretation of Hegelian Sittlichkeit and to show that this forms the basis of a critical theory in a broad sense. I argue that this critical theory does not only offer a diagnosis of social pathologies and misdevelopments, such as social misrecognition, social nonrecognition, and invisibilization. It also helps reveal the following additional social pathologies and misdevelopments not accounted for by Axel Honneth, namely, epistemic silencing, testimonial injustice, and hermeneutic injustice. The chapter begins with charting a genealogical story in which Kant himself anticipates an intersubjective turn that is then robustly developed in the post-Kantian tradition. I then move on to discussing central features of Sittlichkeit and Deweyan democracy, which offer a powerful critique of liberalism. In the third section of the chapter, I argue that there is compelling reason to suppose Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit and Dewey’s notion of democracy have significant critical dimensions. The chapter concludes with the fourth section’s discussion of #BlackLivesMatter and whether the neo-Hegelian critical theory response recommends revolution or reform.

Citation

Giladi, P. (2020). Hegelian Sittlichkeit, Deweyan Democracy, and Honnethian Relational Institutions. In S. Stein, & J. Gledhill (Eds.), Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophy (318-347). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351205559-17

• Acceptance Date: Apr 2, 2020
• Publication Date: Apr 2, 2020
• Deposit Date: Sep 7, 2023
• Publisher: Routledge
• Pages: 318-347
• Book Title: Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophy
• ISBN: 9780815383734
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351205559-17